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COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL DEBATES

OFFICIAL REPORT

SECOND SERIES

VOLUME XVIII—(Part I)

1944

First Session: 4th and 5th February, 1944

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ERRATUM SLIP

Volume XVII, Second Series—

Column 781: In line 20 of Mr. Nicol's speech,
for Uganda £6,049,000 read
Uganda £600,000 odd.

List of Members of the Legislative Council

President:

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR, SIR HENRY MOORE, G.C.M.G.

Ex Officio Members:

CHIEF SECRETARY (HON. G. M. REDDIE, C.M.G., M.C.).

ATTORNEY GENERAL, ACTING (HON. T. A. BROWN), (1)

FINANCIAL SECRETARY (HON. L. TESTER, C.M.G., M.C.), (2)

CHIEF NATIVE COMMISSIONER (HON. W. S. MARCHANT, C.M.G.), (3)

DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES (DR. THE HON. F. J. C. JOHNSTONE).

DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE (HON. D. L. BLUNT), (4)

DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION (HON. A. T. LACEY, O.B.E.).

GENERAL MANAGER, K.U.R. & H. (HON. R. E. ROBINS, C.M.G., O.B.E.).

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS (HON. J. C. STRONACH, C.M.G.).

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ACTING (HON. E. E. LORD).

COMMISSIONER OF LANDS AND SETTLEMENT, ACTING (HON. G. J. ROBBINS), (5)

Nominated Official Members:

HON. H. M. GARDNER, O.B.E. (Conservator of Forests).

HON. S. O. V. HODGE, C.M.G. (Prov. Commissioner, Coast).

HON. C. TOMKINSON (Prov. Commissioner, Central).

HON. K. L. HUNTER, O.B.E. (Prov. Commissioner, Nyanza).

HON. H. IZARD (Prov. Commissioner, Rift Valley).

HON. T. A. DENNISON (Solicitor General, Acting), (6)

HON. R. DAUBNEY, C.M.G., O.B.E. (Director of Veterinary Services).

HON. G. B. HERDEN, C.M.G. (Postmaster General).

HON. R. PEDRAZA (Commissioner of Mines).

European Elected Members:

MAJ. THE HON. F. W. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK, C.M.G., Nairobi North.

HON. S. V. COOKE, Coast.

HON. F. J. COULDREY, Nyanza.

HON. W. A. C. BOUWER, Uasin Gishu.

COL. THE HON. E. S. Grogan, D.S.O., Ukamba.

MAJOR THE HON. A. G. KEYSER, Trans Nzola (Acting).

HON. W. G. D. H. NICOL, Mombasa.

LT.-COL. THE HON. LORD FRANCIS SCOTT, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Rift Valley.

HON. A. VINCENT, Nairobi South.

HON. MRS. O. F. WATKINS, Kiambu.

HON. E. H. WRIGHT, Aberdare.

Indian Elected Members:

HON. SHAMSUD-DEEN (Central).

HON. S. G. AMIN (Central).

HON. A. B. PATEL (Eastern).

HON. K. R. PAROO (Eastern).

VACANT—Western Area.

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL—Contd.

Arab Elected Member:

HON. SHERIFF ABDULLA SALDIL

Nominated Unofficial Members:

Representing the Interests of the African Community—

HON. H. R. MONTGOMERY, C.M.G.

REV. THE HON. L. J. BEECHER

Representing the Interests of the Arab Community—

VACANT. (7)

Acting Clerk to Council:

Mr. K. W. Simmonds.

Reporter:

Mr. A. H. Edwards.

- (1) *Vice* Mr. W. Harragin, C.M.G., transferred to Gold Coast.
- (2) *Vice* Mr. J. F. G. Troughton, M.B.E., Acting Financial Secretary.
- (3) *Vice* Mr. E. B. Hosking, C.M.G., O.B.E., retired.
- (4) *Vice* Mr. A. B. Killick, Acting Director of Agriculture.
- (5) *Vice* Mr. C. E. Mortimer, C.B.E., on leave.
- (6) *Vice* Mr. T. A. Brown, Acting Attorney General.
- (7) Hon. Soud bin Ali, resigned.

ABSENTEES FROM LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SITTINGS

4th February—

- Hon. R. Daubney, C.M.G., O.B.E.
- Hon. Shamsud-Deen.
- Hon. Arab Elected Member.

5th February—

- Hon. R. Daubney, C.M.G., O.B.E.
- Hon. Shamsud-Deen.
- Hon. Arab Elected Member.



COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL DEBATES

FIRST SESSION, 1944

Friday, 4th February, 1944

Council assembled in the Memorial Hall, Nairobi, at 11 a.m. on Friday, 4th February, 1944, His Excellency the Governor (Sir Henry Moore, G.C.M.G.) presiding.

His Excellency opened the Council with prayer.

The Proclamation summoning Council was read.

ADMINISTRATION OF OATH

The Oath of Allegiance was administered to: Hon. L. Tester, C.M.G., M.C., Financial Secretary; Hon. W. S. Marchant, C.M.G., Chief Native Commissioner; D. L. Blunt, Esq., Director of Agriculture; G. J. Robbins, Esq., Acting Commissioner for Lands and Settlement; T. A. Dennison, Esq., Acting Solicitor General; W. A. C. Bouwer, Esq., Member for Uasin Gishu.

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE
THE CHAIR**

**COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE
VOTE**

His Excellency made the following communication from the Chair:—

Honourable Members will recollect that during the budget session a dispatch which I had addressed to the Secretary of State, communicating the broad outline of our development proposals, was laid on the table. I explained in my Communication from the Chair that the dispatch itself had been followed up by a number of specific applications for assistance from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote, and gave some details as to their nature. I also announced the approval of certain grants which had just been received, and indicated with

regard to the remainder that while it could not be assumed that all our applications would be approved in full, I felt sure they would receive the Secretary of State's most sympathetic and urgent consideration. This has indeed been the case, and Honourable Members no doubt will have read the announcement in the press this week of the approval in principle of two large and important schemes, one for soil conservation and general agricultural development and the other for water supplies.

In order that Honourable Members may be kept informed in more detail of how the different applications in question stand, I have had a statement prepared showing the schemes in respect of which applications have been submitted for financial assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, and the financial assistance which has been promised up to date. The statement will be laid in the course of the present meeting of Council.

MINUTES

The minutes of the meeting of 15th December, 1943, were confirmed.

PAPERS LAID

The following papers were laid on the table:—

By MR. RENNIE (Chief Secretary):

A statement showing (1) the development and welfare schemes in respect of which applications have been submitted for financial assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1941, and (2) the financial assistance which has been promised up to date; and the 1944 By-election Rules.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

No. 1—EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

MR. PAROO (Eastern Area):

Out of the total exports and imports of the Colony (excluding Government exports and imports) from 1st January, 1943, to 30th November, 1943, will Government please state what amount of goods have been exported (a) by European firms and (b) by Indian firms, and also what is the c.i.f. value of the goods imported by (a) European firms and (b) Indian firms?

MR. LORD (Acting Commissioner of Customs): I regret that the information desired by the hon. member is not available. It will be appreciated that many firms clear their imports and exports at Mombasa with the assistance of clearing agents. Customs entries do not show either the identity of actual shippers in the case of exports or of ultimate consignees in the case of imports.

No. 3—PORT REITZ AERODROME ROAD
MR. COOKE (Coast):

Is the Government aware that work which started over two years ago on approximately two miles of road leading to the Port Reitz Aerodrome is still far from completed?

Will the Government give the reasons for this unconscionable delay?

Is the Government aware that the state of the road has caused and is causing large expenditure of public and private funds in respect of broken springs, etc., and the wear and tear on tyres?

MR. STRONACH (Director of Public Works): The work was not started over two years ago. The facts are that tenders were called for in August, 1942, and work began early in September, 1942. Progress was slow owing, among other causes, to the low priority accorded to the work in relation to other more urgent service works in Mombasa and difficulties arising out of the food shortage. Since 14th August, 1943, when highest priority was awarded to the work, every assistance was given to the contractor to expedite the work, and special steps to this end have now been taken.

It is not agreed that the condition of the old road would have caused undue damage to vehicles or tyres if care had been exercised by drivers of vehicles.

No. 4—ASSISTANT INSPECTORS OF POLICE

MR. COOKE:

Will the Government definitely and categorically say whether or not it is the intention to give a substantial increase of salary, irrespective of promotion, to those Assistant Inspectors of Police who have served for 15 years and over and are still drawing less than £450 a year?

If not, why not?

If the answer to paragraph 1 is in the negative, will the Government appoint an impartial committee to review the whole matter?

MR. RENNIE: 1. The Government has no such intention, since it accepted the recommendations and findings contained in paragraphs 33 to 37 of the Report of the Committee on Police Terms of Service.

2. The terms of service of the Kenya Police Force were reviewed by the impartial committee referred to in the answer to part 1 of the question less than two years ago, and the Government sees no reason to appoint another committee to review the matter.

No. 8—CENTRAL WAGES BOARD

REV. L. J. BEECHER (Native Interests):

1. Will Government please state—

(a) the present composition of the Central Wages Board;

(b) if no African or Africans are included in the personnel of that Board whether it is not desirable that responsible Africans from the main labour-supplying areas should sit on the Board?

2. Will Government please give a typical selection of wages fixed by the Board for African labour in the main categories which come within its purview?

3. In view of (a) the very highly increased cost of living to the African labourer's dependants as well as to himself, (b) the rising standard of living which is observable throughout the African community in this country, will Government request the Central Wages Board to review wages fixed by them?

MR. MARCHANT (Chief Native Commissioner): 1. (a) The present composition of the Central Wages Board is as follows:—

Chairman:

The Director of Man Power.

Members:

The Chief Native Commissioner.

The Labour Commissioner.

A representative of the Medical Department.

The Deputy Chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board,

appointed in terms of Government Notice No. 186 of the 2nd of March, 1942.

(b) No Africans are included in the personnel of the Board. The Government welcomes the suggestion that responsible Africans from the main labour-supplying areas should sit on the Board, and is giving consideration to the selection of two suitable Africans.

2. The following extract from Central Wages Board Circular No. 9 is a typical example of the Board's pronouncements on this subject:—

"(2) Wages.—Wages will be expressed in terms of 30 standard tasks, equivalent to one ticket contract. The minimum wage for 30 standard tasks shall be Sh. 14 in the case of heavy labour, and Sh. 10 in the case of light labour. Tasks in excess of standard tasks shall be paid for at rates increased *pro rata*, and decreased tasks at decreased rates."

It should be stressed that these rates are minima, and that on many estates labourers can and do earn much higher remuneration by greater diligence.

3. The answer is in the affirmative, but in the Government's view any such review should include general conditions of service, and not be confined to wages alone.

No. 10—THUMB-PRINT RECEIPTS

MR. BEECHER:

1. Is Government aware that the practice of demanding a thumb impression from an African addressee of a registered letter is exceedingly vexatious to the African community?

2. Will Government please state on what authority such thumb-prints are demanded?

3. Will Government please state the number of instances in which such thumb-prints have been used for purposes of identity in alleged cases of fraudulent demands for delivery to another person than the addressee?

4. Is Government aware that, in the opinion of the experts, the present method of taking the thumb-print, using a violet rubber stamp pad, is entirely valueless in securing an indubitable identity?

5. Will Government please put an end to this method of procedure?

MR. HEDDEN (Postmaster-General):

1. The Government is not aware that the practice of demanding a thumb impression from an African addressee of a registered letter is vexatious to the African community as a whole, but is aware that the practice is vexatious to a small percentage of Africans in Kenya.

2. The Honourable Member is referred to Regulation 44 of the Post Office Regulations, 1935.

3. It is regretted that the information asked for is not available, but it is thought that the number of such instances is very small.

4. The Government is advised that the present method of taking a thumb-print by using a violet rubber stamp is of value if impressions are taken properly.

5. Yes, provided a suitable alternative method of identification can be evolved. The matter is at present receiving further consideration.

No. 12—PORT REITZ ROAD

MR. COOKE:

(a) Is the Government satisfied that the terms of the contract to supply materials for the Port Reitz Road were drawn up with strict regard to the principle that public moneys must be protected?

(b) Is the Government satisfied that the contract has been, and is being, carried out with the expedition and efficiency that might reasonably be expected?

(c) If the answer to (a) is in the negative, will steps be taken to see that future contracts are strictly drawn up?

[Mr. Cooke]

(d) If the answer to (b) is in the negative, will the Government state why steps have not been taken to rescind the contract?

MR. STRONACH: (a) The answer is in the affirmative.

(b) The answer is in the negative.

(c) In view of the reply to (a) above, this part of the question does not arise.

(d) The Director of Public Works has now taken over the construction of the road in conjunction with the contractor.

MR. COOKE: Arising out of that answer, sir, will the hon. Director inform me why that action was not taken much sooner in view of the representations which have so frequently been made?

MR. STRONACH: It was hoped that the contractor, with the assistance the Public Works Department was rendering, would complete the contract, but in view of the urgency that has arisen recently the steps now outlined in my answer have been taken.

No. 13—SIL. I CURRENCY NOTES

MR. COOKE:

(a) Before the decision to print and circulate Sh. 1 notes was come to, did the Government thoroughly consider the possible repercussions of such a step among the Africans?

(b) Is it appreciated that the poorer African will have much more difficulty in protecting these notes from damage by fire; insects, etc., than he has in the case of silver coinage?

(c) Have adequate steps been taken to explain to the African both verbally and in writing the need for this innovation?

(d) Will the Government give the assurance that these notes will be redeemed and withdrawn from circulation with the least possible delay?

MR. TESTER (Financial Secretary): (a) and (b). The answer to these parts of the question is in the affirmative.

(c) The fact that this new currency is being issued, and the reasons therefor, are being given wide publicity both in the press and by District Officers in barazas.

(d) It is the present intention that the Sh. 1 notes should be withdrawn from circulation as soon as adequate supplies of silver coin are available to replace them.

FOOD SHORTAGE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT

MR. WRIGHT (Aberdare): Your Excellency, I beg your leave now, sir, under No. 28 of Standing Rules and Orders, slightly to modify the original motion of which notice has been given in such a manner as will not materially affect its principle. Have I your leave to do so?

HIS EXCELLENCY: Will the hon. member state the terms of the motion as amended?

MR. WRIGHT: "That in the light of the communication from the chair made on the 8th December, and in view of the facts disclosed in the Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report—especially the findings under paragraph 205 of that Report—a thorough reorganization of and changes in the personnel of the Maize and certain Produce Controls is urgently required."

HIS EXCELLENCY: The hon member's proposed amendment does not, in my view, materially alter any principle embodied in the original motion, and I therefore accept it.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, sir. It is fair at the outset to state that, whereas the elected members on this side unanimously agreed to the original draft of the motion, there was a certain amount of difficulty as to how that should be properly construed. The fact that it is known that Government finds a certain portion of the motion unacceptable, and the assurance given that that will be dealt with at an early opportunity in today's debate, impels me to be as brief as possible in respect of the Report on which the motion is based. When we come to the main issue as especially referred to in my motion, I want to say at the very outset that there is no spirit of aggressiveness or vindictiveness in the attitude being adopted by any member on this side of Council. We have before us a Report compiled by three gentlemen of unassailable integrity who, after three months sifting all the evidence,

[Mr. Wright]

have come to certain conclusions. It may be said, it may be thought, that in many respects it is anaemic in its findings, but at least in respect of the particular paragraph cited, namely 205, it gives as a finding a fact which I for one on this side of Council am prepared to act upon. Will Government seek to condone or seek to conceal that finding? It is on that account that I think it would be a pity to waste the preliminaries of what may well prove to be a long debate, in stating all the various principles in the Report and the various problems arising out of it, when ample opportunity will be given to other speakers, and I hope also to myself, sir, at a later stage in the debate.

Paragraph 205, and particularly in respect of the third portion, is the gravamen of the charge in respect of the Controller, and damns the whole Control system with which he has been associated. It reads: "Lt.-Col. Griffiths used his knowledge that he was likely to be appointed to a post under Government as Maize Controller to attempt to secure for himself a lucrative appointment with a commercial firm." Then, in respect of the second and third points, the report goes on: "All this cannot have had any other than an adverse effect on the efficiency of the working of Maize Control, because from the start there was lack of confidence in the Maize Controller by the K.F.A., who are the Maize Controller's own agents for handling all the European-grown crop under the Maize Control scheme, and on our findings set out above this lack of confidence was to a large extent justified." Now, sir, is the justification referred to to be deemed as affecting a venal, or merely a venial, offence? My submission is that it is of such a grave nature that even if he were excupulated on the charge in respect of seeking a lucrative appointment arising out of his Controllership, it is the culminating factor in the whole series of events which made it plain throughout this country before the Commission sat even that the Controller and his system have lost the confidence of the Colony. In support of that statement I would recall, without referring to dates, that the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board submitted a motion, carried with a good majority, that another man for Controller, or that another executive officer, was required.

Government showed supreme disregard for that motion, and at a later date the adjournment of that Board *sine die* was submitted in protest at Government's inaction in what the Production Board thought to be a very grave issue. Still later, the hon. Financial Secretary gave his casting vote, as Chairman of the Maize Control Board, on a rather similar issue, designed, I imagine, to excupulate the Controller, and presumably also himself, from the charge of the lack of confidence in the Controller and the control system applying.

In your Communication from the Chair you, sir, properly reminded this Colony of the grave issues with which we are confronted, of the impending famine and the need to import cereals into this country to seek to avert that famine. The Report itself discloses that in respect of maize at least, and in respect of other commodities which could substitute maize, there have for long been warnings given by people competent to give the warnings that this country had no progressive anti-famine system, and it is a pretty grave reflection on all of us that in this the fifth year of total war we should be faced with famine conditions in this fertile Colony of ours. From the beginning of the negotiations it seemed that Government was afraid to take the risk. Even when the Minister of State in Cairo gave warnings that all these things, all commodities used by troops in the Middle East were urgently required and in great quantity, it was still believed here that there was surplus maize for export, an ill-founded suggestion, and we have got into grave difficulties ever since. The failure of the short rains has been adduced as a reason, but it is not tenable in a country which at all events can grow a number of starch crops in great abundance. So we go on making a mess of things from beginning to end, and Government at that time gave no attention to one wise insurance against famine, namely, encouraging the grower to grow what was obviously required for the Colony's needs. One of the expressions I am constantly meeting to-day, and it is a new one born of war-time needs, is the expression "in short supply". Why not use a good basic English word "scarce", if indeed they mean the same thing. I have, however, come to the belief that in these days when words are

[Mr. Wright] expressly chosen for their real meaning, "in short supply" has distinctly come not to mean scarcity at all, but to mean that in time of scarcely supplies are withheld for other and less honourable purposes through other markets.

One of the most obvious things to me is the vast degree of overlapping in the Controls as they apply to-day. Apropos of that, I recall the story I heard recently of a Japanese spy who was sent to examine the position in Washington. After a long inquiry he reported to Tokyo that it was quite useless to bomb Washington, regardless of how thoroughly it was done, in that every building or organization that could be bombed had been anticipated by the Americans who had several other buildings, fully staffed, duplicating and even triplicating exactly the same work. How much truer could that be said of Nairobi! We have one organization here in this hall to which I would pay tribute, that is the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board. Having worked with its Chairman now for a time, I can speak at least of the efficiency of that department and the difficulties encountered before it reached that high degree of efficiency, but when I find similar accounts and statistics and returns going into Rhodes House, to the Supplies Board, and similar analyses being kept in another office in Hardinge Street, under the Commodity Distribution Board, and presumably also similar facts and figures kept by my hon. friend the Director of Agriculture, and presumably also the Secretariat, I do suggest that the time has come for an overhaul of the Control system and the distribution system as it primarily derives from the most important thing of all—production. The point, and I want to be as brief as possible in this introduction to the motion, whatever the issue, is that Government will somehow allow as speedily as may be some form of overhaul or reconstruction, that in my view, and I am expressing my personal view, I hope Government will analyse other views which may be put forward and introduce some form of inter-territorial amalgamation of production, control and distribution, allowing for decentralization where necessary, since physical control for all three territories is not practicable.

My first intention, until we debated things among ourselves yesterday, was to give a fairly general review of this excellent report, excellent in so many ways, in respect of other food issues, meat shortages, and so on. I am concerned about one or two of these things that leap to the eye. I found out only recently, for instance, that despite the imposition of two meatless days, to which the majority of the people in this town and other towns have to submit, a remarkable meat basket trade has been developed whereby certain privileged people at least obviously cannot suffer from the deprivation affecting meatless days. I do suggest that, whether the custom of a basket trade has obtained in the past or not, in towns such as this and others, where there are quotas given all the butcheries, it is manifestly wrong that there should be a special dispensation allowed to any other group of people to enjoy a basket trade that cannot be enjoyed by all. Is it conceivable that Lord Woolton in a similar case would have a basket of special joints and cuts from Smithfield Market before the rest of the population got their fair ration? That is the analogy of the position of the basket trade in Kenya and I want, particularly as a stock owner, to call attention to that point.

With these few remarks and full of expectation to hear the hon. Acting Attorney General in his attack upon this motion, determined to ensure that he shall have an opportunity before the luncheon hour, after which you, sir, have been good enough to indicate that we elected members may get together for a short adjournment to decide on the rest of the course of this debate from our point of view, I would merely close down on this note: that whatever the result, Government shall make a determined point, and that without delay, to inaugurate a system of reconstruction from the production to the control and distribution side which shall in no way conflict, as these controls do at present, and work for the common welfare during the food shortage that threatens us to-day.

MR. BOUWER (Uasin Gishu): Your Excellency, I beg to second the motion. I was very pleased indeed to hear the hon. mover state that from this side of Council we wanted to assure Council that no spirit of animosity or vindictive-

[Mr. Bouwer] ness actuates any of us. All we want to do is to ensure that the labours of three very energetic gentlemen, who gave three months of their time to this report, should be utilized so that this country of Kenya will be able in future to pull its full weight in the war because, after all, that is the thing that is of most importance. In common with a number of other persons, when I read this Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report the first time, I confess it was with a sense of disappointment, but after I had studied it carefully, and especially after I had regard to the personnel of the Commission, I must say that I came to an entirely different conclusion. The three gentlemen who gave so much of their time to this inquiry are men of accepted intellect and integrity, they are men who are moderate and who have a responsible outlook on life, and I believe they are men who without fear or favour, have tried to get to the bottom of the matter of their inquiry, and I believe that we have got to accept the report in that light. The report is unanimous. Its chairman is a law officer of the Crown with a great deal of experience in taking evidence, and I believe Government has to give very serious consideration to the recommendations and findings of this Commission. This motion calls on Government for a thorough reorganization, and a complete change, in the personnel of the Maize and Produce Controls, and the report gives plenty of justification for doing that. Moreover, the country expects Government to act where necessary without fear or favour.

MR. RENNIE: On a point of order, does the amended motion refer to a complete change in the personnel of the Control?

HIS EXCELLENCY: It does not.

MR. BOUWER: I stand corrected. It is changed, it is slightly different. As I was saying, this report gives plenty of facts and findings on which Government ought to act without regard to who the persons are, or the positions they occupy, and I may say that, in my view, it is not only the Maize Controller and his department which stand indicted and who should be relieved of his post but, in my humble opinion, the report makes out a very good case indeed against other officers

of Government who failed to appreciate the real significance of the several and very distinct warnings which the hon. mover referred to, warnings that were given by people who were capable of giving them and who had the necessary experience and knowledge that entitled their views to every consideration. They failed to understand the very real significant warning that the Maize Controller and Chairman of the Kenya Supply Board had on 10th February, 1942, by the letter which was written by Col. Griffiths at that time and which, if properly understood and appreciated, showed distinctly that the country was at that time on the verge of a shortage of maize. This is very clearly put in paragraphs 78 to 86. I have no doubt that all hon. members have read this report very carefully, and I do not intend to read those paragraphs. Again, in paragraph 181 we find a clear indictment of the Maize Controller and the Maize Board, although I do not blame the Board so much because, in any case, at that time it had not been constituted and up to the 1st October, 1942, was only an advisory one. As we see in paragraph 186, the Controller and the Chairman kept that Board completely in the dark over a small matter of 100,000 tons, or a million bags, of maize which they had sold to the Middle East knowing perfectly well that it was not in the country and knowing that they could not have sold any but would have to import. To me, it seemed that they were kept so much in the dark that they concluded this agreement with the U.K.C.C. on the 5th May, 1942, and not until the 24th August when pressed did they think fit to inform the Board of what they were doing. I believe it is absolutely essential that we put our house in order, and I believe I am stating nothing but the truth when I say that the country definitely expects and demands it, and if no real attempt is made to do so by Government and they try on one pretext or another to evade the issue, the question of Government's sincerity and, in fact the fitness to govern, will be an issue which will come before the country, and be a large issue before the country.

Although Kenya has cause to be proud of her war contribution in many directions, I do not believe there is one hon. member that will quarrel with me

[Mr. Bouwer]
 when I state categorically that we can have no pride whatsoever in the fact that, at a time when shipping and sailors were a vital necessity to the war, this country had to call upon sailors to risk their ships to bring food to a country which ought to, and can, supply all the food necessary for itself. I say that, because it is not that Kenya is unable to produce the necessary food but because Government and its officers failed to appreciate the position in time and the vital fact which is brought out by the report that consumption was rapidly overtaking production. This in spite of the warnings by people competent to give those warnings, which again is brought out by the report. I believe the demand right through the country for a complete change in the personnel of the Maize Control is a very real one, and here I am going to try and do something constructive. I believe it will be made easy to have a simplified Maize Control scheme if the scheme put forward in Appendix L of the report is adopted by Government. I support that simplified scheme of Maize Control, with certain minor amendments which I think one of my colleagues will bring out later in the debate. The effect of the simplified scheme will be that, while retaining the object of Maize Control (which is to obtain physical possession), it will do away with a further grave objection to the present Maize Control, and that is that it will do away with the huge trading organization which has been set up in opposition to the old established channels of trade of the country, and such a big organization as this Maize Control now is will be quite unnecessary. In fact, the way I visualize it will be worked if the scheme under Appendix L is adopted, is in a similar manner to the way the Stockfeed Control operates to-day. The Controller by a system of returns from licensed buyers, buying from natives and from the K.F.A. on behalf of Europeans, will know what amount of maize is available and will distribute it by a system of permits to consumers.

I hope that what I am going to say now will not be ruled out of order, because I agree that under the terms of the motion as drafted it is apt, if strictly adhered to, to tie one down, but I believe it a mistake if other portions of the report which do not specifically deal with Maize Control, produce departments, and

so on, are not debated by this Council. They certainly deserve to be debated and considered, because there are many recommendations and many findings which can be of immense value to this country. The first point I want to discuss is the recommendation of the Commission that an arrangement shall be made by Government whereby an amount of 400,000 bags of maize be purchased annually from the European crop as long as is necessary to the country. Representatives of the maize growers have for years now tried to tell this country, the consumer, and Government that it is dangerous for Government and consumers to rely completely on native maize, and I believe I am stating nothing less than what is right, and the report amply bears that out in its recommendation. That is a step in the right direction which I welcome very much, but I want to sound a note of warning. It is not only necessary to say that Government should purchase those 400,000 bags, it is also necessary for the Council and the country generally to realize that there still remains the question of what the conditions will be under which that maize will be purchased. This, of course, as is again made clear in the report has not been done in the past. The consumer of maize has not realized that he was cutting his own throat by paying a sub-economic price for this article in the past, which did not allow the European grower of maize to return to the land that which had been taken out of it. Take the case of other crops where an economic price has been paid. It has paid the country handsomely to do that with one crop, wheat. Wheat as distinct from maize is treated in an entirely different manner, it is treated in a reasonable manner by Government, and the country is reaping the benefit of that reasonable treatment in that they have had the biggest crop they have ever had, and I am not exaggerating, and I believe the big record wheat crop this year has saved this country. In the past, as far as this question of price and conditions under which maize was grown is concerned, it has, I think, always been too little and too late. The price offered has always just lagged behind the cost of production, and the net result of all, as far up to now, is that the maximum maize has never been produced. If that had been

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 realized in time it would have paid the country handsomely. The extraordinary part about this question of maize, which I trust is the last we shall ever hear of it as far as it being a bone of contention, is that for some unknown reason there has been a feeling among Government advisers that they must always talk in terms of a surplus. They have a surplus fear complex, and that is one of the reasons that we are so short of maize to-day. When I say that they are afraid of this question of a surplus, I mean it, because not so long ago, about 5 weeks ago, the question of the price of maize was discussed between the directors of the K.F.A. and the Chairman of the East African Supply Council, and you will be astonished to learn that the argument he used was, "Well, if we pay you too big a price there might be a surplus of maize next year".

I put it to you, sir, is there an hon. member in this room who can reasonably say that he thinks it possible to have a surplus of maize next year in view of the tremendous locust invasion we know of in the country at the present moment? There is more to it than that. Say optimum conditions prevail and we have the biggest maize crop we have ever had. I believe that even in those circumstances there can be no possible talk about a surplus in the country, because what has not been realized by many people, but has been in this report is that this country to a large extent has been living on reserves, and before there is a big surplus those reserves held normally by every farmer and native and every planter and everyone in this country who consumes maize have to be replenished first of all, and that is a figure that must run into millions of bags, so that if this debate serves no other purpose than disabusing people's minds of the slightest possibility of a surplus in food in the future, it will serve a very useful purpose indeed.

The last point I want to make is over this question of storage. The Commission has made some recommendations, and a gentleman toured the country not so long ago and, I presume, made certain recommendations to Government; another gentleman is touring the country at this present moment, and I take it that when he has finished he will also

make his recommendations about storage. What we want to know, what the country wants to know, and I trust Government will tell us during this debate, is: what is their storage policy? If they have one. I trust that after the report of the Commission, after these various gentlemen have also reported, Government will be able to make up its mind what its storage policy will be, because I can understand to a certain extent the fear of the gentlemen who suffer as a rule from the surplus-fear complex. It is because of lack of storage that a surplus one year cannot be carried to the next, and I believe it absolutely essential that this country should have adequate and efficient storage facilities. I trust, sir, that your Government will in due course in the debate inform us what they intend doing. The sort of questions being asked are, first of all, has Government any policy whatsoever? I suppose it has, I trust it has. If so, what is that policy? Are they going to erect silo storage or the storage envisaged in the report? If so, at whose expense? Those are some of the questions that are being asked. Sir, I beg to second the motion.

ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL (Mr. Brown): Your Excellency, hon. members will have noticed, and the point is fairly material to the motion as far as Maize Control is concerned, that neither in the Commission's report nor in the speech of the hon. mover nor in the speech of the hon. seconder has any suggestion been made that the actual detailed handling of the Maize Control organization has not been done with complete efficiency; nor has any suggestion been made that it has not been handled in the best interests of this country as a whole—I refer to the actual handling of the Maize Control organization. That, I think, is rather remarkable when you consider the difficulties which have beset this Control from its inception, particularly in its initial stages, with practically no proper figures, no proper statistics of production or consumption, particularly of consumption, with no real figures of the business done before Control by the millers and the traders engaged. And whereas at the beginning of the year 1942 the discussions laid emphasis on having a surplus for export, as was not unreasonable at that time, the Control soon found itself confronted by a position when it had to meet immediate

[Mr. Brown] internal requirements in a shortage. And as you know, we were living during the months of July, August and September, 1942, almost from hand to mouth, and very short delays in the delivery of trucks, for example, caused great inconvenience, and the Control (as Controls invariably are) was blamed for something that was not really any fault of theirs. Day after day they had the disappointment of seeing expectations upon which future operations had been based not being realized. Those were something of the practical difficulties. But, added to that, and immensely increasing the burden of the Maize Controller, were the personal difficulties. You had the resolutions passed by boards demanding the withdrawal of the Maize Controller, and as the Chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board said in his evidence dealing with the meeting of his Board: "There had been a great deal of discussion throughout the country about this for a long time, and people got fairly easily worked up before this resolution was passed by the Production Board", and the Maize Controller day by day knew that the public feeling in the country was mounting against him. As if that was not enough, you had the allegations made by the Kenya Farmers' Association of unfair discrimination, which was investigated by the Maize Board on the 5th and 6th January and found to be lacking in substance. Those allegations were again investigated by the Maize Commission, and again they were found to be lacking in substance. But I do not know how any hon. member would have cared to carry on this extremely responsible Control beset by the difficulties, both practical and personal, particularly personal, which this man was faced with. What I do know is that in this Commission's report, as I have said, there is no suggestion that the handling of this Maize Control organization by the Maize Controller has not been done with efficiency.

Therefore the matter boils down to what I may call the personal issue, and particularly paragraph 205 of the report which has been made a particular feature of this motion. May I say before I deal with that, that I am very gratified to hear from the hon. mover that no spirit of vindictiveness actuates this motion, and I am very glad to hear from the hon.

seconder that no spirit of animosity animates him in seconding this motion. It is said in paragraph 205, in the third finding, that "Col. Griffiths used his knowledge that he was likely to be appointed to a post under Government as Maize Controller to attempt to secure for himself a lucrative appointment with a commercial firm". And it is quite clear, certainly from the speech of the hon. mover when he asked whether Government was going to condone that finding, that he has not got the whole picture. I share the observations that both the hon. mover and seconder have made with regard to the personnel of this Commission, and it is no reflection whatever on that personnel when I say that I do not think that in Chapter XV of this report, compressed as it no doubt had to be, I do not think that hon. members have been given quite the assistance that they might have been given if they had heard the evidence and knew the facts. There is enough in the chapter to confirm all that I am about to tell you, enough for that, but I think anybody reading this chapter does not get quite the whole picture—necessarily so, because you cannot in a report set out 1,200 pages of evidence. There are three facts which have got to be made absolutely plain. And that is why I think it is necessary for me to intervene at this stage in order that this debate may continue with the whole of the facts before Council.

The first fact is the relationship which existed between Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and the K.F.A., and on that I want to quote just six lines of the evidence which was given by the Managing Director of Mitchell Cotts in East Africa to the Commission: "I should like to point out that our organization have been agents for the K.F.A. for the best part of 20 years. I think we have run our agency efficiently for them and it has been a very happy organization, and our Chairman on the London Board would do nothing that would upset that wonderful relationship we have with the K.F.A. as an organization". The point contained in that fact is that nobody but a fool, or somebody who did not know about this relationship, would have dreamed of going to Mitchell Cotts in order to induce Mitchell Cotts to do something to the detriment of the K.F.A. (Laughter.) That is the first fact. The second fact is the relationship which existed between Col. Griffiths himself and

[Mr. Brown] Mitchell Cotts. Col. Griffiths, as General Manager of the K.F.A., had been known to Messrs. Mitchell Cotts for some years and he had been on terms of the closest friendship with that firm. Long before Maize Control ever came on the tapis—actually it was in November, 1941—the Managing Director of Mitchell Cotts, Mr. Aldridge, saw Col. Griffiths and said to him, "If you are ever free and if you want an appointment we will take you on", and a salary was mentioned of £4,000 a year. It was not employment that would be confined to Kenya; it was to be employment which would probably embrace the whole of Africa. That was the conversation he had back in November, 1941. On the 6th February, 1942, the directorate of the K.F.A. accepted the resignation of Col. Griffiths. And, as any man would who was out of employment and wanted it, he remembered that conversation and he wrote to Cairo. On the 15th February he had this reply from Mr. Aldridge, Managing Director of Mitchell Cotts, with whom he had had that conversation: "Yours 7th received to-day. View somewhat unexpected news which opens up additional phase feel essential we meet. Could you contact me in Cairo within say next 10 days all charges our account as difficult for me to keep my appointment elsewhere this stage my programme. Would much look forward seeing you. Regards. Aldridge".

Mr. COOKE: May I interrupt the hon. gentleman. Would he tell us whether that was put in evidence before the Commission?

Mr. BROWN: I think I am right in saying it was put in.

Mr. COULDREY (Nyanza): He says he thinks; could that be substantiated?

Mr. BROWN: In order to substantiate it it would necessitate looking through 1,200 pages of evidence, but I will certainly do my best to ascertain that.

Mr. WRIGHT: On a point of order, is the hon. member entitled to hint that paragraph 205 of the chapter referred to is lacking in substance, as submitted by the Commission of Inquiry in view of the evidence given?

Mr. BROWN: I am not aware if I have hinted that paragraph 205 is lacking in substance; I am going on to deal with that.

The point about this second fact is that, when he booked his passage to Cairo, he was going to Cairo with a view to getting employment which was certainly more to his financial advantage than anything he could have got as Maize Controller; and he could not possibly have had in his mind anything other than that other appointment of £4,000 a year at that time, because at that time Maize Control had never even been hinted at or suggested. The third fact which it is necessary to establish in order to get the complete picture is that, on the evening prior to his departure for Cairo, the hon. Chief Secretary rang him up at his house in Nakuru and said that Maize Control was probably going to be introduced and that if it was his name would be suggested as Maize Controller. And he was definitely asked by my hon. friend not to commit himself in Cairo to any employment outside Kenya because it was represented to him as his duty that he should stay in Kenya and accept the appointment of Maize Controller. That is the third fact. That telephone conversation altered the whole basis of his discussions in Cairo.

Mr. WRIGHT: On a point of order, why in such a case did the hon. Chief Secretary not give evidence to this effect before the Commission of Inquiry?

Mr. BROWN: That is a matter with which my hon. friend will no doubt deal! (Laughter.)

That is the third fact. The whole basis of his discussions in Cairo were thereby altered. From going for this very much more lucrative appointment he went to discuss an appointment only upon the basis of his being appointed Maize Controller. He could discuss it on no other basis unless he was to disregard the representations which had been made to him, unless he was to throw what had been represented to him as his duty to the winds, and unless he was to pursue purely and solely his own financial advantage. And when he got to Cairo of course he discussed his prospective employment; he could do nothing else. The other job—the £4,000 a year job—was off; the prospective job as Maize Controller was on; and it was only upon the basis of that prospective job that he could take employment with Messrs. Mitchell Cotts.

It will be remembered that at that time the form which Maize Control would

[Mr. Brown] take was unknown. It was not known whether it would take the form of an agency basis or not. That was not known at the time he was discussing this matter with Messrs. Mitchell Cotts. But there was certainly nothing new if it had been on an agency basis, and there was certainly nothing new if the Controller had been an employee or a member of a firm and had operated the Control through the organization of that firm as Government agents, the firm being the Government agents. For the life of me I cannot see what was wrong in this man saying to Messrs. Mitchell Cotts: "I can only discuss the question of my employment with you upon the basis of my probably being Maize Controller. What form the Control will take, whether on an agency basis or not, I cannot say, but if it does take the form of an agency basis and if Government does decide to run it on an agency basis, there is nothing wrong with my accepting an executive seat on your Board, my running the Control through your firm and you being the Government agents, always provided"—always provided, and this was understood by both parties from first to last—"always provided that the consent of the K.F.A. was obtained to every proposal and provided the consent of the K.F.A. was obtained to their going out of trading in the native reserves". That was essential. The whole thing was contingent on that, contingent on the consent of the K.F.A. to these proposals and to the K.F.A. going out of trading in the native reserves. The trading in the native reserves was very closely linked up with the military contracts for native produce other than maize. The question of trading in the native reserves had been a contentious matter for some time on the Board of the K.F.A., and Col. Griffiths had been the main protagonist of that policy, and, as sometimes happens, Col. Griffiths had got his own way! (Laughter.)

With regard to the military contracts in respect of native produce other than maize, Col. Griffiths took the view firstly that the K.F.A. would never have got those contracts but for him, and secondly that the K.F.A. would never have retained them once he had left. (LORD FRANCIS SCOTT: Question.) As to the first he was probably right; the contracts would not have gone there but for him. As to the second, that is surmise

because it was a matter entirely for the East African War Supplies Board and, as you know, since the 1st July, 1942, the East African War Supplies Board has not placed out these contracts; they have handled them themselves through the various Controls. But so far as I know there is nothing to indicate that once Col. Griffiths had left, the K.F.A. would continue to have the military contracts if they had been placed out. With regard to the trading in the native reserves, Col. Griffiths took the view, and the Commission have found that he had every reason for taking that view, that once the Control came in the K.F.A. would be no longer interested in trading in the native reserves because the whole point of trading in the native reserves, the whole policy of the K.F.A. in trading in the native reserves, had been to force up the price of maize, and once Control came in that was no longer possible and there was every reason to suppose that the K.F.A. would no longer be interested in that line of their business.

I hope that I have made the third finding in paragraph 205 clear in the light of those three facts, firstly the relationship between Mitchell Cotts and the K.F.A., secondly the relationship between Col. Griffiths and Mitchell Cotts and that previous offer of employment, very remunerative employment, much more remunerative than anything he could get as Maize Controller, and thirdly, how the telephone conversation to Nakuru altered the whole basis of his discussions in Cairo unless he was prepared to throw his duty to the winds. I note that there is no finding of impropriety in this third finding of paragraph 205, nor do I see how there could possibly have been when you consider that the whole thing was dependent on the consent of the K.F.A. I need hardly mention that it was dependent on the consent of the Government. The whole thing was dependent on the consent of the K.F.A., and if there was anything they objected to, they only had to go and say so.

In the first finding it is stated that the way in which the Chairman of the K.F.A. heard of the negotiations was such as to arouse the suspicions of the K.F.A. They heard of them through a third party; who he was, what he said, how he said it, or when he said it, I cannot tell you. But this I can tell you: that on the 4th March, 1942, these tentative proposals

[Mr. Brown] which had been discussed in Cairo were put to the Government and they were turned down by the Government. Therefore on the 4th March these tentative proposals were finished and absolutely dead. On the 5th March Col. Griffiths attended a board meeting of the K.F.A. I do not know if there is any suggestion here, or if the suggestion is going to be made, that he should have told the K.F.A. on the 5th March about these negotiations which had taken place in Cairo. If that is so, perhaps somebody will tell us what possible object could have been gained by telling them when the matter was at an end, since it had been turned down by Government the previous day. What possible object could have been gained by Col. Griffiths telling the Board on the 5th March about something which was completely dead and which had been turned down the previous day?

Now I come to the allegation regarding the engagement by the Maize Control of servants of the K.F.A. who were engaged in trading in the native reserves. We are told in this Report that some 26 servants were engaged by the Maize Control who were employed by the K.F.A. I am informed in fact that four of them had already been employed by the Potato Control for some months and three more were employed by the Vegetable Section of the K.F.A. which came to an end when they no longer had the military contracts. That is what I am informed; I do not think it matters—26 or 19. By the Maize Regulations, the Maize Controller was made responsible for engaging servants. No complaint surely can be made if 26 or 19 servants of the K.F.A., hearing that Col. Griffiths had resigned from the K.F.A., knowing that he is about to be appointed Maize Control, did tender their resignations to the K.F.A. in order to take employment with a person whose policy had been responsible for the coming into existence of their jobs. I cannot see what possible complaint there can be made if those people, who were free agents like Col. Griffiths—(LORD FRANCIS SCOTT: Were they not on the reserved occupations list?)—No. (LORD FRANCIS SCOTT: Definitely they were.) My information is they were not. (LORD FRANCIS SCOTT: One was released from the Army specially for service with the K.F.A.) Certainly not all of them, and this is the

first time I have heard about that one. (MR. COOKS: Why were they not prosecuted?) If I am right, as I believe I am, that practically all 26 were free agents I can see nothing wrong in them leaving the K.F.A. and going to the man whose policy had been responsible for bringing their jobs into existence. But it is said that the procedure which Col. Griffiths employed was wrong. He was dealing with the secretary of the company, incidentally, and it was insisted that he should have dealt with the chairman direct. Well, it is certainly the fact that his relations with the chairman at that time were such that he infinitely preferred to deal with the secretary, Mr. Bennitt, but the point I am trying to make is that there was nothing clandestine about this matter. He was not going behind the back of the K.F.A., he was in touch with Mr. Bennitt from first to last discussing these servants, and there is on record a letter, I think addressed to the chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board. This letter was written with the knowledge, in the presence of and with the concurrence of the secretary of the company, Mr. Bennitt, in which Col. Griffiths says: "If only Trench will leave us alone, Bennitt and I can come to an amicable arrangement about the whole position with reference to staff". From first to last the negotiations with regard to this staff were conducted perfectly openly as far as Mr. Bennitt was concerned.

MR. BOWEN: Was that letter submitted or brought out in evidence?

MR. BROWN: I think that was not, but I see no reason why I should not bring it up now.

MR. WRIGHT: On a point of order, is it permissible for an officer of Government to challenge the findings of a Commission of Inquiry appointed for the purpose, and in doing to introduce new evidence and facts which were never outlined before that Commission of Inquiry?

MR. BROWN: I think it is perfectly permissible. I know of no rule whatever against it. The question we are asking ourselves is, where does this finding of lack of confidence lead us? Did it lead to non-deliveries of maize, a question very material to the terms of reference, or did it not? On that there has been no finding by the Commission so that I

[Mr. Brown] cannot give you an answer. But we are told that, while lack of confidence on the part of the K.F.A. was there, and in the opinion of the Commission it was justified, "no substantial reason was put forward why individual farmers lacked confidence in the Controller" and, "as far as most witnesses were concerned, their evidence on the grounds for lack of confidence in the Maize Controller was vague". But we are told that this lack of confidence cannot have had any other than an adverse effect on the efficiency of the working of Maize Control—

MR. BOWLER: On a point of information, I would ask the speaker if confidence is a matter of chapter and verse?

MR. BROWN: I do not understand what the hon. member means. He will perhaps make himself clear. Lack of confidence means dislike—(Members: No, no!)—lack of confidence is dislike—(Members: No, no!). I would say it means dislike, lack of confidence in the running of the organization of the Maize Control—

MRS. WATKINS (Kiambu): Your Excellency—

HIS EXCELLENCY: On what point is the hon. member going to speak?

MRS. WATKINS: On a point of order.

HIS EXCELLENCY: What is it?

MRS. WATKINS: Is it a legal term?

HIS EXCELLENCY: That is not a point of order; it is a question.

MR. BROWN: Unless it led to maize not coming in, unless it led to lack of co-operation on the part of those who were bound by law and every canon of commonsense to co-operate, I do not, frankly, see what effect it had on the question in the terms of reference. Now, upon this personal issue, two questions arise, and they are questions which are absolutely separate and distinct. The first question is, what action should be taken? What reorganization, if any, should be made in the Maize Control? The second question is the reputation of this man—the reputation of this man—and with that question I have endeavoured to deal, I have felt some anxiety in dealing with it because I feel that this man needs, and in my personal conviction, deserves a very full and fair hearing by hon. members in this Council. With regard to the first question, what is to be done? The Maize

Controller himself has taken a course which makes the solution of the question easier, and I am authorizing Your Excellency to say that he has placed his resignation in Your Excellency's hands. (Members: Hear, hear!) I want to make it absolutely clear that in taking that course he has, like the members of the Maize Board, who have taken a similar course, put what they believe to be the interests of this country before their own. (Hear, hear.) It is not the time that Col. Griffiths has put the interests of this country before his own. At the beginning of the war he very naturally wished to rejoin his unit in New Zealand in which he had held a commission for over 20 years. But he was asked—and I have seen the letter—by Mr. Lockhart, in which again it was represented to him that it was his duty to stay here and organize the purchasing of supplies for the military and, if the need should arise, for the civilian population. So he stayed. He stayed in response to the telephone conversation with the hon. Chief Secretary to which I have already referred. And now he has placed his resignation in Your Excellency's hands. If, sir, it is accepted, and if we are to lose his almost unique knowledge and experience at a time when, as the hon. member said, we are faced with famine conditions in this fertile colony of ours, if we are to lose his services at that time, and if times become leaner, I hope it will be remembered that, while Government cannot escape the responsibility for allowing him to go, they are in no way responsible for the feeling in the country which has caused him to go. If I may express my own personal view: I think it is a tragedy that this man, with his unrivalled capacity in this particular line, should have been driven into a position when the only proper, patriotic and dignified course is to place his resignation in Your Excellency's hands.

HIS EXCELLENCY: I do not know whether hon. members would prefer to have the lunch interval at this stage?

MR. WRIGHT: If it would suit you, the adjournment now would be suitable to elected members, sir.

MR. PATEL (Eastern Area): Your Excellency, I desire to give notice of an amendment to the motion, and that amendment is: "That in the light of the Communication from the Chair made on

[Mr. Patel] the 8th December, and in the light of the experience so far gained, a necessary and suitable reorganization of the Maize and certain Produce Controls are urgently required". I would prefer to make my remarks and observations on the amendment if Your Excellency thinks that this amendment is in order.

HIS EXCELLENCY: I would suggest to the hon. member that he lets me have a copy of the amendment, and I shall have an opportunity of going into the point during the interval. The hon. member will then be free to speak to that amendment if I find it is in order.

Council adjourned at 12.25 p.m.

Council resumed at 2.30 p.m.

HIS EXCELLENCY: Before the adjournment the hon. member Mr. Patel rose to move an amendment which I have considered in the interval. I have explained to him that it is not strictly in order, and I understand that in the light of our conversation he does not wish to proceed with it. That being so, the debate will be resumed.

LORD FRANCIS SCOTT (Rift Valley): On a point of order, sir, the hon. member having risen to move an amendment, does that count as having spoken to the main motion?

HIS EXCELLENCY: I think that as he is not proceeding with his amendment, it would be only courteous that he should have the right to speak later on.

MAJOR CAVENDISH-BENTINCK (Nairobi North): That being the case, Your Excellency, I conclude that the debate is resumed on the original motion.

This motion deals with the report of the Food Shortage Commission, whose terms of reference were: "To inquire into the present food shortage with a view to ascertaining and reporting on the causes thereof and to make recommendations to prevent a recurrence", and its secondary terms of reference were: "To inquire into the system of control of maize which has been in operation since the 1st of July, 1942, and to report whether it has been administered efficiently and in the best interests of the country". I venture to suggest that the more important of the two aspects of these terms of reference, and incidentally of our motion, is to find out why

we have been short of food and, above all, to try and see whether we can devise ways and means of remedying the position in which we find ourselves. The question of efficiency or inefficiency of individuals, which I am going to deal with in my remarks later, I do suggest is secondary to the main issue. Therefore I was going to take a little time in dealing with one or two recommendations of the report in the order in which they appear in the report itself. We have been told that this report is of moderate value and that the recommendations are not very precise, but I would support previous speakers in that three gentlemen, well known, with considerable experience of this country, have given us their views, and I do not consider that this report is by any means worthless. It touches on a great many subjects which I think deserve further consideration than we have given them up to now.

On page 4 of the report, the Commission finds, before they deal with the specific sections of their inquiry, that there was some difficulty in exactly ascertaining how the various inter-territorial and territorial organizations that have been set up either in respect of production or distribution, or price control, inter-locked. I must say in support of what the hon. Member for Aberdare said this morning, that I do think there is considerable room still for us to clarify our own minds on that issue. There is a certain amount of overlapping, and there is still some lack of clarification as to the precise responsibility for any inter-territorial or territorial basis of individual boards and so on. That is partly because of the difficulties of trying to effect an effective inter-territorial organization, and in matters of food supplies for East Africa the fundamental organization must be inter-territorial; it cannot be territorial. So I think that members on this side of Council would suggest to Government and all concerned that this particular remark made by this Commission is well founded and deserving of further consideration. On page 7 it is recorded that the Director of Agriculture, in giving evidence, said: "I can remember during my time in this country four or five occasions on which there has been a failure of the short rains insofar as Nairobi and the Central Province were concerned. That is by no means uncommon. It has generally re-

[Major Cavendish-Bentinck] suited in a food shortage or some difficulty over food supplies in that area which it was always in my time possible to make good by importing foodstuffs from the European or other native areas. But in no year since I have known this country has there been a failure of the short rains at the end of the year in the Nyanza Province". I particularly mention this because in the course of our discussions I think we should bear in mind that there has not only been one failure of the short rains in the Nyanza Province but there have been two successive failures in that Province, and this is a factor we should not lose sight of. We then come to the first definite recommendation made by the Commission. That is contained on the same page, page 7, "that when more normal times return the whole subject of seasonal forecasts should be investigated with a view to utilizing the best scientific methods for obtaining accurate weather forecasts and for making them available to agriculturists by the quickest possible means." Possibly hon. members on the other side will make some comment on this recommendation, but I would lay stress that if it is possible for us to improve our Meteorological Department and get these forecasts broadcast for what they are worth, it would be of very great value to farmers throughout the country, even if it were to cost a little money. I hope therefore that that recommendation will be accepted by Government and will be borne in mind.

The next chapter of this report deals with a short history of maize in this Colony, and it begins by stating that from a very early stage in the history maize had been regarded as the most staple food of the native population. It goes on to say that "by 1908 there was a talk of 'increased demand'". Well, I was not here in those days, but I question whether historically that is an accurate statement. I believe that by the beginning of this century there was little, if any, maize grown anywhere in the country except small patches on the coast, even if there. I believe that maize was not grown in this country until some time after the beginning of this century, and I am informed by my hon. friend the Member for Ukamba that he was present when the first experiments were made in growing maize, but the experimenter

knew nothing about cross fertilizations, and planted two or three rows of different types on land now occupied by Mathari Mental Hospital. (Laughter.) He will no doubt enlarge on this, but I do believe it is a fact that maize did not exist in this country before we ourselves introduced it. This chapter then goes on to deal with various statistics, and one of the most interesting, to my mind, is that recorded on page 8, which gives the area harvested of European maize and the average yield per acre, and it shows that our yields per acre—and I know there are lots of reasons to account for it—have not, as commonly supposed, violently decreased as has been suggested. Our average yield last year in European areas was 7.6 bags, and looking through those statistics you will find that for 12 years out of the 18 for which there are records, the average yield was below the figure of last year. I only mention that because it shows that it is really a question of acreage and not purely a question of yield per acre, although no one is more anxious than I am to increase the yields per acre in this country. We had a maximum year, 1929-30, when there were 233,000 acres under European maize, and this year I think we have about 112,000 acres under maize. Our European acreage went down during the war, for reasons which will be given probably by other speakers on this side, to as low as 63,000 acres. On page 11 reference is made in paragraph 27 to a visit which was paid to England by a mission which, it says here, consisted of the then Financial Secretary, one European elected member, and the present Maize Controller, and it states that while they were there they "endeavoured to dispose of maize, bacon and butter surplus to local needs." As a matter of fact, that was one of our first efforts, to try and ascertain from the home Government what they wanted us to do in this part of the world to help the war effort in regard to production. It was before Italy came into the war. I was the elected member referred to there. The Financial Secretary in point of fact did not accompany us, but he came home on leave before we left and helped while we were there, but he was not part of the mission, which was inter-territorial in character as there was a Uganda representative. We did not only deal with butter, bacon and maize, but with no less than 40 com-

[Major Cavendish-Bentinck] modities. I have our report here. We tried to find out which of those 40 commodities was wanted and so on, and we dealt with various details in regard to shipping and so on. We also dealt with a number of other subjects such as imports of essential articles, coal for the Railway, and numerous other things. We did, I think, a certain amount of good in that way, and we did begin negotiations which have since been pursued in respect of the disposal of a number of our crops. Flax in particular: I think we can say that we did a good job of work. It is also true to say that as far as one or two commodities were concerned, although we were of the opinion that sooner or later they would be wanted, we were told at that time that it appeared unlikely, owing to our geographical position—may I repeat that at that time Japan was not in the war, Italy was not in the war, and there was no strong reason to suppose they were immediately coming in. After that I went to India, again on a similar sort of mission, and also to Cairo, and by the time I had left England and had gone on to India and Cairo there was no doubt to my mind that the authorities in general had come to quite a different conclusion about this particular part of the world. I just mention that because it gives a sort of background of the then position.

On pages 13, 14, and 15 of this report an account is given of a conference held in this hall on the 4th June, 1941, of a number of associations such as the K.F.A., Coffee Board, Sisal Board, Pyrethrum Board, Kenya Tea Growers, and so on, some of whom were maize producers and some maize consumers. A great deal has been said here about the warnings that were given at that time by the representatives of the K.F.A. I presume the Commission give these at some length in their report because it formed part of the evidence given, quite properly, by the directors of the Association, but at the end they say that these "warnings were meant to be general by the Chairman and one director of the K.F.A.; both of whom admitted in evidence that such warnings were not made with regard to the immediate future but were only general warnings". Well, that is true to some extent, but I would like to draw attention to a verbatim extract of what I myself said at that time as

Chairman opening that Conference. In the light of what I said, and it was no doubt founded upon what I had been informed by such people as the K.F.A. and others, it is obvious that we were at that time not entirely oblivious to the difficulties that might present themselves: "As he understood the position"—(that is, myself)—"the European grower, whose quota contribution towards internal requirements was still needed, was saying that under existing circumstances he was going out of maize. He therefore felt that he should warn the country of the position, and of the fact that although given good climatic conditions, crops surpluses of cheap native maize might become available for a short space of time, sooner or later, owing to instability and other factors, the country would find itself short of maize and the consumer would then have to pay import parity which might prove a very high figure."

I go on to say what people thought themselves: "The Chairman added that he would never have called a Conference to discuss so intricate and contentious a subject during wartime, and when many maize consuming interests were very hard hit, had he not been convinced"—(and here I gave my personal view)—"that there was every likelihood of serious complications arising in connexion with maize supplies. The probability of a large native crop this year, and the fact that maize was already being bought at ridiculously low prices in no way shook his conviction. On the contrary the reaction on next year, when the shipping position might well be even more difficult, might be very serious and in 1942-1943 if no steps were taken, the country might quite conceivably be faced with an actual maize deficiency." That was said in 1941. I do not pretend to have been a prophet. I only say that I think that the warnings given were not quite as vague as the report makes out. I will admit that in 1941 and in 1942 we had no proof that there was a shortage of maize, and I am coming to the reasons which I think misled us at that time as I go through further recommendations in this report. On pages 18 and 19 a certain amount is said about statistics, and certain suggestions are made in regard to statistics collected by the board over which I have the honour to preside. The same subject is dealt with

[Major Cavendish-Bentick] further on, on page 54 of the report, and rather than repeat myself I will take both references to the subject of statistics at the same time. There is a further recommendation on page 54 that urgent consideration should be given as to how statistics are to be obtained and pooled to the best advantage. If this report does nothing else but force us into getting accurate statistics in the future, I suggest that it will have served an extremely useful purpose. One of the troubles we were faced with was that from the moment war was declared we had practically no statistics at all except such as were collected, and had been over a number of years, by the Agricultural Department in their yearly agricultural census. These went so far, but nothing like far enough, and when it came to questions such as what was the total amount of maize, how much was bought from squatters, how much was bought by farmers from neighbouring reserves, how much maize was consumed through the normal channels of trade, and elementary questions of that kind, nobody knew even the approximate answer. That has been one of our difficulties from the time the war started.

Taking first of all the recommendation on page 19 that under the provisions of that Ordinance, that is the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, the rendering and collection of statistics and the enforcement of the filling up of requisite questionnaires should be rigidly enforced by law, I would say that I believe everything possible is being done in that direction. I do not claim that our arrangements were perfect last year, but human beings are human beings, and you have got to treat farmers with a certain amount of reasonable tact in the first year in which you have to force them into doing all sorts of things which to them are very strange and unacceptable, more especially at a time when many of them are short handed and they have a great many forms to fill up. But we did our best last year, both in reasonable enforcement and in education, and this year we are being very strict indeed and it seems to be working, because so far our returns have practically all come in on the appointed date. They do not go quite far enough; I want to go further, and we have got to go further, when we are faced with the position with which

we are faced to-day. The position now is that by November we know the farmer's amended programme. In many cases, for some reason or another, weather, sickness, deaths, etc., there are a certain number of variations between the farmer's original proposals and those he has actually implemented, but by November we have the actual acreages. During the course of November, December and January we get, based on these actual acreages, an estimate by Sub-committees of the crops in those Sub-committee areas. That is done with the assistance of members of Sub-committees and the agricultural officers. We actually have those statistics printed. The next step is to get the harvesting returns of actuals which we check. Now I want to bring in yet a further improvement, which is, having got the actuals, having got what proportion the Sub-committee allows a man to keep, I want to place the K.F.A. in possession of those facts so that they know exactly where to look for the produce. At the moment all they get is what the farmer says he wishes to dispose of, but this is now all being tied up. Therefore I think I can satisfy members of this Council that everything possible is being done in connexion with this first recommendation on the subject of statistics.

Taking the second recommendation on the subject of statistics, page 54, I am not so happy. As a result of this recommendation, we had a meeting a few days ago with Group Captain Walter, and went into the question of how we could improve our statistics and more especially how we could make full use of hollerith machines in order to take out information quickly as and when required. The difficulty there is—and this was mentioned I may say by the hon. Member for Aberdare this morning—that we found that there was overlapping and that statistics were kept in a multitude of different places. For instance I kept a lot here. I do not believe I overlap very much with the Director of Agriculture in regard to European statistics, but I do overlap very much with the Pig Controller and the Meat Controller and various other bodies which also deal with European production. The Coffee Board get their statistics and, the Pyrethrum Board up to now have got theirs. We are taking those over. I do therefore suggest that there

[Major Cavendish-Bentick] is a great deal in this recommendation, and if we are to achieve a set of records that are going to be of use to us in the future we should, here and now, make the most of the opportunity we now have of getting figures we have never had the opportunity of getting before, owing to war circumstances. We should see that these are compiled in a proper and scientific way so that they can be used to the best advantage in the development of this country afterwards.

The next note I have is to deal with page 20 on which a recommendation appears from the Commission that "the East African and the Kenya organizations should be constituted from the Colony point of view to ensure that the responsibility for the production of food-stuffs, and the satisfying of consumers' requirements, and also the responsibility for obtaining statistics, should be undividedly fixed." I am not quite sure what is meant by that recommendation, and I hope that, if Government is going to inform us what action they are going to take in regard to these recommendations, we shall be told what reading Government has put into this particular recommendation, because if it means that all three territories are to endeavour to satisfy their internal needs first and then swap the surpluses, I can tell you here and now that it will not work, but I do not believe for one moment that that is meant. I think really what these gentlemen intended was a reiteration of what they said in the preamble to their report, a comment on which I have already spoken, which is that they did not quite know where the inter-territorial and territorial organizations began and ended. Their next recommendation is concerned with the rationing of food-stuffs and registering of natives in Mombasa. I will leave that to be dealt with by members who know more about Mombasa than I do, but I would draw Government's attention to the labour statistics that have been compiled as a result of the December 15th labour census recently taken. I think you will find that there are at least double the number of casual labourers in Mombasa to-day than would be required for normally dealing with the work which is there, and the explanation given, I understand, is that to ensure the quick turnaround of ships they must have ample

casual labour available. My answer to that is that perhaps this labour should not all be so casual, and that employers should engage it more permanently even if they do have to keep it unemployed for three or four days when there does not happen to be a ship in. I am purposely tralling my coat in the hopes of getting an answer from some gentleman better acquainted with these matters than I am, but I do believe that it should be possible to evolve some definite system of control of the numbers of people in that particular urban area.

Now we come to the causes of the food shortage. It says here that there are quite a number of possible causes, and it tabulates a series of them on page 22 and goes through them one by one. I shall not do that, but I must comment to some extent on the comments on page 23, in which they state that, when the Increased Production of Crops Regulations came in and when the first issue of the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance was introduced, the guaranteed minimum returns and the breaking and clearing grants per acre varied considerably in respect of the various crops, and of course wheat was the one which came off best. It is easy to be wise after the event, and I admit that we might have been wiser had we not had the differentiation at that time to the extent we did, but this Increased Production of Crops idea was pretty revolutionary at that time and we rather had to feel our way to see how far we could go towards getting our ideas accepted. Furthermore in our ignorance—I say our because my Board was in on this, we discussed it at great length, practical farmers sitting round a table—we even went so far as to see whether we could not arrive at a method of assessing the individual costs in individual areas for individual crops. Of course, we were trying to be too precise and we could not do it, and what we did was the best first shot we could make under the circumstances which then existed. The Commission talk about causes, and they mention on page 24: "Whether in the past when the Statistician to the Governors' Conference"—this is again quoting the Director of Agriculture—"functioned he had any figures I do not know, but there were no figures available so far as I am aware as to what the normal consumption of maize for in-

(Major Cavendish-Bentick) stance was." That leads me to express the opinion that one of the main causes of increased consumption has never been touched upon—at least I do not think it has—in this report. Of course, we had no figures as to what the internal maize consumption was for reasons I have already indicated. Maize was grown all over the country, it was bought in all sorts of ways all over the country, it was kept by various people and never came on the market; nobody knew what they were using, and the maize was being moved all over the country by devious methods over which nobody had any control. Without some form of rationing or control of distribution in a country like this it would be impossible to have any accurate figures of what consumption was. There is one thing we do know, and that is that the proportion of maize which comes out of the native reserves as surplus is only a small fraction of what is grown by the natives for their own consumption either in the way of food or drink. Up to now the native has not been well off, and he has not been overpaid. I think we all must admit, although it may not be a very palatable thing to admit, that he has in consequence had a tendency to sell anything he had over his barest margin in order to get cash to buy various things. A completely new position has now arisen. The native has got more money than ever before in history and he has got less opportunity of buying things, because there has not been an overwhelming supply of certain types of things the native likes, and I believe the native has in consequence taken to eating a good deal more, which is perhaps a good thing, and when, taking East Africa as a whole, you take a small increase in what everybody eats spread over 22 million people, you soon make a big difference to any surplus, quite apart from weather conditions. That is where I believe we slipped up more than anything else. We slipped up because we did not make due allowance for weather conditions; we slipped up because we had no sort of storage or reserves to fall back on, and we slipped up because it had never occurred to us that there was more being consumed internally than had been consumed in the past.

On page 25 there is a suggestion about the amount of maize that is consumed by stock. That is again a difficult figure to arrive at until we have some figures, and I think we are now beginning to have some because, according to the law, cereals can only be fed to stock under certain laid down conditions and at certain rates. In my opinion, the amount kept back by Europeans last year for feeding stock and for feeding labour—and in stock I include pigs and everything else—was about 275,000 bags which, if you work it out, is not really a very high proportion. They delivered actually to the K.F.A. between 360,000 and 370,000 bags, approximate figures. This year, I have had within the last few days, to alter our regulations on this subject, because it is humanly impossible to forbid a farmer to use maize he has grown himself for his own stock, which he was encouraged to do originally, if we cannot give him any substitute. If I can give him a substitute in the way of concentrates such as cake, one can in a food shortage use fairly strong measures to compel him to give up what maize he has grown, but owing to the unfortunate state of affairs in Uganda I find myself unable to supply the concentrates we had in view, and for that reason, subject to the production sub-committees granting permission, we shall allow people to keep a limited amount for feeding stock. I am explaining this because people may just as well know what the position is. The Army want our bacon, there is a shortage of milk in many districts at the moment, and our butter fat is wanted, and we should also remember that we have been told that the minute the war begins to look like being over or the military advance into Europe takes shape, the most urgent requirements to prevent people dying will be animal fats of one kind or another. Now to jump quite a long way, to paragraph 67 on page 28. This is a chapter which deals with the reasons for the maize shortage, and particularly says that certain merchants and large traders under the present system of Control did not deliver all their maize to the Controller. I fervently believe that has been the case, and I do hope that in any re-organization that may result out of this debate or out of the visits recently paid by the Deputy Director of Agriculture (Mr. Killick) and others to the reserves,

[Major Cavendish-Bentick] steps will be taken to close the gaps that some of us have said for years were still wide open, and I will leave it at that. In para. 69 the Commission went into the question whether or not the food shortage was increased by our having a lack of agricultural machinery and spare parts. That again is one of the responsibilities which my Board has assumed, and I speak of the ordering and indenting on America and England for machinery and spare parts. I can say this, that to some extent against the advice of the importers and against the advice at that time of a great many people, we took the bull by the horns and took hold of all outstanding commercial indents and went through them, added to some, pared some down, and put them in the form of a Government pool order on America long before anybody else did, and owing to that we have on the whole been quite fortunate in our machinery position. We are comparatively quite fortunate, because there is a world shortage of iron, steel, and agricultural and other machinery. As regards spare parts, we have not been quite so successful; it is not from lack of trying, but I am glad to be able to say that spare parts on order for nearly two years arrived in Mombasa about five days ago, and were coming up three days after being unloaded in Mombasa, so that we are still better off for spare parts. The position is not easy, in my opinion, judging from the long report we have received from Washington, because the United States themselves are now getting pretty short of machinery, and all stocks that were there have now been absorbed. Still, I hope we shall continue to have a reasonable share, and I do not think there is anything we can do which will help that position more than we are doing at present, and that seems to be more or less the conclusion come to by this Commission.

Turning now to pages 43 and 44, again a long way on, this morning the hon. Member for Uasin Gishu asked to be informed as to what Government's policy was in regard to storage, and on pages 44 and 45 there are various recommendations more or less connected with storage of reserve stocks. Precisely what Government's policy is, of course, I cannot answer, but I can explain what

the position is at the moment, which I think may possibly be elaborated later by a speaker on the Government side of Council. I do not think that the storage position has been very satisfactorily handled in the past, for the same old. We have had too many people dealing with storage problems. I refer to cold storage, of course, as well as to cereal storage, and recently, as difficulties have arisen, it has been decided that there should be a small sub-committee of the Inter-territorial Production and Supply Council which should bring to a common focus all the various problems arising out of storage and the various plans made by individual bodies, and I have been made Chairman of that sub-committee. The position at the moment is, as regards cereal storage, that we have in Nairobi—we do not necessarily put storage up, it is to be done by an appropriate body—a Government store which will hold 22,000 bags, at Ol Kalou one of 10,000, in Nyanza a series of stores holding about 100,000 bags; in addition, in Nairobi a permanent store is going up to which will be attached a conditioning plant, for 29,000 bags plus stacking capacity for an increased quantity. Under consideration is another store in Nakuru, which I hope will be operated by the K.F.A., capable of holding 22,000 bags; there will be one at Molo, another at Eldoret (both to be operated by the K.F.A.), and I think that these will considerably ease the position. In addition, we have the Nakuru aerodrome hangars which have been adapted to storage for reserve supplies belonging to the East African War Supplies Board. We have also a certain number of umbrella sheds going up at railway stations for which Government have voted the necessary funds. Before leaving cereal storage I would say, as it was mentioned this morning, that inquiries are being made in regard to a long range type of store. I am referring to silo storage. I do not at all agree with the recommendation made in this report to the effect—they are only talking about maize—that it is much better to spend a certain amount of money in erecting weather- and vermin-proof stores at high altitudes for storage of a reserve stock of maize rather than to embark upon an expensive scheme of grain silos which, for the purposes of preventing a further food shortage, will

[Major Cavendish-Bentinck] be unnecessary if inexpensive stores at high altitudes prove successful". My view is that naturally, after the war, our cereal production will decrease, and we all hope it will, because we are overdoing this ploughing up of land which we have to do at the moment, but we must make ourselves self-sufficient, and if you make yourself self-sufficient year after year and avoid getting into difficulties in bad years, you must provide for a surplus in good years in order to have reserves to carry you for certain months of the year and to make sure you are not caught. For years farmers have suffered because when they did have a surplus they had to sell immediately at export parity, and were at the mercy of merchants because they could not keep cereals for a sufficient length of time to await an opportunity of making some satisfactory arrangement. I do not believe that any country can go ahead unless it has modern equipment, and I do not believe that any country can compete with those countries that have modern equipment if it has nothing better in the way of storage facilities than a temporary shed at the top of Mau Summit or Anabkol. Furthermore, subject to correction by the hon. Director of Agriculture, it is by no means certain that a store erected at a high altitude will keep cereals in adequate condition even for short periods, as such stores will become infested sooner or later, and badly, and it is by no means easy to restore them to a satisfactory condition. I do not believe that for some years to come, especially so immediately after the war, it will be possible for the producer to bear the cost of erection plus the cost of operation, of even a small scale silo. I therefore personally think that it is the duty of Government to see that within reason modern equipment is provided, which could be operated at the cost of the producer, because he would be relieved of storage on farms, but it is not possible to expect the producer, possibly at a time when prices are going down, to accept the liability of capital expenditure plus cost of operation. The position is that we cannot make plans for silo storage until we know more about it. One gentleman has submitted a report, and is pursuing inquiries in England, and another is here now, and when we have full information we shall make

certain recommendations which then can go to all concerned for their approval or disapproval. As far as the Government's policy is concerned, I would say the Government has given us full leave to go ahead with these inquiries in order that they may be in possession of all the facts. They have by no means turned our proposal down.

The next thing I want to deal with which was mentioned this morning, is the suggestion that a certain number of European bags of maize per annum—page 46—should be purchased through the agency of the K.F.A. under a contract. In other words, a contract would be made ahead and consideration should be given to the form it should take and so on. I am not going into that now, I do not myself think that under existing circumstances that plan is practicable. On the other hand, I think there is a great deal to be said for some of the suggestions contained in Appendix L, which is another plan for working Maize Control, and the new suggestion—which may not meet with everybody's approval—whereby we should guarantee certain prices and pay largely increased prices for increased quantities, has a great deal to be said for it. That plan is going some way to meet the suggestion on page 46, and I have no doubt these proposals will be discussed in greater detail subsequently. On page 52 a certain tribute is paid to local production sub-committees. I should be lacking either in decency or gratitude, if I were not to take this opportunity publicly in this Council of paying the greatest compliment I possibly can to the work that has been done voluntarily by these local production sub-committees all over the country. (Applause.) I would say that, from my experience, I do not believe any Financial Secretary has ever had a greater regard for the public interests in matters concerning public moneys than have the members of these local production sub-committees: they are stricter than any Government official I have ever known! On page 53 the Commission makes the comment "that in the present policy of fixing guaranteed prices for agricultural products, such prices should be so correlated that the return from any particular product, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, should not be greatly in excess of the returns obtain-

[Major Cavendish-Bentinck] able from other agricultural products." Well, I suppose they are referring to foodstuffs, because it is not quite possible to correlate everything, and I suppose they are saying—and possibly with some justification—that wheat has always had a better show than maize. I admit that is so. We were told in England, we were told in Cairo, we were told in India, wherever I have been up till recently great stress has been laid on wheat. Therefore we stressed it, with the result that we have increased our production, I think to a very remarkable extent. I have figures here, but figures are very boring things, but we have increased deliveries from something like 250,000 bags to what this year may be over 600,000 bags. Coming to page 62—I am taking up a tremendous lot of time, but this report is worth going through without hurrying—I want to draw attention to a very small paragraph which is not printed in black letters: "From the evidence we have no doubt that the natives in the reserves did profiteer at the expense of their unfortunate fellow natives, and this was emphasized by the Acting Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza". I cannot believe it is true to say that we have so lost our grip on native administration that we must allow natives in one reserve not to deliver their maize where it is wanted but to sell it at a price equivalent to Sh. 60, Sh. 70, or Sh. 80 a bag to their starving fellows in neighbouring reserves. That has been going on, and when we pointed it out we were told, "How can anybody stop it?" If that is the case, and I do not believe it is the case, then I think we have come to a sorry pass, and it really means the only people we can control are the non-natives in this country.

Turning to page 67, "The system of Maize Control", it mentions in paragraph 163 "We had no clear and concise evidence as to the exact reason for the introduction of Control". Well, I have no doubt that somebody else will allude to this, but I will give what I think reasons which as far as I recollect, were briefly these. Firstly, it was impossible to have any sort of price fixation which we wanted to introduce without some form of control. Secondly, we wanted to get the maximum possible quantity into the

physical control of the authorities for internal consumption, for the needs of the military, and for export, for instance, to Northern Rhodesia which at that time we let down very badly indeed. In my opinion, some possibility of shortage was envisaged at the time control was introduced. Generally speaking, on the operation of the Maize Control I would like to say that I think that there has been a great deal too much centralization, and possibly a great deal too much interference, whether necessary or not—I think possibly unnecessarily—with the ordinary commercial activities of traders in the reserves. We have it on evidence from people who have been in close touch with the reserves to which I refer that their hands are tied from Nairobi. You cannot run so comprehensive a scheme as that entailed by Maize Control throughout this country if you are over centralized. I am sure that that has been one of our biggest mistakes, and it is for that reason that members on this side of Council, in view of this report, suggest there should be a very considerable overhaul of the existing system. I am told that as a result of the Deputy Director of Agriculture going round the country certain recommendations have been made which are likely to go a long way on the road towards which a number of people have advocated we should go. I do not know whether we shall hear exactly what these are, or perhaps these recommendations have not yet been prepared in sufficient detail, but I do know what his ideas are: a stricter control over movement and a greater use of existing commercial channels, and probably the abolition of Maize Control buyers except possibly at rail head. If these are his recommendations, I suggest they go in the right direction, and especially would I stress control of movement, because we do know in the past that maize has been brought in to native markets which has never found its way to rail head. There were too many side tracks out before it got there.

Lastly, I come to a matter that was discussed this morning, which is the position of the Maize Controller. It is discussed in this report at some length, and begins in chapter XV with the suggestion that "evidence on the grounds for lack of confidence in the Maize Controller was vague" and that there were no solid grounds for lack of confidence,

[Major Cavendish-Bentinck]. so the Commission disregarded such evidence as to lack of confidence. I mention that because I am coming back to it. I was quoted this morning as saying that "there had been a great deal of discussion throughout the country and people can be fairly easily worked up," but that quotation was only the second sentence of what appears as my statement, the first portion of which stated that "the resolution of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board was based on lack of confidence which was expressed with considerable unanimity at the meeting." Both portions are statements of fact. There was lack of confidence unanimously expressed, or practically, at that meeting, and the subject was and still is discussed all over the country. I admit that people do get worked up when such subjects are discussed, but the fact remains it was and is discussed all over the country. The report then goes on to say: "In fairness to the Maize Controller we would point out here that during his tenure of office as General Manager of the K.F.A., a position he occupied for a number of years, he energetically devoted much of his time and efforts to furthering the interests of European maize farmers who were members of that Association. In doing so he was inevitably brought into opposition to maize consuming interests who viewed his activities as Maize Controller with a certain amount of suspicion". I think it is true that he was suspected and perhaps not *persona grata* with those interests, and owing to his severing his connexion with the K.F.A. he equally became *persona non grata* with them. It then goes on to say that in so far as the K.F.A. was concerned they, the Commission, could see no reason why he should not have put up certain proposals in Cairo. Your Excellency, we here are the ultimate judges where very serious allegations are made against an individual, and for that reason, whilst accepting that anything that appears in this report must have been very carefully thought out before it was put in, I did warmly welcome the fact that Government saw fit to put a man up to give us the other side of the case. After all, we are judging a man who has been many years in this country and in the past has served this country extremely well. I do not think we should

forget that, or too lightly throw him over with the very definite black mark against him which appears in paragraph 205. My reason for saying that is partly because I heard what was said this morning in his defence, and partly because I myself was to some extent implicated in the early stages with the steps he took which have led to these very uncomplimentary remarks which appear in this report. I was not closely in touch with the internal affairs of the K.F.A. I did not know that Col. Griffiths had left them, although I knew that there was such a possibility. I happened to be in Nakuru one day about February 14th or 15th, and Col. Griffiths came to me and informed me that he had left the K.F.A. and that he was proceeding by air that day, or the next, or the day after, to Cairo in order to accept a job which had been offered to him up north. I am afraid I did not exactly cross-examine him as to the job, but I concluded it was either something to do with the activities of a certain firm which has already been mentioned this morning in Syria, or Palestine or that part of the world, or that it was something to do with the U.K.C.C., as I knew he knew one of the leading members of that body in Cairo very well, or something to do with the New Zealand Forces. Whatever it was, it was a job which was likely to give him a fairly considerable salary. At that time we had had great difficulties in connexion with feeding the troops and supplying the needs of this country, and it occurred to me that Col. Griffiths had perhaps greater knowledge and experience of these matters than anyone else I knew of in this country, and it occurred to me that it would be improper to allow Col. Griffiths to leave the country if we could possibly avoid it, so I rang up Mr. Gurney on the telephone and said I did not think Col. Griffiths should be allowed to leave the country, that we wanted him here too badly in one capacity or another. Having done that, I went off and saw a colleague of mine who is sitting in this Council, and asked him for his advice and told him what I had done. He said "I think you are perfectly right; I should have done exactly the same thing in your place." Subsequently I believe you, sir, asked other members on this side of Council whether Col. Griffiths would be a suitable person to put in this particular

[Major Cavendish-Bentinck] job, and I believe the answers given to you were to the effect that, although there might be difficulties with him, they agreed he was the most able man they knew of for this particular job.

LORD FRANCIS SCOTT: All members on this side of Council?

MAJOR CAVENDISH-BENTINCK: I said certain of them! That, sir, was the position. As far as I know he went up there in order to discuss his prospects of employment outside this country, and only at the last moment was he told that as a matter of duty he should stay here, and I honestly believe that he accepted the view that it was his duty to stay in the country he knew and therefore he was prepared to do so. What happened subsequently to that I do not know, but I do think it was only fair that I should say that that is what happened and that those were the facts as they came to my knowledge. Another point has been mentioned in connexion with his subsequent actions after he had been appointed Maize Controller, notably in connexion with the engagement of staff from the K.F.A. In that respect it was stated this morning that some letter was sent to me in which it was suggested that if this matter had only been left to Col. Griffiths and to the then Secretary, Acting General Manager, of the Association, and no interference had taken place on the part of the Chairman, all would have been well. I have tried during the luncheon interval to find that letter, but this goes back a long way, I have an enormous number of files and have not been able to lay my hands on it. I am pretty sure, in fact almost absolutely sure, that at that time I had warned Col. Griffiths that in my opinion it was very unwise and very unfair that he should take staff away from the K.F.A. without the full knowledge of everybody concerned, and that this quotation was from his letter in reply. I suggest that although it may not have been criminal—I do not think it was—it was egregious folly on his part to take away staff from where they were employed without the agreement of their employers. (Hear, hear.)

I feel, and I will again repeat, that if a man cannot get a fair deal here, there is nowhere he can get a fair deal, and that, unless we are absolutely convinced that he has committed some crime or

done something thoroughly improper we should not insist, having heard the explanation given this morning, on keeping in our motion the special reference to paragraph 205, but that does not mean that in my personal opinion I advocate that Col. Griffiths should be kept on as Maize Controller. What I am saying now I have told him to his face, so I am not in the least going behind his back. I consider that if a man, as is evidently proved in this report, is incapable of inspiring confidence almost anywhere over a long period of time, then, sir, that alone justifies Government in making a change. I personally think, and I agree with all my colleagues on this side of Council, that Government should make a change and should tell us that they are going to make a change before this debate ends. In order not to leave a man with his record with a black mark, and a black mark underlined by this Council, which may be undeserved—and many of us feel perhaps is undeserved—I would suggest if I might the following amendment to the motion. That all the words after "the 8th December" be deleted and that the following be substituted therefor: "and of the recommendations made in the Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report and of experience since gained, a thorough reorganization of the Maize and certain Produce Controls, with such consequential changes in personnel as may be found necessary, is urgently required". In other words, if my amendment is accepted the motion will read as follows: "That in the light of the communication from the chair made on December 8th and of the recommendations made in the Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report and of experience since gained, a thorough reorganization of the Maize and certain Produce Controls, with such consequential changes in personnel as may be found necessary, is urgently required." I think that states quite plainly what we on this side want, it is not vague like the amendment that was proposed this morning, and if it is accepted—and I believe Government should be prepared to accept it—we shall at any rate feel that this report and the work connected with it has not been in vain.

HIS EXCELLENCY: If that amendment is seconded and adopted the result will

[H.E. the Governor] then be that the motion before the Council, if the hon. mover of the substantive motion and his seconder so agree, will be as follows:—

"That in the light of the communication from the chair made on December 8th and of the recommendations made in the Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report and of experience gained, a thorough reorganization of the Maize and certain Production Controls, with such consequential changes in personnel as may be found necessary, is urgently required."

MR. VINCENT (Nairobi South): Your Excellency, I have pleasure in seconding the amendment to the substantive motion. There is just one point that I want to make before I start, and that is that on page 52 the Commission, as referred to by the last speaker, stated: "We have no hesitation now in recommending that the authority and supervision of these committees and sub-committees should be maintained on a permanent basis in peacetime." I may be imaginative, but it may be misconstrued, and I hope that, by the omission of any mention of the head committee, it does not mean that that should disappear. I give that, not only as my personal opinion but as the general opinion, because the Production Board itself is not mentioned, and should be.

I will probably take a different line to other speakers because I want to continue with the theme I commenced when the original motion appointing this Commission came before Council. You very often find when setting up a commission, as you do in most things that are scientific, that rule of thumb methods, simple methods, are very often ignored and not appreciated, and it is because I feel that this Commission has entirely ignored, not entirely but it has brushed aside, one of the most serious things which is happening in this country today, that I am not going to follow previous speakers; I want to quote chapter and verse because I want it to be recorded, because I have learned in this Council that it is just as wise to have everything down in black and white, with the T's crossed and the I's dotted, and leave nothing to the imagination of your hearers or readers. But firstly, I must just ask the hon. Chief Secretary,

who I am certain with his usual courtesy will give me a reply when he rises to reply, one specific question. On page 2, paragraph 4, it states: "Government was represented before us by Mr. H. E. Stacey, Crown Counsel". I think personally it was a great pity Government found it necessary to be represented before the Commission by Crown Counsel, because the natural interpretation of that to most people, like myself, is that Government felt it necessary that they should be defended. I must say I think Government have come out extraordinarily well—I will not say they were whitewashed, but perhaps criticism of Government is dealt with in silence by members of the Commission, and if Mr. Stacey was not there to defend Government I am sure the hon. Chief Secretary will tell me why he was there. I would remind him that the Chairman of that Commission was a man of great legal experience, and surely could extract all the answers in evidence from the various witnesses without the assistance of Mr. Stacey. I must congratulate Mr. Stacey on the excellent job he made of what I "think he did". I would also take this opportunity of congratulating the Manager of the K.U.R. & H., who I now understand has the services of Mr. Stacey, or will have in the very near future. I would not like it thought, however, that I was unaware of the fact that the Railway even to-day is very well able to look after itself! Despite Mr. Stacey's presence, except when he was ill for a few days, as a guide to the Commission, I find, as has already been referred to by the hon. Member for Nairobi North, that the Commission makes an astounding confession. I can only call it that. This is what it says: "As will be seen later in this report, we are still not clear as to the exact lay-out and functions of the various bodies on an inter-territorial and territorial basis in spite of the amount of evidence devoted to this matter and the number of questions asked by us in an endeavour to get a clear picture". I do not know whether to attribute that to Mr. Stacey's absence or lack of understanding of the Commission, but I consider that we must be in a sorry state if those three gentlemen, each brilliant in his own sphere, are still in the wood and cannot get out.

I disagree with the trend of opinion on certain matters in this report as found

[Mr. Vincent] by the Commissioners. You will remember, sir, that just prior to the original motion it had been found necessary to institute road blocks, and you will also recollect that I, as Director of Road Transport, requested Government to insert into those regulations a minimum penalty of £100 or 6 months imprisonment or both. At that time I was informed that 1,500 bags of maize were missing from a Kericho mill. I am sorry to bore you on a sultry afternoon, but I must repeat what led up to it and the dispute. On pages 78 and 79, para. 184, the report says: "We ascertained that the mill referred to was situated at Kericho and that the maize belonged to the K.F.A. We made detailed inquiries into this allegation, both from the General Manager of the K.F.A. and the D.C., Kericho, from whom Mr. Vincent received, through another witness, the information on which he founded the allegation he made in Legislative Council. The D.C., Kericho, gave evidence that he had mentioned that there was a shortage of maize related to that particular mill, but that he had no recollection of having mentioned the exact number of bags of maize which were alleged to have been short. He further stated that he never was under the impression that the maize which was short was maize which should have come into the hands of Control. The General Manager of the K.F.A. in his evidence informed us that the shortage amounted to 1,061 bags, but it had nothing to do with the Maize Control as it was spread over transactions in maize between the K.F.A. and this particular mill for the period 1939-1942. That mill gristed maize for the K.F.A. and in the gristing of maize allowance is always made for a shortage unless a higher gristing charge is paid. In these transactions, the K.F.A. paid the higher gristing charge and therefore any shortage had to be met by a payment from the mill to the K.F.A. We were supplied with a statement showing that the shortage of gristing over the period 1939-1942 was 731 bags and that the remaining 330 bags had been used by the millowners to supply their own employees with food for the same period, making a total shortage of 1,061 bags of maize, and the mill had paid the K.F.A. for that shortage. Hence we find that this was maize which in any event was no

concern of the Maize Control. The shortage of 1,061 bags was due partly to the customary shortage in gristing on transactions covering a period of over three years, and the balance of 330 bags was due to the millowners using the maize to supply their own employees over the same period."

I was very interested as a reader of the local newspaper in the reports which were published of the evidence, and I wrote a letter—of which I have a certified copy here—to the Commission when all the evidence had been published so that they could see my point of view, based on the sequence of the evidence which had been given them. On the 9th September, 1943, I sent this letter to the Chairman of the Commission, headed "Missing Kericho Maize", in which I said: "Now that the evidence is apparently complete on this matter, and in view of its conflicting nature as published, I wish to submit the following:—

Vide E.A. Standard 11-6-43.

Mr. Bennitt, General Manager of the K.F.A. stated "When things were 'tightened up' we found that the mill owed us about 1,063 bags . . . the partners blamed each other. The one said the other had been careless in looking after the stocks . . . They gave as an excuse that at one time they had been asked to stock more maize than they had been in the habit of doing, and that some thieving had taken place or that rats had gone away with a grain or two.

Vide E.A. Standard 22-6-43.

Three members of the African Civil Servants in giving evidence at Kisumu said 'owing to the black marketing in the township of Kisumu, they had to pay as much as Sh. 30 and Sh. 35 a bag for maize meal'.

Vide E.A. Standard 29-6-43.

Mr. B. B. Patel, partner in a potho mill at Kericho admitted a shortage of 330 bags over a period of four years, which had been used as food for his mill boys. All the grain belonged to the K.F.A.

There had been a hot discussion with his partner about paying cash equivalent for this maize used as food. The witness also referred to a further shortage which he said amounted to 1,061 bags for which, eventually, the mill paid. There had been no thefts from the mill.

[Mr. Vincent]

Vide E.A. Standard 30-6-43.

Capt. F. D. Hislop, formerly District Commissioner, Kericho, stated that the form of the Legislative Council statement was unfamiliar to him, nor had he any recollection that he had ever put it in that form. He did not think importance could be attached to the figure given by Mr. Vincent, save that it emphasized the point that there had been a shortage of maize.

Some time in October last, one, Amir Khan, a partner of the last witness (B. B. Patel)—whose trade name was Lalaji Nanabhai informed him (Capt. Hislop) that he had discovered a serious state of affairs at the mill where they gristed for themselves and the K.F.A. There was a shortage, finally given as 1,290 bags about which Amir Khan was worried and which he had discovered on taking stock when the mill manager proposed to go to India.

A District Commissioner, added witness, frequently had allegations made to him regarding business disputes between Indians and 'one begins to be cautious over a space of years.' He, therefore, advised Amir Khan to take a civil action or, if he was convinced the maize had been stolen, to inform the Police and ask for an investigation.

Some time later he (Capt. Hislop) had been informed by the Police that the matter had been 'arranged' and took no further action. In consequence, Amir Khan, who died last April, had appeared to think that he had been defrauded by someone inside the mill and that the maize had gone in about three months from the time Control became effective, in July.

Capt. Hislop added that this maize had nothing to do with Control and 'if I may say so, Mr. Vincent got slightly off the rails.'

I submit; In making this statement, in Legislative Council based on very reliable information, that '5,000 bags went into the mill and 3,500 came out' I did so in order to draw attention to this occurrence as an example of what I believe generally went on throughout the country.

From the evidence published, a curious attitude of complacency seems to emerge,

because the amount of maize that disappeared was not 1,500 bags (as I was informed originally) but a mere 1,290 bags or 1,061! The fact that the late Amir Khan thought this maize had 'gone' during the first three months of the Control is very significant!

The whole trend of this matter and the evident general satisfaction in being able to 'cover up' or 'arrange matters' is lamentable, because, firstly, an 'admitted shortage' of even 1,061 bags in time of famine is a most serious matter. Secondly, the selling of a bag of maize in the Kisumu black market would have yielded approximately £1 per bag additional profit to the seller. Thirdly, the removal of such quantities of maize from any area, must have completely defeated 'maize control' (if it existed). Fourthly, 'Maize Control' as such did not exist—the 'Maize Controller' was, in fact, only a Maize 'Market Operator' and 'Distributor to Districts'. What happened to the maize after that, does not appear to have been anyone's business or concern.

Finally, the 'Control' was incomplete in its operation and was thus liable to become a most dangerous 'blanket' for 'black market operations' from which the country has suffered so much—Yours, etc., A. VINCENT."

Just to comment on that evidence briefly, because it is the basis of my theme, Mr. Bennett said "that when things were 'lightened up.'" I do not know whether the K.F.A. work on a 4 or 5 or 10 year plan, but I do submit that it is rather curious that they only "lightened up" once every four years. It is an amazing state of affairs, and perhaps it is not for me to question it, but I should think when the Commissioner of Income Tax has sufficient staff he might be asked how the mill owners or the K.F.A. render their true balance sheets under the circumstances. But I agree with Mr. Bennett in one thing—there were "rats" in Kericho. (Laughter.) The trouble is that he did not specify how many legs they had—my guess is two! I cannot conceive that Amir Khan—who unfortunately is now dead—unless he was pretty certain of his facts, would have gone to the trouble of taking this case to the Police. It is quite illogical to think of such a thing. I cannot under-

[Mr. Vincent]

stand it, and it quite defeats me how the Commission just accepted the evidence which apparently suited them. That is the only way I can view it, because all other evidence seems to have been ignored. Perhaps hon. members will think that Kericho maize does not matter, but behind it is a sane and real principle. Therefore, as it has been spontaneously confirmed by an hon. nominated member behind me, who thinks it a matter of no consequence, I will refer you to something closer and nearer home. In my letter to the Commission I stated that this sort of thing was going on generally throughout the country. We have a council called Nairobi District Council, which is a body of men who hold the respect of their community and do a very fine job of work. Their area embraces 42,000 souls who are employed in agriculture or other industry, and the Council presented evidence in the form of a memorandum to the Commission—which does not seem, by the way, to have had very much effect, as some of the salient points in that memo seem to have been ignored. To show you that there was some substance in what I said about the general disappearance of maize throughout the country, I will content myself with quoting from paragraph 10 of their memorandum: "On the 27th October at the request of farmers, a visit was made to Fort Hall with a view to endeavouring to obtain a larger export of maize from the Reserve. The visit resulted in a tour with the D.C. who was able to prove, without doubt, that he had exported over 10,000 bags during the month. A larger number than usual, as only just over 4,000 had passed through the Thika books from the 6th and as the Fort Hall control and D.C.'s books tallied for this period, one can only say that a very large quantity disappeared and at about this time, a number of convictions were obtained at Kitui against lorry owners and drivers for using a route for which they were not licensed."

I think 4,000 from 10,000 makes 6,000! Again, in the Commission's own report, despite the information given by Kisumu merchants in good faith that a much larger quantity of maize and maize meal was exported to Uganda and Tanganyika during May and June, 1942, than was normal during those months in

preceding years, the Commission proved that this movement did not take place by rail or dhow. Therefore we can only assume, if the Kisumu merchants were correct—and I take it they know their own business—this maize was moved by illicit means, but these disappearances according to the members of the Commission did not seem to matter at all, as witness the last part of paragraph 63 on page 27: "Accordingly we have grave doubts whether the Maize Controller is on firm ground in advancing this as a reason for the shortage and in any case such maize, if it was in the hands of consumers, would be bound to be consumed at some time or other, and on that ground could not have had any bearing on the shortage throughout the Colony." A surprising feature of this statement is the fact that the Commission did not appear to think it possible that maize could be held to be sold at black market prices to starving natives. Again, on page 28, paragraphs 67 and 68, they again attribute a complete ignorance of the black market when they state: "If, however, the trader indulges in black marketing and does not report all his maize transactions to the Control, he can buy 200 lb. of maize at Sh. 8/96, bag it at a cost of Sh. 1/20, which brings his total expenditure to Sh. 10/16 per bag, and then sell it on the black market at just below the selling price of Sh. 12/50, which would allow him a larger margin of profit than if he dealt with the maize legitimately through the Control". I ask you, how could the Commission possibly make up their minds that the black marketeer is the man who has gone to the trouble of secreting maize to sell it at just under Sh. 12/50 a bag instead of at Sh. 30 or Sh. 35 which Africans had to pay for it in Kisumu? In paragraph 68 again they state: "There is no doubt that on the figures quoted above there is an incentive for traders not to declare all their transactions in maize to the Control, but here again the maize would still be in the Colony and would be bound to be consumed sooner or later and on this account could not have had any effect in helping to create a shortage of maize". This astounding logic must surely have been born in complete ignorance of the position, and I find it extremely hard to understand. On page 73, paragraph 176, it says: "The Maize Controller stressed that there is a check on traders by the

(Mr. Vincent) Agricultural Department through their inspection centres, but in spite of this check we have grave doubts that all maize which should come into the hands of Control really does so." Again, commenting on the amount of the commission allowed, at the end of paragraph 177 they at last realize the gravity of the position, and state: "In our view this commission is insufficient in the case of many traders and is a further incentive to them to claim more profit by not delivering maize to the Control. Any such illegal sales would obviously militate against the efficient working of Maize Control." At the fourth attempt they have got it, and I say to you, sir, that the disappearance of this maize at a critical time was one of the most dastardly things that happened in this country or is ever likely to happen, and I therefore submit that no matter what your new system is, unless you take proper precautions to see that all the maize gets into the hands of the Control, the whole thing will fail. The lukewarm attitude of our courts and apparent lack of appreciation of the position, and their small and nominal sentences, only aggravate the position and make it possible for black marketing and under-handed practices to be a commercially paying proposition. Your answer to me is this: "We have no jurisdiction over the courts." I say you have in this respect, that if you make heavy minimum fines and imprisonment—and I stress imprisonment—definite in your reorganized regulations, then they will have some salutary effect. As Controller of Petroleum Products and Director of Road Transport, on my application to Executive Council you were good enough to let me have a minimum penalty, and I must say that, although Walter Harragin said to me when I mentioned to him that I had had no convictions since the regulations were published, "Old boy, I don't suppose there was any case in which you could get a conviction". I am certain that as long as Government make it possible for these nominal stupid fines to be inflicted instead of making them salutary, the whole basis of any structure you are trying to build will collapse. I happen to know that in Nairobi to-day there is a big scheme of foodstuffs racketeering by members of 5 or 6 large firms through their retailers, which causes acute dis-

tress to the Indian community, and I have been told this to-day by men I trust and know.

I claim that the maize shortage has been greatly aggravated by deliberate evasion of the control; of that there is no doubt, and I do not think anyone of us in our wildest dreams can calculate the enormous amount of maize which has gone into the black market in this country. I have given you two examples which took a lot of sifting out. I just want once again to refer to the report and that is they say on page 72, paragraph 173: "Although not expressly stated in evidence, we gathered the impression from both the Chairman of the Maize Board and the Controller that the Maize Control scheme was not designed to meet any shortage of maize. We do not understand this in view of the provisions of Regulation 5 (1) (e) of the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942", and yet I read less than five minutes ago a finding in which they said: "Hence we find that this was maize which in any event was no concern of the Maize Control." It just defeats me. If missing maize is no concern of the Maize Control, then whose concern is it? The operations of control as we know it, that is from the producer to the individual consumer, could not possibly have been carried out efficiently with the organization set up by the Controller, and I maintain that quite unconsciously these three gentlemen, the members of the Commission, admitted that my statement was correct, that the Maize Controller was not a Maize Controller; he was merely a maize market operator and, as such, he only concerned himself with maize which came under his control. He did not even realize what his duties were and what was expected of him, and I must say, and this is my criticism of the Government, that they failed to tell him in time. I therefore feel that the Government should have stepped in much earlier or the Controller should have enlisted their help, for there is no doubt about it there was a great gulf between the Maize Controller as he understood it and Maize Control as Government and the public understood it, and that is where the whole trouble lay.

I am going to quote a little bit more in order to give you a picture of the

(Mr. Vincent) chaos which existed because of this grave misunderstanding. I will again refer to the memorandum of the Nairobi District Council which was submitted to the Commission. I will not read all of it, but certain illuminating paragraphs. This was evidence given by the Nairobi District Council and yet, to my amazement, there is no mention of it in the report in connexion with the original "set-up" of Maize Control:—

"Pre-control Organization.—At the time when control was brought in this very large volume of trade was carried out most efficiently by a number of firms, which had been in the produce business for very many years, which suggests that there was little they did not know about native produce distribution in flush years as well as lean ones. Like produce dealers throughout the world these firms had had their ups and downs but, what is all-important, they had gained experience of a type which no one could hope to attain in a short period. Great experience may be a danger to the public but, with guidance, it can prove invaluable.

New Organization.—As soon as control was brought in an Asian staff was engaged, local offices rented and means of transport, of a somewhat luxurious type if we may say so, was provided for the Asians. This staff at once set about destroying commercial enterprise and to oust those who had for so long carried the local produce market through thick and thin.

Control Methods.—In actual fact an Asian clerk sat in a central office at Thika issuing permits but admitted openly that he took no pains to ascertain whether or not maize to cover his permit was available at the buying station or to trace the maize once it had been bought and converted into meal. The effect of this policy was that the control clerk issued permits for, let us say 500 bags, whereas the buyer was only able to buy 200, nevertheless, because the permits had been made out for 500 bags, this became the official record of the transaction. Again, as the buyer converted the maize into meal at the earliest opportunity, the buyer was legally free to dispose of it as he liked.

Intrusion.—At the beginning of October the situation became so critical

that a communication was sent from Thika announcing that the District Commissioner intended stepping in and instituting an intensive 'control within the control'. This brought the reply that the Controller was prepared to depute all or any of his powers, neither of which was requested, for it was found that matters had reached such a pitch that traders with one accord were willing to co-operate and submit to a voluntary control of meal, in addition to maize.

Control within the Control.—On the 6th of October, this intensive form of control was instituted within the Thika District, necessitating the submission of daily returns from the local control office, all millers and dealers, with a bar on the sale of maize or meal without the District Commissioner's permit. As may be well understood this increased work very considerably but the tracing of every bag from the producer to the consumer resulted in a better form of distribution so reduced the numerous appeals made personally at the office by farmers at their wits end.

Revised Control.—The new form of control, which required all consumers to submit their demands on blue cards was doomed to failure from the start, owing to control's refusal to allow cards to be checked by those best able to assess the demands. It is true that, when very strong representation was made, this arrangement was agreed to but too late. Of the cards so checked it was found that shoemakers, who had never sold a grain of produce, were to become budding produce merchants, genuine consumers were magnifying their demands in the hope of obtaining a percentage which would cover their actual needs and other genuine consumers making excessive demands with a view to accumulating stocks against still worse times."

So there you have the picture, utterly chaotic, because one man thought he had become a maize market operator and the country expected him to be a maize distributor and controller to the consumer. Maize disappeared like magic in the black market thus sabotaging control. No attempt was made until too late to decentralize and use the trade and enlist the services of district commissioners. Do not tell me the district commissioners were too busy; I know they were, but it was inevitable that they

[Mr. Vincent]
 should be brought into food distribution because who would any member of the community go to, either native or employer, if not to the district commissioner to ask what it was all about? I maintain that if the district commissioners had been brought into this picture from the outset, as they should have been, they would have been saved a tremendous amount of work and a great amount of distress, and I believe, from my own experience of them, that they are most co-operative and sincere and would have welcomed the opportunity. Finally I must again stress that the whole fabric of this new organization will demand that more stringent penalties should be inflicted by magistrates, and if the magistrates will not inflict sensible penalties then Government must see that they have no option by prescribing minimum penalties. What happens now when these cases are brought before a magistrate is that the magistrate can only inflict a fine of say Sh. 20 which is totally inadequate, after the special police have taken a lot of trouble and you, sir, in Executive Council, and many of your officers have gone to the trouble of drawing up regulations in order to protect the community. Penalties must be revised, the community protected, of that there is no doubt. If not, I warn you we shall fall again, and this distressing state of affairs will continue in spite of all our endeavours. We must make the punishment fit the crime.

LORD FRANCIS SCOTT (Rift Valley):
 Sir, I rise to support the amendment. I have no objection to it being introduced because I have no wish to see that paragraph stigmatising the Controller being included in any resolution passed by this Council, and I look on the matter from the broad point of view of the good of the country. I rise now, because it is an opportunity to reply to some of the remarks made by the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General. He stated that this report nowhere impugned the efficiency of the Control. The hon. Member for Nairobi South has already quoted from this report and supported it by outside evidence as to the inefficiency of the Control. I am not going to repeat anything he said, but I am going to read from the report a few paras. which do

criticise the efficiency. On page 72, it says: "It therefore appears to us that the Maize Control scheme as originally enacted took into account, and provided for, the contingency of a shortage and gave the Maize Board first the power and secondly the duty to meet such a contingency." That is just preliminary to paragraph 181, page 76, where it says "The Control started with insufficient maize for distribution to satisfy the needs of the Colony, and in spite of the provisions of Regulation 5 (1) (e) of the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, enacted on the 1st May, 1942 (already referred to in paragraph 173 of this report), which appears to us to provide for the contingency of a shortage of maize, neither the Maize Board nor the Controller appear to have ever contemplated such a contingency and therefore were not in a position to deal adequately with the situation when the maize began to be in short supply. The Maize Controller admitted in evidence that as regards traders and millers he had no statistics of their pre-Control trade and that he only knew the milling capacity of each mill". On page 77: "Hence we find that when the shortage of maize occurred neither the Maize Board nor the Maize Controller had taken any steps to be in a position to allocate and distribute maize in a systematic manner and this affected the efficiency of the working of Maize Control". That is a definite statement. On page 78, under paragraph 183, it says: "From the above we find that the decision to cancel orders for maize on the Control by traders was initiated by Mr. Wollen and not by the Maize Board". On page 80 we have an interesting account of how the Maize Controller with the agreement of the Chairman of the Maize Board but without reference to the Maize Board itself, entered into that contract for the export of a million bags, and on their own showing they had only estimated for a margin of 350,000 bags, so that it does seem to me inefficiency to lead people like the U.K.C.C. to expect they would get a million bags. Personally, I think that that was one of the most incompetent deals ever perpetrated by a responsible person in charge of a department. Finally, page 84, at the top, it states: "We consider that the Chairman and members of the Maize Board and the Maize Controller, on the figures before

[Lord Francis Scott]
 them from time to time, had several clear warnings of an impending shortage, and in view of those warnings they should have taken definite steps to secure definite figures of the consumption of maize and also to have recommended to Government prior to the 7th December, 1942, that rationing should be introduced. Their failure to do so had an adverse effect on the administration of Maize Control". I shall not bore the Council with more quotations, but I have said enough to show that this commission did definitely impugn the efficiency of the Maize Control.

The next reason, apart from lack of efficiency—because I do not think it was efficient, I think the Maize Control has not proved efficient—apart from that was what was referred to before, the lack of confidence by people in the country. Living upcountry where I do, I do not get there very often, but when I do I meet people and hear their views, and even up there they are very strong and have been for some time. Just to show this Council that I am not speaking from nothing, I will read two resolutions sent to me by associations in my constituency. One is: "In view of what has been brought to the notice of the general public by the Food Shortage Commission with regard to the control of maize, this meeting considers that the present Maize Controller is not a fit person to hold that position, and asks that he should be removed from that and any other position of control." The other one reads: "This Association, having considered the report of the Food Commission, is unanimously of the opinion that a change in the personnel of the Maize and Produce Controls is imperative in the interests of the Colony, and urgently requests the member for the constituency to support the proposal to that effect tabled for discussion at the forthcoming special session of the Legislative Council." These come from associations at the opposite ends of my constituency and do represent the general feeling. I am not prepared to say that Col. Griffiths is to blame altogether for what has happened. I am not in a position to say so. Many other people have been blamed before now for things which were not their fault, but which as head of the show they had the responsibility for, and in vac. time, when every-

thing has got to be done to help the war effort to the maximum, people at the top who are a failure have to make place for somebody else. It is happening every day in the Army, probably the men were not to blame at all but if they fail they have to go. I do feel strongly that it is essential for the good of the country and for this general question of food shortage—which in effect does boil down chiefly to shortage of maize—under present conditions there should be a complete overhaul and reconstruction of the Maize Control and of the personnel administering it. Coming to a few specific points in reference to the para. now to be left out. I should be only too pleased if I could feel that the very eloquent and moving speech by the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General on behalf of his client—(laughter)—convinced me that the Commission's report was entirely wrong, but I cannot get away from this fact. There you had three gentlemen, one of whom is a trained lawyer, who has acted here as Attorney General, well accustomed to sifting evidence, and two others very wisely selected by Government as men completely impartial and of independent minds. It is hard to get away from the fact that they, having heard all the evidence, and I think all the evidence which was produced before us to-day, had come to that conclusion. The hon. and learned member made a great point of the telephone message by the Chief Secretary, which is referred to on page 86 where it says: "It would be appreciated if he did not commit himself definitely in Cairo." That is not any fresh evidence, the Commission knew all about that, and I do not honestly see anything further being adduced here which that Commission did not know, and they were in a position which nobody here is, of having heard all the evidence. Some of us have read it all, but we did not hear it, which is a different matter. But I am glad that that para. is going to be omitted because, as far as this Council is concerned, there will not be that stigma from this Council on Col. Griffiths. Even so, that will not wipe out that para. in the report.

The question of the employees of the K.F.A.: The position, of course, was at that time that Europeans employed by the K.F.A. had to be applied for to be given exemption certificates under the

[Lord Francis Scott] exemption system which then was in force, I believe it was subsequent to that that it was made illegal by law for anybody to change their occupation, but in practice those of us who had to deal with the system did exempt people for specific work and they were not supposed to change it. In one case there was an officer in the army who had been released specifically to work for the K.F.A., and he transferred to the Maize Control. I am not going into the question of the rights and wrongs of getting these people, but what I wish to controvert is the statement of the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General that they were all free agents. Another point that he made was that lack of confidence meant dislike. That is quite untrue. You can like somebody awfully but have little confidence in their ability or judgment very often. All of us know many instances of that, and it is not a question of dislike of Col. Griffiths. Personally, I have looked upon him as a friend of mine for over 20 years, but I am quite convinced that in the interests of the country, in view of the fact that this feeling, whether justified or not, of lack of confidence in him as a Maize Controller is so widespread, it is quite essential, if a new scheme, whatever it is, is going to have a chance of success, it should start with somebody new who will carry the confidence of the country, and will not be mixed up, anyhow, with the suspicion which exists at the present moment.

MR. COULDREY (Nyanza): Your Excellency, there is not very much on this question of the amendment which I can add to what has been said by the noble lord, but I want to rub in for one moment what he said about the astonishing statement made by the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General because, in my opinion, that statement, made undoubtedly on the instruction of, and on behalf of Government, is one of the big underlying causes why there has been such lack of confidence not only in Col. Griffiths but also in the Government throughout this year. He told us that "lack of confidence meant dislike", and that has been the attitude of Government throughout. The moment anyone said he had not got supreme confidence in any operation of Col. Griffiths, he

was immediately looked upon as that gentleman's greatest enemy, and it has been because of that attitude that there has been this terrible feeling of unrest. I imagine that the hon. member said what he did on the instructions and on behalf of Government. If he has not, I am sure that somebody later on will say once again that he has made a mistake. There are one or two other minor things about the hon. member's speech to which I must refer. I personally am only too glad to have this paragraph 205 deleted. I had not intended to speak on it except to point out that three very well known, very able, men had put it in, and that was an added reason why we should not have confidence in Col. Griffiths. But when the hon. and learned member, in his defence of what I may call his client, attributed to him all the virtues of an angel, even then I did not mind very much when he went further and seemed to indicate that he had the attributes of an archangel! (laughter). I also was not very disturbed when he went further and appeared to infer that he had all the commercial qualities of a Selfridge and Woolton and a few others as well. But people must wonder why it is that, through the length and breadth of the country, there has been this great lack of confidence in Col. Griffiths. And why is it that we eleven elected members, representatives of the people, should have failed signally to realize that Col. Griffiths is really the wonderful man that the hon. member has tried to make him out to be? Of course, the hon. member is quite right to make the best of his case for his client, and I think he has done so, but there are two facts—I had not wanted to bring these up but I must do so—where I think he was wrong.

First of all, he stated that Mr. Aldridge in Cairo agreed and came to the conclusion and stated it, that they would not take any decision at all without the consent of the K.F.A. I have the authority of the director of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts to say that is not so: the caveat that the K.F.A. should agree did not come from either of those two gentlemen. I am quoting. I may say, the managing director here of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts. It came straight from a gentleman called Mr. Alexander Hamilton in London. It was he who made that stipulation and not Mr. Aldridge or Col.

[Mr. Couldrey] Griffiths. Those are the facts as I know them. If they are not true, then I regret it, but I believe the time has come to give Council some indication why we thought it necessary, in bringing forward this motion, to include this reference to paragraph 205. It is undoubtedly true that Col. Griffiths stated he was going up there to take up a position with Mitchell Cotts probably outside the country. It is perfectly true that the Chief Secretary did telephone him the night before and asked him not to come to any decision until he had seen him. There was a slight inaccuracy here: it was not made to his house, but to my office, Col. Griffiths' house was not on the telephone at the time, but that is only a slight inaccuracy. I do not know whether it was admitted in evidence that Col. Griffiths was going to take up a position worth £4,000 a year. I have no reason to doubt it, but if it was so why was not that evidence produced before the Commission? (Mr. Rennie: It was.) You are convinced it was? (Mr. Brown: I have seen it.) I withdraw that remark. Why, if the Chief Secretary thought it was urgent, he did not appear himself before the Commission and give evidence? I would point out that Government were represented by learned counsel, an able, learned counsel—in fact, he has been promoted since and given a job worth £200 a year more. Whether that is the result of his able handling of this inquiry I do not know, but those are the facts. (Laughter.) Why, then, should this Commission, presided over by an extremely able legal gentleman, why should they not, if they considered it necessary, call the Chief Secretary? or did they? and he still refused to obey? If they did not, why did not grounds of common courtesy urge him to attend? It has been no pleasure to anybody on this side of Council, I assure you, sir, to read this paragraph 205. Of course, the hon. and learned member proves conclusively that no sinister influence could be derived from this paragraph and then went on to prove that the sinister influence which was not there was wrong. But that is an ordinary legal trick and does not matter. Why was that paragraph put in? Seeing that Government was represented by a very learned counsel, since promoted, seeing that they had a law officer of the Crown presiding over the Commission,

unless there was some reason I consider it extraordinary, and I think it unfair, for the Chief Secretary to have abstained from giving evidence in favour of Col. Griffiths and then to produce this evidence in Council after the verdict has been given. I do not wish to say anything more. It is no part of my case to attack Col. Griffiths, and there is no question of attacking his honour. Like the hon. Member for Rift Valley, I did however intend to attack him on what is contained in the report itself and on what I consider proved the Control to be incompetently handled. I must labour that point for one moment. I agree that maize was a very difficult thing to control. And so if Government had, as it has done in so many other cases—as for instance it did in the Information Office—simply taken a district commissioner and said to him "You do not know anything about the job, but get on with controlling this". I do not think anybody would have raised a voice, but would have said "It is a difficult job and he has done his best". But the Government did not do that. They went into the market and got hold of what may be described as a big business man and a man whom they believed had tremendous business ability, and paid him a price which was about twice as large as any salary as any of the other controllers got; literally twice, in fact, and much more than twice that the Director of Production got, and twice as much as he gets now. Therefore, when you take a man like that, when you say "We have taken you and are going to pay you nearly the biggest price we pay anybody in this Colony, if not the biggest, in actual substantive salary" (although there are no hidden emoluments attached to it as there are to other salaries), then we have a right to expect a greater degree of efficiency than from a man suddenly pitchforked into a job of which he has had no experience before. That is why I believe it is entirely wrong to allow these proceedings to be broadcast all over the country giving the impression that everything everybody has said is entirely wrong and that they have no grounds for lack of confidence in Col. Griffiths, and that the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General when he criticised the verdict after it has been given is right. That is why I accept this amendment gladly, because I think it a thousand pities if a

[Mr. Couldrey] man who has done as much as Col. Griffiths has for the farmers of the country should be allowed to go with a slur on his integrity, if that slur be not justified—and I do not believe it is justified—I am therefore glad that it is going. But, on the other hand, I think it entirely unfair to allow the country to believe, as the hon. and learned member has tried to make out, that there has been no failure at all in Col. Griffiths' administration. My learned friend said that through the length and breadth of this report there is no criticism about his administration, but it is not so, as the hon. member has just pointed out, but there is no need to repeat it, what he said, although through the length and breadth of the report it does show there was great lack of confidence, not necessarily dislike, but lack of confidence, in the administration of the Maize Control. I have to make this point, but at the same time I am glad the amendment has been accepted.

MR. MONTGOMERY (Native Interests): Your Excellency, there is only one point I wish to refer to, and that was the remark made by the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General about the staff of the K.F.A. going to Col. Griffiths, and the interception by the noble lord the hon. Member for Rift Valley to the effect that they were in a reserved occupation and so legally could not go. During the luncheon interval I looked up our records and, as far as I can find out in the short time, there was one European who left. His exemption from military service was cancelled in September, 1940. He joined the forces and later was released to the K.F.A., and he was tied to the job by regulations which came into force in 1942. I have seen a letter signed by Col. Griffiths on the letter paper of the Production and Supply Council which said that while he was General Manager of the K.F.A. he seconded this gentleman to the Potato Control and later, with the consent of the military authorities, he joined the staff of the War Supplies Board. I think that disposes of the European. I understand from the noble lord in conversation that possibly there are others who left, but I have no record in the Man Power office about them. As regards the Asian staff it is a fact that a considerable number did leave the

K.F.A. and followed Col. Griffiths to his new appointment, but they had the legal right to do so because, in fact, they were not in reserved occupations.

MR. RENNIE: Your Excellency, I am very glad that this amendment to the original motion has been moved from the other side of Council. The Government welcomes this evidence that the points made by the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General this morning have at least a certain amount of substance in them which has appealed to the sense of fair play of the hon. members on the other side of Council.

I do not propose at this stage to deal with the remarks made by the last two speakers other than those that refer to paragraph 205, since it is to the deletion of the reference to that paragraph that this amendment particularly relates, but tomorrow I have no doubt the hon. Financial Secretary will deal with the points that have been made as regards the inefficiency of the Control, and I will leave that aspect of the matter to him. But taking one or two points on the paragraph 205 aspect, the question has been asked by more than one speaker why I did not give evidence before the Commission in respect of these happenings that led up to the findings in paragraph 205. The short fact is that I did not expect that the Commission would attach such importance as they did to these happenings, knowing as I did, since I was involved in some of the negotiations in February and March, 1942, the inner history of these negotiations, and had I for one moment imagined that I should have spent as much time since I read the report of the Commission in going into paragraph 205 and trying to connect up the whole matter, I would certainly have preferred to have spent a few hours of my time before the Commission than the many hours I have spent on the matter since then. However that may be, the point has been made by the hon. Member for Nyanza that two facts presented by the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General are incorrect. He was not too sure of the substance of his first fact; I rather gathered that from the way he put it across. I have no first-hand evidence of that myself, but I am in a position to say that Mr. Hamilton in his evidence before the Commission made it clear that, in the

[Mr. Rennie] first communication he received on the matter of these negotiations, it was clearly understood between Col. Griffiths and the Chairman of Mitchell Coits that these tentative proposals must have the consent of the K.F.A. Board of Directors. He also stated that the first advice he had of these tentative proposals "was a proposition received from my Chairman"—those are his words—"on the 27th February, 1942." If by "my Chairman" he was not referring to Mr. Aldridge, I certainly took him to be referring to him, and if in fact he meant by "my Chairman" the Chairman in London, then the point made by the hon. Member for Nyanza is quite correct.

MR. COULDREY: That is what he states, Sir, on a point of explanation.

MR. RENNIE: I am not aware that that makes a great deal of difference to the matter. The point is that in his negotiations in Cairo and in the continued negotiations here in Nairobi, Col. Griffiths made it perfectly clear that he was well aware that the prior consent of the K.F.A. Board of Directors was required before his negotiations with Mitchell Coits could come to a successful conclusion. I have discussed this matter with Mr. Hamilton, I may say, and although I have not his authority to make this statement, I am sure he would agree that Col. Griffiths in his negotiations was aware from the word go, just as Mr. Hamilton was when Col. Griffiths came back and put the proposition to him, that the prior consent of the K.F.A. Board of Directors was required before these negotiations could succeed. That is the first point.

The second point I have already dealt with. I do not propose to go over all the ground again. As I have stated, I am only too pleased that the amendment suggested from the other side of Council shows that my hon. and learned friend's eloquence—the word I think is taken from an hon. member on the other side—eloquence has brought home the fact that there are other aspects of these negotiations and of the picture presented in paragraph 205 that are not touched upon, or not given sufficient light, shall I say, in the references made in paragraph 205. My own feeling is, and I was in on this matter from quite early

in February, 1942—I need not traverse the ground that the hon. Member for Nairobi North has already covered since he was instrumental in bringing me into the matter round about the 16th or 17th of February—I need not go over all that ground again, but my own feeling is, looking back on it all, if it had not been for the intervention of the third party referred to at the bottom of page 87 of the Report, the whole matter of these negotiations would have died a natural and quiet death for the simple reason that as soon as Col. Griffiths, after negotiating with Mr. Hamilton on his return to Nairobi, came across and in discussions with the hon. Financial Secretary and myself said quite clearly, or put the proposition quite clearly to us, whether it would be acceptable to the Government if he operated Maize Control, Potato Control and certain Produce Controls under the aegis of Messrs. Mitchell Coits, he was told quite plainly that the question of an executive directorship would not be acceptable to the Government. The question of an advisory directorship was raised and was settled some time later, but in view of the answer given to him on the 4th March it seems to me that the natural sequence of events would have been that had he had the time—and one must remember that early in March, 1942, Col. Griffiths was spending a great deal of time between Nairobi and Nakuru and was also engaged in preliminary discussions on maize control—had he had the time to go back to Mr. Hugh Hamilton before the Director of the K.F.A. saw Mr. Hugh Hamilton on the 15th or 16th March, Mr. Hugh Hamilton and Col. Griffiths would have agreed, in the light of the Government attitude, that the whole thing was off and there would have been no question then of any ill-feeling on the part of the Board of Directors of the K.F.A., because the proposition was not coming before them—that is, the proposition in respect of which their consent was to be requested. That is my own feeling in the matter and as I have said it is a great pity that these negotiations were not allowed to die a natural death. They came to a somewhat violent end and, unlike most corpses, they were not allowed to rest quietly thereafter. They were exhumed, post mortem after post mortem was held upon them, and I can only hope that if this

[Mr. Rennie] amendment is accepted, as I trust it will be accepted—on the part of the Government it is acceptable—we shall quietly re-enter the weary bones and ensure that they lie in peace hereafter. (Applause.)

HIS EXCELLENCY: As the hon. Chief Secretary has indicated, the Government is prepared to accept the amended motion, and unless any other hon. member wishes to speak on the amendment I think it will probably facilitate matters if I put the question now and then resume the debate on the motion as amended.

The question was put and carried.

The debate on the motion as amended was resumed.

MR. COOKE (Coast): Your Excellency, the hon. Member for Nyanza in a forcible speech said people may wonder possibly why this motion has been brought at all. I am inclined to wonder myself because, having listened so far to the debate, I have not heard anything that would add one maize cob or one sack of potatoes to the food supply of this country. It is true that there have been suggestions of a kind put up from this side, and members have said that they regard the report as a good report, and at the same time they have started to find various loopholes in it! I have not the slightest hesitation whatever in saying that I regard it as an extraordinarily bad report. I doubt if in the whole sombre and sinister history of committees in this country there has ever been a worse one. The mountain laboured for months and produced a mouse! There is hardly anything in the report that one can really bite on.

With regard to this question of Col. Griffiths, I personally was very glad to hear his vindication in the able speech of the hon. Acting Attorney General. I have taken the trouble personally in discussion with Col. Griffiths to try and obtain his side of the question. My first reaction on reading the report was that he was deserving of the censure that he had received. I yield to nobody here in my condemnation of any Government official who will do what it is alleged that Col. Griffiths had done, because, as somebody said in an inquiry at Home recently, a Government official in his public relations must not only be

scrupulous, but even fastidious. The hon. Chief Secretary, with whom I do not always agree, has, I am glad to say, given the reason why he did not give evidence before this particular Commission of Inquiry, and I think that the greatest condemnation of these distinguished and able gentlemen, two of whom have been my personal friends for some time, is that they failed to call the hon. Chief Secretary, and that in my opinion stigmatizes them as having failed: conspicuously failed, in the work which they were given to perform. We had on this committee a learned counsel, lately hon. Solicitor General, who must have known that these grave aspersions on Col. Griffiths should if possible be thoroughly investigated and he had every opportunity of calling my hon. friend, and he omitted to do so. I think that is one of the gravest animadversions which I myself would place on the report. To me, the failure of the Maize Control, if indeed it was a failure, is not the failure of the Control but is the failure, right throughout the history of this country since the war started, to show energy and determination in carrying on the food production campaign in this country. As my hon. friend the Member for Nyanza referred to archangels, I would say that even the Angel Gabriel—and even you yourself, sir—(laughter)—could not have controlled what did not in effect exist! and therefore you were asking the impossible of Col. Griffiths to control maize which, in effect, when he took over the control of maize, hardly existed. I think it is most unfair to condemn a man for that so-called failure. There is an old Latin tag "*Ex nihilo, nihil fit*", which loosely translated means "take nowt from nowt and nowt is left"; and I think that in that respect Col. Griffiths must be absolved from blame.

As was the case with my hon. friend the Member for Nairobi South in his eloquent speech, the gravamen of my charge against this Commission is that they omitted certain evidence which had been put before them, and if they were not such sincere and able men I would be forced to the conclusion that these gentlemen had formed conclusions and then had used the evidence which happened to fit in with the conclusions they had formed. I am going to read, just to give an illustration of what I mean, a very brief passage from this

[Mr. Cooke] report. It says in paragraph 27, page 12: "In view of all these circumstances"—and they had enumerated the circumstances—"we are of opinion that the Government's policy throughout 1940 and 1941 with regard to the production of maize was understandable . . ." What was Government's policy, if Government ever had a policy, during those years? After great research I found statements as to that policy. The policy was very clearly laid down by my hon. friend, whom we must regard as a Government servant pro tem, the hon. Member for Nairobi North who from the very beginning of the war did not cease to emphasize the necessity for subsidising crops, for building silos and for the production of more crops. I gladly admit that on many occasions I have misjudged my hon. friend when I have attacked him, but I have gone very carefully into this matter and I do think that he showed great diligence and awareness of what would probably happen. (Hear, hear.) What I do criticize him for is that, if I may say so, he was too much of a gentleman in dealing with Government! I have a pretty good knowledge of the Government and I know you get nothing from Government—although I have not got very much myself (laughter)—unless you approach them with a bludgeon in the one hand and a pistol in the other. That, in my opinion, is where my hon. friend has failed. It is unfortunately true, and I am going to say something which I know my hon. friend the Chief Secretary rather dislikes because I have repeated it so often, that Government is too often compelled to yield to force what it should have conceded to reason. If it had conceded to reasons put up by my hon. friend the Member for Nairobi North, we would not have been in so much difficulty to-day.

First of all, it is commonly thought that no one had advocated the production of maize. That is quite wrong. From the beginning of the war the production of maize was advocated. I have first a quotation saying that Mr. Daubney and Col. Griffiths on their visit to the Middle East in 1939 had come to the conclusion that "maize would be needed in the Middle East". In early 1940 a deputation went to London, and Your Excellency yourself said in an address you delivered

in this Council in August, 1940, that that visit to London had "greatly improved the maize situation." I have several other quotations which I might read, but I am not going to labour this matter or to bore Council by making a long speech, but I can assure you that these references were given in evidence—I have here a copy of my evidence before the Food Commission—and were totally and entirely disregarded in their summing up. Another point which they make was that farmers could not be spared from the army. The Acting Governor, in November I think it was, of 1939, in his address said that production must take first place. Your Excellency said the same thing on more than one occasion, and Lord Moyns made it perfectly clear in his dispatch that if production was suffering in this country he would use all his influence to get men released from the army. These quotations were given by me to the committee, and again were totally and entirely disregarded in their findings. These, among other reasons, are why I have not confidence in the Commission's report. I personally feel that since the beginning of this war we have been floundering in a slough of doing nothing and discord, and nothing has been accomplished. We have had a Government that has not governed, we have had an opposition which has never opposed, and leaders who seldom led and that, I think, is the primary cause why we find ourselves in the position we are to-day. I do not want to blow my own trumpet, but so long ago as August, 1940, I made a speech in this Council for which I was very much criticised because it was regarded as a reflection on Your Excellency—of course, it was no such thing. Among other things I said: "My chief criticism is directed towards what your address did not contain rather than what it did contain. I did not hear a clarion call to victory nor could I trace the leadership for which the country is anxious and which everyone, irrespective of race or creed, is prepared to follow however long and hard the road may be. And I am a critic and will remain a critic until I see signs in Government that they realize they must display more wisdom and more energy and courage in the grave days which lie before us." That was four years ago and I still remain a critic!

[Mr. Cooke]

I went on later to emphasize that the country had little confidence in the way things were being conducted, that things had gone from bad to worse. When Your Excellency's Production and Supply Council was formed, we had great promises. I think Your Excellency said, but I cannot trace the reference—perhaps the hon. Member for Kiambu can, she is also looking for it—that if the members of that Council were not satisfactory they would be dismissed. Well, as they have not been dismissed, we can only conclude that they enjoy Your Excellency's confidence. I doubt if they enjoy the confidence of many in this country; and unless and until we can get people who do enjoy the confidence of everyone in this country, as far as possible, I do not see how much progress can be made. Lord Woolton and others have warned us that things will be worse before they are better. We are not by any means out of the wood, and I would beseech Your Excellency, as other members have—notably the hon. Member for Nairobi South—to have a complete reconstruction. I do not think that anything will be accomplished merely by getting rid of Col. Griffiths or reconstructing the Maize Control. What really is wanted is what was said of Mr. Churchill recently by Mr. Casey, that "wherever Churchill goes the pace quickens and the tempo speeds up". I would ask you, sir, whenever you journey throughout this country, to see that this inefficiency, this gross inefficiency which is apparent to other people, ceases, and that we do make a total effort in this totalitarian war, and recruit every man, woman and child in a total effort. At home we have recruited boys of 16 years to go to work in the mines and, as I said during the budget session, I can imagine no reason why Africans in the towns here should be allowed to loaf about the place instead of being put into a labour battalion to play their part in carrying on the war, because the increase of production is our contribution to the carrying on of the war. With those remarks I support the motion.

The debate was adjourned.

ADJOURNMENT

Council rose at 5.30 p.m. and adjourned till 10 a.m. on Saturday, 5th February, 1944.

Saturday, 5th February, 1944

Council assembled in the Memorial Hall, Nairobi, at 10 a.m. on Saturday, 5th February, 1944. His Excellency the Governor (Sir Henry Moore, G.C.M.G.) presiding.

His Excellency opened the Council with prayer.

MINUTES

The minutes of the meeting of 4th February, 1944, were confirmed.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

No. 5—SOMALI SETTLEMENT AT ISIOLO

MR. COOKE:

With reference to my Question No. 10 of 1941, is the Government aware that a number of the Somalis referred to in that question are suffering from a definite sense of grievance on account of their landless condition?

Will the Government expedite the matter as promised in the answer to my supplementary question?

Will they now appoint a committee to go into the whole matter?

MR. ROBBINS (Acting Commissioner of Lands and Settlement): The Government is aware of the overcrowded nature of the Somali Settlement at Isiolo and a scheme is being worked out with a view to improving the situation. Consideration is also being given to the question of improving the water supply and the tsetse fly position in the Northern Frontier District.

The Government will expedite the matter as far as possible, but no final decision can be taken pending the completion of the further investigations which are now being made.

The solution of the problem involves a much larger question than the settlement near Isiolo of the ex-Government servants to which the hon. member refers, and the present time is not considered opportune for the appointment of a committee to go into the general question.

No. 6—VACATION LEAVE

MR. COOKE:

(a) Will the Government state why the monetary assistance to officers proceeding on leave to South Africa was made retroactive only to the 1st August, 1943?

[Mr. Cooke]

(b) Is the Government aware that those who spent their leave in South Africa prior to that date and received no monetary assistance feel a sense of grievance?

(c) Will the Government therefore make the arrangement retroactive to the beginning of the war?

If not, why not?

(d) Will the Government state what sum would be involved if the suggestion in my third paragraph is adopted?

MR. RENNIE: (a) The concessions referred to were granted as a result of the recommendations of a departmental committee which reported on 14th July, 1943. No suggestion was made in that report that the recommendations should be made retrospective to the beginning of the war, as the object of the concessions was to encourage officers to take short periods of leave in future. No such policy was considered necessary in the early years of the war.

August 1st was fixed as the earliest convenient date after the receipt of the Committee's recommendations, although in fact the proposals were not approved by the Governor in Council till 17th September or submitted to the Standing Finance Committee till the 7th of October.

(b) Certain individuals have made representations to the Government in the matter.

(c) The answer is in the negative for the reasons already given. Any arbitrary date must work unequally in individual cases.

(d) Approximately £5,000.

MR. COOKE: Arising out of that answer, is that not penalizing the officers who voluntarily went on leave before this particular regulation came in?

MR. RENNIE: I think there is no doubt that that is the case but, as mentioned in the reply, the fixation of an arbitrary date must penalize some officers.

MR. COOKE: I am very sorry to have to go on with this matter, but it would not be an arbitrary date if it had been the beginning of the war?

ORDER OF THE DAY

HIS EXCELLENCY: I notice that in the order of the day the Clerk has put down the second reading of the Companies (Amendment) Bill before the continuation of the debate on the motion regarding the Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report. I should like to know the feeling of Council in this matter. Ordinarily, Bills come later in the order, but it is important that this Bill, which is formal in character, should be passed, and I should like to know the wishes of hon. members whether we should take it now.

MR. WRIGHT: As far as we are concerned, sir, the order of the Order Paper is acceptable.

COMPANIES (AMENDMENT) BILL

SECOND READING

MR. BROWN: Your Excellency, I beg to move that the Companies (Amendment) Bill be read a second time.

The object of this Bill is to remedy what is an obvious omission in section 333 of the Companies Ordinance. As it stands, the Ordinance says that no company consisting of more than 20 members shall be formed unless it is registered as a company or is formed in pursuance of some Act of Parliament or letters patent. This leaves out of account a co-operative society which can be registered under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance, and as the law now stands a co-operative society would first have to be registered under the Companies Ordinance before it is registered under its own Ordinance. The object of this Bill is to remedy that omission.

MR. DENNISON (Acting Solicitor General) seconded.

MR. NICOL (Mombasa): Your Excellency, this Bill has been brought forward at the request of residents of Mombasa, and on their behalf I should like to express their thanks to Government.

The question was put and carried.

MR. BROWN moved that Council do resolve itself into committee of the whole Council to consider the Bill clause by clause.

MR. DENNISON seconded.

The question was put and carried. Council went into committee, and the Bill was considered clause by clause.

MR. BROWN moved that the Bill be reported without amendment.

Council resumed, and His Excellency reported the Bill accordingly.

THIRD READING

MR. BROWN moved that the Bill be read the third time and passed.

MR. DENNISON seconded, the question was put and carried, and the Bill was read the third time and passed.

FOOD SHORTAGE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT

MR. WRIGHT, with the permission of the President under Standing Rule and Order No. 28, had moved the following motion in substitution for the motion of which he had given notice: That, in the light of the Communication from the Chair made on the 8th December, and in view of the facts disclosed in the Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report—and especially the findings under paragraph 205 of that Report—a thorough reorganization of and changes in the personnel of the Maize and certain Produce Controls are urgently required.

MR. BOWEN had seconded.

MAJOR CAVENDISH-BENTINCK had moved that the motion be amended by the deletion of all words after "8th December" and the substitution therefor of: "and of the recommendations made in the Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report and of experience since gained, a thorough reorganization of the Maize and certain Produce Controls with such consequential changes of personnel as may be found necessary, is urgently required".

MR. VINCENT had seconded.

The debate had been adjourned.

The debate was resumed.

COL. GROGAN (Ukamba): Your Excellency, as far as this debate has proceeded, I think it is one of the most depressing debates that it has ever been my misfortune to listen to. I am going to endeavour, in my own small way, following on the effort that was made by my hon. colleague the hon. Member for Nairobi North, to restore some measure of proportionate realism to the discussion

of the big issues that are at stake. In the first instance we have got to get really clear in our minds what is the main fabric of the issue that is before us and the country. Firstly, quite obviously, it is the fact that after 3½ years of total war a country, occupied by 12 million people and with an area approximating probably more than half Europe, finds itself in the ridiculous position of having to appeal to the rest of the Empire and call upon its shipping resources to import food to remedy the deficiency that exists. This fact alone undoubtedly constitutes one of the gravest, most frightful indictments that could possibly be brought against the governance of the territories involved. I say governance of the territories involved quite designedly, because I do not wish to concentrate the odium upon the Government of Kenya as distinct from any other individual Government, and when I say governance of the territories involved I mean the whole fabric of government which, as we know quite well, ultimately resides in Downing Street, with a very very small distributed authority to the gentlemen in charge of these respective territories. That indictment was in the minds of all the peoples of this community.

The next move was taken by my hon. friend on my right, the hon. Member for Nyanza, and he in this Council challenged this position in the form of a motion. That motion led to the appointment of a commission, and the title of that Commission was the Food Shortage Commission. It seems an astonishing title for that Commission bearing in mind the debate that has ensued in this Council, because practically not one single word has been said about the food shortage at all. The terms of reference of that Commission were, first—and this was the essential term of reference—why is there no grub, and is there any prospect of getting any grub? That was the gist briefly of the first term of reference of that Commission, and as a sort of ancillary and secondary and relatively unimportant term of reference there was the question whether or no there had been satisfactory machinery for distributing one, and only one, of the cereal foods of the country. Government, quite properly alarmed at the weight of this indictment and the importance of it, and as proof of their alarm, took the rather exceptional step of appointing counsel to

[Col. Grogan]

go and watch the examination by the Commission on their behalf, to protect them and see that they got a fair deal, presumably, in an investigation which could only lead probably, as far as one could see, to a general impeachment of the whole governmental system of these territories. In due course the report appeared. Now I have read that report two or three times and I pay full tribute, as other members have done, to the diligence, quite apart from the status of the members of that Commission. There is no doubt about it they took an enormous amount of trouble; there is no doubt about it that the public took an enormous amount of trouble to try and give them the essential facts. If you can read it as a whole I think anybody must admit that there is no really dramatic suggestion as to how or why there was nothing to eat in these vast territories with a relatively trivial population, and secondly, there was certainly no dramatic suggestion as to how that position was to be remedied in future. There was reference to the importance of wimbi for nursing women, as far as I remember; there was a suggestion that if and when you had adequate storage space you should put into it the food you had not grown, but if you had grown it in excess of your requirements you should protect it from rats by spending umpteen thousands of pounds on silos. There were many other, as they quite rightly call, long range suggestions which, because of their importance, have been tabulated, but which were known to practical members of society in advance. But in practice the vast problem of why and how there was no food and whether we were going to have any food I submit, sir, was lost in the maze of maize! Both in the report and in the debate, this enquiry, which should have amounted to an impeachment of the whole system, in fact has degenerated into the much easier, and certainly much more amusing game which is generally known to the public as the hunting of the snark. No wonder, as the debate developed into that jolly game, a therapeutic smile began to spread across the faces of hon. members opposite primarily concerned with this terrible happening.

I think we have to consider very carefully again, because they have not really been tabulated, what are the essential factors which go to make this dreadful

issue with which we are now faced. To anybody conversant with Africa as a whole, watching the position gradually grow under his eyes, the first shock would be that there were 100,000 new European mouths coming into the country attached to the carcasses of prisoners of war and various refugees. That 100,000 white population, which was five times the pre-war white population of these territories, quite obviously were what might be described, from the general dietic point of view, as selective feeders; they were not people who were prepared to take a dollop of cassava chucked at them or a bunch of taro or something of that sort, but people who wanted the things to which they had been used—milk, rashers of bacon and all the pleasant exotic things of life in this land. Then in addition to that we were also faced with the presence of a large army. We do not know, probably very few people know, and it really does not matter how large, but it was a very large army, and they represented another enormous quantity of even more selective mouths, because they were in a stronger position to insist on selection than the other people! We also had now and again, at one time when things looked dangerous, a very large invasion of the Navy, who were also even more selective in their food requirements and drink requirements. (Laughter.) We are also faced with the fact that we have neighbours round us in the other territories who have never really bothered very much about food questions at all. If there was no food the people died, and if there was food there was lots of tembo, and so it went on in a happy sort of way, but when war problems arose they also began to draw on our residual supplies. And on the other, the producer, side—I have dealt with the consumer side—we also should have borne in mind that umpteens of tens of thousands of our labour force on the productive side were being drawn away from production and incorporated in the consuming side. They were not quite so selective, but were taught to be selective; the ordinary native who in the ordinary course of events was quite happy with his dollop of posho is now being fed with pork and beans in tins and other luxuries. Also, still more important probably, there was being taken away from the control of the productive side of this country a very large proportion of the more active overseas,

(Col. Grogan)

European overseers. The result was that the producing machinery was being strained to the limit and the consuming end of the country was being extended *ad infinitum*.

Anybody conversant with Africa, and I am afraid that people in control of our affairs to-day are becoming less and less experienced in Africa, must know that Africa was a place where there are never any margins. It has always been the tradition of Africa, and it still is the practice of Africa, that when their appears to be any excess of food over and above the seed necessary for replanting it is promptly converted into booze. Now, with the pressure of controls and the various other distortions of social life going on to-day—their name is legion—the tendency of the wise native is to take no risks and when he has a personal margin to turn it quickly into booze. (Laughter.) Anybody conversant with those essential and vital facts of Africa should have come to the conclusion that they were faced with the necessity of a root and branch readjustment of the whole African economy, and that leads us to a consideration of what in fact was done on the part of Government. Of course it is a question-begging term, Government, in the Colonial Government system, because there is not in fact and could not be in fact any such thing as Government in a Crown Colony. The delegated authority is so trivial, and a government can only function as a government if it is in a position to deal with each issue as and when it arises, and if every trivial matter has got to be referred, as it is in practice referred, to some mystic gentleman who catches the 10 minutes to 9 Putney bus, of course Government really in practice is not a Government. It can be fairly stated that because Colonial Office governance precludes government, the only reaction to this vast problem was a mild twittering as between the terror of finding a surplus of this thing and the panic arising from the possibility of deficiency of something else. The public on the other hand, I must admit they were a bit sketchy in their methods, but certainly the more experienced members of the public did begin to press upon Government warnings of all kinds and descriptions, and eventually that pressure became concentrated more or less through the persons of my hon.

colleague the Member for Nairobi North and Capt. F. O'B. Wilson, to both of whom I am quite convinced this country will recognize they owe an immense debt of gratitude (applause), because they did bring to some sort of focus the pressure that was growing all over the country. They did bring to some sort of focus this feeling that something, and something quite dramatic, has got to be done. To the credit of Government it must be said that they did in fact yield to that pressure a long way beyond what is traditionally permissible, and very large powers were given to a non-official body to try and do what they could to remedy the position. Those powers were delegated to a body up here who have done a magnificent amount of work in my opinion, but I think they will admit that it is fair—I will not say criticism—if I say they are as a body naturally from their vocations essentially highlands minded. They are practical farmers, in many cases successful farmers, who deal in the production of what to me as an old African I regard as exotic—not indigenous crops of the country at all—but exotic crops, and the result was that the emphasis fell upon maize, bacon and wheat.

Now the history of those three exotic crops are well known to me, it all happened in my time, and it has already been suggested by my hon. colleague the Member for Nairobi North that I in fact did see the first official planting of maize in what was then known as the British East Africa Protectorate. When I went through Africa in the first instance in the 90's, quite a long time ago now, I can assure you that with one exception which will always stick in my mind, because I could never understand why there was in fact one small *shamba* in the middle of Ruanda on the edge of the shores of Lake Kivu, where I found a few maize plants growing and helped myself to some green cobs, and with that single exception I can assure you, sir, that between the Congo border and far beyond the Congo border and the East Coast littoral where the Arabs probably planted a certain amount of maize, there was not one single maize cob growing in the whole of these territories. When Mr. MacDonald came up from South Africa to make an agricultural report on the possibilities of this country before he came here as Director of Agriculture, he brought along with him a little parcel of

(Col. Grogan)

maize, 30 or 40 varieties, to hand over to the then Director of Agriculture (they did not give him anything like as dignified a title in those days, and incidentally he was supposed to look after the forests, which he asserted did not exist). He took the 30 varieties of maize and planted them in closely contiguous rows in one of the most congested and useful out-crops of murrum anywhere in the vicinity of what was at that time the Government experimental farm, and as my hon. friend suggested very properly, is now the Mathari Mental Home.

If we turn to wheat, again what is the history? The history of wheat was that it was introduced into this country by Lord Delamere, and he also introduced a gentleman to attempt to breed wheat that would live in this country because the first experiments were hopelessly unsuccessful, and after having bred a considerable number of varieties of wheat he then handed them over to the Agricultural Department, which had then been moved, to see whether wheat would grow in the country and whether the strains he had grown showed some measure of rust resistance. Because of the departure of his plant breeder they were deposited at the Agricultural Department up at Kabete, and Mr. MacDonald, who had then taken over, began wandering around to see what was going on, and said "What is this stuff?" There were a lot of bags of stuff lying about and there was no proper record of what it was, and he said "Chuck it away to the chickens", so the first wheat experiments were only really enjoyed by the chickens! This is a little bit by the way, but I do want to drive into the minds of people that these are exotic crops. As far as bacon is concerned, I had the privilege of introducing the first lot of pigs into this country.

Let us turn for a moment to what is the relative value of these exotic crops and let us deal with the question of maize. I tried to work out with the hon. Member for Nairobi North last night a small calculation. I do not like calculations but still, we struggled along, and I said "All I want to get is some vague sort of figure to show what is the relative importance of this cereal to this country", and the way we worked it out was this. We assumed, I think it is more or less correct, that the population of the territories concerned is approximately

12 million and we assumed that man, woman and child could not possibly live unless they had at least say 1½ lb. or 1½ lb. of some starch food a day. That gives you a total starch consumption, a minimum starch consumption, of 2½ million tons for these territories. I think my hon. friend the Director of Agriculture opposite will bear me out that in all probability the total maize production of these territories starting in Nairobi and gradually spreading round Nairobi into the contiguous territories, does not exceed a matter of a quarter of a million tons. A quarter of a million tons is 10 per cent of 2½ million tons, and therefore I think we are reasonable in assuming that this cereal, which has absorbed 95 per cent of the talk of this Commission, does not in fact exceed a 10 per cent factor in the maintenance of the life of the communities with which we are concerned.

That leads us to a consideration of what in fact is being done; what is the remedy? Let us turn for one moment—I do not want to labour the question—to the machinery that has been elaborated for the purpose of distribution of what is available to-day, I say without the slightest hesitation, speaking now from two years "in the bush" and daily contact with large plantations and people who live remote from these controls and so on, that it has been a 100 per cent failure. It is incredible what it means to people who are trying to do things. You will find that the people upon whom these plantations to-day rely spend 90 per cent of their time and activities in their offices, instead of in the fields, in filling in multitudinous forms and returns about everything that has nothing whatever to do in the majority of cases with the business with which they are primarily concerned. I only give one example to show how hopelessly this machine is failing to work. I had a letter from a very distinguished member of Government the other day—a personal letter—in which he informed me that the food position was getting steadily worse, and he informed me incidentally that one of the big sugar plantations, I think it was Kakira, presumably in Uganda, was shutting down for 12 months now for lack of cane because of rain failure. That means to say the whole produce of that particular plantation disappears completely out of the picture for 12 months. I wrote back

[Col. Grogan] and said "that is very tragic, it is going on all over the country, but let me draw attention to another sugar plantation which exists 40 miles away from where I am working, namely the Arusha Chini plantation. The position there is that they do not rely on rain because they grow cane under irrigation, and that plantation has also shut down. It is alleged that the reason why that plantation has shut down is that they have limited storage capacity, and that storage capacity is to-day filled with 18,000 bags of sugar they are not allowed to move, and as the rains are on intermittently in that part of the country they cannot produce the sugar to store in the rains, and therefore they have stopped production, and 40 miles away nobody can get a lb. of sugar". There must be something drastically wrong. I think I am correct in that information because it sounded so laughable to me, and I said "I cannot believe it even of the Control system", and I therefore got a very responsible friend of mine to go over and find out whether it was true. He came back and assured me it was an absolute fact. That I only throw out as an example on a rather large scale to prove that this thing still, after years of organization, reorganization and re-multiplication, subdivision and God knows what, is to-day still not functioning as an effective machine. What I hope, and I am sure my colleagues hope, is that some responsible member of Government on the other side will tell us what in fact—let us forget all about the past; let us stop all recriminations as to what has happened and who was responsible and why it was not there, and let us for heaven's sake deal exclusively with the much more important problem to-day of whether we are going to have anything to eat to-morrow—I do trust some responsible member of Government will tell us tersely and completely what steps have been taken to produce somehow, by hook or by crook, not what we have got to have to-morrow but how and by what means we are going to have at least six months reserve of food in these territories.

Finally, sir, I am going to throw out a few constructive suggestions of my own and others which may have a little bit of value. Firstly, I want to deal with native discipline. We are in the very fortunate position now of having a new Chief Native Commissioner who has come red

hot from contact with the real raw facts of war and will therefore, perhaps, approach these problems with a somewhat different mind from the mind which has been dealing with it up to date. We have got to recognize this fact, and I think it is accepted on all sides, that there has been and is going on a progressive deterioration of native discipline. I do not think there is any question whatever about that. The why and whereof of it is one of those large human problems to which probably nobody in this country is in a position to give a complete answer. My own view, for what it is worth, after 50 years close contact with the native of Africa, is that it is probably an aberration, one of those quite inexplicable mass communal psychological reactions to ill-conceived propaganda. I think that really has quite a lot to do with it. As far as my contact with the natives—and they are quite large—go I see no signs whatsoever of bad feeling among the native populations of this country to-day, but I do see, and everybody sees and everybody agrees and all the facts and returns of companies prove, that the output of native labour has gone down in the last two or three years at least 33 per cent.

I want also to refer to the policy in the reserves. I believe that there has not yet been a sufficiently insistent direction of concentrated policy to the administrative officers responsible for the running of the reserves. I do not believe that the policy in the reserves has yet been brought into focus with the general war effort. I will quote one example of the Teita Hills where you, sir, quite recently had a look round. The Teita people are people with whom my interests in that part of the world have been in the closest sort of contact ever since they began, and the general consensus of opinion of all the people who have ever worked with me is that the Teita were in fact a first class tribe, pleasant people, willing people, reasonably hard working people and reliable people. The general consensus of opinion now is that they have degenerated in the last few years beyond belief. I believe the reason for that very largely is that they have been quite properly inspired to produce vegetables for a ready market in Mombasa, and that was a very proper administrative effort to get them to grow vegetables for Mombasa where they were wanted. They were the nearest reliable source of supply and it was

[Col. Grogan] obviously bringing prosperity to that particular tribe. All that was very proper and correct administrative procedure, but these astonishing psychological reactions which none of us foresaw but which we have now got to recognize became rapidly in operation, and the result to-day is that these people are absolutely chock-a-block full of money. They cannot buy anything with their money, not even food, and there is, in fact, a certain amount of food shortage in that part of the world now, and all the people who have got money cannot buy food because the food is not there. Nor, in fact, is it possible suddenly to alter an acquired momentum of native habit; you cannot persuade them to eat the vegetables they do grow, and therefore you have the position that these people have no longer any incentive to work and are expecting to be fed by Government. I say there again in my opinion it is wrong policy when you have to go and remedy food deficiency and famine conditions in the reserves, that you should give these people food at less than it cost the general community. If in fact you have to give them food to keep them alive, why not turn the people out to do an honest job of work somewhere else and give them food there? It seems the only practicable and sensible way of dealing with the situation. These are matters which I have no doubt come closely under your consideration and, as I say, we have a new mind brought to bear on the matter. He has not yet really got on to the thing yet, but they are some of the most important factors in the light of this food problem which have got to be dealt with.

I now come to another matter entirely and that is the question of locusts. I am certainly the only man in this room and probably one of the very few men in this country who can say they have lived through two major locust infestations. All of us have seen sporadic outbreaks of locusts here and there, but unless we are up to the allotted span none of us could have seen the two major infestations which I have seen. I personally am of the belief that we are now faced with a major locust infestation. Many of us will remember the last one. I fought a lone hand then in protesting against Government expenditure in fighting locusts in the offensive sense. The net result was that we spent £108,000 or thereabouts on a futile

attack on locusts, and I do not think that that expenditure saved one radish from destruction. Now, sir, I say quite carefully and intentionally that I believe that we are now up against a locust infestation on a major scale, and although I am quite agreed, because I have discussed this matter with my hon. friend opposite, that Government was right in the first stages when they were dealing with a hopper infestation in close contact with food producing areas, in spending quite a lot of money in trying to destroy those hopper bands and thereby protect the crops, which in fact they did protect and save, that was good practice and no word can be said against it, but when we are certain that we have got locusts on a vast scale on the wing in this country then we have to reconsider the whole policy. I am quite convinced myself that with the two experiences of these infestations I have had, every single pint of petrol and wear and tear on tyres, every human being, every particle of food is now completely wasted if you concentrate on an offensive attack on the locusts now in these territories. I suggest, sir, really earnestly that you switch the whole strategy from the offensive to the defensive. By the defensive, of course, I mean concentration of whatever labour and transport there is available firstly on the development of every possible irrigable area you can find in the country, because that does give you a chance of a come-back in respect of the green foods that are required by the Army and by the community. If you see the first crop eaten off you have not got to wait for possible rains, but can replant the next day. In that sense every acre of land you can put under water to-day, no matter what it costs, is good insurance against shortage of the essential green foods of the community. But I should also go beyond that, and I say every possible resource that is at your disposal should be concentrated on a mass attack upon the dry lands of the country where you can grow locust-proof crops, locust-proof crops of course being cassava, pigeon pea, sweet potato and, where conditions are more humid, there are the great order of the taro and the millets and so on and so forth. I believe we have one example of a very daring, very successful, very well organized mass communal effort that has been made on the Masai land on the Athi Plains in growing wheat as a Government

[Col. Grogan] effort. Now wheat is subject to drought and especially subjects to locusts, and if we can take steps like that it is a very good effort and looks like being quite successful, but under locust conditions very precarious—why cannot we do the same thing on a major scale with these other crops which locusts do not like?

That is all really I have got to say, but I do want to make a final appeal that Government do not rest content with having thrown Col. Griffiths to the wolves for the time being, but do realize that we are again faced with a major crisis. We have again got to pull ourselves together and try and get a complete team, not only in this territory but in the contiguous territories in a mass attempt to solve these problems, but primarily to produce and secondly to make more perfect and more effective the machinery of distribution. In conclusion I do want to emphasize the fact that production, production, production and production alone is the remedy for the now omnipotent black market which has taken charge of the whole territory. (Applause.)

MAJOR KEYSER (Trans Nzoia, Acting): Your Excellency, my hon. friend the Member for Ukamba said he thought the time had arrived when we should give up recriminations and get down to the problem itself. I happen to be one of those who, since the war started, have been warning Government of a coming food shortage, and I think that at this stage we should continue recriminations because, as Churchill said, the value of recrimination is to ensure effective action in the future. As a result of all our attempts to get something done for the increased production in the country seems to have been a most appalling chaos in the food position this Colony has ever seen. I think we should continue recrimination until we get the food position on a proper basis. Therefore I am going to start recriminating. I agree with the Food Commission report when they say that the food problem of the Colony is pre-eminently one of maize, even though it may have the stigma attached to it of being exotic, because on maize depends practically the whole of the rest of the food position of the Colony, if you are going to supply butterfat, pigs, sisal, and everything else, and it has the added advantage of being a big yielder and of

growing over a big area of East Africa. When we first started considering increasing production, a number of us were of the opinion that the most effective way of doing it was by means of the European farmer. The advantages of using him were that more control could be kept of production, of the ordinary ways of farming, it was easy to get estimates, and there would also be a saving in man power, because man power was sooner or later going to become a problem. A native working on a European farm will produce about five times as much as he will working for himself in the reserve, and in order to conserve man power and to have a control on the whole production of the Colony we considered that the best way of doing it was through the Europeans. A curious feature in this report is that in paragraph 20 they refer to the Bowring Committee that sat in 1922 and to the Agricultural Indebtedness Committee that sat in 1935. Both of those committees recommended the encouragement of the European maize industry. We all know the encouragement that that industry received, and how the acreage of 233,000 in 1929 dropped to 63,000 in 1941, the third year of the war. The least amount of European maize that has ever been required in the Colony for internal consumption during the last 20 years has been 300,000 bags. Our food trouble started in 1942 when the 1941 planted crop was being consumed. It is interesting to note that of that 1941 crop, the total deliveries of European maize only amounted to 310,000 bags or an equivalent of the least amount that was ever required in the piping days of peace. In 1941, when the crop was planted, the Abyssinian campaign was drawing to its close with the impending possibility of having to feed large numbers of prisoners of war and possibly civilian populations in the conquered territories; we had a large army of Africans to feed, there were refugees coming into the country. There were also the lessons of history to warn Government that one result of waging war was a shortage of food. In 1941 the native crop had been quite a good one. There were no statistics at all of what consumption was or what consumption was going to be but, as I have shown, there were possibilities that consumption was going to rise very steadily and rapidly.

[Major Keyser] In the past we have always had, except with few exceptions—two years I think in my time here—a surplus of maize, and the country had unfortunately got into the position of living in a fool's paradise and never considering whether they would starve or import—they always relied on the surplus. A surplus is very nice from the consumer's point of view, but it must be remembered it is a great disadvantage to the producer, as with a surplus of maize he is not going to get an economic price for his crops—he has to sell it at some price that is going to attract increased consumption. That is the position that we were faced with in 1941. At the beginning of 1942, although it appeared that consumption was going to rise, there were no figures to indicate what it was going to be. Government did not seem interested in the fact that it might rise, and the marketing societies in the country like the K.F.A. were very worried about a possible surplus. They therefore had to make arrangements to get rid of that surplus. You must remember that the 1940 crop only fetched Sh. 5/88 to the European grower. With a possible surplus on the 1941 crop he was faced with having to sell his maize probably as low as Sh. 2 or Sh. 3 a bag, and that is why that contract was entered into with Egypt for the sale of 40,000 tons in 1942. It is mentioned in the Food Commission Report that the Ministry of Food had warned the Colony of the difficulties of shipping with regard to the export of the surplus crop of maize, and that is so. In 1941 the K.F.A. had a contract with the Ministry of Food for a small amount, I think 100,000 bags or something like that, and there was very considerable difficulty in getting shipping for it. At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942, it was also obvious to everybody that the Middle East was rapidly becoming a scene of major military operations, and for precisely the same reason that the Ministry said they could not take the Kenya maize to the United Kingdom, the Middle East would require feeding from Kenya in order to save shipping. Quite a lot of the farming community in the Colony felt at that time that we should be preparing to feed the Middle East during the coming year. You will recollect no doubt, sir, that somewhere about April, 1941, you granted an interview to the Production Board where

these views were expressed. At the end of that interview you asked that those views should be put in writing and sent to you, and I should like to read a sentence out of that letter, which was dated 19th May, 1941: "In addition to setting up an organization for providing the local armed forces, insofar as is possible, with commodities which merely happen to be produced locally, my board feels that it should be the aim of Government actively to stimulate production in order that far more becomes available, not only for local requirements, but for overseas, etc., requirements, and it is in this sphere that Kenya has, in the opinion of the Production Board and farmers, so far failed". That was part of paragraph 7. Paragraph 9 states: "If the attitude is taken that our productive capacity is on too insignificant a scale to count, that no risks can be run with the taxpayers' money, that we had far better remain dormant, accepting the minimum of assistance from the United Kingdom Government in respect of any unsaleable or unexportable surpluses until the war is over, then the sooner farmers are informed that that is our policy the better. Farms can then be closed down, and probably a few more men could be found for the military forces, and we can (but not with a very clear conscience) refrain from endeavouring to contribute to the very real supply difficulties which already confront this part of the world. My board cannot, however, believe that this point of view can seriously be accepted by anyone". That shows you the feeling of the production community of this Colony. They felt that we could do more to assist in the war, that we were going to be asked to do so, that Government was taking no steps to encourage that increased production which could be of so much use to the war.

As a result of that interview, Your Excellency broadcast to farmers on the 25th June, I think it was. In your broadcast a sentence appeared about maize. You said: "I know that many farmers are worried about the problem of maize, and recently the Settlement and Production Board convened a conference between the producing and consuming interests in the hope of finding a solution to a problem which is common to many parts of Africa. The conclusions reached by those who attended this conference are at present being examined. In the meantime,

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I suggest that maize be only planted by European farmers on land likely to produce a high yield per acre and that in areas less suitable for maize another crop be planted wherever possible. The desirability of feeding maize to cattle is no doubt borne in mind. That was in June, 1941. In November, 1941, the Minister of State in the Middle East in a statement published in the *East African Standard*, gave a list of food that would be required in the Middle East in large quantities in order to save shipping. It does seem to me odd that backvelders like ourselves should be able to foretell the situation months before the Minister of Supply in the Middle East, and I fancy that there is some explanation for that that we really do not know. Anyhow, the point is we did anticipate that position arising, and the fact was that it did arise, but that this Government neither anticipated it nor wanted to, nor made any attempt to meet the situation if it should arise. Again, you had the warnings given you by the chairman of the K.F.A. at his first general meeting in December, 1941. The Food Commission in their report say that those warnings were only of a general nature. They were, of course, of a general nature, but the point about them is they were not meant to be prophetic: they did not refer to any particular time, they referred to particular circumstances, that if certain circumstances did arise owing to the low level at which production had sunk the country would be in difficulties over its food supplies. That is all those warnings were meant to be, and I cannot see that it depreciates from their value by saying they were of a general nature. I referred to a surplus, and that in the past one of the troubles of the maize industry was dealing with a surplus. It is quite obvious that a surplus, if kept in the Colony, will have a debasing effect on the price, and it is quite understandable that the producers of the surplus may be anxious to get rid of it. In the days of peace, the K.F.A. used to decide on what they considered the country required and try and get rid of the rest by exporting it at a low figure, but as soon as we changed from peace into war I maintain the responsibility for the disposal of that surplus was on Government, especially as there were signs that consumption might rise, and that is where Government should have

stepped in and done something with that surplus in 1941, even though it was only an imaginary one, but part of the surplus was allowed to leave the Colony. In December, 1941, Government at last took some action to stimulate production, and the report mentions, I think in paragraph 28, "that once the Minister of State in the Middle East had made his announcement in November, 1941, Government wasted no time in taking action to stimulate the production of both native and non-native ground maize". That is perfectly true. In November the statement was made, and in December Government took action by giving certain guarantees to the producers of the Colony.

But the point about that is, that the stimulation that was given to production was not effective nor likely to be effective, for reasons which I will give. It was effective with wheat, but it was not effective with maize, and the reason why it was not was that there was a bias on wheat and the stimulation of maize was insufficient. Maize was given a Government guaranteed price of Sh. 8/50. That sounds very good, but that was a guarantee for one year, for the 1942 planting, and that was given in December. In December you cannot break land to plant a crop in the following year, because for one thing the ground is probably too hard, for another it has no time to weather, and, again, the whole operation would take too long and planting would come in too late, so that the guarantee given of Sh. 8/50 looked very nice on paper, but was really quite ineffective because you could not increase your production during 1942; and that guarantee was for one year only, so that if farmers broke up land during 1942 for the 1943 planting they had no guarantee that they were going to get any price at all for it, so that this very nice looking guarantee was really absolutely worthless. At the same time, Government guaranteed a minimum return of Sh. 35 an acre for maize, which was of some value in the event of the crop being destroyed, for it gave the farmer sufficient money to replant. There were also Sh. 10 per acre given for breaking new land. Compare that with the guarantees given wheat. Wheat got Sh. 25 a bag and Sh. 27/50 later on; it got Sh. 40 an acre guaranteed minimum return, Sh. 20 an acre breaking grant and up to Sh. 30 for clearing land. Those were generous. They were neces-

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sary at the time, and we have seen the response those steps produced. We have to-day, as the hon. Member for Nairobi North said yesterday, a crop of over 600,000 bags just reaped. Of that, quite a proportion will be available for the feeding of natives. I do not know how much, but something between 100,000 and 120,000 bags, I should say, so that if it had not been for that wheat crop the food position of the Colony would be in a much worse position than it is to-day. Against that, had maize been given proper encouragement, you would have had possibly 200,000, 300,000 or 400,000 more bags of maize with which to feed the Colony to-day. It might be said, why should maize require something more possibly than wheat? What maize asked for was a guarantee of a price for a period of years. That was not necessary for wheat, because wheat has no rival, that is the European wheat industry of this Colony has no rival, whereas the maize industry has a rival: it has a rival in the maize surplus grown in the adjacent territories, it has a rival in any surplus coming out of the native reserves, and it had been the avowed policy of the consumers in the Colony and of Government to procure large amounts of maize from those sources. I say the avowed policy of Government, because at a Production Board meeting where a motion had been put up for increasing the guaranteed price of European-grown maize Mr. Clay—I cannot follow the changes that take place!—who was then Director of Native Production for East Africa, and therefore any statement made by him was presumably agreed to by this Government, told that meeting he was definitely against European maize being guaranteed Sh. 12 because of the inflationary influence in the Colony, and he thought that Uganda could produce a million bags at Sh. 6 a bag. Of course, the consuming interests were extremely pleased to hear that and backed that idea rather than increase the guarantee for Europeans.

What I am getting at is that the European maize industry has never been encouraged since the war started. The Director of Agriculture gave evidence, which appears in paragraph 84, and said: "I think the granting of Sh. 8/50 to Europeans was not done with the idea of any largely increased production of

maize; the argument was advanced that the price had been too low and European maize acreage would continue to fall or disappear altogether if the price was not put higher, but I don't think the intention behind it was to stimulate a largely increased production of maize". In 1942 we get the position that we were trying to export from this Colony 400,000 bags of maize and we had a shortage coming on us. A lot has been made of that letter of 10th February which the Commission show by a little bit of arithmetic, shall we call it, that there was a shortage of 200,000 bags in the Colony really instead of a surplus. It is immaterial to the debate how much there was really and what the shortage was or who should have known when the shortage was coming. What I maintain is that somebody in Government should have known that position; knowing that consumption was rising it should have been obvious to anybody, and they should have sat down and made out some calculation as to what consumption was going to be and how it related to production. Instead of which we just happily went on living in a fool's paradise and allowing maize which was going to be required very badly in a short time to leave the Colony.

I am very surprised on the second day of this debate that nobody from the other side of Council has risen to tell us—as I feel exactly the same as the hon. Member for Ukamba does that we are not being told—what is going to be done to relieve this present food position, and in the face of no statement of that sort one must only conclude that Government's policy is to continue importing food until our consumption has decreased to the production level. I think that if we adopted that policy to-day without making some sort of suggestion first it would be very deplorable, and I welcome the suggestions made by the hon. Member for Ukamba for increasing the production of crops which are not susceptible to locust invasions and the use of irrigation in producing other crops, but the area of the Colony that could be brought under irrigation in a period of time that would really matter is very small. I am not trying to detract from its importance; I think we should use every available stream, every bit of water that can be used for the production of crops, but I do not think it is going to solve our main problem. I think our main

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problem at the moment should be confined to trying to produce more maize and more wheat. Apart from the suggestions that he has already made, I think quite a big acreage of wheat could be obtained down here somewhere round the Masai wheat lands and there are quite a few areas in the Colony which could still be put under maize.

With regard to the future of Maize Control, the suggestions put up by the Commission in their Appendix L could form the skeleton of a Maize Control which would eliminate some of the present methods which have made the Control so much criticized. The present system of Maize Control has been a failure because it was unable to check black marketing, and at no time has Maize Control had physical control, which was the reason put up by the Maize Controller for the present system, and the Commissioners themselves found that physical control of maize was impossible under the present system. I do not think it would be possible under any system. The present system is that at all railheads and trading centres there are Control servants who actually buy maize from the smaller traders. Under the present system at all railheads and all trading centres there were big wholesale buying firms who bought the maize from the smaller traders. The only difference between that and the present system of Control is that you have the Control brought in between the traders and the millers. In any new system of Control, if it is to be successful, I think it would be necessary to remove all Control servants from trading centres and allow normal trade channels to resume their pre-control activities. It could be done, as recommended by the Commission, by having licensed buyers at the trading centres. The licensed buyers should be firms of repute and literacy. The Control could then be assured of having the returns it required, and you would also be assured that they would carry out their instructions, because if they failed to do so they would have their licences cancelled. I think there is no doubt at all that out of Appendix L a committee, with representation by experienced members of the trade, a system could be evolved which would eliminate the extra middleman of Control, and the proper Control functions of collecting statistics

of production and consumption and the distribution of available supplies could be vested in the Maize Board with an executive officer and a small staff. Not only would this ensure channels of trade and the confidence of the country, but if it was considered desirable to all interests it could also be a form of control which could be continued after the war by legislation when the Defence Regulations lapse.

DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE (Mr. Blunt): Your Excellency, I am very glad the the debate yesterday took a turn towards what I consider the more important aspects of the Report, namely those contained in the first part thereof. This morning we have been taken on to a still higher plane involving considerations outside this Colony. I propose in the first place to deal with certain aspects in this Report referring to the Colony itself and I will finally follow my hon. friend the Member for Ukamba on to the higher plane to which he led us earlier. I wish to confine my remarks, owing to the fact that time presses, to certain of the recommendations made in the first part of this Report to which reference has already been made by members on the other side of Council. I then want to consider in detail the implications of Chapter VIII of the Report.

Referring to the first recommendation which appears on page 7 of the Report under paragraph 19, and which was referred to yesterday by the hon. Member for Nairobi North, I think there can be no doubt that everybody will agree that this is a most desirable recommendation if in fact it can be carried out, but so far as I know those who are concerned with weather forecasting have never yet arrived at the position where they are able to forecast weather conditions over a sufficiently long period in advance to be of any value in planning crop production. What has been done at home and in America and other parts of the world is to arrange to issue forecasts covering the immediate future few days, and those forecasts are of extreme value to the farmer in planning his immediate operations, particularly in cases such as hay-making and harvesting, and I sincerely trust that with the information that is being acquired by the meteorological section during the present period of war it will be possible to provide some such forecasts to be of use to farmers in the future.

[Mr. Blunt]

Now I should like to go on to page 19, the question of agricultural statistics, and I propose to take the recommendation in paragraph 44 and at the same time the further recommendation dealing with statistics which occurs on page 54 under paragraph 130. The hon. Member for Nairobi North referred at some length to this question of agricultural statistics yesterday and to what has been done, and pointed out that the Production and Settlement Board statistical section is working in close touch with that of my Department. In fact, members are aware that my Department has ceased to collect the returns which we have been used to collecting under the Agricultural Statistics Ordinance, because it was felt that, with statistics that were being collected by the Board, there would be too much duplication if we continued to do so. But my Department is concerned with statistics of native production, and while the difficulties in arriving at statistics of European production were stressed yesterday, I must say something about the difficulties that arise over native statistics. The hon. member pointed out that the organization of the Board was such that the returns were sent in before planting took place, that harvesting returns could be called for and that these were submitted by farmers and tabulated. In the case of native statistics nothing of that kind can, of course, be done because we are there dealing with vast numbers of small producers, illiterate, who have little idea of what an acre of land is, and have no means of measuring it and who have little idea of the yields per acre they get. And yet, particularly as regards maize, the statistics of native production are of prime importance since the surplus available for the Colony is derived more from native sources than from European. We have considered on various occasions any methods that may be possible whereby we could obtain better statistics of native production, and various suggestions have been put forward, many of them involving much work and not appearing to hold prospects of any greater accuracy than those that we now adopt.

The method that we now adopt is this, that the Agricultural Officer with his native staff in a particular native area, when the crop has been planted and when the time arrives when it is possible

to say something about the prospects, sums up his view as to whether that particular crop is planted over greater or less areas than in the year before, and during the period of the growth of that crop considers how weather conditions and other conditions which may affect it are in fact affecting it, and from time to time he submits his estimates, which are now called for monthly, as to what the crop prospects are. That is not by any means the end of the matter. However good a judge he may be, there are further complications that come in at a later stage. They are the same complications that arise in the case of the European, and in the case of the European figures can be given for them. It has to be decided how much of the crop that is being grown the native is likely to retain for his own consumption and that, as members will realize, is no easy matter and involves consideration of other factors, and particularly other crops which may be available to provide his food supplies. Nevertheless, in spite of those difficulties, we have arrived at a stage when we feel that the estimates that we can give have very considerable value, and in fact we have given estimates for crops in years past, when weather conditions have been as nearly normal as we know them in this country, which have been within a very small percentage of the actual crop realized when harvesting was completed. From what I have said I think it will be realized that, although we do make out these estimates and we can place some considerable reliance on them, they can never be as accurate as those which can be collected for European agriculture. I shall refer to this matter again later on in my remarks.

The next recommendation of the Commission with which I should like to deal are those on page 44 dealing with storage questions, and I propose to take a number of those recommendations and discuss them together. The first recommendation is that part of the reserve supply of foodstuffs shall be in the form of wimbi. With that recommendation I am to some extent in agreement, but I would like to point out that it does not, to my mind, go very far towards a solution of our problem. It is true that wimbi is held in store more easily than almost any other native grain and deteriorates less rapidly. Unfortunately the

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areas in which wimbi is produced and could be produced are distinctly limited, and it is estimated that on the average the production of wimbi per acre of land is only about 70 per cent of the production of maize or miama from that same land, so that if our aim is to increase our production of foodstuffs, as it must be at present, we cannot advocate changing over from maize and miama to wimbi. The question of how it is to be used again presents a certain amount of difficulty because, although wimbi is in many parts of Africa the staple food of the population, in Kenya that is not the case. It is eaten, as has already been mentioned, by women at certain times. The bulk of it, however, goes into the manufacture of beer. It may interest members to know that it is estimated that some 150,000 acres of wimbi are planted annually in the Nyanza Province and that, prior to the war, such export as there was from that Province used to go to an area on Kilimanjaro where the people had plenty of money and wished to ensure their supplies of booze!

It is somewhat surprising to me that, whereas the Commission have made a number of recommendations in regard to storage here they have not made one which I personally should have considered of prime importance, and I think my hon. friend the Member for Ukamba will agree with me. I believe that the proper method of storing surplus native foodstuffs, or shall I say the best method of storing surplus foodstuffs for natives—and after all we are considering foodstuffs for natives here much more than for any other part of the population—is in the form of crops which themselves suffer less than many others from locust attack and which can be retained in the ground. The crops that I refer to are those already mentioned, such as cassava, sweet potatoes, yams, colocasia and others of that nature. Those crops are produced in the reserves and can be produced in almost all reserves; they can be produced by the individual in the reserves and they can be kept underground in safety for varying periods of time, and they form an effective reserve against a time of shortage of cereals. Moreover, those crops grown in that way do not involve any question of transport from one area to another. They are there on the spot and they do not have to be

transported, and the saving in transport and in cash, if those are the main reserve crops of the native, must be in the aggregate enormous. I might mention as a matter of interest—I mentioned yams in this connexion—the yam has, as members will probably know, almost gone out of cultivation in the Central Province where it was a very important crop in recent years, but I am glad to note that within the last year or two cultivation of the yam has begun to come back to its own, and that is entirely owing to the fact that due to the biological control which has been achieved over mealy-bug, in connexion mainly with coffee, it is now possible to grow yams and get reasonable yields where that has not been possible for a number of years.

The Commission made a recommendation that a minimum quantity of reserve foodstuffs should be put into store. It is not apparent whether the Commission have really considered all the factors which are necessary before a determination can be made of the quantity which it is desirable to hold in store, and to my mind it is a matter which needs very careful consideration. Before we can definitely say what ought to be kept in store, we have to take into consideration such factors as what is the production position, what are we doing in the way of exports of the surpluses, what the tendency of the native population is towards changes in foodstuffs, and in the future when conditions of transport come back to normal, if they ever do, whether or no it is better to spend a certain amount of money on storing foodstuffs that we have produced within our borders—and we may have to keep them for some time—or whether it would be better to rely on importations. It may be that reliance on importations under normal conditions when the war is over may be a cheaper method of insuring ourselves against famine conditions.

There is a recommendation in paragraph 110 to the effect that foodstuffs should be held in storage at stores of inexpensive type to be erected at high altitudes. That recommendation at first sight is inclined to appeal to one, but there are certain considerations that have to be borne in mind before it can be adopted. It is perfectly true that high altitude wheat farmers, for instance, are

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able to hold their crops a considerable time without any appreciable deterioration. It is a question of the average temperature at which those crops are held, and the lower the temperature the less rapid is the breeding in grain crops of the weevil, but the weevil does breed even at fairly low temperatures, such as there would be in these stores at these high altitudes, at a certain rate. The wheat farmer is in the position of putting his wheat into a store uninfected with weevil to start with, and a crop put into a store that is never infected will never develop weevil and there will be no loss from that source, but if we are considering storing the maize crop we have to remember that in this country in certain areas, and particularly in one of the highest producing maize areas in the country, the crop is liable to be infected actually in the field, and however carefully it is handled in taking it to these high altitude stores, it is likely to arrive there infected. If it does so and if there are no means of destroying that infection, either by heat treatment or chemical treatment, there will be losses, and even at high altitudes I believe those losses may amount to something quite considerable in terms of cash. I therefore feel that we should go very carefully in adopting that recommendation out of hand, and that further consideration has to be given to the possibility of erecting what is a more expensive type of store in which we could be certain that, when we fill it with grain, we can keep that grain free of weevil without serious deterioration until we want to take it out again.

In paragraph 111 reference is made to the cost in connexion with storage. It has been suggested that the capital costs of erecting storage might properly be a charge on Government. In my view, there are certain arguments that have already been advanced why that may be considered a reasonable view, but I question very much whether the recurrent costs in connexion with the storage of cereals are a proper charge on Government. They are not, so far as I know, generally held to be so in other countries, and I would only like in that connexion to refer to the position as I have been used to it in parts of England, where the standing of a farmer among his fellows is very largely judged by the

length of time that he holds his cereal crops himself in stocks.

Now I should like to go on to the recommendation at the head of page 46, in section 114, and to consider this recommendation in conjunction with that in paragraph 124. It appears to me that the Commission have in view that a minimum price should be fixed for all maize, and that in addition Government should enter into a contract to purchase 400,000 bags, or some such figure, of European-grown maize at a special price, and I presume that price will be higher. They further recommend that the exportable surplus shall be kept as low as possible. Taking these three recommendations together, it appears to me that we are led into a considerable difficulty and that the only means of solving the difficulty which that leads us into is to continue so long as it lasts some form of maize control. We are going to have maize on the one hand bought at one price and, on the other hand, maize bought at another price, and it cannot be suggested that it should be sold on that basis of two prices to the consumer: the price will have to be averaged out, I presume, and that needs a considerable amount of control over it. Moreover, in these recommendations it is suggested that the price shall be fixed after consulting the producing and consuming interests. A number of members of this Council must have been present, as I have been, at various discussions ranging over many years in the past when the producers of maize and the consumers of maize have endeavoured to arrive at agreement. At no meeting of that kind which I have attended can I ever remember agreement having been reached, except on the basis of the expedient which has been put forward from time to time that the central Government should bear the cost of the difference between the views of the producer and the consumer. (Laughter.) I see a great deal of difficulty in accepting the suggestions made in these paragraphs. But there have been published, as hon. members are aware, proposals to deal with the coming year, and they were published in the *East African Standard* I think, on Thursday, and have already been referred to. It is true that those proposals also involve control. We have control of sorts at the moment, and they do not, therefore, present immediate difficulty.

(Mr. Blunt) but when we come to consider what is going to happen in the distant future that is a question which we must, I consider, bear in mind, I should like to go on to page 52 and the recommendation there in paragraph 125. With that recommendation I am heartily in agreement. I have previously in this Council paid tribute to the work that has been carried out by production committees and sub-committees in the districts, and I should like to associate myself with the remarks made by my hon. friend on the other side about them yesterday. They have done most valuable work, and I trust that their work may continue. But, looking to the distant future, I see certain difficulties. At present these committees derive their authority directly from the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, but probably more effectively from the fact that they are the people who recommend farmers for guaranteed minimum returns, grants, and so on. In a way they may be said to hold the purse strings of farming, and naturally their recommendations receive the maximum amount of attention. I do not know the extent to which, in the future, farming in this country will be controlled. My personal view is that I should hate to have to introduce into this Council any Bill for the control of farming operations in the future, and I should hate still more to be saddled with the duty of carrying out the terms of such legislation. I believe the time will come when we shall have to allow a farmer to put into practice his individual ideas, and to a large extent remove controls which are all very well and acceptable in war time, but I do not think such controls would be accepted in peace time. If we can overcome that difficulty, and the committees or their successors can be given the authority which I would like to see them have, I sincerely hope the system may continue, and even extend, because of its valuable effect in improving the general farming standards of the country.

Although there are some further important recommendations to which I would like to have made reference, particularly that in para. 138, since they have not been raised by hon. members on the other side of Council I will not refer to them, but will now come back to Chapter VIII, "Causes of the food shortage". Paragraph 52 commences with

these words: "The evidence before us discloses that certain witnesses were by no means satisfied that the failure of the short rains in 1942 was the main reason for the food shortage". The phrasing of that indicates to me that quite a number of witnesses did consider that the failure of the short rains was at least a prime reason and the main reason for the shortage, and my evidence at least was to that effect. In paragraph 82, summarizing the reasons for the maize shortage, the Commission said: "We have no doubt that the shortage in this commodity, which has had such a serious effect on the internal economy of the Colony, was due to the fact that the rate of consumption increased to such a degree that it overtook and ultimately surpassed actual production . . . This shortage was inevitable, irrespective of the failure of the short rains; the failure of those rains made matters worse . . ." I have been through the deductions and the arguments in this chapter, very carefully, and I am afraid I am not able to agree entirely with their finding, particularly in respect of the effect the failure of the short rains had. The evidence, so far as I find it, on which they base their statement is, first of all, that, as they say in paragraph 56, evidence was produced that in the Kericho area the low prices in 1941 had the effect of decreasing planting in 1942. With that I agree. They refer to the Kericho area, and the Kericho area is a small producing area when considering the whole native maize production of the Colony. Later on, in paragraph 72, it is stated: "There was general unanimity among the native witnesses that the low prices for native-grown maize prevailing in 1941 had discouraged the natives from planting maize, with the result that they did not plant as much in 1942 as they had planted in 1941. . . ." That is all the evidence I find in support of the suggestion that less maize was planted in 1942 than in 1941. Let us examine the question of price. I have in front of me prices which were paid for maize in certain native markets in the years from 1936 onwards. I am not going to give you a lot of figures, and I am not going to try to give an average figure for the value of the native maize crop in any one year; I do not think I can give a figure which would be sufficiently accurate. There is no doubt, however, that these figures disclose by and large that

(Mr. Blunt) prices were very low in 1936, they were reasonable in 1937, 1938, 1939, but following the failure of the short rains in the Central Province in 1939 they were high in the early months of 1940, although they went down to what might be considered a more normal figure later in the year. The 1941 prices were what I would consider normal prices for native maize, they vary at different times during that year, from a maximum figure of Sh. 5/60 to a minimum figure of Sh. 3/50.

What was the position when the 1942 maize crop was being planted as regards prices? In the Kikuyu areas prices at that time were higher than they had been in the corresponding time of 1941; in the Broderick Falls District, which serves the main native producing area of Kitosh, they were again higher than they had been in previous years; and in the Yala trading centre they exceeded the prices payable in the previous year by more than they did at Broderick Falls. I submit, therefore, that in the main producing areas the price factor was not such as would be likely to cause smaller plantings but, if anything, would be likely to cause larger plantings. The Commission in paragraph 56 states, and quite rightly states, that the native takes into consideration the price that he got for his last crop when he plants his next crop. That is very true in the case of cash crops, but although it does apply in the case of the main food crops I believe that what the native considers at the time of planting is much more the provision of an adequate food supply for himself and his family, or rather, that the native's wife considers an adequate supply of food for herself and the family, rather than the actual price which went immediately before. Be that as it may, I do suggest the prices at that time were not considered low by the natives and, in fact, evidence to that effect was very definitely obtained by my deputy, who visited Kitosh area in February, 1942, and discussed with certain natives there the price that was then being paid, and was given clearly to understand that the native in that area regarded a price of round about Sh. 4 at that time as a satisfactory one. About that same time you, sir, were also in the Nyanza District, and I believe that while no guaranteed price was given

the native you did state that the price he would receive for the coming crop would not be less than the price he had got for the last crop. I submit, therefore, there is clear evidence on the price basis to expect no reduction in planting.

Mr. COOKE: On a point of explanation, as one who has brought up this matter before, does the hon. member recognize the fact that the cost of living to the native was rising out of all proportion to the cost of his produce?

Mr. BLUNT: I am prepared to accept that the cost of living to the native was rising, but we are dealing with the production of food, and if the cost of living was rising surely he would plant all the more to make sure that he would not have to come on the cash market. There is reference again in paragraph 27 of the Report to a meeting which was held between myself, the Provincial Commissioners of Nyanza and Central Provinces, and the senior agricultural officers on the 9th December, 1941. As a result of our discussions I sent out a circular to all my officers with copies to Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners indicating the decisions we had arrived at at that time, and the main decision which my officers and the administrative officers were asked to put into effect was, one, that there should be increased plantings of maize in certain specific areas, and those areas were those in which maize was known to be of a good crop, and in which it was grown within reasonable-reach of the Railway. At that time it may be remembered that the transport position was not looking particularly hopeful, and while we might under other circumstances have suggested increased maize production in areas further from the railway, on the information we then had in regard to the probable transport position we were afraid to do so. However, definite instructions were sent out that we required an increase in the production of maize in the maize areas, of miama in the miama areas, and oilseeds such as groundnuts and simsim in the groundnut and simsim areas, and potatoes and beans in the areas in which they could grow best. As a result of the decisions arrived at at this meeting, the instructions given, and the propaganda that ensued, I think it is reasonable to expect, bearing in mind that the price factor was favourable, that there would be increased plant-

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ings in the main producing areas. From my own observations and from the reports I received from all my officers, and from the discussions that I had with administrative officers on the question, I had not the slightest doubt that the amount of native crop planted in 1942 was greater, not only than the crop of 1941 but of any crop that had ever been planted. During the period of growth of that crop weather conditions were reasonably favourable. At one period there was excessive rainfall and that did, undoubtedly, reduce the prospective yields in certain areas. That is mentioned in this chapter, and it did, I believe, reduce probable yields to some extent.

Nevertheless, the estimate which was formed and which I submitted to the Maize Board, and for which I take full responsibility, of the amount of maize likely to be marketed from that crop, was 1,050,000 bags. I was satisfied then that I had every justification for submitting that estimate, and I am just as satisfied now that the estimate at that time was a good one. That estimate did not represent a vast increase, and if it is considered that the amount of maize that the native puts on the market is only at the most a third of his total production, and probably only a quarter, because he keeps the rest to put in his reserve, it only represented a matter of some 7 or 10 per cent increase in total plantings, and I suggest that 7 or 10 per cent total plantings did in fact take place. The hon. Financial Secretary will probably point out to you that if this estimate which I gave had in fact been forthcoming, the difficulties that we did experience during that year would never have existed, and probably the Commission would never have sat, and we should not be debating the matter now. I would like you to consider what happens in the short rains and what we may expect as a result. In the 1940-41 season, the short rain crops exported from the native reserves amounted to 419,000 odd bags, and in the 1941-42 season they amounted to 384,000 odd bags. By short rain crops I do not mean necessarily crops grown during the short rains and exported then—what I mean is the amount of maize exported from the reserves subsequent to the short rains. We know that in many cases the short rains crop is not a maize crop, but when the

native plants his short rains crop and sees that it is satisfactorily under way to producing a crop he releases some of the maize he is holding from the previous long rains crop. In these two years the figure was round about 400,000 bags, one year more, in another less. It is illuminating that in the 1939-40 season following the failure of the short rains in the Central Province only, the short rains crop exported was 265,000 bags. One traces the 135,000 bags shortage directly to that failure of the short rains in the Central Province. There is no doubt that the short rains crop, both in Central Province and in Nyanza Province, did fail—I do not think that anybody suggested that it did not. Rainfall records indicate that it could not have come to much, and we know it did not. Therefore I submit that the shortfall during that period was due almost entirely to the failure of those rains in both the Nyanza and Central Provinces, and that had those rains not failed we should have produced the estimated quantities of maize for sale, 1,050,000 bags. I find no indication in the Commission's Report that they considered these figures which I have just given you of what are the normal exports following the short rains plantings, and I believe that if they had examined them in the way I have done now they could hardly have come to the conclusion which they did come to which I indicated when I started to discuss this chapter. I have not referred in this discussion at all to the European crop because, as members are well aware, the short rains plantings do not really enter into the question, although they do so largely in the native areas. But, as a matter of interest, the European estimate in the early stages was a surplus of 500,000 bags, and that estimate was finally reduced to 360,000 bags, and that final estimate was slightly exceeded by the marketing of 369,000 bags.

Now I should like to reply to some of the points made by the two last speakers and first of all to the remarks of the hon. Member for Trans Nzoia. He referred to the question of warnings given that a shortage of foodstuffs, particularly of maize, might be anticipated. I do not propose to go into that question at length. It is dealt with in the Commission's Report. I was present at some of the meetings to which reference is made,

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and I would only like to say that I personally agree with the finding of the Commission on that question. Although I heard many of these warnings, and in fact uttered some myself, I did not and I do not believe most of the people present on these occasions took them as referring to a definite year immediately in the future. They were general warnings and they were obvious ones. As is indicated by the figures of maize production by Europeans, production was steadily falling and it was quite obvious that if it continued to fall it would shortly come to the stage when it was practically ineffective. The hon. member referred to the fact that the stimulus which was given by the increase of price suggested in December, 1941, could not have been effective because land could not have been broken thereafter for planting in 1942. That is perfectly correct so far as it goes and new land, if it was going to be cropped in 1942, should have been broken well before that, but I do submit that there was a great deal of land which, although it had not carried a crop of maize the year before, did not necessarily want breaking and treating as if it was new land. There was a considerable acreage which had gone out of maize cultivation within the last year or two years and which could subsequently to that date have been brought into production, and in fact there was an increase in that year and therefore some of it did come back, but the point I should like to make here is in connexion with native production. It is not the habit of the native to break up his land for planting far in advance of planting time, and, in fact, the native seldom breaks any land for planting in the long rains before the middle or end of January, or even later, and the great bulk of the land that he breaks and plants is broken just before or at the time the rains commence, so that while there is a certain amount in what the hon. member says, particularly as regards European planting, that factor could have had no effect in my mind in reducing native plantings.

The hon. Member for Trans Nzoia and the hon. Member for Ukamba both referred to the fact that they would like a statement as to the Government's policy in regard to increased production. I am surprised at them getting up and

asking that question when they see and they know perfectly well the terms of the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, which has been accepted by Government, and the policy that has already been adopted this year, and to some extent last year, in trying to achieve increased European production. As regards native production, the way in which it is dealt with is the way I have indicated it was dealt with in early 1942. Instructions go out from my office to Agricultural Officers as to the particular crops that they should encourage in particular areas and the extent to which they should encourage them, and that is broadly speaking the policy of Government in such matters. If hon. members expect me to get up and make suggestions which are likely to provide certain food supplies for the country over the next twelve months and additionally enable us to put six months' supply away, I must confess I am quite unable to do so. If they have any suggestions I should very much like to hear them. I should like now to refer to the speech of the hon. Member for Ukamba. He took us on to the larger plane of East Africa rather than confining himself to the inquiry which we have in hand, which was in regard to the actual food shortage in this country, and he produced figures, if I understood him rightly, indicating that 2½ million tons of starch foods were required for a population of 12 million in these territories, and suggested that only about ½ million tons was produced in the form of maize and that that represented only 10 per cent of the total production of starch foods. I am not in a position to check his figures, but broadly I accept them as being somewhere near the mark, but I would point out that as far as this country at least is concerned that is not the position. The starch food consumed by the country does not consist of 10 per cent of maize and 90 per cent of other foods, but—and here I am rather guessing, and I think he will agree—it must be well over 50 per cent of maize that is consumed and less than 50 per cent of other foods. I have already indicated that I agree broadly with the suggestion that we should encourage the production of foodstuffs which can be readily stored, such as those he mentioned, and I have also mentioned . . .

COL. GROGAN: On a point of explanation, are we to understand that the hon. gentleman is still thinking exclusively in terms of Kenya in regard to foodstuffs?

MR. BLUNT: I am thinking in terms rather of the motion which refers to a matter confined to Kenya, and I am not prepared to enter into a discussion of what people in other parts of East Africa eat or do not eat, though I am perfectly well aware that in other countries of East Africa than Kenya, native consumption of maize is invariably small and the populations to a large extent live on other starch foods.

Now I come to a matter on which I must join issue with my hon. friend the Member for Ukamba, and that is in connexion with his remarks on locusts. While granting that he has considerably more experience of locust infestations than I have, I think he has not appreciated quite the difference, between the present outbreak and the outbreaks of earlier times to which he referred. In the earlier outbreaks, and even in the earlier outbreak that I remember and which to my sorrow I was closely connected with, we were fighting rather as a lone unit trying to do something to save our crops here without having much backing outside. The position now is very different. As hon. members are aware, there have been set up certain organizations over the last 10 years for dealing with locust outbreaks should they occur. There is the central organization which has been in existence in London for some time, which receives reports and which, in fact, has maintained scouting officers in certain areas where these outbreaks commence. I believe that that organization might have been considerably more effective in reducing the scale of the present outbreak had it not been for the war, but that organization is of necessity international in character and includes various people who, for various reasons, were unable to take the action necessary when the outbreak started. Be that as it may, the outbreak from which we are now suffering started in an area in Western India some three years ago. Locusts spread outwards from there westwards and gradually filtered, breeding as they went, through Iraq, Persia, through Arabia, across the Red Sea and into East Africa, where they have become fairly widespread. The position is not as

it was in the earlier outbreaks because a great deal of effort is being expended in all those countries which I have mentioned en route in trying to exterminate what locusts there were and trying to prevent further breeding of hoppers. All those territories I have mentioned are doing the best they can. Russia is exerting considerable effort, not only in their own areas, but assisting, as I understand it, in Persia in combating locusts there. Action is being taken in Iraq and very considerable effort has been expended in trying to get satisfactory action taken in various parts of Arabia. That action was not successful in the early stages but there is a considerable organization now working there, and while they may not be able to bring about complete control at any rate they are in a position to let us know what is going on and what we have to expect coming out of that area in the future. Action was taken last year, not only in this territory but in other territories of this group, notably in British Somaliland and Somalia, and that action resulted in a fairly satisfactory clearing up of the locusts that were bred during that year's breeding within our borders. There was one gap in our defences then which was represented by Southern Abyssinia, and in Southern Abyssinia we believe, although we were rather short of exact information, at that time, that breeding went on unmolested. Certainly the indications are that that was so because, in spite of the satisfactory clearing up we were able to achieve, we were infested again with flying swarms.

But the matter has gone further since that time. In August there was held in Nairobi a locust conference which was attended by Dr. Uvarov, who is the head of the Anti-locust Centre in London and the world's foremost expert on locusts, and another representative of the Colonial Office, and was attended by representatives of the East African territories, British and Italian Somaliland and the Belgian Congo. At that meeting the Colonial Office representative explained to us the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to locusts, and pointed out that the attitude was, under the present circumstances, that locust destruction and control was considered second in importance only to the actual fighting of the war. I do not think it is necessary to discuss the

[Mr. Blunt] reasons for that, but broadly we must admit—in fact the tenour of the debate this morning has been—the difficulty there is and the difficulty there is going to be in providing adequate supplies of foodstuffs, and the locust menace is probably the greatest menace there is to the foodstuffs that are produced over large portions of this part of the world. That is the policy as indicated to us at that meeting of His Majesty's Government. It was further suggested at that meeting, and was accepted at the meeting, that in order to achieve more satisfactory control in this part of the world there should be set up an organization, with its centre in Nairobi, which should be responsible for seeing that the campaign is conducted as satisfactorily as it should be in all the countries concerned. That organization has been set up. It is referred to as the Anti-locust Directorate for East Africa, and I had the honour to be appointed Chairman thereof. That directorate has kept in close touch with all the other countries concerned. It is sent their plans for dealing with the locust menace during the present period, and it has either approved those plans in the first instance or sent them back with suggestions as to how they should be improved before they can be approved. We have in that way got a considerable tie-up in all the countries of the group, though the tie-up is not yet entirely satisfactory as regards Southern Abyssinia, but in Southern Abyssinia the position, as far as we are aware, is less difficult than it has been in the past. An officer who scouted the area recently reported that he did not find any hoppers although there were a certain number of young flying swarms, so we are not immediately faced with the development of further swarms from there.

COL. GROGAN: Which area?

MR. BLUNT: Southern Abyssinia. But we have to look to the future position which may arise.

HIS EXCELLENCY: Order! Order! As it is now 1 o'clock I will adjourn for the luncheon interval and meet again at 2.30 p.m.

Council adjourned at 1 p.m.

Council resumed at 2.30 p.m.

MR. BLUNT: Your Excellency, I will not take up the time of Council much longer. I have tried to explain the position and organization in connexion with locusts, and I was just coming to the position as it exists at the present time in Abyssinia. I pointed out that as far as our information goes there are no hoppers in Southern Abyssinia at the moment. I would go on to say that we have now secured the co-operation of the Abyssinian authorities to the extent that the Emperor has issued certain instructions in regard to locust work in this southern area; we have, moreover, been in contact with the local Governor, who has indicated his readiness to assist us by placing all the facilities he can at our disposal to enable us to undertake operations there, and the General Officer Commanding has agreed that under the circumstances he will be prepared to allow us to use troops in that area in the same way as we are using them now in Kenya. I tried to indicate how different the position is now from what it has been during the past campaigns, when we were very much playing a lone hand and when we could not be sure of what would come to us if we cleared up the locusts within our borders. If I may come to the more immediate position as it was last year and as it is at the moment. Hon. members will be aware from locust reports that there was a very heavy infestation last year and that the greater part of the area was in country extremely difficult to deal with, namely, the Northern Frontier Province and Turkana. In spite of those difficulties and because of and with the help of the military, we were able to complete what I consider personally was a very successful campaign. It is true that escapes took place, but they were on a small scale, and when we compare that campaign and what we did with the previous campaigns we have undertaken and did then, there is no doubt in my mind that we have advanced tremendously, and we can say to ourselves that there is every prospect of success, however difficult conditions may be and however large the infestations we may have to deal with. At the present moment there is a considerable infestation over a large area in the Northern Frontier Province, and there have been heavy hatchings of hoppers in the eastern part of Kitul, and between there and the coast, and it is true that that

(Mr. Blunt) particular country that I have referred to is about the most difficult that we could possibly have to deal with in Kenya. We have, however, the full co-operation of the military, and we have more troops on the job at the moment than I think we have ever had before. We have had a very considerable effort by the native population in the Kitul areas and east of that, and although we do not expect that we shall get a complete clean-up through this country, difficult as it is, we have dealt with hoppers that existed there, and we are dealing at the moment with those coming out of there, and it is perhaps fortunate that there is a definite movement on the part of those hoppers towards more accessible country and we have a cordon which meets them there.

I do not propose to say anything more about the locust position, but I would like to take this opportunity of paying a tribute of thanks to those people who have made this effort possible, and I refer particularly to the G.O.C. and the military authorities, and to Colonel East-King, who is acting as our liaison officer with the military and who is very largely responsible for the magnificent co-operation that we have received. (Applause.) This campaign and the last campaign would have been quite impossible to undertake on the scale that we have undertaken them and with success had it not been for that co-operation. I would also like to express my great thanks to the co-operation which the Royal Air Force has so willingly given us in placing planes at our disposal in the past and thereby enabling those in charge of operations to get quickly on the scene of them when they had been going wrong. The Royal Air Force has gone further than that, and have made application for a special flight of machines to be sent here to be placed at the disposal of the Locust Directorate. There is only one thing more that I have to say, and that is that we form part now of a large organization. We are no longer playing a lone hand, and I do not consider that we, even if we thought the position so hopeless here, would be justified in giving up and thereby letting down the people in other countries who are working on the same major problem. I am perfectly satisfied in my own mind that in view of what we have done in

the past and the fact that we have undoubtedly saved the crops of this country from destruction on a very large scale, it would not be good policy for us to cease taking all possible action against locusts in the country.

There is only one other matter to which I would like to make a brief reference, and that is the question raised by the hon. Member for Trans Nzoia earlier in the debate, in which he noted the disparity of treatment between European wheat growers and European maize growers. The Commission in their report have gone into that question. They have pointed out that up to the end of 1941 the emphasis had been on wheat. The hon. Member for Nairobi North also indicated why that had been so. At that time, all our information was to the effect that what was required was wheat and that maize was not particularly required. It was only in December, 1941, when the Minister of State in Cairo made his announcement that the Middle East was prepared to take a whole series of crops from us, that maize was first suggested outside our borders as being a crop particularly required for war purposes. But even at that time, there was still some doubt as to whether that really was the fact, because shortly after that announcement was made an officer high in the councils of the Middle East in connexion with food supplies came to this country, and indicated to Government and certain other people here that although that statement was true as a general statement of what was required, still at that time the emphasis was rather on wheat and less on maize. Under those circumstances I suggest that the course that was being taken by the Production and Settlement Board and the bias that was purposely put on the production of wheat and has been put on the production of wheat from the commencement of the war, was the proper bias and was designed to obtain what we and the countries near us were in the greatest need of.

MR. PATEL (Eastern Area): Your Excellency, at the opening of the debate this morning the hon. Member for Ukamba really did a great service by directing the attention of the Council to the serious necessity of considering the food position and the steps necessary to improve it, because my feeling is that during the last 20 months in all the dis-

[Mr. Patel] discussions about Maize Control, in the evidence given before the Food Commission, and even in the report itself, everything appears to be overshadowed by consideration of the personality of the Maize Controller, and a certain amount of hostility towards him from certain quarters. I am very glad that to-day that cloud has been lifted a bit. Sir, as far as the Indian community is concerned, it is very indifferent to the recommendations of this report, because Government had acted unreasonably and had unjustifiably refused to include an Indian member of the Commission, thus giving it real cause not to take any interest in the work of the Commission, and therefore it has refused to take any interest in the findings of the Commission. But I desire to make a few remarks from the Indian point of view. I must at the outset join with other speakers in agreeing with the ability, eminence, and honest effort to direct their minds towards the problem by the three members of the Commission. At the same time, I cannot help but remark that the document they have produced is neither inspiring nor has it any vision. Moreover, as is pointed out by some speakers in this Council, they have not appreciated in some of their findings certain evidence given them, as the hon. Member for Nairobi South pointed out in the case of the Kericho mill and shortage of maize there. They have not also appreciated certain facts in making certain other findings, as was pointed out by the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General regarding paragraph 205. Further, the Commission has completely failed to appreciate the requirements of Indian diet. Certain members of the Indian community, who had refused to give evidence in pursuance of the policy adopted not to give evidence because of lack of Indian representation on the Commission, were compelled to go before the Commission on account of summonses issued on them under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, and when they went there they pointed out what their difficulties were as regards Indian food.

I would not have referred to the Indian food in this debate but for one reason, that it is not appreciated by Government, and it has not been appreciated by the Commission, that the poorer

class of the Indian community, particularly the artisans, are underfed to-day. I make that statement having fully investigated it. Moreover, there is a large number of the Indian community who do not get the essential items because they are not available in the country in the quantity required, even under the rationing system. When they receive their coupons they go to their retailer, and they find that a particular item is not available. Moreover, I have definite information, and I have investigated it, that the efficiency of the Indian artisans is going down on account of malnutrition: the quantity of food given them to-day is not sufficient. That has been represented time after time to the Kenya Commodity Distribution Board. Even the quality of certain important items which compose the Indian diet have become poorer day after day, and in some cases they get certain important items in adulterated form. That is the reason why I want to point out that this Commission has showed a complete lack of appreciation in regard to the needs of the Indian diet. On page 21, paragraph 49, the Commission refer to the shortage of ghee, which forms the most important part of Indian diet. They say: "Another complaint we had in Mombasa was from Indian witnesses regarding the amount of ghee available in Kenya compared with that available in both Tanganyika and Uganda. At the time such evidence was given, ghee was rationed in Kenya among the Asian population at half an ounce per head per day. The allegation made to us was that while ghee was being distributed in Kenya on this rationed basis, in both Tanganyika and Uganda ghee was in free supply among the Indian population there. We have no knowledge of what the position is in Tanganyika and Uganda, and therefore cannot give any conclusive finding on this allegation". I fail to understand why the Commission did not take pains to give some finding on a matter like this where a large number of the Indian population was concerned. The same item has been referred to by the Commission on page 37, paragraph 90: "We had evidence of a serious shortage of ghee in the Colony which caused some hardship among the Asian population, as it is an all important item in their diet". From the evidence, they found it was "an all important item in their diet", and found there was some hardship. Even then, the

(Mr. Patel) Commission made no recommendation whatever, they have given no finding whatever on the steps that should be taken to improve the position. They have not even taken pains to find out whether there was a shortage, and why even the amount rationed was not available for the community. I do not agree when they simply say there was some hardship among the Indian population. With many of the poorer sections, particularly the artisans, it has definitely caused great hardship and malnutrition. I am very glad that the Commission has recommended that, as far as rice is concerned, efforts should be made to make this country self sufficient but, as is generally the case with Government officials, it is also the case with this Commission, that they do not know what are the important items that make up the Indian diet. They probably thought that ghee and rice were the only two items by which the Indian population of the country was living, but there are so many other items which Government officials have neither studied nor know about, nor has the Commission cared to study or know or to suggest any means by which the Indian diet can be supplied. What surprises me most is that on page 57, paragraph 142, the Commission states: "The European and Indian diets are governed by special considerations which place them outside the scope of our inquiry". Reading the terms of reference of this Commission, I do not know whether, by a stretch of imagination, these diets are placed outside the scope of inquiry of this Commission. The terms of reference are very clear—

Mrs. WATKINS: On a point of explanation, if the hon. member reads the next sentence he will get the whole meaning of that paragraph.

Mr. PATEL: The terms of reference are: "To inquire into the present food shortage with a view to ascertaining and reporting on the causes thereof and to make recommendations to prevent a recurrence". It does not mean that that applies only to a native food shortage, and obviously they had to make an inquiry for all the communities. They state later, I know, in the same paragraph 142: "That the agricultural policy of the country should be such as to provide adequate quantities of the foodstuffs

required for the dietetic needs of these communities". They say that it is outside the scope of their inquiry, and that is the reason why, having taken a wrong meaning of their terms of reference, I submit that they have taken a wrong step in not making an inquiry into the needs of the Indian diet and making recommendations and findings regarding what was in short supply and what steps should be taken to supply them according to the needs of the community, or at least according to the amount of rationing. I submit that there is no hue and cry in this matter from the Indian side because the top class has not felt the pinch; it is the bottom class, the artisans, who are underfed and have lost all keenness to work, and their voice has not reached Government so far. Ultimately, however, these circumstances forced the Indian Congress held on the 14th January under the presidency of the Hon. Shamsud-Deen to pass a resolution, "that in the opinion of Congress, the Government has failed in its duty to provide the Asian community with most of their food requirements, and experience has shown the neighbouring territories have been unable to help in the matter, it is essential to make Kenya self-sufficient in the production of food grains and other articles of Asian diet such as ghee, simsim oil, milk, etc. This Congress therefore appeals to His Excellency the Governor to create a special department charged with the responsibility of preparing a properly considered plan to achieve this object". Congress was forced to pass this resolution, because the members felt that the majority of the Indian community was underfed.

As far as this report is concerned, I can cite other instances also to show that they have not appreciated certain matters and have not taken pains to make necessary findings. I can give one more instance in support of my contention—I think it has been mentioned by an hon. member in this debate, but it will stand repetition. On page 4 the Commission, referring to the organizations, say: "This difficulty was accentuated by the fact that among the witnesses intimately connected with the inter-territorial and territorial organizations there was no unanimity of opinion as to the exact functions of the various East African and Kenya bodies and the manner in which such bodies are

(Mr. Patel) correlated and co-ordinated. The absence of clear evidence regarding the background on which the organization of production, distribution and rationing and consumption of foodstuffs is built handicapped us throughout our inquiries". Members of any Commission who had undertaken to give concrete findings should have taken pains to call further evidence from these various controls and departments to find out their correct working, so that their inquiry could be correct. They themselves admit at the beginning of this report that they were handicapped throughout their inquiries, and still we are asked to-day by some hon. members to believe that this report is a very useful document. No doubt there are some useful recommendations, but they are recommendations which could probably have been made by the Director of Agriculture without hearing all that evidence and wasting three months. Looking at this page, we find one other reference about non-natives, page 4, paragraph 12: "We are also left in no doubt that although there has been a shortage of some commodities (wheat, beans, fowls, eggs, ghee, bacon, meat, sugar, butter, potatoes, rice and fresh vegetables) for several months, the non-natives of Kenya have been no more than inconvenienced". I read some reference in the *Kenya Weekly News* last week that, as far as the European community was concerned, it has not suffered, but when the Commission states that the non-natives of Kenya have not been more than inconvenienced it merely shows a very complete ignorance of facts existing with regard to the Indian diet.

I do not desire, Your Excellency, to take up the time of Council by repeating what other members have said, but I do desire to say one thing in regard to the Maize Controller, not because I desire to discuss a personality, but because it raises two very important principles in this country. The first thing is that when the Commission was sitting, Government employed an advocate, and in the last sittings the K.F.A. also employed an advocate, giving the impression to an outsider like myself, who did not take any interest during the time of the evidence, that there are two parties to the dispute, the Government and the K.F.A., which engaged advocates to defend themselves,

and the case was conducted against the accused, the Maize Controller, who was in the box, with the question of a food shortage as a very secondary matter. One member said that after deleting the reference paragraph 205 from the motion: "We are all very happy now that we have taken out the personal reference to the Maize Controller". There can be no doubt that the struggle was between the K.F.A. and Government—the K.F.A. is the most influential trading organization in this country, and Government has given way. (Members: Question!) Yes, sir, as some member has questioned me I would refer to some of the paragraphs that I had not intended to. (Laughter.) It was made very clear in this Council yesterday that Col. Griffiths was persuaded, with a view to taking advantage of his long experience in this country, to help in the war effort by accepting this post. Unfortunately, he accepted this post at a time when he had quarrelled with the directors of the K.F.A., and at a time when the most influential trading organization was offended by him. There is no doubt from all the evidence which was tendered, and even from some of the findings of the Commission, and from what we heard yesterday in this Council, that from the very beginning there was a hostility towards the Maize Controller, arising out of the instinct of self interest which is very prominent among trading interests nowadays. Paragraph 164 of the report and the last but one sub-paragraph thereof on page 68 shows this, and it indicates how the most influential trading organization in this country worked up the feelings of other people in this country. They were influential enough to move even Government House.

MAJOR KEYSER: On a point of order, will the hon. member tell us what section of the evidence that comes under? He said there was evidence to show it.

Mr. PATEL: It is said there that there was lack of confidence in the Maize Controller in the whole country and public opinion was against him. I note that in this country public opinion—non-official public opinion—means only the opinion of the non-official European community. When allegations were made in this Council yesterday that there was lack of confidence of the whole country, did anybody ever care to know what was the opinion of the Indian community? Nobody ever tried to find out what was

[Mr. Patel] the opinion of the African community and what they thought of it. It is all very well to say that the country thought so-and-so. It is no business of mine to speak either for or against the Maize Controller, but as I said, it raises a very important principle; that no organization, however influential, should be allowed to overshadow the important policies of the Government of the country, as has taken place in this case. The Maize Controller, as one can see, was not even given the opportunity to work. The hostility against him was shown from the very beginning, from the time he was appointed as Maize Controller. It is all very well now to say that he has failed; did he fail from the day he was appointed? I would refer again to page 68, the last but one paragraph, of the report. I will not read the paragraph and take up the time of Council, but there it is shown very clearly that even before the first regulations regarding the operation of Maize Control were allowed any chance to work, and even before the Maize Controller had had time to work, hostility was shown from certain quarters and the Government was compelled to revise the regulations. On page 69 it is stated that the power given to the Maize Controller in the first regulations was: "The Controller may in writing appoint servants or agents in any area within the Colony, and any such servant or agent may exercise such duties, powers and functions of the Controller as may be specified in the appointment". It goes on: "This was criticized by the K.F.A. representatives on the above-mentioned ground because it gave the Controller absolute power to appoint agents and servants throughout the Colony as he pleased. This criticism was replied to by the Maize Controller, who said that the only practicable method of working was for the Controller to be free to make his own arrangements" and so on, and in the next paragraph: "Eventually it was decided at that second meeting to recommend the addition of the following proviso to the above-mentioned Regulation: 'Provided that the Kenya Farmers' Association (Co-operative), Limited, shall be appointed as agent of the Controller in respect of the purchase and handling on behalf of the Controller of all maize produced by European producers'". And in paragraph 165: "The first Regulations,

entitled the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, were promulgated by Government Notice No. 430 on the 1st May, 1942. Under those Regulations the sole right to buy and sell maize produced in, or imported into, the Colony was vested in the Maize Controller on behalf of Government, and no one could export maize from the Colony without his permission".

That was changed and the Maize Board was given the power because hostility was shown from those quarters. I am quite sure the first Regulations were drafted by Government with the advice of its officers and these were not even given a chance to work. On page 71, paragraph 117, reads: "The first Regulations evoked considerable criticism, mainly directed against the wide powers vested in the Controller, the procedure regarding squatter-grown maize, the difference in price between European-grown maize and native-grown maize, and so on. Eventually new Regulations were enacted by Government Notice No. 877 on the 1st October, 1942". Those Regulations would not have been published in the Official Gazette by October, 1942, unless the matter was represented to Government a short time after the institution of the Control and the promulgation of the first Defence Regulations. Not only that but no opportunity was given to enable the first regulations to work. At this stage I want to say that some of the Controllers are given greater powers than the Maize Controller had, and yet nobody so far has raised a finger against them, but because in this case an influential trading organization was involved it was able to work up the feelings of the country. One reads, on page 91, paragraph 211: "Finally, allegations were made by the K.F.A., through their Chairman, of unfair discrimination against themselves by the Maize Controller in the distribution of maize. The Chairman of the K.F.A. particularly mentioned that four firms of Indian millers in Nairobi had received preferential treatment to themselves as regards the amount of maize allocated to them by Control. This allegation had already been inquired into by the Maize Board and at its meeting on the 5th-6th January, 1943, the following resolution was before the Board: 'That this Board, having inquired into the complaint by the Kenya Farmers' Association (Co-opera-

[Mr. Patel] tive), Limited, of unfair discrimination against this Association by the Controller in the distribution of maize supplies during July and August, 1942, at Nairobi and Mombasa, considers on the evidence put before it that no case of such unfair discrimination has been substantiated. At that meeting one member recorded his opinion as 'not proven' and all the other members voted in favour of the resolution. We examined the figures produced before us by the Maize Controller and the K.F.A.—that is the Commission now—"and the books of the four Indian millers, in addition to hearing their evidence. On that evidence and from an analysis of all the figures produced before us, we find that no case of unfair discrimination against the K.F.A. in the allocation of maize by the Maize Controller is substantiated".

This paragraph shows conclusively that not only was hostility shown, but a certain amount of persecution was followed against the Maize Controller. I have raised this matter, again I repeat, sir, to show that there is a general trend in the whole world to-day in all democratic countries against any trading organization with monopolistic tendencies getting control over society. If the Government gave way in this case, I think such procedure will be against the best interests of the country generally. It involves a great principle, because the Government in such case has not ruled but has succumbed to a certain amount of blackmail.

Before I sit down I should like to say one thing, that I suggest some commission be appointed to inquire into what influence is exercised by powerful commercial organizations in this country against the best interests of the country and its development. I am sure there will be some very interesting stories to be told.

MRS. WATKINS (Kiambu): Your Excellency, before I came to this session I was briefed and prepared to say a good deal rather strongly. Notably the female of the species is more deadly than the male in this kind of attack.

"Very rarely," says Kipling of men, "Very rarely will he squarely push the logic of a fact

To the ultimate conclusion of unmitigated act.

Man's timid heart is bursting with the things he must not say,

But the woman that God gave him can give a few away!

So it comes that man, the coward, when he gathers to confer

With his fellow braves in Council rarely leaves a place for her."

I think Kipling is right for we are generally rather more outspoken. This time we do not want to be pushed, so I am going to stay my hand, but I do want to make two points that are very important. One was made by Your Excellency himself. We have been hectically hunting, some of us on this side, for the particular reference, but we have not found it, but I think Your Excellency will remember assuring us that the sole reason for retaining people in office in war time when they were non-officials and acting almost in a voluntary capacity was that they should be good at the task they perform. Now, Maize Control has proved itself a failure, but Government has not yet admitted that failure. The hon. Member for Nairobi North did very generously admit mistakes on his side, but we did not get the same admission at all from the opposite side, or we have not got it so far. It seems a pity we have got to "whitewash" it. It seems to me that one is best reminded of another quotation—"And he, willing to justify himself, said—"—he said quite a lot! (Laughter). But I do feel that we have got to realize failure and because we are all of us very much aware of our own mistakes, yet we do realize that we do not want to push the ultimate conclusion of the other man's mistakes too heavily upon him unless the war effort is at stake. In this case it has been at stake and still is at stake, but I do not think it was individual failure; it was collective failure; it was the failure of nearly all of us, and particularly the Maize Control, to even appreciate what Maize Control meant. They do not seem to have looked up "control" in the dictionary—they thought it meant sitting at a table with a bit of paper in front of them and writing out slips of paper, regardless of what was in the stores up country. That was how it seemed to us farmers. I do not speak with nearly the same amount of experience of course as all the hon. members

[Mrs. Watkins]

from my right, because I am only a coffee farmer and I only talk to coffee farmers, and although we are dependent on the maize farmers and have to leave most of that side to them, we do feel very strongly indeed that these mistakes have been collective and that they should be admitted and that they should be enumerated here and now in this Council.

The first one is I think that almost magnetic mistake of centralization in Nairobi—the dear old bottle-neck appearing in another form. I have protested against the bottle-neck from the first day I got into Legislative Council until now, and I shall continue to contest it. One of the most harmful things is to have centralization in Nairobi for Nairobi by Nairobi. That is the impression gained by the rest of the country. I am very glad to hear the hon. Member for Nairobi North, who has so much to do with it, say that he is hoping to decentralize now. That is the first. The second is rather old history perhaps, and that is the abolition of the Statistical Department. It was, of course, one of the major mistakes at the beginning of this war that it was not reinstated immediately. I am glad it is now back, but it is perhaps rather too late, and perhaps rather too little to my mind. Next is an old protégé of mine, one of the biggest leaks in the production tank at the moment, and that is the crime of not dealing with crime. We are told that we cannot interfere with our magistrates or with our laws which are the law of Britain, which means that like the laws of the Medes and Persians they cannot be changed. I should like to draw the attention of Council to the fact that the laws of England have been changed, enormously heavy penalties have been imposed on people who take advantage of the war to commit crimes. For instance, lifting a packet of cigarettes from a bombed shop in London carries a heavier punishment than that for forging a £4,000 cheque before the war. Out here we have done nothing, and as far as I can see we are content to do nothing. When a magistrate gives a reasonable sentence not tied up with technical legalities, or legal technicalities, he is immediately deprived of his good intentions by the High Court who reverse the sentence, the native “cocks a snook” at us, and goes off and does it

again. I have neighbours who have squatters, and they cannot plant maize because it is stolen, and I also have neighbours who plant potatoes and lose as much as two acres in a night. They are only planting to feed the black market. Until we do face this position of crime in the country, until we face it realistically, we are not going to do very much more about the small man's production. We know quite well that Army property—blankets for instance—are being stolen and are brought into court, and we know we cannot buy these things out of the Army control, and yet we let that criminal go free because we are too weak to make a law that deals with the case realistically. We cannot continue in this way and it adds enormously to the indiscipline of our labour.

Let me deal for a moment with that labour. The indiscipline would be ludicrous if it was not tragic. It has gone to this extent. Your Excellency, that the Government decided that in respect of certain essential products which, luckily for us, included coffee, conscript labour may be used. We were forthwith told that a fairly heavy fee was payable, I think it was Sh. 18 per man. A lot of us paid that fee. We saw our conscripts, or rather we saw some of them, or a large proportion of them, but quite a large percentage never arrived at the farm, so naturally I went, hat in hand, to the Government and said, “Can I have my fee back, or can I have some other conscripts?” and I was told that all the Government could do was to order the men to go, not to see that they arrived or to see that the order was obeyed, but only to give the order. Now I know where one or two of these conscripts are and I have notified where I think they are. One has been taken, three have never been seen, and yet I have paid the full fees. That has happened all over the country. That is discipline for you. While every British boy and girl has to turn out and do a job whether he likes it or not, the native snaps his finger at us and we let him go and charge fees for issuing the order! The question of storage is another point. The Director of Agriculture confirmed my suspicions to-day in that his only policy is one of procrastination. Storage is very vital from the farmer's point of view because it means he can carry stocks from one season to another, and that means that

[Mrs. Watkins]

and try and take away the whole of his staff, landing him in a crisis. It is one of those things that seems to me to be indicative of the whole proceedings. As one is always hearing how badly people come out of these things, let me refresh you with a story of somebody who came out rather well. A girl was approached with an offer of further employment; she did not know definitely whether it was improved employment, but probably employment with a fairly high salary. She said “Thank you very much; the K.F.A. have always treated me very decently and I will not think of deserting them in this hour of crisis” and, being a woman, she slammed the door. I am very glad a woman did that because after all women are not as a rule as well paid as men. It does her credit and it does credit to the way the K.F.A. treat their employees.

I should like to add one further word in conclusion, and that is I think this Report, which has followed the admirable British custom of being a masterpiece of understatement, will have served its purpose if we can face up to our joint, our collective, mistakes and our collective responsibilities, if we do not try and “white-wash” ourselves or anybody else, and just say, “Yes, we have done this and that, we have misjudged, we have considered ourselves first, and now we have to get right on to this and to consider the whole aspect”. I particularly recommend these two considerations, which nobody else has stressed: to the hon. Chief Native Commissioner the matter of the indiscipline of the native and the possibility of apprenticeship for native boys so that they may learn the conscientiousness of work and the importance of work; and to the hon. Attorney General for some strengthening of our laws, some help to our overworked magistrates who know their cases are going to be reversed on the very slightest technical flaw one can possibly fish out of the legal book. This is what is happening at the present moment. Law and order are not being kept, it is just the letter of the law that is being underlined, and in a native country it does not help the people it is supposed to serve and it is ruining the war effort.

With those words I will conclude.

I should like to answer one or two points, if I may be so bold, that the hon. Acting Attorney General made. He made one point on behalf of the Maize Controller I should like to deal with, and that was that this man had done one or two great things for this country, and I cordially agree he has, but I do not agree that included in them has been the refusal of a £4,000 job so as to take a £2,000 job at the present time with the chance of converting the whole of the native grain trade to the firm that is going to employ him in the post-war years. I do not believe that on the face of it there is anything disinterested in it. I do not think he did it in any dishonourable sense, but I do not think as a business deal it was such a bad thing to do. The post-war years are going to be tricky years, and if he looked ahead and thought on those lines good luck to him, but I do not think it could be held up as a noble action, any more than anybody else who sells land now when he may get a better price than he will later. When he was dealing with other people's employees the Acting Attorney General seemed to refer to it in a very light manner, that he took the employees and they were free to go! Of course, the Acting Attorney General must be legally minded and he may be perfectly right from the legal point of view, but to the ordinary layman, who tries to be honest on the ordinary standards, he is absolutely wrong. You do not go to a competitor

and try and take away the whole of his staff, landing him in a crisis. It is one of those things that seems to me to be indicative of the whole proceedings. As one is always hearing how badly people come out of these things, let me refresh you with a story of somebody who came out rather well. A girl was approached with an offer of further employment; she did not know definitely whether it was improved employment, but probably employment with a fairly high salary. She said “Thank you very much; the K.F.A. have always treated me very decently and I will not think of deserting them in this hour of crisis” and, being a woman, she slammed the door. I am very glad a woman did that because after all women are not as a rule as well paid as men. It does her credit and it does credit to the way the K.F.A. treat their employees.

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With those words I will conclude.

FINANCIAL SECRETARY (Mr. Tester):
Your Excellency, the hon. Member for

[Mr. Tester]

Ukamba stated that he considered that the earlier of the two terms of reference of the Commission to be much more important, and he seemed to me to deprecate the reference to the second part. I myself agree with him but, as the noble lord the hon. Member for Rift Valley stated yesterday, really quite serious allegations had been made against the Maize Controller and Maize Board, so that in these circumstances I should like to say something about those allegations. On page 30 of the report the Commission says that neither I nor Mr. Norton, that is the chairman and secretary of the Kenya Supply Board, "looked upon the figures in that note as a means of revealing that at that time, in February, 1942, a serious shortage of maize was imminent". My opinion is that in the analysis of the note of 10th February, 1942, the Commission have definitely misdirected themselves, and they have formed the impression among those who do not understand the maize position that we were in a far worse position in those days than we really were; that is, that consumption had overtaken production at a tremendous rate. My opinion is that in 1941/42 consumption was rapidly overtaking production, and from those figures on the 10th February, 1942, it was quite clear they were and that consumption had reached production with a small margin for export outside East Africa which had already been arranged. That did not mean to say that an imminent shortage was about to occur, because the Agricultural Production Board was undertaking a large programme of production. As we know, they produced more maize that year than before. The Director of Agriculture had already gone to the provinces and increased native production and, as we know, his estimate of production was a quarter of a million bags more in 1942/43 than in 1941/42. At the moment I have been speaking only of maize, but as well as an increased production of maize there was an enormously increased production of mitama, wimbi, and various other native crops, so much so that during the first half of 1942 we were able to put stocks aside which were not used until famine came. I should like to invite hon. members' attention to these figures, because I think there is a great deal of

misapprehension. On page 31 we have the production figures of 1,216,000 bags as estimated by the manager of the K.F.A. If we look at the bottom of that page, the Commission agrees that the production was 1,219,000 bags. In these circumstances I think we can agree that both the manager of the K.F.A. and Mr. Norton and myself had got the right figures of production in any event, and we can leave this for a moment.

If you continue on page 31, you will find that the actual consumption figures were given in the note which we considered, at 525,000 bags for the first six months and an estimated 95,000 bags per month for the last six months. Those figures were remarkably accurate, and I think there is no doubt at all that they were the consumption figures. That is about 87,500 bags per month for the first six months and something under 95,000 for the last six months period. That consumption is the total local consumption; that is to say, the military, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and I am not sure that that is made entirely clear in some of the correspondence. The net result of that examination was that we expected to have a surplus of 8,000 bags, 8,000 bags on a year's working. I think that it is a proof that consumption had caught up with production, but it is not at all proof that a shortage was imminent. It at least proves that the reserves in the country were not touched and, in fact, had been slightly augmented. If the Commission had left it at that and had taken the statements of the general manager of the K.F.A. to be correct, as they were, I do not think that we should have been in the position of hearing all over the country—and now it seems all over the world—that consumption had galloped ahead of production and that we contemplated without taking any action, ending up the year with about 2½ days reserve of maize and things of that nature.

I will take you further on with the analysis. We ended up with 8,000 bags surplus which I maintain was as near as possible correct. It proved that we were accurate in our estimates for 1941/42. We come down to the part of the statement, head II, page 31. This is really a most curious statement, because Mr. Norton and myself are accused of making rather a mess of the reading of the letter

[Mr. Tester]

of the 10th February, 1942, which dealt with a specific period. Suddenly the Commission now produces the figure of 136,755 bags. That relates to a different period from the period discussed in the letter of the 10th February, 1942, but it is as a matter of fact not an enormously important point. It does show that if we take these figures, which were not then available, there would have been a shortage of 15,000 bags on the year's working. But, what is more curious about this part of the analysis marked II, is that although the Commission takes an increased figure of exports using a different period, they have not taken the reduced figure of civilian consumption for the same period. I think it would have been a more usual way to set things out to us, but here you have the first part, as the letter of the 10th February, 1942, shows, giving a surplus of 8,000 bags, and now you take the second part, and what really happened was that 136,000 bags were exported, but a considerable amount less was consumed by Kenya and the East African population in the different period, still giving a surplus of some 8,000 bags. If they had taken both figures you would find the result would come back again to about 8,000 bags surplus or thereabouts. At any rate, it was not a rapid deterioration of the situation and there was no diminution of the stocks or reserves.

Now I come to the point where I think the Commission have really severely misdirected themselves. This is in connexion with the consumption figures. Turning to page 32, we find that the Commission come to the astonishing conclusion that there was a shortfall on Kenya consumption by 202,000 bags. I am afraid this is going to be very boring and trying for everybody, but it is a matter of analysis of the figures, and I will try and give it as simply as I can. On page 31 it is agreed that the actual bag consumption was 525,000 odd, which works out at about 87,500 bags a month. If we turn to page 32, we have actual figures again: the military about 24,000 bags a month; Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika and the flour diluent totalled altogether and divided by 12, about 24,000 bags a month; those two added together are roughly 48,000 a month; deduct them from the figure of 87,500 I mentioned and you find, deduc-

ting the actual figures, that the consumption was about 40,000 bags a month. The next figure we have of consumption is 95,000 bags a month. On the same basis that leaves us with a consumption of 47,000 bags monthly. Therefore I think it is perfectly clear and can be substantiated in many ways that the civil consumption of East Africa and the military, the local East African consumption, was rising during the period 1941/42 from about 40,000 to 47,000 bags monthly, say an average of some 45,000. That, of course, has quite a distinct relation to the increase in labour out at work. It seems to me a most astonishing thing that having actual figures which substantiate the letter of the 10th February, 1942, the Commission should then go on to imaginary figures and supposition. They seem to think there must be some reason for the maize shortage and the warnings given and tried to find out what it was, and the Commission came to the conclusion that it was not 40,000 to 47,000 a month as the local East African consumption but that 60,000 a month was that consumption. How do they make that out? You will find it on page 32, Head V. They say there were 247,401 registered natives in employment on the 15th December, 1942, and 2 lb. per head per day would come to about 74,220 bags a month. But I would remind you that the hon. Member for Nairobi North stated that he thought that about 275,000 bags of maize were kept back by maize farmers for their own labour and stock. The Commission have included that consumption by labour. There are 59,000 people in the Rift Valley, most of whom are employed on farms which feed their labour, and they included them in this figure. That is how the Commission's calculation has gone up from 45,000, the proper figure, to their figure of 60,000, and the difference of 15,000 monthly multiplied by 12, is 180,000, which in fact cancelled out the imaginary and supposed figure of 202,000 shortage. That is quite an honest and straightforward deduction, and I do not think we can get away from it.

I do think that with the best intentions in the world the Commission misdirected themselves on this point. Of course, if you realize there was not this enormous shortage in 1941/42, the whole attitude to the letter, and to Mr. Norton and myself and to the position we took on

(Mr. Tester) the letter, must be completely altered. What we did was to immediately stop exports, which I gathered this morning the hon. Member for Trans Nzoia undoubtedly considered was a wise thing to do. We stopped export immediately, and the result was that we came to the end of the year 1941/42, the 30th June, 1942, we ended it so far as stocks were concerned very much as we were a year ago. I think you will want some supporting statements in regard to that. When Maize Control took over on 1st July, 1942, it took over 72,000 bags of maize as against a normal reserve in the hands of millers and traders of about 90,000 bags. We also have evidence in paragraph 81 of the Commission's report itself that stocks in the hands of employers of labour must have been at least normal, because in the temporary shortage that followed in July, August and September, 1942, the country lived on this maize which they had in reserve. Not only is that the case, but we have evidence that more maize was being sold just before the coming into force of control. All that maize went into the country, and the figures of stocks, I think, without the least doubt in the world, our internal stocks, in the hands of millers and traders were slightly under the usual figure and in the hands of employers of labour were considerably greater than is usual at that time of the year. Of course, that gives not the slightest reason to be complacent about anything, because for the year 1941/42 we certainly did not improve our position at all and we ended up, as I say, really just about in the same state as we had been a year ago. The Commission seems to have thought that Mr. Norton and myself should have done something about it on the 10th February, 1942, but we did nothing except stop exports, for these reasons. We looked ahead to 1942/43, we knew that there was going to be increased consumption—how was it going to be coped with? By measures of increased production that were taking place, both European and Native. Also, there was a figure here of 136,000 bags exported in 1941/42 which there was no necessity to export in a subsequent year, and finally there was the fact that other native food-stuffs had been grown in increased quantities and relieved the pressure on maize.

Now I turn to Chapter XIV, page 73, which deals with the administration and operation of Maize Control. As I mentioned when I started to speak, the noble lord the hon. Member for Rift Valley quite rightly stated that this chapter contained some severe criticisms on the Maize Control and, in fairness, to the Board, I think I should throw some light and give some explanation of these charges. If you turn to paragraph 175, it deals in fact with the written note of the 10th February, 1942, and to my mind, as I have already said, I think it is quite certain that the Commission misdirected themselves. We next come to paragraph 176: the real question here is—did all the maize that should come under the Control come under the Control? This is a very difficult question to answer, because quite early on in the days of Maize Control we had opinions expressed that all this maize was not coming under the Control. My hon. friend the Member for Nairobi North made a number of investigations, we consulted administrative officers, agricultural officers, and for some time we could get nothing in the way of proof. Later on, especially from the Rift Valley Province, came some information that maize was being traded over the back door and that sort of thing, and we were losing quite a lot. Hon. members will know that we have done our best, especially in regard to squatter maize and forest squatter maize, to stop that sort of thing, and I shall be able to tell you later the steps taken in the Nyanza Province. Paragraph 177 deals with a very small point, but at first sight it did affect Maize Control. This is the matter of the trader's commission. The suggestion is that if we had paid native traders Sh. 1 a bag commission we should presumably have got more maize under control. I might remind Council that the extra 50 cents commission would have cost the consumer £25,000 a year. The Maize Board, before it fixed the price of 50 cents, went into the matter and the average usual commission was found to be 34 cents a bag, and therefore it seemed—bearing in mind the consumer and bearing in mind the very small amount of maize affected—that it was a wise decision to stick to the 50 cents. I think it must have made little difference one way or the other the amount of maize coming into the Control. There is another rather trivial dead business re-

(Mr. Tester) ferred to in paragraph 178, this is the long notice sent out by the Controller to all traders, whether they were African traders dealing in two bags or the K.F.A. dealing in 200,000 bags. There is one point not brought out by the Commission, that is that an administrative circular was sent out to all administrative and agricultural officers asking them to explain to the natives exactly what they had to do, but the reports says the Commission had no doubt that the circular sent out by the Controller resulted in the distrust by the native traders of the scheme from the start. As I said, an administrative instruction was sent out and it was explained to the natives, and as far as I am aware no one ever heard that there was distrust among the natives. Perhaps a witness being wise after the event led the Commission astray.

Paragraph 179 deals with the date of the introduction of Maize Control. I think that this must remain a matter of opinion, and as we shall not be again introducing Maize Control for the first time I think that may be regarded as running a dead horse. But there is this to be said. We are considering a different system of Maize Control, and it is quite obvious that the date it is introduced is a factor which will require consideration. I come to paragraph 180, which deals with the unfortunate relations between the Maize Control staff and the K.F.A. staff in Nyanza Province. I think both the Maize Board and the present general manager of the K.F.A. are perfectly well aware that there has been a great deal of friction between these two staffs and have been of the opinion that the remedy was that the K.F.A. should have a good man there and that the Maize Board should have a good man there to settle all local differences on the spot. I think each of the two parties concerned has during the past few months been able to get more responsible people, and to some extent the friction is not so acute. Of course, it really raises the question whether servants of the Maize Control are wanted there at all or not. In paragraph 181, we come to the question of the distribution of maize, and the Commission is of opinion "that neither the Maize Board nor the Maize Controller had taken any steps to be in a position to allocate and distribute maize in a systematic manner and this

affected the efficiency of the working of the Control". Is that quite correct? We certainly did not start rationing, but when the Maize Board first began to function it had before it production estimates of over 1½ million bags, and there was no reason whatever at that time for any native or trader to anticipate an acute and lasting shortage. It was of the greatest importance that the Maize Board should get accurate figures of normal consumption, not an artificial figure based on rationing, but the amount of maize actually eaten outside the reserves. As you know, we were not concerned with the consumption in the reserves. In order to do that, the Maize Controller sent maize to areas according to past experience, and when the maize once got to the area the normal demand took up the maize. To my mind, that should have gone on if we had not gone into a period of acute shortage during the continuation of Maize Control, because it is a way to limit consumption of maize to a normal amount and not artificially stimulate it by rationing and placing maize in the hands of people who were not usually eating it and probably would not have eaten it at all unless they had a ration ticket for it. Paragraph 182 deals with this question of "something wrong with the Maize Control", and the fact that Mr. Wollen took over distribution and the chairman of the Production and Supply Council took over the allocation of maize. The Maize Board is not of the opinion that there was something wrong with the Control because these two things happened. They considered that Mr. Wollen was most fortunately available at a time when the Maize Board continued to be short of staff, and when rationing came in an immense amount of additional work was necessary so that his assistance was made use of in the natural course of events. It was not a question of something being wrong with the Control before. Equally in the same way, when the whole of East Africa became short of cereals, the whole of the Maize Control became in effect, though not in law, a part of a cereals pool, and it was most definitely a matter for inter-territorial allocation to be done by an inter-territorial authority.

I should now like to deal with the reason why there was delay in rationing after it was decided to ration. It was on

[Mr. Tester] the 7th December, 1942, that the Maize Board recommended rationing. Steps were taken at once and the scheme was ready and people were asked to register, and there has been a great deal of criticism, I think perfectly justifiable criticism, on the point that it took about two months to get the rationing going. What happened when people were asked to register was that they registered and the public of Kenya put in applications for 270,000 bags of maize a month, and never at any time have they used more than about 60,000 or 70,000, so that they put in for about four times as much as they needed, and then wondered why there was delay in sorting things out and why rationing did not get going about a month before it did. You will remember that at about the same time, in February, stocks of maize held by various people were called for and 1,007 people gave either false returns or no returns or late returns. I should like to go back to this question of registration by consumers. I remember that as late as March, 1943, Mr. Wollen made a statement that even then everybody had not sent in their requirements. But before we come to that period we have got in the view of the Commission various warnings that we were short of maize. The first warning was supposed to have been in July when the deliveries to the Control were very small—about 14,000 I think it was in July and another small quantity in August, and not a very large quantity in September. The Maize Board did not look upon that as a warning of impending shortage, of imminent shortage. The Maize Board took the view that these deliveries were delayed and that it did not mean a reduction in the total quantity of maize at all. I am very pleased to be able to point out that in paragraph 66 of the Report the Commission agrees that the cold and wet weather in July and August, 1942, had only delayed the harvesting of the crop. So I think perhaps I may have managed to "white-wash" the Board in so far as that warning was concerned.

Now we come to a very much more important so-called warning when we come to the first reduction in the crop production estimates on the 21st October, 1942. I think hon. members will be familiar with the figures. There was a total reduction of 195,000 bags. Again

the Commission refers to this as a warning; it certainly was a warning to review the situation and the Maize Board took steps which I think were quite reasonable to meet the situation. When the Maize Board got its first estimates of production it had 129,500 bags a month to deal with throughout the 12 months. On the 21st October, in view of the fact that deliveries had been delayed, even although the production estimates were cut down, the Maize Board had 145,000 bags a month to deal with for the rest of the year, so it seems to me there was no need to have taken any special steps, such as reducing the ration to about ½ lb. and sending natives back to the reserves and upsetting production at that time. The next time we had a meeting was on the 23rd November, 1942. Again there was a reduction in the production figures, but still we had to come from production 113,500 bags a month, which was very little less than our average for the whole year, and in the meantime we got rid of the Military liability for six months and the matter of the U.K.C.C. contract. It seems to me that on none of these occasions, when you look at the figures and when you have the advantage, as we have now, of hearing figures which the Commission had not got at the time—not all of them—I do not think the Maize Board can be blamed for not having taken steps to ration natives on farms and to send them back to the reserves and other violent action before it did on the 7th December, which was the first time that the production figures showed that they were below our average consumption for the remainder of the year. It, too, has to be remembered once more that rationing of maize does not by any means mean a reduction in consumption of maize, but it secures even distribution.

In another respect the Maize Board and the Maize Controller and myself have been criticized and that is in connexion with the 1942/43 contract with the Middle East. I have already explained that the first contract was broken and export was stopped in February, 1942. Then you come to the second contract, quoted on page 80 of the Report, about which we have been very severely criticized, and to my mind there has not been such a story of much ado about nothing since Shakespeare wrote comedies about 450 years ago. Has the public considered the U.K.C.C. side of this? The U.K.C.C.

[Mr. Tester] were most anxious to have a contract covering any surplus we might possibly have, so that there would be no maize on the market affecting their various operations in maize. They wanted to get the whole of our maize; they wanted none of it to be free to operate against them. I think that was a most wise provision of the U.K.C.C. and, with its escape clause, a most useful provision for us. There is no reason to my mind at all why this contract should be criticized; it was useful to the U.K.C.C. and it was useful to us in any circumstances in which we had a surplus. But there are still further complications about this contract, because evidently the Commission thought that the U.K.C.C. agent had been very badly dealt with by the Controller. You will see, if I can find the telegram that was sent by him, that it must have been lapse of memory on his part which gave rise to the evidence before the Commission. The Controller and myself are blamed, in paragraph 187 of the Report, for not having warned him or given him any indication that he would not get 100,000 bags of maize at the time the contract was signed. This is the telegram sent by the U.K.C.C. representative 5 days before the contract was signed: "As the planting season has not yet been completed it is difficult to pin the Maize Controller down to a definite figure that will be available for export. The fear of locust attack is also in his mind. I therefore propose to sign agreement for total exportable surplus with minimum of 20,000 tons and maximum of 100,000 tons." It seems to me that that quite clears any charge against the Maize Controller and myself of having misled the U.K.C.C., especially as the minimum was governed by clause 4 of the contract.

MR. COOKE: May we know whether this was produced before the Commission or not?

MR. TESTER: I do not know whether it was produced in evidence; I know a copy was sent to the Chairman.

MAJOR KEYSER: What is the date of the telegram?

MR. TESTER: The 30th April, 1942, and you will remember the contract was signed on the 5th May.

I hope that in the short time available to me I have dissuaded Council of some of the charges made against the Maize

Board and the Controller and Mr. Norton, but what is far more important is to look to the future. I think it is definitely necessary that the system of Maize Control should be altered. (Hear, hear.) The situation is absolutely different now from the time when Maize Control was first introduced. I do not think the present scheme was such a bad scheme as long as there were fairly plentiful supplies and we had not got to ration, but the moment we had to ration and to use mixed meals it was absolutely essential that the Government directions behind Maize Control should come from an inter-territorial body, and in fact for about a year it has come from an inter-territorial body, that is to say the East African Production and Supply Council, and equally in regard to the recommendation in paragraph 46 of the Report, regarding the set up of future controls and so on, I am emphatically in agreement with my hon. friend the Member for Nairobi North that this must be on an inter-territorial basis. What is the set-up of the Kenya Food Controls at the moment? (MR. COULDRAY: God knows!). (Laughter.) These Controls are supervised by the Director of Produce Disposal, a director of the E.A. Production and Supply Council, with the exception in fact of the Coffee Control of which I am Chairman, and with the exception of the Maize Control, legally speaking, but, as I explained before, the East African Production and Supply Council does the allocation of maize supplies, which is taken out of the hands of the Maize Board. That being so, it seems to me only wise to make that fact plain in legislation and to provide for a system of Maize Control which will benefit from some of the experiences of the present Maize Control and will be a more efficient vehicle for the public good. Mr. Killick has been to the Nyanza Province and has worked out tentatively a scheme for Maize Control in that Province. He believes, as I do, and I am pleased to know the hon. Member for Kiambu does, that we must not centralize too heavily in Nairobi, and his idea is that in the Nyanza Province there should be control which would control movement and control native deliveries as far as possible, so as to get all the maize into the markets and hence into the main Maize Control, the Nyanza Control to be managed by the Agricultural Department. His idea is

[Mr. Tester]

also that there should be Control servants at railhead who would then take over the maize. This has not been studied by Government. I myself am not so sure that reputable business houses could not do that work and eliminate Control servants, and probably the best way of all would be by syndicates, including all the more efficient maize trading bodies. I think it would be quite unfair if the hon. members on the other side asked Government to say "yes" or "no" to this or that proposal. (MR. COULDREY: You are optimistic.) I think it is quite necessary that these proposals should be studied by members on the other side of Council who are interested in maize and by representatives of the consumers, and in fact those who know most about maize, and I suggest no one knows more of the difficulties of Maize Control than some of the members of the present Board who have placed their resignations in Your Excellency's hands, and I trust Your Excellency will be able to consult them in drawing up the new system.

The hon. Member for Ukamba raised a question about sugar this morning. I have had inquiries made, and he will be glad to hear that the sugar has been moved and that the Director of Produce Disposal is in touch with the Arusha Chini mill in case they should become congested.

There are one or two recommendations that I should like to refer to on page 94 of the report. One is this question of storage. The hon. Director of Agriculture did indicate that a final statement of storage capital charges and recurrent expenses was not very practicable until we see the peace time use to which the storage could be put, but I am able to tell you that the erection of storage, especially silo, will be extremely expensive in war time, and that the proposal now is at any rate that the Government shall finance the erection of storage and the three Governments of East African territories should share in any capital expenditure above the economic value of that storage at the end of the war. Therefore, at any rate this country will not be landed with silo storage built at enhanced war-time prices. There is another point I should like to refer to, recommendation 16, the price of maize to producers. This Government has accepted this recommendation with very little difference, as you

will have seen in the Press where there is a further announcement of a price for one year. I should like to say that I think it is really most important that maize prices should be fixed for 3 years. (Hear, hear.) I have no doubt that Your Excellency will give consideration to the suggestion. With that, sir I have nothing more to say.

MAJOR CAVENDISH-BENTINCK: Your Excellency, I do not know whether it is possible on a point of explanation for the hon. member to clarify what he said about storage. Is that a Government pronouncement that they are only to pay the difference between the enhanced price and the peace time cost of the erection of specific silos, or does it mean it is as far as they have gone for the time being?

MR. TESTER: That is as far as Government have gone for the time being.

MAJOR CAVENDISH-BENTINCK: A further question, on the possibility of financing such storage, whether other means can still be considered?

MR. TESTER: Oh, yes, indeed.

Council adjourned at 4.20 p.m.

Council resumed at 4.40 p.m.

MR. NICOL: Your Excellency, the hon. Member for Nairobi North referred to the question of casual labour at Mombasa, and suggested that steps should be taken to put some of the casual labour on to a permanent basis. I could not agree with him more, and wish it could be done. As far as stevedoring is concerned, about which I know something, both in 1939 and again last year I endeavoured to encourage about 300 Africans to come on to a permanent basis, but they declined the offer. The reason is that they only work approximately 15 to 20 days a month; in other words, they can earn sufficient in 15 days to sit back and do nothing the rest of the month. Of course, we should require down there housing and the like, and it is a matter which I think Government ought to go into very seriously. In regard to the question of registration at Mombasa, the Provincial Commissioner for the Coast will no doubt be dealing with that, but I should like to say in defence of the Local Commodity Board that it would require a tremendous amount of staff, far

[Mr. Nicol]

more than anybody here visualizes, to put it into effect, and I doubt whether it would be satisfactory at all. As far as I can make out, the conclusions to be drawn from this report and the debate are three. The first one is, that it was undoubtedly lack of foresight or courage on the part of Government in that they did not encourage production—that does not go just for this Government here but the Governments of the adjacent territories. Secondly, I think the most important thing brought forward most forcibly is the absolute necessity that food production and distribution should be on an inter-territorial basis. Thirdly, I am quite satisfied that the Maize Board and Maize Control have been a complete failure.

MR. BEECHER (Native Interests): Your Excellency, I feel that I rise to speak under a considerable disadvantage: the hour is late, and most hon. members are very tired and will not wish to listen to very much of what, in fairness to those who have been kind enough to write at considerable length to me about Africans in relation to the food situation, I have to say, I should like, if I may, to preface what I have to say with a brief remark. I should like to pay tribute to the very considerable assistance I have received in my preparation for this debate from African correspondents, not least from those who wrote to *Baraza*, and from the editorial staff of *Baraza* itself. In doing this, I should like to be allowed to pay a very warm tribute to the work done for that newspaper by the late Col. Oscar Watkins, and give it is my very sincere opinion that he rendered very considerable service to the African community in this country in establishing a standard of journalism which ranks very high. (Hear, hear.)

When first I began to prepare for this debate, I was singularly unhappy. The motion as it stood was only describable as retroactive bull-dozing, and it seemed quite clear that we were going to ask for one man's head on a charger. I therefore welcome the amendment which was accepted, because it opens the way quite rightly for a discussion on the Food Commission of Inquiry Report and the whole subject of food and food production. But I feel that Government, in accepting that amendment, and Govern-

ment members in speaking to it, are rather giving us an opportunity, as a friend of mine put it, not so much asking for one man's head on a charger but a whole lot of people's heads in kerais! The reason I say that is this, that we have done very little in this debate so far to follow up the suggestion made by the hon. Member for the Coast, that we should concern ourselves with a constructive policy which will produce food, and I submit that in much of what we have listened to during the course of the debate we have had little to increase the production of food, nor food for thought. I feel singularly depressed at the present stage in the debate by what has been said. I feel with the hon. Member for Ukamba that, until we get it out of our minds that we have to concern ourselves almost entirely, if not entirely, with the stepping up of production of maize, until we dispossess ourselves entirely of that idea, we are not going to get very much further in the life of this country. If we are going to content ourselves with building up the production of maize and producing an exportable surplus, even if only an imaginary one, we shall not be living in a fool's paradise so much as in a paradise of fools. And I should like, therefore, to direct the attention of this Council to a very important chapter in this Food Commission of Inquiry Report, namely Chapter X, and to the paragraph which the hon. Director of Agriculture referred as having been one so far neglected, namely paragraph 138.

Paragraph 138 contains a most important recommendation: "We recommend, on broad principles, the formulation and adoption of a long-term policy for agriculture, containing the following essentials—(1) regard for the needs of the population, with particular reference to improving the diet and raising the standard of health of the natives"; That Commission, when it was receiving evidence, received such evidence as to enable it to say on page 58 of the report: "We have had evidence that the undue prominence of maize in the native diet (and therefore in his agricultural economy) has been a development of the last 30 years or so. From the early days of European settlement the practice has become established of giving 2 lb. of maize meal per day as the basic ration for employed labour. Although some employers, realizing the importance of a better

[Mr. Beecher] balanced diet, do now issue some additional food, the tradition of the 2 lb. of maize meal still persists". Not only is that true of employed labour but, as has already been indicated in the course of this debate, it is something which has profoundly affected the whole question throughout the whole African area. It is, of course, true that the Army has done a great deal to improve native feeding. Again, the excellent Labour Department has also insisted that conscript labour receive food on a better scale than a mere 2 lb. of *posho* a day. But still the ration scale is tied by the heel to this concept, that having given an African 2 lb. of *posho*, with a little of this and that, all has been done that is necessary, and the Commission was quite clearly aware of this because, at the foot of page 59, it makes reference to the African soldier's diet: "While discussing this question of the African soldier's diet it must be remembered that when the war is over many African soldiers on demobilization will return to Kenya as industrial labourers. During their Army life they have become used to a balanced diet and in consequence, though they may not know the reason for it, they have felt fatter men. If they are suddenly put back on a single diet of maize meal they will begin to feel less fit, and tend to become disgruntled. Hence, for that reason alone, this question of deciding on a more balanced diet for the native is one which should not be long postponed". To concern ourselves, therefore, with this long-range policy of an improved diet for the majority of the people in this country, is something to which this Council should be addressing itself here and now—to do this by a determined policy affecting both the Medical and Agricultural Departments, and to which Recommendation No. 24, recorded on page 59, refers. I submit that it is no use whatever preparing "Paterson's stew" as a nine-day wonder and feel that the whole question of improving native dietetics has been dealt with. I feel that Recommendation 24 should be written in large letters, framed and presented to every officer in the Administration and in the Agricultural and Medical Departments, and if in the course of a very short while nothing is done to put that recommendation into effect, I feel we should be very justified not in asking for one man's head

but, figuratively speaking, to ask for whole rows and rows. The recommendation reads as follows: "We recommend therefore that a concerted policy should be worked out by the Medical and Agricultural Department within the framework of a general native policy setting out in broad outline on the one hand the nutritional needs and on the other the agricultural policy designed to meet those needs. Such policy when approved should have the full support of the Government and all necessary measures taken by propaganda, administrative instructions and legislation to have it carried out". That is something indeed which is very much worth striving after and, in point of fact, what we really need in this country is a policy for better living for all members of the community for whose welfare this Government is responsible, and the declaration of such a policy is something which, if I may say so, is long awaited.

Shortly after the eight points of the Atlantic Charter had been made known to the world, including the declaration in the sixth point about freedom from want, the Hon. J. H. Hofmeyer, Minister of Finance and Minister of Education of the Union of South Africa, made an announcement in Pretoria which is of considerable importance: "The Government desires a better life for the people, and when we say 'the people' we mean the whole people, not just the European sections, but all sections of the people. It is of course much easier to put forward attractive plans for the post-war world if you think only in terms of Europeans . . . but there can be no social justice in South Africa when the aim is merely to hold a 'just balance between Europeans'. If that is true in South Africa, I submit that every word of it is abundantly true of the country in which we now are. Important document though it is, the Atlantic Charter is somewhat sketchy. Its various points need very careful elaboration. Little or no attempt was made in this country, or indeed in Great Britain, to elaborate the Atlantic Charter in any way realistically, but an elaboration did take place in the United States of America by the continuing body of the Phelps-Stokes Commission. It has published a book entitled "The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint" which should be in the hands of every member of this Council. It pays

[Mr. Beecher] considerable attention to the question of food shortage, and at the risk of boring Council I would ask to be allowed to quote from page 59: "Freedom from fear and want. As Africa is not, on the whole, a land with a rich soil, and as methods of agriculture are generally primitive, a large proportion of Africans are still living on the borderland of want. They fear the day when their lack of ready cash will be so great that they cannot secure the simple implements, tools and seeds for productive agriculture. They fear that their children may want (for) medical attention and education. They fear especially in industrial centres, where subsistence farming is impossible and where wages are low, that they cannot provide their children with nourishing food. In Africa . . . the wolf is . . . frequently at the door, and to be relieved of fear and want would be an indescribable boon. The goal is, practicable under an intelligently conducted economic and social system". Every sentence, every word, of that is amply borne out by the correspondence which I have been receiving from my African friends, particularly during the last fortnight. The goal is practicable, and the practicability of that matter was the subject of discussion by the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Virginia, in the United States of America, between 18th May and 3rd June, 1943. The resolutions of that conference have been published in two Command papers, and Mr. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a pronouncement on this subject in the House of Commons on the 6th July last year, and in a speech for their part in the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, have no hesitation in accepting the resolutions and the obligation to give effect to them insofar as they apply to conditions in the United Kingdom. They will comply with the resolutions in the Governments of His Majesty's Colonies, Dependencies, and Overseas Territories.

His Excellency's Order, order, I do not want to interrupt the hon. member's development of the theme on the subject of inflation, but I would like to remind him that the motion we are debating is that in the course of the Commission that in the future the hon. member should, and of the recommendations

made in the Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry Report and of experience since gained, a thorough reorganization of the Maize and certain Produce Controls with such consequential changes of personnel as may be found necessary is urgently required". I would therefore ask the hon. member, in any remarks that he has to make, to remember that they should be confined to the question what reorganization to give effect to the objects he has in view can best be made.

Mr. BEECHER: I shall have that very fully in mind, sir, and I apologize for any unnecessary digression which has infringed the ruling which you have just given. But I shall take your leave to point out, although it is not my intention to quote extensively, scarcely lifted at all from the findings of this conference. I would like to quote one sentence, and only one, from the first page of the first of the Command reports: "The conference met to consider the goal of freedom from want in relation to food and agriculture" which seems to me a matter singularly relevant to our discussion in this report and on the motion before Council, and their conclusion is contained in these words: "In short, better conditions mean better farming". On the one hand the African is still tied by the heel to the maize standard, and our debate has shown that very clearly, and on the other we find that there is little or no attempt yet envisaged and I submit it is the duty of these Controls and production committees to envisage this change towards better standards of farming. Reference has already been made in the debate to the Government's new maize production quota. It has been announced that there is an increase of Sh. 1 a bag to Sh. 13 as the basis of calculation. It has been pointed out that there is proposed an additional payment under the system of planting subsidies of Sh. 10 an acre to those European and Indian farmers entitled to receive it, and there has been fixed a price of Sh. 20 a bag for all maize produced above a certain target figure yet to be defined in the case of each of the three races. In equity the boards responsible for these decisions, in view of the fact that in the future maize is undoubtedly required, should in fairness to the African fix his target at a figure very low, because the system of planting subsidies is something that does not operate in native

[Mr. Beecher] reserves nor operate in the case of squatter-grown maize, and that causes me to ask a question to which I think now, or some other suitable time, I should like an answer. That is this, what about the squatter maize, which target is that to be related to, and who is to get the extra money?

But there is a very unhappy feature about this suggested drive for increased production. The announcement to which reference has already been made says that the cost of implementing these measures will not be passed on to the consuming public? Will it not? Maize, in all due deference to the hon. Member for Trans Nzoia—and I know he will accuse me of not being a farmer, but I must reply that I come of a farming community—is a gross feeder, and makes very heavy demands on labour, and it requires very considerable labour for its cultivation and its harvesting, and this drive to exceed a target figure is going so heavily to impoverish the soil unless the production committees take very considerable care, that not only the consuming public but their children's children will be considerably penalized. You have enjoined me, sir, not to make a long discussion into the subject of dietetics, but I do hope that your production committees, in consultation with the Director of Medical Services and Director of Agriculture, will soon place before this Council the programme which they envisage for dealing with this question of food shortage by a programme of dietetic improvement for the whole peoples of this country. I would not weary you with the details of the latest facts which have become available to the medical profession, but it is now possible for them to state categorically in terms of dietary patterns details of the kind of food required for an African to be healthy, and I submit that in the reorganization of your production committees you should have a very considerable regard for those findings which the medical profession now have placed at their disposal. In Great Britain, Lord Woolton took early opportunities of producing vitamin- and mineral-fortified flour. On the other hand, in this country we have mixed meal which, in alternative weeks, produces either a poor bran mash or photo-paste, and the only suggestion of a mineral fortification is the lump of grit that gets

between the teeth in every other mouthful. The question of ghee and its production and distribution is a subject which cannot be ignored if we are going to ensure for the African balanced food supplies. I am not satisfied that what the Commission says about the subject, I am not satisfied that they went sufficiently into the shortage of ghee. They appear to have confined themselves, with all due deference to the hon. member Mr. Patel, to the complaints of the Asian community about the shortage of butterfat. But I must say that, from my knowledge of African feeling, and the correspondence I have received, there is deep resentment that he is unable to obtain or get for his own use in any quantity—that is, of any use from a dietetic point of view—any ghee or the equivalent he was accustomed to using long before there were any Asians in this country. He is completely at a loss—and I realize that here I am treading on very difficult ground—to understand why several thousands more of a ghee-eating community should within the last few weeks, when this country is still facing a food scarcity, have been allowed to add themselves to the number of mouths to be fed without any apparent let or hindrance. (Hear, hear.)

I trust I shall be in order in bringing before you, sir, complaints with regard to food rationing that I have received from the African. He has little or no other opportunity of voicing such grievances before you, and to take them very briefly and excluding quite a large number of them, he asks this: In the first place, why should rationing facilities be so incompletely organized in Mombasa? This has already been the subject of a reference by the hon. Member for Mombasa. He wants to know, in other words, why Recommendation 4 of the Commission has not been implemented. The second question he asks is: Why should African wives and children of bona fide town-dwellers be debarred, as they are in so very many instances, from receiving rations on a scale comparable with those issued to wives and children of town-dwellers of other races? He sees lots of ladies of very doubtful reputation from among his own African community coming into town and receiving ration supplies. I recognize the fact that the Municipal Native Affairs Officer of this town in a singularly difficult job has

[Mr. Beecher] endeavoured to send as many away as possible. The African is also very concerned—and here I submit that in any reconstruction of your production and distribution committees this fact should be borne in mind—with the amount of sugar available to him for general distribution through the shops in the native reserves. One question which is singularly difficult to answer is: Why should an African in Nakuru receive as his ration of sugar $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. a week whereas the ticket elsewhere has entitled him so far to 1 lb.? Again there is the more advanced type of African, generally regarded as a potential source of nuisance—yet I submit if wisely handled is a potential ally of considerable importance in developing relationships between the white and black races—he finds considerable difficulty in getting food of a standard to which he, from his early childhood, and his parents before him, have in many cases been accustomed. It is my duty, however, to announce that I am informed that the Secretariat have the matter under active consideration. I hope I know what that means—(laughter)—and that the matter will be put right at an early date. If I may summarize what I have been trying to say, it is to ask you and your Government in the reorganization of your production and distribution committees to seek to formulate a policy for better living which will be for the welfare of all the people of the country, and not least the African, and not leave it to the committees in America and Downing Street to get on with the job, but to show that we are determined by that reorganization of production and distribution committees to show here and now that better living is to be made possible along with better farming methods for all communities in this country.

MR. AMIN (Central Area): Your Excellency, when I heard the debate on this motion yesterday I felt that the debate was proceeding on barren ground, and it was not until late in the evening yesterday with the speech of the hon. Member for the Coast that I realized that there was some hope that it might produce something useful. This morning the hon. Member for Ukamba, I thought, took the debate to a level where something really useful might be produced which would have some effect on the pro-

duction and distribution of foodstuffs. I take this opportunity—I am sure he will not mind—to pay tribute to him, the most senior member of this Council, from myself, perhaps the most junior member. It was that kind of clear vision, the broad view, the wide grasp, which were needed in the members chosen for the Commission. I am quite convinced the country has such types of people, able to take these things into consideration and to make recommendations which are courageous irrespective of whether either the Government or other people in the country find them to their liking or not. It was from that point of view that I deeply appreciated the manner in which the hon. Member for Ukamba contributed his views in this Council.

Coming to the causes of the shortage of foodstuffs in the Colony, I should like to associate myself with the hon. Member for Ukamba in most of what he said. In my submission, any commission inquiring into shortage of foodstuffs should from the very beginning have realized the necessity of obtaining figures of consumption of particular food items and the figures of production, and to have found out the resultant shortage or excess. It is easy for anybody to see, without a commission going into it, that consumption has increased considerably since the beginning of the war. You have got hundreds of thousands of new people in the country, you have got prisoners of war who perhaps do not contribute at all to the production of foodstuffs, you have got refugees who probably consume better food than either the Indian or African communities. Prisoners of war, I am told, are given butter which could be more beneficially turned to the use of ghee. There is also the military personnel requiring foodstuffs which the country must produce. It was easy to find out these things, but the Commission does not seem to have paid any attention to it. There is the other side of the question, and that is the necessity to increase production to meet these increased demands. In order to produce more foodstuffs more land should be brought into use and more labour should be made available. Capital would not be much of a problem because Government assistance is now available. Land ought to be brought into use, and land would have been brought into use if labour had

[Mr. Amin] been available. I am not one of those who believe that this country has an unlimited supply of labour. I believe quite confidently that whatever extra labour is required for the production of one particular crop will have to be removed from the production of some other equally important crop. We did not foresee the shortage, but now that the shortage is here we have to think out how to use the labour to the best advantage. In my opinion, the labour available in the country is so limited that any effort to divert it from one channel to another will result in the shortage of another commodity. Increased production of particular crops is not the only reason for the shortage of labour. We have removed from the labour market hundreds of thousands of Africans into the Army. Quite a lot of young man power from the native reserves has been diverted into the Army, and these men could have produced more food in the reserves if they were there, and they could have produced or helped to produce more food in the highlands if they were there. If with the immense reduction in the labour supply and with the very large increase in consumption the main reason for the shortage of foodstuffs was not easy to find without a commission, then I wonder what more easy thing there was to find. Try as one may, one fails to trace in the whole of the report anything pertaining to these aspects of the problem.

There are some other aspects of the report which I should like to allude to. In regard to the question of machinery and spare parts required to help the production drive, I am quite sure this is a matter which is not so easy to handle, because you want men to work those machines. I have my doubts if men can be spared from any other industry or from the Army to work on the farms. Why not say to the Home Government right away that we have done our best to produce the maximum and request them or the Governments in the neighbouring territories to help us to provide more foodstuffs for prisoners of war, for refugees and for the Army. Is it not fair to suggest this as the most helpful and, perhaps the most successful remedy to meet the food shortage? In my submission it is the only reliable source of additional foodstuffs. One thing has

emerged from the debate yesterday and to-day and that is that an influential organization of traders—the K.F.A.—have found that when control was established it took away the possibility of the monopoly which was likely to come into their hands. The K.F.A. has for years been demanding that they should be allowed the control of maize. Consuming interests, including distributing interests, have opposed this, and so when Government established the machinery to control maize the K.F.A. realized that this machinery will prevent the control of maize ever coming into their own hands. This caused great irritation in the minds of those who control the K.F.A. If the K.F.A. now realize what an awful thing it is for a competing agency, such as Mitchell Cotts, to obtain control of a commodity they themselves desire to control, then perhaps they understand why some people, the distributing agencies in Kenya, have objected to control passing into the hands of the K.F.A. If this serves any useful purpose, I am quite sure in future we will hear less from the K.F.A. clamouring for monopolistic control of commodities. As regards the Controller himself, may I ask the people concerned with the K.F.A. what they would have done if Col. Grogan had remained Director of the K.F.A., or the Managing Director—

COL. GROGAN: On a point of order, I have never occupied that august position!

MR. AMIN: I am extremely sorry for the slip! I should have referred to Col. Griffiths, I am quite sure we would not have heard all these arguments for months, for more than a year, if the Maize Controller had remained Managing Director or one of the directors of the K.F.A. Coming to some of the things which the Indian community would have liked the Commission to do which the Commission has failed to do, I will first touch on the question of ghee. I am quite sure there is not sufficient ghee for the African and Indian populations because more milk is diverted to the needs of the people who have come into the country from outside. Consider the amount of milk and butter the prisoners of war consume—

MRS. WATKINS: On a point of explanation, they are not allowed to have butter, I believe, or ghee.

MR. AMIN: I am quite sure they consume milk.

MRS. WATKINS: Milk, yes.

MR. AMIN: There is a great shortage of milk, and milk is the commodity from which butter and ghee are produced, and the increased amount of butter which I have already referred to has been consumed by the military, and the amount of milk consumed by prisoners of war could have been easily diverted to the needs of the Africans and Asians. The hon. Member for Native Interests complained that thousands of Indians had come to this Colony in the last few months while the ghee supply was short. I will add that there are thousands of Indians who for the last few months have been wanting to go back, but could not go back because shipping was not available. Normally, these people could have left if the facilities to go to India were as good as the facilities to come to Kenya, and this difficulty I am putting forward is the one which up till now nobody has borne in mind, and I commend the solution of this difficulty as a matter of urgent necessity. As soon as it is found that artisans and clerks are not needed, I am quite sure there will be a sudden decrease in the number of people coming as artisans and clerks. Perhaps nobody has yet realized that restriction on entry into the Colony in respect of artisans and clerks which were effective before the war are at the moment not so strict. If a business man wants to come in he has to lay down a certain sum of money; if a professional man wishes to come in he still has to fulfil regulations, but artisans and clerks are encouraged. They are not encouraged for the purpose of increasing the Indian population of this country. They are encouraged to come because they are wanted for the military, and up till now they have been wanted. It was military necessity which dictated their easy entry into the Colony. If, as is possible, many of them will soon be out of employment, or may even now be out of employment, facilities for their return to their mother land should be made available. (Hear, hear.) But this does not mean that there has been any encouragement from any organization or group of people to bring people from any country where there is no food.

On the question of meat, I should like to refer to a particular passage in the

Report. Dealing with the question of meat the Commission found that there had been slaughter of immature animals, which should be deprecated, and that steps were being taken to prevent the slaughter of immature cattle. In justifying an error of that kind the report also mentions the fact that certain demands had to be met and immature cattle were slaughtered. Looking at that statement squarely in the face, what does it mean? It means that in their enthusiasm to provide meat for the market they went to the extent of slaughtering immature cattle. I am quite sure it covers another glaring error on their part, and that is the slaughtering of mature cattle of milk-bearing capacity without realizing the milk needs of the Colony. One hon. member commented that there was a shortage of milk already in the country and that it was likely to be more serious in the future. If somebody will tell me that no animals of milking age are allowed to be slaughtered I will be satisfied, but at the moment I am under the impression that that is not so. If immature animals are slaughtered they do not reach the age when they can give milk. I suggest that in the policy of slaughtering cattle the possibility of this should be realized by—

MRS. WATKINS: On a point of explanation, only cows give milk!

MR. AMIN: I have that fact in mind, and I am under the impression that cows are slaughtered. If it is not so I will be perfectly satisfied. In regard to the question of ghee there is another aspect which should be taken into consideration. Imports of ghee were considerable before the war. The Imports Controller should be asked to grant extra facilities for the import of ghee from outside. Prices for imported ghee are high, but even then the quantity that could be obtained is material and not the price. If it is found that the shortage can be made up by imports for which we have to pay heavily, then the excess price can be distributed over the commodity available locally and a reasonable price which the community is capable of paying can be fixed. For more than three years now there has been no import of ghee from India, and if giving priority to foodstuffs of that kind can help the matter I am quite sure Government will give it due consideration.

[Mr. Amin]

There is one point which I should like very much to stress in regard to the organization of Controls generally. Several members have referred to the difficulty of finding the appropriate person who deals with a particular commodity. If the Commission finds it difficult to get through the maze of Controls, then I beg to suggest that the man in the street finds it still more difficult. I would go so far as to say he finds it impossible to find the appropriate man within a reasonable time. I have my own experience to recount. Within a fortnight of my arrival in the Colony, about the middle of last year, when people spoke to me about this difficulty, I tried one particular case five or ten times before I got somebody to state that he was responsible for the kind of problem I was investigating. At the end of that amount of labour the gentleman said that he could not deal with the matter because a new Control was being established or that the Control was being reorganized. Without pursuing the matter further, I would say that if a new office in Nairobi were established where there would be a guide who could tell people where to go in connexion with particular Controls, it would serve a very useful purpose, and I suggest that this should be acted upon without delay. It must be understood that the guide should suffer the consequences of error and not the person who obtained the information from him. I am quite sure Council shares my view on this point. The guide will soon find it impossible to bear the responsibility of conveying inaccurate information. Moreover, there are hundreds of people who cannot speak to any Controller who often knows very little of their language, so that they find it very difficult to go about these Controls, and by the time they have made the necessary inquiries they are sufficiently discouraged not to approach any Controller in any matter. This is on the question of Controls generally. The motion before Council calls for the reorganization of Produce Controls, and as the matter is of serious importance because of the food shortage I suggest an official guide with a staff which can explain things to the common people who come to inquire will add to the efficiency of the Controls, and the usefulness of the office will be in obtaining better co-operation and more willing

co-operation (from the people who want to co-operate with Controls.

I will finish my remarks with these words. At the time the Commission was appointed, some of my people seriously tried to think why an Indian member was not appointed and had much difficulty in finding a reason. Though for all these months they failed to find any reason, they now think they have got some understanding of the reason behind the Government's refusal. I think they are wrong. I hope they are wrong. But they think that the Government did not want an Indian member to witness what was going to happen before the Commission. The Commission has produced the report, and if it is all that was intended to be done by the appointment of this Commission, we can easily understand the necessity for the absence of an Indian member, who would have proved to be rather an inconvenience. Perhaps the time wasted in the discussion of a very unimportant matter, the lack of confidence in the Maize Controller, the time wasted on these unpleasant and unsavoury accusations would have been saved. The Commission should have had an Indian member, because at any rate I am quite sure the presence of an Indian would have checked much of the recriminations. I do not say this with any desire to put blame anywhere. Nobody has had any blame except the Maize Controller. The Commission has blamed him for the inefficiency of the Control, but nobody has blamed the prime movers of all this trouble, that is, the K.F.A., who kept on harassing the Controller all the time. Both the Commission and the Government found it impossible to blame so big an organization like the K.F.A. in the present war circumstances. I have nothing much to add, but I seriously suggest that a very useful purpose would have been served by having an Indian member on this Commission.

[Mr. Hodge (Provincial Commissioner, Coast Province): Your Excellency, both the hon. Member for Nairobi North and the hon. member representing Native Interests have drawn attention to the recommendation of the Commission at the end of paragraph 48, page 21, which recommends that urgent steps should be taken to register the natives resident in Mombasa for the purpose of rationing foodstuffs there on as fair and equitable

[Mr. Hodge]

basis as the system in force in Nairobi". In the first place, I should like to say that I am quite prepared to accept the principle of the registration of Africans, but I do not think it is feasible at this moment to carry out this suggestion in Mombasa. I think in the first place that we have got to forget the old proverb, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The Commission suggest that a scheme should be put through on the same basis as the Nairobi scheme, but it must be remembered that the two towns are so dissimilar and conditions so very different that any comparison might be very misleading. From the point of view of Africans, I think we might say that Nairobi is a non-native town, and Africans are only allowed within the municipal area if they adhere pretty strictly to very clearly defined regulations that are laid down. This is not the case with Mombasa, which is a native town and does not have the same regulations as apply in Nairobi. I think we should find it very difficult to separate the distribution of food in Mombasa from the supply of food to natives who live on the mainland or roundabout, and who from time immemorial have always looked on Mombasa as their shopping centre. If registration of natives was started, I do not know where it would stop. I think we should find that we would have to increase the area and spread it out very considerably indeed into the surrounding district.

If it were brought in, I think the following points should be borne in mind. First of all, a large staff consisting of both Europeans and Africans would be necessary, and they would have to be kept on, all of them, for quite a considerable time, and some of them permanently, to deal with the inward and outward flow of labour. The second thing I am rather frightened about is that, if you give an African a coupon and tell him that that means he gets so much food, he expects to get that food on presentation of the coupon; if it is not there, he will probably have a very legitimate grouse against Government because he will not understand why, when he is given the coupon and takes it to the *duka*, the food is not there and he is not served with any. Another point to remember is that, I think, it will be difficult to stop duplication of registra-

tion, so that the Mombasa Commodity Distribution Board will probably find it has asked for very much more food from up here than is actually necessary to keep the population going. As hon. members are aware, there is at the moment a system of distribution which is carried out by the Mombasa Commodity Distribution Board, and they give out rations through employers to 48,970 Africans, of whom 25,500 are employees and 23,470 are dependents of employees. Those figures, of course, can only be regarded as approximately correct because they are very difficult to check up. We get returns from employers and it is not always possible to check them. In addition to that, native food supplies for 11,000 Africans are placed in selected shops. Mombasa Board restricts the hours of sale in those shops and the quantity per head, and some supervision is carried out by local headmen and their assistants who work under instructions from the district officer. In conclusion, I submit and suggest that any registration scheme for food distribution for Mombasa is more likely to succeed if it is carried out when normal food supplies are obtainable.

MR. RENNIE: Your Excellency, before I begin to deal with various points raised in the course of the debate, it is only appropriate to say on behalf of the Government that, although we have had a good many criticisms of this report, the report is a valuable one, and the Commissioners concerned have done a very good and painstaking job of work. (Hear, hear.) In view of the wide field covered by the report, it is easy for any one of us who has intimate knowledge of some particular part of that field to criticize various aspects of the report, but we cannot get away from the fact that the report has clarified the position in respect of certain matters that required clarification, and that the recommendations made are of the type that require very careful consideration by the Government and the country. On that account, I feel that when we have shot so heavily at the Commissioners as we have in the last day or two, it is only right to take the opportunity of acknowledging the debt of gratitude we owe to them for their very long, arduous, and painstaking study of the problem presented. (Hear, hear.) Before going on to deal with the points raised by the hon. mover, I should like

[Mr. Rennie] to express appreciation of the tone that he set to this debate right from the outset. He made it clear that there was no question of aggression or vindictiveness, and I think the lead he gave has greatly facilitated and expedited the course of this debate, and I am very grateful to him, and to hon. members for adopting the course he set.

The report deals with many matters, but when I came to consider it myself in detail it seemed to me that the one that was most important from the point of view of criticism of the Government was the letter of the 10th February. The hon. Financial Secretary has dealt with that letter at some length, but if I may be forgiven I shall touch upon one or two additional aspects of that most important letter. As hon. members are aware, that is really the chief point of the criticism of the Government, and in my view, if the Commissioners had not come to the conclusion that they did in respect of that letter of the 10th February, they would have been more disposed to devote more time to some other causes of the food shortage such as, for example, the cause that the hon. Director of Agriculture emphasized, namely the failure of the short rains. At the risk of boring hon. members, may I take them back to those rather important pages, 31 and 32, and without giving them any headaches by quoting too many figures at this rather late hour I merely want to make one or two points. The first is as regards the shortfall referred to near the bottom of page 32, and the questions I would ask—and the questions I did ask myself—about this shortfall were these. If indeed there was a shortfall of 202,000 bags of maize in respect of the year 1941-42, what happened during that year in respect of the maize position, what happened during that year? I submit only one of three things could have happened. Either we restricted consumption to try to ensure that consumption did not outstrip the amount of maize available—and that did not happen because we are all well aware that no rationing took place during the year 1941-42 and that maize was in free supply. Knocking out that suggestion, another thing that might have happened was that the stocks in hand, the stocks in the hands of traders and millers, might have been high at the beginning of the year and low at the end

of the year, and in that way stocks additional to the actual production of the year might have been put on to the market. Well, that is a point about which I have tried to get statistics, and reference has been made in this debate to the absence of statistics. I regret to say that I have been unable to get any very definite figures, but we have figures given by the Commission themselves on page 32, that the stocks in the hands of millers and traders at the end of the year were 72,000 bags, and I am told by those who are supposed to know about these matters that the normal stocks in the hands of traders and millers amount to roughly 90,000 bags. I give that figure for what it is worth. I have no first hand knowledge, that is what I am told. The difference between the figures is 18,000 bags. If that is all the difference between the normal stock and the stock at the end of the year, it does not account for this 202,000 shortfall. I do not myself feel that that 18,000 explains the whole thing. I have endeavoured to go further into the matter, and the best figure I could get was something like 50,000 bags, but even if 50,000 bags were drawn from stock in the course of the year into the market, that still does not account for this 202,000 shortfall.

The third point has already been referred to by the hon. Financial Secretary. Stocks might have been in the hands of large employers. He has made the point that the Commission has stressed the fact that the large employers fed their labour for the first three months of Maize Control, the months of July, August and September, 1942, from the stocks they had in hand; he has quoted the case of a large employer who said he normally kept three months' supply. If those employers used up their stocks in the first three months of Maize Control, they could not have used them to any great extent in the previous year unless the figure quoted here is rather less than the normal figure in the hands of employers. If none of these three things happened, it is difficult to account for this so-called shortage of 202,000 bags, and I give hon. members the task, a week-end task, of trying to think out that problem and I will give them another. It is this—the comparison between the figures in Part I of the statistics on page 31 dealing with consumption, and those in Parts IV and V. We get from Part I

[Mr. Rennie] consumption figures, the total of which the Commission say is, actual and estimated, just over one million bags for the year; that is roughly 91,000 bags a month consumption. We get in Part IV the figure of 701,000, which is included in the 1,095,058 on the previous page. But one figure is not common to both, namely exports, and if you make allowance for exports and do a little arithmetic, you will find that subtracting the figures in Part IV from the figures of consumption in Part I, you are left with a total of 560,000 bags. The significance of this figure is this, that if you have that 560,000 figure it amounts to 47,000 a month—and remember that that is included in the 91,000 figure to which I have referred in the earlier page—and if you subtract one from the other you get what should be approximate Kenya consumption. As the hon. Member for Mombasa would tell us, if we deduct 47 from 91 we get 44, 44,000 bags. The hon. Financial Secretary was speaking about the figure of 45,000 bags. I have arrived at this by rather different methods from those he adopted, but that is the nearest figure I can get to Kenya consumption in the year 1941-42. Why then, the question may be asked, did the Commission work out a figure of 60,000 bags a month and from that deduce a shortfall of 202,000 bags? The answer is fairly easy. It is that in arriving at that figure of 60,000, they worked on an entirely artificial figure for the month of February, 1943, and they were trying to arrive at consumption for the previous year. Admittedly they made a number of deductions from the figure that the Maize Controller gave them in respect of February, 1943, but did they take into account sufficiently the difference in the conditions between February, 1943, and the corresponding month of the previous year? In February, 1942, we had maize in free supply; we had, so far as the Central Province was concerned, a province exporting maize; we had a normal flow from the reserves to large employers without going through the markets; we had a normal flow in places outside Kisumu into Kisumu town without going through the markets; we had people in the reserves helping their friends in the towns by taking maize directly to them. What happened in February, 1943? Maize Control was instituted; the Central Province was an

importing area in respect of maize instead of exporting; as far as the movement from people in the reserves to towns was concerned, it had practically ceased; and, what is most important of all, we no longer had employers of labour allowed to take their maize in the ordinary way from the native reserves adjacent to farms, all those transactions, in other words, were supposed to go through the Control.

My submission is that the Commissioners, in arriving at that figure of 60,000 bags, were really working on a very artificial figure and, as the hon. Financial Secretary has indicated, if you take into consideration the fact that, so far as the maize producing areas were concerned they fed their labour without those operations going through the markets, you can straight away take 15,000 bags off that 60,000 figure, and therefore get somewhere in the region of 45,000 bags again, and if we multiply, as my hon. friend did, 15,000 by 12, we get 180,000 bags, which is not very far from this so-called shortfall of 202,000 bags. My argument is that in arriving at this supposititious figure of 202,000 bags as the shortfall, the Commission, as my hon. friend pointed out, really fed themselves into a maze, and if my argument is accepted, we then get on to the point that if we remove from the scene this argument that consumption in the year 1941-42 was outstripping production to the extent that the Commissioners thought it was, we must find some other reason for the shortage. As mentioned earlier, the hon. Director of Agriculture referred to the failure of the short rains. I have endeavoured, again in the absence of accurate statistics, to find a figure that might reasonably be taken as the difference between the short rains crop in 1942-43 and in the earlier years, and the result was a figure just over 300,000 bags. In addition, we had the shortfall to which he referred in respect of European maize. Adding those two figures together, we get quite a substantial figure which, when you take it into consideration with the figures I will now attempt to give you in respect of 1942-43, indicate that the Maize Board was not so very far wrong in its operations up to the end of December, 1942.

I hope I have disposed of the argument that consumption was far outstripping production in respect of

[Mr. Rennie] 1941-42. As regards 1942-43, as the hon. Director of Agriculture has indicated, he was working on a figure for native production of 1,050,000 bags and he said to-day that he went into that estimate carefully and he takes full responsibility for it. He has indicated that it was a small increase of 7 per cent or 10 per cent on the figure for the previous year. So far as the native estimate is concerned, I think we can take his word for it that it was based on sound calculations: So far as the European figure for that year is concerned, it is 500,000 bags, and that figure, if my information is correct, was obtained from the K.F.A. The total of these two figures is 1,550,000 bags and the Maize Board in its calculations worked not on the old consumption figure of 95,000 bags for 1941-42, but on two figures, a minimum and a maximum, the minimum being 100,000 bags a month and the maximum being 120,000 bags a month. Even taking that maximum figure of 120,000 bags a month, that multiplied by 12 is still below the million and a half figure that I have referred to earlier, leaving the 50,000 bags out of account for the moment. What actually was the consumption in 1942-43? The consumption was under even the minimum figure. Consumption was not 1,200,000 bags in respect of 1942-43; it was 1,141,565 bags. That is to say, it was under the minimum figure of the Maize Board. Now it is perfectly possible to argue, and the Maize Board made this point, that that consumption was reduced by rationing. It was also reduced because other products were used in place of maize. The Board have made such calculations as they could to step up that figure of 1,141,000 and they have arrived at a figure of 1,362,000. Even that figure hon. members will realize is well below the target figure of 1,550,000 bags that were estimated for, and I must make it clear that the Maize Board was not responsible for these estimates of production; it accepted the estimates of production put forward by the Agricultural Department on the one hand and either by the Chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board or by the K.F.A.—I am not quite sure which—on the other. But the fact is that the Maize Board was not responsible for these estimates; it accepted the estimates in good faith; it made its calculations as regards consumption on a

considerably increased basis, and the Maize Board's contention is—and I think it is largely justified—that had production come up to the estimates there would not only have been sufficient maize in the country to feed all the mouths that were waiting to be fed, but there would even have been a number of bags, and not too small a number, for export purposes. That is my main contention as regards production not coming up to expectations in relation to consumption, but I should like to make it quite clear that I do not contend for a moment that consumption is not increasing. It would be idle to do so in view of the statistics that are produced in the report and in view of the remarks which have already been made in this debate, but the Maize Board realized the position; they realized that they would have to estimate for higher consumption in 1942-43 than for the previous year, which they did. I am not aware of their estimate in respect of 1943-44 because that year is not dealt with in the report, but if I may touch on 1943-44 for a moment I would remind hon. members that we are in the position we are in largely because in two successive years we have had a failure of the short rains.

That I think deals to a considerable extent with the first term of reference of the Commission, and my contention in a word is that although consumption was undoubtedly rising in 1941-42 and 1942-43, in the earlier year, although consumption was rising, it was not outstripping production in respect of 1941-42 to the extent that these two pages, 31 and 32, would appear to indicate.

If I may go on to one or two of the other points referred to by hon. members, I shall attempt to be as brief as possible. I feel I cannot allow the opportunity to pass in respect of Recommendation (18), to which reference has already been made, without associating myself on behalf of the Government with the tributes that have already been paid to the work of Production Sub-Committees. We all know these committees have done an extraordinarily stout job of work and we all hope it will be possible, despite the difficulties to which the hon. Director of Agriculture referred this morning, to ensure in some way or other, by giving them some legal status after the war, that the good work they are doing will continue.

[Mr. Rennie]

More than one speaker has referred to the reasons for the introduction of Maize Control. I think it is only right, if I may be excused a somewhat lengthy quotation, to quote from a memorandum that was prepared by a man for whom we all have the highest respect in these matters, Mr. Roger Norton. He put up a memorandum suggesting a Maize Control scheme at the beginning of February, 1942, and this was the opening of the memorandum: "If the Supply Board succeeds in making contracts for the exportable surplus of maize"—they were thinking of an exportable surplus at that time, which may seem rather curious now—"which may amount to anything from 50,000 to 100,000 tons for the 1942-43 crop, apart from its military and Zanzibar contracts, it appears essential that the Board should have control of the entire output. Control is necessary to ensure that supplies are brought down to the coast at the proper time in accordance with the shipping programmes, that the available maize is suitably allocated between the various consumers, whether they are coffee planters or sisal estates, military, Zanzibar or overseas and that unnecessary congestion on the railway or at the port is avoided. If other interests are allowed to purchase maize from producers, it may well happen that the Board will be unable to get their requirements from a producing area at the proper time because of competitive buying. Again, as happened this year, it may be found difficult to fulfil contracts because there is an increased local demand or because the crop proves smaller than had been expected. In such an event, unless there is control, it is impossible to prevent merchants from buying and hoarding maize which otherwise would be available for export or to ensure that the correct quantity is retained for local requirements". That, I think, is sufficient to indicate that in the early days of the discussions on Maize Control, the idea was to get physical possession of maize to ensure that any exportable surplus that was available would come into the proper hands, and I remember myself some time before that the K.F.A., if I remember rightly, having considerable difficulty in raising sufficient maize against competitive buying to deal with a particular contract that they were concerned in at that time. When I read that memorandum the

point that had come up earlier was brought home rather forcibly to me. So far as Maize Control was concerned, when it began its operations it did not expect to have to become a distributing agency, and I think the point made, if I may say so, by the hon. Member for Nairobi South that the Maize Controller expected to be a maize operator, whereas the country expected him to be a maize distributor, is a very good one indeed and sums up the situation very well.

The hon. Member for Nairobi South asked me a straight question—why was Mr. Stacey appointed to represent the Government case. I have much pleasure in replying. The Government considered it advisable to try to ensure that the many aspects of the Government case should be properly co-ordinated and presented. As hon. members will understand, we had quite a number of officers concerned in this matter who in the ordinary sense were well outside the "bottle-neck" of the Secretariat, and I in the early days realized that we had these various officers working to some extent on their own and that it was advisable to see that the Government case was adequately put forward. I realized that the subject was a very complicated and difficult one, and I knew that Mr. Stacey had been dealing with the drafting of the Maize Regulations and had been in discussions connected therewith, and I thought that his presence as the Government representative would assist everyone concerned, even including the Commissioners themselves. If it is thought that Government did anything very wrong in putting Mr. Stacey in that position I would merely quote section 13 of the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance: "Any person whose conduct is the subject of inquiry under this Ordinance, or who is in any way implicated or concerned in the matter under inquiry, shall be entitled to be represented by an advocate at the whole of the inquiry, and any other person who may consider it desirable that he should be so represented may, by leave of the commission, be represented in manner aforesaid." That, sir, I think is the answer to that particular point.

I do not propose to follow the hon. Member for Nairobi South through all the intricacies of his argument about the rats in Kericho, but in fairness to the Maize Control and in fairness to the

[Mr. Rennie]

Commissioners I would ask him this question about the 1,061 bags of maize that were missing, and I would ask him the question for this reason, that there is a reference in the relevant paragraph (which he can quote better than I can no doubt), to the period 1939/42, and the inference that can be taken in respect of that period is that all this happened—paragraph 184 I think it is—all this happened before Maize Control was instituted. The question I would therefore like to ask him, in fairness to all concerned, is: Did all the transactions that relate to the shortage of 1,061 bags occur after the 1st July, 1942, when the Control was introduced?

MR. VINCENT: According to Captain Hislop's evidence, Amir Khan, who unfortunately has died, alleged that the maize had gone in about three months from the time the shortage became effective. The shortage was reported to the District Commissioner in October, three months after the so-called Maize Control had been instituted. It was not reported to the Controller at all; it was treated as an ordinary dispute between partners, and in my opinion the reference in that evidence to transactions covering four years was simply a blanket to cover 1,500 bags of maize which were stolen after Maize Control was brought in and sent into the black market.

MR. RENNIE: I thank the hon. member for his explanation. I thought it advisable to raise the point in fairness to all concerned. Passing on, more than one hon. member has raised the question of the efficiency of the Control. I do not pretend for one moment that the Control was 100 per cent efficient but as hon. members are aware, there is no finding in the Commission's Report in respect of the second part of their terms of reference which deals with inefficiency, and although the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General was taken to task when he said that so far as the detailed working of the Control was concerned there was no reference to inefficiency, the fact is that the Commissioners drew attention to several factors which militated against the efficiency of the Control, but in respect of the detailed working of the Control, with the possible exception of the paragraph to which the hon. Financial Secretary referred (when Mr. Wollen took over) and in respect of which he has

given his explanation, there are, so far as I can see, no references to the detailed working of the Control, and that I think, if I understood him correctly, was what the hon. and learned Attorney General was referring to. But as I said at the beginning, I do not pretend for a moment that Control was perfect. Could anyone reasonably expect it to be perfect? It was set up at a most difficult time. It had, as the hon. Member for Nairobi South has indicated, to do a complete switch round as regards its operations. It came in with the object behind it that I have already quoted; it had no large stocks in hand, and it was faced with a most unexpected shortage of supplies. One must remember, too, the delayed harvest in that year, and one must remember the Commission's own figures, that only some 14,000 bags of maize came forward in July, 45,000 in September and some 75,000, whatever the figure may be, in September, and I think that living hand to mouth as it had to do in that period—and I remember myself how anxious the time was—I think the Control could hardly be expected to come out of that particularly difficult period without a great deal of criticism. It got that criticism all right!

The other point I would mention is merely this in respect of the operations of the Control. How many of us in this room today would be prepared to have our work over the past year examined in detail over a period of several months as the Control's work has been examined, especially those of us who deal with the public, and expect to come out with 100 per cent marks? I say that not one of us here who was really honest with himself could hold up his hand when I ask that question! That brings me really to the question of the main point of this motion, the reorganization of the Controls. The hon. Financial Secretary has indicated what the Government has in mind at the moment as regards the reorganization in the Nyanza Province. The investigation that applies to Nyanza will be carried out in the Central Province as soon as possible. He has also indicated that the functions of the Maize Board are no longer what they were now that we have a Cereals Pool working on an inter-territorial basis, and it is obvious that quite a thorough reorganization will be required. The question of the acceptance of this motion I have not yet touched upon, but I might have explained at an earlier

[Mr. Rennie]

stage that the amendment that came from the other side of the Council has made possible the Government's acceptance of this motion. (Hear, hear.) The hon. and learned Acting Attorney General mentioned in his speech that Col. Griffiths, once more subordinating his own inclinations to the interests of the country, has placed his resignation in Your Excellency's hands, and you have authorized me, sir, to say that you have accepted that resignation. But I would make it abundantly clear that, in doing so, Your Excellency has no doubt of Col. Griffiths' personal integrity in respect of matters touched on in paragraph 205 of the report. (Hear, hear.) Your Excellency has accepted his resignation on broad grounds of general policy in the interests of the country as a whole, in view of the feeling that has been expressed in this Council by hon. members representing each of the constituencies, the feeling that a change in the holder of the post of Maize Control is necessary. I feel that we should at this time remember that we shall be losing in Col. Griffiths as Maize Controller a man who, although subjected to criticism, has done an extremely good job of work, in my opinion, in that post; and when I advance my own personal opinion in that way I have the support of people who have worked in very close touch with him, and all I can say is that we shall have very great difficulty in finding a successor. I have noticed no suggestions from any hon. member in this Council as to who his successor should be in the event of Col. Griffiths giving up his post—that has been left, like a good many other things, for the Government's consideration. But I should like to make it clear that if a suitable opportunity arises to make use of Col. Griffiths' services, to make use of his undoubted ability and experience in some suitable post, the Government will avail itself of that opportunity, and I gather from hon. members on the other side that they would welcome such an eventuality.

If I may sum up as briefly as possible. As regards the terms of reference, in respect of the first item I have, I think indicated sufficiently clearly that, although production was undoubtedly rising, consumption had kept ahead of it in respect of the year 1941/42 on which the Commission based their main argument for the shortfall of 202,000 bags. In

1942/43 the Maize Board worked on estimates that it had had presented to it by responsible bodies, and had done the job in the light of the figures available to the best of its ability. In respect of 1943/44 we are in the unhappy position that we find ourselves at present because of two successive failures of short rains. As regards the second term of reference, the point that I have made there is that there is no definite finding of inefficiency nor any definite finding on the second part of that term of reference, namely, the question of Maize Control being operated in the best interests of the country—there is no finding that Maize Control was not operated in the best interests of the country. On the motion itself, I have indicated that the Government has accepted the motion, that it will get down to this question of reorganization, which will not be an easy task as the hon. Financial Secretary has indicated, but we shall get down to that as soon as possible in the hope that such new arrangements as may be arrived at will ensure a smoother, and more efficient working, and a more acceptable working, of Maize Control.

MR. COULDREY: Your Excellency, I should like to follow the last three speakers who started off by saying they were not going to occupy much of your time. The reason they have done that is that, for some reason or other, it has become the rule rather than the exception to endeavour to hurry through a session of Legislative Council in a manner which is certainly not in the best interests of Council and, therefore, I suggest, the best interests of the country. I say it is becoming the rule rather than the exception. I say this with all due respect to yourself, sir, and I admit that some of my colleagues on this side of Council also share the idea that it is better to sit late in the day and get this thing over rather than give what in my opinion is sufficient time to discuss all aspects of what is surely a most important report. I was very interested indeed to hear the hon. Chief Secretary say—I think he said it—that it was an excellent report—that it was an excellent report—(MR. RENNIE: Valuable I think was the word I used.)—valuable. I was very glad, more than glad, I was surprised, because I think anybody who has listened to this debate all through must have wondered what was the attitude Government was going to take to this report. First of all,

[Mr. Coudrey]

we have the hon. and learned Acting Attorney General, who appeared to oppose paragraph 205. I am very glad he did. Then we had other speakers who paid very great tribute to the Commission, stating that they were most excellent people who had worked very hard, and that it was a most intelligent and valuable report except where it passed any strictures or suspicion on Government. (Laughter.) Even the hon. Director of Agriculture when he talked about agricultural recommendations was careful to say they were excellent recommendations—but. Of course, like the goat, the *ng'uni* is on the "but"! He then said they were either impractical or impossible or could not be done, or something like that. So that all through the debate Government has taken the attitude that where there was any strictures or suspicion on any member of Government they used the words—I think the hon. Financial Secretary coined them—"the Commission have misdirected themselves". (Laughter.) Personally, I think Government is very ungracious not to have put up at least one speaker to defend the competence of the short rains, as the only thing that this report has done, the only stricture it has made other than on the Government, has been on the short rains, and I think Government should have tried to prove either they had not failed or alternatively, if they had, they had done their best, but it was not their fault and they had merely misdirected themselves. (Laughter.) In a good many years, I will not say in Legislative Council, but in watching public affairs, I do not think I ever before have been given such a marvellous example of a Government, having appointed a very excellent commission as everybody agrees, having appointed counsel, and very able counsel, to put up their point of view at that Commission then, when it is all over and when they have made their report, when their verdict has been given, have come along and, in a debate which they hoped would only take two mornings—but which unfortunately for them has gone on until well past 6 o'clock on two evenings—have tried to reiterate and re-give their evidence again, and say this Commission had misdirected itself. It is farcical.

I had hoped to deal with the speech of the hon. Financial Secretary in some

detail. He spoke late in the afternoon, and the acoustics of the hall are very bad, and he flung at us a lot of figures, and if anybody on this side of Council knows what he was talking about then I am very much mistaken indeed. I think it is unfair, in my opinion, either for Government to put up speakers late in the afternoon at a time like this or to throw at us a large mass of figures and expect anybody to reply. There are, however, one or two points, and I am serious in saying I will not take up time because it so happens I have the same tastes as hon. members opposite, and I have the same inclinations and the same thirst! But there are one or two points I must take up. First of all, I must refer to the speech of the hon. member Mr. Beecher. I am sorry, Your Excellency, that you ruled the hon. member out of order when he began to speak about dietetics. I think it is a most important subject, and if it was not strictly in order and your admonition put him off, I regret it, but when he talks about natives being given only 2 lb. of *posho* I think he will agree with me that that is very often not the employer's fault. We would like our natives to have a more varied diet, but far too often they themselves insist on the 2 lb. ration of *posho* and will not accept a more varied diet. So if he is going, as I hope, to go out on a programme of improving the diet of natives, he will at the same time have to embark on a good deal of propaganda among the natives themselves to get them to accept it. I do not think he will get over that. The hon. Member for Ukamba got off his chest a very favourite hobby of his, and told us he did not like the locust programme, but I should like right here and now to say that I entirely agree with the hon. Director of Agriculture who, possibly because it was late in the afternoon, did not make himself clear, and I did not gather from him whether he was taking into his account sufficiently the very great and real menace of the locust; that is to say, whether he was instructing natives in the reserves to grow what I call locust-resisting crops. He may have made it clear, but I have asked other members on this side, and he did not make it clear to them either. If that is not his intention, I beg that he will give that point every consideration.

Mr. ELUNT: It is my intention.

Mr. COULDREY: About the most valuable thing the hon. Financial Secretary said—he said two valuable things. First of all, he said they were going to reconstruct this Maize Control about which the hon. Chief Secretary spoke so beautifully: he nearly moved me to tears about the marvels it had done and how beautifully it was going to be reconstructed. (Laughter.) May I, however, just make a few remarks, late as it is and thirsty as I am, why Maize Control really failed? I am not going to resurrect this debate, and will certainly not indulge in personalities. The real reason why it failed was this. The man who was appointed Maize Controller, and whom I welcomed being appointed because I thought him the best man for the job, had a theory, which I at that time shared, that the right thing for Government to do was to go into the market as a maize operator, a phrase used by the hon. Member for Nairobi South. He believed that Government could pay for Maize Control out of the profits of the Control, and if he had had a little bit of luck and had got away with one or two things, he would have done it and would have made a big profit in addition. I believe very sincerely that when Government starts to think of any new form of Maize Control, they must abandon any idea of maize trading themselves. (Hear, hear.) I am convinced that they are going to fall again if they use only their own servants and enter into competition with established agencies. They must stick to agents. I am not an authority on Maize Control, although many people are, but I am sure of this—you must abandon any idea of thinking you are going to make money out of it or even make it pay for itself. I believe myself that the emoluments and salaries of Maize Control should be paid out of revenue, and no attempt should be made to make Maize Control pay for itself. (Hear, hear.) I believe the attempt to do it caused all the abuses—I do not burke the word—which have arisen owing to the late lamented Maize Control idea which was such a wonderful thing—

I am afraid I cannot go on, Your Excellency, I am not very well. (Mr. Coudrey retired.)

Mr. WAICAT: Your Excellency, I am extremely distressed that my hon. friend,

to whom we are so greatly indebted for his forceful reply, feels unwell and unable to continue his summary of to-day's debate. He was entitled to that position and especially deserving of it because, while I am the mover of this motion in my capacity as Chairman of the Elected Members, you will remember that it was due to his inspiration that such a debate as this has taken place. It has been a useful debate. We have learned a lot about many important matters contained in this report, and did time permit I should like to pursue one or two points myself, but I am aware that, in strange contradistinction to the present atmosphere, there will presently in this hall be a lecture on practical Christianity, which is rather a different matter.

The hon. Financial Secretary mentioned three particular things that are of interest to me, namely silos and grain storage, but not so much about cold storage as I should have liked to hear, and I was glad to hear his own view on long-term minimum guarantees for the commodities required. Government has not given us much information about the financing of these projected silos for cereals which, in the course of things, may not have happened at all; they are expensive units, but if, as is likely, famine reserves have to be held such silos will be necessary. The sites, I hope, will be well chosen, and the people who build them will, I hope, be experts at the job. I should like to hear, having raised the matter in Council before, that it is part of Government's determination to make provision for cold storage at the coast. That is one of the essentials if after the war we are to build up our export trade as planned. The world will want our produce and we must have such facilities, but the financing of these ventures, whether it be cold storage, silos or the like, is what this country wants to know about. It is manifestly wrong that charges should be levied to wipe out the cost of such experiments on the producer side. It should be run more or less as the Railway is run by my hon. friend the General Manager, but rather better than that, if I may suggest it (laughter), in this sense, that while he amasses great sums for betterment, the Installations I suggest we need in this country should be run on a strictly maintenance basis only. After all, their existence is adding to the wealth of Kenya and the country can stand the

(Mr. Wright) In conclusion, I would like this opportunity, on behalf of my colleagues on this side of Council, of thanking Government for its ready acceptance of the motion before the Council.

The question of the motion as amended was put and carried.

ADJOURNMENT

Council rose at 6.45 p.m. and adjourned *sine die*.

Written Answers to Questions No. 7—SISAL PRICES

MR. NICOL:

Will Government inform Council whether or not they have ascertained the prices paid for sisal by the Ministry of Supply and/or America emanating from sisal producing areas outside the East African territories? Will Government please state what those prices are?

Reply

The Ministry of Supply purchases sisal from East Africa only. Sisal available from all other sources is purchased by the United States of America, and neither the Ministry of Supply nor the Government of Kenya is informed of the prices paid by the United States authorities. From such information as is available, it appears that the price for Portuguese East African sisal is \$160 per ton f.o.b. Beira for No. 1 grade. Madagascar first quality is said to be a few pounds cheaper.

No. 11—WHISKY ALLOCATIONS

MAJOR CAVENDISH-BENTINCK:

Arising out of Government's reply to Question 100 (of 1943):

1. Is it a fact that, regardless of the accepted principle of allocating whisky supplies according to 1941 sales, Government do sanction allocations in wholesale quantities to any newly-opened restaurant or respectable establishment which can obtain a licence or the transfer of a licence?

2. Is Government aware that, in addition to such allocations, the proprietors of these establishments employ persons who go from retailer to retailer daily, and who endeavour to insist that a legal obligation rests on

each retailer to sell at least one bottle of whisky, wine, or other stimulant, for cash, provided such are in stock?

3. Are retailers obliged by law to sell to such runners and/or to any casual customer one bottle of any stimulant they may have in stock, for cash, provided the demand is made during licensed hours?

4. Is any control exercised over the prices charged by the proprietors of restaurants and dance halls for a bottle of wine and/or a tot of spirits?

5. Does Government consider that farmers, other up-country residents, and old-established hotels (members of the Hotelkeepers' Association) should receive preference over neoteric restaurants and night resorts, in the allocation of limited supplies?

Reply

1. No. In two cases, however, present allocations are based on licences granted in 1941 which have been transferred to new premises. In two other cases the licences were taken out during the latter part of 1941, and for this reason it was considered equitable that a small allocation should be made, although the establishments were not operating during the whole of the basic period.

2. No.

3. Yes. The Price Controller would not, however, normally support a prosecution for refusing to sell where a retailer is endeavouring to ration his supplies fairly to his customers.

4. The price for a tot of spirits and for a bottle of wine is not price-regulated, but the latter comes within the category of "other goods" to which the factor system applies and the selling price is controlled.

5. No. The Government does not consider that preferential treatment should be given to any class of liquor licensee. A fair allocation, based on past performance, is made to up-country establishments from which farmers and other residents obtain their supplies.

No. 14—PRICE CONTROL CASES

MR. COULDREY:

Will Government state (a) the number of cases arising out of Price Control Regulations in Mombasa, Nairobi and

Kisumu respectively, (b) how many of these cases were dismissed, and in how many cases were convictions obtained, (c) what was the total of the fines paid, (d) in how many cases was imprisonment imposed without the option of a fine? and will Government state in each case the nationalities of the people convicted?

(c) What was the total of fines paid:—

Mombasa Sh. 47,315
Nairobi Sh. 33,914
Kisumu Sh. 766

(d) In how many cases was imprisonment imposed without the option of a fine:—

	Nationalities		
	European	Indian, Arab	African
Mombasa 11	8	3	—
Nairobi 8	5	—	3
Kisumu 1	1	—	—

Nationality of persons convicted:—

	Nationalities			
	European	Indian	Arab	African
Mombasa	1	97	69	8
Nairobi	6	79	—	7
Kisumu	1	7	—	1

(a) The number of cases arising out of Price Control Regulations in Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu respectively:—

Mombasa 187
Nairobi 74
Kisumu 27

(b) How many of these cases were dismissed and in how many cases were convictions obtained:—

Convictions			Acquittals			Discharges		
Mombasa	156	8	6	The remainder of the cases brought were either withdrawn or are pending.				
Nairobi	60	10	—					
Kisumu	9	5	3					

The number of persons convicted does not agree with number of convictions, as in some cases there are several accused.

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SECOND SERIES

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committed to Council.

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