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Congestion at Kilindini & Mombasa Harbours.

Contravenes Statement & Deductions made in Major Leggett's letter to Co. S. Aug. 16, & sends report showing actual position & matters. Requests that papers be brought to notice of Army who otherwise may be misled by Major Leggett's allegations.

Mr Read.

You saw Major Leggett's letter of the 6th of August at the time (M.I. 57766). At that time Major Leggett stipulated that his letter should not be sent out to the Protectorate. And yet only a day or two later he sent a copy to the Governor, and it is this copy which has provoked the present rejoinder. The Governor has evidently been deeply moved by Major Leggett's criticisms and allegations, and has got the General Manager of the Railway to answer them in detail. Mr Eastwood has dealt very faithfully with them, and has gone to an immense amount of trouble in the attached memorandum, in which he takes Major Leggett's letter paragraph by paragraph and replies to it, ^{Three} ~~and in the~~ diagrams which go with the memorandum. It is impossible to summarise adequately the criticisms and the replies; they have ~~main points~~ ^{main points} and in detail to be properly appreciated. But the ~~main points~~ ^{main points} with which Major Leggett dealt were

as

Subsequent Paper

M.O.

59616

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(1) Delay in unloading and loading ships, and use of lighters. The General Manager demolishes Major Leggett's figures as to the delay of ships at the port. He shows that as against the stay of "20 to 40 days" alleged by Major Leggett the average stay of commercial ships at Kilindini and Mombasa is only 5.81 days. In Mombasa itself (where Major Leggett erroneously thinks all commercial cargoes are dealt with) the average stay was only 5.18 days. The General Manager delightedly remarks that the most serious cases of delay occurred with ships for which Major Leggett's company were agents.

The General Manager also demolishes Major Leggett's figures as to the amount of lighters available on procurable, and gives the lie to the statement that the Government was not making full use of the lighters owned by the Handling and Company.

(2) Native labour at the Port. The General Manager blames the merchants for intense competition, resulting in abnormal prices, and consequent idleness on the part of the labourers. He makes no remark on the suggestion that Government regulation should be ^{admitted}, but we have recently heard from the Governor that this has actually been done with success.

(3) Port facilities. The General Manager convicts Major Leggett of grave inaccuracies in his statements as to the quantity and character of the facilities available, both at Mombasa and Kilindini, and shows, I think, conclusively, either that Major Leggett's memory has played him false or that he is actually unacquainted with the plan of the wharves, jetties and sheds at these ports.

(4) Congestion on the railway and at the Lake ports. The General Manager gives figures and supplies diagrams which seem to show that Major Leggett grossly exaggerated the congestion and the delays in trans-

mission.

(5) Proposals for handling import and export cargo. Major Leggett's proposals on these heads were very detailed, and on the face of them attractive. The General Manager maintains that they are entirely vitiated by Major Leggett's inaccuracies and ignorance as to the facilities actually available and to the use made of them. He also criticises the railway part of the proposals as showing ignorance of the possibility of railway working.

Major Leggett wrote his letter, I think, in 1904. The difficulties have been moved to Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga, and the Lake ports and on the railway, as we are assured by the Governor, has been relieved, and we do not hear any more of abnormal delays in the handling of ships at Mombasa and Kilindini. In fact, the one difficulty appears to be that of securing enough tonnage for the shipment of produce. We are, therefore, not called upon to take any notice upon Major Leggett's letter. Indeed, it was decided some months ago (see Officially 40724) not to do so. There is no necessity to say anything to Major Leggett, but I do feel that this handling of his criticisms by the General Manager should make us very chary of accepting his statements without examination in future. He is always cocksure, but, often very far from accurate. The General Manager has taken a very great deal of trouble in this matter, and I should like him to know that we appreciate it. Sir Henry Belfield will have left the Protectorate before a letter written now could reach him, but I should like to be allowed to tell Mr Baring that we have received the General Manager's memorandum and that we are much obliged to him for all the trouble which he has taken in examining Major Leggett's allegations, and that the information which he has supplied has made it possible to form a more correct appreciation of the position. I can let Sir Henry Belfield know that

*We had
never
seen
the
figures
before
4/10/04*

we have written in this sense when he arrives.

HAB

So proceed - & send the first
time to Mr Graeme Thomson
privately for perusal & return.

at once.

H. J. R.

30/7/17

Mr. Hena.

Please see the attached letter from Mr. Graeme
Thomson dated the 5th of February. It is pleasing
that the Admiralty had discovered for themselves the
inaccuracy of Major Leggett's statements. It would
be a good thing for the Protectorate authorities to
know this. If you agree, I will send Mr. Bowring a copy
of Mr. Graeme Thomson's letter for confidential communi-
cation to the General Manager of the Railway, and I
will let Sir Henry Belfield see it when he arrives.

HAB

13/7

at once.

H. J. R.

13/7/17

I have shown the letter to Sir H. Belfield.

HAB

27/6/17

Bowring Street,

15th February, 1917.

~~Confidential~~

My dear Bowring,

In continuation of my letter of the 31st of January, I think it well now to send you a copy of a letter which I have had from Mr. Graeme Thomson. It is very pleasing to find that the Admiralty discovered at once for themselves that some of Major Leggett's principal allegations were inaccurate. You may show Mr. Graeme Thomson's letter to the General Manager of the Railway confidentially. It is only due to him that he should see it.

Yours sincerely,

(SD) F.G.A. BUTLER.

E. BOWRING ESQ., C.M.G.

Transport Department,

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Admiralty.


5.2.17

Dear Mr Butler,

Very many thanks for your letter of the 31st ultimo enclosing copy of Sir Henry Belfield's letter to you and the memorandum of the General Manager of the Uganda Railway which I return herewith. I have read the letter with great interest.

On receipt of Major Leggett's letter, I made enquiries by cable ~~from~~ the Naval Commander in Chief as to the accuracy of some of the principal statements made by Major Leggett, and as the reply I received flatly contradicted the allegations made the matter was allowed to drop.

Yours very truly,



F.G.A. Butler Esq,
Colonial Office,
S.W.



GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
BRITISH EAST AFRICA

Mombasa,

9th December 1916.

My dear Butler,

When I received the enclosed letter from Major Leggett, covering the attached copy of his communication to Mr Graeme Thomson, and observed that he had furnished the C.O. with a copy of that document, I was so impressed by the misleading nature of his statements and the inaccuracy of his deductions that I asked Eastwood to go fully into the subject and to furnish me with his comments on Major Leggett's letter and with a statement of the actual facts. I now send you Eastwood's reply, together with illustrative diagrams, in the light of which you will probably agree that the value of Major Leggett's allegations and suggestions may be materially discounted.

I shall be glad if you will show these papers to Read, and I think that Mr Graeme Thomson should be made acquainted with our comments upon what he may have accepted as an accurate statement of prevailing conditions.

Yours sincerely
Al Lawry Bayard

Downing Street,

31 January, 1917.

Dear Mr. Grasse Thomson,

You will remember the letter which Major S.H.M. Leggett wrote to you on the 8th August last about the congestion and delays to shipping at Kilindi and Mombasa. At the same time he sent a copy of his letter to Sir Henry Belfield, the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate. Sir Henry has taken the matter up very keenly and has sent me a letter of which I enclose a copy. I send in original the memorandum in which the General Manager of the Uganda Railway deals with Major Leggett's letter paragraph by paragraph. There is of course no action to be taken in the matter, but we think it very desirable that you should see the General Manager's reply to Major Leggett's allegations and criticisms. No good purpose would be served by embarking on a controversy with Major Leggett on these matters of delay. I would ask, therefore, that you will treat the memorandum as sent entirely for your own information. Please let me have it back at your convenience.

Yours very truly,

(Sd) F. G. A. BUTLER.

Downing Street,

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31 January, 1917.

My dear Bowring,

A letter sent to Sir Henry Belfield would not catch him before he leaves East Africa, so I think it desirable to let you know that I have received his letter of the 9th December, enclosing a memorandum by the General Manager of the Railway on Major Leggett's letter to Mr. Greene Thomson of the 8th August last, relating to delays ~~of~~ ⁱⁿ ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~and~~ ^{and} congestion of traffic at Kilindi and Mombasa.

We want Mr. Eastwood to know that the memorandum ~~has~~ ^{has} reached us and that we are much obliged ~~to you~~ ^{to you} for all the trouble which he has taken in examining Major Leggett's allegations. The information which he has supplied has made it possible to form a more correct appreciation of the ~~position~~ ^{position} and we are taking care that Mr. Greene Thomson, to whom Major Leggett's letter was addressed, is made acquainted with the reply to his criticisms.

Yours sincerely

(Sd) F. G. A. BUTLER

British East Africa Corporation, Limited. 178

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3523
REC'D
REC'D 18 JAN 17

90, GRESHAM HOUSE,

12th Aug 1916

Secretary
P. T. PRESSLAND
TELEPHONE LONDON WALL 6176.
(CABLES)
TELEGRAMS: TRAIL AVE. LONDON.
CABLES: INCREASE. LONDON.
COPY:
METERS UNION AND BROOMHALLS
COMBINATION
AND AT
MOMBASA, NAIROBI, KISUMU, SOCO
SOUTH EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE,
AND
KAMPALA, JINJA, MABINDI, &c.
UGANDA PROTECTORATE.

In your reply please refer
to No.

Personal.

My dear Sir Henry:

Have been to Admiralty asked me to see their Director General of Transport - informally re Kikindi's Congestion - I had a long conference with him & Royden (with a Cunard line, but now a member of the central shipping committee under Lord Curzon's chairmanship) they asked for all suggestions I could make, as fully as if our spoken as possible - & then asked me to put my suggestions in writing privately.

It is due in courtesy to you to send you the enclosed copy. I might add that I saw our C.O. people after seeing the Admiralty & was told that they (C.O.) are very anxious to do anything Admiralty may wish that may help

attended, and to pass on such wishes to you.
I have given you a copy of the enclosed letter.
also saw one was other people who
would fall in with Admiralty, wished
this. How it remains to be seen what
Admiralty may decide to do.

The importance - Imperial financial
of getting the B.E.A. produce shipped
more is really becoming considerable.
to stir up the S/S lines all possible to
have secured extra boats from time to
time but when such boats get held up
in Kilmindin for unreasonable periods,
e.g. Benick Castle 48 days - the S/S
lines feel that it is not an experiment
to repeat & that their boats could do
better work for the world & Allied Commerce
put on to other routes & occupied.

With all kind regards
Yr Sincere
Ethel Leggett.

Secretary

F. T. PRESSLAND.

TELEPHONE LONDON WALL 8176.

TELEGRAMS: TAAL, AVE, LONDON.

CABLES: INCREASE, LONDON.

CODE:

WESTERN UNION AND BROOMHALL'S

COMBINATION.

AND AT

MOMBASA, NAIROBI, KISUMU & C.

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE,

AND

KAMPALA, JINJA, MABINDI & C.

UGANDA PROTECTORATE.

96, GRESHAM HOUSE,

LONDON, August 8th., 1916.

In your reply please refer
to No.

Confidential
C/er

Dear Mr. Graeme-Thomson,

As desired by you during our recent talk over harbour congestion and delays to shipping at Kilindini-Mombasa, I now write a summary of the points mentioned.

1. You probably do not want detail figures from me to prove that the congestion and delays are excessive. I think you took that to be a fact. Broadly, my information is that the tonnage of cargo handled, adding together Government and commercial cargo, both import and export, averages under 1,800 tons, and probably not over 1,500 tons, per 24 hours, at the two harbours on Mombasa Island, viz. Kilindini and Mombasa taken together. The number of steamers in port at any one time has varied from 8 up to 32 - average about 20. Of these about 3 at any one time would be about the average on commercial account, the rest being steamers on Admiralty account, including in the latter your boats carrying coal for Uganda Railway (military, and for Naval Services. Thus the handling of cargo, import and export, has probably not averaged above 100 tons, per 24 hours, per steamer in the port.

2. If in these notes I seem to lay too much stress upon improvement in the port working as necessary to the commercial cargo, I beg you not to suppose for a moment that I fail to appreciate that the quick and efficient clearance of Government steamers and handling of military cargo is in every way paramount. I admit to the full that the commercial traffic must take second

That being so, if the suggested reorganisation can improve the latter, it follows that it must be even more successful in its results for Government steamers and Government cargo. I also hope to add some data in support of the view which I know you already hold, that relief to the present semi-paralysis of commercial cargo, and especially exports of East African produce, is in itself an economic issue of real Imperial importance.

3. Present Port Facilities, Lighterage. Kilindini and Mombasa are both lighterage ports. There is not depth alongside for even the most shallow-draft ocean going steamer. Before the war there were 3 lighterage firms in the port, viz. Messrs. Smith, Locke & Co. (British), The B.A. Lighterage Co. (British) and Messrs. Hansing & Co. (Germany). Messrs. Hansing owned about 1000 tons of craft. This became derelict in the port when German staff were interned at outbreak of war. The B.E.A. Corporation at once applied to the Prof. & Secy Government in August 1914 to lease, sell, or license Hansing's craft to the B.E.A. Corporation, (East African Agents of Union Castle Line and Scandinavian East Africa Line) in order that the lighters might be kept pumped and maintained and be used for the general purposes of the port. This was refused by the Governor of B.E.A. on the grounds that disposal of enemy alien property must await formal negotiations. The lighters were allowed to lie about, some gaping in the sun on the beach, some sunken or sinking, and all deteriorating badly, and no use of them was made under the powers existing under Martial Law. It was not until May 1916 (22 months) that the Colonial Government put this lighterage plant up to auction or tender. It was then bought by Smith, Locke & Co., but it must take some time to get it into fit state for use, and some probably elapsed repair. The port has thus for 22 months been deprived of the use of that plant.

4. During the war both Messrs. Smith Mackenzie & Co. and the E.A. Lighterage Co. have added to their fleet of lighters. The former now has 2,400 tons of craft and the latter about 1,600 tons. In addition, the Naval Authorities have brought in captured lighters and dhows from other ports to total of about 1,000 tons. The port of Kilindini-Kombasa has thus had the use of about 5,000 tons capacity of craft since January 1916, and has about 100 tons throughput the year 1915.
5. Allowing for proportion under repair, this fleet should be enough to handle 2,500 tons daily exports plus imports of the wharves and Harbour Railway system were worked to full efficiency. Coupled with abolition of the present highly inefficient method of handling all commercial cargo to be handled now by the Government House jetty (see remarks below, paras 12 and 13).
6. In view of the improbability of getting the wharf work on the Harbour railway working sufficiently improved to obtain the above result from the existing harbour craft, it is desirable to add about 2,000 tons to the latter. This can be rapidly done by purchasing Arab and Indian dhows on the coast, say at Zanzibar, Mombasa and Zanzibar, etc., dismantling them, unsteering the masts, and using them as lighters or floating warehouses. The cost of such dhows would probably be about £10 per ton capacity. The purchase should be made before end August, after which date the change of monsoon would make it difficult to work the dhows southwards to Kombasa. The need for this additional harbour plant is likely to be felt at once when Tanga and Dar es Salaam are opened for Government and other cargo work, as it is unlikely that the harbour plant at those ports will be found in an efficient state of maintenance. The opening of those ports should ease the strain upon Kilindini, but on the other hand, may require transfer of some of the present Kilindini plant to the service of the captured ports.
7. Present Port Facilities, Native Labour. This was a growing difficulty in the port before the war, but is now very

much worse. There is vital need that all the native labour supply for stevedoring, wharf work and hamalage (manual transport) ex Customs and shipping sheds, should be taken under Government control, not only as to wage rate schedules, but also as to the hours and discipline of labour. At present the system is that such labour as offers itself for work collects at certain points and bargains for its services for the day. It is now common for a "boy" to be paid 6d. for carrying a sack of rice from the Customs shed to the warehouse (a few hundred yards) and the merchants can afford to pay or any price, *& control for the labour accordingly* recovering ~~it~~ ^{cost} in the selling price of rice. The corresponding charge before the war was under one penny. The result is to reduce very materially the quantity of labour seeking employment, as the native is only too glad to take for longer intervals. Gross competition exists between employers for labour for stevedoring work and for "hamalage" on shore, and a consequent alternating shortage in one or the other of two services which should be co-ordinated and worked to give a regular flow of traffic if blocks are to be avoided on the ships, in the lighters, at the wharf, or in the sheds.

8. It has been strongly recommended to the Governor that the native followers Recruiting Ordinance of 1915, by which the supply, discipline, pay and general control of native labour for military transport and military depots up country are governed, should be applied to the matter of labour for the port. This was absolutely refused by the Governor, although the proposal was unanimously asked for at a meeting of the lighterage and other parties concerned at Lombasa, held on 30th. April 1916, and General Edwards, Inspector General Lines of Communication, ~~being present~~ who was present officially at the meeting is understood to have strongly recommended it to the Governor.

9. I attach copy of memorandum dated May 23th, signed by Mr. W.M. Sim, Member of Legislative Council, local head of the firm of Smith Mackenzie & Co. This memo was drawn up in consultation between Mr. Sim and Mr. Cox, local head of the British firm.

Africa Corporation Ltd. at Mombasa, representing the Corporation and the Union Castle Line. This memo deals with lighterage and labour.

10. Present Port Facilities, Wharf & Jetty. Since December 1915 Kilindini Harbour is allocated entirely to Government cargo, and Mombasa Harbour to commercial cargo.

11. Kilindini has a lighter wharf wall about 140 yards long, with 8 or 9 cranes. Besides this, lighters can to some extent land and ship cargo at the beach in extension of the wharf wall in both directions, but this method is, of course, not applicable to every kind of cargo. Unfortunately the frontage of the shipping sheds, which extends the whole length of the wharf wall, is so close to the wharf face that there is only room for two lines of rail along the wharf and no roadway. There is thus great delay in the movements of full and empty railway trucks. The line of buildings is continuous, without intermediate alleys to allow cross transit to the road behind the sheds. The best course would have been to have pulled down these sheds at once on outbreak of war (when it was seen that Kilindini must become an expeditionary base port) and to have laid a third line of rails with frequent cross-overs, to enable quick shunting to and from under the wharf cranes, and to give access to the port road. Also by removing the sheds, the fatal temptation to the military and other authorities to allow the wharf sheds to be used for storage would have been eliminated. The campaign is perhaps so far advanced as to make it unnecessary to take this step now, but a great improvement in the working, and a doubling of the wharf capacity, can be obtained by the means proposed in succeeding paras.

12. Mombasa Harbour landing and shipping facilities consist of a single jetty, about 60 feet long, 15 feet wide, with one lifting crane only. This crane can only deliver onto the jetty itself. All traffic has to be man-handled onto and off the jetty down, or up, a steep winding path (as practicable even to hand cart

traffic) connecting with the Mombasa Customs enclosure above. A more perfect instance of bottle neck could not be devised. The Customs enclosure opens into a maze of narrow Arab lanes, in parts less than 12 feet wide, leading out onto the main road connecting with the railway station yard, about 1,200 yards distant, by a severe gradient. Everything has to be transported on small hand carts, man handled. The waste of labour is prodigious.

13. This relegation of the commercial cargo to Mombasa Harbour, and the disabilities under which it is conducted, appear to be based upon a view that the delays, extra expenses, incurred, are a necessary evil falling upon the merchant firms through them upon the civilian population of the country, and an inevitable concomitant of the state of war which requires priority use of all superior facilities to be reserved for military services. Admitting the premises, there appears to be a serious fallacy in the particular application, since it cannot be denied that a certain volume of civilian traffic in essential goods, is a necessity of the State, and cannot be shut out entirely. Non essentials can be and should be absolutely denied the facility of import, if the available facilities do not admit of reasonably efficient handling of essentials. The distinction can be effected by the import license system after due notice given.

But it is surely a doubly mistaken course to subject all civilian traffic, whether essential or non-essential, to a system of handling which cannot but react, and does react, to the grave detriment of the handling of the Admiralty steamers and the military traffic itself. This results from the system of a rough and ready apportionment of the total privately owned lighterage of the port (four fifths of the whole) being attempted by the Naval Transport Officer, as between the different ships or groups of ships (Government and Commercial). The N.T.O. requisitions on

the lighterage owners for such craft as he thinks necessary for Government steamers, leaving the lighterage owners to employ the balance of their craft on the commercial cargo. But this use of craft is conducted under the disabilities of the Mombasa Customs jetty, as above described. The result is that the craft spared from Government work, by the self-denying procedure of the N.T.C., is not really being used to best advantage in terms of volume of cargo handled.

PROPOSALS re Import Cargo.

There would, in my opinion, be a clear gain to the work of the port as a whole, i.e. both the Admiralty and to commercial steamers, if the procedure were to be as follows -

Deploy the whole tonnage of the port to work steamers in turn, so that there were only at a time, so that each steamer is discharged as rapidly as cargo can be put over-board, 100 to 250 tons daily, each boat to be regarded as a steamer.

They are not to be allowed to lie at anchorages in the more remote part of the harbour to await their turn, but are to be under way, discharging to take the anchorages reserved to the lighters, to save towage delays to the lighters. The idea of 10 or 20 steamers simultaneously, each putting on board 150 tons only per day only, to be absolutely abandoned.

Commercial steamers as well as Admiralty steamers to be handled in a different way, loading and shipping at Mombasa Customs House Jetty not to be allowed, except for coasting and local Indian trade for which a small allotment of dhows or other craft can be definitely told off.

If the commercial cargo desiring landing or shipment at the port is excessive, having regard to the Government cargo requirements, the commercial cargo should be limited by license and confined to essential goods. It is against public policy to allow commercial steamers to stay in the port for periods of 20 to 40 days, and longer, handling 100 tons or so only per day, occupying essential anchorages, increasing the demand upon the scanty resources of the place, and depriving other British routes and ports of the sea carrying time of the steamers. Such commercial cargo as is allowed to be landed or shipped should be given its turn along with Government cargo, and equally quick despatch. Merchant agents and shippers, on the other hand, must submit to emergency handling procedure on wharf etc. as necessary.

ary for quick despatch of Government boats and Government cargo.

All use of Kilindini shipping sheds and the stacking ground in rear thereof, whether by Government (military etc.) departments or by the civil community, for purpose of warehousing, to be strictly suppressed. No sorting of goods, Government or private, to be allowed on the wharf, in the wharf sheds, or on the stacking ground in rear of the sheds. All cargo on landed on the wharf to be urgently cleared ex harbour premises. The wharf sheds to be used only for temporary dumping of goods that would suffer from rain or if left in the open. All other goods to be temporarily stacked on the stacking ground in rear of wharf sheds, alleys being cut through latter from front to rear to enable goods to be carried through from wharf for dumping. This dumping to be solely as an auxiliary to immediate removal direct of wharf in harbour department rolling stock to depots outside harbour premises. Goods so dumped in sheds or on stacking ground to be removed ex harbour premises by harbour dept. rolling stock and hand carts, within 24 hours. Military and other Government department receiving and storage depots to be removed to interior of Mombasa island or on mainland (if not so placed already), i.e. none to be allowed in harbour premises. Similarly, a receiving depot for civilian goods to be established, say in the Mombasa railway station goods yard in the interior of the island, to which all civilian import cargo be removed ex harbour. All sorting of import goods to be done at these depots and no delay to goods for sorting on the harbour premises to be allowed. No loading of main line rolling stock for despatch of import cargo to up country (whether Government or civilian) to be allowed direct ex wharf. To attempt such loading requires sorting of goods on the wharf, and delays of the truck on wharf to obtain the necessary careful stowage. This blocks

the wharf and delays wharf working. Probably some loading of main line rolling stock, on the sidings on the stacking ground (dumping ground in rear of sheds) may be possible in the case of bulk cargo, such as building material, but no goods that require detailed sorting and tallying should be allowed to be loaded onto main line trucks inside harbour premises.

The system of special harbour dept. rolling stock, as worked in the Capetown etc. docks during the South African war, should be adopted. These should as a rule be low sided trucks, or flats without sides, on which cargo can be roughly loaded for haulage at slow speeds from the wharf frontage to the military receiving depots or the civilian goods receiving depot.

Exception to the above rules to be made in the case of troop, remount, and ambulance trains, which must probably load in harbour premises in near proximity to wharf, but even these should be kept well away from the wharf crane lines.

Tallying goods onto wharf ex lighter to be simplified, and delays reduced, by requiring boat notes to be made up on each lighter alongside ship, and the Harbour authorities accepting the clausing of boat notes as final, thus eliminating the making up of wharf "Receipt for goods landed". At present the work is done virtually twice over in order to get definition of responsibility for damage ex ship (claims against ship) damage ex lighter (claims against lighterage owner) and damage ex wharf (claims against lighterage the railway dept. which works the wharf). The boat note will clause the condition in which goods are received ex ship, and the harbour dept. should pool and bear all claims for damage ex lighter and ex wharf.

Export Cargo (Country Produce).

With the present congestion and delay in the working of the port, it is as difficult to ship export cargo (country produce) as it is to land imports. Until very recently the railway main line has been so occupied with military emergency traffic that port deliveries of export produce from up country have been insignificant, despite every desire to move same. East Africa and Uganda are chock-a-block with such produce. Items awaiting export, some arrived at coast, some at various points of transit on rail down country, some lying at Lake Victoria ports or other up country railway stations, and much more lying in planters' and merchants' warehouses awaiting the ability of the railway to accept for transit, include the following:

about 12,000 bales of cotton,	value	£350,000
4,000 tons castor seed,	"	50,000
3,500 tons coffee,	"	150,000
1,000 tons sisal hemp,	"	50,000
1,000 tons hides,	"	125,000
2,000 tons sesame seed,	"	50,000
5,000 tons maize & beans,	"	100,000
Miscellaneous, probably about		175,000
(Wool, Chillies, Copra, etc. etc.)			

£2,000,000

Much of this has been lying in the country for weeks past. The new harvests are now coming on, and between September 1916 and March 1917 may be expected to produce £1,500,000 worth of exportable produce, notably cotton (estimated new crop November to March 40,000 bales £600,000) and Sisal Hemp (estimated 3,000 tons £150,000) and Hides (estimated £200,000). These figures are exclusive of important additions to be handled at the Lake Districts of German East Africa (hides, etc.) which must pass through Kocobass and Kilindini. The Usambara province of German East Africa, exporting via Tanga, is likely to have over £1,000,000 worth of Sisal Hemp, Hides and Copra etc. to export during the next nine months after permission and facilities are available for such export. The Magadi Soda Lake can put out 5,000 tons

£40,000 per month, as soon as railway, port and shipping can handle it.

The importance, to Imperial finance and to Military and other Imperial supply considerations, of getting this total of over 3 millions sterling worth of raw materials made as speedily as possible available to the U.K. and Allied countries, needs no repeat. The harbour congestion prevailing to-day makes anything like prompt shipping impossible even of the very limited quantities delivered by rail at the coast. The harbour block will increase when the railway delivers more.

The Admiralty recently offered to release requisitioned steamer s.s. "Orinoco" for homeward loading at Mombasa if it could be arranged between the U.K. and the East African export houses. The offer had to be refused by myself on behalf of exporters, as the steamer would not deliver the cargo at the coast. Similar offer could not probably be accepted so far as the delivery of cargo at coast is concerned, but whether the harbour, as at present worked, could ship the cargo in any reasonable time is a matter of doubt.

The supply of tonnage for export cargo may be from two sources (a) release of requisitioned steamers, and (b) homeward loading of commercial steamers after discharge of import cargo at Kilindini (Mombasa). The excessive detention of commercial steamers in the port (for example "Berwick Castle" 48 days, "Glenart Castle" 28 days) must deter owners from loading to that port even when homeward freight is assured. The managers of the Glen Kilier and Harrison Joint Service recently called their Mombasa agents that unless improvement in despatch could be obtained they must consider suspension of their East African service. The next point is referred to in the attached memo by Mr. Bin (Smith Mackenzie & Co., East African Agents of British India Line).

PROPOSALS re Export Cargo (Country Produce).

- (a) That this be shipped at Kilindini, the steamers being put on their turn for use of lighterage and the latter worked to the fullest extent that ship can take in cargo while on her turn.
- (b) Dates to be fixed when Harbour Dept. will receive cargo for named steamer. Until the respective date no export cargo to be received into harbour premises. When date fixed, the railway to load export truckage at up country stations only for that steamer until time closed.
- (c) Cargo consigned to named steamer to be railed direct into harbour premises and dumped on special stacking ground. Export cargo arriving from up country for steamer not on receiving list to be taken delivery of by owners (or coast agents of owners) at Mombasa railway goods station, and become "town cargo". Town cargo may be delivered into harbour premises, as soon as harbour dept. is receiving for named steamer. Town cargo may be delivered by cart, or by harbour dept. truckage ex Mombasa railway goods station.
- (d) Loading of cargo into lighters for the ship to be done by harbour department.
- (e) Regulating station to be established at Voi (102 miles from Mombasa, about 24 hours rail journey) at which all trucks ex up country will be sorted, and made up into trains for Harbour Dept. (named steamer receiving list, and for Mombasa town station respectively, and the truck numbers be wired to Mombasa for exhibit to the public at Mombasa Railway station. The public to be responsible for clearing its goods ex Mombasa Railway station within 24 hours of truck arrival, and also for making the necessary Customs export entries re goods proceeding in trucks into harbour premises. The public to be enabled to effect this by a system, to be adopted by the railway, of advice notes from up country loading stations detailing by

description and marks, the contents of each truck loaded for coast, and mailing these advices by passenger train. These advices to be available for public inspection at Mombasa. Any member of the public failing to acquaint himself, to lose any ground for complaint. This system, of town and harbour traffic advices, and of harbour receiving for export, has been worked for many years with success by the South African Government Railways and has proved a great public convenience.

CO-ORDINATION OF DEPARTMENTS ETC. CONCERNED

Finally, I ventured to suggest to you that useful result might follow from getting together, under the auspices of the Admiralty Transport Dept., representatives of the various Depts. etc. convened for exchange of information upon which you would decide the re-organisations necessary, and to then co-operate to make the re-organisation speedily effective. You asked me to include in this letter, the names I mentioned in this connection. I think that such an advisory meeting might usefully include the following, in addition, of course, to your own representative, viz.:

- War Office. An Officer of K.G.2.E. (Operations).
An Officer of O.K.G.2. (Transport) (Invent)

Colonial Office Mr. Reed or Mr. Bottomley

Special. Major Blake Taylor, late General Manager of Uganda Government Railway and Harbours.
and on Staff of M. I. C. Dept War Office.

Commercial, Shipping etc. Major W.H.L. Leggett, M.A., Managing Director of British East Africa Corporation Ltd., and representing Union Castle Line East African Service. Major Leggett (present signee) was responsible at headquarters during the South African War, for making base arrangements etc. on the lines advocated in this letter.

I further suggest that nothing but good could result from a corresponding advisory conference being constituted at Mombasa

by the Senior Naval Transport Officer there. It appears to me imperative that this Officer, or another appointed ad hoc, should exercise complete powers over all departments and interests making up what I have termed in this letter, "the Harbour Dept.". I am aware that no such distinct and comprehensive Dept. as yet exists at Mombasa, and the results of divided control are only too apparent.

There seems to me no reason at all why the port of Mombasa should not, under the proposed scheme, handle 50,000 to 60,000 tons of import plus export cargo per month. This would amply satisfy all Naval and Military needs, and would ensure that several millions sterling worth of country produce raw materials, get homeward despatch. There seems every ground for the assertion that the volume of Naval and Military cargo on the East Coast of Africa could then be handled by a much reduced number of Admiralty steamers.

I am,

Yours very truly,

(80) S. H. M. Aggitt.

(80) W. A. B. Aggitt

Frederic Thomson Esq.,

Director of Transports,

Admiralty, S.W.

LANDING CARGO AT MOMBASA.

Since the arrival of the s.s. "Logician" on the 15th, the following is the Cargo to be landed -

"Logician",	3,000 tons	discharging
"Glenart Castle"	4,500 "	" "
"Palapotta"	800 "	" "
"Berwick Castle"	3,200 "	due on 29th. inat.
"Pundus"	2,400 "	" 1st prox.
	13,900 tons.	

s.s. "Dunera" is due about the middle of June with a full cargo of Rice for this Port and Zanzibar, and the French Steamer is due on 26th, with about 200 tons and the Italian about the same time.

These steamers have in addition to their Export Cargo some 10,000 tons Export Cargo to load, most of which will have to be handled at the Mombasa Custom House.

The situation is without precedent, and to cope with it some organisation of the labour for clearing the cargo from the Jetties expeditiously is wanted, also to clear the Customs Godowns. Unless every available Coolie works, there will be a block either in the Lighters or in the Customs Godowns.

When cargo is being landed in large quantities the Consignees, especially meantime, when there is an acute shortage of certain food-stuffs, are anxious to take delivery quickly and to effect this enter into competition for the labour. Just now as much as 30 and 35 cents per bag is being paid to Coolies to remove cargo from the Customs House to the Bazaar against the usual rate of 6 cents to 8 cents per bag.

I may point out that, under the rules of the late Supply Committee, Merchants would not have paid these rates without loss, the enhanced prices at which they are now selling permits of increased charges.

The consequence of paying these high rates is to attract from the work of clearing the Lighters to the work of

removing the cargo into the Town and also to enable the Labour to earn in a day or two enough money to live in idleness for the rest of the week. If the Landing Contractor puts up those rates, the Labour is then attracted from clearing the Godowns to the work of taking the cargo from the Cranes, in either instance a block ensues, and some control on the labour, or the price of labour, is required to regulate this.

An easy, if somewhat shortsighted way out of the difficulty is for the Shipping Companies and their Landing Agents to increase the pay of the Labour to a point that will keep all the labour in their hands, or to engage for their own work all the available labour. Such a step would lead to an outcry on the part of the local Merchants.

The situation has been brought about by the Military operations, and I think warrants exceptional measures being adopted to deal with it.

If nothing is done to lessen the delay to Merchant Shipping in the Port, I fear it will tend to prejudice the Port in the minds of Steamship owners.

Lighterage There is more lighterage to-day in the Port than there has ever been before.

My firm has lighterage for a carrying capacity of some 3,300 tons, one steel lighter of 120 tons capacity under construction, and another being built at Home. We shall be ordering more in the near future. A powerful one has been on order for a long time, but has been delayed by War work. I am, however, in receipt of a cable that the Minister of Munitions has sanctioned these coming under Class A, and their delivery should thus be expedited.

A number of lighters taken from German firms at Hamburg and Tientsin have been brought to the Port for military use, and the Lighterage plant of Hansing & Co. has been under the control of the Authorities since the outbreak of War.

The E.A. Lighterage Co. have also made additions to their plant since the outbreak of war. No amount of lighterage will suffice, however, if it is not expeditiously cleared of cargo at the landing places.

(Sgd) W.A.M. Sim.
