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Normalization of Political Corruption in Africa with special reference to Kenya

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DECLARATION

I declare that this project is my original work and has not been presented for examination in any other university.

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my mother, Mary Anyango, not only because she took me to school for the first time but also because she is a remarkable person who impressed me from an early age with her capacity to evaluate happenings in a sound manner, a phenomenon that would later as a philosophy student make me wonder if mothers are instinctive philosophers. It is also dedicated to my father, the late Francis Nyongesa, himself an uneducated gentleman but who cherished education with all his heart and sacrificed all that was humanly possible in his life's circumstances to ensure that my formative years were anchored in the pursuit for knowledge.

ABSTRACT

Since African countries' independence, the perception of political corruption has remained widespread despite government reforms that have included adopting constitutional, legislative and institutional anticorruption frameworks. This study set out to investigate underlying factors that may have entrenched and permitted political corruption to thrive into its pervasive and enduring nature. The study had several assumptions: a) that factors enabling political corruption to thrive seem to be linked to a phenomenon uniformly experienced across the continent; b) that colonialism is likely that shared experience across Africa; c) that some aspects of colonial legacies in Africa may be the factors facilitating the never-ending political corruption in Africa; and d) that study findings on political corruption in a formerly colonized country such as Kenya, can be writ large in Africa. The study had the following objectives: a) to investigate whether the widespread perception of political corruption in Africa can be traced to colonialism; b) to explore possible factors for the entrenchment of political corruption in governments and if there exist deliberate processes to forge new norms that subvert anticorruption efforts; and, c) to investigate the possible link between the colonial experience and the apparent perception of tolerance of political corruption in Kenya. The study's objectives were pursued through conceptual analysis applying Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's cultural hegemony which proposes that there is often the overt or subtle imposition of the ruling cl ass' worldview, and it's embodying economic and social structures, as being legitimate, normal and just for the benefit of all, despite those structures only benefiting the ruling class. Through philosophical speculation and argumentation the study arrived at findings that included: a) colonial hegemony entrenched a virulent form of political corruption in Africa as public office was transformed into a platform for power relation, advancement and protection of individual and class interests; b) the postcolonial political class in African countries such as Kenya, use their proximity to state power to dominate the economy, corruptly acquire wealth and increase their domination of African societies; c) there has never been any real political transition in African countries since the colonial era and therefore, colonial extractivist ideology and structures remain intact on the continent; d) that in normalizing corruption, perpetrators in Africa deploy three mutually self-reinforcing hegemonic processes, namely, *rationalization,* where corruption perpetrators develop self-serving ideologies to justify and perhaps even glorify corrupt acts; *institutionalization*, where initial corrupt acts become embedded in the state structures and processes, becoming part of routine in service delivery; and *socialization*, where newcomers into the political class are imparted with self-serving bias and norms that fortify group-think and also induce them to view political corruption as permissible and desirable. The study recommends acknowledgement that the persistent perception of political corruption is an aspect of colonial legacy in Africa, and therefore to effectively discourage the vice, anticorruption frameworks ought to incorporate counter-hegemony ideas to dismantle these aspects of colonial holdovers.

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background to the Research

1.1.1   Political corruption

Tangri and Mwenda (2013, p. 68), hypothesize that the causes and effects of political corruption as well as how to fight the vice, forms one of the greatest challenges and defining public issues of 21ˢᵗ century in Africa. Whereas there are various forms of corruption, political corruption is the most persistent despite widespread awareness of the associated dangers and costs to the public. The definition of political corruption varies, but *The World Bank*'s definition as "the abuse of public office by public officials for private benefit" is the most commonly used (World Bank, 1997, np). The abuse of office may involve a single one-off act of corruption, but it is normally characterized by a pattern of corrupt actions. This damages the moral character of role occupants and undermines institutional processes and purposes, therefore, eroding trust in government and its institutions. The resultant condition creates unmerited inequality and exclusion where relatively few corrupt individuals use government largesse to enjoy a lavish life while majority citizens are deprived of their basic needs and resources for development.

José Ugaz writing for *Transparency International* in a report titled: "*People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015*", articulates that political corruption is widespread in Africa and has far-reaching effects on economics, politics and society; as well as on environment, health, education, administration and institutions. He adds that the vice is perpetuated by powerful and influential public sector officials working in cahoots with corrupt individuals in private sector (Transparency International, 2015, p. 26). Political corruption is exhibited through acts of bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, parochialism, patronage, influence peddling, graft, and

embezzlement. The vice is so pervasive in Africa, that analysts link political upheavals, economic slump and social hardships to the vice (World Bank, 2010, *np*). In most cases, it appears to facilitate other criminal enterprises such as land grabbing, drug trafficking, money laundering, poaching, human trafficking, and electoral fraud, among others. It is also appears to drive misuse of government powers as in the case of suppression and repression of political opponents.

The problem of political corruption is not new in African societies as it appears that the colonial government faced a proliferation of the vice such that the regime had to enact laws to manage the vice. For instance, the anticorruption legislation in Kenya dates back to 1956, a period when the society was under colonial rule (Wambui, 2018, p. 42). In the struggle for independence from colonial rule, most freedom fighters across Africa claimed that they wanted to remove colonial governments on the continent, take power and eradicate political corruption from African societies (Mamdani, 1997, p. 273*ff*). Following independence, postcolonial governments in Africa did not eliminate political corruption as had been promised, and the vice continued to spiral to cataclysmic proportions. In the early independence period, the continent of Africa was engulfed in spates of military *coup d'états*; where the military coup leaders claimed they were taking over power to rid their countries of corrupt regimes. However, the military regimes or military-civilian coalitions did not reduce widespread perception of political corruption in Africa (Decalo, 1973, p. 105*ff*).

Similarly, in the political struggle to introduce multipartyism in Africa was fought on the claims that one party rule was vulnerable to political corruption and that the opening up of the political space to multiparty politics would help get rid of the vice in government. However,

even after many countries adopted multiparty politics, political corruption incidents continued to be reported.

The effort to fight corruption on the continent has also involved Africa's development partners whose prescription has involved the imposition on African governments of reform programs designed to improve governance, and also the funding of civil society groups to create public awareness on the vice. However, these too did not improve the widespread perception of political corruption (Gareth, 2010, p.32).

In a recent Global Perception Index, *Transparency International* placed Sub-Saharan Africa among the worst performing regions, in that majority of the countries made little or no progress in reducing political corruption. In the developed countries where corruption perception appears to be very low, it is argued that those countries enjoy robust constitutional, legal and institutional frameworks (Transparency International, 2018, p.14).

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

There is no doubt that in most African countries, including Kenya, the challenge of political corruption underlies almost every prevailing challenge: from crumbling infrastructure, to the squalid state of the majority, to recurrent post-election violence, to a poorly performing economy, to the high rate of unemployment, to name but a few. The perceived prevalence of the vice continues to foment disillusionment amongst the citizenry. This in turn breeds contempt for the rule of law, undermines confidence in private institutions such as the fairness of free market, as well as erodes trust in public institutions.

Political corruption is allegedly condemned by religions, ethical codes, and legal systems. Most African governments have adopted robust constitution, legislative and institutional anticorruption frameworks but perceptions of political corruption remain pervasive in African

societies to the extent that is claimed that political corruption is becoming a norm rather than exception. The threat of political corruption and the debate on how eradicate the vice, has some claiming that there is a need for further institutional reforms, while others claim that the existing institutional framework is robust enough to resist corruption.

1.3   Research Objectives and Questions

1.3.1   Research objectives

i)   To investigate whether the widespread perception of political corruption in Africa can be traced to colonial experience.

ii) To explore if there exist deliberate processes that have forged a culture that subvert efforts to undermine political corruption.

iii) To investigate the possible link between colonial legacy and the persistence of political corruption in Kenya.

1.3.2   Research questions

i)   Is the widespread perception of political corruption one of the colonial legacies in Africa?

ii) Are there deliberate processes that have forged a culture that subvert efforts to undermine political corruption in Africa?

iii) Is there any connection between colonial experience and the persistence of political corruption in Kenya?

1.4   Justification and Significance of the Research

Political corruption has a negative influence on decision making processes and actions in public life, especially in the application of power and authority in the general management of the economy and the use of public resources. The vice also raises the cost of doing business and

discourages inflow of foreign investments, which has an adverse impact on the production of goods and services; employment trends and these together affect the standards of living of a people. Therefore, research on how to eradicate corruption is important to the economy and ultimately to the people's well-being (D'Arcy and Cornell, 2016, p. 54*).*

The struggle for independence from colonial rule was premised on taking power so as to eliminate corruption from government. However, postcolonial regimes and leadership have not reduced perception of political corruption in African societies. Most African countries boast of robust constitutional, legal and ethical frameworks but this has not helped to reduce perception of political corruption on the continent. It appears that political corruption is tolerated and valorized as perpetrators mobilize solidarity from sections of society to resist accountability. If the society and government agencies have to deal with political corruption, there is continued need for researched understanding as basis for addressing this problem (Kempe, 2015, p. 127).

There is a lot of research attention to political corruption and this research is a contribution to that body of knowledge.

1.5 Scope, Assumptions and Limitations of the Research

This study was on the phenomenon of political corruption in Africa with special reference to Kenya. The study focused on Kenya as an African country that shares similarities in population growth, poverty, inequality, diversity, ethnic divisions, bad governance and even colonial legacy with most other African countries. Kenya is located in the eastern coast of Africa and lies on the equator. The country is bordered by the Indian Ocean to its south-east, Tanzania to the south, Uganda to the west, South Sudan to the north-west, Ethiopia to the north and Somalia to the north-east. On a regional level, the country is a leading economic hub and commercial powerhouse for East Africa Community and COMESA blocks. Kenya has close to

over 50 million people and roughly 45% of the population lives on less than $1.25 a day. The country did not meet the MDG goals by 2015 and still struggles to keep up with SDGs, but the country also has some of the richest individuals at continental and global scale.

The study assumed that factors enabling political corruption to thrive seem to be linked to a phenomenon uniformly experienced across the continent. It also assumed that colonialism is likely that shared experience across Africa. In addition, the study assumed that some aspects of colonial legacies in Africa may be the factors facilitating the never-ending political corruption in Africa. Further, the study assumed that study findings on political corruption in a formerly colonized country such as Kenya, can be writ large in Africa.

The study was limited to library and online sources and used Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony to reflect on research objectives and questions. This research also recognizes that investigation of political corruption is an interdisciplinary exercise, and therefore acknowledges that this is not a definitive study but a contribution to the existing body of knowledge on the subject. The scope of this study is within university postgraduate project work requirements for completion and award of Masters' degree.

1.6   Definition of Key Terms

Accountability is subjecting officials to more rigorous oversight and control, either by
      hierarchically superior government officials or by the public.

Common good is that which benefits society as a whole, in contrast to the private good of
      individuals and sections of society.

Governance is the exercise of sovereign authority in the making and administration of public policy and affairs of state. By extension, good governance is the proper exercise of sovereign authority in the making and administration of public policy and affairs of state.

Government is a group of people and structures that control and make decisions for a country or the process or manner of controlling a country. It exists not only as a creature of the citizens, but also as an independent entity from the citizens. For government to function, it is accessorized with a pot of resources, and selected individuals, leaders, who serve as workers and custodians of the collectivity.

Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system.

Hegemony refers to domination maintained by ideology, and the economic and social structures that embody it, as legitimate and just for the benefit of all, including in situation the structures only benefit the dominant group.

Political will is the demonstrable commitment of power holders and bureaucrats to effectively implement a set of governance objectives and to sustain the costs of those actions.

Subaltern groups or subaltern forces are formations of individuals outside the realm of ruling powers, involved in activities that challenge the status quo with aim of taking over power.

1.7   Literature Review

1.7.1   Corruption

The phenomenon of corruption has existed from time immemorial. However, there is no single, universally accepted and comprehensive definition of the concept. Although, there is no agreement on the definition of corruption, there is concurrence on the description of the vice as

destructive, endemic and pervasive in nature. According to Bidyut Chakrabarty, in *"Ethics in Governance in India",* a convergence on definition can be located in the etymological definition of its *Latin* word "corruptus" which means "to break away," "contaminated" or "perverted" (Chakrabarty, 2016, p. 16-18). This depiction illustrates the destructive nature of corruption upon the fabric of a society.

Wells and Hymes (2012) write that corruption is a global phenomenon that is not restricted to any particular political system, geographical location or race. They also observe that corruption is not a relatively contemporary phenomenon as the vice can be traced to ancient civilizations including civilizations that inspired modern democracy (2012, p.106). In the United Kingdom, Rubinstein observes that in the late sixteenth century through to the early nineteenth century, there were pervasive anxieties about corruption in Britain (Rubinstein, 1983, p. 60). While in the United States, Williams (2003) observes that corruption and scandal have been features of American politics and government for a long time. For instance, nineteenth century's land, oil and railroad scandals and early twentieth century's electoral scandals of the late twentieth century.

In a report, Transparency International (TI) (2015) writes that at least six billion people across the world live in countries struggling with corruption. The widespread nature of corruption suggests that no country in the modern world is corruption free. However, some countries especially on the African continent are characterized as having serious corruption problems (TI, 2015, p. 45). In Africa, failure to recognise corruption's endemic nature or fully appreciate its magnitude in some institutions, has translated into an inadequate, often complacent, response to its growing threat, including by anti-corruption institutions (Ibid, p. 56).

Corruption seriously impacts emerging economies such as Africa's, with its effects including the breakdown of the rule of law, injustice, poor governance, increased infant mortality rates, market prices manipulation, reduced economic investments, high poverty levels due to reduced income levels, general under-development as well as crime catalysis such as money laundering and terrorism financing (Ibid, p.64).

1.7.2 Forms of Corruption

Joutsen and Keranen (2009) observe that there are various forms and categorizations of corruption. These can vary from corruption perpetrated based on the participants' role within an institution, t

o that characterized by the transaction at hand, to that based on certain underlying motives, to that criminalized by applicable statute. For example, bribery and kickbacks both involve irregular payments to public officials but the first is primarily an inducement, while the latter is a future payment, for the commission or omission of certain actions taken in their institutional roles. From a transactional perspective, bribery involves an irregular payment offered to a public official, while in extortion it is the public official that demands the irregular payment, to carry out their role in a certain manner. In addition, transactional corruption could be viewed as either grand (happening at high government levels) or petty (occurring at lower and mid-level government) as dictated by its volume and regularity (p. 176, 179).

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (2016) further classifies as corruption: the bribery of foreign officials, the embezzlement and misappropriation of property entrusted to a public official by virtue of their office, the trade in influence or abuse of function in order to obtain undue advantage for oneself or for someone else; and the illicit enrichment of a public official manifested by the uncharacteristic accelerated increase of their

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assets. UNCAC also classifies corruption based on the method, the level, effect, and impact on society (UNCAC, 2016, p. 29).

Classification based on impact is as follows: a) *petty corruption,* involving a few people within small circles and typified by the exchange of small unwarranted favours. It involves bribery and requires minimal planning before undertaking it. It is prevalent in government and private sectors where individuals desire to access goods or service they do not deserve. An example of such petty corruption may involve a police officer letting an offender buy their way out of police custody hence aiding the offender's escape from prosecution; b) *grand corruption* occurring on a broader scope and involving multiple systems and structures. In this case the act of corruption is spearheaded by a very influential person in a position to force the political, economic and judicial systems to bend established transactional rules for such person's interest or benefit to prevail. The force exerted by the influential person does not have to be direct; it can be other people doing the job on the person's behalf. This form of corruption is prevalent in authoritarian and dictatorial governments or organizations. For instance, a powerful politician may directly or indirectly force procurement procedures in a government entity to make a certain tender available to him or his choice person; and, c) *systemic corruption*, exploiting existing loopholes within the government or private sectors procedures. Corruption perpetrators take advantage of the loopholes to tactfully act dishonestly and without the knowledge of many. This may take place in a situation where the structures do not boldly state that certain actions may create opportunity for this type of corruption. The effects of this type of corruption can take a very long time to manifest (Ibid, p. 45, 49. 51).

The above classifications of corruption are based on the analysis of the scope of act of corruption and the jurisdiction in which it takes place. There is another type of corruption that

stems from the aforementioned ones, political corruption. This form of corruption manifests when any of the foregoing forms of corruption are deployed to manipulate policies, institutions and rules of procedures involved in allocation of resources in a manner that enables and maintains the perpetrator's power and wealth status (Ibid, p. 58).

1.7.3   Causes of Corruption

Much as there are various forms of corruption, there are various causes of corruption. Joustein and Keranen (2009) observe that the primary factors that could trigger corruption include: a) unenforceable rules and regulations, where rules have loopholes that can exploited by in position and power to take advantage of the system failure; b) insufficient income, which becomes a push factor when an individual is unable to meet their basic needs or regular expenditure and is therefore vulnerable to engaging in corrupt acts as a strategy for financial stability; c) scarcity of services that takes place whenever it is difficult to get public services and people turn to paying bribes so as to receive such services or just enjoy preferential treatment; d) low levels of integrity resulting in corruption when appointed officials lack adequate integrity to uphold what is right and firmly oppose whatever is wrong; and, e) an ingrained culture of corruption where there are habitual acts of corruption in government or organization creating an ingrained culture of being corrupt (Joutsen and Keranen, 2009, p. 84, 88, 90).

1.7.4   Political Corruption in Africa

1.7.4.1 Pre-colonial Africa

Munyae and Lesetedi (1999) argue that in pre-colonial Africa, most of public life was founded on ethical values often packaged in spiritual terms, and therefore pursued social justice and compliance. They also argue that rampant corruption is an alien culture in Africa (p. 156).

Igboin (2015) claims that past studies reveal that there are two popular schools of thought about corruption in Africa, namely: Afrocentricism and decolonization. Afrocentricism argues that African societies were corruption free because those in positions of power and authority subscribed to the communal spirit and were also restrained by gods-centered-oaths. The argument here is that the abuse of positions of power and authority for selfish benefit was deterred by the fear of severe punishment from the gods. In addition, shared community values also served as major deterrence from engaging in corruption in the administration of public affairs (p. 147-150).

In support of the decolonizaton theory, Nunn (2008) observes that, since corruption is a universal concept, pre-colonial Africa societies most likely had corrupt practices independent of colonial influence. He argues that African societies' perception of kings and their families as god's representatives on earth insulated the latter from accountability even for glaring corrupt acts. In these native societies, royalty had unlimited power which meant that leaders did not account for the kingdom's resources as they were above the law. In some cases of bizarre abuse of power, a King could forcibly take someone else's wife without there being an avenue for challenge from such wife's previous husband (p. 150).

In another illustration of corrupt domination of pre-colonial society, Nunn references Mansa Kankan Musa, the King of Mali Empire. Nunn documents that on his visit to ancient Egypt, Mansa Kankan Musa donated huge amounts of gold, causing the collapse of the gold market in the region, and also showered his hosts with expensive gifts acquired using community resources. This seeming misuse of communal resources demonstrates the King's lack of differentiation between public and private property, which is an aspect of political corruption. Nunn also narrates that the lavish lifestyle of the King abroad resulted in a serious economic

crisis that forced him to borrow as a cover-up; an act that in modern day is equivalent to money laundering (p. 152).

1.7.4.2   Colonial Africa

Uzochukwu (2005) observes that during the colonial era the indigenous population witnessed colonial administrators and functionaries looting their natural resources and undertaking labor exploitation for repatriation to the mother country. African chiefs and other leaders were rewarded with life-long appointments for their loyalty to the colonial regime. Those that served in the colonial administration abused power and authority; harassed and terrorized indigenous populations and even denied them public services. As a survival strategy in the face colonial brutality, to avoid paying punitive taxes, or even simply to access public services, the indigenous people resorted to bribing the chiefs and kings, a habit that remains to-date (p. 103)

Bennett (2013) observes that to manage sharp class relations differences that had emerged from colonial rule, the colonial bureaucracy created a police force whose purpose was not protection of all citizens and their properties but protection of European elites, collaborators and their properties. The law was not applied equally among the inhabitants of the colonies as the political class made up of White settlers and African collaborators were exempted from transgressions of the law. For instance, some scholars write that *"British Army officers understood that the law was malleable to their definition of necessity"*. Thus, the laws enacted by colonial powers as of necessity legalized the abuse of public office for the benefit of colonizers and their collaborators (p.195).

Njomen (2015) argues that the destruction of Africa's social fabric by the colonial masters paved way for systemic corruption. This manifestation of corruption involves political

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actors manipulating the economic system to create economic leverage for favored actors to secure control of the government. Initially, the colonizers dismantled traditional value systems and standards, and this eliminated the checks and balances that underpinned the indigenous society. The rapid transformation of indigenous society to a colonial society meant the reorganization of the indigenous people's way of life: ideas, values, and beliefs alongside European culture. The colonizers dominated the indigenous population by imposing European religion, institutions, values and ideology as a way of civilizing the indigenous people (p. 56).

The British in colonies like Zimbabwe and Kenya used the tax system to coerce indigenous people into cheap and free labour. For instance, the British tax was paid only in cash and those who lacked cash were forced to work in White settlers' farms and mines for very little pay. This type of labor exploitation was quite important in the primitive accumulation that characterized colonial economy. In this case, it is must noted that the corruption is not the monetary system put up, but the manner in which the system is being manipulated for some people's gain (Ibid, p. 63).

In the struggle for independence from colonialism, Uzochukwu (2005) writes that freedom fighters mobilized the indigenous population's support on the promise that they wanted to take power so as to eliminate corruption in government and recover resources that had been looted by colonial powers. As colonialism came to an end, the newly independent African countries inherited governments and institutions that had internalized a culture of illegal extraction and oppression of masses. During the transition, the collaborators who had been inducted into public service by Europeans, were co-opted by the freedom fighters into independence authority and power (p. 97. 103).

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1.7.4.3   Postcolonial Africa

Uzochukwu further observes that upon independence, these leaders who got into leadership courtesy of mediocre credentials began the institutionalization of mediocrity and abuse of public authority in Africa. They did not institute any meaningful change in the institutions that governed society, and broadly speaking, the behaviour and practices of post-colonial Africa's political class is just an extension of corrupt European's adverse policies and practices of capital extraction. Today the continent of Africa is considered one of the most corrupt regions of the world, and this is considered one of the reasons for stunted development and high poverty levels amongst its populace (p. 114).

In a report, *People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015*, Transparency International (TI) observes that political corruption has caused incapacitating effects on the African continent's economics, politics, social as well as environment (p. 13). African scholar Gyekye acknowledges the existence of multiple forms of corruption but goes on to assert that it is political corruption that is the most entrenched, challenging and debilitating to Africa's development agenda. Gyekye argues, and separately Nyarwath agrees, that political corruption is a moral problem that requires a "moral revolution" for public officials to "avoid involving themselves in acts of political corruption" (Nyarwath, 2002, p. 275-282; Gyekye, 2003, p.407).

Oyobode (2014) attributes the failure to curb corruption in Nigeria to the "hypocrisy" of the nation's ruling class. He argues there is a lack of political will to discourage corruption in Nigeria and in particular points to the apparent tolerance from the ruling class for the misconduct of its members and friends on matters to do with corruption. Further he asserts that various approaches used in anti-corruption including the constitutional, legal and the institutional

framework have not been effective in the country because discouraging corruption takes more than just signing and ratifying documents (p. 19).

In Uganda, Justice John Bosco Katutsi, the head of the Anti-Corruption Court, in a ruling against corruption case is quoted to have said that *"This court is tired of trying tilapias when crocodiles are left swimming"*. Another anti-corruption officer is on record complaining that the anti-corruption war faced a lot hurdles because of *"Untouchables. Come rain, come shine, they're never going to court, not while there's somebody close to them in power. That's because of the politics involved"* (Prosecutor in the Anti-Corruption Court, Uganda, May 21, 2013). Writing on the same country, Human Rights Watch in an article *"Letting the Big Fish Swim"* allege that millions of dollars' worth of funds were diverted from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization in 2006 and from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2005. Despite investigations, none of the high-ranking government officials who managed the implicated offices have faced criminal sanction. They remain in office, untouched, and in some cases only individuals working at the technical level have faced prosecution. Occasionally when government ministers have been forced to resign from office on corruption implications, such resignations have been temporary and they were eventually reappointed to key positions in government, in what one diplomatic representative termed a "game of musical chairs" in the war on corruption (Human Rights Watch, 2016),

Mbaku (1998) observes that besides corruption diverting resources intended for development and provision of public goods, the vice also alters a people's outlook on life. He further theorizes that political corruption also feeds inequality and injustices, erodes rule of law, contributes to conflicts and enables state-capture by organized groups (p. 325).

Transparency International (2016) reported that six out of ten Kenyan citizens consider political corruption pervasive and widespread in government sectors. This indictment is especially worrisome considering that in 2010 Kenya promulgated a robust constitutional order with provisions for institutional and ethical frameworks for fighting corruption. The report goes on to say that the country loses billions of money each year through political corruption. A majority of the citizens perceive corruption to be on the rise, think that their government has failed to fight corruption; and also feel disempowered as regards citizens' action against corruption (p. 45).

The Africa Centre for Open Governance (AFRICOG) (2019) also flags Kenya as being under capture of political corruption cartels citing the country's inability to rein in the vice. In their report titled *"State Capture Inside Kenya's Inability to Fight Corruption"* AFRICOG argue that current anti-corruption efforts will likely fail since state institutions have been repurposed for private profiteering – hence the reference to state capture. As per the report, the current measures that involve publicity-driven prosecutions are more likely to entrench corruption, since indictments and prosecutions will get weaponized to partisan ends and not address fundamental factors that entrenches political corruption.

1.8   Theoretical Framework

This researcher used Antonio Gramci's theory of cultural hegemony to investigate the research objectives and respond to research questions of the study. Cultural hegemony refers to the domination of society via an ideology and the economic and social structures that embody it, touted as being legitimate and just for the benefit of all, including where the structures only benefit the dominant group. The hegemony theory is based on Karl Marx's theoretical concepts of "base" and "superstructure" in analysis of political economy. In his commentary on political

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economy in 1859, Marx wrote that the economic structure of society forms the real foundation of relations in society. According to Marx, the "base" refers to the means and relations of production and encompasses all the people involved in the production process. It accounts for the relationships between different players in the production process, the roles they play and the materials and resources involved in supplying society's wants and needs. It is from the relations of production that emerges the different classes in society.

The power relation between classes encompasses aspects of domination and subordination. Also important in power relation among the classes is the fact that it is from the "base" that the "superstructure" emerges, and the superstructure comprises all other aspects of society, everything not directly to do with production. These include among others: culture, education, art, family, law, ethics, politics, ideology and the state. Considering the fact that the "superstructure" emerges from the "base", the superstructure normally reflects the ideology of the dominant class in the power relations at the base. As a result of the dialectical power relations between antagonistic classes, there is a self-reinforcing relationship between the base and superstructure such that both maintain and shape each other.

Building on Marx's conception of the base and superstructure, Gramsci proposed that the superstructure which emerges from the base has two aspects: (a) the Civil Society that comprises religious institutions, political parties, trade unions, schools and universities, media, and non-governmental organizations; and (b) the Political Society which is the State and its agencies. Gramsci explains that in any given society, the dominant ideology shapes and exerts its influence on civil society and political society through the manufacture of consent from the subordinate class.

According to Gramsci, the goal of domination is achieved by the use of ideological means to exert influence on civil society and political society. The ideology deployed is usually a reflection of the interests and worldview of the ruling class. According to Marxist view, the ruling class consists of those who own and control the means of production and thus are able to dominate and exploit the working class, sometimes referred to as the masses, by using their labour to produce surplus. The accumulation of surplus-value enables the ruling class to accumulate more power and to extend class domination. The domination in turn aids the imposition of their self-serving ideology and the masses are manipulated into conceding the ruling class' interests as "just, legitimate and designed for the benefit of all". In other words, the superstructure developed from the base is used by the governors to cleverly coerce the governed into consenting to whatever political, economic and socio-cultural propositions are demanded by the dominant group in the power relation at the base. This leads to the ruling/political class' ideology, worldview, attitudes and wishes becoming the prevailing perception of reality in society and accepted as normal. What emerges from manufactured consent becomes the framework and organizing principles that then justify the entire social, political, and economic sphere as natural, inevitable, perpetual and beneficial for everyone, rather than as artificial social constructs that benefit only the dominant class. In turn the emergent frameworks and principles once firmly in place then morph into the prevailing hegemony in society.

Gramsci argues that the political class uses the power of hegemony to influence the civil society and thereby effectively managing to manipulate the whole society to serve their sectional interests. It is through the civil society that the political class' interests are imposed on the masses non-violently in what Gramci referred to as the manufacture of consent.

The manufacture of consent by the political class is achieved through dominating social institutions such as education, religion, language, law, media and market. Once the manufacture of consent is achieved and accepted by the masses as "common sense" and as the only sensible way of seeing the world, then the goal of domination by the political class is also achieved. This dominance becomes pivotal in influencing political culture in society.

In some cases, there is spontaneous consent elicited from the masses as a result of what Marx referred to as false consciousness - a perception of reality that obscures a person from perceiving the true nature of reality. In this case, the masses may agree to the political class' wishes as a product of the feel-good attitude of wanting to associate with the political class, because of their dominant position in the sphere of production. The political class sometimes employs coercion to manufacture consent by use of their benefactors in charge of political society to legally bring in line those who do not consent, whether actively or passively.

When the non-violent approach fails or is resisted by the masses, then the political society is always ready to deploy its legitimate force in aid of the political class and their benefactors. In other words, the political class use the power of hegemony to work their wishes through social institutions in order to manufacture consent from the non-political class; and if in any case consent is not achieved, then they deploy the political society, namely, state and its agencies, to step in and force consent.

This research finds Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony useful to tackle the research questions because not only does it describe the activities of the dominant class, in this case the political class, but it also describes the process by which groups come to gain power to lead, acquire more power and maintain it. The Gramscian conception consists of other constitutive theories and concepts such as power, ideology, norms, class struggle, collectivity, group

behavior, imperialism, cooperation, alienation and self-interest which are important to understanding power relations. It also provides an understanding of how the political class influences culture and historical outcomes which in turn determines sociopolitical and economic interactions. Cultural hegemony is also spread through media, trade unions, religious bodies, academia, government, non-government organizations, and influential opinion shapers in the society; all very important agencies in the analysis of the problem of political corruption. Most importantly, the hegemony framework provides a lens through which to critically examine the objectives of this study and respond to the research questions, as well as adopt conclusions and formulate recommendations, to bolster the understanding and management of political corruption in Africa.

1.9   Research Methods

This research is generally internet and library-based research, in which various primary texts are examined. The research makes use of two philosophical methods, that is, critical and logical analysis. The study also used conceptual analysis to examine literature on the research objectives and respond to research questions on the never-ending political corruption in Africa and Kenya in particular. Another method used is philosophical speculation and argumentation to arrive at conclusion, distil findings and make recommendations. Research information was collected from scholarly literature, statute books and case reports, government reports such as Auditor General Publications, non-government reports such as the World Bank's and other agencies', among others, was logically analyzed in respect to research objectives.

CHAPTER TWO

COLONIALISM AS POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter acknowledges historicism as necessary in creating a philosophy to address the legacies of the past. The chapter investigates the historical roots of the emergence of the perception of acutely widespread political corruption on the continent of Africa by going back as far as the continent's shared colonial experience. It analyzes certain pertinent aspects of colonialism from the invasion to the occupation of African territories between late 19th century and mid-20th century.

The chapter adopts a working definition of political corruption and then proceeds to investigate whether the origin of the perception of political corruption emerged as a direct response to colonial rule, which latter imported and superimposed institutional systems with a different ideology on the existing institutional landscape, totally disregarding that the two deeply conflicted with, and contradicted, each other. It also examines the relationships between the perception of political corruption and colonial legacy.

2.1.1 Political Corruption: a Working Definition

The ideas of break away, contamination and perversion appear to underpin the *World Bank*'s definition of political corruption as the "abuse of public office for private gain" (World Bank, 2012) or *Transparency International's* broader definition as "abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International, 2011). The foregoing definitional background, together with Stockdell's conception that political corruption is a dysfunction of a political system that has slowly been reconfigured to serve the interest of private-gain-seeking group(s) of

society at the expense of the public interest (Stockdell, 2016, p.178), guided the use of the term 'political corruption' in this research.

2.2   Political Corruption in Pre-colonial Africa

While it is not conclusively determinable whether corruption existed in pre-colonial Africa, there are historical facts and examples of public conduct that suggest the vice may not have been alien after all. Nunn observes, in an afrocentric view, that for a long time African societies supported a triangular trading system with the Western world where they supplied captured slaves in exchange for manufactured goods. He gives an example of African Muslims who during their pilgrimage to Mecca brought prisoners of war and exchanged them with European slaves captured by the Arabs. Nunn also points out that African Kingdoms were notorious of enslaving members of their own ethnicity and families which must have necessitated abuse of the communal judicial system (Nuun, 2008, p. 139-143). Thus, slavery and slave trade together formed a process of domination, extending ownership relations and forms of exploitation; and in essence political corruption, as those in authority abused entrusted power.

Gyekye adopts a decolonization stance citing that in pre-colonial Africa, it was normal for powerful kings and chiefs to receive gifts such as brides and slaves for personal use as a bribe to influence judgments, even though conventional wisdom required them to reject such corrupt gifts. As much as this kind of exploitation depended on consent through manipulation of the subjects, the rulers also had armies and exercised absolute control over the subjects and whenever necessary the armies were deployed to force cooperation with the establishment. This untrammeled power corrupted leadership and unsurprisingly kings and queens squandered vast amounts of communal resources on wars and luxurious palaces. This kind of conduct in

postcolonial reckoning could be regarded as abuse of public office and for such corrupt acts to have continued to take place without frequent revolts means pre-colonial societies also experienced total domination by the ruling class (Gyekye, 2003, p. 395).

Hrituleac (2011), on the other hand, observes in a dissertation on *The Effects of Colonialism on African Economic Development*, that as much as it is appreciable that pre-colonial societies had some level of political corruption, the problem was not as pervasive as what emerged from the colonial experience. This is because colonialism involved the creation of colonial states which tended to centralize the authority and power necessary for appropriation of resources, imposition of sudden accelerated means of production, exploitation of labor, erosion of traditional social relations and denigration of native knowledge. It is the net effect of all these colonial activities that may have given birth to the present-day virulent and ubiquitous strain of political corruption (p. 41-43).

Gramsci's concept of hegemony, which probes the promulgation and establishment of enduring cultures by one group over others using tools of domination, is efficacious for this study's investigation of how the imperialist establishment of colonial states, economies and social institutions transformed and shaped the future of African societies such that colonialism seemingly remains perpetually dominant.

2.3 Partition, Invasion and Colonization of Africa

By the 16th and 17th century, the Western world had achieved scientific exploits enabling access to strong armies and lethal weapons that excited them into imperialism and the desire to conquer and exploit other places in the world. Besides military power and scientific discoveries, European societies had articulated collective ideologies that inspired them into forming nation-

states. The emerging sense of nationhood fueled a sense of superiority over non-Europeans. Also, following the global suppression of human trafficking and slavery, colonialism presented an attractive alternative economic opportunity. The Europeans saw colonization of Africa as an effective way to access raw materials to support industrialization, guarantee market for their produce and provide profitable investment outlets (Sanderson, 1974, p. 1-54).

It is for these reasons that by the start of the 19th century, Africa experienced relentless European imperialist aggression that included diplomatic pressure and military invasion that weakened and made African societies vulnerable to colonization. Colonialism may be defined as the deliberate extension of a nation's sovereignty over other territories through the establishment, either of settlements or the exploitation of colonies in which native populations are directly ruled, dominated, or exterminated. It also involves imposition of socio-cultural, religious, and linguistic structures on colonized societies. The aim of colonization is to dominate the resources, labor, and markets of the colonial territory (Fanon, 2001, p.27).

During the colonization period, mother countries helped their citizens to form and resource companies for the exploration and conquest of new land, the establishment of an administration system to manage resource extraction, and expropriation. For instance, the *Imperial British East Africa Company* was the administrator of British East Africa, a forerunner of the East Africa Protectorate that later became a country called Kenya. Through such companies, the Europeans exploited the "ignorance" of African societies by cleverly manipulating the latter's leaders to enter into contracts that turned out to be treaties that in essence symbolized Africans signing away their sovereignty to European powers; but which Africans mistakenly saw as symbols for commercial friendship (Sanderson, 1974, p. 23).

Once the colonialist set their eyes on certain land on the continent, they spent a lot of time convincing the targeted African society that the colonizer's presence was good for the community's welfare, yet it was wholly driven by self-interest. As part of their strategy to dominate, the Europeans used their scientific exploits to impress on the native people that the latter were naïve and incompetent while the White race was superior. Colonial powers also exploited inter-tribal conflicts and wars to propose to Africans that they could not rule themselves and therefore could not reach political modernity. Instilling inferiority in the indigenous population was essential to lay the ground for domination of African societies and manufacture consent for their imperialist ideologies (Ibid, p. 27).

Following a series of imperial acts and conquest, the Europeans established a colonial state, with its agencies and colonial economy as the apparatus for colonialism. Just as Gramsci describes in his hegemony theory in relation to the process by which social groups gain power, as part of domination of the indigenous populations, the Europeans sought to redefine the agents of socialization such as family, education, rites of passages and religion. They also established new institutions such as the church, schools, media, and other non-governmental institutions. The state apparatus, economy and social institutions together became robust machinery for the domination, imperial control and exploitation of the colonized African societies. It also forced colonial values, attitudes and beliefs on colonized societies, and thereby provided a cultural direction that was dialectical to what had until then prevailed amongst the indigenous population. According to Gramsci this type of control on society is referred to as cultural hegemony. Cultural hegemony organizes society into 'the leaders' and 'the led'; it also establishes and reproduces cultural ideas, beliefs, attitudes and practices, of the leaders upon, and adopted - whether voluntarily or involuntarily by, the led (Stilwell, 2002, p. 11-15).

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2.3.1 Colonial States and Emergence of Political Class in Colonial Africa

An ideology is a system or form of thinking that underpins people's material practices, conditions of life and the way they think, behave and act. Colonial ideology as a hegemony was based on the cultural hierarchy and alleged supremacy of white race, and therefore, in every colony that was established, the colonial powers automatically assumed responsibility of administration of state and economy as well as social institutions such as schools, churches, and media (Ibid, p. 14).

The domination of these institutions meant that the colonial powers had total control of both the 'political' and 'civil' society aspects of African societies. Political society here refers to the coercive power of state and its apparatus, and the civil society is the social institutions through which the ideology of the dominant group percolates and produces the base's consent to domination. The deployment of a mix of coercion and manufactured consent served an instrumental role of percolating colonial hegemony throughout colonized societies. To manage the "subalternity" - which refers to the resistance to domination – the colonialists recruited workers from among the African collaborators to serve in the auxiliary government and non-government functions. The recruits served in a range of roles such as cooks, messengers, clerks, interpreters and local administrators. As they worked and interacted with Europeans, they were subjected to cultural imperialism that transformed them into Africans in blood and color but European in attitude, opinion and morals (Benett, 2012, p. 189; Luguori, 2015, p.120).

As colonialism entrenched itself, there emerged sharp class structures on the continent whose impact continues to reverberate to date. The classes that emerged were new on the continent as pre-colonial societies were relatively egalitarian without all-encompassing

superstructures and institutions such as the ones that had been established under colonialism. These classes comprised of Europeans as the "upper class", African collaborators as the middle class, and the masses made up of general Africans. The collaboration, loyalty and symbiotic relation between the upper and middle classes as well as their relative position in the control of colonial state, economy and social institutions transformed the two classes into a powerful political class on the continent against whom there ensued a class struggle with the masses (Imhonopi, Urim and Ugochukwu, 2013, p. 107-122).

2.3.2 Political Class and Political Corruption in Colonial Africa

The altering of the social, political and economic relations on the continent by, among others, the introduction of plantation agriculture, factory system, a colonial brand of education, a new religion and cultural shifts, had far reaching ramifications including the emergence of a class structure, alien to Africa. In the emerging hierarchical class structure, the political class, a group comprising of colonialists and collaborators was the most powerful and significant.

According to classical elite theorists, Mosca's theories of *Ruling Class*, Pareto's *Circulation of Elites*, and Michels' *Iron law of Oligarchy,* the political class, also referred to as bourgeois, is a group of people in the society endowed with certain attributes to rule. This group has an all-encompassing influence on society as it is from its membership that the leadership for all important institutions including government, workers union, media, religion, and education, is drawn. In *Politics as a Vocation,* Max Weber describes the political class broadly as individuals who live "for politics" such as politicians and legislators; and those who live "off politics" such as policy makers and bureaucrats. As a group they dominate and control the political, economic

and social spheres based on their group self- interest and are least concerned with common good and society values (Mosca, 1939, p.50-53; Pareto 1935, p. 686-87; Michels, 1966, p.365).

During the colonial era, the political class made up of colonial administrators and African collaborators took advantage of centralized power in the colonies to emerge as the most powerful small group of individuals within the territory. In Marxist framework, this group's ability to politically, economically and militarily dominate the colonies established them as a hegemony. As Gramsci observes, hegemony is a system whereby the dominant class reinforces their domination taking advantage of both "political" and "civil" society apparatus to ensure their worldview, attitudes and practices are accepted as inevitable and natural. Generally, those in power shape the hegemony for any society. However, the idea of hegemony is itself neutral and what emerges in a society as hegemony can be good or bad, positive or negative. Hegemonies that support vices such as corruption in societies are products of negative hegemony. The colonial hegemony was characterized by self-interested groups, pervasive patronage and rent-seeking behaviors which led to the emergence of a virulent strain of political corruption that remains resilient in post-colonial Africa (Imhonopi, Urim and Ugochukwu, 2013, p. 117-119; Luguori, 2015, p.121).

In "Colonialism and Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa", Mulinge, Munyae and Lesetedi argue that the colonial government had 'administrative language' that translated into different normative and cognitive standards of behavior for the colonial administrators and inhabitants of the colonized territories. Colonialists bragged that the indigenous population was inferior and needed civilizing including the establishment of modern political authority and new modes of production. However, the indigenous population only saw colonial apparatus for personal

aggrandizement, instigating ethnic divisions and for subjugating the masses. To them, the colonial government was nothing but a framework for exploiting and expropriating African resources and labor for their mother countries (Mulinge, et al., 1998, p. 15-28).

Tarus points out that the colonial administration's arbitrary conferment of titles to local chiefs and kings and use of propaganda to incite different indigenous ethnic groups as part of divide and rule tactics, was a corruption that planted seeds of ethnic animosity among indigenous populations and its effect is felt to date. It also affected the indigenous population's perception of leadership in "modern political authority". The absence of due process for appointments in the colonial state and its institutions and the rampant award of public appointments to social misfits, debased people's perception of public leadership. Cases abound where collaborators were gifted with Western education, missionary work and economic favors and this type of patronage socialized the indigenous population into the perception that government was an avenue for personal gain, which view persists to-date (Tarus, 2004, p. 129).

As a strategy to maintain the loyalty of collaborators, the colonialists segregated a percentage of the tax collected under the colonial tax system as commission paid to the collaborating chiefs and kings. The commission was meant to motivate chiefs and kings to collect more taxes and by extension to use their public office to amass wealth as a demonstration that it paid to cooperate with the colonial hegemony. The wealth and influence that came with these corrupt opportunities served to enhance their hegemonic power. As this corrupt culture became modus operandi in public affairs, it encouraged the formation of corruption cartels in state institutions, patronage and the emergence of rent-seeking behavior in government, which carried over in succeeding governments (Tarus, 2004, p. 125; Mazrui, 2008, p. 47).

Johnson observes that the political class turned the colonial state and its apparatus into a brutal antagonistic platform for forcefully extracting obedience from the indigenous populations – a form of Gramscian manufactured consent. To assert their dominance, the colonialists used the "state's legitimate tools of violence" to suppress revolt and to coerce cooperation and consent to colonial rule. In various cases, the suppression of resistance involved killing of rebels by lynching, hanging, or sometime maiming of able native men to demonstrate colonial power (Johnson, 2014, 138-141). During this period, the policing services did not exist to provide security to all but existed fundamentally to protect colonial agents and their respective properties as well as coerce cooperation whenever necessary. For this reason, it is not inconceivable that colonial activities alienated indigenous people from state and government, with the former viewing the bureaucratic structure as a painful intrusion into their lives. All state institutions were apparatus for domination and exploitation, including the judiciary. The judicial courts and the law were not applied equally, as the political class and its benefactors, were exempted from transgressions of the law. The whole enterprise of colonialism involved gross human rights violation that had far reaching historical ramifications on the continent (Ibid, p.139, 143).

In the Congo, by the end of Belgian reign, King Leopold and his men had made a fortune from pillaging local resources while the Congolese population was decimated by almost 50 percent in less than two decades. The indigenous population was reduced through executions and sometimes deaths in resistance battles. This brutality psychologically affected the indigenous populations on large scale. More so, it socialized the postcolonial leaders into a culture of deploying state power for private gain and acts of impunity; and notions of brutal suppression of subaltern groups or forces that dared to challenge the bourgeois hegemony – these were now seemingly accepted as the norm for political leadership.

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In *Corruption in Africa,* Nduku and Tenamwenye observe that as colonialism came to an end, postcolonial leaders who had internalized the colonial ideology, logic and culture of illegal extraction ascended to state power saw it as their "turn to eat". This sabotaged real transition from the corrupt governance that had characterized colonial governments to a real government of "the people, by the people, for the people". Following independence, the collaborators who were part of the colonial political class clung to the freedom fighters and through clever manipulation recruited and socialized them into adopting abuse of power and authority. This explains the foundations for the disregard for accountability and transparency in public affairs management that has characterized post-independence governments (Nduku and Tenamwenye, 2014, p. 124).

Conclusion

This chapter adopted a working definition of political corruption as being the abuse of entrusted power for private gain as a result of a dysfunction within the political system such that private interest is exalted over public interest.

The chapter highlights that while there may have been corrupt acts in pre-colonial Africa, the relatively egalitarian African societies with a barter trade economy lacked essential factors for political corruption such as centralized power and monetary economy. There was low proclivity to corruption because pre-colonial societies did not have sharp class differences and instead had a group identity that was analogous to communal aspirations. Also, pre-colonial societies were largely characterized by religious and communal attitudes, beliefs and practices which discouraged primordial accumulations of material wealth.

The imperialist centralization of power and the imposition of a colonial administration both in the political and civil societies across the continent, led to a sharp Marxist class

stratification and saw the emergence of a powerful political class that controls and dominates the rest of society for its own self-interest. This political class was comprised of colonial administrators and their indigenous counterparts who had interacted and internalized the colonial extractivism ideology, attitudes and beliefs towards reality. Through Gramscian lens, it is apparent that during the colonial period the political class deployed a cultural hegemony by taking over various social institutions, adopting an administrative language and manufacturing consent by manipulation and coercion as necessary. Institutions were captured into facilitating the political group's selfish interests to the exclusion of the masses.

The political class worked on normalization of economic inequalities in African societies through clever ideological propositions. The colonial hegemony camouflaged the economic basis of people's lives and convinced indigenous population that the status quo was inevitable. The excesses of the colonial hegemony entrenched a virulent form of political corruption as public office was transformed into an avenue for the advancement and protection of individual and group self-interest to the detriment of public good. In fact, if political corruption is abuse of office for illegitimate gain, then colonialism was a perfection of political corruption. The independence regime and its successors inherited the colonial state, and the colonial social and economic structures, and did not bother to reform the institutions. It appears we continue to be colonized once we have been colonized; nature of colonization creates a state of perpetuity and therefore, in postcolonial Africa, colonial hegemony remains intact.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL CLASS AS AGENTS OF NORMALIZATION OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

3.1   Introduction

In chapter two, the study focused on the connection between the perception of political corruption in Africa and the continent's colonial experience. It related the embedding of the vice in African societies with the establishment of colonial states and economy and the role of the bourgeois class that emerged in the colonial era. It was concluded that the emergence of a political class with a superiority attitude, that is economically exploitative, politically aggressive and socially domineering is one of the legacies of colonialism. Therefore, in this chapter, the study reviews the characteristics and effect of such emergent political class and how it continues to shape the present and future norms for African societies, especially African countries.

This chapter assesses the political class' extent of influence on 'who gets what, why and when', as well as the continued role of the political class in the sustenance of anomalies that arise in the allocation of resources and values. The political class derives its overbearing influence from the existence of stratification in society, and from its own place within the socioeconomic strata. From a Marxist philosophy, stratification is a system by which individuals in society are categorized into classes with similar stature, common share of comparable levels of power, wealth and social status; and ranks them in a hierarchy.

The membership of the political class is largely drawn from the upper-stratum. This class shares social and economic interests that conflict with others in society and it promotes the group's welfare through political organization and interest-representation. In this regard, this

chapter examines the political class that emerged in postcolonial Africa, its effect on the national norms on the continent, particularly with regard to political corruption.

3.2   The Evolution of Political Class and Political Corruption in Africa

3.2.1   Political Class in Pre-colonial and Colonial Africa

Per Marxist analysis, the political class is a group of people in the society endowed with certain attributes to dominate and rule, either by force or consent. In order to keep hierarchies of dominance, the dominant class comprising of a "minority" has to convince the dominated class comprising of the "majority" that their condition is natural and normal.

Some prominent Africans (Senghor, 1964 and Nyerere, 1968) in their books observe that pre-colonial Africa was classless and egalitarian; but this proposition is challenged as implausible as differentiation and grouping is a product of human attributes which are a historical constant in society. Njoku observes that the development of social classes in Africa dates back to the pre-colonial era when African institutions operated on the basis of loyalty, land ownership, subjugation of the weak tribes and superiority of the strong and powerful tribes. For instance, the ruling groups and middlemen who engaged in trade accumulated the wealth and social status necessary to expand or strengthen their traditional authority. However, it is African societies' contact with the Europeans through trade in slaves, minerals and other commodities and later through colonialism that sharply transformed and consolidated the social class system on the continent (Njoku, 2005, p. 99-116).

Nunn defines colonialism as the practice of domination and subjugation of one people by another and involving political control over a defined territory for the economic benefit of the colonizing power and its auxiliaries. Such political control involved: the institution of colonial

administrations that became the bedrock for stratification based on racial distinction, the possession of certain technical and administrative skills, the appropriation of central political power, the deployment of a factory system, the imposition of a new religion and enforced cultural shift (Nunn, 2003, p. 16-23).

How did the colonialists, a minority, manage to assert and retain control over majority in African societies? To impose colonial state and colonial domination on African societies, colonialists recruited and armed local militias as well as used material inducement to systematically compel African chiefs, kings and other influential persons to collaborate. They also reassigned traditional chiefs' administrative responsibilities and tapped on any collaborator who had acquired colonial education, religion and mannerism to help in rhetorical acts which inculcated the colonial ideology. They used self-serving ideologies to justify acts of domination, deny the obvious subjugation and reframe violations as necessary and even desirable (Mazrui, 2008, p. 36-50).

The colonial state apparatus became instrumental in class formation, and accordingly, the classes that emerged in colonial Africa included: a) an upper class that included European colonizers and was mostly in charge of government and economy in the colonies; b) a middle class composed of African collaborators that worked for the upper class, managing their business and economic interests, referred to as white-collar workers; and, c) the lower class composed of blue-collar workers, artisans, and crafts-related workers, mostly unskilled and semi-skilled laborers. This sharp class structure of the upper class, the middle class, and the lower class that emerged, became representative of the work and social relations in many African countries.

As a result of the reciprocal relationship between upper class and middle class, and the nature of an all-encompassing colonial system of reproduction of class relations in all aspects of society, a political class emerged as a 'hegemon' in colonial societies (Ibid, p. 41, 43, 47).

In Marxist framework, the ruling minority in society use their position of control to rig systems of resource allocation to ensure that the ruling class either as individuals or as a collectivity benefit more. In the colonial capitalist mode of production, this meant that society was segmented such that the dominant class generated profit out of the labor of the rest. The antagonistic classes in colonial Africa were (a) the capital-holding and investing bourgeoisie; and (b) the landless and resource-less working class or proletariat. In this bourgeoisie mode of production, the bourgeois political class emerged as instrumental in securing systems of political and economic power to achieve the goals of colonialism even as they personally benefited from their pivotal positions. It is this abuse of public authority that heralded the widespread perception of political corruption in Africa.

3.2.2 Political Corruption in Colonial Africa

Colonial rule in Africa was about domination and exploitation of the physical, human and economic resources on the continent to benefit the colonizing nation. In the extraction of resources, the colonialists used coercive measures, including forced labor, punitive taxation and violence that had horrible ramifications on the continent. In the case of forced labor in the construction of roads and railway line, colonizers rationalized their corrupt acts as important input towards nation-building, but natives interpreted it as abuse of power. To force cooperation with the colonial rule, the colonialists established legal systems and courts that served to subjugate the masses and prop the bourgeois political class as the dominant class in

society. Colonial authorities appointed judges that would mostly exert moral and intellectual leadership through making high-impact decisions in matters such as the state's legitimate use of power. The net effect of institutional violence on indigenous population was to create subservience and acceptance of underlying imperialist notions as 'common sense' (Dahrendorf, 1968, p.76; Green, 2011, p. 394).

Khan infers that this meant that the state and its apparatuses were in the chokehold grip of the European-dominated bourgeois political class; so that they could control overarching colonial systems of political and economic powers to secure colonial goals even as they personally benefitted from their positions. The deliberateness that was deployed to control the dialectical relationship between the base and the superstructure underscores that institutions matter. The establishment of the colonial state was such that the state was the bourgeois political class and the bourgeois political class was the state (Khan, 2016, np).

Nuun observes that it is from the unrivalled control of state and economy that the political class amassed all the necessary power and influence to blur the demarcation between private and public properties, thereby making public resources vulnerable to the self-interest of the bourgeois political class. Those in authority and power used their positions to avail to themselves personal benefits through bribery, extortion, dishonest duty or blatant theft of public resources. For instance, it was not uncommon for Africans in the colonial public service rising to miraculous wealth, power and influence courtesy of various acts in the execution of their public duties. Also, the state did not extend protection of property rights to indigenous people. This tacitly allowed forceful evictions of the indigenous by the ruling class as well as unfettered acts of appropriation of individual and community properties, either for self-gain or to benefit the colonizing country (Mamdani, 1996, p.153; Nuun, 2003, p.27).

The political class also made sure that the economy set up in Africa had policies that favored the political class' economic dominance. For instance, the Europeans introduced a money-based economy to replace the traditional barter system. The cash system favored colonialists since they had familiarity with its workings and also enjoyed preferential treatment from financial institutions. Also, the monopsonistic character of colonial trade implied a reduction in prices to producers far below competitive market prices. In addition, introduction of coercive institutions such as compulsory cultivation and various forms of forced labor in European plantations allowed the colonizers to enjoy huge profits. Further beneficiaries in these predatory policies were the middle class, composed largely of Africans who had adopted the essential values of the colonial ideology and the will to share in the material benefits of colonial plunder (Gareth, 2010, p. 11-32).

In Gramscian manner, the Europeans admitted indigenous people into the ruling class as a strategy for weakening subaltern group reprisals to subjugation. While these collaborators enjoyed token admission to political class, they internalized colonial ideology and logic and worked ruthlessly to ensure that the 'apartheid' colonial system was fully operational. Despite the cooptation into colonial hegemony, new subaltern groups kept emerging to challenge the status quo. Opposition to the establishment attracted the deployment of colonial state tools of violence, the military and police, to force obedience and subservience of the indigenous populations. Thus, the colonial bourgeois hegemony was supremely established by force and maintained by the state's coercive methods. The brutal violence that was visited on the masses created disillusionment and cynicism towards the emergent state. The disenchantment was also extended to the economy and effectively alienated the masses from their country's production process. All these worked together to escalate class differences. Above all, colonial hegemony

became a site of class struggle as subaltern groups and indigenous populations that felt exploited and subjugated found means and occasions to put up protracted resistance that finally brought an end to European colonialism (Green, 2011, p. 389).

3.2.3 Political Corruption: Acts of Omission and Commission in Postcolonial Africa

There was no meaningful transition following the collapse of colonial rule in Africa. There were not then, and do not seem to be now, any real shifts in regime – rather the existence of a quasi-regime. This is because the subaltern groups were made up of Freedom Fighters that largely comprised individuals who 'resisted what they admired': wealth, power and influence. Therefore, the postcolonial political classes that emerged across the continent were not interested in reforming the colonial states, economies and other institutions; and that meant the colonial hegemonic order remained intact (Mazrui, 2008, p. 48).

In the early post-independence days, the political class established itself as a custodian of the state and its agencies. Consequently, there were no reforms of these institutions. In particular, the political class formed a cartel web around the presidency that had quickly emerged as the most dominant institution in the new nations. Per Gramscian analysis, the institution of the presidency had a far-reaching influence that extended across the political and civil society. This meant that by controlling the presidency and its auxiliaries, the postcolonial political class effectively captured the state and turned the institution into an infrastructure for fleecing the commonwealth and manufacturing legitimacy in a similar manner to their colonial predecessors (Dahrendorf, 1968, p.80).

As a consequence of the capture of public institutions, postcolonial elites used their proximity to power to dominate societies and access the material influence necessary for the

political patronage to continue 'colonial hegemony'. Over six decades after gaining independence, it appears most African states still conform to the original purpose for which they were established - a 'corporate entity for the benefit of its shareholders' and exclusion of third parties. The sole difference now is that the proceeds from the 'entity' end up in the pockets of postcolonial elites rather than the colonial nations, to the continued exclusion of the masses. Just like pre-independence colonial administrations, postcolonial elites manage African states for their own benefit (Kempe 2015, p. 87).

The acts of corruption commonly reported in the media or sometimes just whispered, can no longer be perceived as occasional but as systemic, widespread and rampant. He goes on to claim that the nature of political corruption in Africa is fast becoming normal behavior and honest public service, the exception. Kempe's articulation on the perception of corruption in Africa resonates with the Gramscian theory of hegemony, where the ruling classes are postulated as dominant groups with overwhelming influence and ability to forge countervailing norms in society (Ibid, p. 93).

The correlation between the political class and political corruption appears to have a long history. In the early nineteenth century, Bentham expressed a critical view of the political class, alongside those who do their bidding in government, as being culpable for the abuse of government and bureaucratic power for individual gains. In spite of robust legal and institutional frameworks to mitigate political corruption in African governments, the perception of political corruption among citizens remains high (Bentham, 1827, p. 139). It appears the most fundamental challenge to fighting corruption is that a majority of those in government are deeply involved in the vice. According to anticorruption initiatives at the *World Bank* and *Transparency International*, right from the top to the lowest rank, government officers are basically focused on

how to use their official position to gain illicit advantage of whatever form to the overall detriment of the state and the economic system. It would appear that the powerful individuals who benefit from the prevailing corrupt systems would not allow its dismantling, and would rather deploy all possible tactics, their power and their influence to stop such changes from happening (World Bank, 1997; Transparency International, 2018).

In some cases, the tactics involved included successive 'regimes' establishing commissions of inquiry into major corruption scandals, staging arrests and prosecution of corruption perpetrators and hosting anticorruption conferences so as to hoodwink the rest of population that something is being done. Such charades create what in Gramsci's philosophy is referred to as *false consciousness* that inhibits the masses from recognizing and rejecting their oppression. It also demonstration that dominant groups have an invisible power, pervasive hegemony, that reproduces class relations and conceals contradictions. In reality of African nations, the hegemony expressing itself as patronage is used to impair law, policy and institutions so as to give unmerited, ethnically, nepotically or politically influenced appointments to mobilize political support. In this case the behavior of the masses fits the analogy of accepting crumbs that fall off the table or indeed handed out to make them keep them quiet rather than claiming a rightful place at the table (Mouffe, 1979, p.186; Transparency International, 2018).

Thongori (2007) observes that various approaches used in the anti-corruption war, including the constitutional, legal and the institutional framework, have not been effective in many African countries because fighting corruption takes more than just signing and ratifying documents. It is time anticorruption strategies and tactics accounted for the role played by political elites in sabotaging the war on corruption. As a result of their all-encompassing

influence in society, the political class use their power, influence and wealth to make a mockery of all constitutional and institutional anticorruption frameworks (Thongori, 2007, p. 87-93).

In particular, the political class' control of the superstructure ensures that they control the framing of laws against corruption, ensuring camaraderie with those in charge of social institutions such as media and religious institutions; and if that does not get them off the hook, then deploying bribery or forces of coercion over those in charge of the relevant institutions. The ruling elements flout constitutional mechanisms supposed to guard against the misuse of power, respect of due process, and to guarantee equal protection against the tyranny, even of the minority (Okech, Kibwana and Wanjala, 1996, p. 32-92; Thongori, 2007, p. 92).

In Nigeria, Mbah, Nwangwu and Ugwu (2019) blame the failure to curb corruption in the country on the ruling class. The ruling class enjoys hegemonic influence on the politics, economics and morality of society and this influence is diffused as the ruling class dominates even private organizations, such as the church, trade unions, and schools. Mbah, et al., also decries that the tolerance exhibited by the ruling class for the misconduct of its members and the double standards when it comes to sanctioning their own in matters to do with public morality, demonstrates the existence of classes with conflicting interests (Mbah, et al., 2019, np).

Kaufmann observes that the personal interest of politicians renders the efforts in the fight against political corruption ineffective. He points out that the ruling class often prefers to tackle the symptoms of corruption and provide "quick fixes" for political gain. For instance, when ministers have been forced to resign from office, such resignations have been temporary and they were eventually reappointed to other key positions in government, in what one diplomat termed as a "game of musical chairs". It is rather obvious that the political class rarely show enthusiasm

towards fixing the underlying causes of political corruption and react to revelation of corruption scandals as normal occurrences (Kaufmann, 1998, p. 63).

Liedong argues that in Africa, leadership is not taken seriously, especially in respect to integrity and competence and which then allows individuals of questionable character to manage state affairs. The consequence is the obliteration of the distinction between public and private funds (Liedong, 2017, p. 123). Moyo and Onsongo, separately observe that the prevalence and difficulties in undermining political corruption in Zimbabwe and Kenya respectively is chiefly a lack of political will that is displayed by politicians' behavior and actions that seem to normalize the vice. The idea of political will can be understood as the obligation of actors to undertake certain actions to achieve certain goals, in this case, implementation of anti-corruption policies and programs. It appears the aspect of obligation is a fundamental precondition for any success in the resistance against political corruption (Moyo, 2014, p.38; Onsongo, 2014, p. 87).

3.3 Normalizing Aspects of Political Corruption in Africa

The definition of political corruption as abuse of public office for personal gain implies an act of deviation by an individual from the laid-out parameters or social values that are relatively accepted in society. This conception of political corruption as purely acts of individuals, is narrow and limiting as it ignores the fact that while a vice may be pursued by an individual, the same individuals will often adopt a collectivist defense strategy and tactics to leverage the higher group survival. Also, human behavior in politics is such that politics is partly about self-interest, and also about joining with the others to pursue a collective goal that ultimately secures individual interest. In Africa, the extended family places significant pressure on individuals, especially those in public service, forcing them to engage in corrupt and nepotic

practices. This may explain why bureaucrats exploit their public positions to generate benefits for themselves, their families, and their ethnic group (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, p. 176; World Bank, 2012; Kempe, 2015, p. 85).

In *The Social Conquest of Earth*, Wilson argues that human morality is a product of group selection and therefore involves multi-level selection through intra-group and inter-group competition. For instance, within the team, individual interests are often pitted against each other, and when the same team faces another, they act differently as now they have no choice but to cooperate against common odds. Thus, the concept of political class implies a feeling of common cause with others in the same position, as opposed to the non-political class. Also, for this reason, in pursuit of their cause, the political class may foster either good ideals in the society or widespread cynicism about virtues (Wilson, 2012, p. 127, 129, 131).

In this vein, Barnette argues that the behavior of the political class of a country can make all the difference between fostering a flourishing society or not. It follows that the political class is responsible for creating public confidence or lack of it in the political system through their demonstration of integrity and a commitment to the public good. This is because political classes covertly or overtly influence culture of a given society, and when that culture becomes pervasive it transforms into a dominant hegemony in society. The political class that emerged in postcolonial Africa retained colonial hegemony which metastasized a new strain of political corruption in the continent. Thus, political corruption is embedded in the institutions of African countries including constitutional and legal frameworks such that the vice is more or less normalized. From Gramscian analysis, three hegemonic self-reinforcing processes, namely, rationalization, institutionalization and socialization that normalize cultural hegemony, similarly

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underlie the normalization of political corruption in Africa (Barnett, 2006, p. 3, 19, 20; Kempe, 2015, p. 85).

3.3.1   Rationalization of Political Corruption

The idea of rationalization is concerned with maximization of one's own best self-interest and ignores altruism and self-sacrifice. It is a self-defence mechanism that individuals or groups involved in corruption use to shield themselves from psychological damage. It involves justifying one's own actions, and the explanation advanced normally disregards morals and what is right. For instance, it turns out that those who engage in acts of corruption also think that stealing public resources is morally wrong and that is why they engage in reframing their unethical actions. In *Illegal but not Criminal,* Conklin argues that individuals involved in pilferage of public funds refuse the label of 'corrupt' because they find such labels to be pejorative, undesirable and adversarial to their social identity (Conklin, 1977, p. 35; Gannett and Rector, 2015, p. 165-175).).

A study on deviant behaviour (Sykes and Matza, 1957, p. 664 – 670) proposes that there are various techniques of rationalization for deviant acts. The complementary nature of the techniques makes them very useful in understanding how corruption perpetrators produce a rationalizing ideology for their unethical acts. The rationalizing techniques include: a) denial of victim, where the corrupt person paints the act of corruption as a form of justifiable revenge, especially in the case where there is a claim of "others" who have committed similar acts; b) denial of responsibility, where the offender argues that they are not directly responsible for the loss of public resources; c) appeal to higher loyalty, where the offender chooses to incorporate others into victimhood by playing upon some social ties between the offender and the larger

grouping - for example the ethnicisation of the war against corruption where perpetrators then claim that their ethnic community has been unduly targeted; and d) applying sanitizing nomenclature to describe the corrupt act, such as saying the person has "hit a jackpot", which hides the shame of the irregular source of money or wealth.

The complementarity of the techniques allows corrupt persons to deny that anyone was harmed by their corrupt act even as they appeal to higher loyalty such as claiming the 'unethical' action was necessary for the interest of tribe. This defense mechanism explains the controversial behavior in a seemingly logical manner even though the explanation avoids facts of the matter and is simply designed to make the situation tolerable. Rationalization process is especially useful for those engaging in corruption for the first time because they need to justify the act to themselves (Ibid, p. 667).

In *"Why "Good" Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices"*, Gellerman observes that corruption is likely to occur where an individual has a perceived need, an opportunity and a way to rationalize the unethical action. Gellerman outlines web of rationalizing ideologies as follows: a) corruption perpetrator capitalizing on legal loopholes to make public claims that the offender acted within the law and has therefore not committed any crime by participating in the allegedly corrupt act; b) the corruption suspect resorting to "condemning the condemnor" for example disparaging the law for being vague or being weak based on perceived gaps and vilifying the enforcer of such law as being ostensibly motivated by another agenda such as political witch-hunt; and c) the person accused of corruption denying that anyone has actually been harmed or injured as a result of the alleged act of corruption and therefore claiming that the absence of a victim or injury negates the existence of a crime (Gellerman, 1986, p. 85-90).

In a neo-Marxist perspective, hegemony is a form of intellectual and moral rationalization process characteristic of a dominant group and it enables the group to socially construct rationalizing ideologies which mutually echo and serve to transform actions from self-serving fictions into social facts. This study postulates that the rationalizing ideologies and strategies provide a psychological defense mechanism for individuals in the political class to engage in political corruption while perceiving themselves as virtuous or "honorable" members of society (Dylan, 2011, p.30).

3.3.2 Institutionalization of Political Corruption

Marx and Gramsci contend that various political, legal and cultural structures in society serve to spread the values, beliefs and vested interests of the ruling class, thereby making them hegemonic structures. Through these structures, the political class' story and ideology is manoeuvred to push for cooperation with the ruling hegemon. Also, the structures serve to exercise control over a people and to manufacture cooperation and consent to their own domination, while the institutions help to maintain the status quo (Dylan, 2011, p. 17).

Institutionalization of political corruption takes place when the initial acts of corruption get embedded in the structures and processes, thereby making corrupt actions routinized. For such action to take place, the actors work on the altering of values to serve the political class' self-interest. Then as acts of corruption become systemic and planned, as opposed to sporadic, this transforms bureaucracy into an infrastructure for patronage (Dwivendi, 1967, p. 62-71; Zucker, 1977, p.37).

In other words, as a hegemonic process, institutionalization involves certain personal acts that trigger the initially non-organized acts to morph into organized or patterned sets of group

behavior reflecting shared values, norms, and rules. And in situations where institutionalization has taken place, acts of corruption become part of daily activities such that the perpetrator may not notice the inappropriateness of their behavior. That means corrupt actions should be viewed as a slippery slope where initial corrupt practices diffuse across structures and also previous regimes acts of corruption become institutionalized in successive regimes (Zucker, 1977, p.43).

According to the hegemony theory, leadership is an important aspect in institutionalization of corruption, not only as a signaling force but also as a role model for others in the group. At organizational level, apart from leadership signaling 'acceptable and condemnable' behavior, the hierarchical nature of structures in public institutions may act as insulators of those in high level positions from blame and thereby encourage corruption (Dwivendi, 1967, p. 69). On the other hand, at societal level the leadership may be responsible for subordinates not following administrative regulations or the ethical framework governing institutions, and thereby, creating a permissive climate for corruption. Also, subordinates may assume that past high-level decisions or acts were based on 'rational' reasons and therefore, are appropriate for use in future. In the event that re-enacted corrupt acts are successful then even stronger precedents are set for the future (Zucker, 1977, p.51).

Another aspect of institutionalizing of political corruption from Dwivendi's and Zucker's separate perspectives has to do with culture, more specifically, political culture and behavior. Political culture is important because it lays out set attitudes, norms, values and beliefs, underlying the assumptions and rules that govern behavior of actors in a political system. In any society, it is the dominant group's ideas, beliefs and values that tend to characterize the culture that underpins individual's behavior. Consequently, when the dominant group engages in persistent corrupt practices, corruption becomes a worldview that is embedded in the ongoing

processes of public institutions and then corrupt practices become tolerated in ways that neutralize the stigma of the vice (Dwivendi, 1967, p. 65; Zucker, 1977, p. 42).

Dwivendi and Zucker also postulate over certain aspects of hegemony when they argue that the prevalence of corrupt practices routinizes and turns the vice into a habit that is embedded in political class consciousness, thereby blunting their awareness of political corruption as a moral issue. The vice comes to be seen as normative, to be adapted to and acted on mindlessly. This kind of culture may also lead to situations where corruption is valorized and perpetrators create linkages that yoke different corrupt actors into a cartel-like relationship of interdependent processes. As a result, the political class is induced to voluntarily engage in corrupt deals as long as there is no formidable threat from subaltern groups. Thus, the process of institutionalization adapts and embeds corruption practices in public institutions such that corruption survives the turnover of successive generations of political class. The adaptation results in mindless corrupt acts performed easily and without giving significant consideration to the effects and consequences (Dwivendi 1967, p. 68; Zucker, 1977, p. 41).

3.3.3   Socialization of Political Corruption

Dylan observes that socialization is a process where individuals cross-pollinate values, beliefs and ideologies that they have come to embody, to others, thereby affording a shared character that allows them to function effectively as a group. Socialization is an effective process for getting new comers into leadership or political class to buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon. This process takes place as individuals interact with others and learn behavioral norms required to fit into a certain group. It is a lifelong process through which individuals learn about social expectations, develop personalities and human potential, and also learn about their society and culture (Dylan, 2011, p.19).

Marxists claim that for elite groups, class socialization bequeaths to individuals norms, values and traits of their class; and the behavior that an individual develops is based on the social class one belongs to. Through the socialization process and dynamics, social influence plays a pivotal role in inculcating into a subaltern groups corrupt values, beliefs, motives, and techniques necessary to reduce the threat of counter-hegemony. The process of hegemonic socialization involves what Ugal, Obi and Aniah describe as three self-reinforcing phases of social influence that could be useful in describing how subaltern groups are made receptive to political corruption, and these phases are: a) social cocoon, b) cooptation and c) incrementalism.

In socializing subaltern groups into political corruption, the trio claim that the political class starts by creating a psychological social cocoon where: a) veteran corrupt individuals glamorize corrupt behavior to entice newcomers into easy acceptance; b) once seduced by the glamorous life of corrupt individuals, newcomers are encouraged to interact and establish bonds with the said veterans; c) these interactions create a platform for bombarding newcomers with targeted propaganda that removes moral contradictions; d) newcomers that display revulsion to corruption are frowned upon as naive; and e) and newcomers maybe punished for being hesitant or attempting to backslide into non-corrupt behavior (Ugal., et al, 2009, p. 45- 63).

Ugal., et al, (2009, p. 51, 58,) also observe that socialization process involves cooptation, where newcomers are further enticed with rewards of "lucrative commissions" to skew their attitudes and perception towards corruption. The inducement of rewards works subtly on individuals to assuage their conscience in such a manner that those being inducted do not realize that they hurtling down the slippery slope of corruption. In addition, Ugal, et al., propose that socialization undergoes incrementalism, which involves the escalation of one's commitment to engaging in political corruption through ever expanding innocuous decisions and harmless

actions that together lead to depths of corruption that a newcomer would not have attempted had they known from the outset. The incrementalism approach holds that, initially one engages in relatively harmless actions that continue to accumulate slowly until it tips the scale and puts an individual in a compromised state where they find it difficult to unlearn corruption. In some cases, fear of negative consequences such as being cut-out, ostracism or demotion may also force an individual to prove themselves as a productive workforce member in the corruption enterprise (Ibid, p. 51, 56, 62).

Conclusion

From Gramscian analysis, it is notable that the political class is highly organized and is endowed with the capacity and ability to take control of state, economy and all important structures in the society such as media, religion, education, businesses, and workers unions; and use them to acquire, increase or maintain power and influence in society. The political class uses their influence to inculcate their ideologies into the laws, policies and institutions of the society and this helps in establishing hegemony. Within Marxist analysis, this influence creates a situation where nothing in society is sacred nor beyond self-interest of individuals or group's conversion into gain or patronage accessory. For instance, political class' pervasive influence enables the political class to cut illegal deals with those entrusted with handling significant public resources; to create corruption cartels for siphoning resources and to build networks for shielding themselves from severe sanctions by existing legal and institutional mechanisms.

Subaltern groups' resistance to colonial rule in Africa rested in part on a criticism of the colonial state and its institutions. However, they chose to retain colonial institutions after the end of colonial rule. These institutions were instrumental in entrenching colonial hegemony, in pilfering African resources, and in colonial control and repression that led to a long history of

conflict with the indigenous populations. This study proposes that it is this abuse of centralized public institutions that heralded a heightened perception of political corruption in Africa. The fact that freedom battles were fought at least in part to get rid of the institutions, laws, policies and ideologies of the colonial state, but that they persist is a sign of failure to transition. The failure to transition means that colonial hegemony that was embedded in colonial structures that straddled across African societies remain intact and this explains the persistent perception of political corruption.

The failure to transition at the end of colonial rule suggests that the subaltern groups made up of freedom fighters fought against what they admired in colonial state, and therefore, as they assumed a hegemon position, they assumed it was their 'turn to eat'. Colonial collaborators who had been socialized and had internalized colonial logic offered their expertise in managing "independent governments" as civil servants. The partnership between freedom fighters and formerly collaborators led to the emergence of a postcolonial political class beholden to a colonial hegemony of using state institutions to serve class interests. In essence, postcolonial political class and bureaucrats in African nations are merely an extension of the colonial hegemony that served to entrench the interests of a few while oppressing the majority. It is no wonder that past African presidents and their successive 'regimes', just like former colonial masters, have been accused of leaving behind corruption legacies.

In spite of a majority of African countries boasting of robust constitutional, legal and institutional frameworks for regulating public service conduct, the perception of political corruption on the continent remains high. This study suggests that political corruption remains embedded in the postcolonial state structures such that it is perpetuated as normal. The postcolonial political classes continue to deploy three mutually self-reinforcing hegemonic

process to subvert the anticorruption mechanisms on the continent and thereby normalize political corruption. These hegemonic processes include *rationalization*, where corruption perpetrators develop self-serving ideologies to justify and perhaps even glorify corrupt acts; *institutionalization*, where an initial corrupt acts become embedded in the state structures and processes becoming part of routine in service delivery; and *socialization*, where newcomers into political class are imparted with self-serving bias and norms that fortify group-think and also induces them to view political corruption as permissible and desirable. These three mutually self-reinforcing hegemonic processes remain a part of the entrenchment and persistence of political corruption across African countries in spite of 'regime and leadership' turnover.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A KENYAN CASE STUDY

4.1 Introduction

This study chose Kenya as a case study of normalization of political corruption in Africa because the country shares similarities in population growth, poverty, inequalities, ethnic diversity, governance and even colonial legacy with most African countries. The study investigated political corruption in Kenya through different 'regimes' from colonial era to postcolonial period.

In the previous two chapters, this study attempted to investigate the connection between persistent acts of political corruption and shared colonial legacies across the African continent. From investigation it is suggested that the postcolonial leadership that emerged after colonial era comprised subaltern groups, 'freedom fighters', that admired colonial hegemonic power and African collaborators that had been socialized into and had internalized colonial ideologies. The subalterns and collaborators morphed into a postcolonial political class and inherited bourgeois colonial hegemony that put them in control of the overarching systems of economic and political power on the continent. They continue to collectively act as a class in pursuit of their own self-interest that is in conflict with others in society, and to use their key positions in the statecraft to personally benefit. The apparent capture of state institutions for their private gain suggests that the postcolonial political classes on the continent continue to act as the colonialists, and to some extent even expanding the plunder of resources and oppression of fellow Africans. In addition, this study proposes that political corruption has been normalized and entrenched in society

through three mutually self-reinforcing hegemonic processes, namely, institutionalization, rationalization and socialization.

4.1.1 Political Corruption during the Colonial Kenya

Colonization of Kenya by the British started at the end of the 19th century and lasted until its independence in 1963. Wanyande and Okebe observe that like other places, colonialism in Kenya was primarily about political and cultural domination as well as economic exploitation of the colonized area to the benefit of the colonizing nation. Towards fulfillment of their goal, colonizers established a centralized governance structure and demanded abolition of decentralized indigenous structures. Apart from setting up the colonial state and economy, they also established a parliament and a court system that operated on colonial ideology, policies and laws. Besides, they also introduced colonial religion, education, and media among others, which were instrumental in the entrenchment of colonial hegemony. Some of the sweeping colonial policies with far reaching ramifications included introduction of commercial agriculture that sucked indigenous populations into indentured labor and also abruptly replaced barter trade with alien cash economic system with accompanying finance institutions (Wanyande and Okebe, 2009, p. 49-64).

The net effect of the establishment of colonial administration and the implementation of a raft of colonial policies and laws, abruptly transformed indigenous African societies into capitalist societies underpinned by colonial values, attitudes, norms and beliefs.

Neo-Marxist ideology as set out by Antonio Gramsci conceptualizes capitalist society as comprised of a "base" and "superstructure". The "base" comprises the economic foundations of a given society, including the relations between all of the people involved in the production and

resources involved in producing the things needed by society. The "superstructure" refers to all other aspects of society, including culture, ideology, norms and expectations, identities that people inhabit, social institutions (such as education, religion, media, family), the political structure, and the state as the political apparatus that governs society. To ensure total colonial domination and subjugation of the indigenous population and maximum annexation of African land and exploitation resources, the British made sure they controlled both the "base" and "superstructure" of the Kenyan society (Marx, 1970, p. 20-21).

Some of the immediate effects of colonialism included transformation of the formally quasi-egalitarian society into a class society with sharp contradictions within a short period. The colonial state and its modus operandi became a platform for polarization and class struggle that pitted the rulers and ruled against each other; the economy created the "haves" and "have nots" and ultimately antithetical classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat emerged in Kenya.

The British colonialists as the dominant group (bourgeoisie class) controlled both the "base" and "superstructures" so as to create favourable conditions for a firm colonial hegemony.

However, in the nature of colonialism and its dynamics, there was another group of individuals subsisting off the bourgeoisie class (Shivji, 1975, p. 145). It was a type of petty-bourgeoisie that comprised Kenyans who had undergone ideological indoctrination qualifying them to be junior civil servants, teachers and clerical workers. Those who were in these positions became the "middle class" and stood above the peasant-workers due to their leveraging the cash economy to produce for more than just subsistence, acquiring more land and even employing the peasant-workers. This middle class were the functionaries in the base and superstructure conception of capitalist economy.

The third class was the proletariat, the majority poor, the peasant-workers, who possessed no property and survived on selling their labor for wages (Tarus, 2004, p.30).

The colonialists' ability to effectively control the "base" and "superstructure" established a hegemony that institutionalized a pattern of class relations in society and concurrently superimposed the scheme into a dominant symbolic framework that reigned as 'common sense'. Sklar observes that in their effort to manufacture consent to colonial hegemony, the British embarked on massive scale of ideological indoctrination through colonial education and religion as well as broadcast of media propaganda glorifying their mission to civilize barbaric native Kenyan societies. However, where their 'civilization mission' was met with resistance or challenged by subaltern groups, the British responded with violence and coercion of genocidal proportions to force compliance with colonial hegemony. The combination of manufactured consent and coercive compliance enabled the British to establish total domination and subjugation of the native Kenyans and also opened up the native land for exploitation of natural resources for their own benefit and that of mother country (Sklar, 1979, p. 531-552).

Neo-Marxist theorists observe that hegemonic order always requires continued creation of an enabling space whereby potential allies and even antagonistic elements are gradually co-opted into the institutions of the state and economy. It is against this background that those who collaborated with colonialists were made functionaries in the colonial state and economy in Kenya. For example, British hegemony established the Chief's Act which rewarded collaborating Kenyans with chieftaincy appointments to exercise vast powers over their fellow Kenyans in the name of maintaining law and order, but in effect used the powers for personal enrichment and colonial propagation. According to Sklar this cooptation started class relations in

Africa that are not determined by the control of the means of production, but by relations of power, that persist to date (Ibid, p. 538).

The early reports of political corruption involved chiefs abusing their mandate and position. The complaints against the chiefs included claims of grabbing land from peasants, leading a reign of terror on fellow Africans to force compliance with colonial hegemony, and other cases involved widows paying chiefs bribes in order to be exempted from paying taxes. The complaints against government functionaries' abuse of position and authority kept growing, and by 1955, the perception of corruption at the Nairobi City Council had started threatening the British hegemony and this forced colonial government to set up the *Rose Commission* which established that bribery, among other abuses of office, was rampant at the Council. In 1956, Kenya's first anti-corruption legislation was adopted in the form of the Prevention of Corruption Act which mandated the punishment for acts of bribery involving holders of public office. However, there was not much compliance with this legislation (McCann, 2010, p. 465-482).

Impatience with the continued abuse of office by government functionaries and the general reaction to domination and oppression gradually fomented an ever-growing resistance to British hegemony. The resistance came through civil society formations such as trade unions and ethnic associations (e.g. Kavirondo Welfare Association) and some nascent regional political parties (e.g. Kenya African Union). Such resistance is what Gramscian analysis referred to as subalternity − an antithetical reaction to hegemonic power with the intention of taking over the system. The subaltern groups agitated for values such as inclusiveness and fairness in the economy and management of state affairs. As the agitation escalated, the British colonial hegemony reacted by unleashing genocidal "government terror" to demand compliance with the status quo − a form of manufactured consent procured by coercion. Other techniques deployed

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included propping up of select political formations (e.g. Kenya African Democratic Union) and increased co-option of the subalterns (Wanyande and Okebe, 2009, p. 52-58).

Laitin observes that the colonialists' efforts to coerce cooperation from the native Kenyans with colonial hegemony forced them to engage in desperate actions. For instance, in Kenya, the colonial hegemon stoked ethnic divisions among the natives and incited racial animosity between natives and Asians, all in an attempt to forestall and foil any counter-hegemony narratives. However, the mobilization of the subalterns was immense and on reaching this realization, the British colonial hegemony was forced into a negotiated settlement for independence of Kenya that left the status quo intact and protected the colonial political class and hegemony functionaries from sanctions for their repressive acts of omission or commission.

In essence, independence was nothing but the removal of white colonialists and replacing them with black colonizers who also aspired to power for self-interest (Laitin, 1985, p. 312). During the early days of the postcolonial 'regime' those who had collaborated with British hegemony and internalized colonial ideology and values used the opportunity to induct by rationalisation ideologies, and to incrementally socialize formerly subaltern groups (Freedom Fighters) into the modus operandi of the colonial state and its agencies. Thus, instead of Kenya transitioning from the colonial era to independence, the country was left in a state of colonial perpetuity.

4.1.2 Political Corruption in Kenya's Inaugural Post-independence Regime (1963-1978)

Gramsci's theory of hegemony and domination is useful to understanding the postcolonial development challenges facing Kenya, such as the widespread and persistent corruption. While the predominant view is that the independence of Kenya was as a result of a subalterns' revolt

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against British hegemony and domination, it is instructive to note that in reality there was only a 'semblance' of transition where all infrastructure and accompanying hegemony that animated the colonial state and economy remained in place, to-date (Hornsby, 2013, p. 219-242).

It had been hoped by the masses that a new political dispensation was going to be the beginning of a fresh conception of state institutions and an attendant economy for the welfare of all. Hornsby observes that the revolt against British bourgeoisie and their sympathizers gave birth to a new African nation called Kenya, but this position is simplistic as the subaltern struggle only produced a new leadership that was self-interested and continued to preside over the colonial ills they had previously castigated (Ibid, p. 224).

Since Independence, Kenya has had four semblances of different regimes, it has enacted numerous laws in an attempt to rein-in the spread of political corruption and recently also promulgated a constitution that many hoped would reduce the perception of political corruption in government. However, the corruption vice persists in its complex manifestations and continues to threaten the nation. A critical examination of the 'transition' from colonial rule to postcolonial era in Kenya shows that hegemony and domination in the colonial era is linked, and extended, to the post-colonial era (Kempe, 2015, p. 187).

Maloba (2010) observes that the ruling class that emerged at independence was drawn from subaltern groups that wanted to take over hegemonic order and collaborators who had fraternized with and admired the colonialists' way of managing public affairs. Like their predecessors, the emergent postcolonial political class was also a greedy lot that turned to using their public position and power to loot public resources and accumulate wealth. The political class used their wealth to fortify their social status, and public position to expand political patronage, in the society by controlling appointment to public offices and using public money to

buy political support. This type of abuse of office was rationalized and institutionalized as necessary and in accordance with the expected and normal actions of any public officer. Following perception of increased political corruption involving the independence regime, their emerged some resistance from subalterns. This jolted the independence regime into a reactionary strengthening of hierarchical administrative structures, gifting rivals with public resources in order to co-opt them and in situations where the regime's legitimacy was seriously threatened they resorted to use of lethal force to maintain authoritarian order (Maloba, 2010, p. 185-190).

In a Marxist framework, the independence leadership can be seen to have made sure they were in control of the "base" and "superstructure" as well as the prevailing equivalent of the Gramscian civil and political society. The control of these aspects of society ensured that the ruling class was in charge of all important institutions in society. All public institutions including Judiciary, Parliament and Executive remained under some influence of corruption cartels. This enabled the independence ruling class to manipulate public institutions toward their self-interest, and operate in the knowledge that laws and regulations could be side-stepped, ignored or even tailored to fit their whims. However, after some time, in the face of claims of rampant political corruption, the independence leadership started facing subaltern revolt from amongst its membership and some of the government functionaries. In reaction to the resistance, the independence government set up what was referred to as the Ndegwa Commission (Kenya, 1971).

In an attempt to expand the prevailing hegemony, the Ndegwa commission recommended expansion of the independence civil service and also permitted civil servants to supplement their wages with private business. Maloba observes that part of such expansion involved meritorious recruitment and promotion of lower rank to middle rank, but largely, the top government jobs

remained under influence of patronage, where filling up of vacancies depended on a presidential vote of confidence or favor from the president's confidantes. This led to corruption cartels capturing the presidency in order to use their proximity to power to subvert the constitutional institutions whilst maintaining the outward forms of those institutions. Through the years, this abuse of the presidency has enabled some people to enter the political class through patronage and ensure their descendants remain in power through successive regimes (Maloba, 2010, p. 187, 189).

The state-sanctioned participation of civil servants' in the private sector amounted to the legalization and legitimization of private-public interest conflict – a clear demonstration of the hegemonic forces at play to create the perception that the ruling class' interests were just and legitimate for the benefit of all. This emboldened the abuse of public office in such a way that public goods could easily be converted to private property, and those in public service prioritized their private businesses over public service. Some of the political corruption scandals included rampant poaching of elephant ivory, and coffee smuggling to Uganda. There was also embezzlement of resources meant for fertilizer and cashew nut factories and fraud in a tender to construct the national airport. In all these scandals, no criminal charges were made against perpetrators and those who dared to speak out against government ills easily found themselves in trouble with the state (Wrong, 2009, p. 175; Maloba, 2010, p. 185).

The capture of state institutions by the political class for private gain took place contrary to the official government policy, namely *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya commonly referred to as Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965,* that aspired among others to mutual responsibility, human dignity, political equality and social justice (Kenya, 1965). Increasingly, the ruling class' and government functionaries' personal interests got intertwined

with public interest and as 'wealth and politics became intertwined, it became difficult to separate private and public purposes'. The situation was exacerbated when some politicians and civil servants took advantage of the Africanization policy to demand something from their clients in return for their patronage. This type of exchanges in government services resulted in the emergence of patron-client networks in public service delivery. This meant that previous bribery became protection money of sorts and as public office holders competed for wealth acquisition, public interest was sacrificed (Williams, 1987, p.73).

As the subaltern forces interested in challenging the status quo grew, a culture of intolerance to criticism, brutal repression and political assassinations emerged in the independence regime as the officially sanctioned order of managing dissent – the ruling class manufacturing consent by coercion. The assassination of political leaders like Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya and J.M Kariuki provide apt examples of the criminality of the regime. The cruelty of the regime as demonstrated with assassinations is in line with Gramsci's conception of the way hegemony secures itself through coercion whenever cooptation techniques such as bribery fail (Hornsby, 2013, p. 234). During the independence regime, the civil society in Kenya was then only in its infancy. It entailed largely voluntary self-help groups that focused on development projects rather than political activism. The hegemony also took advantage to create false consciousness among tribes and stirring ethnic antagonism which crippled emergence of a formidable civil society. The media at the time was largely a government-controlled network and private media enterprises were still at a nascent stage. The absence of political consciousness in the civil society meant hegemony did not face imminent threat from that frontier and therefore its focus was consolidation of the political society. The academia and some student unions tried

to fill the watchdog role of civil society but the hegemon responded with lethal force to force compliance (Wrong, 2009, p. 180; Maloba, 2010, p. 189)

In the sunset days of the independence regime, it was clear that those the colonial hegemonic forces that underpin political corruption had transitioned into independence leadership to become an ongoing, collective undertaking in postcolonial Kenya. The persistence of incidences of corrupt acts and reactions of corruption perpetrators as they justified their actions continued the institutionalization and rationalization of corruption. The compromising of, escalation of corrupt acts, and cooptation of the subaltern continued the socialization of corruption. The three self-reinforcing hegemonic processes, of rationalization, socialization and institutionalization in government ensured continued normalization of political corruption across successive generations.

4.1.3   Political Corruption in Kenya's Second Regime (1978-2002)

As the second post-independence regime came into power, there was an expectation that the new leadership might bring about some changes but this view was misplaced. For those who were in doubt it was the declaration by the new president that he will follow the footsteps of previous 'regime' that made everything clear. Apart from the fact that the new president was part of the political class that had internalized colonial ideology; he had also deputized the presidency in the preceding 'corrupt regime' and also inherited a government with deeply embedded corrupt practices and entrenched private interests across the institutions (Wrong, 2010, p. 173).

In the nature of hegemony suffering its own internal contradictions, as the new leadership took power there emerged some jostling designed to eliminate those viewed as elements disloyal to the "new hegemony". The jostling led to the pushing out of deemed influential political

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leaders drawn mostly from the previous regime as well as an emerging propertied class courtesy of dubious power relations activities. These excluded elements coalesced into a subaltern group that would morph into an opposition leadership that embarked on lobbying for the reintroduction of multi-party politics. However, such opposition that emerged was largely oriented around ethnically defined political groupings that engaged in shifty opportunistic alliances in the quest to capture power for political patronage (Fowler, 2008, p. 58; Maloba, 2010, p. 186).

While the opposition remained weak because of its ethnic antagonism, the regime was careful to continue managing the stability of the prevailing hegemony by co-opting antagonistic and in other cases deploying lethal force to coerce compliance with the status quo. Following a failed subalterns' attempted 1982 coup, the hegemonic order fearing for its stability, moved into a massive constitutional amendment that overnight turned Kenya into a de jure one-party state. As the regime continue to feel threatened from counter-forces, it waged full hegemonic war destroying all possible centers of alternative power; crippled parliament to a mere rubberstamping institution; and went on to amend the constitution so as to centralize all political power and fortify the presidency into an organ of total domination and subjugation. All other vital state institutions including the armed forces, security services, public service and strategic public enterprises were populated by individuals from the then president's region or by compliant servicemen. This led to power being monopolized and centralized in an individual and hence consolidation of what is referred to as personal rule. This was reminiscent of the colonial hegemony move to consolidate all power, reward faithful collaborators and stamp out all opposition (Fowler, 2008, p. 71; Maloba, 2010, p.192).

The personal rule was reinforced by the entrenched patron-client political system. Haugerudi, observes that during the second regime, the ruling class and government

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functionaries competed to give money to public causes associated with the president as a demonstration of loyalty. To raise money for these kinds of activities led to an increase in the misappropriation of public resources. These were days that heralded the phenomenon of the "overnight millionaire" in the country. The hegemony was keen on compromising any formidable elements in the subaltern group and this led to increased socialization in corruption. The patronage pyramids also included distributing personal favors, such as assistance in securing government employment, loans, licenses, and land; and/or constituency improvement projects like roads and schools construction (Haugerudi, 1995, p. 61-71).

To keep the hegemony strong, the regime deployed coercion tactics of harassing opponents. For instance, through the NGO Act of 1990 non-government activities were proscribed, pro-regime Lawyers were sponsored to destabilize Law Society of Kenya activities, some organizations such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority was reconstituted into regime friendly Nyayo Tea Zones by governmental fiat. The regime compromised the leadership of social movements such as the Coalition of Trade Unions and Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (women movement) and then co-opted the organizations as appendages of the regime. Freedom of expression was restricted, and media operations especially via television was also largely controlled by the regime through state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation and private-media licensing bottlenecks. Religious groups especially the Anglican and Catholic Church attempted to provide an alternative platform for resistance and this was met by a brutal reaction from the regime as well as a divide and rule approach to split church antagonism. Towards this goal, the regime infiltrated the church movement by co-opting some competing church establishments such as the African Inland Church and the Legio Maria, and these became counter-church voice (Blaney and Pasha, 1993, p. 45, Fowler, 2008, p. 64).

In *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa,* Macharia describes a phenomenon of state capture in what appears to similarly be a description of hegemony. He describes state capture as an extreme manifestation of a political system where the state is regarded as private property belonging to a section of people. State capture is achieved when top figures of the ruling class usurp and monopolize all state functions resulting in a self-interested consolidation of power. In state capture, law enforcement and rule-of-law institutions such as the police, the judiciary, and anti-corruption prosecution agencies are weaponized against counter-forces. Everything is done to hinder political change and accountability through periodic elections either by compromising election managers or deploying violent intimidation on political opponents. Also, in state capture there is a countervailing of civil society and media, as institutions are compromised to advance the state capture agenda. The totality of all these becomes an enabling institution for the political class to dole out economic favors to one another and that becomes their motivation for engaging in politics (Macharia, 1995, p. 162-180).

According to *The Shadow of Kenyan Democracy: Widespread Expectations of Widespread Corruption,* the author Burbidge argues that there are four preconditions to successful state capture which is another way to conceptualize hegemonic chokehold. Firstly, the compromise of oversight institutions such as the offices of Controller of Budget, the Auditor General, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and parliamentary committees in Kenya. Secondly, the weakening and weaponization of law enforcement and rule of law institutions such as the police, the judiciary, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and the prosecution agencies. Thirdly, hindering political change and accountability through periodic elections either by compromised election managers or violent intimidation of political opponents.

Fourthly, stifling the space for countervailing such as civil society and media or their compromise and redeployment for state capture agenda (Burbidge, 2015, pg 35).

After 24 years of reign, as the second regime faced stiff challenge from subaltern groups, the then technocrats working in government leveraged their position to help the politicians they owed allegiance, even as they helped themselves with government largesse. That is how the politicians' then working in cahoots with the technocrats misappropriated public resources, property and grabbed expansive land for themselves.

The second regime had a fair share of grand corruption scandals. For instance, the construction of the Turkwel Hydroelectic Power Station between 1986 and 1991 is said to have been completed at thrice the estimated cost yet producing below capacity; and between 1992 and 1993 up to KShs 79 billion was lost in the Goldenberg scandal that involved subsidized gold exportation. All these mega corruption scandals took place in spite of the existence of a legislative framework for combating corruption. By 1993, in reaction to the subaltern groups' pressure, the second regime set up a police anti-corruption squad ostensibly to spearhead the fight against corruption. Astonishingly, the same government had very recently removed the security of tenure of some critical collaborative offices being those of the Attorney General and the Controller and Auditor General by Act no. 14 of 1986, and that of the Judges and Public Service Commission via Act no. 50 of 1988. The establishment of the anticorruption police squad was a follow up to a 1991 parliamentary amendment that sort to introduce stiffer penalties in the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1956. However, the police squad was disbanded by 1995 as the institution may have been at variance with the rational course for a self-interested political class (Fowler, 2008, p. 63; Mbate, 2018, p. 321).

After some time, in another reaction to political pressure from subalterns, a further amendment was made to the Prevention of Corruption Act in 1997 to establish the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority; but the authority was also disbanded in 2000 as it may have been in conflict with institutionalized 'privileges' of the ruling class. A last-ditch attempt was made by establishing the Anti-Corruption Police Unit, as the hegemonic order sought to ward off subaltern groups' assault that painted the regime as corrupt (Mbate, 2018, p. 257).

4.1.4 Political Corruption in Kenya's Third Regime (2002-2013)

In Laitin's work, hegemony is conceived in two aspects, where it: a) points to the significance of a subaltern agency in the construction of hegemonic formations, and, b) emphasizes the element of consent over coercion. To bring an end to the second regime, subaltern groups had to wage a relentless struggle to gain any substantial political rights to challenge the hegemonic order as well as to maneuver consent of the governed and bourgeois hegemony (Laitin, 1985, p.67).

In 2002, the end of the second regime's over two decades reign ushered in a third 'regime' that had been dubbed as "Kenya's Second Liberation" from neocolonialism. Like the freedom resistance against colonialists, the third regime rode to power on the promise that it was going to change hegemonic order and also slay the dragon of political corruption that had characterized public and private sectors since the colonial regime. As the "new hegemony" took reins of power they pretended to be serious on bringing 'real transition', they enacted an Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act No. 3 of 2003 establishing the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) and also enacted the Public Officer Ethics Act No. 4 of 2003 to guide public servants' behavior in the line of duty. However, after two years into their reign, it became

clear that perhaps good intentions do not really matter, only incentives and outcomes do. The regime settled into a "business as usual" mode and reports of scandal after scandal started emerging. The high approval rating of the hegemony that saw Kenya then ranked the most optimistic nation in the world, slumped to disenchantment and despair (Owiny, 2009, p. 24-26).

Murunga and Nasongo observe that one of the reasons for the turn of events can be blamed on the "dynamics of rational self-interest on the part of the new political elite". By the time third regime took the reins of power, the bureaucratization of government systems had been made worse by the logic that social order and welfare depended on an almost monarchical president and corruption-laden government structures and processes. The situation of state capture had led to equating order and stability, to hierarchical bureaucracies, and therefore, a decision taken by juniors was always seen as susceptible to instant reversal by senior most officials as custodian elements of hegemony (Murunga and Nasongo, 2006, p. 1-28).

In a highly centralized government, officers are by-passed and favors sought from more powerful officials at the centre of power. In this kind of environment if corruption becomes prevalent and entrenched, it becomes very difficult to reform government structures so as to undermine the vice. These kinds of actions not only institutionalize corruption but also turn personal behaviours into impersonal norms and idiosyncratic acts become shared procedures. Moreover, increasingly casual practice of corruption continues to degrade the ethical climate of the government institution. In short, these actions of senior officers and reactions of their juniors become hegemonic forces of socializing, rationalizing and institutionalizing corrupt acts (Ibid, p. 16, 18, 21).

This corruption-permissive climate ravaged most institutions, including the judiciary, parliament, and the public service, as they were all subservient to the captured presidency. The

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president enjoyed enormous power, he appointed the high court judges and all senior public servants, and also had power to dissolve parliament, as well as control the national budget. This extensive presidential power was a holdover of colonial hegemony as little had changed since independence. In the usual behavior of subaltern groups that have managed to dislodge a previous hegemonic order, the third regime reneged on the promise to reform government institutions as well as changing the constitutional order, and hence government businesses remained as usual (Mbate, 2018, p. 301).

As the third regime settled into routinized acts of corruption in an environment that showed leniency and low frequency of formal sanctioning, more and more hegemonic actors realized corruption does pay and took to exploring opportunities for corruption scandals. As the perception of corruption in government continued to grow, the emerging subaltern groups saw an opportunity for waging an antagonistic war on the regime. The custodians of hegemonic order responded by providing self-serving accounts to neutralize the countervailing accusations of unethical behaviour. The hegemony also decided to bureaucratize the anti-corruption war, including by the ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). All these were clever designs to absolve the political class of personal commitment to anti-corruption as the war on corruption was technically "surrendered" to experts that could then be, and were, frustrated quietly. In cases where certain corruption scandals truly threatened the hegemony, for instance, in a situation where an audit report uncovered massive corruption, those involved in the investigations were compromised and co-opted into the corruption cartel. In some cases, fear was induced by coercion and the threat of negative consequences such as personal harm, social ostracism and professional demotion (Ibid, p. 238).

Reminiscent of the previous regimes, and in order to strengthen hegemonic order, certain elites emerged comprising individuals largely drawn from the president's ethnic group that resorted to vicious coercion to fight back against the growing subalterns activities. They infiltrated all government bureaucracies; took charge of lucrative government jobs and benefits from government tenders in education, military, and roads; and from that they marshaled enough resources for political patronage. This meant, the country remained stuck in the grip of a ruling class in pursuit of social and material interests using predatory state bureaucracy (Murunga and Nasongo, 2006, p. 20; Mbate, 2018, p. 336)

As the subaltern forces challenged the hegemonic order, polarization became visible everywhere – and internal contradiction in the political class was real. New alignments emerged, made up of both state and non-state actors. The shaken hegemony took to enacting anticorruption laws to demonstrate some form of commitment to the anti-corruption war, but the subaltern groups continued to mobilize a counter-force and the frustrated masses saw through the hegemony's actions as too-late-in-the-day public relations. Some of the laws that were enacted in this period included the Public Procurement and Disposal Act adopted in 2005, followed by the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2009 and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act in 2010. However, even with these many laws political corruption continued to be reported, since the hegemonic order lacked political will to follow through the intentions of the enacted laws (Murunga and Nasongo, 2006, p. 18-20).

The major scandals of the third regime included the *Anglo-Leasing scandal* that involved expenditure of billions of shillings in non-competitive tendering in relation to the procurement of passport equipment; which secured huge kickbacks for confidantes of the president. The local chapter of Transparency International and one of the government agencies, the Kenya National

Commission on Human Rights, also accused the regime of spending 12 million dollars on personal use vehicles for senior government officials, for selling Grand Regency Hotel below market value and for securing kickbacks for some elites. The corruption expose rattled the hegemony which led to further deployment of atrocious coercive tools that saw an increase in incidences of extrajudicial killings and shrinking human rights space, civil society and media freedoms (Puchala, 2005, p.575; Mbate, 2018, p. 321).

The hegemonic control started weakening resulting into a heterogeneous political domain with powerful subaltern groups and formidable civil society groups mobilizing numerous resistance movements. The strength of the subaltern groups, backed by disenchanted masses led to a further split of the bourgeois hegemony, creating a sub-class within the political class as the incumbents fought to stay in power and those in opposition fought to overthrow the hegemonic order (Puchala, 2005, p. 580). Through enticement of rewards, the hegemony managed to co-opt some of the churches, civil society groups and media into spreading hegemonic narratives and propaganda meant to secure the status quo. However, subaltern pressure was overwhelming and therefore to secure second term, the hegemony had to fiddle with presidential polls so as to lock out the subaltern group from overthrowing the hegemony. The aftermath was chaotic and resulted in post-election violence that lasted several months. The tussle for control of hegemonic order led hundreds of lives were lost, billions-worth of property damaged, and mass displacement of citizens. Those in power asserted their dominance by unleashing state tools of coercion and subdued the subalterns' claim to overthrow the hegemony through persuasion of the masses. As is characteristic of hegemonic rule, always ready to accommodate powerful subalterns as a self-preservative strategy that scuttles antagonisms, the post-election violence

came to an end following a negotiated political pact between the hegemony and the subaltern groups, which ensured the continuation of hegemonic order (Mbate, 2018, p. 333).

Puchala observes that hegemony is dynamic as it is continually modified, renewed, defended and recreated. The ruling class hegemony is not just a passive form of dominance as it always faces challenges and resistance from the opposition. Notably, where the ruling class' survival is threatened by agitation for reforms, the ruling classes will quickly device ways of capturing the force of change and re-directing it in such a way as to avert a revolution. In this way, when the third regime's hegemonic order and its subaltern groups realized that the demand for constitutional and government reform threatened the survival of the status quo, they quickly closed ranks and took charge of delivering a new social contract, "The Constitution of Kenya, 2010" (Puchala, 2005, p. 579-583).

4.1.5   Political Corruption in the Incumbent Regime (2013-2019)

The current regime came to power in the wake of Kenya's promulgation of *The Constitution of Kenya, 2010*. The Constitution has been cited as a robust and progressive social contract. It has constitutional provisions aimed at strengthening governance, enhancing democracy and the rule of law, and promoting transparency and accountability in leadership. There are also elaborate provisions on separation of power between the organs of government, the comprehensive Bill of Rights and a devolved system of governance. Most importantly, Chapter Six of the constitution provides a strong framework for improving integrity in leadership as well as articles establishing an independent ethics and anti-corruption commission to arrest the spread of corruption in the country. Chapter Six lays out the principles for the conduct of State officers including the Presidency, members of the Cabinet, Judicial officers, Members of

Parliament and Commissions, as well as members of the devolved government. The Constitution also establishes and insulates the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions from political interference. An Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission was also established pursuant to Article 79 of the Constitution (Kempe, 2018, p. 493-512). Promulgation of the Constitution and the enactment of all these laws, implied an aspiration for new hegemonic order. It is however not apparent whether the political class was ready.

In *Bringing the Future in Kenya: Beyond the 2010 Constitution,* Kempe observes that in spite of the new constitutional dispensation and numerous legislations reenacted, a revamped judicial system and the institution of anti-corruption agencies such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and Auditor General's office, corruption remains rampant and virulent, and the country's leadership from top to bottom is anemic of any form of moral accountability. Indeed, the judicial system remains captive to the dominant powers and the country's general political machinery and structures remain captive to the service of corrupt political elites regardless of counter-opinion. The current hegemony is intolerant and easily triggered to coercive retaliation to any criticism about the immorality of runaway political corruption (Kempe, 2015, p. 91, 95).

As a matter of fact, the circumstance under which the current regime ascended to power is demonstrative of the agency of hegemony in elevating and preserving the ruling class' interests at all cost. Given the magnitude of the international criminal charges the incumbents faced at the Hague-based International Criminal Court, it flew in the face of Chapter Six of Constitution of Kenya to permit their consideration, let alone, clearance to run for the highest political office (Kempe, 2015, p. 88). Thus, it is the trappings of power, based on their place in the hegemonic order that facilitated an evasion and dilution of the constitutional provisions on

leadership integrity, by citing a simplistic application of the principle of innocence until proven guilty.

In an article, "Gramsci Reconsidered: Hegemony in Global Law", Buckel and Andreas argue that law can be understood as a strategy for organizing hegemony in and through the state so as to produce consent among the dominated classes, as well as organizing the administration of force to preserve the status quo. In this case, it is instructive to note that the role of judges in Kenya's criminal courts in countervailing the rule-of-law presents them as 'technicians of repression' in the bureaucratic machinery of the state; and therefore, the judicial decision-making process as a player in producing intra-class consensus and at the same time inter-class consent for the dominant social order (Buckel and Andreas, 2011, p. 67).

In modern societies, the judicial system presides over the decision of moral standing by identifying and deciding upon the conflicts in society. However, the laisses-faire judicial response to crimes involving the ruling class in Kenya definitely reeks of impunity and serves to emboldens the ruling class' dominance and subordination activities. Besides flouting constitutional provisions in the run up to elections, in a manner reminiscent of Macharia's conception of state capture in *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa,* the presidential incumbents are accused of having secured their ascendancy to power in what was suspected to be high level electoral manipulation in cahoots with rogue electoral officials and the establishment (Macharia, 1995, p. 170).

Kempe argues that political corruption persists in Kenya primarily because there are people in power who benefit from it and the existing governance institutions such as the anti-corruption commission lack both the will and capacity to stop them from doing so. This view partly reflects reality, but a more robust diagnosis of the persistence of political corruption in

Kenya must endeavor to account for how hegemony evolved through a continuous process of interactions between dominant and subordinate groups. The failure of 'regime after regime' to address political corruption decisively seems linked to how some subaltern groups are always incorporated into the hegemonic state to maintain status quo. This creates a permissive ethical climate that incubates more and more corrupt acts involving high level politicians as well as an entire ruling class (Kempe, 2018, p. 499, 515).

The relative stability of the current status quo continues to demonstrate that corruption pays, as those who find the "opportunity" siphon funds from the public treasury, and from state corporations, in preparation for future political competitions. It is no wonder that the current regime is accused of manipulating the last general elections so as to generate the necessary numbers to totally monopolize and centralize power, co-opting the Opposition, emasculating parliament and reducing citizens' representation and watchdog institutions into tools for the monolithic power of the executive. All this is evocative of the castigated shortcomings of the preceding regimes and additionally demonstrative of transitions in Kenya simply comprising hegemony as a contested process in which subaltern groups attempt to dislodge hegemonic order so as to have a turn at enjoying institutionalized privileges (Kempe, 2014, p. 497; Macharia, 1995, p. 150).

The failure of successive post-independence 'regimes' to rescue the Kenyan state from the capture of a kleptocratic political class continues to undermine development; and transforms state bureaucracy into a parasite that extracts resources from society, not for purposes of development but for the benefit of elites. In this kind of situation, what is touted as development is but a whimsical distribution of national resources under the framework of political patronage. In *Political Corruption in Africa*, Williams argues that the political elites' vested interests have

resulted in major discrepancy between national public policies and their implementation. In most cases, elites advance public policies that afford them political patronage to their constituents and that cement consent to their 'god father' status. This kind of haphazard policy-making and implementation results in unplanned resource distribution of natural resources and also provides easy resources for plunder. Another way patronage has been used to strengthen hegemony is that appointments to the civil service and state corporations are not based on ability, merit or competence but on the loyalty to the head of the executive and the occupant's desire to dispense favors and patronage. These together with a heavily politicized civil service become conduits for corruption cartels (Williams, 1987, p. 25-38).

In an attempt to deflate subaltern groups' assault on the hegemony, the state instituted a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to look into complaints of historical injustices in the country. In 2013, TJRC presented the current president with a report containing recommendations on how to address the anomalies in the statecraft. Slye and Tutu observe that the TJRC report's findings painted corruption as a moral crime against the majority in the margins of politics and assigned culpability on 'big names' in the political elite group. The report's recommendations for the investigation and appropriate criminal action against perpetrators of grand corruption remains shelved because it implicates the prevailing hegemony as well as some powerful actors in the subaltern groups. Another, Lanegran, points out that in reaction to the report's indictment of the political elite for crimes against citizens, some of those indicted denied responsibility arguing they had no choice due to circumstances beyond their control because they were following orders from 'above'. Some claimed that such actions had precedents and some even argued that they played only a small part. It appears that citing precedent helps legitimate the corrupt deed. It is also illustrative of the elites' default inclination

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to rationalize their corrupt practices in ways that neutralize the stigma of corruption (Lanegran, 2015; Slye and Tutu, 2018, p. 231).

In 2015, as part of the incumbents' reaction to subaltern groups' castigation of runaway political corruption in the regime, a Multi-Agency Task Force on Corruption was set up comprising the National Intelligence Service, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, the Anti-Money Laundering Unit, the Asset Recovery Agency, the Anti Banking Fraud Unit, the Financial Reporting Centre, the Kenya Revenue Authority, the Cybercrime Unit, the Anti-Counterfeit Body and the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (Transparency, 2018). So far, the only achievement of this initiative has been charades of arrest and release of suspected corruption perpetrators. It is against this background that Transparency International's 2018 report on corruption revealed that 42% of Kenyans surveyed believed that corruption and mismanagement of public funds remains widespread across government structures and processes (Ibid). Also, the Auditor General's report pointed out that least 567 billions of Kenyan shillings may have already been lost to mega corruption under the incumbent regime. Most recently, the Auditor General pointed out that 48.2 billions of Kenyan shillings allocated for countryside water projects was missing, misappropriated or unaccounted for (Auditor General, 2017, p. 431)

Although the media has attempted to play a watchdog role in exposing the various corruption scandals, it has not been without counter -pressure from the hegemony. For example, a leading civil society group, Africa Centre for Open Governance (AFRICOG) chronicles that in 2017 the country was plunged into media blackout as hegemony flexed its muscle of coercion to stem subaltern groups' use of media to challenge the status quo by raising accountability questions. At the same time, there are some media houses that have compromised and been co-opted into advancing hegemonic agenda, whether by dint of their being owned by hegemonic

elites or business persons with political links, or by being paid premium advertisement rates, to sanitise and ensure stability of the hegemony (AFRICOG, 2019, p. 186).

Whenever, those on the margins of establishment have organized into anti-corruption crusaders to raise awareness on political corruption through public interest litigation, they have encountered a counter-culture in the form of pro-establishment who have been deployed to counter the onslaught and deflect accountability questions. Counter-culture activities have included besmirching the moral authority of anticorruption activists or in other instances there has been outright compromise and cooptation of some anti-corruption crusaders. Religious institutions, especially some churches have also been compromised and co-opted rendering the institutions anemic of moral standing since their pulpits too have been used for laundering corruption money by elites in exchange for broad support. The academia too has not been left behind in co-optation into the political class agenda. There are numerous academics who are now regular columnists or op-ed bloggers engaged in pro-establishment rhetoric. Like previous regimes, negative ethnicity has also been instrumental in the resistance to counter-hegemony demand for accountability rampant corruption (AFRICOG, 2019, p. 176, 183, 192).

Following the last bitterly contested 2017 presidential elections that left the ruling class almost evenly divided, and in an effort to restore hegemonic stability and maintain the status quo, the incumbents and the opposition seem to have closed ranks yet again in what civil society groups such as AFRICOG have described as an attempt to neutralize opposition so as to reduce antagonism to the status quo. This eloquently captures Adamson's views in "Gramsci's Interpretation of Fascism", where he articulates that the dominant culture at once produces and limits its own forms of counter-culture. The camaraderie between the incumbent regime and the arch rival group, the opposition party, have largely been interpreted to serve the function of

securing the political interests of the elites in either camp. In this case, the incumbent is afforded peace to finish what is left of this regime's term even as the opposition is effectively muted as its members continue to benefit from inter alia, government tenders and appointments to plum jobs at home and abroad (Adamson, 1980, p. 615- 633; AFRICOG, 2019).

4.2   Normalizing Aspects of Political Corruption in Kenya

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the culture of greed and selfishness in Kenya's ruling class traces its aggressive origin in colonization and has flowed through successive regimes for lack of substantive or authentic leadership transition. Instead the various regimes have deployed the mutually reinforcing processes of rationalization, socialization and institutionalization to entrench political corruption. For instance, Leonard notes that colonial chiefs were rewarded for collaboration and permitted to engage in abuse of office, so as to propagate a perception of there being a benefit to cooperation with the colonial hegemony. In what was perhaps the inaugural socialization process into political corruption for newcomers, chiefs were taught to perform and accept corrupt practices. As chiefs continued to benefit from cooperation with the colonial hegemony, they developed a rationalization narrative to justify their corrupt acts as legitimate acts of reality. Those hegemonic processes of socialization and rationalization seeded the institutionalized political corruption that remains in government today, where political corruption is the natural order of operation. Thus, the plague of political corruption remains difficult to root out in the society because the vice is essential to bourgeois state and economy (Leonard, 1991, p. 127, p.145, p.156).

At independence, those who had collaborated with colonial ideology were instrumental in the 'transition' and ordering of postcolonial hegemony. Wrong and Khamisi observe that the

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post-colonial regimes have always viewed ascendancy to power as their "turn to eat" after years of subaltern agitation (Wrong, 2010, p. 134; Khamisi, 2018, p. 173). To hoodwink the masses and as a reaction to subaltern groups' challenge to hegemonic order, successive regimes have pretended to engage in a reform agenda; but intentions articulated to the public have never translated into any meaningful assault on corruption cartels in government structures. This view of hegemony and subalternity is founded on a Gramscian understanding of power as the outcome of the interactions between the forces of domination and subordination. Subalternity and subaltern groups or forces refer to the phenomenon of those on the periphery of hegemonic power always challenging the establishment with aim of taking over power (Adamson, 1980, p. 634).

To-date the postcolonial hegemonic order continues to mobilize coercive power and violence to counter popular insurgencies and resistance movements that challenge its runaway corrupt nature. However, the same hegemony draws citizens into its model of hegemony through recruiting and socialising antagonistic forces into a form of periphery state hegemony. In other cases, it uses patronage to excite ethnic alliances and cobble up a semblance of legitimacy from the masses. Nevertheless, the nature of hegemonic politics in Kenya paradoxically remains engendered on a powerful postcolonial state grappling with subaltern groups seeking to dislodge the incumbent political elite, simply for their turn at "eating". It also provokes struggles with cultural and political modernity and bourgeois economy, while also creating conditions for scuttling counter-hegemonic protests and resistance movements (Charles, 2013, p. 219ff). Thus, hegemonic contestations among various elite groups in different regimes, and counter hegemonic resistance in Kenya can be explained by exploring both the colonial legacies and the intricacies of postcolonial state formation. The mobilisation of subaltern groups into counter hegemonic

protests and resistance movements can be traced back to pre-colonial and colonial state formations and what is quintessential is that: what they seek to achieve is also what they seek to overthrow.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the study took Kenya as a microcosm of Africa to review the normalization of political corruption, through Gramsi's conception of cultural hegemony. The country was best suited because in terms of nature, spread and persistence of political corruption, Africa is Kenya writ large.

This chapter explored the evolution of political corruption in Kenya beginning from the colonial experience and how the postcolonial state came into existence. While there may be some evidence of pre-colonial acts of political corruption, it appears the persistent and widespread strain of political corruption in Kenya has its links to the country's colonial experience. The establishment of the colonial state, its administration and its modus operandi appears to have entrenched and institutionalized political corruption into government structures and processes.

The chapter has also showed that political corruption persists and has continued to flourish throughout the four independence regimes because there has never been a real transition of power in Kenya. The postcolonial state is characterized by self-interested political elites socialized in the colonial logic of plunder. Kenya's bourgeois hegemony was reproduced under the postcolonial state as an off shoot of the colonial bourgeois hegemony. It is this bourgeois' ideology and attitudes that have shaped the form and trajectory of the Kenyan postcolonial state to-date.

The current bourgeois hegemony in Kenya, like its predecessor, is essentially predicated on power relations in the state playing out for economic interests. As a result, the country is under state capture by political elites for purpose of securing their self-interests. The turnover of regimes has not reduced prevalence of political corruption because there is a continuous socialization into corruption of succeeding regimes by the recruitment and induction of political elites into corrupt practices. There have evolved convenient rationalisations for those manipulated or strong-armed into joining in corrupt practices – with excuses about how hard it is to change the system. That the corrupt practices have somehow been institutionalised in government processes as a means of legitimating them, speaks to the uphill task that has been anti-corruption initiatives.

What perhaps most frustrates the fight against political corruption in Kenya and the continent as whole is the failure to trace the linkage between political corruption and colonial experience as well as inattention to the hegemonic processes behind normalization of political corruption in Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1   Summary

This research analysed the normalisation of political corruption in Africa and adopts Kenya as a case study. The main objectives of this research were: a) to investigate whether the emergence and widespread perception of political corruption in Africa can be traced to colonialism; b) to explore possible reasons for the entrenchment of political corruption in governments and if there exist deliberate processes to forge new norms that subvert efforts to undermine the vice; and, c) to investigate the possible link between Kenya's colonial experience and the apparent perception of tolerance of political corruption in today's government. In this regard, the research was guided mainly by three questions: a) is political corruption one of the legacies of colonialism in Africa?; b) does the perception of entrenchment and tolerance of political corruption portend forging of a counter-culture that tolerates and subverts efforts to resist the vice in Africa?; and c) is there any connection between Kenya's colonial experience and the perception of apparent tolerance of political corruption in government?

The study adopted the view of political corruption as the improper use of public office to confer benefit to self, family or associates. While corruption is found in almost every society, it is seemingly stubbornly entrenched in African societies. The vice is considered a strong constraint on the growth and development of society. Over the years, the problem of corruption has received extensive attention from (non)governmental agencies, researchers and scholars, and a lot of resources have been deployed to set up mechanisms for anti-corruption strategies. However, the perception of corruption remains widespread and persistent.

In *Police Corruption and the Security Challenge in Kenya*, Kempe (2014) characterized the problem of corruption on the continent as a "cancerous", "legendary" and continent-wide "climate of unethical leadership". In *Corruption in Zimbabwe: An examination of the roles of the State and Civil Society in Combating corruption*, Moyo (2014) argues that lack of political will explains why most anti-corruption strategies have not worked thus enabling corruption to thrive. This argument is shared by Onsongo (2014), in a paper, "Political Will and the Fight Against Corruption in Kenya" where she argues, political will exists when political actors genuinely develop common understanding of a particular problem and the required solution. These scholars envisage a situation where political actors including politicians, civil society organizations, faith based organization, nongovernmental organizations and the general public come together and attack perceived causes and effects of corruption at all levels of society. However these ignore the fact that in most cases political actors in society have antagonistic goals that are self-interested, and in any case, their goal for public life is to takeover, and carry out business as usual.

In "Money talks in Ugandan election," Powell writes about Uganda's head of anti-corruption court who complained about "untouchables" in the war on corruption and admonished the prosecutor for putting on trial only small offenders. A similar view is articulated by Oyebode in the "Hypocrisy of Nigeria's Ruling class fuelling Corruption" where he observes that in Nigeria's fight against corruption there are "sacred cows" and that is why there is selective enforcement of anticorruption laws. The scholar goes on to point out that the sluggishness exhibited in the anticorruption strategies betrays a high tolerance level for the unethical activities of some public office holders. These types of indictment against various countries' respective anti-corruption strategies are very common and appear to reverberate across the continent. The

accusations appear not to recognize the fact that in most African countries those who make laws and enforce the laws are normally products of patronage and are in place to safeguard certain vested interests.

Corruption in post-colonial Kenya has a history which spans four independence regimes but the vice has been a challenge since colonial times. The official attempts to fight corruption can be traced back to 1956 when the British colonial authorities passed the Prevention of Corruption Act to provide a legal framework for combating public corruption. In *Anti Corruption and Good Governance in East Africa,* Ojienda observes that there was little compliance with this law even in the early postcolonial period. The country continues to experience the perception of widespread corruption on a larger scale with each of the four regimes being criticized for their involvement. In *The Anatomy of Corruption in Kenya,* Okech, Kibwana and Wanjala had claimed that heightened perception of corruption in government was a result of lack anti-corruption institutions and accompanying laws. In reaction to public pressure, the government enacted several anti-corruption laws and established anti-corruption agencies with clear mandate to fight corruption, but this did not dissipate the situation.

Michela Wrong in, *It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower*, argues that corruption in Kenya is a problem of a political leadership taken hostage by ethnic interests. While this position has weight, it does not go as far as acknowledging nor articulating the historical factors that gave birth to such sharp ethnic consciousness, routinely manipulated by corrupt politicians to shield themselves from sanctions. The author also blames multilateral institutions such as the World Bank for abetting political corruption in Kenya, but her criticism does not articulate why such powerful institutions would get trapped in corruption cartels of a country in sub-Saharan Africa.

Like most African countries, Kenya is a signatory to the *United Nations Convention Against Corrupt* and apart from having a raft of many other anti-corruption laws, recently promulgated a new constitution which heralded far reaching changes on governance, leadership and integrity in efforts towards anti-corruption. The country is among many African countries that boast of a robust constitutional, institutional and legal framework for fighting corruption. In spite of all these anti-corruption efforts, perception of widespread corruption remains high, raising fundamental questions on why anti-corruption strategies and tactics are ineffective.

5.2   Conclusion

This study notes that according to the World Bank definition, acts of corruption involve manipulation of rules, regulations or state laws to confer illegitimate benefits. It involves a complex network of individuals and group with access to power and influence in public and private sectors. The individuals may include elected representatives, political appointees, bureaucrats and their benefactors and as a group they are a part of a social class i.e. political class.

While tracing the history of political corruption, the research analysis reveals that some 'type' of political corruption indeed existed in pre-colonial Africa where outlandish acts of gift offers were normal. However, it is the colonial experience that followed the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, at which the European countries agreed upon strategies to dominate and exploit Africa, that metastasized the vice into what in *Corruption and Development in Africa*, Kempe argues is a "cancerous", "legendary" and continent-wide "climate of unethical leadership". The modern day problem of corruption started as the European powers worked their way into African societies, taking advantage of ethnic rivalries to divide and conquer; gaining allies and proxies through compromise; co-opting some kings and chiefs through patronage; and where they met resistance

they resorted to coercion, and unleashed their technological advances of the Industrial Revolution and military might to force cooperation. These heralded hegemonic politics that persists in a number of African states and that is crucial in assessing contemporary problems and solutions.

This study has noted that the phenomenon of colonialism involved imposition of colonial states, economy and social institutions in various societies of Africa. These institutions then formed the infrastructure for annexing land, looting resources and insubordinating the native population, and conferring on colonial administrators illegitimate benefits. In reaction to European exploitation and domination, there emerged two formations: collaborators and resisters. The collaborators cooperated with the emerging colonial hegemony but the resisters formed themselves into subaltern groups to challenge hegemonic order. Following Second World War experience, the resistance movement led by subaltern groups and backed by some bureaucratic bourgeois class began to clamor for independence. As the subaltern groups' resistance gained momentum, these forced European powers to cede their colonies to hand-picked African elites that filled the power void as an expansion of hegemonic order.

The study has further noted that hegemony involves a group of people, bourgeois, seizing power in the institutions of society, and thereby enabling themselves to dominate culture and political discourse. This research then used Gramsci's cultural hegemony conception to analyze political classes' domination of societies in various part of Africa. From a Gramscian analysis, the political class domination is exercised subtly through cultural and economic power, and rests on a mixture of manipulation of consent and coercion. Apart from the states and economies, acts of domination were also exerted through other colonial institutions such as education, law, religion, and media. According to Marxism, the ultimate triumph of domination is when the

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masses are indoctrinated to adopt a bourgeois ideological position that is contrary to their own interests.

While on the face of it collaborators and resisters appeared different, from neo-Marxist analysis, they were one and the same, it is only the tactics adopted to achieve their objectives that differed. Both were interested in self-determination and self- preservation. To manage colonial institutions, colonial administrations tapped on collaborators and created them into elite classes of local leaders within their colonies. These new African elites learned from the colonialists the importance of the relationship between wealth and politics and it is this phenomenon that is likely to have birthed the lingering, persistent and widespread 'strain' of political corruption on the continent.

This study therefore proposes that the nature of political class that emerged from colonial project is *sine qua non* to political corruption. In that case, the pervasive and persistent political corruption across the continent is a problem of the pervasive and persistent political class. In addition, there have been regime changes from colonial to postcolonial as well as postcolonial transitions, but there has not been an accompanying systemic change to alter the pervasive bourgeois hegemony. Therefore, the continent remains in the firm grip of the colonial exploitation ideology and beliefs and consequent persistent and widespread political corruption. More so, political corruption has not been resisted by the majority of Africans egregiously affected by the vice because the masses have been indoctrinated through various social institutions to believe that bourgeois ideology, culture and modus operandi of bourgeois institutions as 'inevitable and normal'.

Further, the stratification of African societies by colonialists; emergence of class structures and the bourgeois domination of society continue to shape social relations in the base

and superstructure and produce hegemonic forces that shape the status quo in the African societies. These behavior and actions can be synthesized into three self-reinforcing hegemonic processes, namely, socialization, rationalization and institutionalization that are vital to the normalization of political corruption in Africa.

The socialization process involves the bequeathing of certain norms and traits to a class membership. An example is where newcomers to the political group are seduced into the glamour of corrupt acts. Rationalization as a process encourages developing valid justification to excuse corrupt acts and thereby making unethical actions appear normal including to the offender's conscience. The institutionalization process involves evolution of random personal corrupt acts into routine behavior undertaken without much thought and is embedded in the structures and processes of public decision making.

It is important to point out that it is in the nature of human beings to create norms and rules that normalize certain aspects of people's reality and therefore, the idea of hegemony is inevitable. In the history of mankind, it appears hegemonic powers have emerged one after the other and served as necessary principles for ordering reality, creating and maintaining stability. Those who distinguished themselves legitimately (or sometimes illegitimately) in the hierarchical order of what society held as valuable, used their position and capabilities individually or collectively to enforce the norms and rules of society through a mix of persuasion and coercion. The important part of this proposition is that people somewhat voluntarily accept the ideology of the hegemonic power over society based on its perceived benefit or at least usefulness to the whole society. In this case, hegemony and its processes: rationalization, socialization and institutionalization are neutral realities and it is their instrumental use and outcomes that ultimately matter.

The study reviews how in pre-independent Kenya, colonialists and collaborators, though few in number held nearly all the key positions and influence in the society. This gave them an advantage in dominance within the meaning of Gramsci's original conception of hegemony as being a contested dominant culture that meets the minimum needs of the majority while overwhelmingly serving the interests of the dominant class.

Through a hegemonic process of consent, resistance, and coercion Kenya eventually became an independent country ushering itself into a postcolonial hegemony. The independence leaders inherited the colonial system, refused to reform it, and therefore, colonial notions, ideology and attitudes continued to dictate the rules, norms and form that governed. The more noticeable unique force of hegemony in independent Kenya was the myth of classlessness as encapsulated in the *Sessional Paper number 10 of 1965 on African Socialism*. This argument mystified the lived reality of a majority of Kenyans, deceiving or socializing them into embracing a system of values and belief that served the interests of the ruling class at the expense of their own. This clouded the class consciousness of a majority of Kenyans of their interest within the structure of the economic or social order in which they live. In contrast, it thrust them into false consciousness, a failure to perceive oneself as part of a class interest's relative economic order and social system.

Under the delusion of false consciousness, majority of Kenyans to-date continue to watch rather helplessly as the political class entrench themselves in employment, appointments and promotion in the public service. For instance, some Kenyans enjoy key positions in the public sector simply because they went to the same schools with the bosses of government entities or because of political patronage.

The researcher notes that as in most African states, in Kenya, patronage networks tend to operate within an ethnic context, promulgating the norms and attitudes of a given ethnic group. When ethnic consciousness is properly achieved it is pushed into an instrumental dimension of tribal hegemony with the goal of capturing and sustaining power among ethnic elites. This explains why on the continent and especially in Kenya, informal norms dictated by ethnicity and reinforced by patronage networks tend to be stronger than the norms of formal State institutions. The problem of tribal hegemony is extremely bad such that in case there is a conflict between informal ethnic norms and formal state norms, the informal norms tend to prevail. In this regard, for public servants given a choice between preserving the integrity of public office and using the office to meet societal expectations, they will likely choose the latter. Is it therefore any wonder that political mobilization and resource distribution in Kenya is primarily organized along ethnic and patronage lines?

From independence, Kenya has witnessed ethnic posturing to capture and retain control of society's 'chief resource' - the state. Behind this reality is the fact that Kenya's political system is characterized by entrenched patronage and strong ethnic identities. It is the convergence of patronage and ethnic consciousness on the state that creates significant incentives for political corruption. Once in public office, ethnic patrons find themselves in rabid rent seeking for personal accumulation and also to nourish their patronage networks. It is the competition for finite state resources by ethnic champions and patronage networks that has led to the persistence of political corruption in Kenya, through socialisation, rationalisation and institutionalisation, one regime after another.

Patronage also continues to play a critical role in political party financing in multiparty Kenya. Thus, corruption related to election financing has become the norm as patrons take

advantage of their proximity to state resources to secure finances for election campaigns. For instance, the money used to finance the second regime's re-election in 1990s was allegedly raised through the Goldenberg scandal. The financing of the third regime's re-election in 2007 was likewise allegedly raised through the Anglo-Leasing scandal. The money for campaigns for re-election of the fourth regime in 2017 was allegedly raised through the National Youth Service scandal. The increase of political corruption under multiparty rule continues to affect the nature of governance, rule of law, transparency, accountability, political participation and competition.

In Kenya, another aspect of patronage network is a type of 'broker' that appears to be part of normalized corruption. Brokers are rent-seekers who peddle information and introduce to patrons to other networks that they might find beneficial. At a global level, brokers play an even more crucial role of serving as bridges between national patrons and global capitalists. They broker international contracts for a commission, negotiate kick-backs on behalf of government officers and assist them to hide their corruptly acquired assets abroad.

Finally, it is important to understand the hegemonic contexts in which political corruption occurs as this is undoubtedly crucial if anti-corruption interventions are to have a better chance of succeeding. Anti-corruption reforms should not only aim at strengthening state institutions and addressing capacity issues. They should also account for the political values, cultures and shared morals that underpin these institutions which may be facilitating political corruption.

5.3   Recommendations

On the basis of the foregoing, this researcher recommends that a first step towards undermining political corruption in postcolonial Africa is to acknowledge the fact that the vice has a historical connection to colonial hegemony that is lenient towards, and encourages the

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normalization of, the vice. Thus, it is recommended that anti-corruption strategies in Africa be escalated to qualify corruption as a high-risk activity and therefore anyone found guilty by judicial process, be subjected to ultimate penalty irrespective of their status.

Second, to undermine political corruption it is important to appreciate Gramsci's conception of hegemony, common sense and ideology and how these play out in the ruling ideology which is a coherent system of thought, and in the subordinate ideology which exhibits contradictory consciousness; as well as the consequences thereof. Also, important is an appreciation of the persistence of the colonial bourgeois hegemony and its connection to present day persistent political corruption on the continent. In addition, it is important to account for the role played by imperial presidency in the entrenching and hampering efforts to fight political corruption.

Third, to undermine political corruption it is important to understand that bourgeois culture works tirelessly to prevent social revolution, and therefore by extension even reforms that have potential to bring antagonism to their class interest. Also, the bourgeois hegemony controls the overlapping spheres of state (political society and civil society) through a mixture of coercion and consent to extract or manufacture cooperation from the masses for continued domination of bourgeois values that oft normalizes unethical behavior. Additionally, it is important to account for false consciousness among the masses that makes it possible for corruption perpetrators to mobilize support from a section of society to shield themselves from sanctions.

Fourth, recognize that cultural hegemony has limitations because it is always challenged by, among others, internal contradictions and subaltern groups. That challenge can sometimes reach a substantial threshold, such as can be directed to converge with the realities in peoples' lives, and which can then overthrow the status quo. Thus, it is recommended that efforts to

undermine political corruption should seek to dislodge respective African countries hegemonic orders by fueling internal contradictions and molding majority of citizens' behavior into a subaltern group that poses real threat to the political and bureaucratic establishment.

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