UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

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ROLE OF AFRICAN UNION IN PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF IGAD IN SOUTH SUDAN

BY

THURANIRA CAROLEAN KARIMI

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DECLARATION

This research project has not been presented to any other University and is my original work.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

Thuranira Carolean Karimi

R50/7925/2017

Supervisor

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University of Nairobi Supervisor.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

Prof. Maria Nzomo

University of Nairobi

College of Humanities and Social Sciences

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

DEDICATION

Many thanks to my parents Peter & Sabina, children; Tania, Curtis & Kyle and husband Frank for their unwavering love and support.

This study is dedicated directly to each one of them for the sacrifices made for me to achieve this important academic milestone.

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I give thanks to God for the gift of life, grace and abundant blessings.

To my Supervisor, Prof. Maria Nzomo for giving me guidance and mentorship in carrying out this study. It was a great honor.

OFFICIAL MAP OF IGAD MEMBER STATES[1]

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[1] Strategic Intelligence Service. 2018. *https://intelligencebriefs.com/*.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Collective Security – refers to states sharing a general agreement on sharing common objectives of balancing existing power and aggregating their combined military strength against any threats to peace.

Conflict – is a disagreement between people with different needs, thoughts, opinions, values or goals.

Development - A multi-dimensional mechanism that affects the culture, politics, and society of the countries where it takes place.

Peace - It is a stress-free state of peace and tranquility that comes when there is no war or battle, everything coexists in perfect harmony and liberty.

Regional Co-operation - Agreement for enhancing integration by means of regional rules and institutions established by States in the same region

Research - Is an organized and empirical search on a topic for relevant information.

Research methodology - It's a way to solving the study problem systematically.

Security - The condition or sense of freedom from danger or risk.

Sustainable development - refers to timely and lasting change at the political, economic, socio-cultural, scientific and technological, protection, security, legal and judicial level as well as individual levels.

Violence - The avoidable loss of basic human needs or, to put it more broadly, the impairment of human life, which decreases the actual degree to which someone may meet their needs to what otherwise would be possible.

Violent Extremism - Refers to aggression motivated by extreme points of view that could be either religious, cultural or political.

A security system It is characterized as including key core security agencies; security policy, management and oversight bodies; and a public grievance commission responsible for managing and controlling security forces, as well as judicial and law enforcement agencies.

Failed States - Refers to countries that are unable to provide basic goods to its citizens e.g. education, functional water and health systems, legal services and critical infrastructure.

ABSTRACT

This study aimed to examine the Role of the African Union's in promoting sustainable peace in Africa with a key focus on IGAD and its South Sudan activities. The big question this study aimed to address was: What is the African Union doing to arrest instability in Africa? Are its efforts enough? What more needs to be done by the African Union to ensure stability within African countries? And what are the competing interests that interfere with mediation efforts of IGAD's member states? What emerged strongly from this study is that African Union's conflict resolution structures and mechanisms exist and have been effective in Africa. Nevertheless, all member states should collaborate to ensure that there is peace and security in Africa. The study also concurred with the liberal ideology that stable states were unlikely to be involved in conflicts with their neighbours unlike unstable states. This study concluded that countries that are stable are more peaceful than unstable countries. Stable countries had governance structures in place and that there was interdependence and cooperation with other states. Unfortunately, Africa has been plagued by issues of governance that have led to failed states due to political instability, ethnic clashes that consequently increase the number of displaced people. Despite intervention by the international community through the UN and other non-state bodies, Africa needs to resolve its post-colonial-rooted problems. This study was able to establish that the APSA peace and security instruments were functional however the discussion is to what extent? IGAD was hailed in 2005 after mediating the South Sudan CPA, however since South Sudan reversed back to a political crisis it has not been able to effectively mediate nor bring the belligerent parties together. Prospects for peace are however not doomed since the South Sudanese nationals are optimistic that their leaders will be able to negotiate a peace truce that will steer lasting peace. Neighboring countries also play a key role in South Sudan's peace and security, especially in ensuring that mediation does not fail despite the challenges of getting the warring parties involved in the negotiations. The United Nations needs to invest financially in securing peace in this fragile state. Accordingly, the study concludes that the AU should continue the peace and security discourse and that while donor support for peace and security initiatives is waning, the AU should be able to work within the available resources to be effective in its key peace and security mandate.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMISOM   African Union Mission in Somalia

AU   African Union

AUCSP   African Union Commission Strategic Plan

CAR   Central African Republic

CEWARN   Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

CEWS   Continental Early – Warning System

CPA   Comprehensive peace agreement

CSO   Civil Society Organizations

EA   East Africa

GoSS   Government of Southern Sudan

GRSS   Government of the Republic of South Sudan

GTD   Global Terrorism Database

IGAD   Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IPF   IGAD Partners Forum

LAPSSET Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor

MINUSCA Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in The Central African
         Republic

NPCA   NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency

OAU   Organization of African Unity

PRIO   Peace Research Institute Oslo

PSC   Peace and Security Council of the African Union

POW   Panel of the Wise

PF   Peace Fund

REC   Regional Economic Community

SDGs   Sustainable Development Goals

SIPRI   Stockholm International Peace Research institute

SPLM   Sudan People's Liberation Movement

SS   South Sudan

SSA   Sub-Saharan Africa

UCP   Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP)

UK   United Kingdom

UN   United Nations

UNOAU   United Nations Office to the African Union

UNSC   United Nations Security Council

USA   United States of America

VE   Violent Extremism

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

When the cold war-era came to an end in 1991, a new framework for resolving the changing face of intra and inter-conflicts was introduced by the UN's Security Council which is the principal international agency designated with the statute of preserving global Peace and Security.[2] The growing severity of disputes within its 194-member states and need for multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations guided this decision.[3]

Peace as a scholarly area of interest has existed since 1960's and was established as an academic discipline by the 'pioneer and father of peace & conflict studies' – Johan Galtung.[4] In his in-depth study, he contended that Peace is two dimensional; it can either be positive or negative.[5] His contribution elaborated on the difference between the two whereby positive peace is the absence of conflict while negative peace incorporates social transformation that works towards an unbiassed society or generally, it is the absence of violence.[6] International Relations scholars; Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr who represent the classical realist school of thought articulate that there can be no permanent peace without a world state and thus claim that due to anarchy absolute peace becomes elusive and thus not likely to be

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[2] (United Nations 1998)
[3] (Howard 2008)
[4] (Galtung1948)
[5] (Galtung 1969)
[6] (D'hères 2007)

achieved.[7] Accordingly, the scholars argue that governments just like people have a longing to control others, which has prompted numerous conflicts around the world.[8]

The persistent civil wars in Africa have bolstered the region to being classified as the world's most conflict-prone continent in the world as at 2017 where within the 54 African states there were 50 non-state hostilities.[9] As the severity of these conflicts increased, so did the deaths of innocent civilians. On this basis, the African Union has adopted a robust conflict resolution process since its creation in 2002 by encouraging States to synchronize their responses to security concerns, and this has been implemented in South Sudan which is the country of focus in this study.[10]

South Sudan became independent after a harmonized referendum result after seceding from Sudan on July 9, 2011. Thirty-six months later, on 15 December 2013, a civil war broke out, turning a dispute over political power into an ethnic conflict. This marked the beginning of the current civil war.[11] Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) [12] is put into focus in this study as a key building block and Regional Economic Community (REC) under the AU which works on issues that are a priority for Africa's Horn region and claims the achievement of a landmark milestone in the all-inclusive truce agreement forged in August 2005 for South Sudan.

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[7] (Zarkov 2015)
[8] (United Nations 1998)
[9] (Bakken and Rustad 2018)
[10] (Allison, 2015)
[11] (African Union 2018)
[12] (IGAD 2019)

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Therefore, it is on this basis that this study sought to analyze how successful IGAD has been in implementing its frameworks for peace and safety within its member states. Further, evaluate and analyze why the AU's cease-fire and security mechanisms are unable to enforce and negotiate for a substantive peace and security agreement in resolving the protracted crisis in South Sudan.[13] As well as review conflict of interest that has prevented Kenya and Ethiopia from effectively mediating in the South Sudan crisis.

1.2 Problem Statement

The protracted inter-conflict within the North and South Sudan's territory has been recognized as the longest human conflict in Africa lasting twenty-two years. The break from the war after the peace agreement ushered the seceding of the Southern Sudan in 2011 – i.e. six years later. Unfortunately, this peace was short-lived and in December 2013 due to political tensions, South Sudan broke into civil war till present in 2019.

From these prolonged conflicts, South Sudan has suffered significant loss of human lives, destabilization of the delicate economy and its social-political structures while posing significant peace and security threats to its neighbours and the region at large.

Despite IGAD's presence, the African horn area is the world's most unstable and South Sudan ranks among the top three war-torn countries in the world. The African Union as well as the International Community through IGAD-Plus have intervened and made efforts to mediate without a reasonable long-term breakthrough to South Sudan's security and stability.

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[13] (Gebrekidan, Getachew Zeru. 2015

The goal of this research was therefore to investigate the role of the African Union in promoting sustainable peace and security among its member states, to investigate why the African Union's peace and security mechanisms are unable to negotiate and enforce a substantive and lasting peace and security agreement in Southern Sudan, and finally to examine the specific interests of Kenya and Ethiopia that restrict its effectiveness as mediators in the South Sudan conflict.

1.3 Research Questions

To realize the study's objectives, the following questions were asked:

I. To what extent have the conflict interventions of AU contributed to peace and security in Africa?

II. How has the conflict of interest among IGAD member states affected its capacity to realize peace and security in South Sudan?

III. What are the specific interests of Kenya and Ethiopia that affect their mediating capacity in South Sudan?

1.4 Study Objectives

The overall objective of this study was to investigate the efficacy of AU peace and security structures in Africa, evaluate the overall impact of IGAD member states on their conflict of interest on the peace and security of South Sudan and finally analyze the unique national interests of Kenya and Ethiopia that weaken their capacity as mediators in the conflict in South Sudan.

1.4.1 Specific objectives

I.   To assess the impact of conflict interventions of AU and IGAD in Africa

II. To assess triggers of conflict of interest among IGAD member states and how they have affected its capacity to realize peace and security in South Sudan

II. To analyze the specific interests of Kenya and Ethiopia that affect their capacity as mediators in South Sudan crisis

1.5   Hypotheses

This study attempts to test the following research assumptions:

I.   **H1** – Conflict interventions of AU have influenced the increase of insecurity in Africa.

II. **H1 -** Conflict of interest among IGAD member states affect its ability to realize Peace and Security in South Sudan

III. **H0** – Specific interests of Kenya and Ethiopia affect their capacity as mediators in South Sudan Crisis

1.6   Significance of the Study

1.6.1 Policy Justification

This study will be instrumental in strengthening policies in governments within IGAD Member States and thus lead to sustainable peace in the region. Outcomes from this study will also provide a guideline on structural mechanisms of dealing with new and existing threats to Peace and Security and form new patterns of effective co-operation within the region.

1.6.2 Academic Justification

For researchers and scholars, the contribution of this study will be useful as it will provide a new framework for viewing peace and security and how lasting solutions can provide relief in our socio-political economies.

Data collected from this study will also enhance existing literature thus providing a supplementary point of reference. This research paper seeks to add something new to this debate because it analyses the South Sudan conflict based on fresh evidence and current status. It will provide new insights on how the African Union has resolved security concerns in South Sudan, identify specific gaps and limitations and review key peace and security frameworks that can be developed. Several researchers have attempted to research about the South Sudan conflict; however, many are from outside the continent and seek to use secondary sources to answer the research questions. Evidence that is presented in this research is from an African mind, therefore, presenting the facts as they are from observation. For this reason, this research is instrumental in proving evidence and the way forward for the African Union mandate in the region, and future African conflicts and includes direction for further research and policy.

1.7 Scope of the Study and Limitations

This study focused on the responsibility of the African Union (AU) to fulfill its African peace and security mission. It has reviewed broadly the current situation and interventions that the AU has enlisted over the past few decades and examined how effective these peace strategies have been.

Further, South Sudan as a country that is in conflict was reviewed in line with IGAD as the REC that is greatly involved in its mediation and conflict prevention process.

This study had few limitations. The core of the study focused critically on the ongoing South Sudan conflict. At the point where the researcher was collecting data, the AU, IGAD and UN jointly signed an agreement and released an adoption notice detailing the Revitalized Conflict Resolution Agreement in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in which all of them agreed to increase their efforts to help the adoption of the contract by the Parties. The South Sudan calamity is still active therefore no data was physically collected in South Sudan. This however did not affect the quality of the data collected since majority of the data was collected from South Sudanese nationals who are residing in Kenya and could effectively give information that was relevant for this study. Secondary data was collected from various sources; books, journals, media etc.

Based on this study, conclusions and recommendations on how to realize a sustainable peace framework have been provided.

1.8 Literature Review

18.1 Empirical Literature Review

1.8.1.1 Introduction

This segment of the study aims to present an account of various publications and research studies on the African Union and its consequent impact on South Sudan's peace and security. Various scholarly literature have been reviewed to highlight some of the prevailing models that explain issues concerning peace and stability. Lastly, the section will establish the gap ensuing from the reviewed literature that may have been left in the previous studies.

The literature has therefore been reviewed and sub-divided into the following areas; Impact of conflict interventions of AU on Africa's peace and security, review causes of conflict of interest by IGAD member states and how this affects the realization of stability in South Sudan and lastly analyze how the specific interests of Kenya and Ethiopia have affected their capacity as mediators in the South Sudan crisis.

To achieve this, the section is structured systematically, that is, it will present first the empirical review followed by a theoretical assessment of the existing literature which will begin at the international level then continental, regional and later sum up the national level studies on peace and security.

Scholars have examined the evolution of regional conflict systems and agree that security situations can be transferred across borders.[14] These regional conflict formations are interdependent and multifaceted and are closely bound by national interests and geographical proximity.[15] These regional conflict complexes therefore stem from inter and intra conflicts and eventually establish a strong link between the conflicts.[16]

Kumar highlights the issue of ethnicity as one of the major cause of disputes in third world countries which are mostly in Africa and notes that this problem has gradually increased the intensity of the conflicts requiring intervention in most cases. He adds that even those deemed triumphant in the conflicts end up with a net loss and that in many cases the absence of conflict only means that tensions are simmering.[17]

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[14] (Oliveira 2017)
[15] (Lake, SSRN 2007)
[16] (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998)
[17] (R. Kumar 1987)

1.8.2 Impact of African Union Conflict Interventions on Peace and Security

Conflict Barometer report by Heidelberg (2000–2016), notes that Africa Sub-Saharan region had the highest concentration of conflicts with fourteen out of a total of thirty eight conflicts recorded worldwide.[18] Many peacekeeping undertakings of the United Nations are in Africa, with the largest number of UN forces serving in countries of conflict.[19] Conflict interventions have also been mired in the escalating number of terrorism occurrences in Africa, with mostly civilian casualties.[20]

Global Terrorism Database (GTD), a database of open sources of information from the University of Maryland specifies that from 1970 to 2015 there was an exponential increase in acts of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa between 2010 and 2015, with a peak in 2014.[21] According to Amnesty International, developing countries which primarily are in Africa, host approximately 85 percent of the world's displaced people.[22]

This state of affairs in South Sudan has called for IGAD's[23] immediate involvement to address the humanitarian crisis that has devastated the nation and is likely to advance into a major conflict if the new multi-brokered peace agreement fails. However, over time the crisis has grown in its ferocity, calling for more assistance from the international community through an extended mediation-IGAD Plus.

IGAD Plus was officially launched in mid-2015 at an African Union conference after 15 months of IGAD's unsuccessful mediation. The mediators comprised: the African Union,

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[18] (Furley and May 2006)
[19] (Adebajo 2011)
[20] (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015)
[21] (University of Maryland n.d.).
[22] (UNHCR 2017)
[23] (IGAD 2019)

the United Nations, IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), European Union, China, Norway, United States and the United Kingdom.[24] The key mandate for IGAD Plus was to come up with a plan for sharing power, setting up control structures and security arrangements.[25]

1.8.2.1 Existing structures for peace and security within the African Union

Article 2 (2) of the PSC Protocol of the African Union states that a 5-person committee of esteemed persons from various segments of society, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Peace Fund (PF), the African Union Commission and the African Standby Force (ASF) support the Council.[26]

All these frameworks of peace and stability constitute the anchors of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the primary mandate of directly promoting the PSC's efforts in the context of conflict prevention, in addition to prioritizing AU regional support for South Sudan's stabilization strategy.[27]

1.8.2.2 The South Sudan Turmoil

South Sudan in East-Central Africa belongs to the 30% land-locked countries in the continent. It borders; Congo's Democratic Republic (DRC), CAR, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan.[28] South Sudan's civil war has displaced an estimated 1.9 million people, and the

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[24] (IGAD 2019)
[25] (Koopmans 2018)
[26] (Weldehaimanot 2009)
[27] (African Union 2018)
[28] (World Atlas 2018)

influx of refugees to neighboring countries is estimated at two million and is increasing every year.[29]

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was officially unveiled as a collective security and advance warning system in May 2004[30] to enable effective and timely reactions to conflict and humanitarian circumstances in the continent.[31] Conflicts in Africa have generally been associated with crucial development problems that have been persistent within the continent. However, in the past few years interventions both direct and indirect have minimized civil strife.[32]

1.8.2.3 Resolving Conflicts in Africa

Most of Africa's conflicts have seen militarization of interventions which has worsened disputes and hampered mediation efforts.[33] The negative impact of these conflicts has increased human and food safety, environmental degradation, illegal weapons, human rights violations and a general disorder in most war-ravaged countries.[34]

A new model of resolving these numerous conflicts has indicated positive results through unarmed civilian protection (UCP) model of peacekeeping that helps create lasting peace.[35] It is based on debunking the idea that to restore peace and stability, where there is war then there must be a militarized peacekeeping option.[36] On the reverse it confirms the premise that where there are armed actors on either side whether peace keepers or the warring

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[29] (World Vision 2019)
[30] (Dersso 2010)
[31] (Williams 2011)
[32] (Smith 1994)
[33] (Brown 1996)
[34] (Tadesse 2009)
[35] (Furnari, Oldenhuis and Julian 2015)
[36] (Bellamy and Williams 2014)

parties, then this only introduces protracted violence.[37]   This method has been used successfully in Bangladesh, Iraq, Philippines and South Sudan. Unarmed civilian protection approaches have lessened political temperatures and led to the working together of civilians acting as peace activists.[38]

The Horn of Africa has generally been afflicted by inter and intrastate conflicts for several decades and hosts the highest number of UN Operations to maintain peace in the world.[39]   This is besides the 'African Union Mission to Somalia' (AMISOM) which currently has more than 21,000 troop strength. Serious humanitarian crisis is common in this region due to the large flow of refugees thereby requiring reinforced peacekeeping response.[40]   The enlarged troop numbers are as a direct consequence to the conflicts affecting IGAD member states and resultant negative impact to the affected populations.

Africa has been the scene for some of the world's longest conflicts, and greatly affected by human security. Conflict management has therefore become Africa's number one agenda with human security being prioritized.[41]   The approach to conflict resolution is "a situation in which the opposing individuals enter into a prearrangement that addresses their core discordance, recognizes the long-term existence of each other as parties and ceases all violent actions against each other".[42] To understand the various scenarios of peace in international relations, it is important to recognize that war has been lingering event in the history of nation-states and the essence of international affairs and the driving factors that

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[37] (Hewitt 2018)
[38] (Duncan, Carriere and Oldenhuis 2015)
[39] (Cilliers and Schunemann 2013)
[40] (Adebajo 2012)
[41] (El- Affendi 2001)
[42] (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010)

trigger intervention, reaction, collaboration, conflict and peace between and within the international system.[43]

Sixty-three multilateral peacekeeping operations have been registered worldwide with Africa having the largest number of missions, with twenty-five.[44] There were eighteen European operations, nine in the Middle East, six in Asia, and five in the Western Hemisphere for perspective. Around 75 percent of all peacekeeping forces accounted for African peacekeeping missions, with African countries responsible for the bulk of those soldiers.[45] This account shows how porous African countries are to conflict and leads to the question what are real triggers of these conflicts?

1.8.2.4 State Failure in Africa

The idea of state collapse was developed in 1992 by scholars.[46] Although they disagree on what the actual definition could be, they generally term it as "Nations that are unable to carry out their domestic functions or perform their responsibilities under international law due to the collapse of the central authorities." [47]

Rotberg adds to this theory by suggesting that fragile states generally suffer from geo-economic and physical challenges due to poor governance coupled with community-based intra-communal tensions exacerbated by either religious or ethnic divisions.[48] This analysis of failed states has proved to be true since when states fail then general anarchy commonly followed in Africa by allegations of serious economic crimes and rulership by despots who

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[43] (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2018)
[44] (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2018)
[45] (Campbell 2018)
[46] (Helman and Ratner 1992)
[47] (Jones 2008)
[48] (Rotberg 2004)

may or may not be elected democratically occurs; countries that have suffered this situation are Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Angola, Somalia, Central Africa Republic. In contrast, failed states are not defined by the severity of the war, but by the long-term duration of the aggression.

John Yoo undertook a study on the critical association between terrorism and state failure. John Yoo in his study concluded that failed states pose the greatest challenge to international security and order while serving as incubators for crimes against humanity, trans-shipment for illegal arms and drugs as well as a surge in the availability of mass destruction weapons. In the international system, they often produce negative externalities by damaging their own civilian populations and allowing criminal enterprises and terrorists to function freely on their soil. He reckons that Rwanda (during genocide), Somalia, former Yugoslavia among others were failed states that metamorphosed to human rights catastrophes. It is now obvious that more lives have been lost through intra wars than from inter wars since the Second World War. To resolve this issue of state failure, countries have consistently work to re-build institutions of state control by establishing market control and a working democracy.

Restoration of peace and security in countries has not worked all the time since John Yoo views international law to be irrelevant to the objective of restoring states. Public choice theory suggests that nations will always participate at below the optimal level.[49] Conflict of interest has been a key driving factor since there are powerful disincentives to why countries intervene in failed states which include no clear advantage to the country leading the intervention, the high cost of losing civilian and military personnel, the difficult moral

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[49] (Dennic C. Mueller 2008)

dilemmas involved in deciding who to support in the war, as is the case in South Sudan currently and the extreme difficulty in withdrawing once a state has committed its resources to a war. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations further complicates this situation by banning nation states from using violence against any state's political independence or territorial integrity except in self-defense or with the Security Council's authorization.[50]

Thus, countries must moderate the force they go into a conflict with since it is regulated under the UN Charter. International rules also make it harder since the costs of intervention are increased further by putting a requirement that failed states must be restored to full sovereignty which is difficult task.[51]

In 2005, the Khartoum government and the SPLM reached a peace agreement to end what had been Africa's longest-running civil war. This accord, known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), paved the way for general elections and a constitutional referendum in the North, after which South Sudan, spurred by the Juba SPLM, took over on 9 July 2011.[52]

Despite the CPA, the connection between the two countries has remained tense, with parts of the peace agreement yet to be fully implemented and disputes started emerging in January 2012 when South Sudan's government was angered by Khartoum's one-sided decisions regarding management of shared resources of oil and border security.

During the signing of the CPA led by IGAD, most SPLM leaders in a unified front put aside their differences but this was not to be since positioning for political offices was rife.

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[50] (United Nations 2019)
[51] (Ghani and Lockhart 2008)
[52] (Medani 2011)

Notwithstanding this, there remained festering ethnic hostilities and bitter interpersonal rivalries, increasing under the pressures of setting up governing institutions and assuming increased responsibility for growth. These simmering tensions however erupted and South Sudan was back to full blown conflict and humanitarian crisis.[53]

1.8.2.5 Factors affecting linkage of IGAD and AU in maintaining peace and security in South Sudan

Most conflict situations in Africa have gone through a series of negotiations. Ordinarily, at the end of the negotiations, a peace agreement which is an integral part of conflict resolution should be reached. A third-party mediator plays a significant role in facilitating conditions for the exploration of lasting peace by conflicting parties. This combines military and security clauses, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and political stipulation.[54] In the peace agreement phase of conflict resolution, the representation of secondary parties in the conclusion of any peace agreement is equally important as the involvement of primary conflict actors.[55] This is because in the course of the conflict, secondary parties may be involved in the conflict by providing the parties with either material or psychological support.

Johan Galtung in his book Theories of Conflict considers value-based conflicts to be the hardest to resolve among all human conflicts.[56] In Europe this model of resolving conflicts has worked however in Sub-Saharan Africa the politics of 'who knows whom' complicate all efforts on sustainable peace within South Sudan.

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[53] (Blanchard 2013)
[54] (Adebo 2005)
[55] (Blanchard 2014)
[56] (Galtung 1958)

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According to the findings of the APSA Impact Report of 2016, the AU tackled twenty-eight out of sixty-seven conflicts, the report concludes that the African Union and the regional economic structures are more likely to be involved in high-intensity conflicts.[57] Seventy-eight percent of the measures were considered effective or partially effectual. The findings also noted that in maintaining Africa's peace and security, the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities have become strong, indispensable actors, but major challenges remain.[58] Some of the recommendations include the strong need for a more inclusive approach for civil society, particularly for youth and women and the need to strengthen regional integration and clearly divide the roles and responsibilities of APSA.[59]

1.8.2.6 Security Challenges of South Sudan

Introduction

When the CPA was signed in 2005, it provided for future engagements of the two states; Sudan and South Sudan. Historical triggers of antagonism were insufficiently addressed, and this has led to the prevailing situation in South Sudan.[60] Among the serious security issues are crimes against humanity; rape, murder, cattle rustling, arms and light weapons proliferation. Insecurity continues to be a major national concern. The Interim Constitution of South Sudan provides that in case of conflict between customary law and the Constitution, the latter prevails.

John Young in examining "The fate of Sudan," points out that Sudan's Peace Process is likely to fail and lead to persistent instability. Young argues that political expediency of

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[57] (Desmidt 2019)
[58] (Tavares 2009)
[59] (Institute for Peace and Security Studies 2017)
[60] (Sørbø 2010)

liberal peacemaking elevated elites at the loss of the civil society. Rather than concentrating on the authoritarian roots of the conflict and the nature of the Sudanese state, the CPAs architects remained fixated on forging any deal, following a standard, liberal internationalist checklist. As a result, the peace process actively side-lined multiple actors and reinforced the very elite-based power structures responsible for decades of civil war and political instability in Sudan.

1.8.2.7 Oil Interests and South Sudan Neighbours

Another cause of instability is the inadequate laws to guide the oil sector in South Sudan. There is also no formula for allocating local revenue and there is no regulatory mechanism. Indeed, the oil sector's management is corrupt; the sector's oil money has been a major source of conflict. If this resource is managed well then it may greatly improve the development goals of the country.

1.8.2.8 Roots of multi-faceted conflict of interest by IGAD member states on South Sudan

Conflicts in Africa have largely been mediated by parties with various ideas, expectations and inconsistencies thus leaving most of these problems unresolved. Sadly, the African Union's structures for resolving security issues, including the international community, have not brought any significant improvements to the various conflicts on the continent.[61]

IGAD has been in the middle of regional and international power politics that have

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[61] (Achankeng 2000)

undermined its negotiation and peace-building mission.[62] Due to ineptitude of its peace

building activities, IGAD was forced to call upon the international community to intervene in

the crisis in South Sudan, thereby creating a REC offshoot called IGAD-Plus.[63]

It should be noted that since IGAD established a decree for peace and security, there

has been no significant or recognized reduction in the level of conflict in the Horn of Africa or

any significant move towards collective security arrangements.[64]

The Horn of Africa continues to be clouded by obsolete inter-state rules of territorial

sovereignty and mutual non-interference on each other's affairs and lacks a regional security

mechanism to direct Member States.[65]

IGAD unfortunately due to many of the above variables is paralyzed due to existing

conflicts among its member states and is most unlikely to make progress in its key mandate in

regional conflict resolution and management.[66]

1.8.3 Summary of Gaps in the Literature

The current literature on regional peace and security has focused so much on specific

conflict areas and situations in Africa. The literature is also deficient to the link of African

Union and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) specifically IGAD.

It was also evident that there are few empirical studies that provide a clear and recent

account on the impact of IGAD on sustainable peace in South Sudan.

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[62] (Healy 2009)
[63] (Haysom 2006)
[64] (O'Brien 2007)
[65] (Healy 2011)
[66] (Pevehouse 2005)

Noticeably, AU regional role on sustainable peace in addition to the resultant areas of cooperation and how they can be explored further remains to a large extent unexplored. As a result, this study paper aimed at filling this gap.

1.9 Theoretical Literature Review

This study is anchored on the Liberal Theory as follows:

1.9.1 Liberalism Theory

According to Liberalists, the theory is anchored on two dominant fundamentals; co-operation and interdependence.[67]   As a theoretical standpoint, liberalism emphasizes that states are interdependent with non-state actors as a key feature of the international system. Therefore, key players in this theory are governments, international institutions and NGOs.

Liberalists claim that this interdependence leads to a society that is more equitable, stable and cooperative. They also make a positive critical paradigm that a politically open international economy with sovereign-based rules and institutions offers opportunities for international co-operation and influences foreign policy in a manner that promotes peace.[68]

The African Union and Regional Economic Communities work together based on reciprocated co-operation by all member states. Regional cooperation is therefore a key component of APSA dealings and is anchored on the PSC protocol.[69] For the pillars of the

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[67] (Walt 1998)
[68] (Keohane 2002)
[69] (Arthur 2017)

PSC to be effective, they must also work interdependently thus there is significant interplay of cooperation and interdependence.

The theory holds that International institutions can support states overcome anarchy through urging states to forego immediate gains in order to enhance cooperation.[70] Since there is no state that is self-sufficient then interdependence is also regarded to promote economies, and this discourages states from using force against each other. Thus, systemic factors eventually lead to conflict and co-operation behavior. Moravcsik also complements this report by stating that the relations of nation states from an intra to inter context is that they are closely associated, and this is what determines the behaviour of states in the world of politics. Communal philosophies, interests and institutions have a great impact on state behaviour as this is what determines the strategic intentions of governments.[71]

Another view of this theory states that due to interdependence of states economically, states are discouraged from using force against each other. The interdependence creates mutual respect that is garnered from co-operating through trade etc.[72] Countries that are interdependent on each other's resources would generally avoid instances of conflict as these would have a negative effect on their respective countries and thus, they pursue fostering of co-operation for the good of both countries.[73]

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[70] (Moravcsik 2006)
[71] (Moravcsik 1997)
[72] (Doyle and Recchia 2011)
[73] (McMillan 1997)

Chandler criticizes the conceptualization of the liberal perspective of peace, adding that it merely imposes Western ideals of state sovereignty which focus on elections where democracy is defined by winner takes it all, individual rights and economic philosophies of the free market.[74] This criticism is viewed as referring to most African states where leadership is forced on citizens and free-market ideals are clearly not applicable.[75]

In his criticism of Political Liberalism, Johnstone says that human beings need to develop a capacity for justice in order to build worthy lives. Rawls justice theory also supports justice as fairness, including nature and distribution of resources.[76] These philosophies of social justice give rise to idealistic views that may not be relevant in most cases. The central premise of liberal theory is that the ultimate players in politics are members of the domestic society who seek to promote individuals or private groups based on their independent interests. While states are embedded in civil society at home and abroad, their actions are constrained and based on international law. Thus, as much as states want to push their sovereignty, they can only push to some extent whereby they must work within international law and this constrains their actions e.g. during war where crimes against humanity are committed.[77]

Waltz also criticizes the liberal view that peace would be enhanced through economic interdependence and rejects the claim that bipolar states are more stable as compared to

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[74] (Chandler 2010)
[75] (Aune 2001)
[76] (Johnstone 1994)
[77] (Buchan 2002)

multipolar states and reaffirms that states pursue power because of the international system's distinctive structure of survival.[78]

Liberalists have been accused of being too egalitarian for the present world as they claim that tensions around the world can be significantly reduced, contributing to global stability. The fact of the matter is that there is no such thing as an ideal world with virtually no conflict thus opening to criticism.[79]

States behave in a singular logic and have diverse interests in decisions that they make. These interests prompt states to either react positively or negatively in a situation whereby they are required to co-operate. Co-operation in this case helps resolve underlying state interests.[80] The non-state actors AU and IGAD also have a strong influence in how states come together to resolve the conflict.[81]

In this study, IGAD has sought cooperation for peace and security in South Sudan through its member countries.[82] Although all member states have their distinct vested national interests in the ensuing conflict, they are bound by the international system through international laws.[83] Co-operation is the underpinning mode of the relationship between

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[78] (Waltz, Theory of International Politics 1979)
[79] (Barry and Valentini 2009)
[80] (Franceschet 2001)
[81] (Mcmurtry 1984)
[82] (Malan 1999)
[83] (Gaubatz 1996)

member states. Institutions also act as the sole mechanism for representation of social interests.[84]

Liberal views also say that liberal countries are more stable than non-liberal states and that the spread of liberalism around the world can mitigate global conflict.[85]

1.10 Research Methodology

Research methodology refers to methods or techniques used in the classification, collection, storage and analysis of data on a subject.[86] It clarifies the reasoning behind the selection of a specific method or procedure.[87]

Utilizing both subjective/qualitative and quantitative research approaches this study fundamentally will check on the role of the African Union in promoting Peace and Security with specific reference to IGAD and its role in South Sudan.

1.10.1 Research Methodology

This section provides a guideline of the methods of research that were used to undertake this study. The research methodology is outlined in the following sequence: study design, study location, methods of data collection, target population / sampling frame, sampling and sampling scale, ethical issues, interpretation and presentation of results, study range, research limitations and chapter outline.

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[84] (Carnoy and Castells 2002)
[85] (Slaughter 1995)
[86] (Kumar 1999)
[87] IBID

1.10.2 Study Design

Research design is a manual on how the research is directed.[88] It offers procedures and tools of analysis and data collection. The aim of a work layout is to ensure that we can reply as explicitly as possible to the initial question with the evidence obtained. Descriptive and exploratory observation was the research framework used in this study. The reason these research models were selected was principally because they are transparent and adaptable; they afford opportunities for varied research topic standpoints and are perfect for open-ended methods of data collection. By defining variables and theoretical concepts, this model obtained a lot of information by concise and explanatory. The layout of exploratory research tried to explore IGAD and its conflict management role in South Sudan.

Most of the study involved obtaining primary data using open-ended questions. The benefit of using such questions is that it allows respondents the ability to express themselves and provide more data. They also give reliable responses since their privacy is protected by respondents. Secondary data from official reports on the Horn of Africa, AU and South Sudan was obtained from IGAD.

Other resources related to peace and security reviewed were books on international law, sub-regional, regional and international peace treaties, including relevant data from educational and regional websites, UON library catalogues, databases of journals, reports and newspapers addressing peace and security issues.

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[88] (Groenewald 2004)

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1.10.4 Study Site

Part of this research will be performed in the field and in Nairobi specifically. Work on the field would enable the author to interview relevant peace and security officials and stakeholders. Diaspora citizens from South Sudan, South Sudan Embassy in Nairobi, Scholars from South Sudan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Rift Valley Institute.

1.10.5 Data Collection Methods

Qualitative analysis of data will be used based on its validity, reliability and adequacy to confirm the research hypothesis and in accordance with the research objectives. Also, qualitative data analysis has been selected since our study will not include a wide data set and it will be able to reveal patterns and themes in our data.

In this study, several methods of data collection were used, including an open-ended questionnaire for the key informants. It provided it with an advantage because the answers to the questions were not constrained. Besides primary data, secondary data was used.

1.10.6 Target Population (Sampling Frame)

A sampling frame is the collection of source materials from which the sample is chosen. The concept also includes the function of sampling frames for the selection of target population participants to be interviewed in the survey.[89]

In this study, the population represented by the sampling frame was the list from which the sample was selected. A correctly drawn sample provides enough data to identify the sampling system's population of elements.

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[89] (Turner 2003)

This study considered relevant officials and stakeholders in charge of peace and security. Diaspora citizens from South Sudan, South Sudan Embassy in Nairobi, Scholars from South Sudan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Rift Valley Institute. The target population was the same group of participants interviewed by the researcher. The population therefore matched a certain requirement that was being analyzed by the researcher. The target population was 55 for this study. It was stratified as a target through the different groups.

Table 1.1: Target Sample Size and Population

Sample Target	Sample Size
Diaspora Citizens	35
South Sudan Embassy in Nairobi	5
Scholars from South Sudan/Rift Valley Institute	10
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	5

1.10.7 Sampling and Sampling Size

Sampling refers to the selection process, including the type and number of respondents, for a representative sample of the target populace to be encompassed in the study area.[90] The non-probability method of sampling was used by the researcher which is also referred to as sampling method of purposeful or judgmental sampling as the selection of samples was focused on the research's nature of goals. Non-probability sampling infers that

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[90] (Wu 2005)

the sample is selected because of its relevance to the topic of the study rather than its '
representativeness, ' which determines how people are selected to be studied. Also, through
sampling through non-probability, the samples were collected in a method whereby not all
individuals in the population are given equal chances of being selected. The sample size was
55. The purposeful sampling approach was used to ensure that the group selected a
reasonable representative sample. The researcher then followed the Neuman's book principles
for a small population (under 100); for a high degree of accuracy, A broad sampling ratio
(approximately 30%) is required. Usually, purposeful sampling considers the most common
features of the form it wants to sample, tries to find out where to locate these people, and
attempts to research them. The aim of qualitative research, according to Glaser and Strauss,
should be to achieve saturation.[91] Saturation does not result in additional insights or
knowledge when more participants are added to the sample. Our sample size was therefore
set at 55.

1.10.8 Ethical Issues

The researcher was aware, while doing research, of what is considered acceptable and
what is not. Sometimes social research is an infringement into the lives of the people that
information is obtained from. It helps in building credibility. Ethical behavior depends on the
researcher.[92] The author had professional and moral responsibility to be ethical even if her
research subjects were subconscious or unaware of ethics.[93] Therefore, the author did not
benefit from the unfamiliarity of subjects ethically nor harm them in any way. The

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[91] (Glaser and Strauss 1999)
[92] (Neuman 1997)
[93] (Malhotra and Miller 1998)

researcher's questionnaires considered confidentiality and were used exclusively for academic purposes to protect any information given by her respondents.[94]

1.10.9 Data Analysis and Presentation

The collected data was coded. Coding involves providing numerical codes for all assumptions based on their context in order to enable data collection.[95] After coding, data was entered and analyzed using content analysis to analyze the data.[96] The percentage distribution was then used and the results in terms of description are presented in the form of a story and simple chart.

1.10.10 Scope of the Study

The study examined the African Union's role in the promotion of sustainable peace and security in Africa, focusing on the role of IGAD in conflict management in South Sudan. The analysis was limited to qualitative and quantitative methods of research.

1.10.11 Study Limitations

In general, qualitative design did not draw samples from large-scale data sets due to the time and costs involved. It also took a long time to collect, analyze and interpret data collected.[97] This study was also limited by sensitivity of information which many respondents may were not willing to provide.

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[94] (Peterson 2000)
[95] (Malhotra and Miller 1998)
[96] (Bowen 2008)
[97] (Mcmurtry 1984)

1.11 Chapter Summary

This Study is organized into six chapters:

Chapter 1 – Introduction & Background

This chapter provides a comprehensive background overview of the study and presents the Statement of Problems, Objectives, Research Questions, Hypotheses, Study Justification and Significance, Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology.

Chapter 2 - Impact of Conflict Management Mechanisms of AU on Peace and Security in Africa

This segment will assess how the ineffective conflict management mechanisms in AU and IGAD have led to high incidents of insecurity in Africa.

Chapter 3 – Triggers of conflict of Interest by IGAD member states on South Sudan

This chapter will assess the multifaceted conflict of interest among IGAD member States and how they have affected its capacity to realize peace and security in South Sudan.

Chapter 4 – National Interests of Kenya and Ethiopia that affect their capacity as mediators in South Sudan Crisis

This chapter will explore the underlying national interests that make Kenya and Ethiopia engage in the crisis in South Sudan and serve as deterrents to act as effective mediators as well.

Chapter 5 – Data Presentation and Analysis

This chapter will statistically analyze data collected through set data collection instruments and present the results in graphical format.

Chapter 6 – Summary and Recommendations

This will be the final chapter of the study whereby the researcher will provide valid summary and conclusions based on all data collected through the study and give appropriate recommendations that will guide policy and expansion of academic discipline in Peace and Security.

CHAPTER TWO

CONFLICT INTERVENTIONS OF AU AND IGAD IN AFRICA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The International Conflict Research (ICR) found that there were 90 active conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018.[98] This is a significant number of conflicts that the AU has had to deal with their prevention and management. The drive for ' Africans solving African problems' has contributed to the international community's position not to intervene with regional conflicts and has led to regional organizations developing new approaches to solving intra and inter regional conflicts.

The high number of active conflicts has advised on decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations to dedicate the highest number of UN troops to Africa in peacekeeping missions. Most of the troops have been deployed within the Horn of Africa which has been ravaged by protracted wars. The region is now famously described as "The Hot-bed of the world". Statistics have also indicated that terrorism incidents aimed at civilians have increased over the last three decades.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) statistics show an open-source database that tracks terrorist events around the world which indicates an exponential increase in terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2015, with the largest instances in 2010 and 2015, with a peak in 2014.[99] This being the case, IGAD and AU have been forced to develop innovative multi-pronged

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[98] (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2018)
[99] (University of Maryland n.d.)

strategies in setting up sustainable structures in the management of Africa's Peace and Security.

2.1.1 Sudan Peace Process

The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005 is the culmination of regional and international consultations refereed under the Intergovernmental Development Authority (IGAD) and the IGAD Partners ' Forum expanded to include the United States of America, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy and the United Nations. The symbolic signing of this treaty signaled the end of Africa's longest civil war. Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) became the ruling party in Southern Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) into South Sudan's Army. The strategic intention for this was independence, which would lead to an internationally monitored self-determination referendum. The outcome of this notable process was the birthing of the Republic of South Sudan on 9th July 2011.[100]

IGAD played a significant role in the mediation of the Sudan peace process and eventual prevention, management and resolution of conflicts whereby a meeting between the Government of Sudan and SPLM was facilitated. Kenya a significant neighbor was appointed mediator and succeeded in getting both parties to commit to the CPA of 2005.[101]

From this agreement both warring parties; Sudan and South Sudan had committed to upholding lasting peace however this peace did not hold for long as the relationship between the two independent countries continued to deteriorate fast and disputes over border security, proliferation of arms, oil production and exports of South Sudan oil began to fragment the

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[100] (Dewaal 2014)
[101] (Brereton and Ayuko 2016)

historical unity. Their commitment to also reduce the size of their military capacity on both sides also added to these woes. This failure to establish meaningful reforms on the SPLA after the CPA had also some bearing on the explosion of the crisis in December 2013.[102]

The failure of the Peace agreement was largely blamed on regional and international players which include the AU and by extension IGAD for lack of stringent follow-up that would ensure that pressure was exerted on the two governments to implement the pact.[103] Consequently, in 2015, the AU Peace Agreement - The Republic of South Sudan Mediation Framework named ARCSS was signed in Addis Ababa between the two belligerent factions supported by IGAD and supported through the establishment of legal mechanisms to pursue justice for human rights violations.[104] The AU is blamed for its lack of presence in administering the process and its lack of faith on the South Sudanese nationals over an African led conflict resolution and have engaged the international community for assistance. It is necessary to note that South Sudan inherited a country without structures and strong institutions to deal with the magnanimous conflict situation that has had a negative effect on expectations that would support the common citizen facing interrelated challenges of weak rule of law and insecurity.[105]

Assumptions that negative peace could resolve historical conflicts have also been proven wrong. The 2013 violence was not an isolated event but a buildup of crisis over a period. This was clear when the Agreement led by the Intergovernmental Development Authority (IGAD) was signed in Addis Ababa on 17 August 2015, when President Salva Kiir

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[102] (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2018)
[103] (African Union 2014)
[104] (Murithi 2012)
[105] (McNamee 2012)

expressed his disappointment with the agreement by stating that although all the parties to the agreement seemed happy with the foregoing; there was a new reality of critical reorganization that was going to take place.[106] By this statement President Salva Kiir had denounced his commitment to the CPA.[107]

The conflict which manifested as a political dispute spiraled into an intra-ethnic crisis between the Nuer and Dinka. Mahmood Mamdani, a representative of the AU Commission of Inquiry investigating the 2013 crisis, explains how the 2005 comprehensive peace framework that established South Sudan's state and government "was based on a militaristic premise that only those who waged war could decide the terms of peace." The height of this war was in 2014 however violence has since diminished, and most parts alternate between state of war and peace. Challenges of displacement of innocent civilians, violence and poverty continue to beleaguer the young state.

The AU has over time been known to have aggressive peace and security goals but are unable to get amicable reconciliation between the aggressive leaders.[108] Unfortunately, for South Sudan to have peace then leaders must give room for external interventions that impose peace for the good of civilians.[109]

2.1.2 Conclusion

There is no doubt that IGAD, its member states and the supporting international organizations have used vast resources of time, financing and political capital to help resolve

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[106] (The East African 2016)
[107] (Onditi, Sabala and Wassara 2018)
[108] (African Union 2014)
[109] (Williams 2010)

the South Sudan humanitarian crisis.[110] Key challenges of lack of institutions, focus on political elites, centralization of decision-making organs, internal divisions and power struggles have made the process of resolving the long-standing conflict to be difficult.

IGAD will need more diplomatic effort to resolve its disagreements and its leaders participate in IGAD-PLUS to succeed in ending the war in South Sudan. Regional Heads of State will have to agree on a unified political policy with the help of the high representative of the AU. IGAD will need more diplomatic effort to resolve its disagreements and its leaders participate in IGAD-PLUS to succeed in ending the war in South Sudan.

To support this strategy, IGAD-PLUS members should clearly outline the incentives that they can bring to the table. A dedicated UN envoy for South Sudan and Sudan will represent the UN and promote a more united approach to the wider international community, using the required and contextually relevant means to persuade the unruly South Sudanese parties to agree. IGAD-PLUS is the last, best chance for peace in the near term, however flawed the process is, and its progress is crucial to prevent further uncertainty in South Sudan and the region.[111]

The transitional government controls most of the country, in addition to other factors, and should be encouraged to promote peace and improve living conditions. Revive the AU High-Level South Sudan Ad Hoc Committee, informally known as AU5, comprising of Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa, Chad and Rwanda in order to bring back peace to South Sudan.

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[110] (Adar 2000)
[111] (International Crisis Group 2015)

2.2 Somali Peace Process

2.2.1 Introduction

The African Union's regional operations to maintain peace in Somalia through AMISOM -African Union Mission in Somalia were deployed in March 2007 with the approval of the United Nations with the sole mandate of setting up transitional governance structures, nation-wide security plan, ensuring that the environment is secure for the delivery of humanitarian aid and training of Somali security forces.[112] This deployment is feted as the largest, most costly and deadliest peace keeping operation in the history of the African Union. Somalia conflict has increasingly crossed borders posing a direct security risk to both its neighbours and the African continent as well.

2.2.2 The Somali Peace Process

The sovereign state of Somalia gained independence by 1960, when the two territories of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland merged.[113] This predominantly Muslim country with an estimated population of 11 million is part of the Horn of Africa in the region of Eastern Africa. Dictator Mohamed Siad Barre led a bloodless coup in 1969 and was subsequently forced into exile for twenty-two years after his military government was ousted in January 1991 by the United Somali Congress.[114] He went into exile in Nigeria in 1992. The collapse of the state led to warlords dividing Somalia into 3; Somali Repulic, Puntland State of Somalia (former Italian Somalia) and South-Central Somalia.[115] The UN intervened through UNOSOM I (United Nations Operations in Somalia I) which run for a period of one

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[112] (African Union 2019)
[113] (Caroll and Rajagopal 1992)
[114] (Ayalew 2012)
[115] (Murithi December 2008)

year (April 1992 – March 1993) with a 500-man effort. UNOSOM could however not reach its intended mandate due to complete breakdown of civil order. This called for the launching of peacekeeping mission UNITAF (United Task Force), code name 'Operation Restore Hope' which was a US led and UN sanctioned multinational force which operated from December 1992 to May 1993. The main mandate for UNITAF was to effect United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 tasked with creating a secure environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the Southern half of Somalia.[116]

The continued civil strife led to one of US historic failures when an American Black Hawk UH-60 helicopter was shot and three soldiers on board were killed and shortly afterward two additional Black Hawks UH-60 were shot down killing eighteen US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis. Although elder clansmen in January 1994 agreed to a ceasefire, the two leaders of the warring factions did not attend the talks thus indicating lack of commitment to the process. In May 1993, the UN intervened with UNISOM II (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) with an aggressive mandate of enforcement. This mission was considered a failure as after 15 months the US withdrew its troops followed shortly by the UN peacekeepers in March 1995.[117]

Although the decree of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and UNOSOM II was largely carried out to provide humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Somalia, its presence ended in tragedy. The UN intervention has been argued to worsen the civil war by acknowledging warlords as a legitimate political force. Among other things, by giving them the status they do not deserve, the warlords were treated as legitimate

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[116] (United Nations Security Council 1992)
[117] (United Nations Security Council 2019)

interlocutors. This by far contributed for the consolidation of clan politics.

Besteman points out that the crisis in Somalia has endured because of the highly militarized environment of mistrust and the supremacy of violent political struggles.[118] However, efforts to restore stability in Somalia have been progressive. The AU is now on the forefront in peace building and there has been considerable achievement indicating that when regional bodies have a key role in resolving issues within their member states.

2.3 Central African Republic (CAR) Conflict

2.3.1 Introduction

The Republic of Central Africa (CAR) has been witnessed years of conflict and instability since gaining independence in 1960. The country is land locked and borders Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, DRC Congo and Cameroon and has a population of around 4.6 million. While the country is rich in minerals – gold, oil, diamonds and uranium, it has one of the poorest populations in the world and is devastated by conflict.[119]

According to Global Conflict Tracker in 2019, approximately 2.9 Million CAR citizens are in urgent and dire need of humanitarian assistance, approximately 641,000 people have been internally displaced and the UN Peace Keeping personnel are now at 14,632.[120] 75% of the population now lives in poverty.

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[118] (Besteman 1996)
[119] (Human Rights Watch 2019)
[120] (Global Conflict Tracker 2019)

2.3.2 The CAR Sectarian Conflict

The Central African Republic has for decades faced economic, social and political crises after gaining independence from French colonial powers. Unfortunately, this situation has been aggravated by 10 military coups between 2005 and 2015 with various leadership. The country is described as a 'phantom state' due to the absence of security forces and its inability to establish government institutions after its independence occasioned by the stormy history of political instability and violent conflict.

The conflict in CAR begun when the Muslim rebel coalition, Seleka attacked different cities and launched an offensive against the government and President Francoise Bo'zize regime in 2012. They later staged a successful coup in March 2013 thus seizing the Capital city of Bangui. The rivaling group – Anti-Balaka generally had Christian fighters. The situation was, therefore, a mixture of religious chaos and hostility among Muslims and Christians, significant deterioration of safety in the region, and increased ethnic rivalry.

More than two-thirds of the population needs humanitarian assistance and protection and half of this number is children. Crimes against humanity such as gender-based violence (GBV) are alleged to be committed every 60 minutes with the main victims being women and girls. The population also has no access to clean and safe water and almost 50% of the population is food insecure.

Anti-balaka forces launched massive revenge attacks on Muslim civilians in September 2013 and displaced thousands of Seleka people in the northern part of CAR. The Government however intervened and scattered the Seleka forces who congregated and began revenge attacks thereby plunging the country into a serious war-torn state followed by a humanitarian

crisis. Around 575,000 of the internally displaced people have been fleeing to Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

When President Faustin Archange Touadera was elected in 2016, this did not also change the situation however a territorial partition did help in minimizing the conflict between Muslims and Christians but the fighting between the factions of the ex-Seleka have increased. Disarmarment programs have also not been successful since the Government only controls the capital – Bangui. The situation outside the Capital has been chaotic leading to the thriving of the armed groups in eastern, Western and Central provinces.

2.3.3 CAR Civil War Interventions

The UN initiated MINUSCA with deep concern for the retrogression of political, security, humanitarian rights in the Central African Republic.[121] Studies by human rights groups indicate that human rights violations and war crimes have been perpetrated by both the Seleka forces and anti-balaka militias. MINUSCA was therefore mandated to protect civilians and ensure that support for transition processes are progressed as a matter of urgency. This deployment of MINUSCA was signed off by the Security Council on 10th April 2014[122] as a ceasefire mission anchored in Chapter seven of the UN Charter focusing on action on threats to stability, infractions to peace and violent acts.[123] By this charter under articles 39 to 51, the African Union peace keeping force known as MISCA was transformed in a UN peace keeping mission and became operation on 15 September 2014.[124]

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[121] (Welz 2016)
[122] (United Nations 2019)
[123] (United Nations 2019)
[124] (W. Dersso 2015)

MINUSCA currently has more than 15,000 troops on the ground ensuring that they focus on repatriation process, reintegration, disarmament, demobilization, defense of human rights, facilitating humanitarian assistance and overall supporting the transition process.[125] In carrying out its mission of protecting civilians and dismantling armed groups, MINUSCA faces significant challenges, largely due to insufficient resources and unwillingness to intervene militarily. Numerous attacks on UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers have also been carried out, making the efforts to maintain peace ineffective.

2.4 Factors that Impede Peace in Central African Republic (CAR)

2.4.1 Insufficient Donor Funding

It is reported that in 2018, over 60% of the humanitarian requirements could not be implemented due to insufficient funds. This is a serious situation since when AU and International donors through their different countries do not prioritize funding to implement security measures in CAR thus humanitarian crisis will continue to exuberate.[126]

In 2019, USD.515 Million is required to address the existing needs. To put this into perspective, only 10% of this funding had been provided by May 2019 making CAR to be the most deserted humanitarian crisis in the world by the international community.

2.4.2 State Capture by armed Groups

The existing government in CAR in 2019 is domiciled in the Capital City Bangui which has a population of 734,000 representing 15% of the total population.[127] This therefore leaves 85% of the regions under armed groups and militias.   Although the Central African

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[125] (Akonor 2017)
[126] (Lombard 2016)
[127] (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti 2009)

Republic is 42nd largest country in the world, the small population also sparsely populated with only 8 people per square kilometer.[128]   Population distribution thus makes implementation of humanitarian support to be extremely difficult coupled with the poor funding and scarce resources provided by the international community. These circumstances have led to internally displaced persons from not returning home due to the continued violence and conflict.

2.4.3 Population Dynamics

The continued crisis in Central African Republic has ignited shift of thousands of the population to neighboring countries especially Cameroun and Democratic Republic of Congo. Correspondingly, due to civil strife thousands continue to be killed in the conflict.   This population displacement has led to the country having a young population comparatively in the world. According to the United Nations, more than 75% of the population is under 35 years old. These demographic dynamics have increased insurgency by militias since the young population is largely unemployed and easy target for recruitment by armed rebel groupings. Thus, prospects of peace and security continue to diminish.

2.4.4 Targeting of Humanitarian Staff

One of the strategies for Militias to continue being strong in Central African Republic, humanitarian aid workers are the most vulnerable targets, and this has ranked the country as the most dangerous for aid workers.[129]   Unfortunately, a study conducted by Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD) indicates that approximately 107 aid workers have been killed

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[128] (World Population Review 2019)
[129] (Ramalingam 2012)

within the period 2013 and 2019 majorly through unrelentless shooting through ambush.[130]

Majority of aid agencies are unwilling to send their staff to this volatile environment or at best defer humanitarian schedules thus making the vulnerable population to be in dire need and crisis of basic needs.[131]

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[130] (USAID 2019)
[131] (Burnell 1997)

CHAPTER THREE

TRIGGERS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST BY IGAD MEMBER STATES ON SOUTH SUDAN

3.1 Introduction

South Sudan's intra-conflict has created a massive humanitarian catastrophe with an estimated 2.3 Million people documented to have crossed the borders to neighbouring countries i.e. Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. Internally, close to two million residents have been displaced exuberating the situation and thus making South Sudan to be the country with the largest refugee crisis in the continent after Syria and Afghanistan.[132] This situation has now introduced regional dynamics which are influencing greatly the political posture that neighboring countries are taking in the South Sudan's security landscape.[133] Understanding and exploring these territorial elements, on both a bilateral and multilateral level, is a vital part of accomplishing security stability in South Sudan.

3.2 Refugee Integration and Re-settlement

South Sudan's humanitarian crisis is classified as the biggest human population movement due to the protracted conflict and this has had an undesirable outcome on its relationship with its neighbors.[134] It is recorded that between 2016 and 2017 approximately 1.6 Million refugees fled to neighboring countries as follows; Ethiopia (380,000), Kenya (105,000), Democratic Republic of Congo (80,000), Uganda (1 Million), and (2,000) in

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[132] (UNHCR 2019)
[133] (Mbembé and Rendall 2000)
[134] (Kirbyshire, et al. 2017)

Central African Republic.[135] This situation has caused a humanitarian emergency. Internally displaced persons in South Sudan are 4.3 Million and include refugees, asylum seekers and IDP's. 63% of these numbers are aged under 18 years and majority of the affected are women and children. Uganda and Sudan are reported to host more than half of all refugees from South Sudan.

With the magnitude of these crises it is therefore the greatest refugee catastrophe in Africa and the world's third largest after Syria and Afghanistan. Most of these refugees have settled in camps with only 8% living in their own accommodation.[136] Uganda has been greatly affected by this human movement and now hosts Africa's largest number of refugees, 69% being from South Sudan and is currently ranked third largest refugee hosting country worldwide.[137] Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are among the top ten refugee hosting countries among IGAD member states. This refugee crisis continues to reignite conflict and affects peace and security. Refugee crisis has now become a multifaceted challenge to sustainable development and has increased poverty since majority of the refugees are not comfortable to return to their countries once peace is restored.[138]

A Voice of America (VOA) interview with Uganda's State Minister for internally displaced in 2019 revealed that Uganda's capability to help was being tested by the South Sudan's Situation by hosting over one million people from South Sudan only whereas the numbers have always remained stable between 200,000 and 300,000 persons even when hosting refugees from DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.[139]

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[135] (Carmody 2017)
[136] (UNHCR 2019)
[137] (Bariagaber 2016)
[138] (Sriram, Martin-Ortega and Herman 2017)
[139] (Voice of America 2019)

The challenges of refugee integration and resettlement are immense. In May 2019, the United Nations Refugee Agency and Uganda government appealed for USD.927 Million to address refugee funding until 2020. Unfortunately, this appeal was marred by allegations of misuse from previous aid and exaggeration of refugee numbers which led to the firing of several Ugandan officials. The Uganda refugee situation although serious, is no longer viewed by donors as an emergency which is a drawback in the resettlement of refugees. Although Uganda has maintained an open-door policy towards the South Sudanese refugees, they are also benefiting from the situation by re-routing the funds required for basic needs of the refugees. In 2018, the UNHCR confirmed that only 57% of the Uganda refugee response plan was funded.[140] The question now is whether Uganda is truly committed to supporting restoration of peace in South Sudan.

3.2.1 Economic Interests fueling Insecurity in South Sudan

The economy of Southern Sudan is regarded as the most fragile and the most under developed in the world. Humanitarian petitions to provide South Sudan with support have over the years of this intra-conflict been severely underfunded. In 2018, the UN appealed for USD.1.72 Billion and only 68% of this budget was funded. The same has been repeated in 2019 whereby USD.1.5 Billion was requested for critical support and only 30% funding has been provided. With this situation, it is obvious that human suffering will linger if funding continues to decline and mediation efforts are not arrived at quickly. The roles that South Sudan's neighbours and alliances play in the conflict are majorly viewed from an economic

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[140] (UNHCR 2019)

point.[141]   The natural rich resources of South Sudan have played a critical part in how the neighbours want the conflict resolved and how they run their interests within South Sudan.[142] According to Paanluel Wel Media Limited in South Sudan, UN agencies and International NGO's are on a labour looting spree through available employment opportunities.[143]   These agencies have been flooded with staff from Kenya, Ethiopia, Congo and Uganda who are the immediate neighbours.

South Sudan's natural resources have played a key part in triggering these economic interests too.   Majority of South Sudan Government revenue – 98% of it comes from petroleum.   The oil reserves are estimated to be 472 million tons.   Oil production has decreased steadfastly and foreign investors in oil drilling and production have in the evolution of the situation increased.   After secession from Sudan, South Sudan had to share with Sudan 50% of oil proceeds.   Sudan has taken advantage of the situation that South Sudan is land locked and must rely on Sudan's pipeline to export to the international market its oil.

Besides oil affairs, the politics around the building of (GERD) - the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam became another important factor as South Sudan's civil war progressed.[144] To contextualize these dynamics, it is worth observing that the agreement signed in 1929 on Nile Waters between Egypt and Britain granted Egypt an unprecedented monopoly in the administration and use of the Nile River water, notwithstanding that ninety-seven percent of the water flowing into the Nile originates outside Egypt's territory. The Blue Nile, originating in the highlands of Ethiopia, contributes approximately eighty five percent of the Nile's

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[141] (Otieno n.d.)
[142] (Ross 2003)
[143] (UNHCR 2019)
[144] (Chen and Swain 2014)

overall flow. The rest comes from rivers and lakes in the southern riparian states (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Kenya).

In 1956, Egypt concluded a bilateral pact with Sudan to cede 18.5 billion cubic meters per annum, that allowed Sudan to build hydroelectricity and irrigation systems in Gezira State for growing cotton and other crops. Since then, Egypt has opposed claims by the other riparian states, asserting "historical rights" over the Nile waters on which it depends for all its domestic, agricultural, and industrial use.

With population pressure mounting, however, these riparian states have increasingly sought ways to exploit the Nile's upstream as well as other water bodies in its catchment area for electricity and irrigation.

When the agreement on the cooperative framework of the Nile Basin (CFA) was accepted by Ethiopia and the other riparian states in 2010, Egypt and Sudan were the only states to decline its implementation.[145] The CFA sets out the framework for use and management of Nile water and was signed by Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda.[146]

The GERD construction in Ethiopia, which will hold sixty two billion cubic meters of water, incensed Egypt who reportedly threatened war in Ethiopia if the flow of Nile were interrupted and has lobbied the other CFA signatories not to ratify the treaty.

As the dispute over the GERD continued, GOSS, with alleged facilitation from Uganda, strengthened its diplomatic relations with Egypt with the aim of weakening Sudan and Ethiopia's influence in South Sudan. In 2017, it was alleged that Egypt, which cooperates

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[145] (Tawfik and Rawia 2015)
[146] (Salman 2013)

with the GOSS on water projects in South Sudan, not only provided funding but also supplied military goods and services to the GOSS through Uganda. Although Egypt and South Sudan do not share a border, the former's concern over sustainable access to Nile waters informs its interest in South Sudan, which occupies 45 percent of the Nile Basin.

For its part, Kenya's economic interests in South Sudan are in the banking sector and air transport industries. Besides running vibrant businesses in different sectors, Kenyan nationals have formed a key part of the burgeoning hotel staff in South Sudan. Several banks have shut down mainly due to currency destabilization, while one of three Kenyan airlines originally operating in South Sudan collapsed due to its reported inability to move over two million dollars out of South Sudan. [147]

3.2.2 Structural Flaws of IGAD

The role played by IGAD in Southern Sudan goes back to the signing of the cease-fire agreement - (CPA), which was negotiated under its patronage. IGAD also played a noteworthy role in the negotiation of the agreement on the determination of conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) by bringing in international support in resolving the protracted crisis. [148]

IGAD has also been mandated by the African Union (AU), with the support of the countries of the Troika (Britain, Norway and the United States) and the wider international community, to lead the progress in the ARCSS work of the monitoring Committee and Joint assessment (JMEC).

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[147] (Vertin 2018)
[148] (Vhumbunu 2016)

Despite this ongoing commitment, IGAD has so far been unable to advance the required demeanor of the South Sudan warring parties.

In addition, regional competing interests have exacerbated the current crisis, adding to its complexity. Difficult situations of violent conflicts, social fragmentation and economic turmoil facing Southern Sudan since the signing of ARCSS in 2015 could have been the area of the solutions if the international community and acted in a coordinated manner.

Indeed, the ARCSS provides the basis for addressing the origin of the crisis. However, IGAD and the letdown by the international community to develop a common approach to ensure that the terms of the agreement are respected, inhibited a robust response when many initial violations of the agreement are not canceled. The lack of an approach by the international community allowed the perpetrators, the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to get away with violations which undermine the ARCSS. The lack of a credible response means that are ignored by the GOSS repetitive and ineffective threats. Inaction on these violations, and violations unabated human rights seem to have convinced the parties to the agreement that regional organizations are ineffective, impotent, and mere paper pushers. Part of the problem is conflicting economic regional actors, political, and security in South Sudan.

3.2.3 Security and Territorial Interests

Security and territorial interests of IGAD member states have constantly aided in exacerbating the conflict in South Sudan.[149] From the disrupting outcomes of the civil strife in

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[149] (Healy 2011)

the territory of Sudan, IGAD member states were gradually stirred and encouraged to come together and broker a peace deal with the belligerent warlords.

In the 1990's, the Yoweri Museveni's government in Uganda was infiltrated in the northern region by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which had become a threat to the regime.[150] To subdue this situation, Uganda endeared itself to rebel opposition SPLM/A that was headed by John Garang and supported peace initiatives within the Sudan's territory. Khartoum was on the other hand supporting the LRA. Uganda's efforts eventually paid off when LRA's traction was contained however its interests in South Sudan still linger.

Ethiopia's western region – Gambela was the entry point for refugee inflows from Sudan's territory, which also acted as the SPLM/A haven.[151] When the Ethiopia's new regime took over, support that had previously been given to the SPLM/A warlords ceased and the rebels that were managing Gambela were expelled. Since then, Ethiopia has sought to provide neutral assistance to the South Sudan crisis as it pursues it regional hegemony on matters peace and security. Unlike other IGAD nations, Ethiopia has, for the most part, given neutral and objective stewardship on the Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the republic of South Sudan peace talks signed in Addis Ababa on 17th August 2015.

Regionally, there has been fears of escalation of Islamism extremism if the war in South Sudan is not resolved.[152] Out of the fear of terrorist uprising, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea have forged together to ensure that the increasing level of Islamism from

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[150] (Lomo and Hovil 2004)
[151] (Young and Walmsley 2007)
[152] (Ylönen 2014)

Khartoum and through the porous Juba is mitigated to minimize situations of political volatility and aggression in the region.

3.2.4 Political Interests

Once independence was given to South Sudan, it resulted in a loss of 1/4 of Sudan's territory and 3/4 of its export earnings amounting to around $13 billion. This culminated to a considerable and permanent loss of more than a third of the government's revenue.[153] This fragile state was feared that it would reverse the efforts made on the signing of the South Sudan peace truce. Sudan therefore strategically permeated South Sudan's government in its desire to influence events in Juba.[154] Ironically, Sudan had strong political reasons to want cautious relations with Juba, given these events.[155]

3.3 Justice and Accountability

Another defining issue that frames how regional actors approach the South Sudan conflict is justice and accountability for the atrocities committed since 2013.[156]

The South Sudan Human Rights Commission under the United Nations has identified 40 South Sudanese warlords as complicit in crimes against humanity and war crimes.[157] Regionally, there has been great hostility against international justice and its Court and the case of South Sudan unfortunately brings to the fore these debates on how to enforce peace

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[153] (Medani, Strife and Secession In Sudan 2011)
[154] (Naylor 2014)
[155] (Tutlam 2013)
[156] (Schomerus and Rigterink 2018)
[157] (Jacobson 2005)

and justice.[158] In fact, the geography of international justice in Africa now seems to overlap effortlessly with the physical map of the Greater Horn of Africa.[159]

The international tribunals have been accused of unfairly targeting African leaders in its pursuit for justice. The Horn of Africa has most of its member states undergoing the tribunals. Notably Central Africa Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, DRC Congo have been key subjects with Kenya going the long haul and being indicted which did not go down well with other African countries where they opposed the Court.[160]

The African Union has been active in setting up various Judicial Commissions to undertake justice for victims of war crimes in Africa. Although the commission set up for South Sudan has so far failed to bear fruit following the AU's second attempt, South Sudanese nationals are hopeful that all perpetrators of war crimes will be brought to book.[161]

3.4 Conclusion

The national interests of regional actors has complicated the conflict in South Sudan through the provision of financial, military, and unwavering diplomatic support to belligerents who are indifferent to the face of a worsening humanitarian situation.[162] Regional support should also be given in the form of sidelining of Riek Machar as well as the arrest and

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[158] (Rangelov, Theros and Kandić 2018)
[159] (Nouwen, James and Srinivasan 2018)
[160] (Llewellyn and Philpott 2014)
[161] (Hansen 2013)
[162] (Zunes and Mundy 2010)

prosecution of South Sudan of opposition leaders.[163] The conflict in South Sudan is festering

because of the narrow interests of regional players and the international community's inability

to take firm action through execution of arms embargo and targeted sanctions.

The way forward to resolving this protracted conflict would be to enforce stringent

sanctions and active judicial process that leads to prosecution. In the past, reforms of the

security sector have been doomed by a lack of political will. One of the consequences of this

failure is that the sector remains one of the main destabilizing forces in the country. The

proposals made in this review could contribute to the creation of a capable, accountable, and

effective security sector.

However, reforms are unlikely to take root in the prevailing political, economic,

social, and institutional environment. Broader institutional reforms are necessary to build the

foundation for and foster the deepening of the rule of law while strengthening democratic

institutions. Additional reforms to circumscribe and limit the powers of the political branches

(executive and legislative), empower those on the periphery, expand human rights protection,

and facilitate democratic expression are imperative as is the need to combat the entrenched

culture of impunity.[164]

The United States has called for the UNSC to impose further sanctions and embargoes

on South Sudan due to arms.[165] This comes in the wake of a worsening situation marked by

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[163] (Washburne 2010)
[164] (Kuol 2018)
[165] (Vines 2012)

mounting numbers of those displaced currently standing at 4.3 million (including 2 million refugees), restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and unabated gross human rights abuses. Although the UNSC may continue to be divided over South Sudan, the early signs of a shift in U.S. policy toward South Sudan may provide opportunity for building a unified and common position within IGAD on the peace agreement and the fate of the TGoNU.[166]

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[166] (Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan in Germany 2016)

CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONAL INTERESTS OF KENYA AND ETHIOPIA THAT AFFECT THEIR CAPACITY AS MEDIATORS IN SOUTH SUDAN CRISIS

4.1 Introduction

National interest is a concept that has existed since nation-states were established and refers to the goals and aspirations of foreign sovereign entities.[167] It also refers to other elements of the nation's security. National interest is also termed as the general interests of the country in international relations, such as the principles, aspirations and specifics that together shape a state's foreign policy.[168]

National interests are based on the premise that nation-state leaders act rationally in pursuit of state goals and enact policies that the leaders believe will promote society's well-being regardless of the constitutional system.[169] National interest is presumed to be power that a state exudes in realist theories while in neorealist theories it is understood to be state survival at the minimum and power at the maximum.[170] Survival is deemed to be the basic goal for states as they pursue their political ends.[171] Power equations lie at the heart of how

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[167] (Burchill 2005)
[168] (Stolberg 2012)
[169] (Nuechterlein 1976)
[170] (Morgenthau 1978)
[171] (Waltz 1979)

states are thinking about the world around them.[172] Power is the currency of politics of great power, and states compete for it.[173] Not only does power drive states, human nature drives the need for power, and this is replicated in the international system. Because survival or control exists at the national or social level, these assumptions about political goals lead further to the assumption that states are the precise unit of analysis in theories of world politics.[174]

4.2 Kenya's Foreign Relations with South Sudan

In its political past, Kenya has played a key role in being neutral in terms of peace and security between two amorphous classes of extreme and moderate states.[175] It is on this basis that Kenya has had strong bilateral ties with South Sudan that traverse economic, social and political interests and therefore a key strategic partner for Kenya.[176] Therefore, Kenya has been very cautious in ensuring that it remains neutral and that its interests do not interfere with the slow and long process of peace through the strategic position Kenya holds in the ongoing mediation of South Sudan. During one of the key meetings held in Nairobi in 2018, Kenya's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Macharia Kamau is quoted saying that 'Kenya will not allow its interests to interfere with the South Sudan Peace talks.' This was a significant statement since South Sudan neighbours have been unable to veil their various interests especially during the peace talks.[177]

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[172] (Gomory and Baumol 2000)
[173] (Mearsheimer 2001)
[174] (Lake 2007)
[175] (Howell 1968)
[176] (The Brookings Institution 2014)
[177] (The East African 2018)

Kenya's South Sudan relations date back to before it achieved independence in 2011. In the negotiation process, Kenya played a pivotal role that culminated in the historic signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as a precursor for referendum in South Sudan and subsequent independence.[178]

4.3 Kenya's National Interests in South Sudan

4.3.1 Economic Interests

The shared vision of cooperation between Kenya and South Sudan has led to positive trade ties over the last few years. South Sudan is ranked significantly as the 141st export economy in the world. In 2017, exports from South Sudan were $1.23B and imported $532M, contributing to a progressive balance of trade of $697M. South Sudan's exports have risen from $575 million in 2012 to $1.23 billion in 2017 at an annualized rate of 16.2% over the past six years. The top exports from Africa are from Uganda at USD.5.29M while the top import origins are from Uganda at USD.253M and Kenya at USD.161M.[179] These trade indicators project the need for co-operation which otherwise would have an effect on Kenya's and South Sudan's Gross Domestic Production (GDP) as well as opening land-locked countries i.e. South Sudan, Uganda and DRC Congo.[180] To boost this, South Sudan and Kenya have entered infrastructural collaboration in building roads that would benefit both countries. The latest agreement is in 2019 where Kenya and South Sudan are implementing the LAPSSET Corridor Highway (Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor) and plans for Eldoret-Lokichoggio-Nadapal-Kapoeta-Torit – Juba road are also

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[178] (Peace Accords 2005)
[179] (OEC 2019)
[180] (Mburu 2013)

underway. Infrastructure projects are projected to improve the living standards of the inhabitants through provision of employment opportunities on these highways and at the ports where ships will be off-loading cargo.

4.3.2 Security Interests

Fundamental to Kenya's peace and security diplomacy is the recognition of peace and stability as a necessary pre-condition for development and prosperity under the 'Peace Diplomacy Pillar' in Kenya's foreign policy.[181] The conviction of Kenya that its own security and economic well-being depend on the stability of the sub-region, Africa, and the rest of the world is linked to this. [182] This ideology has given Kenya a reputable position among its peers in the region and put Kenya at the forefront of the fight against violent extremism and acts of terrorism through the support of IGAD, AU and United Nations.

Kenya has also played its diplomacy card in support of security in the region when President Omar Al Bashir visited Kenya in August 2010. Sudan's president had been accused by the international criminal court of masterminding the genocide in Darfur which is a crime against humanity. Kenya's government cited that it had strategic interests in Sudan and that his arrest would have unfavorably had an effect in Sudan's peace and stability which is crucial to the enduring peace and well-being of Kenya.[183] On-going mediation efforts were also cited as also one of the key reasons that his arrest would scuttle all the effort that had been put in bringing all the warring parties to the table.

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[181] (Evoy 2013)
[182] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001)
[183] (Associated Press Service 2010)

Kenya has supported peace efforts by the African Union and United Nations by significantly providing troops to these organizations in order to combat atrocities committed in countries under civil strife and by providing leadership in peacekeeping missions across the continent and globally. Through this obligation of restoring peace in the region, in 2017 Kenya was appointed the lead command of the forces based in Darfur by the United Nations which indicates confidence in Kenya's East African region leadership. Kenya has also been in involved in numerous actions in promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts and has been able to work closely with other African countries in strengthening institutional capacity of regional institutions to prevent, manage and resolve emerging conflicts. These key issues make Kenya to have a major stake and national interest in what is going around the region and specifically in South Sudan.

4.3.3 Regional Integration

Kenya has been an integral player in Africa in promoting regional stability which is also a key foundation of how Kenya works with other sovereign states.[184] Regional integration has had its advantages whereby countries have resolved conflicts and used the opportunity to boost trade.[185] Kenya has been in various institutions, the East African Community (EAC) which constitutes all its neighbours, Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which includes more countries in the horn of Africa, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) that enables Kenya access Africa's largest economic trade block by providing Kenyan exports with a large market and is a major source

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[184] (Daniel and Cheeseman 2008)
[185] (mattli 1999)

of significant investment opportunities for stakeholders in Kenya.[186] The African Union also has been where Kenya uses it as a platform to pursue its strategic national interests which can be political, trade, security etc.[187]

On this basis, Kenya had to participate in the guarantee of peace and stability in South Sudan to reinforce peace and mutual support of its neighbours and minimize risk of destabilizing regional integration and ongoing large-scale infrastructural projects.[188]

4.4 Ethiopia's National Interests in South Sudan

4.4.1 Introduction

There is no doubt that Ethiopia is one country that is geopolitically central in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has for decades been perceived to be a neutral player in the international arena and this notion has progressively been nurtured through the establishment of strategic partnerships. Ethiopia has actively performed a crucial role in being a member of the United Nations and this is what has led to Ethiopia being appointed at the UN Security Council for two years. This is a critical position where matters on the Horn of Africa have been submitted ably through the representation of Ethiopia.[189] This strategic positioning of Ethiopia in IGAD as well as its appointment of its top diplomat Mr. Sevoum Mesfin to lead South Sudan international mediation process has gradually strengthened its presence in global affairs and endorsed the view of being the hegemon in the region. Ethiopia has invested greatly in bringing together the region to preserve peace and security by marshalling other countries in

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[186] (Khadiagala 2009)
[187] (African Union 2019)
[188] (United Nations African Renewal 2014)
[189] (Byiers 2016)

the region towards a common approach thus technically being recognized as a force to reckon regionally.[190]

4.4.2 Security

For the last seventy-four years, Ethiopia has been a member of the United Nations and has played key roles in support of various peace and security objectives that have been significant to international peace.[191]

Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, Rwanda, Liberia and DRC Congo can also not be understated.[192] The country has single-handedly managed to be the principal troop contributing country globally and this has not been a minor fete, but it instructs on where Ethiopia wants to be positioned in the world. The country has provided over 8,000 troops as peacekeepers who work in various missions of the United Nations globally. Twenty-five percent of these troops i.e. two thousand in numbers are in South Sudan and this has reiterated Ethiopia's interests in pursuing peace and stability in South Sudan. The findings of UNHCR 2018 indicate that four out of five refugees stay in countries that are neighboring their country of origin. Ethiopia also hosts over 400,000 internally displaced persons at the Gambela region. Unfortunately, Ethiopia now follows Uganda and is now the third largest refugee host country in Africa as at 2019.[193]

Based on these scenarios, security agenda has been prioritized to support its internal military strength. Ethiopia through president Abiy Ahmed's administration has revamped its

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[190] (Nyaba 2019)
[191] (White 1997)
[192] (United Nations 2018)
[193] (UNHCR 2018)

defense forces through addition naval forces which form a critical component of its military and defense capabilities in the region in the event of cross border interference.

4.4.3 Social Interests in South Sudan

Through its geostrategic position Ethiopia has been keen to boost its image globally through active participation in global affairs which include conflict prevention, fostering capacity building and information sharing and generally working on how to increase Ethiopia's credibility in the world.[194] This has consequently made Ethiopia to be involved in social activities that have capitalized its bilateral relations with South Sudan.[195] Management of border relations between the two countries has also been key since the two countries share two key ethnic communities the Nuer and Anyuak who have for a long time suffered intra-communal tensions. Thus, these communal affairs have had to managed to ensure conflict is minimized within the borders. Ethiopia's main refugee inflows from South Sudan are of the Nuer ethnic group who have mainly occupied Western Ethiopia - Gambella region. Although there has been a situation of insufficient resources of water and land. Ethiopia has managed to contain the situation by ensuring cross communal relations remain mutual as South Sudan resolves its crisis.

Ethiopia's interest in fostering bilateral relations with South Sudan are aimed towards curbing Eritrea's geopolitical activities that have strained their relations for decades and this has made Ethiopia to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relations with South Sudan which are

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[194] (Mesfin 2012)
[195] (Montclos and Kagwanja 2000)

guided by the joint political committee which monitors the implementation of various agreements that have been signed.[196]

4.4.4 Oil Interests in South Sudan

In recent years, Ethiopia has seen exponential growth in various infrastructural and manufacturing ventures.[197] This has put a strain on its national energy requirements which have to be sourced from neighbouring countries. South Sudan is one strategic country to Ethiopia when it comes to meeting its energy requirements and vast energy uses since it dominates the River Nile. South Sudan's human conflict and protracted crisis has had a negative impact on how Ethiopia will achieve its key economic milestones. Thus, stability in South Sudan has been one of the areas Ethiopia has a lot of interest.

Ethiopia being a land-locked country requires alternative means of distributing its resources to other markets.[198] Thus, a pipeline that is cross border is what would resolve this situation.[199] China has been refining oil from South Sudan and this oil has been significant to Ethiopia. Thus, the stability of Sudan and South Sudan is key to Ethiopia's national interests and becomes complicated since oil from South Sudan flows through Port Sudan which is in the North.[200]

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[196] (Verjee 2017))
[197] (Foster, Butterfield and Chen 2009)
[198] (Lahiri and Masjidi 2012)
[199] (Italian Institute for International Political Studies 2019)
[200] (Saleh 2008)

4.4.5 Energy Interests in Nile Basin

The White Nile is dominated and controlled by Southern Sudan where 90% of it falls within the Nile Basin which is the central convergence point of the White Nile rivers.[201] Southern Sudan is the territory where the White Nile sources of Equatorial and Ethiopia meet, and where the White Nile loses and later re-establishes itself.[202] Hydro hegemony on this natural resource has been the theoretical framework for analyzing transboundary water interactions over the past decade.[203] Based on this, countries have invested greatly in the building of dams on shared water borders and this has threatened to escalate tensions on disputed water boundaries.[204]

Dam-building and its downstream effect across national boundaries, such as Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, tend to escalate tensions and redefine national claims on disputed regions.[205]

One of Ethiopia's ambitions is to develop capacity for 4,000 Megawatts of energy that can be sold to its regional partners in the 2011-2021 period.[206] If Sudan and Ethiopia can cooperate and work on energy and security, then South Sudan's supply of oil and Ethiopia angling on electricity would work positively on sustainable regional development due to comparative regional advantages.[207]

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[201] (Salman 2011)
[202] (Verjee 2017)
[203] (Tawfik 2016)
[204] (Paisley and Henshaw 2013)
[205] (Zeitoun and Warner 2006)
[206] (Verhoeven 2011)
[207] (Swain 2011)

4.4.6 Internal and External Political Interests

Ethiopia's political interests in the world and with its neighbors have made it take a long-term diplomatic viewpoint.[208] IGAD cannot be discussed and Ethiopia is not the key state that interplays at the high-level politics of the REC. One of the observations states that in reference to regional interests of peace and security, the aspirations of IGAD are equivalent to those of Ethiopia. Ethiopia's IGAD leadership and IGAD headquarters in Addis Ababa have struggled to resonate well with its neighbors. However, this self-styled proactive-political approach has demonstrated its regional hegemony status through the large number of troops engaged in the region's UN and African Union missions especially in South Sudan. By having Kenya endorse Ethiopia for its leadership role in IGAD, this approach has helped Ethiopia accumulate a regional approach and greater credibility for its political vision. Among the IGAD member countries, it would be accurate to say that if Ethiopia continues its stable strategic direction, it will establish its dominance within IGAD, and this would help to boost its activities regionally and internationally.[209]

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[208] (Clapham 1988)
[209] (Elowson and Albuquerque 2016)

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of data collected and its analysis. The summaries are based on the three set objectives which were; 1) To assess the impact of conflict interventions of AU and IGAD in Africa 2) To assess triggers of conflict of interest among IGAD member states and how they have affected its capacity to realize peace and security in South Sudan 3) To analyze the specific interests of Kenya and Ethiopia that affect their capacity as mediators in South Sudan crisis.

5.2 Respondents Response Rate

A total of 90 Questionnaires were dispensed and 70 were successfully completed and returned to the researcher. Consequently, the response rate was 78 percent, which was tolerable for our descriptive study.[210]

Figure 5.1: Questionnaire Response Rate

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[210] (Mugenda and Mugenda 2003)

5.3 Target Population & Sampling Frame

The study interviewed 70 individuals derived from different sets of the sampling frame as follows; Diaspora Citizens, South Sudan Embassy Professional Staff, Scholars from South Sudan/Rift Valley Institute and the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Kenya.

Figure 5.2: Population Sample by Gender
Source: (Researcher 2019)[211]

From this chart, 43 of the respondents were male while 27 respondents were female. Gender seemed to play a key role as majority of those who could be interviewed were male and were mainly diaspora citizens.

5.4 Population Sample by Age Bracket

The survey respondents were asked to indicate their age group which is shown below in Figure III. From the study, population seemed to be skewed towards a young population that is within the age bracket of 23 – 30 years which represented 35.6% of

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[211] (Thuranira 2019)

the total number of respondents. The age group of 60 years & above had the lowest

number of respondents at 4.3% of the total population sample.

Figure 5.3: Population Sample by Age Bracket

Table 5.1:

Age Bracket	No. of Respondents	% of Total Respondents
(23-30)	25	**35.7**
(31-35)	13	**18.6**
(36-40)	9	**12.9**
(41-45)	12	**17.1**
(46-50)	8	**11.4**
60 & Above	3	**4.3**
TOTAL	**70**	**100.0**

These statistics of a young populace is supported by below demographics tallied by the

United Nations World Population Prospects in 2019 indicating South Sudan has a

young populace which is under 24 years representing 66% of the country's

population.[212] This could also be attributed to the fact that the young population are children of parents who left Sudan as the war raged on over the last three decades.

Table 5.2:

Age (Years)	Per cent	Male	Female
0 – 14 years	46.2%	2,613,696	2,505,794
15–24 years	19.7%	1,148,967	1,030,596
25–54 years	29%	1,547,552	1,666,242
55–64 years	3.1%	186,460	154,924
65 & Above years	2.1%	133,300	102,600

5.4 Population Sample by Nationality

Figure 5.4: Population Sample by Nationality

The focus of this study was on South Sudan and most of the respondents were South Sudanese as illustrated on Figure IV. The nationality cut across all different sets of the sampling frame as follows; Diaspora Citizens, South Sudan Embassy Professional Staff,

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[212] (United Nations 2019)

Scholars from South Sudan/Rift Valley Institute and the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Kenya.

5.5 Population Sample by Education Level

Figure 5.5: Population Sample by Education Level

Over 50% of the targeted population sample had attained university education. College level respondents were 28% while those who have reached secondary school level were 19%. Issues on IGAD and African Union were well understood and articulated across the sampling frame.

5.6 Population Sample by Professional Affiliation

Figure 5.6: Population Sample by Professional Affiliation

The selected population sample was stratified from various relevant sectors; Diaspora Citizens, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Sudan Scholars and South Sudan Embassy in Kenya. Majority were refugees under 'diaspora citizens' had experienced a stint at Kakuma refugee camp and were represented by 69% of the respondents. 1% of the Respondents worked at the South Sudan Embassy in Kenya while 5% were scholars working in Kenya. To ensure that the respondents were balanced, relevant staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were interviewed and they represented 25% of the respondents.

5.7 Impact of conflict interventions of AU and IGAD in Africa

The study derived findings from this objective which was to assess the general impact of conflict interventions of AU and IGAD in Africa. From the study, it was clear that majority of the respondents were aware of IGAD and AU interventions across

Africa and specifically in South Sudan. From the respondents; 97% confirmed that they were aware of the interventions of IGAD and AU in South Sudan while a paltry 3% did not have an idea of the IGAD and AU institutions.

The general conflict intervention mechanisms were acknowledged however most respondents faulted the weak implementation that has resulted in South Sudan retraction back to war. Another issue that came out strongly was that IGAD was viewed as not having mandate to instill and implement sanctions on the belligerent leaders or countries. Based on this, neighbouring countries were also taking sides with different parties thus diluting the mediation efforts.

Figure 5.7: Respondents Awareness of AU and IGAD Interventions

The study sought to find out the general view of the respondents on how the interventions have sustained peace and security in Africa. Majority of the respondents confirmed that IGAD and by extension the African Union had done a lot to contain the

conflict and sustain the mediation talks despite the resistance from the warring parties. IGAD had been successful in the signing of various agreements and its main challenges in enforcing the mediation agreements were mainly external and not internal. IGAD member states have also involved themselves in conflict of interest in matters South Sudan and this was hampering peace efforts.

5.8 Do 'African Problems require African Solutions'?

Inter and Intra Conflict situations require solutions that are domesticated. 89% of the respondents agreed that African problems require African solutions. 11% of the respondents disagreed that Africa can resolve its own problems and indicated that the international community was instrumental in resolving many conflicts in Africa. International organizations eg. The United Nations had invested a lot of resources in the set-up of peace and security mechanisms within the various RECs.

These mechanisms were however hierarchical and therefore escalation of the conflict situations could only happen when the issues could not be resolved at the national level. Most respondents also concurred that the international community interventions may miss historical, political and existing root causes of these conflicts that can enable solutions be sought during the mediation process. To add to this, the international community has been accused of providing one solution that fits all conflicts which has proven in most cases to be ineffective.

African Problems Need African Solutions

11%

89%

Yes

No

Figure 5.8: African Problems Need African Solutions

5.9 IGAD's Management of the Conflict in South Sudan has increased insecurity

Although efforts by IGAD were generally appreciated, it remained clear that IGAD was not doing enough to ensure that the existing stalemate ends. IGAD was involved in a lot of mediation efforts while it was time to act on sanctions and other mechanisms. The management is also faulted for creating and allowing conflict of interest situations through how IGAD member countries were supporting South Sudan and taking sides thus giving the perception that it is part of the protracted political rhetoric.

Majority of the respondents – 66% believed that IGAD was not doing enough to resolve the protracted situation in South Sudan. Due to IGAD's sluggish posture the warlords were persisting in plundering the country into a failed state. 34% of the respondents had a lot of faith in efforts that IGAD has put in place in the restoration of peace and security.

Figure 5.9: IGAD's Management has increased conflict in South Sudan

5.9.1 Do the rivaling Parties in South Sudan respect IGAD and the International Partners?

From the study, 74% of the respondents believed that the warring parties did respect IGAD and the international partners. The key reason was that the talks have persisted and there is no time when there has been a total failure in the mediation process. The warring parties have been consistent in availing themselves for discussions despite the rigid viewpoints that have destabilized the ceasefire situation. This has also been coupled by lack of enforcement of transitional peace agreements which keep delaying prospects of lasting peace.

The opinion that they do not respect IGAD and the International Partners was also supported by the thought that since there is a lot of self interest in the conflict situation in

South Sudan and that things might not change soon since there are those that are gaining from the war.

Correspondingly, on this question 26% of the respondents believed that the belligerents did not respect IGAD and the International Partners. The respondents asserted that IGAD did not have the muscle to impose any sort of sanctions and therefore the parties involved in the war did not perceive any threats given to be serious enough to compel action on their end.

Figure 5.10: Do the rivaling parties respect IGAD and the International Partners?

5.9.2   Lack of Intervention by IGAD Member States has escalated conflict in South Sudan

From this study, various issues came to the fore as to why there was no robust intervention by IGAD member states. These countries were blamed for letting the situation escalate without them committing to ensuring that peace was achieved. Conflict of interest on South Sudan resources was a key area where respondents argued that countries want to have a

part of South Sudan through its rich resources of oil, Nile, Trade etc. Uganda was accused of supporting rebels thus having political interests in South Sudan. Uganda has been supporting opposition leader Riek Machar thus not neutral in their support of the conflict. Most countries were perceived to be not neutral and thus not gaining the respect of the warring parties. Border conflicts have also escalated the situation. Sudan and Uganda have existing border disputes with South Sudan which have not been resolved. Funding was also a key issue where neighboring countries were low in providing financial support in peace keeping activities.

Most respondents represented by 92% alleged that IGAD member states have through the reasons given above exacerbated the situation in South Sudan. A paltry 8% believed that IGAD member states were not to blame for the current situation since its purely internally instigated.

Figure 5.11: Lack of Intervention by IGAD Member states has escalated conflict in South Sudan

5.9.3 Is there existing conflict of interest by neighboring states on South Sudan Conflict

Conflict of interest was regarded as one of the key reasons why South Sudan was still in conflict. Internal conflict was highly driven by self-interest of the warlords who were sustaining the conflict. The gains from the war were highly considered to be social-political and economically driven by the warlords.

The respondents also expressed concern that the Government was being looted by those in power and stolen funds being channeled to neighboring countries. The respondents alleged that the families of the warlords were not in South Sudan and therefore the warring parties did not mind having the conflict extending to unreasonable periods.

Externally, territorial interests through border disputes, economic interests through businesses that are being initiated in South Sudan e.g. Kenya has key banks – KCB and Equity in South Sudan, gains from global repute of hosting refugees from the humanitarian crisis.

Is there existing Conflict of Interest by Neighbouring Member States on South Sudan Conflict?

8%

92%

■ Yes
■ No

Figure 5.12: Is there existing conflict of interest by neighbouring member states on South Sudan conflict?

5.9.4 Are there prospects of peace in South Sudan?

There is a lot of optimism in South Sudan that Peace will prevail. New crop of leaders that do not have historical linkages to the wars would ensure that the country is at peace and back to its economic and agricultural stronghold in the region.

Figure 5.13: Are there prospects of peace in South Sudan?

Most respondents – 76% appreciated that South Sudan is rich in natural resources and they could be utilized for the common good of all. Neighboring countries and especially IGAD member states would help by ensuring that they play 'big brother' role effectively. IGAD on the other hand needed to enforce its peace and security mechanisms strongly to ensure that peace prevails.

About 24% of the respondents were pessimistic about the prospects of peace and asserted that new crop of leaders are the ones to get South Sudan out of this crisis situation.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary

This study as set out in Chapter One was to investigate the role of the African Union in promoting sustainable peace and security in Africa – a case study of IGAD in South Sudan. The study was guided by the liberalism theory with the concept of co-operation and interdependence. Any conflict in one state has the capacity of spilling to neighbouring countries. Thus, member states in a sub-region or region have the obligation to guide and be involved in the process of resolving existing conflicts. The general collective approach of states in the pursuance of peace and security has been proven to a large extent to be feasible through regional organizations such as IGAD.

Chapter two reviewed literature on the impact of conflict interventions of the African Union and IGAD in Africa. This literature revealed that there are positive and negative results that have come from various interventions that have been done in Africa and specifically in IGAD member states namely; South Sudan whereby IGAD was very successful in mediating the 2005 CPA but has been unable to resolve the new conflict of 2013 six years down the line. The study also indicated that IGAD has had its limitations that are making it not to be able to achieve success as intended. Key challenges of lack of funding, focus on political elites, centralization of decision-making organs, internal divisions and power struggles have made the process of resolving the long-standing conflicts to be difficult and disrupted the potential of regional organizations in promoting diplomacy.

In Chapter three, factors affecting effective collaboration of IGAD and AU in maintaining Peace and Security in South Sudan was analyzed. Internal structures of IGAD were reviewed and the politics that surround it among member states were interrogated. It was clear that IGAD has a complex structure and it does not have the mandate to enforce sanctions to countries that are involved in conflicts.

The study revealed that these warlords in Somalia, Central Africa Republic and South Sudan were committing humanitarian atrocities with impunity and IGAD as a REC was not able to enforce any kind of restrictions. From this study it was also clear that these warlords were keen on pursuing their own selfish interests since they are gaining from public coffers and resources. In this chapter we also reviewed how best the AU and IGAD can work better thorough a structured approach. Replication of tasks was a key factor affecting the actualization of effective management of peace and security issues. The issue of funding through its membership was reviewed unfortunately IGAD, AU are underfunded and therefore this becomes a great challenge in the advancement of peace and security.

On the fourth chapter a key area was reviewed, the causes of conflict of interest by Kenya and Ethiopia on South Sudan. It was clear from the study that South Sudan is rich in natural resources and that those in political positions were inclined to exploit the resources and channel the funds to safe havens in other countries.

Oil and Gold were the main drivers of conflict as the money from the resources was being redirected to other countries where their families were living large. It was also observed that the warlords seemed comfortable with the protracted conflict since if peace was enforced and structures put in place then they would lose out thus both sides of the warring

parties were keen on guaranteeing that the conflict continues for a long time. This point was also supported by the fact that they do not fear IGAD nor AU thus sanctions were not effectively enforced.

On neighbouring member states, it was clear that each member of IGAD seemed to gain from the conflict and this affected their objectivity when it came to resolving the existing issues in South Sudan. The issue of refugee integration and re-settlement was a big crisis for Uganda especially since majority of refugee inflows were from South Sudan. Uganda on the other side was playing its own politics with South Sudan. Kenya on the other side is engaged in building its international profile with South Sudan since it was playing a key role to hosting several high delegation meetings before the CPA of 2005. So here there is no genuine neighbor as they are all seeking to pursue their selfish interests. Among other areas that were key causes of conflict of interest were political interests, Justice and accountability, Security and territorial interests, structural flaws of IGAD.

6.2 Recommendations

IGAD has succeeded in bringing member states together to negotiate and find permanent solutions to the ongoing conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. However, IGAD should continue engaging member states in a dialogue to effectively define the way forward for managing conflicts emanating from within the region. IGAD should also desist from fully depending on the donor community to fund its peace initiatives. The peace processes should be planned and budgeted for through the available resources. There is need for the institution of IGAD to be more independent financially may be by initiating projects that can generate income. Besides, the institution should commit the regional member states to meet their

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targets when paying their annual quotas. Countries that have lagged in payments should be pushed to pay their arrears promptly so that to ensure that the institution fulfills its obligations on a timely manner.

IGAD's enforcement of sanctions should also be perceived to work since if these restrictions are not enforced then IGAD's work and especially on peace and security will be difficult to accomplish.

IGAD efforts on ensuring that dialogue ensues is paramount to the achievement of peace in South Sudan. Effective monitoring of implementation process of all agreements is key to achieving peace. Thus, IGAD should take centerstage of these processes instead of leaving it to the parties to implement by themselves.

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APPENDIX I: Interview Questionnaire

Dear Respondent,

My name is Thuranira Carolean Karimi, a Master of Arts scholar at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies department, University of Nairobi where I am studying Master's in International Studies.

Am therefore conducting a research on **"The Role of African Union in Promoting Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa. A Case Study of IGAD in South Sudan."**

I therefore request your indulgence in participating in my research study. The information you will provide will be treated ethically and will solely be used for academic purposes only. Your participation is highly valued.

PART I: Bio Data. Please tick the most suitable response.

1. **Sex:**

[   ] Male   [   ] Female

2. **Age:**

[   ] 23-30   [   ] 31-35   [   ] 36- 40   [   ] 41-45 [   ] 46-50 [   ] 51-55 [   ] 60 and above

3. **Nationality:**

[   ] Kenyan   [   ] South Sudanese [   ] Other

4. **Highest level of education attained:**

[   ] Primary education   [   ] Secondary education   [   ]   College   education (Diploma)

[   ] University education   [   ] Other _____

5. **Please indicate your professional affiliation**

[   ] Diaspora Citizen   [   ] Professional/South Sudan Embassy

[   ] Scholar from South Sudan/Rift Valley Institute [   ] Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

PART II: IMPACT OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF AU AND IGAD IN AFRICA

1. Are you aware of AU and IGAD interventions on conflict in Africa?

(a) Yes [   ]   (b) No [   ]

If yes, how do you think the interventions have impacted on sustaining peace and security in Africa? Explain;

…………………………………………………………………………………………..

2. What has been the impact of the South Sudan conflict on refugees to neighbouring countries and Africa at large?

…………………………………………………………………………………………

3. What are the underlying factors preventing AU and IGAD in resolving the South Sudan conflict?

………………………………………………………………………………….……

4. Do you think the political proponents in South Sudan have perpetuated the war in South Sudan

(a) Yes [   ]   (b) No [   ] .

If yes or no explain;

…………………………………………………………………………………………..

5. The South Sudan conflict has led to so many deaths and displacement of thousands.

 a) Yes [   ]   (b) No [   ]

PART III: FACTORS CAUSING THE INABILITY OF IGAD TO COLLABORATE WITH AU IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN

6. Has IGAD's management of South Sudan crisis increased insecurity?

…………………………………………………………………………………………

7. What strategies has IGAD employed in the management of the conflict in South Sudan?

....

8.Do you think that the rivaling parties in South Sudan respect IGAD and International Partners?

If Yes or No, please explain

…………………………………………………………………………………………….

9. What challenges has IGAD faced in its South Sudan conflict management efforts?

………………………………………………………………………………………….

10. What are the possible solutions that have been tried by the government and South Sudan community leaders to manage the conflict?

………………………………………………………………………………………….

11. In your view, what challenges has the government of South Sudan faced in implementing each of the above measures?

………………………………………………………………………………………….

PART IV: NATIONAL INTERESTS OF KENYA AND ETHIOPIA THAT ARE HINDERING THEIR CAPACITY AS MEDIATORS IN SOUTH SUDAN CRISIS

13. Lack of intervention by IGAD member states on South Sudan has escalated insecurity in South Sudan

 a) Yes [   ]   (b) No [   ]

14. If yes, explain

…………………………………………………………………………………………

15. Does Kenya and Ethiopia have national interests that affect their role as mediators in South Sudan conflict?

…………………………………………………………………………………………

16. What are the specific interests of Kenya and Ethiopia that affect their role as mediators in the South Sudan conflict?

…………………………………………………………………………………………

17. Do you think that there are prospects for peace in South Sudan soon?

a) Yes [   ]   (b) No [   ]

16. If yes or no explain

…………………………………………………………………………………………

THANK YOU

APPENDIX II: List of Respondents

S/No.	Names of Respondents
1	Emmanuel Ageer - Embassy of South Sudan in Kenya
2	Col. Rtd. Francis Munuve - 1st Battalion Commander Yugoslavia & UNHCR Officer
3	Daniel Machier
4	Mark Rieny Athul
5	Ante Majok
6	Daniel Akol Diing
7	Deng Gueng
8	Wol Dul Arumjok
9	Abiem Kur
10	Abikash Gargash Ma
11	Achap Arol Deng
12	Chol Achiek
13	Achol Deng Lual Dor
14	Yuong Achuil Mayiik
15	Adam J. Awang
16	Adhok Wut Deng
17	Adhot Wol
18	Bulo Adudu
19	Aduot Malueth
20	Akok Adut Achuen
21	Aduolgak Laa
22	Agaijang Hazel
23	Agany K. Nyang
24	Agiu Deng
25	Agot Maliar
26	Agoth Atak Chiman
27	Agotich Alier Ajak
28	Sunday Maduk
29	Kuol Tong
30	Malang Dau Dut
31	Diing Hou
32	Biar Aler Biar
33	Akol Magak Akol

S/No.	Names of Respondents
34	Deng Malual Biong
35	Barnabas Bol
36	Christine Mading
37	Chuol Dop Ayany
38	Thok Thor
39	Peter Gatkuoth
40	Annah Aliel Mayol
41	Winnie Tong
42	Dhuor Reek Thon
43	Chocho Akuach Jok
44	Makuel Abuk
45	Collins Vunya
46	Aloro Gasper
47	Angok Sammy
48	Albino Ayii Atak
49	Atu Haire Maler
50	Daniel Malek
51	Kevin Aluga Achol
52	Aweng - Sadat De
53	Adut Bior
54	Abildiar Makuer
55	Akol Alberto
56	Jima Luak Kok