


EAST AFR PROT

35755 A.M.



War Office

1915

4 August

Last previous Paper

German East Africa

Telegraph from 9 o'clock as to

operations

Mr. Balfour Mr. J. Anderson  
Mr. Bent

See also 35623 As situation is  
temporarily unsatisfactory and if  
no news of the introduction of  
ammunition in time it is most serious.  
I consider it that the War Office take  
immediate steps to assist in the operations against  
and to assist in the operations against

9.7.2.

Balfour

Aug 4/8/15

S.C.B. 4.8.15

If so! Title is not given an adequate  
force now there seems to be a risk  
of the Germans obtaining the offensive  
so compelling as to send a force -  
perhaps bigger than will be required and  
possibly to become the party mainly at

Next subsequent Paper

No

374578

deteriorating. I gathered from what  
Lord Selborne said to me yesterday that the  
white settlers are / to J. R.  
losing interest.

4/8/15

Mr 4/8/15

The whole position seems most  
unsatisfactory

AS 12 5 8

I have done to Dr Johnson  
in two a/ccts

page 68.

Further minutes and  
correspondence attached.

deteriorating. I gathered from Mr.  
Lord Selborne and to me yesterday that the  
State settlers are losing interest.

H. J. R.  
4/8/15

Mr. 4/8/15

The whole position seems most  
unsatisfactory

AS-12 58

I have come to the Johnson  
in this aspect

April 6th.

Further minutes and  
correspondence attached.

about  
P/B Bone Law

This looks as if  
any moment it  
might lead to  
fisticuffs and that  
the trouble may be  
due to not taking  
the matter in hand  
in time.

Now I have  
and with great  
difficulty

As P. 5/8

Black  
18<sup>th</sup> Bone Law

This looks as if  
any moment it  
might lead to  
war, and that  
the trouble may be  
due to not taking  
the matter in hand.

In fact

we have a

and with it the  
same old

of 12 5/8

*From Major General J. G. K. Nkomo to Wimborne*

27281

Today I posted a summary of the present status of affairs. My summary is given below. The situation is as follows:

Saturday 29th April.

(1) Although the Koatengera has been captured, it is not known if the guns may be salvaged. Neither the A.C. nor the British have been able to do so. If so, these will greatly increase our strength.

(2) The Navy sank a Minchay gunboat and a small boat. A gunboat and a small launch were also destroyed. The total gunnery report received lately denotes a large number of field guns. 8 inch guns, 3000 rifles and 700,000 rounds of ammunition of recent date have been freely used against us. The enemy now has African troops under their command among the good fighting tribes in Northern East Africa. They have an efficient recruiting general. If the reports of "Tigray" are true the Germans would have 20,000 armed African troops by the end of the year. If sufficiently well armed and helmed by many machine guns these are better fighters than any but the best Indian troops.

(3) Among the white troops discipline is serious. Nearly all the poor fighting has been in material areas and in absence of open fight out by excess of exertion. Possibly the poor discipline and subsequently I have not been able to "spare" them for the sending forward due to the fact that the greatest striking force could concentrate this month in the Victoria would be July 2nd. It is liable that the 18 guns will be machine guns. I can find no men at present but non-commissioned could be easily obtained.

(4) I regret that at Mbauwa some of the Zulu did not return to their homes awaiting trial by court martial for self-incitement.

(5) I have had to return two good Commandos to the 1st King's African Rifles to Nkauzana. Men long time in red and therefore associated.

(6) As regards possible plans for the future. Most is still the most important area. With one extra brigade the railroad could be pushed to Nyaro or Santa and possibly the Germans might be induced to attack us. With two extra brigades I should propose to demonstrate against Tanga, sending a mobile column via Longido and using every other available man to attack Tanga. With three extra brigades, if the Belgians were then co-operating at Lijip, I should propose that one brigade should take the road to Salama, the remainder operating as before. This would not only assist the Belgians but great political effects would follow from the possession of Dar es Salaam.

50 SAS  
367555

270

Secret

1<sup>st</sup> August 1915

DRAFT

Mr Secretary  
Our Office

MINUTE.

Mr. Bottomley 6/8/15  
Mr Read 6

Mr

Mr

Sir G. Hildes.

Sir H. Frost.

Sir J. Anderson. *b/f*

Mr Steel-Holland.

Mr. Bonar Law

sent information  
(... by Mr. Anderson)

I am directed by the  
Secretary Board to  
ask you to inform the  
Army Council that in  
view of the recent  
tidings it is to-day  
Office of the 2<sup>nd</sup> &  
Agent (as 3225) to  
cannot as regards the  
transmission frontier  
in East Africa with  
great anxiety. He will  
be glad to be informed  
whether the Army Council  
are satisfied that no  
further steps are to be taken  
to improve the situation.

H. J. Anderson  
of Steel Battalion  
and Selanore, the leading settlers - to  
S.A.S., having represented unofficially to  
the Deptt. that the military position <sup>279</sup>  
Part II was unsatisfactory, a meeting with  
him took place yesterday at which Mr.  
Steel-Battalion, General Colwell of the  
G.O. & I was present. Briefly Lord  
D's. points were as follows:-

(1) Relations between F.M. + G.O.C.

Want of co-operation between F.M. + G.O.C.  
The former unplies both with officials &  
unofficials & supposed to be obstructive  
- the latter not man enough for the  
job, which is a very big one. What  
is required - either a strong F.M. or  
strong G.O.C. who can impose himself

upon both Civil + military General Colwell  
said that G.O.C. was considered by Lord Kitchener  
to be good man.

(2) Settlers. They turned out well at  
beginning & were supposed to have done  
good work. Later on F.M. gave them  
to understand that they wt. be of more  
use on other farms than in the fighting  
line. On the other hand letters, which  
we know to be written by the G.O.C.  
were appearing in the local press  
reflecting on the slackness of the settlers.

He thought that settlers ought to have  
some indication of what was expected  
of them. Personally he wanted them to  
make maximum effort - & to make known  
immigration, reputation, or anything else  
which would serve them. In the first  
place the 900 settlers (or about 5%  
of the population) had been in excess.

(3) S African Contingent. Argued  
that as regards a contingent of  
Africans he did not want  
men who were of value in certain  
parts of the State - particularly  
those who could be utilized in the  
disturbances between Europeans &  
Native & as a matter of fact  
most of the settlers in service are  
Native. I am told to S Africa  
we said that mounted native  
I think in amount of 16,000  
General Colwell is going to ascertain  
by tel. from the D.O.C. whether  
mounted native would be of use  
to him.

(4) Native in G. East Africa. From what  
he knew of the tribes along the  
S.A.P. border he was confident that

that they were ready to declare for  
us as soon as fear of former had  
been removed - but that at present  
our prestige was at best even in  
on our <sup>front</sup> ~~front~~ from the native's  
point of view - both front & rear  
seems desirable.

With regard to (3) ~~mark~~ no action on  
our part is required at present.

With regard to (1) or (2), it might  
be well to send, subject to the  
commander, a tel. on the lines  
of accomp<sup>2</sup> S.A. ?

A.J.R.

12/8/15

A. I agree.

as to 3 It would be an excellent thing to  
get for E.A. the equivalent of the S.A.  
Contingent coming to Europe. Once that  
is recruited, I think we should get  
S.A. to send fifteen hundred or two  
thousand men to Uganda and to make  
a strong diversion on the Southern  
Border of German East Africa. but

could offer more difficult terms  
of enlistment as those have been  
granted to the force of 260 who  
already enlisted for Queensland. They  
would not be immediately connected  
with the troops operating from East  
Africa, and no difficulty would  
arise therefore from having two  
ranks of pay.

Aug 12. 8. 15

Am 13. 8. 15

Could offer more defence troops  
of importance as those have been  
granted to the force of 260 who  
already enlisted for Queensland. They  
would not be immediately available  
with the troops operating from East  
Africa, and no difficulty would  
arise therefore from having two  
ranks of pay.

Oct 12 8.15

Am 13.8.15

To John Andrew

As part of the conversation  
which place between you & yourself  
myself I am attached  
part of it so that you  
may have it in case you  
are writing any minute

Yours truly

Answers

Q. What is the difference  
between  $\pi$  and  $\tau$ ?  
Ans.  $\pi$  is the ratio of the  
circumference of a circle to its  
diameter.  $\tau$  is the ratio of the  
circumference of a circle to twice  
its radius.

In the course of a further conversation with General Galloway, after Mr. Read and Lord Selborne left us, I asked him informally about the sending of troops to East Africa.

He said that if the contingent from South Africa were willing to go there, he imagined the War Office would be willing. He thought however that the South Africans would naturally want to come and serve in Europe. I said that I thought so - it then put me this question.

What is the main difference of our fighting force in Europe between (a) the South Africans going to East Africa, and (b) the South Africans coming to Europe, in equivalent number from one of the new armies being despatched to East Africa. A certain amount of time would be lost in transit, but was there any other difference? General Galloway said there really was not, that on the whole speaking informally, he did not think it would be a bad arrangement, though it must not be brought up in evidence against them. He thought however Lord K. would have a fit if it were proposed, but that if he were to have a fit, perhaps it might be best effected if the Secretary of State were to make the suggestion to him.

~~War Office~~  
Whitehall.

S.W.

11th August 1915.

Dear Mr. Steel-Maitland,

Since seeing you today I have received a letter from General Thompson from Cape Town, of which the enclosed is an extract. I wired to him to sound the authorities out there with regard to sending a contingent to East Africa without suggesting in any way that we here in the War Office were putting the matter forward.

Yours sincerely,

Chancellor

Mr. Steel-Maitland, Esq., M.P.,

COLONIAL OFFICE, S.W.

Extract from letter from General Thompson, G.O.C.,

Cape Town, to General Callwell, dated  
24th July 1915.

With reference to your cable No. 6362, I have in private conversation referred casually to the German East idea both to Smuts and to Sir David Graaff Finance Minister. I find that both had it firmly fixed in their minds that the Imperial Government only wanted African troops in Europe and that German East was the preserve of the Indian Government. Smuts told me that there had been correspondence to this effect and when I hinted that whatever had occurred in the past that it was quite possible if a contingent was offered by the Union Government now for G. . A. that it would be favourably received, his eyes sparkled and he said that Britz and Alberts and Moha were ready to go at once with their commandos and had often said how they wanted to have a go. When I left Smuts I came away with the fixed impression that the question would be raised straight away. David Graaff was also of exactly the same opinion and I think he carries weight in the Cabinet.

## PARAPHRASE

TELEGRAM. The Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate.  
(Sent 11.45 a.m. 14th August, 1915.)

August 14th.

Rumours have reached me from a source which I cannot ignore, firstly that there is lack of complete co-operation between the civil and military in the Protectorate, and secondly that the General Officer Commanding is dissatisfied with the settlers but that the latter have been given to understand by Civil Government that they will be of more value on their farms than in fighting line.

While I accept these reports with all possible reserve, I think it well to state with regard to the first that His Majesty's Government attach the utmost importance to the successful prosecution of operations and that I confidently rely on you to secure the whole-hearted support of the civil administration for the military.

With regard to the second, if the facts are as stated I suggest that in consultation with the General Officer Commanding you take steps to make it generally known that His Majesty's Government highly appreciate services which have already been rendered by the settlers, that on account of their military aptitude and local experience their co-operation will be of the utmost value in future and that the Government trusts that after providing for bare requirements of civil industry they will send every available man to local forces.

It

It is realized that course of operations hitherto may have had a depressing effect but the position is receiving the constant consideration of His Majesty's Government and they are seeking to improve position so far as more urgent demands on their resources will admit.

PONAH LAW.

S

Sent 11.45 am  
8pm + at

August 14<sup>th</sup>

Rumours have reached

DRAFT Cypher tel  
Limerick  
Naas

re from a source which  
I must ignore, justly

MINUTE  
Read 12 Aug/5

Let there be last &  
complete co-operation  
between civil and  
military in Port <sup>to</sup>.

Mr H. J. Sturt  
Sir A. Anderson 12  
Washington.

You shall understand (as you) secondly that G.O.C.  
for Bawdsey 14<sup>th</sup> in despatched with

(I have seen for Colwell  
& to agree  
D. J. R.)  
14/8/5

settled but that letter  
have been given to  
understand by him  
first that they will  
be