

A STUDY OF CONCEPTS OF THE
NATION IN POSTWAR JAPAN

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by
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ABSTRACT

This is a case study of the foundations of nationalism, a major force in contemporary world politics, with special emphasis on the attitudinal aspects of the nation. It analyzes the nature of various concepts of the nation, investigates socio-economic conditions that formed and sustained such concepts, and examines some of the characteristic factors in postwar Japanese nationhood.

Japan's defeat in the Second World War marked the collapse of ethnocentric ultra-nationalism. The theory of "peaceful" and "democratic" patriotism during the Occupation was manifested in the popular support for the total negation of the hitherto deified prewar nationalism. As Japan resumed her independence, however, the idealistic nationhood formed under the Occupation faced the hard realities of the domestic and the international political situation and gradually lost its initial appeal. Instead, efforts by the government and the conservatives, especially through school education, became the primary issue of the late 1950's. The conservative majority, as distinguished from the rightist and traditionalist group of conservatives, does not necessarily advocate prewar-type nationalism, but neither has it been successful in presenting a new national vision. High economic growth under the Ikeda Government has contributed greatly to the restoration of confidence among the Japanese people and has produced a kind of economic nationalism which is still the basis of Japanese nationalism. The present Sato policy of stressing the need for a willingness on the part of the people to support national defense is the first indication since the war that the government advocates national self-defense as the key to nationalism. This, paradoxically, has widened the gap between the "conservatives" and the "progressives" concerning a desirable Japanese nationhood.

Based on this historical analysis of varying concepts, this thesis examines conflicting views of national security, the question of nationalism in education, and the imperial institution, in order to shed light on the nature of postwar nationalism.

The Socialist Party's policy of unarmed neutralism is diametrically opposed to the prevailing Liberal-Democratic Party's policy of maintaining self-defense forces and the security treaty with the United States. The Communist Party advocates neutralism as a tactical step toward Communization of Japan. Unarmed neutralism is also supported by a considerable segment of the population from an anti-war or pacifist viewpoint. Thus, it is important to distinguish motives and philosophies in the same policy by the Marxist-leftists and the pacifistic general public. However, the security policy that enjoys the greatest popular support is presented by the Komei-tō. This Party urges limited armament and gradual dissolution of the present security treaty. High support for this pragmatic and middle-of-the-road policy indicates the people's tendency to avoid any drastic change in the present situation.

Education has been a prime instrument of the government for enhancing nationalism. By means of centralization of the education system and the tight control over textbooks, school education has begun to call the attention of the younger generation to the question of the nation. However, textbook descriptions of the nation and nationalism are moderate, rational, and balanced, thus weakening the leftist criticism that the government is attempting to restore militaristic prewar nationalism.

The imperial institution, which played the decisive role in prewar nationalism, has experienced a drastic change by the qualitative transformation of the family system from Confucian paternalism to the so-called "my-homism," as well as the changes in its Constitutional status. The present "symbolic" imperial institution has enjoyed overwhelming support of the people and has remained, and will remain, an important element in Japanese concepts of the nation.

The Meiji Centenary provided an occasion for re-examining concepts in a historical perspective. A conflict was inevitable between the traditional-conservatives and the Marxist-leftists concerning the evaluation of Japan's modernization.

Despite the splitting and conflicting concepts advocated by both political and literary leaders, there exists an agreement among the general public with respect to some of the controversial issues including the maintenance of both the present scale of self-defense forces and the symbolic imperial institution. The characteristics of the concepts supported by the general public is, above all, pragmatic and nonideological, and is domestic and beneficiary-oriented. People are interested primarily in domestic affairs and economic well-being. This popular agreement, backed up by the often neglected but important ethnic homogeneity of the Japanese, tends to mitigate the split in national concepts of the leadership.

If the present dominant priority on private affairs, as expressed in "my-homism," can be guided to and balanced with individualistic citizenship and positive responsibility, the trends in the popular nationhood such as limited armament and social welfare will lay the foundations for a desirable future Japanese nation and nationalism.

Because the theme concerns a very contemporary and up-to-date question, this thesis employs a method of content analysis of the primary source materials which are the press, magazine articles, public opinion surveys, and personal interviews by the writer.

In contrast to the abundant studies on the Meiji Restoration and prewar ultranationalism, there hardly exists a comprehensive academic study of postwar Japanese nationhood and nationalism. This is an attempt to contribute to filling this gap.

PREFACE

The Japanese people listened to the Emperor's broadcast at twelve o'clock noon on August 15, 1945, in which the Emperor declared his decision to surrender to the Allied Powers and, in addition, his conviction that Japan could succeed in maintaining kokutai, or the fundamental national polity of Japan. According to the Outline of Japanese History, prepared by the Ministry of Education in 1943, kokutai meant something as follows:

The Great Empire of Japan is ruled by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages, in accordance with the divine will of Amaterasu-Ohmikami. This is our national polity unchanged for ages. Millions of people in one mind as a large family-state observe the holy decree, and express the virtue of loyalty and filial piety based on this great polity. This is the essence of kokutai.¹

The Meiji Constitution stipulated: "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable."

In a New Year's Message to the People in 1946, however, the Emperor denied his divinity and proclaimed:

We stand by the people and we wish always to share with them in their moments of joys and sorrows. The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon

1. Ministry of Education, ed., Kokushi Geisetsu (Outline of Japanese History), vol. 1, 1943, p. 1.

mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on false concepts that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.

The new Japanese Constitution that was promulgated in May 1947 makes the following stipulation concerning the status of the Emperor:

The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power (Article 1)... The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of State as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government (Article 4).

A simple comparison between the Meiji Constitution and the new Constitution, and between the theory of kokutai and the so-called human declaration of the Emperor, is sufficient to indicate that "the maintenance of kokutai" as expressed in the Emperor's broadcast accepting the Potsdam Declaration was a mere illusion. To be more specific, there was no room for doubt that Japan's defeat in war brought an end to the continuation of absolute monarchy. It was claimed, however, by many wartime and prewar leaders that Japan still maintained the same national polity, despite fundamental changes in the Emperor's status. For example, Premier Higashikuni was reported to have said in a press conference on August 30, 1945:

The maintenance of kokutai is our firm belief that transcends reason and emotion. It is a kind of belief that runs in our blood from our ancestors. I believe this faith is not to be eroded by the surrounding situation, or by wind and rain. At the present time, it is the maintenance of kokutai to observe the Emperor's decree that was given the other day. In addition to this, we must faithfully follow orders from foreign countries, for this is the only way to restore and increase our national

confidence and pride... The Japanese people have devoted all their energy to the pursuit of war. If we can divert our mind [from the war] and devote all our might and wisdom to the development of man and his culture, I am convinced that our country's future will be bright like the gentle light after a storm. [Emphasis added.]²

In this statement, we can find the deep attachment of the ruling class to kokutai, and its illusion that the principle could be secured by a blind following of the Occupation orders. There is a deeper psycho-political attitude of a hierarchy which can be preserved if a new intrusive authority can be temporarily accepted.

The defeat and subsequent occupation caused various reactions from the people. For the Communists, defeat was an indispensable opportunity to bring down the Emperor system and to establish a People's Republic based on the "People's Will."³ For some of the young officers of the army, defeat was clearly unacceptable, leaving them recourse only to coup d'etat or to suicide.⁴ For the majority of the people, however, defeat meant an end to the war: it meant emancipation from air-raids and other horrors of war. In the midst of ruins, the masses of the people accepted this day with both anxiety and relief, with both excitement and despondency.⁵

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2. The Mainichi Shimbun, August 30, 1945, as quoted in Hidaka Rokuro, ed., Sengo Shiso no Shuppatsu (Departure of Postwar Thought) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1968), pp.53-58.
 3. Tokuda Kyūichi, Shiga Yoshio and others, "Jimmin ni Utaeru" (Appeal to the People), Akahata (Red Flag), October 1945.
 4. Cf. William Craig, Fall of Japan (New York: The Dial Press, 1967), Chapter 13.
 5. Rōyama Masamichi, Yomigaeru Nippon (Resurgent Japan), (Nippon no Rekishi, vol.26, Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1967), p.27.

War and defeat brought about both economic dislocation and mental dislocation. The supreme power of the State was under the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) while the Japanese Government governed the people in compliance with Occupation directives and, therefore, was nothing but an agent of the victorious powers. The Japanese people were forced to realize that Japan as a sovereign nation had disappeared, to say nothing of the "maintenance of kokutai." Militarism and statism, so highly regarded and praised one day were condemned the next as being responsible for the reckless war. In a word, the value system that prevailed until the defeat began to fall steadily and rapidly. General Douglas MacArthur as SCAP described the mental status of the Japanese people right after the defeat with considerable accuracy:

A spiritual revolution ensued which almost overnight tore asunder a theory and practice of life built upon 2,000 years of history and tradition and legend. Idolatry for their feudalistic masters and their warrior class was transformed into hatred and contempt, and the hatred and contempt for their foe gave way to honor and respect. This revolution of the spirit among the Japanese people represents no thin veneer designed to serve the purpose of the present. It represents an unparalleled convulsion in the social history of the world.⁶

The Emperor's "maintenance of kokutai" and MacArthur's "spiritual revolution" provided strange contrast. How has postwar Japanese history responded to this? I have written that the national polity underwent a complete change. Has MacArthur been proven correct, then, in pointing out that the spiritual revolution erased 2,000 years of history and tradition?

6. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1964), p. 310.

This paper purposes to study Japanese concepts of the nation in the postwar period by examining the awareness and attitudes of the Japanese people toward the nation and by analyzing institutions and policies of the government. The overall question has three aspects: first, an examination of concepts of the nation presently held by the Japanese people; second, the question of cause, or "why" the Japanese people have such concepts; and third, the question of institution and policy, or "how" such concepts have become prevalent among the Japanese.

Any nation consists of objective factors such as common language, government, and territory, and subjective factors such as a sense of sharing a common past and future and national consciousness. As many scholars have pointed out, subjective factors play an important role in cementing objective factors to a solid unit of community. A study of the concepts of a nation is primarily a study of the subjective side of a nation, as is seen in the fact that patriotism and nationalism, which are manifestations of national ideas, are aspects of social consciousnesses and are best understood in terms of psychology. This is particularly true in an examination of what the concepts of a nation are. For the question of "why" and "how," the reciprocal relationship between the more objective environment and consciousness has to be studied thoroughly. Basic environmental change, such as the one Japan experienced by the defeat, has a penetrating impact on human minds. Economic and political elements are bases of an environment, and education and propaganda in a broad sense usually reflect those elements. This paper, therefore, discusses communication channels or institutional settings that combine basic environmental factors and human consciousness.

When we define nationalism as a common state of mind, we must also ask when and how it became common at all? Karl W. Deutsch's Nationalism and Social Communication (1953) is a pioneering work and an attempt to find an answer to this question. He and other interested scholars have contributed to filling the gap between the traditional study of the subjective side of nationalism and the more objective factors that have formed a nation.

This study confines its scope, however, to ideas and attitudes toward the nation and does not cover the process of national integration, or nation-building. The primary justification for this approach is that the period to be examined here is a post-nation-building era. In other words, the Japanese nation as a solidly unified socio-economic and political unit is in existence beyond doubt throughout the period of study. Only the transitional period from Tokugawa to Meiji periods will provide rich resources for a study of a modern nation-building or modernization process, but not a nation in a broader sense that can include Tokugawa Japan; it is only a contradiction.

Discussion first will focus on the meaning and role of nationalism in contemporary international politics. And the process of Japanese nationalism from the end of the Tokugawa period to the ultra-nationalist era of the 1930's and 1940's will be examined as a prelude to a study of postwar Japan.

In Part I, arguments and controversies concerning the nation in postwar Japan will be analyzed by dividing the past two and a half decades into four periods: "Peaceful" and "Democratic" Patriotism (1945-1951), Priming for Nationalism by the Conservatives (1952-1960), Economic Nationalism (1960-1964), and Concern over National Security (1964-1968).

Part II examines and analyzes several important issues which are characteristic to concepts of the nation in present Japan.

The sixth chapter will examine the confrontation of views on national security and defense in present Japan.

Seventhly, the paper will deal with the question of nationalism in education, which was and is a major institution in forming national consciousness.

Eighthly, a unique question of the Emperor system will be analyzed with special reference to the changing family system.

Finally, the paper examines differing evaluations and arguments over the Meiji centenary and attempts to establish a base by which the often-sought national consensus could possibly be reached.

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CHAPTER 1

PATTERNS OF NATIONALISM IN THE MAKING

A. Nationalism in Contemporary International Politics

1. Problems of Definitions of the Nation and Nationalism

The Nation is a group of people bound together by a common sense of solidarity and primarily denotes those persons who compose a political community. On the other hand, the State is the ultimate possessor of physical force in the name of sovereign power.¹ The following, Max Weber's famous definition of the State, confirms this point.

A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.²

The term Nation is often used in the meaning of the State as described above — for example, "The League of Nations" and "The United Nations," international organizations based on the sovereign nation-state. In this paper, however, the word State is to be used to designate the Nation as a political association. A distinction has to be made also between the State and the Government that is an agency of the State. The Government consists of a group of people who exercise the sovereign power in the name of the State. So far as the Government exercises this power, for all

1. Cf. A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. xvii.

2. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills eds., From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 78.

intents and purposes, loyalty to the Nation is loyalty to the State, and loyalty to the State means nothing other than loyalty to the Government in power. When these three loyalties are consciously distinguished or perceived as mutually contradictory, the legitimacy of the Government in power is questioned and, in the final analysis, revolution is a probable outcome. Max Weber discussed three types of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and legal dominations. These are forms of legitimization. Their effectiveness is determined by the degree to which the State (and, therefore, the Government) successfully represents the interests of the majority of the people. When Voltaire wrote about patriotism, he was indeed pointing out this problem. He noted that:

Only he who has a share in the national soil or other property under secure protection of the law, and a share in political rights, forms a member of the community and only he has a fatherland.³

A Japanese Confucian scholar, Nishimura Shigeki, expressed the same view in his book Son-nō Aikoku Ron (The Theory of Imperial Reverence and Patriotism), published in 1891. He wrote:

The idea of patriotism that is currently used in our country is not of Chinese origin, but a translation of a Western word, petorotismu. . . . Reading Japanese and Chinese classics, I have found no equivalent word to patriotism in the Western sense and no one who practiced patriotism.⁴

3. Quoted in Friedrich Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics: A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 317.

4. Ishida Takeshi, "Ideologie to shiteno Tenno-sei," (The Imperial System as an Ideology), *Shiso*, June 1952, p. 538.

The absence of patriotism in the Western sense in the late nineteenth century Japan indicates indirectly the tradition of the feudal Tokugawa and the absolute political system of the early Meiji Japan where common people did not share true economic and political rights. In this connection, it should be remembered that communism successfully theorized the problem of the Government-for-whom to one end. The Communist Manifesto declared that modern State power was nothing but a committee to administer the common affairs of the bourgeois class. Lenin maintained in his book, The State and Revolution, that the State was a tool of oppression for the ruling class, and would therefore wither away after the successful communist revolution.

It is appropriate now to examine some of the definitions of the Nation that help to clarify the complicated phenomenon of a human group. Benjamin Akzin makes a distinction between the State and the Nation by means of a "political-vs.-ethnic standard," claiming that the State is a political phenomenon whereas the Nation is an ethnic phenomenon. Nationalism is, according to him, "attachment to the nation," and patriotism is "attachment to the state." In a mono-ethnic state, like Japan, the two attachments tend to merge, and can be expressed in the following formula:

...while in the mono-ethnic State the intensity of cohesion is represented by the sum total of patriotism and nationalism, or $C = P + N$, in the poly-ethnic State the intensity of cohesion for all but the dominant ethnic group represents the difference between the two, or $C = P - N$.⁵

5. Benjamin Akzin, State and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p.81.

The origin of the Japanese people has not yet been decisively determined, but in a broad socio-anthropological sense the Japanese can be regarded as a homogeneous ethnic people. Thus, the above formula suggests that the intensity of cohesion among the Japanese is very high. However, Japanese nationalism has undergone various phases with different degrees of cohesion in the past century, during which time the Japanese people have remained unchanged as an ethnic group. The reasons for different manifestations and different degrees of nationalistic intensity, therefore, have to be sought elsewhere. Akzin's formula is a helpful tool in understanding the general characteristics of nationalism as well as the relation between State and Nation, but it cannot explain why nationalism -- an ethnic response -- can capture the people's loyalty and devotion at a certain moment and not at another moment in a mono-ethnic setting.

Leonard W. Doob makes a distinction between nationalism and patriotism by judging whether the particular phenomenon can result in an action or a movement. According to him:

Patriotism: The more or less conscious conviction of a person that his own welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his society.

Nationalism: The set of more or less uniform demands (1) which people in a society share, (2) which arise from their patriotism, (3) for which justifications exist and can be readily expressed, (4) which incline them to make personal sacrifices in behalf of their government's aims, and (5) which may or may not lead to appropriate action.⁶

6. Leonard W. Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations (New Haven: and London: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 6.

Are these distinctions commonly accepted? Let us examine some of the major definitions of nationalism and find out what really are the essential qualities of the Nation and nationalism. Nationalism is:

A consciousness, on the part of individuals or groups, of membership in a nation, or of a desire to forward the strength, liberty, or prosperity of a nation, whether one's own or another.⁷

A state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be to the nation-state.⁸

Nationalism centers the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or desired.⁹

Sentiment unifying a group of people who have a real or imagined common historical experience or a common aspiration to live together as a separate group in the future.¹⁰

As far as these definitions can demonstrate, the distinctions made by Akzin and Doob are not commonly accepted. Nationalism is, above all, a question of human psychology, as is seen in the use of words such as "consciousness," "state of mind," and "condition of mind." Secondly, nationalism is a manifestation of an individual's identification of self and interest with a nation-state, either existing or desired. Thirdly,

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7. The Royal Institute, op. cit., p. xviii.
 8. Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Revised edition, Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1965), p. 9.
 9. Hans Kohn, "Nationalism," International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.
 10. Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955), p. 10.

this psychological element can only become politically meaningful by bringing about or developing into an action or movement.

It is appropriate to mention here the Japanese terms that correspond to the English words Nation, State, Patriotism, and Nationalism. When the sovereign power is the question, kokka (State) is usually used. Kokka is a compound noun made of oku (country) and ka (family). Kokka-shugi (Statism) is a derivative of kokka. Kuni roughly corresponds to the Nation, but it also means one's home town or prefecture. It is common to ask "Where is your kuni?" to a friend, referring to his home town. On the other hand, it can mean the State, such as in a slogan, "For the sake of kuni!" Nationalism is translated into Japanese in three ways: minzoku-shugi, kokka-shugi, and kokumin-shugi. Minzoku-shugi is usually adopted when the major emphasis is given to an ethnic phenomenon of the Nation, whereas kokka-shugi denotes the Nation as a political association. This distinction, however, is not very strict and the two are often used interchangeably. The last word, kokumin-shugi, places more emphasis on the rights of the people as opposed to kokka-shugi. Thus, "ultra-nationalism" is usually translated chō (super) kokka-shugi since it was a government-directed nationalism rather than a popular nationalism. Nationalism is often used directly in Japanese and is written nashonarismusu. Patriotism is aikoku or aikoku-shugi and signifies the more or less sentimental aspects or feelings of unorganized individuals toward the Nation.

2. Nationalism in International Politics

Emergence of the multi-faceted nation had to wait for the French Revolution that stimulated reorganization of old political entities. Nationalism, in this early stage, played an important role by consolidating common ethnic groups in the hope of establishing their own nations.

Since then, it has manifested different characteristics, functions and forms. For example, Carlton Hayes, writing in 1931, distinguished five kinds of nationalism: Humanitarian, Jacobin, Traditional, Liberal and Integral. In his celebrated work Nationalism and After, E. H. Carr wrote at the close of the Second World War that the climax of nationalism occurred during the interwar years. Concerning nationalism in Asia, where the cry for liberation from colonialism was a gathering force, he merely stated: "...the demand for self-determination bay still be heard, though perhaps more faintly and less confidently than of late."¹² Nationalism is Asia and in Africa has been, however, the greatest force in bringing about national independence. This caused membership in the United Nations to rise from 51 in 1945 to 125 in 1968. Nationalism is still the most powerful political ideology and movement in contemporary international politics. It is necessary, therefore, to examine how nationalism came to be what it is today.

As is often pointed out, the French Revolution and ensuing Napoleonic Wars marked an end to one era and the beginning of another in European politics. Hayes wrote:

The French Revolution promulgated to Europe and then to the world the dogma of national democracy. It asserted the right of individuals not only to determine their form of government but also to choose the state to which they belong. In other words, it enunciated both the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the doctrine of national self-determination.¹³

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12. E. H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1945), pp. 36-37.
 13. Carlton Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 44.

The Industrial Revolution brought about birth of the national economy and, by means of education and propaganda (made increasingly effective by the development of technology), brought about a mass national movement. German Romanticism injected a mystique into nationalism and by the middle of the nineteenth century nationalism declined as an emancipative movement, became increasingly irrational, and finally plunged the world into its first global conflict.¹⁴ Hayes had good reason to be pessimistic about nationalism when he wrote that "Nationalism is woven and inextricably interwoven with militarism."¹⁵ He noted also, in his other work, that:

Nationalism in one form or another has almost certainly conferred innumerable blessings on many people. International peace, however, is not one of the blessings which nationalism has conferred upon the world.¹⁶

When the world experienced the first total war in which nationalism demanded and, at the same time, eased people's sacrifices, it could not have been viewed otherwise than from a viewpoint of world peace.

In the same manner, the domestic role of nationalism as a challenger to the ancien regime had also changed. With the development of the Industrial Revolution, nationalism began to be associated with those who wished to maintain the status quo. By the latter half of the nineteenth century:

14. Hayes, op. cit., p. 52.

15. Ibid., p. 189.

16. Hayes, Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, p. 304.

It [nationalism] stood in sharp and repressive opposition to socialism, an international movement that included the industrial workers and landless peasants, who generally felt excluded from the national society, and expressed their oppositions.¹⁷

In this connection, we are reminded again of the Communist view of the state as a tool of oppression for the ruling class. Friedrich Engels developed his theory of the state in Anti-Dühring and completed the original model in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. This was later adopted by Lenin in The State and Revolution. Engels claimed that the state came into being in the interest of the ruling economic class in order to check the class struggle against it. By controlling the state mechanism, the dominant economic class could also be the ruling political class, and exploit the oppressed class. Engels made the famous prediction that with the proletarian revolution and the abolition of classes:

The state inevitably falls with the classes. The society organizes production anew on the basis of free and equal associations of the producers and will put the whole state machinery where it will then belong — into the museum of antiquities, next to the spring wheels and the bronze ax.¹⁸

This Marxian view of the state has a unique significance with respect to contemporary Japanese politics, for, as will be discussed later, it enjoys a very strong and tenacious influence in the political thought of Japan. Therefore, it is important fully to understand these concepts.

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17. Hans Kohn, "Nationalism," International Encyclopedia.
 18. Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York: International Publishers), p. 158.

The changing nature of nationalism indicates that nationalism varies with factors such as political thought, tradition, history and the particular international situations of the moment. It is both irrelevant as well as impossible to determine a priori whether nationalism is a vice or a virtue.¹⁹

The Second World War unquestionably brought about several developments in international politics. First, the emergence of nuclear weapons; second, the emergence of newly developing countries and the accompanying "north-south" problem arising from different levels of economic development; and third, the process of multi-polarization from bi-polarized world politics. The emergence of nuclear weapons as ultimate weapons had made the United States and the Soviet Union "Super Powers" for only they have succeeded so far in exploiting nuclear weapons with effective delivery systems. However, the other two aspects -- newly independent nations and multi-polarization of world politics -- confirm the growing intensity of nationalism in world politics today. After the First World War application of President Wilson's principle of national self-determination was largely confined to Eastern Europe; after the Second World War it was extended to include the whole world for the first time. Carr saw the climax of nationalism in the interwar years, and he was perhaps right as far as Europe was concerned, but certainly the climax of Afro-Asian nationalism did not come until after the conclusion of that war. The nationalism of Asia, Africa, of the ex-colonies in particular, is distinguishable from its European predecessor. What MacMahon Ball

19. Cf. Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1962), p. 12.

wrote about the nature of Asian revolution is largely true of Afro-Asian nationalism. He named three characteristics:

(1) a revolt against foreign political control, against colonialism, against imperialism, and claim for self determination; (2) resentment against economic inequalities; and (3) a revolt of the East against the West.²⁰

These points explain external relationships between the colonized and the colonizers, but at the same time, nationalism in Asia meant emancipation from or liberalization of pre-modern domestic political institutions. Several innovative movements and efforts at the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty in China are cases in point. The fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty can be explained to a large extent by the fact that the old system finally crumbled under the pressure of encroaching European power. Awakening Chinese nationalism called, first of all, for overall change in the old fashioned political system.

Anti-colonialism seems to provide a common goal and a common policy for the developing countries in Asia and Africa, thus uniting them on the North-vs.-South question against more developed nations. When countries undergo the process of fundamental and radical change, as these countries are now, nationalism plays an important role of asserting the continuity of the nations by re-evaluating their history, culture and tradition.²¹

We have seen that nationalism, both as an idea and as a movement, originated in European political culture in the late eighteenth

20. MacMahon Ball, Nationalism and Communism in the Southeast Asia (2nd and revised ed., Melbourne University Press, 1953), p. 1.

21. Cf. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 340.

century. It is often pointed out that many Afro-Asians became nationalists through contact with this Western political philosophy of national self-determination. Some of those educated in Europe became champions of nationalism against the West. We have also seen that nationalism meant emancipation from the ancien regime during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, and the same is true in Asia, particularly when it was a challenger to the traditional despotic governments. It must be remembered, however, that in many newly developing nations in Asia and Africa intense nationalism has not adopted the Western parliamentarism, but has given supreme power to the one-party dictatorship with the military playing a major role in government. This fact demonstrates that the struggle for national self-determination, however democratic it may seem in international politics, does not in itself guarantee democracy in domestic politics.²² As we have discussed, the same can be said of the relationship between nationalism and democracy in Europe. Rousseau's idea of nationalism that had such a great impact on the course of the French Revolution and ideals at the beginning of the Revolution certainly stood for liberty and equality of individuals against the ancien regime. Nonetheless, the nationalism that sought for freedom, equality and dignity of the individual deteriorated in a short time to an expression of the exclusive egoism of groups.²³ Hayes' "Jacobin Nationalism" and "Integral Nationalism" are good examples of this process. The relationship between nationalism and the political systems is not fixed, but changes depending upon the configuration of other variables. In this respect attention should be duly paid to the

22. Cf. John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations: World Politics of Our Time (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 72.

23. Cf. Hayes, Historical Evolution, especially the chapter on Humanitarian Nationalism. Also see, Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, pp. 22-27.

political cultures of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa for, as we have seen, many of them have adopted authoritarian political systems despite principled cries for democratic governments. Here again, political culture alone is not responsible for the form of government. The external environment and the dynamics of a nation's domestic politics have to be examined closely along with political culture.

Generally speaking, the function of nationalism differs during the movement towards independence during the actual period of independence, and in the post-independence era. David Apter, after discussing two strong ideologies -- nationalism and socialism -- in newly independent developing countries in the process of modernization, argues that nationalism reaches its peak in the period of dependence to independence and that it is gradually caught up by socialism which, in turn, completely replaces nationalism in the post-independence period. After a certain period of time, nationalism begins to rise again as an antithesis of socialism.²⁴ In the stage of struggle for independence, nationalism will absorb the most primordial passions of the colonial people and often will become an objective in itself. With independence, the former common enemy is ousted, which has the effect of changing the nationalist movement from revolutionary to evolutionary in nature. The immediate task of the newly independent people will become the establishment, maintenance and development of their own political and social systems for which they fought. Above all, economic development is usually the primary objective, and socialism can make a strong appeal as a means of its realization. The ideology of socialism, expressed sometimes as "national socialism," is

24. Apter, op. cit., pp. 337-339.

not necessarily a universal theory when applied to concrete situations. On the contrary, it is a "nationalized ideology" and is not contradictory to nationalism, but rather compensatory. This compatibility of the two ideologies is due to a large extent to the flexible nature of nationalism. The following description by Apter may serve as a good summing up of the nature of nationalism as an ideology:

Nationalism incorporates primordial loyalties in a readily understandable synthesis, taking up the slack in identity and solidarity left by the failure of socialism. Diffuse enough to encompass all specific forms of loyalty and tradition, it elevates them to a national inheritance. 25
The value of nationalism lies in its functional flexibility.

B. A Case in Japan

From Nationalism in Embryo to "Ultra-Nationalism"

1. The End of the Tokugawa Period

In the middle of the nineteenth century, shortly before nationalism came to be attacked by Marxists as an ideology of the ruling class, China experienced her first and shocking blow by losing the Opium War against the British in 1839-42. The Chinese defeat was a blow not only for the Chinese, but for the Japanese as well; they knew they were a small nation and regarded China as their teacher of civilization. Thus, Japanese nationalism made its first cry in the face of advancing Western powers whose strength had been demonstrated in the defeat of China. Although it is true that Japan, as a nation, had been a unified political entity for more than ten centuries by the time the Western powers tried to break the isolationist policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate, it is difficult

25. Ibid., p. 381.

to compare Japan under the Tokugawa government with Western powers which had become modern nation-states. As Maruyama Masao claims, in late Tokugawa "Japanese thought only of divine country and national pride since ancient times. This did not develop into any popular consciousness of political solidarity, or idea of national unification."²⁶ He continues:

The Tokugawa feudal society was clearly split into two parts. On the one hand, the warrior class shouldered all political responsibilities to the common people; for they regarded themselves as primarily political constituents. On the other hand, the common people, who comprised more than 90 % of the population, were passively brought into a given political order primarily as objects of political control. How can one talk about the existence of the unified "nation," when the rulers and the ruled are socially fixed?²⁷

In addition to the fixed division of the ruler and the ruled, the identity of the Japanese (and we can refer here only to the politically conscious samurai class) did not transcend the clans they belonged to. Samurai loyalty meant loyalty to their feudal lords, who in turn provided them with land and rice. The situation at the end of the Tokugawa period did not satisfy conditions for a modern nation-state. For the Tokugawa leaders, Chinese defeat in the Opium War brought with it a realization of Western military strength, and thus of danger. Battle between the Satsuma Clan and the British fleet in 1863, and a war that broke out between the

26. Maruyama Masao, Nihon Seiji Shiso shi Kenkyu (Study of History of of Japanese Political Thoughts) (Tokyo: Tōdai Shuppan-kai, 1952) p. 325.

27. Ibid., p. 327.

Chōshū Clan and the four Western Powers at Shimonoseki in 1864 kept alive the impression of the overwhelming military power of the West. Sakuma Shōzan, for example, did not hesitate to criticize the Tokugawa Shogunate for its maritime defense policy on the ground that the question involved more than the interest of the Tokugawa family. He writes in his famous Kaibō Hassaku (Eight-Point Program of Maritime Defense):

It is truly gracious that a humble man like me should make comments on the Shogunate's policies. However, the question of foreign invasions is different from that of civil wars and can possibly threaten the peace and safety of the ever-lasting line of Emperors, unparalleled in the world. Thus, it concerns not only the prosperity of the Tokugawa family, but also the joys and sorrows of the entire divine country. I humbly submit, therefore, that it is a duty for all of us who were born in this divine country, irrespective of rank, to worry and think about this question.²⁸

As early as 1791, and in a different political setting than Sakuma Shōzan's Eight-Point Program, Hayashi Shihei published Kaikoku Heidan (War Story of the Maritime Country). The time was premature for the Tokugawa government to take his advice seriously. It hoped, perhaps, that by banning the book the danger might be avoided. The sense of urgency and concern over security problems felt by political leaders and intellectuals after the Opium War was different in quality from that in the time of Hayashi's publication.

Naramoto Tatsuya sums up the impact of the Chinese defeat in the Opium War upon the Japanese intellectuals in the following words:

28. Cf. Ueyama Shumpei, ed., Nihon no Nashonarismu (Japanese Nationalism) (Tokyo: Shisei-do, 1965), p. 110.

The defeat of Ch'ing was certainly a great blow to the Japanese intellectuals who had been adopting Chinese study and culture as supreme human products. Patriotic activities of Sakuma Shōzan did originate in a reaction to this state of affairs.²⁹

The government of the Shogunate established a "defensive" coast guard in 1845, veiling the order to attack foreign vessels so as not to offend the Western powers. However, in face of the overwhelming Western military power, nationalism of the Japanese ruling class found its expression in the slogan of "Expel the Barbarians" or iyōi. The reason why we need the qualification, "of the ruling class," is that nationalism was still a monopoly of the samurai class; commoners were virtually prohibited from participating in the political question of nationalism. The theory of iyoi in Aizawa Seishisai's Shinron (New Theory) and that of the Mito School was "contrary to the modern nationalism (kokuminshugi) that tries to defend the country from an external aggression with the mass of the people.... They were fearful of their own people's move."³⁰ These facts do not necessarily mean that there was no effort to arrive at a nationalism in the true sense of the word -- including the ruler and the ruled. Ando Shōeki is a case in point. He was one of the first few sharply to criticize the feudal system, giving expression to Japanese nationalism in its embryonic form. Ando demanded a complete abolition of the feudal system of status as well as the so-called Bakuhan Taisei or Shogunate-clan system.³¹

29. Naramoto Tatsuya, "Shishi-teki Kōdo no Genri" (The Principles of Patriotic Action), Meiji Ishin-ron (The Theory of Meiji Restoration) (Tokyo: Tokuma-shoten, 1968), p. 307.

30. Maruyama, op. cit., p. 352.

31. Cf. Inoue Kiyoshi, "Nihon ni Okeru Minzokushugi no Rekishi to Dentō," (History and Tradition of Nationalism in Japan), Shiso, no. 335, May 1952, p. 2.

He was, however, rather exceptional in his argument for a true nationalism. At that time the national consciousness of intellectuals and samurai was based on a self-righteous and exclusive theory of divine country as opposed to barbarous nations of the West. Their final and immediate goal was to expel the barbarians. As the Shogunal government was not considered effective for this purpose, they wished to be reinforced by the spiritual authority of the Imperial throne. Thus, the slogan was coined, "Expel the Barbarians and Revere the Emperor!" "Revere the Emperor" was later used as a justification for overthrowing the Shogunate, which, in the minds of the intellectuals and samurai, had failed faithfully to execute the will of the Emperor. Such reasoning demonstrated the widely accepted belief that the Imperial throne was superior to the Shogunate as far as political legitimacy and symbolic appeal was concerned. Some of the anti-Tokugawa patriots believed that unification of the country was possible only with the assistance of Imperial authority.³² The theory of Imperial rule was advocated by some Confucian scholars, especially the Mito School as symbolized by Fujita Yūkoku, and the kokugaku, or the study of national classics. For the latter, achievement of the ideal Imperial rule lay in a return to the good old days when Japan had not yet been influenced by the Chinese culture. Such a view was implicitly and potentially anti-Shogunate and became an important factor in Japanese nationalism.³³ Motoori Norinaga, for example, claimed that the Shogunal government should be

32. Sakata Yoshio, "Meiji Zenppanki ni okeru Seifu no Kokkashugi" (Statism of the Government in the First Half of Meiji), Meiji Zenppanki no Nashonarismus (Nationalism in the First Half of Meiji) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1958), p. 11.

33. Cf. D. M. Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 217.

respected as an Imperial deputy, but no more than that. The sole source of legitimacy of government consisted in the Imperial throne, he wrote. Theoretically speaking, therefore, the Shogunate would become an illegitimate ruling junta when the Emperor decided not to entrust his ruling power to it. The historical shift from "Revere the Emperor" to "Down with the Shogunate" was thus prepared for in the minds of patriots, many of whom dared to cut their ties with their feudal clans. Emergence of a political power determined to overthrow the Tokugawa regime had to wait until the mid-1860's, however. Saigo Takamori, for instance, accepted the idea of overthrowing the Shogunate only in 1865, after having played a major role in the Shogunal attack against the Shōshu Clan in the previous year.³⁴

It was indicative of the future course and the attitude of the Meiji government that the main burden of fighting and overthrowing the Shogunate was shouldered by the two clans, Satsuma and Chōshu, which had undergone the bitter experience of losing engagements against the Western powers. These clans, sensitive to and appreciative of superior Western military technology, had overcome narrow anti-foreignism. It was also fortunate for Japan that the Meiji Restoration was carried out chiefly by young low-ranking samurai, for their relative youthfulness made drastic political and social changes easier. As of 1863, the year of the Satsuma-British confrontation, Saigo Takamori was 37; Ohkubo Toshimichi, 34; Kido Kōin, 31; Kusaka Genzui, 24; Takasugi Shinsaku, 25; Ito Hirobumi, 23; Nakaoka Shintaro, 26; and Sanjō

34. Konishi Shiro, Kaikoku to Jyōi (Opening of the Country and Expulsion of Barbarians) (Nihon no Rekishi vol. 19, Tokyo: Chuo Koren-sha, 1966), pp. 346-347.

Sanemi only 27.³⁵ The rōnin, or lordless samurai, such as Sakamoto Ryōma and Nakaoka Shintarō, added a new national flavor unrestricted by clan interest.³⁶ The national consciousness of a group of intellectual samurai was destined in the end to oppose a feudal system that divided the Japanese nation into some 260 clans -- a division hindering the idea of a strong, unified Japan. On the other hand, the national consciousness in this transitional period was never deeply formed nor systematically theorized. This was due to the fact that the Tokugawa Shogunate came to an end with unexpectedly little resistance, and the new leaders were fundamentally influenced and directed by the sense of common external threat and situation rather than by their own voluntary conviction about the ideal Japanese nation. However, even with these qualitifacions, it can be concluded that Japan, by the end of the Tokugawa period, had all the factors of a nationalism potentially effective enough politically to unify the Japanese nation, although lacking mass participation as Maruyama has pointed out. The nationalistic education of the general mass of the people was left to the Meiji leaders.

Before we turn our attention to the post-Meiji Restoration period, brief metion should be made of a rather prophetic statement about Japan's expansionism. Recognition of an outside threat first took the form of advocating maritime "defense" and then of a strong unified government supported by a strong army. External expansionism, one of the natural outcomes of the policy of Fukoku Kyōhei (Rich Nation and Strong Army),

35. Ibid., pp. 229-230.

36. Cf. Mauris B. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), especially Chapter 8, "The Restoration."

had already been urged by a strategist and agricultural economist, Sato Nobuhiro, in his book, Udai Kondō Tairon (Outline of Foreign and Domestic Policies), published in 1823. He argued that Japan should first take Manchuria, an easy target geographically, and then China and Korea, weakened by the loss of Manchuria, and then, finally, Tibet and Thailand. In his words:

Upon conquering Manchuria and China, all that is possible must be done to increase production, to rid the pains and hardships of all peoples, to establish shrines to celebrate various great gods of the Imperial ancestors and to build schools and educate the talented in all fields. If we remain diligent, day and night, and expand our ancestors' enterprises for our descendents under our Emperor, all the world will become the Emperor's countries and prefectures, and all chiefs and kings of the world will come under Imperial rule.³⁷

2. From the Meiji Restoration to Defeat in War

In the first two decades of Meiji, the political system of Japan as a new modern nation was largely completed. The central government stabilized its foundation by the abolition of clans and the establishment of prefectures in 1871, and it successfully gained control over the military through the national conscription law of 1872. The school education law of the same year marked the beginning of Japanese national education, which later became a major instrument in fostering intense nationalism among the people. Economic centralization was also on the way with the national tax law of 1873 and the establishment of the first national bank that same year. The Tokugawa feudal system thus gradually but steadily gave way to a modern nation-state under the

37. Sato Nobuhiro, Udai Kondō Tairon (Outline of Foreign and Domestic Policies), Shimada Keikichi, ed., (Tokyo: Daisokan shobo, 1937), p. 65.

absolute monarch, the Emperor. It must be remembered that all these drastic changes were carried out not through the shattering blood of revolution, but on the basis of compromise and, at times, of limited civil war. Existing national identity among some of the leading figures of the day remained largely intact; "The new was built upon the foundations of the old."³⁸

We have discussed the important, and perhaps the only, unifying role of the Imperial throne in the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate. However, to achieve a balanced picture, it is necessary to examine what the Emperor really meant for the leaders of the Meiji Restoration. In short, this amounts to a modification of the Imperial role. The Emperor's sacred and inviolable image, such as we find in the Meiji Constitution, was a product of the mid-Restoration years. Such an image was first sanctioned by the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890. For the shishi, or patriots, who worked for the Restoration, the Emperor was above all a convenient tama, or instrument of legitimization. For the general masses of the people, he was a remote object of folk-worship and an existence of little immediate concern. Fujita Shōzo evaluates the realism of the leaders concerning the Emperor in the following sentences:

Those who took part in the political side of the Meiji Reformation did not do so because of their loyalty to the Emperor. On the contrary, they manipulated the tama as an "instrument of conspiracy" in a most disloyal fashion. We find there a quite distasteful Machiavellianism

38. J. W. Hall, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Japan," in Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rostow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 39.

on the one hand, but also the independence of the State from the traditional value and commonly accepted prestige on the other.³⁹

Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the greatest thinkers of modern Japan, described relations between "the people" and "the Crown" as follows:

Our people did not know for several hundred years that they had the Emperor. The existence of the Imperial throne was handed down only by tradition. Although they claim that the political institution was restored to that of several centuries ago by the act of the Restoration, it does not mean that there now exists a close emotional relationship between the Imperial throne and the people. The relationship is only political at best. When it comes to the question of emotion and attachment, the present people cannot but feel more attached to their former feudal lords, as they were governed by them ever since the Kamakura era. In theory, we have now only one great lord, but this is not always true in practice. Judging from the present trend of affairs, the people may easily lose their attachment to their feudal lords. It is very difficult, or almost impossible, however, to create the deep sense of attachment to the Imperial throne and make the people feel as if they were babies before the Emperor, when we observe the minds of the people and the pattern of civilization.⁴⁰

In this connection, an interesting episode is recorded in the diary of a German doctor, Toku Berlz, about how Japan's first Prime Minister regarded the Emperor. Ito made a frank statement on his view of the Emperor at an official conference where discussion focussed on the

39. Fujita Shōzo, Ishin no Seishin (Spirit of the Restoration) (Tokyo: Misuzu-shobo, 1967), p. 20.

40. Fukuzawa Yukichi, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (Outline of the Theory of Civilization), Fukuzawa Yukichi Senshu vol.2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1951), pp. 237-238.

wedding of crown prince Taisho, later to be Emperor. He is reported to have said: "It is really unfortunate to be born a crown prince, As soon as he is born, he gets all tied up by a chain of etiquette and as he grown he has to dance to a flute played by his close attendants."⁴¹

As time passed, however, efforts to deify the Emperor turned out more fruitful than Fukuzawa anticipated. The process was greatly eased after promulgation of the national ethical code, the Imperial Rescript on Education. Several factors other than national education contributed to the deification of the Emperor. The personality of Emperor Meiji and his self-disciplined manner could certainly be among the major factors, especially when he started to make contact with the people at large by traveling over the country. There were also institutional elements such as establishment of the property of the Imperial Household, creation of the system of nobility, and independence of prerogative of the supreme command of the armed forces as stipulated in the Constitution.⁴² The following letter of Ito Hirobumi to Ito Myoji on September 14, 1881, expresses Ito's anxiety to establish a peerage to bolster the Imperial system.

I believe that this [the creation of a peerage] is an absolutely indispensable instrument for fortifying the position of the Imperial House... We are both worried about the recent tendency of both the government and the people to slip unknowingly into the spirit of republicanism. If we do nothing about it, and it finally reaches an irredeemable situation, no matter how good a plan we have, it will be

41. Toku Berlz, Beruzu no Nikki (Diary of Berlz) (Translated by Suganuma Ryutaro, Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1952), p. 19.

42. Kano Masanao, Meiji no Shiso (Thought of Meiji), (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1964), pp. 110-112.

useless. Therefore, I hope to find a way to save the situation by taking advantage of the fact that as yet the after glow of the feudalistic pro-Emperor sentiment has not completely died down [and create a peerage] even though this is contrary to the spirit of the times and goes against the feelings of the people. I hope you will support me in this.⁴³

Granted that the Meiji political system was absolutist, there existed nonetheless a national orientation for a modern nation-state, which should be clearly distinguished from Tokugawa feudalism.

The popular right movement in the early Meiji period was an effort to form a true "national" identity and consciousness. Had it not been for this movement, "nationalism that can be appropriately called national patriotism would never have been formed, having broken through the hitherto narrow regionalism of the village community."⁴⁴ In 1874 Itagaki Taisuke organized the Aikoku Kōto, a Patriotic Public Party, whose platform read in part that "to secure heavenly gifts by insisting on the people's rights is the way to love the lord and the country." This new concept of patriotism is fundamentally different from that of loyalty to the feudal lord. And despite decline of the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement, this concept of the nation was "an epoch-making event for the Japanese history of national consciousness."⁴⁵

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43. Ito Hirobumiden (The Biography of Ito Hirobumi) Tokyo: Shunbo Ko Tsuisho Kai, II, p. 218, quoted in Ike Nobutaka, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), p. 172.
44. Irokawa Daikichi, Kindai Kokka no Shitsugen (Emergence of a Modern State), (Nihon no Rekishi vol. 21, Tokyo: Chuo Koren-sha, 1966), p. 468.
45. Inoue Kiyoshi, Meiji Ishin (The Meiji Restoration), (Nihon no Rekishi, vol. 20, Chuo Koronsha, 1966), p. 386. Cf. also, Nobutake Ike, "Political Leadership and Political Parties," in Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rostow eds., op. cit., p. 394.

Leaders of the early Meiji, whether they were in power or out of power, were in general agreement as to the desirable goals of Japan's modernization. Recognition of the stronger state power on the part of the advocates of popular rights deprived them of some of their sharpest attacks against the government, but the political philosophy of popular rights was never really silenced until the military takeover in the 1930's. Tokutomi Sohō, in Shōrai no Nippon (The Future Japan), published in 1886, expressed his view on the relation between the state and the people.

We are those who are desirous for the prosperity and peace of the Imperial throne, of our nation's prosperity, and of our government's stability. In sincerely desiring these, we are second to none. The people dwell, however, in a straw-covered hat and if the state fails to give such a people safety, freedom, and happiness, it cannot exist for a single day.⁴⁶

Nippon, the newspaper published by Kuga Katsunan, and Nippon-Jin, by Miyake Setsurei and Shiga Jyuko, were instrumental in the advocacy and expression of popular nationalism; they urged a voluntary and internal awakening of individuals to the need for nationalism and political integration as opposed to a national integration imposed by the central government under the authority of the Emperor. They made a distinction between "the domestic state power and the state's right of independence in foreign relations and tried to insist that the interest of

46. Tokutomi Sohō, Shōrai no Nippon (Future Japan) as quoted in Yoshimura Takaaki ed., Nihon no Nashonarismus (Japanese Nationalism), (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1964), p. 256.

the state was not always in harmony with that of the Japanese people."⁴⁷ Kuga Katsunan made severe attacks on the absolutism or bureaucratic statism and wrote: "It is most distasteful for me to hear the mistaken argument of extreme monarchists that absurdly claims the expansion of the monarchical power and that oppresses any political movement based on the popular will or power."⁴⁸

Before these two confronting arguments for state power and the people's rights saw any real settlement or solution, Japanese nationalism — absorbing the above two theories — experienced one of its peaks during the interwar years of 1894-1905 when Japan won two wars against her powerful neighbors, China and Russia. National sentiment was complex: it was joy and pride over the victories on the one hand, and anger and resentment for what they had expected and could not get due to the Three Power Intervention and the unsatisfactory treaty of Portsmouth. This deep national enthusiasm was proof of the high degree of identification the Japanese people felt for the nation, whatever it might mean for them. Delmer Brown accurately pointed out this situation and the state of popular minds when he wrote:

... the expressions of national consciousness, between 1895 and 1905, not only were indicative of a more definite

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47. Motoyama Yukihiko, "Meiji 20-nen dai no Seiron ni Arawareta Nashonarizumu," Sakaguchi ed., op. cit., p. 43
48. Quoted in Maruyama Masao, "Kuga Katsunan to Kokuminshugi" (Kuga Katsuna and Nationalism) in Meiji Shiryo Renraku Kai, ed., Minken-ron kara Nashonarizumu-e (From Theory of People's Rights to Nationalism) (Meiji Shiryo Kenkyo sosho vol.4, Toyko: Ochanomizu shobo, 1957), p. 199.

identification with the nation but represented the thoughts of a far larger segment of the Japanese nation.⁴⁹

Temporary frustration of the people was more than compensated for by the victories themselves, and by the abolition of extra-territoriality in 1899 and the restoration of tariff autonomy by 1911. Beginning with the Treaty of Kanagawa with the United States in 1854, the Shogonal government concluded the so-called unequal treaties with the Western powers by which Japan ceded the right of tariff autonomy and granted extraterritoriality. After the Meiji Restoration, the treaty revision naturally became the most pressing issue in the foreign relations of new Japan. Chitoshi Yanaga of Yale University described the situation as follows:

Except for some of the problems of internal development, there was no issue of greater importance in Japanese politics than treaty revision during the first twenty-five years of the Meiji period. . . . Successive Cabinets devoted their energies to the removal of stigma of unequal treaties. Many a foreign minister was forced to resign for the failure in treaty negotiations.⁵⁰

The restoration of these sovereign rights, therefore, gave great satisfaction to the proud Japanese people.

49. Delmer Brown, Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 146.

50. Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, (New York, Toronto, & London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), p. 176. Cf. also pp. 191-197.

The value of the State began to dominate other values.

(Together with progress so defined) a note of devotion and service to country dominated the language, and no doubt the thought, of the Meiji period.... Everywhere in Meiji Japan one is struck by the stress on dedication and responsibility to what is described as the national interest.⁵¹

The second version of the national history textbook, published in 1907, proudly declared that "Japan has gradually manifested her national prestige abroad and has now reached a position of equality with the major world powers." The last paragraph of the textbook was devoted to a highly nationalistic "preparedness of the people." Such a nationalistic education was also called for to reinforce the national mores of "loyalty and filial piety," for it had become questionable whether loyalty to the state and filial piety were harmonious at a time when the war casualties brought dissolution and hardship to so many families.⁵²

In addition, the rapid process of domestic industrialization began to reveal its impact on the old order. In William W. Lockwood's words:

New values had begun to erode old loyalties and solidarities, especially in the cities. A new class consciousness bred social interest and called into doubt the old authoritarian concept of order.⁵³

51. Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 67.

52. Cf. Sumiya Mikio, Dainippon Teikoku no Shiren (Challenge to the Great Empire of Japan) (Nihon no Rekishi vol. 22, Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1966), pp. 354-355.

53. William W. Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization," in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rostow, eds., op. cit., p. 133.

It was the concept of the family-state that was emphasized as the official view of the nation in order to overcome contradictions between the state and the family or individuals. The Japanese word for state, kokka, is a compound of state and family. It is not hard, therefore, to see how familial structure and order could be used as a handy model of explanation for the state from time immemorial. Direct source for the ideology of the family-state is, however, to be found in Inoue Tetsujiro's work on the Imperial Rescript on Education. He explained:

The Emperor for the people is like the parents for children. That is to say, the nation is an expansion of the family and the directions and orders of the sovereign to the people are analogous to the benevolent guidance of the parents for their children.⁵⁴

Rapid transformation of the feudal system to a strong unified nation-state made some important compromises inevitable; the ideology of the family-state is a case in point. It was especially useful as a linking concept between the pre-modern community consciousness and modern national consciousness. In the beginning, the Emperor's prestige as head of the family was emphasized, but as socio-economic contradictions deepened, more emphasis was given to the image of the Emperor as a benevolent father. "In order to reach the people from an emotional side, they [Meiji leaders] tried to attract the familial affection of the people to the state by creating the concept of one family -- one state based on the harmony of the theory of social organism and

54. Quoted in Karasawa Tomitaro, Kyōkasho no Rekishi (History of Textbooks) (Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1956), p. 164.

tradition.⁵⁵ By 1911 the concept of the family-state became the core concept of the nation in school education.⁵⁶ Since the concept of the family-state was the crux of prewar Japanese nationhood, it is proper and necessary here to examine the relationship between familialism and Imperial rule. The prototype for the family-state had existed in the traditional community, the mura (village), although on a much smaller scale. This meant that familialism did not have to jump to the state level without an intermediary to pave the way. Kamishima Jiro, for instance, claims in his book, Kindai Nohon no Seishin Kōzo (The Mental Structure of Modern Japan), that "the legitimate source of the Imperial system in modern Japan consisted fundamentally in the order of the natural village. The order was composed of five principles: Shintoism; gerontocracy; familialism; feudalism; and mental autocracy."⁵⁷ Indeed, familialism was an important factor in the natural village order. In the family-state ideology it was, as Ishida Takeshi pointed out, a Confucian one and primarily the prescription of the samurai class rather than of the majority of the commoners. Until Meiji, Japanese familialism consisted of two different principles and ethics: one was the Confucian familialism of the samurai; the other was that of the peasants and fishermen. The civil code of Meiji did not purport to maintain the existing familial orders, but

55. Ishida Takeshi, "Kokkashigi no Shiso to Kōdo," (Thought and Behavior of Statism) in Maruyama Masao, ed., Nihon no Nashonarismu (Japanese Nationalism) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1953), p. 122. See also Ishida Takeshi, Meiji Seiji Shiso shi Kenkyū (Historical Study of the Meiji Thoughts) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1954), Chapter 1 passim.

56. Ishida, Historical Study of the Meiji Thoughts, p. 29.

57. Kamishima Jiro, Kindai Nihon no Seishin Kōzo (Mental Structure of Modern Japan) (Tokyo: Iwasami shoten, 1961), pp. 22-24.

aimed at transforming them into a more authoritarian order. This, the leaders of the time expected, could serve as "a training agency to 'subject' personality under absolutism."⁵⁸ The objective was not quite successful, for where all family members worked for their livelihood, the authority of the family head had to decrease proportionally. What dominated among the masses, as far as familialism was concerned, was the atmosphere of cooperation rather than authority.⁵⁹ The familialism of the people was familialism in "the order of the natural village" as Kamishima noted. It was to this kind of familialism that the government endeavored to appeal by shifting emphasis to a more emotional aspect from the power aspect of former familialism. As Confucian familialism owed much to "external" restrictions and regulations for its existence, the institutional contradiction could easily erode and weaken the internal values and the system itself. The family-state concept emphasized in early twentieth-century Japan was actually a shift of emphasis from one aspect (Confucian) to the other aspect (popular) of dual familialism in Japan.

The Taisho period witnessed Japan's rise to one of the Five Great Powers of the world. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 and the Washington Conference of 1922 amounted to a de facto recognition of Japanese power in Asia. In domestic politics, Japan experienced her first parliamentary democracy, however limited it may have been. National education began to pay more attention to internationalism, and

58. Kawashima Takenori, Ideologie to shiteno Kazoku Seido (The Family System as an Ideology) (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1957), p. 10.

59. Kawashima Takenori, Nihon Shakai no Kazoku-teki Kōzo (Familial Structure of Japanese Society) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1950), pp. 14-15.

nationalistic propaganda became relatively moderate. There ran, however, dangerous currents of so-called ultra-nationalism under the cover of democracy and glory as world power. In foreign relations, Japan's Asian policy — and her China policy in particular — symbolized the root of Japan's future expansionism. Domestically, the same trend is observable in the strong policy taken toward the labor movement, which had become active under the stimulus of the Russian Revolution.

Expansionism during the transition from the Tokugawa period was represented by Saigo Takamori's argument in 1873 for war with Korea. In 1885 Fukuzawa Yukichi, resenting the world powers' misconceived impression of Japan's position, wrote in Datsua Ron (Out of Asia) that Japan should cut off emotional attachment to her fellow Asians and treat them as Westerners would treat them. He continued:

To make a policy today, we cannot afford to wait for the enlightenment of neighbouring countries to raise Asia together. Rather, we should get out of their group and act in line with the Western civilized countries. We don't have to pay special consideration in dealing with China and Korea, merely because they are our neighbours: we should treat them as Westerners do. If you are a friend of bad companions, you cannot escape being called a bad fellow. We are those who reject the bad companions in the East in our mind.⁶⁰

Ten years after the publication of Fukuzawa's article in Jiji Shimpō, Japan defeated China. With the victory over Russia, Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and served an ultimatum containing 21 demands on China in 1915 during the First World War. As Fukuzawa argued, Japan paid no "special consideration" to her neighbours and the way Japan dealt with

60. Jiji Shimpō, March 16, 1885 as quoted in Keio Gijiku ed., Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu (Complete Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi) (vol. 10, Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1960).

her fellow Asians put the Western powers on their guard. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China, together with the strong policies of Western powers toward expansionist Japan, aroused a kind of morbid fear about foreign relations, which somewhat resembled the Japanese reaction to the first encounter with Western power at the end of the Tokugawa era.

In domestic politics, emergence of the Hara Cabinet marked the success of party politics, and the universal suffrage law of 1925 was often regarded as a symbol of Taisho Democracy. With reference to the concept of the nation, however, the picture was not all bright. The Law for Maintenance of Public Peace was put into force to deal with radical movements of the working class. Article One of that Law stipulated that "those who organize associations for the purpose of changing the national polity or denying the private property system shall be condemned to a period of less than ten years." This law eloquently demonstrated that the new bourgeois class had found comfortable shelter in kokutai. Oppression of the labor movement intensified as it began to show some characteristics of syndicalism and Bolshevism.⁶¹ The right wing was not yet an influential power as compared with the leftist movement in this period. Kita Ikki's celebrated book, Kokka Kaizo An Genri Taikō (Outline for National Reconstruction), was published in 1919 and stimulated the rightist group of young military officers. We cannot forget that an "ultra-nationalist" trend was already present in the most internationalistic phase of the Taisho. Kita Ikki was not an exception in holding the view that war was holy. He said that "those who

61. Cf. Imai Seiichi, Taisho Demokurashy (Taisho Democracy) (Nihon no Rekishi, vol. 23, Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1966), pp. 282-309. Cf. also, R. P. Dore, "Education in Japan," in Ward and Rostow, eds., op. cit., p. 148.

detest the armament of the state are children in their wisdom." He also spoke of "national competition" and of the "gospel of the sword." An interesting point about this document by a well-known rightist is that it was a revolutionary plan for the reconstruction of Japan rather than merely a rightist self-indulgence. In addition to his introduction of socialism, or more correctly national socialism, to his theory, he advocated a change from "the people for the Emperor" to "the Emperor for the people. . . . The Emperor is the representative of all people and the central pillar."

The democratic movement of the Taisho period was, from a different viewpoint, an expression of the awakened labor force and the economic development that demanded a broad base of workers. Tension was increasing in the society and, with monarchical nationalism still young and vigorous, there was a trend toward reassertion of this authority to hold together the existing orders. This became more pronounced when Japan became seriously affected by economic depression. The Taisho period was no longer a period of great transition such as the Meiji, and this had the effect of lowering the consciousness and ideal of state power. A poet, Yoshimoto Takaaki, described the situation as follows:

Nationalism of the masses of the people during the Taisho period evidently lost the central theme of the political ideal of 'for the sake of the country' and the social principle of 'personal advancement.'⁶²

62. Yoshimoto Takaaki, ed., op. cit., p. 26.

Such an indifference of the people toward the affairs of the state prepared, in an ironical manner, for the more aggressive and militant nationalism of the following period. Culminating in the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the supreme power of the state gradually fell into the hands of the military⁶³ and, as a result, Japanese nationalism began to be directed by the government to an unprecedented degree.⁶⁴

National history textbook revision in 1934 expanded a short paragraph on the preparedness of the people to a chapter. Creation of the chapter was decided in consideration of the post-Manchurian situation and was designed to enhance the spirit of the Imperial subjects.⁶⁵ Increasing emphasis on national spirit was more directly expressed in the moral textbook. The first national textbook of moral teaching, published in 1883, devoted its first chapter to the teaching of unlimited obligation, or on, to the parents and its second chapter to "brotherhood." Only in its third chapter did it discuss "the Imperial Throne." After promulgation of the Rescript on Education, the order was changed and "loyalty to the Emperor" appeared in the first chapter, "the parents" in the second. As we have discussed, a benevolent Emperor image came to the front after

63. For a discussion about how the military succeeded in controlling the civilian government, cf. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations, New York: Random House, 1957), pp.134-138.

64. Cf. D. Brown, op.cit., p.236.

65. Nihon Kyōkasho Taikai: Kindai-hen (Outline of Japanese Textbooks: Modern Period) vol.20 (Tokyo: Kōdan Sha, 1962), p.596.

the Russo-Japanese War. The war in China and economic depression in the early 1930's spurred this trend for national mobilization around the Emperor. The fourth revised edition of the moral textbook of 1936 — the year of the February 26 Incident — recognizing the split and conflict between state and family, taught that it was a virtue to sacrifice the individual and family for the state.

Our country was created by the Imperial ancestors. The people have protected this wonderful country by assisting the Imperial cause since our ancestors' time. When the country was in danger, all people of one mind followed the way of loyalty-patriotism disregarding their own and their families' lives. It goes without saying that our country is one of the oldest in the world and her prestige has never been damaged by foreign powers. She has also been prosperous. This fact owes much to the authority of the Imperial Throne, but equally important is the fact that the people have had a strong sense of solidarity.⁶⁶ [Underlined by the present writer.]

Generally, national education has contributed significantly to the inculcation of national identity, to the formation of national unity, and to the popularization of nationalism in all nations of the world. This was especially true in Japan where the national school system developed and diffused education with surprising rapidity.⁶⁷ In 1903, a year before the Russo-Japanese War, elementary school attendance was 94%; in 1923, 99%; and in 1933, 99.58%. Achievement of an almost perfect system of compulsory education made the relations between education and nationalism

66. Jinjyō Shōgakkō Shushin-sho, kan 5 (Moral Teaching Textbook for Fifth Grade), vol. 5

67. Cf. Chapter VII, "Nationalism in Education," of this paper.

inseparable and significant.⁶⁸ In Japan, "elementary education was skillfully used to inculcate nationalism. . . ." ⁶⁹ The significance of national education as a mass media in prewar Japan was even more enhanced as it occupied a relatively more powerful position than it does today. In 1924, for example, about one in ten obtained a daily paper as compared with one in two and a half in 1959. The diffusion ratios of radio and TV sets and the so-called boom of monthlies and weeklies have qualitatively changed the volume of information.⁷⁰ Moreover, the freedom of the press that postwar Japanese are enjoying was fundamentally absent in prewar Japan, except possibly for the early Meiji days before the central government was in firm control. The absence of freedom of speech and press meant that other private information sources could only supplement and assist the government policy toward nationalism.

Japanese nationalism after 1937 became more and more intensified only to be condemned as "ultra-nationalism," the enemy of world peace, by the victors of the war. Kokutai no Hongi (Essence of the National Polity) was circulated in 1937, and "The New Order in East Asia" was declared by Premier Konoé Fumimaro in 1938. Kokutai no Hongi was

68. Cf. Herbert Passin, "Education in Japan," in James Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 276.

69. R. P. Dore, op. cit., p. 204.

70. Kato Shunichi, "The Mass Media in Japan," in Ward and Rostow, eds., op. cit., p. 237. Cf. also, Brown, op. cit., pp. 212-215.

a crystallization of "Japanism" which rejected all Western culture and values; the humble and open attitude of the Five Articles of the Imperial Oath was totally neglected. This document described selfless loyalty:

...offering our lives for the sake of the Emperor does not mean so-called self-sacrifice, but the casting aside of our little selves to live under this august grace and the enhancing of the genuine life of the people of the State.

As to the relationship between the Emperor and the people, the document read:

Our relationship between sovereign and subject is by no means a shallow, horizontal relationship such as implies a correlation between ruler and the citizen, but is a relationship springing from a basis transcending this correlation, and is that of 'dying to self and returning to [the] one,' in which this basis is not lost. This is a thing that can never be understood from an individualistic way of thinking.⁷¹

The road to Pearl Harbor was short after the reopening of hostilities in China in 1937. The Spiritual Mobilization Act was enforced in 1939, to be followed by the dissolution of all political parties and the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA). Publication of Shinmin no Michi (The Way of the Subject) in 1941 prepared for the coming hardship of war. Richard Storry, who studied the ideas and activities of Japanese nationalist associations and groups during the period 1931 to 1941, called the extreme nationalists of this decade "the double patriots." He commented on nationalistic fever after the Manchurian Incident as follows:

71. Ivan Morris, ed., Japan 1931-1945: Militarism, Fascism, Japanism? (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1963), p. 47.

...what must be considered significant is the way in which violent nationalism, like some deep-sea cuttlefish, was able to emit a fluid that would stain and darken and, finally, blacken the surrounding waters. 72

Brown concludes that the activities of individuals and nationalist societies became secondary in importance since the ruling class controlled and promoted "ultra-nationalism" after 1936.

Now the whole nation was to be subjected continuously to the influence of nationalist propaganda disseminated through various public channels and by means of all public information and entertainment media. The state shrines, the schools and the police system were far more centralized and standardized than they had been in earlier days. 73

The reasons why Japanese nationalism between the 1930's and 1945 was labeled ultra-nationalism and had to be distinguished from previous forms were four-fold. First, the simple fact that it was stronger than the rest -- as Storry put it: "A double whisky is stronger than a single tot." Second, it was consciously promoted by the ruling class and the government through systematic nationalistic education and propaganda. Third, the name was given by the victorious powers of the war to a nationalism of the defeated that was troublesome, annoying, and perhaps, incomprehensible to them. To christen it ultra-nationalism was designed politically to denounce and nullify such a nationalism as vicious and immoral. The fourth reason concerns the different values of the Japanese nation as

72. Richard Storry, The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), p. 229.

73. Brown, op. cit., p. 235.

compared to those of modern Western nation-states. To demonstrate, Maruyama Masao claims that the modern Western nation-state is ein neutral Staat whose characteristic he defined as follows:

...the State adopts a neutral position on internal values, such as the problem of what truth and justice are; it leaves the choice and judgment of all values of this sort to special social groups (for instance, to the Church) or to the conscience of the individual. The real basis of national sovereignty is a purely 'formal' legal structure, divorced from all questions of internal values.

On the other hand, following the Meiji Restoration period in Japan:

...when the country was being rebuilt as a modern State, there was never any effort to recognize the technical and neutral aspect of national sovereignty. In consequence Japanese nationalism strove consistently to base its control on internal values rather than on authority deriving from external laws.⁷⁴

As Maruyama's comparison touches the fundamental nature of the Japanese nation, it is worth examining critically. His comparison between the neutral Western state and the non-neutral Japanese state is in a higher historical stage. More importantly, his is not a comparison in a strict sense of the word, for, in fact, he is making a comparison between an idealized European state and the real Japanese state. Does the European state take a neutral position with respect to "internal values"? Does it really keep away from private affairs of its nationals and devote all its attention and interest to public affairs in a formal and technical fashion? Ultimately, is it possible to draw a demarcation line between

74. Maruyama Masao, "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 3-4.

the value and the non-value fields and between internal and external affairs as he describes? The state is a place of high politics. And, if politics is a struggle of different values for their realization, how is it possible for a state to be neutral about values? The Marxist view of the state runs counter to Maruyama's argument. Harold J. Laski criticized the argument that the typical modern state (especially a democracy) being a Rechtstaat founded on the rule of law, favors neither the rich nor the poor. His following criticism of the theory of the rule of law applies to the theory of ein neutral Staat.

...the idea of a Rechtstaat is a purely conceptual notion; it is a category of essence and not of reality. It makes the rulers of a state bound by the law they make; but it still leaves them free, through the use of the appropriate organs, to make the law.⁷⁵

With all these modifications, however, Maruyama's point is well taken. Value-neutrality of the state was rejected in principle in Japan and the state was regarded as an embodiment of morality. In modern Europe, on the contrary, the rule of law or a Rechtstaat held it an ideal to be neutral concerning social values affecting the spiritual and intellectual environment of citizens. Another question that arises, if one accepts Maruyama's argument, is that Japanese nationalism throughout the past century would qualify as ultra-nationalism, which seems to contradict the commonly held view of Japanese nationalism as ultra-nationalist only during its most militant phase. The present writer submits that the relationship between value and the state is only one of the necessary

75. Harold J. Laski, The State in Theory and Practice (New York: The Viking Press, 1935), p. 154.

conditions, but not the sufficient condition of ultra-nationalism. When a government-supported nationalist movement and thought is more aggressive and more expansionistic relative to the rest of the world, it can be labeled ultra-nationalism. It will be easier for a people to be more aggressive when they believe that their nation personified superior morals and is fighting for higher ideal than when they believe that their nation is only fighting for power. In this respect, Maruyama's point is well taken.

Japanese history during the 80 years from the Meiji Restoration to the end of the Second World War was a process of modernization with heavy emphasis on "the rich country and the strong army." Rapid modernization was promoted by the strong central government. Cultivation of national consciousness and inculcation of nationalism were left primarily to education and other policies of government. Inevitably there was a tendency to make light of what the masses of people actually felt and thought under such a strong central government. An undue and disproportionate emphasis on official government policies and publications could easily distort the concept of the nation that was held by the majority of the relatively voiceless masses, if they held one at all. With this in mind, the legitimacy of our discussing primarily the nationalism of the elites in this chapter lies in the fact that nationalism of the leaders -- the ruling class and the government -- was the most typical and most representative nationalism in Japan during this period. Such a nationalism was tied with power and therefore enjoyed a decisive influence on the course of Japanese history. It also follows that this kind of nationalism was fated to collapse as war brought defeat to its power base. In other words, the nationalism of kokutai was to share the destiny of kokutai itself.

Japan's nationalism after the 1930's could be extreme only when supported by a totalitarian government mechanism that crushed all opposition.

The sudden disappearance of Japanese ultra-nationalism is a phenomenon more natural than surprising when we examine its nature. The confusion and psychological shock of defeat, however, gave the impression that the Japanese had lost even a minimum of national consciousness, which was an astonishing change for those who experienced and knew something about Japanese ultra-nationalism. The present writer shared this astonishment. Study of postwar Japanese nationalism demands a thorough examination of the entire Japanese postwar period of two and half decades. The issue of concepts of the nation has been a popular and widely discussed one. The literature on patriotism and nationalism is abundant. Almost all of it, consciously or unconsciously, has reflected the prewar concepts of the nation like a mirror of the past. It has therefore been necessary to review prewar concepts of the nation in order to examine their counterparts in the postwar time, to which we now turn our attention.

PART I

ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF JAPANESE POSTWAR NATIONHOOD

Part I undertakes to discuss and analyze critically the literature on the question of patriotism and nationalism in postwar Japan. In order to grasp concepts of the nation held by the people at large, data will be sought through statistical data such as public opinion polls. Postwar ideas and attitudes toward the nation can be divided into four periods. This may be somewhat arbitrary but corresponds roughly to changing tones in expression, including literature. The first period covers the Occupation years, 1945-1951. The second, 1952-1960, can be called the period of priming for nationalism by the conservatives. Then came a period of economic nationalism under the Ikeda Government, 1960-1964. The last period for this study, 1964-1968, is characterized by special concerns with problems of national security and defense.

CHAPTER 2

"PEACEFUL" AND "DEMOCRATIC" PATRIOTISM (1945-1951)

The argument on nationalism during the Occupation period underwent some changes in emphasis due to the initial shock of defeat and the change of Occupation policy. Generally speaking, however, it was a time when the hitherto praised value of "loyalty-patriotism" (Chukun-Aikoku) fell from grace when people started to search for new ideas of the nation and patriotism to fill the vacuum left by the sudden fall of prewar concepts. The new patriotism, according to general agreement of the time, had to be democratic and internationally-oriented if it was to be built upon a complete denial of the old patriotism. Such an agreement reflected partly the Occupation situation which logically demanded a kind of internationalism as opposed to anti-foreignism.

The ruling class* devoted all its energy to the maintenance of Kokutai vis-à-vis the Occupation authority, but was not able to preach patriotism to the people. The immediate postwar phenomenon appeared to be one totally lacking in patriotic or nationalistic sentiment. Ohkuma Nobuyuki described such a state of mind as follows:

Imperial worship ceased under the unprecedented defeat; the ideological system of national morality fell; and national pride and consciousness for national unification disappeared to be replaced by self-contempt and regret. It seemed that patriotism in any sense of the word had gone.¹

1. "Nippon no Aikokushin Ronsō," Riso, no. 224, 1952, pp. 42-43.

* "Ruling Class," or Shihai Kaikyū in Japanese, is loosely used to denote powerful groups of people including big businessmen, influential politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats. This term is employed throughout this thesis not to refer to the bourgeoisie as distinguished from the proletariat in the strict Marxian usage.

Ironically it was Nosaka Sanzo, the Communist emigre, who, returning to Japan from Yanan in January 1946, made the first appeal for patriotism to the Japanese people under such circumstances. It symbolically set one extreme line of controversy over the question of the nation. In his article, "Appeal for the Democratic Front," Nosaka claimed:

Fascists have called Communists "non-Japanese" and condemned them as "traitors." It has been proved, however, throughout the last war in every country that it was the Communists who really loved their people and their country.²

Thus, he rejected "fascist patriotism" of "the bourgeois-landlord class" and argued that patriotism of the free and friendly people "will never stand against the peaceful international spirit."³

Although Nosaka did not make his view on the Emperor clear in the article quoted, the other Communist leaders, Tokuda Kyūichi and Shiga Yoshio, released from prison by the Occupation directive of October 4, 1945, called for the overthrow of the Imperial system in their first statement, "Appeal to the People." Tokuda, in the same magazine that carried Nosaka's article, asked "if it is possible to construct democracy and socialism under the Imperial system." Answering his own question, he declared that "without overthrowing the Imperial system, construction of a democratic and socialistic nation is impossible."⁴

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2. Nosaka Sanzo, "Minshu Sensen no Teisho," (Proposal for a Democratic Front) Shakai Hyoron, February 1946, p. 3.
 3. Loc. cit.
 4. Tokuda Kyūichi and Shiga Moshio, "Jimmin Ni Utaeru," (Appeal to the People), Akahata, no. 1 (October 1945).

As for other views on the Imperial system, the Socialist Party urged only "the re-arrangement and curtailment of the Emperor's prerogatives" and transformation of "the absolute monarch" to "the constitutional monarch." The Japan Liberal Party and the Japan Progressive Party were still insisting on the maintenance of kokutai. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) was most consistent in its opposition and rejection of the idea of kokutai and nationalism of "loyalty-patriotism." It could not, however, get general support from the people. According to the Mainichi Shimbun polls of May 1946, only 11% supported abolition of the Imperial system, as opposed to 86% supporting continuation of the Imperial system in one form or another. Readers' contributions to Asahi Shimbun during November 1945, concerning the Imperial system and its future were subdivided as follows: 136 for protection of the Imperial system; 21 for abolition; and 12 without clear ideas. These figures are probably representative of the people's general attitude toward the Emperor and the Imperial system.⁵ The question was not given thorough reflection and reconsideration by the intellectuals, politicians and the people in general, despite its fundamental importance for the nation. It became a temporary issue only when the Communists determined to overthrow the Imperial system. The essentially dualistic loyalty pattern of Chūkun-Aikoku (Loyalty and Patriotism) was conveniently switched to the monolithic loyalty of Aikoku (Patriotism). It was hoped that, by dropping the Chūkun (Loyalty) side of nationalism, a "democratic" and "internationalist" nationalism would automatically follow.

5. Shinobu Seisaburo, Sengo Nihon Seiji-Shi (Political History of Postwar Japan), vol. 1, (Tokyo: Keiso-Shobo, 1965), pp. 227-228.

In this period of the Occupation, few statements or remarks on the question of the nation were made by statesmen in power. Most of the arguments were carried on by those outside of state power, mainly the Communists. The Communists were not always leading the discussion on the issue of patriotism during this period, for which the change in Occupation policy from reform to stability was chiefly responsible. As far as the present writer has been able to find, the first serious discussion of patriotism in a major newspaper appeared in Tokyo Shimbun, August 10, 1948. Katayama Tetsu, Abe Yoshinari, Tarubashi Wataru, and Horiuchi Kensuke took part in a discussion of "Patriotism for Reconstruction." It began with an introduction by Fukuda, vice-president of the Tokyo Shimbun Company, who claimed "the absolute necessity of U.S.-Japanese cooperation" and "anti-Communism." This article symbolized the emergence of a non-left and anti-left cry for a new nationalism. The discussion dealt with: (1) awareness of a statesman's responsibility as leader; (2) the role of education; and (3) institutional reforms with respect to the question of patriotism. "Patriotism" to them was "something humanistic and internationalistic." "The love for our country is the love for the world of man" (Tarubashi). "A new nation should not be the same as the old one. A nation of the people by a new system, that is, a peaceful, cultural and democratic nation that the masses of the people can love" (Katayama, emphasis by the present writer). On the other hand, there was reaction against the extreme anti-Westernism of prewar days. A novelist, Nagao Yoshio, expressing his lost confidence in things Japanese, wrote:

Except for a part of our culture which we can be proud of (it is, in a word, the field of art), Japan should be swiftly internationalized and the united with the world. It is the only way for Japan's survival to endeavor to find a place for self that is worthy of existence.⁶

Such a view was not new. Mori Arinori, the first Minister of Education, once preached the Westernization of Japan before becoming a more rigorous nationalist. Being too extreme, this kind of view has never become a majority opinion. The favored adjectives for "a new patriotism" were "democratic," "peaceful," and "international." Aikoku no Riso to Minshu-shugi (Ideal of Patriotism and Democracy) compiled by Yanagita Kenjūro and Yokota Kisaburo in 1948 is representative of this immediate postwar viewpoint. Yanagita maintained that democracy and socialism based on the awakened individual would be never militaristic but always concordant with world peace and human love.⁷ Yokota, a prominent scholar of international law, distinguished state-egoism from international cooperation and argued that the latter could be perfectly compatible with true nationalism.⁸ There were those who insisted that the construction of socialism should be the basis of a new patriotism, and others claimed the importance of democracy in forming a new nationalism.⁹

6. The Tokyo Shimbun, September 26, 1948.

7. Yanagita Kenjūro and Yokota Kisaburo, eds., Aikoku no Riso to Minshushugi (Ideal of Patriotism and Democracy) (Tokyo: Bunri Shoin, 1948, p. 34.

8. Ibid., pp. 41-63.

9. Ibid., p. 110.

There were a few people who regretted what appeared to them to be a swing-over to "de-nationalization." Yanaihara Tadao thought that the hatred of the word "patriotism," and the disappearance of attachment to national holidays and the national flag was "an unhealthy situation of a defeated people and an extreme reaction." He drew attention to the necessity for international cooperation and understanding in a period when people seemed to indulge themselves in their private daily affairs, neglecting everything beyond their immediate interest, including international affairs and politics.¹⁰ His argument is also interesting as the first criticism of the so-called "my-homism," which will be discussed later. Koizumi Shinzo went one step further by reasserting and rescuing some of the attitudes of past merits. He warned against the prevailing atmosphere to make light of affairs of the state.

Indeed, we cannot forget that we have renounced the war and that we are under the Occupation. We must correct our mistaken attitude not to recognize anything from the past; however, I believe the question of patriotism must begin with a re-evaluation of the right values and character that our nation possesses.¹¹

Challenges to nationalism and patriotism from the leftist viewpoint had only a very limited effect precisely because they were challenges from a well-defined class to the amorphous emotion of nationalism with which many people tended to identify, regardless of

10. The Asahi Shimbun, March 27, 1949.

11. Ibid. Cf. also, Koizumi Shinzo Zenshū (Complete Works of Koizumi Shinzo) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjuu-Sha, 1967), p. 18.

social or economic class. Tokyo Shimbun of November 25, 1949, in its editorial "To Love the Country," proclaimed that "the postwar stupor of loyalty to the state was clearly a mistake" and warned against the foolishness of "A burnt child dreads fire" reaction. It regretted "the tendency to fear that the hoisting of the national flag can lead to militarism.... It seems to us that the Japanese people have little love for their country. We believe that we should think more frankly about our country and our people."¹² These statements were increasingly frequent after the change of Occupation policy around 1947 and 1948. The national flag was permitted in April 1948 by SCAP. Three months earlier to this, Japan was already being regarded as a defense-wall against Communism in Asia. Purge of the Communists had begun, whereas amnesty for former war criminals prepared for a new conservative party politics. Kishi Nobusuke, a war criminal of A class, was released from Sugamo Prison in December 1948.

The new Constitution promulgated in May 1947 stipulated the Emperor as symbol of the State and the unity of the people. This so-called "symbolic Emperor" system found overwhelming support in the people, which forced the Communist Party to withdraw its slogan to overthrow the Imperial system. This seemingly national consensus on the Emperor, however, did not mean that the new concepts of the nation should or would be established centering around the Emperor. The truth was that the people were too busy to think about the high ideal of the state or the nation; they simply were not interested in a radical change in socio-political structure, and the "symbolic Emperor" system appeared to

12. The Tokyo Shimbun, November 25, 1949.

meet their mood of moderate reformation. Their lack of interest in affairs of the state can be demonstrated by the results of a public opinion poll in February 1950 concerning the national flag. Of those investigated, 27% did not own national flags and 43% of those who possessed flags did not hoist them on national occasions. Less than one-third replied that they would hoist flags. As a reason for not hoisting the flag, 44% answered that "it seems strange to do so when others do not."¹³ These answers reveal two facts: (1) that there was a general atmosphere of hesitation to hoist national flags; and (2) the people were following the "others" without making up their own minds whether the flag should be hoisted or not. The second point is particularly important in indicating the general attitude of the people toward the question of the nation during this period.

By the end of 1950, the leftist theory of nationalism had left its initial sharp criticism and attack of the wartime idea of patriotism behind and was largely on the defensive against the resurgent anti-class-oriented theory of nationalism. The reasons were two-fold: practical and theoretical. Escalation of the cold war was obviously a disadvantage for the Japanese Communists under the American dominated Occupation. The "red purge" and suspension of the Communist Party newspaper, Akahata (The Red Flag), were only the conspicuous aspects of the difficult Communist situation. When the Communists resorted to physical violence after accepting the Cominform criticism of the Japan Communist Party in January 1950,¹⁴ they lost support among Japanese generally. The theoretical weakness of the Communist theory of and

13. The Asahi Shimbun, February 27, 1950.

14. Cf. R. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 61.

appeal to nationalism was that, although it was effective in denouncing the wartime nationalism, it failed to offer an attractive alternative to the non-class-conscious Japanese masses.

Attitudes of the Japanese toward the peace treaty of 1951 were indicative of their views on Japan's position and role in world politics. There existed a very interesting contrast between the intellectuals as a whole and the masses of the people with respect to the treaty. The Asahi Shimbun survey of 86 opinion leaders in December 1949, concerning the peace treaty, found that 59% (51 persons) chose a peace with all nations as opposed to 21% (18 persons) for a peace with the majority of the nations.¹⁵ This latter group, supporters of the so-called one-sided peace, believed that the earliest possible termination of the Occupation was desirable in itself, especially when they felt peace with all ex-enemies was impossible in the existing cold war. On the contrary, supporters of the so-called all-out peace argued that such a "one-sided" peace would subjugate Japan to the United States and exacerbate international tension.

On the other hand, a public opinion poll demonstrated that the majority of the people sided with the intellectual minority on this issue. The turnouts were:¹⁶

For all-out peace	21.4%
For partial peace	45.6%
Undecided	33.0%

Tōyama Shigeki, a Marxist-oriented progressive, expressed the frank anxiety of a leftist intellectual on the defensive about the issue of nationalism. He wrote:

15. The Asahi Shimbun, December 15, 1949.

16. The Asahi Shimbun, November 15, 1950.

We, intelligentsia, are watching with a thrill of horror the recent trend where national consciousness "patriotism" or "defense" are loudly preached. Our honest reaction will be: "Again!?"¹⁷

A brief comment on the connotations of the word "patriotism" is in order. For most of the "progressive" intellectuals, "patriotism" was taboo because of its prewar association with the oppressive Imperial State. They were puzzled when a Communist from Yenan started to cry for "patriotism" right after the defeat. They preferred to use "nationalism" -- usually romanized but not translated -- because it had a connotation of anti-colonialism and by using the word they thought they could enjoy a spiritual association with the Afro-Asian people who were fighting against imperialism. Nationalism, they argued, was based more on the positive and voluntary involvement of the people in "national" thought and movement, whereas "patriotism" was too closely woven with "loyalty to the Emperor."¹⁸ The prewar usage of "loyalty-patriotism" indeed subordinated patriotism to loyalty to the Emperor. Even after patriotism became institutionally free from loyalty after the defeat, its former relationship and association with the Imperial system bears definitely a negative tone, especially among the Senchu-Ha (wartime generation) who experienced compulsory wartime patriotism.

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17. Tōyama Shigeki, "Futatsu no Nashonarizumu no Taikō: Sono Rekishi-Teki Kōsatsu," (Confrontation of Two Nationalisms: Historical Study) Chuo Koron, vol. 66, no. 6, (June 1951), p. 33.
 18. Rōyama Masamichi, "Futatsu no Sekai to Azia no Kadai," (Two Worlds and the Problems of Asia), Chuo Koron, vol. 66, no. 6, (June 1951), p. 249.

Finally, a few words are in order, before we turn our attention to the post-Occupation era, concerning a theoretical work by Maruyama Masao, Professor of Tokyo University, on the structure of Japanese nationalism. As we have discussed in Chapter 1 of this paper, Japan's rapid modernization after the Meiji Restoration caused serious imbalance and contradiction in her social and economic development. It was not conducive to the healthy growth of democratic forces and helped lead Japan on a military-expansionistic course. The nationalism of kokutai was a result of central government manipulation and was not deeply rooted in the minds of the people, at least among the educated people. There was

the tendency to symbolize the State as the direct extension of the primary group (family or village) in which the individual is submerged; secondly, love of fatherland, expressed pre-eminently as love of one's native place which in turn is an aspect of love of the environment.¹⁹

This thesis of Maruyama on the characteristic of Japanese nationalism was written in 1950 and became a base for any further study of the subject. As the ideology of kokutai was an integral one in Japanese life, its fall left a big mental vacuum. However, Maruyama went on to state that

... it would not be quite right to say that the old nationalism had either died out or qualitatively changed. It would be more precise to say that it had

19. Maruyama Masao, "Nihon no Nashonarizumu" (Japanese Nationalism) (as translated by David Titus, in Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (edited by I. Morris, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 114.

vanished from the political surface only, to be inlaid
at the social base in an atomized form.²⁰

He further concluded that Japanese nationalism could be democratized
"only by destroying the tenacious family structure in Japanese society
and its ideology."²¹ We will refer to this point later in our discussion
and proceed to the second period in postwar Japanese nationhood.

20. Ibid., p. 151.

21. Ibid., p. 152.

CHAPTER 3

PRIMING FOR NATIONALISM BY THE CONSERVATIVES (1952-1960)

This section covers the period from Japan's resumed independence in April 1952 to the revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1960. With independence, the U.S. forces in Japan were limited to those based on the security treaty between the two countries. May Day of this year turned out to be "Bloody May Day," the first confrontation between the radical and violent Japanese Communist Party and the first independent conservative government. While the JCP's appeal of "Anti-Americanism-Nationalism" was not successful due to reasons already discussed, the conservatives were successful only in defending their pro-American policies and were unable to offer any attractive national goal and purpose around which nationalism was to be formed. Despite all this, restoration of independence demanded a national consensus on the concept of the nation. The basic weakness of both the opposition and the government on this question was that neither gave a proper place to the people who were to be the holders of nationalism.¹ To make the situation worse, the cold war at large began to influence directly divisive concepts of the nation at home. The Occupation had formerly cushioned the external power struggle to some extent. But now, Sakamoto Yoshikazu states, "The international cold war was reproduced and intensified in the domestic

1. Rōyama Masamichi, Yomigaeru Nippon (Resurgent Japan) (History of Japan, vol. 26, Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1967), pp. 157-158.

cold war, thus promoting bipolarization at home and abroad."² The ruling hierarchy tried to win nationalism to its side by identifying Japan with the West, the United States in particular, in the formula of "independence-nationalism." Opposition and progressive intellectuals ~~insisted on~~ "nationalism by neutralism," at the same time associating Japan with Afro-Asian nationalism. In a strict theoretical sense, it is harder to find disagreement than agreement in these claims, but the real difference lay in their emphases and practice. It should be borne in mind that whatever the opposing sides argued, there were clear intentions to win the symbol of nationalism to their respective sides.³ It was perhaps unfortunate for Japan that "nationalism" was first used as a political tool to justify a partisan view and interest. The outcry of Communists that "patriotism in present Japan must first of all be anti-imperialism"⁴ could appeal only to those who held the Marxian view of history and the nation. Since nationalism has an irrational element -- expressed in the famous phrase, "My country, right or wrong," -- a political platform of overthrowing the existing government by force will produce negative effects unless the situation is regarded as desperate by the majority of the people. The political and economic situation of Japan in the early 1950's was far from such a revolutionary situation.

2. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Nihon ni okeru Kokusai Reisen to Kokunai Reisen," (International Cold War and Domestic Cold War in Japan), in Reisen (Cold War), (Iwanami Koza Reisen: Seijigaku teki Kosatsu (Cold War: A Political Study) (Iwanami Koza, Tokyo: Iwanami-Shoten, 1963), pp. 346-347.

3. Ibid., p. 347.

4. Awa Tokusaburo, "Kyōsan shugi to Aikokushin," (Communism and Patriotism) Riso, no. 224, (January 1952), p. 14.

In Bismarck's Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Russia during the latter half of the nineteenth century, nationalism was regarded as "the political doctrine of the upper classes, of the rights in the political spectrum of the age."⁵ Japanese Communists were mistaken in attacking all non-Communist theories of "nationalism" as if they were the same as the "nationalism" of Bismarck's Germany. If the Marxist view of the state as an oppressive tool gave Japanese Communists a strong weapon with which to attack the government in power, it also deprived them of a "national" appeal that transcends "class" consciousness. If the Japanese government were a dictatorial regime without popular support and depended on foreign assistance for its survival, the Communists would be able to combine "class" and "national" through "national liberation front" under the name of "revolutionary nationalism." The fact is, however, the political situation in Japan does not justify such a Communist claim.

Meanwhile the peace treaty settled the dispute over "one-sided" vs. "all-out" peace as a living political issue. The focus of arguments shifted to the question of defense in relation to Article Nine of the Constitution. The official government interpretation concerning the status of the Self-Defense Forces underwent a clear change from faint and puzzled political justification to positive and confident constitutionality. Opposition forces were again on the defensive in protecting the Constitution against an accumulation of fait accompli by the government. A public opinion poll indicated that more people shared the government view on this issue:

5. Hans Kohn, "Nationalism" in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.

"Q. Do you think we need to build an army in Japan or do you think it is not necessary?"⁶

Necessary	32%
Necessary depending on conditions	24%
Not necessary	26%
Undecided	18%

The presence of U. S. bases in Japan ignited popular resentment, if not national emotion, against their existence. Involvement of opposition parties and radical labor unions in the Nada anti-base struggle in Ishikawa Prefecture and the Sunagawa Incident in the early 1950's had the effect of turning what originally were non-ideological, localized conflicts into a more widespread, highly anti-American movement. But as long as these anti-base struggles were manipulated and used by a group of politically-oriented people for the benefit of their particular interests, they cannot be called expressions of nationalism in the true sense of the word, although nationalistic elements were not altogether absent. The JCP's call for nationalism was not regarded with full credit because it was too closely associated with the guidance and directive from the Cominform, the Soviet Russia and Communist China. The situation of split nationalism was summed up by Fujiwara Hirotatsu in the following:

The pattern of movement that is now under way in Japan is far from touching the (naive) sentiment of the masses of the people. It is carried out as a leftist and

6. The Asahi Shimbun, March 2, 1952.

rightist movement directed by rigid dogmatism and neglecting the realities of the nation.⁷

The first direct remark by a key governmental leader that emphasized patriotism was Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's statement ... of September 1952. After rejecting the view that the Police Reserve Force constituted rearmament, he stated:

We must start building our army from both spiritual and material aspects. As to spirit, we must cultivate patriotism by teaching Japan's incomparable history and our beautiful country in history and geography courses in school. It is patriotism, after all, that is the base of rearmament.⁸

The government and conservatives recognized the potential of education in cultivating and enhancing national consciousness and attempted to reform the educational system to suit their purpose. After resigning from the office of Education Minister, Amano Teiyū published Kokumin Jissen Yōryo (Outline of People's Practice) in which he proposed a prototype of Kitaisareru Ningen-zo (The Ideal Image of Man). He maintained: "national life becomes possible where the individual contributes to the state (kokka), and the state to the individual. The state should not, therefore, make light of the dignity and happiness of the individual and the individual must not lose love for the state."⁹ This outline of national ethics remained ambiguous and merely stated the

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7. Fujiwara Hirotsu, "Minzoku Bunretsu no Kiki to Uyoku," (Danger of National Disintegration and the Right Wing), Kaizo, vol. 34, no. 10, (October 1953), p.36.
 8. The Asahi Shimbun, September 2, 1952.
 9. Amano Teiyū, "Kokumin Jissen Yōryo," (Outline of National Practice) Kokoro, January 1953.

reciprocity between state and individual. Patriotism was heavily emphasized because "the rise and fall of the nation depends upon whether the people are patriotic or not." It was not made clear why, as contended, "true patriotism coincides with love for mankind." As to the Emperor, Amano had this to say:

To have the Emperor is our unique national character. The Emperor is the symbol of the unity of the people. Therefore, we must love the Emperor and respect our national character.¹⁰

Thus, the conservative logic goes, since the Emperor is the symbol of the people as stipulated in the Constitution, those who love the country have to love the Emperor. It was clear that the way for the once-praised "loyalty-patriotism" was paved and needed a shift of emphasis from "the country" to "the emperor." We will examine this question in our discussion of the Kitaisare Ningen-zo (The Ideal Image of the Japanese).

The second important remark by a key governmental figure on this issue was made by Ikeda Hayato, then Chairman of the Party's Policy Research Committee, after the Ikeda-Robertson Conference in October 1953, on Japan's security. The memorandum on this U.S. - Japanese conference referred to the ideological education of the Japanese people with respect to defense.

Unless and until the Japanese people hold firmly the conviction that their country can only be defended by themselves in the final analysis, the hurried adaptation of a number of young people to the Hoan-tai (Peace Reservation Force) will only serve to create a kind of mob. Education is primarily responsible for

10. Ibid.

giving the people such an attitude (toward the defense problem). This is a question of reorientation and cannot be rectified in a short time.¹¹

The process of centralization of education was carried out at an increasing speed. Political activities of teachers were banned in 1954, and the previously elective boards of education were made appointive in 1956. The government also started a vigorous and strict investigation of textbooks by setting up a group of investigators to rule on textbook authorization. Moral education was introduced in the spring of 1959. We can safely conclude that institutional reorganization and centralization of education was completed during this period. In 1954 the conservative Democratic Party, joining the attack on textbooks, circulated a pamphlet, Ureubeki Kyōkasho (Deplorable Textbook), which criticized four of the high school social studies textbooks. It was charged that the textbook entitled Akarui Shakai (Bright Society) and edited by Hidaki Rokuro and others, was prejudiced in support of leftist ideas.¹²

Inoki Masamichi pointed out that these governmental leaders were keenly aware of "the danger that Japan faces today."¹³ What is the danger? And to what kind of Japan? For those who felt on the defensive vis-à-vis the government, the new movement for tightening

11. Cf. The Asahi Shimbun, October 25, 1953.

12. Minshutō, Ureubei Kyokasho Mondai (Deplorable Textbook Question), 1954. Cf. also, Marius B. Jansen, "Education, Values, and Politics in Japan," Foreign Affairs, vol. 36, no. 4, (July 1957), p. 670.

13. Inoki Masamichi, "Nihon no Hōkō: Minzoku Shugi to Kokusai Rentai Shugi," Course for Japan: Nationalism and International Cooperation Chuo Koron, vol. 67, no. 4 (April 1952), p. 10.

textbook investigation and the introduction of moral teaching constituted the "danger" to their image of "Japan." Munakata Masaya's following comment expresses the general reaction of the so-called progressive intellectuals to the government offensive in education:

The government is not seriously thinking about neutrality of education when it insists on the maintenance of educational neutrality. The neutrality the government speaks of means an agreement with the government or at least no opposition to it.¹⁴

Whatever the case may be, it must be borne in mind that the question of patriotism and nationalism became an important political issue through this period of priming for nationalism by the government and conservative parties. This reminds us of the fact that it through the state-controlled national education system that the Japanese were raised as a highly nationalistic people. The contents of nationalism held by these postwar leaders seem to resemble the prewar "loyalty and patriotism" in a slightly modified fashion. The degree of effectiveness of these policies and appeals depended largely on how the people regarded them with reference to their war experiences and their understanding of defeat and Occupation.¹⁵

The necessity for a stronger national consciousness was also felt by non-governmental journalists. The following citation is from Tokyo Shimbun's editorial in December 1952.

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14. Munakata Masaya, "MSA to Aikokushin Kyōiku," (MSA and Patriotic Education) Kaizo, vol. 35, no. 3, (March 1954), p. 10.
 15. Mashita Shinichi, "Aikokushin no Tsuite," (On Patriotism), Chuo-Koron, vol. 69, no. 4, (April 1954), pp. 142-145.

We believe patriotism can be changed by education. If so, the repulsion to patriotism among the young people demonstrates the mistake of present Japanese education. Postwar education has emphasized too much that patriotism would lead to militarism, and to war. Such a view is historically significant in that it is a confession to war. At the same time, however, it neglects the importance of kokka which is a fence to protect our happiness. Theory jumps from human dignity to service for man.¹⁶

Japan's restoration of independence in 1952 demanded some kind of national consensus as to the nature and function of the sovereign nation. Yet, the question seemed not so urgent as Japan remained relatively isolated until her admission to the United Nations in 1956. The problem is that theories of the nation were presented from two sharply confronting ideological camps of the Communist-oriented and anti-Communist-oriented, making a constructive dialectical development of theories impossible. In addition to Japan's particular political situation, difficulty was inherent in the subject of the nation itself. For example, among those who recognized the importance of patriotism, some regarded it as an attachment to one's own home town or village; it was nothing but "love for environment." Others thought it was an expression of devotion and sacrifice to the state (or the central government). The first view of patriotism will not produce much of a problem, for it hardly is political and "national." Ohkuma Nobuyuki, one of the supporters of the second view, defined the core of patriotism as "loyalty-obligation to the state."¹⁷ The state,

16. The Tokyo Shimbun, December 19, 1955.

17. Cf. Ohkuma Nobuyuki, "Aikokushin to Chūsei Gimu no Mondai," (Patriotism and the Question of Loyalty Obligation) Chuo Koron, vol. 68, no. 6 (June 1953).

according to him, is "violent, the expression of which is war.... The state is an evil in domestic political relations, as well as in international political relations."¹⁸ However, he was not as clear in his evaluation of patriotism, or the obligation of loyalty to such a state, as his theory of the state may indicate. He gave three reasons why the Japanese people lost their patriotism: the Occupation policy; non-existence of the army; and insufficient analysis of the question of war responsibility. He further maintained that "the essence of loyalty-obligation to the state is best manifested in the military order, and therefore in a country without an army, there is no problem of loyalty that demands devotion and sacrifice of the people."¹⁹ Ohkuma was not alone in pointing out the effect of the Occupation on Japanese national consciousness. Analysis of the Occupation's impact was characteristic of theories of the nation during this period. Inoki described the psychology of the defeated as they came to experience Occupation. He wrote:

[Since] grand and magnificent attitudes of the Americans in both spiritual and material aspects were so distinctive, the majority of the Japanese were caught by an overwhelmingly strong inferiority complex. This inferiority complex, together with despondency in defeat, completely dissolved our nationalism. We were, in a way, completely disarmed in a spiritual sense.²⁰

The question of the nation and nationalism remained as popular as ever in Japanese journalism. Kaizo devoted its October 1953 issue to

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18. Ohkuma Nobuyuki, Kokka Aku (State Evils) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1957), p. 209.
 19. Ohkuma, "Aikokushin," op. cit., p. 249.
 20. Inoki, "Nihon no Hōkō," op. cit., p. 5.

"Fear and Resistance — Contemporary Problems of Nationalism."

Eguchi Bokuro, evaluating the attitude of the masses regarding nationalism, wrote that they "are no longer weak nor easily guided by the ideology of the leaders.... They are now restricting the restless leaders."²¹ By "masses," Eguchi meant the class-conscious workers rather than the people in general. Another contributor to this special issue on nationalism, Fujiwara Hirotsu, claimed there existed no common ground where the "nation" could share joys and sorrows, and thereby move toward a kind of "community of destiny." He stated that this lack of common identity among the Japanese was "one of the greatest tragedies of today's Japan."²² The change of tone or undercurrent in these arguments was clear. The almost morbidly negative attitude toward "ultra-nationalism" previously evident was now seldom observable. References were not made to hurt or destroy the naive but natural affection of the people to their country (kuni).

Formation of the Hatoyama government in December 1954 was welcomed by the majority of the people as being more independent of the United States as well as a change of mood after the long period of governments led by Yoshida.

With respect to nationalism, the most important policy of the Hatoyama government was the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, done at some risk of displeasing the United States. Although a complete peace was impossible due to the uncompromising views of the parties concerned on the northern territory, partial rapprochement with the Communist camp made Japan a full member of

21. Eguchi Bokuro, "Nashonarizumu no Atarashi Kadai" (New Problems of Nationalism), Kaizo, vol. 34, no. 12 (October 1953), p. 34.

22. Fujiwara Hirotsu, "Minzoku Bunretsu no Kiki to Uyoku," (Danger of National Disintegration and the Right-Wing), Kaizo, op. cit., p. 35.

of the international community, with subsequent admission to the United Nations that same year.

U.S. bases in Japan were sources of friction throughout this period, uniting some segments of the Japanese population on one side and the U.S. and Japanese governments on the other. The Nada anti-base struggle continued until 1957 when the base was returned to Japan. Struggle against expansion of the Sunagawa base resulted in some bloodshed and finally the issue was brought before the Supreme Court. The Court overruled the so-called Date judgment, a previous ruling that the presence of U.S. bases in Japan was unconstitutional, on the grounds that the case was a political one and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the Court. The decision left the issue to politics, and the conflict remained unresolved. The "Girard Case" and other base incidents naturally caused widespread popular resentment — resentment the government found difficult to combat as the people's reaction, if not entirely desirable for the convenience of the government, was in line with the national consciousness it wished to foster.

Another development, and perhaps a more important one with respect to concepts of the nation in this period, was the peace movement, particularly as directed to nuclear weapons. Pacifism has been a strong emotion and conviction of the Japanese people since the war. The overwhelming support for Article Nine was one of the expressions of this pacifist disposition. It was not, however, until 1954 that the popular pacifist "mood" developed into a mass peace movement. This was sparked by the incident of the "Lucky Dragon," a fishing vessel caught in the "dead ash" fall-out of an H-bomb explosion, and the resulting death

of one of its crew members, Kuboyama Aikichi. The significance of this movement lies in the fact that it started as a spontaneous signature-seeking campaign led by housewives in Tokyo's Suginama Ward to ban the testing of nuclear weapons. It was a grass-roots peace movement that derived its main driving force from their war experiences in Hiroshima and Hagasaki. As the movement grew, it fell victim to political ideologies and party struggles between the JSP and the JCP, which alienated the original supporters and participants. The split of this people's pacifist movement did not mean, however, that the pacifist tendency of the people itself was on the decline.

CHAPTER 4

PERIOD OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM (1960-1964)

The material destruction caused by war cut the Japanese economy down to one-half its prewar scale. Net national income in 1946 was only 57% of the prewar level (1934-1936). Net per capita income dropped to 52% of the prewar counterpart. Export and import levels immediately after the war marked only 10 - 20% of those before the outbreak of war in China. Japan's economic recovery, however, was rapid after 1950. Let us look at the following table.¹

	Prewar (%) (1934-1936)	1946	Postwar (%) 1955	1966	Recovery of Prewar level (year)
Industrial Production	100	29	189	703	1951 (115%)
Net National Income	100	57	144	529	1951 (107%)
Net Per Capita Income	100	52	108	384	1955 (108%)
Agriculture & Fishery	100	78	135	173	1950 (100%)
Consumption Standard	100	--	115	193	1953 (106%)
Export (volume)	100	7.2 (1948)	72	353	1959 (107%)
Import (volume)	100	18.2 (1948)	90	388	1956 (114%)

1. Tsuchiya Kiyoshi and Hirayama Yūji, Handobukku Nihon Keizai, (Handbook: Japan's Economy) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1968), p. 24.

Except for foreign trade, Japan's economy was restored to its prewar level by the mid-1950's. Economic growth rates in terms of net national product were high: during 1956-1960 the average was 9.8%, and 9.7% during 1961-1965. Growth rates in Gross National Product (GNP) ~~for the respective~~ periods were 12.5% and 14.8%. During these two periods, the economic growth rate in Germany was 6.4% and 4.8%, and in the United States 2.2% and 4.7%.

Although, as these figures show, Japanese economic growth was not limited to the period 1960-1964, the reasons we shall emphasize for the economic aspects of these years are three: (1) economic growth in the latter half of the 1950's is only meaningful when considered in relation to the high growth rate during the Ikeda government 1960-1964; (2) the Ikeda government consciously put primary emphasis on economic rather than political policies; and (3) liberalization of trade and foreign exchange was rapid after 1960, and by 1964 approximately 90% was liberalized, resulting in closer contact and competition with foreign industries.

In domestic politics, the Ikeda government made efforts to avoid confrontation with the opposition as did its predecessor, in order to force ratification of the revised U.S. -Japanese security treaty in May-June 1960. Ikeda Hayato's motto was Kanyō to Nintai (Tolerance and Patience), and his primary goal was the celebrated "Income Doubling Plan in Ten Years." Prime Minister Ikeda's principle of "Economy First" was the chief theme of his address to the 12th Party Convention in 1962. He stated:

One of the tasks that deserves our closest attention is hito-zukuri (human development), in addition to

economic prosperity. Only by educating people of rich culture, high personality and of action, are the eternal developments of the nation (minzoku) and prosperity of the national economy achievable.²

The Ikeda government's economic priority did not mean, however, that ~~conservative~~ leaders during this period remained silent or inactive concerning the questions of the nation and of nationalism. Prime Minister Ikeda once emphasized the necessity of patriotic education in his memorandum following the conference on Japan's defense in 1953. Also, it was his decision -- and the first of its kind after defeat -- to decorate the war dead. It was rather in posture and method that he differed from his predecessors as far as the essential concept of the nation was concerned. He spared no effort in building up among the people the kind of national image he held himself. The characteristic of nationalism under his government can be appropriately called "economic nationalism."³

Most arguments by the political opposition paid only a marginal or practically no attention to Japan's resurgence as a great economic power. Even those arguments which referred to this fact hastened to dismiss it as insignificant to their theory of nationalism or as a government propaganda of self-glorification. In the following pages we shall discuss the general trend of the press, public opinion, and special issues relating to concepts of the nation during this period.

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2. Ikeda Hayato's speech at the 12th Party Convention as included in Wagaō no Kihon Hōshin (Basic Policies of the Party), 1963, p. 17.
 3. Statement by Maruyama Masao in Umemoto Katsumi, and others, ed., Gendai Nihon no Kakushin Shiso, (Progressive Thoughts in Contemporary Japan) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1966), p. 15.

The anti-treaty movement in 1960 mobilized a greater number of workers, students and citizens than any other after the war. Everybody was not in agreement as to the reasons behind this movement, but democracy and nationalism were both crucially involved.⁴ It is not difficult to imagine that this massive movement had an important impact on people's images of the nation. From a study conducted in May-June 1960, Arase Yutaka concluded that the old cliché of the hierarchy, "To be always with the people," was no longer believed by the people -- a development to which the anti-treaty movement greatly contributed. It seems quite difficult, however, to separate the actual effect of the movement from the effect of defeat and postwar Japanese history prior to the movement, since Arase does not deal with the question in a comparative manner. The merit of his study consists in an examination of images of the nation as of mid-1960. For example, a peasant in Tōhoku region was reported to have mentioned his distrust of leaders in general.

Leaders in both Free and Communist camps seem to forget the general will of their people. They are too much concerned with interests of their parties and countries. I believe that the true politics are guided by people's will.⁵

Arase drew the following interesting conclusions:


National consciousness among a considerable segment of the people has changed in two respects. First, kokka (state) is separated from kokumin (people). And, these

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4. Cf. George Packard, Protest in Tokyo (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966) Passim and also, Robert Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 116.
 5. Arase Yutaka, "Nihonjin no Kokka Kan," (Concepts of the Nation) Shiso, no. 434 (August 1960), p. 43.

people agree in demanding leaders who are responsible to the people, and not kokka that leads kokumin. Second, there is an assumption that kokumin is no longer a group of homogeneous people but embodies heterogeneity.⁶

The split in concepts of the nation previously discussed was primarily a split between opposing political leaders. Here a new element of alienation appears between the leaders and masses. The conflict pattern may be diagrammed as follows:

(The arrows show direction of conflicts; the broken arrow shows a weak or potential conflict.)



The Mainichi Series on "Patriotism"

The question of patriotism again became a burning issue due to an incident which, at least in terms of increasing debate, was fortuitous. A 17-year old rightist boy, Yamaguchi Otoya, assassinated the Socialist Party Chairman, Asanuma Inejiro, during a public campaign speech. Imprisoned, the boy committed suicide, leaving as his last message a view of himself as a patriot who had sacrificed his life for the sake of the country. His will, inscribed on the prison wall, drew public attention

6. Ibid., p. 43.

anew to the never-settled argument of patriotism. Mainichi Shimbun put out a 16-day serial "On Patriotism" commencing October 26, 1960. General reaction to the young rightist's view of patriotism was adverse and sometimes severly critical.⁷ Some of the critics denounced such patriotism as "the last refuge of a scoundrel," to use Dr. Samuel Johnson's phrase.

We will discuss what "patriotism" meant to the Japanese as indicated by the Mainichi Shimbun special serial. This series brought to light a difference between the Teachers' Union and the Education Ministry on this subject. The Minister of Education, Araki Masuo, was interviewed:

Q. Is it necessary to teach "patriotism" in school?
Will patriotism disappear if no change is made?

Araki: When the new education curriculum is put into practice, the young generation, who are lacking any national character or personality, will acquire a clear character as Japanese. It is mere Communist propaganda to claim that patriotism appears [only] if the country is worthy of it. It's no use to be in Japan if you don't have consciousness of right and responsibility to improve things that you deem bad. I believe it is natural to teach such a thing in compulsory education. I am not saying this to be snide, but isn't it partisan to teach only the bad aspect of Japan?⁸

The Chairman of the Japan Teachers' Union, Kobayashi Takeshi, expressed his view on patriotism in the following answer:

We have never denied the good aspects of Japan or the good tradition. You can recognize how much we have labored to make students understand the merit of Japanese

7. The Mainichi Shimbun, October 26, 1960.

8. Ibid., October 27, 1960.

culture just by looking at our teaching of the Japanese language. If we do not love our country, we would not be doing the Teachers' Union activities. I must say, however, that our patriotism is different from the patriotism expressed in the Imperial Rescript on Education, and aims at constructing a peaceful and cultural nation as prescribed in the Constitution and the Fundamental Law on Education. There seems to be a danger of Japan's being drawn into war by the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. The real question is why does the Minister of Education have to preach patriotism under such a circumstance? Because the Minister is demanding the kind of patriotism that makes the people ready to die in war for the state. In China, for example, they distinguish "just war" from "unjust war." We, however, take the view that all wars are evil. Our patriotic education consists in making the Japanese respectable for foreigners, in making the people highly capable, and in building a peaceful cultural country.⁹

Both insist on their recognition of the importance of patriotism and its inclusion in education. The similarity ends here. What is more distinct is the deep mutual distrust, self-justification and self-righteousness on both sides. Naturally, doubts were raised about these theories of nationalism in the opposing political camps. Tsuru Shigeto's criticism is an example in case. He stated that value-judgments on patriotism should be free from the political level and labels such as "pro-governmental" or "anti-governmental." "Just as the peace movement is anti-power and apolitical and transcends political struggle, patriotism must be united with eternal peace."¹⁰

During this period, the debate on patriotism was not a monopoly of the government, the opposition and articulate intellectuals. Members

9. Ibid., October 27, 1960. Kobayashi Takeshi was elected to the House of Representatives in 1962. He discussed patriotism in an article in Shin Shūkan, July 31, 1962, pp. 30-33. Cf. also, The Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 1960.

10. Shin Shūkan, August 21, 1962, pp. 31-33.

of the general public participated in the discussion by contributing to newspapers. The following quotations are from Mainichi Shimbun in 1960.

An old man in Niigata Prefecture wrote that "the restoration of patriotic loyalty to the Emperor is distressing.... Once under the beautiful name of 'respectable Japanese' many people had to die. I suspect that the Education Minister's view is dangerously prejudiced and nearsighted." On the other hand, a citizen in Chofu City argued that correct patriotism was necessary. He went on:

What will be the result of an education that does not teach pupils to love the country? We try to defend the peace of Japan, for we love Japan. In sum, patriotism is quite necessary. It was the prevalence of militarism that was wrong. The two must be distinguished. A just patriotism is necessary. I admire those who lead Japan to be a truly peaceful country.¹¹

The old man in Niigata Prefecture pointed out also that patriotism could be cultivated by teaching respect for human dignity and freedom and a warm consideration for peace and international cooperation. He then concluded that "patriotism must not be used for the purpose of accomplishing selective [political] goals."

Although the opinions of these two men appear to be quite different, we must bear in mind that neither was against "patriotism" as he himself saw it. Both were in complete agreement as to the necessity of "just" patriotism. The real difference lay in whether or not the educational laws should be changed in order to emphasize patriotism in the schools.

11. The Mainichi Shimbun, October 28, 1960.

Two 18-year old high school students wrote in on the subject.

One, a student in Fukushima Prefecture, expressed resentment toward his education and said:

Throughout my six years in middle school and high school, I have never heard of the word patriotism. Needless to say, I have never heard about the ideal of the national foundation. What we learned at school are only the bad aspects of Japan. Only recently, however, I have come to realize the good aspects of the Japanese.¹²

The other student in Fukoka Prefecture wrote:

I have no memory of reading Japanese history in which I can take pride. Consequently, I am not very proud of being a Japanese. I have learned, however, some fine merits of Japan. I can now love Japan in my own way. I wish I had learned Japanese merits earlier when I was little.¹³

Replying to these contributions by students, a housewife in Tokyo frankly expressed her surprise at the neglect in teaching things in which the Japanese people could take pride. A company employee in Fukushima Prefecture showed his anger at such an education, saying that it was suicidal for the nation. However, one of the contributors indicated that a forced patriotism from above would become "ideological and intolerant resulting in a state of fanaticism."¹⁴

In all these opinions there exists an agreement as to what constitutes an undesirable patriotism, but no agreement in a positive way as to a desirable patriotism. It is easier to get an agreement about what is not humane, than to get an agreement about what is humane. The problem

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

of patriotism originates to a large extent from the same kind of difficulty of arriving at a positive agreement on its content.

The two contributions by high school students are indicative of the general reaction of those who sought for some kind of national identity but were not encouraged to do so by their school education. It was an expression of resentment and frustration over their late discovery of what they wanted. As these boys were 18 in 1960, they were born in 1952 and were only three years old at the time of the Defeat. They were completely products of the postwar era with little knowledge of war and its hardships. These facts lead to the question whether postwar education has been successful in providing students with food for thought on the question of the nation, nationalism and patriotism, even if leading teachers insisted they did not neglect the problem as Secretary Kobayashi of the Teachers' Union claimed. The typical understanding of "patriotism" held by junior and high school students was that "patriotism" is the same as "love for man," that to love peace and patriotism are one and the same thing, and that patriotism is also a natural emotion.¹⁵ In other words, such an image of patriotism is of the ideal patriotism. The real questions in present international politics must be: Is it always possible? What should we do when "patriotism" and "love for man" seem incompatible? What happens if the "peace" and "security" of the country appear contradictory?

15. Cf. Naikaku Kanbo Chōsa Shitsu, ed., Sengo ni okeru Aikokushin rōngi no Tembo, (Review of Postwar Patriotism Argument) (Shakai Fucho Chōsa Shiryo no. 12, Tokyo: 1962), pp. 22-23.

We will continue our discussion based on the same special serial in Mainichi Shimbun during October-November 1960. The following excerpts from men of all walks in life help suggest some of the prevailing ideas about the character of the nation. Kuwabara Yoshikichi, president of the Chamber of Commerce in Gifu Prefecture, had this to say:

The idea of patriotic loyalty and dying for the Emperor seems no longer acceptable. It is also true that postwar Japan lacks a spiritual backbone to replace the prewar patriotism. Japan has to make contributions to the whole world in the field of economics, not in military competition. In order to carry this out, the Japanese people must have the spirit of peace and coordination. Our foreign policy, once decided, should be pursued in a bi-partisan way.¹⁶

Suginome Harusada, president of Hokkaido University, expressed the following view:

All nations of the world have their own history, manners and customs, and traditions. Patriotism is the effort to develop good aspects of things Japanese (for Japan), by improving what is to be improved, with the ultimate goal of contributing to world peace and the happiness of mankind. Our growth and development should be accompanied by love for the larger community.¹⁷

These opinions, the second one in particular, resemble the views expressed by high school students in their idealistic tone and generality. The real problem arises when attempts are made to turn this high principle into concrete educational and other policies for the nation. Many of the debates on the nation stop at this level of generality -- which has the effect of avoiding the real and burning issues at the core of

16. The Mainichi Shimbun, November 18, 1962.

17. Ibid.

nationalism. Nosaka Sanzo, who had the distinction of starting the controversy over patriotism right after the war, departed from an abstract ideal of patriotism to a concrete but partisan view when, after pointing out that "kuni" meant nothing but "kokumin," he claimed:

The most important patriotism today is to fight voluntarily for the emancipation of the people half occupied by the security treaty and to win our independence.¹⁸

Nosaka's view on patriotism remained intact as far as his anti-governmental position was concerned. The change came in his view of the U.S. as a liberator in 1946. and then as an imperialist oppressor of the Japanese people from 1950 on.

A rightist leader, Akao Bin, expressed his view that

... there is no difference between the prewar and postwar years as far as patriotism is concerned.... We must create a new democracy built upon Japanese tradition and history. That is, to have the Emperor as our head, and the Emperor and the people living together like a family. It is an integration of the monarch and the subject.¹⁹

For Akao, the assassin of Asanuma was a patriot and hero. "Mr. Asanuma was not a patriot. Mr. Yamaguchi killed him in order to save the life line of the nation. This was an act of self defense."²⁰

Another rightist, Kojima Motoyuki, expressed his regret that the Japanese national consciousness had been badly hurt by the Occupation

18. Ibid. He added in another interview that "the JCP is against any aggression to Japan. We shall fight if the Soviet Union or Communist China should invade Japan. But it is absolutely impossible for them to invade Japan." Shin Shūkan, July 24, 1962, p. 35.

19. Shin Shūkan, August 14, 1962, pp. 26-27.

20. Ibid., p. 29.

policy and the postwar progressive intellectuals. He was content, however, only to emphasize "particularities of Japan" in his support for an integration of democracy and national consciousness.²¹

In summing up the trend of journalism on this issue during the period of "economic nationalism," Ohkuma's essay serves as a good indication of progress, or lack of progress, in the development of the long argued subject. Ohkuma repeated his theory that patriotism means loyalty. Loyalty includes institutionalized obligation as well as personal emotion toward the state. And, he argued, "loyalty of the Japanese people to world peace is loyalty to the Japanese Constitution."²² This understanding is based, as we have discussed previously, on his assumption that the state is essentially evil. Many of the Japanese found his theory too simplified, but few argued back that the state was essentially a force for virtue. Hayashi Kentaro's criticism of Ohkuma's theory advocated a more balanced common sense for the majority of the Japanese. He maintained that the evil of the state only "arises under a particular circumstance and is not unconditional."²³ A high school teacher, Ōhi Kai, warned against the tendency to treat the question of patriotism as being synonymous with democracy and peace. Recognizing

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21. Kojima Motoyuki, "Yugamerareta Minzoku Ishiki" (Distorted National Consciousness) Shiso no Kagaku, April 1961, pp. 55-59.
 22. Cf., the same article and also his article, "Sokoku Sōshitsu no Nihonteki Jyōkyō" (Japanese Situation of "Lost" State) Gendai no Me, vol. 4, no. 7 (July 1962), and "Aikokushin towa Nanika" (What is Patriotism?) Monbu Jiho, no. 1023, November 1962.
 23. Hayashi Kentaro, "Aikokushin no Riron to Jissen," (Theory and Practice of Patriotism) Jiyu, vol. 4, no. 10 (October 1962), p. 12.

that there had been efforts to plant democracy, pacifism, ideal of the nation, disarmament and universal ideal of man in the core of Japanese nationalism, he stated:

Nationalism cannot be formed on the universal ideal of the human-being only, because it is the sentiment which tries to display the uniqueness of the people and is usually based on the consciousness of the peculiarities of their history and tradition.²⁴

The interesting point of the above statement is that such a common sense view of nationalism, rather than being evident to all, had to be expressed at that time in Japan.

Opinion Surveys

Now we will turn our attention from journalism to the concepts of the nation held by the people in general as revealed in public opinion surveys. First, most Japanese people believed they had a general feeling of "patriotism" without specifying what it meant to them. In one survey carried out by Yoshimura Yuzuru of Saitama University and others in 1963, 80.5% answered that they felt patriotism; 3% denied it; 15.6% found difficulty answering either way; and 3% were undecided.²⁵ A majority of the people (77%) recognized a change in the Japanese people's ideas and attitudes toward "patriotism" before and after the war.²⁶ The word "patriotism," however, still was closely associated with war in people's minds. One out of every four confessed that they had bad

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24. Ōhi Kai, "Nippon Nashonarizumu no Keisei," (Formation of Japanese Nationalism) Chuo Koron, vol. 78, no. 7 (July 1963), p. 36.
 25. Yoshimura Yuzuru, "Nihonjin no Aikokushin," (Patriotism of the Japanese) Jiyu, vol. 7, no. 3 (March 1965), pp. 23-24.
 26. The Yomiuri Shimbun, September 7, 1964.

feelings for the word. Indeed, 42% of those in their thirties expressed a sense of hatred for the word.²⁷

As to the symbols of the nation, the national flag and the national anthem were endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the people. Eighty-seven percent thought the Japanese flag (hinonaru) was good and eighty-four percent supported the national anthem (kimigayo).²⁸ Thus, together with stable support for the Imperial system, symbols of the nation received steady and firm support from the majority.²⁹ An interesting survey of 1961 is also available concerning the concepts of "patriotism." To the question, "To love Japan is to love what?" the following are answers.³⁰

People	39.1%
Land and Nature	28.7%
Emperor	10.9%
Tradition	10.4%
Others	2.1%
No opinion	8.8%

These figures indicate that the base for old "loyalty-patriotism" has to a large extent been replaced by the new concept of "people's patriotism." This tendency is confirmed by another question in the same survey.³¹

27. Yoshimura, op. cit., pp.24-25.

28. The Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1963.

29. Naikaku Soridajjin Kanbo Kōhōshitsu, Kōshiki-Sei do ni Kansuru Yoron Chōsa, (Public Opinion Poll concerning the Official System), 1962.

30. Naikaku Kanbo, Aikokushin, op. cit., p. 12.

31. Ibid., p.9.

Do you feel most rewarded when you work for
or live for:

Parents	1.2%
Emperor.	0.7%
State or Nation	1.4%
Society	5.8%
Husband or wife	3.2%
Children.	41.5%
Family	22.8%
Sweetheart.	0.5%
Mankind	0.6%
Yourself	15.0%
Class	0.3%
Others and no opinion	7.0%

To the first question approximately 10% answered that "patriotism" was "to love the Emperor." When we consider that less than 1% answered they felt most rewarded in working for the Emperor, there seems little left of the old concept of patriotism, or Chūkun Aikoku.

The definitions of patriotism differ considerably according to age and education. One survey item, tabulated according to age and education, offered two alternatives with special emphasis on the individual vs. state issue:

Choose one of the following two views of the state that is closer to your own opinion.

- A. Patriotism is to sacrifice the individual national for the sake of the whole country.
- B. No. The most important thing in patriotism is to value each individual.

The number choosing sacrifice of individual for country (View A) increased with age level as follows: 5.6% of those in their twenties; 8.4% of those in their thirties; 13.9% of those in their forties; and 21.5% of those in their fifties. On the other hand, support decreased as education level increased. Of those with only a compulsory education, 14.1% chose View A, as opposed to 11.8% of those with professional and university education. Support for "the individual" thesis (View B) drops off by age as follows: 76.0% of those in their twenties; 61.4% in their thirties; 56.9% in their forties; and 47.3% of those in their fifties. And by educational level, 55.8% of those with a compulsory education; 66.1% of those with secondary education; and 70.4% of those with professional or university education.³²

Is the tendency for privatization of interest and concern peculiar to Japan or a world phenomenon? An interesting international comparative study on patriotism carried out during November 1957 to February 1958 is available although it is not completely reliable due to its inadequate sampling and other difficulties. It serves, however, as a good indication of the general understanding in the countries examined.

International Comparison of "Patriotism" of Youth³³

Do you think it is always ridiculous to sacrifice priceless human life for the cause of the country?

	Japan (17 - 18 yrs) 2321 samples	Germany (15 - 20 yrs) 115 samples	Great Britain (15 - 18 yrs) 79 samples	France (16 - 18 yrs) 48 samples
Yes	32.4	36.0	14.5	8.3
No	41.5	42.0	73.9	25.0
Undecided	26.1	22.0	11.6	66.7

32. Cf. Tamura Eiichiro, "Aikokushin wa Duo Kangaerarete Iruke," (What People Think About Patriotism) Kyōiku no Jidai, (Age of Education), June 1964, pp. 24-26.
33. Ushijima Yoshitomo, Seio to Nihon no Ningei Keisei (Human Formation in the West and Japan) (Tokyo: Kaneko Shobo, 1961), pp. 295-297.

Which of the following do you choose when your country becomes a belligerent against her will?

	Japan	Germany	Gr. Britain	France
Willingly Participate	15.9	33.4	86.1	83.3
Unwillingly Participate	33.6	44.6	17.4	12.4
Absolutely No Participation	48.7	14.9	13.0	2.1

In the case of Japan, 32.4% answered that it is ridiculous to sacrifice the life of the individual in any circumstances. About half of those who answered "undecided" are presumably in the last group of "Absolutely No Participation" in the second question. The answers to the second question are more or less expressions of desire or ideal. Answers to the following third question demonstrates the realism of Japanese youth.

In case of (2), which of the following do you think your countrymen will take?³⁴

	Japan	Germany	Gr. Britain	France
Willingly Participate	9.7	35.1	72.5	47.9
Unwillingly Participate	66.7	56.0	24.6	33.3
Absolutely No Participation	15.9	1.0	1.5	2.1

It is clear that Japanese youth are the most unwilling to participate in their country's defense activities. Of the Japanese who answered in the positive concerning defense, 9.7% are in contrast to the 35.1% of German young people who also experienced war and defeat. This survey of youth must be qualified by introducing all age groups in order to get a balanced view of the Japanese attitude toward defense in case of external

34. Ibid., p. 295.

aggression. The following table shows results of opinion polls carried out in Nagoya City and Gifu Prefecture concerning the reactions of the people toward external aggression in 1960, 1961, 1964, and 1967.³⁵

In case of foreign aggressions, do you stand up with a gun? Or, do you think all Japanese should stand-up if they are Japanese at all?

	1960	1961	1964	1967
1. Fight against any aggressor	43.4	32.6	44.4	47.1
2. Fight against particular aggressor only	1.3	1.1	3.0	1.7
3. Not fight against any aggressor	15.3	18.3	13.0	14.8
4. Wrong to fight with guns	12.2	16.5	11.2	8.7
5. There will be no aggression	8.6	8.9	11.5	6.0
6. Undecided	19.2	22.6	16.2	21.7

Nationalism is manifested in its most extreme and simplest form in relation to defense of the nation against an external aggression. The above figures show that less than half of the Japanese are willing to fight against any and all aggressors. The survey previously quoted showed that 80.5% of the Japanese clearly answered that they felt "patriotism of some kind." This leads to the conclusion that at least one out of two

35. Naikaku Kambo, Aikokushin, op. cit., p. 10.

thinks that armed defense against external aggression is not a necessary condition for being a patriot. Those who answered that they would fight only against a particular aggressor can be better identified with those who rejected fighting in toto, for their compliance with foreign domination runs counter to our definition of nationalism as a demand for self-government.

In the following section of the third period of "economic nationalism" we will discuss several issues that deserve separate treatment. They are Eda Saburo's theory of patriotism, Hayashi Fussao's history of the Greater East Asian War, and the Tokyo Olympic Games.

Eda Saburo's Theory of Patriotism

Eda Saburo, then Chief of the Organization Bureau of the Socialist Party, provided one of the focal points for the patriotic argument of this period. We have mentioned that the word "patriotism" was unpopular among the progressive intellectuals and among those who were in their forties and fifties because of its association with war. The previously quoted remark by the leader of the Teachers' Union was one of the rare statements by the non-Communist left. One can therefore understand why the Eda statement of May 1964 on patriotism, made by such an eminent man of the left, created quite a sensation. Eda's statement aroused opposition within the Socialist Party because many of its members considered it to be pro-government. It read in part as follows:

It is certain that patriotism and morality are necessary, but the reformist camp has so far avoided any reference to these questions. The avoidance on our part has been restricting our reform movement. We have resisted the use of words such as patriotism and morality because these words are being used by the conservatives for moral education. Such opposition has given the world an impression that the reformist camp has neither patriotism

nor morality. Moreover, our position on this matter has been made use of by the conservatives and reactionaries. It must be the reformist camp that begins to preach patriotism and morality clearly and courageously and launch the first attack on the conservatives.³⁶

Sasaki Kōzo, an opponent of the Eda faction, criticized Eda for attempting to seek publicity for himself. Furthermore, an ex-Teachers' Union leader and Diet member condemned it as inopportune at a time when the Education Ministry was promoting "official moral education."³⁷ To these criticisms, Eda endeavored to explain his true intention in Mainichi Shimbun, May 23, 1964. He further stated:

We believe that to love the country means to make Japan a country where the Japanese people can really enjoy a comfortable, peaceful, cultural and rich life. In this sense, we may say that our party platform itself is an expression of this principle of patriotism.... We must admit that some of us, in the progressive camp, have been afraid of, or tried to avoid, words such as "moral education" and "patriotism" because these words were once used by the prewar ruling class. Or, they are afraid of fighting against the present ruling class over the issue of nationalism. I believe that we should not only oppose the backward-looking moral education and patriotism claimed by the conservatives, but also vigorously advocate to the public the true patriotism and moral education according to our belief.³⁸

Eda's idea of patriotism is not new: such a view has been presented and discussed by many progressive intellectuals. Eda was the first responsible man of the Socialist Party to insist that the party propose its own version of patriotism in order to cope with the conservative offensive. The

36. The Sandei Mainichi, June 7, 1964, p. 22.

37. Ibid., p. 23.

38. The Mainichi Shimbun, May 23, 1964.

Teachers' Union took the view that there was no need to teach patriotism itself as a separate theme; it maintained the conventional view that courses in history and other social studies could deal with the question better. Little attention was paid to Eda's warning that the Socialists were giving the wrong impression to the general public that they did not care for patriotism. Thus, Eda's statement was successful only in temporarily stimulating argument on the question of patriotism and education. This demonstrates how difficult it was among the "progressives" to talk about patriotism during that period.

Discussion of the Nature of the War

About the same time, there appeared a self-assertive, rightist, and nationalistic interpretation of the war by an ex-Communist novelist who had been "converted" to a rightist position during the war. This man, Hayashi Fusao (b. 1902 -), rejected the commonly used terminology of "the Pacific War" and called the war Daito-A Senso (The Greater East Asia War), the terminology used by the militarists. The title of his series in Chuo Koron was a rather provocative one: Daito-A Senso Kōtei Ron (Affirmative Theory of the Greater East Asian War). He claimed that the so-called Daito-A Senso began with the kyōi (Expel the Barbarians) movement at the end of the Tokugawa period, and ended with the surrender on August 15, 1945. It was, furthermore, his contention that this century-long war was primarily a war for the liberation of Asia from aggression by the Western powers. It was Japan's tragic destiny to be the principal protagonist in this struggle. The 100 years war was, however, supported by the national passion of the people rather than government compulsion and manipulation. Since August 1945, Hayashi wrote, Japan had retired

from a leading position in Asia; the war against the United States in the Pacific was only the last part of a greater war.³⁹

Sometimes a man has to fight even when he knows that he will lose. There are unavoidable things for the nation, as well as for a man. That war [Pacific war] was such a situation.⁴⁰

However, for at least the next 100 years, there will be no war in which Japan takes a major part.⁴¹ He disclosed his motive for writing this controversial essay in the postscript of his book.

I resolutely resist the interpretations of Japanese history which are distorted by the "progressive" intellectuals of Japan since defeat. History must be written as it was and as it is. The history of Japan is as beautiful as those of other countries. Our history contains something that is not beautiful, but is also valuable for us Japanese.⁴²

Hayashi's theory of the Daito-A war was written as an antithesis to the historical view of "the Pacific War." Although he was the first man who attempted to restore the wartime historical justification in toto, he was not the first to criticize the so-called "Pacific War" theory which denounced all justifications of Japanese efforts and policies with respect to the Daito-A war. For example, Takeuchi Yoshimi proposed to make

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39. Hayashi Fusao, Daito-A Senso Kōteiron (Affirmative Theory of the Greater East Asian War) (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1964).
 40. Hayashi Fusao, Nippon Seishin no Shinzui (Essence of Japanese Spirit) (Tokyo: LDP, 1967), pp.14-15.
 41. Hayashi Fusao, "Daito-A Senso Koteiron," (Affirmative Theory of the Greater East Asian War) Chuo Koron, vol.79. no.4 (April 1964), p.185.
 42. Hayashi Fusao, Daito-A Senso, op.cit., p.262.

a distinction between war against the developed countries and war against underdeveloped countries. He argued that:

The Daito-A War was a war against imperialism as well as a war of colonial aggression. It was integrated in practice, but, theoretically, this distinction must be maintained. Japan did not intend to invade the United States and Great Britain. Japan took Dutch colonies, but not the Netherlands itself. Imperialism cannot overthrow imperialism. Neither can imperialism judge imperialism.⁴³

Ueyama Shumpei wrote an article, "Philosophical Significance of the Daito-A War" for Chuo Koron in 1961 based on Takeuchi's essay. Ueyama emphasized the imperialist aspect of the war, calling it an imperialist war for the re-distribution of colonies. Thus, he rejected both "the Pacific War" theory and the wartime ideology of "the Daito-A War." He argued that, as long as one accepts the concept of the "sovereign nation," no "sovereign nation" can judge another, since war is itself an expression of the rights of the "sovereign nation." Ideals, such as "democratic nationa" and "peace-loving nations," cannot be universal as long as they are combined with "state power."

In order to put Japan on an equal footing with the Allied Powers, Hayashi eliminated one aspect of Takeuchi's theory that was not consistent with his own and skillfully introduced Ueyama's relativistic view. Hayashi cautiously avoided the word "justification" and adopted the more neutral work "affirmation." However, it is obvious that he justified the 100 years

43. Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Kindai no Chōkoku" (Conquest of Modernity) in Yoshimoto Takaaki, ed., Nashonarizumu, (Nationalism) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1964).

44. Ueyama Shumpei, "Daito-A Senso no Shiso shi teki Igi" (Ideological Significance of the Greater East Asian War) Chuo Koron, vol. 76, no. 9 (September 1961).

war as a defensive war by Asians against the encroaching Western powers. As Nakase Juichi pointed out concerning Hayashi's view of war, the fact that the Japanese desire to justify "that war" prepares the base for such an argument.⁴⁵ In an article by a rightist, The Daito-A War is described as follows:

The Greater East Asian countries have achieved their independence through the course of this war. The conquest of the white people ended... Japan had to resort to wars in order to defend herself against white aggression. The Greater East Asian War was the inevitable destiny of Japan as a newly born nation...⁴⁶

Quite expectedly, historians were highly critical of Hayashi's theory. Inoue Kiyoshi, for example, indicated that Hayashi was inaccurate in his presentation of the historical facts. He questioned the view that Japan's annexation of Korea could be justified as part of a war to liberate Asia. On the other hand, Ueyama saw some validity in Hayashi's point that some Japanese had dreamed of liberating Asia, although few of these held high bureaucratic or military positions. According to Ueyama, Hayashi's view is a natural reaction to the one-sided interpretations of the Second World War held by progressive intellectuals and historians.

The general reaction of the critical world was not, however favorable to Hayashi's interpretation. Indeed, Hayashi appeared partisan and dogmatic in his conclusion even to those who generally agreed

45. Nakase Juichi, "Daito-A Senso Kōteiron no Shisoshi-tei Keifu " (Ideological Genealogy of the Affirmative Theory of the Greater East Asian War) Gendai no Me, vol.5, no.10 (October 1964).

46. Muto Teiji, "Daito-A Senso Kōteiron ni Kangekisuru " (Impressed by the Affirmative Theory of the Greater Asia War) Hikari, October 1964.

with his sentiment concerning the war. In the concluding chapter, this controversy will be discussed again in relation to different interpretations of Japan a century after the Meiji Restoration.

The Olympic Games

The third and last topic concerns the Tokyo Olympic Games in October 1964. They formed the first large-scale international gathering to be held in Japan after the war -- a gathering which was to attract the attention of the people to an unprecedented degree. The Games provided a good opportunity for Japan to boast of her economic recovery and progress. Aida Yūji of Kyoto University wrote in Asahi Shimbun concerning Japanese "Olympic fever: "

Passwords such as "Until the Olympics" and "By the Olympics" enjoy tremendous authority as everything seems to be rushing toward completion under these passwords. Construction works in Tokyo are continuing in a half-crazed manner. Anything that has no relation to the Olympics appears to have been temporarily abandoned.⁴⁷

With the opening of the Games, newspapers carried many contributions from their readers. Many pointed to an increased awareness of nationality resulting from the Olympics. A housewife in Tokyo wrote in Mainichi Shimbun on October 27, 1964, that her husband watched the Olympic programs on TV every day and quoted him as saying: "I seem to have patriotism. I am glad of it." A middle-aged company employee in Tokyo confessed that he had not liked the idea of spending so much money on the Olympics until he saw them: "The Olympic Games helped us greatly to

47. The Asahi Shimbun, May 23, 1964.

recover our national consciousness."⁴⁸ A critic, Okuno Takeo, valued the Games highly: "Unconsciously, the Japanese people seem to have objectively expressed both nationalism and internationalism. They have been liberated from an unfounded national and racial inferiority complex."⁴⁹ A student in Tokyo expressed a similar view. He wrote that the Japanese people, having been defeated, were caught up by a feeling of inferiority.

However, Japan is now sponsoring these great Olympic Games and our champions are making fine records. Without hesitating, they proudly demonstrate "the Nippon spirit." The Japanese have risen again overcoming defeat. I am grateful to the Olympic Games for dispelling the defeatism of the Japanese.⁵⁰

A lady critic, Sakanishi Shio, recognized the Games' contribution to the awakening of Japanese national consciousness:

First of all, we learned that we are Japanese and live in a country called Japan... we were obsessed by the strange illusion that it was desirable to lose our national character and become internationalists. We thought that those who discarded our national flag and anthem were liberated internationalists... in the Olympic Games, every time a gold medal was won by a Japanese, our national flag was raised to our national anthem. We were told, even against our will, that we are Japanese after all. The two-week-long Olympic Games cultivated the Japanese national consciousness among the people.⁵¹

48. The Mainichi Shimbun, October 25, 1964.

49. The Yomiuri Shimbun, October 14, 1964.

50. The Tokyo Shimbun, October 21, 1964.

51. The Asahi Shimbun, October 26, 1964.

As the medals were announced and the winner's national anthem played, the Japanese were naturally compelled to compare themselves with other "foreigners" and "foreign" countries. They recognized "Japan's place in the world," for the Olympics are games in which "state power" is inconspicuous. The government made a survey on the impact of the Olympics on the national consciousness of the Japanese people in December of the same year.⁵²

Did you feel anew that you were a Japanese during the Tokyo Olympic Games?

Yes	34%
No.	35%
No Opinion	31%

The breakdown of those who answered "yes" is as follows:

Those who felt Japan's power, etc.	13%
Those who felt patriotism.	4%
Those who felt Japanese were lacking in physical structure	4%
Those who felt need for more vigorous efforts on the part of the Japanese.	4%
Those who felt more friendliness toward foreigners.	3%
Those who felt Japanese behavior was good	1%
Those who felt Japan was recognized by foreigners	1%
Others	5%

52. Sōrifu Kōhōshitsu, Olimpikku Tokyo Taikai ni Tsuite (On the Tokyo Olympic Games), 1964.

About 20% answered that their feelings toward the national flag were changed by the Olympic Games. Thus, the Games gave the Japanese an opportunity to re-evaluate and reconsider "Japan" and "Japanese" free from a close association with war. However, in the final analysis, it was Japan's economic growth that made this international sports-event possible. This was "economic nationalism" even if it was not publicly discussed as such. The Japanese people knew what it was that they could take pride in at that time.

CHAPTER 5

CONCERN OVER NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE (1964-1968)

The fourth period, 1964-1968, is the period when government policy shifted from Ikeda's economic emphasis to Sato's emphasis on national security and defense. The government began openly to demand an awakening to the necessity of having a strong national consciousness and will to defend the country.

National Foundation Day

The Sato government restored and legalized the old holiday, Kigensetsu (Day of Emperor Jimmu's Enthronement), which symbolized the prewar concept of the nation under the name of Kenkoku Kinenbi (National Foundation Day). The question of Kigensetsu had been an issue ever since the Occupation era. According to government research on national holidays, conducted in 1948, Kigensetsu was ranked third in popularity, following New Year's Day and the Emperor's Birthday.¹ Backed by public support, the Japanese government had planned to continue Kigensetsu under the Occupation. The Occupation authorities, however, took the view that this particular national memorial day was a product of Japanese statism, established to fortify government prestige. Although the Occupation powers were not against setting a national foundation day other than February 11, the Japanese government chose not to include Kigensetsu at all among the national holidays in the hope that

1. Naikaku Yoron Chōsa Shitsu, Shikusaibi ni Kansuru Yoron Chōsa (Public Opinion Polls Concerning the National Holidays), 1948, p. 2.

it could freely set the date after independence.² In 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru declared his intention to "restore Kigensetsu after independence," but an actual legislative move had to wait until 1957 when a bill to amend national holidays was presented by Liberal-Democratic Party members to the Diet. The bill did not become law due to a strong Socialist opposition, and conservative efforts to restore Kigensetsu continued unsuccessfully in 1958, 1961, and 1963. Then, under the Sato government, the bill was presented to the Diet as a governmental bill, rather than as a bill sponsored, as previously, by members of the Diet.

Prime Minister Sato made his view clear on this issue at the Gubernatorial Conference in Tokyo on February 3, 1965. He said that he favored February 11 as the date for national foundation day and continued:

There are a great many different ideas as to when national foundation day should be observed. Some people seem to oppose February 11 for the date. However, I don't think we should argue too much about such a matter. I think the best plan is to hold it on February 11, the day people know as the day of observance of Kigensetsu in prewar years.³

In that same address to the conference, Sato referred to the question of patriotism:

I have made it clear also that when the people lose their sense of responsibility and mission toward the state (kokka), and when the people lack the spirit for construction and the will for progress, society stagnates and the state declines. In order to avoid

2. Nihon-Shi Kenkyukai, ed., Nihon no Kenkoku (National Foundation of Japan) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1966), pp. 212-213.

3. The Asahi Shimbun, February 4, 1965.

such a misfortune, a new patriotism is needed: true patriotism that loves Japan's traditions and culture, contributes to the prosperity and progress of our country, and strives for world peace and the welfare of mankind.⁴

Emphasis on the necessity of responsibility to the state and re-evaluation of Japanese culture and traditions gradually led to a more clear-cut and louder cry for the awakening of a defense consciousness.

As we have seen, the people supported Kigensetsu immediately after the war. This support, however, did not continue throughout the postwar years, thereby lessening the Sato government's justification for restoring Kigensetsu. A public opinion poll carried out by the government in 1960 indicated that only 40% favored the establishment of a national foundation day as compared to 80% in 1948. Thirty percent felt no need of setting such a day. The survey also disclosed that only 18% supported February 11 as the date.⁵

The opposition parties strongly opposed Sato's speech. A large group of historians joined in opposition by submitting a petition to the Diet against restoration of Kigensetsu on the grounds that such a move would restrict the people's freedom in thinking about history.⁶ Members of the general public took part in the arguments, but the opposing minority remained the most articulate. As an indication of how widespread this

4. The Mainichi Shimbun, February 3, 1965.

5. Cf. The Mainichi Shimbun, February 11, 1965.

6. Nihon Rekisi Kenkyukai, op. cit., p. 238.

argument was, during the month of February 1965, 550 readers' contributions to Asahi Shimbun concerned Kigensetsu. Sixty-five percent of these were against its restoration as opposed to thirty-one percent in favor. Seventy-four percent of those opposed did not reject the idea of a national foundation day itself if the date were other than February 11.⁷

Opposition in the Diet resulted in the setting up of a commission in July 1966 to study the date for the national foundation day. The commission reported in December that February 11 was the most appropriate date for observance.⁸ Thus, the first national foundation day was observed on February 11, 1967. The Ministry of Education sent a notice to the boards of education in January which read in part as follows: "On the occasion of the National Foundation Day, it would be most significant for us to think of the prosperity and development of the nation." Generally speaking, however, most primary and secondary schools were not prepared to celebrate the day and little observance was reported throughout the country except at shrines and several cities such as Kashiwabara where, according to tradition, Emperor Jimmu was enthroned some 2,600 years ago.⁹

We will examine the reasons for and against the restoration of Kigensetsu on February 11 relying on readers' contributions to newspapers.

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7. The Asahi Shimbun, February 28, 1965.
 8. The other parties proposed different dates for the national foundation day. The Socialist Party, May 3 (The Constitution Memorial Day); The Democratic Socialist Party, April 30 (Day when Shotoku Taishi announced his 17-article Constitution; and the Komei-To, April 28 (Day when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came to power).
 9. Jiji Nenkan, 1968 edition (Tokyo: Jiji Shimbun-sah, 1968), p. 155.

But first we will perhaps best discuss the question of the Kigensetsu controversy by quoting from a discussion televised from the TBS network on February 8, 1965. The participants on the panel discussion were: Nagayama Tadanori (67), LDP member; Watanabe Izo (80), Free Asia Association; Oda Makoto (32), novelist and critic; and Takahashi Shinichi (53), historian. The first two favored establishing the national foundation day on February 11, while the other two were opposed. After relatively calm presentations by the panel members, the discussion became rather heated.

Watanabe: Ever since defeat in war, some of the Japanese people have been caught by defeatism and they jabber and protest that the date of Kigensetsu is wrong or something of this sort. I am sure that those fellows never discussed the spirit of Kigensetsu.

Takahashi: (Interrupting) I don't quite agree with you.

Oda: (Interrupting) Do you mean to say all of us who were born after the war are captives of defeatism?

Watanabe: The Japanese people were forced to adopt the Constitution before they decided their national holidays.

Oda: (Interrupting) Mr. Watanabe, do you...

Watanabe: Shut up! (Oda said something that was not understandable.) You, shut up!

Oda: (Interrupting) Even if you are speaking, I...

Watanabe: You are uncouth to interrupt!

Oda: Uncouth? What do you mean?

Moderator: Please come back to the point.¹⁰

10. Sandai Mainichi, February 21, 1965.

This rather unusual televised discussion indicates how highly emotional, and prohibitive to rational, calm discussion the Kigensetsu issue was.

A typical view opposing Kigensetsu was expressed by a 55-year old company employee in Tokyo.

The people have not forgotten the miseries of war brought about by militaristic thought which was reinforced by hinomaru, kimigayo, and Kigensetsu. No, we cannot forget even though we may want to. What on earth are the views of the government and the LDP about this sorrowful memory that is deeply engrained in the minds of the people? Many people fear the return of the militaristic age because of this series of restorations.¹¹

The main reason for the opposition was psychological repulsion to Kigensetsu and mistrust of the government's intentions in restoring such a suspect event. Other reasons seem secondary in importance, but among these are: (1) February 11 is historically inaccurate as the day of Emperor Jimmu's enthronement; (2) To observe such a day would be to teach a mistaken view of history and a false concept of the nation.

On the other hand, a typical supporting view was contributed by a middle-aged company employee in Kyoto.

Those who oppose Kigensetsu seem to accept uncritically postwar society and education without recognizing the abnormality of being under the military occupation of the victorious powers. I wonder if independent politics and education existed at all in Japan at that time when, owing to defeat, a servile mood prevailed among the people. We cannot help but recognize the value of these ancient myths beyond their historical truth.¹²

11. The Asahi Shimbun, February 7, 1965.

12. The Asahi Journal, vol. 7, no. 8 (February 21, 1965), p. 13.

Many who favored restoration of the national foundation day reasoned that nations, like individuals, should have their birthdays. February 11 seemed the natural day for such an observance because the people had once been accustomed to it. There were also those who demanded restoration chiefly because the holiday had been abolished by the Occupation. These supporters were expressing simple, naive nationalism in their identification with an historical Japanese image, even when it was opposed by others from universal viewpoints such as peace, democracy, human dignity, and historicity.

The Ideal Image of the Japanese

The conservatives who launched their first challenge to the postwar education system with "The Deplorable Textbooks," never spared their efforts to bring education under their control by means of centralization of the educational system itself. By 1965 they had gone beyond criticizing education negatively, and were rigorously presenting their own ideas about what education should be. Even under the so-called "low posture" of the Ikeda government, the Education Minister took a "high posture" in his struggle against the Teachers' Union.¹³ In January 1965, the 19th Special Committee of the Central Council of Education published an interim report on "The Ideal Image of Man" in Japanese society (Kitai Sareru Ningen-Zo). The final report was made available in October 1966 with some organizational and terminological modifications. However, the two reports are essentially one and the same. Publication of the interim

13. Cf. Araki Masuo, Watakushi wa Kyōiku o kou Kangaeru, (My View on Education) (Tokyo: Yoyo-sha, 1961), passim.

report "caused active national controversy and more than 1,000 articles and essays were published in newspapers and magazines both for and against the report."¹⁴

In an effort to discover the reasons behind and the issues involved in this controversy, an examination of the final report is warranted. Under the title "Questions for the Japanese People," one section of the report analyzed the contemporary situation in Japan:

Postwar Japanese economic recovery is one of the miracles of the world. At the same time, however, it is unfortunate that along with economic prosperity there is a tendency toward egoism and epicurism among some of the people. In addition, the spiritual vacuum and confusion of defeat still remain present. If material desire persists alone, without spiritual idealism, we cannot expect long-range economic prosperity nor advancement of true human life.

The miserable fact of defeat, in particular, caused the illusion that all Japanese past ways and values were wrong -- an illusion resulting in neglect of Japanese history and national character. New ideals have filled this gap but they have not paid much attention to the significance of the fertile Japanese cultural soil. Some have even failed to see characteristics that the Japanese people have so far retained.¹⁵

Under the section "As a National," the ideal Japanese is described as follows:

To Have Correct Patriotism

There is no individual nor nation that does not construct a state or belong to a state in the present world. The state is the most organic and the strongest grouping in the world. Happiness and security of the individual greatly depend on the state. Usually, the way to contribute to the world is

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14. Monbusho, Kitaisareu Ningen-Zo, (Ideal Image of Man) Tokyo, 1966, p. 42.
 15. Ibid., pp. 9-11.

through the state structure. To love the state correctly is loyalty to the state. Correct patriotism leads to love for mankind.

True patriotism is the mental preparedness and effort to enhance the value of one's country. To remain indifferent to the existence of one's own country and to make no effort to enhance that country's value may lead to hatred of one's country. We must have correct patriotism.

To Respect the Symbol

To respect and love the Emperor is, in the final analysis, to respect and love the Japanese nation. For to respect and love the Emperor, who is the symbol of Japan, means to respect and love the Japanese nation symbolized by the Emperor. The special characteristic of the Japanese nation is to have the Emperor above us.¹⁶

The report is not clear as to what "spiritual vacuum and confusion" mean. What are the "good aspects" of Japan and the people? Despite difficult phraseology, mere generalities rather than concrete policy were proposed. The report was a product of the old concept of the nation held by the older generation. It is interesting that this old Chūkun Aikoku patriotism survived and reappeared, though in a slightly different fashion, and that it was published by the government. The fundamental line of this report coincides perfectly with Prime Minister Ikeda's understanding of the postwar situation and its causes. He once stated that "educational reforms and destruction of our tradition and culture after the war caused the deterioration of patriotism and moral degeneracy."

Naturally, the report is critical of the Fundamental Law of Education -- the real foundation of postwar education. Kosaka Masaaki, chairman of the committee that published the report, wrote to the Asahi Journal on this point as follows:

16. Ibid., pp. 36-39.

Various opinions were presented to the Committee concerning the Fundamental Law of Education. None of us found any bad points in the Law. At the same time, however, the international and domestic situations have changed from those when the Law was promulgated. We should pay attention to this fact. It should also be admitted that there is little consideration of how to accommodate the Law to the Japanese mentality. Negligence of Japanese history makes this accommodation impossible. We considered this point seriously.¹⁷

The report actually amounted to a catalog or criticisms of postwar education. This criticism was skillfully developed into a proposal for revising laws enacted during the Occupation period in order to suit the "present" needs of Japanese society and the state.

Public reaction to the Kitai Sareru Ningen-zo report can be broadly categorized into the following four attitudes: all-out support; support for the general contents with reservations on several points; opposition to the contents; and opposition to the government's undertaking of such a report. The first attitude was expressed by a 39-year old school teacher.

Many critical opinions have been expressed by some of the intellectuals concerning the "Ideal Image of Man." As a school teacher I wish to give my support to the pronouncements and ideas of the report. The problem confronting teachers was that the ideal image of the Japanese was presented by the present educational world from a national viewpoint. Therefore, lacking a concrete image, I found it difficult to teach patriotism in my moral education course. Since this report was announced, however, we have had discussions on the question and I feel more confident in carrying out my educational activities.¹⁸

17. The Asahi Journal, vol.7, no.8 (February 24, 1965).

18. The Mainichi Shimbun, January 15, 1965.

Another reaction appearing in the Asahi Journal was that of Kudō Shōhachiro, permanent member of Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Association) and head of the Tokyo Metropolitan Bank.

It is merely a statement of the obvious. What I want to know are the means of attaining such an image, but no concrete approach is shown.¹⁹

Hayashi Kentaro shared this feeling when he wrote:

What kind of people are they thinking of? The image is not clear... I do not oppose the underlying idea of the report, but I do think it would have been better if they had included historical data to demonstrate the ideal Japanese.²⁰

Opposition to the report in toto was expressed by a young novelist, Ōhe Kenzaburo, who particularly criticized the idea of linking the Emperor with patriotism. A young company employee in Tokyo reacted strongly to what he saw as an attempt by the older generation to impose a value judgment.²¹ Many others questioned the Committee's understanding of "spiritual confusion" in postwar Japanese society.

The fourth group was opposed to the fact that the government dared to undertake such an enterprise as the establishment of an "ideal image" of the Japanese. They felt that this was a subjective matter which should be left to the individual. For instance, an artist, Okamoto Taro, stated:

19. Ibid., January 11, 1965.

20. Ibid.

21. The Asahi Shimbun, January 11 and 15, 1965.

It is beyond government competence to direct and establish a moral standard and an ideal image of man. We cannot morally forgive it. The report emphasizes individuality and liberty in order to make its appearance acceptable. It rests, however, with our independent judgment to decide what is right and what is the ideal image of man. We should alienate this right to no one. What do liberty and individuality mean when they are set from above? We ought not to repeat the prewar mistake of allowing the government to direct our thinking.²²

The Socialist Party, predictably opposed to the report, issued the following statement:

The Party claims that the report not only presents an improper image of the man who shoulders the new Japan, but also embodies reactionary statism as well as conservatism. The Party is especially against the view that loyalty to the Emperor and to the state should be the foundation of education. Such a view threatens the spirit of the Constitution and the Fundamental Law of Education.²³

It is interesting that the Socialist Party, unlike the last group mentioned above, did not object to the government's undertaking of such a moral enterprise. To the contrary, a group of Party members attempted to propose its own image of the ideal Japanese to counter the conservative proposal. The Teachers' Union, however, was more vehement in criticizing and denouncing the report, calling it a step toward militarism.²⁴

The controversial report takes the view that "the world is divided in two: a group of free nations and a group of totalitarian nations." And, as the "happiness and security of individuals owe much to the state" as the

22. The Shūkan Asahi, January 29, 1965.

23. Cf. The Mainichi Shimbun, January 15, 1965.

24. The Asahi Shimbun, October 31, 1966. The leftist reaction to the report can be summarized as "a blue-print for reactionary education and cultivating militarism." Cf. Miyahara Tadimitsu, ed., Kyōiku Kokūsho (Black Paper on Education) (Tokyo: Rodo Jumposha, 1968), p. 66.

most powerful unit in such a divided world, education must awaken the people's consciousness of being members of the Japanese nation. To all intents and purposes, the report is an attempt to shift emphasis from internationalism to nationalism through teaching the "ideal image of man."

An education making no mention of "Japan" and the "Emperor" -- as prescribed in the Fundamental Law -- undoubtedly appeared very unsatisfactory to some of the older generation. The report's concern with and emphasis on the integral nature of the Emperor and the Japanese nation are expressions of the prewar concept of the nation in which the two were held inseparable. (Under the present Constitution, however, the formal status of the Emperor rests with the general will of the people and can be altered or abolished by a two-thirds vote in the Diet and by a majority vote in a popular referendum.) The report neglects the possibility of the people's loving Japan, the substance, without "respecting and loving" the Emperor, the symbol.

The question of the Imperial institution is seldom discussed in relation to the concept of the nation despite its important prewar role as the ruling force and its postwar role as symbol of Japan. This is partly because the majority of the people support the present Imperial institution.

Concerns Over National Security

Since November 1964, the policy and approach of the Sato government concerning the question of the nation can be characterized by its basic concern with security problems. Restoration of Kigensetsu and publication of Kitai Sareru Ningen-Zo were preliminary steps by the government designed to foster confidence in and devotion for Japan. This, in turn,

hopefully would prepare the people for the possible need of national defense. The first direct appeal for such an awareness was included in Prime Minister Sato's address to the extraordinary session of the Diet in December 1967. He stated:

I firmly believe that we can expect a better position in the world and also can contribute to the stability of Asia only when all the people have the will to defend Japan by their own hands and ponder realistic policies (for national defense). . . . Frankly speaking, I do not think the people are paying enough attention to this most important question of securing the safety of their country by their own hands. ²⁵

Nadao Hirokichi, Minister of Education, stressed the need for "defense education" at a press conference that same month.

In postwar education it has been regarded as taboo to take up the question of national security and consciousness for national defense. We should be getting over this tendency by now. ²⁶

The LDP Convention in January 1968, adopted a highly defense-oriented platform which defined 1968 as the year of defense controversy.

It is indicative of great progress in terms of our national security that defense problems have been publicly discussed. . . . Dogmatism of the leftist forces is responsible for much of the present division in national views. In our march for the common national goal, we endeavor not to allow the leftist forces to sacrifice national prosperity and national interests.

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25. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku's speech at the House of Representatives, December 5, 1967.
 26. The Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 1967.

Since the war, Japan has been protecting her security by the small armed self-defense forces and the strong U.S. military forces set up under the U.S. - Japanese security treaty. If we are at all an independent people, we must have the spirit and will to defend our country by our own hands. It is regrettable, however, that many of the Japanese remain rather indifferent to the defense of the country owing to the despondency of defeat, resistance to the restoration of militarism, the habit of depending on the U.S., and ideological attacks by a group of agitators.

During 1968 we shall continue our vigorous campaign to achieve a better understanding of the U.S. - Japanese security treaty and to enhance the people's defense consciousness based on the awareness of Japan as an independent nation.²⁷

When the LDP members attempt to attribute the major responsibility for the division over security matters to "the dogmatism of the leftist forces that sacrifices national prosperity and national interests," they are choosing to appeal to the people directly concerning security and defense problems, bypassing or abandoning possible discussions with the leftist opposition. The Socialist Party's reaction to the LDP program confirms the depth and width of the gap that lies between the two major parties in Japan. The Socialist Party described the Sato government as "the most reactionary regime among the postwar conservative governments" and criticized its defense policy in the following words:

The Sato government attempts to develop a theory of national interest and reactionary nationalism in order to destroy the peace and democracy of the people and to cultivate defense consciousness and statism. It has also launched ideological offensives such as the restoration of Kigensetsu, the publication of Kitai Sareru Ningen-Zo, and the Meiji centenary. The government attempts to infuse the young people with reactionary thoughts by means

27. The LDP, 1968 Nen Undo Hoshin (Activity Program for 1968) (Tokyo, LDP., 1968), p. 84.

of state controlled education and other mass-communication measures including the TV networks.

We must recover the initiative in the struggle and win the offensive struggle against the "Strategy for '70 of the Ruling Class."²⁸

The first test of these two antagonistic platforms came with the visit of the U.S. atomic aircraft carrier, the "Enterprise," to Sasebo in January 1968. A subsequent public opinion poll showed that less than 10% of the people favored future visits by the carrier.²⁹ The people seemed not to have overcome the so-called "nuclear allergy" which the government had previously dismissed as an unfounded fear.

The second test resulted from a statement by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the following month. Minister Kuraishi Tadao, while discussing the fishery problem in the northern sea, is reported to have said:

We cannot hope for effective foreign policy without having warships and guns. The Constitution is too dependent on others in entrusting (its security) to the sincerity and good will of other countries. Japan, with such a constitution, looks like a U.S. concubine. She has no ground to stand on. We must defend our country by our own hands. If we have atomic bombs and an army of 300,000...³⁰

He later argued in the Diet that this report was exaggerated, embellished and did not convey his true intentions. However, he recognized and emphasized again the limits of foreign policy without armed forces.³¹

28. The JSP., 1968 Nendo Undō Hōshin (Activity Program for 1968) in the Gekan Shakaito no. 131, March 1968.

29. The Sukan Asahi, April 5, 1968, pp. 22-23.

30. Minister Kuraishi's reply to the Budget Committee of House of Representatives, February 7, 1968.

31. The Asahi Shimbun, February 7, 1968.

The Socialists, feeling challenged and provoked by this statement, persistently demanded Kuraishi's resignation and blocked discussion of all other subjects in the Diet. ~~Their main~~ reasoning was that he denied the spirit of peace embodied in the Constitution. Also, his remark that unarmed Japan was a "~~U.S. concubine~~" "insults the Japanese people and nation."³²

The Kōmei-To also reacted strongly. The February 10 editorial in Komei Shimbun dealt with "The Kuraishi Statement and the Real Nature of the LDP," reading in part as follows:

The contents of the Kuraishi statement denies the spirit of the peace Constitution and has disclosed the intention of restoring militarism under the name of independent defense. It is a grave situation when a man who holds such a dangerous idea and speaks lightly of the Constitution holds the post of Minister of Agriculture as well.³³

The Democratic Socialist Party at first showed a different reaction when a party member stated that "Mr. Kuraishi's affection for the farmers and fishermen was honestly and frankly expressed."³⁴ The three opposition parties decided to act together in demanding a reply from the government on the following points: the threat to the Constitution posed by the Kuraishi statement; dismissal of Kuraishi and the Cabinet's apology; and basic principles concerning fishery rights in Japanese waters.³⁵

32. Question by Yanagita Shuichi (JSP) at the Budget Committee of House of Representatives, February 7, 1968.

33. The Kōmei Shimbun, February 10, 1968.

34. Sasaki Ryosaku's Question at the Budget Committee of House of Representatives, February 7, 1968.

35. The Asahi Shimbun, February 8, 1968.

The government rejected these demands and the Secretary-General of the LDP stated that the government and the LDP would not accept the demand for Mr. Kuraishi's dismissal. "Even if Minister Kuraishi should offer his resignation, Prime Minister Sato would never accept it."³⁶ However, the opposition coalition remained firm, stalling progress in the Diet for 17 days. The government finally capitulated, and decided on Kuraishi's dismissal because "there has been no progress on the budget deliberation so crucial to the people."³⁷

Solidifying the opposition coalition were severe criticisms of Kuraishi's statement and of the Sato government which, according to the coalition, over-reacted in his defense. An editorial in the Asahi Shimbun, for example, criticized the government's attitude and policy:

Judging from the characteristic and recent shift to the right of the Sato government, we cannot dismiss our suspicion that the theory of Constitutional revision has been developed as an organized movement, and not through a mere slip of the tongue. We believe the easy-going manner of the Prime Minister and the executives of the LDP toward the Constitutional question is primarily responsible for the suspension of the Diet session.³⁸

As far as the Diet was concerned, this issue was officially resolved by the resignation of Minister Kuraishi. It is clear, however, that the issue was never satisfactorily settled and that the controversy left a wider,

36. Ibid., February 9, 1968.

37. The LDP Statement, February 23, 1968.

38. The Asahi Shimbun, February 24, 1968.

deeper gap between the conservatives and the progressives.³⁹ The Kuraishi debate brought out the basic differences between the conservative and progressive camps on the role of the military in international politics, or, more specifically, the role of the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. - Japanese Security Treaty. The conflicting views concerning "the state" with respect to those concerning "the armed forces" were based on different war experiences and different concepts of how national security could be achieved in the nuclear age. The government and LDP approach this question in an "inductive" manner based on realities of present international politics, whereas the Socialists tend to take a "deductive" approach based on the Constitutional principle of peace -- which is still the exception rather than the rule at this stage of human development. Therefore, the oft-discussed comparison between the "realistic approach of the conservatives" and the "idealistic approach of the progressives" has some truth as far as their attitudes toward the defense problem are concerned. The conservatives' "realistic" policies are supported by the hard realities of world politics but are unable to offer the people a future vision of Japan or a sense of national mission. On the contrary, the Socialists' approach has been attractive idealistically, but fails to show the people how their ideals can be realized or how Japan's security can be guaranteed unless the world becomes secure for unarmed nations.

* * *

39. This point was fully recognized by the leading party members. Cf. the above-mentioned LDP statement of February 23 and Horigome Seido, "Kuraishi Mondai to Goken Undo," (The Question of Kuraishi and the Constitution Protection Movement) Gekkan Shakai-To, no.133, May 1968, pp.94-101.

The reaction following the war was one denying completely the prewar concept of the nation. Although some of the leftists advocated the overthrow of the Imperial system and establishment of a people's republic, they were soon forced to drop these demands in face of overwhelming support for the new "symbolic Emperor system." The concept of the nation during the Occupation may be characterized as "peaceful," "democratic," "cultural," and one which did not contradict the "idealistic" a-political state. Indeed, the "Japanese state" during that period did not possess sovereignty and the government acted as a mere agent of the Occupation in domestic politics, as well as in international relations. The ideal of an a-political state was not, therefore, a complete illusion. A valid question is whether such a "state" can really be called a state in the normal sense of the word. For the Japanese people, who had deeply felt the influence of state power, the fall of kokutai was a total liberation from that power. It is also true that for the Japanese who had experienced and known only kokutai, the fall of Japan meant the fall of the state in general. When the necessity for a new state was recognized during this period, such a state had to be created. The predominant thinking of the time was that there were given absolute values such as peace and democracy, and that the state had to be created in concordance with these values.

With the enforcement of the San Francisco peace treaty, a state that was not yet "created" suddenly emerged. The traditional concept of the state, silenced during the Occupation, began to assert itself again. The government and conservative parties started implanting their concept of the traditional state -- supported by the state power which was in their

control -- by means of correcting "the excesses of Occupation policy" to suit what they held to be the realities of Japan. The educational system, considered primarily responsible for the anti-power concept of the state, was their first target. Centralization of educational institutions was forcefully carried out during the second period. The "roll-back" policy, or return to traditional concepts, quickly weakened the concept of the idealized state built up during the Occupation. The conservatives made good use of "the realities of international politics," and skillfully avoided direct confrontation with the "ideal" concept of the nation simply by distinguishing between the idealism and the reality of the nation. The reality of the nation gradually drove out the idealism, resulting in a wider gap between the two concepts of the nation. The anti-treaty revision movement in 1960 marked one climax, and the gap remained.

Economic growth since the latter half of the 1950's reached an astonishingly high level under the Ikeda government. The conservatives, who had dealt a grave blow to the idealized concept of the nation, shifted emphasis to "nation-building" from the non-ideological viewpoint of economic development. They attempted to gain the people's support by focusing on material gain, rather than a mere ideal. In sum, this was "economic nationalism," successful in developing Japan into a major economic power in the world. As the second period ended in keen political struggle, the third period symbolically came to an end in the "national" festival of the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo.

Under the Sato government, an awakening of the national consciousness has been called for with renewed vigor. The conservatives now consider the people ready, both spiritually and materially, for more

vigorous and greater demands by the government for the sake of the nation. The war in Vietnam and Communist China's political offensive backed by nuclear weapons are used by the conservative government in order to emphasize external threats, and the need for national defense and security. Formerly veiled arguments for national defense have now emerged as a new "realist" school in journalism and other mass-communication media. This "realist" school of relatively young scholars has begun emphasizing the necessity of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty and of rearmament with conventional weapons, and thus is shifting the general tenor of discussion by Japan's articulate public opinion leaders on the question of national security. The Diet session in 1967-1968 was called "the Diet of the national security and defense controversy." The opposing attitudes of the conservative and progressive camps have become increasingly entrenched in anticipation of conflict when the present security treaty with the United States comes up for review in 1970.

Thus, a quarter of a century after defeat, Japanese concepts of the nation, with varying degrees of intensity, have come to focus on the question of national security and defense -- an issue which lies as the core of nationalism as often pointed out by scholars in this field.

Postwar Japanese concepts of the nation have undergone various drastic changes: complete denial of the prewar concept; proposal of an ideal concept; "roll-back" or return to the conventional concept; an economic-oriented concept; and, finally, a security-oriented concept. We treated these concepts as they occurred rather than attempting to discuss a single concept throughout the postwar period. At the same time,

however, it is possible to extract several relatively continuous elements found in these concepts. The second part of this thesis discusses these elements in detail. In discussing them, it is important to bear the following three reference points in mind in order to locate these elements properly in the complex and contradictory concepts of the nation.

The first frame of reference is the "left" vs. the "right" in the spectrum of political ideology. This refers not only to the pro-governmental and anti-governmental power struggle. It means the conflict between Marxist philosophy and anti-Marxist creeds as well as the struggle for state power.

The second frame of reference is generational -- particularly important to consider when people experience such a drastic experience as the Defeat was for Japan. As we have repeatedly indicated, it makes a great difference whether a man experienced the war in his twenties, thirties, forties, or sixties, or not at all. The so-called Senzen-Ha, (Prewar Generation), Senchu-Ha (Wartime Generation), and Sengo-Ha (Postwar Generation) are significant subdivisions in any characteristic of these national issues.

The third frame of reference is the conflict between the "idealist" or "pacifist" and the "realist." Although this third reference point overlaps somewhat with the first two, it must be clearly distinguished from them. The pacifist attitude is often expressed in anti-government action, but it differs in motives and goals from the Marxist-oriented anti-government movement. The leftist anti-government movement, even with its slogan of peace, must be carefully examined.

PART II

FOCI OF CONTROVERSY

Part II examines some of the controversial issues that symbolize the nature of postwar Japanese concepts of the nation. The various views of national security signify the depth and the width of conflicting concepts of the nation in contemporary world politics. Education, the prime instrument for enhancing nationalism and the focus of the heated controversy between the "conservatives" and the "progressives," has been tightly centralized and has begun to contribute to the awakening of a new national consciousness among the younger generations. The imperial institution which played the key role in prewar nationalism has experienced a drastic change both in its basic structure and in its legal status. This institution, however, constitutes a uniquely Japanese view of the nation. The occasion of the Meiji Centenary provided an opportunity to reflect and re-examine Japan's past century from different historical viewpoints. This chapter, together with the chapter on the imperial institution, examines continuity and discontinuity between prewar and postwar concepts of the nation.

CHAPTER 6

CONFRONTATION OF VARIOUS VIEWS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Question of Principles: Article Nine of the Constitution and Rearmament

This chapter examines one aspect of the concepts of the nation by analyzing the ideas and policies behind the question of Japan's security and defense. Along with the view of the state held by the people, the leftist attitude toward national security provides a uniquely Japanese concept of the nation in its relation to other sovereign states. To some extent, the optimistic view of an unarmed nation surviving and thriving in the world today is a direct extension of the distrust toward state power prevalent in domestic politics. This leftist distrust frequently appears coated by a highly idealistic view of the world as a peaceful community -- often to such an extent that the genuine ideal and the distrust are no longer distinguishable. In any case, the real question for a student of international politics is whether or not complete unilateral disarmament would jeopardize the security of the nation.

We will first discuss the problem posed by Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution with reference to the de facto and expanding Self-Defense Forces of Japan. The Preamble of the Constitution proclaims the high ideal of peace as follows:

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relations. We have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. . . . [emphasis added]

The famous Article Nine reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people renounce war forever as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potentials, will never be recognized. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

We will not discuss legal interpretations concerning the question of a defensive war. It suffices here to know that the majority view of scholars holds that the article renounces all kinds of war, including defensive war, as well as the use of force to settle international disputes.¹ The issue for us to study is the impact of this war renunciative clause on Japanese concepts of the nation.

The Constitution-Making Process

The first question is: who was responsible for this article? This has special relevance for those who advocate constitutional revision. They urge revision on the grounds that the Constitution was formed under the Occupation and, therefore, has not been an expression of the free will of the Japanese people. "Nationalism" seems to favor this reasoning. According to the most authoritative study of the Constitution, carried out by the Kempō Chōsa-Kai (The Constitution Research Committee), Article Nine came into being under strong pressure from the Occupation authorities. To summarize the committee's agreement on this point:

1. Cf. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Nippon Koku Kempō (The Constitution of Japan) (Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha, 1955), p. 165.

On the following grounds it is sufficiently justifiable to say that the Constitution was forced on the Japanese people by the Occupation authority: the undeniable fact that the draft, in English, was handed to the Japanese government; even if accepted willfully by the Japanese, the Constitution was formed under the Occupation, which could order virtually anything based on the Potsdam Declaration. In particular, it is an incontestable fact that the major reason for accepting it was to maintain the Imperial system.²

The fact that Japanese leaders at that time accepted the revolutionary concept of an unarmed nation primarily because they wished to maintain the Imperial system leads to the core of the second question: that the concept of the nation held by the ruling circle right after the war was the same as the wartime principle of kokutai, and possessed no germ for a democratic nation. Ashida Hitoshi, one of the Shidehara Cabinet members who drew up the draft of the Constitution, later mentioned the atmosphere in which the Constitution was formulated. According to this account, his group felt that acceptance of the MacArthur draft was the only way to save the Emperor. He further maintained that publication of MacArthur's draft would encourage journalistic support, and that if the Shidehara Cabinet had resigned, avoiding responsibility for the Constitution, the succeeding Cabinet would have accepted the entire American draft. The prevailing mood of the Cabinet was to accept it as a quid pro quo.³ As to who initiated Article Nine, opinions diverge: some claim that it was Prime Minister Shidehara; others attribute the primary responsibility to General MacArthur. MacArthur himself

2. Kempō Chōsa-Kai Jimukyoku, ed., Kempō Seitei no Katei ni Kansuru Hōkokusho (Report on the Constitution Establishing Process) (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1961), p. 499.
3. Jushi Kempō Kisei Dōmei, ed., Imano Kempō o Kou Omou, (Views on the Present Constitution) (Tokyo: Jushu Kempō Kisei Domei Shuppanbu, 1958), pp. 5-7.

testified that the renunciation of war clause was the Prime Minister's idea.⁴ Dr. Takayanagi Kenzo, Chairman of the Research Committee, shared the same opinion. Former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, on the other hand, believed the MacArthur was chiefly responsible. He stated:

In my opinion, this [Article Nine] was added by General MacArthur. Needless to say, Prime Minister Shidehara shared the conviction and perhaps he said something about it when he met with the General. I can not believe, however, that Premier Shidehara proposed to include this kind of stipulation in the Constitution.⁵

The report by the Constitution Research Committee did not draw a conclusion as to who was the actual initiator of the article. Some contended that it was useless to inquire into this particular question as the Committee recognized that the whole Constitution was established under Occupation pressure. Nakasone Yasuhiro, for instance, claimed that Japanese will prevailed only within the framework of Occupation policy, and that SCAP "recommendations" were utilized to maneuver Japan to act supposedly under the guise of her voluntary will.⁶ To the more critical members of the Committee, such as Kamikawa Hikomatsu,

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4. Cf. Douglas MacArthur's testimony at the Joint Session of the Military and Foreign Affairs Councils on May 5, 1951 and his answer to Takayanagi Kenzo's letter of inquiry as recorded in Kempō Chōsa-Kai, ed., op. cit., pp.270-271.
 5. Kempō Chōsa-Kai, op. cit., p. 262.
 6. Cf. Sato Isao, "Oshitsuke Kempō Rongi no Kiketsu," (Consequence of the 'Compelled' Constitution Theory) Sekai, no.222 (June 1964) p. 99.

Article Nine was tantamount to an American conspiracy. Although this was an extreme opinion in the Committee, it signifies the anti-American feeling-of-the older conservatives concerning the constitutional question. This elderly professor emeritus of Tokyo University maintained:

Fundamentally, Article Nine is an application of the American policy of disarmament and demilitarization that aimed to place Japan under the permanent control of the United States by prohibiting Japan from having all kinds of armaments including those with war potential.

In order to camouflage this policy, the Preamble and Article Nine are veiled by beautiful phrases. In this sense the Preamble and Article Nine are deceptions.⁷

Now, it is clear that the conservative ruling circle felt compelled by Occupation pressure, but accepted the MacArthur draft in order to save the Emperor and the Imperial system. The primary and gravest concern was how to save the Emperor and kokutai. Little consideration was given to the implications of the article. Only the Communists voiced doubts and opposed the renunciation of defensive war. Amid the confusion and despondency of defeat, desire for peace and disarmament was a "national" emotion -- among the ruling circle as well as the people. The sublime ideal of world peace was an honest reflection of the time. Prime Minister Shidehara stated his view on peace in the Privy Council on March 20, 1946, in the following words:

...I believe Article Nine has no counterpart in the world. I do not believe that Japan's renunciation of war will induce other countries to follow our example immediately. The renunciation of war is a just cause.

7. Kempō Chōsa-Kai Dai Ichibukai, ed., Zembun, Tenno, Senso no Hoki, Kaisei, Saiko Hoki ni Kansuru Hōkokusho (Report on the Preamble, the Emperor, Revision, and Supreme Law) (Kempo Chosa-Kai, Appendix no. 7), pp. 145-146.

Japan shall march along in the wild field of international society, upholding the banner of her ideal. With or without followers for our cause we shall dare to go on because it is right to do so... It is regrettable that a policy of military might prevails today. However, I believe that 20 to 30 years from now nations of the world will come to ponder deeply the necessity of renouncing war. My great pleasure will be to look over my shoulder from my grave at the nations of the world following this great cause.⁸

Shidehara was not alone in supporting the ideal of peace as prescribed in the Constitution. There was general agreement among the Japanese on the United Nations' role in providing security for Japan.⁹ Although this was a consensus of wish, there were many who pointed out the UN's inability of any such guarantee of security. There was strong Japanese willingness to sacrifice part of its own sovereignty to the UN, but, ironically, victor and other nations were known to be unwilling. Lack of discussion on whether or not the article renounced defensive war was an indication of agreement that it did. Prime Minister Yoshida took this view in his reply to those who justified defensive wars. Addressing the House of Representatives in 1946, he stated:

Although this clause concerning the renunciation of war does not deny the right of self-defense directly, it does renounce war as an execution of the right of self-defense through prohibition of any kind of armament and of the right of belligerency in paragraph two. Many wars have been fought in the name of defensive wars. The Manchurian Incident and the Pacific War are cases in point... You seem to imply that defensive war is legitimate, but I believe that this kind of recognition is harmful.¹⁰

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8. Kempō Chōsa-Kai, ed., Kempo Seitei no Katei, op. cit., p. 357.
 9. Ibid., p. 339.
 10. Kobayashi Naoki, Nihon ni Okeru Kempō Dotai no Bunseki (Analysis of Constitutional Dynamics in Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963), pp. 201-202.

Government interpretation has undergone drastic changes since then. Before we discuss this issue, it is appropriate to examine the ~~factors that led to such an article~~ and made it acceptable to the majority of the Japanese people. First, the people's war experiences: 15 years ~~of hardship dating from the Manchurian Incident to the Pacific War~~ and the disasters in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have made rearmament and the military emotionally repulsive to the Japanese. Second, as previously discussed, the initial American policy of demilitarization of Japan induced or at least reinforced the article.¹¹ Third, although the cold war was just starting in 1946-1947, Japan's military position in Asia was not considered as important as that of Chiang Kai-shek's China. In addition, ~~there was still some after-glow-of-hope~~ of an effective concert of powers supporting and utilizing the UN and its agencies. Fourth, the primary concern of the Japanese ruling circle at that time was the Imperial system. And, finally, Japan's situation as a defeated nation under the Occupation contributed to relative negligence of her security problem. However, all these factors can be regarded as passive factors. If only as a way of getting through a complicated situation, it became one of the "given" factors for the Japanese. But none of these reasons suggested gave active Japanese impetus to an anti-war clause.

11. For example, according to the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (August 29, 1945), one of the "ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform" is "to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world." For this purpose, "Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed." The SCAP, ed., Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 423.

Despite this initial passive acceptance of the ideal of peace, postwar education in a broad sense has been successful in diffusing and ~~implicating~~ the spirit of the Constitution. The young writer, Ohe Kenzaburo, is a good example of those who internalized this ideal into their own value ~~systems.~~ Ohe was twelve when he saw the Constitution promulgated. He later wrote that "the people's sovereignty and the renunciation of war became fundamental ingredients, along with my body and spirit, of my moral sense as a man of the postwar generation." For Ohe, who regards the renunciation of war as part of his moral awareness, criticisms against the Constitution appear as denials of his own personality and disturb him.¹³ The expanding armed forces and the louder outcries for constitutional revision have caused him despair and frustration. He reaches the conclusion that "Japanese politics is practiced beyond our reach... Japan is under American control and it is a fact that what moves Japan is not the will of the Japanese."¹⁴ His attribution of all faults to "American imperialism" is grossly oversimplified and incorrect. It resembles the dogmatic leftist creed, yet must be distinguished from that creed because Ohe's argument is based on his personal morality rather than on the systematic social theory of Marxism. If Ohe does not represent the opinion of the majority of the postwar generation, he is a typical representative of the "purely cultivated" product of postwar education.

12. Ohe Kenzaburo, Genshuku na Tsuna-Watari, (Serious Rope-Walking) (Tokyo: Bungei Shinjusha, 1965), pp. 133-134.

13. Ibid., p. 135.

14. Ibid., p. 113.

Today, when all but the first of the above-mentioned reasons, i. e., war experience, for the acceptance of the Constitution have disappeared, it is remarkable that we still find strong support among the people for the renunciation of war clause. As shown in repeated opinion-polls, the people's war experience alone is not able to account for the present pacifist tendency. Part of its strength derives from the fact that this experience was institutionalized in the form of the Constitution, and this, in turn, has made it possible to transmit the war experience to the postwar generation, as well as to keep it alive among those who experienced the war. This "institutionalization" may also involve the widespread Japanese attitude toward laws once they are enacted. Efforts to erase the "nuclear allergy" by conservatives indicate their awareness of the above fact.

Changes in the Government's Interpretation of Article Nine and the Move for Constitutional Revision

General MacArthur delivered a New Year's Message to the Japanese people on January 1, 1950, in which he referred to Article Nine in the following way:

Some contemporary cynics deride us visionary Japan's constitutional renunciation of the concept of belligerency and armed security. Be not overly concerned by such detractors. A product of Japanese thought, this provision is based upon the highest of moral ideals, and yet no constitutional provision was ever more fundamentally sound and practical. While by no sophistry of reasoning can it be interpreted as complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack, it is a ringing affirmation by a people laid prostrate by the sword, of faith in the ultimate triumph of international morality and justice without resort to the sword. [Emphasis added] ¹⁵

15. The Nippon Times, January 1, 1950.

It became clear that the Occupation's interpretation of the article did not renounce defensive war. The conservative government lost no time in following ~~the~~ example, but with caution and reservation, until the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954.¹⁶ Government logic was that the ~~Police Reserve Forces and the Peace Keeping Forces~~ did not constitute "war power" as prohibited in the Constitution. By government contention, they were not "armies" and therefore not unconstitutional.¹⁷

With the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces the government adopted the interpretation that "armament for self-defense is not unconstitutional." Public opinion surveys indicated popular support for the government's interpretation. Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro proclaimed that "~~the government defense policy is to~~ establish defensive power in order to realize the position of independent self-defense as soon as possible."¹⁸ In 1957 Prime Minister Kishi Shinsuke announced the government view that "possession of nuclear weapons is possible as long as they are within the scope of the right of self-defense."¹⁹ And to hostile reactions the government replied: "Criticism that the government interpretation changes and expands constantly is unfounded.... There has only been a change in nuance."²⁰ A summary of the government's interpretation, as reported by the Committee in 1961, reads as follows:

16. Kobayashi, op.cit., pp.209-211.

17. Yamauchi Kazuo, Seifu no Kempō Kaishaku (Government's Interpretation of the Constitution) (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1965), p.31.

18. Ibid., pp.31-32.

19. Prime Minister Kishi's reply at the Internal Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors, May 7, 1957.

20. Kempō Chōsa-Kai, ed., Kempō no Unyō ni tsuite (On the Practice of the Constitution) Appendix no.5, p.244.

Right of Self-Defense and Defensive Action

Paragraph one of Article Nine does not deny Japan the inherent right of self-defense as an independent nation. . . . As long as we have the right of self-defense, we are entitled to take necessary actions in order to repel external attacks to the land and the people, or any necessary measures for self-defense.

War Potential

Force short of "capability to prosecute modern warfare" or the maintenance of "the minimum power necessary for self defense" is not unconstitutional.

Nuclear Weapons

As to present government policy, the Self-Defense Forces will not be equipped with nuclear weapons. As to constitutional interpretation, however, the government takes the view that all kinds of nuclear weapons are not against the Constitution.²¹

Thus, official interpretation of the Constitution does not prohibit "defensive" weapons. The renunciation of war clause, however, has been restricting government policy to such an extent that for more than a decade the government has been determined to abolish Article Nine. The first concrete move for constitutional revision was the establishment of the Liberal Party's Constitution Research Committee in March 1954. The progressive camp had organized the National Federation for the Protection of the Constitution in January of that same year, with the purpose of "consolidating the people's opinion for the protection of the Constitution."²² In the general election to the House of Representatives in February 1955, "the Constitution was the primary -- if not the sole -- issue."²³ The election results were as follows:

21. Ibid., pp. 248-251.

22. Kempō Chōsa-Kai, ed., Kempō Kaisei Mondai no Suii (Transition of the Constitutional Revision Problems) (Tokyo: Kempō Chōsa-Kai, 1961), p. 33.

23. Maruyama Masao, "Kempo 9-jyō o meguru Jyakkan no Kōsatsu" (Some Studies Concerning Article Nine), Sekai, no.235 (June 1965), p. 44.

Parties	Previous No.	Total	New Seats	Total
Democratic	124	304	185	297 (loss of 7)
Liberal	180		112	

Socialist (left)	74	135	89	156 (gain of 21)
Socialist (right)	61		67	

Rono	5		4	
Communist	1		2	
Other	10		6	

The so-called "Constitution Protecting" forces won more than one-third of the Diet seats, making revision impossible. Stalemate in the Diet deprived the constitutional issue of its sense of urgency and the movements for and against revision have been more or less dormant since then. The only controversial step toward revision was the establishment of the Constitutional Research Committee "under the Cabinet" in 1957 for the purpose of "studying the Constitution of Japan and related problems, and reporting the findings to the Cabinet and to the Diet through the Cabinet." The Constitution Research Committee Law of 1956, which set up the Committee, stipulated that it be composed of 30 Diet members, 20 qualified academics, and others, but owing to the Socialists' refusal to participate, the Committee was originally composed of the following members:²⁴

24. Cf. Kempō Chōsa-Kai, ed., Kempō Chōsa-Kai Hōkokusho no Gaiyo (Outline of the Report by the Constitution Research Committee) (Tokyo: Kempo Chosa-Kai, 1961), pp. 2-3.

Diet members belonging to the LDP	18
Ryokufu-Kai	2
Scholars and other qualified people	<u>19</u>
	39

Although the Committee's purpose was to study the Constitution in its entirety, the focal point was Article Nine as the following paragraph of the Committee's report demonstrates:

We may say that the central issue in the question of Constitutional revision is whether Article Nine should be revised or not. The whole argument over revision originated in the controversy over this same article. It is also because of Article Nine that the issue of constitutional revision is marked by strong political confrontation.²⁵

The question of Article Nine has immediate relevance to the status of the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, but fundamentally it is a question of Japan's national security and the understanding of Japan's position in world politics. Committee members from the LDP publicized their suggestions for revision of the Constitution in a report entitled, The Direction of Constitutional Revision. According to their report, "struggle over the interpretation of Article Nine has aroused deplorable phenomena" as follows:

25. Ibid., p. 40. Other issues of Constitutional revision as advocated by the conservatives includes: (1) strengthening of the position of the Emperor as the head of the state; (2) articles concerning rights and duties of the people (Chapter III) should be simplified and ordinary laws should determine them in detail; (3) reformation of the National Diet, including appointive members; (4) reformation of the Cabinet, especially its control of the armed forces; (5) reformation of the Court, including the establishment of extraordinary courts; and (6) reformation of the local government for further centralization. Cf. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi and others, Kempō Kaisei (Constitutional Revision) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1956), pp.230-245. Cf. also Ienaga Saburo, "Kaikenron wa Nanio Mezashiteiruka" (What Does the Theory of Constitutional Revision Aim At?) Sekai, no.222 (June 1964), pp.35-41.

(1) Through distrust with regard to the government and the governmental party, distrust and dissatisfaction are now prevailing among the people with regard to politics in general, rule of law and parliamentary government.

(2) Division in national opinions.

(3) The undesirable influence of struggle and suspicion over interpretation of Article Nine on the people's psychology. This is a grave obstacle to the establishment of a national defense system. For example, it virtually prohibits us from possessing any kind of nuclear weapons, improving cooperation with the United States (i. e., the question of the atomic submarine), and increasing our own defense forces by our own will. It is obvious that these limitations arise primarily from Article Nine (or from the fact that interpretation of the article is not without controversy). In particular, it has a grave influence on the morale of the Self-Defense Forces.²⁶

The report proposed as an amendment to the article that "Japan shall renounce all aggressive wars and shall not resort to war as a means to settle international disputes."²⁷ The revisionists desired a Kellogg-Briand type of declaration, denying the whole spirit of the epoch-making provision of the Japanese Constitution. One can argue that "the renunciation of aggressive wars" and "war as a means to settle international disputes" are duties of United Nations members and need not be prescribed in the Constitution. The above-mentioned report by the LDP members of the Committee reveals the real purpose behind the proposed revision of the Constitution.

Public Opinion

.With respect to our theme of concepts of the nation, the Constitution -- especially Article Nine -- presents two questions that should be

26. Yagi Hideji, et al., Kempō Kaisei no Hōko (Direction of the Constitutional Revision) (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1963), p. 51.

27. Ibid., p. 51.

theoretically distinguished but are mutually interdependent. One is the fact that establishment of the Constitution under pressure from the Occupation has produced a naive nationalism which demands "an independent Constitution." The other is the fact that, through controversy over Article Nine, the Constitution has provided the people with much food for thought on the question of national defense. The majority feeling of the Committee -- that the Constitution was not a product of Japanese will and that revision was necessary -- is not widely shared by the people in general. Moreover, this feeling has been diluted recently. For example, the feeling was shared by 31% of the people in 1958, but only by 21% in 1965.²⁸ A more recent survey by the government posed a rather leading question:

The present Constitution was established based on the SCAP draft when Japan was under the Occupation of the Allied Powers such as the United States and Great Britain. Do you think this is a grave fault of the Constitution, or do you think it is a question that you don't have to be overly concerned with?

Among those who could identify some of the characteristics of the Constitution in the previous questions of the survey, or 64%, only 20% answered in the affirmative; 49% in the negative; 16% answered that a simple, unqualified reply was impossible; and 15% were undecided.²⁹ Twenty years' practice of the Constitution has given the people the feeling that it is now their Constitution even if its "birth certificate" is somewhat

28. Naikaku Sōridaijin Kambo Kōho Shitsu, ed., Kampō ni Kansuru Yoron Chōsa (1-10) Sōgo Hōkoku (General Report on the Public Opinion Polls Concerning the Constitution, 1-10) 1967, p. 21.

29. Naikaku Sōridaijin Kambo Kōho Shitsu, ed., Kempō ni Kansuru Yoron Chōsa (Public Opinion Survey on Constitution), 1967, p. 14.

in question. This means that the theory of Occupation pressure held by the conservative revisionists was not seen -- by this poll sample -- as a sufficient or convincing argument, even as an appeal to the national sentiment of the people. There is also opinion on the Left that revision of Article Nine would open broader possibilities of revision, and that more time is needed for younger political leadership to emerge before there might be serious undertaking of Constitutional revisions. Also, there have been some strong interested groups who have gained by the 1947 Constitution and they are not eager to see ambitious revision.

It is important to know, as far as we can, the general understanding of the people concerning the Constitution before we proceed in more detail to their specific reactions to the constitutional problems with regard to national defense and security. According to a poll carried out in 1967, about 40% of the people have read the Constitution either in its entirety or in part. Eighteen percent do not know that the Constitution was established after the war.³⁰ It is notable that one out of five are unaware that a totally new Constitution was drawn up after the war. However, approximately two-thirds are aware of the war renunciation clause, as shown by the following survey results.³¹

Do you know that there is an article that renounces war in the Constitution?

	1961	1962	1963	1965
Yes	73%	76%	76%	65%
No	27%	24%	24%	35%

30. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

31. Ibid., p. 33.

Now, as to interpretation of Article Nine: 31% interpret it to renounce "all kinds of armament;" 42% believe that it does not renounce armament for self-defense; and 27% hold no opinion.³² On the contrary, in a poll taken in 1963, a majority of scholars and legal experts expressed support for "unarmed pacifism," and less than 10% supported the maintenance of defense forces through amending the article.³³ It is clear, therefore, that the majority view of these constitutional scholars and public figures has formed the main current in the world of education and the press, although it is a minority view among the people-at-large.

Public Opinion surveys indicate that, as far as the Constitution is concerned, the people stand in the middle of the road -- between the conservative revisionists and the progressive intellectuals and the Socialists. That is, the survey majority opposes the revision of Article Nine and does not believe that it renounces defensive war.

Three Concepts of National Security

These various views on the Constitution and the people's reactions to them can be grouped into three concepts of national security. They are:

32. Remarkable differences are reported according to ages. Those who are in their twenties support the view of renunciation of defensive war with 47% to 39% (male and 36% to 33% (female). More support the idea of self-defense among those who are in their thirties, and among those older than 60, 55% (male and 25% (female) take the view that the Constitution does not renounce defensive war, as opposed to 19% (male) and 18% (female) who consider it has renounced all kinds of war. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

33. Cf. Hōritsu Jihō, November 1963, carried out a survey by mailing to 286 scholars and practitioners of public law; 161 persons answered (56.3%).

1. Security through complete disarmament and reliance on international agencies;
2. Security through limited armament and alliance with the U.S.; and
3. Security through unlimited armament and complete independence or basically reconsidered alliances.

The first concept of national security finds support among those who consider defense forces unnecessary for Japan's security. The latest survey on this matter (November 1968) disclosed that about 15% of the people hold this view.³⁴ However, this figure needs to be qualified by the answers to a more direct question: "What do you think we have to do in order to protect Japan?" As many as 28% answered that Japan's security could be realized by "complete disarmament and neutralism." These figures seem contradictory, but the conflict is resolved as we discover the reasons why the majority of the people support the Self-Defense Forces:³⁵

The Self-Defense Forces are necessary in order to:

Guard against external aggression	17%
Secure public order	31%
Cope with natural calamity or accident	27%
Attain equality with other armed nations.	6%
Other	19%

Those who consider defense forces necessary in time of "natural calamity or accident" may also believe that the best way to secure Japan's safety

34. The Mainichi Shimbun, November 25, 1968.

35. The Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968.

is through complete disarmament without realizing the contradiction -- namely, that the Self-Defense Forces are not intended to meet events such as natural disasters or accidents. Moreover, the fact that only 5% of the people interpret Article Nine as a renunciation of all wars, including defensive,³⁶ demonstrates the inconsistency and further contradiction in the people's attitudes toward defense problems. The size of support for the first concept of national security varies depending upon whether one decides on 5%, 15%, or 28% as the indicator.

The Socialist Party's platform calling for an end to the Self-Defense Forces represents the 5% of the people rather than the 28% who favor the policy of unarmed neutralism in their tenacious attitude toward the question. The Way for Disarmament and Neutralism of the Socialist Party describes Japan's security in the following pacifist terminology:

Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution does not deny the right of self-defense which is recognized in international law as a right of an independent nation, but, at the same time, it is based on the spirit of absolute pacifism supported by positive action against war. The means of executing the right of self-defense must exclude any military measures and be confined to peaceful ones alone.³⁷

The same document discusses "abolition of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty," "declaration of neutralism," "reinforcement of the United Nations," and "conclusion of peace treaties with the Soviet Union and Communist China." As a domestic measure for disarmament and neutralism, it maintains that the Party "shall promote institutional democratization, by abolishing reactionary laws and organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, backed up by the wide support of the people."³⁸

36. The Mainichi Shimbun, November 25, 1968.

37. The Shakai Shimpō, January 1, 1969.

38. Ibid.

We will discuss the Socialist Party's policy of national security in the latter half of this chapter. Let it suffice here to note that more than half of those ~~supporting the Party~~ consider defense forces necessary and less than one out of five express positive opposition to them.³⁹

~~The second concept, that of limited armament, enjoys majority support.~~ In this connection, we are reminded of the middle-of-the-road attitude of the people on defense problems. In addition, the relative apathy of the people toward this question seems to drive them to choose this concept simply because it reflects the reality of Japan's position. There are at least three conditions that distinguish the second (limited armament) from the third concept (unlimited armament). First, ~~Article Nine must not be amended.~~ Second, armament must be limited to conventional weapons. And, third, self-defense is recognized in the narrowest sense of the term. Lack of any one of these three conditions will put the argument into the third category. According to one of the previously quoted surveys, 58% of the people support the Self-Defense Forces as they stood in 1968.⁴⁰ Maintenance of the "present" forces is again misleading as they are constantly growing and are better equipped each year. It is true that in Japan "annual increase in the military budget is the highest in the world."⁴¹ However, some of the contradiction can be resolved by the fact that the original allowance for the military

39. Naikaku Sōridaijin Kambo Shingishitsu, Kokubo Ishiki ni Kansuru Yoron Chōsa, (Public Opinion Survey Concerning Defense Consciousness) (Tokyo: Sorifu, 1960), p.31.

40. The Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968.

41. Asahi Shimbun Sha, ed., Nihon no Boei to Keizai (Defense and Economy of Japan) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1964), p. 78.

force was quite modest, and also ratios of the military budget have remained about the same during the past decade or so. The following table shows the ratio of the military budget (A) to the Gross National Product (C), National Income (D), and the National Budget (E).⁴²

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
A/C (%)	1.01	1.00	0.99	0.97	0.96	0.93
A/D	1.24	1.24	1.24	1.22	1.20	1.17
A/E	8.34	8.10	8.41	8.16	7.71	7.70

A recent Mainichi Shimbun survey of September 1968 indicates that a little more than one-half of the people are content with the 1968 military budget (7.25%); 16% answered that it should be increased, and 17% favor its decrease.⁴³ The question remains, however, whether those who are satisfied with the "present" Self-Defense Forces and with the "present" military budget are really aware of what these are and what they were. There is more evidence that the people misunderstand the relevant facts. This is one reason that poll data are so often dubious in value and have to be quoted with care and caution. For example, a government survey in 1962 investigated the people's knowledge of the weapons possessed by the Self-Defense Forces. Only 25% answered that they were knowledgeable, and the remaining 75% said they knew very little about the kinds of weapons

42. Asahi Shimbun Sha, ed., Jieitai (The Self-Defense Forces) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1968), p. 262.

43. The Mainichi Shimbun, November 25, 1968.

possessed.⁴⁴ The basis for the people's judgment on this question of the "present" status is, therefore, quite uncertain. There are pitfalls in a casual "realism," as Maruyama Masao has pointed out. The first pitfall is that "reality" is often mistaken for fait accompli, despite the fact that "reality" is formed daily and is ever-changing. The second pitfall is the tendency of over-simplification which results from emphasizing only one aspect of a complex phenomenon. The third pitfall is that "the direction chosen by the ruling power of the time is considered "realistic" and the opposing directions tend to be labeled "idealistic" or "non-realistic."⁴⁵ This third pitfall has a significant impact in Japan where the hierarchy vigorously attempts to pile up faits accompli to justify its own concept of the nation. The people's support for the "present status of the Constitution and the Self-Defense Forces amounts to ex post facto recognition rather than positive and calculated support.

Among the political parties, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komei-to belong to this second group supporting limited armament. Since the Komei-to's final goal is the abolition of all armaments, the Democratic Socialists' view is the most representative of this group. Their platform emphasizes the necessity of a "minimum measure" to protect the "valuable tradition of our national culture and the security of the national community from external aggressions."⁴⁶ Another document of the DSP gives the Party's interpretation of Article Nine of the Constitution:

44. Naikaku Sōridaijin Kambo Kōhō Shitsu, Jieitai ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa, (Public Opinion Survey Concerning the Self-Defense Forces) (Tokyo: Sorifu, 1962), p. 13.

45. Maruyama Masao, "Genjutsu-Shugi no Kansei" (Pitfalls of Realism), Sekai, no. 77 (August 1952), p. 124.

46. The Platform of the Democratic Socialist Party, 1966.

We hold the view that Article Nine prohibits Japan from resorting to war as a means of settling international disputes, but does not deny the power of self-defense in all forms. We believe that a minimum self-defense force is permitted and that we should have it.⁴⁷

Such an interpretation is criticized by some as constituting an actual amendment, for it recognizes the Self-Defense Forces as constitutional. However, the DSP's position toward the Constitution as a whole can be grouped with other Constitution-protecting forces.⁴⁸

The third position with respect to national security seeks to establish defense forces unrestricted by the Constitution. Those who subscribe to this view regard the Constitution as their greatest obstacle and attempt to amend or abolish Article Nine in expectation of Japan's possession of nuclear weapons and some future need to dispatch troops abroad. This concept of national security, supported by only 20% of the people,⁴⁹ is especially significant because it is the official government attitude and the LDP's longer run policy. It is necessary here to examine the policy of the LDP. We have discussed The Direction of Constitutional Revision, written by the LDP members of the Constitution Research Committee, which holds that military power is an indispensable component of a sovereign nation. The weak support for this security view among the people is more than compensated for by the fact that the view is in the main current of political thought in world politics. The purpose of armed forces from the viewpoint of the LDP is not only to

47. Minsha-to, ed., Minsha-To Koryo Kaisetsu (Explanation of the DSP's Platform), 1966, p. 153.

48. Kempō Chōsa-Kai, ed., Kempō Kaisei, op. cit., p. 86.

49. The Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969.

defend the country from external aggressions; military power is also needed to meet possible "indirect aggressions" from the leftist fifth column within the country. Nippon no Anzen to Bōei (Security and Defense of Japan), edited by the LDP's Research Council on Security Affairs in 1966, specifically refers to this point:

It is regrettable that followers of Marxism in Japan have considerable power which is not compatible with the above-mentioned national tradition, spirit of national harmony, and the spirit of the Constitution.... As such, they are fundamental threats to Japan's security.⁵⁰

The conservatives maintain that the "class state" view of the left wing aims "to change the present political and social system" and, therefore, they conclude, "it is natural that the Japanese Socialists should retain close ties with other Socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and Communist China in order to construct a Socialist system in our country."⁵¹ The same report further contends that "the Socialist Party regards the Japanese state as bourgeois-controlled machinery to oppress the proletariat."⁵² It is indeed true that the Socialists, the left Socialist group in particular, speak in Marxian terminology, but this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all Socialists desire to overthrow the present political system by extra-constitutional means. A symplistic

50. Jiyu Minshu To, Anzen Hosho Chōsa-Kai, ed., Nippon no Anzen to Bōei (Security and Defense of Japan), (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1966), p. iii.

51. Ibid., pp. iii-iv.

52. Ibid., p. 310.

but definitive conclusion such as this one held by the LDP makes constructive effort in search of a national consensus on this issue impossible. Or, is it perhaps futile to expect such a joint effort at all? The revolutionary Marxian terminology and flavor must be balanced by the fact that the Socialist Party, although it has cooperated in united fronts which were intended to topple governments, has never attempted or resorted to physical violence to overthrow the existing system. The LDP image of the JSP needs to be qualified, especially with respect to the rightist faction of the Socialist Party.

The security policy of the Communist Party remains most undefined and ambiguous among the political parties. The Party proclaims, however, Constitutional revision and abolition of the "present" Self-Defense Forces. Opposed to the Socialist "unarmed neutralism," the Communists urge "necessary and minimum defensive measures within the conventional weaponry in order to cope with the new domestic and foreign situation" under Communist Japan.⁵³

The conservatives maintain that Japan is threatened by the Soviet Union and Communist China, both of which aim to communize Japan through their superior military power. The security treaty with the United States is therefore necessary and indispensable as Japan alone cannot withstand them. The conservatives' orientation to judge things primarily on the basis of military comparisons often blurs the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons — generally regarded in Japan as an almost sacred demarcation line. For example, the LDP tenaciously

53. The Asahi Shimbun, April 24, 1969.

opposed a Diet resolution which declared that Japan shall not "produce," "possess," nor "bring in" nuclear weapons (labeled the three principles of non-nuclearization), in the hope of keeping open options for future exploitation of nuclear weapons.⁵⁴ As a counter-proposal to the resolu-

~~tion,~~ the LDP proposed the so-called four pillars of nuclear policy:

(1) the three principles of non-nuclearization; (2) efforts for nuclear disarmament; (3) dependency on the U.S. nuclear deterrent against international nuclear threats; and (4) peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy.⁵⁵ To the question of possible total annihilation by nuclear

warfare, the LDP report answers quite plainly that "if there is some prospect of victory...short of a literally scorched earth and suicidal strategy," it is necessary to "take a self-denial strategy in order to stagger the enemy's attack and 'find life in death.'"⁵⁶ The report continues, "In a case where there is no hope of victory, it is better to make compromises, suspending defensive action, than to be totally annihilated. The scorched earth and suicidal policy makes our comeback impossible, whereas surrender leaves room for comeback."⁵⁷

The question is: how can we judge the "prospect of victory" in nuclear warfare? History has proven that it is almost impossible to

54. The LDP gave two major reasons for not supporting the Diet Resolution for the Non-Nuclear Declaration. They are: (1) such a resolution will bind the people for ever; (2) consideration must also be given to U.S. will in this matter.

55. Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, ed., Kiroku: Kokai Ampo Ronsō I (Diet Discussion on the Security Problems I) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun sha, 1968), pp. 150-151.

56. Jiyu Minshu-To, op. cit., p. 263.

57. Ibid., p. 264.

suspend actions during war, especially for the Japanese who never found a chance to do so after 1931. This LDP report shows that nuclear war is regarded in a similar manner as a conventional war that lasts for years. Prime Minister Tōjo Hideki also made a memorable statement when he said, "Sometimes one has to decide, knowing that his decision is tantamount to jumping off the stage of the Kiyomizu Temple." The previously discussed Kuraishi statement points to the continuity of the conventional war concept held by the majority of the people who subscribe to this third concept of national security. To these people, others with different opinions on nuclear warfare appear merely to be victims of "nuclear allergy" and lack the proper consciousness as to defense of the nation.⁵⁸ They should be re-oriented and educated in matters of national defense -- a task especially urgent as the present U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty comes up for review in 1970.

We have examined the contending concepts of the Japanese on national security with special reference to Article Nine of the Constitution. Fully to understand concepts of the nation in their relation to national security and defense, we need now to examine how these concepts are manifested in actual security policies.

B. Question of Policy: Neutralism and Collective Security

Neutralism as it is discussed here must be distinguished from "neutrality" in international law. Neutrality in a legal sense exists only in relation to war.⁵⁹ A neutral nation owes abstention and impartiality

58. Jiju Minshu-To, Waga To no Kihon Hōshin, (Basic Policy of the Party), 1968, p. 94.

59. Cf. Hans J. Mongenthou, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 188-189.

vis-à-vis belligerents. This concept of neutrality received a grave challenge through the emergence of cold war, which has blurred the conventional demarcation line between war and peace, and by the development of the so-called collective security systems headed by the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the collective security system of the United Nations. Neutrality and collective security are mutually exclusive concepts. Neutrality requires a nation to refrain from war, abstain from military action, and remain impartial to belligerents, whereas collective security requires the member nations to fight against the common aggressor.

It is obvious... that neutrality and collective security are mutually exclusive. Collective security, implying the universalization of war by virtue of an abstract legal principle, and neutrality, seeking the localization of war for reasons of expediency, cannot co-exist.⁶⁰

The reason Switzerland stayed out of the United Nations was primarily in recognition of this mutual exclusiveness of neutrality and collective security.⁶¹ However, due to the fact that the military arrangement of Article 43 of the UN Charter has not been realized, and that the member states are not in fact compelled to engage in either military or non-military actions because of the veto of Article 27, the probability of a neutral nation's membership in the United Nations has greatly increased. Austria's entrance to the United Nations was chiefly based on this practical compatibility of the two theoretically exclusive concepts.⁶²

60. Ibid., p. 192.

61. Cf. The United Nations Conference on International Organization, Doc. Vol. VI, pp. 459-460.

62. Cf. Takano Yūichi, "Kokuren to Chūritsu" (The United Nations and Neutrality) in Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, ed., Churitsu-Shugi no Kenkyu (Study on Neutralism) (Tokyo: Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1196), pp. 290-291.

One further clarification is in order concerning the concept of collective security. Collective security was originally considered to be the antithesis of "alliance" for the potential enemy was seen as coming from within the membership. In other words, whereas "alliance" ~~prescribes some kind of joint action against an external enemy~~, "collective security" prescribes such a measure against the enemy within. The following description of collective security by Inis Claude points out this difference:

The world is concerned [in collective security systems] not as a we-group and a they-group of nations, engaged in competitive power relations, but as an integral we-group in which danger may be posed by "one of us" and must be met by "all of the rest of us." ⁶³

The United Nations security system is most comprehensive and universal in its purpose and membership. Other regional collective security systems based on Article 54 of the Charter, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact and other bilateral security arrangements, bear more characteristics of an "alliance" than of "collective security" in the true sense of the term. The term "collective security" was used after the Second World War to denote "good alliances" or "defensive arrangements." ⁶⁴ In this paper, collective security will be used in the latter looser sense.

Neutrality in the bipolarized world in the early 1950's, such as Nehru's "non-alignment," Nasser's "positive neutrality," and Tito's "active co-existence," ⁶⁵ meant an independent "third way." However,

63. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power in International Relations, (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 114.

64. Cf. Ibid., p. 115.

65. Cf. Hamilton Armstraong, "Neutrality: Varying Tunes," Foreign Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1, (October 1956), pp. 59-60.

the emergence of the newly independent nations which have adopted "neutralism" by exploiting a new middle ground left by loosening bipolarization changed the meaning of "neutralism" significantly. Neutralism in the 1960's amounts to abstention from formal alliance. Former neutralist countries also shifted their policies. India, for example, has clearly sided with the United States and the Soviet Union against Communist China after the Sino-Soviet split and border conflicts. Egypt is aligned with the Soviet Union as main source of military strength against Israel. As for characteristics, neutralism is: (1) a concept espoused primarily in times of peace, as opposed to neutrality that presupposes war; (2) a political concept whereas neutrality is a legal concept; and (3) "an attitude of individuals"⁶⁶ as well as a national policy.

The question of neutralism can be treated from different levels of power. First, it can be examined at the top state level, or with regard to national policy. Second, it can be approached as a popular movement. Lastly, the question can be studied at the individual level of political consciousness and attitude.⁶⁷ Theoretically speaking, the most stable neutralism can be achieved, other things being equal, when positive feedback between the level of policy and the level of individual consciousness functions smoothly. This point is especially important in the case of Japanese neutralism, for a wide gap seems to exist between these two levels in politics.

66. Denis Healey, Neutralism (London: Ampersand Ltd., 1955), p. 11.

67. Cf. Sakamoto Yshikazu, "'Heiwa Kyōzon' to Chūritsu-Shugi" ("Peaceful Coexistence" and Neutralism), Shiso, no. 447 (September 1961), p. 2.

Background and Public Opinion

Japan has never taken a policy of neutralism as her national policy and has, since 1952, been under the bilateral security treaty with the United States. Japan, therefore, cannot be classified as a ~~neutralist~~, according to the frame of reference of international politics. Nevertheless, an examination of Japanese neutralism is essential for a study of national security concepts precisely because, according to poll data, a large segment of the people subscribe to neutralism despite the government's strong commitment to a regional security arrangement. Again, the people's war experiences and postwar social education are the mainsprings of this tendency toward neutralism. At a certain period during the Occupation, neutralism was encouraged as the best means for Japan's security. In an interview with J. P. McEvoy, General MacArthur was asked, "Should Japan be rearmed?" He is quoted as answering:

Japan cannot possibly raise any army or air force large enough to protect herself. Besides, the raising of armed forces would attract rather than dissuade aggression. Japan should be the Switzerland of the Far East, and neutral for the same reasons that Switzerland is neutral -- no matter which side she might join she would inevitably be destroyed.⁶⁸

As one critic wrote, "These words of General MacArthur, who ruled Japan as her practical sovereign, had a tremendous influence on the despondent and humiliated Japanese people."⁶⁹ Also, the Constitution

68. J. P. McEvoy, "General MacArthur Reports on Japan," Readers' Digest, May 1950, p. 15.

69. Sugiyama Shigeo, "Nihon ni okeru Chūritsu-Ron" (Theories of Neutralism in Japan) in Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, ed., Chūritsu-Shugi no Kenkyū, vol. 2, (Study on Neutralism) (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1961), p. 395.

of Japan, in renouncing war, exerted a great influence on the thinking of the people. An Asahi Shimbun editorial (March 3, 1949), for example, wrote that "there is no way other than neutralism for a Japan that has proclaimed its renunciation of war."⁷⁰ Yomiuri Shimbun (April 9, 1949) echoed this tone and maintained that "neutralism is the only possible choice for a peaceful nation that has abandoned weaponry."⁷¹ Thus, renunciation of war and neutralism were considered as being two sides of the same coin. The Socialists' Basic Policy Concerning the Peace Problem (1950) was the first document to state neutralism as the clear policy of a major political party. The document reads in part:

Japan has declared non-armament and peace in her Constitution, the spirit of which naturally dictates a neutral position in international disputes, to say nothing of the voluntary renunciation of war on our part.⁷²

The important point to note is that "a neutral position in international disputes" is primarily justified by the Constitution and political reality of the world is given little attention to. The same was true in the non-Socialists' appeal for neutralism. By 1950, neutralism had become a center of Japanese politics as the peace treaty was imminent at that time. Article Six in the peace treaty of San Francisco mentioned the possibility of the "stationing or retention of foreign armed forces" in Japan. The

70. The Asahi Shimbun, March 3, 1949.

71. The Yomiuri Shimbun, April 9, 1949.

72. Shakai-To, Kowa Mondai ni taisuru Kihon Hōshin (Basic Policy Toward the Peace Problem), 1950.

security treaty between the United States and Japan, signed on the same day as the peace treaty, stipulated the exclusive right of the United States to station its troops in Japan.⁷³ The peace treaty was in effect an integral component of the regional collective security system. The conflict over the "one-sided" and "all-around peace was one between those advocating neutralism and those advocating a regional collective security system. As discussed in the second chapter of this paper, the intellectuals' attitudes favoring all-around peace influenced education and journalism strongly.⁷⁴ We have also discussed how the attitude of the general public was different from the intellectuals' view. On the issue of the treaties, the conservative parties supported both the peace and security treaties, while the Socialists were split between the rightist group which supported the peace but not the security treaty and the leftists who opposed both treaties.⁷⁵ Generally the security treaty never enjoyed as much support as the peace treaty. For example, in answer to a nation-wide opinion survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in December 1949, the following preferences were given to the question of security policies:⁷⁶

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73. Article Two of Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan (September 8, 1951).
74. Cf. Naikaku Kambo Chōsa Shitsu, Sengo Heiwa ron to Heiwa Undō (Postwar Theories of Peace and Peace Movements), (Shakai Fuchō Chōsa Shiryō no. 14), 1963, *passim*. Also, Cf. Allan B. Cole, ed., Japanese Opinion Polls with Socio-Political Significance, vol. 3, (Medford, Mass.: Fletcher School, 1959), p. 658.
75. Cf. Allan B. Cole, et al, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 32-36 and pp. 200-202.
76. The Asahi Shimbun, December 15, 1949.

Permanent Neutrality	39%
Membership in the U.N.	36%
Regional Collective Security	7%
Military Pact with a Particular Nation	8%
<u>No Simple Answer</u>	<u>10%</u>

The second peak in the controversy over neutralism came with the anti-treaty movement in 1960. It is interesting to note that the impetus for neutralism was again external, coming this time from Communist nations. The first message calling for Japan's neutralism came from Ch'en Yi, Foreign Minister of Communist China, on November 19, 1958. He broadcasted:

The Chinese people consistently support the Japanese people's struggle for independence, peace and democracy, and expect Japan to be a peaceful, neutral nation. The way to a glorious future for the Japanese people will be achieved only if an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan established equal and reciprocal relations with the nations of the world, and, above all, if she develops, prospers and peacefully coexists with the nations of Asia. ⁷⁷

The Soviet Union immediately echoed Peking's appeal when Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister, stated on December 3, 1958:

The security of Japan is best guaranteed through resolute observance of her Constitution that stipulates renunciation of war and armament, and offers the possibility for Japan to be neutral. No way other than this way -- Japan's neutrality and independent, peaceful policy -- will bring about her real independence and her true national security. The Soviet Government believes that Japan's neutral policy will be an important and

77. Gaimusho, Ajia Kyoku, Chūkyo Tainichi Jyūyo Genron Shū (Collections of Important Statements by the Communist Chinese to Japan), vol. 4, 1959, p. 105.

constructive contribution to the enterprises of peace and security in the Far East and to the development of an international cooperation founded on the world-famous Five Principles of Peace. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union is prepared to undertake the sacred obligation to respect Japan's neutrality.⁷⁸

The Communist Party of Japan was the first to respond to these appeals, despite the fact that the Party severely criticized the theory of neutralism at the time of the peace treaty, claiming that "there is no third way." The Party's resolution of February 1951 declared that there were only two ways open for the Japanese people: "One is the way of 'war and slavery' under the rule of the international monopoly of capital, and the other is the way of 'peace and independence' that links the democratic, peace-loving forces of the world."⁷⁹ The Communist Party announced, however, in December 1958 that "the only way for Japan to escape from the present national crisis would be to transform the Japanese foreign policy of submission to the United States into a neutral policy." In the following month, the JCP made another similar appeal for neutralism.

Today, as the Soviet Union and Communist China voluntarily recognized Japan's neutralization, we the Japanese can establish an independent Asian country that carries out a policy of peace if we struggle to transform the present policy of submission to the United States to an independent and neutral policy.⁸⁰

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78. Chūnichi Kokkō Kaifuku Kokumin Kaigi, "Nichu Koko Kaifuku Nyūsu" (News of the Restoration of Chinese-Japanese Diplomatic Relations) no.162, pp.6-8. Cf. also, The Japan Times, December 4, 1958.
79. Nihon Kyōsan-To, Nihon Kyōsan-To 50-nen Mondai Shiryōshu (Documents Concerning the Problems of 1950 for the JCP), vol. 3, (Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppansha, 1950), p.5.
80. Nihon Kyōsan-To, ed., Nihon Kyōsan-To Ketsugi Ketei Shū (Collection of Resolutions and Decisions by the JCP), vol. 4, 1959, pp. 106-107.

The first and most important step toward Japan's neutralization would obviously be abolition of the U.S. -Japanese Security Treaty. We will discuss later ~~in this section how the~~ JCP's plan for Japan's "neutralization" is only one step toward Japan's eventual "communization."

~~The Socialist Party, on the other~~ hand, has insisted on "positive neutralism" ever since the merger of the leftist and rightist Socialist parties in October 1955.⁸¹ Achievement of the so-called "Far East Locarno Plan"⁸² was first considered "as parallel with" abolition of the security treaty in terms of priorities. However, under the hegemony of the leftists, the major emphasis came to be placed exclusively on the "abolition" of the treaty. ~~This leftist domination with the Socialist Party caused some rightist members to withdraw from the Party to establish the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in 1960, just before the~~ anti-treaty movement began to gather momentum.

Public opinion concerning treaty revision at this time was also split into three major groups: supporters of the revision, 29%; opponents, 25%; and undecided, 40%.⁸³ As to the means of securing Japan's security, neutralism still enjoyed the greatest support (35%), followed by a second choice of reliance on the United Nations system (24%). Only 14% chose "reliance on the United States."⁸⁴

81. Cf. A. B. Cole, et al, op. cit., pp. 203-205.

82. "The Far East Locarno Plan" envisages the cooperation among the U.S., the Soviet Union, Communist China and Japan on the basis of non-aggression and collective security in the Far East. The participating members are obliged to take a joint-action for the aggressor from outside and within.

83. The Asahi Shimbun, January 18, 1960.

84. Ibid.

In the academic world, neutralism was as popular as ever. A common point among the various rationales for neutralism was that ~~participation in a military alliance~~ would obligate Japan to participate in war, and that neutralism is the only way to avoid war.⁸⁵ The following ~~quotation from an article~~ (August 1959) by Sakamoto Yoshikazu is typical of this way of thinking:

Since the essence of an alliance is to share a common destiny in time of war, those who protect the U.S. - Japanese Security Treaty must be prepared to be annihilated in the end with America. Neutralism cannot save us 100% from the disaster of a total war either. Nevertheless, there is a decisive difference between these two. That is, as long as we continue to maintain the U.S. - Japanese Security Treaty all is hopeless, whereas hope remains should we decide upon a neutral policy.⁸⁶

"To Criticize the Government's Security Plan," by Ukai Nobushige, Saito Makoto and others, is representative of the intellectuals' view on neutralism. The document (October 1959) maintains that the "first condition of our national security is neutrality from any military alliance.... Positive neutralism, together with the reinforcement and utilization of the United Nations," alone can guarantee Japan's security. Furthermore, "when the government says neutralism is an impossibility, it only means that anything the government does not have the will to attempt is unrealistic."⁸⁷

85. Naikaku Kambo Chōsa Shitsu, Sengo Chūritsu Ron to Chūritsu Ishiki, (Postwar Theories of Neutrality and Neutralist Consciousness) (Shakai Fūcho Chosa Shiryo, no.14) 1963, Chapter II.

86. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Chūritsu Nihon no Boei Kōsō," (Defense Plan for Neutral Japan) Sekai, no.164 (August 1959), p. 38.

87. Ukai Nobushige, et al., "Seifu no Ampo Keitei Kōsō o Hihan suru" (To Criticize the Government Plan of Revising the Security Treaty), Sekai, no. 166 (October 1959), pp. 15-42.

The third period marked by increased controversy over the question of neutralism is taking place currently (1969), spurred on by anticipation of the security treaty review in 1970. First, let us examine recent public opinion surveys concerning the national security problem.

~~To the~~ question (July 1968), "What policy do you think we should follow in order to defend Japan?" preferences were given as follows: ⁸⁸

Self-Defense Forces and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty	21%
Neutralism with strengthened Self-Defense Forces	38%
Neutralism without armament	28%
Alliance with the Soviet Union and Communist China	2%
Other and Undecided	11%

Another poll (January 1969) offered two alternatives: "To rely on the United States" or "To maintain a neutral position." The answers were: ⁸⁹

To Rely on the United States	24%
To maintain a neutral position	58%
Other	6%
Undecided	12%

Neutralism, including both armed and unarmed, receives 58-66% support according to these two polls. A collective security system with the

88. The Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968.

89. The Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969.

United States has the support of 21-24% of the respondents -- considerably less than half that of neutralism. It goes without saying that this preference of the Japanese people for neutralism is not realized in their government's national foreign policy. Does it, then, have any effective channels of expression in Japanese politics? The JSP represents only one brand of neutralism, that is, unarmed neutralism. We have seen that "armed neutralism" enjoys even greater support among the people than "unarmed neutralism." It is the Komei-to that vigorously pursues this variation of neutralism. With emergence of the Komei-to (1964), supporters of armed neutralism joined the political scene in Japan for the first time. The Komei-to, more flexible in its attitude toward the attainment of neutralism than the Socialists, proposes "gradual dissolution of the present security treaty" as opposed to the Socialists' call for its immediate "abolition." Members of the Komei-to call their brand of neutralism "perfect neutralism" (Kanzen Chūritsu). The basic principles of perfect neutralism are described as follows:

(1) Firm Will to Carry Out Perfect Neutralism:
Non-intervention and non-assistance in time of war or similar military disputes; complete disavowal of all expansionist policies; non-participation in military alliances; for the time being, gradual dissolution of the U.S. - Japanese Security Treaty.

(2) Consideration for Concerned Nations:
Not to give other countries reason to regard Japan as a threat; not to allow other countries to find any excuse to attack Japan; to make other countries aware of the disadvantage of attacking Japan.

(3) Guarantee for Attaining Neutral Policy:
To foster an international situation in which an Asian-Pacific Non-Aggression Pact can be established; to promote and reinforce the United Nations; to possess the minimum necessary defense capability that is not a threat to neighboring nations.⁹⁰

90. Komei-To, Chūdo-Shugi niyoru Sekai Heiwa e no Michi (Way for World Peace by the Middle-of-the-Road-ism), 1968.

The Komei-to policy of neutralism, through its relative flexibility and moderate call for armed forces, has given the Japanese people an outlet for their pride of independence. As a compromise plan, it has captured substantial public support of the people, as we will show in the following section.

Three Brands of Neutralism

Japanese neutralism can be distinguished by various dimensions. It can be divided into the "unarmed neutralism" of the Socialists and "armed neutralism" of the Komei-to on the policy level. Or, if motives and attitudes are of interest, it is possible to classify neutralism as "pseudo-neutralism," "sentimental neutralism," and "tough-minded neutralism" according to the distinctions of Ivan I. Morris.⁹¹ In this paper, however, we will examine the relationships between the underlying attitudes and actual proposed policies of neutralism under three different, although related, headings.

"Anti-war, Pacifist Neutralism"

The first type of neutralism is "anti-war, pacifist neutralism." This roughly corresponds to the "sentimental neutralism" in Morris' classification. Morris maintains that the basis for "sentimental neutralism is a refusal or inability [on the part of the Japanese] to look clearly at Japan's actual position in the world."⁹² Although he refers to the "horrors of a future war" shared by the Japanese, he seems to underrate

91. Ivan I. Morris, "Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism," International Affairs, vol.36, no.1 (January 1960), pp. 16-19.

92. Ibid., p. 17.

the Japanese people's deep-rooted antipathy toward war. "Anti-war pacifism" appears to be more than an individual faint and passive disposition for peace. ~~It is an internalized~~ value-attitude cultivated among the people during the past two decades or so, and is so strong that it has greatly helped ~~prevention of any~~ attempt to amend the Constitution. The numerous peace movements are only the more conspicuous manifestations of this state of mind. The orientation of Japanese anti-war pacifism toward neutralism is a logical and natural one since collective security, by definition, presupposes war, or at least combined deterrence and possible belligerency. The prototype for this allegiance is expressed in the Three Principles of Peace, drawn up by the Peace Problem Discussion Group in 1949. The principles are: "all-around peace, neutrality and non-intervention, and opposition to military bases." Anti-war pacifist neutralism is based on rejection or distrust of war, and "power," the executer of war. War-rejection is backed up by the war experience and fear of nuclear warfare, while power-distrust is manifested in criticism of state power.

War experience is by far the most complex and drastic compared with peace-time ordinary life: war experience in the military, as a non-combatant civilian, as a youth, as an elder, as the ruler, and as the ruled. The collapse of the fictitious goals of war, accompanied by the collapse of kokutai itself, left all Japanese with a deep, negative feeling toward war. War experiences have been transmitted to the postwar generations by memoirs such as Kiko Wadatsumi No Koe (Herald the Voice of Soldiers) and Senbotsu Nōmin Heishi No Tegami (Letters from the War Dead Peasant Soldiers), as well as by education and numerous other

writings. The hardship of war was more than doubled for those who could not believe in the officially advocated war goals. The following quotation expresses a view ~~by no means~~ exceptional among the educated people. A law student of Tokyo Imperial University, Kikuyama Hiroo, wrote before he ~~was killed on~~ Luzon Island at the age of 23:

October 11, 1943

Do I take up this gun for the Emperor...? Or for the fatherland? Or for love for my own family? Or do I take up this gun to preserve the essence of Japan? Or, perhaps, for some of these things -- or all? I have not yet solved this question of sacrificing my life.⁹³

The ideology of the Daito-A war is totally absent here. This kind of war experience must be distinguished from that of Western democracies who had at least agreed upon a war goal among themselves. What is important here is the kind of war one was forced to take part in, rather than war in general.

The instinctive yet rational fear of nuclear weapons is an important part of the Japanese war experience. It is fear projected to the future, while the hardship of war remains a concrete and bitter memory from the past. The Japanese people, who have experienced three nuclear disasters, including the "Lucky Dragon" Incident of 1954, within a decade, naturally hold the view that any future war will be nuclear. This tends to make the Japanese view of war more realistically pessimistic than that of other peoples. Neutralism is widely considered the only way to avoid such a disaster and annihilation. Japan's leading

93. Nihon Senbetsu Gakusei Kinenkai, ed., Kike Wadatsumi no Koe (Herald the Voice of the Soldiers) 3rd ed., (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1959), p. 88.

nuclear physicists, including Nobel Prize winners Dr. Yukawa Hideki and Dr. Asanaga Shinichiro, issued a statement (1962) calling for peace at any cost.

Japan should be able to make a special contribution to world peace since she suffered ~~from the disasters~~ of nuclear weapons and has a constitution that clearly stipulates the renunciation of war. We wish to emphasize our responsibility to peace and confirm the fact that Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution has a new and greater significance today when the danger of human annihilation by nuclear warfare is increasing.⁹⁴

The controversy over "nuclear allergy" was initiated in 1968 by the government in an attempt to calm the people's fear of nuclear weapons. However, the controversy ended at the original point: Who is normal: -- those who fear or those who do not? And, who is to decide the standard of "reasonable" fear? The government's theory of U.S. nuclear deterrence was rejected by an overwhelming majority of the people in the belief that the so-called "nuclear umbrella" of the United States would drag Japan into a nuclear war rather than keep Japan out. According to Asahi Shimbun polls (1969), 12% have faith in nuclear deterrence as opposed to 67% who find it dangerous.⁹⁵ Although some fear of nuclear power may derive from ignorance, the government is not justified in attributing all or major opposition to the people's ignorance on the subject. Theoretically, nuclear deterrence has many limits and

94. Yukawa Hideki, et al, Kakujidai o Koeru (Beyond the Nuclear Age) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), p. 175.

95. The Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969.

works only when certain conditions are satisfied.⁹⁶ In addition, the theory of U.S. nuclear deterrence preached by the government and the conservative party "lacks serious reflection on the fact that Japan [in the eyes of others] has chosen a hostile relation by taking one of the unclear umbrellas."⁹⁷

Next in our examination of neutralism comes the question of "distrust of power." Those who maintain anti-war, pacifist neutralism share a strong negative judgment of state power. Sakamoto, one of the theoreticians of this group, divides "popular movements in relation to power" into: (1) the relative anti-power movement that aims at replacing a particular power by a new power, for example, independence and revolutionary movements; and (2) the absolute anti-power movement that denies power in general, for example, peace and democratic movements.⁹⁸ "Anti-power" conviction is often expressed by distrust toward the "super powers" of the world. In fact, if the majority of the

96. Cf. Asanaga Shinichiro, "Kaku Yokushi Seisaku no Mujun" (Contradictions of Nuclear Deterrence Policy), Beyond the Nuclear Age, op. cit., pp. 14-33. Henry A. Kissinger, for example, names four conditions for deterrence: (1) the implementation of the deterrent threat must be sufficiently credible to preclude its being taken as a bluff; (2) the potential aggressor must understand the decision to resist attack or pressure; (3) the opponent must be rational, that is, he must respond his self-interest in a manner which is predictable; and (4) in weighing his self-interest, the potential aggressor must reach the conclusions the "deterrer" is seeking to induce. The Necessity for Choice, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962), p.42.

97. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Kaku o meguru Kokumin no Sentaku," (Choice of the People Concerning the Nuclear Weapon), Sekai, no.270 (May 1968), p. 53.

98. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Heiwa Undō ni okeru Shinri to Ronri," (Psychology and Logic in Peace Movement), Sekai, no.200 (August 1962), p.25. Cf. Hayashi Kentaro, "Heiwa Undo no Shinri to Ronri" (Psychology and Logic of Peace Movement) Jiyu, September 1962.

Japanese people felt that they could actually trust in U.S. protection in time of danger or crisis, neutralism would lose much of its appeal. In this connection, the following opinion survey results indicate one reason for the popularity of the type of neutralism we have been discussing:

Do you think the United States would protect Japan whole-heartedly in time of danger: ⁹⁹

- Yes 24%
- No 51%

This neutralism is a sophisticated attitude toward "war" and "power" and has the merit of attempting to project future international politics through critical analysis of defects of the present international political situation. The weakness in this view is in the impatience of its followers to transform the "correctness" of their assumptions directly into practical policy. As is often pointed out, they neglect or tend to make light of the numerous difficulties hindering the formulation of an ideal, practical policy. At the same time, however, their critics tend to over-emphasize the difficulties and to dismiss neutralism as a mere utopian view, failing to perceive the fallacies of their own theory of deterrence.

It is interesting to discover that the Japanese pacifists are "particularists" rather than "universalists," or they are nationalists rather than internationalists, despite their universalistic creed of peace. First of all, they tend to regard the question of Japan's security as being somewhat different from the question of security as related to other nations. They regard Japan's rearmament and security in the limited context of a small cosmos called Japan that is isolated from the rest of

99. The Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969.

the world, rather than in the broader context of the surrounding military and political situation. Japan is, to them, a "sacred place of experiment" where no armament is permitted, and larger armaments in other nations are of little concern. In this context, they seem to advocate pacifism and neutralism partly from a desire for a more independent status and policy, or from a nationalistic reason. Nationalism in this variation of neutralism is a "defensive-isolationist nationalism" as opposed to the "expansionist nationalism" of the 1930's. The underlying tone of this neutralism corresponds to the typical idealism defined by John Herz. "Political idealism" according to him is:

...characteristic of that type of political thinking which in the main does not recognize the problems arising from the security and power dilemma, or if it does, takes notice of them only in a perfunctory way, and concentrates its interest upon "rational" conditions or "rational" solutions.¹⁰⁰

"Marxist-Oriented Neutralism"

The second brand of neutralism is Marxist-oriented neutralism. Here, the neutral policies of the JSP and the JCP must be distinguished. Although the strong Marxian influence in the JSP tends to blur the line, a distinct difference does exist between the two parties concerning neutralism. The "pseudo-neutralism" in Morris' terminology corresponds to that of the JCP. Advocation of neutralism by the JCP is only a tactic to increase Communist power at home and abroad by bringing Japan out of the U.S. sphere of influence and into that of the Communist countries, or primarily Communist China after 1963 when the JCP

100. John H. Herz, Political Realism and Idealism: A Study in Theories and Practices (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 18.

decided to side with CPR. Neutralism, for the JCP, means "non-participation in all military alliances," but at the same time the Party maintains that there can be no real neutrality between a "war power" and a "peace power." Ideally, the Communists believe, it is better to join "the peace and Socialist forces" than to stay "neutral." Furthermore, neutralism is actually dependent on the Socialist forces as they break down imperialist plans to wage war. "Generally speaking, neutral countries are passive in the sense that they do not take aggressive actions within the framework of collective security, and depend on non-neutral nations that possess capability to take military sanctions."¹⁰¹ The following description (September 1961) by Fuwa Tetsuzo, JCP theoretician, reveals the Party's frank attitude toward neutralism:

Neutrality is neither the sole form nor the supreme form of peace policy that nations withdrawing from military blocs can take, even if it plays a positive role as a form of withdrawal from the present imperialist bloc. In fact, as it is the might of the Socialist world system that plays the decisive role in checking the danger of a world war, the conclusion may naturally be made that a nation depending on a military bloc can contribute more to the enterprise of peace by positively aligning itself with and participating in the collective security system of the Socialist countries. Apart from the question of participation in the collective security system, it is generally recognized that a nation whose leadership is won by the democratic forces, rather than by the reactionary imperialist forces, can launch a more positive counter-attack against the aggressor when it is not tied by the obligation of military neutrality.¹⁰²

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101. Ueda Kōichiro, Chūritsu Nihon no Kōsō (Plan for Neutral Japan) (Tokyo: Godo Shuppan sha, 1960), pp. 99-100.
 102. Fuwa Tetsuzo, "Nippon no Churitsu to Puroletaria Kokusai Shugi," (Japan's Neutrality and Proletarian Internationalism), Shiso, no. 447, (September 1961), p. 27.

Despite its assumption that the form of government a neutral nation will take is a purely domestic problem whereas neutralism itself is a question of foreign relations, the JCP claims that Japan's neutralism can be achieved only through the two-front struggle of domestic and external politics: struggle against the bourgeoisie at home and struggle against American imperialism abroad. Therefore, the argument goes, communization of Japan is the first step for neutralism. But in the case of Socialist countries, "there is no room for neutrality, as long as the imperialist military bloc exists, admittedly preparing for war against the Socialist camp. Among the capitalist countries, however, a nation can take a neutral policy in order to avoid being drawn into war."¹⁰³ Japan's communization is considered the first step toward neutralism, yet the above argument leaves no room for Japan's permanent neutralism. The Communist theory of Japan's neutralism is theoretically contradictory and the Party's drastic change and equivocation in less than a decade leads one to doubt its sincerity concerning neutralism.

Neutralism as advocated by the Socialist Party needs to be distinguished from the JCP's neutralism in degree rather than in kind, despite the leftist Socialists' view that seems to blur the distinction.¹⁰⁴ As a practical policy, the Socialists subscribe to "unarmed neutralism" while the Communists consider armed forces necessary to ensure Japan's neutralism. Also, while the Communists regard neutralism as being

103. Takei Takeo "Chūrītsukoku, Chūritsu Seisaku, Chūritsu Shugi," (Neutral Nation, Neutral Policy and Neutralism) Zenei, no. 153 (April 1959), p. 40.

104. Cf. Allan B. Cole, et al, op. cit., pp. 200-205 concerning the split between the right and left Socialists on the problem of neutralism.

tied in with the process of communization, the Socialists seem to view neutralism as a more fundamental policy, at least in degree. The unarmed neutralism of the JSP resembles the anti-war pacifist neutralism that we discussed, as far as policy is concerned. It differs from this pacifist neutralism in one important point: the Socialist brand naturally seeks power, whereas the other turns away from power. The JSP prescription is also designed to weaken the capitalist establishment. Therefore, as far as concepts of the nation are concerned, these two belong to totally different categories.

For the Socialists, the mainspring of neutralism is the renunciation of armaments in the Japanese Constitution. In other words, first there is disarmament, and then neutralism. They see rearmament, with its industrial and other aspects, as reinforcing conservative politics.

The Japanese choice of the neutral way was in answer to the question of securing the safety of Japan, which has abandoned armed forces. In the case of Japan, it is wrong to insist on protecting neutrality through armed forces.¹⁰⁵

Article Nine had a decisive impact on the Socialists' neutralist policy. Their notion of unarmed security is based on the prediction that once military power is allowed, no matter how limited, it will grow to be uncontrollable. The Socialist policy of dealing with external aggression leaves room only for people's resistance.¹⁰⁶ The official Party plan

105. Yamaguchi Fusao, "Hibusō Chūritsu no Jissaisei," (Practicability of Unarmed Neutralism), Jiyu, July 1961, p. 64.

106. The Mainichi Shimbun, January 8, 1969.

maintains that although the security treaty with the United States should be abolished immediately, dissolution of the Self-Defense Forces should be carried out gradually, at a step-by-step pace determined by several conditions. These conditions are: (1) degree of stability of the Socialist government; (2) degree of Socialist control of the Self-Defense Forces; (3) development of a neutral foreign policy; and (4) popular support.¹⁰⁷ Some critics have found "realism" in the Socialists' plan for the "gradual" dissolution of the Self-Defense Forces.¹⁰⁸ From a different viewpoint, however, the Socialists' "transitional" policy for the defense forces embodies the same kind of potential danger that the theory of proletarian dictatorship of the proletariat was supposed to reign only during the transitional period between revolution and the achievement of Communism. The danger is not theoretical but practical, for the transitional period can be extended indefinitely, without really contradicting the stated theory, as long as the proletarian dictatorship is considered necessary or even convenient by the rulers. The above-mentioned four conditions can become quite arbitrary excuses for prolonging dissolution of Socialist-controlled armed forces.

As for domestic politics, the JSP maintains that certain reform measures are indispensable if neutralism is to be realized. These include abolition of defense and related agencies, abolition of the

107. Nihon Shakai-To, Hibuso Heiwa Chūritsu e no Michi (The Way for Unarmed Peaceful Neutralism), 1968.

108. The Yomiuri Shimbun, Editorial, March 28, 1969.

Ministry of Education, and reorganization of the Foreign Ministry into the "Ministry of Peace and Disarmament."¹⁰⁹ In sum, Socialist control of domestic political institutions would be inseparable from neutralism -- a reflection of Socialist distrust in the existing political system. As a foreign scholar put it:

... their skepticism boils down to the fact that Japan is not Switzerland or the United States. They cannot forget the oppressive police state. . . .¹¹⁰

The Socialists' distinction between "peace" forces and "war" forces further blurs the line dividing their policy of neutralism and the Communists' policy. The Socialist attitude toward neutralism is much more flexible when compared with other brands of neutralism. Furthermore, as Ishibashi Masatsugu, Chief of the International Bureau of the JSP, maintains:

When the Socialist Party talks about neutrality, it means "neutrality" in a military sense, and not "neutrality" between Capitalism and Socialism. There can be no "neutrality" between war and peace. We shall support the peace force when the situation becomes clear as to which is the peace force and which is the aggressor. We will not take the neutral position.¹¹¹

In a confrontation between the Capitalists and Socialists, it goes without saying which force the JSP will see as the peace force.

109. Nihon Shakai-To, op. cit., Cf. also Ueda Koichiro, et al, op.cit., pp. 152-159.

110. Cf. Allen B. Cole, et al, op. cit., p. 209.

111. The Mainichi Shimbun, January 6, 1969.

"Nationalistic Neutralism"

The third brand of neutralism can be called "nationalistic neutralism," for lack of a better term. The first and second brands are not without nationalistic elements, but the primary motive is pacifism for the first brand, and Socialism for the second. In the third type of neutralism, national self-assertion is the prime mover. As we have briefly indicated, the Komei-to represents this neutralism as a political party. Labeled "perfect neutralism" by its supporters, it is quite distinct from Socialist neutralism in that it attempts to keep Japan out of any international disputes, regardless of their "peace" or "war" nature. According to The Komei-to's Plan for Foreign and Security Policies, published in April 1968:

The perfect neutral policy of the Komei-to consists in not becoming a party to any kind of war, not supporting any side in a dispute, not participating in any military alliance, and in always keeping an equal distance from all nations. It also promotes an improved international situation in which Japan's status as a peace-loving nation can be secured. 112

Going beyond the military neutrality of Marxist-oriented neutralism, the Komei-to's neutrality means ideological as well as military neutrality. Kuroyanagi Akira, Chairman of the Komei-to's Foreign Affairs Committee, explained philosophical and ideological neutrality as follows:

The majority of the Japanese people favor perfect neutralism. In other words, the neutralist orientation of the Japanese is in the field of thought and ideology, as much as in the military domain. Here lies the value

112. The Kōmei, no. 67 (August 1968), p. 46.

of the Komei-to's neutralism of equal distance.¹¹³

Accordingly, this ideological neutralism will be especially meaningful when "the rigid war of ideologies becomes futile" and the "phenomenon of the 'end of ideology' prepares fertile conditions for the realization of neutral policy."¹¹⁴ This relativistic view of ideologies, the origin of which is the middle-of-the-road principle of Buddhism, makes the Komei-to's neutralism a unique one. Instead of ideologies, however, nationalism is given the central place in this neutralism as can be seen by such remarks as "neutrality in order to exclude big power intervention" and "neutralism of the people makes a national consensus possible and brings about open nationalism of the Japanese."¹¹⁵

As to the present U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, the Komei-to's attitude is a fundamentally negative one.

The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty has now become a nuclear security treaty in the Far East. The existence of this treaty fixes Japan's position as a subordinate one and intensifies international tension in Asia. It is not only contrary to the achievement of eternal world peace, but it also contains dangerous elements that drag Japan into a war she does not want.¹¹⁶

However, the Komei-to argues, immediate abolition of the security treaty as urged by the Socialists and Communists

113. Ishibashi Masatsugu, et al, "'Mamoru' to iukoto -- Chūritsu Kokka no Boei," ("To Defend" -- Defense of a Neutral Nation), Asahi Jyanaru, vol. II (January 1969), p. 33.

114. Yaoi Hidehiko, "Nihon no Anzen to Chūritsu Seisaku," (Japan's Neutrality and Neutral Policy), The Komei Shimbun, January 1, 1969.

115. Ibid.

116. Komei-to, Chūritsu Shugi ni yoru Sekai Heiwa no Michi, (The Way for World Peace by Neutralism), 1968.

...will cause unnecessary division in national opinion and, therefore, is irresponsible. We insist on the gradual dissolution of the treaty in harmony with the spirit of our peace Constitution and the realities of international politics.¹¹⁷

Gradual dissolution includes such steps as (1) gradual shut-down of U.S. bases; (2) strict practice of prior consultation; and (3) abolition of the MSA treaty.¹¹⁸ Along with gradual dissolution of the security treaty, the Self-Defense Forces are also expected to undergo modification rather than abolition. The Komei-to claims it is necessary to maintain "a minimum defense capability that will not present a threat to neighboring nations when perfect neutralism is achieved."¹¹⁹ This minimum defense force is not to exceed the present scale of the Self-Defense Forces.

Komei-to policies toward the security treaty and the defense forces have attracted great support from the people, according to several public opinion polls. For example, Yomiuri Shinbun (April 1968) polled the reactions of the people to the defense policies of major political parties with the following results:¹²⁰

117. The Komei, no. 67, p. 46.

118. Cf. Nishijima Hisashi, "Dai 6-Kai Komei-to Taikai no Ketei ni Tsuite," (Concerning the Decisions of the 6th Party Convention of the Komei-to), Komei-to (Tokyo: Seikasha, 1968), pp. 210-212.

119. The Komei Shinbun, April 10, 1968.

120. The Yomiuri Shinbun, April 22, 1968.

LDP -- continuation of the present treaty . . .	8%
DSP -- treaty with no U.S. troops in Japan . .	15%
JCP -- abolition	13%
JSP -- unarmed neutralism	9%
Komei-to -- gradual dissolution	33%

A recent Asahi Shimbun (January 1969) survey also indicates greater support for gradual dissolution of the treaty.¹²¹

Extention of the treaty indefinitely	4%
Automatic renewal (decided yearly).	15%
Gradual dissolution	42%
Abolition	12%
Other	1%
No answer	13%

Thus, as far as popular support is concerned, the Komei-to's advocacy of neutralism with limited armed forces has the greatest potential of forming a base for a national consensus.¹²² As demonstrated by the fact that more people subscribe to armed neutralism than to unarmed neutralism, the hostility of nationalism toward heavy reliance on the

121. The Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969. According to the Mainichi Poll of July 1968, 9% for renewal of the treaty for a long time; 31% for automatic continuation; 25% for weakening the ties with the U.S.; 16% for the abolition; and 19% for no answer and others. The Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968.

122. The Komei Shimbun, Editorial, April 11, 1968.

United States is gathering momentum quite rapidly, reinforced by Japan's economic growth and the accompanying restoration of confidence. It is no longer a purely anti-war feeling that provides the basis for Japan's neutralism.¹²³ In one poll, among 29% of those who answered that the security treaty was harmful for Japan, as many as 6% based their answer on the belief that "Japan has no independence," as opposed to 2% who expressed anti-war, pacifist sentiment. It is clear, therefore, that nationalism is playing an increasing role in the security treaty controversy.¹²⁴

There are some who insist on neutralism with no limits on Japan's rearmament. Morris called this type of neutralism "tough-minded neutralism," and the best example of this is found in the statements of Tsuji Masonobu.¹²⁵ His publicized view of neutralism is based on the following understanding of the international situation as of 1948.

The Soviet Union will obtain military power or a war capability equal to that of the United States between 1955 and 1960. The Soviet Union will then possess atomic weapons. If the two nations wage war, both will fall. Therefore, if Japan should fight with the United States against the Soviet Union, she will surely be annihilated. I cannot see Japan being defeated twice.

In this sense, Japan should keep a neutral position and must possess minimum armed forces to secure her neutrality.¹²⁶

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123. Wada Takayoshi, "'Chūritsu' wa Hatashite Genso ka?" (Is "Neutralism" an Illusion?) The Ushio, Winter Issue, 1969, p. 229.
124. Cf. Tada Minoru, "Nihon no Anzen Hoshō to Kokumin Ishiki," The Ushio, op. cit., pp. 254-258.
125. Kinoshita Hanji, Nihon no Uvoku. (Right-Wing in Japan) (Tokyo: Kaname Shobo, 1953), pp. 176-182. Cf. also, Ivan I Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends, (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 131-132. Also the same author's "Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism," op. cit., pp. 18-19.
126. Tsuji Masanobu, Chūritsu no Jyōken (Conditions of Neutrality) (Tokyo: Kinsei sha, 1961), p. 281.

He divides "minimum armed forces" into a regular army and a militia.

The regular army, which fights against direct aggression, should maintain adequate fire power and mobility to meet the needs of modern warfare.

The army for meeting indirect aggression of the Communist Party must concentrate on the defense of local towns and workshops. It is desirable to have a progressive militia organization that is directly connected with the people's daily life.¹²⁷

This former colonel considers neutrality only vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union, and maintains a plan to establish "Asian Self-Defense Neutrality." His theory of neutralism is, therefore, quite selective and not in keeping with the correct sense of the word. Tsuji's view was also adopted by the Kyōwa-Sha (Harmony Association),¹²⁸ but the general rightist trend is anti-Communist and pro-American, leaving little room for neutralism. According to Fundamentals of Japanese Foreign Policy, published (1964) by the Nippon Kokumin Kaigi (Japanese People's Conference) which is the liaison body of 42 rightist groups, "the security treaty and cooperation with the United States is the foundation of the present Japanese foreign policy." It further states:

The Communist camp sometimes takes a flexible policy, but it has not abandoned the ambition to communize the world. Japan must, therefore, firmly maintain her position in the Free camp, prevent war and secure her safety and economic development. Also, she must strengthen cooperation with neighbouring Asian nations. If world war breaks out, Japan cannot possibly remain uninvolved as a neutral. Moreover, it should be

127. Tsuji Masanobu, Kono Nippon o (This Japan!) (Tokyo: Kyodo shuppansha, 1953), p. 125.

128. Kinoshita, op.cit., pp.174-175.

realized that Japan's neutral policy in time of peace will endanger her security.¹²⁹

Except in the case of Tsuji and his small group of followers, the rightist organizations generally subscribe to the idea of collective security. Akao Bin of the Dia-Nippon Aikoku-To (Patriotic Party of Great Japan) took this approach when he cried out "The world is divided; no neutrality. Either pro-Soviet and anti-American, or pro-American and anti-Soviet. Be thoroughly pro-American and anti-Soviet!"¹³⁰ Tsuji's view, therefore, cannot be identified with those of rightist groups.¹³¹

Thus, Japanese "neutralism" embodies many different motives and policies. There is the neutralism that fundamentally rejects state power, finding expression in anti-war and pacifist movements. There is the "transitional" neutralism of the Communist and Socialist Parties, differing in degree of commitment and sincerity. There is, thirdly, the neutralism of nationalism, which is hostile to big power domination and intervention. These three concepts of neutralism are mixed and interwoven to such an extent that it is only possible to distinguish them clearly for purposes of analytical interpretation. One individual may possess elements of all three. For example, the first and third -- pacifist and nationalist -- can work in a compensatory rather than a conflicting manner. When there is widespread belief that the national mission should be an anti-war, pacifist one, nationalism may well be combined with inter-

129. Shinoda Senji, Uyoku no Jimmyaku (The Personal Flow of the Right-Wing) (Tokyo: Keisatsu Bunkasha, 1964), p. 116.

130. Arahara Bokusui, Uyoku-Sayoku (Right-Wing and Left-Wing) (Tokyo: Dainippon Kokumin-to, 1960), p. 45.

131. Cf. Sugiyama, op.cit., pp. 422-423.

nationalism. In any case, it is only partly correct to say that neutralism is an expression of nationalism, when the main driving force can be the universal idealism of pacifism or Socialism, as in the first and second types of Japanese neutralism. The argument that readily combined neutralism and nationalism cannot explain why those who subscribe to the idea of collective security can also be nationalistic. In the following section we shall examine the reasoning behind the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.

Justification of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty

Japan's first blue book on foreign policy, Waga Gaikō No Kinkyō (1957), named three principles of Japanese foreign policy. They are: further cooperation with the United Nations; cooperation with the Free nations; and firm maintenance of Japan's position as a participating member in Asian affairs.¹³² In the light of history, it is obvious that the second principle has enjoyed the highest priority and has been the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy ever since 1952 when she recovered her sovereignty. We have noted the fact that only one out of five in Japan, as of 1968, supports the security treaty with the United States. This apparent contradiction has two explanations: the people's neutralism is more an expression of desire than a choice in practical policy-making; and, the security problem has not been the major standard for deciding on party support at election time.¹³³

132. Gaimusho, Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō, 1957, p. 7.

133. The relations between the attitudes toward security problems and the supports for the Sato government are as follows, according to the Asahi survey as reported in The Asahi Shimbun, January 14, 1969: Among the supporters of the military alliance (24%), 57% support the Sato government, 32% do not; Among the supporters of neutralism (58%), 39% support the government while 48% do not.

The government party's view of national security naturally outweighs other views in importance as that party determines actual Japanese foreign policy. "The Mission of the Party," drafted at the time of the merger in November 1955, warns of the danger in "the policy of world domination" held by international Communism. The Party platform calls for "the establishment of defense forces matched to the national situation in order to prepare for the withdrawal of foreign troops." The platform does not specify whether the Party expects to request the withdrawal of "foreign troops" at a certain time or not. In any case, the revised treaty of 1960 froze the situation for ten years, after which time either party to the treaty is entitled to withdraw at one year's advance notice. At present, with one year to go before the treaty review, the LDP has not succeeded in making up its mind concerning the treaty. Some rightist members demand renewal for another ten years, while the majority tends to prefer the so-called "automatic" extension, that is, the Japanese government makes no move concerning the treaty in order to keep it effective on a yearly basis, in expectation that the U.S. government will take the same policy. The necessity of the present security treaty is explained as follows:

If Japan attempts to establish too military a system, she would then have to adopt a militaristic system. Such a system restrains individual freedom to such an extent that the free system becomes untenable. A nation that subscribes to liberalism must, therefore, adopt the collective security system.¹³⁴

134. Jiyu Minshuto, ed., Nihon no Anzen to Boei, op.cit., p. 315.

It is rather dogmatic to conclude that all nations aspiring to liberalism must join some form of collective security in order to maintain both the security of the nation and a liberal domestic political system. This does reflect, however, the conservatives' deep-rooted antagonism toward Communism. The theory of collective security is simpler and clearer than that of neutralism. Armed forces are inevitably given the conviction that international Communism prepares for war. In the nuclear age, national defense cannot be achieved unilaterally. A collective security system is, therefore, the only way to secure national safety.

The Cabinet's decision on the basic principles of national defense in May 1957 expressed the expectation that U.S. military power would play the major role in Japan's defense.

Until that future time when the United Nations will be able effectively to assume the function of preventing external aggressions, Japan shall fight against aggression on the basis of the security treaty with the United States.¹³⁵

The LDP further maintains that the Self-Defense Forces are capable of withstanding aggression by conventional means for several months, whereas any further aggression, especially that involving nuclear weapons, could not be met without reliance on United States armed forces and nuclear deterrence.¹³⁶ In the present international situation where "peace is maintained by a balance of power between the East and the West," the Socialist policy of unarmed neutrality will, in the final analysis,

135. Cabinet Decision, "Kokubo no Kihon Hōshin" (Basic Policy for National Defense), 1957.

136. Jiyū Minshu-To, ed., Heiwa, Anzen Hanei (Peace, Security, and Prosperity) 1968, pp. 74-75.

"separate Japan from the Free camp and draw her into the Communist camp."¹³⁷ According to the LDP, the Socialist stand is a tactic of the Communist forces as well as a utopia.¹³⁸ The Socialist policy of unarmed neutralism is more deceptive than the Communist counterpart since it is advocated under the cover of pacifist idealism.

We will next examine the LDP's view of neutralism as put forth to justify the security treaty with the United States. Neutralism, first of all, upsets the balance of power between East and West and threatens world peace. Second, it necessitates increased armaments and consequent economic difficulty. Third, Japan's economic stability will be further endangered by the deterioration of foreign trade with the Free nations. And lastly, infiltration by the Soviet Union and Communist China will be intensified, resulting in Japan's communization.¹³⁹

Despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of the Japanese people are anti-Communist -- only a few percents support the JCP -- the conservatives and the government take a more serious view of Communism, concluding that Japan's neutralization, and the accompanying economic difficulty, would bring about an eventual Communist seizure of power. Granted that such a view is designed to provoke the people's anti-Communist feeling, the suspicion of the conservatives that the people will easily turn to Communism resembles in a way the anxiety of the pre-Meiji leaders that the people might conspire with the "barbarians" against the central government. In this connection, it has been pointed out

137. Ibid., p. 87.

138. Ibid., p. 88.

139. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

that the conservatives have only an insecure sense of being the rulers and are obsessed with a "persecution complex," despite their wide support from the people.^{140.}

The positive values of the security treaty are, according to The Affirmative Theory of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty by Nakamura Kikuo: (1) assistance from the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the protection of Japan's maritime transportation; (2) U.S. cooperation in the development of Southeast Asia; (3) introduction of U.S. defense technology; and (4) U.S. nuclear deterrence.¹⁴¹ The government, as we have discussed, emphasizes the last point as the primary benefit of the security treaty. The second reason -- cooperation for the development of Southeast Asia -- is not truly relevant since a military treaty is not essential to such a goal. The security of Japan's maritime transportation presupposes a particular pattern of enemy-ally relations. Moreover, it must be realized that modern weaponry has overcome geographical limitations to a considerable extent and that other communication, such as that of information, is becoming increasingly important for national defense. The same criticism applies to Kōsaka Masataka's thesis that "the fundamental of Japan's security is control of the ocean."¹⁴² With differing degrees, all those who support the security treaty base their arguments on the balance of power theory. Nagai Yōnosuke is one

140. Cf. Maruyama Masao, Nihon no Shiso (Japanese Thought) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), pp. 141-144.

141. Nakamura Kikuo, ed., Nichibei Anpo Kōtei Ron (Affirmative Theory of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty) (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1967), pp. 26-31.

142. Cf. Kōsaka Masataka, Kaiyō Kokka Nihon no Kōsō (Plan for the Oceanic Nation, Japan) (Tokyo: Chuō Koron sha, 1965), p.178.

of the protagonists of this thesis. In his article, "Limitations and Choices in Japanese Foreign Policy," he commented on neutralism as follows:

Any action that attempts fundamentally to change the status quo under the Sino-U.S. tension would not be conducive to security or alleviation of strain in the Far East. The view that Japan's neutralization and non-alignment would promote peace in the Far East completely neglects Japan's position and the political influence of such an act on the United States, Formosa, and Korea.¹⁴³

Summing Up

In essence, the conflict between neutralism and collective security is a conflict between the challengers and the supporters of the status quo. The balance of power theory of those who support the security treaty with the United States demonstrates precisely this point. The advocates of anti-war, pacifist neutralism are in fact challengers of the state power and the prevailing concept of national sovereignty. As such, they have remained so far exclusively in the realm of theoretical interest. When neutralism is channeled into real politics, either by the Socialist Party or the Komei-to, it inevitably loses its "anti-power" aspect in becoming a viable political policy. Thus, neutralism is argued and supported on two separate levels with little communication between them: at the non-political party level intellectuals and private citizens are primarily concerned with an "ought to be" concept of the nation; at the other, the political party level, virtually all Japanese political parties are primarily concerned

143. Nagai Yonosuke, Heiwa no Daishō (Compensation for Peace) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1967), pp. 119-120.

with the establishment of a practical security policy designed to secure what they conceive to be Japan's national interests.

There exists no nation in the world today, whether an avowed permanent neutral or a neutral through temporary policy, that renounces armed forces altogether. The policy of unarmed neutralism of the JSP therefore is unique, and, as the JSP is the largest opposition party in Japan, presents a grave challenge to the conventional view of national sovereignty protected by armed forces. The question remains whether the Socialists would really abandon all armed forces, as they claim they would, should they come to power in the future. Otherwise, the question of "challenge" is confined to a highly hypothetical level. The Socialist negative attitude toward both state and military power can be partly explained by the Party's relative distance from power and scant prospects of gaining power in the near future. If this is correct, should the Socialists assume power their attitude can be expected to undergo a change: the stronger their present pretense and gestures are, the greater the change will be. The military, they do recognize, is one of the most important elements of power.

The following two diagrams demonstrate a clear contrast between the JSP's attitude toward the security treaty and its post-security treaty policy, as well as the positions of other political parties with respect to Japan's national security.

Diagram 1 -- Policies of National Security¹⁴⁴





Diagram 2 -- Attitude Toward the U.S. - Japanese Security Treaty



144. Cf. Hans J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954), p. 147.

Only the Socialist policy falls under the Radical-Conservative axis. However, toward the security treaty with the United States, the Socialist Party takes a very tough-minded posture as contrasted to its proposed tender-minded security policy should the treaty be abolished. It is difficult, therefore, to assess different security policies unless they are put in the overall context of Japanese views of national security and the nation.

The main difficulty about the anti-treaty neutralists is their assumption that dissolution or abolition of the present security treaty with the United States would automatically solve the question of Japanese security. In other words, they tend to think that by undoing something with the present collective security system Japan will be relieved of all the evils of the system and will then enjoy only the benefits of neutralism.

The opposite is claimed by supporters of the collective security system; they can see only the benefits of the security treaty and the evils of neutralism. A prerequisite for a national consensus on national security, therefore, is a balance sheet on neutralism and collective security compiled with utmost objectivity, with open references to Japan's course, foreign policy goals, and so forth.¹⁴⁵ For example, the following dichotomies somehow have to be compromised and reconciled in order to reach a national consensus on the security problem.

145. Mushakoji Kinhide and Hidaka Rokuro, "70-nen Mondai o Dou Kangaeruka" (How to Think About the Problems of 1970) Gendai no Me, vol.10, no.3 (March 1969), p. 51.

Positions Items	Neutralism	Collective Security
International Politics	Withdrawal from all military blocs	Participation in the U.S. military bloc
War	Emotional repulsion toward the last war, fear of nuclear weapons	Fear of indirect aggression, belief in the balance of power theory
Constitution	Over-expectation from and deification of the Constitution	De-emphasis of the Constitution
Nuclear Weapons	Provocation = War	Deterrence = Peace

In this picture of confrontation, what is left out is the majority of the people. The people's pacifism is the most neglected element in the political struggle over the neutralism and collective security, and this, in turn merely lengthened the gap between the right and the left.

All these conflicting views on national security and defense remind us of Nakae Chōmin's discussion of Japan's security problem in his book San Suijin Kērin Mondō (Three Drunken Fellows' Debate on Politics) written in 1887. This book published 20 years after the Meiji Restoration recorded a debate involving "a gentlemen of Western learning," "a strong-minded guest," and Nankai Sensei who is, in fact, Chōmin himself.¹⁴⁶

146. Nakae Chōmin, Chōmin Bunshū (Collection of Chōmin's Work). (Tokyo: Bunka Shiryo Chosa-Kai, 1965), pp. 47-48, 89-97.

The strong-minded guest maintains that "the small country" [Japan] should send all her able-bodied men to "that big country" [China] and conquer it in order to exploit vast new territories. The gentleman, on the contrary, argues that the best way to insure national security is complete disarmament. He continues:

To me the only thing of importance is morality. It is not my concern whether America and France assist us, being moved by the greatness of our spirit and the excellence of our enterprise; or whether other nations like Russia, England, and Germany protect us out of balance of power consideration.

The strong-minded guest naturally asks: "What do you do if some violent nation should invade us, taking advantage of our disarmament?"

The gentleman answers:

I do not believe at all that such a violent nation exists. If there were such a nation, we could think only as individuals about how to deal with it. Without taking up a single weapon, or firing a single bullet, I would calmly say, "We have never been impolite to you. We do not have any reason to be criticized. We have governed our country under the republican political system without internal strife. We do not want you to disturb us. Please return to your country." If they refused to listen and persisted in pointing their guns at us, we would only shout loudly how impolite and immoral they are! We would simply die by their bullets, for there is no solution.

Then, Nankai-Sensei comments: The gentleman's theory is only achievable when all people cooperate together; the strong-minded guest's theory is impossible unless an emperor or a chancellor dictatorially decides. He supports the concept of a standing army for defensive war, rejecting both those of complete disarmament and aggression. Asked by the two guests to summarize his points, Nankai-Sensei urges the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, gradual

abolition of restrictions on speech and press, efforts toward economic development, and a friendly foreign policy toward neighbouring nations.

At this point, the guests laugh and say that even a child knows such things. They complain that this is too simple for Nankai-Sensei who is noted for his unconventional ideas. However, Nankai-Sensei warns that unconventional theories do not permit the drawing of a grand design for the nation.

* * *

Our more recent controversy, like that of Nakae Chōmin, occurred 20 years after major social upheaval, that is, the Defeat and the Occupation and the Meiji Restoration. Unfortunately, Japan, by invading China, followed the course urged by the strong-minded guest. The Japanese paid the price for this and similar action. The gentleman's theory of complete disarmament is written into the new Constitution but the actual situation contradicts it. Nankai-Sensei's warning not to play with "unconventional" theories when the national future is at stake holds true at present as in his day.

CHAPTER 7

NATIONALISM IN EDUCATION

A. Prewar Education

The establishment of a modern national education system was critical in the Meiji Government's endeavor to transform society, without delay, into a modern nation-state. The policy of "Rich Country and Strong Army" necessitated both education of able men for nation-building and inculcation of national awareness in the general public.

As early as 1871, the Education Ministry launched a thoroughly centralized education system composed of eight university regions backed up by 32 high school and 210 primary school regions.¹ The first task of education reform was to overthrow the feudalistic status orientation and, by introducing pragmatic, achievement-oriented attitudes, to turn the people's energy toward the advancement of their own social and economic positions. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the influence of American pragmatism during the early years of Meiji was "extremely great," for the initial post-World War II reform was also developed from American recommendations and advice.² The statement issued to explain Gakusei (the Educational System) based its importance on the following points:

1. Tsuchiya Tadao, and others, eds., Kindai Kyōikushi (History of Modern Education) (Kyoikugaku Zenshu vol. 3) (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1968), p. 38.
2. Karasawa Tomitaro, "Changes in Japanese Education as Revealed in Textbooks," Japan Quarterly, vol. II, no. 3, 1955, p. 365.

(1) It is necessary to discipline oneself, to enlighten, and develop one's ability and talent in order to succeed in life and to promote national industry.

(2) The new education is not based on feudalistic learning, which is impractical, but is based on the practical knowledge and technology necessary for all kinds of occupations.

(3) Since study provides the "capital" for advancement in life, everybody, irrespective of class, has to study.

(4) Since study is useful for success in life, its cost should be paid by the people.³

Although the emphasis was put on the success of the individual in life and not on national development, the government's purpose in promoting national education can only be appropriately evaluated within the broad context of "Rich Country and Strong Army."⁴ The initial emphasis on individual benefit was considered necessary for freeing the people from feudalistic bondage and, in this respect, was in harmony with national policy. During this early Meiji period there were few efforts to awaken the national consciousness and little evidence of government interference in the teaching of morals and history.⁵ We must also note that this was a "period of confusion" as far as educational content was concerned, and was "an age of translated textbooks" when the government was simply not ready to exert tight control.⁶

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3. Cf. Horimatsu Takeichi, Nihon Kindai Kyōikushi (History of Modern Japanese Education), (Tokyo: Rishosha, 1959), pp.43-45.
 4. Cf. Kyōikushi Hensankai, ed., Meiji Iko Kyōikuseido Hattatsushi (History of Development of Educational System Since Meiji), (Vol.1, Tokyo: Kyōikushiryō Chosa-Kai, 1964), p. 340.
 5. Cf. Tamura Eiichiro, Nashonarizumu to Kyōiku (Nationalism and Education) (Tokyo: Tōyōkan, 1965), p. 71.
 6. Karasawa Tomitaro, Kyōkasho no Rekishi (History of Textbooks) (Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1956), p.59 and by the same author, Meiji Hyakunen no Kyōiku (Education of Meiji One Hundred Years), (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1968), p.28.

When the government realized the danger of individualistic education, a realization brought on by the popular rights movement, it lost no time in replacing the prevailing education of enlightenment by the Confucian emphasis on submission.⁷ Motoda Nagazane, the emperor's lecturer, played the major role in this change. The Education Ministry began to edit textbooks to emphasize Confucian ethics and principles of government, striking all reference to foreign names and proverbs in 1883.⁸ The "Guide for Primary School Teachers" issued in the same year maintained that, since "much knowledge" often becomes politically dangerous, primary school education should be concerned, above all, with creating "good" subjects who were submissive to the State order.⁹ The apparent problem of Confucian teaching was that it could not effectively foster the national consciousness necessary for Japan's emergence as a modern nation-state. Thus, the government and bureaucrats, dissatisfied with Confucian teaching alone, began a struggle to gain control over educational policy.

In 1885, the first Minister of Education, Mori Arinori, established a nationalistic and pragmatic course for Japan's education. Mori, who had studied in England and served as a diplomat, was aware of Western advancement and, therefore, did not preclude the study of Western civilization. He thought, nevertheless, that only the elite should be entitled to such a study whereas the mass should be educated to become good imperial subjects. Rejecting the view that education should cultivate people's natures through enlightenment, Mori installed a system designed to produce

7. Karasawa, Kyōkasho no Rekishi, p. 103.

8. Ibid., pp. 114-116.

9. Kyōikushi Hensankai, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 16.

submissive subjects¹⁰ and declared that schools were for the benefit of the State and not the people.¹¹ State-authorized textbooks were introduced in 1886 along with the Imperial University Decree. The Decree stated that "Imperial Universities aim at teaching and studying arts and sciences to meet the needs of the State." In addition, by providing details for the education of Imperial subjects, he placed emphasis on the training of teachers equal to that on the training of students.¹²

This educational policy logically led to strict supervision over school textbooks. The introduction of a textbook authorization system in 1886 contributed to uniform content according to standards set by the State. Textbooks became the basic instrument in developing a national consciousness among the people.¹³ Promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890 marked the end of the controversy which had surrounded educational policies and goals since the Restoration. This was a product of compromise between Confucian ethics represented by Motoda and the emphasis of such bureaucrats as Ito Hirobumi who primarily stressed Japan's modernization. Since the Rescript became the basis for modern Japanese nationalism, we quote the document in its entirety here.

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10. Ishida Takeshi, Meiji Seiji Shisoshi Kenkyu (Study of Meiji Political Thought), (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1954), p. 35.
 11. Kyōikushi Hensankai, op. cit., pp. 6-10.
 12. Komatsu Shukichi, "Kokumin Kyōikuseido no Seiritsu," (Establishment of National Educational System), in Tsuchiya, op. cit., pp. 60-63.
 13. Karasawa, op. cit., pp. 145-148.

Imperial Rescript on Education

Know ye, Our Subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne, coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrations the best tradition of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Decendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue. [Emphasis added.]¹⁴

The family-state prototype is evident in the Rescript. Congruence of power and ethics in the person of the emperor became the essence of the ideology of kokutai. As one scholar pointed out, the Rescript became the creed of a religion.¹⁵

As international tension increased, emphasis shifted to sacrifice of the individual in preparation for state emergencies. The Rescript was

14. Government Section, SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1948) Appendix B: 9a, p. 584.

15. Tamura, op. cit., p. 92.

accompanied by detailed instructions as to the teaching of a proper attitude toward the imperial throne. The most important ritual was worship of the picture of the emperor and empress located in a prescribed place in all schools and administered by school principals. This observance was highlighted on national holidays and other important occasions to mobilize national solidarity under the emperor.¹⁶

Nationalistic sentiment, greatly aided by the Rescript, experienced its first concrete satisfaction in the victory over China in 1895. Uniform national education was reinforced further by the revised decree on primary schools of 1900. Another important development during this period was the nationalist move for State textbooks as part of the policy of "Rich Country and Strong Army." The military influence was by no means negligible in this development, as indicated when Kodama Gentaro, army general and one-time Minister of Home Affairs, was named Education Minister.¹⁷ The inception of the State textbooks took place in 1903, a year before the Russo-Japanese War. From then until the defeat in the Pacific War, Japan issued five versions of State textbooks in the following years:

- (1) 1903;
- (2) 1910, after the Russo-Japanese War;
- (3) 1918, after the First World War;
- (4) 1933, after the Manchurian Incident; and,
- (5) 1941, the year of the outbreak of war in the Pacific.

16. Ebihara Masayoshi, Gendai Nihon Kyōiku Seisakushi (History of Modern Japanese Educational Policy) (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1965), pp.125-126.

17. Karasawa, op.cit., p. 210.

History and moral textbooks were the first targets of State control, followed by Japanese language and geography textbooks. Karasawa Tomitaro maintains that "history, as it was taught, became in effect a kind of history for the sake of nationalism."¹⁸ By the turn of the century, State control over education had become increasingly important not only in fostering national awareness, but also in preventing the spread of dissatisfaction among the people arising from tensions of a rapidly industrializing society. After the short-lived liberal and less nationalistic era of Taishō Democracy,¹⁹ the fourth edition of State textbooks in 1933 reflected ascending militarism as emphasis was placed on the spiritual training of dutiful subjects, and the social sciences were virtually banned. Military training on the campus increased. Stricter thought control was intended by the establishment of the Student Section and the National Spirit Research Institute in the Ministry of Education. In addition, specific teachers were placed in charge of thought supervision at each school. The impact of the Russian Revolution on the students necessitated further "thought unification" by the government.²⁰ The first lesson for entering pupils consisted of concepts of the divine country and soldiery. Filial piety, absorbed as one of the highest virtues, became linked with loyalty and assistance to the imperial throne. "Study must find

18. Karasawa, "Changes in Japanese Education," op.cit., p. 372.

19. It is to be noted that the general framework of educational system established during the Meiji period did not receive any vital blow in the Taisho era. Cf. Tamura, op.cit., p.105.

20. Tamura, op.cit., p. 120.

its goal in kokutai and assist the imperial cause," maintained the teacher's manual for moral teaching at the elementary school level.²¹ "It is through study, invention, and discovery that subjects are to assist imperial prosperity."²² This distorted view of study reached one climax when Minobe Tatsukichi's Imperial-Organ Theory came under attack in 1935. School teachers increasingly became "military men in civilian clothing" faithfully discharging their duties as conveyers of the will and orders of the militaristic State. In March 1941, primary school became "the national school" (Kokumin Gakko), and compulsory schooling was lengthened from six to eight years. Its purpose was to provide general elementary education to train the people in the Imperial Way. A comparison between this educational goal and that of the revised elementary school decree of 1890 shows the degree of change in Japanese educational policy in half a century. The decree stated that "elementary school aims, with due attention to development of the pupil's body, to provide ordinary knowledge and technology necessary as a basis for moral and national teaching and life."²³ Inception of a national school marked the transformation of an already highly nationalistic education into an imperial fascist education. "The Way of the Subject" was distributed in July as a preparation for commencement of the war in December.²⁴ The following principles,

21. Quoted in Karasawa, Kindai Nihon Kyōikushi (History of Modern Japanese Education), (Tokyo: Seibundo Shinkōsha, 1968), p. 219.

22. Ibid., p. 219.

23. Tamura, op.cit., p. 121.

24. Tsuchiya, op.cit., p.187.

written in pupils' reportbooks, clearly indicated the government's expectation for elementary education:

(1) I am an Emperor's child and will faithfully serve Him and brighten the light of the Empire.

(2) I am a child of the rising Asia and will perform with sincerity and train myself accordingly.

(3) I am a pupil of the Senju Dai-Go National School and will abide by the etiquette to become an obedient and cheerful child.²⁵

The one moral taught in ethics class emphasized duty as an Imperial subject, and, as a result, the role of the individual as such was played down. Genshi-Hōkō (Self-denial and public service) became the slogan. Collapse of the educational system came with the student mobilization act that suspended all regular teaching. By 1944 students were working in factories and fields instead of in classrooms.²⁶ The contents of textbooks are an important indicator of a society's orientation. The following breakdown of the material in ethics textbooks is especially interesting in that it reflects the shifting emphasis in educational policy. The table indicates a gradual de-emphasis on the individual and an increasing emphasis on the nation. Thus, prewar textbooks "failed to encourage any tendency toward self-reliance or self-assertion."

25. Karasawa, Meiji Hyakunen no Kyōiku, op. cit., pp. 152-154.

26. Tsuchiya, op. cit., p. 202.

A Breakdown of the Materials in Ethics Textbooks²⁷

(Figures are percentages)

Classification of Contents	Period of Publication				
	I 1903	II 1910	III 1918	IV 1933	V 1941
Home	10.7	14.2	11.5	10.5	5.7
Individual	41.5	37.7	35.3	34.6	28.7
School	3.1	1.2	1.3	4.3	6.6
Society	27.1	24.1	27.6	25.3	13.9
National	15.1	17.9	18.6	19.8	37.8
International	0	0	0.6	0.6	1.6
Miscellaneous	2.5	4.9	5.1	4.9	5.7

Karasawa concludes that:

... the books issued by the national government contained little or no mention of justice, responsibility, or commercial ethics. That which corresponded to the Western concept of justice was loyalty to the emperor, or obedience to parents. Basis for these qualities was said to be the kindness of the superior. Thus, school texts failed to teach a modern system of ethics, inculcating instead a mistaken form of thinking.²⁸

B. Postwar Education

1. Institutional Centralization

Occupation Reforms and the Aftermath (1945-1956)

One of the pressing tasks of the Occupation, following dissolution of the army and the rightist organizations, was a re-education of the

27. Karasawa, "Changes in Japanese Education," op.cit., p. 373.

28. Ibid., p. 365.

Japanese people for the complete elimination of militarism in Japan. The reforms had to rely on initiative and power of the Occupation since no idea or intention for fundamental education reform was presented by the defeated Japanese. Formation of the Civil Information and Education (CIE) under SCAP in September 1945 marked the beginning of postwar educational reform. CIE recommended the complete elimination of militarism and ultranationalism from the Japanese educational system and establishment of a new educational curriculum designed to foster democratic ideals and principles.²⁹ Recommendations were delivered to the Ministry of Education through the Liaison Conference, composed of SCAP and the Japanese government representatives. Active participation of the Government Section (GE) in educational reforms brought about some friction among the Occupation authorities, but did not affect the overall function of SCAP in matters of education. Directives were issued one after another to facilitate democratization of the Japanese educational system and policy. "Administration of the Japanese Educational System" (October 1945), "Investigation, Purge, and Recognition of Teachers and Other Concerned Personnel" (October 1945), and "Prohibition of the Teaching of Ethics, Japanese History, and Geography" (December 1945), were the first steps for the Occupation-sponsored reforms. A report by the first American Educational Mission in March 1946 set the basic course for postwar Japanese education. It urged an educational ideal based upon "recognition of the value and dignity of individuals" and recommended the so-called

29. Suzuki Eiichi, "Senryō Kanrikiko to Sengo Kyōiku Seisaku no Kettei Katei" (Administrative Structure of the Occupation and Decision-Making Process of Postwar Educational Policy," Sengo Kyoiku Gurupu, ed., Sengo Nihon no Kyoiku Kaikaku (Educational Reforms of Postwar Japan) (Revised Ed., Tokyo: Sengo Kyoiku Gurupu, 1965), pp. 16-17 and p. 22.

6-3-3-4 system, decentralization through the establishment of boards of education and overall reorganization of curriculum.³⁰ The report, with full support from SCAP, "determined the education policy of the Occupation,"³¹ and the Fundamental Law on Education of March 1947, together with the School Education Law, laid the foundation for postwar education. Establishment of the elective boards of education in July 1948 represented the transfer of education from bureaucratic to popular control.

An overview summary concerning types of education by generation is helpful here in understanding some aspects of differing views of postwar education.

A characteristic of those who were born and grew up in the Meiji era is a strong ambition accompanied by the idea of hard work and self-help. They received education by the first (1903) and second (1910) state textbooks and witnessed two victories over China and Russia. They are usually most devoted supporters of the Emperor and the imperial institution and identify the Japanese nation with the person of the Emperor.

The so-called "Taishoits," who grew up under a relatively liberal and international era of Taisho (1912-1926), value "culture" highly and are greatly influenced by German idealistic philosophy. Their third state textbook (1918) was a product of "Taisho Democracy." At the same time, they witnessed social contradictions caused by rapid modernizations, and the growing labor movement. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was a great stimulus for some of the intelligentsia. In general, they tend to teach their children to be individualistic and men of culture. Therefore, they did not find postwar education reforms hard to accept.

30. Tsuchiya, op.cit., p. 230.

31. Munakata Masaya, Nihon no Kyōiku (Education in Japan) (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1957), p.2.

Those who were born in prewar Showa (1926-1945) and received prewar education by the fourth (1933) and fifth (1941) state textbooks were literally brought up as children of a militaristic state. It was they who were sent to battlefields as students-soldiers. Generally speaking, however, they were young enough to re-orient themselves and adopt new democratic values after defeat, becoming most critical to old values and those who subscribed to them. In this respect, they make an alliance with the Taishoits in defense of postwar education.³²

Thus, the reaction of the Japanese leaders, who were largely "Meiji People," to the educational reforms of the Occupation was not entirely favorable. "Educational policy for Reconstructing a New Japan," issued by the Education Ministry on September 15, 1945, simply pointed out that "education from now on shall endeavor to maintain kokutai and at the same time to end militaristic thought and policy." The new democratic education was not considered a contradiction of kokutai, which, again, manifests the illusory view of kokutai prevalent in the Japanese ruling circle. We will return to this point when we discuss the relation between the Imperial Rescript on Education and the Fundamental Law on Education. Let it suffice here to note that, just as political and economic reforms were carried out only through the decisive power and determination of the Occupation, educational reform became possible only by the determined will of the Occupation. As a result, reforms were subject to policy changes of the Occupation. Such a change is clearly evident in the report of the second American Education Mission of 1950 which recommended increased

32. Cf. Karasawa Tomitaro, Nippon-jin no Rirekisho (Curriculum Vitae of the Japanese) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1961), pp.13-18.

restrictions on teachers' organizational activities. This report was instrumental in the drastic change in the educational policy of the Japanese government.³³ Intensified Cold War, hostilities and the outbreak of the Korean War permitted and encouraged the conservatives to "rectify" the "excesses" of Occupation reforms. However, it is important to know what a time lag existed between education policies and other political as well as economic measures. For example, the Education Ministry published a high school textbook entitled "Democracy" in August-October of 1948 in which the individualistic views and reflections on war and State power were unique in the history of postwar Japanese education. Also, in 1952 the Education Ministry instructed the boards of education that teachers were to have priority over the boards in the selection of textbooks. That same year, conservatives, reacting to the reorganization and increased jurisdiction of the Education Ministry, and attempting to "rectify the Occupation-made educational system," began a campaign which led to the passage of two laws in May 1954 dealing with the political activities of teachers. As Education Minister Ōdachi Shigeo himself stated, these laws aimed at prohibiting the political activities of teachers "who were directed by the well-planned guidance of the Teachers' Union."³⁴

In February 1955, the Japanese Democratic Party adopted as part of its platform "the integration of state textbooks." The following month the party began publication of pamphlets entitled "Deplorable Textbooks," designed to attack what were deemed to be "prejudiced" textbooks.

33. Nagai Michio, Mombusho to Nikkyoso (The Education Ministry and the Teachers' Union), (Tokyo: Chuokoron sha, 1958), p. 119.

34. Cf. Matsumura Takeshi, Kyōiku no Mori (Forest of Education) vol. 11, (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun-Sha, 1962), p. 46.

Establishment of a Highly Centralized System (1956-1968)

The government presented two bills to the National Diet in March 1956 which aimed to control textbooks and to transform the hitherto elective boards of education into appointive ones. Although the textbook control bill failed to pass, the board of education reform passed, thereby giving the Education Ministry access, by way of the appointed members of the boards, to the lowest ranks in the education system. The new law provides that members of boards of education shall be appointed by the chiefs of the local governments with the consent of local assemblies. However, the chairmen of prefectural boards shall be appointed only with the consent of the Education Minister, and the chairmen of village, town, and city boards shall be appointed with the consent of prefectural boards. In addition, boards at higher administrative levels can "guide," "advise," and "assist" boards at lower levels. There have been cases where board members, disobedient to a superior's advice, have been rejected for promotion to the chairmanship of their boards.³⁵ The function of appointed boards of education has become largely the communication of directives from the central government to lower local units.

Education Minister Kiyose Ichiro insisted on tightening government inspection of textbooks, which, he argued, could be done by administrative measures without relying on legislation. The Ministry established the Textbook Research System in October for this purpose. Until then, textbooks had been inspected by five Ministry officials, designated as Messers. A, B, C, D, and E, whose judgment was final. It was reported

35. Ibid., pp. 77-79.

that a sixth man, Mr. F, joined in this decision-making and that his political opinion affected the whole inspection after October 1956. This is the widely discussed "F-Clause Purge."³⁶

The Ministry of Education instructed, in July 1957, that the right of choosing textbooks rested with boards of education, thereby nullifying its instruction of 1952. In 1958, the Ministry published "The Outline for Teaching Guidance" in the Official Gazette and claimed that the Outline had legal binding power. Textbooks were expected to comply with this outline. The textbook inspection of 1958 proved to be a hard one for editors and publishers, as 30% failed to pass the test.³⁷ In the primary school textbook inspection of 1961, only 28% passed the first test, but in the second inspection, held three months later, 98% succeeded in meeting the requirements set by the Ministry.³⁸ Textbook companies naturally attempted to get favorable rulings by eliminating those which editors considered to have been written by "prejudiced" scholars or intellectuals. Some went even further than actually required in an attempt to anticipate the hidden intent of the Outline. A high school textbook of social studies edited by Associate Professor Hidaka Rokuro and others failed to pass the inspection of 1955-1956. Hidaka and his fellow editors resigned in response to the publisher's compromise move to include one of the Ministry's favorite scholars in the work.³⁹

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36. Cf. Naramoto Katsutoshi, "Sengo Kyōiku Nendaishi Nempyo" (Chronological Table of Problems of Postwar Education), Shiso no Kagaku, no.86, April 1969, p.90.
37. Tokutake Toshio, Kawariyuku Kyōkasho (Changing Textbooks), (Tokyo: Shin Nipponsha, 1968), p.119.
38. Ibid., p. 127.
39. Cf. Marius Jansen, "Education, ethics, and Politics in Japan," Foreign Affairs, July 1957.

A Ministry document issued in 1961 concerning the plans for issuing free textbooks referred to the textbook inspection system and its effect as follows:

Since the present inspection is carried out very strictly in accordance with the standard set forth in the Outline for Teaching Guidance, the textbook contents are the same as those of the State textbooks in substance. ⁴⁰

The document reported that the Ministry expected only five textbooks for each subject to remain in the near future. Textbooks became free for primary school pupils in 1964 and for junior high school pupils in 1965. The law concerning State-supplied textbooks conferred the right of adopting textbooks to the city, town, and village boards of education. In practice, however, the prefectural boards of education have exercised the right of textbook selection for local boards. As many as 37 prefectures out of 44 followed this method for primary school textbooks in 1968. ⁴¹ Between 1959 and 1967, choice in textbooks for primary schools decreased to one-half, and that for junior high schools to one-third. Moreover, the three best-selling textbooks received a market share of 77.2% at the primary school level in 1965, and 82.9% at the junior high school level in 1966. ⁴² These figures incontestably demonstrate the effect of State textbook inspection. The above-mentioned statement that present textbooks are the same as the State textbooks seems not far from the truth. "Progressive

40. The Yomiuri Shimbun, May 8, 1969.

41. Tokutake, op. cit., pp. 146-149.

42. Ibid.

intellectuals" have been turned away from textbook writing by the indirect power of Ministry inspection. The leftist Teachers' Union, with 500,000 members, was unable to launch an effective resistance despite its diametrical confrontation with the Ministry. The controversial right conferred on boards of education in 1958 to rank teacher performance, and the restoration of moral teaching in 1959, resulted in further centralization both in terms of organization and content of instruction.

The report on the "Ideal Image of the Japanese" (1965-1966), prepared by educational committee members of the government whose average age was 68 as of 1965, or Meiji type people, officially emphasized the need for a national awareness and the people's responsibility as members of the nation, both in contrast to the individualistic values set forth by the Fundamental Law on Education. We pointed out in Chapter 4 that the Emperor was the patriotic focus in the "Ideal Image of the Japanese."

A noteworthy event in 1965 was Ienaga Saburo's lawsuit against the State for alleged unconstitutional textbook inspection. Ienaga, Professor at Tokyo Kyōiku Daigaku (Educational University), maintained that the high school textbook he edited, A New History of Japan, had received unfair inspection from the Ministry since 1952. His lawsuit was an attempt to "restore justice by resorting to law." We will discuss some of the contested issues between Ienaga and the Education Ministry in the following section. This lawsuit inevitably led to political repercussions in both progressive and conservative circles. "The National Liaison Conference to Support the Textbook Inspection Lawsuit" was organized in October 1965, symbolizing, in a way, the first resistance of those driven to the defensive by the inspection and control of the Ministry.

Against this move, more conservative "scholars, critics, and men of knowledge who wish the normalization of education" established "The Council on Textbook Problems" in December of the same year. This group, in fear that the Japanese educational world will be used for ideological struggle and political conflict, supports stricter textbook inspection. Ōishi Yoshio (b. 1903), a law professor, Oka Kiyoshi (b. 1901), a mathematician and critic, and Fukuda Tsuneari (b. 1912), a critic, are among the originators of the Council. The appeal of this conservative group reads in part as follows:

We fear that, if the State should lose this suit, confusion in the world of education will be inevitable and will encourage a revolution in education. There will even be the danger of a Red Revolution.⁴³

According to a recent report, an "Association for the Protection of Textbooks" was established in June 1969 by scholars and politicians who support the State in the suit. Kōsaka Masaaki, Chairman of the committee responsible for the "Ideal Image of the Japanese," and Naitō Yosaburo, ex-Education Ministry bureaucrat and member of the House of Councilors, are instrumental in this new pro-inspection group.⁴⁴

Despite all efforts by "progressive" scholars and the leftist Teachers' Union, State control of textbooks has proven to be decisive in setting up the course of Japanese education. The Ministry decided in 1967 that the myths of the foundation of the nation should be included in history education. Further doubts were raised over the intentions of the Ministry

43. Uno Seiichi, et al, Rekishi Kyōiku to Kyōkasho Tōsō (History, Education and Textbook Struggle), (Tokyo: Nihon Kyobunsha, 1968), pp. 3-5 and p. 71.

44. The Asahi Shimbun, June 11, 1969.

when its members argued that confusion in the minds of children when combining myth with historical fact would actually provide desirable stimulation to their imagination.⁴⁵

Thus, centralization of the education system has been largely completed by a sequence of events: the 1954 law concerning the political neutrality of teachers, the making of boards of education appointive in 1956, and through strict inspection and State control of textbooks. As a result, some of the important principles of democratic education, namely "decentralization" and rational, unbiased textbooks, have disappeared from Japanese education. We must understand, however, that it has been almost impossible for education alone to remain decentralized when political, social, and financial decentralization in Japan has been only marginal. The idea of local characteristics and control of education was hard to accept for the centrifugal-minded Japanese, accustomed, in prewar days, to State textbooks. As for the central government, centralization was indispensable if education, believed to be divided unproductively between "individuals" and the "world," was to become "national," contributing to such awareness. In retrospect, centralization of education seems almost inevitable, given the organization of Japanese political culture and the imbalance of power between the strong central government and weak local government. As we have seen, institutional centralization has always been accompanied by similar trends in education. Increasing emphasis has been put on fostering students' awareness of the nation and the State, on the inculcation of national pride through re-evaluation of

45. The Mainichi Shimbun, August 12, 1968.

Japanese history, culture, and tradition, and finally, on the need for a patriotism centering on the Emperor and a will for national defense.

In theory, the basis for national education as it relates to concept of the nation is Article I of the Fundamental Law on Education. This states that the purpose of education is both spiritually and physically to develop healthy people, strong in their independence of spirit. The School Education Law contains more concrete articles such as: "To lead pupils to a correct understanding of the realities and tradition of their home towns and the State, and to foster a spirit of international cooperation" (for elementary school, Article XVIII); "To cultivate those qualities necessary for the future formers of the State and society" (for junior high school, Article XXXVI); and "To cultivate those qualities necessary for the future able formers of the State and society." (for high school, Article XVII).

In practice, however, the Education Ministry's Outline for Teaching Guidance sets forth the contents of education in detail, and plays a far greater role than the abstract legal clauses in determining what is to be taught and how. Moreover, such an Outline is subject to change simply by administrative initiative within the Education Ministry. The following conclusion of the Mainichi Shimbun, after conducting an exclusive study of postwar Japanese education, is convincing:

...the controlling power of the Education Ministry over the entire system of education is immense. The Ministry enjoys a far stronger and more comprehensive controlling power than the power that other administrative agencies, such as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of Transportation, have in their jurisdiction over industries or the general public. The controlling power of the Education Ministry resembles

the relation between the Defense Agency and the corps within the self-defense system.⁴⁶

2. Changing Contents of Social Studies Textbooks

The teaching of ethics, history and geography became most problematical under the Occupation since this instruction has dealt directly with the question of the State and nationalism. Following the Defeat, the Japanese government at its own initiative ordered that all militaristic references be permanently struck from the textbooks with Chinese ink. Almost overnight, or within the same month at least, subject matter in the schools underwent drastic change as teachers were instructed to alter their emphasis. Karasawa Tomitaro described in his History of Textbooks the resulting confused state of affairs as follows:

Before the pupils' eyes, the prestige of education fell to the depths. All prior supports collapsed as if attacked by a great earthquake. Two things in particular impressed the students most glaringly: the transfiguration of teachers who had praised war, and the alteration of textbooks previously held most sacred.⁴⁷

SCAP prohibited the use of wartime textbooks in August 1946. The emergence of Shakai-ka (Social Studies) symbolized the postwar educational principle of human dignity and democracy. Social studies courses were given a clear basis by the "Outline of Teaching Guidance: Social Studies" of May 1947. Actual classes began in the following September. Social studies aimed at "giving the young an understanding of social life, and cultivating the attitude and ability conducive to the development of society."

46. Muramatsu, op.cit., p.193.

47. Karasawa, Kyōkasho no Rekishi, op.cit., pp. 608-609.

The social studies outline, in a moment of historical reflection, stated that "individual consciousness and the desire for a human life did not develop soundly as they were suppressed by the external pressure of State and family."⁴⁸ Social studies were designed to be comprehensive, including moral teaching, history, and geography. The basic philosophy behind them was to create an awareness of fundamental human rights.⁴⁹

The postwar record of social studies, however, became one of gradual disintegration of the subject. History and geography acquired de facto independent status within the loose framework of social studies. Moral teaching became separate in 1959. We will examine in this section what kinds of concepts of the nation are being taught in the schools by analyzing the changing contents of social studies textbooks.

Moral Teaching

The Imperial Rescript on Education was rescinded in June 1948 by a resolution of both Houses of the National Diet. The House of Representatives maintained that the fundamental ideal of the Rescript on Education was contradictory to the spirit of the Fundamental Law on Education, although many people seemed to think the Rescript was still in effect and valid in postwar education. We must note that Education Ministers immediately after the Defeat had urged that the Rescript be made the basis of the new education.⁵⁰ Moreover, as late as March 1947, Minister Takahashi made

48. Monbusho, Gakushū Shido Yōryō (Outline of Teaching Guidance), Shakaika Hen, (Social Studies Edition), 1947, p. 2.

49. Karasawa, op.cit., p. 632.

50. Ichikawa Shogo, "Senryoka no Kyōiku" (Education Under the Occupation," in Tsuchiya, op.cit., pp. 222-223.

the following statement concerning the relation between the Rescript and the Law:

There is no contradiction between the Rescript and the Fundamental Law on Education. The Rescript that was issued in 1890 had to be supplemented in many respects in accordance with the moral changes of the times. We are not going to replace the Rescript by something new. The fault of the Rescript was that it was misused and distorted; it was not mistaken in itself.⁵¹

Thus, there took place a drastic transfiguration of leading people concerning the basic goals and policy of education, which helped postwar management by making personnel continuity possible, but, at the same time, they often ended in irresponsible or half-hearted reforms under pressure from the Occupation authorities. Education Minister Araki Masuo criticized the Fundamental Law on Education in 1960, saying that "the Law was forced upon us during the Occupation era, and it hinders smooth development of the superior quality of the Japanese people. Therefore, it must be amended to suit the national situation."⁵² The LDP also made its stand for revision of the Law public, reasoning that the Law "aims at weakening Japan."⁵³

It is significant that all textbook inspection is carried out within this basic educational policy and attitude.

51. Sengo Hihon Kyōiku Seisakushi Kankokai, ed., Sengo Nihon no Kyōikushi (History of Postwar Japanese Education). (Tokyo: 1967), p.100.

52. The Asahi Shimbun, Editorial, September 23, 1960.

53. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 27, 1960.

The stated policy toward education of the Yoshida Cabinet in 1950 included "the enhancement of patriotism, promotion of moral education, and improvement of history education." Minister Amano Teiyū stated that the government attempted to draw a national moral code in lieu of the Rescript in the same year.⁵⁴ The Council on Curriculum reported in January 1951, however, that no moral teaching course should be established separate from social studies nor should any theory be forced from above upon children or pupils.⁵⁵ "The Outline of Guidance for Moral Teaching" put out by the Education Ministry in 1951 was based on this report and urged well-planned and consistent moral teaching for the entire school system.⁵⁶

The conservatives were not content with either the report or the outline. Minister Amano urged that a moral standard be established to serve as a lever for a re-departure of the Japanese people. He said he could not bear to see elementary school children lacking any trace of Japanese nationality. Although opposition in and out of the Diet barred his plan, on his resignation he published in a private capacity "An Outline of Ethical Practice for the Japanese People" in 1951. This document did not attract as much attention as did the later "Ideal Image of the Japanese." However, it was rather important as it offered a prototype for moral education in postwar Japan. The outline consists of a Preamble, Section I: The Individual, Section II: The Family, Section III: Society, and

54. Kyōiku Kisha no Kai and Dōtoku Kyōiku Kenkyukai, Dōtoku Jisshi Yōko no Kaisetsu (Commentary on the Outline of Moral Teaching) (Tokyo: Meijitoshō, 1950), p. 5.

55. Inatomi Eijiro, Meijiikō Kyōikumokuteki no Hensen (Changes in Educational Goals Since Meiji) (Tokyo: Dobunshoin, 1968), p. 113.

56. Nankai Iwao, Shimpan "Dōtoku" Kaisetsu (Commentary on New Moral Teaching) (Tokyo: Gakugei Shippansha, 1950), p. 10.

Section IV: The State. The following are excerpts from the last section:

Patriotism. The fortunes of a country depend on the patriotism of its people. We are responsible for taking over the State from our forefathers and passing it on to our descendants. To create a good State is to make a contribution to the world. True patriotism is the same as love for humanity.

The Emperor. We possess an Emperor who is a symbol of the State, wherein lies the peculiar nature of our national policy. It is a special characteristic of our country that there has always been an Emperor throughout its long history. The position of the Emperor partakes of the nature of a moral focus as the symbol of the State.

The ethics of the State. Morality is the lifeblood of the State. The State, in essence, is founded more deeply on its moral than on its political or economic character. The Emperor possess an objective moral quality. Thus the position of the Emperor symbolizes the fundamental character of the State.⁵⁷

The Council on Curriculum, under a new staff, made a report in 1958 on the desirability of setting up a one-hour moral teaching class to meet once a week. The Education Ministry lost no time in accepting the report and issued an outline concerning moral teaching in the same year. According to this outline, the purpose of moral instruction is:

...to educate the Japanese people to maintain and perpetuate the spirit of human dignity and to apply this spirit in daily life, among the family, in school, and in any other community where one is a member; to strive for the creation of a rich culture and the development of a democratic state and society; and voluntarily to contribute to a peaceful international society.⁵⁸

One important characteristic of this outline is that one of the four principles of moral teaching called for a "moralistic attitude and practical will as

57. Translated by R. P. Dore in his article, "The Ethics of the New Japan," Pacific Affairs, vol. XXV (June 1952), pp. 153-154.

58. Monbusho, Shōgakko Dōtoku Shidōsho (Book of Guidance for Elementary School), 1958, p. 96.

members of the State and society." The Education Ministry emphasized that this principle was especially important in the present stage of moral teaching.⁵⁹ The other three principles were:

- (1) To guide pupils to understand and acquire the basic patterns of behavior for daily life;
- (2) To guide pupils to cultivate their moralistic sensitivity and to train their ability to judge right from wrong, virtue from vice;
- (3) To help the development of personality and guide pupils to establish their creative attitude in life.⁶⁰

Under these four principles, 36 items are given, one of which concerns a concept of the nation.

To love the country with an awareness of being Japanese, and to contribute to the development of the State which is part of international society. (As the central theme it would be desirable to cultivate nationalistic sentiment in the elementary grades, to teach appreciation for the rich land, culture, and tradition of Japan in the middle grades, and to foster the will to contribute to the development of Japan that is part of international society, with an awareness of a responsibility as Japanese nationals in the upper grades.)⁶¹

The emphasis on the awareness of being Japanese and responsibility as nationals to the State was also the basic tone of the "Ideal Image of the Japanese" of 1966. The report is an example of how the above-mentioned abstract principle can be interpreted and applied to more concrete guidance

59. Kyōiku Kishanokai, op. cit., p. 17.

60. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

61. Monbusho, "Dōtoku" Jisshi Yoryo (Zembun) (Outline of Putting Moral Teaching into Practice (Whole Text)), 1958, item no. 35.

of teaching. Therefore, the trend and course of postwar education are far more significant than particular events or cases, however controversial they may be.

An examination of moral textbooks for elementary and junior high schools published by the Futaba Company in 1959 shows a concentration of materials relating to patriotism or national consciousness in the third year of junior high school. Approximately one-half of the teaching materials are related to the subject in one way or other. "Right and Obligation" appeared for the first time in the fifth grade and "national holidays" in the sixth grade. "Letters of German Student-Soldiers Killed in the War" in the third grade of the junior high school was aimed at teaching the disaster of war and value of peace, which characterized the difference between prewar and postwar education about patriotism. Such instruction has since remained very moderate and balanced. "Patriotism" is taught as love for one's culture, tradition and home town and country, not as political chauvinism or defense consciousness.⁶²

In order to illustrate the difference between prewar and postwar moral teaching, a section entitled, "The Good Japanese," is quoted from the ethics textbook of 1933-1940. "The Good Japanese" can be summarized in Chūkun-Aikoku (Loyalty and Patriotism). He obeys laws and respects kokutai and admires virtues of the emperors. The idea of individualism is not only absent but is rejected as inconsistent with the ideology of kokutai.

62. Makino, Tatsumi, ed., Dōtoku (Moral) (Tokyo: Futaba Shippansha, 1959) for elementary school and junior high school, in 9 vols.

Our Great Empire of Japan is a country reigned over by an unbroken line of Emperors. Emperors have loved the people as their children and the people have respected the Emperors as their fathers and devoted themselves in loyal and filial ways. This is the peculiar nature of our country.... The way of Chūkun-Aikoku is to bear kokutai in mind, and sacrifice ourselves, should emergency arise; and to work hard in time of peace in our respective professions so that the country may prosper. We must observe national laws. To observe the important national laws and regulations of villages and towns is the same as love for country.⁶³

It is apparent that the Amano Outline of National Moral Practice (1951) and the "Ideal Image of the Japanese" (1966) have much in common with the above-quoted passage from the war-time textbook. First, both place the Emperor in the center of morality and ethics. Second, both maintain that the imperial system is the unique and superior nature of the Japanese nation. Third, sacrifice, service, and obligation of the people is always emphasized while people's rights are subordinated and de-emphasized. These postwar documents have been produced by men who received Meiji type educations and are critical of postwar education. This means that those aspects that they consider missing in postwar education are overly emphasized in these documents. In any case, these are manifestations of the prewar concept of morality in that the State and morality are linked through the medium of the Emperor.

It remains to be seen whether this type of moral concept prevails in textbooks.

63. Kaigo Muncomi, ed., Nihon Kyōkasho Taikei Kindai-hen (Collection of Japanese Textbooks, Modern Version) (vol. 3, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1962), p. 326.

Social Studies Proper

Social studies classes began in September 1947. The publication of Minshushugi (Democracy) in two volumes by the Education Ministry in 1948 symbolized the anti-war democratic mood prevalent at that time. The book is worth quoting at some length since it did set an important course in postwar education. This textbook, written for high school students, referred to the relation between State and individual in the following manner:

Japan plunged herself into a reckless war that ended in the most miserable defeat. All people were reduced to the direst distress brought about by the dictatorial politics. (p. 7) [emphasis added]

Indeed, the nation and the State are important. However, will there be prosperity of the entire nation without prosperity of individual members of the nation? Is there any room left for prosperity of the State if the people have to sacrifice themselves? Without prosperity of each individual member, there will be no prosperity for the nation and the State. (p. 14)

On education, the textbook amounted to a confession of the government.

...what was even worse was that the previous Japanese education was easily subject to change by the government. It was difficult, therefore, to realize a type of education that would produce an independent, free personality even when teachers and schools wanted to do so. Moreover, the government attempted to infuse pupils with the idea of a divine country through education and finally forced schools to employ military training on their campuses....

It is a source of great mistake that education is always subject to changing powers. The government should assist the development of education as much as it can, but should not try to change education policy to meet its interest. (pp. 285-286)

Although this textbook, Democracy, constitutes an exception, it represented a prevalent aspect right after the defeat. The phrase, "reckless war," was later omitted by the demand of the Ministry from another history textbook written by Ienaga Saburo. The postwar history of social studies has been a process in which the concept of the nation described in Democracy

(individualism and pacifism) has had to undergo a substantial change. Now we will examine some of the textbook contents concerning concepts of the nation.

With Japan's resumption of independence in April 1952, the Social studies course came under severe attack as "nationality-lacking social studies" or as the "brainchild of the Occupation." This subject was greatly revised in 1955; much more space was allotted to ethics in "Society" along with three other subdivisions of "Japanese History," "World History," and "Geography." Before the revision of 1955, there were six kinds of textbooks on "Society" for high school. An average of 3.5% in terms of pages dealt with "patriotism" as compared to 20.7%, or six times as many, in the revised textbooks.⁶⁴

Comparison of Patriotic Materials in Social Studies Textbooks Before and After the Revision of the Curriculum in 1955.⁶⁵

Textbooks	A		B		C		D		E		F	
	Old	New	O	N	O	N	O	N	O	N	O	N
No. of pages on patriotic description	22	80	23	76	29	62	12	75	7	70	10	75
Total pages	504	392	524	386	498	361	556	375	500	303	386	310
Percentages (%)	4.3	20.4	4.4	19	5.9	17	2.1	20	1.4	23	2.5	24

64. Kondo Toshikiyo, Aikokushin to Kyōiku, (Patriotism and Education), (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1957), p.45.

65. Ibid.

However, the increase in patriotic materials after the revision did not mean a basic change in views on national consciousness and the State. Thus, one critic could write:

As far as textbook contents are concerned, there is no deteriorating sign in the "reverse course" as was once feared in relation to the revival of militarism. Rather, new textbooks gave clear explanations and directions for the puzzled young generation about the question of patriotism.⁶⁶

As an example, we will compare pertinent parts in the old and new textbooks edited by Kimura Kenkō and others published by Kōgakusha (which corresponds to textbook "A" in the above table).

Old Textbook (1946-1955):

The Japanese people, adopting only superficial forms of Western culture, jumped to the conclusion that they had digested Western culture fully and were complacent with the idea that theirs was the greatest nation in the world. They began to be obsessed with a fanatic nationalism that only the Japanese were a superior nation. We must revitalize merits in our traditional culture as well as rectifying shortcomings from a world viewpoint, and start adopting new things from abroad. (p. 71)

New Textbook:

Patriotism does not mean a complacence that the national society to which we belong is the best in the world. The national society in which we live must have many defects and the State that forcefully integrates society must possess various defects. Patriotism means a strong will to eliminate these defects in order to make our State and society more beautiful and more peaceful. Therefore, it has nothing to do with extreme nationalism that will lead the nation into an invasion of other nations to expand her power. Those who love their own country should respect other people's love for their own countries. We must distinguish true patriotism from mistaken patriotism and cultivate true patriotism. (p. 61)

66. Ibid.

The latest textbook of "Ethics and Society" (authorized in 1966) by the same publisher, but written by Ōshima Yasumasa, marks no change on this subject.

... true patriotism is not only derived from a naive emotion for territorial and blood relations, but is constituted by a strong awareness that he belongs to an association that has certain culture, tradition, and common destiny and responsibility in the present world. Moreover, it is based on a positive conviction that only those who truly love their own country can contribute to world peace. Therefore, true patriotism must be accompanied by modest reflections on the defects of his own state and the nation, and by the spirit of cooperation for the betterment of his country. (p.184)

History

Postwar historical education started with the publication of Kuni no Ayumi (The Course of the Country) by the Education Ministry in September 1946. According to the account of Ienaga Saburo, one of the editors, the textbook was practically written in accordance with the principles set forth by the Occupation within two months. The Occupation principles were, however, in harmony with beliefs of the editors, according to Ienaga.⁶⁷ This first postwar history textbook was attacked by the leftist historians on the ground that it centered around the mistaken view of the imperial throne.⁶⁸ However, this textbook exerted a strong influence in determining the course of postwar historical education as the first systematic and general introductory textbook written under the auspices of the Education Ministry.⁶⁹

67. Karasawa, Kyōkasho no Rekishi, op.cit., p. 623.

68. Cf. Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon no Rekishi: Kuni no Ayumi Hihan (History of Japan: Critique of The Course of the Country) and also Tokutake Toshio, Shin Kyōkashoron (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1961), pp.85-95.

69. Karasawa, op.cit., p. 628.

It is an historical irony that Ienaga is presently a plaintiff against the State over his high school textbook that has been turned down by the Education Ministry for authorization. Shin Nihonshi (A New Japanese History) written by Ienaga had been widely used since 1953 as a high school textbook until the Education Ministry rejected its authorization in 1960 and 1963, demanding approximately 300 revisions in the text. Ienaga took an action in June 1965 against the State over what he claimed to be the unconstitutional inspection and demand for revision.⁷⁰ The following excerpts illustrate some of the controversial historical descriptions which were presented to the court as evidence:

(1) The Position of the Emperor:

Original Manuscript: ⁷¹

[In the Tokugawa era] the Emperor lost his position as the monarch and his domain became no larger than a small feudal lord's territory.

Critique of the Education Ministry:

The manuscript says that the "Emperor lost his position as the monarch," but the Emperor did not lose his position as the monarch although he lost actual political power at that time.

Ienaga's Counter-Argument: ⁷²

Thanks to Professor Ishi Ryōsuke's Tenno (The Emperor) (1950) and Professor Mizuhara Kenji's Nihon Hōken Shakairon

70. Kyōkasho Kenteisoshō o Shiensuru Zenkoku Renrakukai, ed., Sabakareru Nihon no Rekishi: Ienaga Kyōkasho Saiban, vol. I. (Japanese History under Judgment: Ienaga's Textbook Trial) (Tokyo: Sogotosho, 1967), p. vii.

71. Ibid., p. 411.

72. Ibid., p. 256.

(Study of Japanese Feudalistic Society), there is almost no opposing view in the postwar historic society to the fact that the emperor lost his position as the monarch.

The attitude of the Education Ministry that denies this historical fact and purposefully exaggerates the emperor's position in history not only infringes on freedom of study and Constitutional freedoms, but also proves that the standard for inspection has not yet been free from the ideology of kokutai of the Meiji Constitution.

(2) The Meiji Constitution: 73

Original Manuscript:

Promulgation of the Constitution realized the National Diet demanded by the popular rights movement. The Constitution, however, aimed at strengthening monarchical power and at limiting the jurisdiction of the Diet as much as possible in order to build a political system of the imperial sovereignty.

Critique of the Education Ministry:

Such a description, being indulged in over-emphasizing the backwardness of the Constitution from a vantage point of the present, lacks consideration concerning the historical significance of the Constitution and its background. (For example, the Constitution, prior to any other Asian country, established a modern constitutional polity, only twenty years after the Meiji Restoration that ended several hundred years of feudalism. The significance should be duly evaluated even from a viewpoint of world history.)

Ienaga's Counter-Argument: 74

It is apparent that the inspection of the Education Ministry purposefully over-estimates the Meiji Restoration and the Meiji Constitution....

73. Ibid., p. 442.

74. Ibid., p. 225.

(3) The Pacific War:

Original Manuscript: ⁷⁵

Since the war was beautified as a "holy war" and losses on the battlefields and cruel deeds of the Japanese army were all concealed, the majority of the people could not know the truth and were forced to cooperate enthusiastically in the reckless war.

Critique of the Education Ministry:

This description as a whole one-sidedly criticizes Japan's position and action in the Second World War such as in "beautified" and "cruel deeds of the Japanese army," and fails to make students understand our position and action in the vortex of war.

Ienaga's Counter-Argument: ⁷⁶

Although "reckless war" was dropped by the strong demand from the Education Ministry in the process of inspection of 1963, it is now common knowledge that the Pacific War was a reckless war. The educational consideration that the Ministry speaks about is nothing but an effort to blur Japan's war responsibility and implicitly protect war leaders and to ban the pursuit of the mistake.

Next, a brief comparison of high school textbooks before and after the inspection of 1963 demonstrates increasing emphasis on national awareness in Japanese culture. ⁷⁷ The following excerpts are examples of such an emphasis that appeared only after that inspection. (Emphasis added.)

75. Ibid., p. 465.

76. Ibid., pp. 238-239.

77. Ito Tadashi, "Kyōkasho niokeru 'Rekishizo' no Zittai," (Realities of "Historical Images" in Textbooks), Rekishigaku Kenkyū, no. 290 (July 1964), p. 53.

(1) ... Asuka Culture was more than an imitated foreign culture. It possessed an independent aspect supported by national awareness. (p.26)

(2) With the development of the lawful State system (Ritsuryosei), national consciousness increased and stimulated the movement to compile the history and geographical description of the State. (p. 43)

(3) Owing to the Mongolian Invasion, strong national consciousness became prevalent. (pp. 80-81)

(4) ... Kitabatake Chikafusa's "Jinnō Shōtoki" (Orthodox History of the Imperial Throne) criticized political history with a strong State consciousness. (p. 111)

The following positive evaluation of the Meiji Constitution as "the first constitution in Asia" reminds us of the critique of the Education Ministry against Ienaga's textbook.

(5) [By promulgation of the Meiji Constitution] Japan became the first constitutional State. [By this Constitution] the people were given, although limited, various kinds of rights and duties and the way was open for participating in national politics through the Diet. (p.210)

A passage which said that the Constitution was "not thoroughly democratic" in the textbook before 1963 was omitted from the new version.

Another comparison of descriptions of the Pacific War in the 1961 and 1965 versions manifests a very important change in the interpretation and evaluation of the war.⁷⁸

78. Based on Hara Tadahiko, "Shiryō: Kyōkasho wa kokawatta" (Document: Changed Textbooks), Chuo Koron, December 1965, pp. 256-257.

1961 Version of the Textbook:

The Pacific War: Japan claimed that the reason why the Sino-Japanese War did not easily come to a conclusion was because of the material assistance to China by the United States, England, and France. She also thought that by cutting the supply route and by liberating the Southeast region from European and American colonial domination, she could establish, under her leadership, "the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" whose resources could be freely exploited by Japan. Thus, Japan, taking advantage of the French defeat by Germany in 1940, concluded a treaty with France which permitted Japan to send troops into northern French Indochina. In the following year, Japan sent troops into the southern part.

To counter this move of Japan, America restricted the export of petroleum and iron to Japan, which caused deterioration in relations between the two countries. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands, who had colonies in East Asia, began putting pressure on Japan. The Japanese-Russian Neutrality Treaty of 1941 was interpreted as Japan's preparation for moving southward. In Japan, Army General Tojo Hideki organized his Cabinet in this year and furthered preparation for war. Japan declared war against America and the United Kingdom on December 8, 1941. Germany and Italy also declared war against America.

1965 Version of the Textbook:

The Pacific War: China continued her resistance against our country, helped by the material sent by America and the United Kingdom. Therefore, in order to cut the supply route to China and to control manpower and resources in this area, Japan made a plan to establish, under her leadership, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere* including China, thus liberating the area from European and American colonial domination. In 1940 (the 15th year of Showa) when France lost power by her defeat by Germans, Japan negotiated with the French government, concluded a treaty and sent troops into French Indochina.

Since America restricted the exportation of petroleum and iron to Japan in order to counter Japan's move, the relations between the two countries became worse. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands, who had colonies in East Asia, began to exert pressure on Japan. The Japanese-Russian Neutrality Treaty of 1941 (the 16th year of Showa) was interpreted as Japan's preparation for moving to the

south. In Japan, Army General Tojo Hideki organized his Cabinet and furthered preparation for war.

On December 8, 1941, Japan gave a grave blow to the U.S. Navy by attacking the American naval port in Hawaii from the air and the sea and declared war against America and the United Kingdom, thus entering into the Pacific War.**

N.B. * This clarified the war purpose and attracted the people who were previously not enthusiastic about the war.

** Although our country called it "The Greater East Asia War," the war is called the "War in the Pacific" following the custom of the Allied Powers after the war.

The clear difference in these two descriptions amounts to a re-evaluation of the war. The latter description justifies Japan's cause and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The footnotes are indicative of the changes in historical views. The following statement by one of the textbook inspectors of the Education Ministry presents "the official view of war" and reveals the reason for the change in the above-quoted textbooks.

We understand that conflicts and struggles among modern States arise from the entanglement of national interests and that it is impossible to accept a simplistic interpretation that some States are virtuous and others evil. It is an important lesson of history for pupils to learn this kind of calm observational method. We want to be especially cautious when we think about the position of our own country. Since the historical image of Japan that was formed forcefully during the Occupation is full of irrationality and prejudice, textbooks that have not overcome this influence required correction.⁷⁹

79. Murao Jiro, Kyōkasho Chōsakan no Hatsugen (Statements by a Textbook Inspector) (Tokyo: Harashobo, 1969), p. 85.

It is safe to conclude that, as far as textbooks are concerned, the government has been successful in reinterpreting Japan's modern history, fostering "love and respect" for the imperial throne, and inculcating national consciousness and patriotism. Although the current changes in textbook contents cannot be regarded as the re-emergence or restoration of fascism and militarism, as charged by some of the progressive and leftist critics, the general self-asserting and nationalistic trend in textbooks has at least restored some of the ideas that were practically absent during the first decade after national defeat. Moreover, an examination of the situations in which nationalistic textbooks are called for makes one more concerned about the nature of the resulting nationalism for such a demand has always been closely related with the government's defense policy, from the Ikeda-Robertson Conference in 1953 to the recent appeal by Education Minister Hadao Hirokichi for "defense education" in December 1967.

It has been only a decade since the inception of moral education and it may be premature to make any judgment now concerning the effect of the changing textbooks upon the young generation. Nevertheless, there are signs that more nationalistic textbooks are having an impact. Ōhara Munenori, vice-schoolmaster of Mihara Junior High School attached to Hiroshima University, was concerned with the lack of national consciousness among young people and made special efforts to cultivate it among his pupils in his Japanese history class. Jiyu (Liberty) in its July 1969 issue carried 35 essays on the State written by his pupils. It is surprising that all of the essays literally reiterate the views of the Education Ministry. These young junior high school students seem worried about the lack of national awareness among their fellow students, and emphasize the

need for people's sacrifice and contribution to the State. No reference was made to the tense relations between the State and people. These essays clearly manifest the susceptibility of the youth to nationalism fostered by governmental influence. The following excerpts are by no means exceptional but representative of the tone in all the essays.⁸⁰

The fading of national consciousness means the decline of the country. That is, it means difficulty in our life. In order to make tomorrow's Japan better, we must understand the meaning of the State and always be grateful for the State that our ancestors have built through the long history of 1,800 years.

...I believe we must think what we can do for the State rather than expecting what the State can do for us. Because what we do for the State is in itself good for us.

Postwar democracy and liberalism have had the good effect of diffusing fundamental human rights and equality of sexes, but, at the same time, they have made the people too free.... Where is that sense of solidarity of the past? Where is that memory of striving together, the young and the old, men and women, all together?

An individual acquires the significance of existence only when he belongs to the State. But for the State, there would be no order. If the people are disintegrated, there will be no hope for progress.

...Japan has waged many wars. But I believe every war was for the sake of the State. ...the Japanese people have grown listless because Japan is too peaceful.

Another report by a critic on "The Concepts of the Emperor, the Nation, and the State" (1967) demonstrated the resurgence of nationalism among the young generation in the same direction set forth by the government. For example, the following comment on the Emperor by a girl

80. Ohara Munenori, and others. "Chūgakusei no Kokkakan" (Concepts of the Nation of the Junior High School Pupils) Jiyu, vol. 11, no. 7, (July 1969), pp. 58-87.

student who attended a night school shows the degree of educational influence. She wrote:

I hated the Emperor until very recently. For he makes trips abroad in the guise of good-will trips, using money taken out of us poor people. But now I study world history and believe that Japan can exist and her history can continue as they are because the Emperor exists. Without the Emperor, the people in power would do whatever they like....⁸¹

This view of the Emperor is extremely naive. But the past Emperor worship was no more sophisticated.

Although these examples are neither typical nor representative of the young generation at large, they are important indications of what education can do about nationalism. It still remains to be seen whether this type of "nationalism" will win the hegemony in deciding the future of Japanese nationalism. The major limitation for young students is that they are merely repeating uncritically what they are taught at school and perhaps such comments should not be counted at their face value. Moreover, it is necessary to realize that school education, however tightly controlled by the government, is less effective today in forming "ideal" Japanese than it was in prewar years. Other sources of social education and mass media, fundamentally free from government censorship, can provide different opinions and viewpoints from those at school.

81. Umeda Masaki, "Kōkōsei no Tenno, Minzoku, Kokkakan" (Concepts of the Emperor, the Nation, and the State of High School Students), Asahi Jyōnarū, February 19, 1967, pp.87-91.

CHAPTER 8

THE QUESTION OF THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION

The question of the Emperor and the imperial institution is one that has not been adequately studied or discussed despite its important position in postwar concepts of the nation and nationalism. Theories of "new patriotism" which came immediately after the surrender rejected the "Chūkun" (loyalty to the Emperor) of "Chūkun-Aikoku" (loyalty to the Emperor and patriotism) and maintained implicitly that the question was automatically settled by eliminating the former. Takeyama Michio pointed out that "the question of the imperial institution is discussed as a Constitutional matter, but it seems to sink deep under a pile of facts, without being really resolved as our spiritual problem."¹ Prewar patriotism under the absolute imperial system was indeed denied by the postwar Japanese, and the symbolic imperial institution has become firmly established with strong national support. However, the fact that the absolute imperial system was primarily responsible for prewar ultra-nationalism appears sufficient reason to examine the significance of the present imperial institution in the light of contemporary national concepts.

We will first examine the process of the drastic change from the absolute imperial system to the present symbolic imperial institution. Secondly, we will analyze the bases of the imperial system and institution in order to determine the possible function of the institution in future Japanese nationalism.

1. Takeyama Michio, "Tenno Sei no tsuite" (On the Imperial System), Shincho, vol. 60, no. 4 (April 1961), p. 168.

A. The Change of Kokutai

We have already pointed out that the central concern of Japanese leaders at the end of the war was the maintenance of kokutai. Oka Yoshitake described the situation as follows:

It was remarkable that the political ruling class spared no effort to save the traditional ruling system when it became increasingly clear that defeat was inevitable. When the ruling circle was forced to decide between either a scorched-earth strategy or surrender, they were not concerned with the miserable and desperate victims of the severe air-raids, but rather with how to save "kokutai." The Suzuki Kantaro Cabinet accepted the Potsdam Declaration because it believed that surrender would enable Japan to "maintain kokutai."²

And the single condition requested was preservation of the Emperor's status. The attitudes of the government after August 1945 indicate its belief that kokutai had been maintained. It claimed that the new Constitutional draft would not change the national polity even if the emperor became a "symbol" of the integrity of the people. It reluctantly recognized the change of kokutai in a legal sense, but argued that it did not change in the general spiritual sense of the term. Furthermore, "no National Diet representative insisted on the change; on the contrary,

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2. Oka Yoshitake, ed., Gendai Nippon no Seiji Katei (Political Process in Modern Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), p. 3. The Japanese government sent the following qualification at the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration: "The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th, 1945...with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." (Government Section, SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, Appendices, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946(?), p. 414. The Allied Powers gave the following answer to this qualified acceptance: "The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Ibid., p. 415.

many indicated, either implicitly or explicitly, that it not be changed."³

"Kokutai" in the "general and spiritual sense" is quite ambiguous.

According to Kanamori Tokujiro, a Cabinet member, the government's view reflected an emotional relationship between the Emperor and the people. He maintained:

To be a little more specific, people's hearts reach out and are deeply intertwined with that of the Emperor. In this way, the Japanese nation becomes a stable, integrated body. There is no substitute for the Emperor. Therefore, the basic characteristic of kokutai has not been changed. We believe that the nation possesses its identity. If we mean this by kokutai, it is unchangeable.⁴

The postwar question of the imperial institution was first discussed from legal viewpoints by scholars of public law. Sasaki Sōichi and Yokota Kisaburo insisted on the change of kokutai. The latter, for instance, maintained that the status, base and function of the emperor had undergone a complete change, resulting in a different institution. He declared that "it is not appropriate to call the new institution 'the Emperor' or 'the imperial institution' as we called it before the war."⁵ Sasaki, although he was an earnest supporter of the prewar type imperial system, concluded that kokutai had changed. The division of kokutai into political and spiritual concepts did not satisfy him since they were mutually dependent.⁶ On the other hand, Dr. Watsuji Tetsuro maintained that the imperial right of reign

3. Kokota Kisaburo, Tenno Sei (The Imperial System) (Tokyo: Rodo Bunkasha, 1949), p.210.

4. As quoted in Yokota, op.cit., p.148.

5. Ibid., p.96.

6. Sasaki Sōichi, Tenno no Kokkateki Shōchōsei (National Symbolism of the Emperor), (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1949), pp.34-35.

was established only after the Meiji era, and that from a longer range point of view the postwar change of the imperial status did not mean a change in kokutai.⁷ The generally accepted meaning of kokutai was imperial sovereignty as defined by the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 and by the Kokutai no Hongi in 1938. Moreover, Dr. Watsuji's criticism of Sasaki's theory has little validity since the concept of kokutai was established only after Meiji.

There were also arguments concerning the relationship between the people's sovereignty and the imperial institution. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi maintained that the two concepts were incompatible, while Odaka Asao took the opposite position.⁸ In any case, these arguments by scholars did not produce any conclusion or solution nor did they attract public attention. The investigation by the Constitution Research Committee concerning these questions revealed the same conflicts. "In theories of this kind, we find, above all, the might of the spell-binding power of the traditional rule and a typical Japanese way of meeting value transformation."⁹ At the same time, it indicated that the Japanese people were not ready for a change in kokutai and the people's sovereignty. These changes were gifts of the Occupation authority rather than fruits of victory won through a people's

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7. Cf. Watsuji Tetsuro, Kokumin Tōgō no Shōchō (Symbol of the People's Integrity), (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1948), pp.95-100.
 8. Cf. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Kokumin Shuken to Tenno Sei (People's Sovereignty and the Imperial System), (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1957).
 9. Kobayashi Naoki, Nihon ni okeru Kempō Dōtai no Bunseki (Analysis of Constitutional Dynamism in Japan), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963), p.97.

struggle against a ruling class. The Occupation authority, however, adopted the policy "to use the existing form of government," if not "to support it."¹⁰

And it did not take much time for the Occupation to realize the utility value of the imperial household for the stabilization of Japan.¹¹ General

MacArthur is reported to have told Prime Minister Yoshida that "although Japan was defeated, the imperial throne is still as important as it was.

Japan's reconstruction will be impossible unless the Japanese unite around the imperial household."¹² Edwin O. Reischauer described the United

States policy as follows:

Insistency upon abolition of the Throne would have won us the determined opposition of the bulk of the Japanese people. We would have been setting our course directly into the teeth of the strong emotional head winds of loyalty to the Emperor. Obviously, we were wiser to forge ahead by tacking, aided rather than blown backwards by these winds.¹³

Here we must bear in mind that the imperial institution as it stood in 1946 was not the imperial system under the Meiji Constitution. The people's support for a symbolic Emperor had been revealed prior to the publication

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10. "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan," Government Section, SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, *op.cit.*, p.430.
 11. According to Mark Gayn, a correspondent, General MacArthur received a secret directive from SWINCC (State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee) in mid April 1946 which read in part as follows: "A direct attack on the Imperial system would weaken the democratic elements, and on the contrary, strengthen the extremists, both Communist and Militarists. The Supreme Commander is, therefore, ordered to assist secretly in popularizing and humanizing the emperor." [Original underlined.] Mark Gayn, Japan Diary, (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p.261.
 12. Yoshida Shigeru, Kaiso Jyūnen, (Memoirs), vol.1, (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1957), p.98.
 13. Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan. (Third ed., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.262.

of the Constitutional draft by the Mainichi Shimbun opinion survey in February 1946. Among the 91% of the supporters of the imperial throne, 16% supported the absolute imperial system of the Meiji Constitution; 45% supported the idea of a symbolic Emperor without political power; and 28% supported the idea of the Emperor's sharing sovereignty with the National Diet.¹⁴ With defeat, less than one out of five remained loyal to the ideology of kokutai.

The symbolic imperial institution was acceptable to the Occupation authority and General MacArthur "made the final decision concerning the maintenance of the imperial institution" in accordance with the U.S. policy in Japan.¹⁵ To MacArthur, the imperial throne equaled 20 armed divisions.¹⁶ In the circumstances, the Japanese ruling circle had to contend with the symbolic imperial institution and, as we have discussed, was willing to accept Article Nine. General MacArthur's decision to maintain the imperial throne in some form was a decided relief to the old ruling class.

Prime Minister Yoshida expressed his sense of relief as a conservative when he wrote in his Memoirs:

...the respect and understanding shown by the General toward the throne, and his decision to exculpate the Emperor from all and any relationship with war crimes, did more than anything else to lessen the fears of the Occupation and to reconcile them to it. I have no

14. Kobayashi, op.cit., p. 59.

15. Cf. Kempō Chōsa-Kai, Kempō Seitei no Keika ni kansuru Shō-Inkai Hokoku (Report by the Sub-Committee Concerning the Constitutional Formulation Process), 1961, pp. 314-317.

16. The Asahi Shimbun, July 9, 1948.

hesitation in saying that it was the attitude adopted by General MacArthur toward the throne, more than any other single factor, that made the Occupation a historic success.¹⁷

B. The Left Wing and the Right Wing Over the Imperial Institution

The symbolic imperial institution, which is essentially a product of compromise and political convenience, has won the overwhelming support of the people and appears stable throughout the postwar years. The left wing and the right wing are resolutely opposed to this symbolic imperial system despite their numerical weakness.

The appeal by Shiga Yoshio and Tokuda Kyūichi for the complete overthrow of the imperial throne did reflect some attitude toward the defeat but that of only a small segment of the people. The Japanese Communist Party had consistently advocated overthrowing the imperial system, especially after the "Thesis Concerning the Situation in Japan and the Duty of the Japanese Communist Party" by the Comintern in 1932.¹⁸ Even the symbolic imperial institution has been regarded as a menace by the leftists. For example, Kamiyama Shigeo wrote in 1953 as follows:

Judging from the present mood of the people, it is easier to fight against the enemy that comes from the front, such as the re-armament, but we must be very cautious about the enemy that enters from the back door, such as the fortification of the imperial system.¹⁹

17. Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs, (translated by Kenichi Yoshida, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p.51.
18. Cf. Kamiyama Shigeo, Tenno Sei ni kansuru Rironteki Shomondai (Theoretical Problems Concerning the Imperial System), (Tokyo: Ashikai, 1953), pp.128-159.
19. Kamiyama Shigeo, Shin Tenno Sei Ron (Theory of the New Imperial System), (Tokyo: Shin Kagakusha, 1953), p.17.

Another Communist, Shiga Yoshio, defined the imperial system as "a living ghost that clings around the neck of the Japanese people."²⁰ These statements are candid confessions of the leftists who had come through the oppression of the militaristic imperial state. A leftist historian, Inoue Kiyoshi, in his book Tenno Sei (The Imperial System), criticized the theory that the Emperor himself was powerless before the militarists and thereby not responsible for the war. Since his view represents a typical criticism of the war responsibility of the Emperor, it is worth quoting a paragraph from his book:

The fact that the Emperor himself did not enjoy the despotic rights of European absolute monarchs does not mean at all that he is not responsible for the unhappiness of the Japanese people. The powerlessness of the Emperor has been always used by the supporters of the imperial system to protect the crimes of the Emperor. It is an extraordinary deception. The fact that the Emperor was not involved in the real politics simply means that he did not take part in the oppression of the people but does not deny the grave fact that he sat on the apex of such an oppressive mechanism.²¹

Under the new Constitution, the Emperor is deprived of all political power, but it is again impossible that he, as a symbol, can remain neutral and aloof from politics. Therefore, a leftist contended, the Japanese ruling class has a "class interest" in the symbolic imperial institution for it helped exploit the people.²² "The Immediate Demands of the Japanese

20. Shiga Yoshio, Minishushugi Nihon to Tenno Sei (Democratic Japan and the Imperial System), (Tokyo: Shinsei sha, 1946), p. 5.

21. Inoue Kiyoshi, Tenno Sei (The Imperial System) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1953), pp. 236-237.

22. Moriya Norio "Sengo no 'Tenno-Sei' ni tsuite" (On the Postwar "Imperial System") in Nihon Kindaishi Kenkyū kai, ed., Tenno Sei ni kansuru Shomondai (Problems Concerning the Imperial System), (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1954), p. 158.

Communist Party -- New Party Platform" of 1951 called for the "abolition of the imperial system and the establishment of a People's Republic" and maintained that "the imperial system again attempts to drag Japan to a new and more devastating war than the last. The people will only benefit by abolishing the imperial system."²³ "The Summary and the Immediate Duties" of 1955, however, put more emphasis on a broad "united front" against the "reactionary government" and dropped the slogan of "overthrowing the imperial system."²⁴ The JCP made it clear, however, that dropping this slogan was only a tactical change.

On the other hand, the right wing has not been satisfied with the symbolic imperial institution and has been demanding restoration of the old imperial system. Although 16% of the people supported the absolute Emperor of the Meiji Constitution in February 1946, the stabilization of the symbolic imperial institution has drastically decreased this group. The rightists often consider this tendency "the crisis in Japan" and use it to confirm their sense of mission as vanguards of Japanese nationalism. In fact, according to Nakoura Taro, a critic, in a fundamental sense "the rightist groups without the ideology of the Emperor become gangs of unemployed. To this extent, the right wing and the Emperor are inseparable."²⁵ In order to overcome this crisis, right-wing groups agree on "a strengthening of the family system and a restoration of the

23. Seiji Mondai Kenkyūkai, ed., Nihon Kyōsan-To Kōryō Mondai Bunkenshū (Collection of Party Platforms and Problems of the Japanese Communist Party), (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1957), pp.310-311.

24. Cf. Nihon Kyōsan-To, ed., Nihon Kyōsan-To Kōryō-shū: 1920 kara 1955 made (Collection of the Japanese Communist Party Platforms: from 1920 to 1955), (Tokyo: Shin-nippon Shippansha, 1957), pp.260-297.

25. Nakoura Taro, "Uyoku no Tenno Kan" (Rightist View of the Emperor). Gendai no Me, vol.4, no.5, (May 1963), p.68.

Emperor."²⁶ It is interesting that the rightists have found the basis of the imperial system in the traditional, patriarchal family system. The restoration of the Emperor is the final goal for most of the right-wing groups: that is, "to establish the true kokutai by making the Emperor the head of the state" (Kokumin Dōshi-Kai, The National Comrades Association); to consider Japan as Japan because she has the Emperor" (Dai Nippon Kokumin-To, The Nationalist Party of the Great Japan); "to establish the subjecthood of the nation under the imperial system" (Chian Kakuritsu Dōshi-Kai, Association of Comrades for Establishing Peace).²⁷ We must bear in mind, however, that although most of the right-wing bodies since the war have retained the slogans of anti-Communism and imperial restoration, many of them are mere groups of bullies; only a few can be recognized as political groups with theoretical and organizational sophistication.²⁸ According to figures published by the Public Security Investigation Commission of the Ministry of Justice, "there are about forty major rightist groups with a total membership of more than ten thousand."²⁹ In the final analysis, the Emperor remains the central image of rightist concepts of the nation.

Fujiwara Hirotatsu pointed out the generation gap that exists between the old rightists and the young rightists and wrote that the latter

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26. Cf. Ivan I Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960). p.164.
 27. Arahara Bokusui, ed., Uyoku Sayoku (Right Wing and Left Wing). (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Kokumin-To, 1960), pp.3-56, passim.
 28. Fujiwara Hirotatsu, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Ishiki (Political Consciousness in Modern Japan), (Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1958), p.64. Cf. also, Kinoshita Hanji, Nihon no Uyoku (Right Wing in Japan) (Tokyo: Kaname Shobo, 1953).
 29. Kōan Chōsa Chō, Naigai Jyōsei no Kaiko to Tembō (Retrospect and Prospect of Domestic and Foreign Situations), 1965, p.142.

"express a sort of distrust in and parting away from the imperial system."³⁰ For the young rightists who were born around the time of the Manchurian Incident, when Japan made the first step to invade China, the wartime imperial system appeared as an absolute and ruthless state power without the good old image of the strict but benevolent father, the Meiji Emperor. They did not have the opportunity to experience the sense of awe and respect toward "the head of the family" as older generations did. We have to note in this connection, however, that Fujiwara's survey was made in 1951-1952 when Japan had barely regained its independence and the traditional rightist bodies were still at a low ebb due to the Occupation. The present writer had a chance to observe "The National Convention celebrating the National Foundation Day" held at Hibiya Park in February 1969. The hegemony of the meeting was entirely in the hands of rightist groups who displayed their power by militaristic uniforms and propaganda trucks decorated by various banners and organization crests. The majority of the rightists were in their early twenties. A young rightist student declared in his speech that "I hate this world of the National Foundation Day! Today must be Kigensetsu!" The National Convention hall was filled with antiquated phrases such as "nostalgia of the nation," "history of Japan," and "Kigensetsu, the base for spiritual independence." The present writer was impressed by the enthusiasm of the young rightists for the Emperor. They were far from "parting from the Emperor." This demonstrated the partial success of the old rightists and the conservative education of patriotism and partly the failure of postwar idealism of "democracy" and "peace."

30. Fujiwara, op. cit., p. 83.

The Hinomaru Youth Corps aims at establishing the "perfect political system where all people can rest at ease." The relation between the Emperor and patriotism remains an important question for the postwar generation. Those who think about "loyalty" and "patriotism" among the postwar generation tend to express favorable attitudes toward the Emperor and the imperial throne.³¹ We can find in the students' impressions of the Emperor's visits to their home towns that even those young people who have no clear idea about the Emperor can easily be converted to earnest supporters of the imperial throne if they are given certain opportunities. A high school girl student in Nagasaki Prefecture felt that the welcome for "a person like us, the Emperor" was filled with "enthusiasm and expectation." In her mind, she wrote, there were two conflicting emotions evolving, that is, yearning for solemnity and greatness and youthful repulsion against such things. When the Emperor's automobile passed by, however, she was "stunned momentarily."

I might have been intoxicated by the atmosphere....
I did see the Emperor's face, however. Amidst the intense excitement I found myself crying out and waving the national flag. I felt no longer the indescribable contradiction that I had felt a moment ago. I was, as it were, in an integrated situation that transcended such a contradiction. Our sense of resistance against authority and intellectual repulsion to the imperial throne had blown away. I felt completely refreshed.³²

She has eloquently described the general emotion of the people toward the Emperor that is so highly "super-rational." A middle high school boy in

31. Naikaku Kambō Chōsashitsu, Sengo Sedai no Rekishi Ishiki to sono Haikō (Historical Consciousness and its Background of the Postwar Generation), 1963, p.16.

32. Zen Nippon Fūbo Kaigi Nagasaki-ken Shibu Jyomu Rijikai, ed., Tenno Kōgō Ryōheika Hōgei Kansō-bun (Records of Impressions on Welcoming Both the Emperor and the Queen). (Nagasaki-ken, 1961), pp.69-70.

Gifu Prefecture confessed that when he saw the Emperor, "all worldly thought vanished and he became grateful for having been born a Japanese."³³ Although not all writings by young students about the Emperor are of this sort, these quotations demonstrate that the postwar generation is not necessarily immune from a very emotional Emperor worship, through a simple experience of "seeing" him. This kind of reaction is far from conscious or rational support for the symbolic Emperor. School education may very well cultivate emotional attachment to the imperial throne among the young people. The status of the imperial institution is thus still an important factor among the concepts of the nation in postwar Japan. Right-wing groups have been attempting to instill an awe and respect for the Emperor among the people. Due to their anachronistic ideology and approach, they have not been successful in this respect. However, they have succeeded in silencing criticism against the Emperor, as the unfortunate Shimonaka Incident of 1961 proved. A young rightist boy attacked the residence of the president of the Chuo Koron Company, killing a maid and injuring Mrs. Shimonaka, wife of the president, in February 1961; for he found unacceptable an essay, "Fūryū Mutan" (Graceful Story of a Dream) in the monthly, Chūo Kōron, since the story -- a phantasy -- ridiculed and insulted the imperial family. Chūo Kōron became more cautious about dealing with the imperial throne, an action which profoundly affected the press and critics of criticism on the imperial institution. The same monthly soon began carrying the "Affirmative Theory of the Daito-A War (Greater East Asian War)" by a once-purged rightist, Hayashi Fusao.

33. Gifu-ken, Tenno Kōgō Ryōheika o Omukai shite (Welcoming Both the Emperor and the Queen), 1953, p.144.

as mentioned in Chapter 4. The chief editor of the magazine, Kasuya Ikki, told the present writer that the decision to adopt Hayashi's serial was taken in order to provide the right wing a forum through which it could voice itself. It is significant that a representative monthly should feel the need of giving scope to the right wing after the Shimonaka Incident.

Hayashi Fusao devoted one of his serials to "The Theory of the Emperor," in which he argued that the imperial system was, rather than a political system, a tradition that was deeply rooted in the minds of the Japanese people. He further contended that the imperial system appeared sometimes armed and sometimes unarmed. Therefore, the symbolic imperial institution meant simply a change in its form of manifestation from the armed system under the Meiji Constitution to the unarmed system under the new Constitution. He also maintained that the normal form in the long Japanese history was the unarmed imperial system.³⁴ The rightist tendency to make light of the political aspect of the imperial system and to emphasize the spiritual and traditional aspects of the system leads to the view that the emperor is a perfect personality or a saint. Odamura Torajiro, Professor of Azia University, for example, argued that the reason why people respected the Emperor as the sovereign in prewar years was that he possessed the highest "authority" in his personality and not because of his absolute political right. He claimed that the people's sovereignty cannot be compared with the traditional "holy sovereignty" of the Emperor. The following quotation is a good example of rightist sentiment regarding the Emperor.

34. Hayashi Fusao, Daito-A Senso Kōtei ron (Affirmative Theory of the Greater East Asian War). (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1964). pp.140-176.

The prewar sovereign and the present sovereign differ qualitatively. What does this mean? The artless mind of the people know that the people are sovereigns. But at the same time, the image of the Emperor is projected in their minds as a different kind of sovereign. It will be wrong to recognize two kinds of sovereigns, but indeed, such an atmosphere does prevail. This is because there is no possibility for the general public to attain the discipline and virtue that the Emperor has attained. The people have realized their limitations that distinguish themselves from the high person of the Emperor. The difference can never be overcome.³⁵

In a recent interview in Tokyo, Odamura expressed to the present writer his support for the symbolic imperial institution, but again emphasized that the Emperor symbolized "the way of the spiritual life." Based on his study of the Emperors' poems, he told the writer that emperors have been benevolent philosopher kings who always wish for peace. The mistake was committed when the Meiji leaders adopted the Western idea of the absolute monarch. He argued that the essence of loyalty-patriotism was not wrong, but wrongly taught and practiced by the militarists. For Odamura and the right wing, the good-will of the present Shōwa Emperor, as expressed in his poetry, is tantamount to an indulgence for the war and the defeat.

The emotional Emperor worship often takes a much more violent mode. A Senchu-Iha (wartime generation) novelist, Mishima Yukio (b.1925) recently announced an "Anti-Revolution Declaration" (1969). After rejecting "the thought of the weak" and declaring his intention to adopt "the thought of the strong" à la Nietzsche, Mishima indicates why he is opposed to Communism.

35. Daigoku Kyōkan Yūshi Kyōgikai, and Kokumin Bunka Kenkyūkai, ed., Kokumin Dōhō-kan no Tanjū (Search for the National Identity), (Tokyo: Risosha, 1960), p.332.

Because Communism is not comparable with our kokutai, or culture, history, and tradition. And, it is incompatible theoretically with the existence of the Emperor. The Emperor is the sole and indispensable symbol of our historical continuity, cultural integrity, and national identification.³⁶

For Mishima, the Emperor is not, in any way, a symbol of political power, but is something that reflects "like a mirror" the integrity and continuity of Japanese culture.³⁷ Therefore, what is common in the rightist view of the Emperor and system is "a nonpolitical spiritual backbone" of Japanese culture and tradition. They do not necessarily attempt the restoration of the imperial prerogatives of the Meiji Constitution.

In the light of the development of the people's political awareness and the direction of the monarchy in world history, many of the right-wingers seem to realize the overwhelming difficulties of restoring the absolute Emperor. Moreover, they fear that the political Emperor might hurt his spiritual value and prestige. What has been saved out of the ruins of the absolute imperial system is an ambiguous nostalgia for the past and the mythology of Emperor worship. Maruyama Masao pointed out that while the central concept of Chinese ethnocentrism was "cultural superiority," the crux of the ideology of kokutai was "military superiority."³⁸ The postwar right wing found the source for legitimization of the imperial system in the amorphous but peculiarly strong Japanese worship of tradition and folklore. There was no solid foundation for the imperial system to be built

36. Mishima Yukio, "Han-Kakumei Sengen" (Anti-Revolution Declaration), Ronso Jyaanaru, vol. 3, no. 2 (February 1969), p. 162.

37. Ibid., p. 19.

38. Maruyama Masao, "Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu" (Nationalism in Japan), Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kōdo (Thoughts and Behaviors in Modern Japanese Politics), (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1956), p. 162.

upon at the time of national defeat. These indicate that, if and when a new Japanese nationalism is combined with the rightist view of the Emperor, it will become as exclusive and irrational as was prewar ultra-nationalism. A representative theoretician of the postwar right-wing nationalist type, Ashizu Uzuhiko, maintained that "the reason why the thought and politics of the Japanese people have been in war-like confusion is that after the defeat they lost sight of the spiritual authority of the unbroken line of Emperors and have been obsessed with foreign cultures."³⁹ The right-wing view of the Emperor is intricately interwoven with ethnocentric xenophobia. This constitutes approximately half the core of the rightist concept of the nation; the other more positive part emphasizes the value of continuous, integrative traditions.

C. The Symbolic Imperial Institution Stabilized

We have pointed out that many people supported the symbolic imperial institution before the announcement of the Constitutional draft. The support for this kind of institution has been constant and fairly stable ever since. According to a government survey, the supporters of the present imperial institution were 48% in 1956, 62% in 1965, and 72% in 1967.⁴⁰ Other private public-opinion polls have confirmed this high support for the symbolic imperial institution. In the survey of 1967, more than 80% of a random sample of respondents expressed their support for the retention of the Emperor in one form or another.⁴¹ The following

39. Ashizu Uzuhiko, "Tenno Sensen Umareru" (Emergence of the Imperial Front), Ronso Jyaanaru, vol. 3, no. 2 (February 1969), p. 47.

40. Naikaku Sōridaijin Kambō Kōhōshitsu, "Kempō ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa" (Public Opinion Survey Concerning the Constitution), 1967, p. 27.

41. Ibid., p. 26.

table indicates the breakdown of popular sentiment for the Emperor.⁴²

Toward the Emperor, I feel:

	1961	1962	1963
Sense of worship	24%	24%	24%
Friendly	40	41	38
Neither friendly nor antipathy	30	30	33
Antipathy	1	1	1
Hatred	0	0	0
Unestablished	5	4	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

A Tokyo University survey in 1965 gave "awe-inspiring" instead of "worship" as an alternative; 7.9% answered that they felt a sense of awe toward the Emperor. In the same survey, 52.3% answered that they felt friendly emotion to the Emperor. These figures indicate that more than half of those who answered "worship" in the above-quoted government survey of 1967 did indeed mean friendly attachment rather than a sense of "awe."⁴³ About 8% still maintain the old attitude toward the absolute imperial system, and one out of four feel more than friendly attachment to the Emperor. The apathetic group of 30-33% are more or less potential supporters of the imperial system as the previously cited young students demonstrated.

42. *Ibid.*, p.27.

43. Kobayashi Naoki, ed., Nihon-jin no Kempō Ishiki (Constitutional Consciousness of the Japanese), (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1968), Appendix, p.9.

Very few express positive antipathy toward the Emperor, but those who support the abolition of the system are not confined to this small group. The above government survey shows that 3% in 1956 and 2% in 1965 supported abolition, and the Tokyo University poll found 10.1% in favor of abolition. A significant age difference concerning support for the imperial institution reflects the sharp generational gap. Less than 10% of those who were in their twenties expressed a "sense of worship" for the Emperor, whereas about 50% of those who were older than 60 expressed the same feeling. About half of the younger generation were indifferent to the Emperor, while only 15% of the older generation remained apathetic. The following table shows contrasting views of the Emperor by ages as of 1965.⁴⁴

Views of the Emperor by Ages

(Figures in parentheses are for female.)

Age	Worship	Friendly	Neither Friendly nor Antipathy	Antipathy Hatred	Un- established
20-29	8 (9)	30 (44)	56 (42)	3 (2)	3 (3)
30-39	14 (17)	39 (46)	43 (32)	2 (1)	2 (4)
40-49	26 (27)	40 (42)	23 (19)	1 (0)	3 (4)
50-59	39 (37)	35 (39)	23 (19)	1 (0)	2 (5)
above 60	51 (49)	18 (26)	15 (14)	1 (0)	5 (9)

44. Naikaku, op.cit., p.26.

Students take a strong negative view of the imperial system. A survey of 467 college students in Tokyo in 1959 indicated that as many as 46% supported the abolition of the imperial system as opposed to 35% for its maintenance.⁴⁵ Among Tokyo University students, 61% supported abolition.⁴⁶ There is a high degree of correlation between levels of education and views of the Emperor. Those who have a better knowledge of the Constitution tend to support the present symbolic imperial institution while those with less knowledge are inclined to strengthen the power of the Emperor.⁴⁷ The same tendency is observable between living standards and views of the Emperor, which may be understandable, for the better educated usually enjoy better living standards. According to political opinions, JCP supporters manifest uniquely strong antipathy and hatred toward the Emperor, but there exists little difference among other political party supporters. With the small Communist and perhaps other more extreme leftist exceptions, the present imperial institution appears to enjoy national support regardless of political ideologies. For example, a nation-wide poll by the government in December 1961 concerning the Constitution shows the following result.

45. Kobayashi, op.cit., p.340.

46. Loc. cit.

47. Kobayashi Naoki, "Kaiken Mondai to Minshū no Kempō Ishiki " (Problems of Constitutional Revision and the Constitutional Consciousness of the Mass), Asahi Jvānaru, November 5, 1961, p.10.

Views of the Emperor by Political Opinions⁴⁸

Supporters of	Worship	Friendly	Neither Friendly nor Antipathy	Antipathy	Hatred	Unestablished
LDP	31%	43%	22%	1%	0%	3%
JSP	13	41	41	3	0	2
DSP	17	42	38	2		1
JCP	11	19	49	9	11	1
Unestablished	23	36	31	1	0	9

The attitude of the younger generation toward the imperial institution is the key factor in predicting the future of the imperial throne. The following table shows the findings of two opinion surveys carried out at a ten-year interval; 82% of those who were in their thirties in 1956 supported the Emperor and 87% of those in their forties in 1965 supported the Emperor, a 5% increase among the same age group in ten years. The same applied to all age groups, thus both the total and proportional supports remain unchanged.

48. As cited in Kobayshi, Analysis of Constitutional Dynamism, op. cit., p. 127 and p. 367.

Support for the Emperor by Age Groups⁴⁹

	It is better that the Emperor should exist.		No difference, plus those who think it would be better if the Emperor did not exist.		D. K.	
	1956	1965	1956	1965	1956	1965
20-24	67%	67%	31%	29%	2%	5%
25-29	75	72	23	23	2	5
30-39	82	82	16	14	2	4
40-49	87	87	12	10	1	3
50-59	93	92	6	6	1	3
60 and above	92	92	4	4	4	5

The intellectual and rational view of the imperial institution of the young gradually gives way to the more emotional acceptance of the traditionally existing imperial institution of the more aged.

The rapid process of urbanization does not affect popular support for the symbolic imperial institution. Rather, urbanization, together with the so-called information revolution, has tended to increase the support for the new form of that institution. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that "there is no indication that the symbolic imperial institution may undergo a change in the near future."⁵⁰ The following table is based on the government survey of 1967.

49. Naikaku, op.cit., p.27.

50. Kobayashi, op.cit., p.129.

Are you satisfied with the present symbolic Emperor?⁵¹

	Satisfied	Not Satisfied	Hard to Answer	D. K.
Tokyo (Wards Only)	72.3%	12.6%	4.6%	10.5%
Six Largest Cities	74.2	9.1	5.4	11.3
Cities of more than 100,000	75.2	9.1	5.5	10.2
Cities of less than 100,000	70.5	11.4	5.1	13.0
Towns and Villages	69.0	9.7	6.0	15.3
Total	71.8%	10.1%	5.5%	12.6%

The strongest national consensus on the present status of the Emperor leads us to the question of the real prewar image of the Emperor: Did the Japanese people subscribe to the officially given image of the Emperor as a living god? The fact is that the greatest majority of the people regarded the Emperor not as a god in the Christian sense, but rather as a superior human being. The following survey has several limitations such as the inadequate sampling, qualification of interviewers, and the difficulty of evaluating the postwar description of prewar opinions

51. Naikaku, op.cit., p.114, Cf. also, Nishidaira Jyuki, "Yoron kara mita Tenno Sei to Dai 9-jyo" (The Imperial System and Article Nine Viewed from the Public Opinion), Jiyu (May 1962), pp.56-57.

as given by respondents. In some degree, however, it does suggest prewar views of the Emperor and how they changed after the war.

Relations Between Ages and Views Concerning the Emperor⁵²

(Survey of September 1956)

Views on the Emperor	Age		Under 25		26-30		31-40		Above 40	
	Pre-war	Post-war	Pre-war	Post-war	Pre-war	Post-war	Pre-war	Post-war	Pre-war	Post-war
I think he is a god	42.1	1.0	33.5	0.5	23.0	0	32.8	7.2		
I do not think he is a god, but more than an ordinary man	46.0	11.2	49.5	13.0	55.0	23.0	41.0	29.0		
He is an ordinary man, but somebody like head of family	5.6	27.5	9.0	32.5	14.0	33.0	18.0	38.4		
He is an ordinary man as we are	6.0	60.8	8.0	54.0	8.0	44.0	8.2	25.4		

Those who were under 25 (younger than 15 years old at the time of national defeat) indicated the strong influence of the official school education

52. Kato Shuichi, "Tenno Sei to Nihon jin no Ishiki" (The Imperial System and the Japanese Consciousness), Chisei, vol. 4, no. 2. (February 1957), p. 252.

as 42.1% of them answered that the Emperor was a god. This young group, more than any other, drastically changed their views toward the Emperor and by 1956 more than 60% held the view that the Emperor was an ordinary human like themselves. It is also this age group that has felt the greatest impact of the defeat as far as ideas of the Emperor are concerned. The predominant view of the Emperor is that "he is an ordinary man" who is like the head of a family (for the old) or who is exactly like other ordinary people (for the young). The fact that 80% of the people changed their minds about the Emperor demonstrated the impact of the defeat and subsequent postwar education concerning this matter. Ninety-five percent of those who thought that the Emperor was a god changed their views, whereas most of those who considered him to be an ordinary man did not feel the need to change their minds.⁵³

Prewar Views	Percentage of those who changed their views	To what kind of views have they changed?
(1) The Emperor is a god	95%	(3) + (4)
(2) Not a god, but more than an ordinary man	84%	(3) + (4)
(3) An ordinary man, but like the head of family	53%	(4)
(4) An ordinary man just like other people	8%	(3)

53. ibid., p.251.

We have noted that the image of the Emperor as "the head of a family" once led to the concept of the "family-state." Today, about 30%, irrespective of age, support the analogy between the Emperor and the head of family. However, the drastic postwar change in the family system, especially the abolition of the prewar headship, must be borne in mind when we use the word "family," even if practice and individual attitudes are known to have changed in these respects more gradually than the reformed legal status of such institutions.

D. Changes at the Base of the Imperial System

The prewar imperial system was sustained by means of the indoctrination of Emperor worship with the value-system on one hand, and the force of the army and bureaucracy on the other. The army and bureaucracy possessed a high degree of independence from the Imperial Diet under the Meiji Constitution. The army began to challenge government control after the 1920's, and by the London Conference of 1930, it openly protested against government "encroachment on the supreme command."⁵⁴

With the defeat, the army was demobilized and the bureaucracy was put under more effective control of the new National Diet. Traditional institutions such as the absolute monarchy, the army and the bureaucracy were only the more conspicuous parts of the old system that underwent change. The foundation of the family-state system, like the family system, also experienced basic reorganization after the war. In this section, we shall discuss the family system as the most important socio-economic foundation of the imperial institution.

54. Cf. Imai Seiichi, "Shidehara Gaikō ni okeru Seisaku Kettei" (Decision-Making in the Shidehara Foreign Policy), in Nihon Seiji Gakkai, ed., Taigai Seisaku no Kettei Katei (Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), p.104.

The successful manipulation of the people under the prewar imperial system depended to a considerable degree on the fiction of the state as one family. The ideology of the "family-state," as discussed by Ishida, is a combination of familism with the theory of social organism.⁵⁵ The source of legitimacy of the imperial rule lay in the "natural village order," consisting of Shintoism, gerontocracy, familism, feudalism, and what Kamishima calls mental autarchy, meaning localized mentality.⁵⁶ If it is correct to conclude, as Maruyama does, that the old nationalism "had vanished from the political surface only to be inlaid at the social base in an atomized form,"⁵⁷ we must examine what has happened to "the social base" during the postwar years in order to discover the nature of the base of Japanese nationalism.

The fall of the old imperial system meant not only disintegration at the apex, but also the dismemberment at the bottom of the system. The abolition of the powerful headship and heir-ship in the new civil law democratized the Japanese family system in which all family members are given equal rights and duties. Paternal rights are drastically curtailed. In sum, the old family system was "abolished" by these revisions.⁵⁸ Postwar changes in the family system were not confined to those of rights

55. Cf. Ishida Takeshi, Meiji Seiji Shiso shi Kenkyū (A Study of Meiji Political Thought), (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1954), Chapter I.

56. Cf. Kamishima Jiro, Kindai Nihon no Seishin Kōzō (The Mental Structure of Modern Japan), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961).

57. Maruyama, op.cit., p.167.

58. Wagatsuma Sakae, Ie no Seido: Sono Rinri to Hōri (The Family System: Its Ethics and Law), (Tokyo: Suito Sha, 1948), p.83.

and duties of family members in the legal sense. For example, the old family system was the basic unit of the government's political mechanism and the head of the household was responsible to the State for control of his family. Ideologically, the head man was obliged to govern his family for his familial ancestors and to make his family "a place for the training of his children based on loyalty and filial piety through which his family might contribute to the development of the nation whose epitome was the imperial family."⁵⁹

It is understandable that the revision of the family system was a main concern of the conservatives in the process of Constitutional revision, for the old family system was essentially an embodiment of the old value-system. The family, as the basic unit of the governing mechanism and the seedbed of the value-system, was naturally regarded as more important than individual family members. This produced the concept that "it is natural that individuals should be neglected and sacrificed for the sake of the family."⁶⁰ The almost absolute status of the patriarch was considered inevitable to maintain and develop such a family. The spirit of Wa (harmony) was a categorical imperative, and individualism was condemned as a vice of Western cultures that ought to be replaced by the Japanese virtue of mushi (selflessness). There was practically no room for "independence of personality" to grow in the old family system where "individuals were

59. Monbusho, Senchū Katei Kyōiku Shido Yōkō (Guideline for Wartime Family Education), 1943, as quoted in Isono Seiichi and Isono Fujiko, Kazoku Seido (Family System), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1958), pp. 75-76.

60. Fukutake Tadashi, ed., Koza: Shakaigaku (Lectures on Sociology), vol. 4, Kazoku, Sonraku, Toshi (Family, Village, and Cities), (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1957), p. 73.

completely submerged beneath the alleged natural order of human relations in the hierarchic ranking of the family under the absolute control of the head man's authority.⁶¹

Sociologically, the existence of a small community such as a village is prerequisite for such a family system to continue. "Face" or honor of the family becomes less meaningful in large cities where individuals are more independent and live insulated from their neighbors as contrasted with life in small villages and towns where inhabitants know not only each other but each other's ancestors as well. The five factors of the natural village order proposed by Kamishima existed within the old family system.

The new Constitution and civil laws have contributed to the erosion and partial destruction of the old family system and the familistic patterns of value-attitude. Moreover, the postwar socio-economic transformation has greatly affected the once more static natural village order. Industrialization and urbanization have produced the so-called "nuclear family" in a large segment of the population in which pattern the Japanese people have begun on a large scale to establish functional relations directly with their companies and other organizations without the medium of the family.

As an index of socio-economic change, we can examine the distribution of population by occupation during the past 50 years. More than 50% were engaged in the primary industries at the time of the defeat, which meant little change since 1920. As economic recovery and growth gathered momentum after 1955, the percentage decreased rapidly to 32.8% in 1960, 24.6% in 1965, and less than 20.0% in 1967. This rapid transformation

61. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

resulted in an erosion of traditional familism and in diffusion of the individualistic value-attitude system. . Urbanization has changed the base of human relations from the blood and locational relations to functional relations, producing new norms such as rationality, utility, individualism, universality, and anonymity.

Distribution of Population by Occupation⁶²

	1920	1930	1940	1947	1950	1955	1960*	1965**	1967**
Primary Industries	53.6	49.4	43.6	53.4	48.3	41.0	32.8	24.6	19.3
Secondary Industries	20.7	20.4	26.2	22.3	21.9	23.5	29.1	32.3	
Tertiary Industries	23.8	30.0	29.6	22.9	29.7	35.5	38.0	43.0	80.7
Unclassifiable	1.9	0.2	0.7	1.3	0.1	0	0		
Total Number(%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, Population of Japan: 1960 (Pub. 1963).

** The Asahi Nenkan, 1969.

The phenomenon of urbanization was already remarkable after the First World War. The six largest cities in Japan (Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe) held 20.2% of the total population in 1940 as compared with 17.9% in 1960.⁶³ On the other hand, the vigorous postwar

62. Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, Population of Japan: Census of 1955, pp. 334-360.

63. Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, Population of Japan, 1960, pp. 67-68.

movement for the merger of villages and towns into larger administrative units of cities has doubled the number of cities from 206 in 1945 to 556 in 1960. The number of villages decreased to less than one-third during the same period. Owing to this reorganization of administrative units, the percentages of city inhabitants have increased from 27.8% in 1945 to 63.5% in 1960. These figures are misleading when the change in the administrative system is not taken into consideration. However, the progress in transportation and communication has blurred the traditional distinction between urban and rural areas to the extent that Japan itself has become urbanized. The massive and large-scale socio-economic transformation that has taken place during the period of one generation has produced a deep schism in the traditional "value-attitude" standard of human relations, before it has been able to develop a modern urban standard.

The fall of the State and the family with the defeat amounted to the fall of the value-system in both the "public" and "private" life of the people. It is not hard, therefore, to imagine that the defeat left a grave spiritual vacuum as well as severely divided opinions as to the new family system.⁶⁴

We have pointed out in Chapter 4 that the Japanese people tend to find their greatest reward in working for the family. As many as 68.7% answered that they felt most rewarded when they worked for "parents," "husband-wife," "children," and "family." Only 8.1% mentioned "the State," "society," "mankind," and "class."⁶⁵

64. Cf. Wagatsuma Sakae, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

65. Naikaku Kambō Chōsa Shitsu, Sengo ni Okeru Aikokushin no Tembo (Prospects of Postwar Patriotism), 1962, p. 12.

According to a survey (1966) of those age 14-44, about half feel a purpose and a satisfaction in "family-gathering" and "growth of children." The percentage increases when the sampling is limited to married people.⁶⁶ The same survey investigated value-attitudes by getting rankings among five choices as follows:

Group A.

1. Property
2. Love
3. Freedom
4. Health
5. Work

Group B.

1. Myself
2. Family
3. Company
4. The State
5. Mankind

Group C.

1. Parents
2. Husband-Wife
3. Children
4. Sweetheart
5. Friends

Among Group A, "Health" received 70.1%; "Love," 15.5%; "Work," 5.4%; "Freedom," 4.6%; and "Property," 2.5%. Among Group B, "Family" received 60.3%; "Myself," 28.2%; "Mankind," 4.3%; "The State," 2.4%; and "Company," 1.6%. Among the last group, "Parents" received 34.0%; "Husband-Wife," 32.4%; "Children," 19.5%; "Friends," 4.7%; and "Sweetheart," 1.6%.⁶⁷ The overwhelming choice of "Health" and "Family" attests the people's strong inclination toward "my-homism."

We have examined postwar socio-economic changes which have virtually disintegrated the one-time base for the imperial system. It is

66. Cf. Mita Munesuke, Gendai no Seinen-Zo (Image of the Youth in Modern Japan), (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1968), pp. 14-19.

67. Cf. ibid., pp. 66-82.

necessary here to distinguish the paternalistic prewar familism from the postwar family-orientation which is usually referred to in Japan as "my-homism." The possessive "my" is highly indicative of the insular nature of the new type of familism. Prewar familism was, in final analysis, essentially an integral part of a large community and nation. Its value-system was fundamentally "outward-oriented." On the other hand, the basic characteristic of "my homism" lies in its insulation from and indifference to the surrounding community and its exclusive interest in "my" home's well-being. The emergence of the nuclear family has also changed the old family hierarchy and human relations. Once emphasized filial piety and the respect for elders appear to have been replaced by the voluntary parental devotion to and affection for children. The fact that as many as 41.5% of a surveyed sample found in their children their purpose in life demonstrates the central position that children occupy in contemporary attitudinal patterns.⁶⁸ The following definition of "my-homism" by Tsuda Michio sums up these points in the language of the far left:

[My-homism] is nothing but the pattern of existence of mass egoism under the present capitalistic system. It is a value concept that seeks for "restoration" and "emancipation" from alienation from the labor process in the pleasure of consumption life; it is a sentiment that attempts to pursue and secure primarily a small peace and stability in the small world of the family by restricting one's own interests to his home.⁶⁹

68. When the sampling is taken only from married people, "children" gets the highest score. Cf. Mita, op.cit., p.76.

69. Tsuda Michio, Nihon Nashunarigumu Ron (Theory of Japanese Nationalism), (Tokyo: Morita Shoten, 1968), p.123.

Whereas prewar familism was established as a result of vigorous educationa, political, and legal efforts by the government, postwar "my-homism" has come into being as a result of the government's inaction in this respect and the economic growth which has made the family a place for consumption, separate from production. The decrease of self-employed labor and the increase of employees in large workshops indicate that the family is more and more isolated from the production process. The Japanese attitude not to bring "business" into the home strengthens this tendency.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the indulgence in family affairs does not mean that it is a necessary compensation for the impersonal, bureaucratic life outside the family. On the contrary, "my-homism" has its exact carbon copy in "my-company-ism." Even most Marxist-oriented labor unions are organized by companies instead of industries so that interests of "my-company" are not jeopardized by other companies' workers. A survey in 1968 on the "National Character of the Japanese People" investigated a preference for two kinds of section chiefs: (1) He does not force you to work beyond regulations but also does not take care of you outside of work; (2) He sometimes forces you to do hard work beyond regulations, but he takes care of you outside of work. The latter section chief, or Ninjō Kachō (Sentimental Section Chief) always received more than 80% support during the past decade.⁷⁰ Thus, the benevolent father image is a stable preference of the Japanese. "My-homism" and "my-company-ism" regulate the Japanese people's private and public way of life. Little attention of the people is directed to what is left from these two values such as society and the State.

70. The Mainichi Shimbun, February 13, 1969.

The relatively weak interest of postwar Japanese in matters of mass human groups can be largely attributable to the fortunate success on the part of the government in providing both welfare demands and national security, as well as to a natural reaction to the prewar over-emphasis on the State. Economic difficulties and a military menace will inevitably arouse people's concern for the nation. The Japanese have been fortunate in the sense that they did not have to feel serious and immediate threats to their security, despite wars in neighboring China, Korea, and Vietnam. The question here is: Whether "my-homism" can provide the base for future Japanese nationalism, as familism did for prewar nationalism, when Japan confronts domestic and international difficulties. As we have discussed, "my-homism" is a closed small-group consciousness that tends to separate family from the community and rejects becoming an integral part of the governing system. Moreover, the completely different norms of family relations and systems that lack the authoritarian hierarchy of prewar familism indicate that "my-homism" will possibly become a negative factor for "integral nationalism" or ultranationalism.

The "symbolic" status of the Emperor under the new Constitution reflects not the prewar headmanship but the postwar image of a more amicable father of "my home." Thus, the imperial family appears in mass-communication media as an ideal type of my home. Photographs of the imperial family members are extremely popular in ladies' weeklies and monthlies. The marriage of the Crown Prince to Miss Shōda Michiko, a commoner, was received with nation-wide enthusiasm as an act of democratization of the imperial household.⁷¹ We may conclude that the

71. The Mainichi Shimbun opinion survey disclosed that 94% of the people could name Miss Shōda, the Crown Prince's future bride. 87% supported the marriage chiefly because they saw a hope of "democratizing" the throne. Cf. The Mainichi Shimbun, February 26, 1959.

Emperor is supported as a symbol of the nonpolitical and decentralizing "my-homism" rather than as the integrity of the people. Ishida Takeshi pointed out that the postwar imperial institution has been attempting to maintain "continuity in its nonpolitical and emotional aspect by curtailing its own realm." And this transformation has been given legal sanction by the new Constitution.⁷² Except perhaps in extraordinary cases, the imperial institution based on this kind of support can hardly be effective if it should demand serious endurance and sacrifice in the people's lives.

A few words of final caution are in order. To the extent that the new familism remains a self-centered egoism, it can hardly resist "national egoism" which promises to raise the people's living standard. The flow of "my-homism," "my-company-ism," and "my-country" is a natural one, and there will be plenty of room for my-home egoism to be directly expanded and projected to Japanese nationalism. Since military expansion is considered undesirable as well as impossible for present-day Japan, the primary focus of Japanese nationalism is and will be placed on economic expansion, or even the defense of the status-quo as a major economic power in the world. The role of the imperial institution, however, will be a modest and limited one in this kind of nationalism because of the hitherto discussed structural and attitudinal changes after the war.

72. Cf. Ishida Takeshi, "Tenno Sei no Mondai" (Problem of the Imperial System), in Gendai Shiso (Contemporary Thoughts), Iwanami Lecture Series, vol. 11, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1957), p. 112.

CHAPTER 9

THE MEIJI CENTENARY

Postwar Japanese concepts of the nation are determined by evaluations of the period from the Meiji Restoration to World War II as much as by different views of postwar political development.

The Japanese people experienced a sense of historical discontinuity with the defeat and the fundamental restructuring of the imperial system. This feeling was especially due to the fact that the changes after the surrender, unlike those of the Meiji Restoration, were brought about chiefly by an outside power. The interests of the people immediately after the war lay almost exclusively with survival and other postwar affairs, with the result that much of Japan's history since Meiji was neglected. If it is the nature of man to search for his past, the desire to re-examine Japan's modern history was a natural reaction to the excessive emphasis on this discontinuity of history.

Thus, as the Meiji centennial drew near, the controversy over the Restoration and its aftermath became one of the major issues in circles of commentary and criticism. Kuwabara Takeo of Kyoto University first called for a re-evaluation of the Meiji Restoration in the Asahi Shimbun of January 1, 1956, saying that "we have no hope unless we recognize that, despite many shortcomings and contradictions in the history that followed, the revolution in Meiji was a great national achievement." He demanded that the social critics and scholars re-evaluate the firm will for independence and the resolution for bold modernization that the Meiji people demonstrated.¹

1. Kuwabara Takeo, "Meiji no Saibyōka" (Re-evaluation of the Meiji), The Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1956.

There was no immediate reaction to Kuwabara's appeal. However, the time was ripe for the re-evaluation of the Meiji Restoration when Takeuchi Yoshimi, critic and scholar of modern Chinese literature, proposed in February 1960 to "set up a common subject in the world of criticism preparatory for the centennial year 1968: Should we either celebrate the Meiji Centenary or not? If so, how?" He maintained that the Japanese should evaluate "national viewpoints" more highly, but at the same time insisted on the necessity of discussing this matter not only by students of Japanese history, but also by students of Western history.² Shiso no kagaku devoted its November 1961 issue to "Re-examination of the Meiji Restoration" and Chuo Koron began a year-long serial entitled "Re-evaluation of the Meiji Restoration," from its January issue of 1962. Hayashi Fusao's "Affirmative Theory of the Greater East Asian War" appeared in the context of the attempt to rewrite the events which were so violently condemned after the defeat. Takeuchi maintained, for example, that postwar reforms came fundamentally from outside by the Occupation, and that, in order to make them truly Japanese and viable, we must recognize the dark side of Japan's history. For this purpose, he continued, reconsideration of Japan's modernization was essential.³

2. Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Minzokuteki Namono to Shiso" (Things National and Thought), The Shukan Doku Shojin, February 15, 1960. Cf. also, Ohe Shinobu, "Meiji Hyakunen no Shiten" (Viewpoints of the Meiji Centenary), Shukan Dokushojin, February 20, 1967. Cf. also, Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Ishin no Hyoka to Hyakunen" (Re-evaluation of the Restoration and the Centenary), Shiso no Kagaku, no. 35, (November 1961).

3. Cf. Kuwabara Takeo, Takeuchi Yoshimi, and Hani Goro, "Meiji Ishin no Imi" (Meaning of the Meiji Restoration), Chuo Koron, vol. 77, no. 1, (January 1962), pp. 174-189.

When the tendency in the scholarly world to re-examine the Meiji Restoration became stronger, the government decided, in April 1966, to celebrate the Meiji Centenary in 1968 by establishing a "preparatory Committee for the Commemoration of the Meiji Centenary." The re-examination of the nation's history since Meiji was first initiated by historians without political motivations. The government decision to celebrate the centennial, however, made the whole issue primarily a political one, which resulted in revealing once again the deep schism existing between the conservatives and the progressives over concepts of the nation. In the following section of this chapter, we will examine these conflicting views on Japan's modernization since Meiji and the people's reaction to these views.

A. Conservatives vs. Progressives on Japan's 100 Years Since Meiji

The Preparatory Committee, presided over by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku himself, in its third meeting of November 2, 1966, recommended that the government-sponsored ceremony be held in October 1968, and it presented an outline of other commemorative events and enterprises. According to the official plan, the Meiji Centenary was to be celebrated by: (1) a commemorative ceremony in Tokyo; (2) commemorative events such as a lecture series on Japan's modernization, exhibitions, and presentation of awards; (3) commemorative enterprises which would include national afforestation, maintenance of historical treasures, and a cruise of "the Ship of the Youth;" and (4) public relations activities.⁴ The

4. The Asahi Shimbun, November 2, 1966. Also, Seifu no Mado, no. 293 (January 1, 1968), pp. 8-11.

government publication entitled, "The Basic Attitude Toward Commemorating the Meiji Centenary," represents the official historical interpretation of the period. It reads as follows:

(1) The Meiji period was one of élan and enhancement unprecedented in world history. Japan shook herself free from the feudal system during this period and the whole nation struggled on toward the goal of building a modern nation with astonishing courage and energy. We are about to greet the centennial of the opening of this bright era named "Meiji."

(2) During this century, the Japanese nation realized grand schemes that inspired the world, though not without mistakes when we look back.

However, our predecessors built a great and solid base for politics, economy, and culture. This fact is eloquently demonstrated by Japan's recovery and prosperity conceived by most of the world as a miracle. We cannot but express our respect and admiration to our predecessors' courage and wisdom.

As the centennial draws near, it is natural that the Japanese people should be grateful for this inheritance and desire to enlarge this happiness and pass it to the coming generations. Needless to say, this wish is not a mere admiration of our predecessors.

(3) The goal of "catching up and surpassing Europe and America" which has been inspiring Japan so far has been realized to a certain extent. Therefore, Japan, which was concerned with absorbing civilizations of the advanced countries and following their examples, is now in a position of being asked by neighboring developing countries for guidance and assistance.

On the other hand, since the high material civilization has tended to desolate nature and man, it is high time to re-evaluate the goodness of the Orient and Japan which has been neglected for a long time.

(4) The changing international and domestic situations and Japan's international position demands of us, the Japanese people, a new creative will and resolution.

Especially the young generations who are to shoulder the responsibilities of Japan in the future are expected to make more effort, both spiritually and material, so that they

can be able to deal with such situations and solve various problems.

(5) We must not only reflect on the past but also use the experience and lessons that we have inherited to meet the present situation. We must manifest our resolution to make a firm step toward the new century, correctly and from an international viewpoint.

We, the Japanese people, celebrate the Meiji Centenary with unlimited hope for the future.⁵

The official view of the century since the Restoration is that it was a bright and successful period of modernization from which the present people must learn, in particular, a national spirit and a resolution for advancement. When the postwar spiritual situation is juxtaposed with that of Meiji, the implication is clear enough: the conservatives prefer the authoritarian concept of the nation that was widely held in the prewar days rather than the various concepts that have emerged since the war which are, to all intents and purposes, less submissive to governmental authority. Prime Minister Sato addressed himself to the first preparatory meeting in these words:

I believe Japan's material civilization is no longer inferior to that of Europe and America. Is it only my personal bias, however, to feel something that consistently existed among the Meiji people is lacking in the minds of present Japanese? Though Meiji was not as rich as today materially, the spirit of Meiji has much to offer to the people today.⁶

The major political purpose of the government in commemorating the Meiji Centenary consisted in awakening the people's national conscious-

5. "Meiji Hyakunan" (Meiji 100 Years), Seifu no Mado, no. 293 (January 1, 1968), pp. 6-7.

6. As quoted in Rekishigaku Kenkyu, no. 330 (November 1967), p. 34.

the Centenary on the ground that the government-sponsored commemoration would endanger free historical thinking and education.¹⁰ Marxist-oriented historians or the "progressives" condemned the official interpretation of the 100 years as a "reactionary historical view" that "totally lacks reflection on the past aggressive war." In their further contention, the conservatives "advocate anti-democratic, militaristic ideology" in an attempt to mobilize the national spirit to fascism and war.¹¹ The protagonist in opposition was Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (Council of Historical Studies). The Council maintained that "if we can strengthen the unity of the working class and develop the integrity of the people, the final victory is ours. With this conviction in our minds, let us stop the celebration of the Meiji Centenary and enlarge and develop the movement for independence, peace, and democracy."¹² Some other historians thought that the government's motives for celebrating the centennial were threefold: (1) to elevate the State (kokka) and the Nation (minzoku); (2) to inculcate militaristic thought; and (3) to prepare for the problem in 1970 -- the review of the security treaty. From this perspective, this group felt the need to make anti-centennial efforts on a nation-wide scale.¹³

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10. Akita Kindaishi Kenkyukai, and others, "Meiji Hyakunen-sai ni kansuru Seimei" (Statement Concerning the Meiji Centenary), Nihon Kindaishi Kenkyu, no. 9 (October 1968), pp. 70-71.
 11. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, and others, "Meiji Hyakunen-sai ni Hantaisuru" (We Oppose the Meiji Centenary), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2. For a comprehensive essay by a leftist critic, see Tsuda Michio, Nihon Nashonarizumu Ron (On Japanese Nationalism) (Tokyo: Morita-Shoten, 1968) pp. 160-191.
 12. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, "Senso to Hakai no Saiten Meiji Hyakunen-sai o kokuhatsu suru" (To Prosecute the Meiji Centenary, Festival of War and Destruction), (Statement, 1967), p. 15.
 13. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, "Meiji Hyakunen-sai ni taisuru Kibonteki Shisei" (Basic Attitude Toward the Meiji Centenary), Rekishigaku Kenkyu, no. 330 (November 1967), pp. 6-14.

ness and solidifying national unity for further advancement of the nation à la Meiji.

There was some criticism of views which opposed the Centennial. Takeyama Michio, for example, attacked the thesis that the 80 years since Meiji consisted of a period of "war and despotism" and that the postwar years witnessed only "peace and democracy." He claimed that the postwar progressivism was a disguised Communism rather than genuine pacifism and democracy.⁷ Hayashi Kentaro also criticized the "progressives" for evaluating only the "confused state of affairs immediately after the war" or "the postwar five years" instead of "the postwar twenty years" and "the present democratic system."⁸

On January 1, 1968, the Japanese Socialist Party announced its basic historical interpretation in a statement, "Let Us Overcome the Reactionary Nature of the Meiji Centenary."

... can we define the past 100 years since the Meiji Restoration as 100 years of development as the government and the LDP claim? Indeed, the Meiji Restoration marked one stage of social development from feudalism to capitalism and was historically progressive.

However, it was the government of clans and bureaucracy with the Emperor on top that was established by the Restoration. Japan, under the leadership of this government and under the slogan of "Rich Country and Strong Army," competed with Western powers to become an economically and militarily strong power. That is, domestically, the government oppressed and exploited the working masses and internationally invaded and exploited Asian countries starting with Korea and China. Thus, Japan became a powerful nation of militarism and imperialism.

7. The Asahi Shimbun, April 5, 1965.

8. Ibid., April 7, 1965.

...Japan started the war in the Pacific only to be miserably defeated. The road of militarism and imperialism for 80 years since the Restoration ended here and the new Constitution was promulgated on the denial and reflection of the past. However, the 80 years since Meiji is not only a history of militarism and imperialism. Our predecessors fought against the clan-bureaucratic government for people's liberty and democracy. This movement of popular rights was a continuation and development of the strength of the peasant and the town people who supported the transformation of the Meiji Restoration from below. Later, this movement developed into the Socialist movement. The hard struggle against war, for the enlargement of rights and betterment of life of the proletariat continued. The struggle of our predecessors for peace and democracy bore fruit after the defeat in the Pacific War. This is the Constitution of Japan.

New Japan started by the promulgation of this new Constitution. Twenty years have passed since then. The 100 years of history is not, therefore, one continuous 100 years, but is divided into the first 80 years and second 20 years. The first 80 years is a history of militarism and imperialism that oppressed the movement for peace and democracy. What symbolized this period was the Constitution of the Greater Imperial Japan. The second 20 years is a history of a new, peaceful, and democratic Japan in which the people prevent the conspiracy of reactionary forces from reversing the course.

...the aim of the government when it deliberately neglects the division in the 100 years history since Meiji and admires the "surprising development of the past 100 years since Meiji" is to revive the 80 years of militarism and imperialism in the historical consciousness of the people as "a good old age."⁹

Historians were most articulate and vigorous in opposing the Meiji Centenary by issuing opposing statements and holding opposition meetings. Fifty-four historical associations expressed "deep apprehensions" about

9. Nippon Shakai-To, "Meiji Hyakunensai no Hando-sei o kokufuku shiyo" (Let Us Overcome the Reactionary Nature of the Meiji Centenary), January 1, 1968.

the Centenary on the ground that the government-sponsored commemoration would endanger free historical thinking and education.¹⁰ Marxist-oriented historians or the "progressives" condemned the official interpretation of the 100 years as a "reactionary historical view" that "totally lacks reflection on the past aggressive war." In their further contention, the conservatives "advocate anti-democratic, militaristic ideology" in an attempt to mobilize the national spirit to fascism and war.¹¹ The protagonist in opposition was Rekishikagaku Kenkyūkai (Council of Historical Studies). The Council maintained that "if we can strengthen the unity of the working class and develop the integrity of the people, the final victory is ours. With this conviction in our minds, let us stop the celebration of the Meiji Centenary and enlarge and develop the movement for independence, peace, and democracy."¹² Some other historians thought that the government's motives for celebrating the centennial were threefold: (1) to elevate the State (kokka) and the Nation (minzoku); (2) to inculcate militaristic thought; and (3) to prepare for the problem in 1970 -- the review of the security treaty. From this perspective, this group felt the need to make anti-centennial efforts on a nation-wide scale.¹³

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10. Akita Kindaishi Kenkyukai, and others, "Meiji Hyakunen-sai ni kansuru Seimei" (Statement Concerning the Meiji Centenary), Nihon Kindaishi Kenkyu, no.9 (October 1966), pp.70-71.
 11. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, and others, "Meiji Hyakunen-sai ni Hantaisuru" (We Oppose the Meiji Centenary), op.cit., pp.1-2. For a comprehensive essay by a leftist critic, see Tsuda Michio, Nihon Nashonarizumu Ron (On Japanese Nationalism) (Tokyo: Morita-Shoten, 1968) pp.160-191.
 12. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, "Senso to Hakai no Saiten Meiji Hyakunen-sai o kokuhatsu suru" (To Prosecute the Meiji Centenary, Festival of War and Destruction), (Statement, 1967). p.15.
 13. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, "Meiji Hyakunen-sai ni taisuru Kihonteki Shisei" (Basic Attitude Toward the Meiji Centenary). Rekishigaku Kenkyu, no.330 (November 1967), pp.6-14.

Noma Hiroshi, a novelist, declared that he would side with the "postwar Japan" which is founded on different principles and methods from prewar Japan, that is, peace and democracy.¹⁴ A leftist historian, Tōyama Shigeki, criticized the so-called theory of modernization, by pointing out that the theory evaluates uncritically the speed and success in developing industry and culture and pays little attention to the exploited masses and colonized or semi-colonized countries such as Taiwan, Korea, and China. He argued, furthermore, that the theory totally neglected the period between the monetary panic of 1927 and the Korean War of 1950 in which contradictions of the imperial system and capitalism exploded.¹⁵ Some of them were reminded of the commemoration of the 2600th year of the Japanese calendar in 1940 which was used for enhancing ultra-nationalism under the military dictatorship.¹⁶

Watanabe Yozo of Tokyo University summed up the opposition viewpoint when he described it as follows:

...the Meiji Centenary which is to be celebrated by the government amid a reactionary wave is harmful rather than indifferent to our consciousness concerning this issue. Because, to re-evaluate highly the prewar history that completely destroyed democracy, and to re-estimate achievements of the prewar Japanese capitalism which was realized only by suppressing democracy, means an acceptance of the situation where the government and the LDP are ruining democracy.¹⁷

14. Cf. The Asahi Shinbun, April 6, 1965.

15. Ibid., April 8, 1965.

16. Cf. Masujima Hiroshi, "Nichibei Kyodo Sekinin Jidai to Meiji Hyakunen" (Age of Joint-Responsibility of the U.S. and Japan and the Meiji Centenary), Meiji Hyakunen Mondai, (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1968), pp.9-10.

17. Watanabe Yōzo, "Meiji Hyakunen-shi o dou toraeruka" (How to Understand the 100 Years History of Meiji), op.cit., p.25.

Thus, there existed an unresolvable conflict between the supporters and opponents of the government's idea of proper celebration of the centennial. The fundamental difference was that while the conservatives tended to find glorification in Japan's rapid modernization and continued history since the Restoration, the "progressives" tended to emphasize the oppression of the people by the clan-bureaucratic government and claimed that there should be a clear division in interpreting the 100 years into the 80 years of prewar history and the 23 years since 1945. The conservatives are primarily concerned with the result of the advancement of the nation as a whole, whereas the progressives are concerned with how such an advancement was brought about from a people's historical viewpoint. The progressives' historical view of class struggle, reflecting Marxist influence, is essentially incompatible with the conservatives' less systematic but more nationalistic historical interpretation. These two conflicting evaluations of the century since the Meiji Restoration appear to have split national opinion into sharply opposing ideologies.¹⁸

B. Popular Reactions

The majority of the people, however, remained indifferent to the controversy over the Meiji Centenary and the conflicting historical views. In July 1966, three months after the establishment of the preparatory committee by the government, more than half the Japanese were unaware

18. The rightist and leftist confrontation over the Centenary resulted in a lawsuit of a Marxist historian and the editor of the Kyōiku Hyōron by a right-wing group of the LDP, the Seishin-kai, for the article "The Meiji Centenary and the Way to War," Kyōiku Hyōron, February 1966 issue. Cf. also, Odagiri Hideo, ed., Taiketsu no Shiso (Thought of Confrontation) (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1966), pp. 193-213.

of governmental preparation for the Centenary.¹⁹ Although by August 1968, two months before the central commemorative ceremony, 89% of the people answered that they had either heard or seen the word "the Meiji Centenary," the Centennial celebration was not a subject of much interest to the public. The same survey indicated that 53% supported the commemoration as compared to 26% opposed.²⁰

However, the most important fact is that the mass of the people have rejected the simplistic historical views of both conservatives and progressives and have manifested a more complicated, diversified picture of the 100 years since the Restoration. The Asahi Shimbun public opinion survey on people's impressions of Meiji, Taishō, and Shōwa (prewar and postwar Shōwa) eras demonstrated that: (1) the Meiji era is largely regarded as a progressive and lively period; (2) the Taishō era is a conservative, stable, and stagnant period; (3) the prewar Shōwa era is turbulent and dark period; and (4) the postwar Shōwa era is a progressive, bright, and lively period.²¹ Apart from the ambiguous value concepts of "stability" and "turbulence," if we define "progressive," "lively," and "bright" as positive impressions and "conservative," "stagnant," and "dark" as negative impressions, we get the following figures for respective eras:²²

19. Naikaku Soridaijin Kenbō Kokoshitsu, "Meiji Hyakunen Kinenjigyo ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa" (Public Opinion Survey Concerning the Commemorative Events of the Meiji Centenary), 1966, p. 3.

20. The Asahi Shimbun, September 20, 1968.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

	Positive	Negative
Meiji (1868-1912)	74	30
Taisho (1912-1926)	25	66
Prewar Shōwa (1926-1945)	32	63
Postwar Shōwa (1945-1968)	98	20

Therefore, the apathy among the people in general toward the heated controversy over the Centenary was based partly on different attitudes concerning the issues. The narrow and dogmatic interpretations of the century since the Restoration on both extreme right and left seemed, to this observed and participants, to alienate the general public. It appeared to be the judgment of most commentators that it seemed to leave no mark and to have little meaning for the public majority.

Yet, the Meiji Centenary produced a commercial boom. Books, records, and TV films flooded the scene. It was reported that about 1,000 publications which had something to do with the centennial were printed in the preceding few years.²³ However, the boom was generated mainly by the commercial spirit and benefited chiefly economic interests.²⁴ The world of big business took a favorable attitude toward the Centenary Commemoration but remained fundamentally indifferent to it. Numerous publications by the Kikeiren, Keidanren, and other economic organizations

23. The Tokyo Shimbun, October 23, 1968 and the Mainichi Shimbun, December 6, 1968.

24. The Tokyo Shimbun, op.cit.

virtually ignored this issue and were fully occupied with the problem of capital liberalization and other economic problems. Shinojima Hidco, president of the Mitsubishi Chemical Company and chairman of the Keidanren's public relations office, agreed to the celebration of the Meiji Centenary simply because the passage of a century was worth commemorating. However, he qualified his statement about "historical continuity" by adding that the defeat in war marked an end of the Meiji period.²⁵

Editorials in major newspapers agreed that the Meiji Centenary Commemoration should be an occasion for reflections on the past and an opportunity to think about Japan's future. Evaluating highly the successful modernization carried out by the Meiji leaders, the Mainichi Shinbun called for the return to the original spirit of Meiji and the tackling of problems at home and abroad with modesty and courage in the hope that Japan would fully attain the status of an advanced nation emerging from its recent position as a semi-advanced nation.²⁶ The Asahi Shinbun stressed the necessity of deep reflection on the past so as not to repeat the same mistakes and continued:

We cannot allow the Meiji Centennial to end merely as a formal festival; by looking back on the course taken during the past century, we should make this an opportunity for profound reflection and silent thought on the future form which our nation should assume, and on its course.

For this purpose, it is important that not only the leaders in the various fields such as politics, economics, and culture, but also the people... each and every one... should reflect on the duties with which he or she is

25. An interview with the present writer at the Mitsubishi Chemical Company in Tokyo, January 14, 1969.

26. The Mainichi Shinbun, October 24, 1968.

individually burdened, and fortify his or her determination to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.²⁷

The Tokyo Shinbun concluded that the true significance of celebrating the Centennial was to conduct "grave reflections" on the more recent state of affairs such as self-righteous fanatic student disturbances and the deterioration of politics that indulges itself in factional strife and corruption.²⁸

In an interview, editorial members of the Yomiuri Shinbun explained to the writer that they would neither positively oppose nor support the celebration of the Centennial and said that its only significance would be to encourage introspection. They observed that the government's intention had not been widely accepted, but nevertheless had had the effect of widening the gap between those who opposed it and those who supported it.²⁹

The ceremony commemorating the Meiji Centenary was held on October 23, 1968, at Nippon Budokan in Tokyo attended by the imperial family, Cabinet members, National Diet members, foreign delegations in Japan, and representatives of various fields. In his address, Prime Minister Sato called for the utmost effort to determine a national consensus concerning the long-range future image of Japan. However, the absence of the Socialists and Communists symbolized the degree of opposition.³⁰

27. The Asahi Evening News, October 24, 1968.

28. The Tokyo Shinbun, October 23, 1968.

29. An interview with four editorial members of The Yomiuri Shinbun Tokyo, December 6, 1968.


30. Cf. The Tokyo Shinbun, October 23, 1968.

As we have discussed, neither the conservatives nor the progressives could achieve their goals as far as the Centennial celebration was concerned. The people remained aloof from both the conservative call for national solidarity and the leftist appeal for a united front against the "reactionary conspiracy" to destroy democracy. The significance of the conflicting historical views and the controversy over the commemoration of the Centennial can be properly understood only within the whole context of postwar political struggles for different forms of the State and different political orientations. Both conservatives and progressives regarded the Centennial as only one major occasion for this struggle. The Centennial controversy became one of the most illustrative examples of a sharp political and ideological conflict over the image of the nation, to which the general public remained rather indifferent. It is often misleading to judge the status of national consciousness of the people only by the trend of articulate opinions. The latter do reflect some of the general tendencies of public opinion, but they are also manipulated by small politically-minded groups. Various concepts of the nation in postwar Japan have, above all, been products of consciously thought out particularistic ideologies rather than projections of the unconsciously developing state of the popular "mind."

The Meiji Centenary, by revealing the difference in historical evaluations of Japan's modern century, symbolized the depth of conflict over the concept of the nation in postwar Japan. It also manifested a relative indifference of the general public to the question of the State and nationalism.

I will attempt, in the following section, to summarize the findings and reach a tentative conclusion about the possible consensus as to the nature of the Japanese nation.

Images of the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa Eras³¹



31. The Asahi Shimbun, September 20, 1968.

CONCLUSION

TOWARD WHAT KIND OF CONSENSUS AS TO THE CHARACTER OF THE NATION?

Resurgence of nationalism, along with high economic growth, has been a popular topic in contemporary Japan as well as among foreign scholars and commentators. The nature of nationalism, however, has not been adequately studied. Some are concerned with restoration of the prewar type of ultra-nationalism; others tend to discuss this subject without making a distinction between "ideal" and "actual" nationalism.

For those who observe Japanese political development from the position of third persons, the main interest has been not so much in complex and conflicting images of the nation as in certain visible political tendencies or movements as an outcome of the competitive process of these images. The resurgence of Japanese nationalism, like economic growth, is an incontestable fact for these observers.

On the other hand, those who are deeply involved in domestic political struggles, whether as politicians or critics, have remained mutually disagreed with opposed concepts of the nation, resulting in a serious lack of "national consensus." The severity of views that have characterized the critics has exposed them to accusations for being anti-nationalistic. The nonexistence of Japanese nationalism is loudly deplored by the usually more conservative counter-critics. They have paid only marginal attention to the implications of their actions to foreigners. The somewhat confused states of mind of these people when they hear foreign observers talking about resurgent Japanese nationalism resembles the

puzzled reaction of the Japanese, mixed with pride and hesitation, to the thesis presented initially from foreigners that Japan is a great country.

The difference in viewpoints stresses different aspects of the same issue. For example, the anti-military base struggles can be easily interpreted, especially by Americans, as expressions of anti-American nationalism. That is only partially correct, however. Any conspicuous presence of a foreign power will inevitably cause some kind of friction between the countries involved. The nature and degree of friction depends to a great extent, however, on the background and the form of its presence. Without military bases, for example, the American presence in Japan would not have caused the same degree of anti-American sentiments. In addition to nationalism, the anti-base struggles became a political movement only when they were combined with Marxist-Leninist political tactics, the actual suffering of inhabitants around the bases, and a universalistic and idealistic creed of pacifism. It is somewhat misleading, therefore, to link any anti-foreign movement directly and largely or wholly to nationalism.

On the other hand, we should examine carefully whether those who believe that they carry out anti-base struggles are doing so only as pacifists or Marxists. Those people tend to dismiss the doubt that a nationalistic sentiment against the foreign presence may play an important role in their attitudes. Indeed, it is not always pleasant for those who regard themselves as committed to universalistic creeds to face up to nationalistic elements in their motives. Moreover, their actions can be judged by opponents as the inverted nationalism of anti-Americanism and, in this regard they are actually playing a nationalistic role.

It is obvious that these foreign and domestic viewpoints have much to learn from each other. One is not necessarily superior to the other. Both viewpoints are indispensable to understand nationalism. As this paper has studied the nature of postwar Japanese nationalism by examining concepts of the nation, the main emphasis has naturally been placed on the analysis of the political consciousness of the Japanese. In this conclusion I will attempt to examine the nature of Japanese nationalism which is based on various concepts of the nation as discussed in preceding chapters.

Criticism of power, a basic theme in the Japanese press, has contributed more to the destruction than to creation of a "national" image in any sense. Creation of a new concept of the nation has been of little interest to Marxist-leftists. They have neglected it, apart from a dogmatic view of a "people's republic," even as a theoretical question, to say nothing of it as a practical problem.

Immediately after the war it was argued and agreed that the new concept of the nation must be "democratic" and "peaceful." However, this kind of idealistic image embodied some problems. First, there was no deep understanding nor consensus as to what these concepts meant. Secondly, despite serious difficulties in applying them in the real world, their perfect and idealistic application was demanded. To be "peaceful" meant for many "absolute pacifism" and "complete disarmament." To be "democratic" was often interpreted as more than parliamentary democracy and justified "direct," "extensive democracy" and extra-parliamentary activities. An emphasis on "internationalism" has borne an idea that "the individual" can and should be linked directly with "the world," minimizing the real nature of world politics as relations among nations.

These particular images of the nation, formed under the Occupation, still provide basic discrepancies in the controversy over the nature of the nation.

The pump-priming of nationalism by the conservatives after the resumption of independence in 1952 became effective only when it was backed up by high economic growth. The conservatives have been unable to present a new ideal image of the nation; some of them have urged in a self-complacent manner a return to the Meiji spirit; others, mostly those who support modernization as the first priority, seem satisfied with the nonideological view of high economic growth and welfare, and have avoided philosophical and political controversy over nationalism. Ironically, this less defined and nonideological conservative concept seems to enjoy the greatest popular support. For instance, "patriotic" descriptions in government-authorized textbooks show moderate, rational and balanced views and do not represent the kind of patriotism urged in "The Ideal Image of the Japanese," written by elderly Meiji-vintage people. As to the question of national defense, the insistence of the rightist conservatives on a large military build-up is doomed to failure against the dominant economic rationalism of the government. The events that pleased conservative traditionalists, such as the establishment of the National Foundation Day on February 11 and the Meiji Centenary Commemoration, have proven to be no more than "festivals" and have not ignited the expected spark of Meiji-type nationalism. Any radical change in the imperial institution is not even seriously considered by the conservative majority. A new political force the Komei-tō, presents pragmatic, nonideological views of the nation which have obtained strong public support, especially for that party's defense policy.

The welfare state, as a contemporary and universalistic goal, is a most widely supported concept in postwar Japan, as we shall note later. First, let us examine this seemingly contradictory phenomenon marked by highly ideological and politicized concepts of elites coexist with nonideological concepts of the mass, there being little communication between them.

Ethnic Homogeneity

Hans Kohn distinguishes nationalism that is based on "ancestry and the past" from nationalism that looks to some "universalistic idea."¹ According to him, nationalism that is generated by given factors such as "some peculiar and exclusive biological or traditional characteristics" does not require intellectual or ideological rationalization as does nationalism based on a universal idea. Indeed, it is to be borne in mind in discussing Japanese nationalism that the Japanese people are an ethnically, culturally, and historically homogeneous people living in an insular country. Wartime Japanese nationalism went so far as to claim divine origin of the Yamato people who were superior to their neighbors and destined to be the leaders of Asia. It was racial and ethnic tones that dominated the central theme of prewar Japanese nationalism and ultra-nationalism.

Defeat certainly disrupted the Japanese State as a political phenomenon. However, it left the Japanese Nation as an ethnic phenomenon almost intact, even if it shattered concepts of ethno-national superiority. This

1. Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History. (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1962), pp. 13-14.

means that defeat did not affect the very core of ethnic identity. Postwar reactions of the people indicated strongly that their identification with kokutai was by no means their basic identity as Japanese. Or, they did not feel difficulty in maintaining a distinct identity aside from their Meiji-type political system. Most theories of Japanese nationhood have taken this ethnic homogeneity for granted, partly because it was not basically affected by defeat, and have tended to discuss exclusively political aspects of various concepts. Nevertheless, the firm existence of ethnic identity in Japan paradoxically has provided more room for political schism and conflict, and has made severe political-ideological struggles tolerable without endangering fundamental national unity as a State.

We have seen that the postwar history of Japanese nationalism has indicated little progress in developing a consensus as to the ideal concept of the nation. This has primarily been because attempts to establish a consensual concept have so far emphasized particular ideological views of the State and the Nation to such an extent that they have become contradictory to the realization of the goal. As discussed, therefore, the most successful attempt at enhancing national awareness has been through economic development, simply because it is a much less ideological and deliberate attempt. Thus, ethnic homogeneity has remained the basic identity of the Japanese, despite its neglected existence.

Limited Conflict

Secondly, the conflict between conservatives and progressives has been confined to relatively small politically-oriented segments of the population. We have shown that there is agreement among the majority of the people even on the most controversial issues such as Article Nine

of the Constitution, the Self-Defense Forces, and the imperial institution. Conflicting theories of the nation are often interpreted as signs of national disintegration but have never presented a real threat to the unity of this nation, largely because of the existence of popular agreement. Also, nonideological, centripetal forces have always checked extremism.

It should be noted that this consensus of the majority of people constitutes the basis for national unity; by no means is it the product of lack of interest in, or of sheer apathy toward, State affairs. Rather it is based on the people's own value-judgments.

The leftist concept is fundamentally derived from the theoretical emphasis on elite exploitation of the "masses" in addition to the Marxist view of the bourgeois State. Moreover, leftists continue their attitudes of alienation stemming from experiences of prewar and wartime oppression as well as from postwar frustrations in the role of permanent opposition. Leftist insistence on the cumulative character of reactionary force, however, appears to the general public to be unfounded. Instead, people in general seem to evaluate in positive terms the current trend of affairs.

On the other hand, rightist concepts similar to those of the Meiji Empire have won little support among the people. Considering the stable support for the symbolic imperial system and the drastic changes in the socio-economic basis in postwar Japan, the re-emergence of the old imperial system is quite unlikely. The changed international environment, particularly in Asia, also tends to preclude such a re-emergence. Conservative efforts, chiefly by the LDP and the government have been more effective and successful than those by the progressives. However, when they resort to nostalgic, backward-looking efforts, as in the case of the

commemoration of the Meiji Centenary, the extent of effectiveness and success have proven to be only marginal. The government has succeeded in centralizing public education and has tightened control over curricular textbooks and administration so as to enhance national consciousness among the younger generations. The degree of inculcation of nationalism through school education, however, also depends on government control over other media of communication including inter-personal teaching processes.

Popular Concepts

The next question concerns concepts of the nation that are popularly held in contrast to the above-mentioned ideological concepts which tend to be limited to small segments of the population. It is difficult to grasp clearly the political thought of the masses as distinguished from articulate opinion leaders largely because it remains amorphous. It is possible, however, to discern general patterns among the masses.

Let us first examine a few survey results concerning concepts of the nation. An Asahi Shimbun poll of September 1968 indicated an overwhelming concern with domestic problems of the nation. Foreign policy, peace, and security received less than 20% of the total attention given by respondents.

I. What do you think is most needed for Japan, looking back at the past 100 years? (multiple answer) ²

External

To secure peace by independent foreign policy	20%
Strengthening of armament and national defense	3%

2. The Asahi Shimbun, September 20, 1968.

Domestic

Education	14%
Good politics	10%
Promotion of industry and economic development	15%
Price stabilization and other household problems	15%
Social policy	11%
Urban, housing, and traffic policies	8%

Other

Other answers	3%
No answer	22%
	<hr/>
	121%

A Mainichi Shimbun survey of January 1968 demonstrated the same tendency.³

II. In your opinion, what aspects should be emphasized in order to make Japan a better country? (multiple answer)

External

Positive effort toward peaceful foreign policy	37%
Strengthening of defense forces	10%
Assistance to underdeveloped countries	5%

Domestic

Enlargement and improvement of social security policy	54%
Development of economic power	50%
Progress in science and technology	43%

3. The Mainichi Shimbun, January 1, 1968.

Promotion of education	42%
Modernization of political circles	26%
Promotion of education and culture	10%
<u>Other</u>	
No answer	5%
	277%

A recent survey of April 1969 by the government shows that the people are largely satisfied with the present state of civil rights and liberty and expect primarily socio-economic leadership from the government.⁴

III-1. Name two functions of the State that you want to see performed particularly in present Japan.

	Total	College Graduates	Others
Promotion of social welfare	66%	76%	65%
Development of industry and economy	45	48	44
Protection of life and property	40	41	40
Promotion of freedoms of meeting, association and speech	14	27	13

4. Naikaku Sōridaijin Kambo Kōhōshitsu, Kokumin no Kuni ni taisuru Ishiki (People's Consciousness toward the Nation), 1969, p. 11.

III-2. What functions do you think are most essential for the State? Name two.

	Total	College Graduates	Others
Promotion of social welfare	31%	21%	32%
Development of industry and economy	40	39	40
Protection of life and property	69	79	68
Promotion of freedoms of meeting, association, and speech	28	56	26

The first characteristic of the popular concept as revealed by these survey figures is a domestic orientation. Approximately 80% of the interest of the people in national affairs is concerned with domestic problems as contrasted to about 20% with international affairs. The popular concern with national security, though it may rise under conditions of threat, is normally negligible compared with other concerns with domestic social and economic problems. Since nationalism is, at least in part, an expression of national self-assertion vis-a-vis other nations, this domestically oriented concept indicates that the Japanese people are not too "nationalistic" in their foreign relations. The same government survey shows, despite the government's call for leadership in Asia and international responsibility as a great power, that more people still give priority to domestic rather than to international efforts. As for Japan's international role, as many as 44% answered that Japan should work for

world peace through the United Nations whereas only 12% favored her playing a leading role among Asian countries.⁵ Thus, the popular attitude toward international relations remains highly general and abstract, as shown in the strong support for the United Nations, and hardly matches the increasing emphasis by the government on Japan's political leadership in Asia.

A second characteristic is a beneficiary consciousness. People expect the State to provide better social welfare services and other benefits produced by high economic growth. The State is regarded almost as a service organ and the people as beneficiaries of its services. This beneficiary consciousness is often expressed in a reversed authoritarianism, or an easy demand for protection by power rather than protection from power. People feel more the absence rather than the excess of State power when serious socio-economic problems are left unsolved for some time; they start making complaints, asking: "What is the State doing?" An interesting fact is that the people are aware of this beneficiary consciousness. For example, 43% answered that the Japanese people expected something to be done by the State while 23% expressed a sense of contribution to the State.⁶

The third characteristic is a positive affirmation of the postwar Japanese nation as a whole. Despite both leftist and rightist criticisms against postwar developments in the nation, the majority of the people have positively accepted them as desirable trends. For example, as many as 67% think that postwar Japan as a whole has been moving in the right

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

direction as opposed to 12% in the negative.⁷ It is significant that there is no major difference by age, education, sex, profession, and urban-rural breakdowns on this point. These figures are even more significant when compared with the survey results of 1956 concerning postwar reforms. At that time, 34% thought they were generally good; 11% thought they were bad, and 34% neither good nor bad.⁸

People have found that Japan has made most progress in her domestic sphere, especially in socio-economic development, exactly as they wanted to see. The same survey of April 1969 indicated this satisfaction.⁹

In which of the following fields do you think Japan has made the best progress? (multiple answer)

Politics	6.6%
Industry and economy	46.3%
National life	44.9%
Foreign relations	6.7%
Morality	2.1%
Education and culture	34.1%
None	3.5%
D.K.	13.2%
	<hr/>
	157.3%

7. Ibid., p.49.

8. Naikaku Sōridaijin Kambo Shingishitsu, Sengo 10-nen no Kaiko to Tembo (Retrospect and Prospect of Postwar 10 Years), 1956, p.6.

9. Naikaku, Komkumin, op.cit., p.52.

Thus, there exists a strong correlation between domestic orientation and a positive affirmation of postwar national trends. People are generally content with the essential functions of the State such as protection of life, property, and freedoms. They tend to expect of the State more positive and tangible socio-economic benefits.

The fourth characteristic is that, as far as these three major characteristics are concerned, there exists no fundamental generational difference. Despite a varying degree of disagreement on certain minor issues and some specific policies, such as when national foundation day should be celebrated and whether military expenditures should be increased or not, the younger generation agrees basically with older groups concerning the evaluation and expectations of the Japanese nation.

National Consensus

Our examination has shown that conflicting concepts of the nation do not divide the general public as deeply as the leadership. It is, therefore, true only in part to say that Japan lacks national consensus concerning national concepts.

Achievement of significant national consensus in these matters would require at least two further developments. One is de-politicization of highly ideological or dogmatic concepts of nationhood held by some leftist and rightist leaders. The other is a healthy growth of a political force which would channel the people's amorphous national consciousness into clearer, better focused thought. For the time being, it is the responsibility of the leadership, first, to recognize and appreciate concepts that are held by the general public; then, to guide the people toward more open and harmonious concepts.

Conservative efforts to infuse their national concepts among the people as the sole concepts reflect their traditional view that the people are always to be guided in every field.

It is highly misleading to make an analogy between functions of the State during Meiji and those of the postwar period. The primary function of the State in the early years of the Restoration was integration of Japan as a modernizing nation-state; the government was directly in charge of economic development and building up strong military forces. This has not been the case in postwar Japan. There has existed a solidly unified nation, even though Japan's sovereign power was lost during the Occupation. Her immediate security has largely been secured by the United States and her industrial entrepreneurs have been capable of restoring and further developing the economy without assistance from the government on a scale proportional to that of the Meiji period.

As Maurice Duverger has pointed out, the State is "the statute of Janus" and is "always and at all times"

both the instrument by which certain groups dominate others, an instrument used in the interest of the rulers and to the disadvantage of the ruled, and also a means of ensuring a particular social order, of achieving some integration of the individual into the collectivity for the general good.¹⁰

These two faces of Janus can be called "the administrative or service function" and the "coercive function" of the State. Needless to say, the service function is backed up by the coercive State power and differs

10. Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politics (translated by Robert North and Ruth Murphy, New York: The Robbs-Merville Co., Inc., 1966), p. xiii.

from other private services. When we examine the present trend of the State from this dual character, we find that the military and political, or coercive, function is far more limited, the service function remarkably expanded as compared with those in the Meiji period. This relative decrease of coercive elements of the State is fundamentally related to the popularly held domestic- and beneficiary-oriented concept.

Both conservative and progressive leaderships are unsatisfied with this popular concept and demand people's allegiance to their respective ideas and programs which, in one way or the other, put more emphasis on the coercive aspect of the State. The degree of necessary coercive functions depend on the domestic political situation as well as the surrounding international environment.

In postwar Japan, except for a few brief crises, when the political and social situation has remained relatively stable, the necessity for increasing coercive functions has been explained primarily in terms of Japan's foreign relations. The call of the conservatives for patriotism and national awareness has increasingly acquired the tone of national defense and security. This emphasis runs diametrically counter to the previously examined popular concept. Security-oriented nationalism, if it becomes the accepted form, will naturally favor a stronger military build-up and aggravate the surrounding international situation like a self-fulfilling prophesy. This inherent vicious circle of the armaments race would again apply, as in the past, to Japan interacting with her neighbors.

As we have seen, Japan's political leadership is divided concerning the understanding of international politics and methods of achieving national security. Considering all these disagreements among

leaders as well as between them and the people, any hasty attempt to form a national consensus would be not only undesirable but harmful. Fortunately, Japan can afford the time for a lengthy discussion and persuasion to achieve such a goal, thanks to its ethnic homogeneity, the existence of a degree of popular agreement on the nation, ~~and the~~ surrounding international situation from which there is no immediate and urgent threat to Japan's security.

The next question is: What can or should be the basis for achieving a national consensus? I believe, if the popular concept is accepted as the basis of further discussion, we have overcome the most difficult part of the task. From a pragmatic viewpoint, it is the concept supported by the greatest majority of the people that can provide a common ground. At the same time, this concept has certain valuable merits such as welfare and limitation of armaments which are fundamentally in accordance with a desirable future image of the nation.

The insular nature of "my-homism," however, has to be supplemented by interest in public affairs, and there is need for developing community and civic organizations which will guarantee some more mature sense of participation in public affairs and enhance individualistic citizenship. "My-homism" can only provide a passive resistance to extremism and needs to be fortified by an intermediate zone of interest in organizations (between "home" and "State") that can offer more positive resistance to extremism as well as make contributions to the nation.

Internationally, popular concepts manifest themselves in economic, scientific, and cultural nationalism which is far more desirable than the political and military expansionism of the past. We may realize that even the deep-rooted pacifist tendency is based on tangible economic benefits

as well as on humanitarianism. Domestically, the relatively low military expenditure has helped Japan's rapid economic growth, and internationally peace has always been the basic condition for foreign trade on which Japan's economy depends. The relatively low military expenditure and high economic growth has made Japan capable of contributing more to economic development in Asia than has hitherto been possible. Self-centered insular "my-homism" has to be redirected to the open world.

Nationalism as a Manifestation of Such Concepts

Unless Japan faces some unforeseen, urgent national crisis, either militarily or economically, such a concept of the nation will be manifested in moderate, open, and relatively rational nationalism. The inherent nature of economic transactions to develop beyond national boundaries will provide a basis for overcoming at least self-complacent nationalism.

Economic nationalism is far more conducive than military, political and ideological nationalism to the betterment of inter-"national" relations, for in current circumstances it is in the national interest to cooperate in limiting protectionism. Scientific-technological progress has made the traditional nation-state obsolete -- with probable exception of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China -- as a self-sufficient economic unit and as an effective unit of quite autonomous military defense. The emergence in the world of economic communities and regional collective security systems on an unprecedented scale is proof of this pattern.

Another merit of popular concepts is that, when they become too domestically oriented, a built-in stabilizer begins to work, thanks to the

other characteristic of beneficiary-consciousness which has to depend for its realization on economic development and foreign trade.

The Constitution of Japan has provided a pioneering experiment in international politics, by proclaiming a high ideal that a nation is to pursue. Practical difficulties in bringing this experiment to a successful outcome were originally conceived and expected and do not nullify the experimental value of this idealism. Impatient and immediate application of this principle is destined to fail in the present world where nationalism roars with a proprietary air. At the same time, however, the return to the old complacent nationalism would only be detrimental to Japan's own national interest in the long run. What is wanted today is the Japanese people's resolution to pursue this experiment with caution and with a realistic attitude. Popular concepts of the nation may very well constitute the basis of this purpose.

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