

**THE SOMALI CONFLICT AND KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A CRITICAL  
ASSESSMENT**

**BY  
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## DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other University.

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Date...04/09/2012.

**Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS),  
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This research project has been submitted for examination with our approval as University supervisor.



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## **DEDICATION**

To my late mother, Mrs Teresiah Tipis, for all the sacrifices she made to ensure that I got an education.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all I thank the Almighty God for his unfailing love, grace and faithfulness that have enabled me to undertake this project successfully in spite of the enormous workload at the National Defence College (NDC), and the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi.

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## ABSTRACT

This study critically examines the impact of the Somali conflict on Kenya's foreign policy since the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991 to the year 2010. The main objective of the study is to critically assess how the Somali conflict that has been raging for over twenty years affects Kenya's foreign policy decision making process. The key question that the study seeks to answer is: twenty years since the Somali conflict broke out, how has Kenya's foreign policy adapted to address the challenges of the seemingly intractable and ever evolving conflict? The study also seeks to examine Kenya's foreign policy in respect of conflict management. The study utilizes Graham Allison's models of foreign policy decision making as the theoretical framework. It utilizes the Rational Actor, Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process models to critically examine the impact of the Somali conflict on Kenya's foreign policy. This study methodology utilized interviews, unpublished and published primary documents, to collect data for the case study. It also identified government organs and individuals who have been involved either directly or indirectly in dealing with the Somali conflict or Kenya's foreign policy as key informants. Since independence in the 1960s, relations between Kenya and Somalia have often been defined by the legacy of the colonial of state, especially with regard to the geographical area referred to as the Northern Frontier District (NFD). Although initially the Somali conflict was by all descriptions internal, several factors including cross-border incursions into Kenya by armed Somali factions, terrorism and piracy internationalized of conflict, and threatened Kenya's vital national interests. Consequently, Kenya has been sucked into the conflict, becoming an actor in the Somali conflict. The protracted conflict is identified in this research study as the main cause for the huge influx of Somali refugees into Kenya, and the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) fuelling insecurity and crime in parts of the country. In this study, the Somali conflict is also identified as being highly unpredictable, resulting in phenomena such as maritime piracy and terrorism which pose a threat to Kenya's national interests. The study finds that the unpredictability of the Somali conflict contributes to the perception of Kenya's foreign policy being reactive in many instances, and not proactive, despite recent attempts to formulate and implement a foreign policy strategic plan. In view of the foregoing, this research study asserts that the centrality of the Somali conflict to Kenya's foreign policy decision making is evidenced by the decision by Kenya's Defence Forces (KDF) to go into Somalia in pursuit of Al Shabaab militias as the threats to national security escalated. In terms of Graham Allison models of foreign policy decision making, it emerged that foreign policy decision making in Kenya is consistent with the Rational Actor Model (RAM), judging from the shift from attempts at peaceful resolution of the conflict through the IGAD Somali Peace Process when the stakes and threats were perceived as low, to military intervention when the stakes and threats were perceived as high.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	-	African Union Mission to Somalia
APFO	-	Africa Peace Forum
AU	-	African Union
COMESA	-	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
EAC	-	East African Community
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
KADU	-	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	-	Kenya African National Union
KDF	-	Kenya Defence Forces
LAPPSET	-	Lamu Port- South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor
MFA	-	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NARC	-	National Rainbow Coalition
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organizations
NFD	-	Northern Frontier District
NFPPP	-	Northern Frontier People's Progressive Party

OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
PRC	-	People's Republic of China
RAM	-	Rational Actor Model
SALW	-	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SNF	-	Somali National Front
SNM	-	Somali National Movement
SNRC	-	Somali National Reconciliation Process
SSDF	-	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SOP	-	Standard Operating Procedures
TFG	-	Transitional Federal Government
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
USC	-	United Somali Congress

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	i
DEDICATION .....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vii
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
Introduction to the Study .....	1
1.0 Introduction .....	1
1.1 Background to the study .....	2
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem.....	5
1.3 Objectives of the Study .....	6
1.3.1 Overall objective .....	6
1.3.2 Specific Objectives.....	6
1.4 Literature Review .....	7
1.4.1 Introduction .....	7
1.4.2 Back to Foreign Policy Analysis .....	7
1.4.3 Kenya's Foreign policy .....	10
1.4.4 The Somali Conflict .....	13
1.4.5 Literature Gap.....	16
1.5 Justification of the Study .....	17
1.6 Theoretical Framework .....	18
1.7 Hypotheses .....	20
1.8 Research Methodology.....	20
1.8.1 Primary Data.....	20

1.8.2 Secondary Data.....	21
1.8.3 Limitations and Scope of the Study.....	21
1.9 Chapter Outline .....	22
 CHAPTER TWO.....	 23
The Somali Conflict and Kenya’s Foreign Policy: An Overview .....	23
2.0 Introduction .....	23
2.1 Background .....	23
2.2 Somalia’s Foreign Policy .....	26
2.3 Kenya’s Foreign Policy .....	32
2.4 Kenya-Somalia Relations .....	36
2.5 Personality Traits in Foreign Policy Analysis.....	39
2.5.1 Foreign Policy under Kenyatta.....	40
2.5.2 Kenya’s Foreign Policy under Moi .....	42
2.6 Conclusion.....	43
 CHAPTER THREE.....	 45
The Somali Conflict and Kenya’s Foreign Policy.....	45
3.0 Introduction .....	45
3.1 Irredentism and Kenya- Somalia Relations.....	47
3.2 The Somali Conflict and Issues in National Security.....	49
3.2.1 Refugees and proliferation of illegal Arms .....	50
3.2.2 Terrorism.....	52
3.2.3 Conflict and Kenya’s Economy.....	53
3.2.4 The Somali Conflict and International Security.....	55
3.3 Kenya’s Foreign Policy of Conflict Management.....	57
3.4 Various attempts at Peace Negotiations .....	67
3.5 Conclusion.....	68
 CHAPTER FOUR .....	 69
A Critical Analysis of the Somali Conflict and Kenya’s Foreign Policy.....	69

4.0 Introduction .....	69
4.1 Emerging Issues.....	69
4.2 The role of history and the unpredictability of the Somali conflict.....	70
4.3 Kenya’s foreign Policy: Reactive or Proactive?.....	81
4.4 Graham Allison’s Models and Their Relevance .....	85
4.4.1 Rational Actor Model .....	86
4.4.2. Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models .....	89
4.5 Conclusion .....	92
CHAPTER FIVE .....	93
Conclusions .....	93
5.0 Summary .....	93
5.1 Key Findings .....	93
5.2 Recommendations .....	97
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	99

## CHAPTER ONE

### Introduction to the Study

#### 1.0 Introduction

Kenya and Somalia are closely linked in many ways in spite of the longstanding conflict that continues to ravage the latter for close to two decades. Clapham notes that, before the colonial powers split Somalia, the Somali people shared many historical and societal commonalities.<sup>1</sup> They spoke one common language, practiced similar culture and had common religious beliefs. Even after the colonialists subdivided Somalia, the Somali people who now belonged to neighbouring states still shared a common ancestry, history, culture and customs with their kith and kin inside Somalia.

Somalia is unique as a case study for conflict management and foreign policy analysis. The country has been without a functioning central government since the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991.<sup>2</sup> The internal conflict that ensued following the collapse of the Barre regime continues largely unabated despite numerous regional and international efforts to end the conflict and restore peace and stability in Somalia. Although the conflict is internal, its ramifications extend beyond Somali's territorial borders into the states in the near neighbourhood.

The dynamics and duration of the Somali conflict have had direct and indirect effects on Kenya's national interests, necessitating the re-ordering of Kenya's foreign policy priorities. Considering the prevailing social-economic situation in Kenya, the country should ideally be pursuing a foreign policy of economic diplomacy. However, this cannot be

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<sup>1</sup> C. Clapham, 1996 *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.24

<sup>2</sup> J. Clark 1992/1993, "Debacle in Somalia" *Foreign Affairs* 1992: Vol:1, No: 3, pp.1-33:2

successfully pursued in an environment where national security and national interests are under threat from conflicts such as the one prevailing in neighbouring Somalia. Security is a key element for state survival.<sup>3</sup> It is a base upon which national interest and foreign policies are pursued. In essence, national security is at the core of national interest and foreign policy. The conflict in Somalia therefore, is expected to have some form of influence on Kenya's foreign policy.

The combination of historical linkages between Kenya and Somalia and the former's role in attempts to resolve the Somali conflict has created an imperative for the study of the impact of the conflict on Kenya's foreign policy. However, there have been few attempts to examine how the Somali conflict influences Kenya's foreign policy. This research study, therefore, seeks to critically assess the impact of the Somali conflict as an external determinant of Kenya's foreign policy.

### 1.1 Background to the study

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa region; it borders Ethiopia to the West, Djibouti to the North, Kenya to the South West and the Indian Ocean to the East. Dornboos observes that the Somali Republic (1960-1991) constituted the former Italian colonies of South Central Somalia, Puntland and the former British Protectorate of Somaliland.<sup>4</sup> The state of Somalia is relatively homogenous linguistically and religiously. Lineage underpins Somali society, with divisions defined along clan and sub clan lines.

Menkhaus and Prendergast note that the state of Somali collapsed in 1991 as a consequence of the gradual disintegration of its governance structures and the impact of clan-based armed groups, notably the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation

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<sup>3</sup> R Jackson and G. Sorensen, 2007, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford University Press, p 5

<sup>4</sup> M Dornboos, 2002, "State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections:" *Development and Change* 33 Vol:5:pp.797-815:810

Democratic Front (SSDF) and the United Somali Congress (USC)<sup>5</sup>. Most of Somali's armed clashes since 1991 have been fought in the name of clan, often as a result of political leaders manipulating clans for their own purposes.<sup>6</sup>

To examine the relationship between conflict and foreign policy, Menkhaus argues that, there is need first to understand the dynamics of the conflict *vis a vis* the process of decision making.<sup>7</sup> There is need also to understand the actors in the Somali conflict and the determinants of foreign policy in Kenya. There are four categories of actors with an interest in the Somali conflict.<sup>8</sup> First are those who profit from the protracted conflict. This group has however diminished in number and importance.

Second are criminal elements that have had an interest and a profit motive in the absence of law and order. Third are risk taking actors, including political factions and business communities who stand to lose more from the establishment of a state than from its absence. On the one hand, the business community has emerged as a major power broker inside Somalia. They possess the greatest concentration of wealth in the country, and control the largest private security forces, often surpassing the military capacity of warlords. On the other hand, political factions like the United Somali Congress, the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), were the dominant actors, and monopolized representation in Somali National Reconciliation Process (SNRC).

The fourth category is external actors who have particular vested interests which they pursue irrespective of the effects on peacemaking or state building in Somalia. This category

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<sup>5</sup> K. Menkhaus, and J. Prendergast, 1995, 'Political Economy of Post-intervention Somali' *Somali Task Force Issue Paper No.3*.

<sup>6</sup> P. Collier, 2003, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, The World Bank and Oxford University Press, p.5

<sup>7</sup> K Menkhaus, 2003, Protracted State Collapse: A Rediagnosis, *Review of African Political Economy*, op, cit, p.17

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p.18

includes regional states and those beyond the region. Hansen argues that, often regional states have intermittently engaged in proxy wars in Somalia, which have the potential to create or worsen tensions and violence inside Somali in pursuit of their own goals.<sup>9</sup> Dornboos in comparison notes that, these states have also shown the capacity to support peace building efforts. The interplay between states who have genuine interests to seek for a resolution to the conflict in Somalia and those with hidden interests in pursuit of their own national interests can be gauged by considering their foreign policies.<sup>10</sup>

In this breath, it can be argued that, although East Africa and the Horn states are often considered as weak regional communities, Kenya has played a significant role, especially through IGAD in promoting negotiations between the warring parties in Somalia. The vested interest of Kenya in the Somali conflict influences the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy.<sup>11</sup> This is so because the perceived threats to Kenya's national interests arising from the conflict reorder Kenya's foreign policy interests in the region

The discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis focuses on decision making processes and the role of decision makers. Conflicts create crises situations which foreign policy decision makers have to respond to. The importance of examining the Somali conflict within the precepts of foreign policy is that how the conflict is analyzed will determine what its effect is on Kenya's foreign policy.<sup>12</sup> Kenya has been active in the promotion of conflict resolution in Somalia, in addition to sharing a historical heritage with the country. The intensity of Kenya's engagement in the Somali conflict varies with the government in power. For instance, during President Moi's rule, Kenya paid more attention to the Somali conflict as I shall demonstrate later in this study.

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<sup>9</sup> S. Jarle Hansen, 2007, 'Somali's Anarchy and Meddling Neighbours' *Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst*, pp. 117-119

<sup>10</sup> M. Dornboos, 2002, "State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections" op, cit

<sup>11</sup> J. Fearon and D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 1, p. 1

<sup>12</sup> I. M. Lewis, 1961, *A Pastoral Democracy*, Oxford University Press, p.2

From the above, it can be argued that the Somali conflict plays a significant role in Kenya's national security and national interests and is therefore an important factor in influencing Kenya's foreign policy. This research study will therefore seek to examine how the Somali conflict impacts on Kenya's foreign policy.

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

Since the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has been in a constant state of conflict punctuated by episodes of negotiation and mediation in attempts to reconcile the warring factions. The Somali conflict continues to defy all foreign diplomatic and military interventions aimed at resolving the conflict and establishing a stable government. As such, the Somali conflict has resulted in proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Kenya, the influx of refugees, the threat of terrorism and piracy due to lack of an effective government in Somalia over the last two decades. These factors pose a challenge to Kenya's national security and national interests.

The Somali conflict continues to evolve with new dimensions including the rise of extremist groups such as Al Shabaab and piracy, posing new challenges. The evolution of the conflict would require a flexible and dynamic foreign policy from Kenya to keep pace with the new dimensions and challenges and respond to them accordingly, as and when they arise. As already noted the protracted Somali conflict threatens Kenya's national security and its national interest, which are key concerns of any country's foreign policy.

The conflict also tends to divert Kenya's focus from economic diplomacy to diplomacy of conflict management. This is mainly because Foreign Direct Investment and tourism, two of Kenya's most important economic pillars can only thrive in a safe and secure environment. Moreover, the conflict affects Kenya directly when resources that could have

been used to pursue economic and development interests are diverted to attend to the conflict in Somalia.

The interplay between direct and indirect impacts of the conflict and its related effects on Kenya's foreign policy priorities call for an in-depth assessment and analysis. This study, therefore, aims to examine the relationship between the Somali conflict and Kenya's foreign policy, with a view to understanding how Kenya's foreign policy responds to the Somali conflict in order to safeguard national interests.

The question that begs an answer therefore is; twenty years since the Somali conflict broke out in 1991, how has Kenya's foreign policy orientation responded and adapted to cope with the challenges of a seemingly intractable and evolving conflict in neighbouring Somalia?

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

#### **1.3.1 Overall objective**

To critically assess the impact of the Somali conflict on the foreign policy of Kenya

#### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

- I. To analyze the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy in response to the Somali conflict
- II. To examine the impact of the Somali conflict on Kenya's foreign policy
- III. To assess the role of Kenya's foreign policy in the management of the Somali conflict

## 1.4 Literature Review

### 1.4.1 Introduction

This section will review relevant literature to examine the Somali conflict in the context of Kenya's foreign policy. The literature review will be divided into two sections; the first section will examine the conceptual basis of foreign policy analysis and Kenya's foreign policy since the collapse of the Somali government. The second section will review the development of the Somali conflict since the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991. In addition, the literature review will consider debates and issues underlying foreign policy formulation and conflict management in the context of theoretical underpinnings informing the same.

### 1.4.2 Background to Foreign Policy Analysis

Herman observes that, the behaviour of a state in its regional backyard is determined by its foreign policy.<sup>13</sup> Herman describes foreign policy as a goal or problem oriented program, designed by decision makers and directed towards entities outside their political jurisdiction.<sup>14</sup> It is a program whose objective is directed towards addressing a certain problem or the pursuit of certain goals towards external entities.<sup>15</sup> In this sense, foreign policy is a means through which a state's national interest is pursued and achieved.

Foreign policy in this sense must take cognizance of the objectives the state seeks to pursue and the means it must have at its disposal to realize the same. Modelski notes that, foreign policy is a process through which the state minimizes adverse effects while

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<sup>13</sup> C. Herman, 1990, 'Changing Course: When Governments Choose to redirect Foreign Policy', *International Quarterly*, Vol: 3, No: 19, pp.2-7

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 300-301

maximizing on the advantageous ones.<sup>16</sup> Policy, in this sense, is not a charted course but a calculated response to external challenges.

Plano and Olton argue that foreign policy is goal oriented and can be described as a strategy or planned course of action aimed at achieving specific goals.<sup>17</sup> Foreign policy refers to the actions and declarations that affect the external milieu that is the arena beyond a state's borders. Moreover, Mwamba observes that, foreign policy as an instrument through which a state seeks to influence the activities of another country.<sup>18</sup> Foreign policy is not a static endeavour, but a dynamic process that changes with the needs of the state, as such policy can be economic, security, political or social oriented depending on the prevailing situation.

The premise of engaging in foreign policy is that, every state in the international system possesses national interests going beyond its international boundaries. These interests are collectively referred to as foreign policy. In this connection, Levin argues that, foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by a given state and its ruling class in the relations with other states and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defence of these purposes and interests<sup>19</sup>

Foreign policy has been variously defined in the study of international relations, with Farah viewing it as actions that a state takes in its relations to other states and other actors in the international system in order to defend or achieve its purpose.<sup>20</sup> Along the same lines, Farah further characterizes foreign policy as actions of a state in reference to other bodies

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<sup>16</sup> G. Modelski, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall, p.3

<sup>17</sup> J. C. Plano and R. Olton, 1969, *The International Relations Dictionary*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., p.127.

<sup>18</sup> Z. Mwamba, 1978, *Tanzania: Foreign Policy and International Politics*, Washington: University Press of America, p.iv.

<sup>19</sup> Levin cited in O. Olatunde et al, *African International Relations*. London: Longman publishers, 1985, p44-

<sup>20</sup> I. Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990*, PhD Thesis, University of Nairobi, pp.7-10

acting on the international stage in order to advance its goals for instance security, welfare and preservation and promotion of values.<sup>21</sup> States seek particular foreign policies which are commensurate to their national interests. Reynolds posits that, states primarily seek to advance their national interests through the pursuit of foreign policy.<sup>22</sup> The premise of seeking national interests through the pursuit of foreign policy is that no state is self sufficient.

The proponents of realism argue that the state is the appropriate unit of analysis and is seen as pursuing foreign policy to advance national interest. Furthermore, they observe that, a state's power is an important component in determining how it pursues its foreign policy. Rourke argues that, powerful states can pursue and achieve their foreign policies even under conditions that are not favourable.<sup>23</sup> Khadiagala argues that, African foreign policy has been essentially a matter of deliberate action by elites, limited by a dearth of resources and competing domestic concerns of nation and state building.<sup>24</sup> Farah argues that, individuals are often assumed to be rational when making decisions in the national interest and are thus expected to conform to state rationality. The core of foreign policy often involves decision making, Allison argues that decisions are made by governments in three distinct models namely, rational actor model, organizational behaviour, and government politics model.<sup>25</sup>

Under the rational actor model, Allison argues that, governments are treated as the primary actors who examine a set of goals, evaluate them according to their utility, then pick the one that has the highest payoff. Under the organizational model, Allison argues that,

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> P. A. Reynolds, 1994, *An Introduction to International Relations* 3rd Edition, London: Longman, p.39.

<sup>23</sup> T. J. Rourke, 1996, *International Politics on the World Stage*, Englewood, Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, p.230.

<sup>24</sup> G. M Khadiagala, 2001 *African Foreign Policies: power and Process*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p.2

<sup>25</sup> Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Phillip, 1999, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Second Edition)* Longman, pp. 2-15

when faced with a crisis, government leaders do not look at it as a whole, but break it down and assign it according to pre-established organizational lines.<sup>26</sup> Allison recognizes that foreign policy formulation is an exercise that involves both individuals and the states. Moreover, Goldgeier observes that those individual leaders in states can be substituted as units of analysis for foreign policy without changing the way states behave.<sup>27</sup>

However, Menkhaus and Kegley argue that, realism overlooks the ability of weak states to bargain and manipulate stronger patrons in order to exercise constrained autonomy over their foreign policy.<sup>28</sup> Farah observes that, the realism argument ignores domestic sources of foreign policy as important factors that determine a state's foreign policy.<sup>29</sup>

Moreover, Rothgeb argues that, a state's power cannot guarantee that it will prevail in conflict situation.<sup>30</sup> Morgenthau describes power as the ability of one actor to make another actor do what it will not otherwise have done or to not do what it will otherwise have done. Power in this sense is used to refer to raw power, as postulated by realist theory.<sup>31</sup>

National interests are critical in explaining and understanding state behaviour. Farah observes that national interests serve as an analytical tool to be employed in describing and explaining the thrust of nations' foreign policies and they are used to justify or denounce the

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid

<sup>27</sup> J. N. Goldgeier, 1994, *Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Gorbachev*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, p.43.

<sup>28</sup> K. Menkhaus, and C. W. Kegley, Jr., (October 1988), "The Compliant Foreign Policy of the Dependent State Revisited: Empirical Linkages and Lessons from the Case of Somali," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3 pp. 315-46.

<sup>29</sup> I. Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990*, op, cit, p.10

<sup>30</sup> J. M. Rothgeb, 1992, *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System*, New York, St. Martin's Press, p. 12

<sup>31</sup> H. Morgenthau, 1948, 'Politics Among Nations' New York: Knopf, pp.14-24

purpose by states.<sup>32</sup> In this case, national interests are aggregated into various policies which constitute the strategic objectives of the state at the international stage.

The link between domestic and international determinants of foreign policy has long been a widely debated topic in the field of international relations, and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in particular. In most developing states, foreign policy and domestic politics are interdependent and could spill over into each other. Menkhaus argues that, both have a symbiotic relation; each can influence the other albeit in different dimensions.<sup>33</sup>

### 1.4.3 Kenya's Foreign Policy

Khadiagala argues that, African foreign policy decision making has always been the province of leading personalities including presidents and prime ministers who dovetailed with the post colonial patterns of domestic power.<sup>34</sup> In addition, weak and manipulative bureaucratic structures compounded the lack of effective representative institutions affording ample opportunities for individual leaders to dabble in their countries' internal affairs.

Adar argues that, Kenya's foreign policy was guided by election manifestos of the then ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU). After independence, Kenya's foreign policy stated that it would vigilantly safeguard national interests, including the protection of the security of its people by maintaining necessary military forces and by seeking cooperation and defence agreements with other states in the near abroad.<sup>35</sup>

Kurgat observes that, Kenya's foreign policy focused on the preservation of its national integrity while joining democratic movements in Africa to eradicate imperialism,

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<sup>32</sup> I. Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somali, 1960-1990*, op, cit, p.12

<sup>33</sup> K. Menkhaus, and C. W. Kegley, Jr., op, cit.

<sup>34</sup> G.M Khadiagala, *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, op, cit, p. 5

<sup>35</sup> K. G. Adar, 1994, *Kenya's Foreign Policy Behaviour towards Somali, 1963 – 1983*, Lanham, New York, University Press of America, p.131.

racism and all forms of oppression.<sup>36</sup> The manifestos also stated the need for Kenya to work for international peace and peaceful settlement of international disputes through the framework of the United Nations. Mwagiru argues that among other objectives, the manifestos entailed respect for existing boundaries, a call for the observance of the status quo as the only sure way to maintain the pre-independence equilibrium.<sup>37</sup>

Zartman argues that, it is for this reason that Kenya resisted and defended itself against Somali irredentism as will be discussed later in this section.<sup>38</sup> Farah observes that, the foreign policies of countries in the Horn of Africa region were also largely influenced by their dependence on the developed world which at times prevented them from acting rationally and choosing the course of action which would maximize their gains and minimize their losses.<sup>39</sup>

Kenya's political and ideological proximity to Britain is cited as an example. Zartman observes that Britain had, for instance, sent a survey commission to the former Northern Frontier District in 1962 to survey the border; the team ignored the overwhelming support among the people for unification with Somalia. Instead, Britain granted Kenya independence in line with colonial boundaries, leading to the breaking of diplomatic relations with Somalia.<sup>40</sup> Britain's interest in supporting Kenya was motivated by the interest of colonial settlers in Kenya.

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<sup>36</sup> P. K. Kurgat, 2000, "Kenya's Foreign Policy and African Conflict Management," in G. P. Okoth and B. A. Ogot, *Conflict in Contemporary Africa*, Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, pp.117-126:118.

<sup>37</sup> M. Mwagiru, 2000, "The Elusive Quest: Conflict, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Kenya," in Okoth, G. P., and Ogot, B. A., (eds.), *Conflict in Contemporary Africa*, Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, pp.117-140.

<sup>38</sup> W. I. Zartman, 1989, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.91.

<sup>39</sup> I Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somali, 1960-1990*, PhD Thesis, University of Nairobi, Op cit, p. 53

<sup>40</sup> W. I. Zartman, op, cit

Barston observes that foreign ministries tend to have certain common organizational characteristics as they generally contain geographic, protocol and administrative divisions. Differences in organizational structure occur partly because of particular foreign policy interests, for example the Cyprus foreign ministry devotes a separate department to the Cyprus problem.<sup>41</sup> Similarly, while Kenya has an entire directorate for Africa and African Union (AU) affairs, it has created a relatively new division devoted to the Horn of Africa, principally to deal with the Somali conflict.

Although it is true that states play a critical role in foreign policy as posited by proponents of realism, it is equally true that states are not the only actors in foreign policy formulation. Allison's rational actor model, organizational behaviour model and bureaucratic politics model better illustrate the complex interplay between individuals, bureaucracies and states in the formulation of foreign policy.

#### 1.4.4 The Somali conflict

The name Somalia refers to the *de jure* existing state of the Republic of Somalia. In its present day mapping it consists of the Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, the autonomous region of Puntland in the north and northeast as well as a third part known as Southern Somalia or South Central Somalia.<sup>42</sup> Somalia as a state is notorious for the long standing conflict, lawlessness and insecurity for the international system in general and particularly for the Horn of Africa region.

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<sup>41</sup> R. P. Barston, 2006, *Modern Diplomacy*, Pearson Education Ltd, United Kingdom, p. 18

<sup>42</sup> J. F. Bayart, 1993, *The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly*, London: Longman, pp. 7-8.

Besteman argues that, the continuing political crisis in Somalia can be traced back to the 21 year rule of President Mohamed Siad Barre from 1969 to 1991.<sup>43</sup> Barre had led a military coup in 1969 which ended Somalia's first post-independence experiment with democratic civilian government between 1960 and 1969. Ahmed notes that since then, the nature and composition of key domestic actors in Somalia has changed significantly reflecting the contested nature of authority in stateless Somalia and the fluidity of coalitions.<sup>44</sup>

Pekenham argues that Somalia never had anything resembling a common state; the Somali nation was in the late 19th Century divided among several colonial powers, each of which was built up with state-like administrative institutions.<sup>45</sup> The United Kingdom took control of the northern part in the present Somaliland as well as all of the present Kenya, including those parts in the north which were almost exclusively populated by ethnic Somalis.<sup>46</sup>

Italy in turn took control over various territories along the eastern coast which in 1905 became a colony comprising most of the present Somalia minus Somaliland.<sup>47</sup> Ethiopia also expanded into territories with a Somali majority, mainly the present Somali Region of Ethiopia, formerly known as the Ogaden province.<sup>48</sup> All of these territorial arrangements

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<sup>43</sup> C. Besteman, 1999, *Unravelling Somali, Race, Class, and the Legacy of Slavery*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 80.

<sup>44</sup> A. J Ahmed., 1995, *The Invention of Somali*, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, p. 4.

<sup>45</sup> P. Thomas, 1991, *The Scramble for Africa*, London: Abacus, Lonsdale, John: "The European Scramble and Conquest in African History," in Roland Oliver and S. N. Sanderson (eds.): *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. 6: *From 1870 to 1905*, 1985, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 680-766

<sup>46</sup> I.M, Lewis, 1955, "Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal Islam," parts I and II, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 581-602,

<sup>47</sup> R. L. Hess, 1966, *Italian Colonialism in Somali*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 47

<sup>48</sup> D. Levine, *Greater Ethiopia*. 2000, *The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 69-91.

were negotiated peacefully among the external powers in a series of bilateral treaties without any consultation with the Somalis themselves.<sup>49</sup>

Considering this imposed partition, Laitin notes that, it was thus hardly surprising that the Somali state was born irredentist, with the ambition of unification of the entire Somalia nation into one nation state.<sup>50</sup> Whereas relations with Djibouti have remained rather peaceful,<sup>51</sup> relations with both Kenya and Ethiopia were severely strained. First came the Shifta war with Kenya (1963-1968) in which the Somali government supported the Northern Frontier Districts Liberation Army (NFDLA) in their struggle for autonomy against the Kenyan government.<sup>52</sup>

Mwagiru observes that in conflict system, every conflict has a regional dimension in the sense that even what might at first appear as individualized conflict are parts of wider pattern of conflict regionally.<sup>53</sup> Farah argues that, systemic realities and other actors within the conflict system must be taken into account when addressing a specific conflict.<sup>54</sup>

The relations between Kenya and Somalia are characterized by tension and insecurity. The tension dates back to the colonial period and into the reign of Kenyatta, when Somalia was divided up and demarcated to form part of Kenya's Northern Frontier District (NFD).

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<sup>49</sup>, A. Issa-Salwe, 1996, *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy* London: HAAN Publishing, p.42

<sup>50</sup> D. Laitin, 1976, "Somali Territorial Claims in International Perspective," *Africa Today*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 29- 38.

<sup>51</sup> S. Yusuf, 1977, "Independence for the Afars and Issas: Complex Background; Uncertain Future," *Africa Today*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 45-97:67.

<sup>52</sup> N. Mburu, 2005, *Bandits on the Border. The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity*, Trenton, New Jersey, The Red Sea Press, pp. 64-80

<sup>53</sup> M. Mwagiru, 1997, *The Greater Horn of Africa Conflict System: Conflict Patterns, Strategies and Management Practices* (Paper prepared for the USAID project on Conflict and Conflict Management in the Greater Horn of Africa), p.4.

<sup>54</sup> I. Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somali*, op, cit, p.43

While Kenya regarded the NFD as part of its colonial heritage, Somalia believed NFD was its natural territory. Although, Somalia did not succeed, relations were strained and pined on tension. The tension between Kenya and Somalia formed the base upon which foreign relations between the two states was determined.<sup>55</sup>

Insecurity emerged as a factor influencing Kenya's foreign policy decisions after the collapse of the Somali government. President Moi, in a 28<sup>th</sup> July 2001 presidential decree ordered the Kenya-Somali border closed. He explained that armed refugees were entering into Kenya and contributing to increased incidents of insecurity and crime in Nairobi. For him, the Somalis were to blame for the state of insecurity in Kenya.<sup>56</sup> President Moi argued that the move was aimed at curbing the inflow of small arms and light weapons, which were believed to contribute to the growing wave of crime in the country. This border closure came barely two years after the August 1999 ban on flights to and from Somalia, which was lifted six months into operation.<sup>57</sup>

#### 1.4.5 Literature Gap

The literature reviewed so far indicates that there is insufficient information on the impact of the Somali conflict on the foreign policy of Kenya. Most of the available literature concentrates on the regional and international attempts to resolve the Somali conflict and establish a stable government. Moreover, the literature concentrates on examining the process of negotiation and mediation efforts in respect of the conflict. A few academic attempts have endeavoured to explore the link between the Somali conflict and Kenya's foreign policy. The closest attempt at addressing the Somali issue and Kenya's foreign policy is Adar's *Kenya's Foreign Policy Behaviour Towards Somalia: 1963-1983*. This was nearly three decades ago

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<sup>55</sup> N Mburu,; *Bandits on the Border. The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity*, op, cit

<sup>56</sup> *Sunday Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, p. 1.

<sup>57</sup> *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1 and *Sunday Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, p. 1

and the circumstances have radically changed since 1991, necessitating a fresh review of the how Kenya's foreign policy is responding to the challenges posed by the Somali conflict.

### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

The focus of this study examines Kenya's foreign policy since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991. The study aims to contribute to the academic discourse by filling the research gap arising from the nexus between conflict and foreign policy. This research study will seek to determine the centrality of conflict as a determinant in states foreign policy. The study will also contribute to the academic discourse by tracking and documenting the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy. The findings of this research will therefore be used as a basis for academic reference by students and the starting point to conduct further research.

From the literature reviewed in the preceding section, it is evident that the Somali conflict has a direct and indirect influence on Kenya's foreign policy and the process of Kenya's foreign policy decision making. The conflict directly affects Kenya's national interests, particularly national security interests. This is identified for instance by considering that there is an increase in conflicts among the pastoralist communities in the area bordering Somalia, which is instigated by availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

Kenya's foreign Policy is hinged on the principle of non interference in internal affairs of other states, particularly those in the near neighbourhood. However, considering that Somalia lacks a central government brings into view the reconsideration of Kenya's foreign policy of non interference in light of the fact that lawlessness in Somali influences impacts Kenya's national interests. Moreover, the Somali conflict is unpredictable, it has witnessed emergence of terrorism, maritime piracy and other illegal actors who influence the normal operation of states in the region.

The response of Kenya to the Somali conflict has been varied. The conflict broke out during the reign of former President Moi. His and the government's approach to the conflict were different as compared to President Kibaki's approach. This brings into focus the need to examine the role of individual presidents in the Somali conflict. The impact of the Somali conflict on Kenya's foreign policy has not been determined in the existing literature, resulting in a knowledge gap. This study aims to critically examine the impact of the Somali conflict on Kenya's foreign policy. It will also examine the decision making procedures and processes of the government, the role heads of state and organizational output in Kenya; and subsequently make conclusions and recommendations that will be a useful tool for informing future policy makers in respect of Somalia. The findings of this research will be important to government ministries, departments and individuals involved in foreign policy decision making. Non State Actors and Organizations may also use the findings as a basis for formulating policy options in addressing the situation in Somali.

### **1.6 Theoretical Framework**

This study utilizes Graham Allison's models of foreign policy decision making to draw the nexus between foreign policy decision making and crisis situations such as the Somali conflict. Allison argues that, foreign policy decisions by states are made by utilizing three main models namely, Rational Actor Model, Organizational Process Model and Bureaucratic Politics Model. The rational actor model contends that, governments are unified and rational entities, seeking to achieve well defined foreign policy goals in the international system. Allison observes that governments are treated as the primary actors, who examine a set of goals, evaluate them according to their utility and then pick the one that has the highest payoff. The rational actor model further employs a cost benefit analysis in choosing the policies to pursue. The Rational Actor approach presumes that, individual actors have complete freedom of action to achieve goals that they have articulated through a careful

process of rational analysis involving full and objective study of all pertinent information and alternatives.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, it presumes that this central actor is so fully in control of the apparatus of government that a decision once made is as good as implemented.

Organizational process model contends that, foreign policy decision making emerges from clusters of governmental organizations that look after their own best interests and follow 'Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Allison argues that, when faced with crises, government leaders do not look at the crisis as a whole, but break it down and assign it according to pre-established organizational lines and that, because of time and resource limitations, rather than evaluating all possible courses of action to see which one is most likely to work, leaders settle on the first proposal that adequately addresses the issue.<sup>59</sup> Organizations favor policies that promise to strengthen their organization in accordance with their essence and reject policies that might strip them of capabilities that are considered as crucial for upholding their essence. Also, organizations seek to preserve their own autonomy with respect to both their financial and personal resources and the making and implementation of policies.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, the bureaucratic politics model contends that, foreign policy decision making occurs at the individual level, here individual decision-makers at different levels bargain and compete for influence. Allison observes that a nation's actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders. In this case, even if they share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as personal interests and background.

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<sup>58</sup> J. Bendor, and Thomas H. Hammond, 1992, Rethinking Allison's Models. *American Political Science Review* 86(2): pp. 301-302.

<sup>59</sup> G. Allison, 1971, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York: Harper Collins, op. cit

<sup>60</sup> R. J. Art, 1973, Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique. *Policy Sciences* Vol:4, No:4: pp. 467-490:470m.

In this regard, Allison's models of foreign decision making are relevant in analysing the personalities, organizational processes and procedures that shape Kenya's approach to the crisis generated by the Somali conflict in the governments of both President Kibaki and former President Moi. The rational model will therefore be ideal to assess the role of the head of state, the bureaucratic politics model will be ideal to determine the role and influence of government ministries and departments while the organizational model will form a basis to judge the output of Kenya's foreign policy in light of eminent external threats.

### **1.7 Hypotheses**

This study tested the following hypotheses

- I. Kenya's foreign policy has evolved in response to the Somali conflict.
- II. Kenya's foreign policy is not adequate to manage the Somali conflict.
- III. Kenya's foreign policy of conflict management is reactive not proactive.

### **1.8 Research Methodology**

This study used both primary and secondary data

#### **1.8.1 Primary Data**

Primary data was obtained in two phases, the first phase utilized unpublished primary documents including interview schedules and questionnaires to collect primary data from persons who had been engaged in the past or are currently engaged in formulation of Kenya's foreign policy and managing the Somali conflict. This group comprised of former senior and serving senior government of Kenya officials who had a direct role in the formulation of foreign policy as well as the management of the Somali conflict.

The researcher interviewed twenty respondents. The respondents were drawn from policy and strategic decision making level in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and academia. This was done with a view to extracting information on objectives and the rationale behind Kenya's foreign policy in respect of the Somali conflict. The researcher utilized purposive sampling to determine the respondents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving and former Ambassadors, with a view to obtaining insights into Kenya's foreign policy decision making processes and determinants with respect to Somalia. The information sought aimed at putting into perspective the development of Kenya's Foreign policy since the collapse of the Barre government in Somali.

### **1.8.2 Secondary Data**

The researcher also utilized secondary data from relevant books and journals. This was important particularly in the critical analysis chapter. In analyzing the data, the rational actor model and the bureaucratic politics model as espoused by Graham Allison are employed as a tool of analysis in order to put into perspective the existing foreign policy of Kenya in respect of the Somali conflict. The critical analysis and findings form the basis of recommendations on policy options for Kenya and also recommendations for further research.

### **1.8.3 Limitations and Scope of the Study**

This study critically examines the impact of the Somali conflict on Kenya's foreign policy. The conflict has many aspects that impact not only on Kenya's well being, but also on Kenya's political, social and economic fronts. However, due to the limited time allocated for this research study, the research study focuses on aspects pertaining to national security and national interests, both are key determinants of foreign policy. Another limitation for this

research study was the non availability of primary data from Somalia owing to the ongoing conflict in the country.

## **1.9 Chapter Outline**

The study is structured in the following manner

1. Chapter One introduces the topic of research study, statement of the problem, objectives, literature review, methodology, theoretical framework, hypothesis and chapter outline.
2. Chapter Two examines the Somali conflict, in the period after the overthrow of President Siad Barre and also examines Kenya's foreign policy in the pre- independence period.
3. Chapter Three is the case study chapter, the chapter utilizes primary data collected from key informant interviews, questionnaires and unpublished documents to construct chapter three. 3. Chapter Four is the critical analysis chapter.
4. Chapter Five offers a summary, conclusions and recommendations for this research study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### The Somali Conflict and Kenya's Foreign Policy: An Overview

#### 2.0 Introduction

Chapter one introduced the topic of this research study, it examined the background to the research study, statement of the research problem, literature review, justification of the study, theoretical framework, research methodology, hypotheses and chapter outline. Chapter two will review the literature pertaining to the Somali conflict and Kenya's foreign policy. To achieve this, the chapter will be examined in sections. The first section will attempt an overview of foreign policy studies as postulated in the academic discourse. The second section will on the one hand purely examine the Somali conflict and on the other hand examine the Somali conflict in light of Kenya's foreign policy. The third section will review Kenya-Somalia state relations in the period preceding independence of both states. Moreover, the section will review the contextual basis upon which both states have tended to pursue their foreign policy leaders to make decision in foreign policy.

#### 2.1 Background

This section will open with a broad examination of foreign policy as postulated by scholars. As such, Modelski describes foreign policy from a state perspective; he contends that, foreign policy of a state is the sum of its relations with other states and non state actors in the international system.<sup>61</sup> He further adds that the pursuance of foreign policy seeks to set the standards against which a state will be judged by others in the international community. According to Modelski, therefore, foreign policy of a state defines the character of the nation which is pursuing it, how the people perceive themselves and finally how they would like the

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<sup>61</sup> G. Modelski, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall, p.1

international system to perceive them. By extension, Plano and Olton add that, foreign policy of a state explains what a state wants and how the state intends to get it.<sup>62</sup>

From the above, it emerges that, the pursuit of foreign policy is an endeavour by individual actors on behalf of the state, in pursuit of the state's national interest. Therefore, foreign policy creates another layer of accountability against which the performance of a nation can be judged not only by the international system, but also by its own people. In this respect, foreign policy is a preserve of state actors but pursued by individual actors with a sole goal of attaining national interests. The importance of foreign policy to states operations is that, it can be useful in creating a coherent agenda to be pursued by the government. In this regard, Allison argues that, the centrality of a well articulated foreign policy is that, it allows a state to protect its economic, social and political well being and the interests of her people.<sup>63</sup>

Breuning notes that, for a state to achieve its foreign policies as highlighted above, it must have the capacity to respond appropriately to the prevailing situation way beyond its national borders, the means used must also be acceptable domestically within its borders.<sup>64</sup> Hence, when states pursue foreign policy options, decision makers should consider not only whether such options constitute effective and appropriate responses to the situation, but they must also evaluate how such options will be received by the domestic audience.

From the foregoing, foreign policy can be described as an extension of what goes on domestically within a country and can therefore be described using domestic and systemic variables. In this breath, Goldgeier argues that, domestic variables are concerned with the internal dynamics of a state which are defined in terms of the politics, social and economic

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<sup>62</sup> J. C. Plano and R. Olton, 1969, *The International Relations Dictionary*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, p.127

<sup>63</sup> G. Allison, 1971, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York: Harper Collins,

p.113

<sup>64</sup> M. Breuning, 2007, *Foreign Policy Analysis: a Comparative Analysis*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan,

p.115

relations among the domestic constituents. Systemic variables are the external factors that shape how states relate to one another.<sup>65</sup>

In the same vein, Modelski posits that the foreign policy pursued by a state is dependent on a number of factors chief of which are a state's economic power.<sup>66</sup> The premise of a state's economic power is hinged on the fact that, a state's foreign policy is aimed at securing its national interests. In this sense, foreign policy pursued by developed states is distinct and different from foreign policy pursued by developing states. Moreover, foreign policies pursued by developed states are more likely to reflect and cover a wider geographical scope including their respective regions near abroad and global. Among most developing states, the near abroad region is significant to their foreign policy because the stability, social and economic status of the region determines the kind of foreign policy they pursue.

While the economic status of a state is important among developed states, Juma contends that, the significant determinants of developing states foreign policy comes from globalization.<sup>67</sup> Cox expands this view and observes that, the process of globalization has been reinforced by a new set of trading rules agreed under the World Trade Organization that have undercut traditional preferential arrangements that tied former colonies to their former colonizers.<sup>68</sup>

The defining features of a globalizing foreign policy include; increased interdependence among states, cooperation on economic development and enhanced inter-communication. Although, for a long time economic liberalization was the driving force

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<sup>65</sup> J. N. Goldgeier, 1994, *Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Gorbachev*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, pp4.-7

<sup>66</sup> G. Modelski, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, op, cit

<sup>67</sup> C. Juma, 'Kenya's Makeover in Diplomatic Ties Should Focus on Economic Statecraft' *The Daily Nation*, August 4, 2009.

<sup>68</sup> R. Cox, 1986 "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" in Keohane, R.O. (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics* Columbia University Press pp.70-72

behind globalization, it had tended to favour developed states and regions that had the capacity to adapt to changing global conditions. Foreign policy of the developed states is also driven by their pre-existing technological capabilities.<sup>69</sup> The intensified use of technological innovation as a tool for competitiveness tends to undercut developing states that are historically dependent on export of raw materials or trade in services like tourism that are linked to natural endowments.

Juma notes that, the main challenge to foreign policy of developing states is peace in neighbouring states.<sup>70</sup> Kenya for instance, has historically served as an anchor for stability in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, where it has played a key role as a mediator in the many conflicts that have occurred in the region. But the complexity and worsening situation in Somalia is forcing Kenya to rethink its position and widen the range of options needed to safeguard its own security.

The challenges are further compounded by the impact of the global financial crisis whose full implications are still unfolding in the international system. In addition to global economic challenges, Cerny notes that, developing states are also dealing with major regional issues, especially those associated with economic integration.<sup>71</sup>

## 2.2 Somalia's Foreign Policy

The name Somalia is used to refer to the *de jure* existing state of the Republic of Somalia which is located in the Horn of Africa. In its present day mapping, Somalia consists of the Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, the autonomous region of Puntland in the north and

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid

<sup>70</sup> C. Juma. 'Kenya's Makeover in Diplomatic Ties Should Focus on Economic Statecraft.' *The Daily Nation*, August 4, 2009.

<sup>71</sup> P.G. Cerny, 1990, *The changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State*. London, Sage, p.5

northeast as well as a third part known as Southern Somalia or South Central Somalia.<sup>72</sup> Somali as a state is notorious for the long standing conflict, lawlessness and insecurity for the international system in general and particularly for the Horn of Africa region.

Bestenamn notes that the continuing political crisis in Somalia can be traced back to the 21 year rule of President Mohamed Siad Barre from 1969 to 1991.<sup>73</sup> Barre's regime had led a military coup in 1969 which ended Somalia's first post- independence experiment with democratic civilian government between 1960 and 1969. Bryden adds that this period would in later years become marked by corruption, inefficient governance, and increasingly fragmentary politics centred on clan based political parties and patronage.<sup>74</sup>

Ahmed notes that since then, the nature and interest of Somalia has changed significantly reflecting the contested nature of authority in stateless Somalia and the fluidity of coalitions.<sup>75</sup> Peace and stability efforts have been attempted through a series of no less than sixty clan based peace and reconciliation conferences and meetings. Some of these processes have been prominent than others. The dynamics underlying the outlook of the various reconciliation processes are concealed in the internal interest of various Somali factions, clans and individual actors; and external actors in the region and beyond.

Bradbury et al observe that, like most of the new African states during the 1960s, Somalia had high expectations about what its independence could bring.<sup>76</sup> It's social, political, and economic development since independence in 1960 was influenced by two

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<sup>72</sup> Jean-François Bayart, 1993, *The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly*, London: Longman, pp. 7-8.

<sup>73</sup> ibid

<sup>74</sup> A Bryden and H Hänggi (eds) 2005, *Security Governance and Post-conflict Peace building*, Lit Verlag, Berlin, p.p. 12-17

<sup>75</sup> A. J. Ahmed, 1995, *The Invention of Somalia*, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, p. 4.

<sup>76</sup> M. Bradbury et al., 2003, 'Somaliland: Choosing Politics over Violence', *Review of African Political Economy* No, Vol:97, p. 320-475:471.

objectives. One was political and reflected the popular nationalist feelings among the Somali ethnic population in the region to unite under one rule (Pan-Somalism). The other objective was economic and was no different from the aspiration of Kenya to raise the economic welfare of its citizens.<sup>77</sup>

Jackson and Rosberg argue that, during the colonial period the Somali people were divided between British, Italian, and Ethiopian rule.<sup>78</sup> Following Somalia's independence in 1960 the government supported the idea of Pan Somalism, which is the belief that Somalia should unite all Somali inhabited territories. The inhabited territories were considered as locations in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya where people of Somali origin resided. Jackson and Rosberg further argue that, the goal of Somali unification led to a military build-up that eventually resulted in war with Ethiopia and fighting in northern Kenya.

From a far, Somalia may therefore be judged as a homogenous group of people with a singular ethnic background and religion, but upon close analysis, it emerges that the people of Somalia are different and distinct. The differences in origin can be traced historically. Samatar observes that oral historical tradition locates the origins of the Somali people in a union between African Bantu groups and immigrants from the Arab Peninsula.<sup>79</sup> The Bantu group migrated and settled in the lower parts of Somalia, where most became farmers who depended on agricultural production.

Migrants from Arabia settled in upper parts of Somalia and most were nomadic pastoralist. The difference between the Northern pastoralist and Southern farmers was arguably the first reference point to differences among Somali communities. Lewis observes

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid

<sup>78</sup> R. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, 1982, *Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 1.

<sup>79</sup> A. I. Samatar, 1988, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*, London: Zed Books, pp.3-4

that, the area settled by the Somalis was characterized by a pastoral economic system in which each household or each family was highly autonomous.<sup>80</sup>

Although there are differences in orientation between pastoralist and farmers, both share common practices. Menkhaus argues that, under the traditional setting, Somali families were led by a male member of the family.<sup>81</sup> The qualification for the leader was automatically based on age, and the senior most (in age) assumed the role as the patriarch of the family and was mainly responsible for solving disputes within his family and at times allocating duties to other members.

Bryden and Farah observe that, as families grew in numbers, the rate of interaction with other families also increased, feuds between these families were imminent, hence family leaders found new roles as mediators and the scope of their duties increased from family level to clan level.<sup>82</sup>

On the regional level, Thompson argues that, the battle for the Somali inhabited regions led to a shift in the foreign policy of Somalia and its interactions with other states in the region.<sup>83</sup> Somalia, which prior to 1963, had been allied with Western nations shifted their geopolitical alliances to the Eastern powers allied to the Soviet bloc. On the international stage, the political climate of the rest of the world had a significant effect on African colonies, especially Somalia. During World War II the rivalry between the Axis powers and the Allied powers in Europe also had an effect on the social and political climate among the Somali people.

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<sup>80</sup> I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali*, James Currey, Oxford, p. 9

<sup>81</sup> K. Menkhaus, "The Somali Crisis: Tragedy in Five Acts", *African Affairs*, Summer 2007, p.3

<sup>82</sup> M. Bryden, and A. Y. Farah, 1995 *The Somaliland Peace Committee: Case Study of Grassroots Peacemaking Initiative*, Report for United Nations Development Programme Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p.2

<sup>83</sup> V. B. Thompson, 'Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Kenya-Somalia Relations Since the Ogaden War, 1978-1986', paper presented at the African Studies Association conference, Chicago, 28-31 October 1988, p.42

Clapham observes that after the assassination of elected President Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmarke in 1969, the army took power under Major General Mohamed Siad Barre.<sup>84</sup> Barre's regime promised to achieve both objectives of Pan Somalism and economic emancipation that were envisioned after independence. On the first anniversary of the coup, the government announced that scientific socialism was the official ideology of the government. The foreign policy of the new government began tilting towards the Soviet Union, and its economic policies were geared toward accommodation of socialist concepts. Eastern Europe became a major source of development and military aid.<sup>85</sup>

However, he failed and instead led the country to political and social disintegration and economic disaster. Laitin observes that after Barre's fall, the country was taken over by ruthless warlords fighting to fill the political power vacuum by exploiting and manipulating clan based politics.<sup>86</sup> In the process, the inter-clan wars led to the collapse of the Somali state and to further social disintegration, unending hostilities, and economic disaster. Consequently, Somalia's dream for unity and prosperity drifted further away.

The 1977-1978 Ogaden war with Ethiopia created deep suspicions among the Horn of Africa states concerning the foreign policy intentions of the Siad Barre regime. The continuing strain in Somali-Ethiopian relations tended to reinforce these suspicions among other states and particularly Kenya and Djibouti, where Somalia had claimed that her people were settled.

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<sup>84</sup> C. Clapham, 1996, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 16

<sup>85</sup> L. Gesheker, "Socio-economic Developments in Somalia," *Horn of Africa* 2, no. 2 (April-June 1979): 24-36.

<sup>86</sup> D. D. Laitin, 1976; "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 3, p.457.

The 1980s marked the change in the orientation of economic policies as well as regional and domestic politics in Somalia. Greenfield notes that, the quest for economic restructuring and economic recovery, however, was overshadowed by domestic political discord in the aftermath of the Ogaden War.<sup>87</sup> The 1980s also brought even more social political turbulence and more serious macroeconomic crises than did the period of 1970's. Chandler also notes that the 1980s was characterized by a bloody and ruthless civil war in which the government fought against its own citizens. At the same time the Somali government's erratic economic policies and the failure of its attempts at economic reforms further worsened the economic conditions.<sup>88</sup>

Chandler further observes that, the first half of the 1990s was characterized by the collapse of the Somali state and unending violence between clans who were competing for political and military dominance.<sup>89</sup> Instead of bringing relief, the toppling of Siad Barre's dictatorship was followed by ruthless clan wars that brought the country more misery and hardship. Brons notes that, the Somali state and its institutions disappeared, and the traditional social institutions were powerless to stop the manipulation of power hungry warlords who exploited clan affiliation and frictions.<sup>90</sup>

From the above, it can be argued that the provisional government established in February 1991 inherited a legacy of problematic relations with neighboring states and economic dependence on aid from Arab and Western nations. Relations between Somalia and its three neighbors Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya had been poisoned for more than two decades by Somalia's irredentist claims to areas inhabited by ethnic Somalis in each of these

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<sup>87</sup> R. Greenfield, 1989, "Somali Trouble Rumbles on," *New African*, p. 26

<sup>88</sup> D. Chandler, 2006 ' *Empire in Denial: The politics of state-building* ' London, Pluto, p. 71

<sup>89</sup> Ibid

<sup>90</sup> M.H Brons, 2001, *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: Somalia. From Statelessness to Statelessness?* Utrecht: International Books, p.5

three states. The conflict was therefore bound to bring more misery and challenges to the foreign policies of the neighboring states.

When Siad Barre fled the country, the state was consumed by a virtual state of anarchy. Somalia has not had a recognized government since January 27, 1991, when the United Somali Congress ousted Barre.<sup>91</sup> After the collapse of the Somali government, various factions decided to vie for control of Somalia, which resulted in chaos, inter-clan rivalry, warfare, and fighting.<sup>92</sup> Although Somalia is not as lawless as it was immediately after Barre was ousted, Somali factions still continue to fight for control of the territory and resources.

Somalia is a divided nation that lacks a widely recognized and cohesive government and therefore there is no real overall foreign policy of the country. Civil unrest has been a primary obstacle to economic policy making and development.<sup>93</sup> Foreign policymaking likewise has also been restricted due to the collapse of all sectors of Somalia economy that would otherwise support projection of its foreign policy.

### 2.3 Kenya's Foreign Policy

Kenya's foreign policy is best seen in terms of its political and economic moderation and of its continuing reliance on the Western world. Adar notes that from 1963 to 1983, Kenya's most significant international affiliations were with the East African Community, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth.<sup>94</sup>

While Kenya's foreign policy is influenced by issues in the near abroad region and the global system, the issues in the near abroad carry more weight on Kenya's foreign policy.

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid

<sup>92</sup> S.J. Hansen, 2008 "Misspent youth. Somalia's Shabab insurgents" *Jane's Intelligence Review* Volume 20, Number 10 October 2008 pp.16-21

<sup>93</sup> Ibid

<sup>94</sup> K. G Adar, *Kenya's Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia: 1963 – 1983*, Laham New York and London, University Press, pp 130 - 134

The following section will examine Kenya's foreign policy since independence and thereafter review the conflict in Somalia since the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991.

Adam notes that, although East Africa and the Horn are often considered as weak regional communities, Kenya plays a significant role, especially through IGAD in promoting negotiations between the warring parties within different countries.<sup>95</sup> Since independence Kenya's foreign affiliations have been within the East African Community, the African Union and the United Nations.

Orwa argues that, Kenya's foreign policy was designed and guided by the following basic and universally recognized norms; first is the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and preservation of national security. Second is good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence with others and third is peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, non-alignment and national self interest adherence to the Charters of the UN and AU.<sup>96</sup>

In addition, Howell argues that, from independence, the Kenyan foreign policy was premised to hinge on the following pillars. Good neighbourliness and peaceful coexistence, non interference in other state's internal affairs, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, national security, peaceful settlements of disputes, non- alignment and adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and the African Union.<sup>97</sup>

Breuning argues that, the most important determinant of states foreign policy is its domestic constituencies.<sup>98</sup> Domestic constituents take several different forms, but the main

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<sup>95</sup> H.M Adam, 1994, 'Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea' *Review of African Political Economy* No.59:pp.21-38

<sup>96</sup> K. Orwa, 'Foreign Relations and International Cooperation', op, cit

<sup>97</sup> J. D. Barkan, 2004, *Kenya After Moi*. Foreign Affairs, Vol: 83, No:1, p.5

<sup>98</sup> M. Bruening, 2007, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Analysis*, op, cit, pp.119-122

ones can be grouped into three classes, these include, interest groups, the media, and public opinion. The extent to which domestic constituents influence foreign policy is on one hand gauged by considering how decision makers are constrained by the pressures exerted by domestic constituencies, and on the other hand by how decision makers seek to set the agenda and shape attitudes of domestic constituencies.

Breuning further argues that, the relationship between decision makers and domestic constituencies is determined by the political institutions of the society. In this perspective, it is argued that, authoritative governments provide very few avenues for domestic constituents to explicitly influence foreign policy. By extension, this means that, the role of the public in influencing foreign policy decision making is largely indirect.

Furthermore, Breuning notes that, authoritarian states face few explicit domestic constraints. Leaders in authoritarian governments do not seek to understand their publics, they present foreign policy decisions and problems in terms of verbal imagery that they believe will resonate with their domestic constituents. They also seek to convince their domestic constituents that their policies are in the national interest.

Semi-authoritarian societies have wider access of foreign policy options than authoritarian governments; this is because domestic constituencies are bold in their criticism of government decisions. In democratic societies, domestic constituencies have more avenues to which they can express their opinion as well as the degree to which it constrains decision makers.<sup>99</sup> The structure of political and societal institutions is more open to influence and provides greater access and more contact points for interest groups and other societal actors to influence foreign policy decision making.

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<sup>99</sup> R.Kappen and Muller, 1993, *From the Outside In and From the Inside Out, International Relations, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy* in *The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formation*, Editor, David Skidmore and Valeries Hudson, Boulder, CO: Westview Press p.187

Policy makers try to anticipate the public's reaction to foreign policy decisions and also try to mould public opinion by presenting problems from a particular perspective.<sup>100</sup> The public's impact on foreign policy is dependent between decision maker's efforts to anticipate public opinion and efforts by the public to shape the set of options decision makers will perceive to be viable strategies.

The limited impact of public opinion in Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia tends to occur at specific phases of decision making process. This is because; foreign policy is distinguished between crisis and non crisis foreign policy.<sup>101</sup> Crisis foreign policy focuses the attention of the domestic audience for a short period of time when the issue is highlighted on the media. Non crisis foreign policy occupies decision makers for long periods of time without receiving much media attention during most of the decision making process.

On one hand, although decision makers have greater role in defining the problem during a crisis, the public's attention builds steadily and is usually greatest during the implementation phase.<sup>102</sup> This means that decision makers have less freedom in selecting a policy response. On the other hand, the leaders' circle of advisors has most influence during the problem representation phase, because they are the ones who can define a problem as being a crisis. These patterns of response suggest that different types of policy problems present decision makers with different kinds of constraints. Leaders may choose to launch bold initiatives in response to crisis foreign policy problems even if they know such initiatives may not come to fruition.

Decision makers are likely to choose policies that are acceptable to the public, even if they consider such policies as being less optimal than alternative options. For most leaders,

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid

<sup>101</sup> Ibid

<sup>102</sup> M. Bruening, 2007, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Analysis*, op, cit,

the ability to maintain public support for their policies is a critical dimension that options must be able to meet.<sup>103</sup>

## 2.4 Kenya-Somalia Relations

Helander argues that Kenya's relations with Somalia have been far less harmonious.<sup>104</sup> This is because the region of North Eastern Kenya has been a source of conflict and contention between the two states. Since independence, Somalia has harbored claims on the part of Kenya's territory referred to as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) or North Eastern Province. Somali's irredentist claims on this region posed a serious threat to Kenya's territorial integrity in the 1960's. Somali guerrillas known as shiftas waged a campaign against the Kenyan Police and Kenya Army through incursions and by means of the Voice of Somalia radio based in Mogadishu to take over this region.<sup>105</sup>

According to Gebremariam, the harmony was not achieved because Somalia failed to renounce its territorial claims over the NFD of Kenya and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia.<sup>106</sup> He further adds that, between 1965 and 1967, Somalia organized guerrilla forces that harassed Kenyan and Ethiopian government officials, prompting both countries to adopt deterrent foreign policies. They closed their borders to Somalia's intrusion into their territories and blocked Somalia's nomadic clans from grazing lands and water. The combination of these measures compelled Mogadishu to initiate a policy of détente.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> P. James and E. Zhang, 2005, *Chinese Choices, A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises 1950-1996*, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol:1, No: 1, pp.1-54:31

<sup>104</sup> B. Helander, 1998, 'The emperor's new clothes removed: a critique of Besteman's 'Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence' *American Ethnologist*, Vol:3 pp.489-491

<sup>105</sup> Ibid

<sup>106</sup> K Gebremariam, 2004, "Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Africa's Regional Organizations"

in *Building Sustainable Peace*, T Keating et al, University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, Canada, p 194

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, p 195

Herbst argues that this tense predicament was eased when the Somali government changed in 1967, but it revived in 1977 when the Somalia and Ethiopian war once again placed the area in contention after Kenya supported Ethiopia in the Ogaden war.<sup>108</sup> The predicament was further exacerbated when Kenya's relations with Arab nations worsened after Kenya seized an Egyptian plane transporting arms to the Somali forces. However, these tensions eased after President Moi made an unprecedented visit to Mogadishu in 1984 to negotiate border claims and promote trade cooperation.<sup>109</sup>

The strained relations between Kenya and Somalia can also be traced back to the period after Somalia's independence. Somalia's five pointed star has meant the existence of Somali irredentism for nationalists who claimed an expanded Somalia: the star represents the five territories of Somalia, one of which is northern Kenya. This orientation, led to numerous skirmishes between the shifto and Kenyan security forces. Thompson observes that President Moi's efforts to quell the tension were successful because Somali President Siad Barre declared that he had no claim to Kenyan territory, insisting that he had other pressing domestic problems that eventually forced him into exile and precipitated the disintegration of Somali society.<sup>110</sup>

The collapse of the Somali state and the years of warfare and criminality which ensued had immediate and profound spill-over effects on neighbouring states. Proliferation of illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SWAL), and occasional cross border incursions by Somali factional fighters into the Kenyan territory became a challenge to Kenya's security

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<sup>108</sup> J. Herbst, 2000, *States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 7

<sup>109</sup> Institute of Public Administration, *The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya Dispute, 1960-67* (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969).

<sup>110</sup> V. B. Thompson, 'Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Kenya-Somalia Relations Since the Ogaden War, 1978-1986', paper presented at the African Studies Association conference, Chicago, 28-31 October 1988, pp.553-554

and national interests. These developments were disastrous for security in Kenya's North Eastern Province rapidly which worsened; clannism, previously a minor source of tension in northern Kenya, was mobilized and inflamed by Somalia's spill-over effects; the Kenyan government lost control over sections of its border with Somalia and a large swath of territory in the northeast. Moreover, and the influx of Somali refugees created conflict over resources with local communities, in addition to accusations of refugees involvement in illicit trade smuggling, and other economic activities.

By the mid 1990s, portions of Northeast Kenya were considered to be more lawless and insecure than the Somali side of the border.<sup>111</sup> Spill-over effects which worsened insecurity on the Ethiopian side of the border were also significant, though not as serious as Kenya's crisis in North Eastern Province. In Ethiopia, the fall of the Mengistu regime in 1991 further increased temporary instability and violence in Somali-inhabited areas of the Horn of Africa region. Thousands of soldiers in the defeated army left for home and sold their weapons en route, contributing to the flood of cheap small arms in the region.<sup>112</sup>

In Kenya, too, domestic political changes helped to trigger worsening insecurity. In 1992, under pressure to improve civil liberties, the Moi government lifted the state of emergency on North Eastern Province; at the same time, its weakened armed forces and police began to withdraw from much of the province and preferred to remain in garrisons rather than expose themselves to the worsening insecurity.<sup>113</sup> The vacuum created by the withdrawing security sector could not have come at a more inopportune moment sine the

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<sup>111</sup> K. Menkhaus, 2006, *State Building in a Zone of Protracted Collapse: Informal Governance and Prospects for a "Mediated State" in Somalia*, in Chuck Call (ed.) *The Challenges of State-Building and Peace building* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, p.17

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid*, p 21

armed gunmen and militiamen from Somalia swarmed across the border raiding livestock and attacking commercial traffic.

## 2.5 Personality Traits in Foreign Policy Analysis

The personality trait of a leader or the idiosyncratic variable is described as the act of guiding by influence in foreign policy decision making. According to Rost, leadership is an influence of relationships among leaders and followers who intend to achieve real changes that reflect their mutual purposes.<sup>114</sup> Burns notes that political leadership in a democracy is the reciprocal process of mobilizing by persons with certain motives, various economic, political and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realize foreign policy goals independently or mutually held by leaders and followers.<sup>115</sup> Therefore, one of the fundamental tasks of a leader is to move others towards a specific goal or course of action. From above it can be observed that, where Rost depicts the leader/follower relationship as one of *primus inter pares*, or first among equals, Burns discerns the leader as a more powerful and proactive initiator of action.

The art of leadership implies that some magnitude of consensus regarding the course of action that will be pursued should be identified if the Head of State is to have any chance of realizing his foreign policy objectives.<sup>116</sup> The president or head of state should then determine the appropriate method for achieving such a goal. These may be institutional; for example when the powers are vested in the presidency by the constitution. Environmental or situation specific constraints, such as public opinion; or personal beliefs which structure decision making alternatives are consistent with politically relevant convictions held by the leader in respect of the correct procedure to follow in foreign policy decision making.

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<sup>114</sup> J. Rost, 1991. *Leadership for the 21st Century*, New York: Praeger, p.43

<sup>115</sup> J. M. Burns, 1978. *Leadership*, New York: Harper and Row, p.23.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*

Regardless of the form these challenges take, however, they should be considered when setting out a course of action.

### 2.5.1 Foreign Policy under Kenyatta

In the context of foreign policy, the most important policy formulation institution is the presidency, which is supported by the ministry of foreign affairs.<sup>117</sup> The conducting of foreign affairs is a prerogative of the Head of state. The head of state is the regarded as the initiator, articulator and director of foreign policy. Considering the centrality of the institution of the presidency, this section will trace the development of Kenya's foreign policy by considering the presidents in power since Kenya gained independence.

Murray-Brown argues that, after independence, Kenyatta's style of leadership was reflected in his foreign policy. Kenyatta assumed the presidency at a time when he had achieved hero status among Kenyans and condemnation as a leader *unto darkness and death* by the colonial government.<sup>118</sup>

Howell argues that newly independent Kenya's foreign policy was built on three pillars, which can be identified as non-alignment, the promotion of African unity and the eradication of colonialism in other parts of the continent, in line with the principles of the Organization of African Unity.

At independence, Kenyatta apparently had already made up his mind about Kenya's path in foreign affairs. Subsequent policy documents, such as the KANU manifesto and the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, clearly spelt out Kenyatta's foreign policy, that Kenya would be built along the lines of free enterprise, tied to the West, and that the accumulation of

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<sup>117</sup> R. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, 1982, *Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 1.

<sup>118</sup> J. Murray-Brown, 1973, *Kenyatta*, New York: E. P. Dutton, p.12

foreign capital would be necessary for economic growth, which led to the Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1964.<sup>119</sup>

Howell further notes that, radical politicians at that time like Jaramogi Oginga Odinga claimed that independent Kenya's foreign policy was very much influenced by imperial powers. The claim was supported by the fact that Kenya had adopted a hardening attitude towards the Eastern bloc thus causing criticism among the radicals of the claims to adherence to the non alignment principle. He explains that the ruling party's response was that those making such claims were themselves influenced by foreign forces and did not represent the legitimate opinion of Kenyans.<sup>120</sup>

Howell continues to argue that foreign policy in Kenya was such that it would not damage relations with important states that were providing aid to Kenya. According to this analysis, support for liberation movements was managed carefully so as to avoid offending strategic trade partners.

Kenyatta pursued a foreign policy of good neighbourliness with other East African states while protecting Kenya's territorial integrity. Orwa argues that, on territorial integrity, Kenyatta made it very clear that Kenya would not concede any of its territory.<sup>121</sup> In September 1963, he cautioned the British government against negotiating away the Northern Frontier District (NFD), which the Somali government was claiming. Kenyatta's pragmatic approach to issues meant that Kenya could cooperate with any country in the world as long as it was in the best interest of Kenya. Kenya's priority at independence was economic development and security.

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid

<sup>120</sup> Ibid

<sup>121</sup> K. Orwa, 1988, 'Foreign Relations and International Cooperation', in Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (ed.), *Kenya: An Official Handbook*, Nairobi: Colourprint, p. 308.

### 2.5.2 Kenya's Foreign Policy under Moi

Foreign policy under the Moi administration was more of a presidential prerogative, more aggressive, and consequently more controversial. Foreign policy under Kenyatta, as discussed above, was noncommittal. Kenyatta often sent Vice President Moi or the foreign minister to represent him. In contrast, Moi was as active as any foreign minister.

Under Moi, Kenya's foreign policy of good neighbourliness was identified as his cornerstone policy in regard to nearby countries. Orwa observes that, this was a good strategy because Kenya stood to gain more because it was more economically advanced than its neighbours.<sup>122</sup> According to Ogot, in the 1980s Kenya went through a period of economic decline worsened by the oil crisis of 1979, the collapse of the East African Community, drought contributing to food shortages and fluctuating prices due to the poor economic conditions.<sup>123</sup> Kenya's response was to embrace structural adjustment policies to generally ensure self sufficiency in food production in the hope of dealing with the financial crisis.

Kenya's relations with its neighbours to the north have been far less harmonious due to the yet unresolved irredentist claim by Somalia on Kenya's Northern Frontier District which is predominantly inhabited by Kenyan ethnic Somalis. This claim has continued to pose a serious threat to Kenya's territorial integrity since the 1960's. For four years, Somali guerrillas known as *shiftras* waged a campaign against the Kenyan police and army through incursions and by means of the Voice of Somalia radio based in Mogadishu.<sup>124</sup> As earlier noted the predicament was exacerbated when Kenya seized an Egyptian plane transporting

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid  
<sup>123</sup> B. Ogot. A and, W.R Ochieng. 1995, *Decolonisation and Independence in Kenya. 1940- 1993*. London, pp.4-14

<sup>124</sup> B. Helander, 1998, 'The emperor's new clothes removed: a critique of Besteman's 'Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence' *American Ethnologist* , op cit, Vol:3 pp.489-491

arms to the Somali forces. However, Moi made an unprecedented visit to Mogadishu in 1984 to negotiate border claims and promote trade cooperation.<sup>125</sup>

Although leaders may possess a vision that is not reflective of collective desires, Burns implies that during the process of realization, leaders must persuade followers that they are correct and should be supported.<sup>126</sup> Weatherford argues that, the ability of individual leaders to transform the politics in which they exist, through personal skilfulness or political skill, is thus heavily dependent on the regime they face.<sup>127</sup> For example, President Moi's decisions to surround himself with particular associates and staff contributed to an immediate environment of his own making which may have exaggerated certain Moi personality traits. For example, the choice of Bethuel Kiplagat as his special envoy to Somalia likely reinforced Moi's desire for tact, skill and secrecy in responding to challenges of foreign policy decision making.

## 2.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, it emerges that, the pursuit of Kenya's foreign policy is determined by factors that affect its national interest. During Kenyatta's government, a foreign policy of non-alignment and non interference was adopted. This was because most states in East Africa and the region had just obtained independence states were therefore concerned with how they could prevent external interference. However, during Moi's government, the prerogative of foreign policy decision making was largely influenced by the head of state. States in the region had plunged into internal conflict, hence for Moi, securing Kenya's national interest

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<sup>125</sup> <sup>125</sup> Institute of Public Administration, *The Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya Dispute, 1960-67* (Dar es Salam, Tanzania: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969). Op cit

<sup>126</sup> I.D. Barber, 1992. *Presidential Character*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, p. 349.

<sup>127</sup> M. S. Weatherford, 1994, 'The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency', *Governance* Volume 7, Number 2, pp.135-136.

could only be assured if there was peace in the neighbouring states. The Somali conflict epitomises a case in point where Moi as an individual actor played a leading role in driving a foreign policy of conflict management.

## CHAPTER THREE

### The Somali Conflict and Kenya's Foreign Policy

#### 3.0 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the evolution of the Somali conflict and Kenya's foreign policy. The literature informing both aspects was reviewed in chronological order, as such; Kenya's foreign policy dating back to the period after independence was reviewed. The literature paid particular emphasis on the foreign policy pursued under the three post independence presidents. The literature reviewed in regard to the Somali conflict dates back to the period after the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991.

Chapter three will utilize primary sources of data to build upon the case study of this research study. The chapter will therefore utilize primary data, including interviews, magazines, news articles and unpublished specialized monograms to review relevant data. Moreover, it will utilize published primary documents to build on the case study of this chapter. The data presented aims to present the prevailing situation, in light of the secondary objectives of this research study and within the limits of the timeline indicated in chapter one.

This section opens and notes that, the Somalia conflict has persisted for over two decades following the ouster in 1991 of President Siad Barre. The conflict, compounded by state failure has had spill-over effects on Kenya's social, political, security and economic environment.<sup>128</sup> These four elements are arguably the building blocks around which the national interests and foreign policy of Kenya are founded, hence the significance of the

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<sup>128</sup> M. Affey, *Peace is at Hand*, Daily Nation, April 28<sup>th</sup> 2005

effects of the Somali conflict.<sup>129</sup> The impact of the conflict on the above effects is varied and ranges from one sector to another.

While the prospect of independence for Kenya in 1963 was perceived as heralding much promise, it was an issue that communities in northern Kenya received with much trepidation, leading to the first conflict in 1965, the Shifta War, pitting Kenya's newly independent state against a versatile community seeking self-determination with active encouragement from Somalia. This was largely because the communities, particularly the Somali, were struggling with an imposed colonial border which had dismembered the community, dividing its members into three different countries: Italian Somaliland (present-day Somalia), Ogaden (in Ethiopia and present-day Somaliland), and French Somaliland (present-day Djibouti). This colonial construct wreaked havoc on intra-community relations as well as on their pastoralists' enterprise. In their quest for a pan-Somali identity, the desire of the people of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) was to negotiate for reunification with their motherland in Somalia and the rejection of the 'Kenyan' identity being imposed of them.<sup>130</sup>

Somalia's post-independence pursuit of its political ambition was regarded by neighbouring states as a threat to regional security and to their own internal security. As it were, both the first civilian government of Presidents Aden Abdulle Osman and Abdul Rashid Shermake, and the military regime of Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre, constructed their legitimacy around pan-Somali nationalism. The major goal of this nationalism was to re-unite the Somali people under a single state. Somalia's foreign policy was characterized by an irredentist tendency towards its neighbours, a tendency that generated a series of direct diplomatic and military confrontations with its neighbors. The most memorable are the 1964

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<sup>129</sup> M. Mwajefa, *Diplomats Propose Foreign Policy Shift*, Nation Newspaper Wednesday, July 29 2009

<sup>130</sup> Ibid

and 1976-77 Somalia- Ethiopia wars and Somalia's support for Shifta insurgents in Kenya in the 1960s.<sup>131</sup>

Somalia's socio-political order is based on kinship and clans. The main clans in Somalia include Hawiye, Isaq, Dir, Digil and Darods. The Somali clan system is an intricate weave of clans, sub-clans and sub-sub-clans. Thus the conflict in Somali can be traced back to the multiplicity of political parties, each of them drawing support and loyalty from specific clans or alliance of sub clans, all seeking to acquire economic and political dominance.

### 3.1 Irredentism and Kenya- Somalia Relations

In contrast, Warigi notes that, in the case of Kenya, three fluid phases of violent contestations can be discerned.<sup>132</sup> These conflicts have revolved around questions of statehood, constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy. The remarkable observation is that none of these conflicts have been substantively resolved; hence the cankerworm of deep resentment has continued to fester even when the externalities of the conflict have more or less vanished.

In the lead-up to Kenya's independence from Britain in December 1963, the status of nearly a third of the country, then called the Northern Frontier District (NFD), was not clear. Political leaders of the Somali community in North Eastern and part of the Borana community in Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale districts petitioned the British Government to allow them to secede to Somalia before granting independence to Kenya. But the major political parties of the time, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) opposed any suggestions of partitioning the country.

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<sup>131</sup> K. Mbugua, Why Frontline Peacekeepers Won't do, Daily Nation Wednesday, April 6, 2005, p.9

<sup>132</sup> G. Warigi, Maybe it's time Somalis tried the Swiss model of governance , Daily Nation , December 24, 2011

At the Lancaster House constitutional conferences in London, delegates also engaged in a hotly contested debate between those supporting *majimbo* (federalism) led by KADU and those for a unitary state, led by KANU. Those supporting federalisms won the day and started off with a federal constitution and six federal regions Central, Eastern, Coast, Rift Valley, and Nyanza and Nairobi Special area. Somali delegates at the Lancaster conferences, led by NFD Legislative Council member Rashid Abdi Khaliff, refused to sign the final document because it failed to make provisions for the autonomy of the NFD.<sup>133</sup>

Apparently fearful that granting autonomy to the NFD would not only lay foundations for a potential civil war, but also create a precedent that would have encouraged Somalia to lay claims to other Somali occupied territories in Ethiopia and Djibouti, the British approached the matter with caution. The Somali Republic, which had attained its own independence in 1960, aggressively supported the irredentist bid by the NFD. The government in Mogadishu argued that NFD belonged to the so-called Greater Somali Nation that extended to all territories where the Somalis lived in the region from Isiolo to Ogaden in Ethiopia to Djibouti. Somalia's Prime Minister Rashid Ali Shermarke led Parliament in Mogadishu to vote to cut relations with the British Government on March 19, 1963.<sup>134</sup>

The National Assembly of the Somali Republic, noting with deep regret that the foreign policy conducted by the United Kingdom damaged the interests of the Somali nation, supported the decision of the government to break relations with the United Kingdom, and consequently recommended that all means for the adequate protection of the Somali interests abroad be found.<sup>135</sup> It was in furtherance of Somali interests abroad that the Somali government supported the Shifta secessionist war that broke in 1965, led by Wako Hapi Taro,

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<sup>133</sup> Colonial Office, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962, p 29

<sup>134</sup> J. Clark 1992/1993 "Debacle in Somalia" *Foreign Affairs* 1992/93: Vol:1, No: 3, pp.1-43:7

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid*

the President of the Northern Frontier People's Progressive Party (NFPPP) but which was defeated in 1967.<sup>136</sup>

Although the impact of the Somalia conflict on Kenya is established in many areas, during the interviews for this research study, Mwanzia, Kwanya, Maina, Adala and Abbas observed that, the Somali conflict poses serious threats particularly to security and economic interests of Kenya. As such, this section will review the national security and economic impact of the Somalia conflict on Kenya. Moreover, national security will be reviewed by considering the connection and impact between Somalia refugees, Small Arms and Light Weapons, terrorism, piracy and the Somali conflict.

### **3.2 The Somali Conflict and Issues in National Security**

Maina notes that, the Somali conflict poses a threat to Kenya's national interest both internally and externally. Moreover, he notes for instance, that the prevailing conflict is a hindrance to achieving the Lamu Port-South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAMPSET) project under the Vision 2030 which is projected to propel Kenya to a middle income state. In contrast, Brown asserts that the Kenyan state has not only failed to provide security to its people, but has actively participated and sometimes instigated much of the violence in the country. Ethnic clashes for instance have occurred and recurred since 1990 and resulted in the deaths and displacement of thousands of people. He argues that this has resulted in internal weaknesses; hence any attempt to secure Kenya's borders is frail. Consequently, the Somali conflict or not, Kenya's national security will be adversely affected.

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<sup>136</sup> G. Mathenge, *Kenyan Somalis' Dream of Own State and Shifra War*, Sunday Nation / September 25, 2005, - p 14

### 3.2.1 Refugees and proliferation of illegal Arms

Maina notes that, since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia, there has been considerable proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons, which often leads to destabilization of social structures and intertribal conflicts in Kenya.<sup>137</sup> Specifically, Maina points out the conflict between the Turkana and Borana in northern Kenya and the escalation of terrorism related activities as vivid examples to illustrate this. Moreover, he notes that the conflict in Somalia is the main cause of insecurity off the coast of East Africa, and this phenomenon acts as a catalyst leading to escalation of prices of goods in Kenya and the region at large.

Kwanya echoes Maina's views and notes that, the main effect of the conflict has been the influx of refugees, proliferation of small arms and light weapons leading to increased insecurity, coupled with the radicalization and recruitment of Kenyan Muslim youth to fight alongside extremist groups in Somalia. Moreover, he adds that piracy in the Indian Ocean has affected the shipping industry and the security and economic threats against neighbouring countries has led to their military intervention in the Somali conflict.<sup>138</sup>

In addition, Adala concurs with the foregoing arguments and observes that the influx of refugees and insecurity are the main threats of the Somali conflict on Kenya.<sup>139</sup> He notes on the one hand that, the large presence of Somali refugees that at one point peaked at nearly 700,000 is a point of concern. On the other hand, he notes that, increased insecurity for Kenya emanates from the fact that, some refugees comprising former members of Somali Defence and security forces, crossed in to Kenya with their arms.

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<sup>137</sup> Interview with Amb S.K. Maina, Director, Multilateral Affairs Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi, 9<sup>th</sup> January, 2012

<sup>138</sup> Interview with G. Kwanya, First Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Former Diplomatic and Political Liaison Officer, IGAD Somali Peace Process, Nairobi, 6<sup>th</sup> January 2012

<sup>139</sup> Interview with Amb. Ochieng Adala, Director, Africa Peace Forum, (APFO), Nairobi, 5<sup>th</sup> January 2012

Affey observes that, crime levels increased in Kenya because arms were acquired easily from Somalia.<sup>140</sup> Moreover, the upsurge of inter-clan conflicts coupled with the imminent threat of Al-Shabaab, especially along the Kenyan border, is not only a risk to Kenyans residing along the border, but also to Kenya's territorial integrity and national security in general.

While there is consensus that refugees have contributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and to an extent the threat of terrorism leading to increased insecurity in Kenya, Mwanzia also observes that, the constant influx of refugees into the Dadaab refugee camps (Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley) has led to competition for resources with the local community leading to environmental degradation due to over-exploitation and a possible violent conflict arising from competition for scarce resources.<sup>141</sup> Illegal immigrants into Kenya, a majority of who are from Somalia, put pressure on the government in the provision of basic amenities in areas like Eastleigh and other urban centres.

Moreover, Abbas also notes that the Somali conflict has resulted in an influx of refugees into neighboring states, proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) and infiltration of terrorists propagating attacks on innocent citizens.<sup>142</sup>

Kwanya concurs that, the conflict in Somalia contributes to the proliferation of illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Kenya because some of the refugees who are ex-combatants flee with their arms into Kenya, while others bring their arms into refugee camps for self defense as an extension of the conflict in Somalia, while others are involved in arms trafficking. Mwanzia in comparison observes that despite an arms embargo imposed in 1992,

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<sup>140</sup> M. Affey, Peace is at Hand Daily Nation, op, cit

<sup>141</sup> Interview with Amb. Dr. P. Mwanzia, Director, Foreign Services Institute, Nairobi, 5<sup>th</sup>, January 2012

<sup>142</sup> Interview with Amb. A Abbas, Director, Middle East Affairs Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interviewed on 6 January 2012

Somalia remains a key market for illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), that eventually infiltrate into Kenya through the porous borders.

The proliferation of illicit SALWs has contributed to alarming levels of armed crime in both rural and urban areas. This has led to armed cattle rustling and conflict in pastoralist areas. Adala notes that, given the long porous border between Kenya and Somalia, the inflow of SALWs is difficult to control. He adds that, instability in Somalia also affords the gun-runners the opportunity to move arms to neighbouring states through unstable Somalia.<sup>143</sup>

Mohamed notes that, the Somali conflict has caused constant proliferation of small arms, cross-border raids, smuggling, banditry and general insecurity resulting in a security nightmare to Kenya's security apparatus.<sup>144</sup> To end this, Mohamed argues that, Kenya should do everything to bring about peace in Somalia. He further notes that, Kenya regards and accords this issue priority, observing for instance that after the change of government in 2003, the resolve to stop illegal smuggling was probably the only thing the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government inherited from the KANU Government without criticism, a clear pointer to the importance Kenya attaches to peaceful transition in Somalia.<sup>145</sup>

### 3.2.2 Terrorism

Mwanzia notes that, the conflict situation in Somalia has escalated with the increase in the number of militia outfits like Al-Shabaab.<sup>146</sup> The impact of Al-Shabaab on Kenya's national interest can further be illustrated by considering that, Al-Shabaab poses a threat to Kenya's national interests including social, economic, political, and military security. Specifically, the

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<sup>143</sup> Amb. O. Adala, *ibid*

<sup>144</sup> A. Mohamed, *Somali peace talks at a critical stage*, Daily Nation / Friday, April 25, 2003, p.9

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>146</sup> Interview with Amb. Dr. P. Mwanzia, Director, Foreign Services Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Op

Cit

Somali conflict also poses a direct risk to Kenya through trafficking of illicit weapons, transnational crimes, especially terrorism and maritime piracy.

In extreme cases, Kwanya argues that, the radicalization of Kenyan Muslim youth to join the Somali conflict as part of jihad is gradually leading to home grown terrorism in Kenya, thus a great threat to Kenya.<sup>147</sup> Mwanzia also contends that, there is a very high probability that most terrorists responsible for attacks on Kenya have links with Somalia or their Al Qaeda associates.<sup>148</sup>

### 3.2.3 Conflict and Kenya's Economy

On the economic front, Affey contends that, counterfeit goods are coming into Kenya through Somali ports, thus destabilizing Kenya's manufacturing industry. He therefore notes that, a strong central Government in Somalia could assist Kenya in its endeavour to curb the movement of contraband merchandise across its border. In addition, a stable government would help manage this and handle economic crimes through a taxation regime. Kabii also notes that, the idea that Somalia is a potential strong economic and trading partner with the possibility to enhance economic opportunities for Kenya is the main reason why Kenya should invest in efforts to stabilize the country.

As such Affey notes that, Kenya has every reason to engage state mechanisms in addressing issues that destabilize Somalia.<sup>149</sup> In this breath, Affey adopts both a pessimistic and optimistic view. In the pessimistic view he contends that, Kenya has a right to protect its borders against external threats for as long as the Somalia conflict persists, as such; Kenya

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<sup>147</sup> Interview with Kwanya, First Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Diplomatic and Political Liaison Officer, IGAD Somali Peace Process, op, cit

<sup>148</sup> Interview with Amb. Dr. P. Mwanzia, Director, Foreign Services Institute, op, cit

<sup>149</sup> M. Affey, Peace is at Hand Daily Nation, op, cit

should ensure that its near neighbourhood is stable to guarantee its own stability and prosperity.

In his optimistic view, Affey argues that, when Somalia stabilizes and recovers from the prolonged conflict, it is Kenya that stands to reap the main benefits of the resultant peace and stability. Affey's belief is based on the fact that, Kenyans have for a long time borne the brunt of the Somali conflict in many ways. In addition, Wamunyinyi notes that, Kenya's security is likely to improve if there is restoration of peace in Somalia, as the warlords will surrender the illegal arms that are currently in their arms.<sup>150</sup> Kenya has been engaged in training of Somalia security personnel and civil servants.<sup>151</sup> Wamunyinyi further notes that, with proper strategies, Kenya will be central to Somalia's economic growth.<sup>152</sup>

Because of the instability in Somalia, Kenya is teeming with hundreds of thousands of refugees in camps in the north part of Kenya and in major towns. On several occasions, Kenya has been forced to halt cross-border trade with Somalia because of security concerns. Former President Moi, in 2001, lamented that illegal weapons from the strife-torn country were fuelling cattle rustling, robberies and carjackings in Kenya. He then imposed a ban on flights to Somalia, which mainly transport miraa (*khat*) to Mogadishu. However, the ban was lifted after businessmen protested that the move had hurt their trade.<sup>153</sup>

Adala notes that, although it is hard to distinguish between *bona fide* refugees and refugees with ill motives, it remains a fact that, the influx of refugees has led to increased corruption among government officials particularly immigration officials. Adala points to the increased incidences of forgeries of Kenyan national identities cards and passports to

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<sup>150</sup> W. Wamunyinyi, *Exploit commercial chances in Somalia*, Daily Nation / Friday, June 17, 2005, p.9

<sup>151</sup> Ibid

<sup>152</sup> W. Wamunyinyi, *Exploit commercial chances in Somalia*, Daily Nation / Friday, June 17, 2005, p.9

<sup>153</sup> Peace dividends worth the dear cost of talks, Daily Nation! Thursday, October 14, 2004, p.2

illustrate the point.<sup>154</sup> He adds that some Somali immigrants engage in economic activities in Kenya without formalizing their immigration status and corruption thrives to sustain their businesses.

This reality has exacerbated the perception of high levels of corruption in Kenya and has undermined the profile of the country as a preferred investment destination to the detriment of the economy.

### **3.2.4 The Somali Conflict and International Security**

From the international security perspective, Somalia poses a great challenge as it is considered to host multiple threats including a political vacuum that offers safe havens for terrorists and pirates who are a threat to international security and trade. Moreover, the Somali people have endured continued violence internally and suffered from complex political crises owing to external interference and military interventions for two decades. As a result, Somalia has become the object of contradictory international policy instruments; all seeking to, simultaneously resolve humanitarian, political, social, economic, and security issues.

In this regard, Kwanya notes that the international community should support Somalia in finding and addressing the root cause of the Somali conflict which commenced before the collapse of the Siad Barre regime.<sup>155</sup> Moreover, Adala notes that since the situation in Somalia is a threat to international peace and security, international agencies must be in the forefront to finding a solution. Adala further proposes that the United Nation (UN) must be in

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<sup>154</sup> Interview with Amb. Ochieng Adala, op, cit

<sup>155</sup> Interview with G. Kwanya, First Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op, cit

the forefront, followed by the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD).<sup>156</sup>

Mwanzia observes that, the clan system which has played a major part in social economic and political interactions has degenerated into a regional and international security problem.<sup>157</sup> Moreover, Maina argues that, considering that most Somali refugees have been in camps for 15 years or more this implies that for all intents and purposes that they can claim to be Kenyans, and as such exert some pressure on Kenya authorities for basic amenities. A case in point was the national population census of 2010, where it is suspected many Somali refugees could have been counted alongside Kenyan Somalis. In addition, Adala notes that, the traditional structures of Somali society pledges allegiance more to the clan structures, some of which spill across territorial borders. The central authority is therefore secondary to the allegiance to clans.<sup>158</sup> These factors have resulted in the internationalization of the Somali conflict.

Kwanya notes that, the Somali conflict has greatly enabled piracy to flourish in the Indian Ocean affecting the shipping lanes to and from Kenya. Maina adds that, breakdown of law and order in the hinterland further complicates lawlessness offshore.<sup>159</sup> The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia has no political, military and financial capacity to end the conflict. Mwanzia concurs and argues that, the TFG does not have the capacity to end the conflicts. It's for this reason that AMISOM is required to provide security to conflict areas. The TFG must work with the international community to reconcile people at all levels of society, rebuild its infrastructure, decentralize power and complete its constitution making process.

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<sup>156</sup> Interview with Amb. Ochieng Adala, op, cit

<sup>157</sup> Interview with Dr. Amb. Philip Mwanzia, Director Foreign Service Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nairobi.

<sup>158</sup> Interview with Amb. Ochieng Adala, op, cit

<sup>159</sup> Interview with Amb. S.K. Maina, op, cit

### 3.3 Kenya's Foreign Policy of Conflict Management

Foreign policy is founded on pre-determined conceptions of a state's national interest, which aim at attaining specific or generalized goals in international affairs. The principal and sole subject of a country's foreign policy is the furtherance of its national interests. This principle underlies the actions of states as actors in international relations and is applicable to Kenya as it is to any other state. Whereas the perception of national interest may vary from state to state, there are certain discernible factors which remain constant. They include national security, economic advancement, preservation and enhancement of national power and national prestige.<sup>160</sup>

Every state has its own system of formulating and articulating its foreign policy. In some cases, the mechanism is highly institutionalized and predictable, while in others, it is personalized and quite unpredictable. However, irrespective of which avenue a country opts to pursue, certain factors play a pivotal role in this process. These include an evaluation of a state's position in relation to its neighbours, allies or competitors; consideration of the basic tenets to which the state adheres to and propagates in international relations, assessment of the resources and capabilities, actual and potential, that the state possesses, and an examination of effective strategies for achieving its set goals.<sup>161</sup>

In a February 2003 editorial, the Daily Nation newspaper argued that, although Kenya has had a long history of foreign policy pronouncements, it is an ideal foreign policy and not an actual foreign policy. This is because Kenya's foreign policy is more of what the article describes as fence-sitting. This claim is premised on the argument that Kenya's Foreign Ministry has either hidden behind international organizations, particularly United Nations

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<sup>160</sup> R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, 2007, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford University Press, p. 12

<sup>161</sup> Ibid

(UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or African Union (AU) resolutions or taken cover behind the policy of “non-alignment” or “non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Therefore, the article opines that, Kenya’s foreign policy represents no particular interests, yet the foreign policy of any state is meant to protect and preserve the national interest of the state.<sup>162</sup>

Kenya’s stewardship of the Somali Peace and Reconciliation process enjoyed great support among the international community. This is attributed mainly to the neutral, even impartial role Kenya has played in the conflict. Indeed, for the greater part, Kenya has demonstrated no interest in the internal affairs of Somalia, always embracing initiatives to bring about peace and stability in the war ravaged country only to safeguard its own security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Paradoxically, among Somalia’s neighbours, Kenya has borne the brunt of the estimated one million Somali refugees inside and outside designated camps.<sup>163</sup>

On the other hand, the Daily Nation editorial argued that, Kenya cannot entirely isolate itself from global and regional affairs. The article further identified the efforts to broker peace in the Sudan and Somalia as part of a tradition that goes back a long way to demonstrate Kenya’s foreign policy as one that is oriented to conflict management. Since independence, Kenya has wholly subscribed to these broad principles both in theory and in practice. These are universally recognized and accepted norms in the propagation of any states foreign policy.

There have been numerous attempts to resolve the Somali conflict; and on her part Kenya has hosted some of the conferences and process of negotiating for peace in Somalia.

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<sup>162</sup> Editorial, Declare real stand on war, February 20, 2003, p.8

<sup>163</sup> H. Owuor, New foreign policy to boost Kenyan economy Daily Nation Posted Monday, October 19 2009

Despite all the efforts made, finding a solution has remained elusive. Kwanya notes that, this is because all attempts at finding a solution to the Somali conflict have concentrated on power sharing arrangements without interrogating the root causes of the collapse of the Somali state, especially under the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre.<sup>164</sup>

An article in the Daily Nation noted that, Kenya was set to have its first foreign policy document since independence in 2009. Wetang'ula is quoted in the article noting that, Kenya's foreign policy is contained in a document entitled "Draft Sessional paper on Kenya's Foreign Policy Framework." The document on Kenya foreign policy puts emphasize on and resolution of interstate conflicts and post conflict reconstruction.<sup>165</sup>

Abbas observes that Kenya's Foreign policy is founded on five of pillars, which are economic; peace; environmental; diaspora; and cultural. He further argues that, the most important considerations that inform Kenya's foreign policy decision making processes are political and then economic considerations. He notes that peace diplomacy is often overshadowed by economic and political issues.<sup>166</sup> Mwanzia and Maina in addition note that, Kenya's foreign policy consists of the following pillars; Peace Diplomacy, Economic Diplomacy, Environmental Diplomacy and Diaspora Diplomacy. They further argue that, the main significant considerations that inform Kenya's foreign policy decision making process are as follows; Peace diplomacy, which essentially connotes that the enhancement of peace and security in the region, is paramount to ensure stability in Kenya.

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<sup>164</sup> Interview with G. Kwanya, First Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Former Diplomatic and Political Liaison Officer, IGAD Somali Peace Process, Op cit

<sup>165</sup> *Kenya Set to Have First Foreign Policy Document*, Nation Newspaper, Sunday, August 9 2009

<sup>166</sup> Interview with Amb. Ali Abbas, Director, Middle East Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Op Cit

Adala finally observes that, the pillars of Kenya's foreign policy are founded on economic and political stability, good neighbourliness, peaceful coexistence, regional trade and prosperity at home. He argues that economic diplomacy translates into economic growth and development in Kenya and its neighbours to ensure a sustained link for growth. Environmental diplomacy in turn translates into engagement in environmental programs and initiatives at both regional and national level to improve living conditions, public health, and environmental protection and sustainable development. Diaspora diplomacy endeavours to harness the enormous expertise, skills and resources of the Kenyan Diaspora that can be deployed to market and promote Kenya's interests abroad while also investing at home for national development.

From above, Kwanya notes that, the basic function of Kenya's foreign policy has been to guide Kenya in her relations with other nation states and other international actors.<sup>167</sup>

In comparison, Mwanzia notes that, the main function of Kenya's foreign policy is geared towards managing bilateral, regional and multilateral relations with foreign countries and international organizations. Kenya's foreign policy is, also geared to promote trade and investment while carrying out activities in order to project the country's image. Maina argues that, the main function of Kenya's foreign policy is to ensure economic prosperity at home, in the region and beyond, while simultaneously ensuring Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty are safeguarded. Adala argues that, the most important function of Kenya's foreign policy is the ability to influence other states in order to achieve the objectives of Kenya's foreign policy.

Kenya's foreign policy addresses the challenges posed by the Somali conflict in the sense that, as part of Kenya's peace diplomacy initiatives, the country chaired and hosted the

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<sup>167</sup> Interview with G Kwanya, First Counsellor, op, cit

IGAD Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference from 2002 to 2004. Mwanzia adds that Kenya has sought to foster peace and stability within the sub-region through peace diplomacy. Kenya held peace talks that culminated in establishment of the TFG.<sup>168</sup> It is in this connection Mwajefa observes that, there is need for Kenya to adopt a foreign policy framework which directly addresses the Somalia conflict. For this reason, Mwajefa argues that, the Kenya government has in various times and moments been at pains to adhere to its policy of non interference in other states internal affairs. This was particularly evident after the issue of intermittent maritime piracy and militia infiltration sprouted along the Kenya-Somalia coastline and Kenya-Somalia land border, respectively

Despite the above attempts, Kwanya notes that, in the last 20 years Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia has been very ineffective. On the other hand Mwanzia notes that, Kenya's foreign policy towards the Somali conflict has evolved to deal with the dynamic situation in Somalia.<sup>169</sup> Both, however, observe that the foreign policy needs to be looked at again as there are new trends emerging with mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) coming to an end. Kwanya adds that, while the existing framework addresses political and security issues to some extent, Kenya needs to adequately address new and emerging threats and challenges from the Somali conflict, hence the Government needs to be more proactive on Somalia issues.

Madoka notes that, Kenya has a predetermined and clearly defined notion of what her national interests are. It is these interests that Kenyan representatives seek to advance in all forums, whether national, regional or international. Kenya's strategy in conducting her

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<sup>168</sup> Interview with Amb. Dr. P. Mwanzia,, op, cit

<sup>169</sup> Interview with Amb. Philip Mwanzia, op, cit

foreign affairs has worked effectively. Kenya's foreign policy however, remains dynamic, given the increasingly globalized world.<sup>170</sup>

In comparison, Kabaji notes that, since independence Kenya had been rudderless in its relations with other states in the international system, hence there was need to adapt to a new foreign policy framework.<sup>171</sup> Owuor observes that, Kenya is fine-tuning a new enhanced foreign policy anchored on five pillars namely; economic, peace, environment, culture and Diaspora diplomacy as the drivers of foreign policy.<sup>172</sup> Under the peace diplomacy pillar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be required to prioritize and speed up conflict resolution in the region.

As a neighbouring country, Kenya has closely observed Somalia for the past twenty years, during which Somalia has had no central government. Warigi notes that, since the lawless country has become a thorough nuisance to Kenya, the first step to ensuring security in Kenya would be to create a buffer state to serve as a strategic region beyond Kenya's border.<sup>173</sup> The only way out, so it would seem, is for Kenya to encourage quasi-autonomous units based on clans. Creation of the semi-autonomous area will boost peace efforts in North Eastern Province, leaders say.<sup>174</sup>

This perspective would explain the thinking behind Kenya's endeavour to carve out a buffer state in southern Somalia referred to as Jubaland. Jubaland was to be an entity akin to the semi-autonomous state of Puntland or the self-declared independent state of Somaliland

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<sup>170</sup> M. Madoka, Kenya hasn't Sacrificed its Sovereignty, Daily Nation, Wednesday, April 10; 2002, p.9

<sup>171</sup> Prof. E. Kabaji, Director, Public and Communication, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview on Daily Nation, July 29<sup>th</sup> 2009, Diplomats propose foreign policy shift.

<sup>172</sup> H. Owuor, New foreign policy to boost Kenyan economy Daily Nation Posted Monday, October 19 2009

<sup>173</sup> G. Warigi: Maybe its Time Somalis Tried the Swiss Model of Governance. Daily Nation, December 25<sup>th</sup> 2011

<sup>174</sup> M. Karanja, Posted Sunday, May 8 2011

in the North. Mwanzia observes that, Somaliland and Puntland are good examples of how clan systems can be used, through use of traditional leaders to maintain political administrative units within the larger Somalia.<sup>175</sup> The federal model represented by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has not been successful and hence a loose decentralized state model might be more suitable.

Shill argues that, the Jubaland initiative will be Kenya's first attempt to reassert her influence in a country that has posed a major social and security nightmare to Kenya.<sup>176</sup> He argues further that, Jubaland will help Kenya economically by opening a trade link between Kismayu and Garissa. The Jubaland initiative is also a possibility that can be pursued to help the Southern part of Somalia have order much like Puntland and Somaliland. Moreover, it will act as a buffer zone and an area to contain the refugees to stop their entry into Somalia. However Shill argues that for Kenya to succeed in the Jubaland initiative, it must formulate a proper foreign policy. Abdi Rahaman argues that, a semi-autonomous state in Jubaland will be of benefit to Kenyans, particularly among people living along the border towns of Garissa and Mandera.<sup>177</sup>

In contrast, Adala observes that, the above stated issue of "relative stability" in Puntland and Somaliland are just but illusions. As such, Adala argues that, the best way of containing the conflict in Somalia is that Kenya should join hands with regional, continental and international forces to combat the conflict in Somalia. International assistance to Somalia must also be coordinated through the United Nations and should include training of Somali security personnel.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> Interview with Amb. Dr. Philip Mwanzia, op, cit

<sup>176</sup> Former Fafi MP, Elias Barc Shill, Interview on Nation Newspaper, Sunday May 8<sup>th</sup> 2011

<sup>177</sup> Abdisalim Malim AbdiRahaman, Resident of Garissa town, Interview posted on Sunday 8<sup>th</sup> August 2011

<sup>178</sup> Interview with Amb. Ochieng Adala, Director, Africa Peace Forum, op, cit

At present, Somalia is facing daunting and massive economic and political crises in which many people are dying from hunger and many more are displaced by endless conflicts. In the midst of this misery the military invasion by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) imposes new restrictions on the movement of refugees who are fleeing from these multiple threats which, if not eased immediately, may lead to significant loss of lives.<sup>179</sup> Similarly, Time magazine notes that, there is confusion in the Kenyan government over its decision to go into Somalia to root out terrorist insurgents. In one part, the Time magazine argues that, this confusion is due to deep divisions within the elites and on the other part is due to the fact that, different key international actors have divergent strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa that are designed to control the political decision-making processes in respect of Somalia.

Abbas contends that Kenya has consistently put the Somalia's security agenda forward to the international community, especially the United Nations General Assembly and the UN Security Council. Recently, Kenya took a bold and unprecedented step forward to militarily engage the Al Shabaab extremists in order to protect its national security and territorial integrity.<sup>180</sup> Kiptiness argues that in this connection, the country has further called for support to the TFG and AMISOM to improve the security situation, and has expressed willingness to contribute troops to AMISOM.<sup>181</sup> Kenya's foreign policy has therefore tried to address the challenges posed by the Somali conflict, through national, regional and international initiatives. Mwanzia adds that, the Eldoret Declaration in the lead up to the Mbagathi Peace process sponsored by IGAD is a case in point.

Kiptiness argues that, Kenya through the African Union should continue to lobby the UN Security Council, especially the five permanent members to take over AMISOM.

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<sup>179</sup> Time Magazine, October 2011

<sup>180</sup> Interview with Amb Ali Abbas, Director, Middle East Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Op Cit

<sup>181</sup> Interview with Lindsay Kiptiness, Deputy Director, Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign affairs, Nairobi, Interviewed on 17 January 2012

Mwanzia adds that, Kenya as a member of IGAD, AU, UN and other intergovernmental bodies like G-77 can push the Somali agenda to ensure constant support. Kenya can also integrate its troops into AMISOM and also avail expert advisors to TFG in Somalia. Other neighbouring countries in the IGAD region should join Kenya and the African Union in lobbying the UN Security Council to take over AMISOM. Mwanzia further observes that, neighbouring countries should continue mediating and discussing with top leadership of the TFG to ensure implementation of the Kampala Accord.<sup>182</sup> The States can also provide troops to AMISOM to ensure the required troop levels to effectively stabilize Somalia.

Affey posits that stability in the region can only be achieved through a genuine peace building initiative in Somalia in which the Somali people are assisted to pursue restoration of law and order, a free society characterized by a government accountable to its citizens, an independent media and judiciary.<sup>183</sup> Al-Shabaab is no match for a Somali people united for the common good, but this potential is weakened by the constant external interventions that continue to recreate and strengthen groups like al-Shabab and the warlords who continually pose an existential threat to the Somali State. In contrast, a strong democratic Somali state poses no threat to international security and stability.<sup>184</sup>

Mwanzia notes that, IGAD Member States, The African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the Somali people should all be involved in resolving the Somali conflict. Others who may help are donors who should contribute in rebuilding infrastructure and humanitarian agencies to ensure the country remains conducive for economic activities. Kwanya however observes that, The UN Security Council has to pass a resolution under chapter seven and take over the AMISOM to resolve the conflict.

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<sup>182</sup> Interview with Amb. Dr. Philip Mwanzia, op, cit

<sup>183</sup> M. Affey, op, cit

<sup>184</sup> Ibid

In this context, Kiptiness argues that the events in 2011 that saw Kenya invade Somalia can only be explained in conjunction with the broader globalization agenda that informs particular foreign policy.<sup>185</sup> As Robinson explains, after the end of the Cold War diverse forces battled to reshape political and economic structures as a new world order emerged.<sup>186</sup> He argues that the focus increasingly shifted from power concepts to internationalization of civil wars and of political processes. This means that new political and social relations are formed to assist the emergence of a single global society in which no hostile elements or power vacuums like those operating in Somalia are tolerated. In this perspective, the invasion of Somalia by Kenya can also be understood as part of a broader process of the exercise of hegemonic influence where Kenya and Somalia are less significant in the overall geo-strategic objectives.

During the Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference held in Kenya, many delegates appeared ready to ratify a federal system of government, as a way of healing long standing divisions and rivalries in the country. This would facilitate a process whereby Somalia is divided into several states, each with its own regional administration under a loose federal system of government in Mogadishu. Opala posits that Barre, a younger brother of former Somali strongman Siad Barre, whose ouster in 1991 sparked the conflict that has claimed an estimated two million lives argues that federalism has to do with people who do not share anything and who have nothing in common, and who accept federalism to cover for their diversity.<sup>187</sup> Opala further notes that Barre is not alone; the Arab League wants the country to remain under a unitary government.

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<sup>185</sup> Interview with Lindsay Kiptiness, Deputy Director, Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign affair, Op cit

<sup>186</sup> P. Robinson, *Foreign Policy and Decision Making*, McMillan, New York, 1989, pp.34-35

<sup>187</sup> K. Opala, *Foreign powers stalk Somali talks*, Daily Nation Monday, July 21, 2003, p.11

### 3.4 Various attempts at Peace Negotiations

The role of Kenya in the Somali peace process can be examined by considering the Somali Peace Reconciliation Conference. Kenya was mandated by IGAD to host the conference which began on 15th October, 2002 in Eldoret, Kenya and later in February, 2003 the conference moved to Mbagathi, Nairobi. The conference was the fourteenth attempt to finding peace to the Somali conflict. The peace process in Eldoret was championed by former President Moi and began with the signing of the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities between the warring factions in phase one of the negotiation process. The declaration aimed to identify the true leaders of the Somali community from others who had arguably no basis for participation. The conference also endorsed the Rules of Procedure that were meant to guide the conference proceedings. These Rules remained the backbone of the contentions all through.<sup>188</sup>

During the course of negotiations, divergent state interests played out to derail the realization of a solution. In phase two of the negotiation, some leaders of the warring factions from Somalia, owed allegiance to either Eritrea or Ethiopia. Although IGAD had appointed Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea to drive the peace process, the latter two states tended to influence the direction of the peace process to the detriment of Kenya's role.<sup>189</sup>

This situation was further extended in 2003. The beginning of the year brought with it many changes for the conference that created disequilibrium among the Somalis and affected progress of the peace negotiations. The main factors that led to this situation were a result of political changes in Kenya. The elections of 2002 saw the exit of President Moi, and this impacted negatively on the conference. Ochieng argues that, Moi was the architect of the conference who knew every faction leader and maintained close links with them through

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<sup>188</sup> "Somalia Crucial Charter Adopted" *IGAD News*, no. 8 (July -September, 2003): p.12

<sup>189</sup> K. Opala, Foreign powers stalk Somali talks, *Daily Nation* Monday, July 21, 2003, Op Cit p.11

which the delicate balance of power was maintained.<sup>190</sup> After the departure of Moi, the new NARC government either through lack of interest or lack of factual information failed to contain the situation.

The conference was moved from Eldoret to Mbagathi in Nairobi, and Elijah Mwangale was replaced by Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat as the Special Envoy and Chairman of the IGAD Technical Committee. This change affected the conference operations as the two leaders had different personalities and approach to peace process. On the one hand, Mwangale was a politician, and had direct access to State House. Kiplagat on the other hand was a career diplomat who did not frequent the corridors of power. Although Mwangale had access to the President, the President was nevertheless dedicated to the peace conference at Mbagathi.<sup>191</sup>

### 3.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, Mwanzia, Kwanya and Maina argue that, Kenya needs to seize the opportunity to provide leadership for the emancipation of Somalia from Al Shabaab and other extremist groups, and in uniting Somaliland and Puntland to the rest of Somalia. Mwanzia also argues that, new initiatives and policy options are required to address the conflict situation. These may include policies and laws on how to deal with the threat of terrorism, piracy and proliferation of illegal SALWs, while at the same time instituting measures to protect the tourism sector and deal with the influx of refugees from Somali.

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<sup>190</sup> K. Ochieng., The Somali peace Process, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization, p.174

<sup>191</sup> Ibid

## CHAPTER FOUR

### A Critical Analysis of the Somali Conflict and Kenya's Foreign Policy

#### 4.0 Introduction

The previous chapter utilized primary data to examine the topic of this research study. In the process a number of issues that are relevant to the objectives indicated in chapter one emerged. Chapter four critically examines these issues in light of the objectives of this study. From a distance, the Somali conflict appears as a problem exclusively limited to the people and state of Somalia. This is because the Somali conflict portrays characteristics of an internal conflict with internal ramifications. However, upon closer analysis, it emerges that the internal conflict is internationalized and extends beyond the borders of Somalia. The states that are most affected by the Somali conflict are those within its near abroad. From chapter three it can be argued that, the Somali conflict is internationalized through the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in neighbouring countries, influx of Somali refugees, terrorism, and maritime piracy, among others. The following section will examine the emerging issues.

#### 4.1 Emerging Issues

Chapter four sectioned into three main parts corresponding to the main issues that emerged in chapter three. The first part examines the role of history and the unpredictability of the Somali conflict; the second part reviews the nature of Kenya's foreign policy and in particular analyzes whether it is reactive or proactive. The third part examines Graham Allison's models of foreign policy decision making and their relevance in Kenya's context vis-a-vis the Somali conflict.

#### 4.2 The role of history and the unpredictability of the Somali conflict

For more than sixty years, long before Pan-Africanism became a force on the African continent, individual actors with different motives tried to form a single political unit between the great lakes, the Indian Ocean, and the Ethiopian desert.<sup>192</sup> Among these actors were the Somali leaders who represented the state after independence. Somalia attained her independence in 1960, and immediately embarked on an ambitious project to achieve economic and political prosperity for all peoples of Somali descent who were jointly driven by the dream of Pan-Somalism.

Any attempt to critically examine Pan-Somalism, and the challenges it posed should be done against the backdrop of Pan-Africanism, which was the driving force behind the formation of the Organization of African Unity on 25<sup>th</sup> May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In 1964, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) issued the Cairo Declaration legitimizing national borders inherited from colonial times, unequivocally declaring from the outset that such borders must be respected by all the post independence African states for the avoidance of disputes and conflict on the continent.<sup>193</sup>

Consequently, the objectives of Pan-Somalism ran counter to the OAU Cairo Declaration to the extent that, proponents of Pan-Somalism envisaged a change of national boundaries that they had inherited from colonials. As such the dream of Pan-Somalism arguably commenced on the wrong footing since it set out to challenge the main pillars upon which Pan -Africanism was founded. As such, and as identified in chapter two, the objectives of Pan-Somalism were destined to be difficult to achieve given this background.

For the proponents of Pan-Somalism to go against the set wishes of Pan-Africanism, clearly indicated that, attempts for Pan-Somalism needed a great deal of clout to be able to

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<sup>192</sup> J. Philip and J. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities*, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964, pp.34-35

<sup>193</sup> N. J Padelford, 1993, "The Organization of African Unity" *African Quarterly* 33. No 1 p. 82

bring sufficient pressure to bear on Africa and the international system to endorse an idea like Pan-Somalism.<sup>194</sup>

While Jackson and Rotberg note that Pan-Africanism was a mere sentiment of African nationalism, which represented a weaker but wider sense of community than tribe. It is the belief of this research study that, this was no excuse for Somali to pursue a narrow ended Pan-Somalism agenda which, in light of Pan-Africanism was even weaker. To engender commitment, Rotberg and Jackson conceive that, for Pan-Africanism to succeed, proponents would have to rely on a structure of ideas and a view of the world rather than rest on sentiment alone.<sup>195</sup>

In this regard Nyerere observed that, Pan-Africanism differs from for instance, Pan-Somalism, because Pan-Africanism incorporates more propositions about the international system that have an outward view and are bound to unite more Africa states.<sup>196</sup> Hence, despite a number of challenges it faced, Pan-Africanism involved more ideas than most “pan” movements individual states had attempted to pursue in other parts of the international system. For instance, Pan-Arabism or Pan-Germanism resembled nationalist movements and could rely more on the sentiments of ethnically and linguistically homogeneous populations.<sup>197</sup>

One of the goals of Pan-Africanists was to equip themselves more effectively to defend Africa’s independence.<sup>198</sup> This provided a motive for enlargement when it is accompanied by a sense of community which allows members to identify themselves with the

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<sup>194</sup> Ibid

<sup>195</sup> R. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982, p.24

<sup>196</sup> J Nyerere, “A United States of Africa” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 1, no. 1, 1963, p.65

<sup>197</sup> Ibid

<sup>198</sup> C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*. New York: Praeger, 1962, p.12

larger unit. In this regard, Lewis argues that, Pan-Somalism is essentially a tribalistic doctrine based on the ethnic homogeneity of people of Somali descent.<sup>199</sup>

The issue of Pan-Somalism can be traced back to Somalia's quest for political, economic, and social development which emerged in the period leading to and after independence. Like most of the African states that had gained independence in the 1960s, Somalia had high expectations about what its independence could bring.<sup>200</sup> Its development was influenced by two objectives which it consistently sought. One was political, and reflected the popular nationalist desire among the Somali ethnic population in the region to unite under one rule (Pan-Somalism). The other objective was economic and aimed to raise the economic welfare of all Somalis.

However, after independence, successive governments found themselves frustrated by these two objectives. This is because; both objectives competed for the narrow resource base of the Somali economy. Successive Governments have juggled them, trying simultaneously to achieve both in order to remain in power. For instance, in the first governments of the 1960s, the Pan-Somalism issue, in particular, dominated the political agenda.<sup>201</sup>

The political process was dominated by Pan-Somalism at the expense of all other aspects of development during the reign of the various regimes of the 1960s. More critically, the Pan-Somalism objective led to a war and regional instability. During the same period Somalia's economic growth was steadily declining, partly due to recurrent droughts. Consequently, public discontent with the government's poor political and economic achievements grew and sparked a military coup.

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<sup>199</sup> I. M., Lewis "Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1963, p.1-34:6

<sup>200</sup> W. C McWilliams. and J. W. Polier, "Pan-Africanism and the Dilemmas of National Development," *Phylon*, Spring 1964, p.12

<sup>201</sup> R. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, op, cit

Ultimately, the Somali governments failed to realize the popular expectations, and public dissatisfaction and frustration became widespread. This can be illustrated for instance by the fact that shortly after the assassination of President Abdi-Rashid Ali Shermarke in 1969, the army took power under Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. President Barre's regime promised to achieve both objectives simultaneously.

Nevertheless, the dream of Pan-Somalism remained as elusive as ever. After Barre also failed in this respect, he plunged the country into political and social disintegration and economic disaster. As a result, Somalia fell into the hands of warlords who were fighting to fill the political power vacuum by exploiting and manipulating clan politics. In the process, inter-clan war led to the collapse of the Somali state and to further social disintegration, unending hostilities, and economic disaster. Consequently, Somalia's dream of unity and prosperity for all Somali peoples, fuelled by the ideology of Pan-Somalism drifted even further away than ever before.<sup>202</sup>

The motives of individual actors like former President Siad Barre and the Somali ruling elite are arguably as complex as those of the people they lead. Individual actors, particularly politicians often blend interest and ideal. Hence, McWilliams and Polier note that rarely does one find a case in international politics where clear and weighty interests have been sacrificed for an ideal.<sup>203</sup> Pan-Somalism in the post independence years led to a build-up of the Somali military with the assistance of the Soviet Union, ultimately leading to war with Ethiopia and fighting in northern Kenya.

Thus the Somali nationalist vision became hostage to the predations of vicious patrimonial elites. Moreover, the failure of Somali's state policy makers to transfer their idea

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<sup>202</sup> Ibid

<sup>203</sup> W. C McWilliams. and J. W. Polier, "Pan-Africanism and the Dilemmas of National Development," *Phylon*, Spring 1964, p.4

into a viable and sustainable reality led to the transmogrification of Somali nationalism and the weakening of the post colonial state. Finally, in 1991 and the state institutions and national ideology that had underpinned the sovereign Somalia collapsed leaving behind a political and power vacuum.

The pre- 1991 regime in Mogadishu based its legitimacy on Pan -Somalism. This made most of Somalia's neighbours to be apprehensive of the threat posed by Pan- Somalism to their established national borders. As such, perceived threats of Somali-irredentism robbed Pan- Somalism of any merit it may have had to redress injustices suffered by the Somali people during the colonial era.

Pan- Somalism was predicated on the unification of the idealized "greater Somalia" nation soon after independence. After Somalia gained independence in the 1960 it envisioned the return of Ogaden region in Ethiopia, Kenya's Northern Frontier District and French Somaliland into the jurisdiction of a greater Somalia. This transnational ideology was seen as an attempt to redress grievances suffered at the hands of Ethiopians and European empire builders.<sup>204</sup>

The Kenyan leadership pointed out that seeking to create new African nations on a basis of tribal or religious identities is a sin against Pan-Africanism and a most dangerous weapon for destroying African solidarity. The Somalis are Africans and those who live in Kenya are Kenyan Africans. Kenyan leaders contend that, the Somalis are Africans and those who live with in Kenya are perfectly free to leave Kenya and its territory as this is the only way they can legally exercise their right of self-determination.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> K. Gebremariam, 2004, "Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Regional Organizations," in *Building Sustainable Peace*, University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, Canada, p 192

<sup>205</sup> W. R., Bascom 1962, "Tribalism, Nationalism and Pan-Africanism," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, p.287

The transnational vision of Somali statehood posed the most severe challenge to Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. It was portrayed as an irredentist threat by the three neighbours of Somalia resulting in the said states adopting a defensive approach towards Somalia. This made Somalia to be isolated in its own region. As such Somalia sought to form relations and alliances with states from far away, such as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).<sup>206</sup>

Pan-Somali nationalist feelings did not diminish after the successful merger and unification of the Italian and British Somali territories in 1960. The activities of the branches of the nationalist liberation party, the Somali Youth League, were still in operation outside the boundaries of the new Republic, particularly in Somali inhabited regions of Kenya and Ethiopia. The nationalist sentiment was so strong that all politicians had to appear to embrace it as a minimum requirement for winning popular support. The issue endlessly dominated the debates of the Somali Parliament. Defense spending received high priority in the government budget, and Pan-Somalism defined the foreign relations of Somalia.

The dispute over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya soon evolved into a war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964 and a guerrilla war against Kenya, respectively. Immediately following the wars, the Somali government's preoccupation with security increased, in terms of both human and financial resources. The Soviet Union agreed to provide Somalia with military assistance—to build a 5,000 strong army which later expanded to 17,000 troops. Recurrent expenditure on defense was around 35% to 38% of the government budget.<sup>207</sup> The Somali army, trained by the Soviets, benefited from the closer association with the Soviet Union. The Soviets, attracted by the geo-military-strategic importance of Somalia during the 1970s, provided training and weaponry to the

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<sup>206</sup> A. A. Mazrui, 1977, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*, London: Heinemann, p. 22

<sup>207</sup> D. D. Laitin, 1976: "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol:14, No: 3, p.450-497:457

army. During the 1970-1980 period, the total arms import of Somalia is estimated to have cost about US \$960 million, averaging about 16% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per year. The Somali army became one of the best equipped and trained in Sub-Saharan Africa and thereby raised the popular Pan-Somalism expectations.<sup>208</sup>

From the foregoing analysis, Pan-Somalism had a strong influence on both domestic and foreign policy in Somalia. Its pursuit by successive Somali governments has played a significant role in the country's decline into authoritarian rule, especially under Siad Barre. Moreover, as Pan-Somalism was accorded priority over other critical issues such as economic development and education, this created the conditions that led to conflicts with neighbouring states as well as internal conflict that hastened state collapse that now poses serious foreign policy challenges to Kenya and other neighbouring states.

To confront the threat of Pan-Somalism, the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments agreed to cooperate with each other in the event of war with expansionist Somalia. The foreign policies of both Kenya and Ethiopia have over the years shown consistency by cooperating whenever their territorial integrity has been threatened by Somalia. It is instructive that both countries sent troops inside Somalia in 2011 with a view to countering the threat posed by the conflict in Somalia, and specifically the threat emanating from the extremist Al Shabaab militia group.

Mr. Mohamoud H. Ibrahim Egal, the Somali Prime Minister in the second government, seeing the economic stagnation and the political stalemate over the issue of Pan-Somalism, tried to ease the tensions with Kenya by diplomatic means. In 1967, he initiated an understanding with Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta to the effect that Somalia intended to

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<sup>208</sup> W. C McWilliams. and J. W. Polier, "Pan-Africanism and the Dilemmas of National Development," op, cit.

solve the issue of the NFD through peaceful means.<sup>209</sup> This laid the foundation for the shift from use of force to peaceful resolution of disputes between Kenya and subsequent Somali regimes. This trend held for over four decades, and more remarkably so after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, where despite the persistent incursions into Kenya by various armed Somali groups allied to various factions and warlords, Kenya resisted the option of armed intervention into Somalia until Al Shabaab escalated its hostilities by threatening the critical tourism sector by abducting foreign tourists along the Kenya coast.

In a departure from its traditional foreign policy stance, Kenya Defence Forces invaded Somalia towards the end of 2011, in pursuit of Al Shabaab, by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter on the right to Self defense. Although Kenya's action appears to have the tacit support of the TFG, the armed invasion of Somali territory by Kenyan Defense Forces and the aggressive diplomatic activities to secure regional and international support for her actions point to a significant development in Kenya's foreign policy.

Since the collapse of the government of Somalia in 1991, the ensuing conflict has taken dramatic turns over the years. The Somali conflict has evolved from an internal conflict into an internationalized conflict with regional and global ramifications. The conflict has escalated and encompasses, military, political, social and economic threats that affect not only states in Somalia's near neighbourhood but also states beyond, and the entire international system through include maritime piracy and terrorism.

This Somali conflict has invariably been depicted as an internal, regional, proxy and even a global conflict in ideological terms.<sup>210</sup> The various terms used to refer to the conflict

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<sup>209</sup> Institute of Public Administration, *The Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya Dispute, 1960-67* (Dar es Salam, Tanzania: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969, pp.52-55

<sup>210</sup> G. Gereffi, 1996, 'The Elusive Last Lap in the Quest for Developed-Country Status', in James H. Mittelman (ed.), *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 53-81.

generally depict its unpredictability. From a far the conflict seems as one that broke out after the overthrow of Siad Barre's military dictatorship. However upon closer examination it emerges that, the Somali conflict is underpinned by a multiplicity of interrelated and complex political, social and economic factors that place it in the category of unpredictable conflicts.

The view that the Somali conflict is unpredictable assumes many dimensions. For Alger, the conflict is intractable; because, its roots run deep into the economic, social and political structure of both Kenya and Somalia.<sup>211</sup> Understanding the intractable nature of the conflict requires the laying out of issues that have frozen progress towards a resolution over the decades. According to Galtung, intractability in conflicts has five phases within these dimensions, which help frame the cycle of intractability in the Somali case.<sup>212</sup>

An intractable conflict is characterized by ever present tension and violence. The victims of violence in intractable conflict include combatants as well as civilians.<sup>213</sup> There is a long set of unresolved or apparently irreconcilable issues at stake. The parties may reach temporary cessations of violence but they cannot reach a fundamental and genuine resolution of their issues.

Bar-Tal contends that, psychological manifestations of enmity and deep feelings of fear and hatred generally underlie the relationship between parties in an intractable conflict.<sup>214</sup> Continuous conflict tends to induce stereotypes and suspicions, and these reinforce antagonistic perceptions and behaviour of the parties in conflict. The role of clans and deep divisions of clan system in Somalia is a case in point to illustrate this point.

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<sup>211</sup> C. Alger, 1996, *Adult Education for Peacebuilding: A Challenge to Peace Research and Peace Education*. In R.J. Burns and R. Aspeslagh (Eds.), *Three Decades of Peace Education around the World: An Anthology*. New York: Garland, pp. 263-272

<sup>212</sup> J. Galtung, 1997, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method)*, Geneva: UN Disaster Management Training Programme, p.124

<sup>213</sup> Ibid

<sup>214</sup> D. Bar-Tal, 2002, *The Elusive Nature of Peace Education*. In G. Salomon and B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education: The Concept, Principles and Practice in the World*, pp. 27-36.

Intractable conflict attracts many actors and institutions that want to deal with, treat, manage or resolve the conflict. Moreover, there are many futile attempts at management or resolution but only a few of these actors or institutions are successful.<sup>215</sup> Mwangi notes that, when there are many interested parties engaged in the process of seeking for a resolution towards a conflict, their interests will also multiply, making the conflict more complex.<sup>216</sup> Hence, the more complex the Somali conflict gets, the more unpredictable it becomes.

Another dimension of Gatling's argument is that intractable conflicts present deep feelings of fear and hatred that generally underline the relationship between parties.<sup>217</sup> A closer look at the Somali conflict indicates that there is a myriad of different narratives from each side that include clannism, religion, corruption and struggle for resources. Every narrative has a different storyline and they are all different from each other, with each carrying their own truth.

Another issue that emerges due to the unpredictability of the Somali conflict is the use of clan politics to influence issues affecting the Somali conflict. This claim is premised on the fact that, the clan system in Somalia is not merely the sum of its members hence, decisions emerging from the group are likely to be different from what a simple aggregation of individual preferences and abilities might suggest, and that group dynamics can have a significant impact on the substance and quality of decisions.<sup>218</sup> The existence of clan affinity between the Kenyan Somalis in North Eastern Province, (Mandera, Wajir and Garissa

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<sup>215</sup> J. Bercovitch, "Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases" in Pamela Aall, Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson, *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict*, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007, p. 100-101

<sup>216</sup> C. Ake, 1995, 'The New World Order: A View from Africa', in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 1-17.

<sup>217</sup> J. Galtung, 1997, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method)*. Geneva: UN Disaster Management Training Programme, op Cit p.125

<sup>218</sup> M. Clough, *U.S. Policy Towards Africa and the End of the Cold War*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992, p.23

counties) further complicates the matter and makes it difficult to determine the possible trends it is likely to take.

The clan system in Somalia is arguably better in managing conflict than the governments that have ruled Somalia; the clans are also better equipped to cope with complex tasks owing to their diverse perspectives and talents, an effective division of labour, and high-quality debates on definitions of the situation and prescriptions for dealing with it. The clan system may also provide decision-makers with emotional and other types of support that may facilitate coping with conflict problems. Conversely, they may exert pressures for conformity to group norms, thereby inhibiting the search for information and policy options, ruling out the legitimacy of some options, curtailing independent evaluation, and suppressing some forms of intra-group conflict that might serve to clarify goals, values, and options. The fluid alliances of clan based militias and war lords coalesce and mutate as their interests shift creating a nightmare situation for foreign policy decision makers in the Horn of Africa as a whole.<sup>219</sup>

Moreover, the unpredictability of the Somali conflict can be described by considering the rise of amorphous illegitimate actors engaged in insecurity like terrorism and maritime piracy inside Somalia and the regional states. For instance, the new development emerging from Somalia indicating that the Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda had formally merged, bringing in an entirely new dimension to the complex problem to the Somali conflict. This is in addition to the insecurity problem caused by maritime piracy along the Gulf of Aden and the Eastern Coast of Africa. It is feared that the problem is quickly spreading southwards and may soon be a problem in Southern Africa. The problem of maritime piracy off shore is inextricably

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<sup>219</sup> <sup>219</sup> K. Gebremariam "Building Sustainable Peace" *Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Regional Organizations*, (United Nations Press, 2009) Op Cit p. 197

intertwined with the lack of an effective government in Somali territory due to the prolonged conflict.

#### 4.3 Kenya's foreign Policy: Reactive or Proactive?

In the conduct of foreign policy, Kenya projects different perceptions to states in the near abroad and international community at large. The different faces of Kenya are as a result of the country's prioritization of issues that inform foreign policy decision making. Ideally, Schraeder notes that, foreign policy decision making should be informed by national interest and is premised on medium and long term strategic and vital national interests.<sup>220</sup> The response of Kenya's foreign policy to the Somali conflict highlights issues that will form the core of this section.

In global terms external policy has been markedly radical in nature and characterized by a strong sense of morality and idealism. Rarely does a major Kenyan foreign policy pronouncement fail to contain some allusion to the inequalities of the present international order or some reassertion of both the desirability and the attainability of a peaceful and just international community of nations, premised on rule based multilateralism. Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2008 – 2012 states "*The underlying principles of Kenya's foreign policy have been a strong advocacy for a rule-based international system, environmentally sustainable and equitable development and a secure world. As a member of the United Nations, Kenya has remained firmly committed to the organization's underlying principles and objectives, particularly in ensuring global peace and security.....*"<sup>221</sup>

In regional affairs, however, Kenya's foreign policy has often been governed by a rather more conservative and legitimist thinking, where any radical departure from the *status*

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<sup>220</sup> P. Schraeder, 1994, 'Trends in the United States Africa Policies After the End of the Cold War', *Journal of the Third World Spectrum*, Vol:1, No:2, pp. 1-4.

<sup>221</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Strategic Plan 2008 – 2012: *Turning Global challenges into Opportunities through Innovative Diplomacy*, GoK, 2011, p 8

*quo* is not contemplated. It is apparent that where foreign policy issues touch directly on Kenya's vital interests, say national security or national development, the implied radicalism of Kenya's broad foreign policy, especially manifested in United Nations meetings is subject to considerable restraint.

This ambivalence in Kenya's foreign policy can probably be best explained by examining the basic pressures towards a broad radical policy internationally, and a more cautious and conservative approach towards the near abroad. This policy is evident especially in the Horn of Africa affairs, where Kenya has consistently played the role of a neutral mediator in conflict management.

The Foreign Ministry's strategic plan 2008 – 2012 indicates that Kenya's future is inextricably linked to the African continent. In this regard, the principal focus of Kenya's diplomacy will remain the immediate neighbourhood and the sub-region. By virtue of her strategic location, Kenya is a major stabilizing force for regional peace and security in Eastern Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Kenya's engagement in the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will deepen focus on peace, security, sustainable development and integration in Africa.<sup>222</sup> This perhaps explains Kenya's involvement in seeking to establish a stable government in Somalia, culminating in the hosting and chairing the IGAD Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Eldoret and Mbagathi, from 2002 to 2004.

However, Gebremariam notes that between 1965 and 1967, Somalia organized guerilla forces that made harassing incursion into Kenya and Ethiopia, even after Sudanese

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid p 9

President Ibrahim Aboud had intervened initially to calm the hostilities.<sup>223</sup> This prompted both Kenya and Ethiopia to adopt a deterrent foreign policy. They closed their borders to the Somali nomadic clans to curb intrusions into their respective territories. This forced closer cooperation between Kenya and Ethiopia on Somalia, especially on security issues. The impact forced Somalia to adopt some form of détente. The relations were improved following President Kaunda's personal diplomacy in 1967.<sup>224</sup>

The option of closing the border with Somalia as deterrence was carried into Moi's era when the border with Somalia was closed twice in the 1990s to curb the illegal entry of Small Arms and light Weapons. President Moi, in a 28 July 2001 presidential decree ordered the Kenya-Somali border closed. He explained that armed refugees were entering into Kenya and contributed to increased incidents of insecurity and crime in Nairobi. For him, the Somalis were to blame for the state of insecurity in Kenya.<sup>225</sup> The Kenya-Somali border was closed on 28 July 2001. President Moi argued that the move was aimed at curbing the inflow of small arms, which were believed to contribute to the growing wave of crime in the country. This ban came barely two years after the August 1999 border closure and ban of all flights between Kenya and Somalia, which was lifted six months into operation.<sup>226</sup>

A further analysis of Kenya's foreign policy should consider Kenya's foreign policy decision making organs. Historically, the Department of Foreign Affairs (today's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was established in the Office of the Prime Minister in 1964.<sup>227</sup> Its role was to plan how Kenya should survive and advance its national interests amidst a climate of anarchy and conflict that characterized the region and beyond. Mazrui notes that, in an endeavour to

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<sup>223</sup> K Gebremariam 2004, "Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Regional Organizations," in *Building Sustainable Peace*, University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, Canada, Op Cit p 194

<sup>224</sup> Ibid

<sup>225</sup> *Sunday Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1.

<sup>226</sup> *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1 and *Sunday Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1.

<sup>227</sup> R. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* ( Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), p. 1.

achieve this goal, Kenyan diplomats were trained either abroad, in Oxford, Washington, or Islamabad, among other places, or at the University of Nairobi's Institute of Diplomacy. The reasoning being that, if they are trained properly, then they will be able to implement policies and deduce challenges to Kenya's national interest in a proactive manner.<sup>228</sup>

As yet, however, there is no diplomatic cadre separate from the ordinary civil service. Officers from other ministries often find their way into foreign affairs ministry and vice versa. There has been a quiet debate on whether this is healthy; the debate exploded publicly in 1996 when potential investors complained that Kenyan diplomats abroad were not particularly concerned about informing their hosts on prevailing situations especial the conflict in the region.<sup>229</sup>

Although a detailed study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is beyond the scope of this chapter, suffice to state that the ministry is involved almost on a daily basis in shaping and formulating Foreign Policy. The main thrust being the issues emerging from the region, including the Somali conflict. Moreover, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a department dedicated to Horn of Africa and Somalia affairs. The Horn of Africa Division is relatively new having been established in 2005, at the height of the Somali crisis. In addition, Kenya has over 40 missions abroad which file reports that assist the Permanent Secretary and the ministry in advising the President on foreign policy matters. Of note is the Monday Senior Officials Meeting, held in the ministry's boardroom and this serves as a brainstorming session for foreign policy decision making.

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<sup>228</sup> A. A. Mazrui, 1977, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*, London, Heinemann, Op Cit p. 24

<sup>229</sup> H. Ododa. 'Continuity and Change in Kenya's Foreign Policy: From Kenyatta to Moi Government', *Journal of African Studies*, will examine other issues of importance that have emerged in the course of this research study Vol:13, No:2, Summer 1986, pp. 47-57.

Moreover, seminars on various aspects of foreign policy are held and recommendations have been presented to the government. For instance, the biennial Kenyan Ambassadors and High Commissioners Conference serves as a useful forum for exchanging views on various foreign policy issues.<sup>230</sup> The recommendations of the conference are thereafter presented to the government for further action. Hence, it can be argued that, Kenya's foreign policy decision making is a mixture of reactive as evidenced by the lack of a long term policy on the Somali conflict, and proactive as seen through the strategic plan document, strategy meetings and conferences.

#### **4.4 Graham Allison's Models and Their Relevance**

This section proceeds from the premise that using Graham Allison's models of foreign policy decision making processes, we can be able to draw the nexus between Kenya's foreign policy making process and the Somali conflict. This is in line with the theoretical framework suggested in chapter one as a tool to be used to critically assess the objectives and test the hypotheses identified. This section proceeds from the assertion that what each of Allison's models sees and judges to be important is a function not only of the evidence about what happened but also of the theoretical lenses through which the models capture in regard to the prevailing situation in Somalia. The models also utilize primary data collected in chapter three to capture the issues within the context of this study. The principal purpose of this section is to critically assess some of the fundamental assumptions of Kenya's foreign policy decision making in respect of how to manage the Somali conflict as a way of securing Kenya's national interests within the framework postulated in Graham Allison's models of foreign policy decision making process.

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<sup>230</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, *Nailing Lies* (Nairobi, 1991).

Allison and Zelikow state that, in foreign policy and crisis management, the decisions between nation states are decided in the context of the states politics.<sup>231</sup> As such, they offer three models that they argue, can best help to explain the foreign policy decision making. These include the rational actor, bureaucratic politics and organizational process models.

#### 4.4.1 Rational Actor Model

In Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), there are three models propagated by Allison and used in examining foreign policy decision making in times of crisis, these are Rational Actor Model, Bureaucratic Politics Model and Organizational Process Model. Among these, the dominance in the use of the Rational Actor Model to explain or account for foreign policy behaviour is a case in point in examining the Somali conflict.

Rational Actor Model explains foreign policy by seeing it as goal directed, resulting from conscious choices made by leaders or groups with clear goals. It is assumed that foreign policy decision is the product of rational behaviour. This is an assumption of the Rational Actor Model or the decision-making approach made popular by Graham Allison.<sup>232</sup> The decision maker, like any other rational individual, considers possible courses of action and evaluates the likely consequences of each in terms of cost and benefit. The decision maker then selects the course of action most likely to achieve the desired goal.<sup>233</sup> In using this approach the government is personified, and it is assumed to be like an individual making decisions based on a clear cost-benefit analysis.<sup>234</sup>

Rational decision-making involves the selection of the alternative which will maximize the values of decision-makers, the selection being made following a

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<sup>231</sup> G.T Allison, 1971, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, Little, Brown, p. 23

<sup>232</sup> B White, 1989, "Analyzing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches" in Clarke, M and White, B (Eds) *Understanding Foreign Policy. The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Aldershot, Hants, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 11

<sup>233</sup> GT Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, op, cit

<sup>234</sup> M. Mwagiru, 2004, *Diplomacy: Documents, Methods and Practice*, Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, p.136.

comprehensive analysis of alternatives and their consequences.<sup>235</sup> In this respect, Kenya's foreign policy can arguably be said to be a preserve of the head of state. For instance, after the outbreak of the Somali conflict, President Moi was actively engaged in efforts to find a solution and manage the conflict. This can further be expounded by considering that, Kenya hosted a number of conferences in Nairobi and Eldoret.

The role of the President can further be expounded considering the role the heads of state has played in efforts to manage the Somali conflict. Moi appointed special envoys who represented him during the various phases of the Somali peace negotiations. Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat and Elijah Mwangale served as special envoys to the Somali peace process. The role of special envoys in conflict management confirms the importance that the leader as a rational actor accords the conflict. Often special envoys have special access to the President; they communicate directly to the President and are arguably representing the views of the President.<sup>236</sup>

The limitation of the Rational Actor model of foreign policy decision-making can be found in the various criticisms directed at the model by various scholars including Allison himself who had to give other models to explain foreign policy decisions. One such criticism is advanced by Jones, R.E who contends that human behaviour is fallible. This contradicts a very central assumption in the model and that is the emphasis of the individual decision maker's rationality. This criticism is also emphasized by Brian White who is of the opinion that there are always distortions in the mind of the decision maker. To White, distortion can result from either paucity or an abundance of information, or it can arise from bias.

Michael Clark introduces the issue of environment in the decision-making process. He says that, we should realize that the idea decision-making does not refer only to making

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<sup>235</sup> G.T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, op, cit

<sup>236</sup> H. Ododa, 1986, 'Continuity and Change in Kenya's Foreign Policy: From Kenyatta to Moi Government' *Journal of African Studies*, Vol:13, No:2, p. 50.

conscious choices but also to a range of personal, organizational, institutional and environmental factors which help account for the flow of events.<sup>237</sup> The behaviour or output of the decision-maker is conditioned by influences which operate outside the boundaries of the foreign policy system, but which can serve as significant input into the foreign policy system.

The Rational Actor Model ignores the fact that the individual, say the President is surrounded by a bureaucratic from which he has to obtain information and discuss policy alternatives. Such a structure may influence decisions since it the same structure which is providing the information and alternative from which the rational leader is to make his choice from. It is not realistic that one can divorce the bureaucratic structure from the information and alternative choices it will give. The rational leader is dependent on this same structure which has its own and organizational interests.

Hollis and Smith also criticized the Rational Actor Model by starting with posing a question whether the rational decision-makers are of the kind proposed in the Game Theory or are a mere voices of the bureaucracy?<sup>238</sup> They argue that the Rational Actor Model developed from the Game Theory relies on astringent assumptions about the rationality of actors but two elements are excluded by those assumptions. These are the psychology of the individual human decision makers and how it functions in small decision making groups and the bureaucratic organization in the domestic process of making policy and translating it into decisions and implementation.

Further, they argue that the Rational Actor framework relies on a misleading notion of perception. Actors see the world in a certain way because their perceptions are caused by

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<sup>237</sup> M. Clarke, "The Foreign Policy System: A Framework of Analysis" op, cit, p. 27

<sup>238</sup> M Hollis, and Smith, S. 1991, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p.14

societal, cultural, historical or economic factors. This view is also held by Jervis who posits that decision makers misperceive and make errors in judgment in assessing information.<sup>239</sup>

#### 4.4.2. Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models

Smith argues that although Allison's account of the Cuban Missile Crisis may have been misleading, the Bureaucratic Politics Model remains the major alternative to the Rational Actor Model account of decision-making.<sup>240</sup> Traditional models of complex organizations and bureaucracy emphasized the benefits of a division of labour, hierarchy, and centralization, coupled with expertise, rationality, and obedience. They also assumed that clear boundaries should be maintained between politics and decision making, on the one hand, and administration and implementation on the other.

The central premise is that decision making in bureaucratic organizations is constrained only by the legal and formal norms that are intended to enhance the irrational and eliminate the capricious aspects of bureaucratic behaviour. There is an emphasis upon, rather than a denial of the political character of bureaucracies, as well as on other informal aspects of organizational behaviour.

Organizational norms and memories, prior policy commitments, inertia, and standard operating procedures may shape and perhaps distort the structuring of problems, channelling of information, use of expertise, the range of options that may be considered, and implementation of executive decisions. Consequently, organizational decision making is essentially political in character, dominated by bargaining for resources, roles and missions, and by compromise rather than analysis.<sup>241</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> R. Jervis, 1976, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 11

<sup>240</sup> S. Smith, , 1980, "Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making" *Millennium* Vol:9, No:1, pp21-40.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid*, p 38

Hollis and Smith also commence by posing a question whether the rational decision-makers are of the kind proposed in the Game Theory or are mere voices of the bureaucracy?

<sup>242</sup> They assert that crises may provide the motivation and means for reducing some of the non rational aspects of bureaucratic behaviour. Crises are likely to push decisions to the top of the organization where a higher quality of intelligence is available; information is more likely to enter the top of the hierarchy directly, reducing the distorting effects of information processing through several levels of the organization; and broader, less parochial values may be invoked. Short decision time in crises reduces the opportunities for decision making by bargaining, log rolling, lowest-common-denominator values and the like.

Critics of some organizational bureaucratic models have directed their attention to several points. They assert, for instance, that the emphasis on bureaucratic bargaining fails to differentiate adequately between the positions of the participants. Prior to the fall of Siyad Barre, the Somali government system was not just another player in a complex bureaucratic game. The president ultimately decided and selected who the other players were, a process that was crucial in shaping the ultimate decisions.

Also, the conception of bureaucratic bargaining tends to emphasize its non rational elements to the exclusion of genuine intellectual differences that may be rooted in broader concerns, including disagreements on what national interests, if any, are at stake in a situation. Indeed, properly managed, decision processes that promote and legitimize multiple advocacies among officials may facilitate high quality decisions. These models may be especially useful for understanding the slippage between executive decisions and foreign policy actions that may arise during implementation, but they may be less valuable for explaining the decisions themselves. Policymakers have a propensity to assimilate and interpret information in ways that conform to rather than challenge existing beliefs,

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<sup>242</sup> M. Hollis, and S. Smith, 1991, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p.14

preferences, hopes, and expectations. They may deny the need to confront tradeoffs between values by persuading themselves that an option will satisfy all of them, and indulge in rationalizations to bolster the selected option while denigrating others.

Rothschild also illustrates the effect on decisions of policy makers on assumptions about order and predictability in the environment.<sup>243</sup> Whereas a policymaker may have an acute appreciation of the disorderly environment in which he or she operates, such as that obtaining in Somalia, there is a tendency to assume that others, especially adversaries, are free of such constraints. Graham Allison, Robert Jervis, and others have demonstrated that decision makers tend to believe that the realist unitary rational actor is the appropriate representation of the opponent's decision processes and, thus, whatever happens is the direct result of deliberate choices. The unpredictability of the Somali conflict, as earlier observed, may confound foreign policy decision makers, and Kenya appears to be no exception.

Reynolds, P.A avers that logically the primary influence of foreign policy decision making lies in the goals that foreign policy seeks to achieve. These have been normally security. All foreign policies of all states are basically influenced by security considerations.<sup>244</sup> The emphasis on security aspects of foreign policy supports the stakes threat approach to foreign policy making, since this implies looking at threats and making decisions to minimize or neutralize the threat. It appears as if Kenya had been weighing the stakes and threats posed by the Somali conflict, and as long as they stakes and threat were considered to be low, the possibility of armed responses to the Somali problem remained remote.

According to Astorino-Courtois, contrary to the notion that normative (rational) decision-making is more likely in less dramatic settings, the results indicate that elevated

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<sup>243</sup> Harbeson and D. Rothchild 1995, (eds.), *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges*, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 250-277.

<sup>244</sup> P. A Reynolds, 1994, *An Introduction to International Relations*, Longman Group, p 38

threat encourages rational decision processing, whereas heuristic processing was more prevalent in less threatening situations. He argues that, the added presence of high stakes tends to magnify threat effects.<sup>245</sup> Clearly the attack by Al Shabaab on the sensitive but vital tourism sector of Kenya posed a threat to a vital sector, hence raising the stakes and culminating in a dramatic change in Kenya's foreign policy orientation that hitherto favoured peaceful resolution of the Somalia problem. The change led to invasion of Somalia territory by Kenya Defence forces in October 2011.

#### 4.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, while foreign policy decision makers use different decision making strategies according to the decision task, it is clear that this approach may not be applicable in all instances. Different situations and different foreign policy problems call for different approaches and in most cases a combination of strategies are employed by foreign policy decision makers and strategists commensurate with the specific decision task and the circumstances and issues at stake. Moreover, the personal traits of the decision maker or the leader (idiosyncratic variable) often come into play and may affect the perception in respect of the issues, the stakes and threats and the foreign policy options available.

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<sup>245</sup> A. Courtois, *A Political Psychology*, Vol:21, No.3. 2000, p. 489

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Conclusions

#### 5.0 Summary

Chapter one of this research study introduced the research topic, statement of the research problem, objectives, literature review, hypotheses, theoretical framework, methodology and chapter outline. Chapter two gave an overview of the Somali conflict and Kenya's foreign policy since independence; it examined how the Somali conflict has influenced Kenya's foreign policy behaviour during the leadership of Presidents Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki. The chapter also examined the main factors driving the Somali conflict since the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991.

Chapter three focused on the case study for this research study. To achieve its objectives, the chapter utilized interviews, unpublished documents and questionnaires to collect data, which was thereafter organized and presented. Chapter four critically reviewed the topic of this research study, and highlighted the main emerging issues. The chapter also utilized the theoretical framework to examine the objectives and test the hypotheses as indicated in chapter one. Finally, chapter five summarizes the research study; makes conclusions and ultimately makes recommendations for further research and policy direction.

#### 5.1 Key Findings

This research study has demonstrated that there is a strong relationship between the Somali conflict and Kenya's foreign policy formulation. It is also evident from the study that the Somali conflict directly and indirectly influences Kenya's foreign policy decision making processes. In chapter two it emerged that, from its independence in 1960, the state of Somalia has entertained and supported irredentist ambitions of uniting all persons of Somali descend,

including those in neighbouring states namely; Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. This led to the 1965 to 1967 Shifta war in Northern Eastern Kenya, among other conflicts. The conflict directly infringed on Kenya's sovereignty and territorial integrity, hence threatening the very core of the country's national interests. This inevitably set the tone for future relations between Kenya and Somalia.<sup>246</sup>

On the same breath, in chapter three, Kenya's foreign policy was identified as one anchored on the principle of non interference in internal affairs of other states.<sup>247</sup> On the other hand, Somalia has at different times directly or indirectly violated Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty. This was either as a result of the deliberate foreign policy of Pan-Somalism adopted in the 1960s, or arising from the consequences of internal conflict since the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991. It is against this background that Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia has evolved. Kenya has adopted a foreign policy of deterrence, using the Kenya Defence Forces when violations of its territorial integrity and sovereignty by elements from Somalia have persisted.<sup>248</sup> This was clearly the case during the 1965 to 1967 Shifta war and the October 2011 invasion of Somalia by the Kenya Defense Forces, (KDF) in pursuit of Al Shabaab.

It is also apparent from chapter two and the analysis in chapter four that Kenya's foreign policy decision making process, to a large degree, conforms to Graham Allison's Rational Actor Model. Kenya's leadership and foreign policy decision makers were able to analyze the costs and benefits of the available foreign policy options, leading to pragmatic policies in respect of Somalia. In line with Allison's argument, it is worth noting that Kenya

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<sup>246</sup> Institute of Public Administration, *The Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya Dispute, 1960-67* (Dar es Salam, Tanzania: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969).

<sup>247</sup> See Chapter Three for Details

<sup>248</sup> K. Gebremariam, 2004, "Peace-building in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Regional Organizations," in - *Building Sustainable Peace*, University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, Canada, Op Cit p 194

did not invade Somalia as long as the Somali conflict did not pose any serious and direct threat to Kenya's vital national interest.<sup>249</sup> Moreover foreign policy decisions were based on the assessment of threats and stakes as envisioned by Astorino Courtois.<sup>250</sup> This has culminated in a long history of attempts at peaceful resolution of disputes, such as hosting the IGAD Somali National Reconciliation Conference when the stakes and threats are perceived to be low and armed responses by Kenyan Defence Forces when the stakes and threats were high, as evidenced by the 1960s Shifta war and the October 2011 invasion of Somalia in pursuit of Al Shabaab terrorists.

It can be further argued that the pragmatic approach to the Somali conflict meant that Kenya's foreign policy responds in a proactive manner whenever the threats to vital national interests are perceived to be high. However, due to the unpredictability of the Somali conflict, a proactive approach is not always possible. In addition, the organizational politics model of foreign policy decision making, as espoused by Allison is apparent within the framework of the unpredictability of the Somali conflict. Due the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and the increase in maritime piracy incidences along the East African coast, it is apparent that Kenya's foreign policy decision making and execution oscillates from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Defense or Internal Security, in the Office of the President, as and when the needs and mandates dictate.

The ouster of the Barre regime in 1991 heralded the over two decades long violent conflict pitting clan based militias fighting over control of territory, towns, seaports, airports, airstrips and neighbourhoods. In addition, there are a host of other factors which have since 1991 helped to reinforce conflicts unpredictability and increase Kenya's vulnerability.<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> G.T. Allison, 1972, *Essence of Decision Making*, op, cit.

<sup>250</sup> A.A Courtois, "Political Psychology", Vol 21, No. 3. 2000, p 489

<sup>251</sup> J. Philip and J. Toscano, 1964, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities*, Philadelphia: Lippincott, p.4

These include the rise of a war economy, in which gunmen and powerful conflict entrepreneurs seek to perpetuate conditions of lawlessness and small arms proliferation. The war of 1991–92 also produced a powerful array of interests in perpetuating lawlessness and violence and blocking reconciliation.<sup>252</sup> This situation has evolved to involve terrorism and maritime piracy. Piracy generates millions of dollars that sustain the conflict, as well as disrupting shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the East African coast, further affecting Kenya's trade and maritime sectors.

It also emerged in chapter three that, there are a number of challenges emanating from the conflict that adversely affect Kenya's national interests and influence its foreign policy decision making. For instance, owing to the long and porous border between Kenya and Somalia, illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons from Somalia found their way into Kenya, exacerbating the cases of armed cattle rustling, banditry and armed crime in Nairobi and other urban settings. These developments had a direct bearing on national security and exerted enormous pressure on Kenya's security agencies and resources. Insecurity emerged as a factor influencing Kenya's foreign policy decisions after the collapse of the Somali government. President Moi, in a 28 July 2001 presidential decree ordered the Kenya-Somalia border closed. He explained that armed refugees were entering into Kenya and contributed to increased incidents of insecurity and crime in Nairobi.<sup>253</sup> President Moi argued that the move was aimed at curbing the inflow of small arms and light weapons, which were believed to contribute to the growing wave of crime in the country. This border closure came barely two

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<sup>252</sup> B. Moller, *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors*, (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009. p. 19

<sup>253</sup> *Sunday Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1.

years after the August 1999 ban on flights to and from Somalia, which was lifted six months into operation.<sup>254</sup>

## 5.2 Recommendations

This study set out to critically assess the impact of the Somali conflict on Kenya's foreign policy. Further, the study was conducted with a view to enriching academic discourse by addressing the knowledge gap identified during the literature review, and proffer guidelines on foreign policy decision making in Kenya, particularly in respect of the management of the Somali conflict. As such, it attempted to provide a picture of the Somali conflict and structure of Kenya foreign policy in light of prevailing circumstances and issues in both states. Given this focus, the research study does not provide advice on issues such as political arrangements or configurations, including the ongoing conflict management related issues. The study, therefore, represents but one part of the picture on Kenya's foreign policy and the Somali conflict. Hence, it should be complemented by other studies that examine issues that were purposefully omitted because they were beyond the scope of the study, or were not covered in sufficient depth.

Arising from this study, it emerged that the conflict in Somalia has resulted in the radicalization part of Somalia's population. Al Shabaab, an extremist movement allied to Al Qaeda, controls much of Southern Somalia, and is perhaps the single most powerful armed group in the country. There is clearly a need to conduct further research and find out the nexus between the protracted conflicts and the evolution of extremist groups starting with the Union of Islamic Courts, Hizbul Islam, Al Shabaab and the connection with extremist groups outside Somalia, such as Al Qaeda. Moreover, the Eastern Africa coast is the epicentre of maritime piracy and related criminal activities. There is therefore need also to conduct further

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<sup>254</sup> *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1 and *Sunday Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1.

research with a view to assessing the impact of maritime piracy on regional security and economic activities.

For the last twenty one years, regional and international mediators have tried to achieve peace in Somalia through power sharing arrangement done through transitional governments, to no avail. One of the challenging characteristics of the conflict that militates against the achievement of a lasting solution is the constant metamorphosis and unpredictability of the Somali conflict. Indeed, the envisaged transition to a democratically elected national government of Somalia remains a mirage, hence the challenge persists. Failure by Kenya's foreign policy to keep pace with the evolution of the conflict necessitates a new long term strategic approach that will encapsulate tools for predicting the emerging dynamics of the conflict in good time to facilitate policy adjustments. This research study examined the influence of the conflict on Kenya's foreign policy, but there is need to examine the impact of the conflict on the foreign policies of other states in the region, and the impact of the same on the international relations between and among regional states.

Finally, it emerged from the study that, clans play an important role in shaping the dynamics that inform the Somali conflict. Clans and the clan system form an important segment in the Somali conflict as a whole. There is need, therefore, to conduct further research on the role of clans as sub actors in the Somali conflict. Ultimately, it is envisaged that with this understanding of the impact of Somali conflict on Kenya' foreign policy, the findings and recommendations from this study will enable Kenya's foreign policy to mitigate the adverse effects of the Somali conflict, while at the same time making a positive contribution to finding lasting peace and security in Somalia.

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### **List of Interviewees**

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- Adala,O Director, Africa Peace Forum, (APFO), Nairobi.
- Khalif Farah, UNDP, Somalia Office.
- Kiptiness L. Deputy Director, Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya.
- Kwanya, First Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Former Diplomatic and Political Liaison Officer, IGAD Somali Peace Process.
- Maina, S.K. Director, Multilateral Affairs Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya.
- Mwanzia, P, Director, Foreign Services Institute (FSI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya.