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THE AGRARIAN SETTLER COLONY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT:

A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

OF


KENYA AND TANZANIA

Richard B. Phillips

October 1974

~~June 12, 1973~~

A dissertation in the Department of Political Science submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at New York University.

Approved by   
Research Advisor

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## INTRODUCTION

The following thesis is a comparative analysis of two states in East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania. The intent of the study is to examine the reasons for the failure of the leadership, following political independence in the early 1960's, to mobilize agrarian development for the transformation of their societies.

Kenya and Tanzania were selected because of a number of characteristics which made them a promising two-country study in comparative development. They are neighboring states in the same geographical region. Both countries were British colonies. They obtained political independence within two years of each other and each has maintained the same leadership and a relative degree of political stability which is unusual for the independent African states in general. Finally, the two states diverged after independence in their approach to development. Kenya turned towards a capitalist approach and Tanzania to a socialist approach to development.

The African leadership in both countries, when they came to power and gained control over the state, were intent upon using the state to generate or mobilize development.

The thesis argues that a similar system of underdevelopment was formed in the two countries under colonial rule.

The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the failure of the post-independence leadership to mobilize agrarian development towards a transformation of their societies is caused by the persistence of the economic and social structures, institutions, and values formed in this colonial system which are in conflict with the ideology at the political center.

A vicious circle exists in which the political leadership is unable or unwilling to break down the patterns of the colonial period and these colonial patterns in turn exert a dominant influence in the formulation and implementation of agrarian policies and programs.

In support of this thesis, the study will examine the early colonial period to show, first, the formation of a similar type of settler and agrarian export system in both countries. Second, the study will examine the variation of this type which evolved in the two colonies, later in the colonial period, which the thesis argues is the main factor in the political and ideological divergence following independence. Third, the thesis will examine the underlying system of underdevelopment shared in common at the point of independence.

The persistence of the characteristics of this system, in spite of differing efforts to mobilize development, will be looked for in the con-

straints faced by the leadership in both countries and in the agrarian policies and programs. The expectation is that the content and direction of development, under these policies, is towards the perpetuation of the system of underdevelopment and a deformed capitalist economy in both countries.

## A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

The present names of the two countries are used consistently throughout the following text. The reader should bear this in mind, especially during the earlier colonial periods when different terms were used officially. Briefly, the progression of terms in Kenya was: British East Africa Protectorate, from 1895-1920; Kenya Colony and Protectorate, from 1920 until political independence was achieved in December, 1963. In 1964 Kenya officially became the Republic of Kenya.

The progression of terms in Tanzania was German East Africa from 1889 until the British conquest in World War I; Trust Territory of Tanganyika, officially a League of Nations mandate under British administration from 1919 until after World II; then a United Nations mandate territory until independence was achieved in December, 1961. Tanganyika officially became the Republic of Tanganyika in 1962, and the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, when Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a federation.

The changes are indicated in the text at the appropriate points. Reference in the text is strictly to mainland Tanzania.

## CHAPTER ONE

### EUROPEAN PENETRATION, PARTITION, AND IMPOSITION OF RULE IN EAST AFRICA, 1870 - 1895

Colonial rule was imposed over East Africa by Britain and Germany as part of the "scramble for Africa," which developed out of the growing imperialist rivalry among the major European powers during the end of the nineteenth century. Direct colonial rule replaced competitive "free trade" in the areas not yet under European subjugation as pressures increased upon the European states to obtain security of access in order to protect existing economic spheres of interest or to preempt as yet "undefined" areas for future economic exploitation. The active rivalry of German and British private interest groups in East Africa played a critical role in the sudden turn to active intervention, partition, and imposition of colonial rule within mainland East Africa by Germany and Britain between 1885 and 1895.

#### 1. Zanzibar, The East African Coast, and Early European Contact.

Prior to the active intervention on the mainland, European involvement, both governmental and commercial, was restricted primarily to the island of Zanzibar. Zanzibar was the center of a wealthy, Arab trading empire

which had originated from Oman on the Arabian peninsula.<sup>1</sup> At the end of the seventeenth century, the Omani had defeated the Portuguese, who had conquered the main city-states along the east African coast two centuries earlier but had never been able to maintain effective control of the coast.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout the eighteenth century, the Omani extended their loose control in turn along the coast, from the Juba river in Somaliland to cape Delgado. The Omani empire was essentially a sea-based empire which controlled the extensive Indian Ocean trade between East Africa, the Arabian peninsula, and the east.<sup>3</sup> Full economic and political control existed only in the major trading towns along the coast: Kilwa, Lindi, Dar es Salamm, Bagamoyo, Sandani, Pangani, Tanga, Mombasa, Kismayu, and Mogadishu. Direct contact with the hinterland was extremely limited; it depended mainly upon coastal intermediaries, who were a mixed population that was gradually evolving a distinct "swahili" culture of its own.

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1. Cf. R. Coupland, East Africa and Its Invaders from the Earliest times to the Death of Seyyid Said in 1856 (Oxford, 1961 (1938)).
  2. Cf. Justus Strandes, The Portuguese Period in East Africa, tr. J. F. Wallwork (Nairobi, 1961).
  3. Coupland, Invaders, passim. Also, see G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, The East African Coast: Select Documents from the first to the earlier nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1961), for firsthand descriptions of the trade, culture, and inter-connections as they changed over two thousand years.

Sayyid Said and the Omani empire in Zanzibar.

Consolidation of Omani control over the coast actually took place during the first half of the nineteenth century under the enterprising reign of the Omani ruler, Sayyid Said.<sup>4</sup> The growing wealth from the East African trade led Sayyid Said to take a greater interest than previous rulers, so much so that by 1839 he moved permanently to Zanzibar, established the capital of his Omani empire there, and became the Sultan of Zanzibar as well as of Oman.<sup>5</sup>

Under the Sultan's leadership, an Arab dominated plantation and slave system developed in Zanzibar and the neighboring island of Pemba. The Zanzibar commercial empire was based on the primary plantation product, cloves, and increasingly upon the export of slaves and ivory from the mainland. The ultimate base of the empire was slavery, as the demand for slaves within Zanzibar, the mid-east and the Americas increased. It was a lucrative trade for the Arabs, and from 1839 onward, large

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4. J. M. Grey, "Zanzibar and the Coastal Belt: 1840-1844," in Ronald Oliver and G. Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, I (New York, 1967), pp. 212-230.
5. For background details on the development of Zanzibar and its commercial empire, see W. H. Ingrams, Zanzibar, its History and its People (London, 1931); C. P. Rigby, Report on the Zanzibar Dominions (Bombay, 1861); Mrs. C. D. B. Russell, General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave Trade (London, 1935); R. F. Burton, Zanzibar, City, Island, and Coast, I, II (London, 1872); F. B. Pearce, Zanzibar, the Island Metropolis of Eastern Africa (London, 1920).

caravans were penetrating up to 200 miles into the interior from the major coastal towns under the control of the Arab traders.<sup>6</sup>

This expansion of the Sultan's commercial empire was dependent upon the capital of Indian merchant financiers, the banyons. They provided credit to the planter class and handled the financial administration of the empire, of which the customs collection was most important. But the major role the banyons played was the financing of the Arab caravans into the interior. These banyons, who were British Indian subjects, were estimated by British officials to control half the landed property in Zanzibar and to have several million pounds sterling invest in East Africa.<sup>7</sup>

#### The growth of European influence.

The European powers established consulates in Zanzibar when the Sultan moved there or shortly after. The British established a commercial treaty and a consul in Zanzibar in 1839, the French in 1844, while the Germans established commercial relations from 1844 onward.<sup>8</sup> Trade

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6. According to E. Hutchinson, The Slave Trade of East Africa (London, 1874), p.50, nearly 100,000 slaves were exported between 1862 and 1867 from Kilwa alone.

7. R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890 (Ann Arbor, 1967 (1939)), p.391.

8. Gray, "Zanzibar," pp. 228-29. The Americans were actually the first to establish a commercial treaty (1833) and a consulate (1837). Cf. C. T. Brady, Commerce and Conquest in East Africa (Salem, 1950), pp. 89-97.

with Zanzibar grew rapidly. The British Consul, Rigby, reported that total trade in 1859 was £ 1,664,577, which included imports of £ 908,911 and exports of £ 755,666.<sup>9</sup> Besides, slaves, Zanzibar trade consisted of goods in demand in Europe, such as ivory, gum-copal, and sesame, as well as cowrie shells for West Africa. Imports mainly were cotton cloth, and items for interior trade consisting of beads, brass wire, gunpowder and muskets.<sup>10</sup>

The British position was a dual one with a conflict of interest. The British Consul was responsible to the British Foreign Office in his consular capacity and to the Government of Bombay as the agent of the British East India Company in regard to the Company's interests in the Sultan's dominions.<sup>11</sup> British dealings with Zanzibar involved much more than the direct commercial trade of British firms, which was insignificant in 1859.<sup>12</sup> British interests were heavily committed also to the extensive commercial and financial interests of Bombay in East Africa, since this involved Britain's Indian empire, economically and strategic-

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9. Rigby, Report on Zanzibar.

10. Brady, Commerce and Conquest, pp.116-126; Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 322 ff.; Gray, "Zanzibar," p. 219.

11. Gray, "Zanzibar," p.220.

12. Ibid., p.236.

ally the most important of all of Britain's colonial possessions.<sup>13</sup>

Consequently, the British assiduously cultivated a close political relationship with the Sultan and his successors. During the period of instability and rivalry after Sayyid Said's death, the British exercised its political and naval power to install its own choice of successor and to "protect" Zanzibar from the intervention of other European powers, particularly France.<sup>14</sup>

British indirect dominance over Zanzibar had its economic benefits. By 1871 British shipping and trade was greater than the other powers. British and British Indian trade was double Germany's and nearly triple to that of the United States.<sup>15</sup>

The establishment of Zanzibar as a British client state.

Zanzibar was well on the way to becoming a client state of Britain and the indirect means of access of Britain to the mainland trade. Britain's political influence allowed her to maintain a formal position of "free trade" and equal commercial competition with the

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13. Ronald Robinson and Joan Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961), pp. 9-15. By the 1880's, the British had invested around £ 270 H. or approximately 20 per cent of its entire overseas investments in India. India provided a market for 19% of British exports. It was also the commercial and military base for dominating the rest of the region.

14. Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 14-37 passim.

15. Ibid., p. 114.

other European powers while actually holding a favored position. In the mid-1870's, Britain sought to strengthen the weak, nominal hold of Zanzibar over the mainland through the establishment of a small standing army, which was trained and commanded by a British officer, William Mathews. Mathews was selected by the British Consul, John Kirk, and took his orders from Kirk as much as he did from the Sultan.<sup>16</sup>

Britain's commercial position grew parallel with the growth in political and military control over Zanzibar. Between 1871 and 1879, British shipping increased in tonnage 700 per cent, while the shipping of other powers remained the same.<sup>17</sup>

British commercial activities in East Africa continued to be almost exclusively with Zanzibar, in spite of efforts of Kirk to promote more direct dealings with the mainland. This was influenced a great deal by the lack of information about the interior and its economic

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16. Ibid., pp. 240-43. The army was established formally in order that the Sultan could enforce the abolishment of the slave trade in accordance with a treaty the British forced him to sign upon threat of a naval blockade; see Coupland, ibid., pp. 182-216. The army, however, provided the Sultan with the power for the first time to attempt to establish real control over the mainland. It is clear that a primary concern of Kirk was establishing this control in order to keep other European powers out and to leave mainland east Africa open to future British commercial activities. Coupland describes Kirk's role by analyzing his (Kirk's) papers.

17. Ibid., pp. 319-22.

potential until the 1860's. A growing number of books by explorers and missionaries who penetrated into the interior from the 1850's to the 1880's began to provide this information, stimulate public interest, and lay the groundwork for more direct intervention in the mainland by private companies and the European states.<sup>18</sup>

2. Private Enterprise and European Penetration in the Mainland.

By the early 1870's conditions had developed for a more direct economic exploitation of East Africa by Europeans. A much more extensive amount of information about the land, people and economic wealth, both real and potential, was available to business and government officials. There was also a growing awareness of the wealth in the hands of the Arab traders and Indian financiers, the banyans, who advanced the credits needed for the caravans and handled the ultimate distribution

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18. For examples of these explorations and flow of books which fascinated the Europeans and attracted economic interest, see R. Burton, Lake Regions of Central Africa, I,II (London, 1860); J. L. Krapf, Travels, Researches and Missionary Labour in East Africa (London, 1860); J. H. Speke, Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile (London, 1863); David Livingstone, Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambezi and its Tributaries (London, 1865); Henry Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, I,II (London, 1878); J. Thompson, To the Central African Lakes and Back, I,II (London, 1881).

of caravan products. Their profits flowed from monopoly control and exploitation of the Zanzibar trade network within the East African interior. Investment possibilities began to be taken much more seriously by British businessmen who already had trading interests in the area.

### Early British involvement.

Manchester and Glassgow businessmen predominated during the early period of economic penetration of East Africa.<sup>19</sup> They were headed by William MacKinnon, president of the British India Steamship Company. He moved British merchants towards greater economic involvement in East Africa by the inauguration of regular commercial visits by the steamship line to Zanzibar in 1872.<sup>20</sup> The move promised to complement economic interests which were already substantial in India and the Far East.

By 1877, MacKinnon and other Manchester businessmen applied to the Sultan of Zanzibar for permission to develop economic concessions as a private company venture within the mainland area over which the Sultan claimed sovereign-

19. John Flint, "The Wider Background to Partition and Colonial Occupation," in R. Oliver and G. Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, I (London, 1963), pp.371-72; Kenneth Ingham, A History of East Africa (New York; 1967 rev.ed.), pp. 86, 134-136, 139.

20. Flint, "The Background to Participation," p. 355.

ty.<sup>21</sup> In spite of political pressure, the businessmen failed to obtain backing from the British Foreign Office. While the government cautiously indicated approval, it maintained a hands-off policy and refused to provide active support in the form of diplomatic or other pressures upon the Sultan. This decision reflected the prevailing government policy of avoiding chancy and potentially costly entanglements which had not proven their worth.<sup>22</sup> The concession enterprise was pursued and by 1884 the Manchester group privately obtained the permission of the Sultan to establish concession rights within his mainland domain.<sup>23</sup>

Sir Harry Johnston was sent to East Africa in September as the agent of the Manchester business interests. Operating under the formal representation of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, Johnston obtained "treaty" rights to the fertile Kilimanjaro area inhabited by the

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21. Ibid., pp. 360-361. Cf. R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890 (Ann Arbor, 1967, 1939), pp. 306-315, and Marie de Kiewiet, "History of the Imperial British East Africa Company, 1876-1895," (London, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London University, 1955), Chapter I for a detailed account of these negotiations.
22. Richard D. Wolff, "Economic Aspects of British Colonialism in Kenya, 1895-1930," (New Haven: unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1969), p. 51; de Kiewiet, "British East Africa Company," indicates that Salisbury deliberately sabotaged Mackinnon's negotiations with the Sultan. Evidence suggests that he was concerned about MacKinnan becoming involved over his head, considering his campaign's inadequate resources, and that this in turn would pressure the British government into an undesired involvement.
23. Ingham, History of East Africa, p.135.

Chagga.<sup>24</sup> This was a first step in a long range plan to acquire territorial concessions between the coast and Lake Victoria which would provide a favorable route for the construction of a railway into the interior.<sup>25</sup> The railway would create an alternate method of transport for the area which would give the British merchants the means to break the Arab-Indian trade monopoly, compete commercially with the Arab traders, and exploit the trade with the mainland interior in a more direct and profitable fashion.

#### The sudden German intrusion.

The economic interests of the Manchester merchants as well as British preeminence in East Africa was suddenly threatened in early 1885 by the actions of Carl

24. Ibid. Compare Ingham with Flint, "The Background to Partition." These treaties were a fraud, but they did provide a legalistic cover for imperialist expansion. Signatures of local chiefs or headmen were obtained by any measures available. Those signing them for the most part had no conception of their meaning or intent. In addition, they traditionally had no right to give away communal territorial rights. Cf. G. Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere, 1884-1898," in Oliver and Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, I, pp. 435-36.
25. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 135. Wolff, "Economic Aspects in Kenya," pp. 56-57; Flint, "The Background to Partition," p. 380. These early plans for a railway are significant for they indicate commercial objectives which fit into the British pattern of economic penetration and domination -- imperialism-- at that time under the ideology of free trade. Strategic and humanitarian "reasons" for the railway emerged later, but they served more as public rationale than as objective causes. For a different view of developments in East Africa, with which this thesis disagrees, see Ronald Robinson and Joan Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (New York, 1968 [1961]), pp. 48-50, 190-198, 295-300, 107-311, 462-72.

Peters, one of the most notorious of German colonial adventurers. Peters' impatience with the inactive advocacy role of the existing German colonial organizations had led him to form the Society for German Colonization of East Africa in 1884.<sup>26</sup> That fall, at the same time Johnston was setting out on his Kilimanjaro expedition, Peters sailed covertly into Zanzibar with two companions, to avoid the attention of British and Zanzibar officials. Slipping into the mainland interior, Peters traveled up the Pangani Valley and quickly obtained "treaties" with local chiefs which granted not only economic concession rights but sovereignty over the lands inhabited by the Africans whose chiefs had signed these pieces of paper.<sup>27</sup>

Peters left East Africa and returned briefly to Germany to promote support for his venture. His associates continued to expand the concession rights and colonial claims he had initiated. They pressed on eastward from the Pangani Valley towards the Usambara Mountains and the Kilimanjaro area, obtaining treaties and thus directly challenging the British economic operations.<sup>28</sup> They were to obtain treaties at Witu also, around the mouth of the

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26. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 133; Flint, "The Background to Partition," pp. 368-369.

27. Ingham, History of East Africa, pp. 33-34.

28. Ibid., p. 136; Flint, "Background to Partition," pp. 371-372.

Tana River, in Kenya. The objective was the creation of a second coastal base from which to extend German colonial claims into the interior.<sup>29</sup> Peters' strategy was to dominate not only the area of present day Tanzania but all of East Africa.

Peters had returned to Germany to pursue the political objective of pressuring the Bismark government into active support for his claims and for a policy of imperialistic expansion in East Africa. To promote this goal, Peters founded the Deutsch Ost-Afrika Geselleschaft (German East African Company), ceded to it all the treaty concessions he had just obtained in Tanzania, and then appealed to the German government for official protection. If Peters' timing was coincidental, it certainly came at an extremely fortunate moment. His approach to the German government came at the tail end of the Berlin Conference over Africa which Bismark had convened among the major European powers. The day after the conference ended, Bismark immediately provided Peters with a Schutzbrief (charter of protection) which granted "protection over all territories acquried by the Society for German Colonization in East Africa and recognized the sovereign rights of the Society in those areas." 30

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29. Ingham, History of East Africa, pp. 136-137.

30. Ibid., p. 134; Flint, Background to Partition, p. 369.

### 3. European Rivalry and Government Intervention.

Bismark's decision was a reversal of foreign policy impelled by the changing economic and political forces within Germany and between the major European capitalist powers. Until 1871, German interests were almost exclusively preoccupied with national unification. The Franco-Prussian War, formation of the German Empire, and achievement of German preeminence within continental Europe promoted a growing shift in orientation outward among differing official and private interest groups. The most crucial of these elements was the growth of a newer generation of more "liberal" businessmen and industrialists, who were products of the rapid economic and industrial development generated by the unification of Germany. By the 1880's, these entrepreneurs saw overseas imperialist expansion as necessary to serve the growing needs of their rapidly industrializing economy, to provide additional markets, to secure needed raw materials, and to open up opportunities for future capital investment.<sup>31</sup>

This German development coincided with, or rather represented an important element of, the growing economic rivalry among the dominant capitalist nation-states at the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>32</sup> The economic de-

31. A. J. P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies (London, 1933).

32. Cf. Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, II (New York, 1920 [1962]), pp. 441-484.

velopment of Germany, the United States, and France pressed increasingly upon British predominance over the seas, shipping, trade, and finance within the emerging international economic system. British economic and industrial supremacy was based not only upon its headstart, first in national unification and then in industrialization in comparison to the other states, but also upon the forceable acquiring of overseas colonial possessions, the first empire, and the exploitation of their resources for British economic development. Britain's supremacy in turn had led her to adopt and promote the policy of "free trade," in which Britain had every advantage. This dominance had also led Britain to rely increasingly upon indirect diplomatic and economic influence, rather than increased colonial expansion, as the means to maintain and expand her predominant position. The policy of free trade, backed up by indirect diplomatic and economic influence, was the means by which Britain successfully dominated Zanzibar and the East African area, until Germany challenged these interests in the 1880's.

The economic and political changes within and without Germany created pressures which threatened the Bismark government.<sup>33</sup> Until 1884, Bismark's foreign policy was based upon the consolidation and preservation of Germany's new political and territorial position

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33. Prosser Gifford and William Rogers Louis, eds., Britain and Germany in Africa (new Haven, 1967), pp.

in Europe. He was successful in his diplomatic efforts to isolate France. His overwhelming concern was the prevention of a coalition which might actively support strong French feelings for revanche against the Germans for the French military defeat, territorial loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and national humiliation at the hands of the Prussians in 1870. Bismark accordingly had opposed overseas imperialist activities, particularly those which might threaten British interests and push Britain into alliance with France. The same objective led him to encourage and support French interests in overseas colonial expansion, in rivalry with the British.<sup>34</sup>

Germany's shift to an overseas colonial empire.

The growth of European economic and imperialist rivalry created a shift in European power politics which permitted Bismark to change his foreign policy to a more active overseas involvement without risking the European strategy he had considered essential to German interests. Several events occurred during 1884 which foreshadowed Bismark's reversal of policy in the fall during the Berlin Conference. Bismark noted the intensity of the growing colonial rivalry between France and Britain in the issue of the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement over the Congo in early 1884 and exploited this rivalry to German advantage.<sup>35</sup> His initial step

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34. Taylor, Germany's First Bid.

35. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and The Victorians, pp.168-175.

was to establish protectorates over German spheres of activity in South-West Africa in April, 1884, and in the Cameroons and Togoland in mid-1884, an act which formally entered Germany into the ranks of overseas imperialist powers.<sup>36</sup> Encouraged by the absence of any strong political reaction, Bismark called for a diplomatic conference for the fall, to deal with the immediate issues raised over the Congo basin by the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement and to discuss procedures for resolving the developing conflicts over economic interests and territorial claims throughout Africa.

Bismark entered the conference still pursuing the policy of seeking rapprochement with France and thus initially took the French position on issues. The negotiations soon convinced him to switch to the British liberal position which stood for freedom of trade and navigation on the Niger and Congo Rivers and for a loose definition of "effective occupation" over African territories.<sup>37</sup> Bismark realized that he had much to gain by preserving access for German trade to areas under the influence of other European powers. A loose definition of effective occupation, far from precluding German imperialist expansion, actually gave him much

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36. Robinson and Gallagher, African and Victorians, pp. 173-174;

37. For information with regard to the Berlin Conference, see S. E. Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference, 1884-1885 (London, 1942) passim; A. J. P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid, passim.

greater freedom of action in establishing German colonial rights in those territories not yet under formal colonial rule. East Africa was precisely such an area and Bismark's interest in Carl Peters' activities quickly led to his official support of Peters' colonial claims immediately following the Berlin Conference.

Britain's tentative response in East Africa.

The sudden pronouncement of official claims in East Africa greatly upset the Manchester business group. They recognized that the German East Africa Company (GEA) had been created with the obvious intent of establishing German administrative control over and economic exploitation of the mainland in East Africa. Faced with this threat to their similar economic objectives, the British merchants under MacKinnon's leadership responded in early 1885 by forming the British East Africa Association (BEA). As a private enterprise, they could not counter the German assertion. They sought to protect their own business interests by obtaining the support in turn of the British government, in the form of an imperial charter. Once again private business interests became equated with the economic interests of the British Empire.

The British government was reluctant initially to provide official support for the BEA. The government's primary concern at the time was Egypt, a focus of diplomatic conflict over which German support was sought.<sup>38</sup>

Britain had intervened in 1882, and then imposed permanent control in Egypt to protect its investment in and control over the Suez Canal, the lifeline to important British imperial interests in India and the Far East.<sup>39</sup>

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38. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and Victorians, pp. 132-145, 162, 174, 257-263. During 1884-1885, Britain was faced with the loss of the Sudan to the Mahdis uprising (Khartoum was taken and General Gordon killed in January, 1885). Britain was in conflict with France over Egypt, since their "dual control" had broken down. Britain was also in conflict with Russia over Constantinople and over control of Afghanistan, where their confrontation verged on open war until May, 1885, when a temporary resolution was reached. On all these issues, Britain found itself in isolation vis-a-vis the other European powers. Obtaining German support, then, was considered essential to Britain.

39. The importance of Egypt for British imperialist interests was clearly stated by Charles Dilke, a Minister in the Liberal government of Gladstone, in a speech to the House of Commons in July 1882, as preparations were being made for a military expedition into Egypt: "As regards the Suez canal, England has a double interest; it has a predominant commercial interest, because eighty-two per cent of the trade passing through the Canal is British trade, and it has a predominantly political interest caused by the fact that the Canal is the principal highway to India, Ceylon, the Strits, and British Burmah, where two-hundred fifty million people live under our rule; and also to China, where we have vast interests and eighty-four per cent of the external trade of that still more enormous empire. It is also one of the roads to our Colonial Empire in Australia and New Zealand." Quoted in Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and Victorians, p. 112.

French exploration and expansion eastward across Africa towards the Sudan and the headwaters of the Nile posed a threat to these extensive interests which was not to end until the famous Fashoda incident over a decade later. Britain therefore adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Germany to gain its continued political support against France over the Egyptian issue. In comparison, British interests in East Africa were as yet minor and expendable.

Bismark moved ahead quickly to take advantage of this diplomatic situation. His position was indirectly strengthened by the opposition of the political leadership of the Liberal government in Britain to further colonial entanglements and expense. In August 1885 a German squadron was sent to Zanzibar to force the Sultan to recognize a German protectorate over the mainland areas covered by Peters' treaties.<sup>40</sup> The British government acquiesced initially to the German gunboat diplomacy over the British client state. The Sultan, abandoned by the British, was left with no choice other than to submit to the greater force of the Germans. It was the first step in the rapid dismemberment of the Sultan's mainland empire and the eventual reduction of Zanzibar itself into a colonial protectorate.

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40. Ibid., pp. 192-197; for full details, see Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 429-447.

4. The Division of East Africa between Britain and Germany.

British acquiescence in East Africa proved to be transitional. It was followed in early 1886 by a shift in policy towards active intervention and political negotiation with Germany over a division of East Africa which would satisfy both their interests. A more active imperialist, Lord Salisbury, took over the prime ministry as head of the recently elected Conservative government. The change was a reflection of the increasingly outmoded and ineffective characteristic of liberal foreign policy, based on indirect economic diplomacy, in an era of growing colonial rivalry and imperialistic expansion. There was also a change in view about the geopolitical importance of East Africa.

The major source of the Nile River lay in East Africa and it was rapidly becoming a cardinal policy of the British that control over the headwaters of the Nile was essential to protect the vital British interests in Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Far East.<sup>41</sup> The East African interior which was becoming strategically important was the same area over which private British business interests were seeking to gain economic control. Strategic and economic interests increasingly coincided and the combination tipped the scale towards direct governmental intervention.

41. W. E. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (London, 1951), pp. 102-108; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and Victorians, pp. 254-289.

The Anglo-German Agreement of 1886.

Diplomatic discussions during the year led to the Anglo-German Agreement at the end of 1886, which divided the hinterland of East Africa into British and German spheres of influence.<sup>42</sup> An arbitrary line or boundary was drawn northwest from the Umbra River on the coast to the east shore of Lake Victoria at 1°S latitude. The British sphere was to the north and the German sphere to the south of this boundary line. While the agreement ostensibly recognized the Sultan's rights to the mainland, in fact it actually limited these rights to a ten mile coastal strip extending from the Tana River in Kenya to the north to Tunghi Bay in the South.<sup>43</sup> Following the dictates of realpolitik, the British had moved from passively abandoning the Sultan to actively collaborating with the Germans in the seizure of his mainland empire.

The Anglo-German Agreement provided only a temporary and ineffective political settlement of the East African situation. Both countries sought initially to keep any direct governmental role and expense to a minimum. The establishment of diplomatically accepted spheres of influence within East Africa would provide governmental support for the private companies and a stable political

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42. Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 468-478; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and Victorians, pp. 166-168.

43. Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 494-495.

framework within which the companies were to undertake the direct operations of colonization. It was expected that the GEA and BEA would bear the costs of establishing order and maintaining the minimal administration necessary for the economic exploitation of the areas.<sup>44</sup>

These hopes were not realized due to three main factors. First, the 1886 Agreement did not settle the question of the interior above the 1°S latitude, the area of Uganda and the southern Sudan. Pressures subsequently mounted as renewed competition took place between the British and the Germans. Second, the private companies lacked the power and financial resources to impose control over the areas or to promote economic development. Third, continued Arabic control of the trade network and open resistance by both the Arabs and the African societies threatened the very basis of the European colonial intrusion.

The rival activities of private interest groups, East African resistance, and the renewal of European competition and intervention.

The BEA and GEA moved to consolidate and expand their positions in the respective territories. In March 1887, the BEA obtained a fifty year concession lease from the Sultan over the ten mile coastal strip in Kenya.<sup>45</sup>

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44. Cf. Mary Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918. (New York, 1966 [1930]) for Bismarck's strategy of using the British model of the Chartered Company as the instrument of colonial exploitation. See also Flint, "Background to Partition," pp. 379-386.

45. Flint, "Background to Partition," p.378.

Formally, they were to administer it in the name of the Sultan; in practice, it gave them absolute control and the base they desired to extend into the wealthier interior of Uganda, the BEA's real objective. The government support they needed to carry out this operation was obtained the following year, when the British government granted them an imperial charter transforming them into the Imperial British East Africa Company (BEA).<sup>46</sup>

Germany followed suit. In early 1887, the German government provided Peters' GEA an imperial charter which granted the company political and administrative as well as economic control over the German protectorate in East Africa.<sup>47</sup> Diplomatic pressure by the German government in early 1888 helped the GEA to obtain a comparable 50 year lease over the coastal strip of Tanzania from the Sultan.<sup>48</sup> The lease agreement reenforced the tendency of the GEA to focus its activities on the coast, the only area within their sphere where they were able to establish an effective administration over trade and customs. The GEA could capitalize on the prior development by the Arabs of a monetary economy and trade network on the coast.

The intensification of German administration on the coast and efforts by the GEA to gain dominance over Arabic economic activities led to growing resistance and

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46. Ibid., pp. 379-380.

47. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 140.

48. Ibid., p. 140; Coupland, Exploitation, p. 482.

an open revolt in August 1888.<sup>49</sup> The rebellion was led by the Omani aristocracy, which had controlled the profitable coastal trade in the past, but was carried out with the wide support of the African coastal peoples and seriously threatened the rather weak hold the GEA had over the area.<sup>50</sup> The German government was forced into direct intervention to save the situation for the GEA. Troops were sent under Captain Herman von Wissmann, who operated as Imperial Commissioner in command of the company's agents. The main tide of the coastal rebellion was crushed by von Wissmann by the end of 1889, although remnants of resistance were still being put down a year later.<sup>51</sup>

The Anglo-German Agreement made at the expense of the Sultan of Zanzibar disrupted the existing political balance in the interior, particularly the nominal sovereignty to the Sultan hitherto acknowledged by the powerful Arab traders in the towns of Tabora and Ufiji, in the Kingdom of Buganda, and in Equatoria Province.<sup>52</sup>

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49. W. O. Henderson, "German East Africa, 1884-1918," in Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver, eds., History of East Africa, II (Oxford, 1965), pp. 128-130.
50. John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912 (Cambridge, 1969), p. 13.
51. Robert J. Rotberg, "Resistance and Rebellion in British Nyasaland, and German East Africa, 1888-1915: A Tentative Comparison," in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds., Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, pp. 668-671.
52. Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, 2nd ed (London, 1952), p. 978; Norman Bennett, "The Arab Impact," in Bothwell A. Ogot and T. A. Kiernan, eds., Zamani: A Survey of East African History (New York, 1968) pp. 216-237.

Freed from this sovereignty, the Arabs moved to extend their own dominance inland and to strengthen their economic monopoly. In fact, it was a necessity for the Arabs to do so given the growing European threat to their established trade network. The European intrusion, the coastal rebellion, and the political disruption in the interior triggered off "disorder" and uprisings against Europeans around the great lakes and in the Kingdom of Buganda. Seen by the Europeans as the instability and violence characteristic of "primitive tribes," the uprisings actually represented another stage in the ongoing historical process of dominant African groups moving towards political consolidation, unification, diplomatic manoeuvring, and the extension of control over neighboring African societies.

The Kingdom of Buganda was the major area of political conflict within the interior. The Kabaka, the ruler of the powerful and hierarchical Kingdom of Buganda, had been playing a delicate game of alliances to counter the growing influence of rival Protestant and Catholic missionaries and the increased activities of the Arab traders within his kingdom.<sup>53</sup> Buganda was the one area in East Africa where European missionaries had been highly successful in building churches among the African population. Their growing strength and rivalry led the Kabaka to take advantage of the events

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53. Ake Holmberg, African Tribes and European Agencies (Göteborg, 1966), pp. 324-370; and Oliver, Missionary Factor, passim.

on the coast in 1888 to ally with the Arabs in attacking the missionaries and driving them out. The Arabs then staged an overthrow of the Kabaka and attempted to assert control over Buganda. By 1889, the Christian forces were successful in defeating the Arabs, restoring the deposed Kabaka to his throne, and establishing a tenuous Christian dominance within Buganda.<sup>54</sup>

The events in Buganda generated a renewed competition between the British and Germans for control over the interior north of Lake Victoria. The impetus came from conflict between missionaries, chartered companies, and imperialist adventurers like Peters and Cecil Rhodes, who had grandiose schemes for creating extensive empires in Africa for their respective countries.<sup>55</sup> Both the GEA and IBEA made plans to send expeditions to Uganda to obtain treaties with the Kabaka and to establish the area under their sphere of influence. After the restoration in Buganda, competition between the opposing Protestant and Catholic missionaries was renewed. The Protestants turned to the IBEA and British officials for support, while the Catholic White Fathers sought protection from Peters and the Germans. Both groups also feared the possible renewal of Arab attacks. They feared even more that the Kabaka, strengthened in his

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54. J. M. Grey, "The Year of the Three Kings of Buganda," Uganda Journal, VIII (1950), pp. 23-49.

55. Flint, "Background to Partition," p. 381; Holmberg, African Tribes, pp. 348-370.

rule by the defeat of the Arabs, would turn against them once again.<sup>56</sup>

Missionaries, companies, and adventurers pressured their governments for official support to back up their particular interests. They were effective in mobilizing public attention and support in Britain and Germany for government action. The Protestant missionaries were particularly adept at fostering public outrage against the Kabaka for the "Christian Massacres" he had ordered in 1886<sup>57</sup> and against the Arabs who carried on slaving as an integral part of their trading activities.

In the face of pressure from these actively competing private interest groups, the German and British governments were pulled into more direct intervention. The German government ordered its military commander, von Wissmann, to extend military control north to Uganda. Peters set out on an expedition from Witu up the Tana River to negotiate a treaty with the Kabaka in order to gain German control over Buganda. He also intended to push on farther north, in an attempt to connect up with Emin Pasha, the Governor of Equatoria Province, to provide him with military support against the Mahdist uprising, and to establish German rights to Equatoria.<sup>58</sup>

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56. Ingham, History of East Africa, pp. 146-147.

57. Ibid., pp. 143-144;

58. Flint, "Background to Partition," p.382.

Frederick Lugard was brought from military service in India and sent out on expedition by the IBEA, with a British directive to obtain control over the Uganda region and forestall the Germans. He was also ordered to lay the groundwork for the Cape to Cairo route by extending British claims southwest from Uganda among the Buganda tributary states and linking up with the southern British sphere at Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa.<sup>59</sup>

British and German long-range imperialist interests.

Particular economic and nationalist groups had played a primary role in defining Britain and Germany's long range economic and strategic interests. Now they were instrumental in turning their own particular rivalries into international competition and conflict between the British and German governments. The British government was increasingly pressured to insure the protection of British interests in Egypt, the Suez Canal, and India by gaining control over Uganda and the headwaters of the Nile. To achieve this goal, it had to counter the efforts by Peters, the GEA, and the German government to establish territorial claims to the area. The British government accepted the IBEA as its agent

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59. Ralph Austen, Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule: Government Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939 (New Haven, 1968), pp. 24-27; Margery Perham, Lugard: I, The Years of Adventure, 1858-1898 (London, 1956), pp. 176-188.

in the attempt to establish prior British claims to the contested territory.<sup>60</sup> In pushing the political issue, the IBEA and its backers greatly exaggerated the immediate economic benefits which could be obtained from the exploitation of the East African interior. The British government was also attracted to the Cape-to-Cairo scheme under the persuasive influence of Rhodes, the Imperial British South Africa Company, and the economic interests behind the company.<sup>61</sup>

The German government was interested in extending imperialist domination over overseas possessions wherever colonial rule had not yet been effectively established and where it did not involve outright conflict with other major European powers. It was particularly interested in extending its influence into the Congo basin, linking up its protectorates of Tanzania and Cameroons into one large colonial sphere, and blocking the British Cape to Cairo scheme in the process. While the immediate objective of the German government was achieving access to the valuable Congo outlet, its long range goal was the extension of economic and ultimately political influence over the Congo region.<sup>62</sup>

The German government fully supported Peters and the GEA

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60. Flint, "Background to Partition," p. 383 and footnote 2; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and Victorians, pp. 198-202.

61. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and Victorians, pp. 244-249.

62. Gifford and Lewis, eds., Britain and Germany in Africa, pp.

in the pursuit of these interests, but Peters was equally intent on expanding German claims into the valuable Uganda and Equatoria areas, regardless of the open rivalry and conflict with Britain which this move introduced. Peters was a step ahead of the IBEA in the race to establish effective claims over the East African interior. He reached Buganda ahead of Lugard, at an opportune time. Remnants of the Arab forces still threatened the newly restored Kabaka, who then turned to Peters for support and signed a treaty of protection, thus raising the prospect of German acquisition of control over Buganda.<sup>63</sup>

The 1890 treaty and the partition of East Africa.

Unknown to the participants who were scrambling within East Africa for rival claims, the issue was taken out of their hands in late 1889 and settled through direct negotiations in Brussels. Faced with the inter-governmental conflict, the increasingly unfavorable British position, and heavy pressures from the interest groups involved, Britain's Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, the Marquis of Salisbury, initiated the diplomatic discussions which resulted in the treaty of July 1, the "Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty."<sup>64</sup> While

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63. Flint, "Background to Partition," pp. 382-383.

64. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and Victorians, pp. 290-294.

each government gave up its most extreme imperialist goals for the sake of more important European interests, the British government came out ahead, as it gained on the diplomatic table what it had been losing in the field.

The 1890 Treaty permanently divided East Africa into British and German colonial spheres along agreed boundaries. Both states accepted the 1°S latitude extended west to the Congo from Lake Victoria as the Anglo-German boundary. This meant that Germany gave up all claims to Uganda and Equatoria. Germany also gave up the treaty claims to the Witu district in Kenya which Peters had so persistently sought to exploit against Britain. This guaranteed Britain its colonial sphere of interest north of the Umbra River and insured a route to Uganda for the IBEA. Uganda was recognized in the treaty as a British sphere. In spite of the determined pressures from MacKinnon of the IBEA and from the British South Africa Company, Britain gave up any claims immediately southwest of Lake Victoria and the Cape to Cairo scheme was abandoned. A satisfactory boundary was established between German East Africa and British Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the south. A British protectorate was recognized over Zanzibar and Pemba. To compensate Germany for the lion's share of East Africa which Britain obtained, the British government turned

ever to German the barren but strategic island of Heligoland in the North Sea.<sup>65</sup>

While Germany had to take over direct colonial rule of Tanzania in April 1890 on a permanent basis as a consequence of the coastal rebellion and the obvious inadequacies of the GEA, the British government persisted until 1895 in its effort to have the IBEA carry out the direct and costly task of colonizing Kenya and Uganda. The IBEA was eager to obtain whatever trade and investment profits it could in East Africa, but refused to invest more than a nominal sum in the unprofitable and difficult job of developing an administration, building a rudimentary infrastructure, and pacifying the resistant populations of the two areas.<sup>66</sup>

The IBEA was no more adequate than the GEA had been in carrying out the imperialist task it had undertaken. The company was undercapitalized, suffered badly from disorganization, and lacked experienced personnel with knowledge of the area.<sup>67</sup> The territory nominally under its control was enormous while the only method of transport existing was human portage in caravans. The main focus of the IBEA was Uganda; Kenya at the

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65. Ibid., p. 293; Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 148.

66. Marie de Kiewiet Hemphill, "The British Sphere, 1884-1894," in Oliver and Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, I, pp. 393-411.

67. Ibid., pp. 393, 410.

time remained a very un hospitable territory through which the company had to pass to gain access to the wealth of the interior.<sup>68</sup> Aside from the coastal trade which the IBEA controlled from Mombasa, the company maintained only a few way stations in Kenya along the route to Uganda, at Tsavo, at Machakos among the Kamba, at Dagoretti (later named Fort Smith) in Kikuyuland on the edge of the highlands, and at the village of chief Mumia of the Balahuyia east of Lake Victoria.<sup>69</sup> To economize, the company ordered the stations to maintain themselves off the countryside, thereby initiating a policy of repression which quickly transformed the initial friendliness of the African societies into open hostility and resistance.<sup>70</sup>

The wealth of Uganda was as yet more promise than reality. The one source of immediate profit was ivory. The sources of ivory were diminishing, however, and the remaining trade was still controlled by the Arab traders who could transport it by caravans more cheaply than the company could.<sup>71</sup> The IBEA saw their solution in the construction of the railway from the coast to Uganda.

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68. Ibid., pp. 407-410, 431.

69. Ibid., pp. 408 and map on 392.

70. Ibid., pp. 416-417; Holmberg, African Tribes, pp. 376-377.

71. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 151; Marie de Kiewiet Hemphill, "The British Sphere," pp. 419-420.

It would provide an alternate means of cheap transport and break the Arab trade monopoly. A railway would also stimulate other sources of trade and profits in addition to ivory. Yet the company was unwilling or unable to undertake the cost of railway construction in spite of the untenable situation they found themselves in.

The IBEA turned to the British government and pressured it to take over the task of direct rule as well as the construction of the railway.<sup>72</sup> The company asserted that it had undertaken primarily political tasks on behalf of the government at great expense to itself, when it acted as the government's agent in extending a protectorate over Uganda and in attempting to eliminate the activities of Arab slave traders within the interior.<sup>73</sup> Salisbury was willing, but rightly feared opposition within Parliament to the extension of direct colonial rule into East Africa and to the costs of constructing a railway. He hedged, and submitted a bill for merely a preliminary survey. Under pressure from the Liberal Party in Parliament, even this measure was postponed and the government asked the IBEA to

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72. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 151; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 308-309.

73. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 151-152.

carry the costs until the bill was approved in Parliament.<sup>74</sup>

Faced with governmental delays and growing financial losses, the IBEA speeded things up by threatening to unilaterally abandon its protectorate over Uganda. The government utilized this crisis over the British position in Uganda to pressure Parliament into voting for the establishment of an official protectorate in June 1894.<sup>75</sup> Within a year, negotiations were completed for an additional protectorate to be declared over Kenya.<sup>76</sup> The government was also able to put through a bill in 1895 for the construction of the Uganda Railway. Both protectorate and railway were justified by the strategic threat to British interests on the part of France in the Sudan, the humanitarian issue of eliminating the activities of Arab slave traders within the interior, and

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74. Ibid. Cf. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 307-330, for the political manipulations by the government to turn Parliament, influential groups like the missionary societies, and the public towards acceptance of a permanent colonial control in the area and railway to insure selective occupational control.

75. Ibid., pp. 326-329.

76. Marie de Kiewiet Hemphill, "The British Sphere," p. 430. G. H. Mungeram, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966), p.1. Technically, Kenya was called the East Africa Protectorate and was not a crown colony but had protectorate status. In actual practice, it was viewed and administered as if it were a colony. This was "legalized" in 1920, and officially was referred to as the Kenya Colony and Protectorate. The Protectorate referred to the ten mile wide coastal strip which the British had originally leased from Zanzibar. Again, while legally of separate status, it was administered as an integral part of Kenya.

by the exaggerated lure of the benefits to be obtained for the empire from economic imperialism in East Africa. The political issue was to be resolved shortly, however, within the Sudan. In spite of the humanitarian stress, the primary concern was not the elimination of Arab slaving, but the elimination of Arab trade monopoly within East Africa.<sup>77</sup>

By 1895, therefore, political control had been imposed upon East Africa from the outside by the European powers for the first time. It occurred with no regard for the Sultan's rights which had been respected in the past, for the presence of the Arab traders and Indian financiers who effectively controlled the trade network within the mainland area, or, most importantly of all, for the reality of existing political rule by the African societies which inhabited the territories so lightly being disposed of in the chancelleries of Europe. European control may as yet have been nominal. But from that point the primary role in the future development of East Africa was to be played by the latest and strongest actors on the scene, the imperialist powers, Great Britain and Germany.

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77. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," pp. 57-60.

## CHAPTER TWO

### SUBJUGATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE SETTLER COLONY IN KENYA UNDER BRITISH RULE, 1895-1914.

Basic to an understanding of imperialist rule in general and to colonial rule in Kenya and Tanzania in particular is the recognition that there was no conception of, interest in, or intent to promote development for the best interests of the respective territory or for the African people within the territories. The early concept of a "civilizing mission", or later "trusteeship", was a myth. It served as a rationale for the exploitation of the land and people for the benefit of the imperial metropole, and for particular sub-interests within the imperialist state.<sup>1</sup>

At best, there was a belief that the promotion of imperialist development, of corporate, finance, settler, and nationalist organization interests "worked" also for the benefit of the African people, similar to the belief expressed later by Charles Wilson that "what's good for General Motors is good for the country." Associated with this view was another rationale, particularly among the British. The presence of a modern European sector would stimulate a more modern production by and the development of the African people. The European

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1. Cf. Marjorie R. Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, 2nd. ed. (New York, 1966 /1937/, p. 133-40, 211-82.

sector would do so by providing a model to be emulated and a vehicle through which the requisite experience and training ("civilization") could be obtained. Thus the best way to "promote" the development of the African was to invest in building up European and settler development, a view similar to the "trickledown" theory in economics today.

In reality there was generally no coinciding of interest between European and African but a fundamental conflict. Economic development through settler or plantation production was dependent first of all upon the expropriation of land from the African. And most of the better farming, plantation, and grazing lands were already occupied by Africans according to their own systems of shifting agriculture and grazing.

The development of land in turn was utterly dependent upon labor, and cheap, plentiful supplies of labor, which only the African could provide. The appropriation of the labor of the African was the second requirement for economic development and the critical element in the conflict between African and European. The African had to be reduced from a self-sufficient producer to a laborer working for the needs and interests of the European rather than for his own.

Third, imperialist rule was dependent upon a source of revenue to pay for the centralized, authoritarian colonial administration which was necessary to subjugate the

African, to expropriate his land and labor, and to construct the infrastructure and agricultural services which were necessary in turn to achieve the objective of imperialist rule, the formation of a European owned or controlled tropical export economy. To acquire this revenue, the colonist turned to the African for the appropriation of revenue through taxation of various kinds, forced labor, and low wages.

Until World War I, Kenya and Tanzania developed under British and German domination as variations on this theme of European imperialism. Differences in geography and climate, in the socio-political organization and the response of the African societies, and in the imperialist tradition of the two European powers were significant factors in the variation which evolved.

These variations are of historical interest for their own sake. But the real importance of this formative period lies in the fact that in spite of these varying factors both colonies - dominated by a larger historical process - developed along increasingly similar lines so that by the beginning of World War I the formation of a stable, settler dominated agrarian export colony existed in both.

It was during this period from 1895 to World War I that the foundations were created for the particular colonial structure and agrarian export economy which were to continue to dominate over Kenya and Tanzania's development after independence in the early 1960's.

1. Subjugation and the Consolidation of Rule.

African resistance had to be forcefully overcome and colonial administration imposed throughout the newly acquired territories before the nominal control of Britain and Germany could be transformed into effective and profitable colonial rule. Immediate impetus was given to the consolidation of British rule by the government's demand that colonial officials generate the revenue to pay for the heavy expense of the construction of the Uganda railway and the annual growing cost of administration. Both expenses were a drain upon the British Treasury in the form of imperial subsidies and counter to the British colonial tradition of making the colonies "self-supporting".<sup>2</sup>

The British immediately looked to the African to pay for colonial rule. A primary objective in the initial extension of administrative control over the African peoples was the imposition of taxation, originally in the form of a "hut tax".<sup>3</sup> The major function of the

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2. G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966), pp. 52-53, 76-78, 102.

3. Ibid., pp. 55, 78. The hut tax was a tax levied per hut on the head of each family, thus penalizing polygamy and encouraging overcrowded living conditions. To this first tax was later levied a "head tax" upon every adult male. Both taxes were collected on a basis of "collective obligation;" the headmen of each community were required to insure the collection from all, thus turning them into agents of the colonial administration and the direct oppressors of their own people.

local colonial official was tax collection and the establishment of the degree of control and authority most conducive to collecting taxes.

Efforts by colonial officials to establish administrative order over the African and to exploit him economically triggered off heavy resistance throughout the colony. The Africans had already gotten a taste of what the European presence meant from the IBEA, which had adopted a policy of sporadic forays against the people around their stations for crops and stock.<sup>4</sup> Initial African friendliness had turned to hostility toward the European as a result of these experiences. The consequences of this policy were described by Gerald Portal, an official who had been sent in 1893 to evaluate the situation prior to the assumption of formal control by the government.<sup>5</sup>

By refusing to pay for things, by raiding, looting, swashbuckling, and shooting natives, the company have turned the whole country against the white man.

The colonial government introduced a more orderly and systematic process to the exploitation of the African. Frequent punitive expeditions were sent out against the resistant Africans, particularly during the decade from 1895 to 1905, killing, looting and ultimately

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4. Marie de Kiewiet Hemphill, "The British Sphere, 1884-1894," in Ronald Oliver and G. Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, I (New York, 1967), pp. 416-17.
5. Portal to Lady Alice Portal, February 3, 1893, Portal Papers, quoted in ibid., p. 417.

terrorizing them in the effort to obtain African acquiescence to administrative control and taxation, which to the African was no different than subjugation and forced tribute.<sup>6</sup>

African resistance and the pattern of "pacification."

Colonial penetration radiated out from the coastal center and from the railway line which cut northwest across Kenya to Lake Victoria following the old caravan route. The sequence of African resistance and military expeditions, subjugation and the establishment of permanent administrative centers, graphically demonstrates this pattern in the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule. Early resistance occurred on the coast, where the British penetration was most intense. Revolt broke out in 1895 against the IBEA and continued against the newly imposed protectorate government well into 1896 before it was crushed. The revolt was led by the Mazrui, the ruling aristocracy of Mombasa, which saw its autonomy from the Sultan's rule and its economic control being threatened by the European penetration.<sup>7</sup> The revolt was not limited to the Arabs on the coast, for it was joined

6. Cf. R. Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary, 1902-1906 (Edinburgh, 1957); H. Moyses-Barnett, The King's African Rifles (Aldershot, 1956); C. W. Hobley, Kenya from Chartered Company to Crown Colony (London, 1929).

7. For a full account of this revolt, see Mungeam, British Rule, pp. 21-29.

by the Giriama, who inhabited the territory inland between the coast and the semi-arid interior.<sup>8</sup>

Resistance followed among the major African groups which bordered the railway route, the Kamba, Kikuyu, and Nandi. The repressive measures were severe, for the British believed in the policy that a heavily punitive attack would break any further resistance, eliminate the need for further expeditions, and "save African lives" in the long run. The policy was not noticeably successful. The Kikuyu<sup>9</sup>

resisted the introduction of British administration - at least until they were subdued by a series of para-military operations which spread from Kiambu in the early nineties to Nyeri in the early years of the twentieth century and in which a few British officials, assisted by levies of Masai or Kamba (and sometimes also defeated Kikuyu) overcame the Kikuyu resistance, virtually ridge by ridge, by burning their huts, looting their crops, and rounding up their cattle.

The particular social organization which predominated among the African societies in Kenya contributed significantly to the characteristic patterns of African resistance and British repression. The societies tended to be decentralized, segmental systems, in which the clan was the primary political unit. Therein lay both their strength and their weakness. Unlike the hierarchical kingdom of Buganda or the Haya and Chagga chief-

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8. Kenneth Ingham, A History of East Africa, rev.ed. (New York, 1965), pp. 188-189.
9. M. P. K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country (Nairobi, 1967), pp. 16-17.

doms of Tanzania, the societies in Kenya had no centralized leadership over which the British could impose control. It also meant that societies like the Kamba, Kikuyu, or Luhya were unable to mount concentrated resistance against the British.<sup>10</sup> But resistance did take place within each clan locally against the imposition of British domination. Since the clan organization conformed to the geography in which they lived, each clan occupying a ridge within a highlands terrain bisected by innumerable streams and ridges, resistance had to be countered and administrative control imposed ridge by ridge.

The destructive effects of British "pacification" under these circumstances were great. The African societies suffered a great loss of life, destruction of crops, and seizure of their stock. Their economic and social structures were disrupted extensively. The standard British practice of seizing African stock aimed at more than undermining their means to resist. The British attempted to make the Africans pay for the costs of the expeditions sent against them by selling the expropriated stock cheaply to the growing number of European settlers in the colony. The practice

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10. For a description of the social systems of these ethnic groupings, see John Middleton, The Kikuyu and the Kamba (London, 1953); Gunther Wagner, The Bantu of North Kavirondo, I, II (London, 1949, 1956); Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (London, 1938).

boosted the settlers' economic position while crippling  
<sup>11</sup>  
 the African economies.

Subjugation and the expropriation of land.

The subjugation of the Nandi illustrates additional important characteristics of the process by which the British colonized Kenya. <sup>12</sup> The Nandi inhabited the plateau to the north of the Mau escarpment and were in the process of expanding successfully to the south and southwest against the Masai and other neighboring societies when the European intrusion occurred. They posed a constant threat to the British from 1895 to 1905. The Uganda Railway was constructed through their territory, and it became a frequent focus of raids, for the steel sleepers, bolts, spikes and other materials on the rail line. <sup>13</sup> This followed earlier attacks on mail and other caravans before the railway was completed, as well as sporadic cattle raids on bordering societies. Neither the establishment

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11. Richard David Wolff, "Economic Aspects of British Colonialism in Kenya," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (New Haven: Yale University, 1963), pp. 122-123; Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya, 2nd. ed. (London, 1953), I, p.157.
12. Hobley, Kenya from Chartered Company, pp. 88, 109, 123 ff; Ingham, History of East Africa, pp. 186-88; Mungeam, British Rule, p. 88, 94-95, 145-161.
13. George Bennett, Kenya: A Political History (London, 1963), p. 21.

of a military post nor military expeditions in 1895, 1900, 1902, 1903 were adequate to control the Nandi warriors prior to 1905.

The colonial government determined to crush the Nandi once and for all, and in 1905 the Nandi Field Force was assembled, "the largest of all East Africa's punitive expeditions".<sup>14</sup> The Force consisted of 12 companies of

the King's African Rifles and 1,000 Masai warriors.<sup>15</sup>

It devastated the Nandi territory and resulted in great loss of life and livestock. The Laibon, the religious leader of the Nandi, was shot, and a new, more amenable one appointed by the British. The Nandi were forceably moved away from the railway into a reserve area allotted for them which was less than half the size of their former territory. In addition, they were deprived of their grazing lands in the Uasin Gishu basin.<sup>16</sup>

The displacement of the Nandi in 1905 reveals an important objective in addition to punishment and subjugation. The Nandi lands had become a valuable area for European settlement by 1905, for the Kikuyu highlands opened up earlier to European settlement by the subjugation of the Kikuyu were rapidly becoming occupied by

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14. Ibid.; Mungeam, British Rule, pp. 156-160.

15. Mungeam, British Rule, pp. 156-158. For military details, see H. Moyse-Barnett, King's Rifles; for a vivid personal description, see Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary.

16. Hobley, Kenya from Chartered Company, p. 128.

Europeans. The expedition against the Nandi "freed" a whole new highlands area to the north of the Rift valley for European settlement.<sup>17</sup> By the early 1900's, a significant shift had taken place in the colonial policy of subjugation. Subjugation increasingly aimed not only at extending administrative order throughout the colony, but at expropriating African land for white settlement.<sup>18</sup>

Expeditions after 1905 against the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu around Mt. Kenya and against the Kipsigis and Kisii in the southwest region, demonstrate this same pattern of subjugation with the intent to expropriate<sup>19</sup> land as much as to establish administrative order. The expeditions opened up new fertile highlands areas between 5,000 and 7,000 feet altitude, which the settler community and the government sought for further European settlement as the earlier areas were parceled out. Extensive punitive action, for example, was undertaken against the Kisii in 1908, although they were not

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17. M. B. K. Sorrenson, Origin of European Settlement in Kenya, Memoir No. 2 of the British Institute of History and Archeology in East Africa (Nairobi, 1968), p. 214. Approximately 200 square miles were left for an estimated 45,000 Nandi, while 1,250 square miles were taken for European settlement.
18. Sorrenson, Origin of Settlement, pp. 61-210; Mungeam, British Rule, passim.; R. A. Remole, "White Settlers or the Foundation of Agricultural Settlement in Kenya," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1959. The process generally was not too different from the process of expansion and conquest among the frontiers in the west by the United States.
19. Mungeam, British Rule, pp. 161-66, 171-80; Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, p. 217.

threatening the existing administered areas. The establishment of 5,000 acre settler estates at this time paved the way for the large tea industry which emerged around Kericho after World War I. Sustained government efforts began at this time to force the pastoral Kipsigis to settle permanently on the land as agriculturalists, in order to make their grazing land available for settlement, to bring them into the market economy, and to obtain labor from them for the neighboring settler estates.

While the subjugation of most of the peoples in Kenya had been accomplished by 1905, active resistance continued to be met until 1914 and after. British lines of penetration and subjugation had extended first into those areas with the greatest fertility, population, and economic potential. The areas "pacified" last were those of least value, the northern frontier area and the semi-desert immediately interior from the coast.<sup>21</sup>

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20. R. A. Manners, "The Kipsigi's: Change with Alacrity," in P. Bohanan, ed., Markets in Africa (New York, 1965), pp. 215-247.
21. Attempts by the British to impose taxes and to establish an irrigation scheme in the latter area for white settlement in 1913 led to a second rebellion by the Giriama who inhabited the lands along the Sabaki River. The outbreak of World War I led the British to mass troops and break the uprising quickly, for fear the Germans would link up with the Giriama and promote greater rebellion among the Africans. Cf. Charles Dundas, "Report on the Giriama Rising" (October 25, 1914). The barrenness of the Northern Frontier District led to the maintenance of the most minimal control, recurring skirmishes with the assertive pastoral Galla, and the continuance of military administrations right up to independence.

Subjugation by 1905 indicated a shift in focus towards the more fundamental, long-range objective of land expropriation, European settlement, and the direct exploitation of labor. The decision to promote white immigration, settlement, and investment as the "engine of development" was to decisively influence the basic issues of land and labor, and the structural characteristics of economic, social, and political development.

## 2. White Settlement and the Expropriation of African Land

Within the first ten years of colonial rule the British had clearly decided upon European settlement as the best method of exploiting the people, land and resources of Kenya for the benefit of British imperialist development.<sup>22</sup> An economic policy based on indigenous commercial development was unsatisfactory since it had proved easier to break down the existing trade network under Arab-Indian monopoly than to recreate a new and profitable trade system geared for the European export-import market. Colonial development based on an African economy was never seriously considered. Even

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22. Cf. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement; Wolff, "Economic Aspects;" and Bennett, Kenya.

the "West Coast" policy of African export production for British imperial needs was not considered viable, given the segmental social structure of African societies, the prevailing subsistence economy of the African, and the widespread disruption which resulted from the imposition of colonial rule.

An African-based economy would have required a long-range and gradual program of economic development, when the overriding need was to create a source of revenue to meet the costs of colonial rule immediately and for the near future. The high cost of military spending in the subjugation of the African had added to the existing expenses of administration and railway construction. In 1897-98, military expenses were 30% of total colonial expense; by 1905-06, in a much larger budget, military expenses were still 25% of the total.<sup>23</sup> These expenses were considerably greater than colonial revenue. The deficit was subsidized by imperial grants, which lasted until 1913. British government officials made it clear that high military expenses and the continuing dependency upon imperial grants "precluded funds from London for economic development purposes."<sup>24</sup>

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23. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," Table 4.2, p. 65. Military expenditures were £ 40,000 out of a total expenditure of £ 133,723 in 1897-1898, and £ 104,981 out of £ 418,839 in 1905-1906. Also see Mungeam, British Rule, p. 54.
24. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," p. 66, based on memorandum from Lanadowne to Eliot, August 27, 1901, F. O. 2/443.

From their first contact with the interior of Kenya, most Europeans had noted the fertile and temperate highlands and had recommended European settlement.<sup>25</sup> The first governor, Charles Eliot,<sup>26</sup> became converted to a policy of white settlement in 1902. Kenya was a "White man's country", as Eliot called it, naturally suited for European settlement, while the Africans were not capable of turning it to productive use and the "Asiatics", due to their race, "preferred" the hot, tropical lowlands of the coast or Lake Victoria.<sup>27</sup>

Construction of the Uganda Railway had greatly influenced the turn towards a settler policy. The railway was initiated at Mombasa in 1895 and reached its terminal point, the town of Kisumu on Kavirondo Bay of southern Lake Victoria, in 1901.<sup>28</sup> The construction was an arduous as well as expensive task, due to the

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25. Cf. F. D. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, I (Edinburgh, 1893), p.419; Gerald Portal, Reports Relating to Uganda, C 7303 (1894), pp. 3-4; P. McDermot, British East Africa or IBEA (London, 1895), p.403; Bishop Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa, I (London, 1908), p. 207. He asserted "Kikuyu was the garden of Eden."
26. Elliot's actual title was Commissioner. This was changed formally in 1905, when control of the East Africa Protectorate (Kenya) was transferred from the Foreign to the Colonial Office.
27. Cf. Charles Eliot, Report on the East Africa Protectorate Cd. 769 (1901) and his The East Africa Protectorate (London, 1905).
28. For a detailed description of the construction of the railway and events connected with it, see M. F. Hill, Permanent Way: The Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway, 2nd ed. (Nairobi, 1961).

highly varied and rugged terrain.<sup>29</sup> Once the route of the railway passed beyond the commercially active coastal area, it crossed through nearly 200 miles of barely populated semi-desert until it reached the edge of the central plateau in Kamba territory. Continuing to follow the old caravan route, the railway skirted the highlands where the Kikuyus were located, plunged down across the Rift Valley, climbed up the Mau Escarpment on the northern side, and cut through the thickly populated Nandi territory prior to its gradual descent to the Kavirondo plains and Kisumu, the territorial lands of the Luo.<sup>30</sup>

The completion of the railway created more problems than it solved. Intended to open up the area to European trade and economic development, the major economic consequence of the railway was to leave the government \$5.5 M. in debt.<sup>31</sup> Commercially speaking, the railway was two ends without a middle. Goods from Uganda were available to a limited degree for export from the

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29. The construction of the railway required nearly 35,000 laborers over the six year period, most of them imported from India specifically for the construction, as the Africans refused to serve as laborers (Cf. Hill, Permanent Way). This was an early reflection of the "labor problem" which was to become one of the major issues in Kenya's development.

30. C. C. Wrigley, "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life, 1902-1945," in Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver, eds., History of East Africa, I (Oxford, 1965), pp. 209-210; Hill, Permanent Way.

31. Wrigley, "Kenya," p. 211.

Kisumu terminus to Mombasa on the coast; and Mombasa was an established port through which to import manufactured products inland on the railway. Neither source of shipment was sufficient to make the railway pay, while no other satisfactory source of profitable export goods for transport as yet existed along the long middle stretch of the Uganda railway. White settlement along this stretch of the railway, in the highlands and the Rift Valley, appeared to Eliot and other officials to be the solution to their immediate problems.

It would be an error, however, to consider European settlement as merely an historical accident of officials who saw settlement as the answer to the problem of meeting colonial expenses. It would be equally erroneous to view settlement as "caused" by the construction of the railway. The British government saw its function as opening up other lands for private commercial and financial exploitation. Settlement was one such form for which Kenya was particularly suited. The fertile, temperate highlands were there and would have exerted their attraction for settlement regardless, just as they would have stimulated pressure for the appropriate transport to open them for settlement and economic exploitation. Given British colonial traditions, the favorable conditions of the land, and the demands of capitalist enterprise, land expropriation for planta-

tion and settler development was inevitable once British imperialist rule was placed over the area.<sup>32</sup>

The amount of land expropriated.

Once settlement was initiated in 1903, the expropriation of land for settler and plantation development was followed persistently by Eliot's successors. By 1915 a total of 8,242 square miles (5,275,121 acres) of the most arable farming and grazing lands had been "alienated."<sup>33</sup> Land continued to be expropriated on a smaller scale right up to the 1930's. The total eventually came to approximately 12,000 square miles (7,500,000 acres), almost all in the highlands. An additional 4,000 square miles of highlands were set aside as forest reserves, partly to protect the lands below, partly to serve as a buffer between the Africans

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32. Events in Uganda support this view. Uganda's colonization proceeded on the basis of African peasant production. Yet persistent efforts were made to promote European settlement and plantations as late as the 1930's; Cf. Ingham, History of East Africa, pp.232-37, 324-25, 358-62. This was so in spite of the fact that successful peasant production had been established early, that Uganda was considered "unhealthy" for European settlement, and that early agreements with the Kabaka and the aristocracy of the Buganda Kingdom had created legal, practical and political barriers to land expropriation and settlement.
33. Cf. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, Appendices 1 and 2, pp. 296-97.

and the settlers. These reserves too were denied to the Africans for their own use.<sup>34</sup>

The total amount of land expropriated came to 7% of the total land area of Kenya. Only 75,000 square miles of Kenya's 225,000 square miles of land could be considered arable enough to permit cultivation or grazing above the most marginal existence. Settler expropriation thus amounted to approximately 20% of Kenya's arable land, an enormous liability for future African development. Since large areas to the north, east and south were arid, semi-desert lands, most of the expropriation took place precisely where the overwhelming majority of the African societies lived, in the southwest highlands. The only way the British could do so was to reduce and limit the African societies to reserves, thus "freeing up" the rest of the land for settler expropriation.

The "right" of expropriation and its consequences.

The issue of the expropriation of African land for white settlement has been the subject of a great deal of misdirected argument both within the colony over the years and in writings by social scientists.

34. Cf. M. B. K. Sorrenson, "Land Policy in Kenya, 1895-1945," Appendix I in History of East Africa, II, pp.672-689, particularly p. 688.

Very little of the land, it has been argued, was actually cultivated by the Africans or could rightfully be claimed by them.<sup>35</sup> The land was considered unused or "waste" land at the time of the expropriation. Much of the land was judged later as having been empty "buffer zones" between the territorial spheres of warring African societies.<sup>36</sup> Some of the lands were in the process of being settled by migrating Africans who were considered therefore to have no more "legal" right to the land than the European.

Others have argued that expropriation and settlement took place as it did through British ignorance and misunderstanding of African systems of land tenure and agricultural practices.<sup>37</sup> Ignorance of events such as the smallpox and rinderpest epidemics within the interior immediately prior to the intrusion of the British also is considered to have led the British to the unfortunate but politically irreversible expropriation of temporarily uncultivated lands.

Finally, some people have seen the expropriation as good in the long run, for it created a "modern" economic sector and the bases for development, in spite of the

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35. Cf. Huxley, White Man's Country; also, Elspeth Huxley and Margery Perham, Race and Politics in Kenya, rev. ed. (London, 1955).

36. D.A. Low, "The Northern Interior, 1840-1884," in Oliver and Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, I, p. 51.

37. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, p. 175.

initial deprivation and oppression the African experienced as a result of settlement.<sup>38</sup>

The issue was not a legal one of determining whether or not land was expropriated which was under use or claimed by Africans according to their system of land rights, evaluating how much land was expropriated in this fashion, and assessing the adequacy of the "compensation" provided -- although there is adequate evidence that considerable amounts of land were expropriated in this fashion. And the issue was not a moral one, whether or not it was "just" that Africans were locked into increasingly overcrowded reserves, forced to perpetuate no longer appropriate agricultural methods, and denied the means to develop new modes of production -- so as to provide a pool of cheap labor -- while extensive tracts of unoccupied or thinly farmed highlands were allocated exclusively to Europeans, who were provided every available means of development and extensive, modern services to promote production -- although this systematic process was ever more glaringly apparent.

For one to see the moral and legal points as the only real issue is to accept the colonial situation on the terms of the British imperialist. Within this perspective, one implicitly accepts the "right" of the European to be there, to impose his control over the people, to expropriate the African's land, and to

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38. M. F. Hill, "The White Settlers' Role in Kenya," Foreign Affairs, 38 (July, 1960), pp. 638-45.

force the African to labor for him. Within this framework, one can question the means used to carry out this rule and the consequences of imperialist domination, but only on the terms as they are defined by the imperialist.

The issue ultimately is economic and political. The British were not there by "right" but by the prerogative of greater power and conquest, based on their more advanced economic and technical system of capitalism, as they expanded into contact and then conflict with pre-capitalist societies. The British did not question their right to conquer, control, and appropriate the lands of the Africans in Kenya as representatives of a more powerful and advanced society.

Elsbeth Huxley provides an apt expression of the capitalist mentality during this historical process:<sup>39</sup>

When settlement started there was still a world-wide need for raw materials, a need to which no limit could be seen. So long as industrialized countries demanded products of the soil it was inevitable that that demand should be met. To lock up any productive region in the interests of a tiny group of the earth's inhabitants was considered to be a crime against humanity as

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39. Huxley, White Man's Country, I, pp. 79-80. Also, see F. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa (London, 1922). A similar view was expressed by the 1924 Parliamentary Commission: "To our mind, the financing of transport facilities in East Africa not only is one of the finest possible investments for British trade, but is a moral responsibility resting upon the Mother Country. The development of Africa's resources is needed by the trade of the world, and it will be nothing short of dereliction of duty of British initiative, both public and private, fails to rise to the height of its opportunity." Cmd. 2387, 1925, p. 21.

a whole... [There was a] mandate held by any colonizing power on behalf of the world to develop the resources of any area over which it has control to the maximum extent, and in the interests of everybody.

So long as the world continued to want more raw materials... the pioneer was a benefactor to humanity. By adding to the world's wealth he was adding also to its prosperity. This was his justification for moving forward, if necessary, on to land which he could put to better economic use than its previous owners. Imperialism was not merely a cheap planting of flags, but basically an essential driving of new furrows. The theory of "beneficial occupation" of land - that land in the long run must go to the man who can turn it to the greatest productivity - was part of a world system and was founded on a reality. It was an inevitable corollary of a rising population in Europe. The people must be fed, and fed cheaply; good land could not lie idle while they cried for its harvests.

The quotation is an ideological statement in justification of the economic necessity for capitalist development to take place through imperialist expansion and exploitation. The "world" did not want raw materials; the European capitalist states did. The colonial "pioneer" was not "adding to the world's wealth" but to the wealth of these same imperialist powers, which fueled their own advanced development from the resources and labor extracted from the underdeveloped territories.<sup>40</sup>

Under this ideologically simplified capitalist credo, imperialism became a moral "mandate", social

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40. The settlers, of course, benefited personally, at least those who survived. And many didn't, as victims of land speculation, ill-advised schemes, and swings of the world market. But the real benefits, both absolute and long-range, went to metropole commercial and financial firms and to the metropole itself.

development and civilization an impersonal functioning of a marketplace extended worldwide, and exploitation of the weaker by the stronger justified in the name of "productivity" and profit. Universal and abstract concepts like "the world", "humanity", "civilization", "beneficial occupation", and the "greatest productivity" became a cloak covering the reality of the modern European capitalist state using its superior force to serve the particular interests of private enterprise through the expropriation of the resources and the proletarianization of the people in the less developed lands outside Europe.

Areas like Kenya were seen as "productive regions", as fertile land, and as sources of raw materials. They were not seen as the homelands of other people who lived there, who needed the cultivation of this land for their bare survival, and, most importantly, who required the economic surplus to be obtained from the land's resources and their labor if they were to transform their societies into a more advanced stage of economic and social development. This surplus instead was to be utilized for the benefit of Britain and the immigrant communities colonial rule brought to Kenya. Far from promoting the economic and social development of the African, imperialism meant the deliberate, systematic formation of a system of structural underdevelopment and a condition of pervasive dependency.

The systematic process of colonization.

The deliberate and systematic nature of British imperialist policy was masked by the overt but secondary conflicts in the colonization process between different individuals, groups, and strata. The nature of this policy was also obscured by the elaborate construct of rationalizations, which reflected the fundamental attitudes of the ruling class and their underlying economic and political determinants in British society. The imperialist policy was also characterized by a particularly British form of hypocrisy.

The systematic use of the law as an instrument of exploitation of the African is an important illustration of the deliberate and systematic process at work in the formation of underdevelopment and dependency during colonization and the means by which this process was obscured. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the use of "law" to legitimize the expropriation of all land and land rights in Kenya. From 1833 onward, the British government had been advised by the Law Officers to the Crown that it did not gain any right to "alienate" or control the land within a state over which a protectorate had been established. This remained the legal

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41. Cf. Y. P. Chai and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya (Nairobi, 1970); Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, passim; Krishan M. Maiki, Land Law in East Africa (Nairobi, 1967), Chapter One.

position until the 1890's, when pressure was applied upon the British government by colonial officials within the newly established protectorates of East Africa:<sup>42</sup>

The government was advised that unless a right to deal with waste and unoccupied land was specifically reserved in an agreement or treaty of protection, no such right could be allowed in a protectorate, and even in respect of waste and unoccupied land, it was not clear whether it could be alienated. This position represented a major obstacle to colonial authorities.

Colonial and Foreign Office officials moved to eliminate this obstacle by changing the law and establishing new "principles" to justify these changes. In 1896 the 1894 Indian Land Acquisition Act was extended to the East African Protectorate to serve immediate governmental needs.<sup>43</sup> It allowed the administration to expropriate land for the railway, for government buildings, and for other governmental purposes. The 1897 Land Regulations were enacted in order to provide land for settlers. The regulations legalized expropriation for restricted settlement by allowing the government to "offer...certificates of occupancy, valid for 99 years to those wishing to take up land."<sup>44</sup> While the terms were as yet unsatisfactory and led to few

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42. Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law, p. 25. The existence of a "protectorate" in Africa, of course, was itself a legal nicety. Colonial rule was imposed by "agreement" only among the European powers. The African peoples involved had no say in the matter.

43. Ibid., p.25. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, p.46, 49.

44. Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law, pp. 25-26, in reference to Sections I and IO.

applicants, the Regulations were the thin end of the wedge to wholesale land expropriation and organized white settlement.

The Law Officers gave way to government demands by 1899 and asserted a new interpretation with regard to the land. They made a legal distinction with regard to protectorates of the "African variety", and asserted that regardless of the circumstances by which a protectorate had been acquired, the government could control waste and unoccupied land by rights which "accrued to her majesty by virtue of her right to the protectorate."<sup>45</sup>

The government wasted little time in enacting the 1901 East Africa (Lands) Order in Council which put this more accomodating legal opinion into law.<sup>46</sup> The order established the vague but highly inclusive category of "crown lands" and gave the Commissioner(Governor) nearly unrestricted powers over the land and people throughout the colony. Crown lands were defined as<sup>47</sup>

all public lands within the East Africa Protectorate which for the time being are subject to the control of Her Majesty by virtue of any treaty, convention, agreement, or of Her Majesty's Protectorate, and all lands which have been or may hereafter be acquired by Her Majesty under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 or otherwise howsoever.

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45. F.O. 7356 as quoted in ibid., p. 26.

46. S. R. O. 661, ibid.

47. Section I of the Order in Council, quoted in Ghai and McAuslan, ibid., p. 26 (emphasis added). For the political maneuvering between Commissioner Eliot, the Foreign Office,

The governor was given the power to make grants or lease of Crown land on any terms or conditions he found appropriate, subject only to the approval of the Secretary of State. The 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance was promulgated shortly afterwards by Governor Eliot; it provided for 99 year leases and for the outright sale of land.

British "morality" required a legal sanctification for the assertion of full control over the inhabitants as well as the land. This correction was made in 1902 also in the East Africa Order in Council, which "empowered the Commissioner to make Ordinances for the peace, order, and good government of all persons in the protectorate."<sup>48</sup> The terms were made broad enough to legitimize any act of the colonial administration against the African and to do so in the name of the Africans' own best interests.

The territorial consolidation of Kenya territory was accomplished in 1902 along with the "legitimization"

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the Treasury, and the Law Officers, see Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, pp. 52-58. Simply speaking, all "public lands" became "Crown lands." Conveniently, public lands were not defined in the Order. The general implication was that it meant "waste or unoccupied land." As a result of administrative practice and regulations, the term came to refer to all lands, including those occupied and under African tenure. This is how the land was defined in the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance, which legally completed the process of total expropriation of African land, a process that already had been accomplished in practice throughout the previous fifteen years.

48. Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law, p. 20.

of the colonial administration's full authority and control over the land and the African population. Both established a systematic basis for the exploitation of Kenya. The Rift Valley and highlands north of the Rift were severed administratively from Uganda, where they had formed the southern provinces of the Uganda protectorate, and were incorporated into Kenya.<sup>49</sup> The colonial government moved to Nairobi and established the town as the colonial capital in the center of the highlands. The move logically followed the completion of the Uganda railway and the incorporation of Uganda's southern provinces just as logically placed the railway within a single territory and under one administration. These moves aimed at facilitating the development of Kenya as an economically viable imperial possession through settlement in the highlands. The combination of railway, capital, subjugation of the Kikuyu highlands, and "alterations of the law" was highly successful. European settlement began to take place in considerable numbers in 1903 for the first time.<sup>50</sup>

Far from introducing the "Rule of Law" into Kenya as a major benefit of imperialist rule, the British

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49. Cf. Kenneth Ingham, "Uganda's Old Eastern Province; the Transfer to East Africa Protectorate in 1902," Uganda Journal, 21 (1957), pp. 41-46; A. T. Matson, "Uganda's Old Eastern Province and East Africa's Federal Capital," Uganda Journal, 22 (1958), pp. 43-53.

50. Sorenson, Origins of Settlement, p. 65.

utilized the law as a primary instrument in the forceable  
<sup>over</sup>  
 domination/and reduction to near total dependency of the  
<sup>51</sup>  
 Africans:

...the lawyers constantly adjusted the law to the needs of the politicians and administrators who were carrying out the forward policy in Africa....Neither the lawyers or the politicians saw the law as standing impartially between two sides, or even leaning in favour of the weaker side, but as making the way smooth for the stronger....It may be unrealistic to expect lawyers to have acted any differently, but then it is also unrealistic and not a little hypocritical to suggest that one of the main benefits of British colonialism was the introduction of the Rule of Law into Africa....From the African point of view the English law introduced into East Africa was one of the main weapons used for colonial domination, and in several important fields remained so for most of the colonial period....The role of received law then from the beginnings of the colonial period in Kenya was to be a tool at the disposal of the dominant political and economic groups.

The relationship between colonial and metropole officials.

Much emphasis has been placed upon the disproportionate influence of the settler community in Kenya and upon the alliance between the settlers and colonial  
<sup>52</sup>  
 governors against the British Colonial Office. The alliance and the strong settler influence in combination are frequently cited as the explanation for a "unique"

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51. Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law, p. 34.

52. Cf. Bennett, Kenya; Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement; Mungeam, British Rule; Dilley, British Policy.

pattern of development of Kenya as a "White man's country" in spite of the intentions and efforts of British officials. While these elements did exist they must be seen in a larger perspective. The comparison with Tanzania which follows indicates that this analysis is quite inadequate. The differences between top colonial officials and the Colonial Office - like the differences between settlers and planters, or between settler and district administrator - should be seen as secondary conflicts during the formation of the colonial system from 1895 to 1914. Underlying these conflicts was a basic level of agreement which ultimately prevailed over any issue in which the really fundamental conflict emerged - the conflict between the interests of the European and the African.

The Masai land issue provides a significant example of the actual nature of the conflict between the Colonial Office and the colonial officials and an indication of the respective roles of each in the colonization process.<sup>53</sup> The pastoral Masai inhabited the excellent grazing lands of the Rift Valley which cut through the center of the Kenya highlands. Growing

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53. The Masai land issue also illustrates the total power the imperial government had imposed over the African through the instrument of the law. In addition, it emphasizes that the dominant force underlying the British policy of subjugation was the acquisition of new lands for European settlement, rather than the need to establish a peaceful colonial order, to end inter-African raids and warfare, or undertake a "Civilizing mission" aimed at the long-range benefit of the African peoples.

settler and speculator pressures for additional land expropriation led the government in 1904 to "relocate" the Masai into two areas, the southern Rift Valley and the Laikipia Plateau to the north. The method by which this expropriation was accomplished - rather than the action itself - led to public protest, a controversy between the Colonial Office and the colonial government, and the resignation of the first governor, Charles Eliot.<sup>54</sup>

Eliot had independently "negotiated" the relocation after having committed large leases in the main Rift area - in disregard of existing statutes - to several big South African land speculators, to Lord Delamere, and to a number of other settlers.<sup>55</sup> When the information became public that he had acted without Colonial Office approval and had then attempted to deceive the Colonial Office and M.P.s about the concessions which had caused his action, Eliot was forced to resign. The resignation had no effect whatsoever on policy implementation; the "reallocation" of the Masai, the granting of the concessions, and the pursuit of a policy of settler development were carried out.<sup>56</sup>

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54. On the Masai land issue, see Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, pp. 70-82, 126-29, 190-209; Mungeam, British Rule, pp. 112-123, 259-270.

55. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, pp. 74-75.

56. Ibid., 193-194.

The 1904 treaty with the Masai, which was to "endure so long as the Masai as a race shall exist," lasted only seven years before it was broken.<sup>57</sup> By 1911 the Laikipia Plateau was no longer as isolated or distant from rail transport as it had been in 1904 when part of the Masai people were moved there. Settler pressure on the Governor, Girouard, particularly from Lord Delamere, led to a repetition of 1904. Girouard committed himself as early as 1908 to expropriate large tracts of land on the plateau for grazing leases to settlers without the knowledge of the Colonial Office.<sup>58</sup> He proceeded to pressure the Masai leaders to accept the second move from Laikipia to the southern Rift Valley. He deliberately sought to make it appear as if the Masai were requesting the move in order to reunite the two separated Masai groups.<sup>59</sup> A public protest in Parliament revealed Girouard's deceptive handling of the Masai land issue and led to the Governors's resignation. Once again the policy was carried through after the protest had quieted; the Masai were forced to move, the land was expropriated, and leases for grazing concessions on this valuable grassland were provided to settlers.

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57. Treaty as quoted in ibid., p. 195.

58. Ibid., p. 197.

59. Ibid., pp. 199-203. Giraud reported, in a telegram to the Colonial Office, the "dying injunction" of Lenana, the chief liaison of the Masai, that the tribe be reunited.

The most important aspect of the Masai land issue is the collaboration on policy between the Colonial Office and colonial officials rather than conflict between them. Officials in both the metropole and the colony shared a similar background and values. It was the British ruling class which insisted that any colony not only be "self-supporting" but be exploited so as to contribute to British imperialist development.

Noting the temperateness and fertility of the Highlands, they considered a policy of European immigration and settlement as "natural" and turned to familiar patterns of development in the older dominions of Australasia, North America, and South Africa. This policy orientation was reinforced by the apparent absence of "advanced" social and economic organization among the African societies in Kenya through which the desired imperial economic development could be promoted.

The ruling class, whether politician or official, capitalist or missionary, aristocracy or emerging technocrat, preferred to believe, all evidence to the contrary, that development through settlement along lines of British imperial needs coincided with the best interests of the colony and the African. Their actions were rationalized by their unquestioned and pervasive belief in European racial and moral superiority.

When conflict did arise between metropole and colonial officials, it centered on the question of the best way to deal with the inevitable consequences of

British imperialist policy. European settlement meant the most direct and extreme conflict between settler and African. As the agents faced with the direct implementation of general policy, the colonial officials saw this issue more clearly and followed the imperialist policy to its conclusion, the identification of settler interests with the interests of the colony. In a pragmatic and dissociated manner, they accepted the consequences which the Africans suffered as a necessary step - the "survival of the fittest" - in the economic and social development of the colony and its integration into the empire.

Officials in the metropole did not want to accept the consequences of colonial policy. They were stuck with the public position that African rights and interests were to be respected. But this was in basic contradiction with the more fundamental policy of economic development through European settlement. The issue was resolved for them by maintaining the appearance of protecting the African and his rights while doing the opposite in practice. Formal policy was formulated so as to assert a complementarity between settler and African which did not exist in fact.

When the actual conflict emerged as a public issue, as in the Masai land issue, the government dealt with the conflict in terms of the methods employed by the colonial officials rather than the policy itself.

Blame was allocated to the individual officials "responsible", their resignations obtained, and the public issue quieted down. The content of imperialist policy remained unchanged, however, in favor of settler and speculator aggrandizement at the expense of the African.<sup>60</sup>

### 3. Labor: The Critical Issue in the Colonial Formation.

The British decision to create an agrarian tropical export colony based on European settler and plantation production required the transformation of Africans from self-sufficient producers into a dependent labor force to satisfy the labor needs of settlers, plantation managers, the colonial administration, and others.<sup>61</sup>

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60. The most detailed studies of this period place heavy emphasis upon the distance, difficulties of communication, and lack of control by Metropole officials over colonial officials; upon the independent actions of colonial officials and their withholding of information; of confusion and ignorance over the best policy to follow on the part of the Metropole, which resulted in local officials taking pragmatic measures in the interim; and upon inter-personal hostilities between metropole and local officials. Cf. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement; Mungeam, British Rule. These factors existed. But they do not adequately explain the colonial formation which developed. Underlying all these complex elements and varying interests was the basic factor that metropole officials, colonial officers, and settlers were involved in a common enterprise.

61. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," pp. 127-160; Dilley, British Rule, pp. 213-38; Wrigley, "Kenya," pp. 209-264. As Wrigley put it, "the real economic and social problem, in the pre-war period was not land, but labor." Wrigley, "Kenya," p.229.

This crucial need for a labor force was completely antagonistic to the existing self-contained economic and social structure of traditional African life which was based on subsistence agriculture, shifting cultivation, and pastoralism. What actually was required in the colonial context was the breaking down and transformation of the traditional economic and social structure of African society.

Once the immediate issues of subjugation and the expropriation of land for European settlement essentially were overcome, the basic problem the British faced was obtaining an adequate and cheap labor supply. The major attention of the British until after World War I was devoted to solving the persistent "labor problem". Their efforts to develop the policies, institutions, and mechanisms which would insure the necessary supply of African labor were necessarily piece-meal during this period, but by 1914 the basic foundations had been created for a labor system.<sup>62</sup>

Colonial officials and settlers collaborated in the systematic appropriation of African labor just as they had in the expropriation of land.<sup>63</sup> Settlers were dependent upon the creation of an adequate labor supply for the success of their farming enterprises. The need was obvious. What was less obvious but equally important, they could not get the labor they needed alone.

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62. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," pp. 159-160.

63. Dilley, British Rule, pp. 217-218.

They were dependent upon the political system to provide them the labor, for the African was unwilling to work for low settler and plantation wages and didn't have to: <sup>64</sup>

The conditions of labor supply were peculiar. The crux, of course, was that, unlike the working classes of Europe, the native peoples of East Africa were in possession of the means of subsistence.

The settlers started organizing together as early as 1903 to pressure the government to use its power to provide them with the labor they could not obtain voluntarily. The basic rationale of the settlers was spelled out clearly in a letter from the main settler organization to Governor Sadler during the "labor crisis" of 1907-08: <sup>65</sup>

We must point out, your Excellency, that it is grossly unfair to invite the settler to this country, as has been done, to give him land under conditions which force him to work, and at the same time to do away with the foundations on which the whole of his enterprise and hope is based, namely, cheap labor.

The colonial officials shared the settlers' concern and their perspective, even if they resented the challenge to their political control which the organized pressures of the settlers represented. More importantly, the officials were dependent upon the settlers for the economic development of the colony. Step by

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64. Wrigley, "Kenya," p.230, emphasis added.

65. Fichat to Sadler, March 5, 1908, printed in Correspondence Relating to Affairs in the East Africa Protectorate, Cd. 4122, p. 4.

step, the colonial government began implementing the measures demanded by the settlers, which sought indirectly and directly to force the African to become a laborer for the European by increasingly limiting his means of subsistence and his control of production, like the "working classes of Europe".

**Indirect Methods: land restriction and taxation.**

The colonial government initially relied more on indirect means to obtain labor for the settlers, in the belief that as the African was increasingly "drawn" into the monetary economy the more a "voluntary" labor force would develop automatically under the "laws" of capitalist economic growth. Land expropriation, which had originally been a means to promote white settlement, was increasingly seen as a policy which could be used also to force out African labor by restricting the land available to him for subsistence farming. From the 1905 Land Committee Report onward, the settlers constantly pushed this measure. The committee, composed of two settlers and two officials, and chaired by Lord Delamere, the leader of the settlers, heavily supported the settler position in its report. Among other points it particularly stressed the need

for a "reserve" system to restrict the land available to the Africans.<sup>66</sup>

Restriction of the land was often argued formally as a means to "protect" the African from unscrupulous Europeans or Asians, particularly by government officials. Its basic objective was the opposite, to deprive the African of his means of livelihood and thus make wage labor necessary. The turn towards a "reserve" policy signified the broader policy which was emerging.

Reserves were part of a comprehensive policy to control and exploit the African's relationship with the European-based colonial economy on a selective basis. The policy of reserves, or "separation", was counterposed to the concept of "interpenetration", the settlement of Europeans in the "gaps" between African cultivations. Interpenetration was viewed as bringing the Africans into immediate, direct contact with the European, promoting their transformation to European or "civilized" ways and, more practically, insuring a convenient labor supply nearby.<sup>67</sup>

The real need and choice of the British was neither separation nor interpenetration, for neither the separate development nor the transformation of the African was desired. What was desired and gradually

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66. Dilley, British Rule, p. 215.

67. Cf. ibid., p. 214 for a description of these differing views. Eliot was an early supporter of interpenetration. See also, Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, p. 182, 224.

implemented was a mix of the two through a reserve system on the South African model. Africans were kept separate and denied development as social groups or "tribes", while tied to the European system as laborers and consumers. They were forced to experience the worst of both worlds.

The formal establishment of reserve boundaries was postponed over the years, although the policy was created in 1905. As a consequence the expropriation of land in these loosely defined reserve areas could continue. This provided additional land for settlement and squeezed the Africans through restricting the amount of land available to them for subsistence farming and stocking.

Land restriction for the Africans involved more than the reduction of reserve areas. It also was designed to prevent the natural expansion of Africans

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68. See Huxley, White Man's Country, pp. 132-272 for an interesting insight into this crucial issue as reflected in the changing views of Delamere. Originally, he supported Eliot's view of "interpenetration" as a means of civilizing the African. He was keenly aware of the artificiality of reserves and how they promoted a psychology of "tribalism" as well as economic stagnation. Later, he turned to support the reserve policy and indirect rule as means to slow African political development.

69. Cf. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, pp. 210-25, for examples of further expropriation this permitted: the Kamba areas of Ulu and Kikumbulu in 1906; the fertile, beautiful Mua Hills, which the Kamba inhabited in 1909; excision of Nandi reserve lands in 1910, the Nyando Valley in 1912, and the area for soldiers' settlement scheme, 1919; the Elgeyo land, 1908; the Sotik district of the Kiprigi's in 1908 and 1911; and Giriama lands bordering the Sabaki river, 1913.

into new lands, as their populations increased or as existing lands under cultivation became played out under the practice of shifting cultivation. The rest of the "Crown lands" in the colony were being "reserved" in turn for immediate or future European settlement.

Taxation was used in combination with land restriction as a means of forcing Africans out of the reserves to work for the European. Originally a source of badly needed revenue, taxation had been accepted in kind as well as money.<sup>70</sup> Settlers demanded that African taxes be increased and collected in cash on a more effective basis so that the African would have to turn to wage labor to obtain the money to pay the taxes.<sup>71</sup> The overwhelming source of wage employment was on the settler estates or on the plantations. The government accomodated these demands during this period by deliberately raising and refining taxes for labor purposes. The objective is clearly indicated in the afterdinner speech of the Governor:<sup>72</sup>

We consider that taxation is...compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work. Only in this way can the cost of living be increased for the natives, and...it is on this that the supply of labor and the prices of labor depends.

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70. Cf. Charles Dundas, African Crossroads (London, 1955), p. 34, on his early administrative experiences.

71. Dilley, British Rule, p. 217-18.

72. East African Standard, February 8, 1913. Emphasis added.

Forced labor and systematic recruitment.

Indirect methods were insufficient to force out the large and regular supply of African labor required by the settlers as they rapidly grew in numbers and expanded their highly labor intensive forms of farming. Demands for compulsory or forced labor accordingly grew. The colonial government had used compulsory conscription of labor for public works and portage since the beginning of colonial rule. By conscripting those who did not take employment with the settlers, the government sought to pressure the Africans to "choose" the less onerous task of working for the settlers.

Government officials increasingly recruited labor directly for the settlers as part of their administrative tasks. Numerous circulars were sent to provincial officers spelling out this recruitment function. An announcement by Governor Sadler in 1907, for example, ordered provincial officers and officials of the newly created Department of Native Affairs to "do their best to supply labor for settlers, planters, contractors, and others..."<sup>73</sup>

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73. Dilley, British Rule, p. 216. The Department of Native Affairs was created initially with the main objective of "drawing" out more labor.

The extensive use and abuse of forced labor conscription was well known to officials. According to the inquiry in 1907 by A.C. Hollis, Secretary for Native Affairs,<sup>74</sup>

it transpired that as voluntary labour was usually not forthcoming, chiefs were called upon to provide labour, and natives were seized by chief's orders and forced to go out and work...For some years a system of forced labour had been resorted to in various parts of the Protectorate and like most systems of forced labour had gone from bad to worse. At first mild pressure only was used, then goats were confiscated, and later armed force had to be employed. At Nairobi and Kiambu, all through the Kenya Province/among the Kikuyu/, at Malindi/at the coast/, and in parts of Kavirondo/the Luo/, wherever labour was required by Government or settlers and was not forthcoming, men were seized and sent to work.

While Hollis understandably minimizes the important role of the officials in this system of forced labor, he does indicate the growing importance of a colonial appointed African leadership which was being structured into the British system of administration at the grass roots level. Chiefs, headmen, and elders were being utilized increasingly as labor suppliers as well as tax collectors. Africans were appointed who were amenable to British administrative requirements without regard to their legitimacy within the traditional political system.

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74. C. O. 533/43, memo by Hollis, in Sadler to Crewe, April 8, 1908, as quoted in Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, p. 151.

The African leadership was appointed and held their positions at the sufferance of the colonial government. They were paid from a percentage of the taxes they collected, from "fees" from the local courts over which they presided, and from labor employers. They were given much greater powers by the British than had ever existed within the traditional system and increasingly abused their positions. This African leadership became an essential component of the colonial system, increasingly alienated from their own people whom they exploited, and the dominant element in the "ruling" strata of the class system emerging within the African population.<sup>75</sup>

A systematic policy gradually emerged between the two labor crises of 1907 and 1912. Officials were caught between the increasing demands of settlers and planters for a more direct and systematic governmental role in the supplying of labor, on the one hand, and the rising public concern in Britain by humanitarians and liberals over abuse of Africans and forced labor conscription, on the other hand. Metro-pole and colonial officials sought a "compromise", in which regulations placed formal restrictions on labor recruitment and employment practices, which limited the role of government officers to "encouraging" rather

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75. Cf. Low, "British East Africa," pp. 39-50.

than conscripting labor, to providing "information and advise" about employment rather than ordering Africans to go to work for settlers.

This official response was primarily an exercise in semantics, a change in the form rather than substance. As the Secretary of State Harcourt asserted in the House of Commons debate on the issue in 1914, "it is sometimes difficult to discriminate nicely between advice, persuasion, and compulsion in this matter."<sup>76</sup> He was trying to convince Parliament and the public that persuasion rather than compulsion was actually practiced and that such persuasion and employment was good for the African. It prevented "demoralization" and "idleness" in the reserves while it developed a "work ethic" among the Africans.<sup>77</sup>

Although efforts were made to ameliorate the worst abuses, policy and practice basically remained the same. The colonial government publically could not remove the restrictions and obligations placed on European employers and officials, for it would have been too blatant an act. But, as the governor reassured the settlers at a public meeting in 1908, if "the rules could not be withdrawn, they would be relaxed in several ways proposed by the unofficials [settlers]."<sup>78</sup>

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76. Quoted in Dilley, British Rule, p. 222.

77. Ibid., p. 226-30.

78. Ibid., p. 218.

The labor shortage of 1912 led to the creation of a Native Labor Commission composed of three officials and four unofficials (settlers). The committee's report stressed once again the main measures advocated over the years to induce the Africans to "come out and work": land restriction and reserves, higher taxation and duties, manipulation of traditional leaders and institutions among the Africans, and official government recruitment.<sup>79</sup>

Migrant labor and "squatter" labor.

Two institutions were developed as part of the colonial economic and labor policies which were particularly important to the British, for they provided crucial links between the reserves and the European colonial economy. The first, "migrant labor", was the primary mechanism by which the colonial system insured an adequate supply of cheap labor. The particularly low level of wages was established by settler political pressure; the settler community was successful in imposing its wage policy upon both the administration and the plantations.<sup>80</sup> Since migrant laborers were forced to keep one foot in the reserves they retained

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79. Ibid., pp. 221-23.

80. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," pp. 141, 147.

a traditional orientation, a low level of skills, and a continuing dependency upon their traditional landholdings and subsistence farming for the maintenance of their families. Urban as well as rural labor retained many of these characteristics by necessity. The migrant labor system was justified as preserving traditional social organization and ties and as preventing too abrupt a social breakdown through "detrribalization". The system in turn justified the low wages, for the reserve was seen as providing a form of "social insurance" for the African when he was unemployed. The perpetuation of a low level of skills under migrant labor provided a further rationale for the low wage levels.

"Resident labor"-or "squatters"-was the second and particularly insidious labor institution. Squatting developed from the practice of settlers "allowing" Africans to settle temporarily on unused portions of their estates in the highlands. Frequently these estates were once part of the traditional holdings of the same Africans, whose continued presence was "permitted" by the settlers in order to obtain the

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labor. In exchange for a set number of days of paid labor put in for the settler, the African was permitted to grow crops and pasture his stock. Squatters provided particular advantages to the settlers in

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81. Cf. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, pp. 180-185.

this pre-war period. They provided what was practically a captive form of labor at a time when the colonial mechanisms for forcing out Africans as laborers were still weak. Squatting allowed the settler to utilize the African's cattle for stock-breeding with imported cattle. The practice was crucial for the formation of a cattle industry among the settlers, for it was the only means by which the settler could obtain a higher export quality cattle which also could survive in the East African environment.<sup>82</sup> The abuses of squatter labor were particularly high. The system created a form of "feudalism" in the relationship between settler and African. It created and reinforced a situation of restriction, underdevelopment, and dependency which the African had not previously experienced. The system had the implicit support of the government, for there was little official supervision or control over the settler.

#### 4. An Assessment of Economic Policy and Practice by 1914.

An overall assessment of colonial economic policy and practice from 1895 to 1914 - and the underlying myths - reveals a basic contradiction with important

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82. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," p. 152.

social and political implications for the future of Kenya. Imperial policy was grounded in the belief that European capital, immigration, and settlement was essential to provide the means to make the colony pay for itself and to rapidly create the base for economic development. Yet "up to the first World War, in fact, 'native production' was contributing much more than settler agriculture to the wealth of the country."<sup>83</sup> By conservative estimate, African production contributed some 70% of exports by value.<sup>84</sup>

Settler and plantation development proved to be a heavy burden upon the colonial economy rather than an "engine of development". It was African rather than European production which provided the exports that eventually made the colony self-sufficient by 1913 and which was required to subsidize the burden of settler development.

British officials had placed great stress upon the necessity for European settlement to make the Uganda railway a paying proposition. Railway operations became profitable around 1905-06 through African

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83. Wrigley, "Kenya," p. 227.

84. Ibid., p. 243.

production, however, rather than European economic  
development;<sup>85</sup>

It...was not...the products of European farms which first removed the operating deficits upon the Uganda Railway...but expanding trade in the surrounding regions, and more particularly the growth of the African peasant-grown cotton crop in Uganda.

The railway became a profit-making operation from African production in all three of the East African territories: peasant cotton production in Uganda; groundnuts, coffee, hides and skins in northern Tanzania; and maize, simsim, beeswax, hides and skins, copra, and groundnuts in Kenya, particularly from the Nyanza(Luo) area.<sup>86</sup>

The failure of mass colonization was clear by 1908. Settler demands for compulsory measures to provide African labor at low wages was hardly an indication of success; it was precisely the opposite. Without African labor the European could not have functioned commercially at all. Without the direct and indirect measures of compulsion, the settlers could not have insured the existing system of low wages. And without the low wages, the settlers would have gone completely bankrupt.

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85. Low, "British East Africa," p. 55.

86. Cf. Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1913-1914. This was still true in 1913-1914, when the railway carried 13,945 tons of maize; 8,895 tons of this maize was loaded at Kisumu and Kibos, and could only have come from Luo production. The Luo also provided all of the simsim crop, which was the single highest value export for 1911-1912, and 1912-1913 (Ibid., p. 227).

The settlers also required an extensive range of subsidies and obtained them through political pressure upon cooperative colonial officials. The colonial government provided them with reduced rail freight rates, protective tariffs, and reduced customs duties on such settler imports as seeds and agricultural implements.<sup>87</sup>

While the British taxpayer paid some of this subsidy until 1913 in the form of imperial grants-in-aid, the real subsidizer was the African. In addition to being forcedly exploited on the cheap for his labor, the African provided the major part of the revenue through various taxes, customs duties, and extensive export production.

Settler and official efforts to create a New Zealand colony in miniature were broken over the failure of production in wheat and sheep.<sup>88</sup> In spite of the temperate climate of the highlands, Kenya was still a tropical territory, and these products could not be transplanted without long, expensive experimentation in cross-breeding and cross-pollination. It was increasingly clear that the traditional English temperate crops and stock were not the answer to the major economic pre-occupation of the colonial government. This was the

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87. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," p. 123-26.

88. Cf. Huxley, White Man's Country, passim, for a vivid description of the difficulties involved.

search for competitive export products which could be grown successfully by the settlers who were migrating to the colony in greater numbers in search of their fortune.

Plantation tropical export production was not successful initially either. The capital investment required in plantation and estate production also precluded tropical exports from serving as the cheap and easily grown crops required for large-scale smallholding settlement.

Sisal plantations had been started but sisal required a great deal of capital and took four to five years to mature. In the meantime, the market remained in a slump. Coffee planting had begun on a very small scale but production was discouraged by a depressed world market price which lasted until the boom after 1910.

High prices in rubber on the world market led to a heavy capital inflow in speculative efforts in wild rubber plantation production by British companies. The boom burst in 1912 before the rubber trees matured while East Africa turned out to be an unsatisfactory place to produce rubber, for it was of poor quality and uncompetitive.<sup>89</sup>

The combination of settler and plantation production indicated the ambivalence of official British colonizing efforts. It also demonstrated the differing historical forces underlying British imperialist

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89. Wrigley, "Kenya," p. 224.

expansion. Colonization through permanent settlement was an historical anachronism in the twentieth century. Yet there were strong conservative elements which prompted it in the hopes that eventually another White dominion, modeled after the "mother country", could be carved out of southern Africa similar to the dominions of Australasia.

South Africa exerted a particularly powerful influence in this respect. There was a heavy influx of South African settlers. Many colonial officials had served there earlier and shared the South African mentality.

Large scale corporate investment took place parallel to permanent settlement due to pressures upon British companies to find new sources of tropical products and to establish a more secure supply within the sterling area in a world of growing protectionism.<sup>90</sup> There was also a strong belief within the colonial Office that large scale capital investment was the most effective way to promote rapid economic development, in spite of their fears over the speculative consequences of such investment.<sup>91</sup> Syndicate financing, however, was attracted to more developed and profitable areas.

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90. Cf. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," Chapter five, for an excellent analysis of British efforts to promote tropical production in Kenya in order to provide an assured source within the empire.

91. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement, p. 98-116, 142-56.

The few major corporate efforts which did occur were not terribly successful at first. The East Africa Syndicate invested in wheat and sheep raising, which proved unprofitable. They turned later to the only form of mineral extraction available in Kenya, the exploitation of sodium carbonate deposits discovered at Lake Magadi.<sup>92</sup>

In 1907 the British East Africa Corporation, with support from the Empire Cotton Growing Association, initiated cotton production in Nyanza Province and in the eastern province of Uganda.<sup>93</sup> Peasant cotton production was successful in Uganda but failed in Nyanza, where settler demands for African labor discouraged African cotton production.<sup>94</sup>

The primary consequence of corporate investment in Kenya was the growing concentration of land ownership and control in the hands of a few corporations and a small number of individuals such as Lord Delamere and Grogan. Speculation in land did occur on a widespread basis in Kenya and perhaps represented the major component of economic growth in the European sector during the pre-war period.

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92. Ibid., p. 71-4.

93. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 435-36; and Wolff, "Economic Aspects," Chapter 5.

94. Cf. H. Fearn, An African Economy: A Study of the Economic Development of the Nyanza Province of Kenya, 1903-1953 (London, 1961).

The development of maize production, more than any other factor, demonstrates the realities of the colonial system which was developing in Kenya. Maize was promoted as a settler crop by the government during the second half of the first decade in the hope that at last a cheap, easily cultivated crop had been found upon which to create a viable settler economy.

The colonial government was attracted by the high world market price and by the example of South African maize production. Special rail rate reductions made maize export production just barely profitable. However,<sup>95</sup>

the growth of the maize industry was a by-product of the general growth of the economy, and especially of the plantation industries, for it was the feeding of African labour that provided the maize growers with their most lucrative market.

Cultivation of maize became the main money-making product of the settlers. It bailed out the settler community. It could do so, however, only through heavy subsidies and through a particularly insidious form of exploitation of the African. For maize was a standard African crop which they could produce more cheaply than the settler and, given the same services and aid, of as high a quality.<sup>96</sup>

If some of the expenditure which has been incurred by the Agricultural Department on behalf of European Settlers had been

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95. Wrigley, "Kenya," p. 224-25. Emphasis added.

96. Kikuyu District Annual Report, 1907-1908, as quoted in Low, "British East Africa," p. 52-3.

spent in the interests of the Kikuyu and Kavirondo/[Luo], it is likely that a speedy return would have resulted. At present, the natives are performing the manual labor which enables the latter/[settlers] to grow the best produced for the market without any resultant advantage to the actual workers from the money sunk by the British taxpayer.

From 1895, when formal rule was established over the territory of Kenya, until the outbreak of World War I, the British were engaged in imposing effective control and in establishing a "self-supporting" colony. At the same time, they persisted in constructing an economic and social system subordinate to the metropole and its economic interests.

The existence of a fertile and temperate Highlands, which was attractive to European settlement, dominated British policy and efforts at an early stage. European settlement was promoted actively as the basis for an agrarian export colony. The subjugation of the Africans was directed towards "opening up" the central highlands and expropriating the land exclusively for European settlers. The British reorganized the boundaries of their colonial territories in East Africa to consolidate the highlands as a settler colony. They established a relatively elaborate organization of administrative, agricultural and technical services to aid the settlers in the formation of an agrarian export economy, one oriented to their best assessment of future imperial needs.

This colonial formation was in fundamental conflict with the existing economic and social organization of African societies. The crucial factor was the European dependency upon African labor. The African had to be reduced from a self-sufficient producer to a laborer working for the needs and interests of the European rather than his own. Consequently, the colonial state deliberately and systematically developed labor, tax, and reserve policies to achieve this objective.

By the end of this period, the foundations had been created for the settler dominated agrarian export colony. The consolidation of this colonial formation was hastened by World War I and took place during the inter-war period.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### SUBJUGATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE SETTLER COLONY IN TANZANIA UNDER GERMAN RULE, 1895-1914.

The German colonizers faced a number of circumstances in their colonial sphere in East Africa which contrasted strongly with those in the British sphere. The fertile highlands areas were scattered around the periphery of Tanzania rather than concentrated in a central highlands. The African population was dispersed accordingly, with the major groupings located in more inaccessible areas within the interior. The economic and strategic factors which led the British to construct a railway from the coast along the edge of the central highlands to Lake Victoria did not exist for the Germans and the colonial headquarters was established on the coast rather than in the center.

These factors suggest initially that the pattern of German colonization would develop quite differently than that of the British in Kenya. The factors were particularly discouraging for European settlement along the model of British colonization in the south, central and east Africa.

Factors within Germany also differed from those in Britain and reinforced the tendencies towards a different pattern of colonization. Lacking the British history of overseas colonization, the Germans were not locked into a tradition of European settlement. On the contrary, the Germans had a colonial history which was European oriented and which was

based on expansion and settlement towards Eastern Europe. Growing economic and political conflict within Germany between rightist and leftist elements made colonial policy an issue in the German metropole in a way which did not occur in Britain. This proved true particularly as a result of the colonial revolts in Tanzania and South-west Africa in 1905.

In spite of these differing circumstances, the major characteristic of German colonial formation in Tanzania prior to World War I was the growing similarity to the settler dominated agrarian export colony in British Kenya. The forces behind imperialist expansion and the dynamics of settler development had their own logic which prevailed over the existing obstacles.

#### 1. German Subjugation of Tanzania.

The pattern of German subjugation and extension of administrative rule over Tanzania was similar to the British subjugation of Kenya. First, German efforts to impose control met with strong African resistance which only the direct military intervention of the German government could overcome. It took many expeditions

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1. G. C. K. Gwassa, "The German intervention and African resistance in Tanzania," in I. N. Kimambo and A. J. Temu, A History of Tanzania (Nairobi, 1969), pp. 85-122 gives a detailed account of this period in Tanzanian political history.

over the decade from 1888 to 1898 to subjugate the main areas of the colony. Even then, the Germans were unable to achieve control throughout the colony until after the crushing of the Maji rebellion between 1905 and 1907.

Second, the Germans used the pre-colonial caravan trade routes as their lines of penetration, subjugation, and eventual railway and communication paths.<sup>2</sup> The pattern of resistance to German control can be followed along these routes, which went through the main population and trade centers in East Africa. German penetration along these lines indicates their primary interest in gaining control over the existing Arab trade network for their own imperial benefit.

Resistance broke out first on the coast, in reaction to the attempts by the GEA to impose its political and economic control, once German pressure had forced the Sultan of Zanzibar to sign an "agreement" to lease the coastal area to the Company.<sup>3</sup> The GEA needed this con-

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2. Ibid., pp. 89, 92. These routes were: 1) From the southern coastal towns of Tanga and Pangani to Kilimanjaro; 2) from the middle coastal town of Bagamoyo, near Dar es Salaam, southwest through the towns of central Tanzania of Mpwapwa and Tabora to Ujiji, on the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, and to Mwanza and Bukoba, on the south and west of lake Victoria; and 3) from the northern coastal towns of Kilwa and Lindi into the region of Lake Malawi (Nyasa).
  3. Cf. William Otto Henderson, "German East Africa, 1884-1918," in Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver, eds., History of East Africa, II (Oxford, 1965), p. 128.

trol if it was to exploit the colony and make profits, but the action threatened the existing economic system under the control of Arab traders and Indian financiers. The resistance was not just an Arab revolt, but " a popular uprising."<sup>4</sup> It was directed as much against Omani collaboration with the Germans as it was against the German intrusion, for the coastal peoples sporadically had been resisting Omani control from Zanzibar for years.<sup>5</sup>

Between May and September, 1888, there were risings throughout the whole coast and immediate interior. These were joined by the peoples in the Usambara and Usagara areas of the northeast and by the Yao in the south.<sup>6</sup> Faced with the precarious position of the GEA, the German government appointed Hermann von Wissmann Imperial Commissioner and took over direct control.<sup>7</sup> Wissman

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4. John Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912 (Cambridge, 1969), p. 13.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Robert J. Rotberg, "Resistance and Rebellion in British Nyassaland and German East Africa, 1888-1915: A Tentative Comparison," in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds., Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, 1967), pp. 668-669.
  7. Cf. Mary Evelyn Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918 (New York, 1966 (1930)). Bismarck obtained financial support from an unwilling Reichstag only by exploiting the Catholic anti-slave trade campaign of 1888-1889, and by asserting that the imperial take-over was essential to end slavery on the coast, rather than to

took advantage of a temporary armistice to gather and train a mercenary army, then suddenly attacked and routed the coastal forces in the spring of 1889.<sup>8</sup> While the coastal resistance was broken essentially by the end of 1889, a struggle continued against the Germans until 1891.<sup>9</sup>

The Germans met further resistance in varying forms as they penetrated inland from the coast.<sup>10</sup> The primary area of German interest lay in the northeast, in the regions of Pangani, Tanga, and Arusha. Fertile tropical and highland areas existed in the Pangani river valley, the mountain ranges of Usambara and Pare, and on Mt. Kilimanjaro and Mt. Meru further inland. This information was known from earlier explorations and the areas were highly attractive to planation syndicates and settlers. Consequently, punitive expeditions were sent along the

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protect the investment and profits of a private company. Townsend (pp. 117-118) quotes Bismark's Reichstag speech: "It is not a question of material support afforded to the East African Company; it is a question of civilization, of Christianity and national obligation.... In company with England and France, the German government by signing the Congo Act (of 1885) has assumed the responsibility of christianizing and civilizing the great part of the earth's surface."

8. Rotberg, "Resistance and Rebellion," p. 670. The mercenary army consisted of six-hundred Sudanese soldiers from Cairo, three hundred and fifty Zulu from Mozambique, and fifty Somalis from Adem, in addition to local Askari.
9. Further outbreaks in the south, particularly among the Yao, occurred in 1894 and 1895, in resistance to the levying of taxes. Ibid., pp. 670-671.
10. Cf. Gwassa, "German intervention," for an analysis of the different forms resistance took; armed resistance, passive resistance, diplomacy, and combinations of the three. African resistance is also discussed by Iliffe, Tanganyika, pp. 1-8.

Pangani caravan route to Mt. Kilimanjaro, first against the major chiefdoms in Usagara and Usambara, then inland against the Pare, Chagga, Arusha, and Meru. Expeditions were sent into the central region of Tanzania during the same period, against the Gogo, Hehe, and Nyamwezi, for the main trade route ran through this area and made it second in importance.

The expeditions against the Gogo and Chagga were particularly brutal. They were led by Karl Peters, who at that time was serving as a Military Commissioner. Peters' "pacification" methods were based upon striking terror through heavy military force and upon widespread destruction through a scorched earth policy. Peters describes his response to the Gogo when they showed signs of resistance to his abuse, then made peace overtures to

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Peters:

The Sultan ( chief of the Gogo ) shall have peace. It shall be eternal peace. I will show the Wagogo what the Germans are....  
Plunder the village, set fire to the houses, and smash everything to pieces that will not burn!

Not satisfied with the destruction of the chief's village, Peters determined to strike fear on a more widespread

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11. Carl Peters, New Light on Dark Africa; being a narrative of the German Emin Pasha expedition (London, 1891), pp. 512, 522, 527, 529 as quoted in G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere, 1884-1898," in R. Oliver and G. Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, I ( Oxford, 1963), pp. 444-445.

basis by attacking other Gogo villages systematically: <sup>11a</sup>

Everywhere the same spectacle was repeated. After a short resistance the Gogo fled in all directions; burning brands were thrown into the houses, and the axes did their work in hewing to pieces what could not be burnt. By half-past four, twelve villages were thus burnt down.

The Germans ran into major resistance with the <sup>12</sup> politically well-organized Nyamwezi in western Tanzania. German efforts to impose control over the Arab traders and their trade network centered at Tabora threatened to destroy the economic alliance the Nyamwezi had developed with the Arabs. This led the Nyamwezi to attack the Germans in the late 1880's, eliminate them from the Tabora region, and close off the main trade route for the follow-<sup>13</sup> ing six years. After suffering severe military defeats during 1892, the Germans renewed their offensive in 1893, finally defeated the main forces of the Nyamwezi, and established nominal control over the region.

The most successful resistance to German domination occurred in south central Tanzania throughout the decade <sup>14</sup> of the 1890's. Under the well-known chief, Mkwawa, a

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11a. Ibid.

12. Freeman-Grenville, "German Sphere," p. 452.

13. Rotberg, "Resistance and Rebellion," p. 671.

14. Gwassa, "German intervention," p. 107.

vast Hehe empire had been established over the area between the Rubeho mountains and the Kilombero valley.<sup>15</sup>

The Hehe controlled the central trade route and growing conflicts with the Germans led the Hehe to close the route off to the Germans. The Hehe nearly annihilated a German military expedition in 1891.<sup>16</sup> They continued to dominate the area for the following three years: raiding caravans, destroying the Kilosi garrison of the Germans, and continuing to collect tribute from the vassal peoples and merchants in the area. While the Germans conquered the capital of the Hehe in a heavy attack in 1894, the remnants of the Hehe forces continued guerrilla resistance for four more years, with widespread support from the people of the area, until they were surrounded and wiped out by the Germans in 1898.

Centralized and semi-centralized or "itemi" chiefdoms prevailed in Tanzania, in contrast to Kenya,

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15. Gwassa, "German intervention," p. 113-116; Rotberg, "Resistance and Rebellion," p. 671-672; Alison Redmayne, "The Hehe," in A. Roberts, ed., *Tanzania Before 1900* (Nairobi, 1968), p.37-58, and "Mkwawa and the Hehe Wars," *Journal of African History*, 9 (1968), p.404-436. For a thorough study of the Hehe, see Redmayne's "The Wahehe People of Tanganyika," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1964.

16. Three hundred askaris and ten German officers were killed including the Commander of the German Defense Force in Tanzania. Only sixty-four survived, including four Germans. Gwassa, "German intervention," pp. 114-115.

where the basic system was a decentralized society and the clan was the dominant political unit. Political diplomacy and intrigue appears to have played a much greater role in the interaction of African and European in Tanzania than in Kenya.<sup>17</sup> This process had a significant impact upon German subjugation, colonization, and the long-range political development of Tanzania.

This process was particularly evident in three regions: in Usambara in the northeast; among the Chagga around Mt. Kilimanjaro; and among the Haya in the northwest.<sup>18</sup> In each region, rivalries existed between competing chieftaincies within each of these three societies. The chiefs turned to the Germans for alliances and support in order to bolster their own position in the ongoing traditional process of diplomatic rivalry and intrigue. The Germans sought to use these rivalries to gain allies, split the societies politically, and weaken the resistance against

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17. Not that forms of political rivalry, alliance and intrigue did not take place in the interaction of African and the English in Kenya, but we have less information about Kenya, in contrast to Tanzania. More importantly, in Tanzania the interchanges occurred at a higher political level among chiefs of centralized kingdoms and had greater political consequences.
18. Cf. Gwassa, "German intervention," p. 115; Katherine Stahl, History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro (The Hague, 1964); Ralph A. Austen, Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule: Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939 (New Haven, 1968).

them. One result was the obtaining of land and other aid from certain chiefs. More importantly, the Germans were dependent initially upon these alliances to support their own precarious military and political position.

since German forces rarely exceeded 200 or 300 African troops in any engagement, and were too weak to risk simultaneous hostilities with many different groups. Because the inland peoples were disunited, the Germans were able to ally with one society against its neighbor, or to support one group within a society to the disadvantage of its competitors. The outcome was a number of local arrangements between the European invaders and the groups within each region.

African groups saw the Germans as merely a new factor to be manipulated in inter-African politics. It was not until it was too late that they discovered they were dealing with a new force against which they could not prevail and in the face of which their traditional political rivalry was a fatal weakness leading to the subjugation of all. The German intrusion, in playing upon these divisions and traditional African politics, disrupted everywhere the process of political unification and expansion taking place among the different African societies in Tanzania.

The southeast region was the least valuable area and the last to be pacified in Tanzania. It also differed from many other areas of the colony in that it consisted of a multiplicity of dispersed ethnic societies which had

a decentralized and clan-based socio-political organization similar to the pattern in Kenya. These factors played an important role in the breaking out of the Maji Maji rebellion, the one extensive and widespread rebellion to occur in the two colonies until the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya during the 1950's.<sup>20</sup>

The revolt broke out on the coast in July, 1905 at a time when the German colonial government complacently believed in the stability of the colony.<sup>21</sup> Within two weeks "nearly all the peoples surrounding the Rufiji valley, from Kilosa to Liwali, were in revolt. Missionaries, Arabs, Indians, Askari, and all who had contact with the government were threatened."<sup>22</sup> Opposition was directed against all those associated with the imposition of foreign domination and indicated the incipient nationalism in the rebellion.

By the end of September, only three months later, nearly one quarter of the colony had risen up in a loose but clearly organized rebellion. "Most of the peoples south of a line from Dar es Salaam to Kilosa and thence to the

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20. An interesting parallel between the two rebellions, in spite of the time difference, is apparent here. First, each represented a different stage of the process of nationalist development. Second, there was a striking similarity in the reaction of the colonial rulers as well as in their portrayal of the African people as "barbaric" to justify repression.
21. The summarized account of the revolt below is based primarily upon the account presented by Iliffe, Tanganyika, pp. 18-28.
22. Ibid., p. 19.

northern tip of Lake Malawi were in revolt." <sup>23</sup> The revolt triggered off unrest throughout the rest of the colony, but the more effectively subjugated societies in these areas did not join in the rebellion. The threat of the Germans to raze the Nyamwezi region prevented them from joining. The Hehe, who had experienced the ravaging of their territory for years during the German campaigns of the 1890's, failed to join in spite of the desperate ap-  
<sup>24</sup>  
 peals from the southern groups.

By the spring of 1906, the German counter-attack began to make successful headway. They were dependent upon auxiliaries from African allies outside the area of rebellion and by rival elements within the affected area  
<sup>25</sup>  
 who had not joined their fellow Africans. Even so, it took a year-and-a-half more of widespread scorched earth tactics against a continuing guerrilla warfare before the revolt collapsed in the face of a German-created famine which devastated the rebel area in 1907. An estimated one-hundred twenty-five thousand people died and the whole southeast was ravaged over the two years as a result  
<sup>26</sup>  
 of the violent warfare, starvation, and disease.

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23. The groups taking part in the revolt included the Ngindo, the Mbuna, the Pogoro, the Ngoni, and the Bena. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
24. An important factor in their decision was the failure of the failure of the Ngoni and others of the south to join them against the Germans in their previous struggle.
25. Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 20.
26. Ibid. See also, Henderson, "German East Africa," pp. 141-142.

In contrast to European interpretations of the time, the revolt did not result from either an African "conspiracy" or from German "administrative immorality." As Iliffe indicates, in the most recent and authoritative work on the Maji Maji rebellion, it was triggered off by strong and accumulating grievances against the cotton cultivation scheme which the colonial government had been imposing throughout the coastal districts since 1902.<sup>27</sup>

Because European settler and plantation agriculture was unsuccessful and government revenue was static, the colonial government turned to a policy of imposing cotton export production upon the Africans in 1901.<sup>28</sup> The choice in policy was influenced strongly by the Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee (K.W.K.), the German equivalent of the British Empire Cotton Growing Association. Like its British counterpart, the K. W. K. sought to develop German imperial self-sufficiency in raw cotton production through the exploitation of the tropical colonies.<sup>29</sup>

The German governor did not believe that Africans could cultivate cotton successfully on an individual basis. He developed a scheme of "communal" plots which were established at the headquarters of each headman throughout

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27. Iliffe, Tanganyika, pp. 1-8, 20-26.

28. Ibid., p. 23; Henderson, "German East Africa," p. 128.

29. Kenneth Ingham, A History of East Africa, rev. ed. (New York, 1965), pp. 195-196.

the southern coastal districts. These plots were cultivated by forced labor and each adult male was required to work for twenty-eight days a year. The scheme was "a disastrous failure."<sup>30</sup> Wages were so low the Africans refused to work. The work required to cultivate the cotton far exceeded the original plan and seriously interfered with subsistence farming. The particular demands of this government scheme "threatened African economies far more seriously than did any demands by European settlers in the north."<sup>31</sup>

The rebellion broke out on the coast at the beginning of the 1905 cotton picking season as a spontaneous opposition to the economic exploitation of the colonial administration. It soon turned into outright resistance against all forms of European domination and took on the characteristics of incipient nationalism. As it expanded rapidly, the rebellion became transformed into a religious-based mass movement which served to unite the different peoples of the region in an abortive effort to organize a new socio-political order against the European threat to their societies.

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30. Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 23.

31. Ibid.

The crushing of the Maji Maji revolt put an end to active African resistance in Tanzania. The fear of revolt continued to haunt German officials both in the colony and in Germany. The rebellion and colonial policy also became important issues in the politics within Germany at this time. Consequently, German attitudes towards the policies of colonization and economic exploitation were influenced in ways which differed significantly from those in neighboring Kenya.

## 2. White Settlement and the Expropriation of Land.

In contrast to the British in Kenya, the Germans turned to a more varied and systematically experimental policy in the colonization and economic exploitation of Tanzania. A number of factors influenced this variation. Within the two colonies, significant differences existed in geography, African social organization, and population concentration. Differences also existed in the means of transport available into the interior. Germany did not have Britain's long colonial tradition and was not locked into any pattern. The very policy of colonization became a major issue within the German metropole, as part of the severe economic and political conflict which emerged in Germany at the turn of the century.

All three of the basic policy orientations of the time

were utilized in Tanzania: the "West Coast" policy of African peasant production; the "South African" policy of European settlement; and the "South-East Asian" policy of large-scale plantation agriculture.<sup>32</sup> While elements of the three were used in Kenya, the British by 1904-1905 definitely had opted for settler development in Kenya, and proceeded step by step to introduce those measures needed to create a settler-based economy at the expense of African development.

The Germans reached a quite different conclusion in 1907 in their re-evaluation of policy after the Maji Maji rebellion. Existing settlement schemes had failed. Plantation development was equally unsuccessful. While forced production of tropical exports had led to the outbreak of rebellion, there was clear evidence that if the Africans were provided sufficient economic inducement, they would quickly increase their production to provide a growing export trade.<sup>33</sup> The labor crisis of 1906-1907 also demonstrated that the labor demands of settler and plantation production conflicted with and threatened African production for export and for subsistence. They conflicted as well with the labor requirements of the colonial government for public works, particularly transport construction, and portage.

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32. For a classic study of these differing imperialist policies, see W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Volume II: Problems of Economic Policy 1918-1939 (London, 1942), passim.

33. Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 56-63, 68-71.

The Governor, Rechenburg, with the initial support of Colonial Secretary Dernberg, turned to an economic development policy based on the gradual expansion and reform of traditional African production. The new policy also attempted to discourage settler development. For five years, from 1907 to 1912, German authorities formulated, advocated, and sought to implement a policy based on African peasant agriculture, with economic and political success. But the policy was resisted and reversed during this period by an alliance of rightwing pressure groups within the colony and the Reichstag. By 1912, the settler and planter element was larger than in neighboring Kenya and exercised a comparable if not greater dominance over colonial affairs.

#### Early influences on German colonization

The fertile and highlands areas in Tanzania are scattered around the periphery, rather than concentrated in the center of the country as they were in Kenya's central highlands. German colonial administration was established permanently at an early stage on the coast rather than in the interior.

Settler and plantation development concentrated also in the tropical area of the coast, particularly between Dar es Salaam and Tanga. From there it gradually extended into the northeast region from Tanga to Kilimanjaro. Additional plantations and settlements gradually were established in a scattered pattern around the peripheries in the Rufiji valley of the central region, in the south-

ern highlands and southern coastal districts, and even more sparsely in the northwest.

The absence of a concentrated central highlands area in Tanzania led to other considerable differences in the formation of settlement compared to Kenya. Even in the area of more concentrated settlement, the northeast districts of Tanga, Usambara, and Kilimanjaro, European settlement was interspersed among the African societies living there. Geography, the centralized organization of these chiefdoms, and the weakness of German rule prevented the Germans from the particular form of land expropriation which led to the creation of an exclusive white highlands in Kenya.

The pattern of settler and plantation development was affected also by the limited means of transportation into the interior. The first attempt to construct a railway, from the coastal town of Tanga up the Pangani river valley into the Usambara area, was initiated by a private company in 1893. The venture soon failed due to lack of capital. The colonial government did not step in actively to promote economic development through railway construction until 1902, one year after the completion of the Uganda railway by the British.

The Germans reactivated the Usambara railway in 1902 as a state project but only reached Karogwe by 1905 -- a

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34. Ingham, East Africa, p. 194; Freeman-Grenville, "German Sphere," p. 449-50.

mere fifty miles. The Germans did not begin to open up the rest of the colony by means of rail transport until early 1905, when the Dar es Salaam to Morogoro line was initiated. By the time it reached Morogoro in 1907, plans were already underway to extend this Central railway to Tabora and Kigoma on Lake Victoria and Tanganyika, but the projects were not completed until 1912 and 1914 respectively.<sup>35</sup>

Until 1907, at least, it was the British colonial administration, rather than the German government, which exhibited the more systematic and forward policy of economic exploitation, in contrast to the image commonly held. This was so in spite of the five years head start Germany had in imposing direct governmental rule in Tanzania.<sup>36</sup> Railway construction, for example, not only took place later in Tanzania, but did so in response to the pressures of a growing settler and plantation community. This contrasts with the early state initiative by Britain on rail construction as a means to promote settlement in Kenya.

The German government was concerned, like the British, with avoiding imperial expense in its colonies, and attempted to make them self-supporting by one method or another.

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35. For the politics involved in the railway development, see Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 71-75. Cf. M. F. Hill, Permanent Way: Volume II: The Story of Tanganyika Railways (Nairobi, 1957) for a detailed account.

36. Compare this, for example, with the view in Ingham, East Africa, p. 191-92.

Initially, Bismarck's policy was to utilize chartered private companies, along the British model, to administer and bear the expense of the colonies, in return for monopoly rights to the economic exploitation. As Bismarck asserted in the mid 1880's,<sup>37</sup>

the German empire cannot carry on a system of colonization like that of France. It cannot send out warships to conquer territory oversea, that is, it will not take the initiative; but, it will protect the German merchant even in the land he acquires. German will do what England has always done, establish Chartered Companies, so that the responsibility always rests with them.

The German East Africa Company failed to serve this purpose, as did the chartered companies established in the other colonies. The German government wound up having to subsidize the East African colony, which left it open to attack in the Reichstaag from opposition parties.

Aside from deliberate efforts to mislead the Reichstag on the colonial budget,<sup>38</sup> the German government was left with two alternatives to keep imperial subsidies as low as possible. First, they could wring revenue directly from the African. They imposed taxes on the African population to raise as much colonial revenue as possible. A hut tax was established in 1896 and a poll tax in 1902. Efforts to collect the hut tax were responsible for much of the resistance and the devastating "pacification" cam-

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37. Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 119.

38. Hiffe, Tanganyika, p. 42.

paigns immediately before and after the turn of the century. In addition, the Germans attempted to raise revenue from the Africans through the imposition of cotton and other tropical exports (such as wild rubber). This measure, as was shown above, led to the large-scale rebellion in the southeast. Both measures, as in Kenya, resulted in heavy military expenditures which actually added to the financial drain upon the imperial treasury in the short-run.

The second alternative was the promotion of private investment and economic exploitation by commercial companies and industrial associations interested in establishing new supplies of tropical plantation products. Private enterprise, officials hoped, would enable them to avoid an expensive state role. Special rights were provided for the German East African Company, now a private commercial company.<sup>39</sup> Expropriated land and other attractions were provided to attract plantation investment on a greater scale than in neighboring Kenya. The following plantation exports were promoted initially: coffee in Usambara; cotton, especially along the coast; wild rubber; sisal, which eventually became the most valuable export crop;<sup>40</sup> and tobacco.

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39. Ibid., p. 97.

40. Cf. Ingham, East Africa, 193-98.

German colonial land law and settlement

Limitations of geography, access, and transport meant that expropriation of African lands by settlers and planters took place more slowly in Tanzania than in Kenya, although just as remorselessly. Early settlement took place piecemeal and often occurred before the colonial government had extended effective administrative rule into the area. These early claims subsequently were granted in freehold or on long-term lease after an imperial decree established the Crown Land Ordinance of November, 1895. During the government survey of land rights immediately after 1895, "gigantic claims" were made by settlers and planters who had already established themselves in the Tanganyika and Usambara areas.<sup>41</sup> No pretense was made that the land was under effective settler cultivation or that it was unclaimed under the African systems of land rights. Yet the European claims were generally granted, even if pared down. "Thus the area which was to become the centre of the sisal industry was 'wholly apportioned' among large estate owners before the government gained effective control of the situation."<sup>42</sup>

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41. Hiffe, Tanganyika, p. 58.

42. Ibid.

The German Land Law of 1895 established a systematic policy over land rights, expropriation and usage in order to control and facilitate colonization during the early stage of rule. This approach contrasted strongly with the lengthy ad hoc and cumulative process of developing land laws in Kenya under the British. All lands were declared crown land, except for that under actual occupation and cultivation by Africans or already claimed by European settlers and planters who had established themselves in the colony. The law aimed at defining and designating by survey the "crown lands" available for European settlement and thus encouraging economic exploitation through settlement as much as possible. The land law was designed to provide some protection for African usage, to minimize conflict between the African and European, and to protect African production upon which the colonial economy was dependent. The attempt in theory to "balance" African and European land requirements as if they were complementary met with the same failure as in Kenya, and for the same reason -- African and European economic interests were in fundamental conflict.

The land law included procedures for the establishment of reserves for the different African societies. The German land laws and the reserve system were more liberal than the British, for they set aside four times the actual amount of land in cultivation by the African. Thus the Germans, in spite of their limited overseas colonial ex-

perience, recognized the African agricultural system of shifting cultivation and sought to provide large enough reserves to take into account both the African systems of land use and future population growth.<sup>43</sup>

In spite of this land policy, approximately three thousand, five-hundred and fifteen square miles of land was expropriated for settler and plantation development by the outbreak of World War I.<sup>44</sup> In Tanzania, as in Kenya, settlers and planters tended to strike out and settle new lands, as in the movement of settlers from Tanga to East Usambara, to West Usambara, and on to the Kilimanjaro area. Once claims were made, the government generally acquiesced and granted lease rights, in disregard of African land rights and the regulations of the land law. In fact, the government frequently encouraged settlement into new areas as the more established areas developed land shortages.<sup>45</sup>

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43. Ingham, East Africa, p. 193; J. Roger Pitblado, "A Review of Agricultural Land Use and Land Tenure in Tanzania," Research Notes, No. 7, Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar es Salaam (Dar es Salaam, 1970).

44. Freeman-Grenville, "German Sphere," p. 449-50. According to Ingham, East Africa, p. 200, less than one-fifth of this expropriated land was cultivated, a fact which indicates land speculation was as rampant in German as British East Africa.

45. Cf. Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 59-60 for examples of forced movements of the Arusha and Masai peoples to make way for European settlements as the coastal areas became too populated.

Administrative practice in the "regulation" of settlement actually evolved along similar lines in both countries. Government survey was supposed to establish which lands were "unoccupied" Crown Lands by law, and therefore available for settlement. In practice, the opposite occurred. Land surveys were initiated after claims were made by settlers, and in the face of any uncertainty or conflict as to whether the land should be "reserved" for the African or allowed to the settler or planter, the African stood little chance.<sup>46</sup>

The 1895 Land Law was designed also to ensure European settlement which permanently improved land use and created economic development in the colony, rather than land speculation and quick profits. Under the conditions of the lease, the settler or plantation owner was required to expand the cultivation of the land by one-tenth each year over a five year period or to invest an equivalent value in capital improvements.<sup>47</sup> As with survey regulations, the means and will were lacking to enforce this provision. The estates were large and scattered over a

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46. Numerous examples may be found in Iliffe, Tanganyika. A sudden influx of settlers took place between 1906-1907 at Mt. Kilimanjaro, while local officials were undertaking surveys, and they gained control of the lower slopes of the mountain (p. 61-63). The number of settler plantations jumped from 4 to 82 between 1906 and 1911 around Morogoro as Europeans moved in to exploit the land "opened up" by the extension of the Central Railway (p. 99).
47. Ibid., p. 129 ff. The regulations provided the option of purchasing 20 percent of the leased land for each 10 percent put into cultivation. The total leased land could be purchased if only 50 percent was put to productive use.

great distance, while few administrative personnel were available to provide such enforcement. Just as important, the colonial officials were glad of any development and leary of discouraging settlement with "harsh" regulations, given the initial lack of success of both settlers and planters.

### German settlement efforts

Conflict within Germany and the Reichstag between progressives and conservatives, nationalists and economic imperialists, prevented the active promotion of a settlement policy. The few planned settlement schemes which were attempted on an "experimental" basis were unsuccessful. Efforts were made by the colonial governor in 1902 and 1905 to establish Afrikaner settlements in the Moshi and Arusha areas. By the end of 1905, two hundred Afrikaner families were settled in the foothills of Arusha on farms averaging two thousand, five hundred acres each.

The government initially encouraged the Afrikaners to expand into the neighboring Mbulu plateau in the belief that at last a core of effective small-scale settlers had been found for colonial development. The expansion had to be halted and the area closed to settlement as a result of an uprising among the Iraqw people who inhabited the Mbulu plateau. Further experience with the Afrikaners

led government officials to realize that they were marginal rather than modern farmers, and unsuitable agents upon which to pin their hopes for the development of a modern agricultural sector.

In 1906, the German government experimented with a settlement scheme based on German peasant settlement, after rejecting many such programs in the past. This "radish" policy (Kleinsiedlung) was based on settling Russian Germans in a community of one hundred and twenty-five acre farms near Kilimanjaro.<sup>48</sup> The project failed within two years, as the settlers found the environment too unfamiliar and distasteful. Wheat rust destroyed their crops and provided the finishing blow. The government saw the scheme fall through without regret. The Russian Germans no more represented their conception of appropriate agents in the extension of German culture overseas than had the Afrikaners.

Plantation development was not much more successful, in spite of its profitable potential due to European industrial and market requirements. Coffee was the prevailing crop cultivated on the new plantations which sprung up in the Usambara region during the early colonial period. By the beginning of the century, planters and officials realized that coffee planting in the area was a mistake. The soil was too acidic to produce a profitable yield, given the stage of agriculture, although the coffee was

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48. Ibid., p. 61-63.

a good quality arabica.<sup>49</sup> The yield limitations proved insurmountable when the world price of coffee fell to low levels and remained there until at least 1910. By 1906-1907, the coffee plantations were no longer economically viable, and were increasingly replaced with the cultivation of sisal.

Sisal had first been introduced in 1892 and these early plantations were producing successfully for export at a very high world market price just when it was being discovered that the coffee plantations in Usambara were not going to be viable. Extensive new sisal plantings and replacement of coffee plantings consequently took place. This capital investment shortly began suffering in turn from falling market prices, which dropped sixty per-cent by 1911.<sup>50</sup> New plantations had their investment locked up in an export crop which took four to five years to mature and which was declining in value every year it was maturing. The older plantations were hard hit by the falling world price, since they were struck by high fixed investments in sisal production.

By the time colonial policy was being reevaluated in 1907 in the aftermath of the Maji Maji rebellion, economic

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49. The best yield they could obtain was 1/2 pound of coffee per bush in Usambara, compared to 2-1/2 pounds from the volcanic soils of Mt. Kilimanjaro, which was to develop as the best coffee region in the future. Cf. Ingham, East Africa, p. 195; Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 68.

50. Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 69.

development based on settler and plantation development looked very bleak. Sisal and coffee were not to become very profitable again until the end of the German period; cotton and wild rubber production was just getting started and did not look very promising; and tea, an important plantation export crop in the future, did not get planted in any degree until after World War I.

A fifteen year colonial policy based on European enterprise failed to create a self-financing colony. It had not created a viable tropical export economy which was competitive vis-a-vis the increasingly monopolistic and speculator dominated world market. Even worse, efforts to develop such a policy within the colony placed increasingly heavy and abusive demands upon the African for labor and for export production, severely disrupted the African economic and social systems, and resulted in widespread rebellion by 1905.

Colonial realities, particularly the actions of the African peoples, forced German officials to reevaluate and change their colonial policy. The search by colonial officials for a new and more viable basis for colonial exploitation was restricted severely by the nature of the imperialistic relationship. Their solution was to turn directly to the African peasantry and devise a more stable and effective system to exploit the African for the benefit of imperial interests.

3. African Economic Development, Settler Interests, and The Conflict over Labor.

By 1907, colonial officials formally turned to a policy of colonial development which was based upon the gradual expansion and improvement of African production, rather than German settlement and enterprise. The policy change was influenced by rebellion in the colonies, in Southwest Africa, as well as in Tanzania. It was also influenced by the growing political and economic conflict within Germany and the exploitation of colonial issues in the German political arena. The policy change was inherently a conservative and "defensive" move, rather than the liberal development it frequently had previously. Regardless of the limited long-range possibilities it suggested for African development, the policy was incompatible with existing German interest groups within the colony and within Germany. The policy quickly was undermined from the moment of its inception.

The policy of African peasant production

The African policy was shaped by the new governor, Rechenberg, who was appointed in the middle of 1906 as part of the general shake-up and "reform" of German colonial administration at the time. <sup>51</sup> Rechenberg was

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51. Ibid., p. 1-8, 49-50. The following section is based largely on John Riffe's excellent work.

able to reach the policy conclusions he did about promoting African production because he had no real belief in the value of African colonies or in overseas economic imperialism. Rechenberg was a Prussian autocrat, brought up in the old school, an "Easterner," who saw Germany's future in terms of the traditional drive to expand into and dominate the East European area -- the Mitteleuropa concept.<sup>52</sup> He was not a representative of the newly emerging economic forces in Germany, the "Westerners," who saw Germany's future in competing to become a world power through overseas economic, territorial and political expansion.

In studying the situation during his first half year in Tanzania, Rechenberg concluded that settler and plantation development was a failure. He also feared that a colonial policy based on European development would continue to disrupt the African economies and trigger off future revolts. A growing labor "crisis" gave substance to his fears. Rechenberg well understood the underlying economic causes of African resistance and rebellion:<sup>53</sup>

From what I have seen so far, I have not the slightest doubt that the recent rising was due to economic causes, and this accords with experience gained in other lands. I have repeatedly had opportunity to observe popular movements more or less closely, and wherever

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52. Cf. ibid., p. 51-54 for a sketch of Rechenberg, his background, and values.

53. Rechenberg to German Colonial Office, July 15, 1907, RKA 1056/48-56, quoted in Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 55.

heterogeneous elements united in a general rising, as was the case with the various tribes here; economic questions have been the root cause, to which other factors have been joined only subsequently.

He also understood that imperialism itself worked to destroy indigenous economies. This process could be seen, as he pointed out, in the decline of coastal ports and towns as existing forms of commerce with Zanzibar and the mid-east were increasingly replaced by a European-controlled trading network.  
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The governor turned to the "West Coast" policy in the effort to insure a combination of economic growth and political passivity through the indirect and less disruptive exploitation of the African as a peasant producer rather than wage laborer. Rechenberg viewed the African peasant as no different than the East European peasant. Accordingly, his policy objective was to provide the African incentives to increase his indigenous production, to enter increasingly into the colonial monetary economy, and gradually to modify his production to satisfy German imperial interests in tropical exports. As the African peasant became "integrated" into the colonial economy, the rapidly increasing revenue from taxation and customs duties would pay for the colonies' economic growth and eliminate the necessity for German "subsidies."

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54. Ibid., p. 55.

Justification for this policy existed in economic developments among the African population in the northwest area of Tanzania around Lake Victoria. The area was stimulated by the new transportation network from the Lake to the coast, which the British Uganda Railway provided after its completion in 1901:<sup>55</sup>

Contemporary observers were astonished by its effects on the region.... As soon as transport linked them to a market, the peoples of this area began to expand their output of indigenous products and to sell their surplus crops to the Indian merchants of Mwanza and Bukoba, who exported them to the coast and thence to the Indian Ocean trading area.

Mwanza's exports rose in value in one year from £ 3,560 (71,185 Marks) in 1903 to £ 21,162 (423,246 Marks) in 1904, then jumped to £ 120,448 (2,408,965 Marks) by 1907. Just as important from the administration's view, Bukoba's hut tax revenue rose from Rs. 8,7000 in 1903 to Rs. 106,735 in 1906.<sup>56</sup>

Rechenberg sold this economic policy to Dernberg, the new Colonial Secretary, who was appointed in the fall of 1906 to develop a more progressive colonial policy and administration in the face of strong Reichstag criticism. As a result of his own observations and Rechenberg's effective argument, during an official visit to Tanzania in the fall of 1907, Dernberg had come to accept the

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55. Ibid., p. 71.

56. Ibid., p. 71.

necessity of an African policy:

I have gained the impression that East Africa's economy cannot be based on the activities of plantations and settlers...that this land must be developed through its indigenous products, through the natural experience of its native inhabitants, and that despite all solicitude for European capital, the development of the native economy is the surest way to free the German Empire from its subsidies and thus to open the way to a broadly designed colonial policy.

The Colonial Office proceeded initially to support African production over settler development for economic reasons. The Europeans were demanding a northern railway which would extend from the Tanga area to Kilimanjaro and on to Lake Victoria. This was rejected in favor of Rechenberg's Central Railway, which was to be extended through African areas to the Central Lakes. The Reichstag would not accept the subsidization from the German treasury which the northern railway would have required. The Colonial Office also refused to agree to settler demands that the colonial government provide them with a supply of African labor through additional tax and customs measures, official recruitment, and outright compulsion.

The settlers in Tanzania, as in Kenya, organized themselves under the pressures of a growing "labor shortage" and the anti-settler economic policy of the colonial government headed by Rechenberg. Threatened economically, they

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57. Letter by Dernberg, December 31, 1907, RKA 120/10-17, quoted in Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 92.

58. Ibid., p. 80-81.

organized with the long range objective of gaining self-government (Selbstverwaltung), or financial and administrative autonomy at the local and central levels of government.<sup>59</sup>

More immediately, they sought to acquire sufficient political influence to swing the weight of the colonial state behind European economic development at the expense of the African.

Settler and plantation development was dependent upon the exploitation of African labor and upon an active subsidization through the financial and technical resources of the colonial administration. The settlers, like their British counterparts, clearly recognized that both needs could be met only through the political instrument of the colonial government. Faced with the resistance and even hostility of the government, they turned to the metropole for support from the powerful and well-organized rightwing elements in Germany: the conservatives, nationalists, and economic imperialists. The timing was good, for these elements had just obtained a dominant position in German politics and in the Reichstag under the alliance of the "parties of order," as a result of the "Hottentot election" of January 1907.

The 1907 election suggests that Dernberg was appointed by the Bulow government as Colonial secretary, at full Ministerial level for the first time, for political reasons quite different than colonial reform. The imperial

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59. Ibid., p. 85-87.

government was unalterably opposed to the growing influence of Socialism within Germany and sought to crush it. The colonial issue led to a political crisis between 1905 and 1907, for it brought about a breakdown of the government's majority coalition in the Reichstag. Underlying this immediate issue was the growing political success of the Social Democrats and the deepening economic and social conflict within Germany. The government deliberately brought the political crisis to a head and exploited the colonial issue in the successful effort to win a more stable, conservative majority in a "nationalistic" campaign.<sup>60</sup> Dernberg became an important figure in the elections as he actively campaigned for the "parties of order" and stirred up nationalistic support championing colonial enterprise. In the process, he allied himself increasingly to the colonial organizations and did so on a program of economic imperialism rather than reform and economy in the colonies.<sup>61</sup>

The 1907 elections resulted in rightwing domination within the Reichstag and its Budget Commission, which had control over colonial finances and thus great influence upon colonial policy. It also created a sizeable colonial interest group within the Reichstag which actively promoted settler and plantation interests and a policy of

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60. Cf. Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Cambridge, 1955).

61. Ififfe, Tanganyika, p. 43-48.

economic imperialism against the African economic policy advocated by the colonial government.

The defeat of the African policy by imperial interest groups

From 1908 onward, the conflict between a settler and an African economic policy became increasingly clear. The German government first tried to cover over the conflict, then to work out a compromise policy. But it was forced to make concession after concession to the colonial interests as the price of maintaining its rightist "party of order" coalition on more important issues. The Colonial Office -- and Dernberg himself -- were oriented towards the view that colonial development and exploitation would be promoted best by large-scale capital investment and by private European enterprise. Dernberg was instrumental in obtaining considerable plantation investments as early as 1907.<sup>62</sup>

The ambivalence of the Colonial Office could be seen in the debate on policy in the budget session of February 1908.<sup>63</sup> Dernberg stressed that "the native is Africa's most valuable asset," in winning support for an African policy. He countered the demands of the settler organiza-

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62. Ibid., p. 78-81.

63. The quotes in the following paragraph of Dernberg during the debates on policy in the 1908 Budget Commission are from Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 90-91.

tion, the Northern League, by asserting the view that "we have not gone to East Africa to found plantations for three or four thousand people" and maintaining that "whoever goes out is welcome. He will be treated like anyone else, but he cannot be an object for special advantages." Yet he also maintained that German colonial rule existed in Tanzania "to make a vast country bloom, to find raw materials and create markets for German trade and industry." The German colonial role was portrayed as one which would generate large profits and great imperial benefits through systematic and large-scale economic exploitation. None of these were possible through an African policy based upon peasant production.

The railway construction program undertaken by the Germans after the rebellion indicates the growing dominance of European interest groups over colonial policy and the gradual formation of a settler export economy in spite of the colonial government's promotion of an economic system based on African production. The colonial government, with the support of the Colonial Secretary and the Ministry of Estimates, originally based its transport program on the construction of the Central railway to Taboro, with branches to the central lakes, Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria.<sup>64</sup> The program was designed to get around the

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64. This Central Railway program was "self-financing" and economical. It also allowed the colonial officials to avoid the obstacles in the Reichstag. Aside from the economic aspects, however, was the lure of the Mittelfrika policy. The central rail line would hold out the prospect of linking up economically with the Congo, and from there, to the German Kameruns. Eventually, it was hoped that the whole area would come under German political control as a vast German African empire.

refusal of the Reichstag to subsidize railway development. The Central railway network would be financed initially by a loan from the German government, but the loan would be serviced by the colonial government through the increased tax and customs revenue from the Africans who lived in the areas through which the railway would pass. The railway would stimulate African production and economic growth. The increased production for export in turn would provide the revenue for the railway construction. The program was "self-financing," or more plainly, railway development would take place at the direct expense of the African.

This program was quickly subverted. As construction took place, the lands along the rail line increased in value and attracted settlement. In Tanzania, as in Kenya, railway construction opened up the land for expropriation to settlers and planters as much as it promoted African economic development. Settlers in the northern area redoubled their pressures for the extension of the northern line to Moshi, Arusha, and eventually Lake Victoria in reaction to the colonial government's railway program. They gained the support of the more conservative Reichstag and forced through the Budget-Commission programs for the extension to Moshi by 1910 and to Arusha by 1912.<sup>65</sup> The railway program placed a heavy

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65. Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 102-103. Plans to extend the Northern railway from Arusha to Lake Victoria were prevented by World War I.

financial burden upon the colonial government; by 1914 thirty-two per-cent of local revenue was being used to service railway construction.<sup>66</sup> Most of this burden fell upon the African, who consistently provided around one-third of all government revenue from hut and poll taxes alone throughout these years.<sup>67</sup>

The main area of conflict, as Rechenberg had feared, was the issue of labor. Settlement, and plantation production in particular, demanded extensive labor which only the African could provide. Signs of this were clear in the labor "shortage" of 1906. The northeastern area had too small a population to meet the labor demands of the extensive settlement in the area. The solution was migrant labor from the interior African societies, the Nyamwezi and the Sukuma in particular. These were precisely the societies in which the colonial government was attempting to develop increased African production, not only of indigenous products but coffee and cotton export production also. The conflicting demands for African labor was clear, but the colonial government never confronted the problem.

Rechenberg was responsible for developing a systematic program of labor recruitment to meet the demands of the settlers and planters. This contradicted his African economic policy and his own opposition to settle-

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66. Ibid., p. 76.

67. Ibid., p. 162.

ment. The rationale for this was the correction of the worst of the existing abuses through the regulation of private recruitment. A contract system was established, after the model in neighboring Kenya.<sup>68</sup>

By 1914 a settler dominated agrarian export colony had been formed in Tanzania under German rule. In fact, the size of the settler community in Tanzania was larger than in Kenya at the time and because of its earlier start, was more successful financially.

It is notable that this formation occurred in spite of the efforts of a strong-willed colonial governor who did not believe in settler development and evolved his own strategy to promote an export economy based on African peasant production. In Kenya, on the other hand, settler development was given full support by the succession of colonial governors. This suggests that the role of the colonial officials within the colony was a secondary factor in the formation of the settler/<sup>dominated</sup> export economy.

The direction of development in Tanzania parallel to Kenya was to be fatally disrupted by World War I and the forceable "transfer" of colonial rule over Tanzania to Britain. It introduced a variation in Tanzania's development as a settler type colony which had important consequences for post-independence development in Tanzania.

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68. Ibid., p. 103.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE AGRARIAN SETTLER COLONY: KENYA AND TANZANIA UNDER BRITISH RULE, 1914-1945.

The economic and political rivalry between Britain and Germany was transformed into open warfare in World War I. The conquest of Tanzania and other German colonies by British forces allowed Britain to achieve several long-range objectives.<sup>1</sup> Stripped of its African empire, Germany was no longer able to exploit overseas tropical resources and was set back in its economic rivalry with Britain. The major portion of these colonies were incorporated into the British empire, through the device of League of Nations mandates, which gave Britain secure and privileged access to additional tropical resources and markets.<sup>2</sup>

1. Britain was involved, wholly or in part, in the military seizure of the German Cameroons, Southwest Africa, Togo, and Samoa, as well as Tanzania. The Cameroons and Togo were divided between the British and French, who joined with the British in the conquest. Southwest Africa was placed under the control of South Africa, which had provided the main military force for the conquest; this assured Britain future influence over the territory. Tanzania was divided with the Belgians, who obtained Ruanda and Burundi for their participation in the conquest of Tanzania.
2. Cf. William Roger Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914-1919 (Oxford 1967), on British planning during the war to obtain control or influence over the German colonies through the creation of a mandate system. The League mandate system, as it was devised, lent an air of disinterested "trusteeship," while providing control which differed little from that over the existing colonies.

The conquest of Tanzania was of particular importance strategically. It secured Britain's eastern flank to the dominions of Australia and New Zealand and to the empire in India and the east. Tanzania's harbors no longer could protect a hostile navy which could threaten both the Suez lifeline and the route around the Cape of Good Hope. The conquest also gave Britain control at last over Africa from Cape to Cairo. This achieved an objective of British imperialists which had been thwarted since the 1880's.<sup>3</sup>

In spite of the conquest, Tanzania and Kenya remained similar in one essential aspect. Both were settler agrarian or tropical export colonies. Kenya was an extreme type and Tanzania a variant. From World War I until after World War II British policy aimed primarily at the consolidation and development of this colonial formation.

The variation between the two colonies resulted from the extensive economic and social disruption of the conquest. During the initial occupation, the German settlers were expelled and their "enemy property" confiscated.<sup>4</sup> The poli-

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3. Aside from the failure to achieve this "Cape to Cairo route" due to the 1890 treaty with Germany, the "Heligoland Treaty," Britain also attempted to gain this goal through a treaty with King Leopold in 1894. Britain arranged to lease the Caprivi strip from the Belgium Congo, in exchange for an extension of the Congo's eastern border into the Sudan. German and French protest forced the nullification of this agreement. Cf. Ronald Robinson and Joan Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London 1961), pp. 330-346; William Roger Louis, Ruanda-Urundi (Oxford 1963), pp. 27-40.

4. Kenneth Ingham, "Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron, 1919-1931," in Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver, eds., History of East Africa, Volume II (Oxford 1965), pp. 552-553.

tical dominance of Tanzania's settler community was broken suddenly and was never restored. The seized lands were leased eventually to new settlers, Asian as well as European. This new settler population grew but remained a heterogeneous and much smaller community in which the British remained a small minority.<sup>5</sup> The settlers never regained the dominance which had existed under German rule and did not play a role anywhere near equivalent to that of the settlers in Kenya.

Faced with a devastated economy and broken settler community, the British were forced into a colonial policy based on African peasant production. African production of export cash crops was the only means the British had to reconstruct the colonial economy and recreate a "self-supporting" colony. The African population was spared the extreme form of exploitation which the Africans in Kenya suffered. Economic development through cash crop production was actively promoted, rather than suppressed, and the African peasant consequently had an alternative to working as a laborer for the European.

The conquest also led to the imposition of sub-imperialism by Kenya over Tanzania under the British. Kenya - and Nairobi - became the center of British imper-

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5. Africans obtained some of the ex-German plantations, in contrast to the racial restrictions against African land ownership in Kenya. The new settler community which developed also included Greeks, South Africans, Dutch, Germans, Swiss, Danish and Italians. Cf. R. W. James, Land Tenure and Policy in Tanzania (Nairobi 1971), p. 98 for a breakdown on the number of settler holdings and for acreage by nationality.

ialism throughout East Africa. Tanzania, and Uganda, became linked into a dependent or periphery relationship with Kenya, just as Kenya was forced into a similar relationship with the British Metropole.<sup>6</sup> Formal political union was frequently promoted during the inter-war years, but never implemented, due to Tanzania's mandate status. A practical economic union, however, was quickly established and operated as a drag on Tanzania's economic growth.

Kenya's development also was affected significantly by this new relationship. The sub-imperialist role benefited the settlers and planters, colonial officials, Asian middle strata, British investors and commercial interests. The long-range effect was adverse for the development of Kenya and its African population. A large administrative superstructure developed, mainly to serve the European community, which the colonial economy could not support alone. It was subsidized by Kenya's control over and profit from the East African harbor, rail and customs systems. The considerable amount of re-export "service" to Tanzania and land-locked Uganda obscured an unfavorable balance of trade. Capital investment and additional settlement was attracted primarily to Kenya, among the three East African colonies. This stimulated a degree of economic growth which otherwise would not have occurred. It also intensified the exploitation and disintegration of African society and intensified the underlying conflict between European and African. The sub-imperialist role buttressed an unstable internal situation.

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6. For the concept of the center-periphery relationship, see Raul Prebisch,

It hid the disastrous economic and social consequences of the heavy subsidization of the settlers and the oppression of the Africans. As a result, the British ignored the growing conflict within Kenya until the outbreak of revolt after World War II forced them to do so.

The British consolidated their systematic control within both colonies through the policy of "Indirect Rule".<sup>7</sup> Like the concept of trusteeship, indirect rule was a myth which provided a convenient cover for constructing a colonial system of dependency, exploitation, and underdevelopment. In theory, the policy respected and preserved traditional African social institutions. The stated objectives were African autonomy, self-rule, and self-development, along functionally more modern lines.

In practice, indirect rule was the creation of a system of bureaucratic control over the African, which converted the traditional leadership, the chiefs and headmen, into agents of the colonial rulers. The primary objective was "improving" the economic exploitation of the Africans, through the expansion of agrarian production, forcing out of wage labor, and collecting of taxes. Indirect rule was designed to promote economic expansion

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7. For an excellent study of British indirect rule, see Ralph A. Austin, "The Official Mind of Indirect Rule: British Policy in Tanganyika, 1916-1939," in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds., Britain and Germany in Africa (New Haven, 1967), pp. 577-606; also the same author's Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule (New Haven, 1968), pp. 147-233.

while at the same time repressing social and political change, for it was recognized that such changes would generate the demand for an end to colonial rule and would create the means to achieve this end.

The economic and political objectives of indirect rule were in fundamental conflict or contradiction. The policy led to the disintegration of the indigenous African social systems while preserving a hollow "traditional" shell. This disintegration was brought about by the forced penetration of the capitalist market economy into African society. As the mode of production within African society was gradually transformed, new social relationships were generated which were in conflict with the "traditional" political framework perpetuated by the colonial rulers and with the system of colonial rule itself. The colonial rulers could not prevent this underlying change which they generated; they could only retard and distort its development.

The depression of the 1930's and World War II delayed the emergence of the conflicts building within the two colonies. The delay only intensified the nature of these conflicts when they did break out openly after the war. This proved particularly so in Kenya, where the conflict between European and African led to military repression and open revolt. British policy not only obscured the basic conflict between European and African, but also obscured

the growing conflict within the class system emerging within African society and between different elements within the colonial ruling class. World War II brought these conflicts into the open. The underlying forces generated by the colonial system no longer could be contained by the colonial structure and policy which had been constructed during the formative period.

#### 1. World War I: The Decisive Factor in Colonial Development.

British imperial strategy at the outbreak of World War I was the seizure of as much of Germany's overseas empire as possible.<sup>8</sup> The settlers in Kenya strongly supported this strategy, for it promised to increase their dominant role within Kenya and to expand their influence throughout East Africa. The German government had written off the colonies in the advent of war with Britain. It clearly understood the reality of British dominance of the seas and the vulnerability of geographically separate, scattered and weak colonies.

Lettow-Vorbeck, the German military commander in Tanzania, accepted this reality and still managed to carry out a brilliant defensive military campaign for the four years of

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8. Louis, Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, Chapter one.

the war.<sup>9</sup> Using a mobile force and "bush" tactics, he kept the British constantly engaged and successfully avoided either defeat or capture. Lettow-Vorbeck surrendered only when the news of the Armistice in Europe was announced in 1918. At the height of the 1917 East African campaign, the German commander operated with only 275 European officers,<sup>10</sup> 16,000 African troops, and 4,000 African porters. In spite of a military force much smaller than the British, Lettow-Vorbeck was highly successful in his main objective. He was able to hold down and deny to the European front approximately 130 British officers and 300,000 European, Indian, and African troops.<sup>11</sup>

Lettow-Vorbeck's campaign was a pyrric "victory". It resulted in the devastation of the territory and heavy death tolls among the Africans of both Tanzania and Kenya. At the end of the full-scale British campaign in 1916 under the leadership of the South African general, Jan Smuts, the British had seized the main areas of Tanzania, which included approximately 85% of the land and 90% of the population. An occupying administration was set up over the German territory as it was conquered in order to restore economic production and pay for the cost of both the war and occu-

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9. For a summary of the war, see William Otto Henderson, "German East Africa, 1884-1918," in Harlow and Chilver, eds, History of East Africa, Volume II, pp. 155-159; and Kenneth Ingham, A History of East Africa, rev. ed. (New York, 1965), pp. 245-261.

10. Henderson, "German East Africa," p.156.

11. Ibid., p. 158.

pation. The British constructed a railway link in 1915 between the British Uganda railway and the German Tanga railway, from Voi to Taveta. The initial objective was the creation of a transport line to service the British attack in 1916 against the vital northeast settler area of Tanzania. After the conquest, the line served as a major means for the restoration of the devastated economy of the area. More importantly, the rail link became the primary instrument after the war in the British policy of subordinating Tanzania's economy to that of Kenya.

Europeans tend to evaluate the East African war in terms of the strategic and economic consequences for Britain and Germany. Yet the Africans were both the major instruments and victims of the conflict. African casualties were high and only a small portion resulted from actual battle. The major source of death came from miserable living conditions, official neglect, and rampant epidemics and disease during and after the war.<sup>12</sup> Prosecution of the war was utterly dependent upon portage by African carriers who suffered much more heavily than the troops did. The toll in the British Carrier Corps was officially listed as 366 dead from battle and 41,952 dead from disease, compared to armed forces casualties of 1,377 dead from battle and 2,923 dead from disease.<sup>13</sup>

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12. Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., and John Nuttingham, Myth of Mau Mau (New York, 1966), pp. 26-32.

13. Norman Leys, Kenya (London, 1925), p. 287.

The forced conscription of Africans as soldiers and porters, a particularly widespread abuse of the British, had even more devastating consequences for the societies from which they came. The British conscripted between 350,00 and 400,000 Africans for the war, some 150,000 to 200,000 of which came from Kenya.<sup>14</sup> The Kikuyu, Kamba, and Luo were the main victims of these forced levies. Whole districts were depopulated: an estimated 77% of able-bodied men in Machakos district; 75% in Kitui district; 92,906 men Nyanza.<sup>15</sup> Subsistence food production was severely disrupted. Famine followed and the weakened condition of the population made them highly susceptible to the severe influenza epidemics which appeared after the war ended and the remaining conscripts returned to their locations:<sup>16</sup>

Dr. John S. Arthur, in charge of the Church of Scotland Mission at Kikuyu and in command of the Mission Carrier Corps, reckoned the combined Kikuyu death roll from the war and from the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 at 120,000 in a population of less than one million. Dr. Philip of Tumutumu in Nyeri estimated that between November 1918 and January 1919 there were 17,000 deaths from influenza in Nyeri district alone.

The devastation and death brought to the Africans by this European war was not an unusual phenomenon nor can it be seen as a temporary and unavoidable product of warfare. It represented a continuation of a process initiated many decades earlier: the European stimulated slaving during

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14. Ibid., p. 31.

15. Rosberg and Nuttingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 28.

16. Ibid., p. 31.

the 19th. century; the early European penetration, pacification, and colonization by force; and the exploitation of the African through forced labor for the settlers, planters, and administrators. The heavy price the Africans paid for the imposition of "orderly rule" by the European imperialists in East Africa is brought home strikingly by the actual decline of the African population during this period. It has been estimated that the population levels in Kenya and Tanzania at the turn of the century were not regained until the mid-1920's.<sup>17</sup>

The war cut Tanzania off from the German metropole and revealed important characteristics of the colonial economy which was shaped by European imperialism. These characteristics applied equally as well to Kenya. The export of cash crops and import of foodstuffs and manufactured goods were cut off; the colony was forced into self-sufficiency. It was very successful in adapting to meet its basic needs until the British imposed its occupation over the main areas of the colony at the end of the 1916 campaign. The Germans reversed their emphasis upon cash crop production and promoted surplus food production by the African peasantry. Plantations were converted into the production of previously imported foods such as wheat and potatoes.<sup>18</sup> Embryo industries were

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17. Cf. Richard David Wolff, "Economic Aspects of British Colonialism in Kenya," unpublished dissertation, Yale University, 1963; and Report on the 1921 Census of the Native Population of the Tanganyika Territory (Dar es Salaam, 1921).

18. Henderson, "German East Africa," p. 160.

improvised to provide locally produced substitutes for such materials as quinine, cloth, clothing and bandages, footwear, and dyes.<sup>19</sup>

This brief period indicated the real possibilities of the development of an internally integrated economy and the ways in which colonial rule led instead to a distorted pattern of economic growth. Commercial traders created addependent market for German manufactures. Industrialists and financial investors promoted large-scale production of tropical exports to provide for the rapidly growing needs of German industries. Both economic forces operated to prevent an integrated and diversified agricultural and industrial development. They created an artificially dependent economy and laid the foundations for structural underdevelopment.

European settlers played an important role in this process. While the settler community was represented as "the engine of economic development" by the metropole governments, they actually functioned as catalytic agents in the formation of distorted economic growth and structural underdevelopment. Settlers created an immediate market for European goods and introduced artificial European values and needs into the colonial society. The settlers were an important instrument in the forceable wrenching of the African out of his own socio-economic framework and into the money and market economy imposed by the Europeans. A primary

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19. William Otto Henderson, Studies in German Colonial History (London, 1962), pp. 92-95; and Henderson, "German East Africa," p.160.

element in this settler role was the conditioning of the African to work as a wage laborer rather than as a self-producer.

The function of the settler community, and the equally important role of the Asian trader, help put such concepts as "dual society", "dual economy", and the "enclave theory" into proper perspective. These concepts were the expression of an ideological rhetoric which promised protection for the separate development of the African. They masked the reality of intensive and systematic exploitation of African society. As such, they were as much myths as the concepts of "trusteeship" and "indirect rule". The concepts were also a reflection of the resistance of African society to European efforts to penetrate and break down the self-producing and -sustaining African social system. The expropriation of African lands, appropriation of African labor, imposed tax collection, and the imposed market economy were essential aspects of European exploitation. They were in total conflict with the profession of respect for and promotion of separate African development.

The failure to carry out a clear policy of colonial development has often been noted.<sup>20</sup> This has been explained usually by stressing the absence at that time in the metropole of the concept and practice of government planning and organization of development. A policy of development, however, did exist. The problem is that the locus of the

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20. Cf. J. M. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government (Oxford, 1967), pp. 1-32.

policy was not within the colony but in the relationship between the colony and the metropole.

The colony was subordinated to the metropole, through the instrument of the state apparatus, the colonial administration. Economic surplus created within the colony was appropriated and funneled off in the form of bank deposits, dividends, expanded sales and industrial production, and increased jobs for Europeans. The economic surplus was not invested back into the colony's productive system, particularly its industrial development. This process indicates the extent to which the economic development of the colony was in conflict with and subordinated to the economic development of the metropole.

To the extent economic surplus was reinvested in the colony, it was limited generally to the development of the colonial infrastructure. Harbors were developed, railways and roads extended, and technical services expanded. This development served the settler sector, primarily, and the major objective was the expansion of the economic surplus which could be syphoned off in the future.

Petty commodity trade, which had existed within Tanzania and Kenya at the time of the early European penetration, was either destroyed or gradually supplanted by Asian and European trade monopolies.<sup>21</sup> The indigenous African trade was based

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21. H. Fearn, An African Economy (London, 1961), p. 27-32; and Edward Alpers, "The Coast and the Development of the Caravan Trade," in I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, eds., A History of Tanzania (Nairobi, 1969), p. 48-56.

upon local domestic industries which were also destroyed and replaced with imported European manufactures. Cotton and cloth production on the coast and the production of hoes by the Yao within the interior of Tanzania were important examples of this process.<sup>22</sup> Capitalist penetration under imperialism did not stimulate the development of an indigenous market economy or the transformation of domestic craft production into a more advanced industrial stage. Rather it operated to destroy the very basis for these economic developments.

2. The Reinforcement of Settler Dominance in Kenya and its Isolation within East Africa.

World War I firmly established the supremacy of British colonial rule throughout East Africa. The conquest and incorporation of Tanzania into British East Africa, however, destroyed whatever possibilities existed historically for the formation of permanent and autonomous White rule in East Africa along the South African model. Ironically, the same conquest revived the fantasy of a vast British "Dominion" throughout southern and eastern Africa.

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22. O. F. Raum, "German East Africa: Changes in African Tribal Life under German Administration, 1892-1914," in Harlow and Chilver, History of East Africa, II, pp. 192-193; Ingham, A History of East Africa, pp. 195-224.

The conquest and expulsion of the German settler community did more than break up the settler dominance within Tanzania. It led to the supplanting of settler interests by metropole corporate interests, with which they were in conflict. Future British settlement in East Africa was attracted mainly to Kenya, because of the economic devastation from the war, the subsequent economic subordination of Tanzania to Kenya, and the uncertainties concerning Tanzania's future status during the 1930's after Hitler's rise to power in Germany. Unlike Kenya, the colonial administration which developed in Tanzania did not identify its interests so totally with the settler population and was not dominated by them.

While the war reinforced the dominance of the settler community in Kenya, the developments it caused in Tanzania left the Kenya settlers isolated within the colony and thwarted their hopes of expanding their dominance throughout East Africa. The consolidation of the settler position in Kenya meant that the underlying conflict between settler and metropole corporate interests took a much longer time to emerge and be resolved in favor of the latter. It took the "Mau Mau" revolt of the mid-1950's and the re-imposition of British military occupation for this resolution to occur. The delay, in comparison to Tanzania, was an important factor in the deterioration of conditions in Kenya to the point of open revolt.

The isolation of the settler community in Kenya meant its inevitable doom as a settler colony. Settlement was based solely on agrarian export production. There were built-in geographic and economic restrictions upon the future expansion of settlement and therefore upon the economic growth of the colony as long as the economy remained based predominantly upon settler production. Only the African had the potential for creating the expanding production and export of tropical crops which was the major interest of the British imperial system. And only the African population represented a potentially large-scale market for manufactured goods.

The failure to discover and develop an extraction industry in Kenya and Tanzania, in contrast to South Africa and Rhodesia, was crucial for the fate of the settler colony. It eliminated the one other dynamic which might have created a European community with sufficient class diversity and a large enough population to be self-sustaining and to seize political independence.<sup>23</sup>

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23. The comparison with Rhodesia and Zambia reinforces this view. The development of an extraction industry in Zambia - in contrast to Rhodesia - did not take place to any significant extent until after World War II. The effect of this on the formation of a viable white ruling society is clear, as seen in the following population figures obtained from L.H. Gann and P.

The size and position of the Asian "immigrant" community in East Africa played an important and contradictory role among the historic forces that determined the fate of the settler colony.<sup>24</sup> The British were dependent heavily upon these British "subjects" as the direct agents in the economic penetration and the imposition of a capitalist market economy within the African society.

As petty shopkeepers and traders, the Asians served a crucial function in the creation of systematic exploitation of the African at the grassroots level. This was a function that the European colonist was either unwilling or unable to play. The Asians served this function so well during the colonial formative period that they quickly rose to form a middle stratum in the colonial "class" hierarchy.

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Duignan, White Settlers in Tropical Africa (Penguin, 1962), p.159-167.

<u>year</u>	<u>Rhodesia</u>	<u>Zambia</u>	<u>Kenya</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>
1911	23,606	1,497	3,175	5,336
1921	33,620	3,634	9,651	2,447 <sup>a</sup>
1931	49,910	13,846	16,812	8,228
1946	82,386	21,907	24,900	
1951	136,017	37,221	38,600	
1956	178,000	66,000	57,700	20,200
1960	223,000	76,000	67,000	22,300

a. Decrease resulted from World War I.

The earlier and more extensive settlement in Rhodesia led to the development of a viable settler society within the overall social system and one diversified enough and with sufficient basis of power to establish its autonomy. The basis was the development of a rudimentary industrial sector during the war period, along with the growing subordinate tie to the more developed South African society. Industrialization in Zambia, in contrast, developed during the post-war period within a time of mounting African nationalism and the presence of a predominantly ex-patriate rather than settler white community.

24. Dharam Ghai, ed., Portrait of a Minority: Asians in East Africa (Nairobi, 1965).

Consequently, the Asians came to monopolize permanently the middle level in the commercial and administrative hierarchy within Tanzania and Kenya. They became the immediate barrier to the social and economic development of the African for they preempted the positions and functions the Africans otherwise could have moved into.<sup>25</sup> This in turn became a barrier to the development of the African as a political threat to European political control. The economic and administrative dependency of the British upon the Asian contrasted strongly with the development of the settler colonies in southern Africa.

From the perspective of British imperialists, the Asians played a positive role in the economic exploitation and consolidation of political rule during the early colonial period, but became a regressive and conflict-laden element at a later stage. The functions performed by the Asians prevented the formation of European middle and working classes. The petty bourgeois and skilled worker positions were monopolized by the Asians at wage levels lower than the Europeans would accept. These positions were turned into racial categories which the Europeans came to consider

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25. The immediate and direct role of the Asians made them the primary object of African antagonism and conflict, which was to the advantage of the European colonial rulers. This difference in attitude towards Asians and Europeans still exists, in spite of the greater ownership and controls over the economy by Europeans. See Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic inequalities in Kenya," Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, No. 4 (December, 1969), pp. 702-703.

beneath them and refused to compete for.<sup>26</sup> While the Asian community functioned to exploit the African and to block African development, it also served in the long run to block the formation of a European community large and viable enough to seize independence.

This development was not foreseen by the majority of settlers in Kenya during and immediately following World War I, although it was feared by a few of the more discerning, like Lord Delamere.<sup>27</sup> The settlers generally saw the war as increasing their already substantial dominance within Kenya and as opening up Tanzania in addition to their control.

The success with which the settlers expanded their power within Kenya during the war and the 1920's gave them every reason to have confidence.<sup>28</sup> A major source of this power developed from the War Council which was established in 1915 and which was responsible not only for mobilizing Kenya for the war but also for formulating post-war economic policy.

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26. A good description of this development of European attitudes is Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya, 2nd. ed. (London, 1953), volume I, pp. 64-65; Volume II, pp. 110-139.
27. George Bennett, Kenya, A Political History: The Colonial Period (London; 1963), p. 60 indicates awareness of this on the part of Delamere and particularly by Governor Grigg, who strongly pushed for "closer settlement" and creating a community of all classes which would end European dependence.
28. In July 1920 the colony's status officially changed from East Africa Protectorate to Kenya colony. This the settlers had long wanted; they believed it improved the prospects Kenya'd develop along the crown colony pattern to self-government under their rule.

Three out of the nine members of the War Council were settlers and "though only advisory, its almost daily meetings soon gave it a power and influence which was virtually executive."<sup>29</sup> This executive role in the government was made permanent after the war. Due to settler pressures, the British acceded to the appointment of two settler representatives on the Executive Council as 'compensation' for the loss of executive membership with the disbanding of the War Council at the end of the war.<sup>30</sup>

The settlers also exploited the urgent need of the government for settler cooperation and support during the war to achieve elective representation in the Legislative Council. The settlers had boycotted the Legislative Council from 1913 to 1917 over this very demand. With the support of the colonial government, the settlers obtained approval from the Colonial Office in 1916 to the establishment of elective representation. The colonial ordinance of 1919 established 11 electoral districts for the settlers and gave them 11 representatives, against token nominated representation for the Asian community and the appointment of a European, usually a missionary or retired government official, to "represent" African interests.<sup>31</sup>

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29. Bennett, Kenya, p. 38.

30. Ibid., p. 42.

31. George Bennett, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya up to 1945," in Harlow and Chilver, eds., History of East Africa, II, pp.289-291. Also, M. R. Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, 2nd. ed. (New York, 1966), pp. 47-51.

The settlers used their increased political position within the government to promote greater British immigration and settlement. Their efforts reflected a strong concern over their vulnerability due to their small numbers. The objective was achieved partially through their dominance over two important commissions created during the war, the Land Settlement Commission and the Economic Commission.

The Land Settlement Commission was created to implement a soldiers settlement scheme following the war.<sup>32</sup> Under the scheme, ex-servicemen and officers were provided land and aid in developing small estates. The scheme appealed to the colonial government because it hoped that experiments with flax growing on the soldiers settlements would solve one of the government's major concerns. Flax production, it was hoped, would prove to be the cheap, easily produced crop they were looking for upon which to base small-scale settlement which would be economically successful rather than dependent upon subsidization as previous settlement had been. The hope turned out to be allusory. Flax at the time had an unusually high world market price because of the war. Several years later the price plummeted, most of the smaller soldiers settlement farms failed, and plans

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32. W. M. Ross, Kenya from Within (London, 1927), pp. 81-83.

for extensive small-scale settlement were discouraged.<sup>33</sup>

The Economic Commission was the second and more important of the commissions through which the settlers dominated future economic policy. Not surprisingly, its 1919 report strongly supported every major settler position on colonial policy, for its membership was only two officials and five settlers, including the two major settler leaders, Delamere and Grogan.<sup>34</sup> The Economic Commission also emphasized government subsidization of additional White settlement.

It recommended that land for this purpose be obtained through the expropriation of additional territory from the African reserves, which had only recently been established officially in the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance but which had not as yet been surveyed for "permanent" boundaries. The expropriation was carried out for the creation of the Soldiers Settlement Scheme. This action intensified the strong fear and insecurity among the Africans and clearly signaled that they could not count on any protection from colonial laws.

The land expropriations which occurred after the war took place at a time when over-population was already clearly

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33. C. C. Wrigley, "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life, 1902-1945," in Harlow and Chilver, eds., History of East Africa, II, pp. 233-235. Post-war settlement schemes led to the future expropriation of 4,560 square miles of land in the highlands; Cf. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 33. Much of this land was taken from the African reserves which had recently been established. For example, an additional one-hundred square miles of Nandi territory was expropriated at this time; Cf. Ross, Kenya from Within, p. 81.

34. Marjorie Ruth Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, 2nd. ed., (New York, 1966), pp. 56-57; Bennett, Kenya, p. 43.

beginning to happen in the reserves. The settlers saw this action as necessary to counter-act the acute labor shortage which they experienced again in the post-war period. This "shortage" was the result of the high number of deaths from the war and war-related epidemics, famine, and decline of subsistence production.

The indirect pressures of the war which led to the sudden availability of African labor were gone. The colonial government had cooperated with the settlers during the war by the forceable conscription first of all of those Africans who were not employed by Europeans.<sup>35</sup> The collaboration of settlers and government officials on a system of labor measures was highly successful during the 1920's. From 1924 onward, the shortage of African labor was eliminated.<sup>36</sup>

The commission also recommended and the government implemented a wide variety of economic measures designed to subsidize the development of the settler sector. Harbors, railways, and roads were expanded and improved. The government developed a more elaborate network of agricultural, technical and research services which already served the settler community almost exclusively. Tax, customs, education, marketing and other laws were constructed to benefit the Europeans, and the Asians secondarily, at the expense of the African. A major element

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35. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," p.159.

36. Ibid., p.164-66 and Chapter 7, passim; Dilley, British Policy, p. 222-38.

among these measures was the establishment of protective tariffs to subsidize the uneconomic settler production of wheat, milk and dairy products, and wool and mutton products.<sup>37</sup>

These measures paved the way for an even greater system of protective subsidies during the depression of the 1930's, which aimed at preventing the settlers from going bankrupt.<sup>38</sup> While these measures protected the settler sector, they also promoted agrarian development, discouraged industry, and prevented the development of an integrated economy. Both the labor and agricultural policies were characteristics of the system of structural underdevelopment being created under colonial rule.

The economic depression of the early 1920's generated strong economic pressures for the harsh labor laws and extensive subsidization of the settler sector. The post-war commodity boom collapsed. The world market price for coffee dropped from £150 a ton in early 1920 to £60 only a year later. Sisal plunged from £96 to £12.10s. a ton.<sup>39</sup> The collapse of world market prices hit the settlers at a time when they were heavily in debt due to widespread borrowing from the banks in order to carry them through the economic disruption of the war period.

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37. Wrigley, "Kenya; Patterns of Economic Life," pp. 236-237.

38. Ibid., pp. 247-250; also Masao Yoshida, "The Protected Development of European Agriculture before the Second World War," East African Journal of Rural Development, II, No. 2 (1969), pp. 76-102.

39. Ibid., pp. 234-235.

The settler community had become heavily dependent upon utilizing the power and resources of the state to ensure its own survival. The economic disruption of the war, the following economic depression, and the measures undertaken to counter these conditions clearly indicate the nature of this dependency. The rapid expansion of the political role of the settlers shows what a powerful force they had become within the colony. It also indicates the dependency of the colonial administration upon the settler community for the continued functioning of the colonial system.

The major difference of the post-war from the pre-war period was that the settlers no longer were a strong pressure group outside the government but played a regular role within the governmental process. "Government by agreement" was the euphemism by which this political development was most commonly described. <sup>40</sup> Officials "consulted" with the settler representative and modified their proposed policies to suit the settler views before the formal introduction of bills within the Legislative Council. Much more than consultation was involved. The settler community gained the power of veto over policies and practices which they opposed; they were assured of a practical political monopoly among the conflicting groups within the colony. Besides the exercise of a veto, the settlers gained a preponderance within the working committees which formulated colonial policies and

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40. Bennet, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya," pp. 296-332; Dilley, British Policy, p. 54, passim, particularly on taxation and labor policies.

ordinances. This insured that colonial programs were created and implemented along lines which served their vested interests.

Organized political protest broke out within the African population and the Asian community during 1921 -22 in reaction to the above war and post-war events. The greatest African political activity took place among the Kikuyu, who had suffered the greatest contact and disruption from European colonization and settlement.

The Kikuyu Association(KA) was formed late in 1919 by the more traditional and conservative figures within Kikuyu society, the chiefs and headmen.<sup>41</sup> Their concerns were limited and conservative. They mainly sought to defend the traditional Kikuyu lands. The renewed expropriation of African land after the war led them to form a European-type political organization for the first time in the effort to prevent further expropriation and to seek the restoration of previously "stolen" lands. The political activity of these African agents of the colonial administration was generated by grassroots pressures which resulted from the emergence of population pressures within the reserve.

Of greater political importance was the creation of the East African Association(EAA) in 1919, under the leadership of Harry Thuku, a younger, European-educated Kikuyu who

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41. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 41-43.

worked as a clerk in communications within the Treasury Department in Nairobi, the main center of growing African political activity.<sup>42</sup> While the EAA had a mixed ethnic membership, it was dominated by a younger generation of Kikuyu, like Thuku, who were less tied to the traditional social system, had some degree of European education, and who were employed in various capacities within the European economic and administrative structure.

The EAA represented a much more extensive and critical political protest than the KA. It protested the exploitation of the African as laborers as well as the land issue. The repressive measures of the 1915 Native Registration Ordinance were a particular focus of their protest, especially the Kipande, the fingerprinted identification card which all male Africans were forced to have. Adapted from the South African system, the kipande included an employment record and listed all legal offenses, including the failure to complete "work contracts". The kipande provided a system of identification, control, and punishment over the African laborers and served mainly to provide a large and quiescent labor force for European employment.<sup>43</sup> The EAA also protested the increased economic exploitation which was caused by the depression. The hut and poll taxes were nearly doubled while a settler-initiated and government-enforced cut by one-third in wages

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42. Ibid., pp. 36-44.

43. Wolff, "Economic Aspects," p.152.

took place as part of the effort to shift the burden of the depression to the African wage laborer.<sup>44</sup>

During 1922, the EAA was very successful in politicizing at the grassroots level and in expanding its organization through mass rallies.<sup>45</sup> The sudden political activity was threatening to the control of the chiefs and to the colonial administration which depended on maintaining its domination through these chiefs and headmen. When the EAA attempted to bypass the colonial government and appeal directly to the Colonial Office through a strongly worded petition, the government moved to break the EAA.<sup>46</sup> Thuku was fired from his job, then arrested and jailed in Nairobi, and finally deported to the town of Kismayu, where he was kept under house arrest until the early 1930's. The reason given was that Thuku was "dangerous to peace and good order"; the actual cause was his success in political organizing, his public assertion that colonial rule was a state of slavery imposed upon the Africans by the European, and the belief that removal of the political leadership would end the political "agitation".<sup>47</sup> A

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44. Bennett, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya," p. 293.
45. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 44-49. The organizing took place mainly in Kikuyuland. It did so initially under a cover organization, the Young Kikuyu Association (YKA), in order to appeal more effectively to the Kikuyu population against the KA of the chiefs.
46. Quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 48. It is significant that at this early stage one of the political demands was to allow "natives to purchase land throughout their country."
47. Bennett, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya," pp. 293-294.

large-scale strike and protest demonstration was organized by the EAA while Thuku was held in the Nairobi prison. The demonstration was crushed by force, as the police fired upon the thousands of protestors, killing over fifty, and then arrested the remaining leadership of the EAA. The EAA subsequently declined as an active political organization.<sup>48</sup>

Equally important, the administration took measures against Kikuyu efforts to link up with other African ethnic groups and to organize on a territorial and proto-nationalist basis.<sup>49</sup> Thuku and the EAA made contact with the Kamba and were instrumental in the organizing of a parallel political group, the Young Kavirondo Association (YKA) among the next largest African societies, the Luo and Baluhya.<sup>50</sup> The missionaries, and Archdeacon Owen in particular, were important agents of the government in the effort to divide the different African societies and to divert organized political activities into "developmental" efforts. Owen, with full government support, used his influence among the Africans to transform the YKA into the Kavirondo Taxpayers' Welfare Association in 1923.<sup>51</sup> Every effort was made to buttress the

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48. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 49-54.

49. Ibid., pp. 36, 55-60.

50. Ibid., pp. 47, 55-64, 90. Mass meetings and protests took place in Nyanza in 1921-1922 over the same issues of the EAA.

51. Ibid., pp. 90-91. Also, see J. M. Lonsdale, "Archdeacon Owen and the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association," Proceedings of the Conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, 1963.

control of the more compliant traditional leadership over the Luo and Baluhya and to refocus African activities into "responsible" areas of local "improvement". Stress was placed upon the promotion of "civilized" or European appearance and living conditions, improved agricultural practices and cash crop production, and local participation politically in the Native Councils and Treasuries that the colonial administration had created and controlled.

Asian political protest during the 1920's has received greater attention until recently than African political activities.<sup>52</sup> Asian political organizations were larger, more effectively organized, and used all the established European political techniques with sophistication. Asian political organizations also had the support of important elements in India and were able therefore to wield significant influence within the British metropole.

The Asians protested the growing and racially based system of economic and political restrictions which the settlers were able to impose as a result of the expansion of settler political dominance. These restrictions included: strict segregation of businesses and residences in the townships; an almost total restriction of Asian purchase or leasing of farming or grazing lands; a greater restriction of Asian immigration into East Africa; and the denial of any real political role .

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52. Dilley, British Policy, pp. 141-178; also, Huxley, White Man's Country, II, pp. 126-66.

Asian political activities were particularly disturbing to the British because they couldn't be crushed summarily, unlike the African political movement. The Asians had the money and political connections to undertake a political campaign within Great Britain about conditions in Kenya. They created a political issue which British officials could not keep hidden from the public and could not ignore. The issue was particularly embarrassing to the government because the campaign was conducted in terms of British political values: equal rights for "equally civilized" peoples.

The British officials did not consider the Indians to be equal to Europeans and had no intention of giving way to the major Asian demands, given the conflict between the settler and Asian communities in Kenya. The violence of settler opposition prevented the British government from applying even their usual form of "compromise" on minor issues. In addition to sending formal protest and a delegation to Britain, the settlers plotted to kidnap the governor and take over the colony by force if necessary to preserve their privileged position.<sup>53</sup>

The British established a formal resolution of this explosive situation in the White Paper of July 1923, the Devonshire Report. The policy statement evaded the real

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53. Rösberg and Nottingham, *Myth of Mau Mau*, pp. 64-68. See also Huxley, *White Man's Country*, II, pp. 126-166, and Robert G. Gregory, *Sidney Webb and East Africa: Labour's Experiment with the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy* (Berkeley, 1962).

issues and conflicts in Kenya through the assertion that "primarily Kenya is an African territory....The interests of the African natives must be paramount." This reassertion of the British "trust" was immediately qualified by the statement that "obviously the interests of the other communities, European, Indian, and Arab, must severally be safeguarded."<sup>54</sup> On paper, the British rejected the demands of both the settlers and Asians, in favor of the rights of the African population. And it attempted to promote the image of the British government as playing the role of impartial arbiter who would protect the rights and interests of each group. In reality, the political dominance of the settlers remained and so did their privileged economic and social position.

The Devonshire Report of 1923 was not the turning point in Kenya's colonial development that has frequently been suggested. It did not lead to a reassertion of control by the British Colonial Office over the settler community nor did it mark a reawakening of British concern or "trusteeship" for the African population.<sup>55</sup> On the contrary, events during the inter-war period show a continuation of the pattern which marked the years immediately before and after World

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54. Indians in Kenya: A Memorandum, cmd. 1922 (1923), p.9.

55. According to Bennett, Governor Grigg submitted a memorandum to the Colonial Office and to influential people outside the government while in London in March, 1927. In it, Grigg supported European demands in Kenya for an unofficial majority in the Legislature. Colonial Grigg maintained, according to Bennett, "that the position of the 1923 White Paper, trusteeship for the native races as an Imperial responsibility which could neither be delegated nor shared, was untenable through the influence of the settlers in Kenya; it had, in fact, already been given up." See Bennett, Kenya, p. 60.

War I. Even though the settlers did not achieve their objective of internal self-government, they obtained the functional equivalent. A growing consolidation and institutionalization of settler dominance within the state apparatus occurred during this period. This power was used to increase their privileged economic position. In the process, the African population was restricted and exploited in an increasingly systematic fashion.

The colonial officials and British Colonial Office collaborated with the settlers in this development, behind the facade of trusteeship and the official policy of the paramountcy of African interests. In the name of "good government" and colonial development, the British sought to depoliticise the colonial situation, but the suppression of political activity applied to the Africans and Asians only. Metropole interests were tied to the evolution of Kenya as a settler colony, even though differences did exist between the fundamental interests of the settler community and basic British interests. These differences did not emerge into open conflict until the 1950's, when the widespread resistance and revolt of the Africans forced the British to do so.

3. Reconstruction in Tanzania and the Dependency upon African Production.

The British were totally preoccupied in Tanzania with the reconstruction of the economy and the establishment of political control from 1918 to 1924, in contrast to the rapid political consolidation and economic expansion which was taking place in Kenya.<sup>56</sup> The new - British - colonial government was not faced with just the replacement of a German administration with British officials, but with recreating an administrative system throughout the territory which largely had broken down. They had to reconstruct an economy which lay devastated from the war. German farms and plantations were seized as "enemy property" and the government had to devise methods for the transfer of these lands into new settler hands and get them producing again. Throughout the major part of the territory, African societies had reverted to self-sufficient subsistence production. A primary task of the new administration was restoring the market economy, which the Germans had imposed over the African population. All these tasks were oriented towards the one major objective: the establishment of a "self-supporting" colony through the restoration and expansion of the agrarian export production.

These tasks were complicated by legal uncertainties over Tanzania's status. The Mandate system, which was established

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56. Ingham, "Tanganyika: Mandate and Cameron," pp. 547-562.

under the League of Nations in 1919, was designed loosely enough to give Britain a free rein in Tanzania and its other mandated territories. The British government proceeded to pass the Tanganyika Order in Council of July 1920, which formally established the crown colony pattern in Tanzania. It provided for an administration which did not differ in any respect from Britain's other colonial possessions.<sup>57</sup>

The burden of reconstruction fell upon the African population. Some of the first regulations passed by the new government were tax, labor, and tariff laws which would provide the African labor and revenue required for the both reconstruction and the regular functioning of the colony.<sup>58</sup> The British government required the colony - and therefore the African population - to pay for the expense of conducting the war against the Germans in East Africa, for the costs of of military occupation,<sup>59</sup> for the restoration of rail, road, and other infrastructure destroyed or badly run-down due to the war, and for the establishment

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57. B. T. G. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (London, 1961), pp. 39-41, 48-60.
58. Ingham, "Tanganyika: Mandate and Cameron," pp. 52-59. These regulations included the Native Authority Ordinances of 1921 and 1922, the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1923, the establishment of a tariff system in January 1923 following the creation of a customs department in June 1922, and the hut and poll taxes established in 1923.
59. Ibid., p. 47. Three Battalions of Kings African Rifles were garrisoned in Tanzania, at a cost of £ 240, 000 a year, an expense charged to the colony from February 1919 onward.

of administrative and technical services.<sup>60</sup> The colonial government turned to the promotion of African export crop production to generate the revenue the Africans required to pay the recently imposed taxes and to revive Tanzania's import-export trade. Essentially, reconstruction differed little from the pattern of Kenya during the imposition of colonial rule at the turn of the century.

Economic necessity forced the British to turn to peasant production as the primary basis of the colonial economy. The shattered settler economic sector could not serve this function. The British were able to build upon existing peasant production which the Germans had developed in Tanzania in contrast to the British in Kenya. The regions the British focused on as most promising were the same ones the Germans had stressed: the cotton growing areas on the coast and at Mwanza on Lake Victoria; the coffee producing areas of the northwest and Kilimanjaro; and the groundnuts producing areas of the southeast and the territory of the Nyamwezi.

Coffee production by the Chagga in Kilimanjaro had started early under German rule. Its production had died out due to the opposition of German settlers who also produced coffee, official "neglect", and the absence of a market. The British

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60. The British obtained a number of immediate economic benefits from the conquest and mandate arrangement. The previous public debt was voided; they obtained the Central railway for the nominal sum of £ 33, 995; and additional revenue was obtained by auctioning all the lands seized as "enemy property." Ibid., p.549.

official posted to Kilimanjaro as a district officer was aware of past coffee production by the Chagga. Faced with administrative pressures to generate tax revenue, a money economy, and export crop production by the Africans, the D.O. played an instrumental role in rejuvenating Chagga coffee growing. By 1924 a large, high quality crop was being produced; eventually, the first African cooperative society was formed among the Chagga with the encouragement of the same D.O.<sup>61</sup>

This process among the Chagga illustrates several important points about agrarian production among the Africans under colonial rule. The rapid growth and improvement of production came about because the British were dependent upon African production. The receptivity of the Africans to new modes of production was influenced greatly by favorable conditions and the introduction of more modern agricultural practices took place when they obtained clear benefits without strong disruption of their existing economic system. The contrast in Tanzania between production under German rule, when a powerful settler community existed, and after the war when this settler community was broken, and the contrast with Kenya, where the powerful settler community brought about the prohibition of coffee and other cash export crops, shows what a critical factor European settlement was for African development.

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61. The official was Charles Dundas. See his book, Charles Dundas, African Crossroads (London, 1955), pp. 123-125. Also, Katherine Stahl, History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro (The Hague, 1954).

Generally in Tanzania, economic conditions alone were not favorable enough to generate a significant degree of African export production. Consequently, the British turned to the use of force in many areas. "Forceful measures" were used in the northwest to revive coffee production; these measures included the frequent beatings of chiefs and peasants.<sup>62</sup> The harshness with which production was forced upon the Africans is indicated by the rapid rise of African production: coffee production increased in value from £138,867 in 1920 to £352,529 in 1924; cotton from £164,565 to £373,753; ground-nuts from £78,522 to £359,918.<sup>63</sup> Economically, the colonial measures were a success, for coffee exports from Bukoba in 1919 were five times the highest pre-war figure.<sup>64</sup>

The fluctuations of the capitalist world market were a primary factor in creating unfavorable conditions and in leading the British to the continual use of force. The depression of the early 1920's "discouraged" the Haya. The British attempted to compensate for low export prices by intensifying their efforts to increase production. "The resulting reluctance of Haya coffee growers to exert themselves for an insecure return could only be overcome by the administration with methods of extreme compulsion."<sup>65</sup>

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62. Ralph A. Austen, Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule: Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939 (New Haven, 1968), p. 126.

63. Ingham, "Tanganyika," p. 562.

64. Austen, Northwest Tanzania, p. 126 and table on p. 270. The increase was from 402 to 2,042 tons of coffee.

65. Ibid., p. 137.

The British recreated the German system of rule, based on a highly centralized government and the Akida system, as the simplest and most effective way to reconstruct the colony.<sup>66</sup> They did so in spite of war-time propaganda which condemned these very features as proof of the German's moral failure as colonizers and as justification for the British takeover of rule.<sup>67</sup> The British government retained the German administrative structure of twenty-two districts. The District Officer in each district reported directly to the governor and each was closely supervised in turn by the central government.

The British had condemned particularly the Akida system as the root cause of German "misgovernment". Far from eliminating this system, the British went much further than the Germans in ignoring traditional African leaders and imposing Ganda as well as Arab agents as local British administrators over the African societies.<sup>68</sup> In imposing their control, the British disrupted the African societies much more thoroughly and intensively than the Germans had ever done.<sup>69</sup>

The rule of the British as newcomers and the various needs - particularly economic - of the first years of occupation created an atmosphere encouraging an often abrupt, direct, and total intervention in African affairs. Institutions and relationships

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66. Ingham, "Tanganyika," p.551.

67. Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, Chap. 1.

68. Austen, Northwest Tanzania, pp. 130-131.

69. Ibid., p. 132.

previously left more or less at peace by the Germans were now to be vigorously reshaped and adopted to ends dictated by the administration.

British corporate, settler and commercial interests were eager to obtain privileged positions and to exploit this newly accessible territory in the empire. They strongly opposed the Governor's "bias" toward the African and his delay in establishing economic policies which would open up Tanzania to British exploitation on as favorable terms as existed in neighboring Kenya.<sup>70</sup> The main issue was land. The administration adopted a temporary policy of leasing the land seized from German settlers and planters on a yearly basis only. A permanent policy had to wait until the government obtained a legal determination on this property and gained sufficient information on existing land rights to form a comprehensive land law.

British firms and settlers were impatient with this delay and pressed for immediate freehold purchase or long-term leases.<sup>71</sup> The sisal plantations were already cleared and planted and the sisal market price was still high in 1919. The purchase or rental of these plantations at low prices represented an investment which would be highly profitable to them. They were not willing to risk such an investment on the basis of yearly leasing. Freehold purchase and long-term leasing were not established until the 1923 Land Ordinance. By that time the depression

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70. Ingham, "Tanganyika," pp. 552-556.

71. Ibid., pp. 552-553. The issue over the sisal plantations is included there.

was in full swing, the market price of sisal had dropped badly, and most purchasers were no longer interested.

British occupation immediately raised the prospect of basic conflict between settler and African over the issues of land and labor. The attitude of the British settler and investor was a familiar one, for it did not differ at all from the experience in Kenya. This attitude was clearly reflected in their protest over a speech by the Governor to the East African section of the London Chamber of Commerce, in which he asserted that Tanzania's future lay in the development of African cultivation:<sup>72</sup>

They were convinced that such measures [promotion of African smallholder cultivation] could never produce the wealth which, as the Germans had demonstrated, could be obtained from plantation-grown sisal and coffee. Even to accept the principle that Africans should grow economic crops was not without its dangers, they argued, since the tribes most likely to produce the best results from peasant cultivation were the ones most suited to provide the labor force essential to successful plantation development.

The colonial government was not in basic opposition to European settlement. Far from it. Both the Colonial Office and the colonial officials persisted in their belief that large-scale metropole investment and settlement was the best way to promote economic exploitation and growth within the colony. But the colonial administration was concerned to avoid uneconomic and unstable "experiments" in European settlement. This was seen

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72. Ibid., p. 554. Bennet is summarizing the attitudes of Europeans expressed in the East African Standard and elsewhere at that time.

clearly in the government's strong opposition to a post-war soldiers' settlement scheme like the one which proved so disastrous in Kenya.<sup>73</sup>

More importantly, the government was aware of its dependency upon African production for economic reconstruction and expansion in the short run. European settlement conflicted with this immediate and crucial requirement. The government was determined to concentrate first on the promotion of African export production as the best means at hand to restore the economic system and place the colony on a "self-supporting" basis. Until these objectives were achieved, the government was determined to postpone their long-range objective of an economic and land policy which would satisfy and attract metropole investment and settlement. The small size and weakness of the settler sector made such a program both necessary and possible.

The reconstruction policy had an important influence upon the variation of the settler type colony which developed in Tanzania in comparison to Kenya. The direct role of the African population in agrarian export production, originally established under German rule, was reinforced and expanded. The settler community lost the dominant political position which the settlers in Kenya had. Consequently, they failed to obtain a comperable grip over the land, African labor, and

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73. Ibid., pp.553-554.

economy in Tanzania. The African societies in turn were spared the extreme form of disruption, exploitation, and social disintegration which took place in Kenya.

While less extreme, a disruption and disintegration of African society occurred in Tanzania which followed the same pattern as that in Kenya. The process was similar because the same colonial policy was operating in both colonies. The policy was known as Indirect Rule. It is this administrative policy, and its consequences for African development in both Kenya and Tanzania, which needs to be examined in more detail in the following section.

#### 4. Indirect Rule: The Politics of Control.

"Indirect rule" originated as a pragmatic response by British colonial administrators to the problems of maintaining control in specific situations. It rapidly evolved into a pervasive doctrine of British rule after World War I. As a system of colonial administration, indirect rule is first associated with Lugard's governorship of Nigeria. As a doctrinaire policy which represented a model of "success" in the British empire, indirect rule is associated with Donald Cameron, the Governor of Tanzania from 1925 to 1931. The connection

is no accident, for Cameron worked with Lugard in the colonial administration of Nigeria before being appointed to Tanzania.<sup>74</sup>

Indirect rule involved a minimal administrative cost and insured control over the colonial empire on the cheap. The British government was unwilling to expend more than the absolute minimum in personnel and expense required to maintain colonial control and to exploit the colonies economically. Ruling indirectly through indigenous political leaders provided a convenient means of control for the colonial officials, given the limited resources at their command. British administrators became increasingly adept at using the chiefs and headmen within African societies to control their own people in the interests of the colonial rulers.

The policy of indirect rule was a valuable instrument of exploitation for another reason. It made the British rulers less visible and obscured the direct relationship between European domination and the disruption and disintegration within African society. The focus of African anger and resistance was diverted from the European administrators to the intermediaries, the traditional African leadership, which implemented colonial policy as the direct agent of colonial rule. Through indirect rule, the British encouraged the African popula-

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74. Cameron served in Nigeria from 1908 to 1924. See Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria (London, 1939).

tion at the grassroots level to perceive and respond within a traditional context to a process which was controlled from outside this framework. It channeled protest into inadequate traditional forms and blocked a more appropriate and effective response to this new threat. Ultimately then, the British found indirect rule valuable for the direct political payoff. It short circuited direct protest and revolt, the one thing the British feared above all else.

British colonial control was based on the widespread and indirect manipulation of the African societies. But it owed its success to the generation of dependency, compliance, and despair among the African people. The process of indirect rule generated these attitudes, which operated to internalize control within the Africans themselves. Indirect rule can only be understood if one understands its effectiveness in conditioning the African to operate as the primary agent in his own victimization.

The British defined indirect rule as a policy which respected the traditional African social system and encouraged the gradual adaptation of these societies to more modern ways on their own terms and at their own pace. The consequences of indirect rule in practice reveal just the opposite. The British perpetuated the structure of traditional African society according to an increasingly standardized pattern which bore only a mythic resemblance to the traditional social system. The

traditional framework became rigid, irrelevant, a hollow shell. The inner dynamic atrophied. And the economic bases of traditional society were disrupted irremediably, which led to the growing disintegration of the social relations that were rooted in this underlying economic system.

The model of the traditional African society in the eyes of the British was the chiefly system of the Buganda. The Buganda political system was hierarchical, autocratic, and feudal. Strong political control was maintained internally on a class basis through a combination of the Kabaka, or King, the landed aristocracy, and an effective indigenous bureaucracy. Through their control over the Kabaka and the ruling class, the British were able to obtain power over the mass of the African peasantry and to rule the Buganda society with a minimum of difficulty. British control buttressed the feudal and class system. In return, the colonial government obtained the collaboration of the Buganda leadership in imposing agrarian export production - primarily cotton - upon the peasantry.

Buganda became the model of "traditional" African society and the British attempted to mold other African societies along similar autocratic and hierarchical lines in order to facilitate political control and economic exploitation. After seizing control of Tanzania, the British noted the general similarities of the Haya chiefdoms in the northwest region to the Buganda. They

deliberately attempted to "graft" specific political structures of the Buganda political system onto the Haya, along with the "few good points of the German system".<sup>75</sup>

British control showed little respect for the existing Haya social system. It aimed, rather, at increasing chiefly power, class division, and the bureaucratic administration over the Haya people. The resulting political changes were desired for the added control they provided in the raising of local tax revenue, African labor, and agrarian export production.<sup>76</sup>

The mythic model of the "traditional" African system bore much less resemblance to other African societies than it did to the centralized chieftaincies of the Buganda, Haya, or Chagga. Yet the political structure and organization of this model was imposed with increased uniformity over them all. Segmental, clan-based systems such as the societies of southwest Tanzania and most of the African societies in Kenya, including the major groupings of Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, and Kalenjin, had chiefs imposed upon them when chiefly rule had not existed among them traditionally as a political institution.<sup>77</sup>

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75. See the quotation in Austen, Northwest Tanzania, p. 133 from the district official, Baines, in his Bukoba Monthly Report (January 17, 1919).

76. Ibid., p. 137 passim.

77. Cf. Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (London, 1938); John Middleton, The Kikuyu and the Kamba (London, 1953); Gunther Wagner, "The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo," in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems (London, 1940), pp. 197-236.

A similar process can be observed within societies like the Sukuma and Nyamwezi, in Tanzania, which had Ntemi chieftaincies.<sup>78</sup> The Ntemi, or religious "chiefs", had no real political power traditionally. Power rested instead with councils of elders based on the village, as among the Sukuma, or on a clan and geographic basis, where a pattern of homestead living prevailed. These social and political institutions were disregarded and undermined, while the Ntemi were raised up by the British and given widespread powers they never had before.

The primary concern of the British under the policy of indirect rule was the creation of a standardized "native" administration, a uniform system of institutions for maintaining political control at the local level. The key element in this bureaucratic development was the concentration of delegated power into the hands of chiefs, sub-chiefs, and headmen within each ethnic grouping. They were assigned a multitude of tasks under the supervision of British Provincial and District Officers: maintaining "law and order"; tax collection; providing labor for European needs; expanding export crop production, primarily in Tanzania; enforcing land, cultivating, and stock regulations; providing communal forced labor for public works projects, such as road construction and maintenance; and a variety of other tasks.

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78. R. G. Abrahams, "The Political Organization of Nyamweziland," unpublished dissertation, Cambridge University, 1962; D. W. Malcolm, Sukumaland: An African People and Their Country (London, 1953).

One "positive" aspect of indirect rule which frequently has been stressed was the efforts of the British to maintain or restore traditional chiefs and headmen to their legitimate positions. This point was made particularly about the replacement of German rule by the British after the seizure of Tanzania. The dominant characteristic of British rule during the inter-war period, however, was the installing or deposing of African political leaders on the basis of their compliance to the demands of the colonial rulers, rather than any respect for traditional legitimacy.

Whatever preference the British demonstrated for the support of traditional leaders was due to the pragmatic consideration that traditional leaders could draw on traditional respect and obedience and maintain order better than newly imposed non-traditional leaders. This was the reason why the British persevered in supporting "incompetant" chiefs among the Haya, Sukuma, and Nyamwezi during the 1930's.<sup>79</sup> These chiefs generally were more preoccupied with traditional political intrigue in the jockeying for paramount power among themselves and with protecting and expanding the traditional privileges of their position at the expense of their people than anything else. Consequently, they did little to better the conditions or promote the development of their

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79. Austen, Northwest Tanzania, pp. 202-253, passim.

own people. More important to the British, they were successful in maintaining order and stability. Insubordination, rather than incompetency, was the guiding criterion in assessing African leadership.

Alternate and more popularly based political institutions, which had served as checks on the abusive use of individual power, were suppressed or distorted by the British in the process of building up chiefly rule. Local councils of elders were replaced by a system of "native" councils and treasuries in the late 1920's and the 1930's. Portrayed as adaptive equivalents to the traditional councils, they were devoid in practice of any real power or democratizing role. Nominally headed by the chiefs, they functioned as a traditional cover which obscured the actual dominance over local affairs by the British administrators, who served as Council secretaries.

Communal institutions and functions especially were subject to suppression under indirect rule. The administration banned youth organizations such as the Muteko, among the Haya, and the Elika, among the Sukuma. <sup>80</sup> The Muteko was an institution whereby each generation of youth throughout a Haya kingdom spent a period of education and training at the ruler's court. The Muteko functioned to unify the society politically and to instill a strong sense of collectiveness. It also served as a mechanism which mitigated the effects of class rule

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80. For the following, see ibid., pp. 144-146.

through the recruitment of commoners into the ruling strata. The Elika perpetuated social unity and collectiveness also, as an institution through which the Sukuma participated in forms of mutual help in cultivation and social celebration after harvesting.

Both youth institutions were suppressed because they represented political obstacles to the authoritarian systems of chiefly rule the British were constructing. The youth institutions were a source of political challenge to this chiefly rule. As solidarity organizations, they promoted cooperative and egalitarian behavior and they functioned to restrict the growth in abusive individual and class power. The suppression of these institutions indicated the extent to which all forms of collectivity and solidarity were obstacles to British political domination and economic exploitation.

The social needs these institutions satisfied were difficult to suppress and the youth organizations tended to reappear in new, although more ritualistic, forms. Some of these forms were the pseudo-military bandera associations among the Haya and the dance and secret societies of the Sukuma. As long as these new forms of association confined themselves to innocuous, ritualistic functions or to "modernizing" activities such as spreading the use of European dress, the British allowed

them to exist.<sup>81</sup> As soon as these associations moved to deal with any real problems and needs, their activities took on the characteristics of political behavior, they became unacceptable and were suppressed in turn.

The economic and social forces which were introduced forcefully into the African societies under British rule affected these social systems even more deeply and destructively than the systematic political changes the British imposed. The penetration of a capitalist money economy into previously self-sustaining subsistence societies imposed long-run disintegrating influences. These influences affected the whole fabric of traditional society and were irreversible. They also were in contradiction to the political objectives of colonial rule. New forms of production and exchange, new sources of wealth and economic surplus, and different social relations emerged, which affected the attitudes and behavior of more and more people, first intermittently, then permanently. The source of these changes lay outside the framework of traditional society and the traditional social system proved increasingly incapable of regulating them.

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81. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146. He compares this with the efforts of the British in Kenya, through Archbishop Owen, to divert the political Young Kavirondo Association into a non-political and "improvement" association. In particular, see his Chapter 4, p. 24.

Prior to colonial rule, African societies had very limited sources of wealth and economic surplus. Traditional systems of mutual obligation operated to prevent the growth of any significant disparity in individual wealth and standard of living. They did so through restricting the accumulation of surplus by individual or class and by insuring the dispersion of surplus within the society. Traditional tribute and fees to the indigenous leadership was the one form in which the accumulation and concentration of an economic surplus might have taken place to form a class structure. This process was prevented by traditional restrictions and obligations placed upon the chiefs, as well as by the impermanent or consumatory nature of existing forms of surplus.

Colonial rule and the penetration of a capitalist economic system disrupted this balance. Wage labor, cash crop production, and a generalized exchange created new, more permanent sources of wealth and surplus. The commutation of tribute into a tax by the British contributed greatly to this process of social disintegration, growing inequality, and class division. The chiefs and headmen were turned into salaried agents of the colonial administration, with their pay coming from a percentage of the local taxation created by the commuted tribute. While the traditional tribute and fees had been dispersed back into the social organization, the new tax

served to extract surplus from the society. A large percentage of this surplus was appropriated by the colonial government and used to pay for the costs of colonial rule. Equally important, a sizeable amount flowed into the hands of the chiefs and a small but growing European-educated elite for their own individual use.

As a critical part of this same process, land took on a commodity rather than a use value. The chiefs and new elite took advantage of the new accumulation of wealth and surplus to obtain more land, to establish individual ownership, and to convert their relationships with the people working this land into landlord-tenant or employer-employee relationships.<sup>82</sup>

A gradual breakdown of social controls over the communal utilization of land for subsistence needs took place as part of the overall disintegration of the traditional society. Personal or family aggrandisement at the expense of the social organization began replacing the social use of the land. This development precipitated class conflict out of a system of social cooperation and obligation.

The rapid growth of court litigation over land rights between the wars testifies to the growing ex-

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82. Cf. M. P. K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country (Nairobi; 1967), pp. 40-80; John Middleton, "Kenya: Administration and Changes in African Life, 1912-1945," in Harlow and Chilver, eds., History of East Africa, II, pp. 385-386; and K. Stahl, History of the Chagga, passim.

tensiveness and significance of the breakdown in the traditional system of production, land rights, and social relationships.<sup>83</sup> Artificial scarcity of land was created by the governments as they established reserves and otherwise limited land available to the differing African societies. Land expropriation and scarcity led to the growing deprivation and insecurity of the African, to the disintegration of traditional practices, and to the gradual emergence of class division and conflict within African society, as well as between African and European.

##### 5. Agrarian Policy and the Deterioration of African Society.

Agrarian policy and practice had the same destructive consequences as the more general policy of indirect rule. The restrictions imposed upon the African societies by colonial rule disrupted the traditional ecological balance which had existed and at the same time blocked social and political adaptations which could create a new, more appropriate balance. African systems of land rights, inheritance,

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83. Cf. Sorrenson, Land Reform, pp. 33-39, 72-80, on the development in Kikuyuland, where land conflict and litigation were most intense in East Africa. The process escalated after World War II and in Kiambu District alone fees paid in African court cases, mostly over land, increase dfrom £ 13, 000 in 1949 to £ 24,000 in 1951 (Ibid., p.79).

and traditional agricultural and grazing practices, provided an integrated and effective - although technically primitive - mode of production prior to the imposition of colonial rule. Once their integrated systems were disrupted and new conditions were imposed upon the African people, these practices became increasingly inappropriate. But the colonial system perpetuated these very practices. The result was a growing degeneration of the land, worsening of living conditions, and disintegration of the social organization.<sup>84</sup> This process reached serious proportions by the late 1930's, particularly in Kenya, where settler dominance intensified these destructive developments.

From the beginning of British colonial rule, agrarian policy was directed towards the expansion of export cash crop production as cheaply as possible. Accordingly, little attention or concern was paid to the production of food crops upon which the African was dependent for their existence. British policy assumed that ample land and labor-time was available within African societies to be used for export crop production in addition to the existing production of

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84. A growing awareness of these land problems throughout East Africa took place in the 1930's, during the depression. It was a major element under discussion at the conference of the Colonial Directors of Agriculture; see Report and Proceedings of Colonial Directors of Agriculture held at the Colonial Office, July 1938, Colonial No. 156, H. M. S. O. (London, 1938).

foods. The two were seen as complimentary. The British operated on the assumption that forcing the African into export production was beneficial to him, whether as a wage laborer working for the settler and plantation sector in Kenya or as a peasant producer in Tanzania.

In reality, export crop production was in conflict with food production, given the indigenous agricultural and social practices. Agriculture in nearly all the societies in Kenya and Tanzania was labor intensive. The Africans used a method of shifting cultivation and the hoe was the sole traditional agricultural implement. Lengthy fallow periods were used, instead of fertilizer and crop rotation, to rejuvenate the land after the soil had been cultivated until it lost its fertility. All these practices required an extensive amount of land. The imposition of export crop production upon the traditional agricultural system reduced the amount of land available for food cultivation and grazing. One consequence was a shortening of the period of fallow, which led to a more rapid depletion of the fertility of the soil and poorer harvests. Cash crop production also ate into the lands available for grazing and contributed to extensive overgrazing and land erosion.<sup>85</sup>

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85. Wrigley, "Kenya: Patterns of Economic Life," pp. 253-260.

Conflict in the use of labor-time was just as important as the conflict over land use. The timing required for clearing and preparing land, sowing, and harvesting frequently overlapped on the food and export crops. During the most crucial periods in the cultivation cycle a heavy demand was placed upon the use of African labor. A failure to sow food crops at the proper time before the rainy season, as a result of the demands of cash crops, had disastrous consequences for the size of the food crop. This problem was particularly grave in Kenya because of the more extensive labor demands of the settler and plantation sector. An especially heavy burden fell upon the women, who had to carry out the labor tasks normally allotted to men within the traditional system of labor division as well as the heavy work they traditionally did. Far from freeing African societies from a subsistence economy, the colonial system perpetuated a bare subsistence standard of production which the minimal income of wage labor or cash crop production did not compensate.

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86. The exceptions of the Maya and Chagga emphasize this point. These two societies developed an early form of mixed or integrated farming on their own, based primarily on permanent groves of bananas, for subsistence food, and coffee, for cash cropping. The combination of the two, plus the use of fertilizing, gave them security, prevented the land deterioration developing elsewhere, and led to a higher standard of living, rather than a decline. Cf. K.-H. Friedrich, "Coffee-Banana Holdings at Bukoba," in Hans Ruthenberg, ed., Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania (Munich, 1968), pp. 175-212 and K.-H. Friedrich, "Coffee-Banana Farms at Mt. Kilimanjaro," ibid., pp. 213-219.

These conflicts over the use of land and labor did not exist within a static situation. The reserve system placed limits on the expansion to new lands, limits which had not existed before colonial rule. The restrictions on access to new land was compounded by the rapid population growth which took place from the 1920's onward. Population increase and land restrictions provided the context in which the conflict over land and labor use took place. The context was ignored by the colonial rulers and the conflicts intensified.

Traditionally, these problems had been alleviated within African societies by the divisions of land holdings through inheritance and by migration as the limits of population density on the land were reached. By restricting migration and the availability of land, while ignoring their interrelationship with land division through inheritance, the colonial system distorted the positive social function of the latter. The result was extensive land fragmentation and the reduction of the acreage available per family for subsistence cultivation, a reduction which reached 50% among the Kikuyu in the 20 years from the 1930's to the 1950's.<sup>87</sup> The imposition of the colonial system upon the traditional African society thus converted the system of land inheritance into an additional destructive element in the spiraling vicious circle in which the African societies were caught.

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87. Sorrenson, Land Reform, p. 39.

The way out of this vicious circle could come only from the transformation of the primitive mode of production. Concretely, this meant the introduction and widespread promotion of more advanced and productive agricultural methods; land intensive rather than labor intensive cultivation; the use of plow and tractor, fertilizer, improved seed, and other more modern equipment; more advanced and integrated farming techniques such as contour plowing, irrigation, mixed crop and stock farming, and crop rotation.

Colonial agrarian policy however, was not based on the modernization of African agricultural practices. It overwhelmingly was preoccupied with the expansion of production - more specifically, the production of tropical exports - based on the existing indigenous practices. The British in Tanzania during the 1920's based their reconstruction and growth of the economy upon the forced expansion of export crops by peasant producers.

Their solution to the decline in world prices and reduced revenue which resulted from the depression of the 1930's was a deliberate policy decision not to invest capital into agricultural improvement but to expand existing forms of production. They sought to compensate for lower prices by producing and selling greater quantities of export crops, under the retrograde agricultural program labeled "grow more crops"<sup>88</sup>. This policy

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88. Austen, Northwest Tanzania, pp. 204-210.

was adhered to in spite of the clear and growing evidence as early as the 1931 East Africa Governor's Conference that this very same policy had already led to a serious deterioration of the land and the living conditions of the population.

Even worse conditions were developing in Kenya, particularly among the largest grouping, the Kikuyu, who bordered the White Highlands and were exploited as laborers for European estates and plantations more extensively than any other ethnic group in Kenya. The deliberate and systematic policy of restricting land in order to force out the resident and migrant labor required to farm the European economic sector has previously been described.

The policy was successful in maintaining and developing a modern European economic sector which otherwise would not have been viable. The depression of the 1930's affected the White Highlands severely. Many of the European settlers would have faced bankruptcy without extensive and systematic subsidies by the colonial government on a scale much greater even than in the past. Technical and agricultural services, research, tariffs, loan programs, transport subsidies, and other resources were directed almost exclusively to the settler sector even though the greater part of these resources originated in revenue appropriated from the African population.

As late as 1937, only ten Agricultural Officers and seven Assistant Agricultural Officers were assigned specifically to administer agricultural services in the reserves.<sup>89</sup> In spite of warnings by provincial and district officials in the field that conditions were badly deteriorating in the African reserves, the colonial government continued to ignore the problems it was instrumental in generating.<sup>90</sup>

Some efforts were made to bring about improvements in agricultural practice, but generally they were local efforts on a small scale on the part of enterprising individuals in the provincial administration. As such, they had no hope of breaking through the structure of underdevelopment which had been created by the colonial system. Larger scale compulsory programs of reform were implemented against specific problems, such as terracing to combat soil erosion, destocking measures against overgrazing, and tie-ridging of crops. These not only were uniform failures but stimulated widespread and

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89. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p.206.

90. One of the most severe reports was that of Colin Maher, head of the Kenya Soil Conservation Service in 1937, who asserted that "every phase of misuse of land is vividly and poignantly displayed in ( the Kamba ) reserve, the inhabitants of which are rapidly drifting to a state of hopeless and miserable poverty and their land to a parching desert of rock, stones and sand .... The end result of forty years of British administration is that the reserve stands as a self-evident indictment of the Kenya policy of modified indirect rule." From Colin Mayer, Soil Erosion and Land Utilization in the Ukamba Reserve (Machakes), 1937, as quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 167.

active resistance which took on the form of modern political opposition to colonial rule.<sup>91</sup>

Abstractly, each of these reforms were positive. Undertaken individually, dissociated or separated from the whole web of economic and social practices which together formed the system of structural underdevelopment, these reforms were actually destructive. They added to the already heavy burden of labor demanded of the African, or threatened to deprive him of the means he depended upon to maintain his precarious existence. And they failed to change the conditions in which he lived sufficiently so as to hold out the hope of making his life better or more secure.

The resistance of the African peasant was not conservative opposition to change per se, but generally a realistic response which reflected a greater understanding of the risks, labor, and benefits involved than the colonial administrator had. The reform efforts were erratic and frequently contradictory. There was a pervasive tendency to use compulsion to "correct" individual problems after ignoring them until they had long gotten out of hand. This created a distrust of government-initiated reforms - and of the government itself - which became one of a number of negative legacies of the colonial period that remained as blocks

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91. Cf. Sorrenson, Land Reform, pp. 42-43, 75; Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 164-174; John C. de Wilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, II, (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 415-426.

to the transformation of Kenya and Tanzania by the African leadership after independence.

While the transformation of African society involved the improvement of land and agricultural practices, such a transformation clearly was not to be achieved through piecemeal reforms within the existing colonial structure. Nor was transformation a mechanistic process equivalent to the sum total of such reforms. Transformation ultimately could only be a political process which broke down the colonial structures that perpetuated underdevelopment, while generating a new consciousness of what the social organization could become and new forms of organized power with which to forge it. Indirect rule, beyond its immediate and specific benefits to the British, was designed to prevent such a transformation and effectively did so.

Indirect rule was a critical element in creating a system of underdevelopment and blocking the transformation of African society. But indirect rule also involved contradictions which generated forces for change in reaction to colonial domination and economic exploitation. While doing so, it greatly determined the framework within which the African struggle could take place and thus molded and limited the very objectives of this struggle.

A unitary economic, political, and social system was being imposed successfully throughout each colony.

Its characteristics were formed by the settler sector and by the imperialist links to the British metropole.

The object of the exploitation of this system, the African could not remain within the indigenous social order of the past, for it had been fatally disrupted and was rapidly disintegrating. Nor could he really enter the modern social order of the colonial present, for its foundation was based on his legal exclusion.

The future struggle of the African thus came to be defined in terms of achieving open participation and integration within the state system. The African political challenge was limited. It did not aim to destroy the existing state system but to take it over through achieving self-government. The following two chapters examine the struggle in Kenya and Tanzania between the colonial rulers and the African nationalist movements, a struggle which led to political independence by the early 1960's.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE: KENYA FROM 1945-1963.

A revival of African political organizations took place in Kenya following World War II. The major African organizations had been banned at the beginning of the war, particularly the leading political movement, the Kikuyu Central Association. The African leadership directed their efforts to create a more unified nationalist movement. They tried to create an effective vehicle to reform the political structure at the center and to obtain greater political power within the colonial system. This shift in objectives was strongly influenced by the previous failure to achieve specific economic and social reforms.

The African political movement ran up against the resistance of the entrenched settler community and the alliance of the colonial officials. Their dominance in the colonial system was directly challenged by the African political movement. In spite of the difference in interests between the European community and the metropole, the British "reform" policy of multiracialism after the war actually maintained the settler dominance while providing token African representation in the colonial government.

British economic aid in the immediate post-war period was channelled primarily into the development of the economic infrastructure. The European economic sector in the Highlands was the main beneficiary, while only limited reforms took place within the African reserves. The result was an increase, rather than an amelioration, of the land deterioration and social disintegration within the African areas. European resistance and the failure of the "constitutionalist" approach of the nationalist movement led to growing social unrest and political militancy from below, particularly among the Kikuyu who were the most oppressed. This culminated in the extensive "Mau Mau" revolt which broke out in 1952.

British military forces crushed the revolt by 1955. The revolt brought home the necessity of extensive agrarian reforms in the African land areas. The defeat of the revolt and direct military control also provided the opportunity to impose reforms without resistance. Extensive land consolidation was carried out rapidly and established a pattern of smallholder farms based on private ownership.

The original intention was to create a modified and more stable foundation for continued colonial control. A permanent reorganization of the land in the African re-

was intended to promote the development of the emerging class system within the African population. The British initially attempted to maintain the existing racial land division and colonial structure intact. The revival of the nationalist political movement in the late 1950's revised this objective. The "White Highlands" became a critical political issue once again. The British subsequently implemented a limited and controlled transfer of settler land in the Highlands to Africans.

The transfer of political rule to the African political leadership was carried out parallel with the British designed land transfer and reform. But the transfer of rule was based on African acceptance of the British land reform program. The gradual Africanization, instead of restructuring the agrarian export economy, became the price the British required for political independence. It was a price easily accepted by the emerging African bourgeoisie.

1. The Failure of the African Nationalist Movement to Achieve Reforms After World War II.

A rapid renewal of political activity broke out in Kenya from 1944 onward which gained much of its drive from the restrictions and continued neglect of the war period. African political leaders formed the Kenya African Union (KAU) in the Fall of 1944 and KAU was to

remain the dominant African political organization challenging the colonial system until the outbreak of revolt in the colony in 1952. The KAU initially submitted to government demands that it limit itself formally to the innocuous political role of a study and educational organization, but by 1945 it openly turned to active mass organizing on a territorial basis.<sup>1</sup> The KAU's ability to do so was partly a reflection of the widespread oppressive conditions within African society and partly based on the continued covert existence of the KCA organization after its banning at the outbreak of the war.

The KAU drew on the structure and leadership of previous African organizations which still existed on a district and even locational basis. This organization traced back through the thirties to the early founding of the KCA out of the remains of the original East African Association (EAA). It also included elements from parallel organizations among the Luo and Baluhya (Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association and North Kavirondo Central Association), the Kamba (Ukamba Members Association), and the Taita (Taita Hills Association). As in the past, African politics was dominated by the Kikuyu, for they had experienced the disruptive con-

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1. Carl Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya (New York, 1966), pp. 214-15.

sequence of colonial rule most intensively, had the longest history of political organization and leadership, and were the most advanced in political consciousness.

The "Constitutional" approach to political reform.

The KAU made important advances during the political struggles of the 1940's in the continued effort to create a single nationalist organization throughout the colony. The difficulties they experienced related directly to the colonial policy of fostering "tribalism" through reserves, indirect rule, and administrative efforts to keep the differing ethnic groupings divided and in conflict. The KAU, under Kenyatta's leadership from 1947 onwards, persisted in maintaining a leadership committee in Nairobi drawn from representatives of the major groups in Kenya. It also opened branches in the provinces outside Kikuyuland and promoted the organization of membership as widely as possible.

The growth in the postwar African political movement included strong links to the emerging trade unions, particularly among transport workers and clerical employees.<sup>2</sup> The movement also developed links to a multitude of age groups, welfare, ethnic, locational, and educational associations which had sprung up in the

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2. Ibid., pp. 208-11; Cf. Makhan Singh, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952 (Nairobi, 19 ).

major towns, yet had retained close ties with the reserves. These associations had their origins in the economic and social developments of the recent past, particularly the wartime period. They provided important sources of strength: a more extensive organizational structure, new and varied sources of leadership, and a much larger membership.

In contrast to pre-war political activities, the post-war movement directly challenged the central structure of the colonial state. The major issue in this challenge was direct African representation in the Legislative Council. Earlier African politics had focused on specific, although important, economic and social grievances. In the early 1920's, the issues were land, labor and wages. In the late 1920's, the defense of African culture became the central issue and was reflected in the controversy over female circumcision and the formation of African schools and churches separate from the European missions. From the mid-1930's onward, African protest focused on the recommendations of the Kenya Land Commission and the land and agriculture regulations of the government.

Political protest intensified around these concrete issues during the 1940's, and in fact gained renewed strength from popular opposition to the reforms imposed by the post-war government. But the KAU was formed in 1944 to provide organized support for the first nominated African representative to the Legislative Council, Eliud Mathu. Its political program from that point centered

on achieving expanded African representation in the central government, direct elections which would take African leadership away from the government appointed chiefs, and ultimately political domination within the colonial state, -- thus supplanting the entrenched control of the settlers. This was the political route followed so successfully by the settlers and the lesson had clearly been understood by the new African leadership which emerged after the war.

For seven futile years the KAU led the nationalist movement in a "constitutionalist" approach to achieve these limited political reforms.<sup>3</sup> The failure to achieve them proved disillusioning, and intensified pressure to an explosive degree among the urban proletariat and the rural peasantry in the overcrowded reserves. More militant leadership emerged in turn which rejected "constitutional" political methods as the sole means to bring about change. By 1950, the more militant trade union leadership in the nationalist movement was demanding outright independence in the immediate future. It turned increasingly during the next two years to tactics of civil disobedience and selective violence with the aim of disrupting the colony and provoking direct intervention by the metropole government to achieve their political demands.

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3. Cf. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 220-76.

The frustration of the nationalist movement was all the more severe in that it was demanding little more than the political, social and economic reforms promised by the British and colonial governments in the new colonial policy of "multiracialism" propagandised after World War II.<sup>4</sup> Multiracialism held out the illusion of a modified colonial system based on communal parity or racial equality among the three major groups, the European, Asian and African. It implied the acceptance of the integration of the African within the colonial structure, a breaking down of the rigid political, social and economic barriers forged under the policy of indirect rule, and the achievement of African political control sometime "in the indefinite future."

Several political events between 1945 and 1950 were particularly important in revealing the illusory nature of the government's multiracial policy. The first event involved the composition of representation in the Central Legislative Assembly, which was established in 1945 as part of the promotion of a closer interterritorial association among the British colonies of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa. The second issue involved the modification of representation in the Kenya Legislative Council as part of the "constitutional development" of the colonial system.

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4. Cf. Philip Mitchell, *African Afterthoughts* (London, 1954) *passim*. Mitchell was Governor in Kenya from 1944 until mid-1952 and thus a major figure in blocking the African Nationalist Movement in the name of "multi-racialism," which he strongly expounded.

The post-war British Labour government established an East African High Commission in 1945 which was designed to further British imperial interests through closer economic integration within the East African area and between East Africa and the British metropole.<sup>5</sup> The development advanced the policy of "closed union" which had been initiated and gradually extended since the early 1920's. Britain's post-war economic difficulties made closer economic integration all the more imperative. Economic union was pushed particularly by metropolitan corporations with interests in East Africa. It also received increased support from the commercial, financial, and industrial interests which had grown rapidly in Kenya due to the war and post-war economic boom.

The settler community benefited from the economic union but their support for closer political association was mixed.<sup>6</sup> They had long feared a loss of their political domination of Kenya from closer association with Uganda and Tanzania. Consequently, they insisted that their acceptance of a High Commission and Central Legislative Assembly was conditional. They refused any suggestion of equal representation among the three racial groups on either the Assembly or in the Kenya Legislative Council. Instead they demanded as a minimum the security of representation equal to the other non-European groups.

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5. Cf. Inter-territorial Organization in East Africa, Col. 191, 1945; Inter-territorial Organization in East Africa; Revised Proposals, Col. 210, 1947.

6. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 221-23.

The proposals of the British government were published, widely known, and accepted by the African political leadership as an important step forward towards giving them greater political influence. When the British government backed down and accepted the settler's demand of two European and two non-European representatives in the Central Legislative Assembly, it greatly intensified the Africans' feelings of distrust and frustration towards the European rulers. It also undermined popular African belief in and the acceptance of the position of the African leadership that they could achieve reforms through constitutional means. Unrest increased at the grassroots level and threatened the leadership and control of the African politicians over the mass of the African population.

Essentially the same issue was revived in 1948<sup>7</sup> over the modification of the Legislative Council in Kenya. In spite of extensive African political pressures and petitions, the colonial government gave way to the settler position, which the officials generally shared, of "parity" between European and non-European representation. The new composition of the Council which resulted was eleven European representatives, balanced against five Asians, two Arabs, and only four Africans, in spite of the overwhelming African composition of the population. It was clear to the Africans that this was strictly a quantitative

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7. Ibid., p. 222.

rather than qualitative change in the political structure of the colonial system and changed nothing.

Not one of the major demands of the African leadership was achieved. European majority control was strengthened and only a token increase in African representatives was provided. Election of African representatives was rejected by the government and the selection of representatives continued on a basis of nomination by the governor from recommendations of the Local Native Councils. This procedure insured the selection of conservative African representatives, due to the indirect method and to the continued domination of the local councils by the chiefs and the provincial administration.

A fundamental political issue also was at stake. The procedure indicated the continuing refusal of the colonial government to recognize the legitimacy of the modern nationalist movement, headed by the KAU. The Europeans continued to reject the authority of the modern political leadership to represent the African population. Political recognition was granted only to the administrative organization which the Europeans themselves had created, rather than to the political organization created by the Africans. The issue was basic and the European position made open conflict inevitable.

The successful resistance of the settler/official community.

The political success of the settlers on these issues marked only one of a number of areas where the position of the settler community was consolidated and advanced. The settlers were strengthened by their domination of the interterritorial boards which originally had been established to control production throughout East Africa in order to satisfy imperial war needs.<sup>8</sup> This role was equivalent to the success of the settlers in gaining "shared" participation in and dominance over the major governmental committees in Kenya during and after World War I.

The settler position allowed them to control and channel the colonial resources toward the expansion and modernization of the European economic sector. They were able to draw upon the resources of East Africa in general under the guise of regional development of the economic infrastructure. Reforms aimed at the improvement of the African reserves were blocked or reduced to a totally ineffective level of investment. Legal prohibitions against African production of export cash crops such as coffee were eliminated. But settler dominance insured that stiff regulations limited African production

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8. George Bennet, Kenya: A Political History (London, 1963), pp. 94-95, 100; Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 195-96.

to a negligible level and protected the settlers from African competition.

The reorganization of the colonial political structure by government after the war reinforced the position of the settlers. The central administrative machinery was transformed into a quasi-ministerial system.<sup>9</sup> Thus the Executive Council became a truly executive and administering body, rather than an advisory council, and its representatives became "Members" or Ministers of various governmental departments. The restructuring aimed at creating a more "efficient" government to promote economic growth. The importance of this change lay in the fact that a settler representative was appointed Minister of the Department of Agriculture, giving the settlers an official executive role for the first time in the colonial government. The change also weakened the single line of authority running from the British Colonial Secretary and concentrated greater decision-making power within the colonial government -- and thus under the dominance of the European community in Kenya.

The transformation also reflected the convergence which had been taking place between the settler and official groups. The convergence had reached the point of shared membership as well as shared interests and perspective. This convergence had been speeded up by the

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9. Bennett, Kenya, p. 101.

elimination in 1929 of the restrictions prohibiting administrative officials from buying land in the colony.<sup>10</sup>

As the numbers of administrators increased who brought land and intended to retire and settle in Kenya, their identification with the settler community grew. By the mid-1940's, a single privileged and ruling European class was a closer description of the reality than separate and differing settler and official communities.

The British policies of multiracialism and limited economic reform.

Major intra-European differences did exist and emerged into open conflict during the post-war period. This European division existed between the European colonial community and the Metropole. It reflected above all an economic conflict of interest. The British government's main concern was the promotion of basic imperial interests. These interests lay in promoting a more rapid economic growth in the colony and a closer economic integration of the colony to Britain on terms which subsidized British economic development. This governmental policy reflected the economic needs of metropole corporations which had vested economic interests in East Africa: banks and other finan-

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10. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 203.

cial institutions, trading and commercial corporations, shipping companies, and industrial corporations.

The European conflict between colony and metropole was represented within the European colony to a lesser extent. This took the form of expatriate managers running the subsidiaries of the metropole corporations and the growing but still small commercial and industrial strata in the colony whose economic interests were linked dependently to the metropole. The conflict had existed in latent form as far back as the pre-World War I period, when it surfaced in differences between settlers and planters over the issues of African wages and Asian immigration.<sup>11</sup> The emergence after World War I of this commercial element and a new division within the settler-dominated European community was indicated by the decline of the Convention of Associations and its replacement by the Electors Union in 1944.<sup>12</sup> While the Convention had been created by the settlers and almost totally dominated by them, the Electors Union was a reflection of the more diversified nature of the European community in which commercial figures played a more important leadership role.

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11. Richard Wolff, "Economic Aspects of British Colonialism in Kenya," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Yale University, 1969), pp. 135-37.

12. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 196-97.

A more important indication of this conflict was the political and economic reform policies implemented by the British Government during the post-war period. The policy of multiracialism was less a program of gradually transferring political rule over to the Africans than an attempt to establish a more stable political foundation for maintaining European control indefinitely. The means to achieve the overall goal of continued colonial rule was seen in encouraging the formation of an African elite and allowing its partial integration within the colonial political structure.

Economic reforms, parallel to the political reforms, were initiated by the British government through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1944. Parliament voted a £ 120,000,000 fund to finance ten year development programs, a small amount when spread over the numerous colonies in the empire.<sup>13</sup> The aid was used by the colonial government in Kenya for two purposes: capital development and agrarian reform within the badly deteriorated African reserves. The bulk of the funds were channeled into the former, capital expenditure. These funds in turn were used to expand and modernize the economic infrastructure rather than to develop the productive facilities in the colony. Such expenditure was essentially "pump-priming" rather than development. It

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13. Robert Chambers, Settlement Scheme in Tropical Africa (New York, 1969), p. 23.

provided the economic inducement necessary to attract overseas private investment through which direct development was expected to take place.

Under this program, roads and railway, harbors and communications were developed into a more modern transportation and communications network which fed into Mombasa, the main port, and from there to the British metropole. The program was not designed to promote economic integration and development within Kenya but to construct a more effective conduit through which expanded production, exports, and economic surplus flowed out to Britain and manufactured goods and capital flowed in.

Postwar economic reform thus maintained a crucial thread of continuity stemming from the period of earliest intervention. Large-scale corporate investment was seen as the "engine of development" and political control, economic exploitation, and economic growth in Kenya were oriented to the needs of these imperial corporate interests. Tropical export production continued to be their major area of concern and investment. Improvement of the infrastructure under the post-war economic policy played an important role in cutting the costs and stimulating expanded production and export of tropical crops from the interior of the colony to the metropole. This economic policy was reinforced by the post-war boom and high world market prices, which lasted until the mid-1950's because of the Korean War.

Agrarian reforms in the African reserves were also initiated under the development program, although they were given much lower priority and even less in funds.<sup>14</sup> Reconditioning of the land, improved land use and agricultural practices, and promotion of export cash crop production in the reserves were economic reforms which had been recommended for many years by officials in the field who were vividly aware of the deteriorating conditions.

The Development Act provided for the first time an official sanction for and the means to initiate these reforms. The underlying cause for initiating agrarian reforms, however, lay more in the restrictions of the existing economic structure which blocked the future economic growth of the colony. Kenya was reaching the limits of White settlement and of settler production of export crops. Any sizable expansion of production could take place only in the African land areas through peasant smallholder production.

Prohibiting or retarding African export production, in order to maintain a large pool of cheap African wage labor for settler agriculture, no longer had any economic justification. Restrictions within the economy and the growth in the size of the African population had created widespread unemployment or underemployment. A second

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14. Cf. Ministry of Agriculture, African Land Development in Kenya, 1946-1963 (Nairobi, 1962).

consequence was the severe constriction of the potential consumer market for British import manufacturers. These characteristics were vivid indicators of the structural underdevelopment created by colonial rule in general and by settler domination in particular.

The officially registered African labor force had shifted in composition from sixty per cent in European Agriculture and forty per cent in other spheres in 1936 to exactly the reverse, forty per cent in European agriculture and sixty per cent the other, by 1946.<sup>15</sup> This labor shift reflected the diversification of the colonial economy which resulted from the economic boom during the war and which continued during the post-war period. Although still highly limited, the commercial, industrial, construction, shipping, and service sectors of the economy were growing in importance and the European agricultural sector experiencing a relative decline in the importance within the economy as a whole.

An agrarian reform policy was officially promoted by the British following 1944 because economic requirements coincided for the first time with the moral assertions of "trusteeship," with social concern about the oppressive living conditions of the Africans, and fears over the resulting political unrest. The implementation of reforms, however, was too little and too late.

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15. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 208.

The reforms sought to ameliorate conditions which actually required a transformation of the economic structure. The inadequacy of agrarian reform measures was inevitable given the continued political dominance of the settlers and the alliance of interest of colonial officials. Transformation of the colonial structure threatened the economic monopoly of the European community, and the privileged and subsidized position this conferred. It also threatened to end the settler's domination of the political system, through which their privileged economic existence was maintained.

Ultimately, the economic reforms required by the metropole interests and British government conflicted with and threatened the very existence of the permanent settler/official community. The nature of this underlying economic conflict was obscured because the overt arena in which it was fought out was in the political struggle between the colonial government and the African nationalist movement. The colonial government persisted with a limited reform policy which was based on maintaining self-sufficiency within the African reserves and continuing the rigid racial land and economic division. It remained opposed to the generation of African economic development and the integration of the African economic sector within the European-dominated capitalist economic formation.

Several major statistics indicate the social and economic consequences of the European blockage of the transformation of the economic structure. A tremendous -- and increasing -- inequality of income existed between European and African. It reflected the European monopoly of ownership or control over the means of production. The monetary value of exports ( overwhelmingly European) increased by seven between 1938 and 1952, from £ 3.8 million to £ 25.8 million. African commercial activities generated only six per cent of the net territorial product in 1951.<sup>17</sup>

The African population was highly dependent upon wage earnings from European employment: thirty-two per cent of African income in 1951 came from outside the African economic sector, and two-thirds of African income came from wages. But the actual size of the officially registered African labor force was only 438,702 in 1952 out of an estimated population of 5.5 million. In 1952 the average wage of the unskilled worker was only twenty-five shillings a month, which reflected the success of the settlers in insuring a cheap, abundant supply of African labor.<sup>20</sup>

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16. East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955: Report, Cmd. 9475 (1955), p. 460.

17. Ibid., p. 478.

18. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 203-04.

19. Labour Department. Annual Report (Nairobi, 1952), p. 5.

20. Ibid., p. 6.

The turn to open conflict.

Politically, the rigidity of the colonial system generated unrest on a wider scale than in the past. Organized political protest over the oppressive conditions occurred among the peasantry in the reserve areas and among some 200,000 "squatters" in the Rift Valley of the White Highlands, who were being dispossessed from the settler farms and forceably removed to the already overcrowded reserves.<sup>21</sup>

Of particular political importance was the political protest in the urban areas, notably Nairobi and Mombasa, where the African workforce had expanded considerably since the first appearance of labor strikes in the late 1930's. In addition, there was a growing pool of urban unemployed, generally peasants displaced from the land, having been dispossessed, or among "school leavers" from within the younger generation, both of whom had little hope of employment within the reserves. They flowed into the urban areas in search of scarce jobs and kept returning in greater numbers in spite of mounting efforts by an uneasy government to drive these "vag-rants" back into the reserves -- to be removed from sight and therefore more easily ignored.

The urban Africans were a more immediate and dangerous threat than the rural population, for they were

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21. Cf. M. P. K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country (Nairobi, 1967), pp. 80-85, based particularly upon Rift Valley Province Annual Reports and Land Office files.

more militant, concentrated, and rapidly becoming better organized. The mushrooming trade union movement after 1945 and the turn to the strike as a weapon threatened the colonial system at its most vulnerable point, the European economy. It led the government to move quickly and harshly against a wave of strikes in 1947 and again in 1949-1950.<sup>22</sup> These union actions were particularly alarming to the colonial government and European community because the unions persisted in creating an "illegal" territorial federation, refused to stick to limited "economic" issues, took up the nationalist movement's political demands as its own, and linked up closely with the KAU.

Political conflict escalated swiftly after 1949 and took on an added dimension, as a more militant and younger African leadership turned the organizing skills they had learned in the military service and in the trade unions towards the formation of a second covert level of political mobilization. The existing political, labor, welfare and improvement associations had proved unsuccessful in effecting any changes in the conditions of African society and were even more unsuccessful in changing the political, economic and social structure of the colonial system which perpetuated these oppressive conditions. Yet these institutions were modeled after their British counter-

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22. Cf. Bennett, Kenya, pp. 125-26; Singh, Kenya's Trade Union Movement, pp. 132 ff.

parts, were sanctioned in theory by British democratic and parliamentary traditions, and held up as the "respectable" and "civilized" means by which to "earn" the right to full and equal participation in the social system.

Intensified union activities in 1949 led to the arrest and detention of the union leadership, the breaking of the strikes, and other measures clearly reflecting the determination of the government to crush the union movement or at least to render the unions harmless. The government continued to ignore the widespread popular unrest in the reserves, which was channeled into organized political protest by the KAU. The administration persisted in imposing land reconditioning programs within the reserves. These added to the hardships of the African population without changing the framework which led to these conditions in the first place.

The conflict posed a fundamental political issue, for the governmental response denied the right of the Africans to have any say in either the formulation or implementation of measures which crucially affected their lives. Stepped up government efforts to remove the squatters from the White Highlands and force them into the reserves intensified the existing problems and pointed clearly to the determination of the European community to entrench the racial land and economic division more

rigidly into the colonial system. The failure during the same period of the nationalist movement to achieve any of its political demands in the revision of the Legislative Council was an additional and crucial factor. It led the Africans to turn away from the "constitutional" approach and to utilize more extreme measures.

Acts of violence increased at the grassroots level, against the settler estates and against the conservative chiefs and headmen. The nationalist leadership turned towards greater militancy and created a covert organization<sup>23</sup> within the formal political structure of the KAU. This hidden political structure and covert activities became necessary in the face of European political rigidity.

A major aspect of the inner political organization was the conducting of oathing ceremonies among the African population.<sup>24</sup> The oathings were an act of allegiance and through them the KAU sought to bind together all elements of the population into a united nationalist movement. This political practice was directed first among the Kikuyu; attempts were made later to extend it among the different African ethnic groupings.

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23. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 262-76.

24. Ibid., pp. 241-62.

The efforts were cut short in the fall of 1952 by the mass arrest of the KAU leadership and the declaration of a military state of emergency. The government action followed past patterns, which were based on the distorted political belief that the unrest and violence were the result of the political "agitation" of a limited leadership which was "subversive" of law and order. <sup>25</sup> The arrest of the KAU leadership was expected to end the unrest among the African population. The result was just the opposite. It triggered off armed attacks by guerrilla bands which formed under the leadership of lower and middle level officials of the movement. These officials were more militant than the leadership which had been arrested. They had been kept under control by this very leadership and the mass arrest, ironically, removed this control and generated the armed revolt which the Europeans were most afraid of. Widespread military retaliation by the government followed and a full-scale rebellion exploded in Kenya.

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25. Cf. Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, pp. 251 ff.

## 2. Revolt, Colonial Repression, and Agrarian Reform.

The rebellion which broke out in the Kikuyu reserve and neighboring areas between the fall of 1952 and spring of 1953 was a desperate act of armed resistance against massive British political and military repression, rather than the "cause" of this repression. The resistance was triggered off by the declaration of a military State of Emergency on October 20 and the simultaneous mass arrest and detention of the major KAU leadership, nearly one-hundred political figures including Kenyatta,<sup>26</sup> Parallel with the political suppression of the Nairobi-centered nationalist leadership, the colonial government proceeded to militarily occupy and garrison the most volatile rural areas with the colonial East African Rifles. Police and British troops also were flown in from the Middle East to aid in the effort to "restore law and order." The "Emergency" in actuality amounted to a declaration of open warfare against the African population for its resistance to colonial rule.

These actions by the colonial government were demanded by the European community which had united together during the previous two years in their fear over the sporadic acts of open violence directed against the Europeans on the Highland farms and in the towns. European fear was

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26. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 277.

all the more powerful in that these acts were ascribed to the formation of a conspiratorial, "atavistic" African association, called "Mau Mau" by the Europeans. <sup>27</sup> The Mau Mau were stigmatized as driven by a hatred for Europeans, as a barbaric cult which indulged in atrocities and in the perversion of traditional African practices, such as oathing ceremonies. Through these methods and the fear they engendered, the cult of Mau Mau was seen as quickly gaining control over the minds of the "uneducated" and "superstitious" African. The movement, to the European, was evil, irrational, a primitive throwback which rejected and sought to destroy all that was European, rational and "civilized." Ostensibly, the program of repression was an attempt to isolate out this "criminal" cult before it "infected" all of African society like a disease and threatened to wipe out the civilized achievements of colonial rule over the past fifty years.

The "myth of Mau Mau" and political reality.

The political reality underneath this "myth of Mau Mau" was quite different. <sup>28</sup> The secret association referred to was actually the

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27. For the "official" history of the "Mau Mau" revolt, which reflects this viewpoint maintained by the British throughout this period, Cf. Great Britain, Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Corfield Report), Cmnd. 1030, 1960; also, L.S.B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu (London, 1952), and Defeating Mau Mau (London, 1954).
28. Cf. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 320-54 and passim; Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (New York, 1969 [1967]),

KCU, which had been banned at the outbreak of World War II but had continued to maintain a strong, covert organization on a local, district, and provincial level within Kikuyuland. This organization and leadership was interlocked with the formal territorial political party, the KAU. The employment of oathing practices represented a covert and effective campaign to overcome the class differences which had grown up within the Kikuyu society and to mobilize and unify the people behind the nationalist political cause. It also sought to draw upon modified traditional practices in order to impose discipline within this mass movement, to control individual and group acts of violence, and to direct African energies towards the nationalist goal of achieving political independence. This objective, they had concluded, could not be gained from the existing colonial government, but only through creating sufficient disruption to force the intervention of the metropole government into the affairs of the colony on the side of the African demands.<sup>29</sup>

The political strategy of the KAU was unable to resolve the major tensions and contradictions within African society, which the colonial system had created or intensified before the mass repression of the "Emergency" was abruptly initiated. The disintegration of the traditional

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pp. 95-136; Fred Majdalany, State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau (Austin, 1963). Also, for an excellent account of the guerilla forces from their side, see Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, Mau Mau From Within (New York, 19 ).

29. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 264-65 and p. 270.

African social organization and emergence of a new class structure was widespread, particularly within Kikuyu society. When the KAU turned to concentrate upon a covert program of reuniting the Kikuyu around new bonds of loyalty, based on traditional ceremonies and values, they were striving to strengthen ethnic identity and unity for the service of new, nationalistic political goals. But in important ways, these neo-traditional methods conflicted with the modern nationalist objectives, neglected the development of a territorial-wide political organization, and stimulated existing antagonisms between the ethnic groups within African society.

The strong, often violent conflict this program brought out between groups within Kikuyu society had a class basis. It attacked the British-created African elite upon which the colonial government depended for maintaining indirect administrative control over and "law and order" within the reserves. Thus the political mobilization and conflict within the Kikuyu population concerned the British as much, if not more, than the occasional direct acts of violence against the European. This was an important factor leading to European military intervention against the Africans.

The strategy of the KAU also reflected a misjudgment of the benevolence of the British government, the extent of conflict of interests between the colonial and British govern-

ments, and the degree to which they could count upon outside intervention upon their side. Whatever the underlying economic differences, the British government was in full agreement with the colonial government on the primary need to maintain political control within the colony in order to control the evolution of economic development.

#### Repression of the Revolt.

The abrupt imposition of the Emergency may have been designed and executed by the colonial government, but it had the full concurrence and support of the metropole. The policy of repressive intervention was implemented in 1952 to take advantage of the failure of the KAU to unify the Kikuyu or to create an integrated nationalist, political movement between the different ethnic groupings within African society.

The strategy of full-scale repression was successful in its political aim of exploiting these intra- and inter-African divisions. The mass arrest of the Nairobi leadership disrupted the still fragile political ties among the major ethnic groups. Military occupation of Central Province effectively isolated the Kikuyu from the other groups.

This isolation was to be maintained for six years, until 1959, long after the crushing of the main Kikuyu resistance in 1954-1955. The military occupation and repression, to a lesser extent, also involved the neighboring groups which were most closely related to the Kikuyu: the Embu, Meru, and Kamba.

Kikuyu who lived in considerable numbers in the Rift Valley, in particular, as well as in Masailand, in northern Tanzania, among the Kalenjin groupings, and at the coast, were forcedly "repatriated" to the Kikuyu reserves. The government's objectives were to prevent the spread of the rebellion, divide and antagonize the ethnic groups further, and concentrate the Kikuyu geographically to achieve a more effective control over them. The "repatriation" was also a form of communal punishment which fell severely upon the Kikuyu. Over 100,000 squatter families from the Rift valley alone were forced back into the reserve by the spring of 1953.<sup>30</sup> In the process, they had their homes and crops burned and most of their stock confiscated in a style reminiscent of the early "pacification" at the turn of the century.

Other African groups were provided benefits by the government at the expense of the Kikuyu being repatriated in ways which reinforced the division and conflict between the groups. Employment on the settler estates and in the

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30. D.H. Rawcliffe, The Struggle for Kenya (London, 1954), p. 60; Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 285-86.

towns, particularly in Nairobi, which had been held by the Kikuyu, were allotted to the Luo and other groups. These government actions were effective in isolating the rebellion among the Kikuyu and in laying the seeds for economic and political rivalry at the end of the Emergency and during the post-independence period.

The massive influx of hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu strained the reserves to the breaking point. Many of the younger Kikuyu, faced with the "repatriation camps" set up by the military in the reserves, chose instead to flee to the thick forests of the Aberdares Mountains and Mount Kenya and join up with the armed units which were already forming there. <sup>31</sup> By mid- 1953, an estimated force of 15,000 Kikuyu called the Land and Freedom Army, were operating out of these forests. <sup>32</sup> They conducted armed raids on the settler estates and against the "loyalist" locations of chiefs and headmen who collaborated with the colonial administration in its military operation to crush the armed resistance.

By the spring of 1953, it was clear even to the government that they were dealing with much more than unrest fomented by a few political agitators. The arrest of the most prominent political leadership, banning of KAU, and military occupation, far from restoring order, had triggered off a full-scale rebellion which had the overwhelming support of the Kikuyu people as well as considerable sup-

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31. Barnett and Njama, Mau Mau from Within, p. 150 ff.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

port among the Embu, Meru, and Kamba peoples. The military strategy subsequently adopted was open warfare against the whole population based upon the counter-revolutionary methods which recently had been developed by the British in suppressing the colonial rebellion in Malaya.

Every effort was made to exploit and build upon the division between the minority of government supporters, the "loyalists," and the "Mau Mau." <sup>33</sup> Garrisons and armed protection were provided to those locations under "loyalist" leadership and they were used as a base on which to build an African "home guard." The development of an armed home guard did not prove capable of effectively patrolling the reserves and countering the "Mau Mau." They did create even greater misery and violence within the reserves, for they frequently exploited their position to avenge personal, family, and kin grudges and to profit economically through the confiscation of land and stock of those accused to the government of being "Mau Mau."

The British were faced with a situation in which the mass of the reserve population provided protection, food, clothing and other forms of aid to the guerrilla units, as well as a continuing flow of men to the forests as resistance fighters. The government proceeded to physically isolate the forest fighters from the people in the reserves.

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33. Sorrenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country, Chapter Six; Barnett and Njama, Mau Mau from Within, p. 209-16 and passim.

People were rounded up by the tens of thousands and forced into "protective villages," surrounded with barbed wire, in which they were forced to remain except for limited periods when they were allowed temporarily to work their fields. <sup>34</sup> This "villagization" program was little more than an euphemism for concentration camps and resembled the more recent "strategic hamlets" policy by the United States in Vietnam.

At the price of totally devastating Kikuyuland, the British succeeded in their policy of cutting off the resistance fighters from the body of the population which sustained them. Parallel sweeps and mass detention of Kikuyu living in Nairobi, under "operation anvil" in April, 1954, out the forest forces off from the remaining leadership of the KAU organization. <sup>35</sup> The forest units were also cut off from the supply of weapons and medication which the Nairobi network had been supplying. The physical isolation of the Land and Freedom Army in the mountain forests was completed by clearing a strip one mile wide -- as a "free-fire zone"-- along the length of the forest paralleling the reserve. <sup>36</sup> The forests were then surrounded with British troops. While the Land and Freedom Army was able to tie

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34. Ibid., 332 ff.; Sorrenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country, p. 110-11.

35. Barnett and Njama, Mau Mau from Within, p. 331-32 ff.; see also the description of it's devastating effects on peoples's lives and upon labor and other African organizations by Tom Mboya, Freedom and After (Boston, 1963), p. 30-32.

36. Barnett and Njama, Mau Mau from Within, p. 209-11.

down over a division of British troops for several years in futile search and destroy actions in the forests, their isolation made the ultimate disintegration and destruction of the resistance units inevitable.

The three year struggle had a disastrous impact upon the Kikuyu population. Over a million people, nearly the whole Kikuyu population, were forced to endure virtual imprisonment in the "protective villages" where they suffered stringent control and the most rudimentary of services.<sup>37</sup> Illness and scarcity of food was constant. In addition, over 50,000 were placed in detention camps for captured resistance fighters or suspected "Mau Mau" or "Mau Mau" supporters.<sup>38</sup> Given the conflict between Kikuyu, arrest and detention tended to be carried out in an indiscriminant fashion, by hearsay or by sudden sweeps such as "operation anvil" in Nairobi. These detainees were put through intensive "rehabilitation" treatment of both psychological and physical brutality.<sup>39</sup> The homes of the "terrorists" were razed and their stock and land confiscated. The social and economic organization of the Kikuyu was totally disrupted. Much of this proceeded inexorably from the very strategy of the warfare conducted by the British. It also

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37. Sorrenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country, p.110.

38. Rosberg, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 293.

39. For a firsthand description of detention camp experience, see Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, "Mau Mau" Detainee (Oxford, 1963).

reflected the underlying belief that the existing social organization had to be destroyed if the eradication of "Mau Mau" was to be successful. As a result, mass terrorization of the Kikuyu population was carried out in the name of combating the African "terrorists."

The suppression of the rebellion had other consequences of far greater importance for the period following the war. Military policy and administrative measures within the reserves led to a heavy influx of Europeans which established a "degree of direct administration of the Kikuyu unparalleled among any other people in the history of British colonial Africa." <sup>40</sup> As early as 1953, the British were initiating plans to exploit this situation. The combination of massive military and administrative control and the demoralization, fear, and apathy among the Kikuyu and related ethnic groups, provided a sudden "opportunity" to undertake a reorganization of the reserves on a massive scale without the fear of resistance. <sup>41</sup>

The British government had quickly responded to the demand of the colonial government for military support to suppress the rebellion and reestablish "law and order." But the British were equally concerned with the need to tackle the underlying economic and social causes of the rebellion and to create a new, more stable economic and political foundation for continuing colonial rule in Kenya. The

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40. Rosberg, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 293.

41. Sorenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country, p. 113-14 and Chapter Seven, *passim*.

solution was seen in the Swynnerton Plan. This plan was initially drafted in late 1953, by R. Swynnerton, the Assistant Director of Agriculture, and was put into operation as early as 1954.<sup>42</sup>

The Swynnerton Plan: imposition of agrarian reform.

The Swynnerton Plan was based upon the few experiments at agrarian reform prior to the revolt. It aimed to expand these models into an extensive agrarian reform throughout Kikuyuland. The "villagization" measures of the war had cleared the countryside of the scattered homesteads, placed the Kikuyu under absolute European control, and broken African resistance to the specific agrarian measures the colonial government sought to implement. Officials pushed rapidly between 1954 and 1959 to take advantage of these conditions and impose a new rural order before opposition could revive.

The plan envisioned making the emergency villages a permanent unit of the future organization of the reserves.<sup>43</sup> Permanent villages would enable the colonial government to maintain a more effective control over the Africans in the

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42. Cf. R. J. F. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (Nairobi, 1964).

43. For the following description of the land reform measures, see Swynnerton, A Plea to Intensify Development, passim.

future and would also allow the development of social and community services which scattered household living made impossible.

The crux of the reform plan, however, was the elimination of the existing fragmentation of the land and its consolidation into individual smallholder plots. Private African ownership of the land based on the security of legal title had long been resisted by the colonial government. It now became the foundation of the British agrarian reform policy. A complicated survey and registration procedure was established to measure the existing fragments of the African peasants and to plot out newly consolidated farms on a district by district basis. A percentage of land from each was set aside for common service requirements, such as roads, schools, and villages. Rough efforts were made with the remaining land to provide consolidated plots which had lands as equivalent in quality as possible to the original fragments.

Consolidation could not be successful unless it was used as the basis for establishing modernized agricultural practices. The reforms aimed not only at restoring the productivity of the land, which had deteriorated so badly under the earlier colonial policy, but also at increasing the productivity sufficiently to sustain the increased Kikuyu population at a higher standard of living than the minimal subsistence level which had prevailed before the

rebellion. Farm planning and extension services were established by the Department of Agriculture to introduce intensive land use, contour plowing, crop rotation, proper fertilization, use of insecticides, stock control and other necessary practices. Without such agricultural innovations the whole program of agrarian reform was doomed to failure. And the failure of agrarian reform threatened all hopes for a more secure political foundation with which to maintain colonial rule.

The widespread introduction and promotion of African cash crop production became as imperative under the Swynnerton Plan as land consolidation and the modernization of land and agricultural practices, if agrarian reform and political stabilization were to have any hopes of success. The past restrictions on export cash crop production were dropped.<sup>44</sup> Smallholder production of export cash crops such as coffee, tea, sisal, pyrethrum, and pineapples was promoted rapidly and extensively. The production and sale of these crops were necessary to enable the Africans to pay for the costs of the land redistribution and consolidation imposed upon them, the expense of the development and ex-

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44. Official restrictions were ended in the 1940's, but "informal" restrictions still remained in force until the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan. The informal restrictions affected the Kikuyu in particular, but they also affected other areas. They took the form of official discouragement, technical restrictions, and an approach which limited export cash crop development to demonstration projects. Cf. Robert M. Maxon, "The Early Years of the Gusii Coffee Industry in Kenya," The Journal of the Developing Areas, 6, 3 (April, 1972), pp. 365-82.

tension services, and the costs of improved stock animals, insecticides, fertilizers, and equipment. No improvement in the standard of living was possible without cash crop production.

Agrarian reform and cash crop production were essential to lay new economic and social foundations for political stability within the African reserves. This also coincided with metropole interest in removing the structural blocks to expanded export production within the colony. This twin necessity led the British government to override the economic interests of the settler community for the first time. The massive administrative and military intervention which the British government originally undertook to crush the African revolt, also provided the means to implement the reforms within the reserves which the settlers had successfully blocked until the rebellion. Ultimately, this proved to be the first step in the "selling out" of the settler community for the sake of protecting the greater economic interests of the British government and the metropole corporations.

The form and manner with which the agrarian reforms were implemented were determined by British political considerations, rather than any intent of promoting economic and social development which would serve the long-range best interests of the African society.<sup>45</sup> The British saw

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45. Cf. Sorrenson, Land Reform, Chapters 8-10, for details of the implementation of the land reforms and Chapter 14 for the political basis and objectives of the reforms.

the "loyalist" element as the core of a future political elite which would protect British economic interests. Through the agrarian reform program the "loyalists" benefited considerably in additional land and political influence. All suspected "Mau Mau" were excluded from participation in the consolidation and registration procedures. Many lost their lands in the process; all were excluded as far as possible from positions on the land committees, from the district councils, and from the election of political leaders at the district and Legislative Council levels.

In addition to creating a landed "gentry" at the top of the African class structure, the agrarian reform was designed to create a peasant "yeomanry". This smallholding peasant class also had a vested interest in the land redistribution and consolidation, and formed a conservative political foundation for maintaining the status quo. At the bottom of this class structure was a large and growing class of landless dispossessed. The formation of a rural proletariat had long been feared by the colonial government. The British believed that the cash crop farms of these "gentry" and "yeoman" classes would generate a need for hired labor, a demand sufficient to absorb this rural proletariat and to eliminate it as a future political threat to the colonial system.

The agrarian reform was carried out rapidly in the five years from 1954 to 1959. As significant as the changes were, the British policy viewed them as conservative measures in the truest sense. They were designed to buttress the existing racial division of land and ownership within the colonial system. They aimed at re-establishing the self-sufficiency of the African reserves on a more modern and solid basis, and thereby removing the political pressures against the settler community and continued European colonial control. The reactivation of African politics on a nation-wide scale by 1959 proved this to be an illusion.

3. The Replacement of Settler Domination with African Nationalist Rule.

An African-initiated political crisis in 1959 signified the failure of British efforts between 1954 and 1959 to establish political reform comparable to the agrarian reforms. All organized African political activity had been banned between 1953 and 1955. In 1955 the British permitted the creation of political associations, but they were limited to the district level only in an effort to block the reformation of a nationalist movement.<sup>47</sup>

The isolation of the Central Province imposed during the Emergency and the prohibition of political participation among the Kikuyu, except for those given "loyalist certificates", led to the temporary domination of Kikuyu political activity by the "responsible" Africans who collaborated with the colonial government. Kikuyu influence in territorial politics was greatly diminished. Their leadership role was taken over by the Luo, under Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya, in particular. A rapid rise in political activity and consciousness occurred among the minority ethnic groupings which previously had been quiescent politically.

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47. Bennett, Kenya, pp. 138-39.

Given the suppression of the rebellion, the focus of the political struggle shifted back to the "constitutional" arena and to the political reform of the central political structures. Under the "Lyttleton" constitution of 1954, the British attempted to entrench the existing "multi-racial" system. African representation was increased to eight on the Legislative Council and one African was appointed as a Minister in the newly created Council of Ministers which replaced the Executive Council. The reforms represented little significant improvement in the political position of the African population. The European concept of "parity" was retained. European representation in the Legislative Council was increased to fourteen, which maintained a European representation equal to that of the non-Europeans. Three European Ministers were appointed, equaling the number of non-European Ministers. Election of African representatives continued to be rejected, in favor of nomination by the Governor, in contrast to the long-existing elective system within the European community. The exclusive hold of the Europeans in the White Highlands was reinforced in the new constitution, which gave them a veto over any laws affecting a change in existing land rights.

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48. Cf. Great Britain, Kenya: Proposals for a Reconstruction of the Government, Cmd. 9103, 1954; Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 311-12.

The political situation changed suddenly over the next three years, due to two main factors. First, the British government agreed at last to introduce elective representation for the African population. Second, a more militant, nationalist leadership and organization arose once again through the redevelopment of the trade union movement under a younger generation of Kikuyu and Luo.<sup>49</sup> The victory of this leadership in the election of representatives for the Legislative Council in 1957 led to immediate demands for further political change. The newly elected representatives refused to cooperate with the Ministerial system until new constitutional reforms were enacted.

The "Lennox-Boyd" constitution which was subsequently imposed in the fall of 1957 reflected the success of these demands.<sup>50</sup> But both the demands and the reforms represented little more than the original demands of the KAU during the immediate post-war period. African representation was increased to fourteen in the Legislative Council, which gave them representation equal to the European community for the first time. While the change gave them an excellent political forum and greater leverage, the continuation of European government officials in the Legislative Council in numbers greater than the elected representation insured firm European political control over the colonial system

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49. Cf. Tom Mboya, Freedom and After (Boston, 1963), pp. 21-91.

50. Great Britain, Kenya: Proposals for New Constitutional Arrangements, Cmnd. 309, 1957.

and kept the Council little more than advisory. This situation was reinforced by maintaining a ratio of four European ministers to two African on the Council of Ministers.

The revival of African politics on an ethnic/regional basis.

The "constitutional" struggles over the structure and composition of the Legislative Council and Council of Ministers provided an effective mechanism for the revival of African political organizing on a territorial basis. Colony-wide political parties were still banned by the government but this did not prevent the covert recreation of a nationalist movement which was much more firmly organized throughout the territory than it had been prior to the revolt. The trade union movement under Mboya was an important vehicle for organizing and linking up local and district associations. When the government threatened to crack down on the Kenya Federation of Labor (KFL) for this political activity, its function was picked up<sup>51</sup> by the Nairobi People's Convention Party (NPCP). The NPCP ostensibly was a local political organization representing Nairobi, but it provided a means by which the national leadership could coordinate with other district organizations and to expand the nationalist movement.

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51. Mboya, Freedom and After, pp. 74-78; Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 316-17.

Given this stronger political position, the nationalist leadership once again rejected the "Lennox-Boyd" constitution and the "multi-racialism" on which it was based. The rallying cry of the nationalist movement became one man one vote -- restructuring of the political system to provide an African majority, and African self-rule. The challenge was made even stronger by the demand raised for the first time that the government end the Emergency, end the political restrictions, and release the still-detained KAU leadership including Kenyatta, who was now openly declared to be the leader of the nationalist movement for all the African peoples.

In the fall of 1959, the British government gave way over the resistance of the European community, and abandoned the official policy of "multiracialism" in the face of African nationalist demands.<sup>52</sup> The Emergency was ended and national political organizations permitted. The Lancaster House Conference in early 1960 established "common-roll" elections for 1961 which would provide the Africans with a majority, even though it provided for guaranteed minority community representation for the Europeans and Asians. More importantly, it pointed towards the African political independence in the near future.

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52. Bennett, Kenya, pp. 144-50.

The political victories of the Lancaster House Conference and the impending national elections led to a breakdown of the surface unity within the African nationalist movement. Long existing divisions, rivalries, and fears among the differing ethnic groups within Kenya took on new expression in the form of "tribal" political associations joined together in national political federations or "umbrella parties." The major party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was based on the earlier nationalist movement headed by KAU. KANU represented a coalition of the dominant African groupings, the Kikuyu, Luo, Meru, Embu, Kamba, and a scattering of others. The rival political coalition which formed, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), represented the smaller ethnic groups and the pastoral societies, and included the Coastal people, Baluhya, Masai, and the Kalenjin people. The creation of the KADU opposition rested on their fears of an alliance of the two dominant African groups, the Kikuyu and Luo, and the fear that African self-rule would lead to the transfer of power to the Kikuyu leadership at the expense of the other groups. A particular fear existed that an ending of the racial land division in Kenya would result in the European lands being turned over to the Kikuyu and denied to the other groups who had rival claims.

The ethnic and regional divisions had been fostered throughout colonial rule. They were reinforced by the measures imposed during the revolt and by restrictions

placed on political organization in the late 1950's. The British continued to exploit and intensify these conflicts during the political steps they followed in the "transfer" of political rule to the Africans in the early 1960's. Limited self-government was established after the 1961 elections. The British turned to the minority party, KADU, to form a government, after the KANU leadership insisted upon the release of Kenyatta and the acceptance of him as the political leader before they would accept government office. <sup>53</sup> For two years KADU continued to hold office during this critical transitional period. The British maintained the KADU government in spite of the release of Kenyatta and the removal of all political restrictions upon him in August 1961, shortly after KADU took office.

The British stimulated these divisions also by incorporating them into the administrative reorganization in 1963. Regional boundaries were shifted to conform to the ethnic divisions and this ethnic regionalism was entrenched into the new constitution of 1963. The British exploited these issues in the effort to create a weak, decentralized African government and a federal political system in which strong regional powers would be entrenched into the new political state being constructed.

The ethnic and regional issues during this transitional period obscured the more important underlying class conflict which was emerging within African society and which

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53. Ibid., pp. 154-61.

was to take on a more overt form in the political conflicts during the post-independence period. The artificial political division between KANU and KADU also obscured the conflicts between the Kikuyu and Luo leadership which also was to emerge into the open after independence.

These underlying class and Kikuyu-Luo conflicts were related. Both reflected important differences over the economic structure of the future independent African state and over the direction economic and social development should take. The specific focus of these differences was the issue of the White Highlands and the nature of the agrarian policy to be implemented.

The renewal of the Highlands issue: land transfer and settlement.

Once the nationalist movement achieved its political demands in early 1960, the focus of the struggle shifted to the issue of the White Highlands. The Highlands had long been an exclusive preserve for White settlement. As such it was the bastion of the settler community and the source of its economic and political power. African opposition to the expropriation of these lands had existed since the early 1920's. One of the central demands of the nationalist movement had been the return of these "stolen lands", particularly on the part of

the Kikuyu. As the focus of the independence struggle shifted from the agrarian reforms in the African reserves and the political reform of the colonial government, the Highlands once again became an explosive issue. By 1959, the British government was forced to reconsider its agrarian policy as it related to the White Highlands.

By late 1959, the British announced a formal change in policy. The White Highlands was officially opened to African settlement. The British had hoped that the Swynnerton Plan, which involved extensive land consolidation and reform in the African reserves, would eliminate the pressures within the African population for any change in the status of the Highlands. This policy, like multiracialism, had failed. In revising its policy towards the White Highlands, the British initially attempted to minimize the changes. They tried to open up the Highlands to Africans on a limited basis, while protecting existing White settlement and the modern agrarian export economy of the White Highlands.

The British were not able to maintain this limited reform policy for very long. During the next four years, much more extensive changes took place as the Highlands policy rapidly passed through a number of stages in the face of impending African independence. In early 1960, the first stage involved the opening up of the Highlands Land Board to include an equal number of White, Asian

and African representatives. White monopoly was ended and so was their veto over the sale or transfer of land to African farmers. Strict economic restrictions remained, at the insistence of the settlers, and they basically were aimed at limiting African settlement. These regulations required any buyer to have the capital, experience, and ability to maintain the high farming standards already in existence. In practice, these limitations prevented any African settlement until 1961.<sup>54</sup>

The elections of 1961 and the installation of a minority African "government" forced the British to take further action on African settlement in the Highlands. A number of programs were passed which were designed to actively carry out African settlement, under a new Land Settlement and Development Board which was created in 1961. Resettlement schemes were drawn up to resettle

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54. In mid-1960, the government had introduced an initial settlement scheme program consisting of 3 basic programs: (1) an Assisted Owner Scheme for experienced farmers with substantial capital, who would be aided with loans for the purchase of settler farms; (2) a Yeoman Farmer Scheme for experienced farmers with limited capital; (3) a Peasant Farmer Scheme for farmers with limited agricultural knowledge and minimal capital. Two other programs were included, which even more clearly designed to aid the European settler to sell out: (1) a land bank fund to provide loan capital for land purchase, development, and maintaining the market values for land; (2) aid in turning European farms over to the tenants. Cf. Kenya, Legislative Assembly, Debates (1960), LXXXVI, pp. 1 ff., for the proposal and following debate. By the end of 1961, only a dozen assisted owners and 100 smallholders had settled in the Highlands; Cf. IBRD, The Economic Development of Kenya (Baltimore, 1963), p. 83.

Africans on the undeveloped areas within the Highlands. As yet, the existing settler estates were left untouched.

The resettlement schemes involved a 2½ year program which was financed with \$22.4M in loans from the British government, the Colonial Development Corporation, the World Bank, and the government of West Germany.<sup>55</sup> The program projected the settlement of Africans on 180,000 acres within the Highlands, out of a total of 7,650,000 acres of potential farmland in the Highlands. The program was based on two different categories of resettlement: a "low density" scheme with farms of 250 acres and a "high density" scheme with farms of 50 acres.

This resettlement plan was still highly limited. Restrictions continued to exist, which required skilled African farmers with fairly high incomes. The program was designed to exclude those Africans most badly in need of settlement, the landless unemployed. It aimed at disturbing the existing White settlement as little as possible.

The last stage in the evolution of the Highlands agrarian policy took place only a year later. In

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55. Cf. "Between Kenyatta and MacCleod," Economist, 199(May 20, 1961), p. 788-91; also "Battle for the land," New Statesmen, 61(May 12, 1961), p. 740.

October 1962 the One Million Acre Scheme was introduced.<sup>56</sup> Past restrictions were eliminated. More important, the Scheme represented a large and rapid expansion of land resettlement and introduced the redistribution of land from European to African settlers for the first time. One million acres of White settler estates were to be purchased over a five year period. During the first year, 221 European farms were bought, totaling 295,000 acres. A new high density scheme was established in which 200,000 acres were allotted for settlement of peasant farmers on holdings of 20 acres. The remaining 95,000 acres were allotted for two projects: a low density scheme for farmers on 35 acre plots and an "assisted owners" scheme in which a number of Africans would be aided financially to purchase White settler farms averaging 400 acres.

The One Million Acre Scheme was established because of the highly unstable and volatile political situation which developed between 1961 and 1963. The division of the nationalist movement into two rival coalitions reflected the emergence of intensified inter-African political conflict. In this political context, the continued presence of the settler community and the nature of the land redistribution and resettlement program in the Highlands became a highly explosive issue.

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56. Cf. Kenya, Department of Settlement, The Million Acre Scheme, 1962-1966 (Nairobi, 1966).

Pressures developed from below for the seizure of the settler estates and the provision of free land to the large number of landless unemployed. These pressures were particularly acute among the Kikuyu, who had never accepted the "ownership" rights of the settlers in the first place and who opposed the program of purchasing the settler farms and placing the burden of repayment upon the resettled farmers. An important element among this popular African movement was the former "Mau Mau" fighters and detainees who had lost out in the land redistribution and consolidation within the reserves. This "Land and Freedom Army" attempted to move into the Highlands and take over land as "squatters".<sup>57</sup>

The movement, and the political conflicts connected with it, were intensified due to the scheduling of general elections for the Spring of 1963. At this time, an African government was to be elected into office on the basis of internal self-government. The conflict involved more than the rivalry between KANU and KADU. It also involved conflicts between the radical and more moderate wings within KANU. An important issue in this

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57. For examples, see the East African Standard during the Spring of 1963. Its continuation at the point of independence is indicated in The New York Times, March 28, 1964.

conflict became the issue of the nationalization of the settler lands.<sup>58</sup>

The British had been able to exploit the breakdown of the nationalist movement into two rival parties and to mold the resettlement program in the Highlands according to their own interests in 1961. The British gained the cooperation of the KADU "government" in this effort and this indicates a major element in the British decision to turn to KADU in 1961, rather than KANU. Faced with the problem of gaining political power in the future 1963 elections, KANU in turn moved to accept the moderate reform program of the British in the Highlands. The moderate position of Kenyatta and Mboya won out over the more radical program of Kaggia and Odinga.

The events of 1961 to 1963 indicate that the African leadership shared the British concern over the fate of the Highlands economy and also shared the same view towards the overall economic policy to be pursued in an independent Kenya. Economic stability and the orderly economic growth of the system through expanded agrarian export production were considered

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58. An excellent, detailed analysis of this period may be found in John W. Harbeson, Nation-Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform (Evanston, 1973), p. 81 ff. While the work by Harbeson was published after this thesis was written and was not available for reference, the author reaches substantially the same conclusions as those in the thesis.

much more important than land redistribution and the promotion of economic and social equality. The preservation of the large settler estates was considered crucial for these economic objectives. Thus the resettlement program was designed to alleviate the land pressures from below and remove the Highlands as an explosive political issue.

To achieve this objective, the One Million Acre Scheme was speeded up as independence approached. A compromise had been reached between the British and the African leadership. The British for the first time separated their insistence upon preserving the Highlands modern economic sector from their protection of the settlers. They were willing to sacrifice the latter to insure the former. This "sacrifice", however, was limited, for the British were able to achieve a land distribution program which paid the settlers for their land and prevented outright expropriation.

The African leadership in turn accepted the form in which resettlement was implemented by the British. This essentially followed the outlines of the Swynnerton Plan. Settlement was based on the creation of a small-holding class of farmers and private ownership. Resettlement was limited, mostly, to land within the highlands which was either undeveloped or was grazing rather than the richer farmlands of the settlers. While both the

British and the African leadership considered the land redistribution and resettlement as uneconomical and opposed it, they agreed on the immediate political necessity for it.<sup>59</sup>

The Kenyatta government, which came to power in May 1963, cooperated with the British in carrying out the limited Highlands program as quickly as possible, to avoid political instability at the point of independence. The program extended the class development which the Swynnerton Plan had entrenched in Kenya. It locked the new African government into an expensive land program which benefited the few at the expense of the mass of the African population. The leadership which gained political power also stood to gain by this agrarian program based on private ownership.

The underlying issues created by colonial rule, however, remained to be resolved.

World War II had greatly intensified the existing land and racial conflict within Kenya. It also reinforced the structure of the colonial system established during the early formative period and consolidated between the wars. The British attempted to modify this

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59. N.S. Carey Jones, The Anatomy of Uhuru (New York, 1966), p. 144-78.

colonial formation after the war under the policy of "multi-racialism," in order to establish a firmer foundation for European control within Kenya and to maintain imperial domination within a more integrated East African colonial sphere.

The British effort broke down, since it strengthened rather than resolved the contradictory forces generated by colonial rule. British policy thwarted African efforts to create a unified nationalist movement and blocked the attempt by the nationalist movement to gain political dominance within the colonial state through constitutional means.

Increased overcrowding, deterioration and social disintegration within the reserves led to open conflict between the main antagonistic elements within the colonial system: the African nationalist movement, led by the Kikuyu; and the settler dominated European community. British policy led inexorably to the large-scale "Mau Mau" revolt in 1952.

The rebellion also brought the latent conflict between settler and metropole interests to the surface. The reestablishment of direct imperial control during the military conditions of the revolt led the British to modify the political and economic structure within the colony in order to protect their long-range economic interests.

First, extensive agrarian reform was imposed within the African areas, primarily among the Kikuyu in Central Province, the central source of the revolt. These reforms were based on consolidation of the land into smallholder farms based on private ownership. The reforms increased the capitalist penetration into African society, reinforced the emerging African class system, and strengthened the dominant role of the Kikuyu among the ethnic groups.

Second, the British imposed a controlled and limited transfer of settler land to the Africans within the Highlands. The expensive Highlands program guaranteed compensation to the settlers whose land was transferred and heavily mortgaged the smallholder African settlers and the Kenya government for the future. The program also preserved large-scale farming in the Highlands, capitalist ownership of the land, and the basic structure of the agrarian export economy.

The transfer of political rule to the African leadership was made contingent upon the parallel land transfer and reform. The implementation of capitalist land ownership within the African lands prior to independence blocked alternative agrarian policies after independence and profoundly affected the direction of development after political independence. The collaboration of the African political leadership indicated the vested interest they had in the land reforms as an emerging bourgeoisie.

## CHAPTER SIX

### TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE: TANZANIA FROM 1945-1961

As in Kenya, cumulative social, economic and political pressures had built up in Tanzania during the depression of the 1930's and the war period. They found release during the immediate post-war period in the rapid development of African organizations.

The immediate organizational form was not a nationalist political movement, unlike Kenya, but the formation of numerous ethnic, cultural, and regional associations. In addition, there was a significant development of economic organizations in the form of marketing cooperatives and labor unions.

The only political organization existing was the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) and it was more a social than a political organization. The TAA was formed in the late 1920's with government support and remained limited to a small number of civil servants, teachers and traders. Its importance lay in the nucleus it provided for the formation of the nationalist movement, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954.

The absence of any more directly political organization reflected the disruption that took place in Tanzania during World War I and the subsequent "transfer" of the colony to British rule. It also indicated that the de-

struction of German settler community and the subsequent stagnation of economic growth in Tanzania modified the destructive impact of colonial rule upon the African population. At the same time, it retarded the development of African political activity.

While African energies were primarily focused on economic and social activities until 1954, the growing restrictions and regulations of the colonial government turned the social and economic associations towards quasi-political action. These associations provided the organizational base for the TAA to reach out into the countryside. The growing linkage between these organizations led to the transformation of the TAA into a nationalist political movement.

The growth of TANU as a nationalist movement took place rapidly between 1954 and 1958, when they succeeded in obtaining the first direct elections in Tanzania. Government repression of TANU's political organizing activities was not severe enough to crush the movement, but sufficient to alienate the population and to unify nearly all elements with TANU against colonial rule.

TANU's overwhelming sweep of the 1958-59 elections consolidated its position as the sole nationalist movement. The victory forced the government to reverse its position and to proceed rapidly in the transfer of political rule to the TANU leadership. This was made necessary not only

by the political success of TANU at the central level, but by the collapse of government administrative authority and control at the local level. The TANU leadership assumed the position of limited self-government after the elections of August 1960. Political independence followed quickly in December 1961.

1. The Emergence of the Nationalist Movement in Tanzania.

TANU was formed as a territorial and mass nationalist party out of the transformation of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA), which had existed in Tanzania since the late 1920's.<sup>1</sup> TAA was formed between 1927 and 1929 in Dar es Salaam through the promotion of the colonial government. Its membership was small and composed of an emerging African middle class elite, mainly civil servants, teachers and traders. The organization remained more a social than a political association throughout the 1930's and the war period. It received encouragement from the colonial administration because the government was concerned with absorbing this emergent class into the exist-

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1. For brief but good studies of TANU's history, see George Bennett, "An Outline History of TANU," Makerere Journal, No. 7 (1963), p. 1-18, and Ralph A. Austen, "Notes on the Pre-History of TANU," Makerere Journal, No. 9 (1964), p. 1-6.

frequently were transferred to other districts when they took part in activities which displeased the government.

More importantly, the TAA was composed of a township elite with little or no ties to the countryside. Until the early 1950's, they remained isolated from the mass of the rural population which alone could provide the organizational basis for any political activity of potential influence.

The rapid growth of economic and ethnic, social organizations following World War II.

In the absence of any centrally political organization comparable to the KAU, quasi-political organizing among the African population took place in the form of separate ethnic or "tribal" associations, such as the Sukuma Union, Meru Citizens Union, Bahaya Association, Chagga Cultural Association, Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union, Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union, and the Arusha Citizens Union. Ethnic and regionally based, these associations emerged in response to the growing disruption of their traditional source of unity, protection and promotion of their basic interests.

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4. For descriptions of these associations and their development, see Hugh W. Stephens, The Political Transformation of Tanganyika: 1920-1967 (New York, 1968), p. 62-106; Margaret Bates, "Tangan-

The original focus of these associations was the assertion of cultural identity and unity, mutual aid (particularly among the growing number of townspeople), and economic improvement. The issues they were concerned with were not just social, but political as well, and their efforts led to a growing political consciousness, more openly political activities, and the creation of organizational networks which were to form the basis for future political mobilization against the colonial system.

A few of these associations dated from before the war, like the organizations among the Chagga and Haya, who were disrupted and transformed the most by the extensive penetration of the cash crop economy within their societies. Most of them were formed following World War II, like the Sukuma Union (1945), a consequence of the rapid social and economic changes created by war-time conditions and the economic boom which followed the war.

The economic issues which formed the primary element underlying the rapid growth of organized African protest in Tanzania were substantially different than in neighboring Kenya. They gave a different political shape to the struggle. The rigid reserve system, the explosive issue over expropriated lands, and prohibitions against export cash

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yika," in Gwendolyn Carter, ed., African One-Party States (Ithaca, 1962); Maguire, Toward "Uhuru"; Goran Hyden, Political Development in Rural Tanzania (Nairobi, 1969); Kathleen Stahl, Tanganyika: Sail in the Wilderness (The Hague, 1961); Anton Nelson, The Freeman of Meru (Nairobi, 1967).

crop production in Kenya -- and particularly the concentration of these issues in the highlands among the Kikuyu-- were not the primary issues in Tanzania. Nor were the economic and social demands blocked by a dominant settler community as in Kenya, where the only recourse was open conflict with and political challenge of the settler position.

The settler community did not hold the dominant position that it did in Kenya. European estate and plantation holdings were scattered around the periphery of Tanzania, rather than concentrated as in the highlands area of Kenya. The settler community was shattered even more by World War II, when the German settler population, which had been growing gradually once again throughout the 1930's, was detained and their properties seized. The dominant settler position in the political structure in Kenya was also absent in Tanzania. European "unofficial" representation on the Legislative Council was small and on an appointive basis, as was the case among the Asian and African<sup>5</sup> representatives.

The African peasantry had long had access to cash crop production, had developed this along fairly modern lines in a very few areas like Kilimanjaro and northwest Tanzania, and were rapidly expanding such activities in additional

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5. African representation was first established in 1945, with the appointment of two Africans, and expanded to four by 1948.

areas like Sukumaland after the war. Parallel to the agricultural development was an emerging commercial stratum within the African population which sought to establish themselves as traders, merchants, and businessmen in the face of the traditional Asian monopoly within these economic areas. Farmers and entrepreneurs both ran into structural restrictions which blocked them from further economic "integration" within the capitalist economic system in a number of ways.

African smallholding farmers ran into an ever-growing series of administrative regulations, established in the name of agrarian "reforms," which restricted and governed their lives in any increasingly authoritarian way. Compulsory destocking regulations were passed and enforced with growing severity, as the government's solution to overstocking, over grazing, and a growing deterioration of the land. Like similar measures in Kenya, the destocking measures forced the Africans to sell their cattle at fixed low prices, and imposed a tax on the sale of cattle in addition during the compulsory destocking process. African frustration and opposition increased as it became clear that the destocking program mainly benefited the European Meat Packers Company, by providing them a regular and ample source of cheap cattle.

Additional regulations imposed tie-ridging upon African peasants in efforts to avert soil erosion. The program involved a heavy output of labor, with little apparant economic

return to the African. It was imposed upon the Africans without providing them with any clear understanding of possible long term benefits the program might provide. A multitude of additional regulations governed when they could grow crops, what kind of crops, the procedures for cultivation, restrictions on population movement and expansion into new land areas, land clearance and timber cutting, and many more.

Many of these issues linked economically with the frustrating restrictions experienced by the growing strata of African traders, storekeepers, and business entrepreneurs. The latter found their commercial efforts blocked by the existing commercial monopoly of the Asian "middle class" in the colonial structure. The Asians were strongly entrenched and they had a great deal more capital and business expertise with which to undercut African commercial efforts. These factors placed the would-be African entrepreneur on a severely unequal competitive basis. This unequal relationship was reinforced by the attitudes and practices of the European colonial administration. The government preached "free trade" and "open economic competition," but in practice gave exclusive marketing and trading rights to the entrenched Asian community.

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6. Cf. Maguire, Towards "Uhuru," p. 142.

The marketing and trade of African agrarian production provided the link of mutual interest between African farmers and traders. Both were keenly aware of sharp and fraudulent practices exercised by the Asian traders in their efforts to exploit the Africans and maintain their commercial monopoly. African organizational efforts to overcome these structural barriers and exploitative practices took the form of cooperative development.

The rapid growth of the African cooperative movement in Tanzania after the war exposed the contradictions and conflicts within the agrarian policy of the colonial government. The government sought to expand the production of export cash crops. The government was also aware and concerned about the Asian exploitation of the Africans at the grassroots. But the emergence of a strong, large-scale cooperative organization within the African population was a political threat to the existing administrative structure the government had created through indirect rule and which was based on the "native authority" structure and chiefly rule. Any modern African organization inevitably moved towards rivalry with this government-created political structure and posed the possibility of political challenge to colonial rule.

Sukumaland: the locus of development and leadership.

The emergence of these issues and conflicts can be seen most clearly in the mushrooming economic and political developments in Sukumaland during the post-war period. The Lake Province became the major focal point for economic and political activity between the crucial years of 1950 and 1954.<sup>7</sup> Near the end of the war, the Mwanza African Traders Cooperative Society (MATCS) was formed. Mwanza was the largest township and economic center in the Lake Province. MATCS sought to improve the competitive position of African traders through cooperative organization, and was one of the first efforts of its kind within the African population. Initially they focused upon the wholesale provisioning of manufactured goods to African storekeepers. Their initial efforts to move into the marketing of African produced crops were failures because of the entrenched strength of the Asians.

MATCS finally began to achieve success when it turned its efforts, under the leadership of Paul Bomani, to the marketing needs of the African cotton producers.<sup>8</sup> Cotton was the major cash crop produced among the Sukuma in the Lake Province and the economic issue which most concerned

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7. These historical events are described and analyzed excellently in Maguire, Towards "Uhuru", the work upon which the following section is mainly based.

8. Ibid., p. 83 ff.

the rural farming peasantry. Beginning in 1950, MATCS turned to the promotion of local cooperative societies among the African cotton producers, in emulation of the successful developments of the Chagga and Haya coffee producers. The cooperative movement gave the peasant farmers the organizational strength to arrange the marketing of their own crops, and to eliminate the Asian traders who were able to exploit them as individual producers.

MATCS was able to build upon village organizations which had been developing between 1945 and 1950. These organizations sought to provide supervision over the Asian traders to prevent the cheating techniques which were widely practiced by the Asian traders: underweighing of the cotton loads, excessive reduction for the weight of the containers, use of inaccurate scales, and non-payment for fractional weights. These practices were estimated by the government to cheat the African farmers of an average of fifteen per cent of the value of their crops.<sup>9</sup>

The formation of cooperative societies provided an alternative means for African marketing. The peasant farmers were able to market their own crops directly to the government Lint and Seed Marketing Board, and to eliminate the Asian middlemen. The demand for such an economic organization was so great among the rural peasantry

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9. Ibid., p. 86.

that a full-scale organizing tour by the officials of MATCS in the spring of 1952 led to formation of dozens of local or primary cooperative societies. This success in turn led MATCS to form an over-arching Lake Province Growers Association (LPGA) which united the different primary cooperative societies in a larger union.<sup>10</sup> With subscription collected from these cooperative societies, the MATCS moved to purchase transport and to create a permanent organizational structure for the collection, transport, and marketing of the cotton crop for 1952.

The cooperative movement which sprung up so quickly under the leadership of the MATCS was organized independently of the government administration and without either their approval or formal recognition through the "registration" of the cooperative societies and LPGA. The action and the threat of boycott forced the administration to give its limited approval, despite its distrust of the African organization. LPGA was accepted as the sole agent for the marketing of cotton in the areas in which the primary cooperative societies had formed and replaced the Asians who previously had held a marketing monopoly.

The success of the development in 1952 led to a much greater expansion in the following year. By 1953 there were thirty-eight officially recognized cooperative societies

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10. Ibid., p. 89.

grouped under the LPGA, where there had been none before 1952. Dozens more were formed and had applied for governmental registration and approval.<sup>11</sup>

The independent movement placed the government in a conflicting position. The movement was generating a tremendous expansion of cotton production, a primary objective of colonial policy, as seen in the following table:<sup>12</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cotton Production in Bales</u>
1922	3,000
1948	25,000
1953	38,000
1955	100,000
1957	150,000
1963	235,000

The colonial administration also felt a great deal of political apprehension in the face of this independent organizational development. Both the MATCS and LPGA were able to tap many political grievances that the African peasantry felt towards the "native authorities" and the government in their successful organizing efforts to forge the cooperative movement. The government rushed a cooperative officer to the Lake Province to "supervise" the developing cooperative movement. It wanted to insure that

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11. Ibid., p. 98-99.

12. Ibid., p. 81.

cooperative activities remained within limited economic bounds and that the organization based itself on "sound economic and cooperative principles"<sup>13</sup> -- that is, avoided any political role which challenged the existing colonial administrative order.

Governmental opposition focused on the formation of a province-wide centralized cooperative organization. The cooperative movement effectively was organizing to link the growing number of local cooperative societies into larger unions, nineteen in all, into a centralized provincial organization called the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions (VFCU). Initially, the administration attempted to restrict the cooperative movement to local "independent" cooperative societies, but the political struggle was short-lived. Within two years the government reversed itself and the VFCU obtained official acceptance and registration in 1955.<sup>14</sup>

Political opposition by the government clearly had aided the cooperative movement's efforts to expand its membership and organizational development. Continued opposition, in the face of the growing strength of the cooperative movement, threatened to turn specific economic and political grievances among the cooperative membership into full-scale political opposition, a political develop-

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13. Ibid., p. 98, based on government district files.

14. Ibid., p. 99.

ment the government wanted to avoid. Just as important, a large-scale, centralized cooperative organization was generating a rapid increase in production and promised to make agrarian production and marketing much more efficient and economical. The political fears of the administration were overcome by the clear economic benefits which the British desired. The larger cooperative organization promised to provide these economic benefits where administrative programs had failed.

TANU: the transformation of TAA into a nationalist movement.

The rapid development of the cooperative movement from 1950 to 1954 did not occur in isolation. A parallel development of the TAA took place. It was transformed from a small town-based elite organization to a militant, mass-based political movement throughout the Lake Province. The transformation took place mainly through the TAA's interlinking ties with the cooperative movement. The Growers Association -- and later the VFCU -- created an organizational base and a politicization of the mass rural population which the TAA was able to link to and build upon for the first time. As the VFCU deliberately curtailed overt political activities in its efforts to gain official acceptance from the government, the TAA took

over and extended this political role on a mass, militant nationalist basis.

Political conflict between the administration and the TAA emerged above all over the assertion of the TAA to be a legitimate, representative of the African people.<sup>15</sup> The government refused to accept this political authority of the TAA. As in Kenya, the British had utilized a policy of indirect rule to create a conservative, "traditional" system of local administration based on chiefs and headmen. These "native authorities" were turned into agents of the British administration and provided with a power and authority they never had exercised prior to the imposition of colonial rule. The native authorities provided an organizational facade through which the administration imposed those policies, programs and regulations which they desired, irrespective of the needs and wishes of the African population.

The TAA actively supported the social and economic grievances of the African farmers and traders and opposed the restrictive regulations of the administration. It refused to accept the government's political position that any grievances or differences with government policy must be dealt with procedurally through the Native Authori-

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15. Ibid., p. 112-59. Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika (New York, 1965), p. 218-51. The adamant position of the representative of Great Britain against the representativeness of TANU during the debates over the Reports of the U.N. Visiting Missions clearly indicated the view of the imperial power.

ties who "legislated" these policies and regulations as the only "legitimate" representatives of the people. The chiefs and headmen generally viewed the activities of the cooperative leadership and the TAA as a threat to their authority and privileged position. The rise of alternate African organizations such as the cooperative movement, TAA, and Sukuma Union led the chiefs to ally all the more closely with the colonial government. As they moved to repress the leadership and members of the new organizations, the chiefs alienated most of the population and generated a situation of open conflict.

The conflict emerged as strongly and openly as it did during the early 1950's because the development of modern African political organizations clashed headlong with the political reform policies which the colonial government began imposing from 1949 onward in the name of "multiracialism."

These "reforms" represented a reversal of government policy which existed prior to World War II. At that time, the colonial government refused to carry through its policy of indirect rule to its natural conclusion. The formation of ethnic or "tribal" councils above the district level was considered but rejected. It would have created federated councils of the chiefdoms within each ethnic group and a territorial African Council equivalent to the Euro-

pean Legislative Council. The government refused to carry out this policy for fear it would unify the Africans under a centralized, hierarchical organization and provide a central leadership which would have the power to challenge British rule.<sup>16</sup>

For this very reason, the immediate post-war period led to the formation of ethnic associations which pressured for such a political organization. They demanded as well that representation within higher level councils be opened up to the emerging modern elite. The government reversed its policy in order to provide a more efficient system of native authority administration, one which would be capable of promoting the agrarian reforms and expanded production that were the main priorities of the British following the war. Once again, the conflict between the requirements of political control and of economic expansion led to the modification of colonial policy.

While enacting political reform, the government counted on two measures to provide a new basis for political control along conservative lines. First, the new levels of the administrative system were turned into councils with a more expanded representation, but a representation which was appointed and overwhelmingly "henchmen" of the chiefs. Thus the newly created Sukumaland Federated Council consisted of an expanded represen-

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16. Cf. Ralph A. Austen, Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule: Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939 (New Haven, 1968), p. 147-257.

tation which lent the appearance of change but operated no differently than the Native Authorities of the past.<sup>17</sup>

Second, the administration tried to institute a multiracial composition to the Provincial and eventually the district councils.<sup>18</sup> Rather than representing a strictly separate African political organization along "traditional" lines, these councils were designed to have Asian and European representation also. In developing this policy, the British sought to insure an element in the councils which would provide a more modern and efficient leadership than the chiefs could provide. They also tried to undercut the development of an African nationalist movement, like the KAU in Kenya, by entrenching the concept and practice of multi-racial parity within a single political and administrative organization throughout the territory, from the district level right up to the Legislative Council.

In challenging the chiefs in council, or the traditional "native authorities," the new African leadership was challenging the existing political structure which the British were striving to perpetuate in modified form. In the early 1950's, this challenge to the colonial government was covert, but by 1953-1954 it had taken on the form of open conflict with the colonial authorities.

In 1953, the government began rigidly enforcing a regulation that prohibited government employees from par-

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17. Maguire, Toward "Uhuru", p. 19-26.

18. Ibid., p. 32-36, 196-207.

ticipating in political organizations. The measure was aimed primarily at the TAA and did harm the association in a number of areas. Lake Province was not affected much by the regulation. Most of the leadership at this point no longer were government employees, but had become full-time political organizers. The leadership of the TAA conducted organizing tours throughout the province in 1953, in a direct effort to mobilize the population politically behind them. They called open mass meetings to protest the government's regulations, on a scale similar to that of KAU in Kenya. These actions in themselves presented an open challenge to the authority of the chiefs and to the governmental administration.<sup>19</sup>

A nationalist territorial movement was beginning to emerge in Tanzania and the Lake Province in 1953 was in the forefront of this political development. A major factor was the growth in organizational linkages. Links were growing within each of the regions between the TAA and other ethnic and economic organizations, like the close ties that developed in Lake Province among the TAA, the cooperative movement, and the Sukuma Union. Such linkages were growing not only within a region, but between the major regions of the colony.

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19. Ibid., p. 149-59.

These links reflected a growing awareness of common interests and related struggles. This process was seen graphically during the 1953 politicizing tour in Lake Province. One of the main figures among the political leadership was Japhet Kirilo, leader of the Meru Citizens Union and an official of the Meru TAA branch. Kirilo was the primary spokesman for the Meru in their struggle against the expropriation of Meru land for European Dairy farmers. <sup>20</sup>

The Meru land struggle had become an international issue, and gained widespread prominence when Kirilo had presented the Meru case to the United Nations in 1952. Both the land issue and Kirilo were widely known among the Sukuma in Lake Province. The turnout and response to Kirilo in the organizational tour of the Lake Province clearly indicated the broadening of issues among the African groups, from specific land, economic, commercial, social and other grievances into a nationalist struggle against British colonial rule.

The political protest and mobilization was spreading so rapidly among the African population that the government initiated even stronger measures in those regions of greatest tension. The administration banned public meetings in Bukoba, among the Haya, in an effort to stifle African opposition. When the TAA branch insisted in holding a meeting anyway, in the fall of 1953, it was forceably

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20. Ibid., p. 150-51; Nelson, Freemen, p. 63-77, passim.

broken up by the administration through the use of tear gas. This immediately provided a political issue which further solidified the nationalist movement against the colonial government.<sup>21</sup>

Julius Nyerere had taken over the presidency of the Dar es Salaam branch of the TAA and was seeking to revive it as the headquarters of a more unified political movement. Nyerere came to the Lake Province in an attempt to mediate between the administration and the TAA of the province. He and the rest of the leadership appealed directly to the governor to intervene, meet with the TAA over the the issues involved, and reach a peaceful accomodation. The governor did come to the Lake Province in February 1954, and had intimated that a request for a meeting through official channels would receive a favorable response. While in Mwanza, however, he preemptorally refused to see them to grant any recognition to the TAA leadership as an independent political organization. The government continued its policy of denying the right of Africans to operate politically outside of the existing administrative system.

The climax of the growing conflict came in the summer and fall of 1954. In July, 1954, the growing transformation of the TAA into a closely knit and militantly nationalist political organization was acknowledged formal-

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21. Maguire, Towards "Uhuru", p. 152-59.

ly. A territorial meeting of all branch officials changed the name of the organization to the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).<sup>22</sup> By November, the government clearly moved towards a policy of open repression against this nationalist movement. It banned the Lake Province of TANU headquarters and all the branches in Sukumaland.<sup>23</sup> The government action effectively closed down the TANU political organization in Sukumaland, which until that time represented the most militant leadership of the nationalist movement in Tanzania. The movement continued to develop, however, as the Dar es Salaam headquarters of TANU, under Nyerere's leadership, escalated the nationalist political struggle during the next five years against a resistant and repressive colonial government.

2. Colonial Repression and the Rapid Success of TANU as a Mass Nationalist Movement.

In the short period of five years, from 1954 to 1959, TANU developed into a mass nationalist movement which challenged and won the struggle against the British

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22. Ibid., p. 170-76; Listowel, Tanganyika, p. 218-27.

23. Maguire, Towards "Uhuru", p. 176-79; Stephens, Political Transformation, p. 127-29.

for political control over the colonial state. By December, 1959, the British Colonial Office accepted a political restructuring of the colonial government. The British guaranteed limited self-government under TANU leadership following elections to be held in August of 1960 and promised political independence for the immediate future. <sup>24</sup>

TANU's success in developing from a small elite organization to a mass movement is reflected in its snowballing membership: 15,00 in 1954; 100,000 in 1956; 500,000 in 1959; and one million in mid-1960. <sup>25</sup> It's actual popular support was many times larger than these figures of dues-paying membership. More important than membership was the fact that TANU rapidly emerged as the sole African political organization of any weight or representativeness. TANU was a nationalist movement which extended throughout the territory and transcended all ethnic and regional ties, in contrast to Kenya where a multiplicity of ethnic and regionally based parties emerged in the form of opposing political coalitions, KANU and KADU.

The "constitutional" political struggle and government repression.

The political struggle conducted by TANU took place on a "constitutional" level primarily. Its objective was

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24. Stephens, Political Transformation, p. 145-46.

25. Ibid., p. 133, 146.

restructuring the central government which would give the African leadership political control within the colonial state. In contrast to the ongoing revolt in neighboring Kenya, the political struggle in Tanzania remained both peaceful and moderate. This was so because TANU was successful in its efforts within a remarkably short time. A critical factor in this success was the small, fragmented and relatively powerless settler community in Tanzania compared to the entrenched, powerful and all-dominant settler community in Kenya. The critical role of the settler community can be seen in the sharp contrast between TANU's success and the failure of the nationalist movement in Kenya one and even two decades earlier.

The political demands of the KAU in the immediate post-war period differed very little from the demands raised one decade later by TANU for the first time in Tanzania. What was impossible in the late 1940's became acceptable in the late 1950's after a relatively brief struggle. The nationalist movement in Tanzania benefited greatly from its late development in comparison to its counterpart in Kenya. TANU also benefited from the small, heterogeneous, and geographically scattered nature of the settler population in Tanzania. This had prevented the European community from obtaining the political and economic monopoly it had achieved in Kenya and created a political situation in

which TANU did not have to struggle with a political veto against change by the settler population.<sup>26</sup>

The rapid development of organized political activity from 1954 onward was generated by the extensive underlying economic and social changes during the previous decade, but the repressive policies with which the colonial administration responded to independent political activity proved to be the major catalyst in the formation of a unified nationalist movement under TANU leadership. Government repression was not severe enough to crush the new nationalist movement but sufficient to alienate the large majority of the population, lead them to identify their specific grievances with nationalist issues, and leave nearly all elements of the population with no alternative other than to unify with TANU against colonial rule.

The rudimentary class formation and limited class conflict within the African population contributed to the rapidity and ease with which different elements were able

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26. This element is much more crucial than the trusteeship position of Tanzania, which frequently has been cited as a significant, positive factor in Tanzania's achievement of independence. This work does not view the factor of trusteeship as playing a very significant role. It did provide an international forum through the U.N. Visiting Missions and subsequent General Assembly debates. The Reports and debates never led Britain to a policy different than that which the government chose for imperial reasons. As has been indicated above, Tanzania was administered and treated like any other British crown colony, regardless of its trusteeship status. Cf. B. T. G. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (London, 1961), p. 40-41, and passim. Chidzero concludes the trusteeship status did influence Tanzania's development strongly, but the body of his work does not substantiate this.

to unify within the nationalist movement. This factor is most clearly seen in Sukumaland, and helps explain why it became a major locus of the political struggle, rather than Chaggaland. The striking expansion of cotton production and penetration of the cash economy in Sukumaland following World War II had triggered off significant social changes. The growing socio-economic differentiation among the Sukuma was recent enough that emerging class lines were still fluid. The growing stratum of businessmen and traders remained farmers also, linked to the land and to the farming peasantry.<sup>27</sup> The interests of both were still allied, in comparison to the frustration and conflict they experienced mutually with the colonial rulers. The more developed and rigid class formation among the Kikuyu in Kenya, in contrast, divided and fatally weakened the nationalist movement under KAU.

The colonial government in Tanzania viewed the growing African leadership as a small number of "self-seeking" individuals, "trouble-makers" who did not represent the African people and were out to exploit them for their own benefit, through undermining "authority" and "good government" -- which the British equated as one and the same. This attitude was reflected in a statement of the Governor to the Legislative Council in May, 1954,

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27. Maguire, Towards "Uhuru", Chapter 5.

during the passage of the Registration of Societies Ordinance, which was designed to suppress political activities the colonial government disliked:

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My attention has been drawn to attempts which have been made in some parts of the territory by self-seeking individuals, usually men of straw, who, having appointed themselves as political leaders, have tried to stir up the people against their Native Authorities, and in some cases the Central Government, by exploiting local grievances real or imaginary. They do not hesitate to collect money; indeed, large sums of money from many ignorant or unsuspecting people which they have little qualms in using, or rather misusing, for their own benefit and aggrandizement. This cannot be allowed to continue and Government will not tolerate such activities which are contrary to the best interests of the people and are designed to damage, if not destroy, good government. Respect for authority, which is an inherent trait in the African character, must be preserved.

The refusal to register TANU provincial headquarters and branches in Sukumaland -- in practice, the banning of TANU and suppression of political activity -- indicated the type of harassment the administration undertook against the nationalist movement wherever it experienced TANU as a threat to existing administrative control. TANU offices were closed down or prohibited from being established in various districts and locations. Permission for public meetings increasingly was prohibited. The usual excuse was that TANU incited the population against the administration and encouraged people to refuse to comply with the multitude of regulations which were the expression of "good government" in the eyes of the administra-

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28. Quoted in Ibid., p. 172. See also p. 163-79.

tion. The expression of real grievances and criticism of existing regulatory requirements were seen as attacks on "law and order" and repressed through the arrests of local TANU officials.<sup>29</sup>

The government repression aided in the politicization of the African population. Dislike of specific regulations gradually was transformed into rejection of and resistance to the political system which imposed these regulations in disregard of African interests. More and more Africans became conscious of the fact that their problems were not just economic or social, but were ultimately political. Their opposition turned towards the political process -- and the colonial authorities behind this process -- which allowed them no voice in the governing of their lives. Deprived of participation within the existing authoritarian political system at local, district and territorial levels, they turned to TANU as the only organization which represented and actively supported their interests in opposition to the European administrators and the Native Authorities.

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29. Cf. The East African Standard, during the years 1954-1958, for numerous examples of government harassment, repression, arrests and closure of offices.

The failure of multi-racialism and shift in government policy.

The political structure of the central government and the position of the Africans within it changed rapidly from 1954 to 1959. In April 1955, the British implemented a revision of the Legislative and Executive Councils along the lines of "multi-racialism," the modified policy through which they hoped to create a more stable base for continued colonial rule.<sup>30</sup> In the Legislative Council, nine provincially based constituencies were created, from each of which representatives were appointed, one from each racial grouping. Three representatives at large were established on the same basis, which gave the African population ten appointed unofficial representatives. At one stroke, the Africans obtained greater representation and a more effective political platform at the territorial level than existed in Kenya.

One year later, in April 1956, the government announced the first election of representatives would take place in 1958.<sup>31</sup> While the electoral procedures passed in the 1957 Legislative Council established common roll

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30. Stephens, Political Transformation, p. 127; Taylor, Political Development, p. 134-35, as well as 124-35.

31. Stephens, Political Transformation, p. 137-40; Taylor, Political Development, p. 138-59; Listowel, Tanganyika, p. 283-302.

elections, it also severely restricted the eligibility of voters and created a complicated tri-partite system of voting along the lines of the existing "multi-racial" representation. Each voter had to cast three votes, one for each of the three racial group's candidates. TANU, following the lead of the Kenya nationalist leadership, maintained up until January that it would boycott these elections, based its demands for an end to the multi-racial basis of representation and for universal voting. In January, it changed its position and decided to support those European and Asian candidates who favored the ANU program.

The elections were held in two stages, in September of 1958 and February of 1959. TANU and TANU-supported candidates swept the field, winning every constituency.<sup>32</sup> Seeing these results in the first stage of the elections, the British had no choice but to change its policy in October, 1958, and to promise officially for the first time that African self-government would be established in the future in Tanzania. The United Tanganyika Party (UTP), the only existing opposition and a government-supported "multi-racial" party, proved itself to be totally ineffectual and ceased to exist after these first elections.

The British shift in policy was spelled out clearly<sup>33</sup> in the fall of 1959, In October, the British announced

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32. Taylor, Political Development, p. 170-70.

33. Listowel, Tanganyika, p. 369-79; Maguire, Towards "Uhuru", p. 261 ff.

the next general elections would be moved up from 1962 to September 1960. Two months later, the colonial government accepted the recommendations of the Ramage Committee, which had been established after the 1959 elections to recommend future constitutional revisions. The "multi-racial" policy had failed and was officially abandoned. A Legislative Council of seventy-one elected members was to be created, in which fifty constituencies would be openly contested and twenty-one reserved for the European and Asian communities. Not only did this guarantee an African majority in the Legislative Council, but the British announced that following the September 1960 elections, "responsible" government would be established under African leadership.

Economic and political events at the local level influenced this British reversal as much as the total political and electoral success of TANU as the single nationalist party existing in Tanzania. Abandonment of the "multi-racial" policy at the territorial level was based on the failure of government efforts to impose tri-partite, multi-racial Councils at the District and Provincial levels. The greatest conflict over this issue took place in Geita District in Lake Province, during 1958.<sup>34</sup>

Between March and July, the administration attempted to create a multi-racial district council in Geita to super-

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34. Maguire, Towards "Uhuru", p. 196-234.

cede the existing Native Authorities. Geita was chosen as a test area on the belief by the administration that the people of the district would be more receptive and compliant than elsewhere. The move triggered off widespread unrest and provided a clear focus for African fears that Europeans were seeking to establish greater control throughout the colony at the expense of African institutions, land, production and trade.

African opposition was intensified by the administration's efforts to ban organized political activity by TANU in Lake Province. With all legitimate avenues of protest eliminated, local opposition escalated spontaneously to the point of mass, open conflict. During July, thousands of people from Geita marched to Mwanza, the Provincial capital, to protest the Council. Once there, they insisted on camping there and continuing organized demonstrations until their demands were met.

After five days, it became clear that the provincial administration faced mass civil disobedience and the collapse of their authority. Unwilling to acknowledge this situation, the administration resorted to the traditional response of force, while blaming the disturbances on "outside agitators." Heavily reinforced police and tear-gas were used to forceably disperse the crowd and the leaders of the protest were arrested.<sup>35</sup>

Government repression did not end the protest but stimulated widespread grassroots resistance to the colonial government, not only in Geita, but throughout most areas of Lake Province and in many other districts in Tanzania as well. The three basic demands in Geita became territorial demands: dismissal of the chiefs, abolition of the multi-racial councils, and release of the growing number of political prisoners arrested for disrupting "law and order."<sup>36</sup> The assessment of the situation in Geita in the Annual Report at the end of 1958 applied<sup>37</sup> equally as well to most of the colony:

There has been a strong reaction against the paternalism and tight control on the lives of Geita's population, which / has been/ a very marked feature of the District's life . . . Perhaps more than most districts, Geita has been the scene of major, even dedicated, effort by Government officers in the field of development . . . It is a discouraging reflection on our methods that we have not carried the people with us in these schemes and plans, so full of hope for the future. By the middle of 1958 in the minds of men in Geita District, confidence and trust in Government stood at its lowest . . . The basis of Government, that is to say, the consent of the people, had in large measure dissolved.

Increasingly, resistance took the form of boycott of governmental institutions, like the councils, non-payment of taxes, and the refusal to comply with the multitude of government and and natural resource regulations: destocking,

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36. Ibid., p. 222.

37. Quoted in Ibid., p. 228; Stephens, Political Transformation, p. 143-45.

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36. Ibid., p. 222.

37. Quoted in Ibid., p. 228; Stephens, Political Transformation, p. 143-45.

innoculations, cattle dipping, tie ridging, manuring, communal labor demands, and many others. Public "illegal" meetings were held more and more frequently, in local defiance of the chiefs and European officials. Organized resistance to the oppressive colonial administration grew remarkably quickly.

The breakdown of local control and the overwhelming success of TANU in the elections forced the colonial government to turn to a policy of cooperation with TANU at the local and territorial levels during 1959. Regulations which were locally opposed and could only be implemented by force were repealed or ignored. The ban against local TANU organizations was dropped as the provincial administration reluctantly turned to the African nationalist leadership for help in maintaining order and the functioning of government. Efforts to impose multi-racial reforms in the local councils were abandoned and existing councils were opened up to representation by the new leadership well in advance of the Legislative Council reform which followed the 1960 elections.

3. The Rapid Achievement of Political Independence: Accomodation between the Colonial Government and the Nationalist Movement.

The tentative movement towards accomodation between the Colonial government and TANU by mid-1958 had become the dominant political characteristic in Tanzania after the overwhelming victory of TANU in the February 1959 elections. This accomodation is reflected in the rapid progression towards political independence within the following 3 years. The British promise in late 1959 of an African majority in a restructured Legislative Council and "responsible Government" under an elected African leadership was fulfilled in a little over one year.

After the August 1960 elections, TANU had won all but one of the elective seats in the new Legislative Council. Nyerere became the Chief Minister within the Council of Ministers which had been established in July 1959 to replace the older Executive Council. "Responsible Government" was a reality and proved in practice to be the equivalent to internal self-government. The shift took place so smoothly that in October a constitutional conference was scheduled for March, 1961, to set a definite date for formal independence. The March conference lasted only two days, after which it was announced that political independence would be granted in December 1961.

The existence of a single, unified and territory-wide nationalist party, and the local collapse of the political authority of the colonial government were significant factors in the smoothness and rapidity with which this transfer of political rule took place. But the primary explanation lay in the absence of any serious conflict between TANU and the British over the shape of the future political system, over fundamental policies, and over economic interests.

The British government had reversed itself on the issue of imposing a multi-racial political system which would perpetuate European dominance within the colonial system. It did so not only because it was unworkable as a policy by the late 1950's, but because "multi-racialism" promised to create the polarized conflict which the British were seeking at all costs to avoid after the bitter experience in Kenya during the mid-1950's. The reversal of policy also occurred because continued colonial control threatened to retard economic expansion. Accomodation to the emerging nationalist leadership, however, promised to mobilize African energies towards economic growth, to the benefit of existing British economic interests.

The abandonment of the policy of "multi-racialism" quickly made clear the essential moderation of the nationalist movement. British accomodation to TANU

effectively prevented the formation of a more radical African political organization which might have challenged the socio-economic structure created under colonial rule. The TANU leadership essentially accepted the British values of responsible and orderly government.<sup>39</sup> They sought to supplant European with African leadership within the existing structure rather than to transform it. The rapidity of the progress towards independence actually went way beyond the expectations and even demands of the African leadership. As late as 1956, Nyerere had stressed the unpreparedness of the Africans for self-government and had projected a time schedule which would not have achieved independence for another 20 years.<sup>40</sup>

Economically, colonial policies had placed significant restrictions upon African participation in the capitalist-structured money economy, but the weak role of the settler community had prevented the extreme disintegration of the African society that had occurred in Kenya. Tanzania did not experience the nearly total breakdown of the colonial system which the "Mau Mau"

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39. Cf. the assurance of the moderation of Nyerere and TANU by the conservative Tanganyika Standard, February 25, 1957, p. 2.

40. Cf. Kenya Weekly News, April 20, 1956, p. 15.

revolt reflected in Kenya. Nor did an agrarian reform anywhere near equivalent to the extensive, rapid and imposed land consolidation and resettlement take place prior to independence. Agrarian reform in Tanzania before independence continued on an incremental "improvement" basis. Efforts at the modernization of land use and agricultural practices came too late and too little. When attempted, they were undertaken for the purpose of prolonging colonial rule on a more stable basis as much as they were intended to modernize the agrarian economy. The result was growing resistance by the African peasantry which gradually became transformed from economic grievances to a broader political demand for the removal of the oppressive colonial administration.

The more limited extent and impact of land expropriation in Tanzania made the land issue and European settlement a much less explosive issue than in Kenya. The greater acceptance by the European community of African rule was matched by the moderation of the nationalist leadership with regard to the economically important land under non-African control. TANU assured the settlers that their land rights obtained under colonial rule would be respected after independence. No exclusive White Highlands existed in Tanzania as a political issues which had to be defused before political independence could be transferred by the British.

The TANU leadership indicated as much concern as the British to maintain and expand economic production through the growth of export cash crops and the introduction of improved agrarian practices. The Nyerere government in 1961 fully supported the moderate<sup>41</sup> recommendations of the World Bank report of that year and incorporated them into the Three Year Development Plan for 1961-64 in agreement with the British.<sup>42</sup> Agrarian reform was thus left to the post-independence African government to carry out.

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41. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Tanganyika* (Baltimore, 1961).

42. Hadley Smith, ed., *Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 1961), p. 335-59.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### THE SYSTEM OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT: CONCEPT, STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS.

It is useful to summarize briefly the steps of the argument of the thesis on the colonial formation of Kenya and Tanzania. First we described the partition of East Africa and the imposition of colonial rule during the "scramble for Africa" generated by the imperialist rivalry of the major European powers. Second, we compared the early formation of a similar type of settler-dominated, agrarian export colony by both the British and Germans in Kenya and Tanzania. Third, we examined the variation of the agrarian settler colony which emerged in the two territories during the consolidation of British rule after the conquest and incorporation of Tanzania into the British empire. Fourth, we analyzed the consequences of this variation on the process and conditions under which the two countries obtained political independence.

At the point of independence, Kenya and Tanzania demonstrated all the standard indices of what were called the underdeveloped or developing nations: widespread poverty, low per capita income and gross national product, a miniscule wage labor force, minimal living standards and widespread illiteracy among the mass of the population, and an overwhelmingly agrarian society.

These indices are symptoms of a system of underdevelopment formed during the colonial period. These aggregate statistics obscure the underlying structural formation that characterizes the system of underdevelopment. The economic, political, social and cultural structures perpetuate a deformed pattern of growth that reinforces the condition of underdevelopment. The primary element in this process is the deformed capitalist economy.

The critical factor in the formation of a system of underdevelopment was the subordinate and dependent relationship between the satellite colony and the metropole. This external relationship created in turn a similar set of relationships within the colony.

The perspective behind the comparative analysis of Kenya and Tanzania owes much to the concept of underdevelopment associated particularly with Andre Gunder Frank and his work on Latin America.<sup>1</sup>

The analysis of the colonial formation in Kenya and Tanzania above confirms the validity and value of the concept of underdevelopment. As Frank states,<sup>2</sup>

Historical research demonstrates that  
contemporary underdevelopment is in large

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1. Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York, 1970 [1969]). Also see, Andre Gunder Frank, "Economic Dependence, Class Structure and Underdevelopment Policy," in James Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale Johnson, eds., Dependence and Underdevelopment (New York, 1972), pp. 19-36.
  2. Frank, Underdevelopment or Revolution, p. 4.

part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole.

The British persistently viewed European settlement and investment as the "engine of development." Yet when one considers the actual role and consequences of the settler community, capitalist investment, and related commercial activities, including that of the Asians, and consider as well the realities underlying the "sacred trust" and "civilizing mission" of the colonizing power, one must conclude with Frank that a<sup>3</sup>

...largely erroneous view is that the development of these underdeveloped countries and, within them of their most underdeveloped domestic areas, must and will be generated or stimulated by diffusing capital, institutions, values, etc., to them from the international and national capitalist metropolises. Historical perspective based on the underdeveloped countries' past experience suggests that on the contrary in the underdeveloped countries economic development can now occur only independently of most of these relations of diffusion.

This concept of underdevelopment is counterposed to the liberal capitalist view that countries like Kenya and Tanzania are undeveloped,

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3. Ibid.

or in early stages of a linear path of development that the developed countries passed through centuries ago.<sup>4</sup>

This is inaccurate historically. The developed capitalist countries never had the characteristics of underdevelopment. They were never locked into a subordinate and dependent relationship with advanced economic and technical countries. And they did not have to attempt the difficult task of development within an international system dominated by already developed capitalist countries.

No underdeveloped country has experienced an economic "take-off" through capitalist development during the 20th Century. It has effectively been argued that this is precisely because of the conditions indicated above.<sup>5</sup> Existing evidence supports the conclusion of Rene Dumont that where liberal capitalist development is not already well underway, development<sup>6</sup>

...has become practically impossible within a liberal framework. The Alliance for Progress is thus not only doomed to failure; Africa will follow close behind if it prefers liberalism.

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4. Cf. W. W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, 1960).

5. Cf. Paul Bairoch, Revolution Industrielle et Sous-Developpement (SEDES, 1963).

6. Rene Dumont, Cuba: Socialism and Deveopment, trans. Helen Lane (New York, 1970 [1964]), pp. 197-98.

The relationship of the British metropole to the satellite colonies of Kenya and Tanzania did not promote a capitalist development along the lines which Britain and the other developed capitalist countries followed. On the contrary, it blocked this pattern of development. Instead, it created a system of underdevelopment based on a deformed capitalist economy.

Colonial rule promoted the penetration of a capitalist economy into the traditional African society. Every effort was made to pull the African into the cash and market economy being created within the colonial system. Until the transitional period to independence, this process was deliberately undertaken on a highly restricted basis.

The objective of colonial policy was not the capitalist transformation of the self-producing African societies. It aimed rather at a sufficient penetration to turn the African into a taxpayer, wage laborer for the European or peasant producer of agrarian exports and consumer of import manufactures. Any further advance or transformation was blocked. The reserve system, systems of migrant, resident, and squatter labor, the policy of indirect rule, and the immigrant merchant stratum are concrete examples of the institutions established under colonial rule which blocked a capitalist transformation within African society and produced a system of underdevelopment instead.

These institutions illustrate how the original imposition of the metropole/satellite colony relationship generates an inexorable process in which similar sets of relationships are imposed within the colony in turn. The political and commercial center or centers develop a metropole role in relationship to the satellite African areas in the hinterland. In the agrarian settler colonies like Kenya and Tanzania, the locales of settlement and plantation development also take on a metropole role in relationship to the African satellite areas. This was particularly true in Kenya with the formation of the White Highlands and consequent formation of rigid reserve system.

The parallel set of relationships is not limited within the colony. It also develops in the relationship between colonies under the influence of the primary metropole/satellite colony relationship. Following the incorporation of Tanzania into the British empire, Kenya developed a metropole role in relationship to the neighboring satellite colonies of Tanzania and Uganda.

The nature of these sets of relationships points out the inadequacy of concept of the "dual society" or its variant, the "enclave" concept.<sup>7</sup> According to this latter view, a modern economic and social enclave, linked directly to the metropole economy, is created within a colony whose traditional societies otherwise remain untouched.

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7. For the classic formulation of the enclave economy, cf. J. H. Bocke, The Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy (New York, 1946).

The dual society analysis is seen more specifically today in the contrasts made between market and subsistence economies, modern and traditional societies, and urban and rural "sectors." These are not only contrasting but mutually exclusive analytic constructs which break down under the reality of the interpenetration of these market/subsistence, modern/traditional, and urban/rural elements. This is particularly so in that the interpenetration is not an equal or mutually beneficial relationship, but one based on dominance and exploitation, on the one hand, and subordinancy and dependency on the other hand.

At the point of political independence, Kenya and Tanzania represented underdeveloped countries. The critical characteristic of underdevelopment was the deformed capitalist economy created during the formation of these agrarian settler colonies under British rule. The economic and other structural characteristics of underdevelopment in the two countries at that time are examined in more detail below.

1. The Structure of the Colonial Social Order.

The most overt form of structural division and conflict within Kenya and Tanzania as independence approached was a racially based social order, with the European on top, the Asians in the middle, and

the mass of the Africans on the bottom. This racial hierarchy was the functional equivalent of a "class" system, although it might more aptly be characterized as a caste system.

Within the colonial "class" system there was a clear and direct correlation of race to political, economic and social position and power. A small European minority maintained a monopoly over political power, owned the major economic institutions, and controlled the wealth and capital investment in both societies.

The mass of the African populations were relegated to the bottom of the social order as laborers, "primitive" peasant producers, or petty traders. In between was a middle order comprised of a larger minority of Asians. They controlled the retail trade, the less important wholesale trade, and the middle echelon of the administrative, financial and commercial establishments.

The colonial "class" system was created and imposed by colonial rule. It was also maintained ultimately by the metropole. The racial social order inevitably began breaking down, in its more overt form, during the transition to and following independence. This is reflected in the "Africanization" and "localization" policies which are taking place and will be carried through.

Several points should be emphasized with regard to the racially structured social order. First, the role of the non-Africans,

particularly the white settler, was crucial in the formation of the colonial system. The European, both settler and investor, was viewed as the "engine" of economic development, and played an equal if not greater role than the colonial administration in forging the structure of underdevelopment with which we are concerned.

Yet, once the economic structure had been formed, it took on a self-generating dynamic of its own. To focus on the racial social structure tends to obscure the primary importance of the underlying economic structure, its persistence after political independence, and the force it exerts in maintaining a system of underdevelopment.

Secondly, the importance of the racially based colonial "class" system of the past tends to obscure the class division emerging within the African population. This class formation developed in response to the colonial situation. The characteristics of the emergent African bourgeoisie in particular were shaped in turn by the limitations and values imposed by the colonial structure. The difficulty and time it is taking to "Africanize," to replace non-Africans with Africans in the major political and economic positions, indicates the degree to which even the most overt colonial structure, the racially based social hierarchy, was built within the state system. It emphasizes the strength and pervasiveness of the system of underdevelopment formed during colonial rule. It also raises a primary issue for the future of development in Kenya and Tanzania. Is the African class system emerging in

the two states merely serving to replace the colonial "class" rule within the economic and social structure inherited from the colonial past, or is a process taking place which involves the transformation of the colonial system itself?

## 2. The Dependency of the Agrarian Export Economy.

The structure of the economies of Kenya and Tanzania were overwhelmingly based on and dependent upon agrarian production. This was graphically illustrated by the geographical and occupational distribution of the population. Approximately 95% lived in the rural areas and depended upon agriculture in whole or in part for their livelihood.

The officially recorded wage earning labor force was a small percentage of both the overall population and the actual labor force. Europeans and Asians held a disproportionate percentage of the employee positions and were concentrated among the higher paying skilled and administrative positions.

In 1959, African wage employment in Kenya was 537,000 or 8.3 percent of a total estimated population of 6.5 million. In Tanzania, wage employment was 433,000 or 4.8 percent of a total estimated

population of 9 million.<sup>8</sup> Over half of the work force in both countries moreover, were employed in agricultural production, mostly on estates or plantations owned by the Europeans.

Most of the African wage earners retained landholdings and were dependent upon them to subsidize their own livelihood and that of their families. They were also dependent upon them as a form of "social insurance," in case of unemployment or for their "old age." The official statistics did not record the larger number who earned some cash income within the rural areas as a rural farm laborer or in other kinds of work. This emphasizes, however, the secondary nature of this income and the primary dependency upon agricultural production for subsistence.

The pervasive agrarian structure of the economy is also seen in the aggregate figure for the domestic product of the two countries. In 1959, agrarian production accounted for approximately 41.5% of the total domestic product, including subsistence production, in Kenya, and 59% in Tanzania. Agrarian production also totalled 22.7% and 41.4% respectively of the monetary domestic product.<sup>9</sup>

These figures are merely the tip of the iceberg. They deal with production only. There are no statistics available on the breakdown of

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8. Cf. Statistical Abstracts, for Kenya and Tanzania, 1960.

9. Cf. Statistical Abstracts, for Kenya and Tanzania, 1960.

other economic activities related directly or indirectly to and dependent upon agrarian production. If such figures could be extracted and tallied also for the economic activities of transport, construction, processing, commerce, and administration, agrarian-related activities would total to a much higher percentage of the domestic product.

The agrarian economy was highly dependent in turn upon the production of export cash crops for the world market. Cash crop production for the domestic market was a very minor factor. Nearly 90% of the export trade of the two countries was based on agrarian production, while over 50 percent of exports were dependent upon a few major cash crops.<sup>10</sup> The implications are suggested but not truly spelled out by Walker when he stated that Kenya and Tanzania are dependent economies because "a high proportion of money domestic product [arises] directly or indirectly from the production, transport, processing and selling of exports."<sup>11</sup> It is not only an understatement but somewhat evasive to assert that "the level and growth of their incomes" are substantially dependent upon "happenings outside East Africa."<sup>12</sup>

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10. Cf. Statistical Abstracts, for Kenya and Tanzania, 1960.

11. David Walker, "Problems of Economic Development of East Africa," in E. A. G. Robinson, ed. Economic Development for Africa South of the Sahara (London, 1964), p. 52.

12. Ibid., p. 94.

This external dependency did not just "happen." It was caused by the colonial policies of the metropole which imposed an agrarian export economy upon the countries. And the perpetuation of this dependency was based not on "happenings" outside East Africa but by the integration of this agrarian export economy to a world market controlled by the major industrialized capitalist states.

Kenya and Tanzania were in no position to exert any influence upon such factors as world market demand, prices, quality regulations, and product substitutions. This external control has operated over the long run to the disadvantage of Kenya and Tanzania and to the advantage of the industrial capitalist states.

The consequence of this structural dependency is more than a limitation or uncertain affect on the major source of "income;" agrarian export production, and a possible "affect on other sectors of the economy."<sup>13</sup> It constantly threatens the very economic base of the agrarian countries, and severely limits the actual and potential economic surplus available for development away from the dependency we have been describing.

Dependency upon an agrarian economy is threatening in other respects also. Primary production based on agriculture makes the society particularly susceptible to the uncertainties of natural internal factors such as drought or irregular rainfall, crop or animal diseases,

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13. Ibid., p. 94.

and insect plagues. This affects not only the agrarian export trade, but threatens famine and starvation, or excessive malnutrition at best, among the African population, which is so dependent upon subsistence farming.

3. Capital Investment: Internal Limitations and External Dependency.

A major component in the structure of underdevelopment in Kenya and Tanzania was the severe restrictions upon the accumulation of economic surplus for capital investment and diversified development. Internal sources of capital investment were severely limited and the economies were subjected in turn to a high dependency upon external investment by foreign corporations.<sup>14</sup>

Investment [in Kenya and Tanzania] is almost entirely carried out by the government, by other public or quasi-public bodies, or by large expatriate firms financed, for the most part, by sources of finance external to East Africa and thus dependent in the last resort upon the views of people outside the territories.

The underlying economic structure of the two countries at the point of independence was characterized by the monopoly of ownership, control, or access to capital resources by the non-African, Control of

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14. Ibid., p. 94.

capital rested primarily in the hands of Europeans: managers of plantations and wholesale firms which were controlled by overseas corporations; financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies which were subsidiaries of overseas parent institutions; settlers; European government officials; and officials of the Colonial Office in the British Metropole.

European control of capital points out the intimate linkage between internal capital restrictions and external dependency. This linkage was based upon a common interest in the promotion of an agrarian export economy and, in the last resort, this fundamental interest overrode all specific differences of interest which existed within the European "community."

The African population was locked into the bottom of the colonial social order. It consequently had no significant ownership or control over capital. At the same time they were locked out of access to the European controlled sources of capital. The mass of Africans were peasant farmers producing mostly for subsistence, with some cash crop production over and above this. Or they were unskilled laborers. Or both. In either case, their wage or self-earned income was minimal, barely enough for subsistence, taxes, school fees, and the most limited of consumer purchases.

In fact, this labor, rather than providing a means for capital accumulation by the African through savings, tended to subsidize the European settler, plantation owners, wholesalers, high-salaried

European administrative officials and add to the accumulation of capital in European hands.

Two limited exceptions existed within the African population. One was the African farmer who was primarily a cash crop producer. This segment was only recently emerging and still suffered from numerous restrictions on land ownership, land use, the kind and quantity of crops which could be produced, etc. Such production was limited to smallholder production. No real accumulation of capital was possible, even under the more recent cooperative organizations which were emerging. Capital accumulation and investment control rested at the top, in the hands of the marketing boards controlled by the Europeans.

A second exception was the African petty trader. He in turn was locked into this limited commercial role by the almost total monopoly over retail trade and marketing by the Asian population. Colonial policy actually served to maintain this monopoly position of the Asians in retail and marketing, just as it operated to maintain the monopoly role of the European elements in the major economic areas. Government "paternalistic" policies reinforced this highly limited commercial role of the African through restrictions on licensing, credit, and the availability of educational facilities for learning business skills.

European ownership and control over capital resources also meant control over how this capital was to be invested and the kind of

development which was to take place. In practice, this meant the directing of capital investment into two channels. First, capital was channeled into the expansion of the agrarian export economy. Secondly, capital was channeled out of the country, for example, in the form of capital repatriations by foreign firms and in sterling deposits in the metropole by bank subsidiaries.

Both capital investment flows served to reinforce the structure of underdevelopment and to block the possible alternative investments which could produce a more integrated and less deformed pattern of development.

#### 4. The Minimal Role of Industry and Manufacturing.

The major alternative area of economic development lay in industry and manufacturing. Yet these economic activities played a minimal role in the economies of Kenya and Tanzania. The "absence" of manufacturing and industrial development reflects the obverse side of an agrarian export economy. This is no coincidence, for historically it has been the major characteristic of the colonial structure in general and the agrarian settler colony in particular.

"Development" of the economy was viewed as the province of private foreign (i. e., British) investment. The role of the colonial government was seen as limited generally to the maintenance of law and order, the collection of taxes, and the establishment of an orderly administration, and, at best, the provision of external economies or economic infrastructure by which to promote the "required" private external investment.

In practice, the colonies were viewed as protected areas of imperial privilege which confirmed their "natural" productive and market potential. Imperially required tropical raw materials and foods required by the metropole were to be obtained from them and, in exchange, the colonies would provide a growing market for British manufactured goods.

The bias, then, was towards the promotion of specific forms of investment, those which conformed to the existing economic structure based on agrarian export production. This bias was strongly reinforced by the varied economic interest groups already entrenched and growing within the two countries, and consequently by the continuing absence of economic conditions which might attract a more diversified and productive form of investment.

British corporations based on the production and marketing of tropical crops were thus attracted by their own profit interests and by an imperial policy over which they exercised a good deal of influence in the first place. To the extent they reinvested profits made in planta-

tion production, the reinvestment was oriented to the expansion and modernization of agrarian exports such as coffee, tea, cotton, sisal, pyrethrum, and ground nuts for edible oils. Capital profits were not reinvested in manufacturing and industry, beyond initial stage processing "industries."

The colonial government did not influence reinvestment in manufacturing areas, either directly or indirectly through tax or fiscal measures. Quite to the contrary, Pressure was exerted by foreign corporations upon the government to invest its limited revenue into lowering the costs and promoting the expansion of export production. These pressures resulted in economic infrastructure oriented to the export crop sector, in colonial investment in agricultural research and services with the same orientation. Other pressures were exerted to insure low wages and minimal restrictions on work and living conditions for plantation labor as well as to insure a satisfactory supply of African labor.

The growth of manufacturing industries would have threatened these economic interests, by diverting government investment into other areas, by cutting into the potential labor supply, and by competitively forcing up the wage standards.

Colonial officials, aside from the policy orientations already indicated, had their own interests in promoting expansion of the agrarian export economy over other lines of development. The main

sources of colonial revenue came from agrarian exports, directly or indirectly. Export cash crops provided the major direct source of taxable income, in coordination with indirect "taxes" or revenue tariffs on imported consumer and manufactured goods, which in turn were paid for by the export trade. And the primary source of capital development funds came from the surplus of the cash crop marketing boards.

Ultimately, most of these tax revenues were extracted from the African, as cash crop smallholder, marginal wage laborer, and consumer. It was he who provided the major share of the revenue or economic surplus for recurrent and capital investment. But he had no control over it. Consequently, investment was directed into the promotion of plantation and settler export production in particular and the agrarian export economy in general, rather than a more productive economic formation based on manufacturing and industry.

##### 5. The Underdeveloped and Deformed Internal Economy.

The internal economy was small and underdeveloped in Kenya and Tanzania. Great distortions existed also between segments of the populations and between regions along lines which are by now familiar. This presented a strong contrast to the developed export

exchange system in the two states. The deformed and underdeveloped internal economy was a structural component of the agrarian export economy, along with the absence of manufacturing and industry, and for similar reasons.

Ownership, wealth and income were highly unequal and concentrated, for they were determined by the racial "class" structure of the colonial system. Consequently, there was a very small domestic market with the income to purchase consumer goods to any significant degree.

This market consisted of the Europeans, the Asians, to a lesser degree, and a very small but growing African elite. They were oriented to the purchase of imported goods, as opposed to domestic production, due to their immigrant background, the commercial and mercantilist characteristics of the agrarian export economy, and the policies of the colonial administration.

The vast majority of African population took part in the internal exchange economy, but only to a very limited degree. The colonial system had perpetuated traditional land use and agricultural practices in African agrarian production as well as a widespread dependency upon production for subsistence. Exchange of agricultural and livestock produce remained highly localized and minimal in volume and value. To the extent the colonial government provided any aid to African peasant production, it was primarily concerned with the expansion of export crop production. The result was a continuing retardation of production

for basic domestic needs, of production based on more modern practices along specialized lines, and of integrated, diversified regional and national markets.

The metropole and satellite relationship blocked alternative forms of production or enterprise export production and related commercial activities. Few alternative forms of employment were available to the African given the deformed pattern of economic growth. This coincided with and was intensified by the locking out of Africans in the top and middle level positions within the colonial system due to the monopoly hold of the European and Asian. The limited forms of employment and enterprise perpetuated the localized, stagnant and underdeveloped internal economy.

The colonial system deliberately maintained a low level of wage and self-earned income among the African peasantry in the limited economic activities in which they were permitted to operate. This reinforced the underdeveloped characteristics of the internal economy.

To the extent some small manufacturing activities did develop, they were dominated in turn by the Europeans and Asians, through their access to credit, skills and governmental support unavailable to Africans. Local African craft industries were discouraged except for the tourist trade. They also faced unequal competition from foreign enterprise which the colonial system favored.

The pattern of economic subsidies indicated the influence of the metropole-satellite relationship in forming and maintaining an underdeveloped and deformed economy. Subsidies were established in many forms for European agrarian export activities while they were not provided for "infant" industries designed to produce for the domestic market. These subsidies included: special transport rates for agrarian exports; agricultural research and extension services; maize and other crop subsidies; the promotion of external services or infrastructure designed primarily for European plantation, estate, and limited mineral extraction; the ready and privileged access to credit facilities; and restriction of government contracts for construction and other activities to European and Asian enterprises.

The consequences of these structural limitations within the internal economy have often been depicted as the creation of a "vicious circle," in that they in turn discouraged outside investors from undertaking industrial and manufacturing investment. Low per capita income, the absence of a skilled labor force, localized markets and absence of necessary transport and other important economic infrastructures do tend to make more difficult and thus inhibit the very diversified and integrated internal economy needed for transforming the economic and social development of Kenya and Tanzania.

Yet to perceive this as a "vicious circle" is misleading. It ignores the fact that the situation did not just "happen," or was not the consequence primarily of "traditional" and "backward" practices and

values. The situation, rather is the structural consequence of an imperial and colonial government policy which was primarily interested in creating and promoting an agrarian export economy. And government policy was the consequence in turn of the economic pressures of external interest groups and immigrant groups which held monopoly positions within the state systems of Kenya and Tanzania.

6. A Breakdown of the Differing Spheres of Agrarian Production.

Given the overwhelming dominance of agrarian production in the economies of Kenya and Tanzania, it is important to give further attention to the breakdown of the differing spheres of agrarian production and the problems this differentiation posed for the mobilization of development at independence. Three main spheres will be considered: (1) European plantation and settler estate production, (2) peasant cash crop production, and (3) the predominantly subsistence production of the majority of the African population.

European owned plantations and settler farms and ranches formed a crucial sphere of agrarian production, particularly in Kenya. <sup>15</sup>

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15. For the following figures as of 1959, see *ibid.*, p. 91-93, and Table I, p. 126-29.

In Tanzania, non-African production totalled 25% of the value of total agrarian production, 35% of the value of cash crop production and 45% of agrarian export production, while the share of African production was 75%, 65%, and 55% respectively. In Kenya, Europeans produced 79% of the value of cash crop production and % of agrarian export production, while the African share in production was 21% and % respectively. The extremely excessive percentage of European plantation and settler agrarian production had been dropping since the loosening of government restrictions and the agrarian reforms introduced in the late 1950's. The role of this sphere still remains high, however.

As crucial as this European sphere was in percentage value of cash and export production within the economy, its role was even greater in the deformation of the other spheres of production and the economy as a whole. The presence of plantation production and particularly settler farming generated a skew in the economy. Nearly all the resources of the colonial system were directed towards the further expansion of the European sphere. Development and more effective utilization of land, labor, capital, infrastructure, and research, technical, and agricultural services were directed primarily in the interests of the European export sector, as a matter of both policy and practice.

A policy which perceived European investment as the "engine of development" in reality was a policy which equated the expansion of European enterprise and production with development itself. In doing so, it promoted the expansion of the colonial agrarian economy at the expense of the African and through the retardation of African development. Rather than stimulating African economic and social development through a demonstration effect, or the incentives of new markets, opportunities, and availability of skills, technology, and modern practices, the European directed policy inevitably led to the suppression of the pressure from below for African development.

European and African development were not complementary and reinforcing; they were in conflict. The decision to utilize limited resources for the promotion of the European sphere was ultimately a political decision, not an economic one. And political power rested in the hands of European economic interest groups, within the imperial context. Given this context of dependency, the conflict was inevitable. The critical resource, after all, in colonial "development," was the African himself, in the form of labor.

The utilization of land, capital, and technology for development ultimately was dependent upon labor, and the critical source of labor was the African. It fell upon the state system in the colony to direct the use of this labor, not for the development of the African, but for the European, and for the agrarian export needs of the Empire. The consequences of this can be seen in examining the peasant cash crop and predominantly subsistence spheres of African production.

After over 60 years of colonial rule, the nearly universal characteristic of African agrarian production still remained that of small-scale family production for subsistence, first of all, with a varying degree of additional production above this of cash crops for the market--and primarily the export market. While reference is made "to subsistence incomes and the subsistence sector there is seldom any clear segregation of subsistence and non-subsistence production, particularly where output can be sold or consumed by the household."<sup>16</sup> The distinction between spheres of cash crop production and subsistence is an arbitrary one of degree, based primarily on the proportion of production for the market and for subsistence.

To conceive of this distinction as one based on the evolutionary development along stages from "purely" traditional production for subsistence only to a modern specialized production for the market is distorted, for it leaves out the critical factor that the development of African production took place within a colonial structure which limited and distorted the kinds of change possible. The distinction Yudelman makes between "tribal values" and "economic values" is as erroneous a form of dualism as those already referred to above. And his conclusion is equally distorted, for the problem was not primarily the persistence of a traditional values as the block to development. Nor the solution solely that of replacing traditional with modern values.

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16. M. Yudelman, "Some Aspects of World & Development," in E. A. G. Robinson, ed., Economic Development for Africa South of the Sahara (London, 1964), p. 555.

The African peasant had operated as an "economic man" within the context of his indigenous social and environmental setting. And he tended to change his productive practices as conditions changed around him. The imposition of colonial rule began to drastically change the total context in which he lived and produced, however, and imposed in turn a whole new set of economic demands upon him. The African not only faced the strong limitations set by stringent environmental conditions and the given level of social organization and technological development. Colonial rule locked him ever more rigidly into the "traditional" methods of production--and underdevelopment--by imposing an ever more pervasive colonial structure over which he had little or no political and social control.

The structural formation, institutions, and values described above characterized the system of underdevelopment in Kenya and Tanzania at the point of independence. They developed during the colonial period out of the metropole/satellite colony relationship.

The structural underdevelopment within the countries and external relationship of dependence were the basic issues the African leadership had to face after independence in their efforts to mobilize development and to transform their societies.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### IDEOLOGY, DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, AND AGRARIAN POLICY: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 1967

When Kenya and Tanzania obtained political independence in the early 1960's, control of the state passed into African hands for the first time. A potential was seen for using the power of the state to redirect the two countries through the mobilization of rapid economic and social development. This potential was an illusion.

Such a change required a transformation of the structure of underdevelopment, the institutions and political consciousness that maintained this structure, which has been described above. This means that the generation of a transformational process to break down the existing colonial system and to recreate a new socio-economic system would have to be encouraged. Transformation of colonial underdevelopment was dependent upon an underlying social revolution. But the nationalist movements in Kenya and Tanzania which achieved formal independence were not social revolutions.

Instead, the achievement of national independence represented a partial political revolution. African nationalist leadership replaced European officials within the existing political system.

Formal control of the state was a necessary but hardly sufficient condition for the required transformation, as the

experience of Ghana had proved. "Seek ye the political kingdom," Kwame Nkrumah had asserted, "and all else will follow." His slogan was a popularly accepted view in Africa, but the reality was that "all else" did not happen either automatically or magically.

The hierarchical colonial government, with its many bureaucratic and centralized institutions, was part of the structure of underdevelopment. It had been forged over time to control and oppress the African population. The state apparatus was also designed to serve the limited modern economic sector.

The economic sector in turn was the critical factor in the system of underdevelopment and the resulting dependency upon agrarian exports, the capitalist market, European enterprise and the metropole. The state played an important role in retarding the development of an integrated internal economy, the converse characteristic of the European dominated agrarian export system.

There were severe constraints upon the leadership's efforts to gain control over the state apparatus and to turn it into an instrument to generate a contrasting pattern of development. The leadership elite was small. They had been educated, "judged", and allowed to advance to the extent to which they successfully emulated the European colonial rulers. There was a severe shortage of educated and skilled Africans to replace the European administrative and technical personnel.

Africanization of the state apparatus was slow and tended to replace Europeans with Africans within the existing hierarchical organization, rather than to transform this structure. Similar criteria remained for job functions, salary levels, and bureaucratic methods of operating. The presence of expatriate personnel and advisors perpetuated capitalist values, perspective, and methods of development similar to those under the colonial system.

Following political independence, the African leadership in Kenya and Tanzania developed ideologies of African Socialism and five year development plans to organize the transformation and modern development of their societies. The ideology, development planning and agrarian policies in both countries are examined below for the period following independence until 1967. They are assessed for indications of the generation of a transformational process or whether ideology and planning, policies and programs, were reinforcing the structure of underdevelopment and the deformed capitalist economy inherited from the colonial period.

1. "African Socialism": The Ideological Perspective of the National Leadership in Kenya.

Shortly after independence, the national leadership in both Kenya and Tanzania officially adopted an ideology of African Socialism as the path of development for their societies. Independence marked the achievement of a "political revolution;" African Socialism was to be the means to achieve the economic and social revolution of their societies now that the oppressive conditions of colonial rule were ended. African Socialism implied the kind of society the leadership sought to create in the future. It also indicated the way in which the human material and capital resources were to be mobilized in order to promote rapid economic development and to achieve this future society.

The philosophy of African Socialism was expressed in Kenya by the Sessional Paper No. 10, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, which was "unanimously" passed by the National Assembly in June 1965. The Paper was prepared by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, reputedly by its Minister, Tom Mboya. It was presented to

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1. The copy referred to below is a pamphlet published in Nairobi by the Government Printer, in April, 1965. The date indicates the Paper already was in a finished form and was presented to the Assembly for confirmation, not debate or contributions.

the Assembly and country with the "unanimous support" of the Cabinet.<sup>2</sup> The paper "was never submitted to the Party [KANU] for either discussion or consultation."<sup>3</sup> Contrary to the image projected, considerable division existed within the cabinet, party and Assembly over the paper, and for good reason. The paper, and the ideology it expressed, was neither African nor socialist, but represented a capitalist model of development.

The Paper fails to present a clear or specific definition of what socialism is. At best it indicates a number of generalized, vague objectives which were presented as the objectives of all societies: "political equality; social justice; human dignity, including freedom of conscience; freedom from want, disease, and exploitation; equal opportunities; and high and growing per capita incomes, equitably distributed."<sup>4</sup>

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2. See the statement by President Kenyatta at the beginning of the Pamphlet, Sessional Paper No. 10, African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya.
  3. Ahmed Mohiddin, "Socialism or Capitalism? Sessional Paper No. 10 Revisited," East Africa Journal (March, 1969), p. 10. The author, a lecturer in political science at Makerere University at the time, is highly critical of the Paper and his analysis is similar to that presented below. For a response, see Tom Mboya, "Sessional Paper No. 10: It is African and It is Socialism," East Africa Journal (May, 1969), pp. 15-22.
  4. African Socialism, par. 4, p. 2. The strong differences which continue to exist over the nature of socialism need no elaboration. Nor is this complicated question the subject as such of the present thesis. The following evaluation of Kenya African Socialism and Ujamaa, however, rests

The achievement of these objectives are presented as the goals of Kenya and the nature of Kenya African Socialism.

The overriding emphasis and concern of the Paper is "providing a firm basis for rapid economic growth." All "immediate problems" and policies for tackling them "must be handled in ways that will not jeopardize [economic] growth."<sup>5</sup><sup>6</sup> As a consequence, the Paper did not propose any restructuring of the existing economic system or radical changes, but merely modifications to make the economic system work more efficiently and stimulate economic growth. The major restrictions in Kenya were perceived as limitations of capital, rather than the existence of a deformed capitalist economy based on structural underdevelopment. The key factor in promoting development,

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on the treatment of several basic issues. (1). Is or is not private ownership or control being transformed into social control over natural resources, production, and distribution. (2). Are new collective forms of organization being created which give people real power to make decisions that affect the major areas of their lives and satisfy their basic needs. (3). Are people being drawn into active participation in the development of themselves and their society or is development something being done to them. (4). Are international relationships being structured to promote or retard these internal developments.

5. Ibid., par. 53, p.18. See also ibid., par.1, p.1.
6. Ibid., par. 53, p. 18. The discussion of the application of African Socialism through out the rest of the paper makes it clear that this primacy existed in practice, regardless of the prior assertion that " progress toward ultimate objectives will be the major consideration. In particular, political equality, social justice and human dignity will not be sacrificed to achieve material ends." par. 16, p. 5.

therefore, was treated as the attraction of foreign investment and aid, and the generation of domestic capital, through reliance on the profit motive. An expanding productive sector of the economy and rising per capita income were viewed as the means by which to solve the existing economic and social problems inherited from the colonial period.<sup>7</sup>

The paper rejects both "Marxian socialism" and "laissez-faire capitalism" as "theoretical economic organizations" which were based on rigid and doctrinaire systems of state ownership and private ownership respectively. African Socialism is asserted instead as the system more appropriate to the historical setting in Kenya.<sup>8</sup> No real contradiction existed between this analysis and the perspective outlined above, for these two systems were actually "strawmen" which lacked any real correspondence to marxist socialism and modern capitalism. While seemingly rejecting both in favor of a third way, and one rooted in African traditions, Kenya African Socialism unfolded in the Paper as an ideology and practice which differed little from a capitalist model of development.

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7. Ibid., pars. 54 - 56, pp. 18-19.

8. Ibid., pars. 18- 22, pp. 6-8.

The Paper evaded the fundamental issue of the socialization of Kenya, which could only come about through the restructuring of Kenya society and the creation of new institutions and values. For socialism, The Paper substitutes three reform measures: Africanization, state planning and control, and African traditions. Africanization, the replacement of non-Africans with Africans in the dominant positions within the existing economic and social structure, is presented as a means to regain control within Kenyan society and to direct development along the lines of African Socialism. But Africanization, in the existing context of Kenyan society, could only lead to the consolidation and expansion of the African bourgeoisie, a growing class system, and the entrenchment of western capitalist values.

The only class division and conflict recognized by the Paper was the racially based class system created under colonial control, which Africanization would eliminate within a "short-term duration."<sup>9</sup> Even this limited objective was treated cautiously: Africanization, it was clearly spelled out, would be undertaken in a way which would not disrupt the primary objectives of economic growth. As for class division within African society, "no class problem arose in the traditional African society and none exists today among Africans." The reality of

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9. Ibid., par. 36 and 78, pp. 12-13, 27.

class division and conflict within African society was denied under the formulation of African Socialism. The task for the future, according to the Paper, is restricted "to [the planning of] development so as to prevent the emergence of antagonistic classes."<sup>10</sup> The denial of a class system was crucial. It provided the basis for ignoring the existence of a capitalist formation within Kenya which had to be challenged if a socialist form of development was to take place. It provided the basis also for rejecting marxist analysis and solutions to the task of socialist development.

Kenya African Socialism depended upon state planning and controls to guide the use of resources and the socio-economic development of Kenyan society for the benefit of all. But the denial of class division meant that the class basis of the state was ignored. It was assumed that the state, once it had been taken over by African leadership, would be an impartial and just arbiter in a manner very similar to the British attitude of trusteeship during colonial rule. Through the use of a wide range of flexible economic controls, under comprehensive planning, the state would insure that the "productive assets" were used for the benefit of society and all its members."<sup>11</sup> This did not differ

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10. Ibid., par. 36, p. 12.

11. Ibid., par. 34-35, p. 12.

from the variety of indirect mechanisms utilized in modern capitalism to regulate the economy.

By stressing the use of state planning and a range of economic controls in Kenya African Socialism, the Paper is able to dismiss the issue of ownership of resources and the means of production. The use of property, rather than ownership, is considered crucial under African Socialism. This leaves Kenya "free to choose ... various forms of ownership --state, co-operative, corporate, and individual -- that are efficient for different sectors or that compete with each other provided only that the form promotes the objectives of Government."<sup>12</sup>

Emphasis upon the regulation of property use over the question of ownership provides the justification not only for allowing, but actively promoting, private ownership, the profit motive, economic competition, and foreign investments in the name of African Socialism. The source of this concept is traced to African traditions of property rights.

Under African tradition, the Paper argues, land or property ownership was not an absolute right, unlike European traditions of ownership. Tribal or communal rights existed ultimately which regulated the rights of clans, families, and individuals over the property. Under

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12. Ibid., par. 24, pp. 8-9.

traditional property rights, "land and other productive assets, no matter who owned or managed them, were expected to be used, and used for the general welfare."<sup>13</sup> Thus, traditional property rights and use in African society were socialistic and Kenya African Socialism is the modern expression of this tradition. The state is equated with the traditional tribe, and state regulation over private or corporate ownership equated with tribal or communal controls over the use of property.

Throughout the Paper, a fundamental question constantly intrudes: in a society functioning under African Socialism, what will insure that the state actually promotes social justice, the general welfare, and economic equity, rather than the particular interests of those in positions of power or elements within and without the country who dominate the economy? The solution lies in two characteristics of African tradition, "political democracy" and "mutual social responsibility," which "form an essential basis for African Socialism."<sup>14</sup>

A form of political democracy existed in traditional African society, in which there were institutional checks and sanctions in customary law and religion to prevent the traditional leaders from abusing any "disproportionate political influence" or any "greater wealth."

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13. Ibid., par. 29, p. 10.

14. Ibid., pars. 8-13, pp. 3-5.

Since African Socialism rests on this tradition of "full, equal, and unfettered democracy .... the State, therefore, can never become the tool of special interests, catering to the desires of a minority at the expense of the needs of the majority."<sup>15</sup> As for mutual social responsibility,<sup>16</sup>

it is an extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a whole .... It implies a mutual responsibility by society and its members to do the very best for each other .... Drawing on this background African Socialism expects the members of the modern State to contribute willingly and without stint to the development of the nation. Society in turn, will reward these efforts and at the same time ill take measures against those who refuse to participate in the nation's efforts to grow.

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The Sessional Paper draws on African tradition to create an ideology of African Socialism, which functions to legitimate the new African government, the ruling party, KANU, and the position of those elements of the African petty bourgeoisie which have taken over power as a ruling "elite" within Kenya. The ideology is both historically and analytically fallacious.

While the portrayal of African traditions is simplistic and distorted, a form of these attitudes and relations had existed. But they were rooted in the socio-economic structure of an African society of the past, which

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15. Ibid., par. 8, p. 3.

16. Ibid., pars. 11, 13, pp. 4-5.

17. The Sessional Paper was not alone in this. It also held true for the other government papers, KANU, and the media in general.

had been disrupted and replaced by a deformed capitalist structure during the period of colonial domination.

The Kenya leadership appealed to and propagandized traditional African attitudes while ignoring their disintegration and transformation into capitalist and bourgeois values.

Kenya African Socialism did not deal with this change and failed to create new organizational forms, new institutions, which would realize the abstract socialist objectives. In fact, when one examines the specific policies outlined in the Paper it is clear that the leadership, in its preoccupation with economic growth, was actively continuing the colonial pattern of development.

For example, in the crucial area of land and agrarian development, the Paper is preoccupied with expanding private ownership, a market economy, the dynamic of competition and the profit motive at the expense of a socialist formation:

These African traditions cannot be carried over indiscriminately to a modern, monetary economy. The need to develop and invest requires credit, and a credit economy rests heavily on a system of land titles and their registration. The ownership of land must, therefore, be made more definite and explicit if land consolidation and development are to be fully successful.

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18. Ibid., par. 30, pp. 10-11.

The immediate and pressing problems of foreign ownership of land, the widespread existence of a landless, unemployed class, and the growth of economic and social inequality within the African population based on private ownership and a class formation were subordinated to the primary objective of economic growth. The limited land redistribution of the past is to be ended, for it was based upon "political reasons" rather than "economic benefits." Future agrarian policy is based on Africanization through market forces and "priority [given] in the future to development in the former African areas to "achieve maximum growth" and "increased productivity and output."<sup>19</sup>

The Paper expresses a fear of a "satellite relationship with any other country or group of countries" and asserts it will prevent this through a policy of positive political and economic non-alignment.<sup>20</sup>

Kenya African Socialism thus does not deal with the reality of the existing satellite relationship expressed in the structural underdevelopment created under colonialism and perpetuated through neo-colonialism. An awareness existed at the time that the major means of production, commerce, and distribution were under foreign owner-

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19. Ibid., pars. 81, 82, pp. 28, 29.

20. Ibid., par. 7, pp. 2-3.

ship. This reality was detailed in the study, Who Controls Industry in Kenya?, published a few years later.<sup>21</sup>

Yet the Paper asserts that "the nature of ownership abroad is of no significance in Kenya so long as foreign investors abide by the following guidelines:<sup>22</sup>

1. making shares in the company available to Africans who wish to buy them;
2. employing Africans at managerial levels as soon as qualified people can be found; and
3. providing training facilities for Africans."

Capitalist profit-sharing and Africanization within foreign corporations became the substitute for socialism. This provided benefits to the growing African bourgeoisie, in spite of the fact that "the foreign ownership and management of productive assets in Kenya might be dominated by foreign rather than domestic considerations."<sup>23</sup>

For all purposes nationalization is rejected under African Socialism, in spite of its crucial importance in all concepts of socialism. Several circumstances are listed in which nationalization might be needed, but these are nullified by the assurance that

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21. National Christian Council of Kenya, Who Controls Industry in Kenya? A report of a working party set up under the auspices of the National Christian Council of Kenya (Nairobi, 1968).

22. African Socialism, pars. 38 and 44., pp. 13, 15.

23. Ibid., par. 38, p. 13.

"the Constitution and the KANU Manifesto make it clear that the African Socialism does not imply a commitment to indiscriminate nationalization," they "do commit the Government to prompt payment of full compensation whenever nationalization is used."<sup>24</sup> In weighing the value of a nationalization policy, the capitalist criterion of profitability, rather than an effort to break up the concentration of private and foreign economic power, redistribute and control economic surplus, was used. If an enterprise is nationalized, "it must be operated efficiently, cover its costs and earn a profit at least equivalent to the taxes paid when operated privately."<sup>25</sup>

The dominant concept of development through economic growth in Kenyan African Socialism was a capitalist concept. It reflected the conditioning of the attitudes and values of the African national leadership during the colonial period, a conditioning of consciousness which corresponded to their emerging class interests and future expectations as an African bourgeoisie.

And the overwhelming range of problems and constraints which had been created by the system of structural underdevelopment blocked them from perceiving an alternative possibility of development.

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24. Ibid., par. 73, p. 26.

25. Ibid., par. 76, p. 27.

Once the concept of development through rapid economic growth was accepted, a number of other concepts followed. This growth would take place most effectively through promoting the expansion and modernization of the existing economic system, that is, agrarian export production. Increased domestic capital, government revenue, the balance of trade and foreign exchange, and existing and future wage and salaried employment rested on this agrarian export economy.

Industrialization, previously blocked by the colonial government, had to be initiated. This would occur most quickly through the promotion of "industries" connected with the processing of the primary products as well as with import-substitution industries, rather than capital goods industries.

To achieve these goals, private, mainly foreign investment and aid, had to be encouraged, rather than discouraged. At the same time, existing skilled expatriate personnel had to be induced to stay. Also, additional managerial and technical personnel had to be attracted from abroad.<sup>26</sup>

Nationalization, the Paper stresses, would have an adverse effect upon the economy and be counter-productive to economic growth. Using the limited domestic capital to buy out foreign property would merely change

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26. Ibid., pars. 53-72, pp. 18-26.

the ownership, rather than create new productive and service facilities, according to the Paper.<sup>27</sup> The consequent outflow of capital and expatriate personnel would increase the "foreign exchange and skilled manpower problems." Nationalization could only "discourage" additional private investment, "thus reducing further the rate of growth of the economy."<sup>28</sup>

What the Paper on African Socialism does not consider is that truly effective application of economic controls over the economy would have the same effects as nationalization with compensation. Foreign investors and skilled personnel were attracted by the profitability offered. They could be selective because of the competition among underdeveloped countries. Restrictive monetary, tax, investment, and capital repatriation measures were not profitable and "discourage" private and foreign investment. Such measures equally discouraged the formation of indigenous capitalist enterprise and domestic investment.

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27. Nationalism is always dealt with in terms of purchase, or "full and fair compensation." Outright expropriation was never mentioned, or even considered, apparently, by the Sessional Paper, the government, or the governing party, KANU.

28. African Socialism, par. 74, pp. 26-27.

The reality of economic controls had already been indicated by the passage in early 1965 of a foreign investment protection law, "whose generosity can hardly be excelled by any other country and which aims at attracting foreign capital from sterling and other hard currency areas."<sup>29</sup>

2. Ujamaa: African Socialism in Tanzania.

The ideology of African Socialism in Kenya has been presented first, in greater detail and with more emphasis than the discussion of Ujamaa, or African Socialism in Tanzania, which is presented below. This is so for several reasons. First, Kenya's Sessional Paper (and related expressions of Kenya African Socialism) is considered in this study to be a more elaborate and detailed expression of the basic attitudes of development and the strategies of planning which were shared in common by the leadership in the two countries.

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29. M. S. Wionczek, "Economic Integration and Regional Distribution of Industrial Activities: A Comparative Study, Part II: East Africa," East African Economic Review, III (New Series), No. 1 (June 1967), p. 35.

Second, while the formulation of African Socialism in East Africa was developed first in Tanzania, mainly through the writings of Julius Nyerere, particularly in the 1962 paper, Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism,<sup>30</sup> Kenya's Sessional Paper was based upon and heavily borrowed from Ujamaa.<sup>31</sup> Third, the order of presentation follows that used throughout this study. It reflects the argument of this study that the two countries are essentially similar types of societies (due to the influence of a shared colonial policy under the British which promoted settler export colonies) and that this similarity is one in which Tanzania represented a variant of the Kenyan model, differing only in the degree of intensity and lag in growth.

The formulation of the ideology of African Socialism in Tanzania is based heavily upon the perspective and writings of Julius Nyerere, particularly Ujamaa, but also in numerous other writings of his and in official statements of the Government and dominant party, TANU.<sup>32</sup>

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30. Cf. Julius Nyerere, "Ujamaa: the basis of African Socialism," Freedom and Unity (Dar es Salaam, 1966), for the references below.
31. Cf. Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1970), pp.215-16.
32. Bienen correctly points out that dangers in equating Nyerere's writings along with the actual views and actions of the leadership and population throughout Tanzania. Differences have existed, and important ones; the Arusha formulations of 1967 in a sense reflect the victory of more radical elements within the government and party, who advocated a view of "scientific socialism" in opposition to the individualist and gradualist expression of African Socialism of Nyerere. Ibid., pp. 203-257.

An examination of Ujamaa reveals some of the same underlying perspectives and contradictions that were seen in Kenya's Sessional Paper, indicating a developmental approach similar to Kenya. While this approach is not spelled out in Ujamaa as it is in Kenya's Paper, it is found in Tanzania's first Five Year Development Plan.  
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Ujamaa also rejects capitalism and "doctrinaire socialism" as equally inappropriate to Tanzania's historical past and future development. Like Kenya, a third way is proposed: African Socialism. It will develop in accord with African traditions of equality, communalism, and security through the social sharing or distribution of wealth. Yet Ujamaa does not deal with the way the underlying economic structure-changed significantly from pre-colonial days - strongly influences social relations, i.e., the way people relate to one another and the values they hold in society.

Ujamaa treats socialism as an attitude of mind:  
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In the individual, as in the society, it is the attitude of mind which distinguishes the socialist from the non-socialist. It has nothing to do with the possession or non-possession of wealth.

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33. The United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Tanganyika Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, July 1964- June 1969 (Dar es Salaam, 1964).
34. Nyerere, "Ujamaa," p. 162.

The ideology of Ujamaa recalls this heritage of "traditional socialism;" it calls upon all the people to "re-educate" themselves, to "regain this former attitude of mind;" to hold onto this value and strive "to make sure that this socialist attitude of mind is not lost through the temptation to personal gain or to the abuse of positions of authority."<sup>35</sup>

Unlike the Kenya Paper, Ujamaa acknowledges the existence of elements of capitalism within present day Tanzania. Emphasis again is placed upon attitudes, rather than the structure of society and the class division this has created;<sup>36</sup>

Use of the word 'worker,' in its specialized sense of 'employee' as opposed to 'employer,' reflects a capitalist attitude of mind which was introduced into Africa with the coming of colonialism and is totally foreign to our way of thinking.

The presence of wealthy and powerful foreign capitalists created African capitalists also. These Africans turned to capitalist methods to gain wealth, power, position through the exploitation of their fellow Africans.<sup>37</sup>

Ujamaa does not oppose this desire to acquire wealth and power. It stresses the need for all in the society to work hard. It implicitly counts upon individual

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35. Ibid., pp. 166-167.

36. Ibid., p. 166.

37. Ibid., p.166.

entrepreneurship and acquisitiveness to increase the wealth within Tanzania. This view is based on the acknowledgement of Tanzania's poverty as a country, the need above all to promote economic growth to raise the "shamefully low" standard of living of the "masses" of the Tanzanian people.<sup>38</sup>

It also implicitly acknowledges the lack of resources and organization of the state to undertake this economic growth other than in limited ways.

Inevitably, in this process, certain groups and individuals, by their position, education, skills, and favored role in economic production, are going to obtain better salaries and wages, as well as contribute more to the nation's income than others. Ujamaa stresses particularly a moral imperative on the part of each to "demand only that return for his skilled work which he knows to be a fair one in proportion to the wealth or poverty of the whole society to which he belongs."<sup>39</sup>

In spite of these social and economic differences, all must ensure that a growing "prosperity will be shared by all the people."<sup>40</sup> Ujamaa does not treat these different socio-economic groupings as a class system which will develop along increasingly rigid and antagonistic

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38. Ibid., p. 168.

39. Ibid., pp. 168-69.

40. Ibid., p. 168.

lines unless prevented by more than moral exhortation and appeal to the values and attitudes of a fast disappearing traditional African society.<sup>41</sup>

This limited and contradictory perspective in Ujamaa may be seen also in the views on the system of production and distribution within a society. "The basic difference between a socialist society and a capitalist society," according to Ujamaa, "does not lie in their methods of producing wealth, but in the way that wealth is distributed."<sup>42</sup>

Thus, the importance of promoting an even distribution of wealth is recognized and stressed, while the strong influence the system of production has upon the distribution of wealth and goods within the society is ignored, or dealt with inadequately at best. The perspective differs little from that of Kenya African Socialism.

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41. In Tanzania, the class system is less pronounced or rigid than in Kenya, so there is some validity to Nyerere's avoiding an analysis of potential class conflict as an immediate policy concern. But there is a danger in not considering the possibility that the content and direction of any development program may encourage greater inequalities among economic groups in a society, e.g., the emergence of a class structure based on a capitalist economic system. Nyerere's approach to Tanzanian society is predominantly a moral one, not a materialist one. He seems to either ignore or discount the socio-economic structure of the society. Perhaps his approach to the problem of development schemes and goals is shaped by his Christian education and/or traditional African attitudes. He is not alone in his perspective; many other African leaders advance similar, essentially moralistic, interpretations of African society and collective goals.

42. Nyerere, "Ujamaa," pp. 162-163.

This issue seemingly is contradicted in the discussion in Ujamaa on land ownership and use, the one subject over which the questions of private ownership and a capitalist system of production are specifically dealt with;<sup>43</sup>

In rejecting the capitalist attitude of mind which colonialism brought into Africa, we must reject also the capitalist methods which go with it. One of these is the individual ownership of land.

Ujamaa emphasizes the tradition in African society in which "land was always recognized as belonging to the community" and each individual "had a right to the use of the land." Under colonial rule, "the concept of land as a marketable commodity" was introduced under which "a person could claim a piece of land as his own property whether he intended to use it or not,"<sup>44</sup> The system of private ownership of land and landlordism is rejected as "foreign" and "wrong:"<sup>45</sup>

The TANU Government must go back to the traditional African custom of landholding .... A member of society will be entitled to a piece of land on condition that he uses it. Unconditional, or 'freehold', ownership of land (which leads to specu-

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43. Ibid., p. 166.

44. Ibid., pp. 166-67. It is important that the emphasis is placed upon the issue of whether the land is used productively or not and upon the "artificial value" of the land established under a market economy, rather than the capitalist system of production and marketing and the resulting effects upon social relations and attitudes, and upon the concentration of wealth and distribution.

45. Ibid., p. 167.

lation and parasitism) must be abolished. We must ... regain our former attitude of mind -- our traditional African socialism -- and apply it to the new societies we are building today.

In 1962, the government moved to implement this view, through its paper, Land Tenure Reform Proposals. Existing freehold titles were to be converted to leaseholds with rights of occupancy dependent upon fulfillment of regulations for continuous development of the land.<sup>46</sup>

These changes in land tenure and use applied only to non-African land holdings, however. As important as these changes were potentially, they did not affect the land rights of the mass of the Africans. "Customary" land rights remained in force, with all the changes this included towards the development of individual tenure and use of land. While individual freehold titles and private ownership were not established and promoted in Tanzania in contrast to Kenya, a real question remains as to the importance of this for creating a socialist rather than a capitalist system of land rights and production.

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46. This was made legal under passage of two laws in 1963: Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act, 1963, and Rights of Occupancy (Development Conditions) Act, 1963. See J. Roger Pitblado, A Review of Agricultural Land Use and Land Tenure in Tanzania, Research Notes No. 7, University of Dar es Salaam, Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning (Dar es Salaam, 1970), p.13; R. W. James, Land Tenure and Policy in Tanzania (Nairobi, 1971), pp. 113-166; Krishan M. Maini, Land Law in East Africa (Nairobi, 1967), pp. 89-101.

While Ujamaa talks in terms of capitalist tendencies introduced by colonial rule, nowhere does it acknowledge or deal with the predominantly capitalist structure and characteristics of the economic system of Tanzania. Nor does it deal with the consequences to socialist development from the concentration of ownership and control within the economy by overseas interests, a continuing dependency upon overseas investment and "foreign aid", and a strategy of development heavily based upon agrarian export production for the international capitalist market.

As in Kenya, Tanzania's African Socialism was a conception of development through economic growth, rather than a radical restructuring of society.<sup>47</sup> Economic growth in turn was to be achieved through the existing economic system, modified to work more efficiently and to stimulate more rapid development. Both ideologies relied upon a combination of state planning and controls by the state and the attraction of foreign capital investment to fuel the two countries' economic growth and development. Neither of the two came to the grips with the contradiction of promoting socialist objectives through essentially capitalist means.

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47. Cf. Tanzania, Five Year Plan, 1964-1969.

### 3. Economic Planning, Agrarian Policy and Practice in Kenya.

Following independence, the KANU government turned to economic planning on a more elaborate scale than had occurred under colonial rule. This is indicated in the formulation of what originally was a six year Development Plan, for 1964 to 1970, the "red" plan.<sup>48</sup> This was later revised to form the 1966-1970 Development Plan, the "green" plan, which is the plan referred to in the following assessment.<sup>49</sup> While the Plan re-

While the Plan reflected a more ambitious effort to coordinate economic growth and development, it was a "cautious" plan when one considers Kenya's favorable resources in comparison to other ex-colonial states.<sup>50</sup> The most important characteristic of the Plan was the continuity it reflected with government policy during the later stage of colonial rule. It also followed very closely the basic approach to development and the recommendations of two major international capitalist organizations made during

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48. Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Development Plan, 1964-1970 (Nairobi, 1964).

49. Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Development Plan, 1966-1970 (Nairobi, 1966).

50. Cf. Judith Hayer, "Kenya's Cautious Development Plan," East Africa Journal (August, 1966).

1962-1963, the reports of the World Bank mission to Kenya<sup>51</sup> and of the Commonwealth Development Corporation.

The primary focus here is the agrarian policy. But this will be considered in the context of the plan for development as a whole, particularly the relationship of agrarian policy to the strategy of industrial development. This is necessary in order to assess the effects of Kenya's policies on the structure of underdevelopment.

The Plan and agrarian policy.

The Plan indicated a shift back from the temporary policy of land redistribution and resettlement in the former European highlands to the Swynnerton plan of agrarian reform within the major African land areas. The shift confirmed the essentially political basis of the land distribution program. The British had initiated the highlands program to prevent a collapse in set-

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51. Cf. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kenya: Report of a Mission Organized by the IBRD (Baltimore, 1963). The report of the Commonwealth Development Corporation, prepared by Arthur Gaitskill, a member of the CDC Board, was never made public. It was commissioned by KANU, circulated privately, and had a strong influence on future policy; "Fundamentally...it recommended the continuation and intensification of colonial policies." Cf. N.S. Carey Jones, The Anatomy of Uhuru (New York, 1966), p. 142 ff. Jones was a permanent secretary to the Ministry of Lands and Settlement at the time.

tlar land values and to bail out the settlers who wanted to depart, by guaranteeing them a purchase price at the level of assessed value which existed prior to the drop in land values over fifty per cent during the early 1960's. The British also wanted to maintain the agrarian export production of the colony, nearly eighty per cent of which was concentrated in the European farms and plantations in the Highlands. This European-produced export was the foundation of the colony economy, which was overwhelmingly owned or controlled by British companies. The colonial economy also was structured so that eighteen per cent of its exports went to Britain in 1960 and depended upon Britain for around thirty-one and a half per cent of its imports.<sup>52</sup>

The new African government supported the program for their own political purposes. They feared the growing unrest among the landless unemployed, who were demanding land as independence approached and were moving in as squatters spontaneously on the settler estates in the Highlands. The situation was a potentially explosive one for the African leadership. The demand for the outright expropriation of the Highlands threatened to create economic chaos and undermine the political position of

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52. These figures are computed from Tables 9 and 10 in the Kenya Plan, 1966-1970, pp. 23-24. These figures were significantly higher if one figured the position of the other Commonwealth countries in Kenya's import-export trade.

the leadership which was in the process of replacing the colonial rulers and taking over control of the state in the "transfer" to independence.

The land redistribution and settlement program was a heavy economic burden and destructive to future economic growth and development, as designed by the British. But it was considered politically "necessary" under the operating assumptions and attitudes shared by the British officials and African leadership. The heavy expense of the Highlands program is indicated by the fact that in the budgetary year of 1965-1966, seventy-two per cent of the government's agricultural development budget went into the settlement program.<sup>53</sup> The settlement program drained the existing extension and technical services, leaving only a skeleton staff to serve the main population areas, in addition to monopolizing agrarian expenditures. Thus capital, personnel and technical resources that might have been put immediately to use to improve the conditions and the productive output of the African population were diverted instead for non-developmental purposes.

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53. Kenya Plan, 1970-1974, p. 192, for an excellent analysis. Cf. J Hayer, "Kenya's Agricultural Development Policy," East African Economic Review, II, (New Series), No. 2 (December, 1966).

Only a little over one-fourth of the funds allocated for agrarian development went to the existing African land areas where the vast majority of the African peasant population was located. The figures on agricultural expenditure in the major African areas are deceptive when evaluated in terms of productive benefit. Nearly one-third of these expenditures went into the ongoing program of land consolidation and registration and establishment of private ownership of smallholder plots in the Swynnerton program of the mid-fifties. 54

The plan proposed to reverse this allocation of agrarian development funds. Settlement, which had been rushed through as independence approached, was to be phased out and replaced instead with a program aimed at the African land areas. This presumably would benefit the large majority of the Africans rather than the minority involved in the settlement program. This reversal did not take place, although some shift was made.

Only fifty per cent of the funds allocated for agriculture went to the major African areas by 1969. About fifty per cent was still allocated to the land transfer and development program in the Highlands. 55

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54. Kenya Plan, 1966-1970, Table I, pp. 127-128.

55. Kenya Plan, 1970-1974, p. 192.

The agrarian program for the traditional African areas was designed to expand the land consolidation and registration initiated under the British counter-revolutionary measures during the "emergency" of the mid-1950's. The program aimed at creating a class of smallholder peasant farmers with registered title and private ownership of the land. This was the pattern of land tenure and production the African government proceeded to implement throughout Kenya under its plan. This, clearly, was to be the economic and social foundation for the future in Kenya and the foundation for development.

Yet clear evidence already existed of the problems this policy posed for development in Kenya, and the implications the policy had in particular for the creation of a "socialist" society.<sup>56</sup> The land consolidation imposed after the emergency had created a large number of individual and family smallholder farms, which averaged less than five acres per farm plot. According to government figures and estimates at the beginning of the 1960's, an agricultural holding needed to average seven and a half acres to be an economic holding, rather than a subsistence holding.

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56. Cf. M. P. K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country (Nairobi, 1967), passim for an excellent analysis of the implementation and consequences of this land reform policy.

A sample agricultural census by the Agriculture Ministry in 1961 indicated that in Central Province only eight-thousand, seven hundred out of thirty-eight-thousand, nine-hundred holdings at Kiambu, four thousand, four hundred out of thirty-seven thousand, eight-hundred and eighty holdings at Nyeri, and two-thousand, seven-hundred out of thirty-seven thousand, six-hundred holdings at Fort Hall were seven and a half acres or more.<sup>57</sup> Less than twenty per cent of these smallholdings were capable theoretically of being economic holdings. In reality, the Sample Census indicated that the consolidated holdings were carrying twice the number of people originally estimated, which reduced the number of viable holdings even further ( See Table 8.1, p. 367).

The larger the holdings the greater the increase in the number of family members supported by and living on the holdings. Few of the holdings at all could conceivably be considered effective holdings. Few could support the absorption of landless as agricultural wage-laborers, in contrast to government expectations that a five acre holding would use three hired laborers and larger holdings even greater numbers of wage-labor.<sup>58</sup>

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57. Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Kenya African Agricultural Sample Census, 1960/61 (Nairobi, 1961), p. 11.

58. Cf. R. G. Wilson, "Land Consolidation in Fort Hall District," Journal of African Administration (July, 1956). Wilson's experiments in consolidation in Fort Hall had an important influence on government policy towards consolidation and title registration.

TABLE 8.1

AVERAGE NUMBERS OF PERSONS PER HOLDING BY SIZE GROUP AND DISTRICT  
(KENYA)\*

District	Size Group in Acres						Total
	Up to 2.49	2.50- 4.99	5.00- 7.49	7.50- 9.99	10.00- 14.99	15.00- and over	
	Number of Persons per Holding						
Kiambu	8.14	10.00	10.63	13.45	18.28	11.75	10.45
Nyeri	5.11	4.92	6.01	8.24	18.09	23.28	6.23
Fort Hall	5.25	6.21	8.91	8.62	9.70	11.09	6.39

\* Source: Sample Census, Part I, Text Table 69, p.55 .

Lastly, the expectation of creating a large yeoman farming class did not materialize; rather, at best there was emerging a small "kulak" or "gentry" class of farmers.

The most extensive analysis of the "agricultural revolution" being carried out through land consolidation reaches conclusions which have far-reaching implications for the possibilities of economic and social development  
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in Kenya:

These figures ... signify the almost total failure of plans for the agrarian revolution. The important point is not that consolidation created a landless class-- this was present already, although it was more sharply defined by consolidation -- but that it failed to pave the way for improving the lot of all but a small minority of the landed class. Far from providing employment for the one-hundred thousand extra souls thrown on to the reserve during the emergency, consolidation and the limited agricultural advance that followed failed even to provide a sufficient livelihood for more than two-thirds of the landowners. By providing a secure legal title to every recognized landowner and by restricting the issue of credit and hence preventing widespread rural indebtedness, government made certain that the Kikuyu small holder could keep his land.... Yet his holding is too small and his dependents too numerous to enable him to make a living by farming alone. Except for the abolition of litigation, the basic features of the pre-consolidation land problems of the Kikuyu country were not fundamentally altered by consolidation...

The landed class, or "gentry," which emerged out of the land consolidation and reform in Kikuyuland, was very small in relation to the overall population of the area. Only fifteen-thousand and eight-hundred registered holdings of seven and a half acres or more existed in the three districts and there were only two-thousand and nine-hundred holdings over fifteen acres. Sorrenson estimated that there were

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no more than five-thousand viable economic holdings in the whole of the Kikuyu country. Perhaps half of the owners of these holdings are full time professional farmers.... A very large number of the most progressive landowners are not themselves full time farmers: they are businessmen, government employees (including school teachers and some highly paid civil servants), commercial employees and even politicians...

Following independence, the African government extended the other major ethnic regional areas the same agrarian policy which previously had been imposed in Central Province: land consolidation, creation of individual and family smallholder plots, and the registration of titles which conferred private ownership of the land. Similar problems of high population concentration, overcrowding, and inadequate size of farm holdings also

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60. Sample census, Part I, Text Table 14, p. 19.

61. Sorrenson, Land Reform, p. 233.

existed among the Luo, Baluhya, Kamba, Embu and Meru.<sup>62</sup>  
 The continuation of the colonial policy of land reforms could only lead to the same results that took place in Kikuyuland.

Agrarian reform through consolidation did generate changes in the economy.<sup>63</sup> Largely as a result of the land consolidation, African smallholder production for the market increased rapidly from £ 6.M in 1954 to nearly £ 14.M in 1964, an annual rate of growth of eight and four-fifths percent. The European "large farm sector" during the same period increased the value of its marketed production at

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62. Cf. S. H. Ominde, Land and Population Movements in Kenya (Evanston, 1968). Chapter Six, "The Population of Kenya" provides a breakdown of population density in the different areas according to the 1962 Census, as well as a comparison with the 1948 census. In the key locations of high fertility and rainfall, the density is striking and reveals the inadequacies of indicating density average by Province or even district. Many of these locations had densities over 1,000 per square mile. Averages for the Districts in Nyanza varied from 250 to 500 per square mile. Similar figures were indicated in the Embu and Meru districts. The Kamba population, centered mainly around the Machakos area, showed densities of 500 to 750 in the hills area, and a density between 250 and 500 in the lower southeast part.
63. There is no evidence to suggest that increased African production was caused by registration of title and establishment of private ownership, rather than through the consolidation of land. Consolidation could have taken place on a basis other than private ownership and smallholder plots. Large-scale cooperative and collective farms and land use held out much better possibilities for long-range development.

a much slower rate, 4.2 per cent, over the same period, from £ 27.3 M to £ 41.2 M.<sup>64</sup>

By 1964, the African percentage of the value of marketed agrarian production increased to twenty-five per cent. Expansion of cash crop production in the African land areas in the future, as well as the buying out of settler farms by the better-off African, meant that the percentage of African production in the agrarian economy would increase even more in the future. This anticipated "Africanization" of cash crop production and exports, like the equivalent "Africanization" of the civil service, represented a substitution rather than a structural change. The high level of dependency of the economy upon a few major export cash crops remained.

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64. Kenya, Plan, 1966-1970, Table 3, p. 18. A breakdown into two periods indicates an increasing rate of growth for African smallholder production and a decreasing rate of growth for European production: African production increased at a rate of 6.8 percent from 1954 to 1959, and 10.9 per cent from 1959 to 1964, while European production increased 4.4 per cent and 3.9 percent during the respective periods. These figures are qualified by several points. They indicate the low productivity of the protected and subsidized European farms as much as the higher productivity of African smallholder production. The rapid increase of African production reflects the low level of cash crop production which had existed in the past because of British prohibitions; it does not indicate that this rate of growth in African cash crop production could continue in the future, for continued growth would depend upon increasing productivity rather than an expansion in land used for cash crop production and not subsistence crops alone. In addition, the low and declining rate on the European estates, particularly from 1959 to 1964, resulted from the high level of uncertainty and fear among the settlers over future land policy as independence approached. Investment and maintenance of European farms halted during this period. Cf. Jones, Anatomy of Uhuru, pp. 135-36 and Chapter Six.

Continuation of the colonial land reform program raised serious questions about the possibilities of development. The problems it structured into the society already had become evident during the implementation of the program by the British in the 1950's. The original British plan sought to establish a capitalist development in the African land areas similar to the enclosure movement in Britain centuries earlier. A conservative class of landed "gentry" would be established, with a large intermediate class of "yeoman" farmers, and a large rural proletariat, which would obtain wage labor on the modernized farms under private ownership or in the villages which would be developed as part of the land reform program.<sup>65</sup>

This failed to happen because the conditions did not exist or were not implemented to make this a reality. Instead, the British shifted to a policy which promoted the development of a small group of prosperous landowners and a vast class of smallholding peasants living on the land, rather than in a village-based rural society. While this created smallholder plots which were barely viable economically, it did absorb the large numbers of what

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65. Cf. R. J. M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (Nairobi, 1954); Philip Mitchell, The Agrarian Problem in Kenya (1948); idem., African Afterthoughts (London, 1954); Lord Hailey, An African Survey, revised, 1956 (London, 1957); Jones, Anatomy of Uhuru.

otherwise would be a rural proletariat with few possibilities of employment and means of livelihood. This policy held out a bleak future, for the plots would become increasingly unviable as the population grew and provide a diminishing standard of living for increasingly overpopulated land holdings.

The Kenyatta government attempted to implement a combination of the two policies. It apparently continued the land reform policy in the African areas of largely uneconomic smallholdings as a necessary "trade-off." The policy provided temporary land and economic security for as many people as possible, through smallholder plots, based on restricted ownership, which limited rights of transfer, and the remnants of traditional obligations. This retarded the development of a large landless rural proletariat which posed a political threat for the new elite and the government.

While the Kenyatta government evoked the colonial phrases of an "agrarian revolution" and a transformation of the rural areas, the agrarian policy actually was based on a gradual evolution through improvement. The policy depended on the expansion of extension services to the multitude of smallholdings in order to improve land use and agricultural practices. It also depended upon cooperative development, to organize the marketing of the small cash crop production of the smallholders, the provisioning of

better seed, equipment, insecticides and other means for the raising of the productivity of the smallholdings and the improvement of quality of the crops.

The improvement approach was restricted not only by the heavy emphasis upon land transfer and resettlement in the Highlands, but by the previous abandonment of the village development program. "Villagization" was imposed during the emergency as a means of crushing the revolt. It later was seen as the means, along with land consolidation and smallholder ownership, of bringing about an "agrarian revolution" in the countryside.<sup>66</sup>

Initially, British restrictions limited the movement of Africans out of the villages to those with larger, economic holdings. When it became clear that very few would qualify, the restrictions were loosened, then removed entirely. Near the end of 1955, one million, seventy-seven thousand and five hundred Kikuyu and Embu had been moved forcibly into eight-hundred and fifty-four villages.<sup>67</sup> By the end of the 1950's, these villages mostly were abandoned, because of a traditional -- and practical -- preference to live near the farm plots, because of the punitive nature in which the villages were formed, and, most importantly,

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66. Cf. O. E. B. Hughes, "Villages in the Kikuyu Country," Journal of African Administration, VII, No. 4 (October, 1955), pp. 170-174; Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (Nairobi, 1954).

67. East African Standard, October 20, 1955.

because of the failure to provide the services, both traditional and modern, which would make these "villages" real social centers that could attract and keep people there.<sup>68</sup>

The failure of the Kenyatta government to promote village development was as much political as it was due to the costs of village development. A dispersed population in households scattered over the countryside created less social unrest and dampened any political threat. The implications of this were important, for it greatly reduced the possible effectiveness of the limited extension and social services the government provided in the countryside.

The lack of village development intensified the government bias towards serving the rural "gentry" class, the progressive and better-off farmers who had larger scale farms. They had the potential, which the smallholders did not, for utilizing farm plans, for modernizing their agricultural practices, improving productivity through insecticides and mechanization, and for developing mixed farming.

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68. Cf. Sorrenson, Land Reform, pp. 140-150, 162-64, 178-181, 232-36. Only in southern Kiambu did permanent villages develop to any significant extent. This was due to its suburb role of Nairobi, and greater commercial activity, rather than any government effort to create viable villages.

The agrarian policy in the African areas heavily compromised the leadership's capitalist orientation towards modern agricultural development, through promoting the formation of larger-scale farms on the basis of private ownership and competitive enterprise. The Kenyatta government placed primary emphasis instead upon the large-scale capitalist farming in the Highlands as the basis for modern economic development.

Formation of an African landowning elite in the former European Highlands.

A major strategy in the plan for promoting rapid economic growth and development was the preservation of the Highlands, which was the focus of Kenya's modern economic sector. Every effort was made to restrict re-settlement to unused land on settler farms, to keep intact as many of the settler mixed farms as possible, along with European ranches and plantations. The government expanded programs which aided the new African elite to buy out the European farms as individuals, through partnerships, or corporations.

The Plan allocated £ 3.1 M. for land transfer to large-scale farmers and £ 5.1 M. for the purchase of "national and transitional farms." They were to be turned

over and sold to private African owners as soon as this became possible. Meanwhile they served to preserve large, high-quality dairy farms and cattle ranches as valuable stock sources for future agrarian exports. £ 2 M. was allocated for insuring the transfer of large-scale farms to a few Africans, almost as much as the £ 8.2. M. allocated for the thirty-five thousand small-scale settler families in the existing one Million Acre Scheme and for the expansion of this program.<sup>69</sup> The amount of land involved in the two programs was also nearly equal, for the transfer of large-scale mixed farms to African owners involved over one million acres in the Highlands.<sup>70</sup>

The land transfer and settlement program in the former European Highlands actually led to a greater concentration of large-scale farms. In 1960, there were 3,609 large farms of 2,142 acres each containing a total of 7,730,800 acres. By May 1964, there were 2,958 large farms with a total of 6,797,900 acres, or an average of 2,298 acres each. The average size of the remaining large farms had increased as a result of the land reform program.<sup>71</sup>

Of these large farms, there were 275 with 5,000 or more acres in 1960. They had made up 7.6 per cent of the

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69. Kenya Plan, 1966-1970, pp. 127-28.

70. J. Hayer, "Kenya's Agricultural Policy," p. 36.

71. For the following figures, see Jacob Oser, Promoting Economic Development: with illustrations from Kenya (Evans-ton, 1967), p. 191.

large farms and had 55 per cent of the land in large farms. They totaled 4,250,700 acres and averaged 15,457 acres. By 1964, there were 249 farms with 5,000 acres or more. They made up 8.4 per cent of the large farms and had 60.3 per cent of the land in large farms. They totaled 4,098,000 acres and their average size was 16,458 acres or 25.7 square miles.

While the resettlement program for small-scale farmers has received the main attention, the implications of the transfer of large farms to a growing African upper class are much more important for the future of Kenya. The transfer of large farms entrenched class division, growing inequality, and a capitalist formation in Kenya. It also committed an African bourgeoisie to the existing structure of underdevelopment.

By mid-1966, the government officially adopted the policy of attracting private, foreign investment for the development of controlled game cropping, cattle ranching, and tourism on 1,400,000 acres (2,187 square miles) in the semi-arid coastal region. "Tenure would be on leasehold for 45 years, and the annual rent for the first five years was set at £ 300 (\$840.00), or one United States cent for every 16.7 acres."<sup>72</sup>

The policy reflected the view that private, foreign investment would be the major source of development while

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72. Ibid., p. 192.

the role of government was limited primarily to attracting such investment through "liberal" terms and regulations. This view differed little from that of the colonial period. It represented a conditioned way of thinking inherited from colonial rule more than the economic reality of the role the state could play in undertaking development.

The stress on tourism was particularly disturbing. Scarce capital was directed to unproductive facilities such as luxury hotels to promote tourism as a major "industry" of the future and to obtain the foreign exchange tourism brought. But the growing influx of foreign tourists, living at much higher standards than the African, required the importation of luxury goods. It reinforced values, standards of living, and inequalities that Kenya's society could not afford.

Kenya's agrarian policy held out little possibility of change for the existing system of underdevelopment based on a deformed capitalist development. The class system which was created under colonial rule would be "Africanized." Otherwise it would continue to form along the same lines, while it became more firmly entrenched and resulted in increasingly inequality within Kenyan society.

The strategy of agrarian policy in the rural African areas outside the Highlands, first of all, locked the mass of Africans into the countryside in smallholder plots, under private ownership. These plots were too

small and too overpopulated to permit any real transformation to modern agriculture, to provide permanently rising standards of living, or to create a new social organization which would more effectively satisfy their needs.

Second, the policy was a holding operation. It aimed at the gradual improvement of agrarian production on the smallholder plot to keep pace with the population growth projected for the future.<sup>73</sup> The main improvement was directed towards the "gentry" and the progressive farmer, whose expansion of land through purchase and whose modernization of cultivation was expected to provide additional wage employment for the growing rural proletariat.

The third element in the agrarian strategy, the continued development of the Highlands area, was based on

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73. Existing studies, based on past rates of growth, had serious implications for Kenya's future development. They projected only a small increase, at the optimum, in the urban areas. The rural population in the existing African land areas were projected to increase greatly in both absolute and percentage terms, at least until the end of the century. See D. M. Etherington, "Projected Changes in Urban and Rural Development in Kenya and Implications for Development Policy," in James R. Sheffield, ed., Education, Employment and Rural Development, the proceedings of the Conference held at Kericho, Kenya, in September 1966 (Nairobi, 1967), pp. 54-74. The paper was actually written and presented elsewhere several years earlier. Most of the other papers were also written earlier, by participants who for the most part held positions in the government, Nairobi College, or in international organizations involved in planning and programs in Kenya. The conference generally reflected views which had formed the basis for the 1966-70 Development Plan. The Conference itself was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Dulverton Trust.

the success of the first, the holding operation in the countryside. Expanding economic growth in the modern sector, located in the Highlands and based on the large-scale farming, was viewed as the major basis for development.

Linked with this strategy in the Highlands was the parallel strategy of industrial development.

#### The strategy of industrialization.

The modern economic sector, centered in the Highlands, was considered the base for industrial development.<sup>74</sup> It already had the foundations of a modern infrastructure to attract and support industries. The planning leaned heavily upon the further development of "industries" processing the primary agricultural production, particularly production on the large farms and estates. Second, industrialization was oriented to import substitution industries. These industries were planned for the few main urban areas which already had the infrastructure and semi-skilled labor force, the administrative and financial services that would attract further industrial development.

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74. Cf. Kenya Plan, 1966-1970, pp. 62-66 and chapter 6. For a good summary of Kenya's industrial strategy, see A. Seidman, "Comparative Industrial Strategies in East Afirca," East Africa Journal (June, 1970), pp. 19-43.

Kenya's industrial strategy was based on the realities of the low level of industrial development inherited from the colonial period. As limited as this was, it was significantly greater than the other East African states, Tanzania and Uganda. It aimed at paying the foundations for a high rate of industrial development for the future, which would provide alternate employment than agriculture.

Thus the necessity of the holding operation in the rural areas. Development planning was designed to keep as many Africans as possible on the land until industrialization could increase to the point of being able to absorb the growing numbers of landless unemployed and rural proletariat. Their numbers were of concern already and many more would be thrown off the land in the future, and at an increasingly rapid rate, due to population increase, growth of private ownership of the land, larger-scale farming and mechanization, as well as alternate prospects of urban life.

The government based its expectations of industrial development upon private investment, mainly foreign capital. The role of the state was limited primarily to creating a "hospitable investment climate" and expanding the existing infrastructure, rather than a direct state role in industry.

The private sector was expected to provide approximately 85 per cent of the manufacturing investment. The state would concentrate its investment in infrastructure,

primarily transport and communications. The Plan projected over three-quarters of the infrastructure investment coming from the public sector.<sup>75</sup>

Consistent with the policy of maximizing the rate of economic growth, the government emphasized an industrial strategy to take advantage of existing foundations. Thus the greatest return of investment was seen in promoting industries which linked to the existing economy, such as primary processing industries for the major raw materials of agrarian exports. The location of industries was also oriented to those areas where existing infrastructures (such as transport, power, communications), services, labor force, administrative and financial centers, and industrial linkages were located. This strategy, and the consequences for development, were heavily influenced by the pattern inherited from the colonial period. Few such centers existed and they were located in highly unequal patterns within Kenya. Greater inequalities of growth were the natural consequence of this policy. Redistribution of industry and a growing equalization of development, like redistribution of land and agricultural modernization, was rejected in favor of "maximal" economic growth.

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75. Kenya Plan, 1966-1970, Table 9, p. 111. Actually, dependency upon external investment was even greater than that indicated. Significant amounts in the "public sector" were expected from foreign aid, through bilateral aid programs, and through aid from international organizations, like the World Bank. Cf. ibid., Tables 12 and 13, pp. 120-223.

The limitations of the type, location, and size of Kenya's industries as of 1964 are presented in an industrial survey by R. B. Ogendo of the Department of Geography at the University College of Nairobi.<sup>76</sup> The continuation, rather than the diversification and redistribution --that is, restructuring, -- of this pattern of deformed growth is indicated by the same author's more extended study of 1970.<sup>77</sup> A high percentage of all industries were based on agricultural processing, rather than manufacturing and service industries.<sup>78</sup> The limited role of industry within Kenya's economy is indicated not only by the small number of "plants" but also by the small size of the labor force in the above industries; the total number of employees was 95,692.<sup>79</sup> The same imbalance in the type of industries is reflected in this work force; a little over 58 per cent were employed in agricultural processing, only 11 per cent in manufacturing, and a little over 30 per cent in service industries.<sup>80</sup>

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76. Ogendo, "The Location and structure of the Manufacturing and Service Industries in Kenya's Central Provincial Industrial Unit," (Mimeo, paper, presented to the African Studies Association, 1969).
77. Ogendo, Industrial Geography of Kenya (Nairobi, 1970), passim.
78. Ogendo, "Location and structure of industries." In Central Province, industries of five employees or more totaled 273 Agricultural food processing and Agricultural non-food manufacturing, out of a total of 363 industries; non-agricultural manufacturing was less than one-quarter of manufacturing and service industries ( 22 out of 90), see Table 2, p. 9. The same pattern prevailed throughout Kenya as a whole; see Figures 13-17, ibid.
79. Ibid., Table 4, p. 21.
80. Ibid., Table 4, p. 21.

A similar pattern of inequality or mal-distribution existed in the location of these industries. A high percentage of these industries were concentrated in the central highlands and the coastal port of Mombasa, and the greatest concentration of all existed in Nairobi and the outskirts of Nairobi in Kiambu District of Central Province.<sup>81</sup> This concentration is also indicated by the distribution of the labor force. Over one-third (34.13 per cent were) located in Nairobi alone and over 52 per cent were concentrated in Nairobi and Mombasa.<sup>82</sup> Concentration in the Highlands outside Nairobi was overwhelmingly in the European-dominated townships astride the railway lines to Kisumu and to Thika and along the major road system.

The government depended upon two para-statal agencies to promote industrial development. Both were created during the end of the colonial period. The first, the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) was devoted primarily to the promotion of African commercial and industrial enterprise. It played a relatively small role between 1960 and 1966, for its total loans during this period were £ 108, 942.<sup>83</sup> Under the Plan, the ICDC in-

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81. Ibid., Figures 4, 9, 13-17.

82. Ibid., Table 4, p. 21.

83. Seiden, "Comparative Industrial Strategies," p. 22.

creased its efforts to create private African enterprise through the development of "industrial estates." They were to be located in five major towns in Kenya, thus further intensifying industrial concentration.<sup>84</sup> The first was located in Nairobi, involved a government investment of £ 1M., and was unsuccessful in the goal of providing a core around which to generate an expansion of African "entrepreneurship."<sup>85</sup>

The second agency, the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK), aimed at attracting large-scale private investment. It was established with loans from Britain and West Germany as well as funds from the Kenya Government.<sup>86</sup> By the end of 1966, DFCK had invested around £ 2 M. in fourteen enterprises which involved £ 17 M. in mostly foreign capital. The industries differed little from the pattern indicated above. They included two sugar factories, the Kisumu cotton textile mill, processing industries for food and other agricultural products, and timber products, as well as investments in hotels and insurance.<sup>87</sup>

The industrial strategy did not attract the degree of foreign capital investment hoped for, in spite of every inducement. It led to an increase in foreign and private

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84. Kenya Plan, 1966-1970, pp. 242-44.

85. Kenya Plan, 1970-74, pp. 316-319.

86. Kenya Plan, 1966-1970, pp. 241-42.

87. Kenya, Economic Survey, 1967, p. 59.

ownership within the economy without generating rapid economic growth. While private capital formation increased in absolute terms, manufacturing industry's output declined from 10.18 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product in 1964 to 9.98 per cent in 1968.<sup>88</sup>

The high percentage of foreign ownership in manufacturing retarded economic growth in other ways. By 1968, the capital outflow from these industries had risen to £ 19 M., equal to one and a half the capital formation in manufacturing.<sup>89</sup>

Kenya's development policy did not change the existing pattern of deformed capitalist development and did not modify the structure of underdevelopment of the economy inherited from colonial rule. One can argue that little structural change could be achieved within the short span of time since independence, and that both the rate and absolute value of economic growth also could not be expected to change significantly. But the importance lies first in the fact that no change in the content and direction of development can be observed. Second, the policies developed did not indicate any effort to change this pattern.

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88. Kenya, Economic Survey, 1969, Table 1.3, p. 9; Table 1.1, pp.4-5.

89. Seidman, "Comparative Industrial Strategies," p. 23, obtained from the balance of payments data in Kenya, Economic Survey, 1969.

4. Economic Planning, Agrarian Policy and Practice in Tanzania.

Following independence, the TANU government turned to planned development and a more direct and active state role in mobilizing scarce resources and maximizing economic growth in order to achieve this development. This policy was reflected in its Five Year Plan, 1964-1969.<sup>90</sup> During the interim period, the African government operated on the three year Development Plan, 1961/62-1963/64,<sup>91</sup> which had been formulated by the British colonial government in mid-1961. This plan was based essentially upon a study by the World Bank, and was similar to that in Kenya, which had taken place in 1960.<sup>92</sup>

The interim plan was important in that it revealed the degree to which Tanzania was undeveloped as well as underdeveloped. As a government summary of the three year plan stated, "the main theme of the plan is the laying of foundations for future growth," rather than any expectation of immediate increases in production and income.<sup>93</sup> The

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90. The United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Tanganyika Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, July 1964-June 1969 (Dar es Salaam, 1964).
91. Tanganyika, Development Plan for Tanganyika, 1961/ 62-1963/64 (Dar es Salaam, 1962).
92. Cf. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Tanganyika (Baltimore, 1961).
93. Government of Tanganyika, "The Three Year Plan, 1961/62-1963/64," in Hadley E. Smith, ed., Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1966) pp. 348-59; Cf. Tanganyika Plan, 1964-1969, p. 7-8.

political leadership faced four particularly severe constraints. First, there was little government revenue and investment capital for development. Second there was a severe lack of educated and trained Africans to formulate and implement development. Third, Tanzania had a widely dispersed African population, the great majority of which produced minimally for the monetary agrarian economy. Fourth, there was a highly inadequate transport network, which left a number of potentially important regions almost wholly isolated and the more productive areas unconnected with one another. The three year plan focused on the latter three deformations in Tanzanian society in order to lay the foundations for future development.

The three year plan: the initiation of development planning.

The plan allocated £ 24 M. in development expenditures over the three years. While the amount was small, it was £ 3 M. more per year than had been invested during the past three years under the colonial government. Yet the revenue of the central government for 1960-61 was only £ 20 M. The financing of the plan was highly dependent upon foreign grants and loans (£ 9 M. ) and domestic loans (£ 4 M. ).

Only £ 1 M., or four per cent of the costs of the development plan were to be provided by the government.<sup>94</sup>

The Civil Service was considerably smaller than that in Kenya. In 1961, Africans occupied only 26 per cent of the senior and middle levels of the Civil Service.<sup>95</sup> This had resulted from the colonial policy of maintaining control over the main institutions of the colonial system and, more importantly for future development, from the undeveloped nature of higher education within the colony under British rule.<sup>96</sup> The number of educated and trained Africans was small and even fewer were graduating and becoming available yearly. The government's Africanization Commission reported in 1962 that only 200 Africans were entering Form I of secondary school and they would not complete their education for five years.<sup>97</sup> The problem was complicated in early 1962, after Nyerere stepped down temporarily as Prime Minister to concentrate on reorganizing the party, TANU. The resignations of expatriate officials

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94. Tanganyika Plan, 1964-1969, Table 12, p. 11.

95. Hugh W. Stephens, The Political Transformation of Tanganyika: 1920-67 (New York, 1968).

96. Cf. Tanganyika, Development Commission, A Ten Year Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam, 1946); also The Annual Report of this Commission over the plan's duration, 1946-1956 particularly for 1956. Also see Stephens, Political Transformation, pp. 87-89, for a good summary of the low level of educational development by the end of the 1950's.

97. George Skorov, "Integration of Educational and Economic Planning in Tanzania," African Resource Monographs, No. 6 (UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning, 1966), p.48.

jumped from from 15 to 40 per cent. Shortages of technical personnel became particularly severe, during the first two years of independence. Twenty per cent of all senior and middle level positions were vacant, with much higher percentages in the two main programs of the three year plan: the Ministry of Agriculture had a vacancy of 40 per cent and the Ministry of Communications, Power and Works had a vacancy of 47 per cent.<sup>98</sup>

The high level of vacancies and shortage of skilled African manpower created a major block to the implementation of the Plan. This foreshadowed a similar problem in carrying out the subsequent Five Year Plan. As limited as the capital resources were, they were unable to complete the investment of existing capital available, due to the lack of personnel.

The plan, based on the World Bank's recommendations, placed a primary emphasis upon agrarian development within the African areas. Nearly a quarter of the development plan was devoted to agriculture, £ 5.7 M. Most of this was directed to the expansion of extension services in order to increase the number of Africans producing export cash crops and to improve the existing productivity of the land. Aside from this "improvement" approach, a "transformation" approach was initiated. This was based on pilot

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98. Stephens, Political Transformation, pp. 160, 170.

settlement schemes and community development programs aimed at shifting the pattern of living from scattered households to villages. This shift could enable them to utilize the extension services more efficiently and to enable the provisioning of services which could not be done with the existing pattern of dispersion.

The program was very similar in objectives to the "villagization" program in Kenya during the 1950's, although on a much smaller scale and voluntarily rather than by force. President Nyerere, in his December 10, 1962 inauguration address to the National Assembly (after the official establishment of Tanzania as a republic) stressed the importance of the policy of village development:

It is ridiculous to concentrate on agriculture if we are not going to make any change in our old methods of cultivation and our old ways of living.... The hand-hoe will not bring us the things we need today.... So if you ask me what our Government is planning to do during the next few years the answer is simple.... Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities.... unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or have clean drinking water. It will be quite impossible to start small village industries.... If we do not start living in proper village communities, then all our attempts to develop the country will be just so much wasted effort.... We will make every effort to prepare plans for village development for the whole country as quickly as possible...so as to speed up rural development.

The third major focus of the plan was the development of the inadequate economic infrastructure.<sup>100</sup> Twenty-eight and eight-tenths per cent of the expenditures were allocated to communications, power and works. The largest element in this was directed towards the construction of main trunk roads, which was allocated 13.5 per cent of the total capital budget. In this policy, the government differed with the recommendations of the World Bank and rejected "the Mission's view that the main trunk road system is virtually complete."<sup>101</sup>

The government was keenly aware of the deformed development of the transport network which it had inherited from the colonial period. Tanzania's main productive centers were linked with Kenya's transport network as part of the policy of subordinating Tanzania's development to Kenya. They were not connected to one another in any integrated transport network, while other valuable areas remained in undeveloped isolation. The World Bank Mission report's recommendations doomed Tanzania to a perpetuation of this structural underdevelopment. The development plan described this problem succinctly:<sup>102</sup>

The present main road system looks outwards, particularly in the north and facilitates the flow of purchasing power from the rich provinces in the north to Kenya and Uganda rather than inwards to Tanganyika. Also, there is no direct road connecting the prosperous Lake and West Lake provinces with the Northern Province

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100. Cf. Tanganyika Plan, 1964-1969, Tables 13,14 pp.13-14.

101. Development Plan 1961/62-1963/64, p. 14.

102. Tanganyika Plan, 1964-1969, p. 14.

and with Tanganyika's seaport so that the main flow of imports and exports has to make a detour via Kenya and Uganda. Similarly, there is no convenient link with the potentially rich Southern Highlands and the Kilobero Valley. The Government's view is that the new main road system should connect the areas of agricultural and mineral production (taking into consideration their future potential) with the main outlets in Tanganyika.

The interim three year plan was important also because of the strong influence it had upon the first major effort of development planning by the new African government, the Five Year Plan, 1964-1969 (FYP). This meant that the FYP also reflected the major views for development of the World Bank, which represented the prevailing views of western capitalist system towards development strategies for the under-developed countries.

Thus, the initial thinking in Tanzania, as in Kenya, indicated a mix. There were modifications of development strategies, which indicated their awareness of the structural underdevelopment they faced. But there was an acceptance of the basic premises of the capitalist world, premises that saddled the country with a program that could only intensify the deformed capitalist development emerging in Tanzania.

The Five Year Plan and agrarian policy.

The mixed conceptions of development in the FYP can be analyzed most clearly in its agrarian policy. Under the rubric of a "transformation" approach, the Tanzanian government pushed ahead with a program of village settlement schemes, as recommended by the World Bank.<sup>103</sup> This was their own version of creating an "agrarian revolution" among the African peasantry. Modernization and expansion of the agrarian economy was the basis by which the government planned on promoting the rapid development of Tanzania.

The settlement schemes represented a major proportion of funds allocated under the FYP for agrarian development as well as a large percentage of the total funds allocated for development by the government. In this sense, the program functioned in a comparable way to the resettlement program in the Kenya Highlands.

The total development budget was £ 246 M.<sup>104</sup> Of this amount, the central government allocated £ 102 M. for capital development and £ 130 M. was allocated by all levels of government ( including local government and the East African Common Services Organization (E.A.S.C.O.) as well as the central government).

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103. Cf. IBRD, Economic Development in Tanzania, passim.

104. Tanganyika Plan, 1964-1969, Table on p. 97.

Agrarian development was to receive a 27.1 per cent (£ 27.6 M. ) of the funds from the central government and 22 per cent ( £ 28.6 M.) from all levels of government. A further breakdown indicates the important role of the settlement program. Of government expenditures, 37.5 per cent (( £10.2 M.) was allocated to the village settlements and a further 32.7 per cent (£ 9.2 M.) went to irrigation projects. Since these projects overwhelmingly involved high capital settlement programs also, the combination resulted in 70.2 per cent ( £ 19.4 M.) allocation for settlement schemes and projects.

Only 29.8 per cent (£ 8.2 M.) was to be invested in the traditional agrarian areas, which accounted for most of the country and most of the African peasant population. The lopsided investment between settlement and the rest of the country was strikingly similar to the bias in the allocation in Kenya's early post-independence programs.

The village settlement scheme program in the FYP was part of a longer range planning which covered the period up to 1890, as did the other major programs of the FYP. <sup>105</sup>

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105. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2. The Five Year Plan was considered the first phase of a long-term plan for 1980. In this respect, among others, it represented a superior and more ambitious planning than Kenya's first plan. Yet the FYP listed three main objectives to be reached by 1980: (1) to raise per capita income from the present £ 19/6s. to £ 45 ; (2) to become fully self-sufficient in trained manpower requirements; (3) to raise the life-expectation from the present 35-40 years to 50 years. Given Tanzania's underdeveloped state, these represented arduous tasks; yet there was nothing socialist or revolutionary in them as objectives or as an indicator of the kind of society to be created.

By 1980, the government expected to establish enough village settlement schemes to include one million people throughout the country.<sup>106</sup> The strategy aimed at establishing the settlement schemes partly in the more densely populated and productive areas and partly in fertile areas which as yet were practically unused. Three areas in particular were planned for new village settlement: the Kilombero, Pangani, and Wami River Basins.<sup>107</sup>

The village settlement program sought to achieve two major changes in coordination.<sup>108</sup> New "pioneer" settlers would be attracted out of the overpopulated main producing areas by the aid the government offered for new settlement in unused areas. Government investment in water control, irrigation, modern agriculture technique and services in these river basins would make them highly productive areas in the future. The new settlements would greatly increase the agrarian production within the country and provide an important contribution to the economic growth and social development of the nation.

At the same time, the outflow from the overpopulated areas would reduce the mounting under-employment which blocked the modernization of agrarian production and the raising of living standards in these areas. The remaining

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106. Ibid., p. x.

107. Ibid., p. x., 46-48.

108. Ibid., p. 15.

population in these areas were to be concentrated in village settlement schemes. This would lay the foundations in these areas also for the introduction of intensive extension services, mechanization, and social services.

The first Five Year Plan actually provided for 60 pilot village settlement schemes, each composed of "about 250 comprehensively planned, economically profitable individual farms which will be encouraged to work on a co-operative basis."<sup>109</sup> The average investment, considering the "economic and social overheads," involved in the village development as well as the farm layouts and services, came to £ 150,000 per settlement,<sup>110</sup> or £ 600 per farm/family.

Over £ 10 M. was to be invested for what at most would be 100,000 people by 1969, out of a total population of 12 to 13 millions.<sup>111</sup> Only a little over £ 8 M. was to be invested for all the rest of the population in the agrar-

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109. Ibid., p. 21.

110. Ibid.

111. The government based its planning on an estimate of a population of 9.6 M. in 1964 (p. 72). As p. 73 makes clear, the population was expected to increase to approximately 14 M. by 1980. This was totally unrealistic, as the 1967 census proved; see, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Central Statistical Bureau, Preliminary Results of the Population Census Taken in August 1967 (Dar es Salaam, 1967). The population given of 12 to 13 M. for 1969 is an estimate from the census. Tanzania's population has already reached 14 M. Nowhere in the FYP do they indicate the rate of population increase that is used, although it was obviously too low. It indicates how subject to error all the statistics were that they were working with.

ian economy. The difference in investment represented a striking degree of inequality. The differential was even greater than that indicated. Additional funds were allocated for a variety of other services, such as community development, cooperative and loan services, extension services, education and health.<sup>112</sup> Much of this was directed at the rural society, but it too was divided so that the majority of the funds went to the areas of greatest existing development, in general, and to the new village settlement schemes in particular. As in Kenya, the bias was towards the "progressive" areas and "progressive" farmers.<sup>113</sup>

The failure of the transformation approach.

The agrarian program of village settlement schemes was halted by 1966. It became increasingly clear that the "transformation" approach was creating the reverse of the government's objectives of a socialist path of development, economic and social justice, and equality within the population as a whole as well as between the different regions of the country.

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112. Cf. Tanganyika Plan, 1964-1969, pp. 35-36, 63-78.

113. Part of the bias resulted in a deliberate policy of diverting resources to the new settlement schemes as a priority and as a means of attracting participation. Cf. Nyerere, "Inauguration address to the National Assembly," in his Freedom and Unity, p. 183 ff. This decision in turn was highly influenced by the scarcity of resources; there was insufficient personnel and capital to be directed to both programs simultaneously.

Their own criticisms of the policy followed during the FYP and the formulations for a different policy of planned development can be found in the important "Arusha Declaration," the policy paper, "Socialism and Rural Development," and in the second Five Year Plan, 1969-1974.<sup>114</sup>

One of the major problems in the village settlement schemes was that they tended to create small islands of more modern, productive farming within a generally stagnant traditional economy. It had been expected that these settlements would serve as model farms radiating a positive "emulation" effect upon the peasantry scattered in the surrounding area who were using traditional agricultural practices. They would be influenced in turn to improve their use of the land and adapt more modern farming practices for the market economy.

This process, however, did not occur to any greater extent than it had under colonial rule, and for similar reasons.<sup>115</sup> Such a process demands a radical shift in at-

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114. Cf. Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration," and "Socialism and Rural Development," in his Freedom and Socialism (Dar es Salaam, 1968); Tanzania, Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, July 1969-June 1974 (Dar es Salaam, 1969). Other good critical studies include J. D. Heijnen, "Mechanized Block Cultivation Schemes in Mwanza Region," Research Paper No. 10, College of Dar es Salaam, 1969; Lionel Cliff and Griffiths Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania," (mimeo), Rural Development Paper No. 3, University College of Dar es Salaam, Rural Development Research Committee (Dar es Salaam, 1968); Garry Thomas, "The Transformation Approach at a Tanzania Village Settlement," Makerere Institute of Social Research Conference Papers, no. 427 (Makerere, 1967).

115. Cf. R. Chambers, Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa (New York, 1969).

titude and way of operating, one that does not come about in any automatic way through a "demonstration effect." It also demands a greater labor output in new and risky methods, with great uncertainty as to the outcome, particularly when the peasant is already operating on a thin edge of subsistence and survival.<sup>116</sup>

Equally important, the settlement schemes were not that effective in creating any rapid transformation of land use, productivity, increased income, and higher standards of living. This proved so in spite of the heavy capital investment in land clearing, irrigation, more modern equipment, fertilizer and insecticides, and a variety of expensive services.

Initial crop production on many settlements did not reflect a greatly improved level of productivity and income for the settlers. This was particularly so when repayments for equipment and services were deducted through the cooperative organizations which handled the supplying and marketing for most schemes. This had a discouraging effect on the planting and cultivation for the following year. Difficulties in coordinating these services and in

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116. Cf. John C. de Wilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, I, II (Baltimore, 1967); W. Allan, The African Husbandman (Edinburgh, 1965); Danial Biebuyck, ed., African Agrarian Systems (London, 1963); Hans Ruthenberg, Agricultural Development in Tanganyika (Berlin, 1964); Hans Ruthenberg, ed., Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania: Ten Case Studies (Munich, 1968).

providing the necessary management, technical and other personnel added to the difficulties in initiating the modern production schemes.

The more successful farmers in these schemes frequently were those who already had some experience in more modern farming methods or individuals who had more advanced education and full-time employment outside the scheme, as teachers, craftsmen, civil servants, and officials. These latter individuals turned to wage labor to run their farms within the settlement schemes. Peasant farmers in the schemes tended to spend an increasing amount of time and labor on the small subsistence and cash cropping plots outside the schemes, to the neglect of the settlement schemes.

Many of these trends indicated that agrarian policies which the government had adopted were inappropriate for the development they were attempting to create. The settlements were based upon individual farms. Development depended upon and sought to stimulate individual enterprise. The cooperative element was limited to the economies achieved by sharing of equipment and services within a concentrated settlement of farms.

As in Kenya, the agrarian policy indicated the contradictory fact that a socialist society was supposedly being constructed through economic development using capitalist organization, land use and production.

The Arusha declaration of January 1967 and the subsequent policy paper, "Socialism and Rural Development," reflected the growing awareness of the leadership that post-independence policies were promoting a form of capitalist development:

If this kind of capitalist development takes place widely over the country, we may get a good statistical increase in the national wealth of Tanzania, but the masses of the people will not necessarily be better off. On the contrary, as land becomes more scarce we shall find ourselves with a farmers' class and a labourers' class..../The latter/ will become a 'rural proletariat' depending on the decisions of other men for their existence, and subject in consequence to all the subservience, social and economic inequality, and insecurity, which such a position involves.... The small-scale capitalist agriculture we now have is not really a danger; but our feet are on the wrong path, and if we continue to encourage or even help the development of agricultural capitalism, we shall never become a socialist state.

The settlement schemes, irrigation projects, and the policy of maintaining and increasing the non-African estates, primarily sisal, were also directed towards expansion of a-

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117. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 344.

118. These estates and plantations, as well as those producing other export crops were mainly European-owned. They produced 40 per cent of exports by value in 1964; Cf. Tanganyika Five Year Plan, 1964-1969, p.x. The attitude towards these European owned estates, and Tanzania's continuing dependency, is indicated by the following policy statement in the FYP (Ibid., p.16): "It is nevertheless clear that the achievement of crop husbandry targets within the next five years will still depend in large measure on additional effort and investment by the owners of private estates. That is why government, with a view to encouraging increases in the output of these private estates, is ready to grant them new land concessions provided that the beneficiaries cooperate with it in establishing African estates by providing them with financial and technical assistance."

grarian export production. This aspect of agrarian policy perpetuated the major characteristics of structural underdevelopment and dependency. It continued to subject Tanzanian economy to a gradual declining rate of exchange, as the prices for export crops declined and the price for manufactured imports, particularly capital goods, rose even more rapidly.

The pressures for greater effort by the peasantry to expand agrarian production brought fewer returns for both the individual peasant farmers and for the overall economy. The implications of this for the plans to promote a rapid increase in the rate and gross increase of economic growth were discouraging. Instead of a 6.7 per cent rate of growth during the FYP, Tanzania achieved only approximately a 5 per cent increase. This, combined with a faster rate of population growth and inflation, meant they were working harder and producing more in order to maintain the existing standard of living.

Another important element in the development of agrarian production was the fact, as Nyerere pointed out in his introduction to the FYP, that "the increases in output were almost every where realized without any change in the method of production."<sup>119</sup> Increased production was based upon an expansion of the acreage under cultivation, rather than through improved productivity through the use of more modern agricultural methods and equipment.

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119. Ibid., p. xiv.

Foreign investment and the industrial strategy.

The discouraging implications of the content and direction of agrarian policy take on even more serious dimensions when it is placed within the context of the overall development planning.<sup>120</sup> The resources and institutions of the state were directed overwhelmingly into the agrarian sector, with the expectation that the parallel strategy for development, the foundation of industrialization, could be achieved through private, primarily foreign capitalist, investment.

The financing of the FYP shows how great the dependency was upon external capital investment for economic growth and development. (See Table 8.2, p.406) External financing totaled £ 128.5 M., around 52 per cent or over half of the total financing for the FYP. Only a fraction of this was to come from grants, £ 11.4 M. The overwhelming source

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120. For helpful information and analysis of the development plan in general and planning techniques and financing in particular, see Dharam P. Ghai, "Reflection on Tanganyika's Plan," East Africa Journal (June, 1964), pp. 19-24; Henry Bienen, "Foreign Aid versus Independence," East Africa Journal (February, 1965); Hadley E. Smith, ed., Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1966), Part 6 (Economic Planning); Paul Clark, Development Planning in East Africa (Nairobi, 1965); C.S. Grey, "Development Planning in East Africa: A Review Article," The East African Economic Review, II (New Series), No. 2 (December, 1966), pp. 1-18; Paul Clark, "Development Planning in East Africa: A rejoinder," The East African Economic Review III (New Series), No.1 (June, 1967), pp. 55-64; Clive Grey, "Development Planning in East Africa: A Reply," The East African Economic Review, III (New Series), No. 1 (June 1967), pp. 65-72.

TABLE 8.2

## SOURCES OF FINANCE IN £ M (Tanzania)\*

SOURCE	Central Government	Local Gov't.	EACSO	Gov't. Enterprise	Private Sector	TOTAL
<b>DOMESTIC</b>						
Self-financing	8.5	3.5	-	1.0	72.0	85.0
Domestic Borrowing	14.0	2.5	-	8.0	4.0	28.5
Self-help	-	4.0	-	-	-	4.0
<b>TOTAL DOMESTIC</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>76.0</b>	<b>117.5</b>
<b>EXTERNAL</b>						
Borrowing						
Investment	71.5	-	18.0	12.0	15.6	117.1
Grants	8.0	-	-	-	3.4	11.4
<b>TOTAL EXTERNAL</b>	<b>79.5</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>128.5</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>102.0</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>95.0</b>	<b>246.0</b>

\*Source: Five Year Plan, 1964-1969, derived from table on p. 97.

of external investment was loans, £ 117.1 M. These foreign loans came to nearly one-half of the total financing, 47.6 per cent.

The dependency upon borrowing as a source of development finance was much greater than this. Domestic sources of financing also depended heavily upon borrowing: they came to £ 28.5 M., or 11.6 per cent of the total development plan. The central government alone counted upon domestic financing of £ 14.0 M., out of a total domestic financing of £ 22.5 M., or 62.2 per cent. Total sources of finance through borrowing for the central government was even greater, £ 93.5 M. out of a total investment of £ 102.0, or 91.7 per cent.

Expectations with regard to financing by private capitalist firms within Tanzania are also revealing. Sources of finance by the private sector was anticipated to come from the reinvestment of profits. The expectations of new private capital investment from external sources was remarkably small, 24.2 per cent. £ 72.0 M., or 75.8 per cent out of a total of £ 95.0 M. was anticipated from reinvestment. This planning was quite unrealistic, without compulsory regulations.

Financing of "industrial" investment in general depended greatly upon private foreign capitalist sources.<sup>121</sup>  
Increases in manufacturing rather than in primary processing

depended even more on external investment. Industrial financing from governmental sources depended heavily upon the parastatal agencies created during the end of the colonial period.<sup>122</sup> These agencies in turn were heavily dependent upon domestic borrowing and external financing; £ 20 M. out of a total of £ 21 M. was to come from these sources and only £ 1 M. from the surplus or profits of the enterprises under these agencies.

The actual investment which took place was quite different, as the second FYP indicates.<sup>123</sup> The central government wound up financing 65 per cent rather than 22 per cent as originally planned. And around 70 per cent of total investment came from domestic sources, rather than the 48 per cent as planned. External sources of investment proved to be less available than originally anticipated. This proved so in spite of the favorable inducements of the government to attract foreign capital investment and aid.<sup>124</sup> These included:

1. Guarantees for private investment and the repatriation of capital;
2. The provision of adequately equipped industrial sites;
3. Protection and assistance to infant industries by appropriate external tariffs and accelerated depreciation and investment allowances;
4. Provision of economic surveys and feasibility studies of industrial potential to potential investors;

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122. Ibid., pp. 95-96; A. Seiden, "Comparative Industrial Strategies in East Africa," East Africa Journal (June, 1970), pp. 30-32.

123. Tanzania, Second Five Year Plan, 1969-1974, pp. x, 10-12.

124. Ibid., p. 17.

5. Government participation in the financing of enterprises of the parastatal Tanganyika Development Corporation (TDC).

Several main points should be made about the results of Tanzania's industrial strategy within the overall plan. The deformed structural characteristics of the limited industrial sector remained unchanged. Most "industrial" development remained limited to primary processing enterprises. They added little to the wage employment available to the population. They were limited mostly to the intermediary level of processing, which meant that the value added for export was small. And those which involved final stage processing ran into tariff barriers in the developed capitalist countries (erected reputedly for revenue purposes), which again meant that the anticipated increase in balance of trade earnings did not materialize.

The second area of manufacturing development involved import-substitution enterprises. As in Kenya, this generally was limited to the final stage of assembly or manufacturing. Imports were still required for parts and other materials, so that again the value added was small.

The few major projects which were developed from private capital investment proved highly beneficial to the investors, but much less so to Tanzania. <sup>125</sup> The ENI oil refinery built in Dar es Salaam, for example, benefited in that 50 per cent of the investment was provided by the government through the National Development Corpora-

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125. Cf. Seidman, "Comparative Industrial Strategies," p. 32.

tion (NDC). It provided ENI an entrance to the East African market, in competition with the British and American owned refinery in Mombasa. Management and control remained entirely in ENI's hands, provided them with handsome repatriated profits, and also increased their profits through being able to refine the oil from the Arabian peninsula much closer than previously, saving them money on bulk transport. The extension of a pipeline to Zambia promised them equally valuable benefits in the Central African market.

During the initial post-independence period in Kenya and Tanzania, there was little difference between the two states in the approach to development or in their basic economic policies. Both demonstrated a high level of continuity with the previous colonial period.

There was little indication that the African leadership was able to use their newly acquired control of the state to mobilize their societies or resources and to generate a process of transformation. Given the short period of time, one would not expect to see immediate and extensive changes. But more seriously, the development policies and programs were not designed to change the existing content and direction of development.

On the contrary, the major policies reinforced the system of underdevelopment inherited from colonial rule.

The failure to confront and change the underlying economic structure could only lead to the continuation of a deformed capitalist development within Kenya and Tanzania.

The continuing formation of a class system within African society was clearly evident. Africanization was installing an elite in political positions which they were using to obtain ownership of land, entrance into business enterprise, and economic privilege. An African bourgeoisie was rapidly consolidating with a vested interest in maintaining the existing system.

These points emerge in a comparison of the ideology of African Socialism, development planning, and agrarian policies in the two countries. The comparison also indicates that the differences in emphasis in each state relate back to their evolution as variations on the type of settler agrarian export colony constructed during British rule. The critical period of transition to independence was particularly affected by this variation.

The ideology of African socialism represented more an attitude of mind and an emphasis upon African traditions of the past, than an outline of a socialist approach to development. The main emphasis was placed upon development through rapid economic growth rather than a radical restructuring of society. Modification of the existing system, state controls, Africanization, and the attraction of foreign aid and capitalist investment were the major

means to promote rapid economic growth and development under African socialism. The approach differed little from a capitalist model of development.

The first five year development plans in each country confirm this interpretation. They also indicate that a major influence on development planning was the set of immediate constraints the leadership faced at independence. There was a severe shortage of capital and material resources, a lack of educated and skilled manpower to formulate and implement development, and a heavy dependency upon agrarian export production, particularly production in the European economic sector. These constraints were symptoms of the system of underdevelopment forged during the colonial period.

An examination of agrarian policies and programs in particular indicated the influence of the colonial structure, institutions and values upon the post-independence efforts to mobilize development. The major objective was the expansion of agrarian export production by the African peasantry in the countryside. A parallel objective was the extension of the capitalist penetration into African society. Rural development aimed at "pulling" the predominantly subsistence-producing peasantry into the export-oriented market economy.

The differences in agrarian programs in the two countries were not the product of a basic difference in social systems or approach to development. They resulted

from differences in characteristics of European settlement, in the stage of economic growth, and the impact these had in turn upon the African societies.

The Kenyatta government carried on the program of land reform imposed by the British after the Mau Mau revolt and rushed through prior to independence. The program permanently established a pattern of private ownership and a class of smallholding peasant-farmers in the major African areas. The program also preserved large-scale farming in the Highlands and the gradual transfer of these farms to private African ownership. This Highlands land transfer program, along with the crash settlement scheme connected with it, absorbed most of Kenya's resources allocated to agriculture at the expense of the development of the rural areas.

The TANU government, in contrast, was faced with establishing a program of land reform and development after independence. A combination of a smaller, more fragmented settler community and retarded economic growth in Tanzania had prevented the extreme oppression, disintegration, and revolt within the African population. But these factors also left the state with fewer resources and personnel to carry out agrarian development.

The government accepted the "transformation approach" recommended by the IBRD as its priority in agrarian development. The village settlement schemes reflected the ob-

jectives of "villagization" and land reform imposed by the British a decade earlier in Kenya. And the schemes absorbed the resources of the state for a small minority at the expense of the rest of the rural population in a manner similiar to the crash settlement program in Kenya at independence.

The schemes failed because of the lack of capital, personnel and technical resources. More serious, the program was a failure because it could not transform the countryside; instead, it created a few islands of economic privilege, promoted a rural class system, and furthered a capitalist development.

The failure of the "transformation approach" and related issues led the TANU government to reassess the direction of development and the basis of the existing system. The Arusha Declaration and related papers in 1967 announced a shift towards a socialist approach to development. This was an indication of a commitment to socialism among the top leadership in Tanzania which contrasted strongly with the political events in Kenya at the same time. The question still remained whether the TANU government could formulate policies and develop the means to mobilize a socialist transformation.

## CHAPTER NINE

### DIVERGENCE IN THE APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT: KENYA AND TANZANIA, FROM 1967 TO THE PRESENT.

1966 was a time of political crisis in both Kenya and Tanzania. Major issues came to the surface as a result of the experiences during the initial post-independence period. These issues were basically the same in each country and can be summarized into two categories: (1) the direction of development; and (2) the condition of leadership.

While the issues were the same, the context and form in which they arose were quite different. The political resolution of these issues was quite different also. In Kenya, an open split in the leadership led to the formation of an opposition party. The radical opposition advocated a shift in policy away from the capitalist approach to development and directly challenged the ruling leadership for control of the state. During the political struggle that followed, the opposition was crushed and eliminated. Consequently, the approach to development continued along the same lines.

In Tanzania, on the contrary, a reassessment took place within the top leadership of the TANU government, as it became clear that their policies were continuing to promote a deformed capitalist development in spite of their socialist ideology. This reassessment was pressed by more militant socialists at the middle level of the party and government. But the resolution of the issues did not involve an open split in leadership or challenge for political control. Consequently, the top leadership announced a shift in policy to establish a socialist approach to development.

This shift was spelled out in the 1967 Arusha Declaration and subsequent policy papers.

The divergence in approach to development raises several questions which are examined below. First, the chapter compares the political context and considers the main factors which led to a different resolution of these issues and to an ideological and political divergence.

Second, the chapter compares the specific policies, and programs in their development planning, particularly agrarian policy. A primary concern in the comparison is the question whether there are indications of a substantive change in the content and direction of development.

1. The Challenge to the Capitalist Approach to Development: Political Conflict in Kenya.

The dominant leadership of the Kenyatta government firmly committed itself to a capitalist model of development between 1963 and 1966. The decision was an inevitable outcome of the acceptance by the KANU and KADU leadership of the colonial government's economic and agrarian reform policies which were rapidly implemented in the transition period prior to independence.

The colonial reforms locked the post-independence government into an economic system and development policy based on individual land ownership, preservation of the large-scale Highlands farms as the backbone of the modern economic sector, and private capitalist enterprise.

The KANU leadership accepted these conservative and capitalist reforms as the price they had to pay to speed up independence. More importantly, it ensured that they gained political control of the powerful and centralized state apparatus in the transfer to independence. They did so in spite of their past association with militant nationalism, the "Mau Mau" revolt, and a program committed to the return of the expropriated settler land to the African people. Their decision represented more than a tactical political maneuver. They too had a vested interest in these policies as the leadership of an emergent bourgeoisie.

The opposition party, KADU, was dissolved in November, 1964. Its members, led by the chairman of the party, Ronald Ngala, crossed over and joined KANU.<sup>1</sup> This event indicated how little the differences were between the leadership of the two parties.<sup>2</sup> The previous division of the nationalist movement was due more to rivalry and conflict over power and political position, than to any serious ideological differences. The regional and ethnic differences represented by the two parties had obscured the common class interests which this leadership shared.

By December, 1964, when Kenya was officially declared a republic, a de facto one party state had been formed. It presented an image of national unity, political stability, and independence. This image was an illusion. Kenya's one party represented commitment to a policy of continuity with the past colonial system of deformed capitalist development.

Significant ideological differences did exist, but they were located within the original KANU, rather than between KANU and KADU. The absorption of KADU within KANU signaled the declining influence of the more radical faction in KANU, headed by Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia. It was this faction in the cabinet and in the backbench

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1. Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya (Evanston, 1970), p. 34.
  2. Cf. John J. Okumu, "Charisma and Politics in Kenya; Notes and Comments on the problems of Kenya's party leadership," East Africa Journal (February, 1968), pp. 9-16.

"ginger group" in the National Assembly<sup>3</sup> which had pushed for a break with colonial reform policies. They advocated instead the expropriation of settler land, redistribution of land to the landless unemployed, the creation of state farms, selective nationalization of foreign capitalist enterprise, and a greater state role in development as a move towards the restructuring of the deformed economy.<sup>4</sup>

The existence of the one party state from 1964 to 1966 did not represent the national unity and political stability embodied in TANU in Tanzania. It was a transition period during which political conflict was fought out within the government, the Assembly, and the weak coalition party, KANU.

The result was a realignment of the power base of the Kenyatta government and a growing isolation of the radical faction. This political struggle culminated in the split-up of KANU and the formation of a new opposition party, the Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU), in April, 1966.

The KPU leadership broke away from KANU and formed their own party following the Limuru KANU party conference of March, 1966. The conference was called by Tom Mboya, Secretary-General of KANU, Kenyatta's backing was given, ostensibly in order to "re-

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3. Cf. Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, pp. 39-56, for an excellent description of the role of KANU backbench opposition.

4. See above, Chapter 5, also, KPU, Interim Manifesto (Nairobi, May, 1966).

organize" the party administration.<sup>5</sup> Actually, the intent of the conference was political: the elimination of the radical leaders from all positions within the executive organization of KANU.

The conference was stacked and the objectives easily achieved. Odinga and other radical leaders were replaced by the conservative leaders, which included former leaders of KADU.<sup>6</sup> The action consolidated the conservative bourgeois leadership over KANU and completed the process begun in early 1964. For it followed a similar move within the Assembly in mid-1965, when the backbench opposition organization, once dominated by the radical group, was dissolved. The isolation of Odinga and other radical figures within the Cabinet occurred over this same period.

A highly unequal political struggle subsequently took place from 1966 to 1969 between the Kenyatta government and the KPU. In the process, public discussion and debate took place for the first time over the direction of development in Kenya.<sup>7</sup>

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5. Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, pp. 71-72.

6. For Odinga's views on the events and issues leading up to the 1966 split, see Odinga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (New York, 1967). The Limuru Conference took place on March 12-13, 1966. Odinga's position of National Vice-President of KANU was abolished. The position was replaced by eight provincial Vice-Presidents, one for each Province and for Nairobi. Neither Odinga or any other radical leader was re-elected. The Vice-Presidents were responsible directly to the President, rather than the Executive Committee or Governing Council of KANU. The power of the executive--and Kenyatta--was consolidated further.

7. See the East African Standard and other Kenyan papers and weeklies, particularly for the period through May-June, 1966.

Real issues were raised about economic policies, foreign investment and ownership, the degree of private ownership, the growth of a privileged, increasingly wealthy, landed upper class, and a capitalist versus socialist approach to development.

The full power of the state was brought to bear against the KPU during these years. This was a necessity for the Kenyatta government, since KANU was a weak coalition party, badly divided and totally ineffectual as an organizational instrument.<sup>8</sup> Given a real opportunity, the KPU might have been successful in local and general elections. This was not necessarily due to widespread support for KPU politics. It was possible because of widespread dissatisfaction with local KANU representatives and county council members, and frustration as well with party and government officials because of the high level of neglect, corruption, and privilege which characterized the party.<sup>9</sup>

Yet, by the end of 1969, the KPU was crushed, banned, and its leadership arrested temporarily. The one party state was restored under the formal control of KANU. Total dominance was achieved by

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8. The National Executive and Governing Council of KANU didn't even meet between 1963-1966. District branch offices were organizationally nonexistent until branch elections took place. See below.

9. This was my personal experience, particularly in Machakos district. The Maize scandal, involving Paul Ngei, then head of the Maize Marketing Board, was a noticeable example of corruption.

the Kenyatta government, not through any renewed effectiveness of KANU as a political organization, but through the powerful, centralized administrative machinery which had been restored by Kenyatta after 1964 to the role it had played under the colonial régime.

The underlying basis for ethnic, regional, and class division and conflict.

The political conflicts after independence, and the struggle between 1966 and 1970 in particular, reflected the major characteristics within African society as they were molded during the colonial period. British colonial policy was designed to promote division, rivalry, and conflict among the African groups in order to impede their political development and to prevent a challenge to continued colonial rule. European settlement, extensive expropriation of land in the central highlands, the reserve system, and indirect rule were important factors in this process.

The British policy of "divide and rule" was made easier in Kenya because of the pattern of ethnic grouping in the territory. The African population was composed of a small number of ethnic groups, which were dominated in turn by a few major groups located in or around the central highlands area. This contrasted with some 120 ethnic groups within Tanzania that were dispersed around the periphery primarily and not dominated by any particular grouping.

The pattern in Kenya was reinforced by the differential impact of colonial rule. While the Luo and Kikuyu both came to dominate in Kenya because of their size and relative wealth in their regions, the Kikuyu gained greater prominence because of their strategic location in the Highlands, the severe impact of colonial rule upon them, in contrast to the Luo, the earlier emergence of a class system, and their dominant role in the political struggle over the issue of land as well as colonial rule.

British political policies before and after the revolt prevented the development of a unified nationalist movement, as discussed above. During the "Emergency" restrictions, African political organizations developed on a district basis, then into regional organizations with overlapping ethnic characteristics.<sup>10</sup>

The political parties formed just prior to and after independence were unstable coalitions based on these ethnic/regional organizations. The public dominance of ethnic/regional issues obscured the underlying class division and conflicts that were developing rapidly and cut across the ethnic and regional issues.

The agrarian reforms imposed by the British prior to independence had an equally important influence on post-independence politics in Kenya. Private ownership of land was solidly entrenched within Kenya and rapidly consolidated the development of an African bour-

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10. Cf. Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, Chapter 1 ("The Political Legacy"), for a good summary of the political pattern inherited from the colonial period and persisting after independence.

geoisie. This bourgeoisie formed through the fusion of the older "gentry" and a new political elite. The latter was rapidly exploiting its recently obtained political position to become large land owners and to gain special access in commercial and business fields.

The agrarian reforms also created a large class of small-holder farmers with individual ownership. This process was rapidly expanding as the land reforms were continued by the Kenyatta government. A growing segment of the population had a vested interest in private ownership. Many others were preoccupied with obtaining similar interests. The dominant concern was to avoid losing out in the consolidation of land and establishment of private ownership.

The reform had centered in Central Province among the Kikuyu, to eliminate the underlying causes of the revolt. Consequently, the Kikuyu benefited economically the most during the transition to independence. Their reassertion of leadership within KANU, after the "Emergency" restrictions were removed, led to Kikuyu political dominance in the post-independence government.

This intensified the ethnic and regional bias of politics. It also generated pressures for land consolidation, individual land ownership, and private enterprise among other groups within Kenya.

The revolt, imposition of military and administrative control, and subsequent reforms under the Swynnerton Plan brought about a large expansion of the state administrative apparatus in size, control,

and degree of centralization.<sup>11</sup> The Kenyatta government inherited this administrative apparatus. It contrasted strikingly with the weak party organization, which was ethnic and regionally based, as well as ridden with division and conflict.

The state administrative apparatus, rather than the party as in Tanzania, became the main political organization. The Kenyatta government retained and expanded this administrative structure. It was placed directly under the control of the Executive. The system of Provincial and District commissioners was retained, although "Africanized" by 1965. Revenue and expenditure, land consolidation, distribution, and settlement, the police force, technical services, and development programs were all under the control of the administrative bureaucracy which in turn was controlled by the President and the major cabinet ministers. Post-independence administration in Kenya differed little from the colonial state.

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11. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-25. Gertzel cites the following examples of this expansion: the Ministry of Agriculture increased from 298 in 1945 to 2,519 in 1958; the African Land Development Department, non-existent in 1945, had 477 personnel in 1958; Administrative Office increased from 184 in 1951 to 370 in 1962-63; and the police force increased from 6,057 in 1957 to 12,232 in 1962-63 (pp. 22-23, 25).

Open political struggle for control, 1966-1969.

These characteristics of post-independence Kenya were demonstrated dramatically during the political struggle between 1966 and 1969. The KPU included the more radical elements in Kenya. It also represented those who had lost out in the land consolidation, Africanization, and unequal allocation of development expenditures.

While the KPU was predominantly Luo based, it did cut across ethnic and regional lines, because of the real class issues it raised: control of the land, privilege, wealth, growing inequality, abandonment of the landless unemployed, and regional and district disparities.

The Kenyatta government was able to counter the KPU threat by exploiting ethnic feelings and appealing to the vested interests of those who had recently obtained private ownership of the land, or hoped to.<sup>12</sup> It also had control of the powerful state apparatus. This enabled the government to restrict the political organizing efforts of the KPU and keep people in line through its control over the allocation of resources for development. Finally, the government could evoke the loyalty of people to Kenyatta, the "father" of independent Kenya. It presented

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12. See the East African Standard during the "little general elections" period. Also, for a summary of the events of 1966, see Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, Chapters 3 and 4; John Spenser, "Kenyatta's Kenya," Africa Report, 11, 5 (May, 1966), pp. 6-14, which includes Odinga's resignation statement and the government's reply; and David Koff, "Kenya's Little General Election," Africa Report, 11, 5 (October, 1966), p. 57-60.

the political struggle in terms of a choice of leadership between Kenyatta and Odinga. This inevitably introduced a strong ethnic appeal and submerged the real issues involved.

All these elements came into play during the "little general elections" of June, 1966.<sup>13</sup> Twenty-nine by-elections were held for the seats of the members who had resigned from KANU. The government withheld the official registration of the KPU until May 20. Existing laws prohibited them from campaigning until one week after registration of the party. Since the elections were held from June 11 onward, this severely limited the KPU's period of open campaigning. Other tactics by the government included occasional refusal by administrators to give a permit to KPU candidates to hold public rallies, harassment of KPU meetings by KANU Youth Wingers, and a blank-out by the government controlled radio on the KPU campaign and candidates.

The elections resulted in the victory of KANU.<sup>14</sup> The KPU won ten of the twenty-nine by-elections: six in Odinga's stronghold, Central Nyanza; two in Machakos, where the KPU had taken over the KANU branch and had strong support; and one in the district of Busia, Western Province.

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13. Following the resignation of 30 members of the Assembly from KANU, including Vice-President Odinga and two other Ministers, and the formation of the opposition party, the government amended the constitution to require their automatic resignation from the Assembly also. They no longer were considered to represent their original constituency and had to contest in by-elections to regain their seats.

14. For the election results, see the East African Standard, June 28, 1966.

Several factors in the elections should be stressed. The government was successful in raising ethnic and regional factors to the point of obscuring the economic, class and development policy issues. The power of the government to promote or neglect development in any area was stressed by the Kenyatta government. This factor also had an important influence on the results, since the KPU had no chance of becoming the governing party as a result of the by-elections alone. This factor was especially important in the defeat of Kagia, in spite of his strong base of popular support.

The elections revealed the extent to which the organization of KANU had disintegrated due to the Kenyatta government's reliance upon the administrative structure. "District organization was virtually non-existent,"<sup>15</sup> and the government was forced to rely on campaigning by Ministers at the national level rather than at the local level by party machines. KPU, in contrast, relied most heavily upon organizing and campaigning at the local level.

The importance of this situation was underscored in the local County Council elections of mid-1968. As these elections approached, intense intra-party fighting developed within KANU at the district branch level between rival KANU factions.<sup>16</sup> Control of the branch

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15. Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, p. 81.

16. From personal experience, this intra-party fighting was often quite extreme. In Machakos, the police had to break up a physical battle on the street between the two rival leaders. Subsequent mediation by Mboya and Kenyatta was pretty one-sided.

organization determined the choice of candidates for the councils. The councils in turn were the main source of influence and patronage for district "bosses" and regional leaders.

The factions which lost out frequently asserted they would turn to the support of KPU candidates. General disgust by the local population at this factional fighting and the closed selection by "bosses" of unqualified candidates threatened also to turn people to support KPU candidates as the only way of protest.

The Kenyatta government was faced with the possibility of massive defeats in the local elections which would have important repercussions for future general elections for the National Assembly. The government, through the political machinery of its Provincial Commissioners, declared after the nomination period was closed that all KPU candidates were disqualified for "technical" reasons. Consequently, all KANU candidates were automatically the winners of the uncontested elections.

At one stroke, KANU obtained control over all County Councils. The strategy was apparently devised by Mboya, who played the role of "hatchetman" in the destruction of the KPU. But the strategy had to have the approval of Kenyatta to be implemented. It did so, for all Provincial Commissioners were called to a conference with Kenyatta at his home in Gatundu immediately prior to the disqualification of the KPU candidates.<sup>17</sup>

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17. Personal information.

A similar procedure took place prior to the long delayed general elections of 1970. Primary elections had been introduced for December, 1969. In the fall, following rioting in Kisumu during a visit by Kenyatta, the KPU was banned and its leadership arrested. The KANU candidates once again won all the seats in the national elections by default. All formal opposition to the Kenyatta government and to the capitalist policy of development was eliminated.

2. The Policy of Continuity: Development Planning and Agrarian Policy in Kenya.

The major characteristics of Kenya's development policy during the initial post-independence period were continued in the second Development Plan, 1970-1974.<sup>18</sup> Emphasis was placed on maximizing economic growth, expanding commercial and industrial activity, attracting foreign investment, and promoting private enterprise within Kenya.

The Second Plan did indicate a greater awareness of the magnitude of the problem Kenya faced in the rural area, which still encompassed over 98 percent of the land area and more than 90 percent of the population. Rural development, the Second Plan asserted, would be "the basic development strategy," and the "route of national development."<sup>19</sup> But the major aspect of this development was defined in terms of the expansion of agrarian exports and improved productivity.

The Plan did not elaborate on Kenya's basic problem, the structure of underdevelopment based on an agrarian export economy. Nor did it indicate a strategy to restructure the economic and social system. Yet such a restructuring was necessary to generate development, rather than a continued economic growth along the existing lines of a deformed capitalist economy.

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18. Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Development Plan, 1970-1974 (Nairobi, 1969). It will be referred to as the Second Plan hereinafter.

19. Development Plan, 1970-1974, p. 166.

Rural development and agrarian policy.

The government's approach to rural development followed the outlines of the first Plan: "the path followed will not diverge markedly from that which has been established over the years since Independence."<sup>20</sup> Yet this approach, as argued above, held out little hope for the mass of the people in the countryside.

The focus of rural development was the traditional African areas. Land transfer and resettlement, which had dominated agrarian policy during the "transfer" to independence, continued to be phased out. The methods of development in the African areas remained the improvement approach through extension services. The improvement and extension approach was geared to serve the individual smallholding farmer and the program of registration and establishment of private land ownership was stepped up.

The government approach could only have a small impact in changing the countryside for several reasons. It involved reaching hundreds of thousands of individual families. These farm-families, for the most part, were scattered over the countryside in small-holdings, rather than concentrated in villages. Finally, there was a degree of uncertainty over actual affect of the extension approach upon the agricultural practices of the smallholder farmer.

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20. *Ibid.*, p. 166. See Chapter 6, pp. 166-78 ("Rural Development") and Chapter 8, pp. 191-276 ("Agriculture, Livestock, and Cooperatives"), for the following information and analysis.

The limits of this approach are also suggested by the amounts of direct expenditure in agriculture by the central government; see Tables 9.1, 9.2, pp. 434-37.<sup>21</sup> Out of a total budget of £192.6 M., agriculture was allocated £39.6M., or 20.6 percent. The costs of adjudicating and registering the land for private ownership were £6.3M., or 16 percent of the agriculture expenditures.<sup>22</sup> Settlement of 33,000 "squatter" farmers and the completion of the one million acre scheme accounted for £5.6 M or 14 percent. Squatter settlement was a continuation of the politically dictated policy of settling enough of the rural proletariat to prevent unrest in the countryside as well as their influx into the main towns.<sup>23</sup>

Livestock development and irrigation schemes were allocated £4.5 M (11.4 percent) and £2.5 M (6.4 percent) respectively. Special sugar and tea projects were allocated £4.1 M (10.3 percent) and £1.2 M (3 percent). While these involved smallholder farmers, the actual numbers of people benefiting were small, relative to the cost.

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21. Development Plan, 1970-1974, Tables 5.3, pp. 148-50, and 8.2, p. 195.

22. Only one-third of the land involved was agricultural farming land. The other two-thirds was allocated towards the establishment of enclosed grazing lands under private ownership. This was partially dictated by the fact that livestock was one of the most promising agrarian export products for the international market, and indicated the continuing dependency of development planning upon the capitalist market. It also indicated the development of semi-arid lands which previously had been neglected, as had their inhabitants. Ibid., pp. 210-12.

23. They were to receive an average farm plot of around 10 acres, only half of which was arable, on the average. Cf. Ibid., pp. 201, 207.

Table 9.1  
Public Sector Development Expenditures

	1969-1970				1970-1971		1971-1972		1972-1973		1973-1974		Total	
	1969-1970	1970-1971	1971-1972	1972-1973	1973-1974	1974-1975	1975-1976	1976-1977	1977-1978	1978-1979	1979-1980	1980-1981	1981-1982	1982-1983
<b>AGRICULTURE</b>														
Agricultural Development	2,952	3,241	3,008	3,654	4,765									17,620
Land Settlement and Transfer	2,702	1,818	2,006	1,303	798									8,627
Land Adjudication	1,049	1,306	1,321	1,295	1,324									6,295
Livestock Development	813	886	853	938	1,036									4,526
Irrigation	535	696	476	509	310									2,526
Total	8,051	7,947	7,664	7,699	8,233									39,594
<b>NATURAL RESOURCES</b>														
Forestry	1,063	1,172	1,186	1,255	1,255									5,931
Fisheries	308	300	210	271	267									1,356
Mines and Geology	132	112	30	30	30									332
Total	1,501	1,584	1,426	1,556	1,552									7,619
<b>TOURISM</b>														
Tourism	395	693	793	453	351									2,685
Game Department	162	154	154	148	139									645
National Parks	224	133	131	116	112									200
Total	781	980	1,078	717	602									3,530
<b>MANUFACTURING, COMMERCE AND CONSTRUCTION</b>														
Manufacturing	756	1,084	1,420	1,416	1,468									6,144
Commerce	526	685	942	1,198	1,350									4,701
National Construction Corporation Limited	112	118	75	83	90									478
Total	1,394	1,887	2,437	2,697	2,908									11,323

K£  
thousands

Total  
Central  
Gov't  
only

Table 9.1 (Cont'd)

KE. thousands

	1969-	1970-	1971-	1972-	1973-	1974	Total	Total Central Gov't only
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974			
<b>INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE</b>								
Police	300	916	706	744	505		3,171	3,171
Defence	344	300	300	300	300		1,544	1,544
Prisons	291	244	234	236	236		1,241	1,241
Judiciary	76	105	105	105	109		500	500
Other (3)	78	73	73	6	10		227	227
Total	1,089	1,638	1,405	1,391	1,160		6,683	6,683
<b>FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS</b>								
East African Development Bank	600	600	—	—	—		1,200	1,200
National Bank of Kenya	300	200	75	—	—		575	575
Kenya National Assurance Company Ltd.	100	100	100	100	100		500	500
Workers Investment Trust	150	100	—	—	—		250	250
State Reinsurance Corporation of Kenya	100	100	—	—	—		200	200
Total	1,250	1,100	175	175	100 <sup>a</sup>		2,725	2,725
<b>Total Public Sector</b>								
Expenditure	41,348	49,027	48,778	50,937	52,579		242,669	192,625
<b>Less Expenditure by public bodies not financed by the Central Government</b>								
Equals	9,368	11,183	10,618	10,072	8,803		50,044	—
Central Government Development Expenditure	31,980	37,844	38,160	40,865	43,776		192,625	192,625

Source: Kenya - Development Plan for the Period 1970 to 1974, pp. 148-50, Table 5.3.

Table 9.2  
Development Expenditure on Agriculture, Land Settlement and Co-operatives

	Estimated Expenditure	Projected Expenditure in Plan Period								Total	
		1968-		1969-		1970-		1971-			1973-
		1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974			
1. Land Settlement	1,314	1,334	1,393	1,581	878	373	5,559				
2. Transfer and Development of Large-Scale Farms	1,975	1,368	425	425	425	425	425	425	425	3,068	
3. Land Adjudication	929	1,049	1,306	1,321	1,295	1,324	6,295				
4. Livestock Development (excluding research, education and credit for range areas)	481	813	886	853	938	1,035	4,526				
5. Research	294	674	640	644	661	598	3,217				
6. Agricultural Education and Extension	226	380	495	493	544	287	2,199				
7. Credit for Small-Scale Farmers and Farmers in Range Areas	266	686	837	1,050	1,125	1,050	4,748				
8. Irrigation	653	535	696	476	509	310	2,526				
9. Sugar	340	432	176	150	800	2,550	4,108				
10. Tea	364	380	293	208	224	80	1,185				
11. Wheat and Maize Storage	226	200	500	163	—	—	863				
12. Miscellaneous	200	200	300	300	300	200	1,300				
Total	7,268	8,051	7,947	7,664	7,699	8,232	39,594				

Source: Kenya - Development Plan for the Period 1970 to 1974, p. 195, Table 8.2.

Again, the policies were dictated by the demand on the world market; or, they provided import substitutes to a lesser extent.

What the figures indicate strikingly is that only £2.2 M, or 5.6 percent, was allocated for agricultural extension and education.<sup>24</sup> (See Table 9.3, p.439, for agricultural training output.) This compared with £3 M or 7.6 percent for the transfer and development of large-scale farms, a project which mainly benefited a small number in the growing upper class or African bourgeoisie.<sup>25</sup>

Agriculture expenditures were not the only elements in the rural development program. Expenditures for feeder roads, health, education, and cooperative services, water supplies, and other services contributed to the complex of factors that were involved in improving the living conditions in the countryside. It is difficult to extract the actual amounts in these allocations directed to the countryside, rather than to the urban town areas.

Another indication of the paucity of resources directed to rural development was provided in the special rural development program introduced in the Second Plan.<sup>26</sup> A number of areas were selected for more intensified development through a coordinated program of services in the smallholder farming areas. Fourteen

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24. Ibid., pp. 219-23.

25. Ibid., pp. 208-10.

26. Ibid., pp. 174-78.

areas were selected for surveying; six of these areas were selected for the experimental implementation of the rural program at the start of the Second Plan. The others were to be implemented after the initial results of the "pilot programs" were reviewed.

An estimated £4.5 M was allocated for this program during the Second Plan. £2. M of these funds were to come from the agricultural services indicated above; only £2.5 M additional funds were involved, and the financing was expected from "external sources." The rural program was designed as a "concentrated drive to increase agricultural output."<sup>27</sup>

The exact size of the "areas" involved is not specified, nor the number of smallholders involved. Past characteristics of Kenya's programs would suggest that the rural program was aimed at the more progressive farmers with large holdings. If so, this would further increase the inequality of development in the countryside.

An important and reasonably accurate indicator of the expected effects of economic growth upon development may be seen in the projections of exports by "producing industry. (See Table 9.4, pp. 441-42).<sup>28</sup> Agrarian exports, as a percentage of total exports, are expected to increase from 43.1 percent to 45.8 percent. Processed

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27. Ibid., p. 175.

28. Ibid., Table 5.4, p.153

Table 9.4

## Commodity Exports by Producing Industry, 1967 and 1974

	KL thousands in 1967 prices (f.o.b.)			
	Export Values £'000		Share of Total percent	
	1967	1974	1967	1974
<b>Agricultural Primary Products</b>				
Coffee	15,674	20,000	19.7	16.7
Tea	7,870	15,900	9.9	13.2
Maize	1,424	7,600	1.8	6.3
Wheat	1,608	1,650	2.0	1.4
Rice	176	570	0.2	0.5
Sisal	2,081	1,750	2.6	1.5
Cotton	629	880	0.8	0.7
Other Agr. Products	4,898	6,600	6.1	5.5
1. Total Agr. Products	34,360	54,950	43.1	45.8
<b>Processed Agricultural Products</b>				
Meat Products	3,416	4,000	4.3	3.3
Dairy Products	2,167	1,000	2.7	0.8
Canned Fruits and Vegetables	1,167	3,150	1.5	2.6
Pyrethrum Products	2,918	3,650	3.7	3.0
Wattle Products	863	700	1.1	0.6
Animal & Vegetable Oils & Fats	391	700	0.5	0.6
Other Proc. Agr. Products	1,542	2,200	1.9	1.8
2. Total Proc. Agr. Products	12,464	15,400	15.6	12.8
3. Total Primary and Processed Agricultural Products (1+2)	46,824	70,350	58.7	58.6
4. Forestry, Hunting & Fishing	672	750	0.8	0.6
5. Minerals	1,727	1,750	2.2	1.5
<b>Other Manufactured Products</b>				
Beverages and Tobacco	957	920	1.2	0.8
Textiles	2,343	3,020	2.9	2.5
Clothing & Footwear	2,123	4,200	2.7	3.5
Wood Products	1,366	1,950	1.7	1.6
Paper & Printing	2,231	3,110	2.8	2.6
Leather Products	322	1,050	0.4	0.9
Rubber Products	337	2,200	0.4	1.8
Chemical Products	3,632	8,800	4.6	7.3
Petroleum Products	11,715	14,500	14.7	12.1
Other Mineral Products	1,981	3,200	2.5	2.7
Metal Products & Machinery	2,961	3,250	3.7	2.7
Miscellaneous Products	496	950	0.6	0.8
6. Total "Other" Manufactured Products	30,464	47,150	38.3	39.3

Table 9.4 (Cont'd)

	K£ thousands in 1967 prices (f.o.b.)			
	Export Value		Share of Total	
	£'000		percent	
	1967	1974	1967	1974
7. Total All Manufactured Products (2+6)	42,928	62,550	53.9	52.1
8. Total Exports in 1967 prices (1+4+5+7)	79,687	120,000	100.0	100.0
9. Total Exports in "Current Prices:	79,687	120,000		
10. Balance of payments adjustment	-663	-1,000		
11. Total exports on a balance of payments basis	79,024	119,000		

Source: Kenya, Development Plan for the Period  
1970 to 1974, p. 153, Table 5.4

agrarian products are expected to drop in the total exports from 15.6 percent to 12.8 percent, in spite of the emphasis upon the development of processing "industries." Export manufactures are expected to increase only slightly from 38.3 to 39.3 percent of total exports.

Nearly one-third of this figure is based on the export of refined petroleum. Since crude petroleum is expected to represent 18 percent of total exports in 1974, the actual added value to Kenya's economy will be small.

What the figures emphasize is that under Kenya's development planning, the high dependency upon agrarian exports will not decrease but actually increase. It suggests that little restructuring of the economy is even planned.

The high dependency of the economy upon agrarian exports continues to subject Kenya to a steady deterioration in terms of trade and further limits the possibilities of economic growth. The actual deterioration in terms of trade over the years 1965-1968 was 4 percent.<sup>28a</sup> A continued deterioration of 1 percent per year is projected over the years 1967-1974, or a total of 7 percent.<sup>29</sup>

The major factor offsetting Kenya's continuing, large trade deficit in the past has been the large export surplus to the other two East African countries, particularly Tanzania. This resulted from the sub-imperialism the British established in East Africa in Kenya's

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28a. Ibid., p. 41.

29. Ibid., p. 155.

relationship to the other two states. The issue has intensified the widening gulf between the two states as they diverged in their ideological approach to development. The consequence to both is serious, since it undermines any effort at development.

Industrialization, foreign investment, and African  
"entrepreneurship."

The Second Plan, in spite of statements to the contrary, does not indicate any change in the industrial strategy followed during the first Plan discussed in Chapter 8.<sup>30</sup> It projected a total investment of approximately £100 M; new industrial investment totaled only £79.3 M (See table 9.4, pp. 9-23 - 9-24).<sup>31</sup> This amount was rather small, particularly when compared to the projected investment in Tanzania of nearly £69 M over the same period in spite of its smaller economy and more limited industrial base.

The Second Plan asserted that a greater direct state role would be undertaken in industrialization.<sup>32</sup> Examination of the breakdown in investment expenditure, however, indicated that this direct role was

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30. Cf. Development Plan, 1970-1974, Chapter 10 ("Manufacturing"), pp. 304-40.

31. Ibid., pp. 308-11; table 10.9, p. 321.

32. Ibid., pp. 315-16.

limited primarily to feasibility studies for foreign capitalist investment, management training, and loans through the Industrial and Commercial Development Company (ICDC) and the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK). Direct investment by the Central government was limited to £922,000 (see Table 9.5, p. 446).<sup>33</sup>

Total industrial expenditure by the government in its development program came to £6.1 M out of total government development expenditure of £192.6 M, or 3.1 percent (see Table 9.1 for total government development expenditure). Direct investment (£922,000) was 15.1 percent of the government's industrial expenditure (£6.1 M) and only .5 percent of the government's total development expenditure.

The state's role in industrial investment over the plan period was equally minimal in percentage terms. Total industrial expenditures by the government (£6.1 M) was 7.6 percent of the total new investment projected (£79.3 M). Direct government investment (£922,000) was only 1.2 percent of total new investment.

The same figures emphasize Kenya's overwhelming dependency upon foreign capitalist investment for its industrial development. The dependency upon external funding was greater than indicated by the term "public sector" in Table 9.4 or in the figure of £6.1 M as the government's total industrial expenditure. Both include foreign aid, from bilateral and multi-lateral sources. This dependency upon external sources contrasts strongly with Tanzania's industrial planning, as indicated below.

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33. Ibid., table 10.11, p. 326.

Table 9.5

## Development Expenditure—Industry

	1969- 1970	1970- 1971	1971- 1972	1972- 1973	1973- 1974	Total
Industrial Survey and Planning	10	18	18	18	18	82
Kenya Industrial Training Institute	20	10	10	10	10	60
Rural Industrialisation Programme	—	66	70	73	75	284
Miscellaneous Industrial Loans	172	150	175	200	225	922
<b>Industrial And Commerical Development Corporation</b>						
Investment in major industrial projects	187	250	250	250	250	1,187
Kenya Industrial Estate						
(a) K. F. W. Loans	105	305	575	515	555	2,055
(b) Grants to K. I. E. Ltd.	22	25	30	35	40	152
Small scale and cottage industries	—	10	12	15	15	52
ICDC Investment Company (Loans)	50	50	70	80	50	300
Grants for Small Industrial Loans Revolving Funds	90	100	110	120	130	550
<b>Total Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>740</b>	<b>1,047</b>	<b>1,015</b>	<b>1,040</b>	<b>4,296</b>
<b>Development Finance Company of Kenya</b>						
New and Additional Investment (including income notes)	50	50	50	50	50	250
Bank Consortium Loan Payments	50	50	50	50	50	250
<b>Total Development Finance Co. of Kenya</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>500</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>756</b>	<b>1,084</b>	<b>1,420</b>	<b>1,416</b>	<b>1,468</b>	<b>6,144</b>

Source: Kenya, Development Plan for the Period  
1970 to 1974, p. 326, Table 10.11

Industrial development in the Second Plan reinforced the concentration of Kenya's few industries in Nairobi and Mombasa, in particular, as well as in the few major European towns in the Highlands. This was true of the investment orientation of foreign capital. But it also was promoted by the government through its continued development of industrial estates in the major towns where industry was already located.

The government, through ICDC, planned on completing the Nairobi industrial estate, and to initiate similar estates in Nakuru, Mombasa, Kisumu, and Eldoret.<sup>34</sup> Kisumu was the only town which was not located in the Highlands (aside from the main port, Mombasa), and was not a European based town, among the urban areas where industrial development concentrated, either through the industrial estates or through foreign investment.

A major characteristic of Kenya's industrial strategy was aiding the development of African private entrepreneurs. This was true of the industrial estate program. It also characterized the small industrial loan scheme of ICDC.<sup>35</sup> £550,000 was allocated for a revolving loan fund for small businessmen (see Table 9.5). Added help was provided through training for African entrepreneurs and industrial managers at the Kenya Industrial Training Institute (KITI) and the Management Training and Advisory Centre.<sup>36</sup>

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34. Ibid., pp. 317-18; Table 10.8, p. 318.

35. Ibid., pp. 318-19.

36. Ibid., pp. 322-23.

One of the characteristics of industrial development through foreign capitalist investment was capital-intensive industries. An important consequence was the small increase in industrial employment created. In spite of the total industrial investment of £100 M and new industrial investment of £79.3 M projected, an increase of only 20,000 positions in industrial employment was anticipated (see Table 9.6, p. 449).<sup>37</sup>

Yet, approximately 10,000 new positions were expected to develop from small scale rural industry, through private efforts and the small industry loans which totaled less than £1 M.

The Kenyatta government was as concerned with promoting a petty bourgeoisie in commerce as it was in small scale industry.<sup>38</sup>

Besides giving financial and technical assistance, the Government will continue to use trade and transport licensing to enable citizens to play a bigger and steadily growing role in the private sector.

The major objective in this program, which the government moved actively on from 1968 onward, was the elimination of the Asian near-monopoly in the retail business. Licenses were not renewed and Asians were forced to sell out to African businessmen at low prices. One result of this policy was the development of Asian-African "partnerships" as Asians made arrangements with Africans to forestall

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37. Ibid., pp. 313-14; table 10.6, p. 314.

38. Ibid., p. 9.

Table 9.6

## Industrial Employment Projections

Industry	Product growth		Employment growth 1967-74 in percent	Numbers employed 1967	Numbers employed 1974	Increase in employment 1967-74
	1967-74 percent	1967-74 in percent				
Grain Milling	5.0	2.7	2,273	2,750	477	
Meat Processing	7.5	0.8	2,021	2,150	129	
Dairy Products	6.0	2.6	1,440	1,728	288	
Canning of Fruit and Vegetables	14.0	6.5	1,715	2,659	944	
Bakery Products	8.0	3.4	1,425	1,795	370	
Sugar	15.0	2.6	1,744	2,100	356	
Confectionary	7.8	5.4	131	189	58	
Miscellaneous food	10.6	7.5	1,231	2,049	818	
Total Food Processing	8.1	3.7	11,980	15,420	3,440	
Beverages and Tobacco	6.0	3.7	3,534	4,555	1,021	
Cotton Ginning	5.8	7.7	126	212	86	
Knitting Mills	7.5	10.4	793	1,587	794	
Cordege, rope and twine	-	neg	2,032	1,699	-333	
Spinning and Weaving	24.0	9.6	2,836	5,388	2,552	
Total Textiles	14.7	6.3	5,787	8,886	3,099	
Footwear	7.0	7.9	1,175	2,000	825	
Clothing and Made-up Textiles	8.0	1.4	3,727	4,100	373	
Total Footwear & Clothing	7.7	3.1	4,902	6,100	1,198	
Wood products	8.2	4.5	4,678	6,373	1,695	
Furniture and Fixtures	9.0	0.4	1,929	1,982	53	
Pulp and Paper	26.0	11.9	1,004	2,210	1,206	
Publishing and Printing	7.5	3.5	3,147	4,000	853	
Leather and Fur	9.0	9.6	474	900	426	
Rubber	36.0	10.1	382	750	368	
Chemicals and petroleum products	8.0	3.4	3,217	4,058	841	
Non-metallic Minerals	6.0	3.4	2,056	2,600	544	
Metal Products	7.5	5.1	3,140	4,458	1,318	
Machinery	8.3	2.5	3,946	4,703	757	
Transport equipment	7.0	1.6	14,487	16,251	1,764	
Miscellaneous	7.5	7.8	1,039	1,754	715	
Total Manufacturing	8.9	3.7	65,702	85,000	19,298	

[Source: Kenya, Developmental Plan for the Period 1970 to 1974, p. 314, Table 10.6.]

this action. It frequently led to a profitable arrangement for influential Africans without developing an African entrepreneurial stratum.<sup>39</sup>

Kenya's industrial and commercial strategy in the Second Plan reinforced rather than restructured the existing system of deformed capitalist development. Industrial ownership would remain in foreign hands while a small-business and management stratum was promoted. This policy benefited a minority of Africans, but could only further the formation of a class system and economic inequality.

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39. Personal experience.

3. Reassessment of the Direction of Development:  
The Political Background in Tanzania.

The well-known Arusha Declaration indicated the crystallization of awareness among the national leadership in Tanzania of the problem of the existing pattern of development. It also signaled an effort to make a radical shift in the approach to development. The dominant leadership wanted to reverse the content and direction from a deformed capitalist development towards the socialist path which was vaguely expressed in the ideology of Ujamaa but did not correspond in a real way to actual practice.

The Arusha Declaration was discussed, modified, and approved at the National Executive Committee Conference of TANU at Arusha, in January, 1967, then published in February, 1967.<sup>40</sup> The Declaration was not an abstract, ideological formulation, but an effort for the first time to spell out a more specific and coherent policy for Tanzania's future development. It sought to deal realistically with the existing resources and the needs of the mass of Tanzania's people. The leadership intended this policy to be communicated and taught to everyone down to the grassroots level in order to mobilize the people behind a clear policy and practice of development.

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40. Cf. Julius Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration: Socialism and Self-Reliance," Freedom and Socialism (Dar es Salaam, 1968), pp. 231-50.

Background to the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania.

The Declaration was the result of a number of political and economic experiences during the five years following independence which had an important influence on the TANU government's top leadership.

One critical influence, which has already been discussed, was the failure of the agrarian policy of "transformation" through village settlement schemes. This policy was "checked" in mid-1966 as it became clear that valuable and scarce capital, physical, and personnel resources were being expended with no appreciable results, either in agrarian expansion and economic growth, or in the improvement of the material conditions of the vast majority of the people who lived on the land.

The output of food and other agrarian production barely kept pace with the increase in population between 1960 and 1967.<sup>41</sup> Available evidence indicated that the increases in agrarian production which did occur were mostly the result of the extension services under the "improvement" approach.<sup>42</sup> Equally important, "the crucial thing

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41. Tanzania, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Background to the Budget: An Economic Survey, 1968-1969, p. 6-9. 103.

42. K. Johansen, "Agricultural Planning in Tanzania," in G. K. Helleiner (ed.), Agricultural Planning in East Africa (Nairobi, 1968), p. 12.

for us to realize is that the increase in output were almost everywhere realized without any change in the method of production."<sup>43</sup>

Another important economic influence was the failure to attract the overseas capitalist investment and aid which had been hoped for when the FYP was drawn up. Approximately 70 percent of the total development expenditure had to be provided from within Tanzania, rather than the 48 percent planned for, and 65 percent of the central government capital investment rather than the 22 percent planned for had to be obtained from domestic sources.<sup>44</sup> Indications of this were already clear by the end of 1966.

It was also clear that expectations of foreign aid would have to be sacrificed if the Tanzanian government wanted to stand by certain political principles it considered important. Tanzania broke off relations with Britain in December, 1965, in accordance with the position of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), when Britain failed to take strong measures against Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. This led to the postponement of a \$21 million interest-free loan which had been arranged previously with Britain.<sup>45</sup>

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43. Tanzania, Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, July, 1969 - June, 1974, I (Dar es Salaam, 1969), p. xiv (hereinafter referred to as Second FYP); Cf. Hans Ruthenberg, Agricultural Development in Tanganyika (Munich, 1964), p. 19.

44. Second FYP, p. x.

45. Nyerere, "The Honor of Africa," Freedom and Socialism, p. 115-133.

The realities of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the political organization within Tanzania were driven home over this period. The short-lived army mutiny in Dar es Salaam in January, 1964 was a jolt to the leadership. They were forced to turn to British troops to put down the mutiny. The army easily could have brought down the government if it wished. This was not the objective of the mutiny. Rather, it was a protest against the low pay and the continued rule by British officers over the army.<sup>46</sup>

TANU remained the only political party in Tanzania and had never been seriously challenged. In 1965, TANU status as the only party was to be written into the constitution. But it still retained the loose and decentralized organization it had inherited from the period of its formation.<sup>47</sup> The organization of TANU reflected the same disconnectedness which existed between the center and other regions, as well as between the regions. TANU, like the government, was limited in its links to and control over the district, sub-divisional and local village organizations.

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46. Cf. Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1970 [1967]), pp. 366-81.

47. Cf. Bienen, Tanzania, passim. Bienen illustrates the fact that TANU was a hierarchical, centralized and mobilizing party on paper only by pointing out that as late as the end of 1966, the party lacked a powerful center. The central staff at National Headquarters had less than 25 permanent and full-time officials and lacked a central filing system so that it could not know where TANU members were located or who they were (p. 12).

This reality existed in spite of the inventive efforts of the leadership to develop new institutional arrangements which could provide effective political links from the center throughout all levels of the political system.

After independence, the colonial administrative organization was revised. The 9 provinces were replaced by 17 regions and 58 districts were created. The colonial provincial and district officials were replaced by political regional and area commissioners who were appointed from the center from among the TANU leadership.<sup>48</sup>

The former native authority councils were abolished and replaced with elected councils dominated by TANU. The regional officers were made secretary of the regional TANU organization, as were the district commissioners in the district party branches. Both were made chairmen of the councils at their respective levels. This fusion of party and administration reflected an attempt to deal not only with the limited number of African personnel, but to reinforce the authority of the new government and its officials.

From 1962 onward, village and district development committees were established. The village development committees (VDC's) in particular represented further efforts by the TANU government to reach down into the villages, to promote social change and to serve as instruments for organizing and generating development around self-help projects.<sup>49</sup>

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48. Cf. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania (Nairobi, 1967), pp. 96, ff.; and Bienen, Tanzania, pp. 75, ff.

49. Bienen, Tanzania, pp. 334-56.

The army mutiny provided an impetus for electoral reforms for the selection of representatives to the National Assembly. The existing one party system provided no choice to the population with regard to representation. The reform reflected the growing concern about the loss of popular participation in TANU and its effect upon support and allegiance to the party.<sup>50</sup>

Shortly after the mutiny was ended, a presidential commission was appointed to make recommendations for establishing a democratic one party state. Its report one year later was accepted with some modifications by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of TANU and elections were held for a new National Assembly in September, 1965.<sup>51</sup>

The 1965 General Election "was an unusual experiment, the first of its kind in Africa south of the Sahara."<sup>52</sup> Other elections, where they were held, offered either a single official party candidate or a single party list. Tanzania established open nominations at the district level.<sup>53</sup>

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50. The last election prior to the National Assembly elections of 1965 was the 1962 presidential election. Less than a quarter of the adult population voted. Bienen, Tanzania, p. 382.

51. Cf., Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State (Dar es Salaam, 1965).

52. Tordoff, Government and Politics, p. 31.

53. Cf. Bienen, Tanzania, Chapter 12, and Tordoff, Government and Politics, Chapter 2.

Two candidates were selected by a special district conference of TANU.<sup>54</sup> The names in order of choice were forwarded to the NEC which had the final choice of the two candidates to run. They overruled the district preselection only 16 times. The results of the election were striking: the voters defeated two ministers, 6 junior ministers, and three-quarters of the incumbent Members. The voting did not indicate any special preference for or against the first choice of the district conference and the NEC.<sup>55</sup>

The high number of nominees, 803 for 107 constituencies, and the active involvement during the campaigning, the 76 percent turnout of registered voters, and the high turnover of the Assembly, indicated the success of the reforms in generating popular political interest and independent response. It also confirmed that TANU was not the centralized and monolithic type party associated with the "mobilizing" party.

The election result partly reflected a disillusionment with the lack of substantial change in people's material conditions in spite of independence. It also suggested a reaction against leaders being out of touch with their local constituency, "living in high style" while exhorting the people to sacrifice and work harder, and the wealth they had obtained through their political position.<sup>56</sup>

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54. The decision to use a special enlarged district conference rather than the district executive committee opened up the selection process.

55. Bienen, Tanzania, p. 398.

56. Ibid., p. 394.

The elections contributed to a growing concern of the top leadership about the growth of a political and economic elite, a bourgeois ruling class, and an increasing inequality within Tanzanian society in spite of Ujamaa. There was a growing perception of similar results in the rural areas as a consequence of the "transformation" approach. Both elements contributed to a change in thinking which foreshadowed the Arusha Declaration.

The experiences from 1961 to 1966 led to a rethinking of the role of TANU as a means of communication with people at the local level and as an instrument to mobilizing development in accordance with planning at the center. Tension existed between this concern and the above problem of turning TANU into a more open, democratic, and mass party, whose leadership reflected a closeness and responsive to local concerns.

Mobilization of development at the local level required an increase of centralized control over TANU. It demanded an expansion of party organization at the sub-district level and the establishment of greater discipline within the TANU organization. Greater discipline was needed to instill a more concerted effort among the population among the population to carry out the objectives of national planning and development more effectively.

The formation of the "ten cell" system in 1965 aimed at achieving this centralization, discipline and mobilization of effort at the local

level.<sup>57</sup> TANU branches were considered too unwieldy and ineffective. They were to form cells within their area, one for every ten houses. The TANU members in each cell were to choose a cell leader, who would be able to pass on popular complaints and inform people of government goals. These cell leaders were also expected to promote political education and development efforts more effectively than the leadership at the branches could.

The cell system, like the VDC's, were organizational efforts to extend TANU organization into the local levels in order to utilize the party more effectively as an instrument to promote development. This was particularly true after the FYP was established and development programs increased. The role of TANU was considered essential, because of the scarcity of personnel to implement and oversee development programs and self-help projects. The formation of additional organizational units was also seen increasingly as a means to develop additional leadership and training along more modern lines among the population.

Prior to the Arusha Declaration, these organizations frequently existed on paper more than in reality. They were an indication of intentions rather than established organizations for development.

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57. The decision to establish the cell system was originally made in August, 1963, but the actual implementation did not begin until the end of 1964 in Dar es Salaam and began being implemented throughout the rest of the country in 1965. Cf. B. Njohole, "Building Party Cells in Tanzania," In J. Proctor, ed., The Cell System of the Tanganyika National Union (Dar es Salaam, 1971), p.1; Bienen, Tanzania, pp. 356-60.

The Arusha Declaration: a shift in development efforts.

The Arusha Declaration was a new statement of policy for Tanzania's development. The policy crystallized out of the problems the TANU government had encountered and the modifications it had begun implementing as discussed above.<sup>58</sup>

The essential basis of this policy was self-reliance. Its importance is indicated by the space in the Declaration devoted to it; 14 out of 20 pages, two of which were a restatement of the TANU Creed from the TANU Constitution. The second major concern of the Declaration was that of leadership. One-half of Part Five, the actual Arusha Resolution, is devoted to defining the role and behavior of leaders. It is important to stress that "nationalization," which was emphasized most in the press at the time, was mentioned only briefly in one paragraph in Part Two, The Policy of Socialism. This point was emphasized later by the statement of Nyerere that "self-reliance and the conditions for political leadership are the most important parts of the Declaration--not nationalization."<sup>59</sup>

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58. For a good analysis of the Arusha Declaration, Cf. Lionel Cliffe, "Challenge to Tanzanians," East African Journal (March, 1967), pp. 3-9; Bienen, Tanzania, Chapter 13; Clyde Ingle, From Village to State in Tanzania (Ithaca, 1972), Chapter 1, *passim*.
59. Cf., The President's Press Conference, reported in the Nationalist, March 6, 1967.

Self-reliance meant, first of all, that development had to be based on the nation's own human and material resources, rather than on money and a dependency upon foreign investment and aid. The reality that Tanzania was an impoverished nation had to be accepted. It lacked the money, the capital, to achieve the struggle for modern development.<sup>60</sup>

In the past we have chosen the wrong weapon for our struggle, because we chose money as our weapon. We are trying to overcome our economic weakness by using the weapon of the economically strong--weapons which in fact we do not possess.

Everyone, the Declaration asserted, TANU leaders, government leaders and officials, and the people themselves, had to change their perspective, for they put too great an emphasis and dependence upon money.<sup>61</sup>

By our thoughts, words and actions it appears as if we have come to the conclusion that without money we cannot bring about the revolution we are aiming at. . . . We think and speak as if the most important thing to depend upon is MONEY and anything else we intend to use in our struggle is of minor importance.

Everyone depended upon and turned to the government for money to achieve development. Yet the government did not have the money and could not provide all the things that people wanted. Government funds, the Declaration stressed, came from taxing the people "on the

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60. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 235.

61. Ibid., pp. 235-36.

very little wealth they have<sup>61</sup> and the government would have to increase the taxation to pay for all the development projects people wanted.<sup>62</sup>

The reality was that no matter how heavily the government taxed the people, not enough revenue could be raised to meet the costs of this development. The government couldn't impose this burden and the people couldn't bear it.

The experience since independence had proved that foreign finance was not going to prove any substitute source of funds. To continue believing this was delusion:<sup>63</sup>

It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that our country is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is even more stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our poverty through foreign financial assistance rather than our own financial resources. It is stupid for two reasons.... First, because in fact we shall not be able to get sufficient money for our economic development; and secondly, because even if we could get all that we need, such dependence upon others would endanger our independence and our ability to choose our own political policies.

Second, self-reliance meant that the nation would have to place greater emphasis upon agriculture as the basis of development. Higher priority had to be placed upon agrarian and rural development, for both the people and resources in Tanzania were located overwhelmingly in

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62. Ibid., p. 237.

63. Ibid., pp. 238, 240.

the countryside. Instead, past policy had emphasized industrial and urban development at the expense of the peasantry: 64

We spend most of our money in the urban areas and our industries are established in the towns. Yet the greater part of this money...comes from loans....The largest proportion of the loans will be spent in, or for, the urban areas, but the largest proportion of the repayment will be made through the efforts of the farmers.

The Declaration warned that a "real exploitation" developing in Tanzania "is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants," and that the focus of development had to be reversed. 65

Third, self-reliance meant hard work and the intelligent use of more productive methods. This was the root of development. The people, particularly in the countryside, had to work harder and use more initiative on projects for development, rather than depend on and wait for money and the government to bring about development. The leaders in turn had to go to the people in the villages and show them "how to bring about development through their own efforts." It was the responsibility of TANU, the government and the cooperative societies 66

to see to it that our people get the necessary tools, training, and leadership in modern methods of agriculture....The money and time we spend on passing on this knowledge to the peasants are

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64. Ibid., p. 242.

65. Ibid., pp. 243-44.

66. Ibid., pp. 245-47.

better spent and bring more benefits to our country than the money and great amount of time we spend on other things which we call development.

The growing concern in Tanzania over the characteristics of leadership was reflected in the discussion on rural development. Neither socialism or development could take place without knowledgeable, disciplined and committed leaders throughout all levels of Tanzanian society. Yet the existing leadership was dominated by a small educated elite, which was formed and conditioned under colonial rule. This elite took over governmental, administrative, and political positions in the "transfer" to independence.

As elsewhere in underdeveloped countries, this leadership tended to use their position to acquire wealth, property, and business interests. This trend pointed to the formation of a privileged and propertied ruling class, a bourgeoisie, whose vested interests would become increasingly antagonistic to the mass of the peasant and working population.

A major element in the resolutions of the Arusha Declaration was the listing of strict conditions for leadership, in order to prevent the entrenchment of such a privileged class:<sup>67</sup>

1. Every TANU and Government leader must be either a peasant or worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism.
2. No TANU or Government leaders should hold shares in any company.
3. No TANU or Government leader should hold directorships in any privately owned enterprise.

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67. Ibid., p. 249.

4. No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries.

5. No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others.

Equally important, the Declaration indicated the failure, particularly by the party, to create an alternate form of leadership:<sup>68</sup>

We have not yet produced systematic training for our leaders; it is necessary that TANU Headquarters should now prepare a programme of training for all leaders--from the national level to the ten-house cell--so that every one of them understands our political and economic policies.

The overwhelming emphasis after independence had been placed on increasing the number of skilled and highly educated manpower. And there were good reasons for doing so, since their number within the African population was so small, due to colonial policy, and there was such a great need within every area. But this emphasis had led to a serious neglect in training a cadre from among the people who could provide local leadership in the raising of political consciousness, in the mobilization of social change, and in the basics of day-to-day development along the lines of self-reliance.

Nationalization occupied a small part of the Declaration and should be seen in the context of the policy of independence and self-reliance as the means by which to achieve economic development and a socialist society. The TANU government had decided to take control and ownership of "all the major means of production and exchange."<sup>69</sup>

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68. Ibid., p. 248.

69. Ibid., p. 233.

In terms of its effect upon existing western capitalist investments, nationalization mainly included banks, insurance companies, large-scale trading firms, and the few modern industries in Tanzania. It also included:<sup>70</sup>

land; forests; minerals; water, oil and electricity; news media; communications; ...large plantations, and especially those which provide raw materials essential to important industries.

Taking control over "the commanding heights of the economy," according to Aneurin Bevin's phrase, as Tanzania's nationalization policy came to be described in the country, was both less radical and significant than it suggested. As Nyerere later stated, "the list of firms whose ownership has been affected is... a very small one. It is small because... 'you can't nationalize nothing.'"<sup>71</sup>

Little foreign investment had ever been made in Tanzania, in absolute terms. There were few foreign capitalist enterprises which could be nationalized, as strategic and important as they were rela-

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70. Ibid., p. 234.

71. "Public Ownership in Tanzania," Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 254, an article originally published in Sunday News, on February 12, 1967.

tively in Tanzania's economy.<sup>72</sup> These firms were not expropriated but purchased with "full and fair compensation" through negotiation and mutual agreement with the companies involved.<sup>73</sup>

It was subsequently made clear also that foreign aid and private capitalist investment was still welcome.<sup>74</sup>

We have firmly rejected the proposition that without foreign aid we cannot develop. We shall not depend upon overseas aid to the extent of bending our political, economic, or social policies in the hope of getting it. But we shall try to get it in order that we may hasten our eco-

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72. The following enterprises were nationalized: Grindleys and Standard Banks; the National Insurance Corporation, Ltd., in which the government previously had a majority shareholding; the following large trading firms, which were to be formed into the State Trading Corporation: Smith Mackenzie & Col., Ltd., Dalgety (East Africa) Ltd., International Trading & Credit Co. of Tanganyika; Co-operative Supply Association of Tanganyika Ltd., A. Baumann & Co. (Tanganyika) Ltd., Twentsche Overseas Trading Co., Ltd., African Mercantile Co. (overseas) Ltd.; and Wigglesworth & Co. (Africa) Ltd; and the following food processing firms: Tanzania Millers; Chande Industries; Pure Food Products Ltd., G. R. Jivraj, Noormohamed Jessa, Kyela Sattar Millers (Mbeya), Associated Traders Ltd. (Mwanzo), and Rajwani Mills (Dodoma). In addition, government "control" was established through obtaining a majority share in the following enterprises: Kili-manjaro Brewery, British American Tobacco (Tanzania), Tanganyika Metal Box Co., Tanganyika Extract Co., Tanganyika Portland Cement, and Bata Shoe Co. Bata refused to cooperate in arranging government majority shareholding, so the government acquired full ownership. The government later took over majority shareholding in the major foreign Sisal Estates. Cf. "Public Ownership in Tanzania," an article published in the Sunday News, February 12, 1967, which is reprinted in Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 251-56.

73. Ibid., p. 253. Cf. Seidman, "Comparative Industrial Strategies in East Africa," East Africa Journal (June, 1970), pp. 33-34.

74. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 254. See also, Nyerere, "Economic Nationalism," Freedom and Socialism, pp. 262-66; Second Five Year Plan, 1969-74, pp. 208-16. Private enterprise was expected to finance nearly 25% of the second FYP, Vol. 1, p. 210, Table 2; Vol. 2, pp. 7-8.

conomic progress, and that it may act as a catalyst to our own effort. Similarly with private enterprise: we have rejected the domination of private enterprise; but we shall continue to welcome private investment in all those areas not reserved for Government in the Arusha Declaration.

The policy of the TANU government was to establish three categories. The first two delineated those industrial and commercial activities in which the government insisted on public ownership or a majority share.

All other economic activities were open to private investment on a basis of total private ownership or with government financial participation if desired. Any "request will be given very favorable consideration. If we can co-operate, even on a minority basis, we shall be willing to do so."<sup>75</sup>

The shift in the policy of development outlined in the Arusha Declaration was elaborated upon during the rest of 1967 in a number of speeches by Nyerere and a number of Ministers, as well as in several more specific policy statements. The increased role of the public sector--both the central government and a growing number of parastatal organizations--was spelled out in the following papers: "Public Ownership in Tanzania," "Economic Nationalism," and "The Varied Paths to Socialism."<sup>76</sup>

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75. Nyerere, "Public Ownership," Freedom and Socialism, p. 255.

76. Cf. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, papers # 27, 29, 32).

In March, 1967, the paper "Education for Self-reliance" outlined a program for restructuring the educational system in order to turn the system of education into an instrument to promote socialism and self-reliance.<sup>77</sup>

It indicated how little the system inherited from the colonial had been changed. The education had been designed "to inculcate the values of the colonial society and to train individuals for the service of the colonial state," rather than to prepare people to serve their own country and people.<sup>78</sup>

The content, structure, and purpose of education was to be changed to promote cooperative efforts, training for service in the countryside and for agrarian development. The elitist and academic bias was to be changed towards practical education and training to harmonize with the realities of the existing society. The schools were to be turned into "communities" as much as possible. Farms and workshops were to be added to the schools to make them as self-reliant as possible and enable them to contribute to the national income.

The form and direction of rural development was treated in a particularly vague way in the Declaration. This was clarified in the paper "Socialism and Rural Development."<sup>79</sup> Rural development was

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77. Ibid., paper #30.

78. Ibid., p. 269.

79. Ibid., paper #37.

to be directed towards the formation of Ujamaa villages, cooperative "rural economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all."<sup>80</sup>

Through the organization of Ujamaa villages throughout Tanzania, capitalist development on the land and the formation of a class system in the countryside were to be reversed. For Tanzania could not develop into a socialist society unless a socialist form of production and social organization was established in the countryside, where over 90 percent of the people live and produce. In the process of creating Ujamaa villages, traditional cooperative and egalitarian values were to be joined with modern agricultural practices in order to transfer the life conditions of the people and the nature of Tanzanian society.

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80. Ibid., pp. 348, 351.

#### 4. Post-Arusha: Development Planning and Agrarian Policy.

The TANU government attempted to incorporate into the Second Five Year Plan these basic policies of socialism and self-reliance which it had spelled out in the Arusha Declaration and the following position papers. The Second FYP was designed to avoid the mistakes of the first FYP<sup>81</sup> and to reverse the direction of deformed capitalist development which had become evident by 1967.

The Second FYP was to establish the foundations for modern development and a form of development based on a socialist economic and social organization. "Foundation" must be stressed, because the leadership indicated a clear awareness of the constraints they faced and the difficulties which had to be overcome in achieving this development. They saw the Second FYP in the context of a much longer period of planning, one which stretched beyond the original long-range goal of 1980 to the 1990's.

Development planning was based on a double strategy of rural development and industrialization. Priority was given to rural development for two basic reasons.<sup>82</sup> First, 90 to 95 percent of the people

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81. Cf. G. K. Helleiner, "Tanzania's Second Plan: Socialism and Self-Reliance," East Africa Journal (December, 1968). Also, see the introduction to the Second Five Year Plan.

82. Second FYP, I, pp. 26-27. See Chapter 3 for the discussion of rural development.

produced and lived in the rural, agrarian area and there was no possibility of creating a socialist society in Tanzania unless a socialist form of economic production and social organization was introduced in the countryside. Second, socialist development--not to say any form of development--could not take place without a significant expansion of economic growth. Realistically, the only source of economic growth lay in the rural area: "most of our latent wealth lies in our under-utilized land and in the energies of the rural people."<sup>83</sup>

Yet, in the long-run, economic development and a socialist formation required <sup>84</sup>

the formation of an industrial base.... If a high level of development is to be achieved over the coming decades, the foundations of future structural change must be laid now.

An integrated, independent, and self-reliant economy for the future rested upon the inter-dependency of agrarian and industrial development.

The source of wealth or economic surplus for industrialization had to come initially from rural and agrarian development. The market for industrial production ultimately was dependent on rural development. In turn, industrialization would provide the inputs for further rural development. It would create employment for those displaced from

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83. Ibid., p. 26.

84. Ibid., p. 59. See Chapter 4 for the discussion of industrial development.

agrarian production due to rising productivity and population growth. And industrialization would provide the goods and services to improve the material conditions for the mass of the people in the rural area.

Economic development in general, rather than "economic growth without development,"<sup>85</sup> and a socialist formation in particular, rather than a continuation of a deformed capitalist development, depended upon overcoming the system of structural underdevelopment created during colonial rule. This meant overcoming the imbalance, inequality, and exploitation which existed between classes, between the urban and rural areas, between the modern and traditional sectors, between the export and domestic aspects of the economy, and between regions within the nation.

The attempt to create a socialist formation was an infinitely harder task than that of maximizing economic growth through private enterprise and state controls which characterized Kenya's development orientation and that of most of the underdeveloped countries of the world.

A considerable degree of conflict, both potential and actual, existed between the two objectives in Tanzania's socialist strategy of development. These objectives were: the development of a socialist organization in the way people live and produce; and the development of more modern methods of production and higher levels of productivity.

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85. For the use of this term in economic analysis, see Robert W. Clover, et. al., Growth without Development: an economic survey of Liberia (Evanston, 1966).

The tension and conflict between these two elements were reflected in the policies and programs they drew up for the Second FYP. The implications for the content and direction of Tanzania's development will be considered in a closer examination of the areas of rural development and industrialization.

Rural development and ujamaa vijijini: the conflict of economic and social goals.

Under the new strategy for rural development, the TANU government rejected the previous selective or "transformation approach." That approach had been based on the creation of modern, capital-intensive village settlement schemes in previously unsettled areas. They chose instead a "frontal" approach.<sup>86</sup> This aimed at promoting development throughout the traditional areas where most of the people existed in scattered households and produced mainly for subsistence through traditional agricultural methods.

The rural policy stressed the creation of Ujamaa villages throughout the countryside where people were already settled. They were to be encouraged, persuaded, and pressured to move from their scattered household living pattern into villages.

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86. Second FYP, I, p. xvii, pp. 27-28.

Given the greater concentration of people, a various number of services could be directed more effectively to aid people in improving their farming practices, in growing export crops, in obtaining water supplies, medical care and various other social benefits which could not be provided to scattered individual households. Once the initial step of establishing an Ujamaa village was done, priority was given to directing the resources of the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development (Maendeleo), the Ministry of Agriculture (Kilimo), and the Cooperative Movement into the improvement of village living and production.

Regional teams and TANU were expected to play a key role in the establishment of the villages. They also were to provide political education about the purpose of village development and ways to cope with the organizational problems of cooperative village life, as well as encourage self-reliance and local decision-making.

Ujamaa village development was expected initially to pass through three stages.<sup>87</sup> First was the moving together of people into a village. This stage might or might not include the development of a cooperative or collective plot on which everyone worked and divided the proceeds, in addition to the individual families' own plots.

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87. Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development," Freedom and Socialism, pp. 357-58 and passim.

Second, the collective plots were to be expanded and the methods and productivity improved, along with the improvement of the individual plots. People were to be encouraged to devote a greater part of their time to cooperative labor on the collective plot and less to their individual plots.

In the third stage, the people were expected to integrate their individual plots into a collective farm, which they would work cooperatively and share equally in the proceeds. Individual families would retain only small gardens around their shambas or houses. This process was expected to take place out of the realization by the villagers through practice that they could produce more, with less labor, more productively, on a collective basis.

The resources available to the TANU government to promote rural development were very limited, particularly when spread widely over the countryside in the effort to promote some change and movement towards ujamaa village development in every area.<sup>88</sup> The initial aid to each village was expected to be small, and the emphasis was placed upon making the villagers aware that the improvement of their villages and lives depended upon their own efforts in increasing and modernizing production. Aside from extension services, the government would concentrate on economic and social infrastructure, on training through new Rural Training Centers, and on cooperative inputs, loans, and marketing.

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88. Second FYP, pp. 27-28 and passim.

Ujamaa village development began in 1968 and it is still too early to assess the success of this strategy. There are some indications of both the problems and conflicts involved in implementing the ujamaa program.<sup>89</sup> A number of studies in 1968-1969 indicate that people were discouraged early by the ineffective organization in the formation of villages.<sup>90</sup> The basic constraints which existed in Tanzania made ujamaa development hard to implement. The government frequently could not or did not provide food and other aid to enable the new villages to get going during the first difficult year.

Another problem was the tendency of the people to neglect the cooperative plot in favor of working on their own individual plots. The difficulties of cooperative production were great, for this was a totally new experience.

Traditional cooperative or "communal" labor, unlike generalized and mythic descriptions, hardly ever involved communal production on a collective plot.<sup>91</sup> Rather, it involved shared work in specific

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89. Cf. J. H. Proctor, ed., Building Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1971); Clyde Ingle, From Village to State in Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development (Ithaca, 1972).

90. Cf. six studies in Proctor, Building Ujamaa Villages, passim, particularly the conclusions in each study.

91. Cf. D. Biebuyck, ed., African Agrarian Systems (London, 1963); Melville Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz, eds., Economic Transition in Africa (Evanston, 1964); D.G.R. Belshaw, ed., The Politics of Rural Development (Nairobi, 19 ); Beverly Brock, "Customary Land Tenure, Individualization and Agricultural Development in Uganda," East African Journal of Rural Development, 2, 2 (1969), pp. 1-27; J. Roger Pitblado, "A Review of Agricultural Land Use and Land Tenure in Tanzania," University of Dar es Salaam, Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, Research Notes No. 7 (Dar es Salaam, 1970); and Proctor, ed., Building Ujamaa Villages, passim.

areas: initial clearing of the ground of individual plots, collective work in the construction of a new house, or joint harvesting efforts, again on individual family plots. Actual production nearly always took place on the basis of distinct, individual family holdings.

This pattern generally was replicated in the ujamaa villages, in spite of efforts to counter it.

Government officials, party leaders, and trained cadres, particularly at the local level, also thought in these terms, rather than the collective concept and practice of farming. This tendency was strengthened by the fact that TANU local cell, ward, and district leaders frequently turned out to be elders and other traditional figures.<sup>92</sup> Actual implementation at the local level consequently turned out to be quite different from the concept and planning at the regional and central levels.

Development planning at the central level placed great importance on improved agricultural methods. These included: cash crop farming, crop diversification, expanded output, more sophisticated farm planning, and improved productivity. This frequently led the leadership to emphasize agricultural modernization over cooperative or collective production.

The conditioning from the colonial past, which had a functional and technical bias, tended to be reproduced in the training and education of new administrative and technical personnel. The political aspect of

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92. Cf. Ingle, Village to State, passim.

education, organizing and cooperative behavior was neglected and proved hard to develop. The ideal of promoting self-reliance, voluntarism, and local decision-making often gave way to compulsory methods and agricultural regulations reminiscent of the colonial period in order to meet the demands for expanded production and more rapid economic growth in the rural areas.

A report in 1971 indicated that 1,100 ujamaa villages with a population of 500,000 had been formed by the beginning of 1970. This increased to 2,668 villages totaling 840,000 or approximately 6.3 percent of the population by mid-1971.<sup>93</sup> The figures need to be treated cautiously. Often this included earlier settlement schemes which had been renamed ujamaa villages. There are indications that local reporting of ujamaa development reflected inflated figures of nonexistent villages or traditional villages, in order to satisfy the expectations from above.

The same report broke down these figures into the three stages, which were defined somewhat differently at this point. 2,410 villages were in the first stage, or reflected merely the fact of village formation, rather than anything about cooperative or collective behavior. 241 villages were reported in the second stage,<sup>94</sup>

...where they are sufficiently creditworthy and self-established to apply for registration as Agricultural Associations with the Tanzania Rural Development Bank.

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93. Cf. Tanzania, The Economic Survey, 1970-1971 (Dar es Salaam, 1971), pp. 54-57, Table 41, p. 54.

94. Ibid., p. 55.

Only 17 villages were reported in stage three, or "registered as multi-purpose cooperatives." Significantly, this stage was now described as the "third and final stage of development." Nothing was said about collective village farms as a reflection of a socialist form of production and living.

There is a real question about the defined meaning of cooperatives. Specifically, there is no way of determining if this means anything more than the primary cooperative societies created in many of the cash-crop producing areas during the 1950's and early 1960's, but organized now around villages rather than scattered households.

Those cooperatives represented a capitalist form of production based on individual land use and "ownership" where land was individually bought and sold in practice if not by law. The implications of this form of cooperative development were clearly spelled out in the Second FYP with regard to the cooperative marketing organization. They apply equally well to villages organized as cooperative societies:<sup>95</sup>

The co-operative is basically a socialist institution. However, a marketing co-operative, the members of which are small scale capitalists and which itself becomes a large scale employer of labor, will increasingly take on a capitalist character. The cooperative movement in Tanzania is a source of considerable strength for the growth of socialism--it represents a major advance over a private capitalist trading system. However, if it remains purely concerned with marketing, with the development of commercial farming amongst its members, it will become an increasingly capitalist institution.

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95. Second FYP, I, p. 31.

Several additional points should be made about ujamaa vijijini. First, the average size of the village was 315 people. Since the economic survey does not breakdown its figures any further than the regional level, one cannot determine the disparity in size of individual villages. But the small size of the villages sets limits on social and economic development. There also is no indication of groupings of villages under the Chinese communal pattern.

Second, the regions which indicate the greatest degree of ujamaa village formation tend to be the most underdeveloped regions, such as Mtwora, Lineh, Mara, Iringa. This may indicate less resistance to village formation, due to a very limited capitalist development in the areas, compared to Arusha or Mwanza. It also suggests that the ujamaa village program is focused on the least economically developed areas in order to "pull" them into the market economy and expand agrarian export production.

The program of rural development actually involved more than ujamaa village development. An important element also was the creation of state farms and large-scale irrigation schemes.<sup>96</sup> Both were designed to establish large-scale, mechanized and modern farm units within Tanzania in addition to the small-scale farming that characterized the major part of the rural area. They were designed in particular to promote the production of crops and livestock which required large-scale production to be successful, such as wheat, rice, dairy farms

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96. Ibid., I, pp. 30-31; II, p. 34-39.

and cattle ranches. They were a crucial element in the effort to diversify agrarian production and export as well as to eliminate present imports which were a drain on foreign exchange.<sup>97</sup>

These state farms and irrigation schemes were very capital intensive. They required a high level of organization and management, as well as elaborate inputs and a high level of productivity. Evidence on the characteristics of this project is equally unavailable as yet. However, there are indications again that they are more like commercial capitalist-like industries, rather than cooperative or collective organizations. Given the constraints of limited trained personnel and the inexperience and lack of disciplined, sophisticated production among the members of these state farms and irrigation schemes, it is difficult to expect any other form of development as yet.

Several major points emerge out of this examination. First, rural development is oriented to the extension and improvement approach within the traditional sector. Functionally, this is very similar to the policy and programs adopted earlier in Kenya, regardless of differences in motivation or political objectives. Both emphasize the expansion and improvement of production of agrarian exports, which indicates how the inherited structure of underdevelopment has strongly shaped the direction of development efforts.

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97. The Second FYP makes clear that the high priority given to the rapid development of production of these agrarian products through large-scale farms was due to requirements for selling them "profitably in the world market," and not the need for domestic production (p. 42).

The effort in Tanzania to create villages in the process of rural development also mirrors the villagization efforts under the colonial plan of reform in Kenya. This was basically abandoned by the British and was not renewed in Kenya under the Kenyatta government. The determination of Tanzania to carry this through holds out greater hopes for an improvement in rural life than can be expected in the rural areas in Kenya.

Second, the state farm and irrigation scheme program is not terribly different functionally from the large-scale farming in the highlands in Kenya. Both are seen as crucial to overcome the limitations of smallholder production. They permit mechanization, large-scale production and high productivity, which these products require to be profitable on the world market.

Socially and politically, there are potentially great differences. Kenya's large farms already existed, were created by European settlers, and were concentrated in the highlands. They were also being transferred over to Africans, particularly Kikuyu, on the basis of private ownership. Thus, they intensified the concentration of modern economic and agricultural production in the highlands area, consolidated the development of an African upper class or bourgeoisie, and the creation of a capitalist society.

In Tanzania, these large-scale farms were being created for the first time, under state ownership and management. Given the

constraints in Tanzania, there existed no other way to achieve this objective. While they did not promote private ownership, they also did not create a socialist form of social and economic organization.

The program aimed at creating those large-scale units in every district in Tanzania, which provides a more beneficial pattern of development than the concentration in Kenya. They were also organized to promote ujamaa village development around the state farm areas, and provide a source of advanced equipment and services for these ujamaa farms. Again, this development allows the possibility of a more beneficial development throughout Tanzania than the large-scale estates do in Kenya.

#### Industrialization, state control and the managerial bureaucracy.

Some of the same problems, conflicts, and implications for future development can be seen in the strategy of industrialization. State ownership or control, as carried out in Tanzania, offered limited advantages for industrial development as well as a socialist formation.

Lacking the management to run the nationalized enterprises, the TANU government kept the same capitalist management that had run these farms before nationalization. The enterprises were expected also to make a profit to provide capital for further industrialization. The form of ownership had changed, but little else.

Tanzania counted on this management to train Africans to take over the enterprises. This was clearly part of the arrangement of purchase and nationalization. But this did not deal with the problem that an African management, under this method of training, would emerge with a capitalist mentality and method of operating a business.

The danger for the future lay in the creation of a skilled bureaucracy, running state enterprises on a commercial basis differing little from a capitalist enterprise, and a bureaucracy which would form an important stratum in a future ruling class.

The nationalized industries and enterprises with a government majority holding were placed under the parastatal organization, The National Development Corporation (NDC).<sup>98</sup> The NDC was to be the main instrument by which to promote the industrialization of Tanzania along the lines of socialist enterprise. Yet the management and training programs of NDC were provided by the American management consultant firm, Arthur D. Little, Inc.<sup>99</sup> This was not an encouraging prospect for the development of socialist organization and planning in industry.

Nationalization and the acquisition of majority shares did not increase the productive capacity in Tanzania. It also placed a heavy "mortgage" on the nation's capital for the future. Compensation and

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98. Cf. Second FYP, II, pp. 54-60; Table on p. 17. Many other parastates were created for development besides NDC. There are presented in this same section. NDC was the primary agency promoting industrial development.

99. Monthly Review, 24, 1 (May, 1972), p. 34.

the purchase of majority shares was arranged through loans, mainly from the parent companies of these enterprises, and generally at seven percent interest.<sup>100</sup> The loans were to be repaid out of future profits. Consequently, "these firms could not be expected to provide much additional income to NDC to finance further expansion for the next five to eight years."<sup>101</sup>

The Second FYP projected the development of 380 projects as a minimum target by the parastatals under its industrial program.<sup>102</sup> The investment involved was estimated at £65 M over the five years. This industrial investment was expected to result in only 31,000 additional jobs. After evaluating the increase in labor productivity for industry as a whole over the five years, the Second FYP concluded that the actual net increase in total industrial employment would be 20,000 and that the total industrial employment by 1975 would be around 60,000.

In 1971, the TANU government introduced workers councils in its industries, after studying examples in the socialist countries.<sup>103</sup> This raised the possibility that over time a greater role on the part of

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100. Seidman, "Comparative Industrial Strategies," p. 33.

101. Ibid., p. 33.

102. Second FYP, II pp. 65-67.

103. Monthly Review, 24, 1 (May, 1972), p. 29.

the workers in these industries might be established. The councils were strictly advisory, however, without any real power. The lack of education and experience was also bound to limit their influence upon the bureaucratic management. There is no way of estimating the possible impact of these councils in the future on Tanzania's state enterprises.

## CHAPTER TEN

### CONCLUSION

An examination of the political context in which economic policy was devised in Kenya and Tanzania during the post-independence period indicates that the difference in form and resolution of political conflict was influenced mainly by certain factors molded during the colonial period and persisting after independence.

In Kenya, the division, conflict and weakness within the nationalist movement carried over in the party organization after independence. The more advanced economic growth and class formation created a leadership more dependent upon and inclined towards a capitalist approach to development than in Tanzania. Prior settler domination and the concentration of the modern economic sector in the Highlands reinforced this dependency upon western methods. The impact of land and agrarian reforms was to consolidate the formation of an African bourgeoisie. It gave this emergent ruling class a vested interest in private ownership, capitalist enterprise, and the existing system of underdevelopment.

The weak, divided and ineffectual party organization in Kenya contrasted strongly with the centralized and powerful state administration. The leadership was dependent upon the state, rather than the party, as an instrument of control and as the agent to implement development. The role of the state apparatus was reinforced by party struggles after independence. This combination of factors precluded an effective mobilization

of the people and resources towards an alternate pattern of development. Rather, it led to a reinforcement of the existing system of underdevelopment and a continuation of a deformed capitalist economy in Kenya.

Tanzania was equally influenced by factors molded during the colonial period. But they differed from those in Kenya due to variation in the colonial formation. The lack of division in the nationalist movement carried over into the one party system after independence. Colonial policies in Tanzania retarded the growth of the economy and class formation in comparison to Kenya. Both factors influenced the late development of the nationalist movement and its formal unity.

A smaller, more fragmented and less influential settler community in Tanzania was an important factor in limiting the economic growth and class formation within Tanzania. So was the limited foreign capital invested prior to independence. Both factors were the result of the forceable "transfer" of Tanzania to British rule after World War I and the subsequent subordination of Tanzania's economic growth to Kenya's.

The Tanzanian leadership had a much less vested interest in a capitalist approach to development as a result of this combination of factors. They also had fewer expectations of foreign investment as a source of economic growth after independence. Since land and agrarian reforms were not implemented in Tanzania prior to independence, consolidation of an African bourgeoisie did not occur in Tanzania to the

extent that it did in Kenya. Nor was the leadership locked into a program of agrarian reform based on private land ownership. The leadership also did not have the same pressures from below for such a program since the overpopulation of the land and the number of landless unemployed were significantly less than in Kenya. Consequently, the TANU government had a greater flexibility to attempt a socialist approach as an alternative path to development.

Yet the same combination of factors created limitations or constraints in carrying out this alternate approach. The Tanzanian state apparatus was smaller, less centralized and less powerful than Kenya's. It proved an inadequate agent for mobilizing the people and resources for economic development and a transformation of the society. This situation led the leadership to place greater emphasis upon the party, TANU, as a vehicle for mobilization. Yet the party was also constrained by the same combination of factors; it remained a loosely organized, decentralized and ineffective instrument for the task of mobilization.

The divergence in ideology, political organization, and approach to development between Kenya and Tanzania had little impact upon their specific policies and objectives in development. Agrarian policies after 1967 indicate a common emphasis upon "pulling" the mass of peasantry into the market economy, expanding agrarian export production, and utilizing an extension and improvement approach. Different methods were used; the land consolidation and smallholder farming based on

individual ownership in Kenya; and the ujamaa village program in Tanzania. Both countries placed a significant emphasis upon large-scale farming: maintaining and developing the settler farms in the Highlands in Kenya under a program of gradual Africanization of their ownership; and the creation of large-scale, state farms in Tanzania.

In spite of the different methods, both states placed priority on establishing and rapidly expanding those agrarian exports most in demand by the capitalist market. This priority led both states to organize production of these primary goods at a cost competitive with world market prices. Thus, the programs in both countries reinforced the system of underdevelopment based upon agrarian export production.

The agrarian programs vividly demonstrate the persistent influence of the colonial formation upon post-independence policies despite the different approach to development.

Differences in the strategy of industrialization and commercial development suggest a similar pattern. Kenya depended upon a policy of external capitalist investment and ownership to promote industrialization. The leadership rejected nationalization in fear of driving away foreign investment, disrupting the existing economy and triggering social unrest which would pose a political threat to the Kenyatta government. Kenya also had a sufficient economic base to attract foreign investment and aid. At the same time, the bourgeois leadership had a vested interest in maintaining this existing economic structure while promoting a policy of Africanization of the management.

In contrast to Kenya, the Tanzanian leadership had little to lose by nationalization. It could not forfeit foreign investment which was not forthcoming anyway. The strategy of industrialization through state enterprise appeared realistically as the only available method of industrialization. It offered some possibility of greater state control over the profits or capital assets of these enterprises. This in turn gave the government greater power to direct investment into areas of its own choosing.

Available evidence indicates that nationalization and state control has only a limited effect on the characteristics of these enterprises. Initially, management remained in the hands of the parent capitalist companies. Training of African management in Tanzania took place under the existing capitalist management and under the direction of the American management consultant firm, Arthur D. Little, Inc. for the National Development Corporation. The enterprise continued to operate according to capitalist profit-making criteria.

The overall consequence to date appears to be the development of a managerial bureaucracy which operates according to western capitalist values and methods. While the strategy restricted the development of private ownership, in Tanzania it does not indicate the establishment of socialist organization.

A similar process is indicated in the Tanzanian programs of agrarian development through state farms and ujamaa villages. The

programs appear to be the most effective strategy to promote economic growth, expand agrarian export production, and gradually modernize agricultural practices. It does not yet indicate the establishment of a socialist form of social organization and economic production. At best, the approach indicates the development of a cooperative form of organization based on individual land tenure and production similar to western capitalist cooperatives.

The pattern of development in Tanzania suggests that the structure, institutions, and values formed during the colonial period remain the primary factors shaping the method and approach adopted after the Arusha Declaration. It is important to stress that this persisting influence affects not only the method selected to implement development, but also the substantive policies advanced by the African leadership.

The post-Arusha development planning, policies, and programs in Tanzania indicate a socialist "strategy" of development that functionally shares many of the objectives in the capitalist model of development in Kenya. It does not indicate any greater success than before in the effort to mobilize the people and resources towards the generation of a socialist transformation in Tanzania.

Yet there are a number of elements in Tanzania's approach that hold out more hopeful prospects for change in Tanzania than in Kenya. First, the leadership is creating a more integrated and diversified economy. Second, the strategy for development is lessening the disparity

among regions. It is also spreading the economic and social benefits more evenly throughout the population. Third, the policies are establishing some barriers against the entrenchment of private ownership of land and business enterprise. Fourth, a socialist ideology and political consciousness is actively being promoted and legitimized among the population.

Tension and conflict will grow between these elements and the continuing system of underdevelopment, capitalist practice, and class division. This conflict may ultimately lead to a greater transformation in Tanzania than can be expected in Kenya.

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