

Part of No. 154

November 1913

SECRET

With reference to your letter of the 4th October 1913, I am directed by the Postmaster General to inform you of the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that he has pleasure in recommending Miss J. S. Pate, Sorting Clerk and Telegraphist at ~~Aden~~, for appointment as Post Office Clerk and Telegraphist in the East Africa Protectorate on the usual terms.

Miss Pate is 32 years of age and her established service dates from the 15 May 1904. She is reported to possess a good knowledge of the general work of a Post Office.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,



EAST AFRICA

Colonial
Office

1910

9 Nov

Shipment of dangerous goods and
Hazardous goods to U.S.A.

draft to ... the ... of ...
... to ...
... to ...

Copy CO SAA

51882

NOV 15 1915

9 Nov 1915

65

Urgent (16, 1915)

DRAFT

Mr. O. S. S. H.

70

I am to report you
 before the E. & P. that
 lumber from Orono & 12, 23
 Great Lakes to the S. L.,
 have sold on behalf of
 the Smith & Mackenzie of
 New York, E. & P., about
 1500 tons of Mangrove Bark
 to the Navy Department
 at New York, and that
 since has been ordered for
 the shipment of it to
 the U. S. Navy Department
 100 steamers "Mariana"
 sailing about the end of the
 month for London, where
 to look in the Caribbean



Mr. J. J. Hillier to be
 as soon as possible
 per
 A. J. &
 See 40009

1. The...
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REC. OF
51880
REC. JONVIS

9 November 1915. 63

RECEIVED
COL. OFFICE

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 2nd instant, No. 7014/P.A. I am directed by the Postmaster General to state for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that he has pleasure in recommending Miss J. Bestfield, of Scarborough, for appointment as Telephonist in the East African Protectorate.

Miss Bestfield is 30 years of age and has had over 14 years experience in the manipulation of Telephone Exchange switchboards both of the current carrying type and of the battery system.

I am,

Sir,

your obedient servant,

[Handwritten signature]

Under Secretary of State,
COLONIAL OFFICE.

MSO EAP

51880
15

70

9th Dec

16th Nov 1915

DRAFT

Secretary

990

MINUTE

Mr. Small 16/11/15
Mr. Cartwright 16/11/15

Mr.
Mr. H. Patten
Mr. H. Jones
Mr. J. Anderson
Mr. H. M. Mather
Mr. H. M. Mather

With ref to your letter of the
9th of Nov. (No 2900) re

concerning the PMS's communication
from Mansfield to the

Telephoned with Postal Dept

of 8/11/15 and to request

that the enclosed letter which

the office of afft in order may

be forwarded to Mrs. Mansfield

draft
+ 15

EAST AFR PROT
GERMAN P AFRICA

52251

12 NOV 15

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71

cc
German East Africa

1918

Minutes of Conference as to

the appointment of a delegate of the
C. I. to attend meeting of the
Council of East Africa

(to see)

Mem

11 15 15

SECRET.

Nov. 10. 1916.

7.

Dear Mr. Bonar Law.

The Prime Minister proposes to appoint a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider the question of future military operations in East Africa, with terms of reference as enclosed.

The Prime Minister has asked me to say that he would be glad if you would nominate one or more representatives of the Colonial Office on the Sub-Committee.

I have spoken informally to Mr. Steel Maitland and Sir George Fiddes on the subject this afternoon, and you may like to consult them.

I should be glad of a reply as early as possible, as it is desirable to push on the consideration of this matter as rapidly as possible.

Yours sincerely,

M. P. A. Hankey

H. Han.

1. Bonar Law, M.P., Esq.,

11/11/15

73

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

The Prime Minister desires that a Sub-Committee composed as follows:-

Maj.-Gen. C.E. Callwell, C.B., in the Chair.

Representatives of the:-

War Office.

Admiralty.

Foreign Office.

Colonial Office.

India Office.

Lt.-Col. W.P.A. Hankey, C.B., Secretary.

should meet to consider the question of future operations in East Africa.

Nov. 11, 1915.

Downing Street,

11th November, 1918.

My dear Hankey,

Mr. Henry Law desires me to inform you, in reply to your letter of the 10th of November, that he nominates Mr. Steel-Maitland and Sir George Fiddes as the representatives of the Colonial Office on the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence appointed to consider the question of future military operations in East Africa. He trusts that the Sub-Committee will get to work with all possible speed.

Yours sincerely,

(6d) P. P. A. S. T. R.

Sir G. Fiddes

SECRET

75

Ad-Committee
of the
Committee of Imperial Defence
Future Operations in East Africa

The first meeting will be held at Mitchell Gardens
on Friday November 12th, at 8.30 p.m.

[Sd] N.P.A. Hankey,
Secretary.

12th November, 1918.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

76

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

The Prime Minister desires that a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence consisting of :-

Major-General C. E. Callwell, C.B., in the Chair.
 A Representative of the Foreign Office.
 Mr. A. D. Steel-Hatfield, M.P., Colonial Office.
 Sir G. V. Fiddes, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
 Colonel G. H. Selwyn, India Office.
 Major G. B. Lovason, D.S.O., War Office.
 Captain H. V. Grant, R.N., Admiralty.
 Lt-Col. H. P. A. Hankey, C.B., Secretary, C.I.D.
 (Secretary).

shall meet to consider the question of future operations in East Africa.

Sir G. Fiddes

SECRET

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

I.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY.

In the attached paper, prepared by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the facts affecting the Military Situation in East Africa are set forth. The unexpected salvage of munitions from wrecked or destroyed German ships in August, 1915, seriously altered the balance of military strength in favour of the Germans. The difficulties of maintaining an effective blockade along the coast of German East Africa are such as to make it possible for further munitions to be landed, and for the German superiority in this respect to be maintained. Climatic influences have reduced the available numbers of our troops to such an extent as to make the outlook in certain contingencies one that calls for serious consideration. So far the subject has been taken up by the Foreign Office, at whose instance an Interdepartmental Conference has been held. The conclusions of this Conference are contained in CHAPTER I in keeping with the commission in the last of these Commissions, and following the recommendations of the Director of Military Operations in Appendix II, it has been thought expedient to have the whole question discussed by a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

H.P.A.S.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

Increase in enemy's strength.—The first intimation that the situation in East Africa might become really serious in the near future was given in a telegram from General Tighé, dated 2nd August (No. 222 S.) in which he had special stress on the fact that, according to intelligence reports, the Germans had salvaged 3 field guns, 6 machine-guns, 8,000 rifles, and 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition from a vessel which had been sunk by our navy-of-war in Matsa Bay. In confirmation of these reports he stated that the Germans had lately been using ammunition of recent date.

He estimated that 12,000 African troops had been raised by their state April and that they would have 20,000 armed men in the field by the end of the year if the reports of salvage were true.

He supplemented that telegram by another, dated 14th August (No. 223 S.) in which he made the following statements:—

(1.) That four guns had been salvaged from the "Kontagery" and that others may also be salvaged shortly.

(2.) That a second steamer was believed to have run the blockade and to be in Tanga harbour. In consequence there was no lack of ammunition in German East Africa.

(3.) That in consequence of the above the whole situation in German East Africa was radically altered. The Germans might at that moment have 20,000 troops under arms and be greatly superior to the British in both sea and machine-guns.

In his despatch, dated 31st July, 1912 (No. 14302219), he made the following estimate of the enemy's strength:—

2,178 (German and Austrian)
1,800 to 2,000 natives
62 guns
67 machine-guns

The estimate of machine-guns is probably below the mark, as they have captured several British 709 with great quantities of ammunition.

The British Forces.—On 1st August the British strength amounted to 1,070 British officers and men, 14,072 native officers and men (Indian and African), mounting a total of 17,124, with 28 guns and 56 machine-guns.

In addition to these, there were some 200 or 400 Europeans belonging to Volunteer Corps.

Two battalions with the necessary personnel have since that date arrived in East Africa, and the Rhodesian Regiment has been augmented by about 400 men.

The main British concentration is on the Maktou-Matua line. Maktou is the present terminus of the railway under construction from Yva to Tabora. The remainder of the forces are scattered along the Uganda railway and at important points on the main routes into German East Africa.

The Indian troops have been found to be very unreliable, and there have been several cases of self-mutilation. Both Indian and European troops are suffering greatly from sickness. General Tighé has reported that one Indian Regiment, the 12th Brigade, is suffering to such an extent from malaria and dysentery that "they will never be of any more use in the field." He has added that they may be replaced by another regiment from India. Owing to the inferiority of the Indian troops and the prevalence of sickness, he estimates that his reliable infantry only number 4,000, of which only 2,000 could be concentrated on the Maktou-Matua line.

He summed up the situation thus (No. 222 of 14th August) as

"Against such odds as I have now to meet, if all my troops were fit, I could probably hold my own, but owing to the ever-increasing weakness the reliable infantry now only totals about 4,000, of whom not more than 2,000 can be concentrated in the Maktou-Matua line. Should the enemy make a determined advance on those two lines, a contingency which I regard as quite possible, the situation would be serious."

During the last two months the enemy has shown ever-increasing activity in building the Uganda railway, which has been repeatedly blown up, and in attacking isolated posts. On 14th August one of these posts was cut off.

It is evident that a complete change in the situation became apparent early in August. Before that date it had been General Tigh's intention to push on the railway towards Taveta, and either to attack that place or to induce the enemy to attack him. Since 1st August he has been compelled to adopt a purely defensive rôle, and is experiencing considerable difficulty in even maintaining intact his line of railway communications between Mombasa and Nairobi and between Voi and Maketa.

Reinforcements.—Authority has been given for increasing the Rhodesian Contingent to the strength of a full battalion but there is no prospect of obtaining more than 250 men (High Commissioner's telegram of 18th September).

Reinforcements for the King's African Rifles are being raised in Nyaland. South Africa is preparing to send five 12-pr. batteries to East Africa. It is also proposed to send Cape Colonial battalions, and to send a brigade to East Africa after the German withdrawal. The last project is presumably to some extent dependent on the political situation in South Africa, and it may be that this reinforcement could not leave South Africa till the end of October.

It is hoped that some additional troops can be raised within East Africa. A Regimental Bill has been passed. The effect of this bill, however, will not be felt for some time.

Belgian cooperation.—The Belgians are at present rendering very little assistance. They have, however, evacuated Ruanda (General Tigh's despatch of 21st July) and have found the enemy to concentrate about Mombasa. This has allowed us to withdraw troops from Ruanda.

The enemy to be defeated with our attitude towards them in Northern Rhodesia. We refused to allow them to invade German East Africa from Rhodesia, but when they withdrew troops from our territory we demanded their help. The absence of strength has, according to the report, prevented their assuming the offensive north of Lake Tanganyika.

In view of the attitude, and since the British Naval expedition which is on its way to the lake has not yet arrived, it is improbable that any decisive offensive will be adopted by the Belgians for a considerable time.

Summary of the situation.—The Germans possess a very great advantage owing to their control of the lake and the difficulty of concerted action on the part of their enemies. Their railway communications are excellent. Their two railways from East Mombasa to Ujiji and to Tanganyika are connected by a good road fit for motor transport. Mombasa and Lake Tanganyika are connected with the central railway by a good motor road. Their concentration at Taveta is greatly facilitated by a rail or trolleyway which has been constructed between Mombasa on the Usukuma midway and Taveta. By these means the enemy can concentrate rapidly either on Lake Tanganyika, on Lake Victoria, in the Tanga district, or on the coast.

The British in Rhodesia and East Africa have been reduced to the defensive and the Belgians are weak. The Germans are therefore in a position to concentrate superior forces against us at any point before the others can intervene. There is little doubt that they will make full use of their opportunity and that they will attack General Tigh's line in preference to an attack on an extension of British East Africa which will not only cost us the greater number of men but also upon the Uganda or Rhodesia. The Uganda railway for a distance of 200 miles is at no point more than 50 miles from the coast.

These points of attack will probably take place from Taveta against the Maketa—Mombasa line. We are not unprepared by the advance on Mombasa is on the railway by the coast where the railway is liable to be cut and water is plentiful. These attacks will probably take place simultaneously with other attacks on the railway so as to draw our forces from distant points. Even if railway interruption were only temporary, the loss of the Maketa—Mombasa line would, for the time being, be serious, while it was attacked by superior numbers. This line must definitely hinder the Germans from attempting to sever the Uganda railway and completely block our forces. The coastal route probably is not so good as it is generally supposed to be, and the concentration of our forces is not so easy as it is generally supposed to be.

The general situation in East Africa would probably be so great that our military position would be very largely increased in this direction.

The best opportunity for a German advance would be during the winter season which continues from about the middle of November to the middle of December. Water would then be plentiful on the Maketa route. It would therefore seem that a reinforcement should be sent to East Africa of a strength sufficient in the opinion of General Tigh to provide for the security of the railway. This reinforcement would probably amount to at least one brigade of reliable infantry, which should reach East Africa before the "short rains" begin. The word "reliable" implies a high quality of troops, but in order to render our position untenable, we must be prepared to offer battle in that theatre of war if we should be unable to withdraw an adequate force from East Africa. For this reason we must not be lulled into a false sense of security. We probably have the effect of inducing a large number of the troops in East Africa to join us and the enemy's position would then be so weakened that we could afford to withdraw a large proportion of our forces.

In closing the reinforcement necessary to make British East Africa secure is realized that troops may not be available for this theatre of war, and the Government may decide that General Tigh must do his best with his present resources. The reinforcement is now being prepared.



Postscript.—Since the above was written the following telegram has been received from General Tigh:

N. 248. 21st October 1915. 2500 miles.

(1) The Union Government have offered to send only 12 batteries for service with five batteries with ammunition columns, Belgian staff and personnel complete, and 12 pr anti-aircraft guns and 10 pr anti-aircraft machine guns. Shipping arrangements to be left to the Navy. These provisions notwithstanding I think that these will be a good 12 pr Q.V. battery.

(2) I think that the proposal offered may be improved. As the more troops we can get, the better our position will be. The cost of these additional troops is not so high as it is generally supposed to be. A large amount of good infantry could be sent to the theatre of war. It is possible that we could make such a forward move in the Tanga district as to be in a position to attack the Belgians based on Ruanda (and possibly on Ujiji), to capture the railway communication and the coast, and to relieve the present pressure on the Uganda railway. I believe we could do this if we had the necessary resources.

(3) If in addition detached troops should also be available we could be very well and most probably in the Tanga line.

(Signed) G. J. M.

During the last two months the enemy has shown ever-increasing activity in raiding the Uganda railway, which has been repeatedly blown up, and in attacking isolated posts. On 14th August one of these posts was cut off.

It is evident that a complete change in the situation became apparent early in August. Before that date it had been General Tigh's intention to push on the railway towards Taveta, and either to attack that place or to induce the enemy to attack him. Since 1st August he has been compelled to adopt a purely defensive policy, and is experiencing considerable difficulty in even maintaining intact his line of railway communication between Mombasa and Nairobi and between Voi and Malindi.

Reinforcements.—Activity has been given for increasing the Rhodesian Contingent to the strength of a full battalion, but there is no prospect of obtaining more than 150 men (High Commissioner's telegram of 14th September).

300 recruits for the King's African Rifles are being raised in Nyasaland. South Africa is preparing to send five 12-pc. batteries to East Africa. It is also proposed to raise a Cape Colonial Battalion, and to send a brigade to East Africa after the October elections. This last project is presumably to some extent dependent on the political situation in South Africa, and in any case this reinforcement would not leave South Africa till the middle of October.

It is hoped that some additional troops can be raised within East Africa. A Registration Bill has been passed. The effect of this will, however, not be felt for some time.

Belgian co-operation.—The Belgians are at present rendering very little assistance. They have, however, invaded Ruanda (General Tigh's despatch of 31st July) and have forced the enemy to concentrate about Muanza. This has allowed us to withdraw troops from Kurungu.

They appear to be dissatisfied with our attitude towards them in Northern Rhodesia. We refused to allow them to invade German East Africa from Rhodesia, but when they withdrew troops from our territory we demanded their help. The diversion of strength has, according to them, prevented their occupying the advance north of Lake Tanganyika.

In view of the attitude, and since the Belgian Naval expedition which is on its way to the lake has not yet arrived, it is improbable that any resolute advance will be adopted by the Belgians for a considerable time.

Summary of the situation.—The Germans possess a very great advantage owing to their central position and the difficulty of concerted action on the part of their enemies. Their tactical dispositions are excellent. They use railways from Durban, Salama to Uji and from Tanga to Arusha are connected by a good road fit for motor. Muanza on Lake Victoria is also connected with the central railway by a good motor road. Their concentration at Taveta is greatly facilitated by a road or trackway which has been constructed between Mushi on the Usambira railway and Taveta. By these means the enemy can concentrate rapidly either on Lake Tanganyika or Lake Victoria or the Taveta District or on any point.

The attack on Ruanda and East Africa have been reduced to the defensive and the danger is serious. The Germans who have been completely superior since August out of their own hands (the British and Belgians). There is little doubt that they will make full use of their superiority and that they will attack General Tigh's force in preference to the others, as an invasion of British East Africa will be not only easier but offer greater results than an attack upon the Congo or Malindi. The Uganda railway for a distance of 200 miles is at no point more than 20 miles from the Central Station.

There may attack will probably take place from Taveta against the Malindi-Mombasa line. This may be accompanied by an advance on Mombasa or on the railway by the coast route where the passes are hostile to us and water is plentiful. These attacks will probably take place simultaneously with other raids on the railway so as to draw off our troops from threatened points. Even if railway interruptions were only temporary, the force holding the Malindi-Mombasa line would, for the time being, be isolated, while it was attacked by superior numbers. This force could definitely locate the Germans should be enabled to cross the Uganda railway and completely divide our forces. The course would probably be decisive and would almost certainly lead to the conquest of the Protectorate.

The final effect throughout Africa would probably be so great that our military facilities would be very largely increased in West Africa.

The best opportunity for a German advance would be during the "short rains" which continue from about the middle of November to the middle of December. Water would then be plentiful on the Malindi route. It would therefore seem that a reinforcement should be sent to East Africa of a strength sufficient to the opinion of General Tigh to provide for the security of the railway. This reinforcement would probably amount to at least one brigade of reliable soldiers, which should reach East Africa before the "short rains" begin. This would probably require a preliminary "advance" but to make up for the "short rains" it is probably better to make up for the "short rains" by the advance of reinforcements to the strength of a brigade of reliable soldiers. A success would probably have the effect of inducing a large number of the railway in German East Africa to join us and the enemy's position would then be so weakened that we could expect to withdraw a large proportion of our force.

In stating the reinforcements proposed to make General Tigh's force more fit to withstand the enemy's advance in the quarter of the year, and that the Government may decide that General Tigh must do so far with his present equipment and the reinforcements now being prepared.



General Tigh's force was ordered the following telegram has been received from General Tigh:

No. 101. The Uganda Contingent is ordered to be ready to start on 1st November for the advance on Muanza.

The Uganda Contingent is ordered to be ready to start on 1st November for the advance on Muanza. The force is to be ready to start on 1st November for the advance on Muanza.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st inst. and in reply to inform you that the advance on Muanza will be made on 1st November. The force is to be ready to start on 1st November for the advance on Muanza.

Yours faithfully,
General Tigh

General Tigh

APPENDIX

At an inter-departmental conference held at 21, Whitehall, London, S.W., November 8, 1915, at the request of the Foreign Office, on the subject of the Belgian proposal for a Naval Demonstration off the coast of German East Africa.

MEMORANDUM

Vice-Admiral Sir D.A. Bebbie, I.C.V.O., in the Chair,
Lord Bustard Percy, Foreign Office,
Sir G. H. Pidge, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonial Office,
Major G. V. Leveson, D.S.O., War Office,
Captain Mark Percy, War Office,
Mr. Cyril Longhurst, Assistant Secretary,
Committee of Imperial Defence.

The following conclusions were reached:-

- (1). The Committee are of opinion that a demonstration without an effective landing would be useless, and that the Foreign Office should inform the Belgian Government accordingly.

Assuming any such demonstration, as suggested by a landing of forces, were decided upon, it is of opinion that any other suggestion of an offensive operation should not be entertained unless the troops at the spot — even if strengthened by the force promised in the Union Government's telegram of November 1st, — were further reinforced, either by transferring the first Union Brigade from Europe to East Africa (as recommended by the Union Government) or by substituting another brigade.

- (2). The Committee agree that the question of the control of operations in Indonesia, Nyassa, and German East Africa should receive the consideration of the Committee.

W. D. L. G. C. S. S.

W. D. L. G. C. S. S.

PROOF

SECRET

of the Committee of Imperial Defence,
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

CONCLUSIONS OF A SUB-COMMITTEE ON FUTURE OPERATIONS IN EAST AFRICA

November 12 1915.

1. THE Committee desire to point out to His Majesty's Government that all efforts to secure possession of German East Africa, and to overthrow the operations of the enemy forces, have hitherto proved unsuccessful. They therefore recommend that steps be taken to ensure the conquest of this German colony with as little delay as possible, and express the opinion that this can only be accomplished by the assumption of a resolute offensive with an adequate force.

2. The numerical strength of the additional British force required to undertake such an offensive was next discussed. The Committee, as advised by the military members present, approved of the general figure of 10,000, mentioned on page 3 of the Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff dated the 24th October 1915.*

3. The following reinforcements were then noted as either promised by the Union of South Africa and already arranged for by the War Office:-

1 Brigade of Infantry (South Africa)	4,000
2 mounted corps (South Africa)	2,000
One Coy. of Engineers	500
1 Indian Infantry Battalion	500
Artillery:-	
Five 15 in. G.F. guns	200
Four 4.7 inch howitzers	200
Two 3 inch howitzers	200
	10,000

4. The Committee took note of the request on the part of the Union of South Africa that the 1st South African Brigade, now in England, should be diverted to East Africa. The Chairman informed the Committee that this unit, having been specially trained for service elsewhere, was not available for service in East Africa. The Committee recommended that a British Brigade from a New Army call in the United Kingdom should be substituted for it, so as to make up two complete brigades of white troops. The total force required would amount to 12,000, which the Committee were advised would be adequate for the offensive decided upon.

5. A considerable time must be consumed in the transport of troops, and the early march begins early in April, consequently the time available for the operation will be short. The Committee consider therefore that it is desirable to move the Union Government to render further assistance to make sure of success during the few weeks that will be available for active operations. An increase in the number of troops at our disposal would inevitably accelerate the desired completion of the operation.

6. In order to deal efficiently with such large numbers, a suitable General Staff and Administrative Staff organization is necessary, which at present is non-existent. The Committee recommended therefore that such a staff should be sent from England as

* It should be noted that the Agony of Durney was held to confirm the Memorandum of the 24th October 1915, and is immediately referred to on page 3.

soon as possible, and should include officers with experience in dealing with South African troops.

1. For the better furtherance of operations, the Committee are of opinion that the co-operation of the Belgians is desirable. They consider that this can be secured only by placing a definite and consistent policy before the Belgian military authorities. They suggest therefore that if and when the present recommendations are approved and a plan of campaign has been decided on, the main features of the plan shall be communicated to the Belgian authorities, and co-operation invited.

2. As explained in paragraph 5, every day now saved is valuable. The Committee feel therefore that it is essential that an early decision on the proposals herein put forward should be given.

soon as possible, and should include officers with experience in dealing with South African troops.

7. For the better furtherance of operations, the Committee are of opinion that the co-operation of the Belgians is desirable. They consider that this can be secured only by stating a definite and consistent policy before the Belgian military authorities. They suggest therefore that if and when the present recommendations are approved and a plan of campaign has been decided on, the main features of this plan shall be communicated to the Belgian authorities, and co-operation invited.

8. As explained in paragraph 5, every day now saved is valuable. The Committee feel therefore that it is essential that an early decision on the proposals herein set forward should be given.

C.I.G.S.

I was unable to attend the meeting of this Inter-Departmental Conference yesterday afternoon on account of the War Council. It seems to me that this question of future operations in East Africa requires to be thrashed out thoroughly; but, to start with, the matter should be discussed, if seem to me, by a committee such as assembled yesterday, acting as a sub-committee of the C.I.C. and reporting to the Government. It is on these lines that all the various operations of the war have started at the outset, viz. the operations at Gallipoli, German South-west Africa, in East Africa, etc. in the Pacific.

Hitherto we have been blessing hot and cold on the Belgians; at one time asking them to leave, at another time encouraging them from doing so. Co-operation with the Belgians has to be arranged with the Foreign Office which is therefore concerned in the matter. The question of colonial forces to be supplied from South Africa has to be dealt with through the Colonial Office. The Admiralty is concerned in any projects for attacks on vessels like large and large submarines which are also concerned in the effort to secure command of Lake Tanganyika and in controlling our own ships on Lake Victoria. Thus there is also the question whether the control of operations in Rhodesia and Nyasaland should or should not be taken over by the War Office. I do not think such an arrangement could be seriously considered unless we were prepared to send out a superior officer with a properly constituted staff to run the campaign as a whole. To get the thing on a proper footing I should like to have these points considered by

a sub-committee of the C.I.D. representing the different
departments.

63

(Signed), Charles E. Callwell.

25th November 1954.

D.F.O.

Secretary,
C.I.D.

I think this should be done. Can you get it settled
early?

(Intd), A.J.N.

25th November 1954

C.T.O.S.