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# LOCAL SERVICES
# AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
# IN KENYA

A dissertation submitted to the
University of Sussex
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

**H.K. Colebatch**

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# PREFACE

This is a study of the political aspects of the provision of government services at the district level in Kenya. It focussed initially on a particular policy decision of the Kenyan government to transfer the three major responsibilities of the county councils - primary education, secondary roads, and rural health services - to the ministries of the central government. In explaining the process which led to this decision, however, and in evaluating its impact both in terms of the services and of the governmental structure, I have had to go well beyond the immediate problems of these local services and to set their operation in the context of a much broader pattern of political change.

This research was begun at the University of Sussex in January 1971, and field research was carried out in Kenya between December 1971 and February 1973. I wish to thank the Office of the President, Government of Kenya, for research clearance, and the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi for granting me the status of a Visiting Research Associate during my stay in Kenya. The field research was financed by a grant from the Overseas Development Administration of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (now the Ministry of Overseas Development), whose generosity I would like to acknowledge, while emphasizing that this thesis in no way represents the Ministry's views. I am grateful to the UK Commonwealth Scholarships Commission for financial support in the UK, and also wish to thank the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex for its generous institutional support throughout the project.

I wish to thank the Syracuse University Press for permission to reproduce the maps which appear in figures 1, 5, 6 and 7, and the Director of Surveys, Survey of Kenya, for permission to reproduce the map which appears in figure 4.

More people deserve to be thanked for their help than can possibly be mentioned here. Colin Leys first suggested the topic to me and has been a valued source of encouragement and advice ever since. Bernard Schaffer has opened many doors to me, both intellectual and organizational. In Kenya, numerous people gave freely of their time for my interviews: many of them cannot be named, and I can only record my gratitude to them all. John Nellis and David Leonard gave me much helpful advice, and I learned a great deal from Bernard Njuguna and my other interpreters. For comments on earlier drafts, I am indebted to Ken Davey, Ken Douglas, Geoff Lamb, A.T. Matson, Michael Redley and Meredith Turshen. Bruce Graham constantly lived up to his reputation as one of the most conscientious and helpful supervisors in the game. To all these people I wish to express my warmest thanks. Above all, I want to thank Peta Colebatch, who not only did most of the things that authors' wives commonly do in prefaces (and did them, to boot, in the ten successive homes that we occupied in the course of this research) but managed to write her own D.Phil. thesis at the same time. Without her, this thesis would never have been written.

Lewes,
June 1974

H.K. Colebatch

# CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

When Kenya achieved independence in 1963, a significant role in the operations of government in rural areas was given to elected county councils. In particular, they were made responsible for primary education, rural health services and secondary and minor roads. Belief in the importance of strong local authorities was widely shared. The 1960 platform of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which has governed the country since independence, declared:

> The party intended to make local governments the basis of democracy in the colony, and not merely institutions 'to rubber-stamp the decisions of the central government *via* the District Commissioners and chiefs'. (*East African Standard*,* 19 November 1960)

The Colonial Secretary voiced a similar sentiment when, announcing the convening of the second constitutional conference at Lancaster House, he laid down as one of the four basic principles of the new constitution:

> If the rights of individuals are to be safeguarded, and if there is to be confidence that they will be, Kenya will need in addition other governing authorities [than the central government] with their own defined rights which do not derive from the Central Government but are entrenched and written into the Constitution. (EAS, 30 November 1961)

At the conference itself, it was eventually agreed that there would be two tiers of government below the national level: regional authorities, with substantial powers which would be entrenched in the constitution and the local authorities - county and municipal councils - with considerably wider responsibilities than their pre-independence counterparts.

---

* henceforth *EAS*

Since independence, however, the role of autonomous sub-national authorities has been considerably reduced. The regional authorities were effectively emasculated after only a year, and abolished shortly afterwards. And in October 1969, the central government stripped from the county councils their main responsibilities - for primary education, health services and roads - and vested these in the central ministries. Justifying this decision in his 1970 Budget speech, the Minister of Finance said:

> It is evident ... that the Government, over the last six financial years has gone out of its way to assist the county councils to finance the services entrusted to them until last December. Despite this massive assistance, however, the major services continued to be a matter of very serious concern to the public and to the Central Government, and in the majority of county areas, teachers, for instance, went for a long time without pay and certain roads and medical services were not taken care of. Books of account remained unaudited because they were never kept properly and it was difficult to know at any one time the financial position of any county council.
>
> Some of the causes of this state of affairs ... were, briefly, mismanagement, dereliction of duty, incompetence, failure to keep accounts, failure to collect revenue, failure to maintain financial control, misuse of funds and decisions based on local political expediencies, instead of proper financial control. Now, Mr. Speaker, no Government which respects itself or expects to be respected could have allowed under any manner of excuse that these disclosures should continue unchecked and the take-over of the services means that these services will in future be provided without interruption. I have ensured, Sir, that the necessary funds have been provided in this and the next financial year to meet expenses arising from a more reasonable level of these three services. (National Assembly, Official Record,* 17 June 1970, cols 1420-1)

---

* henceforth NAOR

The fact that the local authorities established at independence with substantial powers should have become so discredited within six years calls for investigation. For as Davey points out (1973), the Kenyan experience is not unique. Following the Creech Jones despatch of 1947 (U.K., Secretary of State for the Colonies: 1947), representative local government institutions were established in most of the British colonies in Africa, and provision for strong local authorities made in the independence constitutions. By the early 1970's, though, this pattern of local government was "widely in retreat" (Davey 1973: 2). In most of the African states, the autonomous local authorities had either completely disappeared as separate bodies, or had lost many of their powers and been subjected to much tighter central control. A study of the Kenyan experience would, therefore, be of more than local significance. The general question of interest is why a particular sort of local institution is unable to maintain its organisational position. What in particular is needed is an examination of the role of local authorities as service agencies: what accounts for their performance in this field, and to what extent did their fate as organisations flow from their performance as service agencies (as the Minister's statement on p. 2 implies) ? Kenya seemed a good case for this sort of study, since one could study not only the operation of council services, but also the operation of the same services under central government control after the transfer of functions, which might be expected to throw into relief the essential characteristics of council operation.

The central government analysis of the problems of local service provision (as shown, for instance, in the statement quoted above) saw them as arising within the councils themselves. Similar explanations have been given by outside commentators: Guy Hunter, for instance has described councils in Africa as being characterized by "various combinations of corruption, bankruptcy and political extremism" (1970: 148). This sort of analysis has focussed on four aspects of council operations. First, councils are said to lack general administrative capacity; frequent references were made to the low calibre of council staff and the incompetence and mismanagement which flowed from this. Secondly, councils are held to be financially irresponsible, in failing to collect revenues due to them, in making poor use of the revenue they did receive (e.g. extravagant allowances for councillors, weak controls on expenditure, prestige spending, etc.), and in allowing expenditure grossly to exceed revenue. Thirdly, the general style of council decision-making is questioned: there is said to be too much "political interference" in council decisions, particularly over the employment of council staff, but also in the determination of service priorities and the location of service facilities. Finally, the integrity of conncils is challenged: councillors (and to a lesser extent council staff, are particularly prone to corruption. The combination of all these factors, it is held, results in constant deterioration of the standard of the service and recurring financial crises.

The defenders of the councils have tended to argue within the same framework;* in particular, they have challenged the financial argument, pointing out that the resources available to councils were largely determined by decisions made at the centre. The root causes of the financial crisis, they argued, were first, the erosion by the centre of the councils' revenue sources, second the government's unwillingness to agree to a realistic grants formula which would match local authority resources with their responsibilites and thirdly its apparent inability to release funds which were due to the councils under the existing formula. To the extent that the deficiencies in service provision were recognised, they were ascribed to the shortage of funds - with the implication that given a more generous allocation of resources, council service operations would conform to the expectations of the centre.

---

* This summary is drawn from council files and reports, from press accounts, and from various interviews with councillors and council officials.

But it would be misleading to analyse service provision only in terms of the structure and resources of the councils as service agencies. Service agencies do not operate in a vacuum, but at the centre of a network of relationships. Within the agency there are hierarchical relationships based on bureaucratic authority and professional skills, but there is also a wide range of other relationships which have an important impact on the operation of the service. There are, first, links with other official bodies: other specialist ministries, formal coordinating committees, and in particular, the provincial administration, which offers a network of organisational links and coercive powers which the service agency may need (e.g. when the District Education Officer coopts the District Officer and the chiefs to a campaign to boost the payment of school fees), and also acts as a channel of communication for the representation of client demands to the agency at various levels. Secondly, there are formal structures of political representation, comprising not only the county councils, but also elected area councils and the members of the National Assembly. Thirdly, there are various structures to represent the interests of the clients of the service. These may be formal, such as the school committee established for each primary school, or informal, such as when demands for road maintenance are put directly to the grader-driver by local people. The service agency interacts with these other structures at various levels: with education, for instance, there are links at the district level between the District Education Officer (DEO) and the District Commissioner (DC), which have their parallel at the level of the individual school in the links between the headmaster and the location Chief. The way a service operates can depend as much on the nature and working of these relationships as on the actual structure and capacity of the agency itself. Indeed, these relationships are an important part of the agency's capacity: they can substantially add to, or detract from, the agency's ability to deliver the service.

The service, therefore, has to be considered in the context of this network of relationships, which may be termed the service structure. The county councils were only a part of this structure (though obviously a very important part), and the transfer of functions did not mean a complete break in the pattern of service provision, but rather a shift in the relationships within the structure. For this reason, the study focusses on the services themselves rather than simply on the councils, and seeks to answer three broad questions: (a. what was the nature of the service structure - the relationships between the various agencies involved, and between them and clients and their political representatives? (b) How did these relationships affect the operation of the services? And (c), how does the experience of the operation of local services relate to the debate over local authority versus central government control of these services, and in the broader perspective, to theoretical explanations of the pattern of political change in Kenya?

# CHAPTER TWO

## SOME THEORETICAL APPROACHES

In this chapter I want to examine some of the fields of research that relate to the operation of local services. This is not intended as an exhaustive review of the literature in these areas. Such revies can be very useful (see, e.g., Dearlove 1972), but of necessity they take up a good deal of space, and my primary concern here has been to seek out analytical concepts, and presentations of empirical material in terms of these concepts, that would help me to understand the strucutre and dynamics of service agencies at the lower reaches of a political and geographical hierarchy: I have not wanted to engage in a discussion per se of the various schools of analysis in the fields of political science and public administration. I have not, therefore, been much concerned with the extensive debate on the determinants of public policy-making (on which see Dearlove 1973: 23-83), or with general organization theories such as those of Victor Thompson (1961), March and Simon (1958), James Thompson (1967) or Downs (1967). Nor have I dealt with the debate on the policy issues of education, health, and roads, which in the case of education has been very extensive. (See, for instance, the bibliographies by Blaug 1966a, Brembeck and Keith 1962, Couch 1962, Strowbridge 1969, and Wheeler 1964.)

On looking into the literature for comprehensive conceptual guides to this field, one is-truck immediately by two general shortcomings: the gap between the theoretical and the empirical, and the confusion between the prescriptive and the descriptive. On the first, Self (1972: 11) has noted that

> ... there is too little relation of theories

> to practice in the study of public administration. There is a large, descriptive literature dealing with the organization and process of modern governments; and there is another substantial literature, mainly American, dealing with theories of organization and bureacracy. However, there is little connection between the two kinds of writing - the one concrete and factual, the other often highly abstract ...

This gap between theoretical and descriptive writing is particularly marked when we consider its applicability to local services. Organization theory is wide-ranging, applying to private as well as governmental organizations, and hence is stated in fairly general terms. Moreover, it is particularly oriented to single, large organizations, dealing with such matters as division of function, communication patterns and organizational control, within the organization. It has seemed to me less helpful in describing the characteristics of small organizations - there seems to be no counterpart in organization theory to the work on small groups done by sociologists and political scientists - or in analyzing complex organisational structures comprising different types of organisation operating at different levels (such as the local service structures with which we are concerned). The more specific, descriptive writing has been dominated by the operator and the reformer, and when it does move beyond pure description, tends to move in the prescriptive direction. This is particularly so in the field of local government. Dearlove (1972: 18) quotes Joseph Redlich, writing in 1903, as suggesting that British writings about local government have taken the form

> either of commentaries upon Acts of Parliament with the corresponding case law, or of essays, pamphlets or newspaper articles upon debatable problems of local government, such as municipal trading, or the management of voluntary schools and of public houses, or the organisation of secondary education.

The consequence has been, as Stanyer suggests, studies showing either "excessive moralising" or excessive legalism" (quoted by Dearlove 1972: 18n). Subramaniam (1972: 31) suggests that this is attributable largely to cultural factors -

> The essence of the British style /of Africanist/ is a severe and indeed arrogant form of empiricism.

but this seems unfair. Self points out (1973: 13)

> Much traditional writing about administration, particularly in the U.S.A., was the work of reformers who had practical knowledge about administration, but whose analysis of the subject was strongly coloured by causes which they wished to promote or by supposed 'principles' of organisation which they wished to advocate. In reaction to this school, modern writing about administration - particularly again in the U.S.A. - has become more academic and detached, but the writers often have little contact with administration itself or with administrators.

These deficiences have been particularly noticeable in the literature about local administration in colonies and post-colonial states - possibly because here, even academics who are outside the governmental structure identify themselves more closely with administrators, and feel more optimistic about their chances of successfully proposing reforms - than they would in their own societies. The Journal of African Administration (now the Journal of Administration Overseas)was set up in 1949 in the wake of the Creech Jones despatch to provide a forum for administrators, and the works of such writers as Ursula Hicks (e.g. 1961, 1965) reflect the concerns of the reformer-turned-adviser, stronger on policy proposals than on empirical evidence on how the system was actually operating in its environment.

More recently, there has been a revival of interest in "local-level politics" (see, e.g. Swartz 1968), but for a number of reasons, this has not often yielded comprehensive analyses of the operation of administrative organs in local areas: often the researchers were concerned to discover patterns of "political" activity to which the acts of administrators were seen as irrelevant; their areas of study sometimes did not coincide with the jurisdictional boundaries of administrative units; and their conclusions were frequently so locally-oriented as to yield no fruitful cues for research in other areas. But within the East African context, there have been a number of useful local studies, including Moris (1972) and Lamb (1974) on aspects of the operation of the agricultural extension structure, Holmquist (1970) on veterinary extension, Ingle (1972) on the field administration and Leys (1967) on a district council.

This being said (and probably said far too briefly and unfairly), there remain three areas of discussion which have particular relevance for a study of local services. They are first, the debate about central versus local decision-making; secondly, the debate about administrative as against representative bodies as service agenices; and thirdly, the discussion of relationships between centre and periphery in the political system. These are all general approaches to the subject rather than distinct and coherent theoretical frameworks, combining analytical constructs, empirical observations, and idealised statements of what ought to be. I will first examine the main themes in each, and in conclusion, discuss the extent to which they contribute to an understanding of this particular situation.

Central versus local decision-making

This question has attracted a good deal of attention from reformers, but as a consequence the empirical evidence of service operation has often been obscured by a romantic idealisation of decentralisation. Fesler

(1965: 538) points out:

> Decentralisation is a means to the achievment of a number of end-values. However, by close association with certain of those values, decentralization appears to have been transformed into a value in its own right , and so into an article of faith for 'right-thinking people' and into an end-value for which political scientists need merely specify how it may be maximised.

Ideological support for decentralisation comes from several different quarters, on several different grounds - from market-oriented neo-classical economists as well as from egalitarian reformers. This is particularly applicable to writers from the U.S., where the ideology of decentralisation underpins a complex and highly decentralized government structure. One consequence of this value-laden approach to decentralisation is that discussion tends to focus on the rather unhelpful dichotomy between "centralized" and "decentralised" structures, which hinders the consideration of more complex aspects of the question, such as the role of intermediate levels of government, or the extent to which decentralisation of administrative power may tighten central control over local authorities and other governmental structures at the district level (Fesler 1965: 565). (It can be argued that the recent decentralisation in Tanzania has had this effect.) Even allowing for this, the treatment of centralization and decentralisation in the literature has been rather inconclusive. Dwight Waldo, after surveying recent discussions of centralization, concluded: "Unless I am overlooking something relevant, the recent material here is rather 'thin'." (1965: 13, n. 13).

When the discussion about decentralization is considered in relation to the under-developed world, the most striking feature is the width of the gap between theory and practice. The consensus of the literature on development administration is that "governments must decentralise authority to make decisions as rapidly as is practicable in order to accelerate economic and social development and to make the effects of their programmes lasting" (UN Technical Assistance Programme 1962: 6), yet Sharp (1963: 462) describes administrative overcentralization as "one of the most intractable problems faced by UN technical assistance groups", and Riggs (1963: 391) writes that public administration consultants have "universally" experienced in under-developed countries a "terrific congestion of business and decision-making at the centre, especially at the higher levels, and paralysis, overstaffing, and inaction at the periphery, that is, in local government and at lower levels". And there is what might be termed an "anecdotal literature" of overcentralization horror-stores: Davey (1973: 7-8) recalls that "a complete rural development programme in one Kenyan division collapsed because a central ministry withheld authority for spending £20 until the planing rains were over".

The classical case for decentralization, both in the form of deconcentration (delegation of powers to field agencies of the centre) and devolution (delegation of powers to independent local authorities) has been put in some detail by Maddick (1963: 26-74). Some of his arguments relate to the accomplishment of organizational tasks: centralized systems find their decision-making machinery swamped by the multiplicity of demands, and this, combined with poor communications, slows down the whole process of government; with decentralization, officials can be more effective at getting the service across, and communications will improve. Perhaps more important, though, are the somewhat more intangible advantages in terms of the relationship between the government and the people which develops under decentralization: while governments in centralized systems have a problem of "spiritual contact" with the "conservative" rural people "who rely upon the customary, the traditional (and often the superstitious) rather than the rational approach to living". Decentralized systems allow for closer contact between government and people, the growth of "political maturity" and "participatory support" for government programmes. This sort of analysis is open to question on a number of grounds, both theoretical and empirical, but even if it is accepted as true and desirable, the fact remains (as Self notes in his broader discussion of administrative theory) that "the general pressures for administrative centralisation are universal" (1972: 136). He sees them as falling into three main types: pressures for policy coordination, for resources coordination, and for technical coordination. But he adds:

> These causes cannot be written off as a kind of technological or organizational determinism. The basic functional cause of centralisation is the increasing specialisation of skills and work processes linked with the lateral subdivision of client groups. The basic political cause is the increased power and legitimacy of centralised executive leadership linked with and supported by pressures for centralisation put forward by professional groups. The two kinds of causation support each other, sometimes probably unintentionally. (1972: 260)

Yet the element of determinism remains. In his discussion of the "functional" causes, the need for policy coordination is said to arise because some task "requires" it. This might mean, to take an example, that a central ministry seeking to promote a particular policy finds that other governmental agencies (other ministries, statutory bodies or local authorities) are unwilling to support it; the ministry would conclude that there was a "need" for policy coordination and hence for centralisation - i.e. an increase in its own powers. "Policy coordination" can mean ensuring that the Ministry of Education does not build a high school on a site scheduled for inundation by the Electricity Commission, or it can mean the extinction of the policy-making rights of one agency in favour of another. And where the demand for it is provoked by an inter-agency conflict over substantial policy questions, policy coordination only becomes a "need" in the context of a government desire to support one policy, or one agency, against another. It would be quite misleading, therefore, to suggest that in this situation policy coordination was an administrative "requirement" imposed on the government.

Similar criticisms may be made of Self's analysis of the "political" causes for centralisation. The increasing power and legitimacy of the central government may be a cause of centralization; equally, though, it may be the absence of such power and legitimacy that induces the centre to bring more and more of the functions of government under its direct control. Self, perhaps in reaction to a normative theme of reformist discussion, does not list the personal interests of central decision-makers among the causes of centralization; Victor Thompson (1969: 98) regards them as of equal importance to "technical" factors.

> The more decentralized an action arena, the more decision-makers must predict the conditions of action and, especially, the behaviour and responses of other relevant people. By enlarging the area of administrative control, the decision maker brings many of those predicted conditions under administrative control, and thus he reduces his own anxieties.

This point is particularly important in considering states where the repression of opposition to the governing elite ("uniting for development" to the government; "promoting political integration" to some social scientists) is a major governmental function.

A number of writers have laid down criteria of one kind or other for the centralization or decentralization of government activities. Fesler (1949: 24-7) lays down four general criteria: (a) the natural distribution of the phenomena with which government must deal: (b) administrative efficiency - which calls for centralization for some reasons (e.g. to enable officials to specialise) but also sets limits to the size of the governmental unit; (c) the adequacy of an area's fiscal resources; and (d) popular control - but here he adds "This factor means such different things to different people and is so burdened with emotional overtones that it almost defies objective description" (1949: 27). Other writers have raised specific points about particular effects of centralization or decentralization. Wilensky (1967: 58-62) offers a lucid discussion of centralization in relation to organisational intelligence, and relates it to the "information pathologies" of hierarchy and centralization. He poses what he sees as the dilemma of centralisation: "plans are manageable only if we delegate; plans are coordinated in relation to organizational goals only if we centralise" (1967: 58). Victor Thompson (1969: 89-106) discusses the problems of innovation in centralized systems ("only those with authority at the centre can legitimately innovate") and writing specifically about development administration, suggests that under conditions of overcentralization (i.e. where central control has been extended beyond the technical requirements of the service), the apparent rational central control is largely illusory (1964: 101) and illustrates this in the case of a central planning office. Wilensky argues along similar lines.

> After administrative reform, a more unified, centralized intelligence agency, producing a unified consensual judgement, then fosters the illusion of security, of reliable intelligence, which as the Bay of Pigs invasion illustrates, can conceal fantasies at the highest level. (1967: 58)

But while the discussion of centralization in the literature brings out a number of useful points, it does not yield many specific and agreed statements on such topics as the consequence of adopting a centralized or decentralized administrative structure for a given service under given conditions. This appears to be, to a large degree, a consequence of the complexity of the very notion of centralization. Wilensky (1967: 62) concludes:

> In short, there is a balance to be struck among various kinds of decentralization - of records, of location, of authority, of loyalty, and of channels of communication - an optimal or at least 'workable' set of gains and losses depending on the purposes to be pursued. This is an area where research has barely begun.

Rleating this discussion to the particular question of the decentralization of governmental structures in under-developed countries, we may say that with governments as with other bureaucratic organizations, there is a general tendency towards centralization. This stems partly from "functional" pressures within the organization, such as technoligical change, and the concentration of specialists at the centre, but these factors are far less important than they are in, for instance, a U.S. corporation or government agency, because the impact of technoligical change and increasing specialization has been less pronounced.

A more important question, which is not really confronted directly in this literature, is the role of the state itself, and the effect this has on the relative centralization or decentralization of the governmental machinery. Colin Leys, for instance, argues (1972) that an important function of the state in Kenya is to maintain protected enclaves in the economy where the emerging petty-bourgeoise may accumulate surplus at a faster rate than would be possible under conditions of perfect competition. This clearly has a significant bearing on the "need" of central decisionmakers to control economic activity at the local level. The general question of the relationship between the public and governmental agencies will be discussed further in chapter three, where I will argue that the extension of central government control was part of a much broader expansion of central authority, the "technical" administrative motives for which were overshadowed by the desire of central decision-makers, both political and bureaucratic, to increase their control over subordinate units in the political system.

Where governments do place increasing stress on central control, increasing administrative strain may result: there may be prolonged, even indefinite, delays in decision-making as questions are referred to the centre; the channels of communication at the centre may become clogged; there may be increasing resort to extra-bureaucratic channels to resolve issues, and a decline in the morale of field staff. But for a number of reasons, governments are able to withstand these strains better than some other organizations. For a start, while business firms depend for survival on the continued provision of a good or service, governments do not. If a business firm fails to provide its service, it will lose customers (and hence revenue) and eventually collapse. But for most government activities, the relationship between the service and revenue is much slighter: tax will still be demanded even if the quality of service has drastically declined. (In the long term, of course, such a decline would affect the ability of the government to collect tax, but there are also other factors to be considered here.) Often, the government is a monopoly suppliers of the service, so that the increasing difficulty of obtaining it simply becomes a cost to be borne by the consumer (if he does not forego the service altogether).

Where the government is not a monopoly supplier, it may not be averse to "losing customers": a government which looks with favour on private medical practitioners, for instance, may not regard the overcrowding in government clinics which compels patients to go to private practitioners as a serious problem. And finally, in most underdeveloped countries, the government has at its disposal relatively powerful means for ensuring that discontent cannot be sufficiently organized to challenge the position of the government.

Although the question of centralisation is formally one of internal relationships within the organisational structure, one of the most critical aspects of it is the relationship between the organization and its environment. As James Thompson points out (1967: 129), the more an organisation is open to its environment, the more sources there will be of uncertainty, and consequently the more likely that forces outside the organisation will come to exercise a significant role in its effective power structure. Hence there is an incentive for organisations to try to insulate themselves from their environment so as to protect their structure of control. Kaufman (1960: 217-8) describes how U.S. Forest Rangers are subject to frequent transfer, particularly in the early stages of their careers, to minimise the risk of their "capture" by either the local community or the face-to-face work group. This, together with a wide range of other organisational practices, serves to reinforce the loyalty of the Ranger to the organisation and enables the Forest Service to retain central control over a highly decentralized structure. There may, of course, be compensations for the organisation in this sort of client penetration. Selznick (1949) showed that the Tennessee Valley Authority, which felt its very existence to be threatened by local political opposition, actively sought to involve local community leaders in its operations, the gains in survival prospects being felt to outweigh the losses in terms of operational control.

Of course, no organization can completely cut itself off from its environment: what the Forest Service aims to do is simply to reduce the importance of social relationships outside the organisation and define its task as more "the administration of things". But other agencies, which deal more directly with people, cannot do this. And an organization which deals with people rather than trees is likely to be confronted with a far more diverse task environment, and a more changeable one. This is the basis of the field administrator's claim for decentralized power, particularly in under-developed countries: the task environment is so diverse, and communications with the centre so poor, that the administrator needs considerable discretion to enable him to frame the appropriate organisational response to meet "local needs". (For a more sophisticated theoretical presentation of this point, see James Thompson 1967: 72-73) In one sense, the argument about administrative decentralization stems from a conflict between two different criteria for specialisation: function and geographical area. (see, e.g., Fesler 1949: 119-52). This argument has been canvassed extensively (though in my opinion rather inconclusively) in the literature, and I do not intend to review it here, but some of its implications should be mentioned.

The argument for decentralisation hangs on the idea of specific local needs, and this concept seems to imply three things: first, that there are objective "needs" for a service: secondly, that there are significant differences in these needs between geographical areas; and thirdly, that the differences between local areas outweigh the differences within them. These are by no means self evident. The idea of objective needs, for instance, implies that the function of a service organization is to supply a clearly identifiable good. It can be argued, though, that (particularly at the local level) clients are not only interested in securing the specific benefits that the service organization provides, but also in having a relationship with the organization through which they may hope to obtain these benefits. In other words, clients (it is argued) do not just want good roads: they also want a relationship with the road agency whereby their preferences and priorities about road work are taken into account. (This point will be discussed further in the next section of this chapter.) And the second and third implications - that the significant differences in service needs are between geographical areas rather than within them - are challenged by the growing body of writing on social stratification in the rural areas of the third world, and the role of governmental activity in the process which creates and increases social differentiation. This will be discussed more fully in chapter three, but mention should be made here of the studies in Kenya and Tanzania by Cowen (1972), Lamb (1972, 1974), van Velzen (1972) and Leonard (1972).

Finally, while one strain in the administrative literature stresses the importance of a service agency being "close" to its clients, there is another, classical strain which emphasizes the need for regular procedure and, by extension, the advantages of a certain distance between agency and client: the very existence of clients, it argues, creates the need for uniformity, for rules, for compartmentalization, for review procedures, and other devices to secure equity between clients. This perspective points to the desirability of large-scale bureaucratic administration rather than to service agencies with a local identity. This is of particular relevance in countries like Kenya, where the local service situation is marked by poverty (making the services highly valued) and a highly unequal distribution of economic and social power (meaning that some individuals will find it easier to get service than others). It can be argued that an appropriate service distribution in these circumstances is best achieved by stringent central controls to ensure rigorous uniformity of treatment. But by and large neither these questions, nor those in the previous paragraph, have been systematically related to the orthodox centre-local debate.

Administrative versus representative bodies

A consideration of the role of representative as against administrative institutions in service provision falls into two stages: first, an examination of the policy by which representative institutions were introduced into Kenya and given a service role; and secondly, an examination of the implications of the policy arguments for service operation, and the light thrown on these by the material in the literature.

As with decentralisation, local government is often advocated as an end in itself rather than as simply an organisational instrument for achieving other ends. "Local government", declares D. N. Chester, "is not just a method of administration, it is also a major element in the democratic way of life." (1951: 20). The Fabian authors of Local Government and the Colonies were even more emphatic:

> The identification between local government ... and the progress of civilization has been too uniform and too frequently repeated not to be significant.
>
> The problem that confronts us is therefore how to recapture some of the magic of civic life that was so remarkable a feature of the Middle Ages, and to develop among the people living in town and country alike a feeling of belonging to a community, of being a 'citizen of no mean city', cared for by others, equally

> responsible for their welfare. (Hinden 1950: 4, 6)

It can be argued that on a very strict construction, statements such as these also treat local government as a means to an end - the end being a more democratic or generally better way of life - but the end is spelt out in such broad terms, and the assumption that local government contributes to it so widely assumed rather than demonstrated, that it may be fairly said that for many of its advocates, local government has become an end in itself. Mair, for instance, speaks of "the dogmas involved in the ideology of representative local government" (1957: 9).

Because of this, the reasons for the adoption of a particular policy, and the expected effects of it, were often stated in rather vague terms. The values it advanced were, in general, those of nineteenth-century English liberalism, but with certain variations necessitated by the "immature" state of social development in the African colonies. Social change was seen as unilinear, and as Mair points out "the fundamental assumption is that the African societies of today are going through an evolution closely parallel with that of European societies in the industrial revolution" (1957: 8), and consequently that reforms in local government were called for similar to those which took place in English local government between the 1830's and the 1880's.

The model for the reforms was the British domestic one: Davey (1973: 1-2) sums up the basic principles of the new structures:

> 1) local authorities should be institutionally separate from central government and assume responsibility for a significant range of local services ...;
>
> 2) these authorities should have their own funds and budgets and should raise a substantial part of their revenue through local direct taxation;

3) local authorities should employ their own qualified staff, seconded from the public service where necessary in the early stages;

4) the authorities would be governed internally by councils, predominantly composed of popularly elected members;

5) Government administrators would withdraw from an executive to an advisory and inspectorial role in relation to local government.

When the new emphasis on local government was announced in 1947, two main reasons were given: the need for appropriate institutions at the local level for promoting economic and social change, and the need for political education of the people whose countries were moving rapidly towards responsible government at the centre. Linked with this second reason was the hope that local councils might serve as electoral colleges for representative assemblies at the centre and at the provincial or regional level: "local Government must at once provide the people with their political education and the channel for the expression of their opinions" (quoted in Keith Lucas 1963: 195).

The aims of the new approach emerged more clearly from subsequent statements and from the measures that were actually implemented. The political aims were seen to be more complex. There was first an assumption that the political ambitions of Africans were more appropriately directed at the local level rather than the centre. "Local Government", said the Colonial Secretary in 1951, "is in the first place the field of activity to which Africans can first look for political training" (quoted in Keith Lucas 1963: 200; see Staniland 1970: 631 for similar attitudesamong French colonial officials). It would, argued Creech Jones, provide " an outlet for the growing political consciousness of the ordinary people"

(1949: 4). To the extent that rural Africans needed representation at the centre, they should be drawn from the local authorities; such men "would act as a counterweight to the urban professional politicians, out of touch with the people in the countryside, who, he /Creech Jones/ feared, would otherwise dominate the political scene" (Keith Lucas 1963: 197). At the same time, it was hoped that the local authorities would attract men of some education - perhaps "persons with more experience of the modern commercial world than is usual among the traditional authorities" (Mair 1957: 9). Mair adds that to some extent this was making a virtue out of necessity -

> It has also been argued, notably by Lord Hailey, that the westernized class was bound to make a claim for a share in the control of local policies which could not reasonably be refused; and this argument alone has quite indubitably been substantiated by the facts.

- but at the same time it is clear that it was in the British interest to try to cement an alliance with the emerging African bourgeoisie, and a local government system in which it played a leading part was seen as offering protection against "extremist politicians" (Keith Lucas 1963: 200).

The idea of an educational role for local government came less from the British liberal tradition than from the colonial situation: as Mair notes, such writers as J. S. Mill regarded participation in local government as "invigorating" in itself, and not merely "a preparatory school for democracy in a wider field". (1957: 9). The educational role was held to be twofold. Councillors would learn through experience the procedures, the techniques, the values, and the constraints of representative institutions. And at the same time, the electors would learn:

> They learn to recognize the specious demagogue,

> since it is harder for him to deceive them on ground familiar to them. They learn by their mistakes in choosing incompetent or corrupt representatives, at a lower price than the same lessons would cost them in the central field. They learn by playing this complicated game that dissatisfaction can only be expressed at stated times and through the ballot box. (Mair 1957: 9)

Finally, local government was seen as a means of checking the power of the centre. Keith Lucas (1963: 200) quotes one Colonial Secretary as saying -

> ... local government can protect a country against unbalanced political development. As we have found in our long experience in this country, strong local government has been the safeguard against the exercise of excessive and even dictatorial power at the centre.

- but points out that the historical evidence for this claim is slight. Lee (1967: 182) quotes a more pointed expression of this view by Creech Jones (the previous Colonial Secretary), who said that strong local authorities were necessary "to act as counter-weights to a central authority which too often passes into the hands of a native oligarchy when the colonial phase comes to an end".

Despite this professed intention, however, the local authorities that were set up remained subject to relatively strong central controls. Woodroffe, writing in 1957, cited Chester's definition of the three essential elements of local government - the right of local electors to elect whom they please, the complete reliance of the council on the loyalty of its officials, and the freedom of the council to spend the proceeds of local taxation as it pleases, and noted "none is apparently possessed in its entirety by any local authority in British Africa" (1957: 3).

It was far less clear, however, what the role of the local authorities in economic and social change was to be. They did participate in a number of service areas, notably 'welfare' services (education and health), markets, minor roads, and a certain amount of agricultural and veterinary extension. But these activities were basically supplementary to those of the central government ( e.g. in Kenya, African District Councils met the running costs of the maternity ward in the district hospital) and there is little evidence of the conscious use of the local authorities "for the administration of plans for progress in the economic and social fields" (Creech Jones 1949: 4) in any way that could be described as a radical departure from previous practice. Moreover, two of the most critical agencies affecting social change,- the provincial administration and the community development structure - were generally kept under central control. All of which suggests that it was the political rather than the social and economic reasons for the change that were uppermost in the official mind.

Official thinking about local government - or at least the phrases in which it was expressed - did change throughout the 1950's, but the changes did not suggest that what was happening on the ground was different: rather, they seemed to reflect a changing time-perspective as independence approached. In the report of the 1961 Summer Conference on Local Government in Africa held at Cambridge, political education is not mentioned among the arguments for local government, and economic development is well down the list. More prominence is given to questions of legitimacy, of mobilizing popular support, of providing a degree of continuity in local administration. Two new themes of particular interest were first, the argument that "Local government relieves congestion at the centre - whether of offices or minds", and secondly, the argument that local authorities are in a better position than other local institutions to increase the supply of, and the demand for, simple technical skills. (CUOSC 1961: 12-13).

The policy discussion surrounding the introduction of representative local government might seem a little remote from the present problems of local services, but there are a number of important implications to be drawn from it.

The first is that the level at which the service agency would be organized was determined by reference to the political structure - what was the most appropriate level at which to establish a representative body? - rather than by reference to the functions of the service - e.g. what was the most appropriate geographical area for a road maintenance agency to cover ? This points to the interpenetration of "internal" (functional) and "external" (political) factors in the policy-making and operation of the service, and ties in with the discussion on pp. 12-14 of the nature of the pressures for centralization. Related to this is the fact that many of the arguments in favour of local authorities had very little to do with service provision - some were concerned, for instance, with the distribution of power within the governmental structure. Another line of argument saw local government as a source of satisfaction per se, providing participation and a sense of belonging rather than merely dispensing services. To the extent that these arguments were held seriously by policy-makers, one cannot assess the Kenyan local authorities simply in terms of their service performance.

Secondly, vesting responsibility for a service in a representative institution raises questions about the relationship between representatives and officials in its operation. The formal image of councillors making policy decisions which are then implemented by officials is clearly too formal: representatives are concerned with details of service operation as well as with policy - probably more so the closer one gets to the point at which the service is actually delivered - and officials are certainly not excluded from the policy-making process. In fact, in both policy-making and operation there is a potential conflict between two different types of expertise - the professional knowledge of the official (technical values), and the knowledge of community demands and preferences claimed by the representative (client values). Blau and Scott (1963: 51-3) argue that although service organizations exist to promote the interests of their clients, this does not necessrrily mean that they will follow clients' wishes, since they are usually run by professionals who claim the right to determine what their clients' interests are by reference to their own professional skills. When a professional service organization is subordinated to a local body of elected representatives, there is likely to be conflict between officials and representatives on the appropriate criteria for determining service needs and hence assessing performance. On the ground, of course, the situation is unlikely to be as clear-cut as this. Officials in the lower reaches of the service hierarchy are likely to be less professional than thos in central ministries. An official may build up a client contact

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network of his own (.e.g. a system of school committees) and so undermine the claim of the representative to have an exclusive knowledge of client demand. And representatives need not be devoid of technical expertise: many Kenyan county councillors, for instance, are former teachers, which substantially reduced the "expertise gap" between them and the District Education Officer. Moreover, the official is not only concerned with "technical" values: while one may conceive analytically of a service professional *per se*, in practice the professional is part of a service organisation, which in turn is part of a larger governmental structure. The professional therefore has an administrative interest to defend and advance as well as a "technical" one, and "technical" claims may be advanced to reinforce, or to conceal, an administrative interest. (This theme will be developed further in chapter five).

The third set of questions concerns the relationship of the service structure to its clients. It is widely argued (.e.g. Maddick 1963: 54-5) that elected local authorities are "closer" to the people than administrative organs of the central government, are more legitimate in their eyes, and hence can mobilise greater support for government activities. This is reflected, it is held, in a greater willingness to pay taxes to local authorities than to the central government. Ursula Hicks argues (1961: 5):

> The connection between the payment of local taxes and the enjoyment of local services is direct and obvious - so much more convincing to the taxpayer, and so much more stimulating to his interest, than the remoter connexion, which is often so difficult to see, in the national budget.

Such claims have a certain common-sense appeal, but are more easily asserted than proved. The fact that Kenyan county councils experienced great difficulty in collecting personal tax (see chapter nine) suggests that the relationship is by no means as direct as Hicks implies, and that it might be necessary to distinguish between the popular acceptance of the usefulness of a council as a means of access to a service, and the acceptance of the legitimacy of its taxes. And the increasing use of "self-help" as a means of raising revenue, and in particular the role of the chiefs in this process, suggests that questions of power relationships, as well as questions of legitimacy, are involved.

Another aspect of service-client relationships concerns the way in which service decisions are made. It is argued that because of their close relationship with their constituents, councillors receive a different flow of information, and are sensitive to different sorts of pressures, than appointed officials; consequently, they are likely to reach different sorts of decisions on service issues. This raises two points of relevance. First, there is the question of how clients actually do get access to decision-makers, which is more complicated than some of the writing implies (and on which see Schaffer 1971, 1973, Katz and Danet 1973). And secondly, there is the question of how institutional forms affect the sorts of decision that are taken. It has, for instance, been suggested that the procedures of council decision-making encourages alliances and coordination among claimants for resources, whereas bureaucratic decision-making does not. Both of these points need to be taken into consideration in this study.

Finally, several points are raised by the contention that local representative institutions can offer a different sort of service, more "local" in its orientation, and using a lower level of technology, which will be more acceptable to "traditional", culture-bound", "conservative" rural people. This again is a matter for investigation, but two points need to be made here. First, much of the writing upholding this contention has been based on the assumption that the "local community" is a "little community" in the sense popularized by Redfield (1966) - i.e. a small, tightly-knit community characterised by face-to-face relationships, in which there can be an intimate relationship between those administering the service and those receiving it. But the smallest local government units are invariably much larger than this, and even their electoral subdivisions (the wards) are usually larger than "the village". And the Kenyan county councils covered anything from 100,000 to 750,000 people: we are, therefore, dealing with intermediate units rather than small-scale government. Secondly, it is open to question that the low-technology village-oriented type of service advocated by outside writers is what clients seek, or that it would meet their perceived needs for service; if it is not, such a service could in fact be more disruptive than the western-type one now complained of.

Centre-periphery theory

Centre-periphery theory takes a number of forms. One is the "dual economy" theory of Furnivall (1948) and others, which saw colonies as having two distinct economies - one "modern" (capitalist) and one "traditional" (Subsistence) - and dealt with the problems caused by their separation. More recently, dependency theory, such as the work of Frank (1967) and Amin (1971), has reversed this perspective, arguing that the "traditional" sector is in fact closely linked to and dependent on the capitalist economy, and that the relationship of exmploitation and dependence between centre and periphery applies to relations between economies in the international capitalist system as well as between geographical areas within the same economy.

My main concern, though, is with the particular political variant of centre-periphery theory that came into prominence among Western social scientiests in the years following the end of colonial rule in Africa (and to a lesser extent, in Asia). It flowed from a perception of political change which saw westernized elites winning governmental power in countries that were highly under-developed, and concluded that one of the main problems of "political development" was the discontinuity between this urban elite and the rural mass: the centre and the periphery. The modernising elite, it was held, was unable to penetrate traditional rural communities sufficiently to induce the sort of social change - values, customs and practices - that would produce modernization of the rural areas. Hence the building of the sort of links which would enable it to do this - variously called political integration, nation-building, political penetration, etc. - was a critical need.

Much of the writing on these lines (though by no means all of it) came from social scientists who identified themselves with the stated aims and aspirations of the newly-independent governments. It is sufficient here to qupte one example, Burke's assessment in 1969 of the "emergent approach" in research on local government in Africa. He notes that there was considerable devolution of governmental functions to local authorities "in the first blush of independence". "However, it soon became painfully apparent to those responsible for national development in the capital cities that, as a matter of fact, the new local authorities were by and large dysfunctional to both national unity and to economic and political development". "With great reluctance", the autonomy of local authorities was severely restricted (1969: 76). Burke concludes

> It is becoming increasingly apparent, not only to the observer but to the African administrator as well, that in the last analysis someone must translate government policy directly to the great mass of people among whom alteration of behaviour is required if that policy is to be implemented
>
> ... the function of local government from an African point of view is no longer that of defending the local community against national domination, as James Madison perceived it, nor is its function primarily that of identifying peculiarly local needs, while aggregating local resources to service such needs. Quite the contrary, its function is that of destroying, if necessary, local parochialism in order to develop national unity and the administration of resources disseminated from the national level according to standards of need as defined at the national level.
>
> ... The future of participatory democratic government at the local level will depend therefore, on whether or not it is possible in the years to come to develop at this level a new elite capable of reconciling demands emanating from the national level with those from the locality.
>
> ... this is an area in which policy and scholarly concerns interact and in which the contribution of the scholar can be both to his discipline and to the solution of the pressing problems facing Africa in the future. (1969: 79-80)

This approach has been criticized by many writers as a retreat from one of the major functions of the social scientist; e.g. Sklar:

> Traditional politcal science is truly and honourably described as a 'muck-raking' discipline. For political science to abdicate its critical function in a fit of system-oriented, nation-building zeal would be a tragedy for both the discipline and the public interest. (1967: 10)

Brett (1973: 9) adopts a more pragmatic approach:

> In fact it will usually be found that the observer tends to identify the public interest with that of particular groups or strata in socienty, and to derive his evaluation assumptions from theirs. Adam Smith spoke for the rising bourgeoisie, Marx for the proletariat; many developmentalists accept the objectives and perspectives of the new political and technological elites. If we accept this, then there is no point in rejecting models simply because they have a normative component; their value will depend upon their content, the social interest with which they tend to identify, their ability to explain observed phenomena, and the implication of their use for the course of future social action.

We can accept the "centre-periphery" as a useful starting point, but in a number of areas, it has substantial shortcomings.

First, while the term "centre-periphery" implies a spatial analogy, it is far from accurate as a characterization of the geographical pattern of under-developed countries. The colonial impact was invariably uneven, touching some areas more heavily than others: consequently, the rate of social change, and in particular the access that people had to new forms of resources such as education, agricultural innovation, political information, etc., varied widely between areas. (Soja (1968) and Gould (1970) trace this process in Kenya and Tanzania.) This differentiation between areas tends to be cumulative: i.e., areas which had some access to the new resources were able to use them to acquire more. For instance, the area where

the first schools

are established was able to draw on the graduates of these schools to open new schools; moreover, school leavers from this area would be able to secure better-paid employment than their uneducated contemporaries from other areas, and hence the area would have more wealth to draw on to build more schools, and so on. Myrdal terms this "the principle of circular and cumulative causation" (1963: 13) and says of it:

> In the normal case a change does not call forth countervailing changes but, instead, supporting changes, which move the system in the same direction as the first change but much further. Because of such circular causation a social process tends to be cumulative and often to gather speed at an accelerating rate.

This differentiation is particularly marked in Kenya, where it was formally enshrined in the colonial period in the distinction between the Scheduled Areas (i.e. the white settler areas) and the African reserves. The consequence of this process is that not all areas are equally "peripheral": some are much more heavily involved in the modern sector than others, and benefit more from government services. Nor is this necessarily a question of geographical distance: an area close to the capital can be more marginal than one several hundred miles away.

The centre-periphery model also tends to assume a certain homogeneity in rural social structures - that just as all areas outside the capital are "peripheral", so are all the people within them. But of course they are not: circular causation applies to individuals as well as geographical areas, and some are wealthier, have better education, have better contacts in the capital, etc., than others. When writers of the "nation-building" school talk of the government's intention of reaching out to and mobilizing the rural people, they rarely specify exactly which people they have in mind, although Burke in the passage cited on p. 34 gives a clearer idea than most: what is required is a new rural elite which will impose on rural areas the demands of the centre. Allied to this point is the idea of centre-periphery conflict as one of values: the centre upholding "modern", rational values, the periphery "traditional" irrational ones. A discussion of value-systems would be outside even the generously-defined boundaries of this study, but it should be noted that these assumptions are highly questionable. Staniland, for instance (1970: 633-6), has challenged the extent to which "tribalism" as a modern political phenomenon can be considered a "traditional" survival, and Mafeje (1971) and Sklar (1967) have pointed to the way in which it may be promoted in rural areas by urban politicians seeking to consolidate their power base:

> It is less frequently recognised that tribal movements may be created and instigated to action by the new men of power in furtherance of their own special interests which are, time and again, the constitutive interests of emerging social classes. Tribalism then becomes a mask for class privilege. To borrow a worn metaphor, there is often a non-traditional wolf under the tribal sheepskin. (Sklar 1967: 6)

Finally, the image presented of the nature of the communication problem - the central government reaching down to, but being rebuffed by, an unresponsive mass - is unreal and unhelpful. First, the government may not be reaching down at all. Cohen (1973: 228) suggests that if "linkage" is a problem in the Ivory Coast, it is not one given a high priority by the government, which is content, in effect, to anaesthetize the rural areas and concentrate its efforts in and around the capital. Or it may be reaching down with police and tax-collectors, to coerce and extract, in which case no notions of "traditionalism" are needed to explain the resistance which such "penetration" meets.

Secondly, it fails to take account of the extent to which constrictions in communication might take place within the government structure, rather than between it and its clients. Staniland, for instance, argues (1970: 626-30) that in the colonial political order, there was a multiplication of new political roles at the top (the territorial level) and at the bottom (the village level), but a constriction in the middle where the generalist administrator dominated the field. The political contest between the nationalists and the colonial administration tended to take place on the one hand at the level of the village, and on the other, in the capital. The post-colonial state had little interest in the establishment of "intermediate institutions" to bridge this gap, and to this extent, "failed to transcend the 'dual' political structure of colonial society". Kenya was something of an exception to this pattern during the 1950's, when national political activity by Africans was severely restricted, but since independence, the need to strengthen district-level institutions, and to improve communications within the bureaucracy, have been recurring themes of advisers and consultants to the government. Thirdly, it represents "the periphery" as an inert mass, pliable clay for the government that can reach down, like the Sleeping Beauty's prince, to waken it. In fact, of course, "the periphery" consists of people and groups with their own political aims and preferences, not all of them the same, and their own ways of pursuing them. And these, while they may not be in accordance with the preferences of government officials, cannot simply be dismissed as "conservatism" (see, e.g. Holmquist 1970, Leys 1967 and Lamb 1974). As Holquist points out:

> Our case study suggests that lower levels of the political system are able to initiate considerable pressures in the other direction - in other words, to 'penetrate' and alter the basic policies of the central government. It does not tally with reality to view the political and administrative environment solely in terms of a central government acting on an inert periphery. (1970: 227)

Which leads to the final point: that it distracts our attention from a whole range of political relationships between centre and rural area that do exist by concentrating on one that is said not to. The argument runs: the government has stated that it wants to mobilize the rural people for development. The rural people have not been mobilized for development. Therefore rural people must be unresponsive to the government's efforts. Yet there is a considerable literature on intermediary rôles - messengers, middlemen, brokers (see, e.g. Bailey 1969) - and also a number of field studies (e.g. Leys 1967) pointing to a considerable amount of communication between villagers and government officers of various kinds. If there is a communications problem of the type suggested, it cannot be that there are simply no messages passing between the two levels. And if the suggestion is that authoritative directions cannot be given to the village level by the centre, then one would have to investigate the actual relationships that do exist to find out if this isso, and if so, why. (See, for instance, the discussion on the chief's role as a tax-collector, chapter nine, below).

Thus although the original presentation of centre-periphery theory is not really very explanatory, yet the discussion has brought out a number of useful points. In particular, (a) it has emphasized the idea of relative advantage (and disadvantage), both between areas and between individuals, and the changes in these relativities over time. Such changes as they affect individuals create social stratification; as they affect areas, they lead to geographical variations in service needs and demands, which in turn have their impact on relativities of wealth and hence future stratification patterns. (b) It has raised the question of intermediary roles between the government and the village level, and the significance of formal government-people contact in the context of a much broader flow of information. (c) It has raised the question of the actual, rather than the proclaimed impact of government activity in rural areas - what is it that government officers actually do, and how does this relate to goals as expressed in the capital?

Discussion

Perhaps the first thing that must be said is that none of these approaches present a convincing and comprehensive framework of analysis for looking at the Kenyan case. The concepts tend to be rather broad in their scope, and to be used to illustrate policy-oriented discussions rather than to explain the actual dynamics of the system's operation. Decentralization and local government, in particular, tend to attract their advocates, and the literature is marked by more policy argument than either detailed empirical study, or abstract analytical models, of the operation of local institutions. But three points of particular relevance may be drawn from this survey.

The first is that what seems to underlie most of the discussion about service provision is a range of assessments of the way service needs are best assessed. To the extent that service needs are seen as essentially political, being essentially claims made by clients asserting a particular sort of political relationship between themselves and the government, then an elected local council is a logical institution for mediating those claims amd relaying them to service officials. To the extent, however, that service needs are seen as technical in nature and best determined by those professionally qualified to do so, then attempts will be made to insulate the service from client pressures and to preserve the decisbn-making autonomy of its professional officials. Whether it is the local or the céntral official who is vested with the responsibility of determining need will depend on the nature of the technical experise seen as relevant: if it is "pure" professional expertise, it is likely that authority will be drawn up to the centre where the specialist professionals are located. If it is detailed local knowledge that is required, then authority is likely to rest with the local official.

But it is important to remember that many of the policy reasons for vesting service responsibilities in elected local authorities had nothing to do with services. The policy of building up English-style local councils in Kenya was determined by political factors, hot by considerations of the most effective way to provide services. The councils were not given power so that they could ofer a service: they were given the services so that they would be powerful. (This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.) And this basic non-service reason was reinforced with other reasons (or hypotheses) about the effect of local government on political participation and consciousness.

And the third point is that while the local service units in Kenya were geographically dispersed, it is dangerous to assume that geographical analogies offer a key to the understanding of their operation - i.e. that they can be considered as "local" or "peripheral", and quite separate from that political system designated as "national" or central". The county councils were not "local"; it is questionable that many of them were "peripheral"; and it is clear that there were strong links between the district level at which they operated and the capital. The nature of their position will be elaborated more fully in subsequent chapters.

# CHAPTER THREE

# THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

## Geography and the pattern of settlement

Kenya occupies an area of about 225,000 square miles (582,546 square kilometres) straddling the equator, and is bounded on the east by the Somali Republic and the Indian Ocean, on the south by Tanzania, on the east by Uganda and the Sudan, and on the north by Ethiopia. It consists of four broad geographical regions (see figure 1, p. 44) (a) a narrow coastal plain; (b) a vast region of arid low plateaus covering most of the north and east of the country; (c) the Kenya Highlands, generally lying between 4000 and 10,000 feet, with good rainfall and fertile soil; and (d) the Lake Victoria borderlands (Soja 1968: 6).

When the British arrived in Kenya in the late nineteenth century, they found that the major areas of settlement were the coastal strip and the Lake Victoria borderlands, and the higher areas on the eastern and western sides of the Kenya Highlands. The centre of the highlands region, and much of the arid region to the north and south of it (along with considerable areas in present-day Tanzania) were controlled by the pastoral Masai, whose raiding parties kept the agricultural tribes largely confined to the ridges, and were even making attacks within sight of Mombasa harbour as late as 1889 (Soja 1968: 12). But the Masai had been weakened by drought, rinderpest, smallpox and internal warfare, and their territory appeared to the British almost unpopulated; the British were able to compel the Masai to evacuate most of their territory in the highlands, which was then occupied by European settlers (Bennett 1963: 16-17, 23). Since then, the

Figure 1: Physical and geographical regions


PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS
A COASTAL PLAIN
B ARID LOW PLATEAUS
C KENYA HIGHLANDS
D LAKE VICTORIA BORDERLANDS
MAJOR ESCARPMENTS
LAND OVER 5,000 FEET
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
Lake Rudolf
Turkwel R.
UGANDA
Mt. Elgon
Trans-Nzoia
Uasin Gishu
Laikipia
Ewaso Nairo
SOMALIA
0°
D
C
Kericho Highlands
Aberdares
Mt. Kenya
Tana R.
B
Lake Victoria
Lake Magadi
Athi R.
A
Galana R.
TANZANIA
N
Taita Hills
0 50 100 Miles

Source: Soja 1968: 7

population has grown to reach 10.9m at the 1969 census, but the basic distribution of the rural population has been little changed, though the highlands are now considerably more thickly populated (see figure 2, p. 46). There is now a considerable urban population: in 1969, Nairobi had over 500,000 inhabitants, and the three other main towns (Mombasa, Kisumu and Nakuru) over 300,000 between them. (Kenya Population Census, 1969).

The country is divided for administrative purposes into provinces and districts. In colonial times provincial boundaries bore some relation to the physical divisions described above: the massive Southern and Northern Provinces contained most of the arid region, the highlands was divided along the Aberdare Range into Central and Rift Valley Provinces, and Nyanza Province contained the Lake borderlands (see figure 3, p. 47). The boundaries were redrawn at independence to create three long provinces running roughly north-south and having less geographical homogeneity. (see figure 4 p. 48). Each province is divided into from three to thirteen districts. These range in size from 214 to 76,858 sq. km. (median 5,795 sq. km.), and in population (1969 figures) from 22,401 to 782,586 (median 184,974).

## The colonial impact

The British involvement in Kenya stemmed from a strategy aimed at protecting Imperial interests in India. These interests, it was held, required that Britain should control the Suez Canal, and hence Egypt, and by extension, Uganda, where the headwaters of the Nile lay. British control of Uganda required the construction of a railway from the coast, and hence the control of the territory through which it passed (Harbeson 1973: 7). Britain wanted to develop an export-oriented economy which could support the costs of the railway and the

Figure 2: Population distribution, 1969


E T H I O P I A
SOMALI REPUBLIC
INDIAN OCEAN
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, 1969
• One dot represents 5,000 persons
O Towns with a population of over 5,000
Compiled from the Census of Kenya
taken on the 24th August 1969
Department of Geography, University of Nairobi,
Nairobi.

Source: Kenya Population Census, 1969, vol.1

Figure 3: Provincial boundaries, 1961


Northern
Rift
Valley
Central
Nyanza
Southern
Coast

Source: Bennett 1963: viii-ix

Figure 4: Provincial and district boundaries, 1969


PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
53
E T H I O P I A
SOMALIA
MANDERA
MARSABIT
TURKANA
RIFT VALLEY
EASTERN
NORTH EASTERN
WEST POKOT
SAMBURU
ISIOLO
BARINGO
LAIKIPIA
MERU
BUNGOMA
KAKAMEGA
NANDI
SIAYA
NYANZA
HOMA BAY
KERICHO
KISII
NAKURU
NYANDARUA
NYERI
EMBU
MURANGA
KIAMBU
RIFT VALLEY
NAROK
KITUI
EASTERN
MACHAKOS
KAJIADO
GARISSA
NORTH EASTERN
TANA RIVER
LAMU
COAST
TAITA
KILIFI
KWALE
MOMBASA
INDIAN OCEAN
LAKE VICTORIA

Source: Atlas of Kenya, map 53

civil administration, and as Brett (1973: 166) points out, there was a clear choice between settler agriculture and peasant agriculture as the basis of the economy. Both options had their advocates, but by the early 1900's, commitments had been made in favour of settlement (Harbeson 1973: 10). From this point, Brett argues (1973:167), "Kenyan policy was very largely determined by the need to maintain the viability of settler agriculture". To say that this was the basic policy aim does not in itself explain why particular policies were pursued, but it does have some broad implications for service provisions, in particular a clear distinction between the service claims of settlers and those of the African population. The colonial state was committed first to attract settlers, and secondly to enable them to produce and sell commodities on the world market. The first commitment called for a considerable promotion and recruitment effort, as well as the provision of a number of "social" services, such as education and health services. It must be remembered that Kenya was to a certain extent competing for settlement with the more established white dominions, such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, which were making strenuous attempts to attract new settlers, including "packages" of land and infrastructural services (see, e.g., Apsley, n.d.). The second commitment meant that settlers had to be given access not only to the basic resources of land and labour, but also to marketing, transport and technical information.

The settlers themselves had a direct interest in those sorts of services, but their interest went beyond the economics of production of export crops to encompass the value of their (usually mortgaged) land as a saleable asset, and the impact of infrastructural services on land values. Moreover, the settlers themselves were not a homogeneous body, but were divided by scale, by crop type, by geography and by the personal frictions of a small expatriate community. They sought a service relationship which would not only give them particular valued economic inputs, but would also shield them against an environment which seemed a constant threat to their weak and exposed position, and to do this they sought to bring together government officials and settler representatives in a governmental structure which would exercise authority over both the external environment and the settlers themselves.*

The service implications for Africans were quite different. It was not necessary to provide them with the producer services - technical information, transport and marketing. Indeed, this would challenge the basis of the settler economy.

> For the new style to succeed, the African had to be made to enter the world of money as wage labourer rather than independent producer; for as long as he had an independent control over the means of production through his control over his own land the African peasant would not be forced to work for the settler but would continue to produce on his own account. (Brett 1973: 169)

Nor did he have the same needs for social services as did the settler. While the latter was "a fully developed capitalist man", African agriculture "was pre-capitalist in the sense that the bulk of production was for subsistence rather than for the market, and the means of production, notably land and labour, were not exchanged on the market for money" (Brett 1973: 168). It was not necessary for this whole system of production to be transformed:N a small part of peasant productive capacity could be tapped for the settler economy, and the remainder left to meet a wide range of subsistence needs. When an African went to work on a European farm, for instance, the maintenance of his dependants, and his own economic security for the future, could be left to be borne by the subsistence sector. This broad approach was never without its critics. Some settlers did want an expansion of certain sort of Efrican export crop production where these would use (and defray the overhead costs of) European processing and marketing facilities (Radley 1974). And there was some limited scope for African producers to enter those sections of the market not occupied by the settlers. But it remained basically unchanged until the government-sponsored development of African agriculture of the 1950's, and the settlement schemes of the 1960's. The former, which was set out in its most comprehensive form in the Swynnerton Plan (1954), aimed to increase the productivity of African agriculture, largely by providing the sort of inputs and services - marketing, credit, technical services, etc. - which the state had been providing for the settlers. It had its greatest impact in Central Province, where it enabled farmers to enter the highly lucrative coffee market, and where it was combined with a programme of land consolidation aimed at giving farmers individual title, which enabled the free transfer of land and the development of a system of social stratification based on land ownership. (see Sorrenson 1967). Settlement was a policy aimed at redeeming the promises of the struggle for independence without destroying the basis of settler agriculture: European farms were bought (with British loan funds) for subdivision among landless (in theory) Africans (and also a small number of landed ones). Large settlement schemes were established in the Rift Valley (notably in Nyandarua and Uasin Gishu districts) and smaller ones in a number of places including Machakos, Nyeri and the Kisii/Kericho boundary (Harbeson 1973: viii). Both of these policies had important implications for service provision: if such substantial changes were to be made in the structure of production, corresponding changes would be required in the service pattern.

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* I am indebted to Michael Redley for clarifying to me some of the complexities of settler politics: see his forthcoming thesis on this subject.

The actual mechanisms of service provision in the colonial period will be discussed later in this chapter: it is sufficient here to note their consequences in terms of the distribution of services and of resources in general. There are two aspects of this distribution.

First, there is the geographical distribution of services. The main thrust of government service provision in rural areas was directed towards building up a high level of services in the Scheduled Areas - the settler enclave. Service provision in the African Reserves was mainly geared to the requirement of the export sector for a stable supply of cheap labour, and wherever possible, was financed by local taxation or the missions.

This pattern of distribution is particularly marked in the case of the development of the transport system. Up to the 1930's, the railway was the most important part of this system: the first roads to be built were largely allowed to atrophy after its completion (Soja 1968: 29), and most of the new roads were feeder roads serving the railway (see figure 5, p. 53.) Settler influence over railway policy was able to secure first, the construction of a number of branch lines into the settled areas (which were so spectacularly unprofitable that the railway eventually stopped publishing the figures because of the criticism they aroused) Brett 1973: 201), and

Figure 5: Growth of the modern transport network


PORTS, CARAVAN ROUTES AND RAILWAYS
KENYA AND UGANDA RAILROAD
BRANCH LINE
1929 DATE COMPLETED
MAJOR CENTERS OF CARAVAN TRADE
RAILWAY CENTERS
CARAVAN AND EXPLORER'S ROUTES
Kitale
Njemps
Thomson's Falls
Solai
Eldama Ravine
Eldoret
Nanyuki
Nyeri
Fort Hall
Thika
Machakos
Naivasha
NAKURU
Vumias
Butere
KISUMU
Fort Smith
Dagoretti
NAIROBI
Magadi
Kibwezi
Tsavo
Voi
Ndara
Taveta
Makongeni
Stockade No. 2
Mazeras
MOMBASA
Witu
Kipini
Lamu
Patta
Malindi
Kilifi
Takaungu
1926
1928
1925
1930
1902
1929
1913
1915
1899
1918
0
50
100
MILES


GROWTH OF THE ROAD NETWORK
MAIN AXIS OF THE KENYA-UGANDA RAILROAD
0
100
250 Miles
A 1908
B 1920
C 1932
D 1944
E 1954

Source: Soja 1968: 28, 30

secondly, the adoption of a differential rating system which subsidized the transport of maize and wheat (predominantly settler crops) at the expense of printed textiles (largely consumed by Africans), cotton (largely produced by Africans) and coffee (the majority of which was produced in Uganda and Tanganyika) (Brett 1973: 92). Road construction increased in the 1920's, particularly in the African Reserves "in an effort to open up the districts for labor supplies and more effective administrative control" (Soja 1968: 31). Roads in the White Highlands were the responsibility of the District Councils, which were financed entirely from central government grants; road costs in the African areas were met by small grants from the central government, larger grants from the Local Native Councils and a considerable amount of compulsory communal labour (Brett 1973: 202). In 1931, for instance, £48,500 was allocated to feeder roads in European areas, £9,430 to feeder roads in the African Reserves (N. Leys 1931: 51). A statutory Road Authority was established in 1951, and

> new construction and maintenance became based on traffic density and on development actually taking place in the areas through which the roads passed. (Soja 1968: 31-2)

Here, Myrdal's principle of circular causation applied (see p. 35) - expenditure was concentrated on those areas already best-endowed with the service. The figures for Road Authority grants to local authorities are illustrative:

Table 1: Road Authority Recurrent Expenditure Grants to Local Authorities

| | European County and District Councils (£) | African District Councils (£) |
|---|---|---|
| 1951 | 142,945 | - |
| 1952 | 165,221 | 27,053 |
| 1953/4 | 160,672 | 22,000* |

| | European County and District Councils (£) | African District Councils (£) |
|---|---|---|
| 1954/5 | 296,418 | 102,043 |
| 1955/6 | 353,371 | 151,480 |
| 1956/7 | 468,061 | 162,746* |
| 1957/8 | 414,589 | 227,484* |
| 1958/9 | 573,838 | 228,932* |
| 1959/60 | 555,046 | 264,062* |
| 1960/1 | 641,746 | 310,760 |
| 1961/2 | 487,835 | 314,669 |

includes payments to the Provincial Administration for roads in African areas

Source: Road Authority Annual Reports, 1951-1961/2

The main beneficiaries among the African areas were Kisii and Meru, where expanding coffee and tea production required increased access to processing facilities. Because of their isolation from European coffee-growing areas, and of the fact that they had never supplied large amounts of labour to European plantations and farms, these had been the first African areas to be permitted to grow coffee. (Soja 1968: 32).

The requirements of the colonial social structure also shaped the pattern of education. The first requirement was that education should serve to maintain the dominance of the European community by protecting its poorer members from the effects of economic inequality within it. The 1924 Annual Report of the Education Department, responding to the expressed concern of the Governor about "poor whites", said:

> It must never be forgotten that the European community is a small handfull in the midst of a large African population and that if Europeans would retain the leadership of Kenya a high

> standard of education must be demanded ... the Department has never ceased to urge the imperative need of education with a view to reducing to a minimum the parasite class - namely the poor white class, the unemployables. (quoted in Anderson 1970:57)

European education was actively promoted, and a European secondary boarding school developed in Nairobi along the lines of an English public school. An education tax of shs. 30/= per head was imposed on both Europeans and Asians, although this met only a small proportion of the cost of education. In 1930, for instance, the European education tax was estimated to yield £11,000 and total school fees for all races £20,950, whereas recurrent expenditure on Europeans education was £56,092 (Kenya ... Estimates ... 1930). Asian education drew more heavily on the community's own resources (see Anderson 1970: 72-3). This applied even more to African education, where schools operated under the sponsorship of a particular mission, but most of the costs, both capital and recurrent, were met by the local community, either by fees or voluntary contributions. The missions provided teachers and supervision, and received a subsidy from the government. The allocation of government resources in education is illustrative of the priorities of the decision-makers, though not necessarily of what was actually being achieved; see table 2.

Table 2: Government recurrent expenditure on education, 1949*

| | Total Population | No. of Children enrolled | Educational expenditure(£) Total | per head of population | per child enrolled |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| European | 29,500 | 4,448 | 281,885 | 9.55 | 63.37 |
| Asian | 98,000 | 23,800 | 184,806 | 1.88 | 7.76 |
| Arab | 23,900 | 989 | 17,092 | 0.71 | 17.28 |
| African | 4,055,000 | 185,338 | 294,449 | 0.07 | 1.58 |

* 1949 is chosen as the year in which the Beecher Committee, which laid down the framework for the expansion of African education in the 1950's, presented its report (Kenya, African Education in

Kenya), and also because no census estimate of the African population is available before 1948. The census figures list a further 2,900 people under "Other", but there is no way of determining where these people would have fitted into the education system.

Source: Col. 1 Preliminary Population Estimates for Kenya from the 1948 census, quoted in the 1950 edition of the Year Book and Guide to East Africa, p. 48; col. 2 Education Department, Annual Report, 1949; col. 3 Kenya, Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure ... 1951.

There was, in addition, a considerable private sector. There was a number of European private schools, catering for about a third of the Europeans school population and preparing them for English public schools (Redley 1974). The Asian community also maintained a number of unaided schools, although these were usually one-teacher schools in small townships, filling the gaps at the bottom of the service rather than (as in the European case) offering a superior alternative to the official service. And there were numbers of independent African schools, whose connection with any mission was either nonexistent or so loose as to be meaningless. Many of these schools were founded in Nyanza in the early years of colonial control (see Lonsdale, forthcoming), and in the 1930's, a radical segment of the Kikuyu broke with the missions over the issue of female circumcision and formed the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association and the Kikuyu Karing's Education Association (Anderson 1970: 118-22). Because of the heavy local contributions required, the spread of education in the African areas depended largely on the extent to which local communities felt impelled to pursue it; its distribution was therefore both uneven, and closely related to other aspects of social change, such as land shortage, outside employment, etc. (see figure 6, p. 58).

The pattern of provision of health services was broadly similar, though there is less information on them. The initial function of health

Figure 6: Distribution of education in African areas


AFRICAN PRIMARY EDUCATION
PER CENT MALE & FEMALE BETWEEN THE YEARS OF 5&9 WITH SOME EDUCATION
over 50
40 to 50
30 to 40
20 to 30
under 20
N.D.
No Data
N. D.
N. D.
0
50
100
MILES
ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS BEFORE 1963
TURKANA
SAMBURU
MERU
NORTHERN FRONTIER
WEST POKOT
ELGEYO MAR.
BARINGO
LAIKIPIA
NANYUKI
TRANS NZOIA
UASIN GISHU
EMBU
TANA RIVER
LAMU
ELGON NYANZA
NANDI
N. NYANZA
NAKURU
NAIVASHA
NYERI
FT. HALL
THIKA
KIAMBU
KITUI
C. NYANZA
KERICHO
NAIROBI
MACHAKOS
KILIFI
KISII
SOUTH NYANZA
NAROK
KAJIADO
MOMBASA
TAITA
KWALE
0
50
100
MILES

Source: Soja 1968: 63, 70

services was to prevent sickness among the European community; the government wanted to protect its own employed, and also to attract European settlers (Beck 1970: 10, 14). Subsequently the Medical Department developed interests in the African areas: rural dispensaries were established from 1925 (partly to assert the government presence as against that of the missionary) and some measures were taken against epidemics, malaria and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness). But the service was essentially town-and hospital-based; the missions provided most of the health services in rural areas, and where government officials did carry out public health activities, they often depended on the Local Native Council voting the necessary funds (Beck 1970: 107).

The geographical distribution of these services has therefore been highly uneven. This uneven distribution tends to be found in other areas of service provision and of social change in the broader sense. Soja (1968: 106-13) concludes his examination of various indices of social change in Kenya up to independence with "a geographical generalization" in which he suggests that the modern entity, the Kenya nation, can be regarded as a series of zones surrounding a "core area": national nuclei, participant areas, effective national territory, a transition zone, and the bulk of the geographical area of the Kenyan state, which he sees as lying outside the Kenya nation (see figure 7, p. 60).

The second aspect of service and resource distribution is the differentation between individuals. A highly unequal distribution of income between racial groups was a characteristic feature of colonial Kenya, and data presented by Singer and Reynolds show that

Figure 7: The pattern of modernization in Kenya


THE KENYA NATION
CORE AREA
NATIONAL NUCLEI
PARTICIPANT AREAS
EFFECTIVE NATIONAL TERRITORY
TRANSITION ZONE
1963
1964
SHIFTA ATTACKS & ETHNIC CONFICTS
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
N
0 50 100 Miles
0°

Source: Soja 1968: 108

it has changed only slightly since independence.

Table 3: Employment and earnings by racial group

| | No. of persons employed | % of total employ't | % of total income | Average income (£ p.a.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1963 | | | | |
| African | 423,013 | 93.4 | 65.8 | 128 |
| Asian | 20,283 | 4.5 | 16.4 | 627 |
| European | 9,632 | 2.1 | 17.7 | 1426 |
| 1971 | | | | |
| African | 541,946 | 93.8 | 72.5 | 201 |
| Asian | 24,268 | 4.2 | 15.2 | 941 |
| European | 11,658 | 2.0 | 12.3 | 1589 |

Source: Singer and Reynolds 1973: 24. The same figures are presented in a simplified form in their more accessible paper, Singer and Reynolds 1974: 26.

Singer and Reynolds also show that there are significant disparities in average earnings in different parts of the country (1973: 27):

Table 4: Average earnings by provinces (£ p.a.)

| | 1963 | 1967 |
|---|---|---|
| Nairobi | 302 | 439 |
| Central | 121 | 122 |
| Nyanza | 109 | 144 |
| Western | 147 | 155 |
| Coast | 207 | 275 |
| Rift Valley | 97 | 111 |
| Eastern | 120 | 129 |
| North-Eastern | 153 | 196 |

Source: Singer and Reynolds 1974: 30

There are also wide disparities in the incomes received from different broad categories of occupation - rural workers as against urban, wage employee as against the self-employed, workers in the formal sector as against those in the informal sector, and so on. The 1972 ILO mission to Kenya made the following estimate of the average incomes of particular categories in 1969:

Table 5: Average incomes of selected groups in urban and rural areas 1969 (£ p.a.)

| | Adults | Men | Women |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | | | |
| Wage employment | | | |
| - large farms | 68 | 73 | 46 |
| - small farms | 38 | 41 | 34 |
| - non-agricultural enterprises | 45 | 47 | 34 |
| Self-employment | | | |
| - smallholders | 113 | n.a. | n.a. |
| - owners of non-agricultural enterprises | 130 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Urban | | | |
| Wage employment | | | |
| - formal sector, Nairobi | 443 | 471 | 297 |
| - informal urban | 40 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Self-employment | | | |
| - informal urban | 60 | n.a. | n.a. |

n.a. = not available

Source: ILO 1972: 77

And these average figures themselves conceal very wide variations. Within the civil service, for instance, salaries range from £120 p.a. to £4,584 p.a. (Ndegwa Commission 1971: 333). Lamb (1972) found variations of a similar kind in his analysis of the crop payments made to the members of a coffee cooperative in Murang'a District - who are, as he points out (9):

> a section of the peasantry which is thought to be very much at the top of the peasant hierarchy - from a politically powerful ethnic group, in a productive district, involved in a high-value export crop.

Even within this producer elite, there was substantial differentiation. Seventeen of the 830 members of the society - 2% - received 20% of the total pay-out, and the top 14% received 64% of the total. The top 2% received an average payment of £526, and the top 14% an average of £247; the average payment to the remaining 86% was £23 (Lamb 1972: 9-10).

These disparities in income interact with other disparities in service provision, in two ways. First, to the extent that service provision depends on a local contribution - a fee, a local tax, or a self-help collection, the level of service provision will depend on the wealth of the community (or the degree to which it can be tapped for these purposes), or in the case of a service fee, on the wealth of the individual seeking the service. Secondly, there may be an effective qualification for the service in terms of wealth - e.g. a cattle dip, which mainly benefits those with exotic (and much more expensive) strains of cattle (see Holmquist 1970: 112-13). Thirdly, services affect the generation of new wealth: secondary education, for instance, is the avenue to a number of well-paying jobs in the modern sector (although not in itself sufficient to secure them).

This leads us to a consideration of some aspects of the dynamics of wealth and service distribution. Basically, the possession of wealth opens up other opportunities of obtaining more. A salaried job or a substantial income from cash crops can enable a man to open a bar or store and hence increase his income. Government services are often important factors in this process, particularly those to do with farming: supplies of technical information, improved seed, government credit, etc, tend to go to the wealthier farmers in any area, and in turn enable them to raise their productivity and farm income. A wealthy man can give his children secondary education so that they can secure employment and hence maintain his privileged position into the next generation. (Secondary school fees range from shs. 450/= in government schools to shs.1000/= or more in private or harambee ones; the ILO Mission (1972: 74) estimated that over 60% of Kenyan households had incomes of less than shs.1200/= p.a.) Equally important for the perpetuation of income disparities is the pattern of land ownership, since it is clear that many of the better-paid members of the urban work force are investing in land in the former European areas and in the former Reserves. This has been accompanied by a fragmentation of land holdings and the proliferation of sub-economic holdings: Singer and Reynolds (1974: 34) estimated that in the twelve main small farm districts, over 50,000 farms were too small to support the average dependants per farm in that district. In Murang'a 25% of all farms, and in Siaya 17%, fell into this category.

This does not necessarily mean that all, or even any, of the farms in question were in fact supporting the average number of dependants, since their calculations indicate a certain link between farm size and family size. It does suggest, though, that the fragmentation of land holdings and social differentiation in terms of land ownership is becoming more marked, particularly in certain areas. Many wage-and salary-earners in urban or large-farm employment hope to accumulate sufficient capital to increase their land holding in the rural areas, but while the investment of urban earnings in rural land was considerable throughout the 1960's and is continuing (Lamb 1972: 4), it is doubtful if this is likely to check in any significant way the process of differentiation. Cowen warns that the evidence of his study of two sub-locations in Nyeri suggests that only the better-paid workers can achieve this ideal: those who had been labourers on European farms were still labourers in the Reserve and, moreover, tended to have had relatively poor fathers (1972: 16-17). But differentiation is taking place in such a way that while many are becoming relatively more impoverished, few of them are being forced out of their holdings altogether, as happened in eighteenth century England, and hence the poor are not being deprived entirely of their stake in peasant society. For this reason, Colin Leys argues, "it seems unlikely that the process of differentiation will be accelerated in the near future to the point where it is incompatible with the maintenance of the peasant society ..." (1971: 329).

## The growth of the Kenyan state

Although the area of present-day Kenya had been defined as a British sphere of influence in 1886 (Bennett 1963: 2), the British government showed little initial enthusiasm for establishing administrative control over the area. British interests were left in the hands of a chartered company, the Imperial British East Africa Company, but its inability to control the situation in Uganda led to the proclamation of a protectorate over Uganda (then extending as far east as the Rift Valley) in June 1894, and subsequently to the proclamation of the East Africa Protectorate (the area from the Rift to the Coast) in June 1895. Even then, to the Foreign Office as much as to the Company, "the Kenyan interior was simply the road to Uganda" (Low 1965: 11), and the protectorate was administered by the British consul in Zanzibar as a "consular district" (Ogot 1968: 258). The administrative structure took shape during the period 1900-1905, during which time the capital of the protectorate was moved to Mombasa (1900), the Uganda Railway completed to Kisumu (1902) and the eastern Province of Uganda (from the Rift Valley to Lake Victoria, was transferred to Kenya (1902). Also in 1902 a new East Africa Order in C Council was promulgated, establishing the basic constitutional structure (see Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 41), and in 1905 a further Order provided for a nominated Legislative Council; in the same year responsibility for Kenyan affairs was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office.

The pattern of governmental activity was, naturally, determined by the perceived role of government in the broader sense: what was government for? It is a cliche of discussions of colonial and post-colonial government to say that colonial governments were only concerned with "law and order" whereas their independent successors are concerned with "development". This is a dangerous over-simplification for any colony, given the general aim of making each colony pay for the cost of its own administration, and hence the implied commitment to the development of an export-oriented cash economy from which a surplus can be extracted to finance administrative services. It is particularly inappropriate in Kenya, where there was a policy commitment to building up the settler economy. Because of this commitment, "government" meant different things in the European sphere and the African sphere.

Government in the European sphere had two aspects: the nature of governmental activity in the White Highlands*, and the role of European interests in the operation of the central government. Because the latter was the more critical of the two, it will be discussed first.

The first point to be made about the orientation of the central government is that there was an overriding commitment to the interests of European settlement. It is true that declarations of policy concerning the importance of African interests were made, such as the 1923 White Paper Indians in Kenya, which stated:

> Primarily, Kenya is an African territory; and his Majesty's Government think it necessary to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict the former should prevail. (quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham 1966: 69).

But these ringing delcarations of principle often seemed unrelated to the actual policy choices. The 1923 White Paper, in fact, was an attempt to resolve a crisis between the two immigrant races, and the reference to the paramountcy of African interests can be seen as an attempt to do this by changing the subject (Redley 1974). And in any case, whatever forms of words might be used in official statements, when the matter was put to the test, the economic interests of settlers, as opposed to particular political preferences ( on which settlers were in any case unlikely to be united,) usually prevailed over conflicting interests. When Grigg (Govenor 1925-31) defended the subsidized rail freight rates (see p. 52) by saying -

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* I will use the terms "the White Highlands" and the Reserves" to refer to the European and African areas respectively. These were not always the legally correct or politically acceptable terms for these areas, but they were the most commonly used.

> White settlement had gone so far that a really serious setback which endangered confidence in the future would endanger at the same time our whole civilization in East Africa. (quoted in Brett 1973: 94)

he was only stating explicitly a working assumption of government that ultimately, settler interests had to be presevod.

The governmental structure which emerged to promote the development of this type of society was characterized by the growth of specialized administrative agencies, and the increasing integration of settler interests into the policy-making process. A differentiated bureaucracy was needed to supply the specialized services required by settler agriculture - land allocation, labour supply, transport, agricultural and veterinary services, and marketing - and the welfare services which the European community demanded - notably education and medical services. By 1903 there were already fifteen distinct government departments (Low 1965: 23). Formal representation of settler interests in the government had begun with the formation of the Executive and Legislative Councils in 1905. The latter had two nominated settler members at the outset, and by 1919 there were eleven elected European members, two of whom sat on the Executive Council and were referred to by the Govenor as "members of the Government" (Bennett 1963: 48). The settler demand for an unofficial majority on the Legislative Council was not granted until 1948, however, and even then it was achieved by increasing the representation of Indians, Arabs and Africans (Ghai and McAuslan: 57).

But despite their lack of a parliamentary majority, the settlers enjoyed considerable influence over policy-making. The Hilton Young Commission observed in 1929:

> ... unofficial opinion has in practice obtained a much larger influence in the counsels of governments than accords with the strictly constitutional position. ... A practice has gown up in the Legislative Council of referring all questions of importance to select committees in which the official majority is seldom maintained. ... This method of reference to select committees is now established by custom over the whole of the business of the Legislative Council, and results in the exercise of considerable influence by the Legislature in the exeuctive sphere. (quoted by Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 59)

European members were also able to secure either the control of, or a substantial voice in, the series of committees which existed from 1923 on to scrutinize the budget before its formal consideration by the Council and which "exercised important influence in modifying financial proposals" (Ghai and McAuslan: 60). Apart from the formal procedures of the Legislative Council, there were a number of other devices for integrating settler interests into the governmental process.* There were, for instance, a number of specialist consultative bodies attached to various government agencies. A Land Board with settler representation had been conceded in 1907, and given "a large unofficial majority" the following year, without reference to London. Although formally a consultative body, it "had a considerable influence on policy formation" (Bennett 1965: 278). This pattern of government was extended by Grigg in the 1920's with (according to Norman Leys) "unprecedented completeness"

> Before his time each Government Department had an executive head who was responsible solely to the Governor. Sir Edward provided the different departments with boards or committees, dealing with education, roads and so forth, composed of settlers, which, though like the Legislature they had only advisory functions, found that their advice was generally decisive. (N. Leys 1931: 11)

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* I am particularly indebted to Michael Redley (1974) for an illuminating discussion of the intricacies of the integration of the governmental and settler spheres, and have drawn extensively on it in the paragraphs that follow.

In time, the base of these committees, originally rather narrow, was broadened to include a wide range of European interests. In this way, they became valuable for the settlers not only as a means of influencing government policies, but also as an institution for balancing and reconciling the potentially conflicting interests within the settler community.

Moreover, the government came to employ settlers on a number of its programmes, particularly those involving dealings with settlers. This tendency, partly prompted by financial stringency, was facilitated by the adoption of "scientific" formulae for dealing with conflicts between the races, which appeared to satisfy the fundamental objection to the employment of settlers in government (ie. that they would not be objective in matters affecting their own interests). Thus the settler leader Cavendish-Bentinck, for instance, could be engaged to conduct the government anti-erosion campaign and the squatter* stock removal programme.

At the same time, many officials acquired a place in the settler community. The normal Colonial Service, prohibition on officials having business interests in the colony in which they served was applied only fitfully, and relaxed entirely in 1919, and many officials either held land or acquired it on their retirement form the service: indeed, retiring officials were enabled to partly commute their pensions for land. Apart from the impact of this practice on the perspective of serving officials, it had the advantage that the ex-officials brought to settler politics an invaluable knowledge of the administrative process, and in many cases occupied the key posts in the district associations that were the basic unit of settler politics.

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* Most settlers only farmed a portion of their land, and allowed Africans to cultivate crops and keep stock on other parts of it. These Africans, who were termed "squatters", initially paid for their occupancy in cash, kind or labour, but by an ordinance of 1918 were confined to a legal status approaching serfdom, compelled to render 180 days service a year to the farmer (see Wrigley 1965: 238-9). The restriction of their grazing and cultivation rights was a continuing focus of settler political activity.

And finally, apart from their success at entrenching themselves in the governmental structure within the colony, the settlers also wielded considerable political influence in London. Several of them - notably Lord Delamere himself - sat in the House of Lords (see Bennett 1965:275) The Convention of Associations (the "Settlers' Parliament") was directly represented on the Joint East Africa Board in London, the main lobby for British capital in East Africa (Brett 1973: 63-4).

As far as government in the White Highlands themselves was concerned, the generalist administrative hierarchy - normally the linchpin of the colonial administration - was less important than elsewhere in the colonies. The formal administrative structure was changed several times in the inter-war period, but for most of the time, the settled areas were classed as "extra-provincial districts", which meant that their lines of communication ran direct to Nairobi without going through a Provincial Commissioner. In any case, the settler district associations were encouraged to communicate directly with government departments and the colonial secretary*. The main task of the generalist administrator was to maintain a steady supply of labour to European farms. His counterpart in the Reserves promoted the flow out; the administrator in the White Highlands was called on to maintain discipline. This he was expected to do with the aid of a draconian labour code (see N. Leys 1931: 82-5) or if necessary, without it. Cooke's case* showed administrators the hazards of confining themselves to their legal obligations in dealing with labour matters.

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* i.e. the Colonial Secretary in Nairobi, not the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London.

Within this framework of service provision, therefore, local government was relatively unimportant. Most services came from the central government, whose Commissioner for Local Government, Lands and Settlement oversaw the provision of services to the settled areas (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 61). These were provided by thecentral departments: until the Swynnerton Plan of the 1950's, for instance, most of the agricultural and veterinary officers of the Department of Agriculture were stationed in the European areas (N. Leys 1931: 95). The sort of local political institutions that the settlers created were small associations (usually covering areas much smaller than the administrative district) which had developed relations with officials that gave them power within the governmental structure. They had, therefore, little interest in developing local authorities that were formally separate from the central government. Moreover, settler leaders were concerned to maintain the principle that services should be provided to all settlers, not simply to those who could afford to pay for them, and resisted the introduction of local government structures that would allow the richer areas to secure for themselves a higher level of services than other areas could afford, and hence threaten the unity of interest of the settler community (Redley 1974).

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* S.V. Cooke was an Assistant District Commissioner in Kiambu who found on taking up his post that there were in the gaol several prisoners who had been charged with no offence but had displeased their employers in some way and been sent to the station for punishment; he therefore released them. The settlers, one of whom was Chairman of the Convention of Associations, complained to the Govenor, and Cooke received a formal reprimand. He demanded a judicial enquiry, which exonerated him, but was subsequently posted to Wajir (a remote and undesirable post) and denied promotion for some years. His predecessor, who had ordered the illegal imprisonments, received congenial posts and repeated promotions (see Ross 1927: 113-114 and N. Leys 1931: 98-100).

Although settler leaders agreed (in 1928) to accept formal District Councils with executive powers, these functions as "no more than local boards for the maintenance of roads with grants provided by the central government". (Mulasa 1970: 236) They refused to levy rates, deriving (in 1945) 97% of their revenue from government and military grants and the remainder from licences and fees (Parker 1949: 275). After the war, there were pressures for extensive change in local government. The government wanted the councils to levy rates and provide social services for Africans (in the context of the conversion of the farm labour force from a squatter to a "cottage labourer" basis), but the councils were unresponsive ~~and as late~~ as 1952, the Nyanza District Council was still refusing to levy a rate (Lonsdale, forthcoming). The settlers, meantime, were trying to use the council's power to regulate labour to wrest control of labour terms and conditions of service from the Labour Department, but they failed to succeed. (Furedi 1973). The local government structure was elaborated in 1952 by the addition of a top layer of county councils, and European councils did to a limited but increasing extent provide services for Africans, but their fundamental character remained unchanged.

In the African sphere, governmental structures were more local in their orientation; the main link between Africans and the central government was the provincial administration, and (until 1944) African interests were represented only indirectly in the Legislative Council, by nominated missionaries and the Chief Native Commissioner. The critical features of the governmental presence in the reserves were the generalist European administrator, the appointed official chief, and direct native taxation. The generalist administrator, exercising judicial, executive and legislative functions, was a common feature of British colonial administration and little need be said about him here. The hierarchy ran upwards from District Officers (DOs) through District Commissioners (DCs) and Provincial Commissioners (PCs) to the Chief Native Commissioner, who reported (through the Colonial Secretary) to the Govenor. Chiefs were appointed because with one or two exceptions, the "stateless societies" of Kenya had no established structure of authority through whom the colonial government could dxercise control. Consequently, their authority rested on the support given to them by the administration rather than on their standing in the local community (see Low 1965: 44-6) and Middleton 1965: 349-50). They were supported by "retainers" who eventually acquired a formal existence as the Tribal Police. Native taxation was critical because it simultaneously secured the revenue necessary to achieve the aim of financial self-sufficiency, and compelled Africans in the reserves to go out and work on European farms and plantations to earn the cash to pay their taxes (Low 1965: 52). The revenue could have been secured by agricultural development in the Reserves, but that would have been against the interests of the settlers: as one settler (quoted by Middleton 1965: 246) put it:

> it stands to reason that the more prosperous and contented is the population of a reserve, the less the need or inclination of the young men of the tribe to go out into the field. From the farmer's point of view, the ideal Reserve is a recruiting-ground for labour, a place from which the able-bodied go out to work, returning occasionally to rest and to beget the next generation of labourers.

Consequently, African cash cropping was discouraged (see Brett 1973: 205-11) and the supporting services required for an expansion of peasant production (.e.g. technical expertise and marketing) not provided (see Low 1965: 52n.). A Hut Tax of Rs.2/=*(shs.4/=) was introduced in 1901; later it was raised to shs.6/= and extended to cover non-hut owners, thereby becoming a hut and poll tax. By 1920 it had reached shs. 20/=, but following riots in Nairobi was reduced in 1921 to shs.12/=. An individual might be responsible for several taxes, and Norman Leys estimated that in 1931 the average taxpayer paid shs.30/=, the average annual earnings of a labourer on a European farm being shs.90/= (1931: 23-5).

In 1924 the *Native Authority Ordinance* was amended to provide for the establishment of Local Native Councils (LNCs) under the presidency of the DC (Middleton 1965: 350). Initially, all councillors were nominated by the PC and many were chiefs; subsequently the principle of election was introduced and the non-official component of the councils increased (Mulaca 1970: 235-8). These councils were introduced to enable the structure of administrative control to accommodate the social changes that had been taking place, in particular the emergence of large numbers of younger educated men - the *asomi*. By 1919 there were 26,618 children attending school, of which 19,626 were in Nyanza Province (Lonsdale, forthcoming). Administrators had "strained to the utmost the loyal support of the old chiefs, by demanding the inclusion of younger men" in tribal councils (Lonsdale 1968: 122), and it was felt that there was a need for a formal structure which, in the words of the Acting Chief Native

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* Until 1920 the rupee, value 1s. 4d., was the legal currency in Kenya. In March 1920, the Indian rupee having risen to 2s. 10d., the East African shilling was introduced at Rs.1 = shs.2/=

Commissioner will attract

> the younger and more vigorous brains among the natives and lead them to take an active part on their own administration, and thus to ensure that they are for the Government and not against it. (quoted in Lonsdale 1968: 128).

It was also hoped that the councils "would be concerned with local needs rather than with programmes of political bodies" (Lord Hailey, quoted in Lonsdale, forthcoming), but this did not preclude the recruitment of members of such bodies as the Kikuyu Central Association, as can be seen from the figures on the composition of the Kikuyu LNCs, quoted by Governor Grigg to the Hilton Young Commission on closer union in 1931.

| | Total membership | KCA | Young mission* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fort Hall | 28 | 9 | 7 |
| Kiambu | 25 | 6 | 5 |
| Nyeri | 22 | 4 | 33 |

* 'Young Mission' means natives educated at missions, who have other organizations and are the main representatives, apart from the K.C.A., of progressive ideas." (quoted in Lonsdale 1968: 129 n. 47)

The government hoped to associate this new elite, "on the growing edge of social activity" (Southall, quoted in Lonsdale 1968: 128), with its measures of administrative control. When, for instance, in 1930, the Government introduced rules to severely restrict Africans' right to collect money for communal purposes, the rules were sent to each DO "with the instruction that he was to summon the Tribal Authority /i.e. the LNC/ of his District, explain the rules to them orally, and instruct them to pass a resolution approving them, thus giving them the force of law" (N. Leys 1931: 71). LNC resolutions carried in this way were, however, often only formal, as in the case of the Kikuyu LNCs' resolutions limiting female circumcision (see Middleton 1965: 364).

The government also sought to meet the cost of local services from local rates levied by the councils, which by 1931 were from shs.1/= to shs.3/= (Brett 1973:195) and by 1938 yielded a total income of £112,000 (Middleton 1965: 351). The councils levied a poll tax (termed a local rate) which by 1931 was from shs.1/= to shs.3/=. While the proceeds of this tax were applied to some local services, the government attached more importance to the collection of the tax than to the spending of its proceeds. In 1926, the total income of all LNCs was nearly £37,000, while their total expenditure was only £1,700; by 1930 their accumulated surplus balances totalled £118,196 (Lyon 1966: 80, 62). The government sought to restrain councils from spending their tax revenues, particularly on education: in 1932 the Fort Hall LNC allocated shs. 100,000/= for schools, but shs.95,000/= of this had been carried over from the previous year, unspent by the Education Department (see also N. Leys 1931: 75, Lonsdale forthcoming). Conversely, administrators induced councils to spend money on projects that they themselves were interested in.

> The President (i.e. the DC) said he wished another £100 to be voted for the construction of the new maternity ward at Fort Hall, in case the P.W.D. required further funds this year. In all possibility, however, this sum would not be spent. (Fort Hall LNC Minute 50 of 1938).

Consequently, the LNC budget became a source of supplementary finance for the DC - provided that he could persuade or coerce the council to agree. Norman Leys (1931: 74) cites several cases where a council was locked up in the council chamber by the DC until they saw the wisdom of his arguments that they should, for instance, buy a truck to carry his baggage on safari.

But while administrators sought to use the LNCs as an extension of the central government, the local elite sought to use it to create a sphere of autonomous local action, independent of the forcefully-expressed preferences of the colonial authorities. Hence their strong desire to support independent schools (Lonsdale forthcoming: 347-8; Fort Hall LNC Minutes 42 of 1934, 34 and 40 of 1935, 5 of 1937), and to employ only local staff (see e.g. Fort Hall LNC Minute 77/38 of 1938 for a progress account of the council's campaign to employ a Kikuyu works supervisor). Providing services was to a certain extent a secondary aim, directed at those areas where the colonial authorities would not provide a service: upper primary education (and education in English in general), and graders to relieve people of the burden of compulsory roadwork, (see Fort Hall LNC Minutes 42 of 1934, 61 of 1938 42 of 1938 and Lonsdale, forthcoming). Finally, the LNCs were a source of prestige and patronage, and a source of income: the first veto applied by the DC to the Fort Hall LNC was applied at the first meeting of the council, when he reduced the councillors' allowances from the voted shs.2/= to shs.1/= and he subsequently vetoed one councillor's application for a loan from the council, to the "considerable surprise" of some of the councillors (Resolution 1 of 1925) Minute 43 of 1938).

Formal government agencies were not the only means of service provision in the reserves. Most roadwork, for instance, was done by forced labour; under the Native Authority Ordinance, male Africans were liable for six days' compulsory roadwork every three months (Ross 1927: 109); they could also be forced to work another month under the Roads Ordinance, "but since in that case they have to be paid, that Ordinance is little used" (N. Leys 1931: 37). And most of the schools in African areas were mission schools - but here a note of explination is called for. Most schools were built by and at the initiative of the local community (Anderson 1970: 108-9). Where they affiliated with a mission, it was mainly to secure the teachers and supervision that the mission could offer, and the recognised status of being a mission school. The conditions for grants-in-aid laid down by the Director of Education in 1934 provided that only "efficient" schools should get grants, and the first criterion of efficiency was "that the school was supervised by a European" (Fort Hall LNC Minute 42 of 1934). But most schools received no grants - in 1938, 1398 of a total of 1802 (Anderson 1970: 138) - and while they may have had a mission affiliation (and many would not even have had a nominal one), a good deal of the burden of the service was being borne locally. The role of the mission as a service agency was to link these local initiatives with higher-standard facilities. This had its costs for the clients; at a baraza /meeting/ held in Nyanza in 1922 to present education grievances to the PC, one speaker complained:

> The missions don't teach us safi /pure/ teaching. We want our own schools. Our teachers are able to manage them. (quoted in Lonsdale, forthcoming).

The missions, in deference to government policy, included a certain amount of vocational training in the curriculum, but to the parents, "pure" literary education, which offered prospects of wage employment, was what counted (Lonsdale, forthcoming).

## Postwar changes and independence

In the first decade after the war there were widespread social and political changes in Kenya. Some were already in train by 1952, but the declaration of the Emergency in October of that year greatly affected them all. A detailed consideration of them would be out of place, but in this context the main features of this process of change were (a) the growth of a more differentiated administrative structure; (b) a substantial increase in the power of the Provincial Administration (c a series of major agrarian reforms, especially in Central Province; (d) increasing political consciousness among Africans combined with severe restrictions on political organisation, particularly at the national level; and (e) the negotiations and consitutional changes which eventually led to independence under an African government.

### (a) Administrative differentiation

The increasing differentiation of the administrative structure took place within a very rapid expansion of civil service numbers, as the following table shows.

Table 6: Expansion of the Kenya civil service

| Year | Posts* |
|---|---|
| 1945 | 14,000 |
| 1955 | 45,000 |
| 1965 | 63,000 |
| 1968 | 72,000 |
| 1969 | 77,000 |

* rounded figures
(quoted by Hyden 1970: 8)

There were very large increases in the ministries of Education, where expenditure rose by 860% from 1949 to 1962, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (580%) and the police and immigration services (605%) (Economy Commission 1962: 6). In particular, there was a marked expansion of agricultural field staff: the staff of the Agriculture Department increased from 298 in 1945 to 2,519 in 1958, and that of the Veterinary Department from 291 to 892 (Gertzel 1970: 22; see also

Ita 1972: 48-50 an account of this process in Mbere Division). New organizations, such as the African Land Development Department (ALDEV) were set up, and plans were made for the more professional Kenya Police to take over much of the responsibility for law and order in the reserves from the Tribal Police of the Provincial Administration: these plans were, however, interrupted by the onset of the Emergency, which brought the Kenya Police under the control of the Provincial Administration.

(b) The Provincial Administration

The Provincial Administration had been weakened somewhat by the increasing differentiation of the administrative structure, but soon regained its position. Sir Philip Mitchell (Governor 1944-52) had directed technical and administrative officers to work together in district teams under the chairmanship of the DC (Lonsdale, forthcoming) and the hegemony of the Provincial Administration was further strengthened by his successor, Sir Evelyn Baring who, to the settler leader Blundell, had "an exaggerated respect" for the susceptibilities of the Provincial Administration (Blundell 1964: 99).

> He would never agree to a lessening of the administration's position, indeed was constantly at pains to improve it; and I once warned him that he must be careful not to build a monster which in later years we should have difficulty in controlling.

In addition to its enhanced authority over technical officers, the Provincial Administration was given "final responsibility" over the substantial machinery of coercion which was built up during the Emergency. The uniformed establishment of the Kenya Police rose from 6,057 in 1951 to 12,232 in 1962, and the strength of the Tribal Police from 2,269 at the beginning of the Emergency to 4,790 in 1962, of whom 1,872 were in Central Province (Economy Commission 1962: 32-4). The Tribal Police were under direct administration control, and the Kenya Police were subject to directions from the Provincial Administration in all matters "concerning the preservation of peace and order" (Sessional Paper No. 24 of 1954, quoted by Gertzel 1970:24). The Provincial Administration's responsibility for "peace and order" gave it a wide range of powers beyond operational control of the police.

> Provincial Commissioners were empowered by Baring to issue order to departmental officers in their provinces if the needs of the Emergency demanded it. He delegated his powers of detention to them. They were responsible for issuing permits for most public meetings .... They occupied a crucial position as agents of control for the Governor, which made them, in effect, political agents for the Executive. (Gertzel 1970: 24).

Thus armed, the Provincial Administration embarked on a stratggy of "closer administration", first in Central Province and later in the country as a whole. Its numbers increased from 184 in 1951 to 370 in 1962, of whom 162 were District Assistants, a new cadre introduced at the beginning of the Emergency below the DO level (Economy Commission 1962: 30), and DOs were actually posted to divisions, instead of touring from the district headquaters (Gertzel 1970: 25; see also Ita 1972: 49-51). The DC's power was enhanced by the growing wealth of the African District Councils (as the LNCs had been renamed in 1950), of which they were the chairmen: total LNC expenditure in 1948 was £500,100, total ADC expenditure in 1952 was £1,036,200 and by 1963 had reached £5,360,000 (African Studies Branch 1952: 37; Economic Survey 1968: 139). But the expansion of expenditure had not been accompanied by the increased autonomy that the councillors sought:

> On the contrary, the development of local government gave the district commissioner more power than ever before, especially in relation to the departmental officers. In the more prosperous agritultural districts, North and South Nyanza, he had a growing source of local finance; in the Imperial concern with local government he had unanswerable ideological support; in his presidency of the ADC he had the makings of a political machine; and the executive arm, the chiefs, were responsible to him alone. (Lonsdale, forthcoming)

## (c) Agrarian change

"Major agrarian reform" is perhaps too ambitious a term for the linked but distinct changes that took place in African agriculture in this period; the main changes were the increasing participation of Africans (as producers rather than labourers) in the export economy, including the removal of many of the restrictions on African production of coffee, and a programme of land consolidation and tenure conversion concentrated on Central Province. The politically critical part of the changes was the land reform: this had become an urgent need, as tension over land had become acute in some areas. "In Kiambu the fees paid in African court cases - most of them land cases - rose from £13,000 in 1949 to £24,000 in 1951. "(Sorrenson 1967: 79). When the policy of concentrating the population into fortified villages (to cut them off from the guerrillas in the forests) was adopted, some DCs took advantage of the opportunity to begin consolidation schemes, and consolidation was adopted as a central government policy in 1955 (Sorrenson 1967: 119). It was advocated as a political as well as an agricultural measure, whose effect would be to create "a solid middle-class Kikuyu population" who would be "too busy on their land to worry about political agitation" (Sorrenson 1967: 117-18); at the same time it would enable better (or richer) farmers to acquire larger holdings on which more effective agricultural techniques could be applied, while worse (or poorer) farmers became landless and were available to serve as the landless labour the rich farmers required (Swynnerton 1954: 10). In fact, the clear distinction between landed gentry and landless labourers did not emerge in quite as clear a form as Swynnerton envisaged, because the restrictions on sub-economic holdings were never enforced (Sorrenson 1967: 217); the consequence of consolidation was, therefore, increasing differentiation among the peasantry rather than a clear distinction into landed and landless classes (on which see C. Leys 1971).

### (d) Political consciousness and organization

The increase in governmental activity in the rural areas was accompanied by an increase in political consciousness. Indeed, it largely contributed to it, since the colonial government was attempting to change substantially social and economic relationships, and in doing so, was confronting rural people more directly, so that the tensions of the colonial relationship were more widely felt. Whereas previously directives from European officers came from a relatively distant district office and were mediated through various African intermediaries, peasants were now brought face to face with European authority. Ita (1972: 49-51) points out that in the Mbere Division of Meru District, not only was a DO posted to the division for the first time, but that there was also an expatriate of equivalent rank in every location - Prison Officer, Detention Camp Overseer, Home Guards Commandant or Assistant Agricultural Officer (this last being posted to Mbere "to suggest how best Mau Mau detainees in Mbere camps could be utilized to promote agricultural and veterinary programs in the area"). The fact that many of the measures so actively promoted seemed to threaten the livelihood of the peasant producer -

compulsory terracing, the culling of cattle, the land consolidation - heightened the tension, and fears of further loss of land to Europeans were kept alive by the expulsion in 1951 of some of the Meru of northern Tanganyika to make way for European farmers (Lonsdale 1968: 143).

There were several other dimensions of this increasing political conflict. There was conflict between the new junior technical staff - e.g. Agricultural Instructors and Health Assistants - and the chiefs, who were no longer the sole line of communication with the higher levels ofgovernment (see Ita 1972: 48). (This often overlapped with another source of conflict: that between the established "communicators" and younger, educated men - the elite "on the growing edge of social activity". See Lonsdale 1968: 120-30 and Ita 1972: 55-6.) More important, there was a conflict between the chiefs and the politicians, usually over the extent to which these competing representatives inclined towards the "official" or the "protester" role in their relationships with the colonial authorities. This was particularly marked in Kikuyuland, where the emergency had sharply polarized the community into "loyalists" and detainees (see Sorrenson 1967: 180 and Lamb 1974:).

This cleavage also often overlapped with the increasingly important economic one: The Mau Mau activists were largely either landless or possessed very little land; active loyalists were on the whole from "the landed and wealthy classes" (Sorrenson 1967: 107), a distinction which deependd during the Emergency: the forest fighters were liable to lose their land, either by actual confiscation or because they were in detention camps during consolidation and unable to defend their interests (Sorrenson 1967: 242-3), and because all the patronage at the government's disposal - trade licences, agricultural assistance, government services - was specifically steered to them (see e.g. Fort Hall ADC Minutes 21 and T&T 2 of 1954). This division was also exacerbated by the fact that for many of the new economic opportunites, both in trade and in junior government employment, the chief was the gatekeeper, and a man firmly opposed to the chief might find himself excluded from these opportunities (see Ita 1972: 54).

The colonial theory of local government had been based on the assumption that district-level political institutions could meet the political aspirations of rural people. But the representative institutions that were set up in Kenya were quite unable to do this (Lonsdale 1968: 135). On most of the really critical questions, the local bodies were powerless. The North Nyanza LNC had been unable to prevent further excisions from the reserve at the time of the Kakamega gold rush in the 1930's, nor could local bodies significantly influence the distribution of central government resources. When members of the Central Nyanza LNC tried to raise the matter of the falling price of sisal, they were told by the DC "The price paid for sisal is no concern of the local native authority"; the DC added in the council minutes:

> I have read these minutes with considerable dissatisfaction as they reveal that members have a lamentably poor understanding of how the problems of local government must be dealt with. It must be remembered that such powers and authority as the local native council possesses have been delegated to it by the central government which remains the ultimate arbiter in all matters of government. (quoted in Odinga 1967: 93)

This point was underlined three years later when the government introduced a by-law to compel the planting of aloe hedges as an anti-erosion measure against the vigorous opposition of the Central Nyanza ADC. In the following year, only 10% of the electorate voted in the ADC elections. "The government had taken the decision, the councillors took the blame" (Lonsdale, forthcoming). In 1959 the council was dissolved by the government after it refused to participate in the Kisaini Afforestation Scheme (Odinga 1967: 135-6). Finally, a large segment of the most innovative and politicized Africans - those working outside the Reserves - were largely excluded from these local institutions, and also from those of the urban and scheduled areas, where direct African representation in local government was not achieved until shortly before independece. The "politics of local focus" could not contain African political aspirations.

But at this time the opportunities for wider political activity were severely restricted - in particular, there was no elected African representation on the Legislative Council. The Emergency was in part the origin of these restrictions, in part the product of them: the frustrations of the "politics of local focus", the inability of the emerging political leadership to command a place in national-level decision-making, combined with the growing economic tensions in Central Province, resulted in the resort to violence by Mau Mau activists. And the British response to Mau Mau was to impose more restrictions and more coercion, and in so doing to exacerbate existing economic and social conflict in Kikuyuland (see, e.g. Nottingham and Rosberg 1956).

The Emergency was declared in October 1952: Kenyatta and ninety-eight others, including all the executive of the Kenya African Union (KAU) were arrested on the first day, and KAU itself was banned in July 1953. By 1955 some 62,000 people were in detention and 17,000 in prison; 9,800 guerrillas had been killed (excluding an unknown number who died of wounds in the forest) and 962 people had been hanged (Evans 1956: 285n). In 1953 all African political organizations were banned, the restriction being partially lifted in 1955 to allow for the registration of district-wide political organizations, except in Central Province (Bennett 1963: 138). Several "District Associations" were formed; they were "essentially parochial organizations that emphasized local issues" (Gertzel 1970: 8), and an attempt in 1958 to amalgamate them into a Convention of Associations (ironically, the title of the main settler political organization in the pre-war period) was disallowed. But Mboya's Nairobi People's Convention Party did have sufficient influence in Central Province to provoke the government to clamp down on its activities and restrict a number of Kikuyu leaders to their home districts (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966: 317).

The creation of district-level political organizations also had significant long-term implications. As Okumu (1968: 12) has noted

> Each of these associations, save the Nairobi District African Congress, was a tribal association led by a tribal personality who used the organization as a personal machine by identifying his interests with those of the ethnic group as a whole.

Notable examples of such associations were Odinga's African District Association (Central Nyanza), Ngala's Mombasa African Democratic Union, and Mboya's Nairobi People's Convention Party. Their two main principles of political organisation - that it was based on geographical (which outside Nairobi meant ethnic) divisions rather than class or interest, and that it focussed on one particular leader - have remained of critical importance in Kenyan politics. (see, e.g. Gertzel 1970: 16).

One consequence of this repression of formal political activity at the national level was the emergence of the trade union movement as an alternative form of political organization. Tom Mboya, then General Secretary of what was to become the Kenya Federation of Labour, reported in 1955:

> Members flocked to union offices with grievances that would have been better dealt with by a political organization. To leave these grievances unattended would have led to the death of trade unions. Individually, no union could handle these grievances, and so they were referred to the Federation. (quoted in Sandbrook 1970: 265)

The government attempted to suppress this aspect of KFL activity, but the Federation had strong outside support in the UK parliamentary Labour Party and the international trade union movement and managed to evade the demand of the Registrar of Societies for an undertaking not to participate in politics (see Sandbrook 1970: 267:8).

A further consequence of this political blockage at the national level was that the political negotiations which led to independence took place between distinct groups in Kenya and the UK government: the Legislative Council might be a useful forum, but no real issues were resolved there. One Colonial Secretary (Lyttleton) imposed on the colony the principles of African participation in the ministry (1954) and direct elections for African MLCs (implemented in 1957). Another (Macleod) imposed (through the first Lancaster House conference) the final moves towards African majority rule and independence. After this conference the restrictions on political activity were relaxed and despite considerable personal rivalries among the emerging leaders, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was formed in March 1960. Fears that KANU would be dominated by its largely Kikuyu and Luo leadership led to the foundation three months later of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). This was led by two MLCs from "fringe" areas - Ronald Ngala (Coast) and Masinde Muliro (Elgon Nyanza) - and strongly backed by the Masai and Kalenjin of the Rift Valley, who feared that as the Europeans left the Rift, their land would be taken over by Kikuyu rather than by those tribes with "historic claims" to the area (Bennett 1963: 152-3). Later, Paul Ngei took his Kamba supporters out of KANU to form the African People's Party, but returned to KANU before independence (Sanger and Nottingham 1964: 4 - 5). There was a succession of pre-independence governments: KANU refused to participate in a government until Kenyatta was released, and the first post-Lancaster House government was a minority government led by Ngala with support from European and Asian members and government nominees. In April 1962 a KANU/KADU coalition was formed (without a chief minister), which was followed by elections at which KANU won a decisive majority, and from which it went on to form the government which held power through internal self-government (June 1963) to independence (December 1963).

### (e) Negotiations and Independence

The details of these rather complicated moves towards independence need not be described here, but one aspect that is relevant is the adoption of the *majimbo* (Swahili for regions or districts) constitution at independence. The idea of substantial devolution of powers to local bodies had been canvassed at various times since the 1920's (see Sanger & Nottingham 1964: 10), and the United Party, representing the hard-line Europeans, went to the first Lancaster House conference demanding the abolition of the Legislative Council and the devolution of all its powers to local councils, which would be European-controlled in the Scheduled areas, African-controlled in the reserves (Hempstone 1960: 3). The United Party made no impact on the conference (Blundell 1964; 270), but at constitutional talks held in Nairobi in September 1961, KADU put up a proposal for regionalism (Odinga 1967: 220-1), which was elaborated at the second Lancaster House conference in January 1962. KADU leaders were becoming aware of their minority status, and seized on the regionalism proposal put up by their European allies "with the object of limiting the power of a central government and of the Kikuyu over the remainder of Kenya" (Blundell 1964: 298; see also Odinga 1967: 226-8).

The main elements of the plan were that there would be six largely autonomous regional governments (of which KADU could expect to control three), with only a minimal role for the central government (see Odinga 1967: 227). At the conference, they linked the apprehensions of the smaller tribes to British apprehension that Kenya might follow the Ghanaian path. At the beginning of the conference, Ngala warned:

> Unfortunate experiences in some ex-British colonies have shown just how easily the Westminster pattern of government can be perverted into a ruthless dictatorship. I assure you that the adoption of an orthodox Westminster pattern for Kenya would inevitably result in placing absolute power in the hands of a dictator. (quoted in Rothchild 1967: 294)

KANU was resolutely opposed to the proposal, and the conference deadlocked. (It lasted, in the end, for three months.) KANU felt itself under great pressure to concede the point, for several reasons. First, the dispute was an obstacle to independence, and by insisting on it, the party was allowing the British government to further delay independence. Secondly, there was a danger that the party might split, with its less radical members allying themselves with KADU to form a government. And thirdly, as Odinga relates (1967: 229):

> As the deadlock persisted, Kenyatta called KANU representatives together. Arguing, he said, was all very well, but we had to reach a settlement. If we failed government would be snatched from out hands. ... We might be forced to accept a constitution we did not want, but once we have the government we could change the constitution.

When, therefore, the Colonial Secretary proposed a compromise that included all the essential elements of the KADU plan, KANU accepted it. The London agreement provided only the framework for the new constitution; the details were to be worked out by KADU and KANU working together as a coalition government. But little real agreement was reached, and the final, terms had to be settled at a further conference in London in September, 1963, three months before independence, when the Colonial Secretary had to impose a settlement of the points still in dispute (Sanger and Nottingham 1964: 19). Under the majimbo Constitution (as it came to be called) there were to be six regions, with a seventh (North-Eastern) being created in March 1963 in an attempt to mollify the secessionist sentiments of its predominantly Somali inhabitants. The regional boundaries, which were determined by an independent commission, were drawn so as to enclose relatively cohesive ethnic blocs; Central Region was smaller and more exclusively Kikuyu than the old Central Province, and Nyanza Province was divided into a mainly Luo Nyanza Region and a mainly Abaluhya Western Region, shedding Kericho District to Rift Valley Region, which was dominated by the Masai, the Kalenjin and the remaining settlers. (The present provincial boundaries are essentially the same as the regional boundaries: see figure 4, p. 48.)

N.B. There is no page 93.

The regions were to be governed by elected Regional Assemblies working through a system of specialised subject committees, without interlocking memberships except for the President of the Assembly, who was an ex officio member of all committees. There was a single public service, but each region had a separate establishment, and the provincial administration was to become an arm of the regional governments. The division of executive and legislative powers between the centre and the regions was highly complex, and was set out in elaborate, confusing and sometimes contradictory detail in the 223-page constitution. Ghai and McAuslan, in their lucid exposition of the constitutional provisions (1970: 197-200), comment (p. 197):

> In this, it reflects the lack of consensus and lack of careful thinking as to the functions appropriate to each government; fears could only be allayed by a detailed allocation of functions - down to the determination of which legislature could provide for public lavatories and refuse and effluence disposal, and which executive was responsible for implementing the law on these subjects.

The regions had exclusive legislative powers over primary and secondary education (except for certain "national" schools), health services (except for major hospitals), and (subject to certain exceptions,) exclusive executive power over these areas. Respnsibility for roads was divided, with the central government being respobsible for trunk roads and the regions for all others. The basic local government structure was written into the Constitution, but the regions had considerable legislative and executive powers over local government, as well as the responsibility for providing grants-in-aid to local authorities.

These provisions were entrenched by the requirement that constitutional changes affecting the rights of regions should either obtain a 75%

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majority in both the House and the Senate (in which each district had one representative), or be approved by a two-thirds majority at a referendum followed by a simple majority in each house. At the same time, there was considerable scope for central intervention in regional affairs, including an unfettered grants power, central overriding powers in emergencies and inmatters arising out of international agreements, and above all, by section 106 (2), which required the regions to exercise their authority in such a way as "not t impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the Government of Kenya": the central government could intervene in both executive and legislative fields if it considered that the acts of the regions contravened this section (though a 65% majority in both houses was required for the exercise of legislative power).

The complexity of the constitutional provisions enabled KADU to represent the regions as virtually states in a federal system while KANU could assert that their powers "were barely larger than those of local government authorities" (Odinga 1967: 244). Ghai and McAuslan (1970: 200-201) conclude:

> It is obvious from an examination of the powers of the Regions that they were not very important, and were in any case somewhat precarious, for the centre could take over regional powers in a number of instances. There was very little true autonomy. The regional executives were so designed as not to lead to strong regional governments; they were clumsy and unwieldy; there was a wide dispersion of authority, and no clear lines of responsibility. This was likely to result in weak regional structures, and to promote occasions for outside interference.

Finally, the constutional arrangements provided for a new local government structure. The basic principles, as has been mentioned, were incorporated into the constitution, and the details covered by regulation. The former European County and Distrct Councils and African District Councils were abolished, and a uniform two-tier structure introduced, with thirty-three county councils and seven municipal councils as the first tier, and a second tier of sixty Area Councils and seventy-two Local Councils (see MacDonald in Gertzel et al. 1969: 387-93).

Counties were coterminous with districts except in the cases of the Sirikwa CC, which consisted of five Kalenjin-speaking districts and absorbed the high-level service structure which had been developed to serve the settlers in Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia, and Central Rift CC, which linked the relatively wealthy Nakuru District and the underdeveloped Baringo District in its hinterland. Responsibility for the supervision of local authorities was vested in the regions, and district commissioners (who became Regional Government Agents) were no longer tax-collectors for local authorities. The main source of county council finance was expected to be a Graduated Personal Tax, to be supplemented by grants from the regions (see Fiscal Commission 1963: 68-9). Councils were empowered by the Local Government Regulations to perform a wide range of functions, but their main responsibilites were primary education, public health and secondary roads. Elections on a common roll were held for all the new authorities in 1963.

## Political change since independence

Questions about ~~the~~ future structure of Kenyan society, and the role of government within it, were seldom clearly formulated by political leaders before independence. The anti-colonial cause provided a relatively broad common ground for political activity, and such internal divisions as emerged related mainly to personal rivalry between competing politicians. Though these did involve social divisions, such as ethnic and (to a more limited extent) economic cleavages, as competing leaders sought to build up a power base, their policy implications tended to be subordinated to the demand for an end to colonial status. But after independence these questions emerged more clearly, and three broad patterns of development can be seen. First, there was an explicit choice of a capitalist mode of development, best set out in the perversely-named Sessional Paper African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya (No. 10 of 1965). Secondly, the state assumed a critical role in the allocation of the resource required for individual economic advance. It allocated licences in commerce, industry and agriculture, extended credit to enrepreneurs, and distributed large quantities of agricultural land acquired from departing settlers. And thirdly, there has been a vast expansion of the power of the central government, both over other government agencies, and over individuals and organizations outside the formal government structure. The first two of these trends, though clearly very important, can only be alluded to here (but see, for instance, the illuminating discussions in Leys 1971 and 1972); this section is therefore largely confined to the changes in the formal political and governmental sphere. It deals with three main themes; the growth of central control over sub-national levels of government, the declining role of organized representation in the process of government, and the extension of central governmental authority over formally non-governmental bodies.

## (a) The growth of central control

The first moves in the extension of central control were aimed at the abolition of the regionalist structure of government. KANU had always been adamantly opposed to majimbo, so it was hardly surprising that they should want to destory it, and since they were the government, with a confortable parliamentary majority, they were in a good position to do so. For as Ghai and McAuslan point out (1970: 200-201):

> ... It is important to remember that the regional structure was a new one, and there had to be a devolution of powers from the Centre before it could begin to function. Thus it lacked a tradition of government, no vested interests had yet been created, and the machinery for administration had to be established, often by transferring personnel from the central establishment to the regional. Under these circumstances, the odds against the success of the regional system were many and great.

And the KANU goverment showed little inclination to devolve the necessary powers to the regions. Even before independence, Mboya had greeted the KANU electoral victory of May 1963 by proclaiming "Regionalism is dead" (Sanger and Nottingham 1964: 18). Just before independence, the Minister for Home Affairs, Oginga Odinga, directed that officers of the Provincial Administration down to the rank of District Assistant should continue to be held on the Ministry's establishment and only seconded to the regions, thus ensuring effective central control of the administrative core of the regional governments (Gertzel 1966: 203). The government also delayed the transfer of some of the services to be taken over by the regions, and (more importantly) retained central control of regional finances beyond the date (June 1964) when the constitution provided for their relinquishment to the regions themselves (Gertzel 1970: 33); in the end, neither the services nor the finances were ever transferred to the regions (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 210).

The regional politicians were able to make little effective response to this steady central erosion of their autonomy: ferocious public statements were made, but there was little attempt to mobilize public support in favour of the regions, and the regional politicians gained no support by their obvious preoccupation with their own reward. The Coast and Rift Valley Regional Assemblies (both KADU-controlled) voted themselves substantial allowances, and shortly afterwards threatened to dismiss teachers and close schools for want of money to pay the teachers (Sanger and Nottingham 1964: 19).

Meanwhile the government was drumming up support for a constitutional amendment to restore unitary government, which it introduced into the House of Representatives in August 1964. The Bill, which also provided for Kenya to become a republic, gave the central government concurrent executive authority over the most significant regional responsibilities (including education, agriculture and health), while allowing the centre to delegate authority on its own terms, and gave the central government direct responsibility for local government and police. But although KANU had the necessary 75% majority in the House (attained since the election through the return of the APP members, KADU defections and the addition of the National Members elected by the House itself), KADU still held fifteen of the thirty-eight Senate seats; the bill therefore provided for a referendum if it failed to reach the necessary majority (Ghair and McAuslan 1970: 211-12). The trickle of KADU defectors into KANU continued, and in November, 1964 Ngala led the remainder across the floor to join KANU and KADU was dissolved. The constitutional amendment was carried unanimously in the Senate, and was followed by others removing the independent revenues of the regions and their remaining exclusive legislative and executive powers, renaming them provinces, and repealing the entranchment of the provisions relating to citizenship, fundamental rights, the Senate and the structure of the regional governments and the provisions for constitutional change. Although the Regional Assemblies remained in existence as Provincial Councils (and their members continued to draw allowances) until 1968, they ceased to perform any functions after early 1965 (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 213). The Senate itself, designed as the guardian of the interests of the smaller districts, was abolished in December, 1966 and its members absorbed into the House (renamed the National Assembly); the same amendment provided for the life of parliament to be extended for a further two years beyond the five years provided in the constitution, on the grounds that elections were "tiresome, expensive and a waste of money", and that it would be unfair to those Senators who would have held office until 1970 to terminate their period of office earlier (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 215).

Attempts were also made to bring local government under tighter central control. African local government had always been subject to a relatively high degree of central control, and with the abolition of the _majimbo_ structure, the Minister for Local Government aquired a wide range of controls over local authorities. Among these were the power to nominate councillors, to approve the appointment of chief officers, to approve council estimates, fees and charges for council services, and allowances to councillors, to approve all by-laws, to determine the level of grants to municipal and county councils, and to wind up any local authority and appoint a commission in its place. (A summary of the main government controls can be found in Gertzel _et al_ 1969: 420-1). Several county councilswere dissolved and replaced by commissions between 1964 and 1969, and in 1968 all local(i.e. location) councils were suspended and replaced (in theory) by commissions headed by the DC (East African Standard, 14 July 1968).

In addition to these controls, which were mainly exercised from Nairobi (Provincial Local Government Finance Officers were posted to the provinces towards the end of this period), there was pressure for the Provincial Administration to be given the responsibility for supervising local authorities, as had been the case before independence. In 1965 the Ministry directed that DCs should be members of councils and should sit on the Finance and General Purposes Committee and also on any contracts committees or tender boards (see Murang'a CC, Minute F&GP 4 of 1965). In the same year it was announced that the Provincial Administration would take over the collection of Graduated Personal Tax, which accounted for roughly a quarter of council revenue (East African Standard, 7 May 1965).

In 1966, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President (who is the head of the civil service as well as being the officer directly responsible for the Provincial Administration) proposed a number of changes to the Commission of Enquiry into Local Government. Emphasising that "local government must be seen as an extension of the executive machinery of the central government" and that people looked to the Provincial Administration as a "benevolent authority", he proposed that DCs should become the chairmen of CC and Area Council finance committees for five years as "an interim training measure", and that the power to approve council estimates should be delegated to PCs as "the man-on-the-spot was in a better position to judge the quality of the estimates" (East African Standard, 23 July 1966).

The Commission did not support these proposals, but in its Sessional

Paper on the Commission's Report (No. 12 of 1967), it was announced that

> The Government proposes that the District Commissioner, as the Government represenative on the Council, shall be responsible for vetoing any new expenditure or project which has not received government approval. (p.7)

In December 1968, the Ministry of Local Government issued a circular (Circular No. 92 of 1968) purporting to give DCs a veto power over any council expenditure which was not in the approved budget, or which was not "in the opinion of the District Commissioner, in accordance with the priority the expenditure deserves" (quoted in Stren 1969: 13). It does not appear that there was any legal basis for this directive, since the government inserted a clause in the Local Government (Amendment) Bill 1970 to give DCs this power. The Assistant Minister moving the bill referred to the Sessional Paper and added "the district commissioners were given powers to go ahead with this in 1968 and this clause now brings the legal backing to the circular which was sent out in 1968" (NAOR, 27 May 1970, col. 1167 - emphasis added). This clause, however, provoked opposition from MPs and was dropped from the bill in the committee stage (NAOR, 16 July 1970, col.2642). It is not clear whether any DCs did in fact use this veto (or the threat of its use) over any council, either before or after the discussion of the bill in parliament, but it did mark a further stage in the erosion of the formal autonomy of the councils,

Despite all these controls, however, the central government found itself unable to make the behaviour of the county councils conform to its own image of local government. In particular, it was unable to prevent the "financial irresponsibility" which led to constantly expanding expenditure and constantly expanding deficits on the part of the councils, which therefore continually pressed the centre for additional funds (see below, chapter nine). Its eventual response, in October 1969, was to transfer to the relevent ministries of the central government the three major functions of the county councils - primary education, rural health services, and secondary roads - and their two main sources of internal revenue, GPT and school fees.

When this transfer was completed in July 1970, the county councils were left distinctly top-heavy: they had their full complement of administrative staff, but few functions to perform. At the time, it was announced that the government would take over the services "until such time as the counties can be strengthened to take back these serves" (NAOR, 4 November 1969, col.1437), but in January 1974 there was still no evidence of any government intention to restore the services to the councils. Rather, other moves, such as the establishment of nominated District Education Boards and proposals for increased non-official representation on the District Development Committees, suggest that the government intends to build up other structures of representation at district level. Some councils, such as the Murang'a CC, responded to the transfer of functions by withdrawing to themselves the powers delegated to the area councils, and by bringing under council supervision certain self-help activities such as nursery schools and youth centres. Others have lapsed into relative inactivity, with salaries and administrative costs absorbing nearly half their revenue. The Minister for Local Government announced at the end of 1970 that location councils would be revived to replace the area councils (East African Standard, 12 December 1970), but two years later it was still not clear to what extent this had been done, or what form the new councils would take.

The main instrument of the extension of central control over local institutions, however, has not been central penetration of the subordinate levels of government, but the strengthening of its own agency, the Provincial Administration. Mention has already been made of the refusal of the government to relinquish effective control of the Provincial Administration to the regions. With the abolition of the majimbo constitution, the Provincial Administration reverted to the colonial pattern in a number of significant respects. It was transferred from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Office of the President (the successor to the central secretariat of the colonial government), and PCs and DCs were designated the direct representatives of the President in their areas, with a general responsibility for all the operations of government in their areas. The Office of the President defined their roles in these terms:

> The Provincial Commissioner is responsible, on behalf of the President, for the progress and welfare of all people within his Province, for the performance and good government of his Province and for the co-ordination of all public services within his area of jurisdiction. He is, in the widest sense of the term, the Head of the Administration and, in each district, the District Commissioner exercises similar responsibilities under his general supervision and control. (quoted in Gertzel et al.1969: 367)

The restored status of the Provincial Administration was symbolized by a return to the former titles (PC, DC and DO), by a new emphasis on official dress and ceremonial, and by the flying of an official pennant (later, the national flag) on PC's cars (Gertzel 1966: 204; see also MayoSSmith 1970 for a Nigerian perspective on the Kenyan administration). But there were much more significant extensions of its role. In 1965 the PCs and DCs resumed the chairmanships of the provincial and district Security and Intelligence Committees by virtue of their general responsibility for law and order; the police became subject to the Administration in respect of law and order (they remained responsible to the Attorney-General in respect of the detection of crime - Gertzel 1966: 205 n.17), and the Administration acquired the power to license (or refuse to license) all public meetings. In March 1965 the Administration resumed responsibility for the collection of GPT. Finally, Administration officers occupied critical positions in the governmental machinery for allocating public resources and economic opportunities to individuals.

> ... the Administration continued to perform a number of functions on an agency basis for other ministries, including price control, tenders, and a widevariety of land transactions. ... Officers also became chairmen of a number of important committees at district and provincial level, including Divisional Land Boards, and Provincial Appeal Committees, which together dealt with all transfers of land; District Settlemnt Committees which selected settlers for the new settlement-schemes in each district; Provincial Agriculture Boards and District Agriculture Committees which carried important statutory responsibilities under the Agriculture Act; Joint Trade Loans Boards, which made recommendations to the Minister for Commerce and Industry on locals to small traders and businessmen. (Gertzel 1970b: 240-1)

This represented a substantial change from the KANU platform of 1960, which had declared that "the 'agents of indirect rule', the Provincial Commissioners and the DC's and chiefs had to go" (East African Standard, 19 November 1960). But the government had already rejected one possible structure of generalist administration - delegation of functions to local authorities - in its opposition to majimbo. (It was made clear that county councils as well as the regions were to be subordinate to the centre.) At this time, Tanzania was attempting to build up the party, in place of the administration, as the main link between government and people, but this option had little appeal for the new Kenya government. KANU had been created to mobilise support for independence, not to shape the post-independence state, as Mboya, its first Secretary-General, explained (1963: 61):

> For the effective struggle against colonialism and for the work of economic reconstruction after Independence, it has come to be accepted that you need a nationalist movement. I use these words advisedly, as opposed to a political party. A nationalist movement should mean the mobilization of all available groups of people in the country for the single struggle. This mobilization is based on a simplification of the struggle into certain slogans and into one distinct idea, which everyone can understand without arguing about the details of policy or of governmental programme after Independence.

Consequently, once independence was achieved, the role of the party was unclear, and the possibility of using it to pursue particular programmes became more remote when it absorbed the former opposition party and became, in effect, am umbrella organization encompassing virtually all the political elite. A school for party cadres, the Lumumba Institute, was opened at the end of 1964 but was suppressed the following year because of its left-wing orientation (Gertzel 1970: 63-4). The party, which had been in existence for less than three years at independence, "existed more in name than in organization" (Hyden and Leys 1972: 393).

> For two years no meetings were called of the national executive or of the Governing Council. ... After the Kiambu conference /at which the party was formed/ there was no further elections. Branches in most parts of the country were allowed to die. ... Membership was not recruited, membership dues were not collected. (Odinga 1967: 271).

Almost the sole remaining function of the party was to provide a set of symbols - party posts at the district level and below - which served as prizes in local factional struggles.

The Government was content for this to happen because it had an alternative political structure available in the form of the Provincial Administration. It fell back, therefore, on both the structure and the values of colonial administration. In its submission to the Local Government Commission of Inquiry in 1966, the Office of the President articulated the classical case for paternalist administration.

> To many of us Government is associated with multi-storied office blocks, electronic computors, drawing boards and statistics, but over 80% of the population lives in rural areas. The majority of these people pursue their traditional way of life untouched by the professional institutions and apparatus of modern government. They look to the Government for personal protection, and also with a definite hope for a better future for themselves and, more particularly, for their children. Government to them is a simple concept of benevolent authority. It is asking them too much to understand the intricacies of the modern Government machine with its functionally distinct Ministries, its para-statal bodies, its sectoral experts and the rest. To meet the needs of these people effectively, Government must be personalized in one individual who is easily accessible sympathetic, understanding and authoritative. Their greatest need is for someone to listen to and help alleviate their grievances and arbitrate in their disputes. It is this concept of the role of Government which the Provincial Administration is designed to satisfy. (quoted in Gertzel et al. 1969: 365)

The Provincial Administration, then, is seen as an omnicompetent link between the government and its people: it controls both the carrot of government resources and the stick of government coercion, and the peasants consequently form a relationship of dependence with it. For this reason, it can equally represent local demands at the centre, and impose central demands on the locality.

The Administration achieves this control largely through the chiefs: DOs, who are the immediate superiors of the chiefs, and relatively junior officers, and are rotated with great frequency: Brokensha and Nellis found that the average length of posting for DOs in the Mbere Division of Embu District between 1966 and 1971 was six months (1971: 9).

DOs also depend on chiefs for much of the legal authority (under the *Chiefs Authority Act*) for their actions (Ragui 1972: 184). There had been considerable friction between chiefs and nationalists in the 1950's, and in January 1964 205 of the 423 chiefs were replaced (Odinga 1967: 242 n.1), their successors being chosen by a process which included short-listing by a committee of Administration staff and local political leaders, open voting on the three candidates at a public *baraza* (meeting), and ratification of the public choice by the Office of the President (Gertzel *et al.* 1969: 374-5). This caused a certain amount of friction within the Administration: the "party activists" chosen under the new procedures "could not meet the expectations of the K.I.A. /Kenya Institute of Administration/ trained bureaucrats". A chief had to be "of a character that would be able to adjust quickly to the norms of the civil service without necessarily causing a lot of trouble to the people and to the new government" (Ita 1972: 61). A greater cause of concern to the government was the implications for this selection process of the emergence of the Kenya People's Union as a formal opposition party: the Attorney-General told the National Assembly:

> Of course, the KPU are in opposition to the Government and, therefore, if a chief is elected by the people in a predominantly KPU area, he is bound to oppose the policies of the Government. (NAOR, 31 May 1968, col. 324)

The Attorney-General's statement appeared to imply that the election method had been retained in non-KPU areas (and he admitted to some confusion on this point: see col.325), but this does not seem to have been the cause (see NAOR, 7 November 1967, cols 1797-1800 and Brokensha and Nellis 1971: 19-20).

The functions of the chief are extensive, though how extensive often depends largely on such local factors as the personality of the chief in question and the sort of relationship he develops with both his constituents and his administrative superiors. A chief has a wide range of formal powers under the Chiefs Authority Act, a general authority to "maintain order" being supplemented by specific powers to issue orders under twenty-seven separate headings. He is, in addition, chairman of the location tax assessment committee which determines if, and at what rate, a person shall pay GPT. But these formal powers are limited in two important ways. First the chief is no longer the sole representative of the location to the government, as he was when the Act was drafted, and MPs in particular are able to intervene at the centre to check the actions of a chief; post-independence political change "has weakened chiefs support not only from the people and the politicians but also from the top executives (i.e. senior government officials) - which is /the/ major source of their formal authority" (Ita 1972: 66). Secondly, a chief has many functions - tax collection, enforcement of rules in agriculture and health, promoting development projects, representing his constituents to higher authority, and others - and the performance of one may conflict with the performance of another. A chief engaged in a tax drive may find it necessary to relax his enforcement of agricultural and health rules - i.e. there is a trade-off between different functions. As Ita (an ex-councillor and an ex-chief) puts it (1972: 67):

> The possible success in one role function depends on the extent to which chiefs can afford to abandon temporarily and safely the other interconnected role functions. This interconnection of their role functions is a critical source of their informal powers, which in turn determine not only the area /in/ which they are capable of manoeuvres but also their success limits in any one role function.

Because of this multiplicity of functions, a chief's effective power depends on his ability to manipulate his different roles to secure the maximum fulfilment of the expectations different groups and individuals have of him. In 1973 GPT was abolished, thus removing one particularly contentious function of the chief, but at the same time there is constant pressure on him to "promote development" by starting "self-help" projects (e.g. "The DC for Machakos ... said that sub-chiefs, like all other civil servants, were the sole guiding stars of the public in initiating self-help projects in their sub-locations " - East African Standard, 6 October 1970). There is a tendency, therefore, for "self-help" collections to assume the nature of a tax, collected through the accustomed administrative procedures (see chapter five).

### (b) The declining role of representative institutions

This theme covers two broad trends: the stifling of partly politics, and the declining importance of representative bodies *per se*. The decline of the party had begun with the KANU/KADU merger of 1964, which has already been mentioned. This was, in a way, the end of the intra-elite struggle that had preceded independence. Politicians had organized their followings into parties which were more concerned with supporting a particular coalition of leaders than implementing particular policies. The issue of *majimbo* had been raised to give one of these parties an advantage over the other, and this divided them, but once the possibility of effective regions had been thwarted, there was little in the way of policy or programme to distinguish the two parties (Okumu 1968: 14). Individual KADU MPs saw the unprofitability of opposition, and had already begun to defect: Ngala chose to bring the rest of the party over while there was still some political mileage to be gained from such action. The party as an organisation decayed (see p.106) and came to be little more than an umbrella encompassing all political activities. The basic statement of government policy, the sessional paper on African Socialism (see p. 97) did not emerge from the party, but originated as a Tresury internal paper and was written by an expatriate economist. (Hayter 1971).

This trend was challenged by the emergence of a radical group within KANU centred around Odinga. It voiced "more radical, populist policies" (Hyden and Leys 1972: 393), calling for former settler land to be distributed free (rather than sold with the assistance of government loans) and more equally, for the implementation of the KANU pledge to provide free primary education, and for the nationalizing of foreign-owned industry. They met oppostion on both personal and ideological grounds, and in March 1966, the leaders of this group were removed from their party positions by "a carefully planned coup within the party" (Hyden and Leys 1972: 394), and resigned from KANU to lead the newly-formed Kenya People's Union. The thirty MPs (ten Senators and twenty MHR's) who resigned fell into three groups: the radicals, who were primarily motivated by opposition to the policies of the government; Central Nyanza MPs who for personal and ethnic considerations felt the need to move with Odinga; and a number representing highly underdeveloped areas (such as North-Eastern Province) who were voicing their dissatisfaction with the failure of the government to promote "development" in their areas but were not fundamentally opposed to the government ideologically (and subsequently attempted to rejoin KANU) (Gertzel 1970: 73-5).

The government response to the KPU was first, to rush through parliament a constitutional amendment requiring MPs who resign from the party under whose sponsorship they were elected to resign their seats (see Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 320-3 for a careful analysis of the implications of this provision). Twenty-nine of the KPU MPs then stood for re-election in a series of by-elections which was termed the Little General Election. KPU polled a majority of the votes in a low poll (33%) but won only nine seats (six in the House and two in the Senate), six of them in Central Nyanza (Gertzel 1970a: 83). Government harassment of KPU continued: a further constitutional amendment gave the President powers of detention without trial, under which a number of KPU activists were detained (Hyden and Leys 1972: 394), and the Provincial Administration refused to issue licenses for KPU meetings (Gertzel 1970: 147). In the nationwide local government elections scheduled for August 1968, all the KPU nominations (except for six town seats in Lamu) were disqualified by the Returning Officers (i.e. the DCs) on technical grounds (Gertzel 1970a: 166). Political tension increased: there was a revival of oathing among the Kikuyu; in July 1969 Mboya was murdered in Nairobi; and in October the presidential bodyguard opened fire on a hostile crowd in Kisumu: at least ten people were killed and seventy wounded (Hyden and Leys 1972: 395). Shortly after this, KPU was banned and its leaders (including Odinga) detained. Kenya was once more a one-party state, and has remained so since.

There remained the parliamentary elections. As they approached, there was a resurgence of activity in KANU, and conflict between local factions over nominations (leading to violence on several occasions) was so intense that the government yielded to demands for primary elections. Backbenchers, "concerned mainly to ensure that the /electoral/ rules did not permit party leaders effectively to defeat the object of primary elections by controlling who could stand as candidates"

(Hyden and Leys 1972: 395) ensured that few restrictions were placed on nomination; the main one being that candidates had to have been party members for at least six months. This clause was designed to exclude the KPU leaders, but Bildad Kaggia, the former KPU Vice-President and the KPU's only Kikuyu leader of any standing, was excluded from its operation by presidential dispensation (though he failed to gain election). In the end, only 5 of the 616 prospective candidates were excluded as failing to comply with the rules (Hyden and Leys 1972: 395-6). KANU itself was clearly incapable of organizing the primaries, and the task was undertaken by the Provincial Administration on the basis of the national electoral registrar; the party primaries thus became, in effect, "quasi-general elections". The results of the elections (in which 77 of the 143 sitting members, including 5 ministers and 14 assistant ministers, lost their seats) are not of direct relevance here, but one point should be noted about their effect on the party system. The inability of party leaders to resist backbench demands for primary elections and few restrictions on nominations meant that the party could not function as a patronage machine for allocating parliamentary office, and the return to it of some former KPU members weakened its ability to pursue a specific programme. It remained an umbrella organisation, and after the elections reverted to the dormant state it had been in before the formation of KPU.

The erosion of the representative role in government can also be seen in the generally weak position of parliament in the Kenyan political system. To say this is not to imply that MPs are necessarily insignificant; as Hyden and Leys put it (1972: 398n) "the institution is weak even though the power and influence of an individual may be greatly enhanced by being elected to Parliament". Parliamentary control of the executive has been weakened in a number of ways, notably by rulings of the Speaker: e.g. that the actions of the President himself may not be criticized except on a substantive motion, and that the doctrine of collective responsibility forbids motions criticing the actions of a particular minister (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 242-5). Hence critics of government policy are presented with the choice of attempting to censure the government as a whole (which in effect means the President) or keeping quiet (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 243). As a censure of the government is generally unlikely in a one-party legislature, parliament is more of an irritant to the executive than a check on it.

Similarly, the executive has often been able to circumvent parliamentary control of expenditure. Overspending of budget votes rose from £137,000 in 1967/8 to £1m in 1968/9, £1.2m in 1969/70 and £2.6m in 1970/1 (EAS 12 February 1970, 18 February 1971, 29 March 1972). In June 1969 the government surreptitiously included gratuities for ministers and assistant ministers in the annual estimates; in the outcry that followed, the Speaker disclosed that such payments had already been made without parliamentary approval, and a coalition of KANU backbenchers and KPU members blocked consideration of the estimates until the provision for gratuities had been removed. The government introduced a bill to legalize such payments, retroactive to 1962 and paid at the discretion of the President; it added to it an increase in the retirment benefits payable to MPs, and the bill passed comfortably (Hakes 1970: 156-7).

This incident also illustrates a significant limitation on parliamentary control of legislation: the use of retroactive legislation to validate actions already taken by the government. Between independence and the middle of 1967, twenty-two Acts of Parliament were passed which were retroactive in whole or in part (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 305). On one such occasion, the Deputy Speaker's ruling demonstrated with unconscious irony the marginality of parliament in the governmental process.

> I think I might state quite clearly, Mr. Lubembe, that quite often governments do something administratively and then seek the permission of parliament to legalize it retrospectively. This is nothing very unusual although it may not be the nicest way of doing it; but it is done. ...
>
> That is why we are here today. We are here to try to legalize, legislatively, Acts that have been done administratively. That is perfectly in order. (NAOR, 22 March 1967, cols 1490-1)

This procedure even extends to constitutional change itself. The boundaries of the districts and provinces were entrenched in the Constitution in 1963, but this did not prevent the government from abolishing one district, splitting another in two and changing the boundary of a third; these actions, which had all been taken administratively, had no legislative sanction until 1968, when a constitutional amendment to remove the relevant sections from the constitution was passed, and a bill introduced to define the new boundaries (Gertzel 1970: 153-4).

Of course, the National Assembly does have to assent to all government legislation, and bills are often fiercely criticized, but on the whole criticism does not lead to amendment of proposed legislation. As Ghai and McAuslan note "Generally, when a substantial number of members are opposed to a measure, the Government induces them to vote for the measure even though they may continue to criticize it" (1970: 338). When a bill does run into parliamentary opposition, a private meeting of backbenchers is usually arranged (on occasions, debate in the Assembly has been adjourned to allow such meetings to take place), to allow differences to be resolved; at such meetings, "it is not always obvious who has made the concession" (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 337). The point about this sort of procedure, however, is not whether individual MPs do well or badly out of it, but what effect it has on the institution of parliament, and it would appear that parliament as such does not gain from it. Parliament as an institution is dominated by the government, which can usually count on a parliamentary majority for its legislation. Parliamentary procedure does create opportunities for backbenchers to obstruct legislation, but where such conflicts arise, they are usually settled outside the forms of parliament. On such occasions, the government is dealing with a small group of recalcitrant MPs rather than with the parliament as such, and the inducements held out to them are frequently extra-parliamentary: the government has wide coercive powers, even over MPs, and also considerable patronage at its disposal. Dissident MPs may also find themselves unable to obtain licences for public meetings (on "security" grounds). In August 1972, for instance, J.M. Kariuki, an Assistant Minister apparently out of favour with the government, was forbidden to go to Uganda to address students at Makerere University. The following January, he (along with two local MPs) was prevented from addressing a fund-raising meeting for a nursery school in South Nyanza, the prohibition being communicated to him a few minutes after his arrival at the school by the DO and "a number of policemen and Special Branch officials" (EAS, 25 August 1972; Daily Nation, 8 January 1973).

The MPs' vulnerability to government patronage emphasizes the weakness of their position. They are a small group of middle-level patrons, resentful of the superior wealth and power of the ministers and permanent secretaries, yet themselves highly privileged in relation to the vast majority of Kenyans. They have, for the most part, no organizational base that would give them a secure hold on their positions (most sitting MPs were defeated in the 1969 elections) and depend on the ministers and permanent secretaries for the flow of benefits to their clients which will, they hope, preserve them in office. They are, therefore, junior and highly dependent members of the circle of central power and privilege. When one MP, attacking the provision of government cars for the private use of permanent secretaries, complained that the commission of enquiry which had recommended this step "was composed of mainly those people in the country known as 'donge kubwa' /'big money'/ people", the Minister of Finance and Planning was able to warn: "'donge kubwa' people must, then, include members of parliament" (NAOR, 21 October 1971, cols 1485-6). MPs are therefore usually careful not to push their opposition too far, and seek to use it to extract concessions from the government while conceding the passage of the legislation in question, so that their opposition does not threaten the position of the government. Indeed, the position of the government is such that it cannot be threatened even by a general election; as Ghai and McAuslan point out of the 1969 elections:

> The elections were therefore not to provide for a new government: President Kenyatta was to continue as head of government, though individual Ministers might lose. (1970: 524)

The decline of the role of formal representative institutions can also be seen in the decay of formal consultative institutions at the district level. In 1965, it was announced that District Development Advisory Committees, with non-official representation, would be set up in each district. But while some meetings of MPs, local leaders and officials were held, they did not generally become institutionalized as regular committees. Officials complained that non-officials were parochial in their concerns and irregular in their attendance; non-officials that they were given insufficient information to make a meaningful contribution, and that as the committees had no decision-making powers their attendance was a waste of time (see Oyugi 1969: 267-8). Neither the DDACs or the local authorities were involved in the 1967 revision of the Development Plan (Gertzel 1969b: 250), and the DDACs became moribund in most areas: the Ndegwa Commission, in recommending the appointment of non-officials to the all-official District Development Committees (1971: 117-18), appeared to be unaware even of the existence of the DDACs.

To say that formal representative institutions have declined in importance is not to imply that no representation takes place, or that formal representatives are unimportant in the process of representation: on the contrary, it will be shown that there is a great deal of representation, and that formal representatives play a significant part in this process. But there are a number of important differences between representation within a formal, recognized government structure and representation outside it. For instance, the sort of representation that takes place when an MP voices a demand for a health centre in his constituency at a meeting of a district-level planning committee is significantly different from that which takes place when he calls on an old school friend in the Ministry of Health to put the same demand. More will be said on this subject in later chapters: it is sufficient here to draw attention to the distinction.

## (c) The broadening of governmental authority

The third main theme - the extension of central government authority over formally non-governmental bodies - covers a wide range of interactions, from the incorporation of community self-help projects into the government machine to the intervention of the Provincial Administration in a factional dispute in the Football Association of Kenya. I will deal here only with two particularly important area of activity: the trade unions and the cooperatives.

The trade unions had been subject to relatively tight tentral government control in the colonial period, and this machinery of control was continued after independence. Moreover, at independence, a number of trade union leaders received government office, and many others aspired to it. Mboya was for a time simultaneously Minister for Labour and General Secretary of the Kenya Feneration of Labour (in the KANU/KADU coalition government), and the proposal that the KFL should sponsor its own parliamentary candidates lapsed after pressure from Mboya, who also promised (as KANU Secretary-General) that several "unruly" union leaders would receive the KANU nomination in their own constituencies (Sandbrook 1970: 278-9).

This inter-penetration of leadership meant that the government could exercise control over the unions through personal links as well as through legislation. Increasing government involvement in the unions was not solely a consequence of government initiatives: factional disputes within unions often led to appeals by faction leaders to powerful patrons in the government, who intervened in favour of their supporters. This in turn reduced the ability of the unions to resist further government controls on their activities. When trade union legislation was amended in 1964 to make it more difficult for dissident members to change union officials or register new unions, the position of incumbent officials was strengthened via-a-vis the dissidents, but unionists were unable to unite to resist further limitations on the right to strike, being divided among themselves and linked to their respective patrons in the government (Sandbrook 1970: 279-83). Further factional conflict between the KFL and a radical splinter group, the KAWC, led to presidential intervention, the dissolution of both bodies, and the formation of a new union organization, COTU, under much stricter government control, and to further limitations on the right to strike.

The basic relationship in this process was an exchange of benefits between the union leadership and the government: union leaders supported the government (e.g. by removing from their COTU offices those union leaders who joined the KPU), while the government supported the existing leadership within their unions (e.g. by the compulsory check-off not only of regular subscriptions, but also levies for special purposes (such as the construction of the KNUT offices) which have been approved by the Minister for Labour but not submitted for the approval of the union membership). The main aim of the government has been to ensure that strikes in the modern sector do not threaten the flow of foreign investment, and that trade unions should not become bases for political opposition to the government; it has largely succeeded in accomplishing these aims.

Similarly, the colonial machinery of government control over the cooperatives was taken over at independence and has been further strengthened since then. The government's general aim has been to protect society members against corrupt and incompetent management committees, but it has also been concerned to extend its control over the rural areas in the broader sense. Under the Co-operative Societies Act of 1966,

> The Commissioner of Cooperative Development is given powers of registration, dissolution and compulsory amalgamation over co-operative societies, power to supervise budgets, approve the hiring and dismissal of graded staff, and approve society byelaws and resolutions, to control financial transactions through the counter-signature of cheques and other instruments, and sundry other powers to ensure that cooperatives are run in an honest and efficient manner. Co-operatives are thoroughly integrated into the State marketing board system, and at the same time State and coθoperative control over individual farmers greatly extended, by the provisions allowing the Minister to require all producers of a particular crop to dispose of it through the co-operatives, provided only that the co-operatives in that area (or throughout the country) can show that their members produce not less than 60% of the crop. (Lamb 1971: 2)

These controls have been imposed through a formal hierarchy of cooperative officers and cooperative assistants, and also through the district cooperative unions, which the government is attempting to use as an instrument of policy (see Lamb 1974: 112-13). Both primary societies and cooperative unions are often seen as part of the government bureaucracy, and in fact often are (Lamb 1971: 7). What these formal provisions mean in terms of effective control is less clear-cut, because they involve the government cooperative officials in conflicts within the traders and richer peasants who are the government's strongest supporters in the rural areas and have a certain capacity for resisting bureaucratic controls. This capacity for resistance (see Lamb 1974: chapters 5 and 6 for an illustration) is probably one of the reasons why the government has been reluctant to allow much expansion of the number of the role of the cooperatives in recent years (Hyden 1973: 30-1). But while the government may have some difficulty in securing the implementation of its more detailed controls, it has sufficient control over the cooperatives to ensure that they cannot be used to mount an active challenge to the government's policies in rural areas.

Implications

This has been a long and varied background chapter, and it is difficult to draw formal conclusions from it, but in this section I want to draw out three themes of particular importance for the study as a whole: the importance of the relationship between local service provision and the state structure; the absence of a clear distinction between bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic roles; and the pervasiveness of state authority over a wide range of social and economic activity. I will conclude by discussing these themes in relation to self-help, which, I argue, is a very important aspect of both service provision and the operation of the governmental process in general.

Local service provision in Kenya has always been closely related to the state structure. The pattern of service received by settlers in the White Highlands - the type, the amount, and the relationships through which it was provided - reflected their relationship with the state structure. The entirely different type of service received by Africans (and the distinction here between Africans in the Reserves and those in the White Highlands )reflected their relationship with the state. To say this is not merely to suggest that some groups or areas may be politically favoured as against others; it is to emphasize that the pattern of local services is not simply the outgrowth of some inherent "local" characteristic, but a reflection of political relationships. For the settler, services were obtained through the close interaction of settler leaders and government officials. For the African, services were obtained by entering into a relationship of dependence with government officials or missionaries. The majimbo constitution was an attempt to change the underlying political structure of service provision-in particular, to weaken the power of the central government -

and was designed with political, rather than service, criteria in mind. Since independence, the policy debate has been conducted as much in terms of state structure - e.g. the need for overriding central control - as of the specific needs of service organization.

The distinction between "bureaucratic" and "non-bureaucratic" (particularly political) roles has always been hard to draw in Kenya: it implies constitutional tradition, with Weberian notions of bureaucracy, which has had little application in Kenya at any stage. In the colonial period, settlers served as government officials, and officials became settlers: chiefs were appointed to exercise political control over their locations, not simply to apply bureaucratic directives; where representative institutions for Africans were established, they were seen as an extension of the government control structure, not as a check upon it. The subsequent development of formally "political" roles (e.g. MPs and county councillors) has tended to obscure the situation, since it tends to convey the implication that the occupants of these roles are engaged in "political"/"decision-making" functions while others (i.e. officials) are engaged in "bureaucratic"/"decision-implementation" functions. But in fact there is so much "overlap" over any matter of any significance that a distinction in these terms becomes inappropriate. What we are concerned with is a single structure of control, very much concerned with the detail as well as the broad outlines of govermental operations, in which different types of political actor compete for a place, drawing in differing ways on a wide range of political resources - at the district level, for instance, those would include the coercive power of the ~~chiefs and~~ police, powerful backing in Nairobi, the disposition of patronage (government and private) and the support of lower-level leaders who can (in the event of an election) "deliver the vote".

The pervasiveness of governmental authority can be seen from a number of angles. In its simplest form, it can be seen in the extent of the coercive powers with which the government is armed. For instance, no society (meaning no association of ten or more persons) can legally exist in Kenya without the permission of a state official, who has sweeping powers to refuse or cancel registration, and from whose decisions there is no appeal to the courts; these provisions have been used on a number of occasions to suppress possible organizational bases for dissent. And the District Officer, Maseno, was certainly correct in his perception of political realities when he told a baraza that "freedom of worship is granted within the Constituion, but this could be curtailed at any time when the Government deemed it necessary" (Daily Nation, 15 January 1972). The scope for control seems to increase as one goes down the administrative hierarchy, particularly by the use of the power to license meetings (see p. 116), and the chiefs and sub-chiefs have very broad scope for repression, both legal and illegal. What is more important, though, is the extent to which an individual's chances of economic advancement are usually dependent on the allocation of certain critical resources by government agencies: education, land, licences and loans. And in the case of the latter three, the allocations are channelled through the one agency: the Provincial Administration (see pp.69-70).

This wide spread of governmental power, coupled with the obvious weakness of representative institutions, leads Ghai and McAuslan to conclude:

> Kenya is becoming once again a bureaucratic state in which administrators, a term which here includes

> Ministers, take precedence over politicians, particularly MPs and local party officials. (1970: 513)

Only the term "bureaucratic state" is open to question here, and the ambiguity in the term is suggested by the authors themselves when they define it to include ministers who, however much they identify with the officials rather than the parliamentary sphere, can scarcely be called bureaucrats in the Weberian sense. Much attention is given to the increasing involvement of the Administration in "political" activities, but less to the involvement of politicians in the "bureaucratic" sphere; I have suggested above that the distinction has lost its descriptive value (though not its analytical value), and that instead of an insulated bureaucracy which is subordinated to the control of independent representative institutions, there is a single control structure in which officials and elected representatives compete for effective power. It may well be (and it would be difficult to make a precise assessment) that the officials have an advantage in this competition, but this still has rather different implications than the concept of the bureaucratic state.

One question left unanswered by the "bureaucratic state" type of analysis is why the Kenya government has been so concerned to extend its powers, unless the answer be that power begets the desire for more power. An alternative sort of analysis is implied by Colin Leys (1972) who argues that the state is attempting to create protected enclaves in which the emerging petty bourgeoisie can accumulate capital, and hence has extended its powers, particularly over importing and trade. Certainly the government ascribes great importance to the promotion of an African business class. In the course of an attack on his fellow ex-detainee Bildad Kaggia (then vice-president of KPU), Kenyatta dwelt on the farms and businesses that he and the other nationalist leaders had

acquired

since independence, and turning scornfully to Kaggia, said "What have you done for yourself?" (Odinga 1967: 310; for the converse of this denunciation of Kaggia see the article on the PC Rift Valley (formerly PC Coast) and his £100,000 tourist hotel near Mombasa - Sunday Nation, 19 December 1971). And "the state" is not limited to the central decision-makers: in January 1973, the PC Nyanza summoned all Kisumu bank managers to his office, demanded that they submit returns of the number of loans given to Africans, and warned that "stern and swift action" would be taken towards bank managers who "still showed a colonial attitude towards wananchi*" - much to the chagrin of the Central Bank of Kenya (Daily Nation, 5, 6 and 8 January 1973) Sunday Nation, 7 January 1973 and EAS, 11 January 1973).

But the "monopolistic petty bourgeoisie" argument can also only be a partial explanation of the pattern of state power (and it must be said that it has not been put forward as a comprehensive explanation of this). Clearly, the extension of governmental power has been far greater than that needed to squeeze the Asians out of retail trade. At the same time, there is obviously a connection between the maintenance of tight political control, the requirement for the "stability" demanded by foreign investors, the limitation of trade union activity, and the creation of opportunities for Africans to find a niche in petty trade under the shadow of the foreign investor - so that to some extent, the concentration of political power was a necessary part of the broader strategy based on the acceptance of massive foreign investment. But the interplay between this sort of pressure, and that springing from the desire of the government to bring those formally outside its authority into relationships of dependence with it, cannot be fully discussed here.

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* "the people": here it means Africans, as opposed to citizen Asians.

The operation of these three themes can be seen in the type of activity loosely called "self-help". This subject will be examined further in subsequent chapters, and I intend here only to extract those aspects of it that are relevant to the present discussion. First, although the initial approval of self-help drew on the themes of community development (see Schaffer 1969: 203-6) and stressed the need for the local community to mobilise its own resources to meet local needs, independently of the government, it is generally seen as being very closely linked to the distribution of government services, and it is used by its promoters as a lever on government agencies. As the Acting DC Kakamega told a gathering of chiefs, "those who initiated more self-help projects stood better chances of receiving aid from the Government (EAS, 24 December 1971). One sub-chief explained to me why it was better for his area to have an incomplete self-help health centre, and incomplete self-help cattle dip, and an incomplete self-help classroom at the primary school, than for people to have completed any one of these projects. Had they done so, he explained, they would have only one of these facilities, and would have met the entire costs themselves; as it was, they had three chances of attracting government resources. Self-help, in other words, is a response to the rules of clientelist politics, and initiating a project is a way of making a claim on the central government. Holmquist, in his study of self-help cattle dips in Kisii, has termed this process "pre-emptive development" (1970). Its aim is to influence the way in which the central government disposes of its resources, and it is based on a fairly accurate perception of the way the government does this. It is now official policy, for instance, that except in the 'education-resistant' pastoral areas, all expansion of government secondary schools will be accomplished by taking over existing self-help schools rather than building new ones; the building of a self-help school has, therefore, become an essential step in the process of application for a government one.

Secondly, although the rhetoric of self-help stresses that it is the people, rather than government officials, who take the decisions, the close involvement of the Administration and the Community Development (CD) staff make this distinction hard to sustain. As Ragui (1972: 185-6) points out:

> Today, one of the roles expected of the District Officer is that of initiating self-help projects of various kinds, e.g. village water supplies, rural dispensaries, cattle dips and village schools. This role places him in a position of leadership in the community development programme.

The same applies to chiefs (see p. 110 ), and CD staff in most areas spend the bulk of their time promoting and organizing self-help projects. This cannot be seen, however, as a simple extension of bureaucratic control, since the relationship is less bureaucratic than political, less one of control than of negotiation, manipulation and compromise. Although the official does usually dominate this relationship (particularly when he is the chief), self-help does involve a considerable sharing of authority with non-officials, and in this process, the role distinction between the "bureaucratic" official and the "political" non-official becomes almost impossible to make.

From this it can also be seen that self-help involves a considerable extension of governmental authority into formally non-governmental spheres. All self-help projects have to be registered by government officials, and no money can be collected without an official licence; and as mentioned above, projects are monitored by Administration and CD staff. (It should also be pointed out that, as indicated above, the extension of governmental authority in this way can also mean its dilution as the officials involved reach accommodations with local leaders.) And the increasing tendency for self-help contributions to be collected by chiefs and to be regarded as compulsory represents, in fact, the extraction of private resources for what are formally non-governmental purposes by the coercive machinery of the Administration

The most elaborate self-help schemes are the projected institutes of technology. Fund-raising committees to promote these institutes are now being organized at the provincial and even the district level, and because they are so illustrative of the nature and possible uses of self-help they are worth examining briefly. The campaign for the N Murang'a College of Technology offers a good example, not because it is typical, but because in many respects it represents the fullest development of this trend. (For a discussion of the other institutes of technology, see King 1972, Godfrey and Mutiso 1973).

In Murang'a, the original proposal was generated in discussions between MPs and county councillors, though the Administration, and influential Murang'a men outside the district were soon brought in to the management of the campaign. (In some other cases, such as the Coast Institute of Technology, the initiative appears to have come from, and most of the control to lie with, the PC.) Funds are raised in a number of ways. The Kenyan subsidiary of British American Tobacco donated shs.200,000/= through their chairman, Mr. Gecaga, who is also chairman of the college committee (King 1972: 182-3). Shs.500 ,000/=

was extracted from the coffee-growers of the district in ways which will be discussed in more detail below.

But one of the most illuminating methods of fund-raising is a system of informal taxation which runs parallel to the formal tax structure. A levy is imposed on all forms of business licence issued by the county council, in accordance with a fixed scale posted outside the cashier's office: shs.200/= for a bus, shs.150/= for a lorry, shs.100/= for a shop, etc. The levy is collected by the council revenue clerks when the licence is issued or renewed and the scale of charges indicates that similar levies apply to licences issued by the DC's office, and that levies have been made on school committees at all levels and on all registered self-help groups. Finally, a poll tax of shs.10/= for men and shs.5/= for women is collected by chiefs from all adults who have not otherwise contributed. It is not clear exactly how much revenue has been raised in this way, but the significant thing is that an almost completely extra-legal system of taxation has been imposed on the district with little public protest. (See, for instance, the letters to the East African Standard by P.Z. Shah and B.K. Waweru, 8 and 14 July 1972, for evidence of a similar system operating in Kiambu.)

The point here is not that the College of Technology is a more popular cause than GPT - it clearly is - but that when the whole established leadership is united on such an issue, people have little alternative but to pay up. As Ita has pointed out (1972: 66-7), a chief who pressed his people hard for GPT payments might find his position undermined by the local MP pressing for a more lenient attitude. But in the case of the College of Technology this sanction of transferring support to another leader does not exist, since all possible representatives to whom appeal could be made are involved in the campaign.

And this illustrates the way these three themes come together in the structures of power that are emerging in Kenya. The campaign for the College brings together officials and local notables at various levels in a new type of political structure which both unites them against possible challenge from below, and at the same time relates them to the central core of state power in a way which, in its comprehensiveness and its fluidity, is more closely geared to the realities of present-day political relationships in Kenya than the formal, distinct institutions of the post-independence years: the District Team, the District Development Committee, and the County Council.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## METHODS AND FIELDWORK

This chapter is an account of the approach I have taken to the subject, and the ways in which I collected my information. It is not about "methodology" in the strict sense of the word - i.e. the construction of a logical framework which can be applied to this or any comparable set of data - but is a brief outline of the choices I faced in making this analysis, and the responses I made to them.

The first step was to define the scope of the study and to determine which services were to be covered. Given that only three services were effected by the transfer of functions, there seemed little point in trying to make a selection within that category, and so all three services were included, but I had also to consider whether another major rural service, such as agriculture, should also be included. While there would have been some advantage in this, it did not, in the end, seem practicable: Agriculture is a vast and relatively diverse ministry (as compared, for instance, to Education, which is equally large but provides a much narrower range of services), and it could only be included in the study if one of the other services were excluded. As the possible advantages to be gained from including a non-transferred service would be more than outweighed by the exclusion of one of the transferred services, I decided to leave the study limited to the three latter services.

Even with the study thus limited, there remained formidable problems of selection. The services themselves encompassed three major ministries, with two other ministries (Local Government and the Office of the President) also playing a significant role, thirty-three county councils, and a number of non-government service agencies; there was, moreover, a wide range of political relationships with an obvious bearing on service provision. There was a need for further selection, on two dimensions.

First, I considered it essential to focus on particular points within the service hierarchy. The ministries themselves have long channels of communication from the Minister down to the actual service point; important decision are taken at national, provincial and district levels; and the actual provision of the service usually occurs well below the district level. I decided to focus on the district level itself, for a number of reasons. It had, in most cases, been the unit of organization in the county council period, and has remained so since; the exceptions (such as roads since the transfer of functions) could be handled as exceptions. Secondly, it was fairly closely linked to the structure of political representation: the district had become the main unit of political organization during the Emergency, and informal political structures were still particularly strong at this level. Thirdly, it is a pivotal point in the service structure, close enough to the actual level of service provision to be relatively well-informed of detail, but sufficiently high in the ministry hierarchy to be relatively well-informed on policy. The district is also the level at which the centrally-oriented and locally-oriented sections of the service structure intersect: e.g. where the District Education Officer, the Ministry's man in the field, meets the district-oriented teaching force, whose members are usually serving in their home areas and do not expect to serve outside it in the course of their careers (see below, chapter five). My approach was therefore to focus on the service structure at the district level, supplementing the information gained at that level with sample "digs" in selected locations, and with a general appreciation of the main policies and organizational concerns of the ministries at the centre. The main gap in this approach was the provincial level, but I made a point of interviewing the provincial departmental heads of my sample districts, and do not feel that much information has escaped through this gap.

Secondly, there was a need for selection of particular areas for study. The thirty-three county councils covered thirty-nine districts, with wide geographical, social and economic variations between them. If information beyond the superficial was to be gained, a smalllnumber of districts had to be selected as case studies, but this required the determination of criteria for such a selection. One possible course would have been to make a purely random selection (e.g. by the use of a table of random numbers), and generalise from the cases thus selected. But this would have been very hazardous given the small size of the sample: for instance, thirteen of the thirty-nine districts are wholly or largely pastoral, but they contain a very small proporation of the country's population. A 10% sample of the thirty-nine districts might have yielded two or even three pastoral districts in the fourt selected, and it would then have clearly been difficult to generalise solely on the basis of the statistical validity of the sample. And making the sample much larger (e.g. 25%) would detract from the aim of having an intensive study of a small number of districts. I thought it better, therefore, to make a deliberate selection of the case-study districts, informed by certain assumptions about the existence and relevance of certain types of variation between districts, and supported as much as possible by statistical data about these variations. It would not be possible to assert that such a sample was representative of rural Kenya as a whole, but it would be possible to say that given the basis on which it was constructed, there was no reason to suppose that the areas not included in the sample would exhibit a significantly different pattern.

The next step, therefore, was to identify appropriate criteria for the selection of the case-study areas. A number of possible criteria suggested themselves, but the first state in such a selection was to make explicit the sorts of variation which were felt to be significant in service operation, and in this context, my assumptions were that three types of variation were of primary relevance, and two were sufficiently relevant to justify bending the selection to accomodate them. Those of primary relevance were: (a) the level of service already offered in an area; (b) the wealth of the area; and (c) the extent of the area's political influence at the centre. The variations of secondary relevance were (d) those between agricultural and pastoral areas, and (e) those between different administrative provinces per se (i.e. quite apart from ecological or socio-economic differences between provinces).

These criteria suggested the choice of a number of paired examples: an area relatively well-provided with services and one relatively poorly-provided; a relatively wealthy area and a relatively poor one; and an area with a high degree of influence at the centre and one with relatively little influence. The secondary criteria could be held as safeguards: i.e. to ensure that the districts selected came from different provinces, and that both pastoral and agricultural districts were represented in the sample. With this end in mind I constructed some crude indices of service provision from the data in the regional physical development plans prepared by the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, and made some rough assessments of relative wealth and influence (necessarily fairly impressionistic).

In practice, these different types of variation tended to coincide with one another. The statistical indices of service provision suggested that districts fell into three broad categories: a small group of districts, mostly in Central Province, with uniformly high services, a larger group of districts with mixed to low levels of provision, and a smaller group of districts, mostly pastoral, with uniformly low levels of provision. The other types of variation reinforced this pattern: the well-served districts were all relatively wealthy and relatively influential compared with the others. (It was more difficult to assess these latter variations precisely, but the general trend was quite clear.)

Before making the final selection, I excluded from consideration several areas which might be considered atypical for specific reasons. North-Eastern Province was excluded on the grounds that it is so marginal in political, social and economic terms that the relevance of its experience for the rest of the country might be questioned. Similarly, Coast Province was excluded on the grounds that it is frequently argued that the cultural and religious differences between the coast and the hinterland make it a special case. Both of these areas would have warranted inclusion in a larger study (say six or eight districts) for these very reasons, but it was difficult to justify their inclusion in a sample of three or four. Finally, Kiambu was excluded on the grounds that its position is a peri-urban district (parts of which are becoming in effect commuter suburbs of Nairobi), and is a particularly powerful district in political terms (it is the home area of the President and of several senior ministers); both factors make it atypical of rural Kenya.

I then selected three districts for the case studies: Murang'a in Central Province (high service, high wealth, high influence, agricultural), South Nyanza in Nyanza Province (mixed to low service, low wealth, low influence, agricultural), and West Pokot in Rift Valley Province (low service, low wealth, low influence, pastoral).

In looking for information, I focussed mainly on two levels: the national, and the district. At the national level I sought statistical information on service distribution and expenditure, information on national policies on service questions, and a general perspective on the problems of service provision as seen from the centre, and the strategies and procedures adopted by central agencies to deal with these. This information was collected in two ways: by a perusal of the published record - annual reports, development plans, parliamentary statements and items in the press -

and by interviewing senior officials in the ministries. Most of this was done either before I went to Kenya or in my first two months there, although I did carry out further interviews in Nairobi (notably in the Ministry of Works) in the light of the data thrown up by the case studies.

At the district level I tried to establish first the operating procedures and routines in the services, and then to pursue particular issues in service provision, either because they were intrinsically important in terms of service structure ( e.g. questions of staffing and staff control), or because they had become points of strain or pressure within the service structure, usually between the officials and the clients (e.g. questions of procedures for expansion and the location of new facilities). A knowledge of which issues fell into this category was derived from my coverage of the press, parliamentary debates and council minutes, and from the interviews themselves.

Some information could be gleaned from printed sources - annual reports, council minutes, and various categories of governmental documentation - and this was done wherever possible. In general, I did not seek access to files (though I did read those that were specifically offered to me in discussions with officials), as in general they tend to absorb a great deal of time and to disperse one's attention among a number of subjects rather than concentrate it on particularly critical ones; moreover, unless the great bulk of all transactions in any procedure are recorded on paper and filed (which, I gained the impression, is seldom the case), the file may give a misleading impression. Most information, therefore, was gained from interviews. At the district level, I interviewed service officials, and also relevant officials from other ministries (such as the DC and the Community Development Officer), officers and officials connected with the Special Rural Development Programme in South Nyanza and West Pokot. I had intended to interview MPs, but it was often difficult to contact them, especially where (as was often the case) they lived in Nairobi rather than in the constituency, and I had to supplement direct interviews with information (possibly more accurate) on the MP's role on the service process from other participants.

I then selected some sample locations from within the districts, working on similar lines to my original selection of districts; I tried to make a selection that would include both more and less "advanced" areas, and also take account of any special circumstances (e.g. settlement in Murang'a, the Special Rural Development Programme in South Nyanza and West Pokot). Within these location I conducted more intensive interviews, first with the officials at both divisional and location level, and with the "service operators" - teachers, medical assistants, etc. - and then with various categories of representative: county and area councillors, and members of school committees and self-help group committees. The possibility of checking the opinions of those entirely without official connections was considered at some length, but any extensive investigation of this kind was judged impracticable; such people were suspicious of direct questioning by me, and I was wary of questionnaire-based research. On one occasion when the conditions were suitable I was able to interview a small sample of ordinary farmers, and their responses did not contradict the picture of service procedures I had gleaned from other sources. But it should be made clear that my sample is of those in or on the fringes of the service structure, and is not intended to be taken as a representative sample of rural society as such.

The interviews were all "structured" in that I prepared an outline before the interview so that the main topics on which I knew I wanted information were covered, and also so that people in comparable positions were all asked a common core of questions. But I felt free to vary this structure if the circumstances dictated it: e.g. I did not feel obliged to continue with a line of questioning if it was proving fruitless or an irritant. Wherever possible interviews were conducted directly, in English: all interviews with officials above the level of the chief, and a number of interviews with chiefs and councillors, were conducted in this way. All other interviews were conducted in the vernacular through my own interpreter. My interpreters were recrutied through the headmasters of local secondary schools, who were asked to recommend boys who were conscious of social implications as well as being bright; some were still at school, some had recently left; all had Form IV or above; none of them had much non-school experience except for one who had been a trade union organizer for several years. There are obvious problems involved in using intermediaries of any sort in gathering information and in interpreting it but there were no special problems in this case. Some interviews were tape-recorded, but in most cases I recorded a resumé of the main points (from notes taken during the interview) as soon as possible after the end of the interview. For this reason, there will be few direct quotations from interviews cited in the thesis.

The fieldwork took about twelve months in all, taken in two spells of roughly nine and three months each. Most of the data was gathered on the first field trip, which included three and a half months spent living in Murang'a, two months in South Nyanza and two weeks in West Pokot. On the second field trip all areas were re-visited for follow-up interviews, including a further two weeks spent in West Pokot. Further interviews were carried out in Nairobi and papers presented for discussion at the East African Universities Social Science Council Conference and the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# SERVICE PROVISION AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL

The aim of this chapter is to outline the empirical context within which the issues raised so far will be investigated. It begins with a re-statement of the central concerns of the study, and then tries to set out an analytical framework for making comparisons within the organizational structure - both between different services, or levels of the same service, and between different points in time for the same service. To do this, I set out three "organizing principles" of service provision which can be distinguished, and six aspects of the service process that are of particular importance for an understanding of the relationships involved; I then illustrate the application of the three organizing principles to the six aspects of the service process. Finally, I outline the organizational framework common to the three services, and sketch in some detail about the actors involved and the sort of links that exist between them.

## The central concerns of the study

The central concerns of this study, as posed in chapter one, are concerned with the relationship between the service and its environment: what is that relationship, how does it affect the operations of the service, and how does it relate to policy debates about local service provision and the theoretical analyses of the pattern of political change in Kenya? We are, therefore, concerned with questions of procedure and communication within the service: with the way in which the need for a service is determined, and the sort of service that it seen as appropriate to meeting that need; with the ways in which officials seek to deliver the service to its clients; and with the sort of interaction which takes place between persons occupying different roles in the structure - in particular, the relationships between service officials, clients and the various categories of intermediary. And secondly, we are concerned with the effect of the service in a fairly wide context: with the sort of benefits it brings and the way they are distributed, both between individuals and between geographical areas, and the significance of its provision within the broader relationship between government and people in rural areas.

## An Analytical framework

It should perhaps be stressed that this is an analytical framework: it is not put forward as a comprehensive framework for the analysis of the services in all situations, but simply as a means of dealing at a modest level of abstraction with some of the salient features of service operation in Kenya so that certain sorts of comparison may be made within and between services; in other words, it has grown out of the empirical material rather than out of a cohenerent set of theoretical propositions about service operation.

The notion of "organising principles" of service provision stemmed from the observation that much of the variation in service provision in Kenya seemed to be related to the existence of several quite different perceptions of what a service is supposed to be, each of which is associated with particularly types of organisational structure, patterns of service-client relationships, and implications for the wider political order. I distinguished three such principles in Kenya: the "applied science", the "government utility" and the "contracting machine".

In the "applied science" model, the service can be defined as the application for public purposes of a coherent body of scientific knowledge. The service task, and the appropriate measures to be taken to accomplish it, are defined by reference to this body of knowledge, and a knowledge of the science is the dominant criterion for the recruitment of service decision-makers. In the "government utility" model, the service can be defined as an authoritative intervention in the environment by agents of the government. Both the service task and the appropriate measures for accomplishing it are defined by reference to broad governmental goals (i.e. not necessarily confined to the particular tasks and needs of the service under consideration). Consequently, the relevant criteron for the recruitment of decision-makers is a knowledge of (and subordination to) the aims and policies of the government as a whole. Finally, in the "contracting machine" model, the service is defined as a response to demands from client groups, usually (but not necessarily) geographically-defined. The service task is defined as the establishment of a relationship which satisfies this demand, and the measures to be taken are determined in the light of this definition. The effective decision-making structure is to be found in the interaction between service officials and those who are accepted as the spokesmen for the interests demanding the service.

Three points of clarification need to be made. First, these organizing principles are all ideal types, and any actual service ~~organization will combine them in various mixtures. Secondly, they~~ represent the observer's model of reality, and do not necessarily correspond to those of the actors; decision-makers do not consciously decide to have an applied science service, for instance, and then allow all future decisions to be governed by this commitment. Thirdly, the value of these principles lies in their ability to clarify concepts rather than to explain relationships. They do not imply that because a service can be classed as following a particular type of organizing principle, therefore it will necessarily have some particular characteristic. The causal relationships involved here are complex, and it is sufficient for these purposes to note that particular sets of attributes tend to occur together and to be connected by links of mutual support, and that for these reasons they may be considered to be parts of a coherent organizing principle. For instance, in the applied science model, the service is defined in scientific terms and the key decision-makers are professionals qualified in that science. If there is a casual link here, it could be that the scientific definition of the service requires the recruitment of professionals to run it, or that the professional decision-makers cling to a highly scientific definition of the service to maximize their organizational autonomy, since laymen find it difficult to challenge such a definition. Interesting as this question is, we do not have to resolve it before we can link the scientific definition of service and the domination of decision-making by professionals as being two parts of the applied science organizing principle.

The three organising principles have been stated fairly baldly here because it is more fruitful to expand on them in the context of the second part of this analytical framework: the six aspects of the service process on which I intend to concentrate. These are (a) the formal organisation of the service structure; (b) the definition of the service, in the broad sense of the perceived need and the sort of action seen as appropriate to meet that need;

(c) the resource base of the service: where the resources come from, and how they are applied; (d) the pattern of staffing; (e) service delivery: the sort of service points or other means chosen to provide the service to its clients, their location and function, and the ways in which change takes place within the service point network; and (f) the relationships between service officials and others in the service structure - clients, other officials, formal representatives and other forms of intermediary. (This last aspect, which could be termed "the service agency in the service structure", is in some respects only the working out in detail of the questions implicit in the service definition, but it does go beyond this, and as will be seen, there are in any case a great many interconnections between these different aspects.)

These are not, of course, the only aspects of the services which could be considered - they do not include, for instance, a direct examination of organizational efficiency, which has been widely discussed in the policy debate - butthey are the ones which bear most closely on the issues with which we are concerned, and they will be used as foci for the consideration of first, the organising principles of service provision, and in subsequent chapters, for setting out the empirical material on the services themselves.

In terms of formal organization, the distinctions between these organizing principles relate less to questions of organizational structure, and more to the nature of organisational authority. With the applied science*, the dominant principle of authority is scientific knowledge: service roles are defined by reference to the possession of this knowledge (usually as measured by formal qualifications). Service professionals therefore tend to have the dominant voice in decision-making, sub-professional staff a subordinate one, and non-professional officials, intermediaries and clients tend to be limited to the role of applicant. In the government utility, the dominant principle is that of hierarchy: the subordination of service personnel to their organizational superiors irrespective of considerations of professional knowledge; in particular, this implies the subordination of professional officers to non-professionals concerned with the determination and implementation of broad governmental objectives as they affect the service. With the contracting machine, the dominant principle of authority is the need for mutually acceptable accommodations between officials and local spokesmen. (Strictly, spokesmen need not be geographically defined - i.e. local - but in the great majority of cases they are.) In other words, the pattern of authority implied in the formal structure may be overridden in the interests of securing such an accommodation. This applies both to relationships between the headquarters and local service administrators, and to relationships between the local administrator and the personnel actually delivering the service.

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* I will henceforth use the terms "applied science", "government utility" and "contracting machine" to refer to the ideal types described in this section.

The distinctions to be made in terms of service definition are very similar. In the applied science, the nature of the service is defined by professionals in terms of their scientific perception of the nature of the problem and the most technically effective means of dealing with it. In the government utility, professional advice would be taken, but decisions about service definition would be made in the light of other government objectives and preferences as well as technical factors. Here, the nature of the definition eventually reached would be less important to the government decision-maker than the way in which it was taken, his objective being to preserve the dominance of the political and administrative interests of the government over the claims of technical specialists. And whereas in the applied science, service officials have a monopoly of the relevant knowledge, in the government utility both officials and political representatives are involved, each promoting particular sorts of concerns as being government interests. Finally, in the contracting machine, the service is defined essentially by client demand as interpreted by the local groups with whom service officials negotiate. Officials are free to propose variations, but they will be incorporated into the service only if they are found acceptable by local spokesmen.

In terms of the resource pattern of the services, there is less distinction between the three ideal types than there is in some other aspects of service operation, but they do carry distinct implications. These mainly concern the link between finance and control. In the applied science, and to a lesser extent in the government utility, officials are concerned to retain control of service operations, which is easier if all service finance comes from a single central budgetary allocation, though this does not exclude the possibility of some of it being locally derived through taxes or service fees. The mere existence of the contracting machine, however, implies the ability of local groups to secure governmental resources for local purposes, and hence to limit the effective financial control of the government itself.

The distinction between the three types in terms of staffing are implied in the discussion of formal organisation. Recruitment to the applied science is based on a knowledge of the relevant body of scientific knowledge, with professionals occupying the higher posts and trained sub-professionals occupying the lower rungs of the service. The main concern in the government utility is that staff should be well integrated into the governmental structure and identified with the goals of the government, rather than with the interests of the profession or of clients. Staff should therefore be recruited as part of the government service, be subject to uniform terms and conditions of service, and be transferable from one area to another. In the contracting machine, this insulation of staff from clients is not sought, and the possibility of clients exercising influence over the service through direct links with the staff is viewed with less concern. In fact, the probability of this happening is built into the system, since one of the resources which local representatives are trying to extract from the government is employment: consequently, service staff are likely to be local and to represent a part of the benefit gained by the locality from the service. Transferability is held to be undesirable, and while training and formal qualifications are desired, they are not held to be of overwhelming importance.

The term "service delivery" covers a wide range of activities and relationships, and only two broad questions will be picked out here: what the role of the service point is seen to be, and the form in which it offers its service in particular, whether it is presented as a coherent "package" or as a series of discrete benefits. On the first of these questions, the role of the service point in the applied science is to apply the appropriate body of scientific knowledge to the agreed targets of the service. In the government utility, the role of the service point is seen in hierarchical terms: the role of the service point is to execute programmes and procedures handed down from the headquarters. In the contracting machine, the role of the service point is to respond to client demands as they are presented. Similarly, the three types of service have different approaches to service presentation and the "packaging" question. In the applied science, a coherent and consistent approach to service provision is desired, but one flowing from a common body of professional knowledge and common training experience rather than from rigid standard procedures. In the government utility, however, a fixed package of services has more appeal, since it both reinforces the control of the headquarters over the staff actually distributing the service, and strengthens the dominance of the service itself over the clients in the process of service definition. By contrast, packaging is likely to be resisted in the contracting machine, since it reduces the ability of clients to take up the elements of the service that they want without having to defer to officials in other respects.

The distinctions between these three types which can be seen in the relationship between the service agency and the service structure are very closely linked with the others that have been noted. In the applied science, relations between officials and outsiders (both other officials and members of the public), other than the direct practitioner-client relationship, are discouraged, since they may compromise the pursuit of professionally-determined goals. To the extent that external relations are necessary, they should be conducted at a relatively high level where officials are less likely to be "captured" by local interests. The government utility provides for a much closer integration of certain types of non-professional external participant - particularly at the top, where the administrator and the politician represent the broader governmental interest in service operation. In general, external relations are legitimate as long as they are channelled through procedures defined by the governmental structure itself, whether these are formal administrative procedures prescribed by the headquarters, or more informal understandings made clear by political influentials. Where, however, they are conducted in other ways, such as direct negotiation between service operator and client at the local level, they constitute a threat to the service's control structure, and are considered illegitimate. In the contracting machine, though, these relations are critical to the successful performance of its service task, since this is defined as the establishment of a relationship which will satisfy client demands for service. This implies not only a close relationship between service official and client at the local level, but also one which is not dominated by service officials - i.e., which is more than consultative.

The reasons for linking these various characteristics of service provision together in three ideal types will now, I hope, be clear. Like all ideal types, they do not exactly resemble any actual service, nor does the existence of this model explain why particular types of change take place. The terms of these ideal types do, however, allow us to describe more precisely the sort of characteristics that actual service institutions do have and the way in which these relate to one another.

## The organizational framework of service provision in Kenya

It has already been pointed out (p. 6) that the service structure consists not only of the hierarchy of service officials, but also of the wide range of other persons and organisations - clients, representatives, and other officials - with whom they interact. The key questions for an understanding of a service structure are "Who (which groups, or organizations, or individuals) are involved in the operation of the service?", and "What are the links between these participants?". I intend here to outline the range of possible participants and to comment briefly on their characteristics and the relationships between them.

The organisation chart on p. 153 attempts to list the participants in diagrammatic form and to show some of the links between them. It must be emphasized that this is only illustrative: it is almost impossible to represent complex organizational arrangements on a two-dimensional diagram, and my main concern has been to show the approximate relationhhip of participants to one another in terms of the hierarchy of administrative units, from the national level down to the sub-location. In showing the "vertical" relationships within each organization, I have distinguished between formal hierarchical authority and other types of relationships. I have sketched in some of the "horizontal" links at the district level, but only by way of illustration: there are many more, and the range of intensity and regularity in these relationships is enormous. This being said, some comments on the chart may be made.

### (a) The service ministries

I have taken the service ministry as the central focus of the service

Figure 8: The structure of service operation


THE STRUCTURE OF SERVICE OPERATION
A simplified organisation chart
Relationships of hierarchical authority
Other relationships
(NB only a selection of possible relationships is shown)
NATIONAL LEVEL
PROVINCE
DISTRICT
DIVISION
LOCATION
SUB-LOCATION
OTHER MINISTRIES
PROVINCIAL OICs
DISTRICT OICs
VARIOUS LEVELS OF REPRESENT-ATION
CLIENTS
COOP-ERATIVE UNION
PRIMARY COOP-ERATIVE SOCIETY
MEMBERS
MINISTRY of COOPERATIVES & SOCIAL SERVICES
PROVINCIAL COOPERATIVE OFFICER
DISTRICT COOPERATIVE OFFICER
ASSISTANT COOPERATIVE OFFICER
COOPERATIVE ASSISTANT
OFFICE of the PRESIDENT
PROVINCIAL COMMISIONER (PC)
DISTRICT COMMISIONER (DC)
DISTRICT OFFICER (DO)
CHIEF
SUB-CHIEF (now named Assistant Chief)
CITIZENS
DDC
DDAC
SERVICE MINISTRY
PROVINCIAL OIC
DISTRICT OIC
DIVISIONAL OIC (Education only)
PRIMARY SCHOOL INSPECTOR
SERVICE POINTS
SERVICE CONSULTATIVE BODIES
VOLUN-TARY AGENCY SERVICES
PRIVATE PRACTI-TIONERS
CLIENTS
MINISTRY of LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PROVINCIAL LOCAL GOVT. FINANCE OFFICER
ALGAK ALGE
COUNTY COUNCIL
AREA COUNCIL
COUNTY COUNCILLOR
AREA COUNCILLOR
CONSTITUENTS
UNION HQ's (KNUT KLGWU)
UNION BRANCHES
UNION SUB-BRANCHES
MEMBERS
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
MP's
CONSTITUENTS
PATRONS
AND OTHER
INFORMAL
REPRESENT-ATIVES

structure. Usually it is the largest component of that structure, and even when it is not, tends to dominate it ( e.g. the dominance of the Ministry of Education over primary education even when the great majority of the pupils were in mission schools). This dominance is partly attributable to its size, partly to its central position in the service structure (as the representative of national policy in service matters as against local or sectional interests), and partly to the resources which it commands and on which the rest of the service structure is often dependent. It has, of course, a direct call on the national budget, and in the national context has more money than other service agencies, though in particular local circumstances other agencies may be wealthier.

It has a particular advantage in obtaining staff, especially highly-skilled staff, both because as a large organization it can offer a career structure where, a county council, for instance, might be able to offer only a single post, and also because it has access to expatriate staff under technical assistance agreements with foreign governments. (Missions, of course, are also able to draw on expatriate staff, and some British volunteers have served with municipal councils, but the ministries' resources here are clearly superior.) Moreover, in the absence of statutory bodies, the ministry occupies the whole of the stage at the national level. The only statutory body at the national level is the Teachers' Service Commission, of which the Minister of Education has said: "... the Teachers' Service Commission is not a body independent of the Government ... it is a department of my Ministry ..." (NAOR, 3 June 1968, col.412).

The organization of the ministries concentrates their specialist staff - the professional core of the service - in the headquarters in Nairobi, with a small number of multi-functional administrators in the provincial and district offices. Somewhere below the level of the district officer-in-charge (OIC) (the exact point varies both within and between ministries), it is possible to draw a line between those staff who can expect to be transferred out of the district and those who, in the normal course of events, will not be. The higher staff are usually transferred from one district to another fairly frequently. This is partly an unintended consequence of the shortage of senior and middle-level staff, partly a deliberate practice aimed at giving officers experience of a number of different areas and at discouraging officers from establishing strong personal links with their client community (or with sections of it).

Junior staff, however, have relatively close links with the community in which they work. Many of them were originally recruited by the county councils - which means that they would almost invariably have come from that district, and possibly obtained their jobs with the assistance of a local patron - and joined the central government staff at the transfer of functions. Many of them will have a shamba (farm) near their jobs and will be drawing food from that; some of them may also have business interests - such as bars and shops - in the areas in which they serve. This group (which includes nearly all those actually "delivering" the service) is obviously much more susceptible to local influences than are the service administrators at the district level; this is particularly important in considering the extent to which there is a distinct "local" aspect to these services, as these low-level staff are often subject to relatively light supervision and control from the district headquarters.

(b) County councils

The formal constitution of the county councils was based on the English model, with a large council meeting from time to time to approve decisions that have been taken by its specialist committees. Most councillors are elected, usually one from each location, although the Minister can also nominate councillors to represent special interests, and the DC, for instance, is always a nominated member of the council. The qualifications for election are relatively liberal, and the requirement in the Local Government Regulations 1963 for councillors to be literate in the official language of the council (s.60(1)(d)) was immediately waived by the Minister (Kenya: Sessional Paper No. 12 of 1967: 3). Councillors are elected for three years, but no elections have been held since 1968, the President having extended the term of office of the present councillors, apparently until 1974.

In theory, a council appoints its own staff, but this statement needs to be qualified in several important respects. Under the Regulations, the Minister has to approve the appointment of all senior officers of the council: clerk, treasurer, medical officer of health and works officer (s.112-113). In addition, the posts of County Education Officer and Medical Officer of Health (in the period 1963-9) were almost invariably filled by officers from the relevant central government ministries who were posted to the council. They were not formally seconded to the council, their appointment did not require the council's approval, and they would be posted to any other position in the Ministry structure without consultation with the council; their primary loyalty, therefore, was to the ministry rather than the council. In 1967 the Teachers Service Commission was established to take over responsibility for staffing all schools (although many of its powers relating to primary schools were immediately delegated back to the counties). As has been mentioned, councils have preferred to appoint staff only from their own areas, and much of the opposition to proposals for a Local Government Service Commission was based on the fear that outsiders (especially ethnic outsiders) would be appointed to councils' staff. The Local Government Service Commission Bill 1971[1] was defeated in the National Assembly on these grounds, and had to be re-introduced in an amended form in 1972.

County councils have two lines of vertical communication with the centre. The Ministry of Local Government disburses the central government grants to councils, supervises council finances and is the main instrument of central control over the councils. Most of its work is done in Nairobi, although there are now Provincial Local Government Finance Officers in most provincial headquarters for day-to-day supervision. In addition, there are two bodies set up by the local authorities themselves, the Association of Local Government Authorities of Kenya (ALGAK), which acts as a general pressure group for local authorities, and the Association of Local Government Employers (ALGE), which negotiates on behalf of all local authorities with the unions over terms and conditions of service.

The powers of county councils, as specified in the Regulations and certain other pieces of legisliation, fell into two categories, mandatory and permissive. The mandatory functions included the general administration of primary education, certain specified preventive and environmental health measures under the Public Health Act, and the maintenance of secondary classified roads. The main permissive functions concerned personal ("curative") health services, shops and markets, social and welfare services, and measures for the promotion of agriculture and livestock. In general, the scope of these powers was fairly narrowly defined, particularly with education and health services, where policies were laid down by the ministries and the councils permitted only to implement those policies, the legal controls being reinforced by the fact that the council service OIC was an officer of the ministry in question. The main power of the council lay in service development, where decisions about goals and priorities were fought out in the council committee. At the time of the transfer of functions, all council powers in respect of these services were centralized, but councils were directed to set up advisory Health and Education Committees and to nominate members to a District Works Committee: these bodies now seem to be dormant.

(c) Non-government bodies

The non-government sector in service provision consists mainly of private practitioners (i.e. commercial service operators) and the missions. In formal terms, the "self-help group" might be regarded as belonging to this category, but as indicated earlier (p.128), self-help cannot really be considered "non-governmental", and it will be considered separately. Private practitioners are relatively isolated from the rest of the service. Some (such as traditional medical practitioners) have little contact with government at all. Others may be formally registered with government agencies at the national or even provincial level, but have few dealings with the district-level bodies. There are some organisational links between private practitioners (and often strong social links between individuals), but they are not extensive, and at the district level, private practitioners appear to constitute a category rather than an organization in service provision.

Voluntary agencies are rather more institutionalized. The term covers a wide range of bodies, from the local branches of international organizations (mainly, but not exclusively, the major Christian missions) with a strong bureaucratic structure and access to considerable outside resources, down to the small Muslim community on the Coast which arranges for the local imam to teach the Koran to its children. In the colonial period the voluntary agencies were of critical importance in service provision: the Christian missions had extensive and highly developed education systems, and also provided much of the medical care in rural areas. Since independence, however, the role of the voluntary agency has declined. The great majority of the mission primary schools were nationalized (in effect) by the Education Act of 1968, and the missions were left with control of only the few unaided schools (of which there are only 120 in the whole country, not all of them mission schools). The mission health services have continued, but they do not seem to have expanded as fast as the government and council services (although reliable figures are hard to obtain) and there appears to be a certain reluctance, in many cases, to use them.

It also appears that as the missions have been Africanized, there has been a tendency (not uniform, but still discernible) to concentrate on the congregation and to leave social services to public agencies.

## (d) Self-help

It is not easy to fit "self-help" into a description of the organizational structure of service provision (it will be noted, for instance, that it does not appear in figure 8), largely because it is a type of activity, or rather a number of types of activity, and not a distinct structure. References can be found to "self-help" groups", but for the great bulk of "self-help" activity, the "self-help group" is an administrative construct, an attempt by officials to impose a tidy regularity on activity at the local level, and as a group, having only a paper existence. The activity, though, is very real, and is, I would argue, one of the most important ways in which the Kenyan state maintains its control over the rural areas. Some reference has already been made to self-help (see pp. 127-128; see also Colebatch 1973), and it will be discussed more extensively in chapter ten: here I am mainly concerned to illustrate some of the organizational connotations of the concept.

The integration of self-help activity into the structure of state control is achieved through three related strategies: formal controls over self-help exercised through the provincial administration and the community development (CD) staff; the co-option of non-officials into the official sphere; and the pre-emption of self-help activity by government officials.

The legal basis of the formal controls ovër self-help lies in the necessity for anyone wishing either to hold a public meeting or to collect money to get a permit from the DC. The detailed monitoring of self-help activity, however, is the responsibility of the CD structure. TheDistrict Community Development Officer (CDO) is generally seen as the officer "responsible" for self-help, and Divisional and Locational Community Development Assistants (CDAs) exercise similar responsibility in their respective areas. CD staff see one of their major functions in this respect as being the formalisation of self-help activity through a framework of committees. In their model, each project has its own committee, elected by the people working on or contributing to the project, and which chooses office-bearers, keeps accounts and registers the project with the CD staff. Each project committee then elects one member to sit on a Location CD Committee, from which one member is elected to the Divisional CD Committee, which in turn elects one member to sit on the District CD Committee. In some areas, these committees are well-established: in Murang'a, for instance, a registration fee of shs.15/= is charged on all projects, which is used to pay attendance allowances to the members of this hierarchy of committees. In other areas, the structure is more rudimentary, especially below the district level, and CD staff work through direct contact with local leaders rather than through a formal committee.

The strategy of co-opting non-officials is aimed at creating an authority structure which will be reinforced, rather than weakened, by self-help activity. Self-help has always been a vehicle for political ambitions, and (particularly in the years immediately after independence) has been marked by factional and clan cleavages as particular projects are identified with individual leaders. Were this conflict limited to the formal representative structure - incumbent and aspirant MPs and councillors - it might have had the effect of increasing the relative power of government officials, but in fact the conflicts were often between officials (usually chiefs) and others, and therefore tended to reduce the authority of the governmental structure itself. The Administration therefore sought to draw both politicians and other leaders into a structure of authority in which government influence (as expressed by the Administration) would predominate. The network of CD committees described in the previous paragraph is one institutional manifestation of this structure, and there are others, such as "leaders' conferences", or the campaign committees for the institutes of technology, which perform the same function (see pp. 129-30).

The extension of administrative authority over self-help in this way is probably assisted by the fact that self-help is in any case aimed at securing access to government resources, so its promoters have something to gain from this sort of formal recognition. The task for the Administration, therefore, is not so much to conquer an autonomous field of activity as to establish the position of particular institutions as the sole channels to certain types of government resources. This may still meet with resistance both from those organising self-help projects (who seek to use these institutions as one, but not their sole, lever on government resources) and from other government agencies. (See, for instance, the call of the PC Nyanza and Provincial and District Development

Committees to have executive powers and their own funds so that they could embark on major projects "without waiting for headquarters to give the final go-ahead" - Daily Nation, 18 August 1972.) The extent to which the Administration (especially the DCs) can establish this sort of institutional control varies, with the most politically-influential areas (not surprisingly) putting up the most effective resistance to any limitation on their independent access to decision-makers in Nairobi.

But while the increasing integration of officials and non-officials facilitates government control of self-help activity, it does not ensure it, and the Administration pursues its own variant of "pre-emptive" self-help. Chiefs and sub-chiefs, in particular, are constantly urged to "take the lead" in the initiation of self-help projects (see, for instance, the statements by the DCs of Lamu and Kiambu, Daily Nation, 6 July 1972 and EAS, 3 August 1972). And as has been pointed out (p. 128), this is also regarded as part of the DO's role. The aim of this strategy is to draw non-officials into this quasi-official sphere in a supportive rather than a competitive role. The Administration and MPs, in particular, can lend one another mutual support, as the DC Siaya indicated when addressing a fund-raising meeting convened by the local MP.

> He /the DC/ wanted to see as many secondary schools as possible established by self-help efforts.
>
> Mr. Ogutu /the MP/ would ensure that the Government helped in furthering the development of such schools. (EAS, 10 March 1972)

At the location level, however, where the chief and the councillor are in more direct competition with one another and can offer less complementary support to each other, these alliances are more difficult to forge. Councillors have complained, for instance, that chiefs prevent them from holding public meetings (EAS, 8 September 1972). Chiefs are therefore more likely to "take the initiative" with the assistance of the sub-chiefs and Administration Police and with less support from political representatives. But although there may be friction, the councillor has little choice in the matter: since the transfer of functions he has had little independent access to the public resource-allocation process and has to enter this government-dominated self-help sphere if he is to have any voice at all.

Hence as a part of the service structure, self-help represents a type of activity rather than a distinct institution, and one characterized by the integration of the roles of official and representative. Within this braod framework, though, there is scope for different balances of influences within the controlling group, and hence for variations in this organization form within which the activity takes place. Thereaare indeed, self-help groups which are groups and not simply administrative categorizations, and in which the role of officials is limited to the tacit acceptance of their activities: women's mbati groups are an example. These are groups of women who hire themselves out to farmers as a labour team in order to raise money to put corrugated iron (mbati)roofs on the houses of their members. It is possible that such a group may receive assistance from a government source, but by and large that is not their main aim and their activity continues whether they receive such assistance or not. (On self-help of this sort, see Mutiso, forthcoming and Mbithi 1970, 1972).

At the other extreme, there is much "self-help" activity which is simply an extension of the normal activities of the Administration. In one location in South Nyanza, for instance, the chief decided that a new chief's office would be built by "self-help": he informed his constitutents of this at a baraza (public meeting), levied a flat-rate contribution on each household, which was collected by the sub-chiefs, and engaged a contractor to erect the building. In this case, the term "self-help" is simply providing normative cover for the chief's ability to impose extra-legal (and possibly illegal) exactions on his constitutents. An energetic PC can accomplish the same effect even at the provincial level:

> Plans to divert the Sabaki River at its entrance into the Indian Ocean at Malindi so as to keep Malindi beaches clear of mud were announced today by the Coast Provincial Commissioner, Mr Eliud Mahihu.
>
> Mr. Mahihu said that he had written to the Kilifi District Commissioner instructing him to start organizing meetings to raise money for the project. ...
>
> 'If local people in Malindi take the initiative and start raising money for the self-help scheme, /it/ will attract Government priority. Once they prove they want to keep their beaches and water clean by helping themselves, the Government will send in technicians to advise and do the job', he said.
>
> Mr Mahihu said that dirty beaches were a threat to tourism and people, including investors, 'must realise it is a problem to be tackled by local people'. (Daily Nation, 22 February 1972)

There are some cases where self-help activity takes place within a contractual relationship between a particular group of clients and the relevant set of officials. In one division of South Nyanza, the divisional Assistant Education Officer was stationed at the district HQ because there was no room for him at the divisional HQ. The teachers of the division, who wanted a resident AEO so that they could be paid in the division, and hence avoid the risk of being robbed as they made their way back from the district HQ on payday, agreed to build the office themselves, and contributed both money and labour for the purpose. On the completion of the office, the AEO was posted to the division.

In the great majority of cases, though, self-help activity has a more general impact (at least as far as making contributions is concerned), and there is usually an attempt to involve a number of political influentials in its organization.

> A sum of /shs./ 8,642/95 and ten bags of cement was raised in Central Alego Location, Boro Division of Siaya District, in two hours during a fund-raising meeting in aid of the Central Alego chief's office proposed to be built on a self-help basis at an estimates cost of /shs./ 60,000/=.
>
> The meeting, convened by the DO, Boro, who promised to give the ten bags of cement, was conducted by the chairman of Siaya County Council, Mr Joash Odhalo Akang'o, who gave a donation of /shs./ 250/=. The Minister for Health, Mr I. Omolo Okero, who was the guest of honour, gave /shs./ 450/=.
>
> He thanked the people of Central Alego for undertaking to build a chief's office and stressed the need for unity. (Daily Nation, 7 June 1972)

This incident illustrates the two principle features of "mainstream" self-help. First, the activity being financed is a normal part of government operations: the provision of capital equipment for the Administration. Secondly, while there may or may not be a formal committee for the project, the actual collection of money is conducted by the DO, the chairman of the county council, and one of the ministers from this province: an *ad hoc* coalition of representatives of the main sources of power, extracting peasant resources for the benefit of one of their number. (It is also significant to note that both in this case abd the other self-help chief's office are from Nyanza Province, formerly the heartland of support for the KPU and still out of favour politically: it is unlikely that a chief's office in Central Province would be built by "Self-help".

One other aspect of self-help which should be mentioned is its implications for service provision. First, it tends to benefit some areas more than others. Areas which are wealthier, where education is more widespread, which have better contact with the government, are more able to manipulate the forms of self-help in order to secure increased government service than areas which have, little cash income, little education and little contact with central policy-makers. Central government officials often describe districts of the first sort as "interested in development" or "progressive", whereas districts of the second sort are "backward", and these officials often regard it as inevitable that the "progressive" areas should be rewarded for their zeal while "backward" areas are not. This pattern of unequal benefit applies within districts as well as between them, and in some districts the internal disparities are as great as the external ones.

Secondly, it benefits some groups or categories of people more than others. Most government services benefit some defined category rather than an undifferentiated mass. Sometimes the limiting criterion is distance: a health centre tends to benefit only those living in its immediate neighbourhood, since most people are unable or unwilling to travel long distances for medical treatment. Usually, differences in wealth enable some people to make better use of a facility than others:

those with more money for bus fares will derive more benefit from a road than those with less. In some cases, there is a clear economic distinction between those who can benefit and those who cannot. Self-help secondary schools only benefit those who can afford the fees - usually from shs.600/= to shs.800/=, in a country where 60% of households have annual incomes under shs.1200/=. Self-help cattle d dips benefit those with exotic strains of cattle (traditional strains being largely immune from tick-borne diseases), which cost several times the price of traditional strains and are mainly owned by wealthy farmers.

The differentiated spread of benefits from self-help has to be seen in the context of the mode of fund-raising. The campaign for the Murang'a College of Technology, cited on pp.129-30, is unusual in graduating its levies to the potential income of the donor: for most projects (particularly smaller projects), it is more common for a fixed rate to be levied on each household. There is always some flexibility in applying such a levy, but to the extent that it can be made to stick, it constitutes a regressive tax. If, for instance, a chief is persuaded of the merits of a self-help cattle dip and organizes a levy of shs.20/= per family to pay for it, what is actually taking place is a transfer of resources from the community as a whole to a small group of its wealthier members (i.e. owners of exotic cattle) of whom the chief himself will almost certainly be one. It is not difficult to see why this mode of financing is preferred: a flat-rate levy bears more lightly on the more influential members of the community than a graduated one, and hence will provoke less resistance.

This aspect of the process of resource extraction is illustrated by an incident in the Murang'a College of Technology campaign. It was proposed that the coffee-growers of the district should donate shs. 500,000/= to the campaign, to be raised by the deduction of half a cent per kilo from the final payment to growers. At the meeting called to ratify this proposal, it met with opposition on the grounds that some growers would have to pay up to shs.700/=, and an alternative proposal was put forward that all growers should pay shs.30/=. (A grower paying shs.700/= under the original proposal would have been receiving a payout of nearly shs.60,000/=.) The expatriate advisors attached to the cooperative union protested that some growers received only shs.30/= final payout, and that in their case the levy would amount to total confiscation of their income. These objections were overridden, however, and the meeting (predominantly attended by the larger growers) voted for the flat-rate deduction, which was described as being "fairer" than the graduated levy.

### (e) Other participants

Brief mention should also be made of the other participants listed on the chart. There are a number of other ministries involved in service operation, notably the Office of the President (Provincial Administration) and the Community Development Department of the Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Services. The Provincial Administration becomes involved in three ways: through its general responsibility for administrative coordination, through its responsibility for promoting development, and through its responsibility for maintaining political control ("security"). The question of coordination will be discussed below, and the "development" objective does not require further elaboration ~~- not because it is not important~~, but because nearly all government activities are defined as "development", and hence it can be used to justify the intervention of administrative officers in any activity in which they are interested. The Administration's security responsibilities extend to monitoring the public political activities of local leaders, particularly where they include the holding of meetings or the collection of money, both of which require a licence from the DC. Self-help activity usually involves all three of these features: local politicians, public meetings, and the collection of money. Both the specific responsibilities of the Administration, and its general strategy of consolidating its control in rural areas by drawing local influentials into relationships of dependence on it, come together in its concern for self-help.

Equally important is the role of the chief at the location level who, as has been pointed out, plays an important role in self-help activity, and is frequently called on by service officials in the regular operation of the service - e.g. to boost the payment of school fees, or to assemble his constituents at given points for a mass innoculation campaign. The role of the CD staff in self-help has already been mentioned, and the CDO is seen as the officer at the district level "responsible" for self-help, and also, in many cases, for relations between the government and the public in general: several service OICs mentioned the CDO as the official to whom they would turn if at any time they needed to establish closer contact with the client community.

Two other bodies which have an important impact on these services are the two unions involved: the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) and the Kenya Local Government Workers Union (KLGWU). These were able to intervene in disputes between a council and its employees and translate them to the national level, and it was their ability to win wage demands by picking off the weakest local authorities first that led to the formation of ALGE as the single negotiating body for the employers. Also, KNUT was probably the most influential voice among the pressures which led to the establishment of the Teachers' Service Commission, and unlike KLGWU, has maintained its importance in the service structure since the transfer of functions; KNUT representatives, for instance, have been nominated to the new District Education Boards.

The last category on the chart requiring explanation is "patrons and other informal representatives". This is not so much another role which can be precisely defined, as a diagrammatic recognition of the fact that representative functions are frequently performed by peoplewho hold no formal position in the service structure. These people may be holders of no position at all, holders of local but overtly non-political positions (e.g. chairman of the cooperative), or holders of political or bureaucratic positions outside the district structure (e.g. a Cabinet minister from the area, or a local man holding a senior position in a ministry in Nairobi). What these people have in common is the ability to command a hearing and the willingness to speak for their constituencies. Their methods, and their effectiveness, vary (see Bienen 1974 for a discussion of patrons), and here we can only point to the existence of this category of actor.

(f) Interaction at the district level

The various participants in the service structure having been outlined, mention should be made of the extent to which they interact at the district level - i.e., the extent to which the district-level actors constitute a district structure. Two aspects of this question may be distinguished: (a) the extent of bureaucratic coordination, and (b) the extent to which non-officials are integrated with the district structure.

Formal bodies for inter-departmental coordination at the district level have been in existence since district teams were started in the late 1940's. In 1966 Tom Mboya, attempting to strengthen his relatively-weak Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, promoted the idea of two parallel committee strudures; all-official District Development Committees, and District Development Advisory Committees, comprising the membership of the DDC plus some nominated unofficials. But while these were intended as agencies through which MEPD could coordinate development activities in rural areas, their actual function was well summed up by the Permanent Secretary the Office of the President, who explained: "We are turning the District Team into the District Development Committee" (Gertzel 1970b: 255). In other words, the coordinating body was to be an arm of the DC, not an executive body in its own right. The DDC appears to meet when formally summoned by the DC rather than at regular intervals, and its actual role in coordination depends largely on the DC. The general pattern appears to be that DDC meetings are used for general exhortation by the DC, and for departmental OICs to report orally on their main activities for the information of the DC and other OICs. The DDC disposes of no funds (apart from recommending government grants to self-help project) and departmental OICs do not require its formal authorization for any of their activities: Service OICs regarded the DDC as a forum for the occasional exchange of information rather than a significant check on their activities, and rarely used it for specific acts of coordination. These took place through informal consultation, either directly between OICs, or between an OIC and the DC, which were more frequent, and were seen as being more productive, than the formal machinery of the DDC.

The DC, therefore, remains the main instrument of coordination. His ability to achieve coordination depends less on formal powers to give directions to departmental officers, since he has few; rather, it derives from his central position in the government machinery, and his control over a number of critical resources that departmental OICs have occasion to call on from time to time - e.g. the support of the DOs and chiefs, additional transport, support in conflicts with other OICs, or with their own ministries. Hence while a DC cannot direct a recalcitrant OIC to follow a certain course, he can make life difficult (though not impossible) for him if he does not. Much depends here on the extent to which the DC can in fact monopolise these resources, particularly the channels of effective communication with the centre. One was left with the clear impression, for instance, (though it would be difficult to prove this) that in Murang'a, where departmental OICs had much readier access (in various ways) to the ministries in Nairobi, the DC was in a relatively weaker position vis-a-vis OICs than were his counterparts in South Nyanza and West Pokot.

In general, the integration of non-officials into the official service structure has been less complete than the internal integration of officials. The county council, which up to 1970 was the main non-government organization in the structure, was quite distinct from the operations of government: it had its own powers and responsibilities (and the ultra vires rule to make sure it kept within them), its own budget and its own staff. Service OICs in education and health services were, of course, central government staff as well as council officials, and this allowed for a certain fusion of local authority and government concerns - e.g. in giving councillors more scope to air their views on the district hospital (a government responsibility) as well as on the council's own services. But in general, other OICs only involved themselves with the council to the extent that they wanted council support for their own projects, and councils were not encouraged to involve themselves in this operation of government services (although on occasions, particularly strong council criticism of a government service might result in the OICs appearance at a council meeting to defend his activities). Conversely, councillors seeking to preserve the council as a sphere of autonomous activity often resisted government attempts to regulate more closely council operations.

Since the transfer of functions, councils have been left with very few responsibilites, and have had even less impact on the general pattern of governmental activity. One council activity which in a sense diverges from this pattern is community development, in which the central government employed the CDO and the council the subordinate staff; but as the CDO was not even nominally a council official and the council exercised little formal control over the service, CD is probably more accurately seen as a central service supported by council funds rather than a service in which government and council representatives are integrated at the level of policy and control.

The formal agency for integrating official and non-official activity at the district level is the DDAC, but as has been pointed out (p. 117), this has always been a relatively weak body, with few real powers and held in low esteem by both officials and non-officials. Following the recommendations of the Ndegwa Commission, non-officials are being appointed to DDCs (which means, in effect, a merger of the functions of the DDC and the DDAC), though it appears that the Commission's proposal that councillors should be elected to the DDC by meetings of all councillors in a division has not been implemented. It is not clear, though, that these changes have increased the effectiveness of the DDC/DDAC as a means of co-opting non-officials in support of governmental activity: in fact, the references in the press and elsewhere, to "leaders' conferences" appear to indicate that the new DDC is not meeting this goal.

In addition to the DDC, there are also specific service consultative bodies which might be expected to play a certain role in integrating official and non-official activities. At the time of the transfer of functions, rather vague statements were made about the government's intention to establish "local boards" to provide a measure of local representation in service operation, but the idea has been taken up only by the Ministry of Education, whose District Education Boards came into existence at the end of 1972. The proposal has been ignored by the Ministry of Health, and strenuously resisted by the Ministry of Works, which found itself with District Works Committees foisted onto it by the Ministry of Local Government: these, however, lapsed into inactivity after drawing up extensive and expensive shopping lists of unclassified roads for takeover by the government. The DEBs had not begun to function at the time the fieldwork was completed, but education officials, with their near-monopoly of information about the internal operation of the service, did not expect the DEBs to be a significant restraint on their activities.

There are signs, though, of the emergence of more informal means of integrating official and non-official activity. One is the "leaders' conference" mentioned above. These conferences have no legal standing, but appear to be ad hoc gatherings of a wide range of influentials, at the district level and below, to co-opt their support for government action. As one DC put it, "We have various leaders. We need their influence.". The leaders invited to these meetings commonly include not only MPs, chiefs and councillors, but also KANU officials, headmasters, and representatives of churches, cooperatives and women's groups. The advantage of such a gathering, from the Administration's viewpoint, is that it does not involve the Government in a continuing commitment to a local institution, since the meeting is purely consultative. Apart from lending support to general government programmes, these conference may also be used to give legitimacy to activities which are ultra vires the existing institutions - e.g. the fund-raising campaigns for the institutes of technology. In this connection the emergence of the campaign for the Murang'a College of Technology is instructive.

There had been considerable factional conflict among Murang'a political leaders throughout the 1960's (see Lamb 1974), but about the beginning of 1970 a formal truce (referred to in the county council minutes as the "New Murang'a Agreement for Unity") was concluded, with provision for regular meetings of councillors, MPs, the DC, the KANU branch chairman, and others. The initial outlet for the new spirit of unity was a stress on cultural symbols, and in particular Mukurwe-wa-Gathanga (the place of origin of the Kikuyu people according to Kikuyu myth), and Kihumbu (where, in 1924, the Kikuyu Central Association had begun its activities). Subsequently, possibly because it was felt that a goal with a wider, less specifically ethnic, appeal was desirable (Godfrey and Mutiso 1973) the proposal for a technical institute was taken up and emerged as the Murang'a College of Technology plan, with the organisational base described on p.130).

Here, the initiative clearly lay with non-officials, and the DC played a minor role. King (1972: 178) suggests that RIAT (the Luo institute) is similarly seen as essentially promoting solidarity among the Luo. But at the Coast, by contrast, the local politicians were unable to sink their factional disputes (which had erupted into violence in 1969) and the DC was able to take command of the institute of technology campaign (see Godfrey and Mutiso 1973: 18, who also suggest that the Kirinyaga institute was promoted by the DC and the Minister for Finance rather than the local politicians). From the point of view of the DCs and the Administration generally, integrative devices such as the institutes of technology campaigns have substantial costs as well as benefits. They do bring together a wide range of influential figures into a single organisation and hence facilitate their co-option in support of governmental aims and operations. But at the same time, the Administration may find itself conceding its support for activities over which it does not have the dominant influence.

On the whole, through, these frictions and shifts in the balance of power within this alliance are less important than the fact of its existence. It establishes a formal framework which links those dominating political and economic relationships of different types and at different levels - e.g. the sub-chief in his sub-location, the cooperative society chairman over his members, and the Nairobi businessman within the trading sector. Moreover, it links them specifically as power-holders, and by implication opposes this linked structure to the mass of the peasants. i.e., it brings together rather different sorts of power into a single structure of authority, controlled at all levels by the relatively privileged.

This extended discussion of self-help and political relationships might seem a little removed from questions of service provision. The point is, though, that while the central core of service provision is under ministry control, committed and largely predictable, there are important "fringe areas" - the disposition of "loose" resources, the use of discretionary powers, and the whole question of service expansion - which serve as a focus for political contest. The sorts of relationships that emerge in this area link the local political structure to the day-to-day operation of the service (i.e. quite apart from the structural links built into the service by its formal organization). The county councils can be seen as one means of channelling these relationships through regular institutional forms, but as indicated in this chapter (and as will be more fully discussed later), there are a number of other organizational forms which serve the same function.

## CHAPTER SIX

## PRIMARY EDUCATION

Education is an important service in any country where it has a significant influence on the pattern of occupational and social stratification. It is particularly important in Kenya, for a number of reasons. First, the disparities of reward between those occupations open only to the educated and those open to the uneducated are very large indeed (see, e.g., the figures quoted on p. 62). This is particularly true of higher education, of which Fields (1972: 8) notes:

> The private rates of return to higher education under the existing full-subsidy system in Kenya are very high compared to rates earned in such developed countries as the U.S. and U.K.

But while the returns are greatest with higher education, a similar pattern occurs lower down the educational ladder. Relatively few primary school leavers do secure jobs in the formal sector, but those that can - as, for instance, Administration police constables (£156-237 p.a.) or even as untrained teachers (£126 p.a.) - are relatively well-off compared to the 60% of households with incomes of less than £60 p.a. Moreover, at all levels, securing a formal-sector job does not preclude involvement in other income-earning activities, such as agriculture and trade: in fact, it enhances a person's chances of getting access to the resources that make such enterprises possible, such as land, credit, skills and licences. So the relative advantage of the educated is even greater than the raw salary comparisons would suggest.

Secondly, even within the educated group, there are some sharp divisions between persons on the basis of the level of education attained. A recruit police constable, for instance, is paid shs. 305/= per month if he is a primary school leaver, shs. 500/= per month if he has his school certificate (see advertisement in the Daily Nation, 23 March 1972). The agricultural extension service is divided into four grades on the basis of educational qualifications, with substantial salary differences between them and very little movement from one grade to the next (see Leonard 1972b: 26). So moving into the upper reaches of the educational system is as important as entering the system in the first place.

Thirdly, as a consequence of these first two factors, education is a major means of creating and maintaining the structure of socio-economic differentiation in Kenyan society. This is particularly marked at the upper reaches of the educational system, where a regressive tax system (see Westlake 1971a, 1971b) finances the distribution of highly lucrative skills to students whose parents "are in higher occupational categories, are better educated, and have larger landholdings than the rest of Kenya's population" (Fields 1972: 13), thereby entrenching the privileged position of the present elite.

This is less marked in the operation of primary education, which is spread more extensively, costs less and yields less than higher levels of education, but this must not be over-stressed. For one thing, only about 50% of school-age children actually attend primary school. (The official statistics suggest 60%, but this figure has to be adjusted to take account of repeaters.) These are, moreover, particularly unevenly distributed geographically: in 1971, the proportion of the estimated primary school-age population actually enrolled ranged from 5.7% in Mandera District to 134.0% in Nyeri District (calculated from the Ministry of Education Annual Report and the 1969 Census). Many non-attenders are excluded because of their preference for a pastoral life-style in which education has little relevance (see, e.g., King 1972a, 1972b), but many others are excluded because their families cannot afford even the relatively low fees charged at primary schools.

The abolition of fees for the lower standards (see below) will modify this pattern, but in many cases only to the extent of introducing a new cut-off point in the middle of primary schooling, with the hitherto-excluded poor dropping out again well short of the crucial Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) exam. And furthermore, there is an enormous range in the quality of primary schooling. In 1972, for instance, all of the 1971 Standard VII class at Hospital Hill Primary School (a prestige multi-racial primary school in Nairobi) obtained places in government secondary schools. Thirty miles away, at Ithanga Primary School in the lower reaches of Murang'a District, only three of the large Standard VII class had been offered places in government secondary schools. (None of them, incidentally, had been able to take up the offer because in no case could their families afford the shs. 450/= p.a. school fees.)

Finally (and somewhat paradoxically), education plays an important part in maintaining support for the present political order. The distribution of the "fruits of independence" (to use the Kenyan term) has been, and is widely acknowledged to have been, highly unequal. The response of the new elite to criticism of the emerging distribution of wealth has been that there is equality of opportunity, and in particular, that positions in the public and private bureaucracies are open to all on the basis of educational attainment. Whatever its deficiencies as a description of the realities of present-day Kenyan society (and the discussion in the preceding paragraph has only scratched the surface of this topic), this assertion has important implications for the operation of the educational system, investing such questions as the level of school fees, selection into secondary school, and even the security of the CPE examinations, with a much greater political significance than would be the case in a wealthier society with a wider distribution of education.

Decisions about education, therefore, are "critical" (see Schaffer 1969: 194); demands for education are of more than routine importance, and the costs of resisting them are heavy. This is reflected in the proportion of the central government budget devoted to education: in the 1973/4 estimates, the Ministry of Education absorbed £34.5m, 30.9% of net recurrent expenditure, of which £22.3m was directly attributable to primary education, and the fee reductions announced subsequently would have added a further £2m to the net cost. By comparison, the next biggest spending ministry was defence, with 9.5% of net recurrent expenditure. This national context must be borne in mind when considering the operation of local education services.

## Organisation

Primary education has always been subject to strong central government influence, and since the transfer of functions, has been largely a central government responsibility (outside the larger towns). There is a handful of private primary schools, mostly for expatriate communities in Nairobi, and a small number of other unassisted schools, mostly in remote areas, which for some reason or other have not yet been taken over by the government. The District Education Officer (DEO) has considerable formal authority over these schools, but in practice it is little used (particularly in the case of the remoter schools). The missions, which were at one time responsible for the great majority of primary schools, were by the Education Act 1968 reduced to the largely nominal role of "sponsors" of schools now run directly by the DEO. Speaking on this bill in the National Assembly, Tom Mboya (then Minister for Economic Planning and Development) emphasized the importance attached by the government to control of primary education.

> There is a need to have more government say and control in the education of the people of this country. We can no longer continue with the system by which you have pockets of authority all over the country, deciding what and how to conduct education throughout the country. There must be established a definite area of government control if we are going to implement our policies. (NAOH, 8 January 1968, col. 3822)

Many missions have, however, maintained a foothold in education by developing their role as managers of self-help schools, both with the few unassisted schools that do exist, and with the much larger number of harambee (self-help) secondary schools. As education officials have tried to enforce tighter controls on the creation of harambee schools, the advantages of having a (usually expatriate) missionary as school manager, and thus the official intermediary between the self-help organisers and the education officials, has become more apparent to local leaders.

In addition, a low-grade form of primary education (not officially recognized as such) exists in the form of nursery schools and youth centres. Nursery schools are usually organized by CD staff, with the initial capital costs being met by self-help fund-raisings and the teacher's salary from school fees. They are encouraged by education officials as a desirable preliminary to primary education, but in some areas they serve as an alternative, or as a means of access to the official system. Pupils may be admitted from nursery schools into Standard II or even Standard III of the primary school, particularly in more remote areas, and demands for nursery schools to be taken over by the government as primary schools proper are common.

In general, though, self-help in primary education is not aimed at providing an alternative service which may become a government service (as is the case with secondary education), but serves to provide certain sorts of resources for the official service. It is organised by school committees in ways which will be discussed below.

The main instrument of government control of primary education has been the DEO, who from 1963 to 1969 was termed the County Education Officer and was responsible to the county council as well as the ministry, reverting to his previous designation with the transfer of functions. (For continuity and clarity, I will refer to him as the DEO throughout.) Below the DEO, there is a tier of Assistant Education Officers (AEOs), usually at the divisional level, but there appears to be little significant devolution of responsibilities to AEOs, whose main functions are to distribute teachers' pay and to act as a channel of communication between teachers and the DEO. Recently, as part of a UNESCO/UNICEF scheme to improve primary education, a new grade of primary school superintendents has been introduced, specifically concerned with improving teaching standards; these officers report directly to the DEO.

From 1963 to 1969, the county council was formally responsible for primary education, and the control structure of the service consisted of the DEO and the Education Committee of the council, with the AEOs and teachers answering to the DEO. In addition, councillors (whether members of the Education Committee or not) tended to act as unofficial supervisors of the schools in their constituencies, and often intervened directly at the level of the individual school as well as passing complaints through the formal council structure to the DEO, although they had no legal authorisation for such action and their "interference" was resented and resisted by teachers and education officials. As has been mentioned, the DEO was responsible to both the ministry and the council, and the terms of the relationship between the DEO and his committee were not precisely specified; this situation frequently led to conflict (and, on one occasion, to the temporary suspension of an education officer by his council for failing to follow council policy).

With the transfer of functions, the Education Committee lost most of its raison d'etre, and although the Ministry of Local

Government directed councils to establish combined Education and Health Committees, there is little enthusiasm for these new committees (which are only advisory), and they meet rarely or not at all. At the end of 1972, District Education Boards (DEBs) were re-established. They consist of the DEO, the county council clerk, three nominees of the council, three nominees of managers or sponsors of schools, one representative of KNUT, and up to six members appointed by the Minister to represent "other interests". The Act did not provide for the DC to be an ex officio member, but it appears to have been accepted that he shall not only be a member but also the chairman of the Board. The functions of the DEBs as laid down in the Act are quite extensive, but they are subject to the Minister's approval in most important respects, and it remains to be seen whether there will be any real shift of power from DEOs to the Boards; as mentioned above (p. 175 ), DEOs do not expect this to happen.

In addition to these district-level bodies, there are also consultative bodies for each school in the form of School Committees. Given that local communities had always been responsible for the capital costs of primary schools, some form of consultation with the local community had always been necessary, but the various semi-formal and informal consultative groups had existed for some time before receiving official recognition. Under the Education Act 1968, local authorities are required to establish a school committee for every local authority school, and the regulations made under the Act provided for each committee to consist of three persons nominated by the parents, three by the sponsor (i.e. the mission that had established the school), and three by the local authority. The main functions of the committees were defined as the maintenance of the religious tradition of the school (where it had formerly been a mission school) and the exercise of a "general oversight regarding admission of pupils to the school and discipline". Their main specific concern appears to be the raising and allocation of the school building fund.

We can see, therefore, that while there has been considerable continuity of administration in primary education, there have been significant changes in the form of organizational contact with clients. At the level of the individual school, the pattern of consultation was not affected by the transfer of functions. At the district level, though, there was a change from client representation by an organizationally-autonomous body with its own electoral base to a nominated body limited to an advisory role and not expected to limit significantly the freedom of action of the DEO. It is particularly significant that the DC has assumed the chairmanship of the DEB, a role which was not envisaged by the relevant legislation. It is not clear to what extent this has stemmed from the desire of DC's to expand their authority, and to what extent it stems from the desire of the DEO to recruit the power of the DC for added strength in negotiations with client representatives; there were probably mixed motives, though the former seems more likely to have been the dominant one. In any case, the effect is to strengthen the position of the Administration in a specialist service - i.e., as the service has moved further from the contracting machine model (by reducing the influence of client representatives), it has moved in the direction of the government utility, rather than in the direction of the professionally-controlled applied science.

Service definition

To speak of the definition of a service is to impose a pattern and significance on a series of small, often local decisions, not always made by officials and which service officials themselves might not even recognize as constituting the definition of the service. It is rare for either officials or clients to define explicitly the nature of the service; at the same time, small decisions throughout the service structure determine the answer to such questions as "What is the service trying to achieve?", "Who are the people it is trying to reach?", or "What are its priorities?". The answers to such questions are the de facto definition of the service, and it is with this, rather than with any formal definitions that may be given in official statements, that this section is concerned.

A number of implied definitions of education can be found in Kenya, and they can be distinguished by reference to the analytical model set out in chapter five. Even in the applied science, two different definitions can be found. The more traditional of them holds that education is basically concerned with transmitting a body of knowledge, that primary education transmits basic knowledge, and leads (via examinations which test this knowledge) to secondary and higher education. The other sees education as a "preparation for life", which in the Kenyan context implies that the great majority of primary school students should receive a "vocational", "rural-centred" education to equip them for life as peasant smallholders or rural artisans and hence divert them from joining the ranks of the job-seekers in the towns.

In the government utility, education is seen more in terms of its general effects rather than its specific content, and is defined in terms of political socialization, as "nation-building": the acceptance of certain values, institutions and procedures which relate both parents and students to existing structures of authority. In the contracting machine, however, education has one very clear function: employment. It exists to equip children with whatever skills will best serve to secure them employment in the formal sector; as a by-product, the education system itself provides employment for some of its products.

Seen in these terms, the dominant definition of primary education in Kenya is clearly that of the contracting machine: to secure employment. This is a recurring theme in statements by parents, by officials and by representatives, and one example will suffice.

> The Assistant Minister for Agriculture, Mr Murgor told the people of Kitany in Elgeyo Marakwet district last weekend that they should send their children to school so that they could compete with children of other tribes in securing top Government jobs when they finished their education. (EAS, 24 January 1968)

And although only about 14% of primary school leavers secure places in government secondary schools (ILO 1972: 235), primary education is almost exclusively oriented towards obtaining such a place. This orientation of the service, which is reinforced by the increasing difficulty primary school leavers have in finding employment, also absorbs the more traditional strain in the applied science definition, since "literary" education, as measured by examinations, is one of the most important criteria of selection for employment.

In addition, however, a relatively minor strain in the working definition of the service is that of the government utility: "promoting national unity". It has a prominent place in public rhetoric, and while the assumption of the rhetoric that the education process strengthens national identity and weakens parochial consciousness is open to question (see Court and Prewitt 1974), the structure of educational provision does increase the dependence of the great majority of the population on the present structure of political authority, since it is that which dominates the whole pattern of educational provision and directly controls some of its most critical points. The exhortation quoted in the previous paragraph, for instance, contains very clear implications that education plays an important role in sustaining ethnic-based competition and clientelist politics. And in those areas (mostly pastoral) where the idea of education meets with widespread rejection, this rejection is associated with a much broader rejection of government aims and in particular, of dependence on the government's terms. The government response to this rejection, both before independence and since, has been the use of administrative coercion to compel at least some parents to send their children to school (see, for instance, King 1972b, 1972c).

The remaining definition - the idea of "rural-centred education" - is of very minor importance. The "vocational schooling" argument has had a long history in Kenya (see King 1968) as elsewhere (see Foster 1965) and has recently been re-stated by the ILO mission on employment (ILO 1972: 241-9). It does have a prominent place in public rhetoric, but it is doubtful if there is much real support for it outside the ranks of the planners in the Ministry of Education and elsewhere: it is not being cynical to suggest that it is the sort of education which the already-educated favour for everybody else's children. And it commands very little support among parents and pupils, who are well-aware of the relative rewards of formal-sector employment (for which "literary" education is a necessary, though usually not a sufficient, qualification) as against smallholder agriculture. The few "practically-oriented" parts of the primary curriculum, which are not examinable, are resented by the pupils, and in some schools they are in fact dropped in favour of the examinable subjects. Where they are taught at all, teachers complain that some pupils "simply revise other subjects from the CPE companions /i.e. examination crammers_/ while the lesson proceeds" (King 1972d: 6). As King comments:

> There is, therefore, the somewhat paradoxical situation in which the only subjects which have a vocational side to them, and which stand high in the rhetoric of politicians and primary school curriculum experts are those subjects which are least regarded in the schools. (1972d: 6)

This particular response of Standard VII students to "practical" subjects is of course largely a consequence of their unimportance in the CPE examination, but there is little evidence that they would feel more favourably disposed towards a "rural-centred" education in any other context - and with the urban life style being more pleasant and potentially so much more rewarding than the rural alternative, one could hardly expect any different.

This general definition of the function of the service has several particular implications. The first is that there is a demand for primary education to be uniform throughout the country. I have already mentioned (pp. 181-2) the importance of education in the official ideology of equality of opportunity as a support for the present distribution of wealth. For this claim to be plausible, there must be schools open to all, and all schools must offer children the same chance of proceeding to higher education. "Local" demands may be made in terms of the exclusion of "outsiders" from primary schools, the employment of "local" teachers, or "local" quotas for admission to the district's secondary schools, but there is no demand for a "local" education which will differ in any significant way from that offered elsewhere in the country.

The second implication is that the actual content of the education offered is geared specifically towards preparing children for the CPE examination, which is the basis for selection to the secondary schools. The CPE has since 1965 been awarded on the basis of a computer-marked multiple-choice examination, and pupils have quickly learnt which skills are relevant in such a test and which are not (see King 1972d for a fuller discussion of this question). The official syllabus is ignored in favour of the crammer's guides which most pupils use, and non-examinable subjects are ignored. And there is widespread repeating of Standard VII (and often, consequently, of lower standards by pupils whose progress into Standard VII is blocked by the repeaters), mostly in contravention of the official rules regulating this practice.

The main factor defining education, therefore, is the distribution of wealth and power, which creates the client demand for qualification-oriented schooling. The pupils are perhaps the strongest group promoting this definition, but they are supported by parents and political representatives, most teachers, and many educational administrators. The Minister for Education, for instance, has defined an educated person as "one who was able to provide for himself with the least effort and within the shortest time possible" (EAS 12 June 1972), and the Nairobi City Education Officer publishes an annual "form guide", ranking his schools in order of the percentage of CPE passes achieved (see, e.g., Daily Nation, 29 January 1972). The breadth of support for this sort of education meant that there was little change in definition following the transfer of functions. There is a good deal of rhetorical opposition to this definition (the "back to the land" theme), but the only effective opposition to it comes from pastoralists who reject the very concept of institutionalized education. This rejection is seen by the government as a challenge to the broad structure of political authority, and determined efforts are made to bring the dissidents into the structure of education.

## Resources

As pointed out earlier (p. 148 ), the three models carry distinct implications for the basic questions of resource allocation in service provision - where are the resources to come from, and who is to control them? - and the debate over the transfer of functions has tended to focus on the relative ability of central and local governments to find the resources for primary education. Questions of finance and the centre-local relationship will be discussed in greater detail in chapter nine; here I want to concentrate on the various ways in which resources were drawn into the service. To a certain extent, I am using the term "resources" almost as a synonym for money. There are, of course, other forms of resources - political support, for example, and the right of appeal to past experience - but in the normal operation of a government service, money is the measure of most of them. This discussion will, therefore, focus on financial aspects, although reference will be made to non-financial resources where appropriate.

For the Ministry of Education, the great public demand for education can be translated into support for increasingly heavy expenditure on education, and the ministry has a good claim on both the recurrent budget of the central government and development funds made available by foreign donors. The ministry's share of net recurrent expenditure has risen from 22.4% in 1963/4 to 30.9% in 1973/4; it can also draw on foreign resources (notably teachers, both contract and volunteer), and has now attracted several loans from the World Bank. Central government revenues tend to be more flexible than those of, for instance, local authorities (i.e., they rise over time), and hence the ministry is better able to cope with rising costs provided it can retain its share of the total budget. The county councils, on the other hand, suffered from a relatively inflexible financial structure, with the yield of their three main revenue sources - GPT, school fees and the central government grant - largely outside their control, as was their largest single cost - teachers' salaries. Consequently, costs rose sharply but revenue remained relatively constant; the councils lacked the political support to increase either their share of central revenue or the size of their own local revenues, and were forced into the cycle of retrenchments and deficits that I have termed "crisis financing".

With the last of the "outside" agencies, the missions, the financial situation is less clear. In the early days of mission education, there had clearly been substantial injections of outside finance, mainly in the form of the salaries of expatriate teachers and of the missionaries themselves, who performed most of the administrative and supervisory functions relating to mission schools. But the missions from a fairly early stage had begun to withdraw the expatriate element from the primary schools, and to shift most of the burden of cost to local communities, either in the form of fees or of local self-help efforts, and from 1963 (when the county councils took over as local education authorities) to 1968 (when the mission schools were brought under the control of the councils), it does not seem that there was a significant flow of outside financial resources into mission primary schools (which is not to deny the value of the non-monetary support, such as administrative assistance and support in dealings with the ministry, that these schools received from the central mission authorities).

More than either of the other two services, primary education has always been heavily dependent on local resources; on Anderson's calculations (1973: 28-33), local contributions in 1968 constituted 35% of recurrent costs and 95% of capital costs (not counting GPT). The contributions to recurrent costs are, of course, the school fees, which vary from district to district but in most cases are from shs. 50/= to shs. 70/= a year. The KANU platform has for some time committed the party (and hence presumably the government) to introduce free primary education, but there has been resistance within the government to the early implementation of this aim. School fees have always represented a larger, less resented and more economically collected source of revenue than rural GPT, and there has been resistance from the Treasury to their abolition. When the Nairobi City Council, which could have afforded to do so, proposed to abolish fees in its own primary schools, the proposal was vetoed by the Government. After the transfer of functions, an attempt was made to introduce a uniform scale of fees, but it was quietly abandoned after a few months, for reasons which are not clear. It may be surmised, though, that there would have been stiff opposition to the move in districts where the new fees were higher than the old; it also appears that the new fees were the same for all grades, whereas the counties had charged lower fees for the junior grades, so parents of junior pupils would have paid more in all areas. In view of the political importance of education, the costs of pushing the new fees through were probably considered to be too great.

As a partial move towards free education, a scheme of fees remission for poorer pupils was introduced. Initially, DEOs, on the recommendation of the relevant school committee, were empowered to exempt 5% of the pupils (later raised to 10%) from the payment of fees. There have been widespread complaints, however, that remissions are given to the well-connected rather than the poor. In the late 1960's, general fees remissions were announced in a number of drought-stricken, mostly pastoral, districts. It is, however, not being over-cynical to point out that in some respects this move was making a virtue out of necessity, since these were the districts where it had been most difficult to collect fees and where the existence of fees was a restraint on the government's aim of building up enrolments in the "education-resistant" areas. In Narok District, for instance, where a certain amount of coercion was applied through the chiefs to maintain enrolments (chiefs were given a quota to fill), parents would send their children to school without any school fees, knowing that they would either be sent home again, or that they would receive free education (King 1972b: 6). Consequently, education officials did not press the issue of fees very hard.

Of more significance, though, was the President's announcement at the independence day rally in December 1973 that fees would be abolished for Standards I to IV (EAS, 13 December 1973). This can be represented either as evidence of the government's determination to attack the foundations of the present domination of local and national elites, by making education more accessible to the poor, or as evidence of its need to make a gesture which would rally political support in the rural areas. Both factors were probably at work, but when considered in conjunction with other things done (and not done), it appears more as a move to rally support behind the government as the source of all significant benefits.

The capital costs of primary schooling are left almost entirely to the local community. Except in certain "education-resistant" areas, where the central government or the local authority may provide some of the costs, the community is expected to erect and equip (e.g. with desks, blackboards, etc.) the classrooms, the teachers' houses, and any other buildings. In the past, this was mainly achieved with unpaid communal labour and the collection of bush materials for building, but now most of the cost is raised by a "building fund" fee, set by the school committee and collected by the headmaster at the beginning of the school year. In some schools, there is claimed to be a certain amount of flexibility in the payment of this fee: instalments may be permitted, or it may be waived altogether. But in most cases it is regarded as compulsory, children are excluded from the school if it is not paid, and in some cases it is also demanded of non-parents.

Two consequences of this reliance on local resources may be noted here. First, there is scope for great variation in the standard of buildings and equipment. In Murang'a, for instance, one may find schools in some parts of the district constructed almost entirely of stone and corrugated iron, and with a full complement of desks and blackboards, while a large double-streamed school in another part of the district has only bush-material buildings, and can afford neither desks nor a proper blackboard for classes below Standard VII. Second, as far as the location of schools is concerned, the local community acquires, at the very least, a veto power, since it would be very difficult for education officials to compel parents to build a school on a site they did not want. (Hence the need for government-financed, contractor-built schools in "education-resistant" areas.)

Primary education is, therefore, a service with a tradition of a strong local resource base, with the service agency trying to extract the maximum contribution from the community and to restrict its own contribution to the provision of teachers and some equipment. Both the central government and the county councils have pursued the same strategy in this respect (except in the pastoral, "education-resistant" areas), and the missions followed broadly the same pattern. But there has been constant pressure from local communities to shift the burden to the centre. During the county council period, the pressures of educational demand were the main lever used by councils to wring resources out of the central government. (This aspect of the centre-local relationship will be discussed in greater detail in chapter nine.) The transfer of functions represented, in many respects, a significant victory for these local pressures. Since the transfer of functions, various miscellaneous council revenues, such as crop cesses and tourist revenue, have not been available for education, nor could the central government continue the councils' practice of financing education through budgetary deficits (i.e. by exhausting council reserves). The central government has been unable either to reduce the rising costs of primary education or to increase the local contribution; rather, it has felt itself obliged to reduce school fees, and hence reduce the proportion of education costs met locally.

## Staffing

We saw in the discussion of the analytical model (p. 49 ) that in staffing, different principles were stressed in each of our three models. In the applied science, the main concern was with professional skills; in the government utility, the main concern was with hierarchical subordination; in the contracting machine, the main concern was the local orientation of the staff. I shall examine the staffing pattern in education to determine the relative weight attached to these concerns.

The primary teaching force is undoubtedly local in orientation. The great bulk of the teachers come from the same district, or from another district in the same tribal area, as the school in which they teach, even if not from its immediate catchment area. This practice was institutionalized by the county councils, which were loath to appoint any employees from outside the council area, but the pattern has not changed markedly since the transfer of functions.

This practice is often justified in terms of language and teaching method: in 1970, for instance, nine Kamba MPs demanded the removal of non-Kamba primary school teachers since they could neither speak nor understand the vernacular "which is the only means of communicating to the children that they are supposed to teach" (EAS, 3 October 1970). But underlying this argument is the more basic question of how employment (a scarce and prized benefit) is to be distributed. Shortly before the Kamba MPs made their complaint, KNUT had also objected to the way untrained teachers were being recruited under the Tripartite Agreement*, saying that parents in non-Kikuyu districts had complained that numbers of Kikuyu teachers were being brought into their districts (EAS, 23 September 1970). And the Kamba MPs had added to their public complaint:

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* under which the government and private employers agreed to take on additional employees in exchange for union agreement to a wage freeze and a ban on strikes.

> We would, however, like to take this opportunity to appeal to all Kamba boys and girls who have got Form IV (School Certificate), G.C.E., K.J.S.E. certificates and who are not employed, to report to their respective MPs for employment consultations. (EAS, 3 October 1970)

The formal response of the government to the MPs' complaint had been a statement by the Minister of Labour that teachers would be posted as required regardless of their tribal origins, but in general the TSC has not attempted to disturb the existing pattern. Its practice is not to post a teacher outside his home district unless he or she specifically requests this, and as few teachers do, the teaching force is homogeneous and local, except in those areas (mostly pastoral) where there are insufficient local teachers and others are imported from "education-surplus" areas such as Central Province and parts of Western Province.

Formal hierarchical control of the teaching service is maintained through the DEO, who is clearly central in his orientation, but this involves considerable strains. DEOs are transferred frequently so that they remain outsiders - "divested of local interests", as one PEO put it, adding that people would lose their respect for the DEO if he stayed in the same district for too long: he felt that two years was the maximum time that a DEO should spend in one area. KNUT has called for this practice to be formalized, noting "with regret" at its annual conference that "the longer education officers stayed in a particular area the more they created hatred with teachers" and calling for a three-year maximum length of posting (EAS, 15 December 1972).

AEOs are less clearly central in their orientation, as they are drawn from among the headmasters of the district in which they serve and given no specific training for their posts. The position of AEO is seen by teachers as a career plum open to them, and at one meeting of a KNUT divisional sub-branch which I attended, a vigorous complaint was made that the AEO's position had always been filled from outside the division (i.e. by teachers from elsewhere in the district). As mentioned above (p. 185), when the UNESCO/UNICEF project to improve the quality of primary school teaching was launched, it was decided to bypass the AEO and set up a new network of primary school supervisors, recruited from the teaching service but given special central training, not necessarily posted back to their own districts and answering directly to the DEO. If the ultimate aim of having one such supervisor for every twenty schools is reached, there will then be two competing lines of communication between the DEO and the school: the superintendents and the AEOs.

In a rather different way, the KNUT also acts as a means of central control over the teaching force, though not in a way which strengthens the authority of the formal hierarchy. The KNUT has been an important centralising force in the way in which it is able to bring disputes between teachers and employers up to the national level, and to provoke the establishment of the TSC. But the sort of control which could be established over the teaching force in this way was quite different to the hierarchic control of the DEO, involving more consultation, negotiation and trade-off of benefits than directives to be handed down. It involved the integration of the KNUT within the central service structure, and the support of the KNUT leadership against its members. In pursuit of the former aim, the government required KNUT to disaffiliate from COTU, the central trade union organization (see EAS, 7, 17 and 18 October 1969). The extent to which the KNUT leadership felt confident of government support can be seen from their attempt to finance the building of a union headquarters in Nairobi by means of an shs. 80/= compulsory deduction from members. This levy, which had been approved by the Minister for Labour but not submitted to the membership or the annual conference, drew angry protests from KNUT members, and a plea from the union president "Teachers are requested to refrain from going to the Press over the issue because the national council is taking care of the matter" (EAS, 17 April 1971; see also the issues of 8 and 16 April). The dependence of the union leadership on government support was further illustrated by the warning given by the union president that teachers (a) could not resign from KNUT without the consent of the executive, and (b) would in any case be ill-advised to do so since the Government would shortly introduce the "closed shop" principle into teaching and only KNUT members would get jobs (EAS, 15 December 1972).

Considerable importance is attached to professional qualifications, but not to the extent of excluding unqualified teachers from the service. As Maleche ruefully comments:

> Apparently we cannot afford to let a patient die in the hands of an untrained doctor, but it is all right to let an untrained teacher warp the personality of an innocent tender youth without even a murmur! (1972: 15)

Most entrants to the teaching force come from the training colleges, but they are never sufficient to fill all the vacancies, and the DEO is empowered to "top up" his staff with untrained teachers, who are mostly drawn from the ranks of the unemployed secondary school leavers. They have no security of tenure and can be dismissed if funds are short or more qualified teachers are found; equally, they may give up teaching if other jobs or training opportunities present themselves. The proportion of untrained teachers in the service has declined from 31.0% in 1964 to 22.3% in 1972 (though the fall was not continuous: in 1969 the figure was 21.7%). But while their numbers are declining, and the ministry is attempting to raise the standard of entrant to the service, the admissibility of untrained teachers is of great importance to the DEO, since it gives him much greater flexibility in coping with increasing enrolments.

Many teachers seek upgrading by studying for the secondary school examinations: a P1 teacher, for instance, who passes the HSC (Form VI secondary) examination is automatically promoted to S1 which means moving from the salary range £447-906 to the range £702-1,306. This means, however, that there are strong inducements for teachers to spend class time preparing for their own examinations, and parents often complain of this practice; consequently, according to one observer, the best teachers are often the older P3 teachers who do not seek promotion and will devote all their time to teaching (Somerset 1972).

This illustrates what Maleche refers to as the "lack of a clear professional identity" among Kenyan teachers: teachers move in and out of the service, qualifications are not essential for obtaining a position, teaching ranks low in the career preferences of many teachers, and in many cases teaching is simply a residual occupation for the otherwise unemployed (Maleche 1972). Many teachers look outside the profession for their future career prospects, either to administrative positions (for which they seek to prepare themselves by obtaining higher secondary education), or to business: the KNUT recently held out to its disenchanted members the prospect of a union loans scheme to enable its members "to buy cars and open businesses" (EAS, 15 December 1972).

The staffing pattern is, therefore, closest to that of the contracting machine. The teaching force is predominantly local in its orientation, and one of the functions of the service is seen as providing local employment. Hierarchical authority is weak, and the ministry seeks an alliance with the union leadership at the national level as a supplementary form of control. Although professional knowledge is counted as important, numbers of teachers are appointed without it, and promotion from one grade to another is determined by the acquisition of educational qualifications, not by the assessment of teaching skills or the attainment of professional qualifications. This pattern has been relatively little affected by changes in the formal control structure of the primary school, from mission or DEB to county council, to Ministry of Education and back to DEB. It appears that size and the entrenched position of the primary teaching force make it very difficult for the formal control structure to have very much impact upon it - hence the introduction of primary school supervisors as a non-local and professionally-trained force to strengthen the arm of the DEO.

Service delivery

Two particular aspects of the pattern of service delivery were singled out in the discussion of the analytical framework: the role of the service point, and the way in which the service is presented (see pp. 149-50). In the applied science, the role of the service point is seen in terms of the exercise of professional skills; in the government utility, it is seen in terms of its place in the general pattern of government services; and in the contracting machine, it is seen as a response to client demand. The discussion of the presentation focussed on the extent to which a service was "packaged" - i.e. presented to its clients as a coherent whole. In the government utility, packaging is seen as desirable as a means of control over both junior staff and clients; the applied science is ambivalent, since it detracts from the ability of service staff to vary the service if, in their professional judgment, that is called for; and in the contracting machine it is unequivocally rejected, since it is designed to limit the client's right to pick and choose from among the benefits of the service.

Taking the first aspect - the role of the service point - and translating it into actual policy choices in school distribution in Kenya, it may be deduced that the applied science would tend to favour larger, multi-stream schools, to enable specialisation among teachers and justify the provision of more elaborate equipment. The government utility would want to relate the pattern of school distribution to the distribution of other government services and to administrative boundaries. The contracting machine would be content to provide schools where there was a demand, which would mean a large number of small, local schools.

The actual pattern of delivery is predominantly one of very small schools. In 1972, 21% of all primary schools did not go above Standard IV, and nearly 80% had only one stream in their lowest-level class. The norm is a school of seven classes, with six to eight teachers and perhaps rather fewer than seven classrooms. Education officials would prefer bigger, multi-stream schools, but there is resistance to amalgamation and schools tend to split when they grow large enough for double-streaming to be practicable. The reasons for this pattern can be found in an examination of the decision-making process.

Actual decisions on the location of schools (including the siting of new schools and the expansion of existing ones) are the result of a process of negotiation between the DEO and representatives of the client community, with the headmaster of the existing school playing an intermediary role. The DEO, who must formally approve the decision reached, has both a professional interest in promoting school quality, and an interest as an official in securing a distribution which is administratively convenient. He would prefer to channel expansion into the consolidation and growth of existing schools, but has few clear criteria to guide his decision and appears to get little support from the ministry. The ministry appears to have no guidelines on school expansion beyond its estimates of how many teachers it can budget for in the next financial year, and according to one of its officials, has accepted an obligation to "assist" (with teachers) any school where the parents put up the buildings.

Client representatives, for their part, press for schools to be very local, and hence small. Parents are particularly insistent on the importance of schools being near their homes: Anderson (1973: 42) cites a case where parents were willing to support an unaided primary school rather than have their children walk the two miles to the nearest county council school. To some extent, such restraint as the DEO can exercise is based largely on bluff, for if the parents actually erected the buildings, it would be very difficult for the DEO to resist the pressures to open a school in them. Matters rarely come to this point, however, and the DEO has the assistance of the Administration and the CD staff in restraining local initiative, but this in turn introduces another element into the decision-making process, for the Administration has its own perceptions of what constitutes an equitable distribution of schools. In the case cited on p. 163 , in which the DC and the MP combined to promote a self-help secondary school, the DC had prefaced his remarks by pointing out that there was no secondary school in the location; the principle that there should be a secondary school in each location would probably be resisted by education officials, but the existence of the Administration interest in distribution constitutes a further constraint on the DEO.

It should not be thought, however, that client pressure is only for expansion. In some areas, it is a defensive pressure to keep open small schools with low enrolments. At the KNUT sub-branch meeting referred to earlier (p. 202), teachers complained that the schools were understaffed; the AEO agreed, but added that there was a much greater shortage of pupils than of teachers, emphasising his point by reading out the enrolment and staffing figures for every school in the division. Ministry policy is for the average enrolment per class to be as near as possible to the maximum figure of fifty, but only one of the thirty schools in the division approached this figure, and only five had an average enrolment of better than twenty-five. In six cases, the average enrolment was less than ten, and one school had only five pupils in two classes. The DEO did not feel it possible to close even these schools; he had, however, replaced the headmasters of the two with the lowest figures in an attempt to get enrolments up to a more respectable figure. There is even one school, in a pastoral area of West Pokot, where a teacher was still posted in 1973 even though no pupils had turned up for three years, because education officials, and more particularly the DC, were trying to forestall charges that the government was doing nothing for this highly remote area.

The DEO is, therefore, conducting a holding operation against continuous client pressure for a small-scale, localized service rather than planning the development of a school system. The transfer of functions was not of major importance here because the county council was not the primary means of representation for client communities, and they have been able to put effective pressure on the DEO through local structures such as the school committee, supported if necessary by pressure through such other channels as the chief and the MP. The ability of the DEO to contain such pressure has, if anything, declined since the transfer, as the central government is seen by clients as being far wealthier than the councils, and therefore less able to plead shortage of funds as the councils had done - and in a way, they are right, as the expenditure figures indicate.

In considering the second aspect of service delivery -

packaging - it should be noted first that to a certain extent, education is inherently a packaged service, usually taken up in relatively large units as part of a more extensive structure. The school year imposes a regularity which the other services do not have. Pupils are taken in at a fixed point in the year, and once they have been enrolled and their fees paid, the service agency delivers a standard package of service. There may be some attrition of pupils as fees become due, and even of staff, and there may be "supply blockages", such as non-payment of teachers' salaries or non-delivery of school materials, but basically, once the school year has begun it may be assumed that any particular school will continue functioning until the end of the year with much the same group of clients.

Packaging is sought by service officials as a means of offering a uniform standard of service and of controlling the teaching force. The sort of control preferred by the applied science, through professional norms and training, is considered inappropriate for the poorly-trained teachers who make up the bulk of the force. But in fact, because of clients' strong orientation towards examination-centred teaching, they are able to a considerable extent to break up the package presented to them - e.g. by emphasising the importance of the academic subjects as against the "vocational" ones, by buying their own "CPE companions" to replace the official curricula, and even by totally ignoring the teacher when lessons on non-examinable subjects are taught (see p. 191).

The pattern of service delivery is, therefore, marked by the dominance of client interests. Administrative and professional factors are also relevant, but are unable to prevail against strongly-pressed client preferences about service distribution or about the composition of the schooling package. Support for this particular pattern came not only from clients, but also from officials and political representatives, and it was not affected by the transfer of functions, since the county councils had not been a critical part of its institutional support. Of the three organisational models, therefore, it is closest to that of the contracting machine.

## Service agency and service structure

The operation of any service involves service officials in relations with others outside the service agency: with clients, with their political representatives, and with other officials. The applied science seeks, as far as possible, to avoid or at least to restrict such relationships. The government utility seeks to confine them within channels established by the agency in such a way that they do not threaten its control of the service. The contracting machine, which exists to meet client demand, is content to allow these relationships to dominate the pattern of service operation.

In Kenya it is not possible for education officials to avoid contact with clients and others from outside the agency: the service is far too important politically to be left to the professionals. The question therefore becomes one of the extent to which the agency can maintain outside links without diminishing its control, and (which is simply the reverse) the extent to which those outside the agency can use those links to exert their influence over service operation. The question will be examined first at the level of the individual school, and then in the broader context of the governmental structure in the district.

The first question that education officials face in defining their relationship with the external environment is determining who their clients are. In the areas where education has been broadly accepted, officials may conveniently assume that almost everyone is a parent or potential parent of a school child, and that therefore the service is aimed at the community as a whole. This assumption is by no means true: in 1971, the proportion of the estimated primary school age population actually enrolled, excluding the eleven districts usually counted as pastoral, ranged from 27.5% in Lamu to 134.0% in Nyeri, and even in South Nyanza, which is not usually regarded as "education-resistant" or specially underdeveloped, only 47.4% of the estimated age group was enrolled*. But the assumption is accepted, with significant consequences for the structures of client-agency contact. Members of school committees are not necessarily parents of pupils now at the school, and in some cases school committees collect (or attempt to collect) building fund contributions from all the inhabitants of a school's catchment area, arguing that they will probably send children to the school sooner or later even if they have none at school now. (This argument is sometimes backed with the threat that if in the future those non-parents do send children to the school, they will have to make up any backlog of unpaid contributions before their children are admitted.)

Education is unusual among the three services in having a formal institutional structure for client contact, in the shape of the school committees. The extent of a committee's activity depends to a large extent on the headmaster, who in formal terms is its secretary, but who informally is also its executive officer, often its treasurer, and generally the source of most of its information about the actual operation of the school. He would find it difficult, though, to dispense with it entirely, not only because of its role in meeting the school's requirements for capital expenditure, but also because educational matters are very easily politicized, and the committee acts as a lightning conductor in providing a forum for local conflicts to be raised in a way which the education authorities find easy to handle.

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* Source: Calculated from Ministry of Education Annual Report 1971 and 1969 census figures. Figures exceed 100% in some cases because of repeating and over-age enrolments.

The school committees, though, are not the only means of contact between clients and the service. Other forms include parent delegations to the DEO (especially when the conduct or efficiency of individual teachers is questioned), and the intervention of political representatives such as MPs, or the Provincial Administration. Present and former county councillors complain of a decline in teacher discipline since the transfer of functions because the sanction of disciplinary action through the council has been removed. Education officials generally deny that councillors had a significant role here (and non-councillor non-officials seldom mentioned it in interviews), but it is clear that the internal disciplinary procedures within the service are weak (see, e.g., the statement by the PEO Nyanza, Daily Nation, 10 March 1972) and that the delegation to the DEO is being more commonly resorted to because of this.

But even outside formal client-service contact, there are a number of very significant ways for clients to influence the service. As has been pointed out (p. 191), pupils may simply ignore the teacher if the teaching does not conform to their expectations of the service. And in a broader sense, education as a service is highly dependent on client inputs: money for school buildings, and also for pupils. As has been pointed out (p. 209), many schools are well below enrolment targets and could well be closed down (leading to the possible retrenchment of their teachers). In some cases, the teachers need the pupils as much as the pupils need the teachers. And in all cases, the dependence of the school on its client community is such that it would find it difficult to operate if it alienated a significant proportion of its clients.

This pattern of agency-environment interaction does not apply, however, in those areas with relatively low enrolments. In these, teachers and education officials are less concerned to find ways of coping with client pressure, and more concerned with defining their attitude to the widespread popular indifference to education: whether simply to teach those children who do present themselves for instruction, or to campaign actively to bring the non-attenders into school. In some ways, this reflects a conflict between the applied science and the government utility - but it must be added that inertia is probably a more significant reason for teachers adopting a passive role here than their adhesion to a narrowly professional view of their role. There seems to be no clear official policy on this question, and individual attitudes vary. In general, teachers do not take an activist role on their own initiative, and most pressure on parents comes as a result of initiatives from either the DEO or (more commonly) the Provincial Administration. Where pressure is applied, education officers and headmasters often take part, but the most significant impact is that of the Administration: chiefs can and do direct parents to send their children to school, prosecute them (under the Chiefs Authority Act) if they fail to obey, and seize livestock to pay school fees (see King 1972b: 6).

Some education officials face a further problem in these areas: that of determining exactly who their clients are. In some of the pastoral areas, special facilities - namely primary boarding schools - have been established to induce the pastoral people to send their children to school. The pastoralists, however, have not responded to these initiatives, and there is considerable pressure from both non-pastoral residents of the district, and from non-residents (such as government officials) for their children to be admitted to take up the vacant places. Education officials argue that there is no legal basis for excluding non-pastoral children from these schools; that in some cases (e.g. West Pokot) it is difficult to distinguish between pastoral and agricultural members of the tribe in question; and that some of the "outsiders" have been born in the district of migrant parents. The consequence is that many (in some cases, most) of the places in these schools are filled by pupils other than the pastoralists' children for whom they were intended. Here, officials have an interest of their own: the "outsider" children in question may be their own, or the children of education officials in other districts, or of other officials, or of prominent politicians, all anxious to take up the opportunity of a high-quality, heavily-subsidised education for their children (see King 1971: 9-11). In this context, universalistic norms of service operation give a normative justification for the diversion of a service intended to advance a fringe group to the benefit of the members of the bureaucratic and political elite.

In considering agency-environment relationships in the general context of the governmental structure in the district, it must be pointed out that the size of the education machinery, and its relative independence of outside inputs (apart from those, already mentioned, supplied by clients) allow it a certain autonomy of many other organizations. Road access may help a primary school to function more efficiently, but schools do operate not only without road access, but also(in some cases) without textbooks, teaching aids and even chalk and blackboards. Nor do other ministries, for instance, call on the schools to any extent. Schoolteachers are used as census recorders and adult literacy instructors, and the schools themselves are sometimes used as service points - e.g. during mass vaccination campaigns. Teachers, as part of the "progressive" rural elite, often fill representative positions on such bodies as the Divisional Land Control Boards, and attend leaders' conferences convened by the DC and his subordinates at lower levels. But in general, the schools are not used extensively as a means of contact with the rural population, largely because of the existence of the Administration/CD network, which officials can use more directly.

Similarly, non-government bodies play a relatively minor role in the service structure. Neither missions nor county councils have played much part in the operation of the service since their schools were taken over by the government, although it will now be possible for them to do so via the DEB. It is significant, though, that there is no automatic mission representation on the DEBs, and that county councils are represented by their clerks rather than by an elected councillor. (The government also resisted demands from MPs for a place on the DEBs, though it was forced to concede their right to sit as non-voting observers: NAOR, 19 May 1971, cols 571-6.)

The one agency with which the education agency does have to maintain a working relationship is the Administration/CD network. As noted above, education depends on important inputs from clients, and while it has its own institutions for client contact, it may need to call on Administration and CD staff from time to time, particularly where popular interest in education is relatively weak. Administration and CD officials may be needed to promote "self-help" activity, such as the construction of teachers' houses, or to use their influence to "encourage" parents to send their children to school, or to pay their school fees. The way in which the coercive power of the Administration is integrated into the service structure can be seen in the way building fund contributions are collected. Officially, school fees, which are paid to the chief, are compulsory, but building fund contributions, which are paid to the headmaster, are not. In most areas, however, the chief will not accept payment of school fees unless the parent produces a receipt from the headmaster for the building fund contribution, thus making the latter effectively compulsory. In this context, the emergence of the DC as the chairman of the DEB (see p. 187) suggests a closer integration of education and the general governmental structure.

## Conclusions

A number of conclusions could be drawn from this chapter, and I shall not attempt to summarize them. Four major conclusions warrant particular mention here. First, while education is a very "local" service in many ways, it cannot be understood in a purely local framework. It is closely integrated into the local community and draws heavily on local resources, but at the same time, its clients see its main purpose as being to give children an opportunity to break out of the local community and find employment outside it. The critical factor in the local service is its national significance, and in particular, its salience in national politics.

Secondly, this political salience of education is the basis for the service being dominated by client interests in most important respects, and in terms of the analytical model suggested in the previous chapter, adhering fairly consistently to the model of the contracting machine.

The dependence of the service on resources raised from the clients themselves has resulted in local consultative bodies, and other forms of client influence, being much more influential than might have been the case otherwise. At the same time, the political significance of the service creates a greater sensitivity at the national level to local education questions. The consequence has been the relative unimportance of the district as a level of decision-making in primary education. The transfer of functions has contributed to this, but as part of a broader trend rather than as a sudden and dramatic shift in the distribution of power.

Finally, the transfer of functions in general did not change the fundamental character of the service. The county councils did have an important representative role, but there were other avenues open to clients when the council one was effectively closed, and the structural basis for the pattern of service provision lay in broader political relationships rather than in the particular institution of the county council. To the extent that there was a change in the pattern of service provision, its most marked aspect was an increased role for the Administration in service operation, rather than the imposition of a more professional pattern from the centre. In other words, to the extent that the service moved away from the contracting machine, it was in the direction of the government utility rather than the applied science.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## HEALTH SERVICES

While the term "primary education" conveys a relatively precise meaning, "health services" is a rather more vague concept. It covers three rather different sorts of activity:

(a) personal medical services - the treatment of the sick. These are often termed "curative services", but as one writer has pointed out, this term

> carries connotations of (technical) effectiveness which are not warranted. Also, while people may hope for a "cure", they are often satisfied so long as "something is done" about their problem. Thus there is a demand for personal medical services even when there is little true hope of cure ... (Powles 1973)

(b) preventive health services - those which are aimed at preventing illness (as opposed to treating it) through measures having a direct impact on individuals, such as mass vaccinations, health education, and attempts to improve dietary habits.

(c) environmental health services - measures intended to prevent illness which are aimed at the environment rather than individuals, such as sanitation, food inspection and malaria control measures such as the spraying of houses.

In Kenya, the county councils were responsible for all three types of service, except for the district hospital, which was the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, and a few specialized services such as mobile opthalmological teams. But their dominant concern was with the first - i.e. the provision of personal medical services through a network of health centres and dispensaries. This pattern of priorities is largely shared by the ministry, and will also be reflected in this study, since I am taking "health services" to be what those agencies formally responsible for health actually do. I do not wish to enter the debate about the extent to which these activities actually do promote health (see, for instance, the issues discussed in McDermott et al. 1972, Stewart 1971, Bryant 1969, and Turshen, forthcoming).

These county council services were taken over by the ministry in 1970 and still form an identifiable "district" service, and this study will be mainly concerned with them, and with the non-government services operating in the district. Other agencies from outside the district, such as the ministry's Division of Insect-Borne Diseases, also operate health services of various types in rural areas, but they tend to be discontinuous and small-scale by comparison with the regular services, and to prevent this analysis becoming unnecessarily complicated, they will not be discussed here.

Although a wide range of traditional health practices has always existed in Kenya, the present structure of health services stems largely from the pattern of colonial penetration and the needs of the colonial order - e.g. the need for personal medical services for government officers, and for a high level of environmental health services in the towns. Government involvement with other personal medical services was limited, and concentrated in the larger towns. In the rural areas in particular, the operation of personal services was left largely to voluntary agencies, local authorities and the working of the market. Responsibility for preventive and environmental services was shared between the central government and the local authorities, but as far as the rural areas proper were concerned, these were relatively insignificant until the general expansion of governmental activity of the 1950's.

Two consequences of this pattern of growth should be noted. First, there is rather more diversity in the provision of health services than is the case with education. There is still a substantial private sector, as well as a considerable amount of mission activity. Although, since the transfer of functions, the central government now operates the bulk of the service, it has not attempted to bring the non-government agencies under its control as it has in the case of primary education. This probably reflects the fact that health services are not politically critical in the way that primary education is, and so have not been seen as a key resource whose distribution must be brought under central control.

Secondly, the health services are highly urban-oriented: environmental health measures are most fully implemented in the urban areas, the hospitals are built there, and the great majority of the private practitioners establish their practices in the towns, notably Nairobi and Mombasa. This orientation has not changed markedly since independence, and to point to its historical origins is not to suggest that these explain its perpetuation in Kenya today: to explain this would require consideration of such matters as the interests of decision-makers as members of the urban elite, the nature of links with foreign aid agencies and their implications for service expenditure, the transfer of technology from industrial countries to underdeveloped ones - in short, the whole process of neo-colonial development (see Turshen, forthcoming).

This cannot be a comprehensive study of all aspects of health service policy in Kenya. It is necessary, though, to draw attention to the peripheral nature of the rural service structure with which this study is concerned, since much of it can only be explained by reference to the more central concerns of the health services.

## Organization

The organizational structure of the health services follows the basic pattern set out in chapter five. The government services come under the control of the Medical Officer of Health (MOH), who is always a doctor (although clinical assistants have acted as MOHs in the absence of a doctor, sometimes for years at a time).

Although all branches of the government service come under the jurisdiction of the MOH, he is more closely involved with the personal services than with the preventive and environmental services. This reflects the fact that in respect of the personal service he combines both organizational and professional authority, as well as the importance placed on personal services by both the service itself and the public as a whole. Personal services are basically offered through a number of fixed points, usually consisting of one district hospital and a number of health centres and dispensaries. A good deal of the MOH's time is absorbed by the hospital, particularly in the smaller districts where there may be only one or two doctors. At present, rural medical facilities (the health centres and dispensaries) are not grouped together to form administrative units, as has been done with primary schools (although there are now plans to do so), and each is directly responsible to the MOH. Supervision of health centres and dispensaries is carried out sporadically by the MOH and various other district-level staff. In organizational terms, little distinction is made between a health centre and a dispensary: the health centre is superior in terms of staff and equipment (and has beds), but both are treated as separate and relatively autonomous clinics - health centre staff, for instance, are not expected to supervise the dispensaries in their area. In addition, the larger and better-equipped health centres - those that can spare both the transport and the staff - send out mobile clinics. These offer a simplified version of the service available in the parent health centre, and in organizational terms can be seen simply as extensions of its activity.

The preventive and environmental services are for the most part offered through a separate public health staff under the District Health Inspector, and operating largely independently of the network of clinics and dispensaries. They are normally based in the market centres, and although in many cases they have office accommodation in a health centre, they tend to operate independently of the other staff, despite frequent admonitions (over the last twenty years) that health centre staff should "work as a team". Public health and personal service staff do come together from time to time for mass preventive measures such as vaccination campaigns, which often also involve non-health service staff such as teachers and the Administration. (Preventive services tend to be an area where the responsibilities of health centre staff and public health staff overlap.)

The organization of the mission health services can also be analyzed in terms of the organizational principles discussed in chapter five. They are clearly seen as part of the total impact of the mission on the community, and as helping to promote the main activity of the mission - i.e. proselytization - and to this extent they share many of the organizational attributes of the "central utility" model. They are run by professionals, but by ones who are clearly committed to the central aims of the mission: not simply mission doctors, but medical missionaries. Mission medical services have not developed into a semi-autonomous network as has been the case with mission primary schools. In part, mission medical services have been provided in response to actual or perceived public demand (e.g. Beck 1970: 17), but this has been a less important factor than it has either with government health services or with mission schools.

Mission health services tend to be relatively small-scale, and to consist largely of individual medical units attached to mission stations (although sometimes the relationship may be the other way around). Some of the larger units, especially the hospitals proper, may have a ring of satellite dispensaries, but missions do not usually attempt a comprehensive geographical coverage of an area. There will usually be some government facilities in the area, and there is some coordination between the government service and the missions over the expansion of health services - the government is unlikely to open a facility if there is a mission one there already - but mission centres are often remote from the main government stations, and in general their service pattern is not closely integrated with that of the government.

With the private sector, it is difficult to speak of its organization, since it is not organised as a distinct service, but consists of a number of independent operators, with almost no formal links between them. The government has not sought to integrate them closely into its service, although the Vice-President did imply in 1972 that in future, work permits for foreign medical practitioners would be granted only for the rural areas (EAS, 28 August 1972). Their contact with the government service at the district level is minimal: Western-style doctors are registered in Nairobi (and have to register only once), while traditional and quasi-traditional practitioners are accorded no recognition and make contact with the government only when an unsuccessful treatment leads to prosecution.

Western-style doctors are concentrated in Nairobi and Mombasa, with only a scattering in the larger towns of rural Kenya. Those that do practise outside the two main cities are generally Asians, but there are now a number of African private practitioners, especially in Central Province. Most run small one-surgery practices, but many have now set up one or more satellite dispensaries in the rural areas, usually locating them in the townships or market centres. They are staffed by medical assistants whose relationship with the sponsoring doctor seems to vary from that of a conventional employee to something like a franchise holder, paying the doctor for the use of his name. Apart from Western-style practitioners, there is also a large number of people who practise some form of medicine. Most would not practise full-time, nor would they seek to make a living out of it. They are often described as traditional healers, but in many cases they have added certain Western medical techniques, such as injections, to their repertoires.

Non-officials have exercised a direct influence on the service through two main channels: the county councils, and self-help. The county councils were up to 1970 the statutory local health authorities under the Public Health Act, a responsibility that had been imposed on the ADCs in 1958. The central government MOH became a council official, but like the DEO was not formally seconded to the council and remained a central government official in every respect. Moreover, unlike the DEO, he was regarded as being only on part-time attachment to the council, with the bulk of his time being spent on non-council matters (mainly concerned with the district hospital) on which he reported directly to his ministry superiors. This, together with the professional mystique of the doctor, meant that the MOH was in a stronger position vis-a-vis the Health Committee than was the case with the Education Officer and his committee.

Consequently, it is more accurate to speak of county council support for the central government health services - support in the form of funds, building sites and local cooperation - than of a council service as such. In return for this support, councillors were able to exert considerable influence in several important decision-making areas, notably the siting of new facilities: here, the council Health Committee had to establish an order of priorities among competing claims for service and hence became a focus for political conflict, often between its own members. In general, councillors did not attempt to influence the precise form of the service offered in health centres and dispensaries. They did try to intervene, however, when the service did not meet general expectations of governmental performance: unusual absenteeism or rudeness to patients on the part of health centre or dispensary staff, for instance, or the non-supply of drugs, but not the ineffectiveness of the service per se.

With the transfer of functions, the Health Committee lost its most significant powers and was subsequently replaced by a combined Education and Health Committee. This was only advisory and commanded no enthusiasm among councillors (it had been established at the direction of the Ministry of Local Government), and the committees meet rarely or, in some cases, not at all. Councillors were less interested in a consultative role in the running of the service than in being able to exercise real influence over the allocation of resources.

This sort of influence is often sought through self-help. A self-help health centre, as has been pointed out, is not a distinct service, but a means of access to the government service. Its aim is to attract a government commitment to take over the building and open a clinic there. Up to 1970, self-help activity was directed at the council as much as the government, but since the transfer it has all focussed on the MOH, who has now lost the shield of the Health Committee and has to confront client demands directly, in ways that will be discussed below. With health services as with other services (see chapter five), self-help is a means of integrating officials and non-officials in a single service structure, but the professionals most directly concerned - i.e. the MOHs -

generally try to avoid involvement in this structure. The official participation tends to come from the Administration, especially the chiefs, who can find in the self-help health centre an officially-acceptable focus for self-help activity. The impact of self-help on the service will be discussed below.

There is, therefore, a marked dominance of professionals in the organization of the health service, but this does not necessarily mean that it resembles the applied science of our analytical model. The professionals are mostly officials, with a role in the service hierarchy as well as a professional role. And those who are not officials are private practitioners, with an interest in attracting clients. These other pressures, therefore, tend to press aspects of the service organization towards the government utility or contracting machine model. It is true, though, that clients occupy a relatively insignificant position in the organizational structure. This is partly due to the mystification with which doctors surround their role, and the respect in which they are held, and partly because of the absence of clear criteria for patients to assess the service - the death of a patient, for instance, can be seen as evidence of the seriousness of his complaint rather than of the ineffectiveness of the service. Health services are therefore further from the model of the contracting machine, and closer to the applied science, than is education, for instance, but the organizational pattern is still fairly mixed.

## Service definition

Although various people within the health services do from time to time pronounce public definitions of their function, the most satisfactory definition, as with primary education, is that drawn by inference from the actual activities of those working in the field. The dominant voice in health service definition is that of the doctor - a reflection of the dominance of professionals within the service structure and the general deference which they command among laymen. They have been trained (either in Kenya or overseas) in Western-style medicine, and tend to see their role largely in terms of responding to the complaints of individuals who present themselves for treatment: the doctor intervenes, and restores the patient to health. The more complex and difficult the intervention, the higher the status of the practitioner. Hence complex surgery (such as heart transplants) commands the highest respect, and tasks not involving intervention (such as preventive and environmental) the lowest. Of the 115 doctors who registered for the first time in Kenya in 1966 (the last year for which an Annual Report has been produced), 69 had basic qualifications, 41 had postgraduate qualifications in one of the branches of personal medicine (including surgery), and 5 were qualified in preventive and environmental health. In 1965 there had been none in this latter category (Ministry of Health 1966: 97).

The fact that doctors have been trained in techniques requiring special equipment or hospital care inclines them to see the development needs of the health services in terms of the provision of more sophisticated institutional care (e.g. the massive expansion of the Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi), an inclination which is reinforced by their membership of the social group which stands to benefit most from these services, the urban elite. Consequently, despite a slight shift of emphasis in favour of rural services, the urban health services absorb a very high proportion of capital spending, and presumably (since no breakdown of expenditure is published) a similarly disproportionate amount of recurrent spending. This perception of the service as being essentially concerned with personal medicine percolates down to the sub-professional staff, notably the medical assistants, who usually wear white coats, often carry stethescopes and are commonly (especially in rural areas) called "doctor" by their patients.

But although the service definition stresses personal medicine, there is still a definite, though clearly secondary, role allocated to preventive and environmental services. These are mostly the responsibility of a separate public health staff, with its own body of knowledge and qualifications, essentially derived from Western experience. They are most effective in urban areas, where they deal with such matters as sanitation and shop and market hygiene. Their role in rural areas varies, and probably depends largely on the extent to which they are given specific instructions and supervision by the District Health Inspector and the MOH. Their responsibilities include a good deal of what might be termed domestic hygiene - e.g. pure water supplies, latrine construction - but the evidence suggests that they tend to concentrate their activities on the townships and market centres. One recent study found that health assistants spent 50% of their time in meat inspection alone, and one former MOH said "They shouldn't be called health inspectors: they are just meat inspectors". This tendency of public health staff to redefine the service in fairly narrow environmental terms is reinforced by their social position: they tend to be absorbed into market place society, and may even become traders themselves.

With health centre and dispensary staff concentrating on personal services, and public health staff on environmental measures, preventive services tend to be neglected. As well as being peripheral to the main concerns of the field staff, they attract little professional interest (as the figures quoted on p. 230 indicate) and even less public support. Consequently, they tend to operate spasmodically, with occasional mass innoculation campaigns characterized by a very high level of activity, and much longer periods of relative inactivity.

This pattern of service definition which emerges from the service itself is reinforced by a very clear client preference for personal services: as one doctor put it, "There are no votes in vaccinations". Where public representatives can gain access to the decision-making process, they press for more (and better) points for the distribution of personal medical service. They do this not only because of the benefits to be gained in terms of welfare (people value the service even if it is not technically effective, because they feel that something is being done about their problem) and the great public demand for the service (as evidenced by the massive queues at most centres), but also because a new health centre is a visible, tangible prize in the competition for government resources, and both incumbent and aspirant political leaders seek the credit for having attracted one to their area.

In general, then, the service is defined as being essentially concerned with delivering personal medical services through fixed service points. As one MOH put it, "After all, 'prevention' only deals with a limited number of complaints." There tends to be a clear distinction between the personal service and the preventive and environmental services, and although in theory health centres are meant to combine all health services in the one organization, in practice this has not been the case. The non-governmental services - the missions and the private sector - reinforce this service definition, being almost exclusively concerned with personal services (public health being left to the government).

While this sort of definition was originally laid down by professionals, it has been accepted with some enthusiasm by clients, and has the implicit support of the Administration. Many professionals now feel that it represents, at best, a poor man's version of urban, Western-style health services, is probably technically ineffective, and that the available resources would be better employed on more widespread preventive and environmental services. The main obstacle to such a redefinition, however, is the clients and their representatives: "there are no votes in vaccinations". The apparent dominance of the professional in service definition is, therefore, misleading: the health services are not defined in the manner of the applied science. The professionals' definition has been bastardized and captured by the clients, and attempts by individual professionals to change substantially the nature of the service have met with little success.

## Resources

The aspects of the resources question with which we are mainly concerned are first, the total flow of public resources to the service, and secondly, the implications of this pattern of resource allocation for service control. When the counties were responsible for rural health services, their total expenditure on them, according to the figures in the Economic Survey, rose from £860,000 in 1964 to £1,453,000 in 1969 (£851,000 to £1,286,000 in constant prices*), although as a proportion of total expenditure it remained fairly constant at approximately 9% (see table 9, p.306 ). In the same period, though, council expenditure on primary education rose from £4,957,000 to £9,940,000 (£4,908,000 to £8,796,000 in constant prices), or from 55% to 62% of the total. The figures for total government expenditure (ie. including the central government and the urban local authorities) show a similar pattern, with expenditure on health services stable at about 9% and the proportion devoted to primary education rising. As county council expenditure accounts for less than 20% of this total, these figures indicate that health services were accorded roughly the same priority by all levels of government, and that this priority remained constant while that given to primary education rose.

In the 1973/4 Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure, however, net expenditure for the Ministry of Health was £87,000 less than the previous year, and the proportion of the total budget fell to 7.8%. A note to the estimate (p. 60A) stated:

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* The figures given in the Economic Survey are in current prices. These have been converted to (fairly crude) constant (July 1964) prices by the use of the Wage Earners' Index of Consumer Prices in Nairobi (Statistical Abstract, 1970, table 198) and the Lower Income Index of Consumer Prices (Statistical Abstract, 1971, table 220). The annual index is in each case calculated for December of the year in question, while the base prices are for July 1964 - hence the apparent paradox whereby the expenditure for 1964 expressed in constant (1964) prices is lower than the current price figure.

> The decrease is the result of a general imposition of economy measures to contain overall expenditure within the limit which the resources of the country can sustain.

At the same time, the provision for Works rose by £1.4m (attributed mainly to increased expenditure on road maintenance), for Education by £2.1m, and for the Armed Forces by £1.8m. The reductions in primary school fees subsequently announced would have added a further £2m (roughly) to the net expenditure on education. This tends to confirm the impression that health services are in a fairly weak position in the competition for central resources.

Resources for health services were derived mainly from the general revenues of government, either local or central. Local authorities had been given specific-purpose grants for health when they became statutory health authorities in 1958, but these were absorbed into the general central government grants in 1964. Charges for outpatient treatment in central government hospitals and clinics were abolished in June 1965 (EAS, 2 June 1965), and the government subsequently made it clear that it regarded this change as being binding on the local authorities as well (see, for instance, the statement by the Assistant Minister for Health, NAOR (H.of R.), 13 October 1966, col. 768). Consequently, fees were relatively insignificant in service financing - the 1971/2 recurrent estimates provided for only 2.8% of Health expenditure to be covered by fees received, as against 17.8% in primary education - although the existence of fees acted as a restraint on demand, and their removal in 1965 was followed by a massive rise in outpatient attendances.

The main direct local contribution to service costs was for capital expenditure. As with primary schools, local communities are expected to raise the capital costs of health centres and dispensaries themselves, though this is a less onerous burden than in the case of education. The amount of building involved is less, for a start: an average dispensary might have one small building and one or two staff houses, whereas an average school, which serves a smaller area, would need at least five or six classrooms, a similar number of houses, and possibly an office for the headmaster. Moreover, health centres and dispensaries tend to be constructed of permanent materials; this means that initial construction costs are high, but it also means that there is not the same call for further contributions to renew bush-material buildings or to replace them with permanent-materials ones, as is the case with schools. This partly explans why the health service, unlike primary education, does not have a permanent structure for local fund-raising. The health services, unlike education, are discontinuous, and taken up in small and separate fragments: the man who uses the service today may not do so tomorrow, and clients as such do not form an identifiable group in the way that parents of school children do. Environmental services have a more continuous impact, but a less perceptible one, which does not clearly demarcate people as being clients of the service. For this reason it is difficult to extract regular contributions from the services' clients, particularly after fees for treatment had been abolished. Local fund-raising for health services tends to take the form of isolated campaigns, directed at the community as a whole, and with a single goal such as building (or completing) a specified health centre. It is becoming increasingly common for these campaigns to be organized by the chief, and for contributions to be straight cash donations of a fixed amount prescribed by the chief or the campaign committee, and hence to be in essence a form of unofficial local taxation.

The resource pattern of non-governmental services is more complex. The government makes grants to missions for health services, but for most of this period the grants were very small and not related systematically to service costs. To a greater degree, probably more so than with primary education, missions draw on outside resources, especially for the support of expatriate staff. As with the government service, local contributions to the capital costs of new buildings are expected, and in addition fees are charged for services, which a number of councillors and chiefs told me was the main reason why people do not accept mission services as an alternative to government ones. (Given that people do use fee-charging private clinics, though, it would seem that the situation is rather more complicated than this, and probably relates to the general pattern of mission-community relationships as much as to the fees issue alone.) Private practitioners are of course entirely supported by client contributions in the form of fees. It was extremely difficult to assess the level of these fees, and it appears that they vary greatly even within the same clinic, but in Murang'a it appeared that shs. 5/= to shs. 10/= was not uncommon.

In general, then, the financial position reflects the dependence of the health service on direct government spending, and their weakness in competing for central resources: at the best they have held their own in this competition, but there is evidence that they have started to slip behind other claimants. At the level of the individual service point, the pattern of resource provision reflects the balance between the government utility and the contracting machine elements in the service: the government retains control over the operation of the service, but at the cost of having to provide nearly all the recurrent expenditure. But there is an established role for local groups to provide the capital costs of new facilities, a role which is exploited by them to advance their claims in the competition with one another for an increased share of government resources.

Staffing

The staffing question, it will be recalled, revolves around the relative emphasis placed on expertise, on bureaucratic subordination, and on local identity. The service has, of course, almost invariably been headed at the district level by a doctor, who is professionally qualified, clearly subordinate to the ministry authorities at the national and provincial level, and usually not identified with the local community. MOHs tended to be subject to frequent transfer, partly (as with other OICs) because of staff shortages and the desire of the ministry to keep their district-level representatives free from local attachments, but also because doctors tend to see the most important and prestigious medical roles as being those performed in large hospitals, and hence tend to derive less professional satisfaction from rural health service work.

Possible variations in staffing patterns, therefore, are more likely to apply to sub-professional staff. When the county councils were formally responsible for health services, they could, in theory at least, draw such staff from three sources: those who had qualified at the formal training courses conducted by the ministry; those who had received on-the-job training at a hospital; and untrained staff who could then be given training of a more or less formal nature. In practice, formally qualified staff were scarce, and informally-trained staff often very competent and experienced. In addition, there was some pressure from councillors for council jobs to go to local people in general (and often to some specified candidate in particular). Health centre and dispensary staff, therefore, were usually from the district in which they served (though not necessarily from the locality) and tended to stay in one post for long periods; and generally they had considerable experience, but often not the formal qualifications prescribed by the government for their posts.

When the central government took over the service, all council staff were absorbed in situ into the civil service. This meant that recruitment was centralized, and staff became subject to transfer, but there was no attempt to change radically the existing staffing pattern - e.g. by inter-district transfers on a large scale. The 1971/2 recurrent estimates listed the total staff in health centres and dispensaries as follows:

Table 7: Health centre and dispensary staff

| Category | Number | % of total |
|---|---|---|
| Medical Assistants | 78 | 1.8 |
| Enrolled Nurses | 410 | 9.2 |
| Health Inspectors | 7 | 0.2 |
| Health Assistants | 332 | 7.5 |
| Subordinate Staff | 2,108 | 47.4 |
| Ungraded Staff* | 1,200 | 27.0 |
| All Others | 310 | 6.8 |
| | 4,445 | |

* This category would include most of the unqualified nurses and dressers taken over from the county councils; lower-level ex-council staff, such as attendants, would probably be classed as subordinate staff.

The standard complement of staff prescribed by the ministry provides for a health centre to be headed by a medical assistant and a dispensary to be headed by an enrolled nurse, but these figures confirm that this is not possible: at this time there would have been roughly 550 health centres and dispensaries in operation, so that even if all the qualified clinical staff (medical assistants and enrolled nurses) were evenly distributed (which they are not), there would still not be enough to staff every centre. One study of rural health units, done in 1969-70, found that only one health centre out of twenty-two had the standard complement of staff, and only fifteen were headed by a medical assistant (ILO 1972:215). In theory, diagnosis and prescription can only be done by the qualified staff, but this is not always possible: in some places there are no qualified staff, and even in centres where there are, the workload is too high to allow the luxury of diagnosis by only qualified staff.

The ministry's response to this situation has been to approve a considerably expanded training programme to provide a flow of new staff to rural health centres and dispensaries, but it cannot be assumed that this will lead to any easing of the staff shortage in the immediate future. The training period is very long (3½ years for both medical assistants and enrolled nurses), the wastage rate is high, and there will also be a parallel increase in the number of health centres and dispensaries. Nor can it be assumed that all, or even a substantial proportion, of the newly-trained will be posted to rural clinics: most of the thirty registered medical assistants who graduated in 1972 from the Nakuru Medical Training Centre were posted to hospitals, and it was understood that the ministry felt that they would still need further training before they could be posted to head rural health centres.

The ministry has resisted suggestions for the dilution of qualified staff by the introduction of a level of qualifications below that of Enrolled Nurse. In 1972, a private member's motion was introduced into the National Assembly calling for a crash programme of training to produce less-skilled auxiliaries to man the self-help health centres. In opposing it, the Assistant Minister for Health said that it would be dangerous for staff with less than three and a half years' training to handle drugs; moreover, international recognition of Kenyan qualifications, which meant that Kenyan-trained nurses "could work anywhere in the world", had to be safeguarded (Daily Nation, 8 July 1972). The second part of his argument is an interesting example of the priorities and values of Nairobi decision-makers: the extension of health services in rural areas must not be allowed to jeopardize the esteem in which Kenya was held by international bodies.

In conclusion, it may be said that the effect of the transfer of functions has been to bring the separate district services under central control, and to make staff subject to central civil service conditions of service (e.g. transferability), and to this extent indicates a shift away from contracting machine aspects of organization towards the government utility model. But at the same time, there has been no attempt to use this central control to break up local links or substantially change the nature of local staff in any other way. The service has followed the professional norms of the applied science in stressing the need for more highly-qualified staff, even at the expense of an increase in numbers. (There may even be a decrease in the annual output of medical assistants as the lower-level Certified Medical Assistant course is phased out.) The proposal for dilution of the service was rejected on strict professional grounds, such as the esteem of the medical profession outside Kenya. The training programme appears to be aimed at new recruits to the service, who can be more readily inculcated with approved skills and values, rather than at upgrading the unqualified staff already in the service. But because of the time lag involved in the training programme, and the concomitant expansion of services, it is unlikely that there will be a substantial change in the immediate future. The consequence is likely to be the continued enunciation of "professional" principles of staffing in policy statements, accompanied by a tacit acceptance of the fact that these are of little application at the bottom of the service hierarchy.

## Service points

The basic outline of service operation is implicit in the previous discussion of service organization and definition: the core of the service is the single service point, offering personal medical treatment (usually remedial) to individuals who present themselves for treatment. Most of these points are run by the government, but while they may be termed a "network" in organizational terms, they operate as individual units. In theory, complex cases which cannot be adequately treated at one level are referred up to the next - from dispensaries to health centres, and from health centres to hospitals - but in practice this seldom happens. This is partly because of the lack of transport at the lower levels of the service, partly because of the tendency towards the routinisation of service discussed below. More commonly, patients will refer themselves, either by taking themselves to a higher-level institution if they are not satisfied with the treatment received at a lower one, or by going directly to the higher-level institution (usually the district hospital) if they feel that their complaint is a more serious one.

A number of hospitals and health centres also run mobile clinics, which operate in much the same manner as dispensaries, giving remedial care to individuals who present themselves at the appointed place; they tend, however, to have a fairly low rank in the service's priorities, and are subject to cancellation when transport, staff or funds are scarce - which is frequently. There are also preventive and environmental services, which operate independently of the clinical services, under their own staff and deriving most of their impetus from the role-conception of their own staff and from such supervision and direction as comes down from the district level.

The actual administration of treatment in health centres and dispensaries tends to be highly routinized. There are wide variations in the workload of different centres, and in some cases - mostly dispensaries in less developed areas - the number of patients treated per day is relatively small. In the more developed areas, though, and at the level of the health centre and above, the number of patients seeking treatment is large, the time allotted to each is short (often averaging between one and two minutes), and the range of drugs available for treatment fairly small. Clinic staff, who accept the "interventionist" role-perception of the doctor (see p. 230), therefore tend to quickly classify patients into a small number of standard complaints, for which there are standard treatments. (While this analysis has dealt mainly with the government services, there is no evidence suggesting that mission health centres and dispensaries, or private dispensaries, operate significantly differently, although private doctors presumably have a wider range of alternative diagnoses and treatments to draw on.)

This standardization of treatment is a form of packaging, but a complex one, and a more detailed analysis is warranted. It springs from the very heavy client pressure for service, and for service of a particular kind: personal therapy, including the prescription of some sort of drug or injection. The service officials concede the validity of the demand and attempt to meet it (rather than by suggesting, for instance, that greater commitment to preventive and environmental services would do more to promote health than further personal care). In the applied science, control over the actual service dispensers is exercised by common commitment to professional norms and the common training service staff have received: in this case, however, the professionals supervising the service could place little faith in either the training or the professional commitment of the sub-professional staff running the health centres and dispensaries. At the same time, the controls that might have been expected in the government utility - the imposition by the centre of standard procedures, with various forms of returns and inspection to ensure that they are used - did not appeal to service officials. What they tend to do, therefore, is to use their control of the drug supply to limit the freedom of action of health centre and dispensary staff: by not supplying certain types of drug to them, and by rationing the drugs that are supplied on a monthly basis. This limited the possible damage that these staff could do, but also increased the likelihood of highly routinised, almost ritualistic, treatment.

Packaging did not extend, however, to the linking of the different sorts of health service - e.g. making the acceptance of certain preventive measures the condition of the provision of further personal services. This has been attempted on occasion: one mission hospital in West Pokot sent out mobile child care clinics and insisted that the mothers who attended should receive instruction on nutrition and similar subjects (including pleas for them to bring their children to the clinic every week, and not just when they were sick), before any personal medical care would be provided. The patients duly attended the lectures, but in a ritualistic way, neither bringing their children regularly as requested nor perceptibly altering their pattern of nutrition. Whatever the reasons for their reluctance (and while they are too complex and too marginal to be discussed here, it should be stressed that I am not implying that this is an example of the "natural conservatism" of pastoral peoples), it was clear that unpopular measures were not more readily accepted for being linked with popular ones.

What this suggests, therefore, is that while the basic operating norms of the service may resemble those of the applied science, it has to work within constraints of staffing and client demand more characteristic of the contracting machine. The basic pattern of internal control is of the applied science type, in that procedures derive from the imputation of a certain level of professional skills among subordinate staff, and that when these are felt to be wanting, there is a reluctance to impose the formal bureaucratic controls more characteristic of the government utility. The existence of a very precise pattern of client demand limits the scope of professionals to present a packaged service. While the breaking down of clinical treatment into standard procedures is a form of packaging, it is one which springs from the nature of client demand and the technical limitations of the service structure rather than from a professional view of what constitutes a coherent and appropriate service. Where professionals do attempt to present a packaged service of the latter type, which combines elements desired by clients with other elements which are not desired, clients are able to break up the package and reject the undesired elements. The professional norms, therefore, are more limited in their operational effect than is commonly supposed.

## Service agency and service structure

The health services deal with a great many "outsiders" as patients, but there is little contact through other institutional channels. Within the government health services (which provide the bulk of the service), officials have little need to call on other officials for service inputs, except to some degree for client contact: the service itself is relatively self-contained. Health service officials do interact socially with other officials, especially on small stations, where they form part of a small government community (whereas a primary school tends to be more isolated, and to form a community in itself). This social interaction is reflected in the privileged access to clinical treatment often given to civil servants, such as the "senior civil servants clinics" at district hospitals. Apart from this, though, these links with other civil servants do not lead to particular sorts of policy pressures on the service, and the agency/structure question is largely concerned with the relationships between service officials on the one hand, and clients and client representatives (who may include other officials) on the other. There are two main aspects to it: the sort of contact that occurs over the ordinary operation of the service, and the contact that is concerned with service expansion.

In the ordinary operation of the service, there is little contact between service officials and "outsiders" apart from the practitioner-patient relationship. There appear to be a number of reasons for this. First, the service itself makes few demands on clients - compared, for instance, to the demands made on the parents of primary school children.

Secondly, the personal services are seen by both officials and clients as being technical matters on which outsiders are not competent to express an opinion. As the President remarked in another context: "There are not many of us, I would hope, who would presume to tell a doctor how and where to operate on a sick person" (quoted in Gertzel 1966: 213). Given that there are few objective criteria for effectiveness of treatment given (cf. primary education) and that the form of service offered is in accord with people's expectations, it is not surprising that there is little client pressure on this aspect. And the preventive and environmental services, which might be thought to affect the community as a whole and therefore to provoke a common response and a demand for involvement, are seen as a punitive imposition of the government rather than a benefit; those directly affected (e.g. market traders) seek to minimize their impact on them by evasion, but few feel competent to challenge the "technical" knowledge on which they are based.

Finally, officials who might feel that more client participation in service operation was desirable would probably be discouraged from pressing this point by the fear that to expose the service to client pressure on this aspect of its operation might also make it more vulnerable to expansionary pressures - i.e. for the takeover of self-help health centres. For these reasons, therefore, in the ordinary operation of the service, the officials are relatively untroubled by outsiders.

Questions of expansion, however, are seen as much more important, not only because of the benefits which people hope to gain from additional health centres in terms of welfare, but also because such centres become counters in political competition. As has been noted (pp. 227-8), the councils' Health Committees were less concerned with monitoring the day-to-day running of the existing centres than with determining the location of the next centre. Hence there has been little interest in the advisory Education and Health committees which councils have been directed to establish since the transfer of functions.

The main channel of outsider contact with officials over service expansion is self-help. The initiative for a self-help health centre comes usually from a local influential - the chief, the councillor, or the MP - but sometimes directly from the middle-level members of the Provincial Administration - DOs, and on occasion, DCs. As has been pointed out earlier (pp. 160-7), self-help projects fulfil many functions, and the building of self-help centres is not simply (or even primarily) undertaken to further the spread of medical care. The Administration and CD staff, having received instructions from Nairobi to limit the building of self-help secondary schools, have for some years been encouraging the building of self-help health centres as an acceptable alternative. Funds are raised in a number of ways - often through public fund-raisings conducted with much ceremony, and including donations from visiting dignitaries; increasingly, however, a fixed rate of contribution is levied by the chief on each household and collected through the sub-chiefs.

The involvement of service officials, though, is marginal. In theory, health centre projects have to be approved by the MOH (either at the start or when they come up before the DDC for approval), but this does not represent a major hurdle.

Sometimes the formal requirement is quietly ignored, or a claim may be made that the project was approved by the county council when it was the health authority, or that approval was given orally by some official who has since left the district. But usually such subterfuges are unnecessary since health service officials (mostly, in this case, MOHs) are reluctant to intervene to check this process. They tend to take one of two postures. Either they recognize the political implications of their activities and accept the role of political negotiator, attempting to secure agreement on priorities for expansion (thereby accepting the inevitability of constant expansion). Or they retreat to a passive role, defining their task in such a way as to exclude most self-help activity. Their definition may be professional ("I am a doctor, but this is all politics: it doesn't concern me") or organizational ("I have enough trouble running the services we have without worrying about all the ones we might have; I leave all that to the ministry - they're the planners").

In either case, underlying this sort of defence is a recognition of the strength of the pattern of political organization of which each project is a part. Some are content to recognize this: one A/MOH explained that he thought it better to allow projects to go ahead rather than "kill the self-help spirit", and that as the average project took five years to come to fruition, service officials had ample time to fit it into their own plans. Others simply despair: "What do you do?", said another MOH, "Tell them to stop?". The fact that MOHs stay only a short time (on average) in each district also strengthens the tendency to opt out of the planning role. When the county councils were the health authorities, this attitude was less possible, since the MOH was a member of the effective decision-making body and hence less able to take an attitude of total unconcern: clearly, he had views and was expected to voice them. Since the transfer, it has been possible for MOHs, by not standing in the way of any self-help project, and then pleading lack of both funds and authority to take over any of them, to transfer the onus of the decision to Nairobi.

The fate of outsider initiatives presented in this way depends on the relative influence at different times of the forces supporting or opposing any particular project. There are officials within the Ministry of Health concerned with the distribution of service points who seek to apply crude measures of equity to new proposals: one PMO reported that the ministry had queried his intention to open a new dispensary on the grounds that there was already a dispensary in the same sub-location (although, as it happened, twenty miles away). But since there are so few projects approved, political considerations usually predominate over the preferences of the planners. These are not restricted to "pork-barrel" patronage of the conventional type (of which a number of examples could be cited), but also extends to alliances between field officials and Nairobi politicians to circumvent the planning process of the ministry - e.g. one official, who was instructed by the ministry to open no further facilities until the staff shortage eased, was able to evade this restriction by judicious siting of the new facilities that he did approve so that there was considerable political support, both in the local context and in Nairobi, for each (including one which began as a self-help project in the constituency of a minister and was opened by the Vice-President).

The pressure on the ministry, and its attempts to resist it, have also meant that final, definitive decisions are not taken; rather, Nairobi yields to particular pressures as they become irresistible. Consequently, local patrons try to keep building up the pressure in the hope that eventually the authorities will capitulate: the following case is unusual only in the degree of sophistication employed.

> X health centre was promoted by the local MP as a self-help project, and he had pressed the MOH and lobbied in Nairobi for it to be taken over as a government centre, but without success.
>
> He then proposed to the Provincial Medical Officer (bypassing the MOH) that the local community should employ a medical assistant and dresser, and that the government should supply the drugs. The PMO agreed on condition that it was made clear that it was not a government project and that the government would not be responsible for the salaries of the staff if local contributions were insufficient.
>
> While this proposal was being considered, the MP appeared at the district hospital with the staff he proposed to employ in the centre, and asked the MOH to interview them to confirm their suitability for the job. The MOH realized that the object of this move was to give strength to the demands that would be made in the future for these men to be employed by the government, but could find no way to avoid complying with the MP's demand.
>
> When the Minister for Finance and Planning visited the area, he was persuaded by the MP to inspect the empty building and to officially "open" the centre. In January 1973 the centre was still not operating, either as a self-help or as a government centre, but the MOH recognized it as being the first priority for expansion in the district. (Abstracted from interview notes)

With non-government services, the situation is less clear. In the case of the missions, a distinction had to be made between the church community and the community at large (from which the clients of mission health services are drawn), but it does not appear that there is more contact with either clients or the church community over the actual operation of the service than is the case with the government service. Service expansion seems to be less important in the case of mission services - possibly because the missions are seen as being poorer than the government and therefore less able to respond to expansion demands. In any case, while generalization is difficult, it does seem that where expansion does occur, more of the initiative comes from the mission and less from the community than is the case with government services.

In the private sector, a distinction has to be made between Western-trained doctors and the more "traditional" practitioners. The former have a purely commercial relationship with their client community: they open a clinic if they think there will be sufficient custom to make it pay. With the latter, though, although less is known about them, it does seem that they operate more within the context of a known set of relationships within a community, and that the treatment of any patient reflects his position in the community. This, however, is neither a clear nor a uniform pattern, and it also appears likely that it is becoming less important as Western techniques are more widely used by "traditional" practitioners.

## Conclusions

In the case of the health services, service officials have more of an advantage over non-officials than is the case in other services, because their monopoly of professional skills is enhanced with a special mystique, and the service is essentially defined in terms of the practitioner-patient relationship (a definition shared by clients and by non-professional officials), which tends to reinforce this dominance of the professional. But it is limited in a number of important respects. The lower-level field staff cannot be regulated by the sort of controls appropriate to professionals, and other control devices have to be improvised. Much of the consensus on service definition derives from the appeal of the present type of service, and it is doubtful that professionals could secure similar acceptance for a radical change in service definition. And local officials have largely opted out of the decision-making role over service expansion, preferring to leave this to the interaction between local influentials, the Administration and decision-makers in Nairobi.

It would be misleading, therefore, to see the service as an applied science simply because of the obvious predominance of doctors and clinical values within it. Its "professional" aspects operate within constraints more characteristic of the other models of service: the limitations set by clients on service definition and presentation, which are more characteristic of the contracting machine, and the control of non-professionals in the governmental structure (official and non-official) over the expansion process, which is more characteristic of the government utility. The influence of the county council had largely been felt over questions of service expansion, and the main consequences of the transfer of functions was that decisions were made not by a formal body (i.e. the Health Committee) but by an informal, and no less political, process of interaction between officials and influentials at both local and national levels.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

## ROADS

The construction and maintenance of roads is a service which differs in a number of important respects from primary education and health services. It is often described by policy-makers in Kenya as being essentially an "economic" service, whereas education and health services are seen as being "welfare" services. This distinction, though, is not necessarily shared by the public and even aid agencies such as the World Bank are now placing an increasing stress on "welfare" criteria for aid. The distribution of the service is also inherently different. Its benefits are more diffuse: they accrue in the first instance to an area rather than to specific individuals, and although the benefits are then taken up in different ways and to differing degrees by individuals, there is still no clearly identifiable client group, as there is with schools and health centres. The service is distributed through mobile teams rather than fixed points, and consequently with less certainty of its continued supply: a community which has a government health centre can be reasonably certain that it will continue to offer a service in the foreseeable future, whereas a road maintenance team can be moved to another area at any time. Finally, a much clearer distinction between county council road operations and central government ones had been made in the period 1963-69, and the organisational impact of the transfer of functions was consequently much greater.

### Organization

From 1963 to 1969, the Ministry of Works was legally responsible for the construction and maintenance of trunk* roads, the county councils for secondary* and minor* roads, and area and urban councils for unclassified roads. In addition, county councils were entitled to maintain, at their discretion, any unclassified roads within their boundaries.

The central government's responsibilities were carried out by the Roads Branch of the Ministry of Works, either directly, or in some cases by a county council acting as the agent of the ministry. Most new construction was carried out by private contractors under tender to the ministry. The Roads Branch was a small organization and its road responsibilities were also relatively small (amounting in 1963 to some 6,169 km. of road) with about 25-30% being bitumen.

It was a highly professional organisation, with professional engineers in charge in both the Nairobi HQ and the provincial offices. Both policy and operational control were relatively centralized, with only responsibility for routine maintenance being delegated below the ministry, and then only to the provincial level. (The provinces of the Roads Branch, both before and after the transfer of functions, have been its own creation, drawn up in accordance with its functional needs, and do not correspond to the provinces as used by the Provincial Administration and other ministries.)

It also had strong outside links: most of its professional staff were expatriate, and even those who were not had all been trained overseas - in the UK, US or USSR. Increasingly, it developed close links with a number of aid-giving bodies, particularly the World Bank, and learned to speak their language, attracting a good deal of foreign aid for its development programme. Its success in attracting these outside resources also helped it to maintain a certain distance between itself and both client representatives, and non-professionals in the central political and bureaucratic elite: because it was able to put through a massive trunk roads programme, it was better able to satisfy the expectations of local representatives without having to entertain specific requests, and because it was able to finance much of its expansion by foreign aid, was in a stronger position than many ministries in the competition for central resources.

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* using the terms in the lay sense; they also have a specific meaning in the various classifications used by the ministry.

In general, therefore, it resembled the applied science model of organization in many important respects, notably the domination of professionals in the organization, and the shared commitment throughout the organization to a common core of scientific knowledge in the form of the accepted procedures for defining the task, carrying it out, and coping with problems. Its insulation from clients (and hence from the "contractor" role) was reinforced by the definition of its task as covering only trunk roads, which meant that a great many particularist client demands could not come to the ministry in any case. And its ability to present complete plans for the development of the road network, deriving from a body of professional expertise and finding acceptance among the aid agencies, helped to insulate it from the intervention of non-professional decision-makers at the centre, both administrators and politicians, and hence from the government utility role.

The road organizations of the thirty-three county councils, which between them were responsible in 1963 for approximately 35,754 km. of classified roads and an unknown length of unclassified ones, operated in a quite different fashion. They were entirely separate units, with few institutionalized links between the various councils, and not a great deal of contact between the ministry and the councils. The ministry did make periodic checks on the standard of council maintenance on grant-aided roads, and occasionally deferred payment of further grants until standards were improved, but it appears that the close supervision of councils (especially ADCs) carried out in the 1950's by the Road Authority (which both loaned staff to ADCs and created the Local Authority Inspectorate to advise them and to train staff for them) was not carried on after independence (see Road Authority Annual Report 1960/61: 2).

Each council appointed a single Works Officer (the title varied) who was responsible to the Works Committee of the council. It was not unknown for a professional engineer to be appointed (Murang'a CC, for instance, had a professional County Engineer from 1965 to 1967), but generally they were sub-professionals with varying qualifications and experience. The fact that council road organizations were small meant that they could not offer a career structure, as the ministry could, and works officers tended to be oriented towards their council rather than to some more widely-perceived profession or career, a tendency which was reinforced by the fact that councils usually selected men from their own areas as works officers.

The internal structure of a council works organisation appears to have been fairly simple: there would be a number of road gangs stationed at road camps throughout the county, and a number of pieces of road plant - graders and trucks - and their crews. The works officer was usually the direct superintendent of all roads operations, inspecting work and giving oral instructions to both gang foremen and grader drivers. In some cases, though, more extensive responsibility for a given area was delegated to a road foreman, and a couple of councils had a more complex formal structure - notably Sirikwa CC, which covered five districts and had succeeded to the more elaborate maintenance structures of the European county councils of Uasin Gishu and Kitale. The councils, therefore, were much closer to the contracting machine model in their organization, relatively isolated from both the central politico-administrative elite and the service professionals in the Ministry of Works.

Apart from that of the ministry and the county councils, there was very little other organised road work in rural areas. Area councils were responsible for the maintenance of unclassified roads, but had no road organization of their own. Usually they voted funds from the proceeds of their poll tax for particular roads to be maintained, and were charged an hourly rate by the county council, whose road teams actually did the work. In the colonial period, many roads were maintained by compulsory unpaid labour at the direction of the chief, but this was very unpopular and appears to have fallen into disuse by 1963. No attempt was made to revive this practice after independence, although some of the self-help road projects launched since then probably amount to the same thing. There is, however, relatively little self-help road work, the reasons for which will be discussed below. The only other significant source of road work is the foreign contractor: there are a number of foreign firms building major roads for the Ministry of Works, and they are often approached by chiefs and occasionally other local spokesmen to lend equipment (usually a grader) for a short period to work on local roads. The contractor will accede to such requests on occasion, but not so frequently as to make this a regular or reliable source of service.

At the transfer of functions, the Ministry of Works absorbed all the staff (and all the equipment) of the county councils, but faced the problem of integrating the district-level council teams into the regular ministry structure, which was basically organized at the provincial level but which extended down below the district to the individual road gang. (This contrasted with the situation in the other two services in which, broadly speaking, the ministry offered services down to the district level and the counties offered the services below that: with roads there was an overlap.) An international firm of business consultants (INBUCON) had already been engaged to reorganize the roads branch, and their commission was extended to take in the expansion of its responsibilities.

In the new structure, as recommended and subsequently implemented, the Roads Department (as it became) retained the province as its basic unit of organization (again, not corresponding to the province as used elsewhere), but integrated the district as a subordinate level of organization under a District Roads Inspector (or sometimes only a District Roads Foreman). In addition, between the province and the district was interposed the division. These divisions, not to be confused with the administrative divisions (sub-districts) of other ministries, are groupings of about three districts, created with the intention of ultimately delegating to this level some of the controls (notably financial) now exercised by the province. Districts were then divided into localities, each one containing a road camp, a road gang under a road foreman, and approximately 150 km. of classified road. Road gangs appear to be permanently assigned to their locality, but plant can be moved from one locality to another at the discretion of the officer in charge at the district level.

One question which was left uncertain after the transfer was responsibility for unclassified roads. The Ministry of Works made it quite clear that it saw itself as having acquired responsibility only for classified roads, and that the unclassified roads remained the responsibility of either the county councils or of local self-help groups. This was confirmed by official statements - e.g. that of the Assistant Minister for Works on 7 April 1972 (NAOR, 7 April 1972, cols 508-9). But more recently there has been some evidence of a softening of the ministry's posture: for instance, a marginal note to the Ministry of Works vote in the 1973/4 Recurrent Estimates (p.72A) says that the increase of £1,446,000 over the previous year's vote

> is mainly attributable to increase under Subhead 118 -Maintenance of Roads to cater for increased routine maintenance work and maintenance of former Local Authorities unclassified roads.

One organizational response to the question of unclassified roads was the establishment of District Works Committees (DWCs). These were set up at the direction of the Ministry of Local Government, consisted of three county councillors and the district roads OIC under the chairmanship of the DC, and were charged with drawing up a list of the more important unclassified roads in the district and the cost of maintaining them. The committees (with the exception of the Roads Department representative) approached the task with some enthusiasm. It was not clear whether they were supposed to calculate the marginal cost of a ministry take-over of these roads, or the cost of establishing a new road organization to reconstruct and maintain them, and one district's estimate of the amount required came to twice the provincial budget for routine maintenance.

In any case, no further action followed: the Ministry of Local Government was unable to persuade the Treasury to make any funds available to construct and maintain the recommended roads, and the Ministry of Works was unreceptive to the idea, insisting that recommendations for the take-over of unclassified roads were being adequately dealt with by the existing channel of DDCs and Provincial Development Committees and that no good purpose was served by the new bodies. In any event, the committees met once or twice to draw up their shopping list, and then subsided into inactivity.

More recently, there has been a proposal for Rural Access Roads Units (RARUs) to offer a lower-grade and more intermittent service for unclassified roads. The details of this proposal have not yet been made public, but the general intention is to create a road maintenance organisation which can do some work on unclassified roads without having to keep to the ministry's standards, and at the same time, provide some rural employment at times when demand for agricultural labour is low. The intention is to have a small core of skilled staff - a supervisor, a couple of foremen, and one or two drivers - permanently employed, but to recruit the remainder as required on daily rates which would be close to the prevailing rates for agricultural labour. The unit would be located within the ministry, but would be distinct from the regular maintenance organisation, and the actual selection of work tasks would be done by the DDC. The government announced in its Sessional Paper on Employment (no. 10 of 1973) that these units would be established, but this has not yet been implemented.

With roads, therefore, the organizational implications of the transfer of functions were considerable, for it brought into sharper contrast the conflict between different organisational principles which had previously been largely segregated in distinct organizations. The Ministry of Works, operating a service close to the applied science model, took over the responsibilities of the county councils, which had previously been met by a service resembling more the contracting machine. The initial response was to attempt to devise an organizational structure in which the small core of professionals could retain control over the expanded service. Operational control was retained at the provincial level in the hands of the professional Provincial Roads Engineer (PRE), and the importance of the district greatly reduced. The responsibilities of the ministry were narrowly defined, and attempts to expand them were deflected into what were, in essence, arms of the Administration: the District and Provincial Development Committees. Finally, attempts were also made to devise new procedures, including computer-based systems of work recording and road standard evaluation, for retaining professional control over the actual implementation of the service on the ground.

Although the professionals were relatively successful at insulating the service in this way, non-professionals within the government became concerned at the implications of defining rigidly the boundary between service and non-service, and attempted to devise organizations which could respond in some way to local demands: first the District Works Committee, and later the Rural Access Road Units. One of the most significant organizational features of both these bodies was the dominant role given to the provincial administration: the DC chaired the District Works Committee, and the RARU was to be subject to the DDC which, even with the addition of nominated non-officials, is still dominated by the DC. There was no suggestion of moving back closer to the contracting machine: local demand was to be mediated through non-professionals in the governmental structure. It is worth noting that the main promoters of the RARU proposal have been planners within the Ministry of Finance and Planning and an expatriate engineer from a UN agency attached to the Ministry of Works, rather than professionals from within the service structure proper.

What can be seen here is the emergence of one of the themes of the government utility: that while professional knowledge is needed to operate the service, it should not be the sole decision-making criterion, and that professional decisions must always be subject to over-ruling by non-professionals. Moreover, this must apply at the local "micro" level as well as at the level of national policy-making. This will be discussed further below, but an example now might make the point clearer.

The Karapokot Division of West Pokot District had until 1970 been administered by Uganda, and this was reflected in its road network: the one classified road (which was also the main road link with Lodwar, the Turkana District HQ) ran through Uganda proper, and the extremely rudimentary bush tracks in the north-western part of the division ran out from the Ugandan town of Amudat (see figure 9, p. 267).

The DC West Pokot, anxious that his lines of communication should not be subject to the whims of the Ugandan military, sought to have reopened an old track on the Kenyan side of the border which had been constructed in the 1950s for army use but which had since reverted to bush. The Ministry of Works, however, had decided to construct a new trunk road to Lodwar running along the eastern boundary of West Pokot, which would make the old road redundant, and was not interested in opening a new road which would carry very little traffic. The Administration pressed its demand at both the district and the provincial level without success, and it was only after the Office of the President took the matter up with the Ministry of Works in Nairobi that the latter agreed to provide plant and personnel for the job. Even then, the road was not added to the classification, and the ministry did not assume responsibility for its continued maintenance.

The point here is that the ministry and the Administration were working on quite different criteria for road construction. The ministry was interested in the number of vehicles the proposed road was likely to carry while the Administration was concerned with its effect on administrative control. Hence to the ministry, the road was marginal; to the Administration, it was

Figure 9: Road access to Karapokot Division, West Pokot


Lodwar
Turkana District
UGANDA
Karapokot Division
Amudat
West Pokot District
Kapenguria
Kitale
Classified roads
old army road
other unclassified roads and tracks

of great importance. The Administration did not deny the validity of the "technical" criteria used by the ministry: it simply wanted the right to over-rule them if they did not meet the general requirement of government.

Service definition

The question of service definition is more complex, and there is less agreement about it among those concerned with the service, in the case of roads than with either of the other two services. Here, too, the divergence between different organizational principles operating within the service can be seen. In the applied science, the dominant role in service definition is that of the professionals, who use their scientific knowledge to determine the nature of the need for a service and the best way of meeting it. To a certain extent, this presumes some sort of broad service goals, some general answer (probably implicit rather than explicit) to the question "What is the road network for?". This need not be professionally-determined (indeed, strictly, cannot be determined on professional criteria), but once these broad goals have been set, the question of how they may be achieved is a matter for professional decisions. These will prescribe the type of organization required, and the precise extent of its responsibilities ensure that these are matched by its capacity. In the applied science, there is a stress on scientific measurement of service needs, such as traffic censuses and calculations of internal rates of return. The delivery of the service is planned, predictable, controlled: road maintenance is routinized, following set procedures deriving from the professional assessment of needs, and ensuring that roads are maintained up to a predetermined standard in terms of their importance.

While the applied science model is not concerned with the broader aims of the government outside the service, these are the most important aspects of service definition in the government utility. Like the applied science, it is assumed that the broad aims of the service will be set by non-professionals: it may, for instance, be seen mainly in terms of promoting certain sorts of economic activity, or as facilitating administrative activity, or it may be seen as having some other goal. But in addition, in the government utility, non-professionals have the capacity to intervene in the operation of the service to promote general central goals - for instance, to influence the allocation of service resources in accordance with a particular conception of equity. Hence while the government utility is not so concerned with the details of service definition, it does assume that the detailed arrangements made by service officials may be overridden by non-professionals on non-professional grounds, and so has less need to specify them precisely. For instance, it may allow service officials to define relatively precisely the responsibilities of the service organization, in the knowledge that it will still be possible to require the service to go beyond these boundaries should the broader needs of the central government require it.

In the contracting machine, service definition flows upwards rather than downwards: from clients to officials rather than vice versa. In this case, the function of the service is to meet client demand, and the nature of the service is therefore defined by that demand as communicated to service officials by recognized intermediaries. What the service faces is a multiplicity of small, localised demands for immediate action, rather than for a comprehensive maintenance schedule, and the service is therefore fragmented and specific rather than coherent and generalized: its responsibilities are not precisely defined, since this would enable it to evade demands made on it, and there can not be a close matching of service responsibilities with the capacity of the service to meet them.

Before the transfer of functions, there had been a sharp contrast in service definition between the central and the local road services. The service definition of the Ministry of Works closely resembles that of the applied science, operating within a framework of general central government objectives: these were expressed in terms of "development", which in rural areas usually meant the promotion of agricultural exports, though in some instances other non-professional considerations such as national prestige appeared dominant - e.g. in the construction of bitumen trunk roads to the Tanzanian border in Kajiado and South Nyanza despite the paucity of traffic. The roads for which the ministry accepted responsibility were defined in the Road Classification, and were categorized in two ways: by functional importance (A,B,C,D, or E) and by road surface and traffic count (the road grade). Traffic flows were measured, and used both for the calculation of fund allocations to provincial offices, and as the basis for allocating any given road to a higher grade or classification. Road use and economic potential were the principal norms for justifying roadwork, especially if it was to be financed by an international aid agency.

The drawing up of technical specifications for various types of road also represented an attempt to define the service in more professional terms, but the ministry was unable to relate these various specifications systematically to either of its categorizations of the road network - i.e. it could not determine that a road of a given class would be of a given technical standard. Nor was it able to routinize its maintenance operations - i.e., it responded to the most pressing needs rather than performed a regular cycle of operations - which allowed some scope for external pressure on service officials, but not to the point where the essentially official control of the process is challenged.

With the county councils, however, the service was defined largely in terms of client expectations. There was a formal distinction between classified roads, for which the county council was responsible, and unclassified roads, which were the responsibility of the area councils, but it is clear that it was not an absolute constraint on the activities of county council road gangs, who were under constant pressure from councillors and other local leaders to work on particular roads irrespective of their classification. Works Officers would usually try to resist this, and might on occasions win the support of a formal resolution in the Works Committee, but this would only strengthen the Works Officer's hand for the moment, and did not produce a recognized settlement of the dispute. The highly professional calculations of the planners in the Ministry of Works - traffic flows and internal rates of return - were not used to determine priorities and potential benefits among the council works organizations, although traffic counts might be undertaken to support a claim for reclassification put to the ministry. The service was therefore disjointed and spasmodic, with priorities being determined by the Works Officer partly in the light of the known condition of the roads, but largely in response to the pattern of pressures from councillors and other influentials.

After the transfer of functions, the ministry tried to impose a more professional pattern on local road maintenance. There was a road reclassification which was supposed to include all roads formerly maintained by the county councils (although it subsequently became clear that it did not) and road teams were under strict instruction not to do any work on unclassified roads. It was made particularly difficult to alter the classification: the ministry would only entertain proposals that had been approved by both the District and Provincial Development Committees and forwarded by the Provincial Roads Engineer, and even when they were accepted the road in question would not be added to the classification until the next full revision. The secondary roads in the Karapokot Division in West Pokot, for instance, which was transferred from Ugandan to Kenyan administration after the 1970 Reclassification was drawn up, were still not included in the 1972 Reclassification.

As had been the case before the transfer, offocials were still unable to impose a regular pattern of maintenance, but they were concerned to ensure that it was service officials rather than clients or their representatives who determined where the priorities lay. It was, however, more difficult to adhere to this goal with the former council roads than had been the case with the trunk roads. The pressures were more direct and urgent: work on a trunk road might make for a faster journey to Nairobi, but work on a local road might be necessary to make it trafficable at all, and because the benefits of the service were more immediate, the political _kudos_ to be gained from having brought them about was correspondingly greater. And service officials had less local knowledge to counter this pressure - the provincial officials were too far from the local scene, and even the district officials, having been moved in from other districts after the transfer of functions, could not speak with the same intimate knowledge as the representatives. So officials had to accommodate client pressures to a certain extent (although far less than had been the case before the transfer), and also a certain amount of pressure from the DC (who might, for instance, be concerned to have "something" done in a particular area so that it did not feel neglected by the government). To this extent, therefore, the professional pattern of service definition was modified by pressures more characteristic of the government utility and the contracting machine.

While this sort of accommodation between the ministry's service definition and the expectations of clients and other officials was at least not manifestly unworkable in the case of the classified roads, it caused major problems with the unclassified ones. Strict definition of the service's responsibilities was a key feature of the applied science service definition, and at the transfer of functions the ministry defined the unclassified roads as lying completely outside its concern. One senior official concerned with the ministry's development programme denied that there was such a thing as an unclassified road: if it was a road, it was included in the classification; if it was not classified, it could only (by definition) be a footpath. Other officials were less uncompromising, but all agreed that service officials should not be concerned with unclassified roads: they could be left to county councils or to local self-help efforts unless local people could establish through the prescribed channels that their importance warranted their takeover by the ministry. The service was, in other words, anxious to limit the extent to which service questions were politically "open".

This approach was not broadly accepted outside the ministry, for a number of reasons. The first was the intense client pressure for work to be done on particular unclassified roads, particularly in cases where roads formerly maintained (however sporadically) by the councils had been omitted from the 1969-70 reclassification. Ministry officials, where they admitted that such omissions had occurred, ascribed them to clerical errors arising from the speed with which the reclassification had to be prepared, but one PRE said that district OICs had simply been asked to nominate the roads which they thought ought to be included in the classification and that their lists had not been checked against the council schedules; in fact, a number of roads had been omitted from these lists by the ministry when it considered that there was no need to maintain these particular roads. When it was discovered that these roads had been omitted, there were vocal complaints from representatives, which in some areas (apparently only in Central Province) were sufficiently powerful to compel the ministry to restore them to the classification as temporarily classified roads, which the PRE was entitled, but not obliged, to maintain. (They regained their full status in the 1972 reclassification.)

A second reason was that the alternative ways of maintenance suggested by the ministry - the councils and self-help - were simply unworkable, for reasons that will be discussed below. The third, and most important, reason was that there was increasing pressure from central officials outside the professional core of the ministry for a different approach to road maintenance. Officials dealing with planning and rural development became concerned at the exclusion of a large number of rural roads from the possibility of any official maintenance: they recognised that only a limited number of roads could receive regular maintenance, but argued that there were many others which with a small amount of work could at least be kept trafficable, and that there should be some organizational means of doing this. This feeling was also shared by some road officials, notably those concerned with the Special Rural Development Programme (then being tested in six pilot divisions). And there was a general concern among central officials about the political implications of rising unemployment, and a hope that some of the unemployed could be absorbed in road maintenance. Consequently, there was some interest in a possible alternative approach to road work - less professional, more intermittent, more labour-intensive, and more open to local (though not necessarily client) expression of needs.

The consequence was the proposal for Rural Access Road Units (see p. 263). These have not yet been formed, and the exact approach they will take to service definition is not yet known, but it is clear that in terms of service definition, of operational style and control, and of staffing, that it will reflect the concerns, mentioned here, which gave rise to their establishment. The creation of RARUs will also have the effect of taking some of the pressure off the ministry's regular operations, although in the long term it will probably mean an increased flow of demands as district-level officials and representatives strive to have RARU-maintained roads added to the ministry's classification.

In conclusion, then, it can be seen that for roads, the question of service definition has been of critical importance. The authority which professionals had established at the centre in this regard was challenged both by client demands and by the more general interests of non-professionals in government - i.e. the principles of the applied science were challenged by those of the government utility and the contracting machine. The organizational cohesion of the ministry, and the external support on which it could draw, enabled it to resist client demands for a greater voice in service decisions, but its very success in doing this added to the concerns of non-professionals, particularly the Administration, since it undermined their ability to channel government resources to rural areas in such a way as to maintain support for the government. The consequence was the emergence of a new type of service organization to meet the demands of the non-professionals, while the professional service definition of the ministry remained. The contradiction between the alternative services had not been resolved, but had been institutionalized in a dual service.

## Resources

The resource pattern is more uniform with roads than with either of the other services: nearly all funds for the service are derived from direct budget allocations - formerly of both the councils and the government, and since 1970, from the government budget alone. In the 1950's, there was a statutory Roads Authority which collected the proceeds of the petrol tax and registration and licence fees, which it then disbursed to the Public Works Department and the local authorities on its own terms. It was reduced to advisory status in 1964 so that road spending came under the direct control of the minister, and was finally abolished in 1968. On rare occasions people are induced to collect money for road work, or turn out for a period of self-help activity on the roads, but in general road maintenance is seen as a government responsibility. The resources question therefore becomes one of budgetary priorities.

It is not easy to determine actual central government spending on roads, since the Roads Branch was grouped with a number of other activities - public buildings, aerodromes and the Government Coast Agency - in the same ministry, and the way in which the ministry's estimates are presented does not permit expenditure on roads to be separated from the total. (Personal Emoluments, for instance, are given only as a ministry total.) Nor has it been possible to obtain estimates from the Roads Department itself. The discussion that follows, therefore, is based on the budgetary provisions for the Ministry of Works as a whole, and therefore on the assumption that actual road expenditure follows broadly the same pattern; as roads clearly account for the bulk of ministry expenditure however, this is not an unreasonable assumption.

In 1963/4, the net recurrent estimate for the Ministry of Works, Communications and Power was £3.1m, slightly less than the previous year's figure because of the devolution of many public works functions to the regions. By 1968/9 the ministry, now shorn of Communications and Power, was receiving £4.1m, but the proportion of the total budget had fallen from 10.1% to 8.4%. More significant, however, was its claim on the development budget. From 1965/6 onwards, the ministry's development vote always exceeded its recurrent vote (although the total recurrent budget was usually nearly twice the size of the total development budget), and roads claimed the largest allocation of development funds - up to a quarter of the total.

County councils received central government grants for the maintenance of secondary (but not minor) roads, and supplemented these from their general revenues. Some councils also received special-purpose grants of one kind or other: the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, for instance, paid councils in cotton-growing areas a grant calculated on the area's production: it was given for road maintenance, but was not specifically earmarked for any particular road, and no attempt was made to verify that it was in fact spent on roads. Such grants were, however, relatively few and small.

According to the figures in the Economic Survey, total county council expenditure on roads rose from £967,000 in 1964 to £1,415,000 in 1969, although the proportion of the total, which had been 10.8% in 1964 and had remained relatively stable at that level, fell to 9.6% in 1968 and 8.9% in 1969. Unlike the central government, though, the councils had almost no access to outside resources for capital expenditure: there was a Local Government Loans Authority, but few county councils were able to meet its conditions for loans. Councils were therefore limited, in effect, to maintenance of the existing road network, since it would have been difficult to prise development funds from the ordinary council budget at a time when councils were exhausting even their renewals funds.

It is almost an article of faith among central government officials today that the councils diverted road grants to other purposes. In 1967, an Assistant Minister for Works had warned county councils that "if they continued with the practice of spending money earmarked for roads on other services the Government might have to withhold grants given to them" (EAS, 16

October 1967). The question is worth examining briefly. Two types of "diversion" need to be distinguished: the use of grants for classified roads to maintain unclassified roads, the use of road grants for other purposes.

To determine if the first type of diversion was occurring, one would need to know what proportion of a council's road costs were incurred in the maintenance of classified roads, and what proportion in the maintenance of unclassified ones. To do this requires a fairly sophisticated system of work recording and cost allocation, and even the Ministry of Works does not have such a system. At present, allocations of maintenance funds to the provincial offices are calculated on the basis of the presumed needs of different categories of road, with a set rate per kilometre for each road grade, but it is not expected that the money allocated in respect of any particular road will in fact all be used on that one: the PRE is expected to maintain all roads "as required" which may involve "diverting" funds from one road to another. A more complex accounting system was recommended by the consultants who advised on the reorganisation of the ministry, and pilot schemes are now being tried in several areas: they require the use of a computer, and have met with little support among senior officials (who are not convinced of the value of the system) and with resentment among junior field staff (who resent the extra clerical work involved). It is quite likely, therefore, that road grants were "spread" in this way, but this would be almost impossible to prove.

The second type of diversion is more serious, but as the ministry's grants to county councils do not appear as a separate item on the estimates, it is difficult to investigate it on a national scale. In the two cases where I have been able to examine the council accounts in some detail (Murang'a and South Nyanza CCs), government grants covered roughly 60-80% of road expenditure, and there is some evidence that other councils were in a similar position (see, e.g. the reports of the Kiambu CC accounts - EAS, 30 November 1967 - and the statement of the financial adviser to the Machakos CC - EAS, 20 October 1967). So while it is possible that in some cases road expenditure was less than the grant, there is no evidence that the practice was widespread or that it contributed to the financial problems of the councils.

In fact, it is not necessary to set up the hypothesis of diversion of funds to explain the poor condition of council road networks (which is what usually underlay claims of diversion). Their potential responsibilities were elastic, primary education was pre-empting most of the increase in council expenditure, and inflation was eroding the true value of government road grants: in 1969, the ministry calculated that the grants covered only 50% of the cost of maintenance to a reasonable standard (see NAOR, 21 May 1969, col.22 ). And as the financial pressures increased, a council's ability to deliver an adequate service declined more than proportionately, as the financial adviser to the Machakos CC pointed out (EAS, 20 October 1967):

> About 75 per cent of the money earmarked for roads went to salaries and the remaining 25 per cent was not enough to purchase material, fuel for machinery and other requirements. Some plant was idle while the men continued to get salaries. The council could not reduce staff.

One suspects, in fact, that the "diversion" claim is really about perceptions of priorities. The Assistant Minister quoted earlier (p. 278) was clearly as much concerned with the priority that councils gave to roads as with the possible diversion of ministry grants. He went on:

> They are spending more money on schools and health services and roads are neglected.... County councils throughout the country should budget for more money to be spent on roads than what they are doing at present.
> (EAS, 16 October 1967)

One District Education Officer even claimed that councils had diverted grants from education to roads: since no specific-purpose grants were given for education, this can only be interpreted as a statement about council expenditure priorities, and the expression of his (somewhat idiosyncratic) feeling that they did not give a sufficiently high priority to education.

After the transfer of functions, ministry allocations rose in absolute terms, although as a proportion of the budget, they remained constant. The true comparison, however, is not between council expenditure before the transfer and ministry expenditure after it, but between the latter figure and projections of hypothetical expenditure for both councils and ministry with no transfer taking place. This exercise, which is carried out in the next chapter, suggests that the impact of the transfer on recurrent road expenditure has been relatively slight. More important, though, is the change in development expenditure.

Table 8: Development expenditure on roads, 1968/9 to 1971/2

| | |
|---|---|
| 1968/9 | £ 6,115,000 |
| 1969/70 | £ 8,191,000 |
| 1970/71 | £13,140,060 |
| 1971/72 | £16,431,431 |

Source: Development Estimates, 1969/70 to 1972/73, Revised or Approved Estimates.

By 1972/3, development expenditure was equal to two and a half times recurrent expenditure, and a considerable proportion was allocated to former county council roads and to the reorganization and re-equipment of the ministry necessary to cope with them. In this year, the ministry received £9,309,262 in foreign aid for road projects, of which £4,088,385 was for former county council roads and the road reorganization.

The transfer of functions has therefore meant a considerable change in the resource base for the local service, mainly because of the increased injection of development funds, including a good deal of foreign aid. This has a number of implications for the future pattern of service provision, of which two in particular should be noted. First, the massive development expenditure now taking place implies a consequent rise in recurrent expenditure, which is only just beginning to be felt (see the quotation on p. 262). Secondly, the dependence on foreign aid will be reflected in the service definition, since that part of the service which is financed by the aid will have to conform to the donor's perception of the appropriate service, and the effect of this will flow over to the service in general. At the present, this means a stress on a high-standard, capital-intensive, export-oriented service, and while some donors (notably Sweden) are beginning to look more favourably on the definition implied by the RARU pattern of organization, the definition may change without the relationship itself changing - i.e. the support that professionals in the donor agencies can give to professionals in Kenya to strengthen their assertion of the right to define the nature of the service.

## Staffing

As might be expected, the ministry has always aspired to the applied science model of staffing, with its stress on technical expertise and the dominance of the professional. Before the transfer of functions, it had a small core of professional engineers, mostly stationed in the Nairobi HQ but with a few in the provincial offices, and a good deal of authority is vested in them. (District Road Inspectors, for instance, do not administer their own budgets.) Below the professional level, there was less emphasis on formal training, and more on the in-service learning of an accepted body of skills, but the aim of generating and maintaining a common approach to problems and a common set of techniques for dealing with them remained. The county councils, on the other hand, were much closer to the contracting machine model. Their Works Officers were seldom professionals, but were almost always local, and they tended to identify with the council far more than did the other service OICs (and were, of course, the only OICs who were actually council employees). While they could not be dismissed without the consent of the Minister for Local Government, they did not enjoy the security of tenure of their counterparts in the ministry, and more junior members of the roads staff, including the foremen actually in charge of the gangs, could be dismissed on a month's notice.

This distinction, however, has to be related to the level of the organization under consideration. The ministry's professionals have always been at the national and provincial level; at the district level, both ministry and council have had sub-professional staff, with most of their skills acquired through in-service experience. And the ministry was constantly subject to pressure from generalist policy-makers in the central government (who saw road work as being totally unskilled) to absorb more of the unemployed into the road staff, especially under the two Tripartite Agreements. This sort of pressure, which is more characteristic of the central utility model, had its illegitimate counterpart in the private patronage over employment enjoyed by some ministry officials. Patronage had always been an important element in appointment to council staff, particularly road staff, but the ministry was not immune: one expatriate engineer admitted that even with relatively strict controls, there was a certain amount of "seepage" of the proteges of political influentials and ministry officials onto the ministry payroll. In general, the difference at the field level between ministry and council staff was less than the differences between the organizations as a whole might suggest.

At the transfer of functions, council roads staff were absorbed in situ by the ministry, although in several cases there were disputes over which members of the council staff actually had been employed on road work. (The Ministry refused to employ some two hundred of the roads staff presented by the Meru CC on the grounds that they had only been taken on by the council shortly before the transfer for the specific purpose of securing central government employment for them.) The more senior council staff - the works officers, and in some cases the foremen also - were transferred to other districts shortly afterwards to lessen the informal links between the service OIC and his clients. Some of the OICs were younger men who had been trained at the Kenya Polytechnic and joined the ministry in the late 1960's, but most were former council staff.

There did not appear to be any immediate change in the staffing pattern as a consequence of the transfer, but some of the INBUCON recommendations on work recording would have the effect of increasing central control over the activities of junior staff (though it is not clear that this was the intention of the proposal). It is of interest to note that these proposals also represent a move in the direction of the government utility model, since its approach is essentially administrative, with standard procedures and formal reporting, whereas in the applied science control over junior staff is largely accomplished by the common body of technical knowledge.

Hence while the models of organizing principles suggest at least different emphases in staffing patterns - with the applied science stressing technical expertise, the government utility stressing the principles of hierarchy and subordination and the contracting machine stressing local identification - and while marked differences can be seen in the patterns of the councils as compared with the ministry, these do not lead to great differences in the staffing pattern at district level and below. This did not mean that the transfer of functions did not affect the way these staff operated, since (obviously) an OIC subject to close supervision from the ministry hierarchy operates in a different way from one who does not; what this does mean, though, is that the important change is a matter of organization rather than staffing.

Service points

In some ways this may seem an inappropriate term to apply to roads, as the service is not offered at a fixed point. There are bases for the service, which may be more or less fixed, but the actual service is given by maintenance teams which move around, both within their area of jurisdiction and, on occasions, beyond it. The roads service therefore differs from the education and health services where, once a service point is established, clients can reasonably expect that a permanent service will be offered, although the amount of service may vary - e.g. the number of classes at a school or staff at a health centre. It could perhaps be argued that a road itself is a service point, comparable to a school or health centre, though the amount of the service given may vary. In practice, though, unless a road is maintained (and therefore kept open to traffic) it offers no service at all, but only a claim to service, like a self-help health centre whose buildings have been completed but which has never been opened. The service is not the road itself, but the maintenance which keeps it open.

Maintenance of non-trunk roads is carried out with a certain amount of basic road plant - a tipper truck, a grader and a bull-dozer - and with small road gangs for manual work. More important roads may be able to command a higher proportion of plant, and less important ones make do with less, but there are limits to the amount of variation possible: road gangs need a tipper to transport them to and from the work site; a grader, when working on poor roads, needs a bulldozer for the heavier work; and so on. If for any reason (e.g. financial constraints), the plant is off the road, there is little (given the present organization and technology) that the gangs can do by themselves (see, e.g., the quotation on p. 280). Ministry and council maintenance teams were therefore relatively similar in composition, although ministry teams tend to be better equipped.

It should not be assumed, though, that this is always the case: when the counties' equipment was taken over in 1970, it was pooled at the provincial level and reallocated, so that counties which were well-equipped (often as a consequence of having inherited the equipment and renewals fund of a European county council) ended up worse off. Some had not regained their former levels by 1972, and one PRE admitted that in one such district, he was unable to match the level of service given by the county council. Road gangs are posted permanently to specific areas, but plant may be moved if requirements elsewhere are more pressing - even into another district. One OIC complained that he had had to relinquish one of his two graders to the adjacent district because a cabinet minister was visiting the area and the roads were being specifically prepared for the visit.

The core of the actual provision of service is the determination of the maintenance programme, which in a way corresponds to both the siting of service points and the location of staff in the other services. The conventional wisdom of central government circles holds that under the county councils, the determination of the maintenance programme was "political" whereas under the ministry it is more "professional"; the conventional wisdom of council circles - that councils responded quickly and efficiently to urgent local needs whereas the ministry is "remote" from those - is simply the reverse side of the same coin. More precise terms are needed for adequate analysis of this question, and at the risk of further complicating the terminology, I would suggest that there are four basic patterns of road maintenance, which I would term measured, cyclical, interventionist, and client-controlled maintenance.

Measured maintenance implies first, that the sole determinant of maintenance patterns is the objective state of the roads, and secondly, that this can be precisely measured. These measurements are monitored by service officials and road teams directed to the roads whose needs (as determined by these indices) are greatest. Cyclical maintenance assumes that this technical information is either not available, or that if it is, it cannot be taken as the sole determinant of maintenance schedules; instead, procedures are determined to ensure that the various road maintenance operations are carried out on each road for which the service is responsible in a regular and predetermined sequence. The procedures are designed in the light of technical knowledge so that any given road will be kept at an acceptable standard, but if this aim is not achieved in any case, the response of the service is not to permit an ad hoc deviation from the regular cycle of maintenance, but to revise the schedules so that the original aim is met.

Both measured and cyclical patterns of maintenance minimise the discretion allowed to service officials; in the case of interventionist maintenance, it is maximized. In this form, maintenance operations follow short-term determinations of need by service officials in the field. These determinations may be based on a number of different pressures or combinations of them: perceptions of need fed up to the OIC through the road organization itself particular centrally-approved policy aims, such as promoting settlement or assisting "progressive farmers"; and demands from clients and their representatives both inside and outside the governmental structure. How the OIC responds to these pressures will vary: the distinguishing feature of this pattern is that the action taken on them is determined by the formal control structure; in this respect it differs from client-controlled maintenance.

In client-controlled maintenance, the service needs are determined by the local influentials with whom the service interacts, and maintenance teams are charged by their superiors with covering a given area rather than performing specific tasks: their day-to-day operations are determined by negotiations with these local influentials who (in the absence of any countervailing pressure from the OIC) are able to ensure that their perception of priorities is that followed by the service.

These distinctions do not correspond exactly with the three organizing principles used so far in this analysis. In many respects measured maintenance might seem a pattern characteristic of the applied science, since it depends entirely on technical expertise, but on the other hand it allows little scope for the exercise of professional judgement. It is probably more correct to say that the preferred pattern for the applied science is interventionist, so long as the professional can dominate the choice of tasks; but as this is difficult, both the measured and cyclical patterns insulate the OIC against non-professional pressures - which is, to a large extent, the point of adopting them. The government utility would normally have an interventionist pattern of maintenance, though in some circumstances the central aims might be met by a cyclical pattern - if, for instance, the dominant central aim was to ensure a geographical distribution of government services that was broadly equal. Contracting machines will tend towards a client-controlled maintenance pattern, although in some circumstances client representatives who are stronger at the district level than their rivals but weaker lower down may prefer an interventionist pattern and seek to force the service in that direction.

Before the transfer of functions, the ministry's pattern of maintenance was predominantly interventionist. It felt itself capable of assimilating the various demands made on it without sacrificing its professional standards, and appears to have shown little interest in the defensive possibilities of measured or cyclical patterns. It was in any case better placed to cope with client pressures than were the councils: it had more resources to offer the sort of service desired, and its organizational structure made it less dependent on the goodwill of clients or their representatives, both at the decision-making level and at the level of the maintenance team itself.

The county road organizations, however, were much more vulnerable to this sort of pressure, and tended to waver between the interventionist and the client-controlled patterns. For a Works Officer to be able even to respond to the pressures put on him, he needed to be able to control the operations of his teams; on the other hand, the local identity of the teams and their vulnerability to local pressures weakened this control. Works Officers would often seek to reach agreement with councillors on immediate priorities and draft short-term schedules which teams could then adhere to. Such agreement might be reached formally through the Works Committee, or informally, and to the extent that it could be reached enabled an interventionist pattern to be maintained. But there was constant pressure on the road teams from councillors, chiefs and others, which sometimes resulted in formal directions to the teams to "consult" with councillors over priorities, or in a measure of devolution of control to foremen at the divisional level, and in any case constituted a constant challenge to the OIC and a potential shift towards a more client-controlled service.

The transfer of functions led to a strengthening of the interventionist pattern, though on slightly different terms. As has been noted, considerable authority over the service was retained at the provincial level, but it was not possible to direct ordinary maintenance operations from there (as had been the case with ministry roads before the transfer). The district OIC had to be left to determine his own day-to-day maintenance programme, subject to general directives from the provincial level, specific demands put to the PRE and passed down, and the pressures put on the OIC at the district level and below. The OIC was expected to work out his own accommodation with local influentials and meet their demands as far as this was consistent with his own role-perception and the specific demands of his superiors. His relationship with these "outsiders" was, however, rather different than that which had existed either between them and the council works officer, or between a PRE and his clients, before the transfer. He was a great deal closer - geographically and organizationally - to clients and intermediaries than the PRE had been, but was not dependent on the goodwill of councillors as the works officer had been. More will be said on this in the next section, but it should be pointed out here that the change brought a rise in what might be called the price of effective influence, that in particular the Provincial Administration had become more influential, often at the expense of elected representatives.

The stronger financial position of the service after the transfer (notably in relation to capital equipment) made it possible to contemplate cyclical or measured patterns of maintenance (which had not hitherto been possible because of a shortage of the technical skills of measuring, and the sufficiency of capacity which would enable the service to keep to a regular cycle). There was, however, little interest in these alternatives in the ministry although the pilot computer-based scheme mentioned earlier (p. 279) implies a move in the direction of measured maintenance; but as has been noted, there has been little interest in the scheme. But the closing-off of the previous possibilities of client control, the exclusion of the unclassified roads, and the raising of the price of effective influence, have created considerable pressure for an alternative service which will be more responsive to low-level demand. The organizational response to this, in the form of the RARU proposal, has been not for a client-controlled pattern, but for a different type of interventionist pattern with more weight given to non-officials and to non-professionals generally.

Hence although there has been a general perception of change in road maintenance since the transfer of functions, a closer analysis suggests that there has been only a limited amount of change as far as the actual pattern of maintenance is concerned, and that this has largely meant the strengthening of the dominant pattern rather than a radical change. Within this pattern, though, there was a significant change in the influence of different district-level actors, and hence of the sort of choices made, in determining how the service's maintenance capacity should be used: this will be discussed further in the next section.

## Service agency and service structure

A great deal has already been said about the external relationships of the service agencies in the discussion of its other aspects, and this section is largely concerned with drawing the threads together. Before the transfer of functions ministry and council service officials stood in markedly different relationships to those outside the service. The ministry was particularly concerned to insulate itself and its field staff from direct client demand, both by strictly defining its responsibilities and by deflecting demands into representative channels outside the service. One ministry engineer voiced a common sentiment when he said that the only form of outside intervention in the service should be directives from the minister to the permanent secretary. It was easier for the ministry to adopt this position than it would have been for the councils, since it was concerned only with the trunk roads, which were naturally in better condition than the minor roads, and hence avoided the intense pressure on the councils to actually keep roads open to traffic. At the same time, the ministry developed links with the aid agencies, and particularly with the engineers and economists in them who dealt with proposals for aid to road projects. These links, together with the fact that all service professionals (both Kenyan and expatriate) had been trained overseas, reinforced the applied science characteristics of the service.

The ministry could not of course insulate itself completely from the governmental process: it faced demands from high-ranking central politicians for "pork-barrel" projects, from other ministries for supporting services for their own activities, and from the provincial administration both on its own behalf and as a general patron for the rural areas, and to a certain extent it had to accommodate these demands. But by limiting them largely to narrowly defined governmental channels, it was able to maintain a reasonable balance between them and its professional aspirations - or so it seemed in retrospect to service officials looking back after the transfer of functions.

The councils' road organizations were more exposed to demands from clients and their representatives (notably, but not exclusively, from councillors themselves). They did not aspire to the "applied science" service model, and hence did not see client demand as posing a threat to the integrity of the service as the ministry did, but attempted (with varying degrees of success) to contain it at the district level rather than to concede complete client control over the operations of works teams. Works officers would often try to secure a formal agreement within the works committee on maintenance priorities to reduce the direct pressure on teams, and this sort of agreement could also be reached at lower levels: Chard (1970: 201) quotes the example of an Area Council clerk in Kiambu who ruled that the council would maintain two unclassified roads in each location, and left it to the councillors from each location to decide which ones. But such agreements were inherently frail because of the scarcity of maintenance capacity, the competition between local representatives, and the essentially local orientation of road staff (in terms of recruitment, training, career structure and the security of tenure), and they could only achieve a limited amount of success.

The immediate consequence of the transfer of functions (in this respect) was a number of moves to insulate the service from client demand: strict definition of road responsibilities, retention of considerable control at the provincial level, and the transfer of all district OICs out of their own areas to reduce the possible influence of local attachments. Particularly powerful demands, however, still had to be accommodated: individual "pork-barrel" projects for ministers, particular maintenance demands from DCs, and the demands from Central Province which led to the creation of the category of Temporary Classified Roads (see p. 274). While conceding these demands to the extent felt to be necessary, the ministry was concerned to limit their implications: i.e. to confine them to the national level rather than the field level as far as possible, to yield to other officials rather than to non-officials, and in particular, to treat them as ad hoc demands rather than as signifying some institutionalized right of consultation. The ministry made no attempt to set up a district-level consultative body comparable to the District Education Board, and gave a cool reception to the District Works Committees which had been foisted onto it by the Ministry of Local Government. To the extent that it was willing to deviate from the applied science model in its external relations, it was in the direction of the government utility rather than the contracting machine.

This did not mean that the ministry was totally insulated. Its links with international agencies and foreign donors continued, and foreign consultants were engaged to reorganise the ministry. They proposed comprehensive plans for tighter central control over works teams, and a system of "quality control" which would (it was felt) enable the ministry to resist specific maintenance demands from, for instance, MPs, since it would have the detailed information necessary to refute their claims of neglect. In 1972, though, there was still little acceptance of this approach within the ministry, possibly because officials did not feel that the pressures on them were so onerous as to make this approach (with its restrictions on their own freedom of action) an appealing alternative.

The ministry's attempt to insulate itself from outside pressures met with criticism not only from political representatives who resented the limitation of their influence, but also from pressures of a government utility type: demands that the service should absorb more of the unemployed, and for more administrative control over government activities in rural areas so that the provincial administration could strengthen its position as a general intermediary and patron. These pressures came from generalist central officials, from the provincial administration, from planners and even from some aid agencies, and led to proposals for some sort of alternative service.

The idea of an alternative service more closely tied to the client community was of course implied in the ministry's sentiment that maintenance of unclassified roads could be left to county councils and local self-help groups (see p. 262). But in the absence of any active promotion of this proposal, little more has been heard of it. Most councils, having lost all their plant and personnel to the ministry, have shown little interest in resuming road maintenance, and one council which did propose to re-enter the field did not receive the necessary budgetary approval from the Ministry of Local Government. Nor has road work had much appeal for self-help promoters: there is little popular enthusiasm for it (partly because of resentment to the compulsory communal road work of colonial times, partly because the benefits are more indirect and unevenly distributed than, for instance, those of a health centre), and CD staff also discourage self-help road work, since a half-completed road soon reverts to its former state whereas a half-completed health centre can always be completed by a further self-help project.

A particularly important point here is that the general acceptance of the present conventional technology of road maintenance - in particular the use of heavy machinery and permanent salaried staff - largely precludes much autonomous local activity. When the councils had their own plant, it was possible (though not very common) for council plant to be officially diverted to work on an unclassified road if local leaders could raise the money to pay the running costs at an hourly rate from the point of diversion. The ministry is reluctant to offer this sort of service: shortage of equipment is given as the reason, but it also appears that it is unwilling to grapple with the organizational problems of collecting the money and of ensuring that no more work is done than is paid for.

In the Migori Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) in South Nyanza, a plan was drawn up for a network of feeder roads which could be maintained by local people with their own resources, the plan providing that local leaders would have to sign an agreement that the road would be so maintained before the SRDP team built it. This proposal met with strong opposition from the local representatives (councillors and chiefs) on the project committee, and although the subsequent battle on the issue (which culminated in the departure of the planning team from the area) had much deeper roots, it was generally agreed that there was little chance of self-help maintenance being accepted by local people as a permanent means of service. "We don't want to deceive ourselves by saying that people will maintain roads", one official said afterwards. He explained that in every field of government activity, people promoted self-help projects in the hope that they will be taken over by the government: "this is development". "Why", he asked, "do they want to carry out this retrograde step of pushing everything back onto the people?" The whole relationship of clientelist service can be seen here, with peasants not wanting to be excluded from the government's largesse, local spokesmen not wanting to promote a pattern of autonomous activity which would make their intermediary role redundant, and government officials being unable to conceive of a pattern of development which would actually break this dependence.

The sort of alternative service which did meet with official favour, therefore, was not autonomous but subject to the control of the general administrator. In the RARU proposal, both the demands of clients and the technical norms of the service official are subject to the over-riding control of the DDC which is still essentially an extension of the DC, even with the addition of selected district-level notables as non-official members. While these latter may be held to represent the people, they are in fact responsible only to the DC, who appoints them, and they are in any case much more remote from the mass of the people than were the county councillors in the period 1963-69.

It would be pointless to speculate in detail about how the RARUs might operate if they are set up, but one may presume that their activities will reflect the alliance between the administration and the local elite embodied in their organization. Sobhan

(1968, especially chapter seven) describes the way in which a small-scale works programme in present-day Bangladesh served to reinforce the political dominance of the large farmers who, as councillors, controlled the allocation of jobs under the programme; the example is relevant, notwithstanding the differences in social structures between Bangladesh and Kenya. The Ministry of Works has already experimented with "labour-only" contractors in some of its own projects, and one of its engineers felt that this offered the best prospect for maintenance of unclassified roads, with sub-chiefs becoming the contractors for their area. The implications of such a move for the patronage and power of the administration do not need to be spelled out (but see Ita 1972: 54 on this sort of patronage in the pre-independence period).

## Conclusions

The case of roads presents an apparent example of a clear distinction between alternative types of service, with different types being associated with particular types of political structure. The ministry was seen as offering a "professional" type of service, the councils a "political" one; hence, a more "professional" coverage of rural roads could be expected to follow the transfer of functions. This analysis has suggested that while the ministry was closer to the applied science model of service and the councils closer to the contracting machine, there were elements of the government utility in both. It is also clear that the differences in service pattern between the ministry and the councils reflected substantial differences in the service situation - in particular, in the sort of relationship existing between the service and its clients, and the scope this allowed the service agency to determine its own operational pattern.

At the transfer, therefore, the ministry was confronted with a flood of particularist client demands of a sort it had not had to cope with before. Its response was to try to preserve its cohesion and organizational autonomy by an increased stress on professional norms, particularly over questions of service definition and organizational control. This meant eliminating the fluidity at the margin of the service, the "grey area" of discretionary service. Bringing pressure to bear for discretionary service of this kind had been an important role for councillors before the transfer; after it, the Administration sought to assert itself more as the mediator of client demand and as an originator of demands itself, both at the district level and below. The service had shed most of the aspects of the contracting machine, but there was conflict over whether it should move in the direction of the applied science or of the government utility.

The conflict was eventually resolved by the creation of another service structure, the RARUs, offering a more fluid service at the margins of the ministry's operations, and in many respects resembling (on a local scale) the model of the government utility. These will serve to shield the ministry from the most intense client demand, and hence better enable it to maintain its "professional" characteristics, just as the council services had done before 1970. The transfer of functions, therefore, has not eliminated the dual nature of the road service structure. It has moved the bulk of the former council roads into the ministry's camp, but there has remained a marginal area of service which the ministry has successfully resisted, and for which a new organization has had to be created. But the dominant influence over marginal service provision is no longer that of the elected councillors, but that of the Administration.

## CHAPTER NINE

## FINANCIAL ASPECTS

Public discussion of service provision during the county council period, and in particular criticism of the councils' performance as service agencies, tended to focus on questions of finance. As will be clear from the statement of the Minister of Finance quoted on p. 2, the central government saw the problems of the services as stemming from the inadequacies of the county councils, and the transfer of functions as a move forced on the government by those inadequacies. In particular, the alleged financial irresponsibility of the councils was singled out as a major cause.

> Some of the causes of this state of affairs ... were, briefly, mismanagement, dereliction of duty, incompetence, failure to keep accounts, failure to collect revenue, failure to maintain financial control, misuse of funds and decisions based on local political expediencies instead of proper financial control. (NAOR, 17 June 1970, col. 1420)

This critique was widely shared within the government, particularly among the Provincial Administration, but a different interpretation was offered by the Ministry of Local Government, which drew attention to the reluctance of the Treasury to release funds for government grants to local authorities. In moving the Local Government (Transfer of Functions) Bill, the Assistant Minister for Local Government said:

> Mr Speaker, Sir, let me say, categorically, that the county councils are not at fault in failing to meet the demand for more and more services to the public .... the general picture of corruption and inefficiency in local government as being a major cause of many councils going bankrupt is wholly unjustified. (NAOR, 4 November 1969, col. 1437)

In examining the financial aspects of service operation in this chapter, I shall first consider the financing of the services under the county councils (which will require a general discussion of county council finance), and then consider the position since responsibility was transferred to the ministries. This will enable me to discuss the financial implications of the transfer of functions. (There are, of course, other agencies involved in service financing, including self-help groups, but the bulk of recurrent expenditure is borne by either the county councils or the ministries, and this analysis will therefore concentrate on these "official" agencies of service provision.)

It should be noted that at the time of their establishment, it had not been envisaged that the county councils would be self-supporting: the Fiscal Commission of 1963 estimated that the total deficit of local authorities in 1964/5 would be about £1.9m, excluding central government grants (Report, tables 5, 7). The majimbo constitution of 1963 provided for the Regional Authorities to make grants to county councils: it is not clear if any grants were paid, or how (although it appears that because of the failure of the central government to transfer full financial authority to the regions, no grants were paid). But with the abolition of the regions in 1964, the central government assumed responsibility for grants to local authorities. Mr Kenyatta, then Prime Minister, announced:

> The Central Government /is/ to determine what taxes the local government authorities should levy and what services they would provide. The Government will make up any deficit in respect of local government finance by means of grants. (HAOR, 14 August 1964, col. 1709)

The actual basis of central government grants to local authorities was not clear. For the period 1964-66, both the total amount available and the criteria for its distribution were uncertain. The Local Government Commission of Inquiry commented:

> ... there is no exact formula for the distribution of the grant and in the end the amount of General Grant distributed is, at present, merely an assessment by the Ministry of the amount which can be afforded to an authority towards making ends meet. (Report: 48)

In its Sessional Paper on the report of the Commission of Inquiry (no. 12 of 1967), the Government announced that a grants formula had been devised in which the total level of grants would equal the difference between "agreed estimates of expenditure" and "agreed estimates of revenue" for the county councils (para. 67), and that the distribution of the grant would be related to the level of council services, the financial resources of councils and their "relative development" (paras 66, 69-71). There were also to be contingent grants in special cases, which were estimated to cost up to £494,000 in 1967 (para. 68). The Sessional Paper also noted that these calculations had been made "without regard to the impact of costs of the recommendations of the Salaries Review Commission and of variations in the calculations which may arise from other Government policy decisions in those years". This latter phrase was no doubt a reference to the recent decision of the government to halve the lowest rate of GPT. The Sessional Paper continued "Additional grants may be required to cover the increased costs or loss of revenue arising from such decisions" (para. 68). (A fuller account of the formula is given in Sharp and Jetha 1968.)

It is not clear to what extent this formula was actually applied. It was already obsolete by the time it was issued because of the salary increases and GPT reductions (i.e. it no longer defined the extent of government grants) and would have become still more irrelevant after the abolition (in 1969) of the shs. 24/= GPT rate. From discussions with those involved in the grant negotiations at this time, one gets the impression that in 1968-69, the payment of grants was even more uncertain and spasmodic than it had been before. Certainly, the Assistant Minister for Local Government admitted in mid-1969 that "due to a shortfall of funds available to this Ministry, it had been necessary to ration grants and to restrict payments to those local authorities experiencing an actual cash shortage", and that some councils had still not been paid their 1968 grants (NAOR, 27 May 1969, col. 291).

It is difficult to say with any confidence what the "true" financial position of the county councils was during this period. For a number of reasons, formal, balanced accounts are seldom available, and the actual expenditure of any individual council may vary significantly from its formal estimates. The annual Economic Survey gives an estimate of county council revenue and expenditure, but does not indicate the source of its figures. These estimates are set out in table 9, p. 306, converted to constant prices so as to enable more significant comparisons to be made over time. (A similar table with the figures quoted in current prices, is given in the appendix, table 15.) In general, the discussion in this chapter will be in terms of real figures quoted in this table rather than figures at current prices, but where the latter are used, this will be indicated in the text.

The estimates given in this table are probably broadly accurate, although some of the figures may be questionable, and the main

## Table 9: County council revenue and expenditure, 1964-71, in constant (1964) prices

| | 1963<sup>a</sup> | | 1964<sup>b</sup> | | 1965<sup>b</sup> | | 1966<sup>b</sup> | | 1967 | | 1968 | | 1969<sup>e</sup> | | 1970 | | 1971 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % |
| **REVENUE** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CPT | 1,459<sup>c</sup> | 27.1 | 2,126 | 27.0 | 2,450 | 25.0 | 2,499 | 25.5 | 2,416 | 25.3 | 2,204 | 21.2 | 2,938 | 23.5 | 262<sup>f</sup> | 8.7 | 219<sup>f</sup> | 7.5 |
| Indirect taxes | 439<sup>d</sup> | 8.1 | 706 | 9.0 | 658 | 6.7 | 669 | 6.8 | 648 | 6.8 | 851 | 8.2 | 765 | 6.1 | 1,262 | 42.0 | 1,086 | 37.0 |
| Income from property | - | - | 103 | 1.3 | 173 | 1.8 | 151 | 1.5 | 221 | 2.3 | 323 | 3.1 | 325 | 2.6 | 420 | 14.0 | 407 | 13.9 |
| School fees | | | | | | | 2,539 | 26.0 | 2,411 | 25.2 | 2,862 | 27.5 | 3,077 | 24.6 | - | - | 3 | 0.1 |
| Sale of goods and services | 725 | 13.4 | 2,593 | 32.9 | 3,373 | 34.4 | 790 | 8.1 | 549 | 5.7 | 731 | 7.0 | 664 | 5.3 | 812 | 27.1 | 781 | 26.6 |
| Government grants | 2,486 | 46.1 | 1,893 | 24.0 | 3,564 | 30.4 | 2,970 | 30.4 | 3,138 | 32.8 | 3,237 | 31.1 | 4,360 | 34.8 | 55 | 1.8 | 175 | 6.0 |
| Other | 286 | 5.3 | 465 | 5.9 | 166 | 1.7 | 165 | 1.7 | 182 | 1.9 | 208 | 2.0 | 383 | 3.1 | 190 | 6.3 | 262 | 8.9 |
| Total<sup>g</sup> | 5,395 | | 7,885 | | 9,795 | | 9,782 | | 9,565 | | 10,416 | | 12,511 | | 3,002 | | 2,934 | |
| **EXPENDITURE** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Administration | 446 | 8.4 | 940 | 10.6 | 947 | 9.4 | 847 | 8.6 | 932 | 8.7 | 1,062 | 8.2 | 1,278 | 9.1 | 1,181 | 36.1 | 1,235 | 28.6 |
| Roads | 530 | 10.2 | 957 | 10.8 | 1,164 | 11.6 | 1,067 | 10.8 | 1,139 | 10.6 | 1,243 | 9.6 | 1,252 | 8.9 | 188 | 5.7 | 34 | 1.1 |
| Community Services | 4 | 0.1 | 73 | 0.8 | 66 | 0.7 | 6 | 0.1 | 71 | 0.7 | 96 | 0.7 | 39 | 0.3 | 112 | 3.4 | 243 | 7.6 |
| Health | 818 | 15.4 | 851 | 9.6 | 894 | 8.9 | 956 | 9.6 | 992 | 9.2 | 1,112 | 8.6 | 1,286 | 9.1 | 7 | 0.2 | | |
| Education | 2,265 | 42.7 | 4,908 | 55.3 | 5,946 | 59.0 | 5,951 | 60.1 | 6,500 | 60.6 | 8,074 | 62.4 | 8,796 | 62.4 | 37 | 1.1 | 2 | 0.1 |
| Other Social Services | 179 | 3.4 | 273 | 3.1 | 222 | 2.2 | 158 | 1.6 | 200 | 1.9 | 256 | 2.0 | 273 | 1.9 | 421 | 12.9 | 375 | 11.8 |
| Economic Services | 577 | 10.9 | 268 | 3.0 | 248 | 2.5 | 237 | 2.4 | 219 | 2.0 | 253 | 2.0 | 273 | 1.9 | 325 | 9.9 | 345 | 10.8 |
| Trading Services | 169 | 3.2 | 325 | 3.7 | 411 | 4.1 | 388 | 3.9 | 471 | 4.4 | 633 | 4.9 | 590 | 4.2 | 772 | 23.6 | 753 | 23.5 |
| Other | 310 | 6.0 | 285 | 3.2 | 172 | 1.7 | 285 | 2.9 | 208 | 1.9 | 214 | 1.7 | 298 | 2.1 | 227 | 6.9 | 209 | 6.5 |
| Total<sup>g</sup> | 5,307 | | 8,881 | | 10,071 | | 9,897 | | 10,734 | | 12,943 | | 14,086 | | 3,269 | | 3,196 | |

Notes: (a) African District Councils only; (b) "includes urban and rural area councils"; (c) mainly poll tax; (d) rates included with CPT; (e) these figures, which are taken from the 1971 Economic Survey, are questionable, but the figures given for this year in the 1972 volume make even less sense; (f) Area Council poll taxes; (g) totals may not agree because of rounding

Source: Economic Survey, 1968-72, converted to constant (July 1964) prices by the Wage Earners' Index of Consumer Prices in Nairobi (Statistical Abstract 1970, table 198) and the Lower Income Index of Consumer Prices (Statistical Abstract 1971, table 220) features of the financial pattern that they show are fairly familiar. In the period 1964-69 (the county council period proper, since the 1963 figures are for the ADCs), there was a large rise in aggregate expenditure from just under £9m to just over £14m. Education expenditure rose at a rather higher rate, from £4.9m to £8.8m. In the other major areas of expenditure - health services, roads and administration - the proportion of council spending declined as education expenditure rose, but absolute spending generally rose. With other categories of expenditure, there is more variation (and probably more variation between individual councils), but the amounts involved are relatively small. It would appear, therefore, that the increase in spending on education was not achieved by reducing expenditure on other services. Individual councils would vary from this general pattern, and fluctuate more from year to year. Both Murang'a and South Nyanza, for instance, spent a higher proportion of their expenditure on education and a lower proportion on roads than the national average as shown in this table.

Council revenues did in fact keep pace with this rise in expenditure, increasing by 58.7% in the period 1964-69 as against a 58.6% rise in expenditure, but there was still an aggregate deficit every year, varying in size from £115,000 to £2.5m. In view of the use of deficit financing, it is probably more useful to consider revenue sources in relation to expenditure rather than as a proportion of total revenue (see table 10).

Table 10: County council revenues as a proportion of expenditure

%

|  | GPT | School fees | Other internal | Government grants | Deficits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1964 | 23.9 | 21.9 | 21.6 | 21.3 | 11.2 |
| 1965 | 24.3 | 25.1 | 18.3 | 29.5 | 2.7 |
| 1966 | 25.3 | 25.7 | 17.9 | 30.0 | 1.2 |
| 1967 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 14.9 | 29.2 | 10.9 |
| 1968 | 17.0 | 22.1 | 16.2 | 25.0 | 19.7 |
| 1969 | 20.9 | 21.8 | 15.2 | 30.1 | 11.2 |

Source: calculated from the figures set out in table 9.

Graduated Personal Tax, which had been designed as the mainstay of council finance, was generally sluggish as a source of revenue, and in 1967 and 1968 collections actually declined. Even if one accepts the Economic Survey estimate of £3.3m (current prices) collected in 1969 (representing a 33% increase over the 1968 figure), the proportion of council expenditure met by GPT declined from 23.9% to 20.9% over this period, and in 1968 it fell to 17%. School fees, which might have been expected to follow the pattern of educational expenditure, and hence to rise relative to other sources of revenue, rose in the earlier years from 21.9% to 25.7% of expenditure, but by 1969 had declined again to 21.8%, while all other internal sources fell from 21.6% to 15.2%. Government grants, which met 21.3% of expenditure in 196f, rose the following year to 29.5% and remained stable around the 30% level, except for 1968, when there was only a small increase in the aggregate grant and the proportion fell to 25%. Shortfalls in revenue from all these sources were made up for by deficits, which accounted for over 10% of expenditure except in 1965-66, and for nearly 20% in 1968.

In analysing these figures, perhaps the first point that should be noted is the relative continuity and uniformity they show, in contrast to the popular stereotype of massive increases in education spending at the expense of all other council functions. Certainly, educational expenditure grew faster than all other forms, and increased its share of council budgets from 55.3% to 62.4%. But there was pressure for expansion in all services, and with one exception (Community Services, which has a rather erratic pattern of expenditure), real expenditure was still higher in 1969 than in 1964. Aggregated figures do, of course, obscure the variations between councils: councils in pastoral areas, for instance, spent a lower proportion on education than did those in agricultural areas.

The rise in educational spending flowed from both a rise in enrolments, and from the increasing cost per child. The first factor is well-known; it has already been mentioned that primary enrolements rose from 688,131 in 1962 to 1,282,297 in 1969, and by 1972 they had reached 1,675,919. The rise was not evenly distributed over this period (see figure 10, p. 310). In the two "transitional" years (1962-64), enrolments rose 46.9%; in the six years of county council control proper (1964-69), the rise was 26.8%; in the first three years of central government control (1969-72), the rise was 30.6%.

Council educational expenditure per pupil also rose sharply in this period - by 40% between 1964 and 1969 - but again the rise was not evenly distributed over the years (see table 11).

Figure 10: Primary school enrolments, 1963-72



Source: Statistical Abstract, 1972, table 175

Table 11: County council education expenditure per pupil, 1964-69

| | shs. |
|---|---|
| 1964 | 106 |
| 1965 | 127 |
| 1966 | 124 |
| 1967 | 125 |
| 1968 | 145 |
| 1969 | 149 |

Source: Calculated from the expenditure figures in table 9, and the enrolment figures given in the Ministry of Education Annual Reports.

Rises in educational costs flowed largely from increases in teachers' pay, which accounted for the great bulk of council expenditure on education (88.6% in Murang'a in 1969). These pay increases were largely beyond the control of the councils, since they were agreed on in negotiations at the national level between the unions and the ministries (Education and Labour), or awarded by industrial tribunals, and then imposed on the councils. (Wages for other council employees were usually fixed in direct negotiation between the unions and the Association of Local Government Employers, though government intervention did occur.) The councils usually did not participate in negotiations over teachers' pay, nor was their financial position taken into account in the deliberations. The Salaries Review Commission of 1967 specifically stated that it had concerned itself only with determining fair salaries, and had taken no account of the state of council finances; it went on:

> ... if it subsequently transpired that some local authorities are genuinely unable to pay those rates after taking all reasonable steps to put their finances in order, then we feel that there is an obligation on the Central Government to provide some measure of

> financial help so that teachers can be paid adequate salaries. (EAS, 2 August 1967)

But the opinion of the Salaries Review Commission (widely shared though it was) did not constitute a binding claim on the Treasury, and in the year following this award, educational expenditure rose by 25%, but government grants to councils rose by only 4% (and as a proportion of council expenditure actually declined). It appears likely that the increased grants were paid in 1969 in most cases, but by then councils had been paying the increased salaries for eighteen months or more.

The main sources of council revenue were also controlled by the central government. In the case of GPT, the central government both set the tax rates and, through the Provincial Administration, collected the money, turning it over to the councils after deducting 5% for expenses. The Local Government Commission of Enquiry suggested in 1966 (Report: 37) that councils might be given the power to set their own tax rates, subject to central government approval, and should resume collecting the tax themselves rather than relying on the Provincial Administration. The Government's Sessional Paper (no. 12 of 1967) rejected these proposals on the grounds that "as GPT is a tax collected on a national basis there must be uniform rates throughout the country" (p. 15).

In 1967 the lowest rate of GPT was reduced from shs.48/= to shs.24/=; in announcing this, the President made clear the political motives for the change: "KANU considers its people, but what has the KPU done?" (EAS, 21 October 1967). Two years later, the shs.24/= rate was completely abolished. The

Minister for Finance, in announcing this, said:

> This change should not lose local authorities a very large amount of revenue if, as intended, greater efforts are made to assess correctly those who will still be liable to pay, and to collect the tax in full from them. (NAOR, 19 June 1969, col. 1395)

He did not make it clear if any special steps were being taken to ensure that the Provincial Administration did this. There had been no mention of compensatory grants to the councils (as envisaged in Sessional Paper no. 12) in 1967, and in 1969 they were specifically described as "unnecessary".

In view of the importance of GPT, the reasons why it yielded so little should be examined more closely. Nellis's case study from Embu District (1972: 10-11) reveals the dimensions of the problem:

> The chief of this location had records to show that there were 3,894 potential tax-payers in the location. Of this number, the locational assessment committees had decided that only 326 earned or possessed enough to warrant their paying tax. 303 were assessed at the minimum rate of shs.48/= per annum; 14 at the next highest rate of shs.72/=, and only 9 - one of which was the chief himself - were placed in higher gradations. Being assessed does not necessarily mean that one will end up paying; in spite of the severe and enforced penalties for failure to pay GPT, over the past few years actual collections in Mbere division as a whole have varied from a low of 44 to a high of 60% of assessments. This is a case of few being chosen, and even fewer being caught.

The chief, who is chairman of the assessment committee and is also the tax collector, is held responsible by his superiors for securing a high rate of tax payment - the DO for the Mbere division of Embu, for instance, stated that "he ranks a chief, first and foremost, on how he handles GPT collection" (Brokensha and Nellis 1971: 13) - but it is not easy for him to meet these expectations. Silas Ita, himself an ex-chief in Mbere, argues (1973: 65ff.) that chiefs "expect relatively little support from the people, politicians and the executives /i.e. the administration/ on whatever they choose to do". They cannot place too much reliance on formal sanctions against tax defaulters (arrest and prosecution) since the use of these exposed them to attack by, for instance, the local MP. They prefer to secure cooperation by manipulation of their other roles: e.g. they may relax the enforcement of health or agricultural regulations in exchange for cooperation during a tax drive. But to do this invites attack from the health inspector and the agricultural officer - in other words, there is a trade-off between the tax-collecting role and the other official duties. So while they may be able to raise the rate of tax-collection during a short tax-drive, they would find it difficult to maintain this permanently.

Some chiefs develop a more sophisticated form of defence by challenging the basis of their superiors' expectations. Ementono (1972: 31-2) cites a location in Busia District where the PC estimated, on the basis of population and previous tax returns, that 4,311 people should be paying tax. The chief's estimate of the "real" number of potential taxpayers, based on "person to person assessment" was 1,639, so that the 1,030 people who actually paid tax represented 63% of the potential taxpayers on the chief's figures, as against 24% on the PC's estimate.

The point about GPT is not simply that it is unpopular (all taxes are), but that the manner of its collection causes great friction, and the erosion of political support for those seen as responsible. For this reason tax collection has always been poor; for the same reason the central government has continually felt obliged to reduce the tax rate. When GPT was first introduced in 1957/8 it yielded £2,222,000, 7.9% of the total tax revenue. By 1962/3 the yield had fallen to £1,262,000 and the proportion of the total tax revenue to 3.6%. The tax rates had been reduced in 1959 and 1961, and in 1962 incomes below £120 were exempted (Jetha 1966: 260-1).

Despite this evidence (and arguments put to it in Kenya at the time), the Fiscal Commission held to its faith that GPT could be "the financial mainstay of rural local government" (Report, para. 183). But as we have seen, it was no more effective in rural areas after independence than it had been before, and no better collected by the Provincial Administration than by the county councils. The government's need for political support compelled it to reduce the rates in 1967 and 1969, and resign itself to widespread non-payment of the tax. It bowed, for instance, to backbencher opposition to a clause in the Graduated Personal Tax Bill 1966 empowering councils to demand the production of current tax receipts as a condition of enrolling children in council schools. The whole process culminated in the complete abolition of the tax in 1973 (even in the urban areas where collections had always been high). As a revenue source, GPT had already failed when it was given to the county councils.

Other council revenue sources, such as fees for council services, were also subject to central control. In 1967 the Kakamega CC submitted to the Ministry of Local Government a proposal to increase school fees and fees for other services so as to finish the year with a £12,000 surplus, but the Ministry stated that the proposal "would not receive its approval", adding that "the council had to conform to government policy on education, which was being considered" (EAS, 30 May 1967) - an interesting contrast to the government's opposition to the Nairobi City Council's plan to abolish school fees (p. 196). In 1965 the government announced that fees for outpatient treatment in hospitals and dispensaries had been abolished, and in subsequent elucidation made it clear that it regarded this decision as being binding on county council health services as well, although there has apparently been no consultation with the councils and no plan for compensating them for loss of revenue was announced (see p. 235). Similarly, the maize cess was abolished, and the Ministry of Agriculture, which advocated the abolition of all agricultural cesses, managed to prevent the levying of coffee cess on European estates in the former Thika District; Kiambu CC estimated that this cost them £108,000 in revenue in 1968 (EAS, 3 August 1968).

County councils could not, therefore, finance their services on orthodox lines: the resources they commanded did not match the expectations that their constituents had of them. There were three ways in which they might be able to meet the "revenue gap": retrenchment of services, deficits and government grants. These were not distinct and mutually exclusive alternatives, but interconnected aspects of a single pattern of financing. One of the main elements of this system was the absence of any real distinction between the concerns of the central government and those of the county councils, so that deficiencies in the services were blamed on the centre as well as on the council concerned. A correspondent to the East African Standard put it like this: "The Government had announced that there would be free medical services and therefore the excuse of the county councils being unable to afford drugs was 'lame'" (6 December 1967). In assuming the right to direct councils not to charge dispensary fees, the government made it difficult for itself to avoid claims for financial support for health services. (This is not to imply that avoidance of such claims was a clear government aim: there are considerable advantages for the centre in bringing the local authorities into this sort of dependency.) To preserve its political credit, the government put strong pressure on the councils not to retrench staff (indeed, pressed them to increase their staffing under the Tripartite Agreement), and made concessions over such matters as sanctions against tax defaulters (see p. 315) and the rate of service expansion. So service deficiencies became the basis of claims on the centre (and not only by the councils themselves), either for increased central government grants, or for a complete central take-over; and the worse the local service, the stronger the claim on the centre.

The other main feature of the system was that the distribution of government grants to councils tended to aggravate rather than ease their financial instability. The absence until 1968 of a formal grants formula, and the uncertain status of the one introduced in that year, have already been mentioned (p. 304). It should also be pointed out that the Ministry of Local Government was quite unable to cope with the formal requirements of the 1968 formula: that grants should be predictable revenue sources for the councils, based on estimates approved by the ministry. The ministry was unable to secure a commitment from the Treasury that it would release the funds necessary to pay all grants that were due under the formula, and so could give no assurance to councils that these grants would be paid. The failure of the Treasury to release these funds resulted in the ministry itself suffering a cash crisis and, as pointed out (p. 305), having to ration grants and to restrict payments to those authorities with "an actual cash shortage".

Moreover, many councils submitted estimates which included substantial deficits, and which the ministry therefore refused to approve, arguing that councils should not have to finance their recurrent activities from capital reserves, and using the unsatisfactory state of council finance as ammunition in its struggles with the Treasury and other ministries whose interests affected local government finance: Education (over teachers' pay), Agriculture (over produce cesses) and Labour (over pay and employment in general). It is also true that councils often lacked properly trained book-keeping staff, and that the Ministry of Local Government was equally short of staff qualified to examine the councils' estimates, but the problem was not essentially an accounting one but a political one: to what extent, and under what conditions, were councils to be allowed access to public resources? These were very much open questions, and the financial relationships between councils and the centre were "interim" and uncertain, offering great scope for negotiation and manipulation of the system, in ways which will be discussed below.

The effect of all these factors was "crisis financing". In the conventional wisdom of local government, a local authority seeks to balance its budget: it has a number of sources of revenue, including a definite and predictable grant from the central government, and it must match its expenditure to these revenue sources. If it fails to do this, it must either retrench on services, or go into deficit - both of which are considered evidence of failure in financial management. In the Kenyan situation, however, the amount of the government grant, and the promptness with which it was paid, were not definite and predictable, but were related to the cash position of the council. In other words, the closer a council was to bankruptcy, the more likely it was to receive assistance from the central government. Similarly, retrenchments of staff (which were almost always rescinded under pressure from the central government) were likely to result in a more favourable consideration of a council's financial claims upon the centre.

So deficits and retrenchments became resources for councils to use against the centre, rather than being necessarily evidence of poor financial management. A council would, through a combination of necessity and design*, exhaust its reserves, so that if, for instance, the Ministry of Local Government failed to pay a grant to which it was entitled, it would suffer an immediate cash crisis. It might then lay off a number of untrained teachers, provoking the KNUT to threaten to strike and take the matter up with the Ministry of Education, often involving the Ministry of Labour in the dispute as well. After inter-ministerial negotiations in Nairobi, more funds would be released and the council would resume normal business.

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* The evidence for this argument is of course largely circumstantial, though one ex-treasurer was willing to admit that he constantly tried to give the appearance of near-bankruptcy to the ministry, for these reasons. The speed with which such "crises" spread to wealthy councils like Murang'a and Kiambu, and complaints from the centre about "crises" that evaporate on close examination, tend to support the argument.

The formal prescription for this sort of situation is usually that the central government should try to reduce the uncertainties in the situation - pay grants only according to the formula, improve financial controls, and limit the influence of external events like wage awards. (The report of the Local Government Commission of Inquiry is a good example of this sort of advice.) This sort of analysis, however, ignores the extent to which budgeting and financial control is a reflection of the way the political system as a whole operates (on which see the illuminating discussion in Riggs 1960, especially pp. 36-43). The uncertainties in procedure gave to a wide range of persons - MPs, Nairobi influentials, DCs, ministers, county councillors and officials of the Ministry of Local Government - an opportunity to exercise influence over financial allocations. To the extent that discretion and uncertainty was removed from the budgetary process, they would lose this power. Underlying (and supporting) the "chaos" of local government finance was the pattern of clientelist politics, and few people with any influence in the political process felt that they would gain from a more rigid and controlled system of local finance.

Other influentials at the centre saw in the recurring financial crises of the local authorities an opportunity to weaken and destroy these bodies*. These people, mainly senior officials and concentrated in the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the Office of the President, saw the councils as irritant bodies, centres of organization (even if not real power) which were outside the control of the central political and administrative network. To people of this persuasion, the apparent financial difficulties of the councils were to be welcomed: in the conventional view, a council in such straits was weak, and could be more easily controlled from the centre. Given this view, and the critical position in the decision-making process of those who held it, it is difficult to believe that it was not a factor in the string of policy decisions which weakened the financial position of the councils - the reduction of GPT, the abolition of dispensary fees, the reduction of cesses, compulsory staff increases under the Tripartite Agreements, and above all, the refusal to compensate councils for the effect of these decisions when the level of grant was determined, and the failure to pay even that level of grant that was agreed.

I am not suggesting that these moves were part of a conscious "conspiracy" to bring down the councils. For one thing, it appears that in some of these cases (such as the abolition of dispensary fees), the concession had been included in a major presidential speech as a move to gain political support (see also the quotation on p. 312), and that senior officials and even ministers in the ministries concerned had not been consulted in advance. What may be reasonably assumed, however, is that in the process of implementing these concessions, a number of senior officials were aware that they would further weaken the councils, but did not see this as an undesirable outcome.

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* Again, this argument is difficult to prove. My information comes mainly from discussions with Nairobi-based academics who have followed closely the activities of the people involved, and from the few (mainly expatriate) officials who were willing to discuss the subject.

If the transfer of functions was essentially concerned with the financing of these services, one might expect it to have a clear financial impact, but this is hard to assess. There was a great increase in central spending on these services after the transfer, but a straight comparison of expenditures before and after the transfer is complicated by the fact that the local authorities and the central government operated on different financial years, and the transfer came in the middle of the central government's financial year. But expenditure by the relevant central government ministries in the complete financial years on either side of the transfer, together with the councils' expenditure in their last year of responsibility for the services, was as follows:

Table 12: Service expenditure before and after the transfer of functions

in constant (July 1964) prices

| | Central government expenditure | | | County council expenditure |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1968/69 | 1970/71 | difference | 1969 |
| Education | 6,049,115 | 17,950,768 | 11,901,653 | 8,796,460 |
| Health | 3,130,531 | 5,498,711 | 2,368,180 | 1,258,841 |
| Works | 3,099,115 | 5,031,754 | 1,932,639 | 1,252,212 |

Source: Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure (cols 1-2) and Economic Survey 1972 (col. 4), converted to constant prices by the indices used for table 9, (p. 306).

The fact that the difference between expenditure in the pre-transfer and post-transfer years is greater than the amount of council expenditure suggests that there was an increase in expenditure as a consequence of the transfer, but this is not necessarily the case. It must be remembered that ministry expenditure had been rising in any case, and presumably would have continued to rise whether the transfer of functions had taken place or not. Similarly, council expenditure had also been rising, despite the apperently desperate financial position of the councils. The question is to determine the difference between the actual post-transfer position and a hypothetical one in which the transfer of functions had not taken place.

This is not easy to do, since detailed figures on actual expenditure, of either the government or the county councils, are not available. A fairly crude measure of recurrent expenditure can be obtained from the recurrent estimates of the central government and from the Economic Survey's estimates of county council expenditure. (In the case of these three services, it is reasonable to class all county council expenditure as recurrent expenditure.) An equally crude measure of total governmental expenditure (recurrent and development) can be obtained by combining the Economic Survey's estimates of central government and county council expenditure. (Expenditure by urban local authorities is excluded from both calculations.) These figures for actual expenditure have been plotted on graphs, and the figures for the three years immediately preceding the transfer of functions extrapolated to produce a hypothetical pattern of expenditure for the years 1970-72 had the transfer not taken place.

The results of the first stage of the exercise suggest that after 1968/9 - the last complete pre-transfer year - there was not only a significant rise in central government spending on these services, but also a marked rise in the rate of increase of service expenditure. (The graphs can be found in the appendix, figures 11-13.) This rise was more pronounced in the case of education and health, less so in the case of roads. The differences between the actual and the projected central government expenditure can (for these purposes) be regarded as the impact of the transfer on recurrent expenditure, and compared with the projected county council expenditure for the same period. This is done in table 13.

Table 13: Estimated and projected recurrent service expenditure in constant (1964) prices (£m)

| | Central government expenditure: Approved estimates minus projected expenditure | Projected county council expenditure | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Primary education** | | | |
| 1970/1 | 9.4 | 10.2 | -0.8 |
| 1971/2 | 12.1 | 11.1 | +1.0 |
| **Health services** | | | |
| 1970/1 | 1.4 | 1.5 | -0.1 |
| 1971/2 | 1.6 | 1.7 | -0.1 |
| **Roads/Works** | | | |
| 1970/1 | 1.1 | 1.4 | -0.3 |
| 1971/2 | 1.6 | 1.5 | +0.1 |

Notes: Central government expenditure on primary education is calculated from the subheads in the estimates; in the Roads/Works section of the table, central government expenditure is for roads and works, while county council expenditure is for roads only.

Source: Projections in Appendix, figures 11-13, based on data from the central government Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure 1964/5 to 1971/2, and from the Economic Survey's tables "County Councils: estimated expenditure on main services", 1967-72.

Carrying out the same exercise with the estimates of total expenditure yields the following results:

Table 14: Actual and projected total service expenditure in constant (1964) prices (£m)

| | Central government expenditure: actual minus projected | Projected county council expenditure | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Education | | | |
| 1970/1 | 10.4 | 10.7 | -0.3 |
| 1971/2 | 14.7 | 12.0 | +2.7 |
| Health services | | | |
| 1970/1 | 2.0 | 1.5 | +0.5 |
| 1971/2 | 2.0 | 1.7 | +0.3 |
| Roads/Works | | | |
| 1970/1 | 6.1 | 1.5 | +4.6 |
| 1971/2 | 8.6 | 1.6 | +7.0 |

Notes: Central government education figures are for total expenditure on education. Central government Works figures include non-road works and also transport; council roads figures are for roads only.

Source: Projections in Appendix, figures 14-16, based on data from the tables in the Economic Survey, "Central Government: Recurrent and Development Expenditure on Main Services" and "County Councils: Estimated Expenditure on Main Services".

These figures must be interpreted with extreme caution. In particular, it must be noted that since the central government expenditure figures (except for recurrent expenditure on education) are for ministries as a whole rather than specifically for the transferred services, it cannot be assumed that any change in the pattern of expenditure following the transfer is in fact a consequence of it. What can be said is that any significant reallocation of resources which might have occurred as a result of the transfer would be reflected in these figures, and that therefore they can serve as a negative check on the assertion that the transfer was forced on the central government by the financial needs of the services.

The significance of table 13, therefore, is that it does not suggest that the transfer was followed by an immediate increase in the volume of recurrent expenditure going to these services, such as was implied by the Minister of Finance and Planning in his 1970 Budget speech (see p. 2). In other words, if there was in fact a need for increased spending to raise the standard of service, such an increase was not immediately apparent in the budget allocations. In fact, there was a substantial increase in recurrent spending on primary education after the transfer, but its effects were not really felt until 1972/3 and 1973/4: between 1970/1 and 1973/4, expenditure (in current prices) rose from £14.3m to £22.3m, and net expenditure (i.e. expenditure minus revenue from school fees and other sources) almost doubled, from £9.7m to £18.0m, even before the reductions in school fees. The reasons for this change were first, the fact that enrolments were increasing, and increasing at a faster rate than before the transfer (see figure 10, p. 310). Secondly, there was a further increase in teachers' pay, which accounted for over £20m of the £22.3m voted for primary education in 1973/4. The figures suggest, therefore, an increase in the volume of primary education, but not necessarily a change in its quality.

Table 14 must also be interpreted with great caution, since its categories cover fairly wide ranges of government activity. Certainly, the differences between the pattern shown in this table and that in table 13 suggest that there were more significant differences between the pre- and the post-transfer period in terms of capital ("development") expenditure than recurrent expenditure. But it is by no means clear that the increases in capital expenditure implied by those figures were in fact going to former county council services. In primary education, for instance, nearly all capital expenditure is provided by the school committees, and the great bulk of development expenditure in the health services goes to urban institutions (Economic Survey, 1971, para. 10.11). Even in the case of roads, where substantial amounts of capital expenditure did go to former council roads, the proportion was still small: 70% of the £20m spent on roads and transport in 1971/2 was for road development, but only 17% of that figure (12% of the total) was allocated to former county council roads.

Any conclusions from this analysis must, therefore, be rather tentative. One thing that can be said is that although the government sought to justify the transfer of functions in financial terms, there is little evidence that the transfer was followed by any substantial reallocation of resources. The subsequent increase in primary education expenditure represents a continuation of the same financial pattern as that of the council period, with an increase in teachers' pay leading to a substantial increase in service costs. When capital expenditure is taken into account, it can be seen that there was a pronounced rise in service spending after the transfer, but only in the case of roads did this expenditure go to a former council service, and even then the proportion so allocated was fairly small and for the most part, derived from foreign aid; it could not, therefore, be termed a "reallocation" of central resources.

One criticism which could be made of this sort of analysis is that the councils had by 1969 exhausted their resources and simply could not have continued to expand their spending as they had been doing, and that extrapolations based on the assumption that they could have done so are invalid. But such a criticism takes too literally both the special pleading of the councils and the fulminations of the central elite. The councils were widely described as "bankrupt", but in fact no council ever went bankrupt, and in the cases of the three councils which were dissolved and replaced by commissions (South Nyanza, Central Nyanza and Kakamega), there were clearly political and administrative motives for dissolving the councils as well as considerations of financial viability, and it is by no means clear that the financial considerations were the dominant ones.

The point here is that the aim of crisis financing is to be, or at least to appear, as destitute as possible in order to exert the maximum possible leverage on the central government. The fact that a council's expenditure appeared to exceed its income did not, therefore, mean that it was about to collapse: from the aggregate figures, one may presume that most county councils were in this position most of the time. In fact, the procedures and structures of service finance made it highly likely that they would be. To take an example which may clarify the situation, it was reported in February 1969 that the Embu CC had a £33,000 deficit.

> The council has been badly hit after paying the increases in teachers' salaries which amounted to £21,190. The central government had to step in with an extra general grant of £57,100 to enable the council to see the year through. (EAS, 28 February 1969)

If the council had adhered to orthodox financial procedures - budgeted for a surplus, and kept adequate reserves in hand to cover such things as salary rises - it would have had to find this money from its own resources. But by exhausting its reserves and not providing for centrally-imposed salary increases, it was able to shift £57,100 of the burden onto the central government. (It is worth noting here that Embu was one of the seven councils whose "particularly serious position" was singled out by the 1966 Commission of Inquiry (Report: 34); its own "financial crisis" was therefore of relatively long standing.)

Seen in this context, the question of whether council financial staff were inadequately trained, inefficient or corrupt is a secondary question: the most critical factor contributing to the "financial crisis" was the fact that crisis financing worked. "Efficient" councils were penalized and "inefficient" ones rescued. This had been the case since the abolition of the majimbo constitution, when the first post-independence central grants were made to the county councils. Even then the overriding objective was to "bail out" those councils which were most heavily over-committed financially, thereby giving every incentive for other councils to follow their example.

Seen from the perspective of the centre, it may appear as a crisis, but once the process is seen from the perspective of the individual council, it takes on a rather different appearance. In 1963, members of the local political leadership had imposed on them the duty of meeting the costs, via the county council, of a number of expensive services, and were given resources which were quite inadequate then and were further reduced in succeeding years. They therefore attempted to shift the burden onto the central government, first by demands for increasing central grants, then by calls for a complete central takeover. (It must be remembered that the local authorities of Central Province were calling for a central government takeover of education and health, but not roads, as early as 1966.)

With the transfer of functions, they achieved their object of shedding the financial responsibility, and the government acquired, in effect, the councils' deficit, since on the 1969 figures, the cost of the three services exceeded the revenue gained by the government (GPT, school fees, and grants to local authorities) by over £1m (see table 9). It was unlikely that the government would be able to make GPT and school fees yield more revenue than the councils had done - and as it turned out, the government felt obliged to abolish the one and drastically reduce the other - so an increasing proportion of the costs of these services would clearly come from the centre. Whether the political costs of this policy to local leaders were justified by the financial gains is another question, but in financial terms the transfer of functions clearly represented a victory for local interests, and in particular, for local taxpayers.

# CHAPTER TEN

# SERVICE PROVISION AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

The empirical evidence of service provision has now been examined at some length, and it now remains to draw conclusions from it. I want to do this in five stages. First, I want to clarify the position of the service agency in the governmental structure. Secondly, I want to discuss the salient features of service operation during the county council period, and thirdly, to consider the impact of the transfer of functions on the services. Fourthly, I want to begin the theoretical analysis of the issues involved in the transfer of functions by considering the themes in the literature and their applicability to this case. And finally, I want to move on to a more satisfactory analysis, one centred on the pattern of political change in Kenya, and in particular, the development of the state structure.

## The service agency in the governmental structure

It is important to start this analysis with a clarification of the position of the service agency in the governmental structure, since much of the policy-oriented discussion of the transfer of functions assumes a clear separation between local and central agencies. Here, one must recall the historical perspective of service provision, because although the county councils were formally established as service agencies in 1963, they were in most cases amalgamations or simple redesignations of existing bodies, so that while some aspects of their role and their place within the political and administrative structure were new, others were carried over from their predecessor organisations.

From the discussion of local service provision in the colonial state (pp. 65-79), it will be recalled that the type of local service provided stemmed from the pattern of relationships with the central government. For a small privileged sector (the settlers), local services were provided either directly by the central government, or indirectly through local authorities which acted simply as spending agencies for central funds. Outside this sector, local services demanded not only a considerable contribution from local resources, but also (to a greater or lesser degree) subordination to the external agencies of control: the provincial administration or the missions. To the colonial government, service provision was important in the maintenance of support for the regime, particularly education: the schools would turn out an educated class who could fill junior posts in the civil service and would be committed to the colonial government.

Although there was some satisfaction with the early results of this approach (see p. 76), by the 1950's it was clearly inadequate (in that it was failing to deliver the required political support), and there was a search(by the colonial authorities and by some European politicians) for new arrangements which would enable an expanded African role in economic and political life without threatening the basis of the settler economy. There was an energetic campaign to increase cash crop production by Africans, which included the relaxation of the restrictions on the African cultivation of coffee, and a programme of land consolidation which (it was hoped) would accelerate the development of social stratification based on the ownership of land. There was also an intensification of political control through the provincial administration ("closer administration"), while political institutions of limited impact (district political associations) were permitted. The consultative Local Native Councils were transformed into African District Councils, both to provide services and to offer a plausible facsimile of the "efficient and democratic" system of local government that colonial governors had been charged to develop. Many of the ADC services were subsidized by the central government, and there was also a marked increase in central government services to the African areas (see p. 80), so there was an increasing flow of government resources to local services. At the same time, effective governmental control of the councils through the provincial administration was retained: it was not thought desirable for the allocation of local resources, or the determination of the nature of the relationship between the government and local institutions, to slip out of the hands of government officials.

Independence represented a continuation of this process of accommodation, rather than a dramatic change: the final transfer of power to a group of political leaders committed to maintaining the essentials of the existing economic structure. In order to meet some of the popular expectations that had been aroused during the struggle for independence, a proportion of the European farming land was taken over and subdivided for settlement, but the rest of the large-farm sector was not disturbed, and the presence of foreign corporations was welcomed.

But while the basic principles of the colonial economic structure were left intact, the nature of the political institutions - and in particular, the nature of local service bodies and their relationship to the central government - had still to be determined. In the colonial state, the local authorities had been closely linked to the government, in different ways. The European local authorities had been instruments for settler representatives to secure government resources for local services at minimal cost to themselves. The African local authorities had been extensions of the Administration through which local resources could be raised to meet the cost of local services. And yet the orthodox British theory of local government (though not British practice) held that local authorities should be autonomous of the government within their defined sphere of responsibility. The question therefore arose of what relationship the new local authorities would have with the government.

The _majimbo_ constitution of 1963 made the new county councils relatively independent of the central government, although not of the regional governments. The taxing powers of the councils were widened, and they became responsible for providing the three services, instead of simply giving support to their provision, as had previously been the case (except to a limited extent in the case of health services, where they had been statutory authorities since 1958). The regions acquired the centre's executive and legislative powers over local government, along with the power to make grants to the councils, but the DCs, who had been the linch-pins of the system of central control of the ADCs, were renamed Regional Government Agents and no longer sat as members of the councils.

This formal structure was, however, highly unstable. It was not accepted by the KANU government, there was little real devolution of powers to the regions (notably over finance and the provincial administration) and in the case of education and health services, a good deal of effective control was retained through the OICs, who remained central officials. The abolition of the majimbo constitution made local service organizations more directly dependent on the centre (particularly through the grants system), and formal central control of primary education was further strengthened by the Education Act 1968, which among other things brought the mission schools under more direct central control.

More important than the formal governmental structure, though, was the emerging pattern of political support in Kenya. The political parties that contested the pre-independence elections had been essentially coalitions of ethnically-based elites, brought together solely to contest the elections and lacking an organizational base (apart from the followings of individual political leaders). The merger with KADU left KANU as an umbrella party, incorporating all the established political leaders but without an organizational life of its own. An attempt to establish a political party with a distinct class* appeal, the KPU, was repressed, and Kenyan politics became predominantly clientelist, with two distinct but interconnected channels of patronage. One was the hierarchy of ethnically-based elites who dominated representative institutions such as councils, cooperatives and statutory boards but who also were able to exert pressure on the government in non-institutional ways. The other was the government machine itself, notably the provincial administration, which came to assume a much more explicit patronage role. (See Bienen 1974 for a detailed analysis of the nature of Kenyan clientelism.) The existence of these elaborate overlapping structures of patronage, with their close links with the centre, made it unlikely that local service structures would in fact operate autonomously, despite the provisions of the formal structure.

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* There are, admittedly, certain analytical problems involved in applying the term "class" to Kenya in general, and to the KPU in particular, since the party had a number of appeals, of which the class appeal was only one (see p.74). (cont. p.336)

The actual process of service operation, as has been seen from the preceding chapters, was marked by a very close interrelationship between local service agencies and the centre, in which the formal procedures of the councils were manipulated to serve the particular ends of the various participants in the service process. This was most marked in the allocation of resources. In the formal model this was a function essentially performed within the council: the central government contributed grants and vetted the final budget, but the determination of priorities was a local matter. In practice, the central control of major council revenue sources and expenditure commitments was used to increase the dependence of the councils on the central government. The Ministry of Local Government withheld approval of county council accounts to exert pressure on the Treasury to release funds due to councils and to agree to an increased allocation for them. The councils themselves exploited their dependence in such a way as to strengthen their demands on the centre. The combination of these strategies produced the phenomenon of the "financial crisis", which was not a "breakdown" in service operation, a

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* (from p335) But the term is sufficiently accurate in this context. On the broader implications of the term, see Cliffe 1973, Lamb 1972, 1974, and C.Leys 1971, forthcoming.

sort of financial deviance, but a particularly public and critical phase in a continuous process of resource allocation which I have termed "crisis financing". In this context, the significance of the transfer of functions is that it removed the county council as an institutional barrier between the clients of the services and the central government, and thus increased the significance in service provision of the informal and formal structures of patronage.

In the same way, self-help became a procedure for integrating local service demands into a pattern of dependence on the centre. Although the rhetoric of self-help stressed the theme of autonomous service provision, it also stressed the patronage of the central government, and held out the promise of government assistance to those who were virtuous in the matter of self-help. In any case, the Administration and CD development staff took action to establish effective control of self-help groups. In addition, the position of the local leaders (officials and non-officials) who promote self-help projects is largely dependent on their maintaining a flow of governmental patronage to their constituencies. Self-help, therefore, has become another aspect of the relationship of dependence between local leaders and the government, being used by local leaders not to meet service needs independently of the government, but as a lever on the centre over the allocation of government resources - "pre-emptive development".

It can be seen, then, that "local" services have operated within a general relationship of dependence and dominance between local leaders and the government. It is not possible, therefore, to explain their operation solely in terms of local characteristics (either of the service agency itself or of its local environment); rather, they must be considered as part of a whole range of governmental services. The question then becomes "What sort of service operates in this sort of relationship, and in what circumstances does it change?", and it is this question which will be considered in the next section.

## The pattern of service operation, 1964-69

The constitutional structure adopted at independence seems to imply two distinct types of service in these fields. It provided for a central service operating at a relatively high level, whose activities might have been expected to relate to natinnally-determined policy objectives. Quite organizationally distinct (and even remote) from the centre were local service agencies, which might have been expected to relate more closely to client preferences and priorities. In between there were the regions, which (to the extent that they were to run their own services rather than simply delegate to the county councils) constituted an intermediate type, probably closer in the most important respects to the local services than the central. But as the regions lasted for only a year and had little real impact on service organization, they can for these purposes be ignored, though it should be noted that the effect of their abolition was to reduce the "organizational distance" between the central and the local service agencies without really affecting the implied distinction in function.

But while this organizational pattern is implied by the constitutional structure, it was only followed closely in the case of roads. In this case, the ministry was not anxious to claim a general responsibility for the service throughout the country. Its task was precisely defined in relation to specified categories of road, while other specified categories and all residual roads were vested in the local authorities, and no general function of monitoring local services was given to the central service. In education, by contrast, the central service exercised considerable control over local services: it had formal powers over such matters as syllabus, examinations and the certification of teachers; its control of the secondary school entry "gate" gave it additional influence over the primary system, since the aim of primary education is generally considered to be the securing of a secondary school place, and the primary schools are therefore very sensitive to the expectations of the central service; and above all, it retained considerable day-to-day control through the OIC, who was a central official on temporary attachment to the local authority. Central dominance over health services was even more pronounced: the segment of the service which was formally devolved to local authorities was a less significant proportion of the total service than in the case of education, and the OIC of the local service was not only a central official, but also acted as head of the central government's own services in the district, which was considered the more important part of his role.

### (a) Roads

It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, to find that there were two quite distinct patterns of operation in the roads service. The central service was a small and highly-centralized organization concerned with the development of a national road network, a task which it interpreted largely to mean the development of high-standard trunk roads, together with feeder road systems in areas of particular agricultural potential. The service was highly professional in both its staffing and its operational style, capital intensive, and not marked by a high degree of interaction with clients. There was relatively little interaction between this service and the local road agencies, which tended to be individual units isolated from one another as well as from the centre, with less sophisticated techniques and equipment, essentially concerned with keeping a large number of minor roads trafficable rather than planning a network, and far more open to the expression of client demand.

The question here is why this particular pattern of service takes shape, and in particular, why this degree of separation between the central and local services persisted in this case despite the general pressures for the two to come closer together. The answer appears to lie mainly in the different sorts of balance between client demand and organizational response which could be obtained at the two service levels. The fact that the central service was dealing only with trunk roads meant that its roads were of a higher standard than those of the councils in any case, and that the demands it faced were for marginal improvement rather than dramatic qualitative change (such as the opening up of an untrafficable road). Moreover, its financial resources were far superior to those of the councils: in particular, its access to development finance (especially foreign aid) enabled it to carry out a general upgrading of its whole network. In the process, it was able to give the appearance of responding to client pressures without deviating from its own plans. Hence the pressure of client demand (in the sense of the gap between expressed demand and the ability of the service to meet it) was less than that faced by the councils.

At the same time, central service officials were better placed to attract support from outside the service agency in resisting client pressure. Although the nature of the service was largely determined by professionals within the ministry, it was also shared by many non-professional officials and policy-makers. And the professionals were apparently willing to be a little flexible in handling divergence between their views and those of non-professional officials. The tarmacking of the road to the Tanzanian border in South Nyanza, for instance, could probably not have been justified in terms of the professionals' criteria of traffic load and economic potential, and appears to have been done primarily for reasons of prestige; and minor accommodations between field staff and the Administration appear to have been tolerated so long as the essential dominance of professional criteria was not challenged.

Finally, the ministry's external links acted to support this pattern of operation, and in particular the role of the professional within it. The flow of foreign aid, for instance, was dependent on the ministry satisfying the criteria of the aid agencies, which in most cases were based on technical analyses of such things as internal rate of return on investment, impact on traffic flow, etc.; in other words, it was a field into which non-professionals could not easily venture, and there was an inclination among them not to interfere in the esoteric but apparently rewarding process. This tendency was accentuated by the fact that most professionals were also expatriates, who were intrinsically less exposed to non-professional influences within the governmental system than their Kenyan counterparts, and who interacted with and gained support from other professionals in the aid agencies, in the professional bodies of the metropolitan countries and in the project teams of the foreign contractors working on ministry projects: i.e. they were, in Gouldner's terms (1957-58), "cosmopolitans" rather than "locals".

The council road services were in a quite different position. Their task, for a start, was much greater: in addition to their extensive network of classified minor roads, they were faced with demands for work on unclassified roads or tracks, of which there were an infinite number. Moreover, because council classified roads were of a lower grade than the ministry's, they were in poorer condition to begin with, and more prone to become completely impassable. Road work was therefore relatively more important to the people immediately affected, and could often mean the difference between having and not having a road link with the rest of the country. At the same time, there was a great shortage of road maintenance capacity: the maintenance obligations of the councils far outstripped their capacity to meet them, and any substantial increase in council spending on roads was precluded by the more important commitment to educational expansion. The pressures on the service were, therefore, very great indeed.

At the same time, the ability of service officials to resist these pressures were much less. They were less likely to be professionals, even at the top of the service, had almost no career structure and did not enjoy complete security of tenure.

Nor were they likely to get much organizational support: councillors and council officials saw the role of the service as being to respond to immediate client demands, and service officials had no secure institutional base for asserting an alternative role-perception. And the nature of the service meant that client demands were small and unpredictable rather than large, packaged and regular - e.g. the demands for a day's work by a grader on occasion, rather than for a big package like a health centre. Consequently, they became the subject of "microdecisions" (see Redford 1969: 83) at a relatively low level in the service, and much harder for the service to respond to in a coherent and consistent fashion.

Hence there were, in the roads case, particular pressures keeping the two services apart. The professionals in the ministry were anxious to maintain their autonomy through a stress on technical expertise, and sought to limit their role rather than to expand it to cover the whole road system. The existence of the councils' road services meant that the ministry was shielded from the most urgent and least manageable parts of the service task. The councils, on the other hand, were anxious to retain control of their own services: their main function being to respond to client pressure, they would be less effective (i.e. less responsive) if they were not directly dependent on the council; moreover, though their capacity might be inadequate, they were at least there, whereas there could be no guarantee that a centrally-controlled service would maintain the same capacity in any area. For these reasons, roads was the service the councils were least anxious to relinquish before the transfer of functions, and most anxious to regain after it.

## (b) Education

The most important special characteristic of education was that it was politically critical in a way the other services were not. Among the consequences of this are the tendency of highly "local" demands to be directed at national-level institutions, and the relatively-greater weight which they carry there. A second important characteristic was that while it might be possible to divide organizational responsibility for different segments of the service between different organizations, the segments were closely linked to one another, the success of any segment of the service (to clients) being judged by its ability to move pupils up to the next level. Clients were unable to move freely from one level to another (as they could, for instance, in the case of roads), the service becoming more inaccessible as one moved up the hierarchy. Finally, it was the most expensive of the councils' services, a characteristic which is probably true in most countries, but which in Kenya had particular consequences for the relationship between service agencies and the central government.

Education is therefore most accurately seen as a central service, with some aspects of it subject to the influence, veto or control of local authorities or even local client groups. With primary education, there was a convergence of interests between government policy-makers and clients. To the policy-makers, primary education was of value in itself, as well as an instrument for promoting a number of other non-educational goals, such as "national unity" or "development". For parents, primary education was the avenue to much more tangible rewards - higher education and employment for their children - and because of the importance attached to it by parents, it was strongly supported by politicians at all levels and by other types of patron. Consequently, primary education was allowed to expand to meet demand, and in those areas where demand was felt to be insufficient, special measures were taken to promote primary education, such as subsidized boarding and coerced attendance. In those areas, of course, there was no convergence of central and client interests: but these were the marginal areas in the governmental system, mostly pastoral, where the government was less concerned about maintaining its popular support.

The pressures from this convergence of interests were only weakly offset by the professional values of the applied science. Teaching was not a highly professionalised occupation: teachers themselves lacked a clear professional identity they were not regarded by the public as the exclusive possessors of an esoteric body of knowledge (as doctors, for instance, were); and significant numbers of them had received no training at all. KNUT claimed to act as a professional body, but in fact operated as a trade union. And central policy-makers generally were far less concerned to limit the admission of untrained staff into the teaching service than they were in the case of the health services.

But perhaps the most important aspect of the operation of primary education was its impact on the financial relationship between local service agencies and the centre. The convergence of interests described above resulted in a continued expansion of primary school enrolments. And as was shown in chapter nine, the cost per pupil was also rising sharply, mainly because of pay increases which were imposed on councils by the central government, and which reflected the nature of the relationship between the central government and the salaried labour force. Given the nature of the councils' financial base, and the limitations on the councils' freedom of action in the financial sphere, the financial participation of the central government in local service provision was almost inevitable: what was not inevitable, though, was the form this participation took. "Crisis financing" did not stem from the financial demands of the services, but from the way in which both central and local decision-makers responded to them, and in particular from the preference of both parties for a strengthening of the relationship of ddpendence between them, rather than strengthening the capacity of the councils to act as autonomous service agencies. The financial needs of the services (particularly education) provided the motive force for the system of crisis financing, but its nature and direction stemmed from wider forces at work within the political system.

### (c) Health services

The health services were also ranked hierarchically, from the local dispensary to the Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi, but the service offered is essentially of the same sort, with the rural dispensary offering a poor man's version of the medical treatment available in the towns from the large hospitals and from private practitioners. The local service also enjoys less organizational autonomy from the centre than was the case with the other two services: as noted above (p. 339), the commitment of the OIC to the local service was less, and in addition, the professional mystique of the doctor insulated him from local pressures rather more than was the case with other OICs. Consequently, the role of the county council as a service agency was one of providing certain types of support for a central government service, in return for a critical voice in the making of certain sorts of decision.

Within this single service, the voice of the professional in service operation is seldom challenged, but it is subject to important constraints in certain areas. The definition of the service had been laid down initially by professionals and accepted by clients and non-professional policy-makers, and as accepted, it supported the position of the professional within the existing service. But this did not mean that doctors could expect similar support for a more sophisticated service: an outpatient for whom a course of injections has been prescribed will often not return for the second and subsequent injections, having on his first visit to the health centre satisfied his own desire for immediate alleviation of his complaint. Similarly, there may be little support for attempts to change the service definition - e.g. to persuade mothers to bring their healthy children, as well as their sick ones, to maternal and child health clinics.

Even more important is the weakness of the professional voice in service expansion at the local level. Expansion is generally seen as consisting of building more health centres, and the critical decision in the expansion process are governed by client and government utility interests rather than professional ones. Health centres have assumed a highly symbolic role in the competition for public resources and political following. Self-help health centres are promoted as part of the competition between members of the local elite. Also (particularly in the later years of the county council period), they have been actively promoted by the provincial administration and CD staff (who were trying to discourage the building of self-help secondary schools) as suitable projects for self-help. The pattern of expansion has been largely governed by the distribution of self-help projects, and the central response to them was dictated by non-professional considerations - e.g. by notions of equity among administrative units, or the desire of a patron at the centre to provide a benefit to his clients.

These factors - the ritualization of service definition, and the control of the process of service expansion by client and central utility interests - reduced the effective control of the professional over the service. At the same time, they served to insulate the central sector of the service from client demand and enabled the professionals to concentrate on the higher-level services which were more highly esteemed. The local-level services served as a buffer zone, an area of service whose medical efvectiveness might be doubtful but which was a response to public demand. The fact that the county council was nominally responsible for the service added to its "buffer" nature, since it meant that most of the cost was met locally, and also that the service demands were filtered through an existing political structure rather than being fed directly into the central service.

## The impact of the transfer of functions

Given the differences in organizational structure and operation between the three services, one might expect to find that the impact of the transfer of functions on service operation was not uniform; this question will therefore be examined seperately for each service.

(a) Education

The main effect of the transfer on the primary education service was to remove one element of the control structure - a formal institution for the representation of client interests at the district level - without changing the basic organization. The change did have its effects. It greatly reduced the significance of the councillor's role in education. Councillors complain, for instance, that teachers no longer show them the respect that they did formerly, and that as a consequence, there was less effective control over teacher indiscipline. The extent to which this is in fact so is open to question - discipline is indeed weak, but there is little evidence that it was noticeably stronger before the transfer - but certainly councillors now show little interest in primary education. Secondly, it has given the provincial administration a more direct part in service provision through the DC's chairmanship of the new District Education Board. The precise effects of this have yet to be felt but it is a significant move in the gradual accretion of power by DCs. Thirdly, the phenomenon of the financial crisis has disappeared, at least from the public stage, though apparently at the cost of a further sharp increase in public expenditure on education.

More important, though, is what has not changed. The basic convergence of interests that supported the continued expansion of primary education in the county council period was not affected. It does not appear to be markedly easier for the

DEO to close or amalgamate schools with low enrolments now that he no longer has to contend with the Education Committee of the county council: indeed, in one case, a teacher has for the past three years been stationed at a school with no pupils, as a result of the DC's insistence that the government must not give the appearance of having abandoned the area. Nor did the transfer affect the relationship between the individual school and its client community - as manifested, for instance, in the ability of the school to meet its capital costs through "self-help" contributions, or in the pressure that parents are able to bring to bear to keep instruction sharply focussed on the CPE examination. The basic pattern of service operation, therefore, was not altered by the transfer.

(b) Health services

There was a similar continuity in the health services: the MOH remained in control, the staff remained in situ, and there was no change in the definition of the service. The financial impact of the transfer is difficult to assess, but it is clear that there was no dramatic change in the volume of resources allocated, and some evidence to suggest that the financial procedures of the councils were speedier and more flexible than those of the ministry.

The main change was the exclusion of councillors from a formal consultative role. This was less important for the day-to-day operation of the service than for service expansion, since the council Health Committee had been a critical arena for setting priorities in the allocation of resources. Since the transfer, there appears to be no district-level institution capable of performing the same function. The MOH does not control the necessary resources, and often prefers to avoid the role of political negotiator; the DDC and DDAC are, in theory, the relevant institutions to set priorities for health centre expansion, but they, too, do not control the necessary resources and tend to be by-passed. Expansion demands tend to be displaced upwards, usually to Nairobi, where demands are made by lobbying of the ministry, by appeals to patrons, and by intensification of self-help activities as a form of "pre-emptive development". Expansion is a relatively minor part of the rural health service, but the fact that it does take place in this way is significant, since the need to press local service demands at the centre, and in this way, intensifies the dependence of local leaders on administrators and patrons at the centre.

### (c) Roads

In the case of roads, the effect of the transfer of functions was more pronounced, largely because of the clear distinction that had previously been made between the central and the local service. Before the transfer, the ministry's service task had been relatively narrowly defined, and it had been insulated from the most particularist and troublesome client demands by the existence of the council services. After the transfer, it had to cope with the whole range of service provision, and in particular, with the problem of defining the boundary between service and non-service at the lower reaches of the service hierarchy.

Its initial response was to try to extend to the former council roads the professional approach it had developed for dealing with the trunk roads. It attempted to define and limit its responsibilities in respect of the former council roads, and to devise procedures for giving systematic maintenance to all the roads on its classification. This meant excluding from the possibility of service a considerable number of roads and tracks which had previously been considered eligible for maintenance. Having absorbed the councils' road staff, it sought to ensure its organisational control of them by retaining considerable authority at the provincial level, and by transferring the more senior ex-council staff to other areas. It was also considered desirable not to establish institutional channels for the representation of client interests, since they would limit the ability of service officials to meet the "objective" needs of the area, and would be used as a lever by client representatives seeking to expand the maintenance responsibilities of the service.

This approach meant reducing (preferably eliminating) the "grey area" of ambiguity at the margin of the service, where service shades off into non-service. In the ministry's model, there should be only two types of road: those which it was obliged to maintain regularly, and those on which it was forbidden to work. It was this aspect of the ministry's approach which provoked the greatest reaction from others in the service structure, since it was precisely this discretionary service in which they were most interested. Government officials wanted an ad hoc service to meet their particular needs from time to time, and challenged the ministry's insistence on prescribed responsibilities and prescribed standards. As one official responsible for rural development put it, "All that is required is the possibility of getting a lorry or two to a certain place at certain intervals". And both the Administration and elected representatives wanted discretionary service so that they could serve as channels for client demand and thus consolidate their position as patrons. At the same time, there was concern among some central officials at the implications of the ministry's approach for other government policies, such as rural development and increased employment, a concern which was shared by some policy-makers in the aid agencies. They therefore lent their support to proposals for a low-grade service.

As a consequence, government approval was eventually given for the formation of Rural Access Roads Units, whose task was to offer a discretionary service on the margins of the official service. But whereas previously the discretionary service had responded to the pressures of elected councillors, it was now to be subordinated to a body dominated by the Administration - i.e., this was not a move back towards the model of the contracting machine, but towards that of the government utility. And the creation of the RARUs once again insulated the ministry from the strains of operating at a level where client demand was vastly in excess of either the capacity of the service agency or the level of service warranted by professional criteria.

## Towards an explanation

Having examined the pattern of service operation under the county councils, and the impact on it of the transfer of functions, I want to consider now the possible analytical frameworks which might explain this pattern of change. One such framework was implied in the critique of the councils as service agencies made by central decision-makers and used to justify the transfer of functions: namely, that as service agencies, councils were inefficient, parochial and corrupt, and that in particular, they were incapable of meeting the financial demands of the services. The discussion in chapter nine, and in this chapter so far, has been an implied evaluation of this implied analysis, and has suggested that it is a totally inadequate explanation of the changes which took place. We have seen that the pattern of service operation has been only loosely related to the constitutional status of the agency, that some of the most important characteristics of the services were unchanged after the transfer, and that where substantial change did occur, it is more related to the nature of the central agency to which responsibility was transferred than to the fact of central government control. And it is clear that the pattern of service finance cannot be simply categorised as evidence of the incompetence of local authorities. It is necessary, therefore, to look for a better explanation, and I shall begin by reviewing the three themes discussed in chapter two to see to what extent they explain the actual pattern of change in those services.

The first theme was the distinction between central and local decision-making. But in examining the Kenyan situation, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between one type of decision-making that is "central" and another that is "local". This can be seen, for instance, in the position of the DC: he is, certainly, a central government official, but one operating in a "local" political structure of which he is very much a part, and not simply an outside observer and occasional umpire. This is very marked in the case of the campaigns for the institutes of technology, where, as Lamb notes, members of the Administration have "in many instances spurred on the spirit of ethnic and regional competition in the building of the colleges" (1972: 13). The DC Meru, for instance, (himself a non-Meru), spent his 1972 Easter holidays in Mombasa, where he had previously been DC, soliciting support among Meru people there for the Meru College of Technology, of which he was chairman of the fund-raising committee (Daily Nation, 5 April 1972). (This incident also illustrates the analytical inadequacy of categorizing ethnic attachments in Kenya as "primordial loyalties".) Similarly, district-level politicians are closely tied in to structures of patronage and dependence reaching through the provincial to the national level.

A shift in power from county councillors to the provincial administration, such as took place at the transfer of functions, cannot be accurately summarized as a change from "local" to "central" decision-making. And even if it were possible to draw a clear distinction between "central" and "local" actors, it is not clear that this would sharpen the analysis: a road engineer in the Ministry of Works, a rural development planner in the Ministry of Finance and Planning, and a cabinet minister manipulating the demands of middle-level patrons might all be described as "central" actors, but it is clear that they are all operating in quite different ways, and not at all clear that the differences within this category are less than those between its members and some other category of actors designated as "local". Hence while there are distinctions which can be made in terms of the level at which actors are operating, they do not appear to be the most important ones.

The second theme was the distinction between elected representatives and appointed officials as decision-makers. It is argued that elected representatives are highly sensitive to their constituents: since they depend on their votes, they will be responsive to their wishes. Hence elected representatives are likely to hold a certain set of values about service operation, and to support a client-oriented service of the type we have termed "contractor". Appointed officials, on the other hand, are not so dependent and hence (it is argued) will hold different values and be more inclined to promote an "applied science" or "central utility" type of service.

In the Kenyan situation, however, the dependence of councillors on the electorate cannot be taken for granted. Elections are not a regular part of political life, either at the local or the national level. In the 1968 county council elections, the KPU candidates were disqualified, and the KANU candidates (who had been chosen by internal politicking rather than any form of popular pre-selection) were declared elected unopposed. Since then the term of office of these councillors has been extended several times by Presidential decision, and their continuance in office is clearly dependent on their relationship with the dominant political forces in Nairobi rather than the approbation of the electorate as a whole. The following resolution of the Finance and General Purposes Committee of the Murang'a County Council is illuminating:

> In pursuance of ALGAK recommendation the Committee was informed that it had been agreed that all Local Authorities should contribute a sum of shs.1000/= each being contribution from the councillors for presentation to His Excellency the President Jomo Kenyatta for charitable organizations in appreciation of His Excellency's act of grace to extend the term of councillors to 1974. Resolved:

> (i) that the Treasurer be authorised to deduct from County Councillors a contribution proportional to their allowances for charitable organizations.
>
> (ii) that the two Chief Officers i.e. Clerk and Treasurer be requested to lend a helping hand. (Minute F&GP 102/71)

Even where elections are held, there is still considerable scope for administrative influence: through rules about qualifications, the issue (or non-issue) of permits for public meetings, and the use of the general influence of the provincial administration, particularly at the location level and below. In the 1969 National Assembly primary elections, "one candidate regarded as a dangerous challenge to Mbiyu Koinange, one of the President's closest advisors, was put in preventive detention three weeks before polling day and thus prevented from standing" (Hyden and Leys 1972: 397).

Finally, even if free and regular elections were held, the responsiveness of councillors to popular interests would have to be considered in relation to the social structure. Councillors are drawn predominantly from the salaried strata, traders and the richer peasants - which are interlocking rather than distinct categories. Moreover, it appears likely that they would draw their electoral support from clan-based local vote-brokers rather than from a direct appeal to the voters (though in the absence of studies of the social basis of county council politics, this can only be asserted) and that these intermediaries would also be the wealthier members of the local community. In other words, the interests and preferences of "the people" would be perceived by a structure dominated by the most privileged groups. This does not mean, of course, that political representatives would not be "responsive", but points to the need to specify more precisely the sort of pressures and interests to which they would respond, particularly when there is a conflict between the interests of the privileged strata and those of the mass of the peasants.

The assumption that appointed officials are necessarily independent of popular support must also be qualified. Even though they have security of tenure, the performance of their job may be dependent on a certain degree of popular support, or at least acquiescence. This applies particularly to the provincial administration and the community development department, where the assessment of an official's worth is heavily influenced by his ability to mobilize popular support for official programmes. And most officials' careers would suffer from a serious confrontation with articulate local representatives.

None the less, it is possible to distinguish (in some respects) between appointed officials and elected representatives as service decision-makers. There are obvious procedural differences in the way client demands are handled. There was a certain pressure within councils for client demands (e.g. for road maintenance, or new health centres) to be channelled through relatively open procedures, with lists of priorities being drawn up and some attempt being made to arrive at an allocation that could be generally accepted as equitable (e.g. by allocating one grader to each administrative division within the council area). Ministries, by contrast, seek to limit the involvement of client representatives, are reluctant to state publicly their priorities, and generally seek to maintain the maximum official discretion in decision-making.

What is open to question, though, is whether this distinction had much impact on the sorts of decisions that were in fact taken at this time. Given the continuity in the pattern of primary education before and after the transfer of functions, it is hard to believe that primary education would have been significantly different in the period 1964-69 if the DEO had been solely responsible for its operation. And while the transfer of the roads function did lead to a change in service definition which entailed far greater insulation of the service from local pressures, this did not so much stem from the fact of control by officials as from the particular sort of organization which these officials sought to achieve: other officials (notably the DC) supported proporals for a different sort of road organization which would be responsive to client demands, but mediated through a quite different structure to that of the councils.

The third theme was centre-periphery theory, which sees the main dynamic as being the conflict between a centre (usually with clear, nation-building goals) and a periphery (which resists their imposition). While this perspective has a certain appeal as a suggestive analogy, it is not easy to apply to the service issues with which this study has been concerned. In the first place, there is the difficulty of determining what the "centre" is (pp. 354-5). The term seems to be generally synonomous with the central government itself, though it is sometimes extended to other agencies which are breaking down the "isolation" of the periphery. It is not easy to talk in Kenya of a single "centre", still less to assume that it is concerned with breaking down the "isolation"of the periphery, when it is clear that a great deal of coercive effort is expended in ensuring that people are kept locked into the present pattern of ethnic-based clientelism. (E.G. the activitie of the DC Meru cited earlier; there is also evidence that the government was most concerned about the KPU's appeal in Central Province, since the recruitment of poor Kikuyu to the party challenged the ethnic basis of political organization.)

The identification of the "periphery" is even more difficult. It seems to be identified in the literature as all areas outside the capital, and the assumption is often made that centre-periphery political relationships are the political reflection of some cultural difference between the "modern"/gesellschaft/ progressive capital and its "traditional"/gemeinschaft/ conservative hinterland. When this geographical analogy is applied to the Kenyan situation, however, it is positively misleading. There are many ways in which West Pokot, for instance, can be considered "peripheral" (see for instance, Soja's map in figure 5, p. 53); there are some ways in which South Nyanza could be so regarded; but it is difficult to regard Murang'a as "peripheral" in any significant sense: parts of it are peripheral, but this fact only underlines the non-peripheral nature of the rest of the district. But if this sort of definition of the periphery is applied, then it becomes clear that we are dealing with conflicts within the centre, and not primarily between the centre and the periphery. Indeed, the dominant elite in Nairobi is less concerned about the periphery (as defined here) simply because it is peripheral to the maintenance of the present socio-economic order. The geographical analogy, therefore, is rather misleading, and cannot be used as the basis of the analysis.

Service organization and political change

We are, therefore, still left without an adequate explanation. I would argue that the reason for this is that the sort of analyses we have been considering have taken the alleged characteristics of "local" institutions, or of service organisations themselves, and trying to relate these to the governmental structure, rather than asking what the governmental structure itself is, and how "local services" relate to that. Consequently, I would argue that a satisfactory explanation of this process can be reached only by looking at it not as a problem of "local services" or even "local institutions", but as a phase in the evolution of the post-colonial state in Kenya.

This sort of explanation has to begin with a historical perspective. In the colonial political order, there is no place for "politics" in the formal, institutionalized sense - i.e. "representative politics". Instead, there is a central hierarchy of officials to coordinate governmental activity, which consults with local notables, whose claim to represent the people is not tested through the elections. Consequently, there is "consultative politics", with intense but enclosed systems of political activity being found at the points where these consultations occur.

In Kenya, this meant different things for Africans and Europeans. For the Africans, who were kept insulated from the centre and from one another, the only form of acceptable political activity was consultation with the Administration on the latter's terms. When local representative institutions -

the Local Native Councils and the African District Councils - were established, they served as adjuncts to the administrative structure, devices of "formal cooptation" aimed at legitimizing the authority of the government by associating non-governmental notables in its operation without relinquishing effective government authority (see Selznick 1949). While these bodies did provide services, they were not primarily service agencies (see, e.g., Lyon 1966: 62, 80 on the massive surpluses accumulated by the LNCs in the 1930's). Nor were they "tribal institutions", as some observers would have it (e.g. Beck 1970: 132).

For the Europeans, who could not be insulated from the governmental structure in the way the Africans could, there was a different pattern of consultation. European notables did not seek full representative politics (which would have raised questions about the representation of Africans and Asians), but a more elaborate system of consultative politics, carried on through the Legislative Council and its committees, through special-purpose boards and committees, and through settler/administrators like Cavendish-Bentinck. They had, therefore, no need for autonomous local government structures, and the ones which were set up were, to the orthodox local government school, "a sad disappointment" (Mulasa 1970: 236).

The elaboration of local government institutions in the 1950's, which proceeded on the assumption that they would become fully-responsible service authorities independent of the central government - i.e. arenas for autonomous representative politics rather than consultative politics - therefore represented a significant change. It must be noted that the new emphasis was to a large extent "externally-fuelled": the initial impetus came from the Colonial Secretary's despatch of 1947, and it was followed up with detailed policy advice from the British local government experts, both as members of the Colonial Secretary's Advisory Panel on African Local Government and as visiting advisers and commissioners in the various colonies. It did, of course, coincide with the desire of the colonial government to meet the growing pressure for services in African areas (including the services which were required in its own plans) from locally-raised revenues, but the government was not anxious to relinguish control over the operation of the services, and devices like the District Education Boards were used to tap local revenues without conceding control.

The critical question was what role the provincial administration would play in any future structure of local government. The concepts and institutions of local government which were being promulgated were essentially derived from British local government, in which there was simply no equivalent of the DC, the linchpin of the colonial administration. There was an assumption among the colonial local government school that the provincial administration would "wither away" as the local authorities developed (see Lee 1967: 53). This was, in effect, the assumption underlying the majimbo constitution: the provincial administration was to become the agent of the regions, not the centre. At the same time, there was a detailed division of executive and legislative power in the formal sense between the centre and the regions, but the control of the administration was the critical aspect of the change, and had control been transferred as provided by the constitution, this would have constituted a very radical change in the structure of the Kenyan state.

The majimbo constitution was, however, highly unstable. This was not only because it was part of a political settlement which was not accepted by the KANU government (see pp. 98-9), but also because there was no real socio-economic base for a decentralized state structure. The export-oriented capitalist economy that had been developed in Kenya was built on the very close links that existed between the dominant economic groups and the colonial government, and on extensive governmental control of a wide range of social and economic relationships. The political struggle of the 1950's had been over the control of this state apparatus, and while the rhetoric of the nationalists had spoken of breaking it down (see p. 1), when they came to power they were more concerned to use it for their own purposes - a concern that was reinforced as the new political and bureaucratic elite succeeded to the farms and businesses of the departing expatriates. The existence of ethnic distinctions (and the promotion of ethnic consciousness by political leaders) was held to require separate political institutions for the different ethnic groups, but the concentration of public debate on this question obscured the integration of the economically and politically dominant strata of the colonial society into a single structure of power, and the implications of this for the future pattern of political activity.

The majimbo constitution, therefore, failed to take root, and direct central control over all areas of governmental activity was restored. But the constitutional forms that remained -

notably the new status of the county councils - did inhibit the DC's freedom of action. Although he now sat on the council once again, he could not control it as his colonial predecessor had done. He might believe (as one DC told me) that "the county council is one of the ministries. They are officials...", but the forms and procedures of the councils enabled them to put up more than symbolic resistance to the exercise of the DC's authority. Murang'a CC, for instance, held no formal meetings for over six months when elected councillors refused to accept the members nominated by the central government, and the dispute was only resolved when the Ministry of Local Government agreed to make new nominations (EAS, 6 and 18 January 1967). The same council also insisted, over the DC's objections, in holding its meeting in Kikuyu, saying the "many members could not express themselves properly when speaking Kiswahili" and adding "those few members who could not understand Kikuyu /which included the DC/ were expected to sit near members who could interpret to them" (Murang'a CC Minute 49/69 of 1969). There were continuous attempts by the provincial administration to regain its power over the councils - in particular, the power to approve budgets, and a general veto over council actions (see pp. 101-2), both of which would have enabled it to transform the councils into subordinate institutions in which a far more consultative type of politics took place.

There was, therefore, an inherent conflict between the councils and the provincial administration, which stemmed from this fundamental difference between representative politics, as embodied in the councils, and consultative politics, as embodied in the administration. In this highly competitive situation, service issues became the occasion of disputes between the councils and the government more often than they were the real cause of them. Central government officials had formal control over most policy issues in any case, and with the education and health services were also able to monitor their day-to-day operations. And the financial disputes, as has been noted in chapter nine, were more concerned with the extent to which the councils would have independent access to public resources, rather than with the actual use to which councils put the resources they did have. And since there had been no real conflict between councils and government over substantial issues of service policy or operation, it is not surprising that the transfer of functions was not necessarily followed by major changes in service operation, and that where changes did follow - in the case of roads - the change was better explained in terms other than the altered constitutional status of the service.

The actual conduct of county councils as service agencies, therefore, was not the real issue. What was more important was the power relationships within the service structure. There was a general pressure for the expansion of government authority, at a number of levels and in a number of different fields - e.g. in the cooperatives and the unions as well as with the county councils. In all three of these cases, while the government's stated concern was with their efficiency, it became clear that its underlying aim was that they should not be capable of constituting an organizational base for opposition to the government. These expansionist pressures pushing down, as it were, met with pressures coming up from clients seeking benefits from government officials within a relationship of dependence: these might be mediated through intermediaries seeking to exercise the role of patron, or could come directly from the client in search of benefits.

The way in which these relationships between clients (i.e. both actual and would-be users of the services), intermediaries and officials took shape was the real question at issue in service operations - not the relative efficiency of local authorities or central ministries as service agencies. There was a range of structures to accommodate such relationships: autonomous non-official bodies such as the county councils, formal consultative bodies such as the DDAC and the DEB, and the informal structures of contact between officials and the individuals with whom they interact. In general, the strength and importance of formal structures of representation - both the councils and the formal consultative bodies - declined in importance over this period, and informal structures of contact became more important.

It is in this context that "self-help" has become critically important in service provision. Its significance lies in the way it blurs the distinction between governmental and private resource use. In the formal model of Kenya government activity, the government raises resources through taxes, the rate of taxation and the penalties for non-payment being fixed by law; the money thus raised is allocated by the National Assembly through the budget; it is then spent by government officials ultimately responsible, through the ministers, to parliament. There are, of course, many important deviations from this model - government revenue is raised from sources other than taxation, spending in excess of the Budget votes is increasingly common*, and money is expended by non-government agencies - but the formal model is still held to represent the characteristic pattern of government resource allocation. With self-help, however, this model does not apply: there is no legal regulation of the rate of contribution, nor of the sanctions applied in their collection; the allocation of these resources is subject to only very weak formal governmental controls; and there are few formal controls to ensure that the resources are in fact allocated to the projects for which they were raised.

This pattern is perhaps what one might expect of private activity, but self-help can no longer (if it ever could) be considered a private activity. As the discussion earlier has made clear (see pp. 120-31), self-help incorporates both officials and non-officials in a single pattern of organization. The nature of the relationships within this pattern varies from one project to another. In some cases, self-help is simply a means by which an official can carry out official tasks without using government funds. At the other end of the continuum, officials may be "captured" by the self-help activities of non-officials: Holmquist's "pre-emptive development".

But the balance of power within this broad group of self-help activists is less important than the fact that it is a coalition of the local elite presenting a relatively united face to the peasantry. Elected MPs often adopt the authoritarian role of the provincial administration: one MP, addressing his constituents,

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* See p. 114. It has now been disclosed that overspending rose to £4.5m in 1971/2 (EAS, 6 December 1973).

> ... appealed to them to participate fully in self-help, because if they failed to donate freely the Government would have no option to using force. (EAS, 17 December 1971)

Another, who was also a Cabinet minister, issued a "development strategy" for his constituency, in which he directed that

> All able-bodied adults in Busia South constituency are to work for six hours daily from 7 a.m., except on Sundays. (*Daily Nation*, 3 February 1972)

"Self-help" as an institution gives normative cover to alliances between government officials and the local elite, and licenses them to engage in the extraction and allocation of local resources outside the formal machinery of government. In this context, the collection of money is as much a symbolic extraction of political obedience as a necessary means of gathering the necessary resources for a project. One MOH mentioned several occasions when new facilities were made available at government health centres, and at which the MP insisted on a ceremonial opening and a self-help collection to "pay" for the new equipment, even though it had already been paid for from government funds. This element of ritual extraction can also be seen in many aspects of the fund-raising for the institutes of technology, and in the ceremonial donations made by those who secure an audience with the President.

Self-help must be seen primarily as a political structure, involving exchanges of support and the extraction and allocation of public resources. It enables the government to share power at various levels with the local elite without creating an institutionalised independent power base. In this way, it is an alternative to local government, allowing the local elite an arena in which to operate while keeping them dependent on the patronage of the government. Members of the local elite accept the terms of self-help and the role of dependant, lending their support to the government; the government, in turn, recognizes and supports their dominance in the local community. The provincial administration seeks to pre-empt the self-help process by constantly urging chiefs to initiate self-help projects, often equating this with "development". As a service, self-help is less important in itself than for the access it gives to government services, and its main impact is to accentuate the tendency of government spending to follow the existing service pattern and hence to perpetuate geographical and social inequalities in service distribution. Self-help projects tend to offer both differentiated and cumulative benefits - the wealthier members of the community are better-placed to take advantage of them, and those who do take up the services are able to use them to strengthen their economic position. In other words, it promotes the development of "cumulative inequality", both between geographical areas and between individuals within them.*

The changes in the local service structure, therefore, are part of a wider shift towards a consultative, rather than a representative, style of politics. This stems from two roots: the first is the increasing coercive power of the state, which makes formal institutional opposition to the government unprofitable and often dangerous. The second is the increasing integration of the dominant elites in the political, bureaucratic and economic spheres, and the increasing importance to them of maintaining solidarity against possible challenge from below. In this sense, the DC quoted earlier (p. 365) was right: councillors are "officials", just as the institutes of technology are "official" projects. Both of these roots can be seen in President Kenyatta's warning in June 1974 to "disenchanted parliamentarians" that the government would "physically crush" anyone attempting to form an opposition party to contest the coming parliamentary elections (The Times, 3 June 1974). Political leaders can choose between taking their chances in an integrated structure of consultative politics, or facing the hostility of a government uninhibited by legal or constitutional forms.

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* This discussion has been based on the premise that the proceeds of self-help collections are all applied to self-help projects: this is clearly not the case, but it is simpler to exclude the question of corruption from the analysis. Nor has the discussion touched on the extent to which self-help projects can become profit-making enterprises for their promoters. Alushula (1969: 12-13) gives an account of a secondary school which was operating in this way, and suggests that there are many others.

And it is these factors which will be the critical determinants of forms of service provision in the future. There may well be organizational changes comparable to the transfer of functions: indeed, to the extent that they can give the appearance of being a positive response to the strains being felt in service provision, they are quite likely. Roads, in particular, is a service where the present organizational forms will be questioned as the dominant groups within the governmental structure seek to erode the autonomy of the professionals within the ministry. But whatever changes do take place will stem not so much from "internal" considerations of effective service provision, as from the dynamics of the wider political structure. The forms that these may take have not been covered in this thesis, but that, as the Jungle Book puts it, is another story.

# APPENDIX

Figure 11: Recurrent expenditure on education by the central government and county councils (current prices)



Source: Government figures from the annual Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure; county council figures from the estimates in the Economic Survey

Figure 12: Recurrent expenditure on health by the central government and county councils (current prices)



Source: Government figures from the annual Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure; county council figures from the estimates in the Economic Survey

Figure 13: Recurrent expenditure on roads by the central government and county councils (current prices)



Source: Government figures (for all Ministry of Works expenditure) from the annual Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure; county council figures (for road expenditure only) from the estimates in the Economic Survey

Figure 14: Total expenditure on education by the central government and county councils (in constant (1964) prices)



Source: Economic Survey, 1969-72, converted to constant prices as in table 9

Figure 15: Total expenditure on health services by central government and county councils (in constant (1964) prices)



Source: Economic Survey, 1969-72, converted to constant prices as in table 9

Figure 16: Total expenditure on roads by the central government and county councils (in constant (1964) prices).



Source: Economic Survey, 1969-72, converted to constant prices as in table 9.

N.B. Central government figures are for roads and transport; county council figures are for roads only.

Table 15: County council revenue and expenditure, 1964-71, in current prices

| | 1963 [e] | | 1964 [c] | | 1965 | | 1966 | | 1967 | | 1968 | | 1969 [b] [h] | | 1970 [b] | | 1971 [b] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | AMOUNT [a] | % | AMOUNT [a] | % | AMOUNT [a] | % | AMOUNT [a] | % | AMOUNT [a] | % | AMOUNT [a] | % | AMOUNT [a] | % | AMOUNT [a] | % | AMOUNT [a] | % |
| REVENUE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| G.P.T. | 1,474 [f] | 27.1 | 2,147 | 27.0 | 2,621 | 25.0 | 2,749 | 25.5 | 2,706 | 25.3 | 2,490 | 21.2 | 3,320 | 23.5 | 299 [c] | 8.7 | 265 [c] | 7.5 |
| INDIRECT TAXES [j] | 443 [g] | 8.1 | 713 | 9.0 | 704 | 6.7 | 736 | 6.8 | 726 | 6.8 | 962 | 8.2 | 864 | 6.1 | 1,439 | 42.0 | 1,312 | 37.0 |
| INCOME FROM PROPERTY | – | – | 103 | 1.3 | 185 | 1.8 | 166 | 1.5 | 247 | 2.3 | 365 | 3.1 | 367 | 2.6 | 479 | 14.0 | 492 | 13.9 |
| SCHOOL FEES | 732 | 13.4 | 2,619 | 32.9 | 3,609 | 34.4 | 2,793 | 26.0 | 2,700 | 25.2 | 3,234 | 27.5 | 3,477 | 24.6 | – | – | 4 | 0.1 |
| SALE OF GOODS & SERVICES | | | | | | | 869 | 8.1 | 615 | 5.7 | 826 | 7.0 | 750 | 5.3 | 926 | 27.1 | 944 | 26.6 |
| GOVERNMENT GRANTS | 2,511 | 46.1 | 1,912 | 24.0 | 3,184 | 30.4 | 3,267 | 30.4 | 3,515 | 32.8 | 3,658 | 31.1 | 4,927 | 34.8 | 63 | 1.8 | 212 | 6.0 |
| OTHER | 289 | 5.3 | 470 | 5.9 | 178 | 1.7 | 181 | 1.7 | 204 | 1.9 | 235 | 2.0 | 433 | 3.1 | 217 | 6.3 | 317 | 8.9 |
| TOTAL | 5,449 | | 7,964 | | 10,481 | | 10,761 | | 10,713 | | 11,751 | | 14,138 | | 3,423 | | 3,526 | |
| EXPENDITURE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ADMINISTRATION | 450 | 8.4 | 949 | 10.6 | 1,013 | 9.4 | 932 | 8.6 | 1,044 | 8.7 | 1,200 | 8.2 | 1,445 | 9.1 | 1,346 | 36.1 | 1,492 | 38.6 |
| ROADS | 535 | 10.0 | 967 | 10.8 | 1,246 | 11.6 | 1,174 | 10.8 | 1,276 | 10.6 | 1,405 | 9.6 | 1,415 | 8.9 | 214 | 5.7 | 41 | 1.1 |
| OTHER COMMUNITY SERVICES | 4 | 0.1 | 74 | 0.8 | 71 | 0.7 | 7 | 0.1 | 80 | 0.7 | 108 | 0.7 | 44 | 0.3 | 128 | 3.4 | 294 | 7.6 |
| HEALTH | 826 | 15.4 | 860 | 9.6 | 957 | 8.9 | 1,050 | 9.6 | 1,111 | 9.2 | 1,257 | 8.6 | 1,453 | 9.1 | 8 | 0.2 | – | – |
| EDUCATION | 2,288 | 112.7 | 4,957 | 55.3 | 6,362 | 59.0 | 6,547 | 60.1 | 7,281 | 60.6 | 9,124 | 62.4 | 9,940 | 62.4 | 42 | 1.1 | 5 | 0.1 |
| OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES | 181 | 3.4 | 276 | 3.1 | 238 | 2.2 | 174 | 1.6 | 224 | 1.9 | 289 | 2.0 | 308 | 1.9 | 480 | 12.9 | 454 | 11.8 |
| ECONOMIC SERVICES | 583 | 10.9 | 271 | 3.0 | 265 | 2.5 | 261 | 2.4 | 245 | 2.0 | 286 | 2.0 | 308 | 1.9 | 370 | 9.9 | 417 | 10.8 |
| TRADING SERVICES | 171 | 3.2 | 328 | 3.7 | 440 | 4.1 | 427 | 3.9 | 528 | 4.4 | 715 | 4.9 | 667 | 4.2 | 850 | 23.6 | 909 | 23.5 |
| OTHER | 322 | 6.0 | 288 | 3.2 | 185 | 1.7 | 314 | 2.9 | 233 | 1.9 | 242 | 1.7 | 337 | 2.1 | 259 | 6.9 | 252 | 6.5 |
| TOTAL | 5,360 | | 8,970 | | 10,777 | | 10,887 | | 12,022 | | 14,626 | | 15,917 | | 3,727 | | 3,562 | |

(for source and notes, see following page)

## Table 15

**Notes:**

(a) £K000's
(b) provisional
(c) Area Council poll rates
(d) "includes urban area and rural area councils"
(e) African District Councils only
(f) mainly poll tax
(g) rates included with G.P.T.
(h) These figures, which are taken from the 1971 Economic Survey, are particularly dubious, but the figures given for this year in the 1972 volume make even less sense.
(j) rates, licences and cesses

Source: Economic Survey, 1968-72. As figures given in any one year may be modified in subsequent volumes, I have used the latest available figure, except where noted in note (h) above.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

Any bibliography must come to rest somewhere on the continuum between comprehensiveness and selectivity: listing, on the one hand, all the works that the author has consulted in the course of his research, and on the other, selecting only those which he thinks others ought to read. This bibliography inclines towards the comprehensive: works of particular importance have been noted in the course of the text.

Were the function of the bibliography solely to lend scholarly respectability to the thesis, it would be sufficient to list the works consulted. But since thesis bibliographies are often used by other researchers as a guide to the literature, I have also listed a small number of references which I have not consulted. These fall into two categories. First, there are other bibliographies in related fields, which were not of sufficient relevance for me to consult them, but could be of value to others in closely related fields. Secondly, there are several forthcoming or recently-published works of whose general contents I was aware, either by discussion with the authors or with other workers in this field, and which were of particular relevance. Since some works are "forthcoming" for long periods (the volume on political penetration in East Africa, for instance, has been "forthcoming" for nearly seven years), it seemed worthwhile recording the existence of these papers for the use of others. These references are preceded by an asterisk (*).

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ADC | African District Council |
| AEO | Assistant Education Officer |
| ALDEV | African Land Development Department |
| ALGAK | Association of Local Government Authorities of Kenya |
| ALGE | Association of Local Government Employers |
| APP | African People's Party |
| CC | County Council |
| CD | Community Development |
| CDA | Community Development Assistant |
| CDO | Community Development Officer |
| COTU | Council of Trade Unions |
| CPE | Certificate of Primary Education |
| DC | District Commissioner |
| DDAC | District Development Advisory Committee |
| DDC | District Development Committee |
| DEB | District Education Board |
| DEO | District Education Officer |
| DO | District Officer |
| DWC | District Works Committee |
| EAS | *East African Standard* |
| F&GP | Finance and General Purposes |
| GCE | General Certificate of Education |
| GPT | Graduated Personal Tax |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| HSC | Higher School Certificate |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| INBUCON | International Business Consultants |
| KADU | Kenya African Democratic Union |
| KANU | Kenya African National Union |
| KAU | Kenya African Union |
| KAWC | Kenya African Workers Congress |
| KCA | Kikuyu Central Association |
| KFL | Kenya Federation of Labour |
| KIA | Kenya Institute of Administration |
| KJSE | Kenya Junior Secondary Examination |
| KLGWU | Kenya Local Government Workers Union |
| KNUT | Kenya National Union of Teachers |

| | |
|---|---|
| KPU | Kenya People's Union |
| LNC | Local Native Council |
| MEPD | Ministry of Economic Planning and Development |
| MHR | Member of the House of Representatives |
| MLC | Member of the Legislative Council |
| MOH | Medical Officer of Health |
| MP | Member of Parliament |
| NAOR | National Assembly, *Official Record* |
| OIC | Officer-in-charge (of a district-level service) |
| PC | Provincial Commissioner |
| PEO | Provincial Education Officer |
| PMO | Provincial Medical Officer |
| PRE | Provincial Roads Engineer |
| PWD | Public Works Department |
| RARU | Rural Access Roads Unit |
| RIAT | Ramogi Institute of Advanced Technology |
| TSC | Teachers' Service Commission |

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