

EAST AFR. PROT

37567

REC'D
16 AUG 15

37567 *Spec*

War office

German East Africa

1915

15 Aug

Telegraphic correspondence as to
operations.

Next previous Paper.

35666

- by ~~Roberts~~
- by ~~Smith~~
- by ~~Dumbart~~
- by ~~S. ...~~

See also 37566. This means that
 the situation is more serious than
 ever (v. 35755) and it is clear
 that something must be done in
 connection with the question of
 reinforcements, what I should like
 to be pursued in the Staff meeting
 suggestion in his minute attached
 to 35755 i.e. that the equivalent
 of the ...

Party

Next subsequent Paper.

38379

coming from Southern Africa should
be sent to South Africa, i.e.
that for each S. African coming
to Europe, a man from the
new Armies here, should be
sent out to S. Africa. Experience
has shown that it is too
dangerous to 'walk back' in
S. Africa; if we remain continuously
on the defensive the enemy increase
his strength and ~~threaten~~ ~~the~~
~~Protectorates~~ threaten our own
Protectorates (cf. the recent events
at Saisi).

In connection with the second
telegram from the G.O.C. should
be read Gov. Gen/368-25 S 2 Africa
in the bundle below.

(Should not a copy of the
telegram be sent to the Protectorates)

35755 be sent to the War Office
for their information?) 29

401 PZ

Eqn. 16/8/15
16.45.16.8.15

Roy 16/8/15

M2 16/8/15

PZ 16/8/15

M. J.
16/8/15

2. the number of recent

calculated to 1000

38500

side

49/14

Dr. Boon Law

By a file coming to you at the same time as this you will see that Col. Hooker had ^{on a month or} ~~more~~ to anticipate this attack on Sain: ~~as~~

Scientific knowledge may modify conclusions but prima facie it looks (1) as if the capture of Sain: if it takes place will be due more to accuracy in sizing up & keeping a comprehensive view of the situation than ought to be the case and (2) that the number of men ~~required~~ required to clean up the whole job is so small in comparison

to one form engaged elsewhere that
in my likely night to get it done

As for me I can father the
Germans before and even after the
Tanga were not expected to
hold out and were ready to surrender

Similarly the actions were
with capturing, hoping for one success
but now we were on the fence.

It so it makes the lack of
progress less dramatic and further
delay may make the question
from a small thing (by comparison)
into one much bigger.

A.S.N. 148

Head

Reference to the Steel handlands

the Bonas last week & glad
to have any information as to how
numbers of books necessary to finish
German War edition

4.10

not needed

The number has made an estimate of the various
orders to the G.O.C. in Belgium, referred to
in letter. General might find brigades may
be taken as the maximum, and I think that even
the figures could have to be amplified by special
reference when the time comes. I have seen
the latest figures but the whole position is altered

I may mention that he has said that any progress
that must be made in the early beginning
with regard.

week 4.10.15

20.11.15

1st Bikaner

297

(File of telegraphic correspondence between War Office and S.O.C. below.)

General Wapshare 2nd Dec (48238)

" Not undertake offensive operations in S. Ea without reinforcements of at least 2 brigades of really good troops

General Wapshare 14th Dec (50228)

" Next troops required for offensive:
1 Indian Cavalry Regiment
2 Good Infantry Brigades

General Wapshare 28th Dec (577)

" Prepared to attack Tangra with 1 fresh Brigade, but 2 fresh Infantry Regiments also required

General Wapshare 14th Dec (20836)

" Minimum reinforcements:
1 Brigade for Tangra
2 Battalions for Voi
Fresh Brigade for Durr-e-Salaam

General Pigne

20 April 1936

"I would prefer two brigades of
really good troops for Tanga,
Taveta and Arusha areas;
1/2 brigades minimum."

General Wapshere's military
appreciation (20836) should
be read in this connection.

Equi 17/8/15

To be read now be added.

General Pigne

Aug 2-3

35755

1. regard possible plans for the
future work in the most important
area with one extra brigade. The
railhead (and be pointed to Kiara or
Sakata and possibly the Germans might be
winded to attack it. With two extra
brigades I would propose to demonstrate
against Tanga sending a mobile column via
dougite and using every force available
man to attack Taveta. With two extra
brigades if the Belgians were co-operating
at all I would propose that one brigade should take
the remainder operating as before."

General Pige

20 April 1936

"I would prefer two brigades of really good troops for Tanga, Taveta and Arusha areas; 1 1/2 brigades minimum."

General Wapshare's military appreciation (20836.) should be read in this connection.

Equ 17/8/15

17/8/15

To be read now be added

General Pige

Aug 2-3

35755

A. regard possible plans for the future work in the most important area with one extra brigade. The railhead need be pushed to Kiara or Salita and possibly the Germans might be induced to attack it. With two extra brigades I would propose to demonstrate against Tanga sending a mobile column via Longido and using every force available to attack Taveta. With 1 1/2 extra brigades if the Belgians were seen co-operating or likely, I would propose that one brigade should take Dar es Salaam, the remainder operating as before."

COPY.

S E C R E T.

from General Tighe to War Office.

August 14th 1915.

10.5.p.m.

26.

The Union Government are about to demobilise six 12 prs. and two 5" howitzers which are not required for Europe. These, complete with personnel and ammunition, would be invaluable here.

I am informed that the Union Government are prepared to recruit for a second Rhodesian Regiment up to 600 strong. To be demobilised and equipped at Petchesfstroom at the expense of the Union Government as far as Union stores permit. The purchase of equipment to complete to be defrayed from Imperial Revenues, also pay and rations and cost of forwarding to East Africa. I strongly recommend that this offer should be accepted.

Major General Tighe to War Office.

14.VIII.18 298
(6.40 p.m.)

25.

With reference to my letter of July 31st. No. 322 and the summary of same which was sent in telegram 325 of August 2nd.

- (A) Reliable information has now been received that 4 guns have already been salvaged from the "Konigsberg" and that others may be shortly.
- (B) It is indicated by recent intelligence that a second storeship (the first was sunk in Mamba Bay) has run the blockade and is in or near Tanga now. The Admiral has been asked to verify this. It is shown by intercepted messages that there is no lack of munitions of war in German East Africa.
- (C) If the above is true the whole situation in German East Africa is radically altered. The Germans have an unlimited recruiting area. The two storeships must have been expected and in anticipation of arms and ammunition being available it is natural that recruits should have been trained. Therefore, the Germans may have at this time 20,000 reliable men under arms and may be greatly superior to ourselves in field and machine guns. For the last three weeks Mbyuni and Taveta area have been so strongly picketed that I have not been able to obtain any information of the enemy's movements there.
- (D) Against such odds if all my good troops were fit I could probably hold my own but owing to the ever increasing sickness of the European and Indian troops, the reliable infantry ^{now} only total about 4,000 men of whom no more than 3,000 can be concentrated in the Maktau and Msima lines. This concentration is now being carried out. Should the enemy therefore make a determined advance on these two lines a contingency which I regard as quite possible, the situation would be ~~extremely~~ serious.
- (E) Only 2nd line troops can be spared to hold coast. to safe guard Mombasa and keep up morale of the inhabitants I consider the permanent presence of a man-of-war is essential.