

EAST AFR. PROT.

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MAY 15 1915

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Was office

German East Africa

1915

May 3rd

Telegraphic correspondence as to operations

Last previous Paper

1914 745

was Botswana
was ~~Swaz~~

Gen. G. Fiddes

as regards Belgian co-operation -

transport is evidently the great difficulty. The question of the Lake Tanganyika control is being dealt with on a South African pp.

Partly?

W.B.

4.5.15

Equ 4/5/15

H. J. R.

M 5/5/15 4/5/15

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Next subsequent Paper

20836 S

From Adjutant-General, Base, Kilindini, to War Office.

(No. 17739.)

20th April, 1915.

My letter 12th February, 1915, 830/S. and 1032/S. (No. 16077). 28th February, 1915, correct casualty return as follows, consequent on receipt of list of prisoners taken in Umba Valley operations, from German authorities. Native officers previously reported prisoners confirmed as prisoners unwounded:—101st Grenadiers: Subedar Major Govindrao Chauhan, Subedars Ramji Swant and Vishnu Palao, Jemadars Abu Talah and Sakaram Gaikwad; 2nd Kashmir Rifles: Subedars Hasan Mohammed and Rahmat Ullah Khan Sues, Assistant Surgeon Mohammed Did. Previously reported missing, confirmed as prisoners wounded—1st Infantry, Subedar Harnam Singh. British rank and file previously reported prisoners, confirmed as prisoners unwounded—31st Signal Company: Lance-Corporal 19 Greer, Private 9280 Wardman. Numbers Indian rank and file confirmed as prisoners wounded—101st Grenadiers, 4; 2nd Kashmir Rifles, 14, unwounded—101st Grenadiers, rank and file, 120; three followers, 6; 2nd Kashmir Rifles, rank and file, 115; followers, public, 11; private, 1; 31st Signal Company, rank and file, 3.

From Commander-in-Chief, India, to War Office.

(No. S. 8339)

23rd April, 1915, 1.25 p.m.

The General Officer Commanding, Nairobi, telegraphs in effect as follows:—

"No. S. 287, 21st April. We shall have to attack strongly fortified hostile positions near Taveta when the general advance is undertaken; it would be invaluable to have 6-inch howitzers, 25 cwt., for this purpose. Can two such weapons be supplied by India, without top carriages but with double-decked platforms and limbers? If so, could we also have six range-tables and handbooks, and 600 rounds of 100-pr lyddite shell for them?"

It is possible to supply two 6-inch howitzers, together with their carriages, limbers and connected stores and handbooks and tables. 450 rounds 100-lb. lyddite shells can be sent, with cartridges and tubes but no fuzes. In place of double-decked platforms, I can send light platforms. Shall the equipment as above be sent?"

From War Office to Commander-in-Chief, India

(No. 4170, cipher. 0137/1897, M S. 3)

23rd April 1915, 6.10 p.m.

Referring to my telegram of 15th April, No. 4059, cipher. No grant of rewards for the unsuccessful action at Tanga is proposed to be made, so will you please inform General Tighe to this effect.

From General Tighe to War Office.

(No. 281/4.)

23rd April, 1915, 6.53 p.m.

Your telegram, 3rd April, No. 4854, Brigadier-General Malleon now assumed command of Mombasa area as Brigade Commander, taking effect from 16th April.

In view of above request, further consideration his status and pay, vide India Office letter, 9th February, to Secretary, War Office

Repeated Military Secretary to Commander-in-Chief with reference to his No. S. 5326, 16th March.

From Base, Kilindini, to War Office.

(No. 25/16.) 24th April, 1915.
 "Purua" and "Cocoonada" arrived from Bombay 24th.

From Commander-in-Chief, Cape, Zanzibar, to Admiralty.

(No. 252.) 25th April, 1915, 3.25 p.m.
 Flight Commander returned safely from successful reconnoitre, enemy* is reported to be heading north.
 Same position as on December 6th near Kokotoni Island, apparently quite seaworthy.

* Refers to "Kouigsberg" up Rufiji River.

From Commander-in-Chief, Cape, Zanzibar, to Admiralty.

(No. 253.) 25th April, 1915, 6 p.m.
 Flight Commander Cull reports "Kouigsberg" appears to be in good condition. She appears to have moved a short distance down river from where reported by natives but in the same position as when seen by first flying machine. Cull fired at by shrapnel and rifles at entrance and by ship. Aeroplane engine damaged but repaired. No further serious damage.

From Major-General Tighe to War Office.

(No. 8 25-1) 25th April, 1915, 3.20 p.m.
 Referring to my telegram No. 273 of 20th April. The railway proposals have been discussed by Sir William Johns and myself, and I am convinced that it will be necessary to continue the line to Taveta; 30 extra miles of track, with fastenings and sleepers complete, will, for this purpose, be required beyond Maktou over an easy alignment, and it would be preferable to have another 20 miles, in order to make a connection later with the Mochi line. I would request early sanction to the above proposal as it takes 2 months to obtain railway material from India and the railhead will reach Maktou early in June.

This message has been repeated to the Chief of the General Staff, India.

From Major-General Tighe to War Office.

(No. 8, 290) 26th April, 1915, 3.15 p.m.
 Co-operation of the Belgians. Malleison, who has just returned from the Congo, has not been able to arrange anything, as on 23rd March General Henry's officials stated that the sole charge of military operations in the Congo had been entrusted to an official of the Southern Congo, and as he had no powers, he was unable to continue conversations. As the new Commander was two months' march distant, Malleison could only return and report. He states that the Belgian Government has ordered the concentration of 7,000 men in Kivu area, and about 10,000 in the Southern Congo for operations against the Germans. Apparently, this will be completed during May, but pending the arrival of all arms and ammunition at an uncertain date, no serious advance can be attempted. He suggests two schemes discussed with Henry, and generally agreed to by him.

I consider the first offers the best results as it secures the command of Lake Tanganyika. The present position of that lake is that the Germans have the old steamer "Weissman" and two motor launches and control over the lake. A new steamer is being completed by the Belgians, and it is said to be in an advanced state. The new

German steamer, however, cannot be completed, owing to the non-arrival of essential machinery. The Germans are able, by their command of the lake, to threaten numerous points and produce dissemination of the Belgian forces. If the Belgians could secure the command of the lake, 10,000 men might be transported to Ujiji and thence by rail towards Tabora, when we are attacking elsewhere. Such a movement would obviate the supply and transport difficulties which would be otherwise very serious, and would be of the highest importance. Accordingly, I strongly recommend that the Belgian Government be approached in order to ascertain exactly the present state of preparation of the new steamer of Albertville and arming of the same. The Admiralty might also be consulted on the feasibility of destroying the German craft "Weissman" by means of small motor launches equipped with guns, mines, torpedoes. By means of the Congo river and railway, launches of suitable size would be able to proceed the whole way from the west coast to Albertville. It is very desirable, if any action be taken on the lake, that the operations should be in charge of British naval officers with few ratings for guns, and these should proceed to Albertville via the west coast.

Failing the above scheme the Belgian forces in Northern and Southern Congo would have to operate separately, and it would be difficult for the 10,000 men in Southern Congo to operate at all as there is no practicable route towards central railway from the Southern Congo. The northern force might cross Ruvubu river, capture Umbura, and then advance on Kigari, the capital of Ruanda. The seizure of this town would have considerable effect politically in that area. A closer march thence through rich country would bring the force to Bukoba, whence it would be possible to tranship it to Muanza. The force would be limited to about 4,000 or less by the difficulties of transport. Muanza is strong and would offer a stout resistance. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Belgian force, by the time it had reached Tanganyika, would retain much of its fighting value, while it would be a very difficult matter to supply such a force from Muanza onwards. I regard this plan as a last resource only, in case the Tanganyika scheme proves to be quite impracticable. In any case, I would urge that very distinct orders be sent by the Belgian Government as to the scope of operation, and that all striking forces should be commanded by regular Belgian officers. Immediate action in the direction suggested should be taken if the Tanganyika scheme is approved. Full report follows by post.

From Commander-in-Chief, India, to War Office.

(No. 8, 2544) 26th April, 1915, 4.3 p.m.

Please let us know if we are to comply with the demands for railway material made by the General Officer Commanding, Force R, in his telegram No. 253 of 25th April.

From Major-General Tighe to War Office.

(No. 28106) 27th April, 1915, 4.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 28104 of the 23rd. General Malleison has taken over the command of Mombasa.

Repeated Chief of the General Staff, India.