

EAST AFR. PROT
16811

16811
7 APR 16

Secret

Local Office
1916
7 April
as previous Paper.
No 16811

German East Africa

Telegraphic correspondence on 16
operations

To Secretary
To Post

2. Gen. Tuck's let. of 4th April. It
has become obvious for some time
that some decision on this important
point must soon be taken if the
Belgians and Portuguese are not to
take over large portions of S. S. Africa from
which it is ^{very} difficult to get
them to withdraw. The case of the
Belgians is particularly difficult since
the part of German S. Africa that they are
invading - Barotsi - is one of the most
fertile provinces of S. S. Africa, and I
arrange that the Brit. will adopt the

11 April
1916
as previous Paper.
1170

greatest importance to securing (1)
full access to the Eastern side of
Lake Tanganyika, & if possible
Lake Kivu (2) complete control of
the shores of Lake Victoria on all
sides.

If we could arrange for the
Belgian & Portuguese forces to
accept British police officers to
accompany them & for the two
Pots to agree to the British
taking over the temporary administration
of all occupied territory, this
would probably be the best course
from our point of view. But can
we get them to do this?

I see that Mr. Harcourt wrote
on 17/5/14 (in no. 2945/14 answer)
"Belgian compensation must (and will)
come in Europe and in cash - not
in F. P. A." This ought to
apply with more force so far as the
"cash" is concerned, to Portugal.

But H. W. G. will presumably
consider the question in all its
branches?

Eg 17 7/4/14

greatest importance to securing (1)
full access to the Eastern side of
Lake Tanganyika, & if possible,
Lake Kivu (2) complete control of
the shores of Lake Victoria on all
sides.

If we could arrange for the
Belg. & Portuguese forces to
accept British police officers to
accompany them & for the two
Govts to agree to the British
taking over the temporary administration
of all occupied territory, this
would probably be the best course
from our point of view. But can
we get them to do this?

I see that the Standard wrote
on 17/10/14 (on 20.2945/14 onwards)
"Belgian compensation must (and will)
come in Europe and in cash - not
in S. S. A." This ought to
apply with more force to Portugal,
"cash" is concerned, to Portugal.

But B. G. G. will presumably
consider the question in all its
bearings.

Es 17 7/14

On another paper you have drawn attention to the bearing of Portuguese misadministration on the question of acquisition of territory. Probably Portugal will after the war be dependent on British capital for her East African development & it may be possible to insist on reforms. Also, if she has a promise of a substitute for development she may not want extra territory.

The new "hard core" of ...
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she can manage, but it is possible
that she may be chiefly desirous of
obtaining access to Lake Victoria. If so
we may be able to suit her by leaving her
a strip of territory ~~unincorporated~~ to the
Lake's strip, which formerly connected
the two with Lake Albert.

H. J. R.

7/11/16

I have a distinct recollection of
having seen a paper in which she expressly laid
down that Belgium was on our side, but she had
no objection to a ~~cession~~ ^{cession} of Belgium. This is the
only point that I am sure of. The
only point that I am sure of is that Belgium will
not be a party to any settlement.
The only point that I am sure of is that Belgium
will not be a party to any settlement.
The only point that I am sure of is that Belgium
will not be a party to any settlement.
The only point that I am sure of is that Belgium
will not be a party to any settlement.

Now found
157/16

At any rate, it will not be our
military efforts that will enable the Belgian
forces to penetrate.
At any rate, it will not be our
military efforts that will enable the Belgian
forces to penetrate.
At any rate, it will not be our
military efforts that will enable the Belgian
forces to penetrate.

Dec. 7. 16

At any rate, it will not be our
military efforts that will enable the Belgian
forces to penetrate. Perhaps you will wonder
if you also approve, the last day of
his reign is before the cabinet. That is
perhaps you a point? Action shall be taken quickly.
H. J. R. 7-4.

who had not seen
for a long time

The Board has

I have seen Sir A. Nicolson

the paper as to the importance of
keeping G. E. off, & he makes it as the
will be well to Sir E. Grey - so
propose

Here with a draft letter for

your content

W

10.21.16

[I put up herewith
the Portuguese declaration
to Camaguey 8377^o 165]

Am 11.4

11 April 1918

My dear Guy

300

I don't know if you have seen the
Telegram from Sombro enclosed. He is
probably correct in his forecast of what will
happen unless we take early steps to make
our news known both to the Belgians & the
Portuguese. I regard it as very important
that we should have control of the whole of
Zone A & B after the war, and I
suggest that you should inform both
Govt's without delay but we ^{prefer} to
assume administrative control of ^{all} the
empty districts as soon as they are
occupied.

You should have no difficulty with
the Portuguese in view of their declaration to
Carnegie (see his report of 20 Oct 1917) that
they "had no dreams of conquering fresh
territory as they were perfectly satisfied
with what they had already got". There
^{possibly} may be more trouble with the Belgians,
but any cooperation with them might
assure ^{altogether} our zone. I do not believe

The idea of some slight rearrangement
of boundaries, though I would not put
this forward until we see what
they say.

You will see that the matter is

very premature. I think we must have

some more definite information

Downing Street,

11th April, 1916.

My dear Grey,

I don't know if you have seen the telegram from Smuts enclosed. He is probably correct in his forecast of what will happen unless we take early steps to make our views known both to the Belgians and to the Portuguese. I regard it as very important that we should have control of the whole of German East Africa after the war, and I suggest that you should inform both Governments without delay that we propose to assume administrative control of all the enemy districts as soon as they are occupied.

You should have no difficulty with the Portuguese in view of their declaration to Carnegie (see his despatch of 29th October 1915) that they "had no dream of conquering fresh territory as they were perfectly satisfied with what they had already got". There may possibly be more trouble with the Belgians,

Belgians, but any compensation to them might assume another form. I do not altogether exclude the idea of some slight re-arrangement of boundaries, though I would not put this forward until we see what they say.

You will see that the matter is very pressing, as Smuts must have a reply as soon as possible.

Yours truly
A. B. Lawrence

(P)

SECRET

OPERATIONS

From Lieut.-General Smuts, Chief of Staff, to General S. S. ...

(P.O. G.O.F. 324.)

I shall appreciate ruling from the War Office or Com. in C. on the following point: Tombeur, with the Belgian forces is to invade Ruanada province this month and to occupy its capital. He does so under agreement with us whereby we make certain territory and march further south-east (simultaneously with our advance) to Muanza. Their advance will be due to our assistance and to the withdrawal of German fighting force from that area owing to our military pressure further east and south. A similar situation arises as soon as Portuguese begin to move in June. In this way the Belgians and Portuguese will (one group undecipherable) peacefully large portions of enemy territory, while the military burden falls almost entirely on us. Must I assume that each Allied Power administers the enemy territory occupied by its army, and that three different systems of administration will thus arise? Or will the Allied Governments arrange for the temporary administration of all conquered territory by the British Government? In the latter case steps may have to be taken in advance to define agreement.

Repeated to Lord Buxton.

SECRET

OPERATIONS

From Chief of the Imperial General Staff to Lieut-General Smuts

(No. 1509E, cipher.)

4th April, 1942, 7.15 p.m.

Your No. I.G. 6 of 3rd April. The documents mentioned may be of considerable importance. The originals should be carefully preserved at Nairobi. The original Governor's circular and the replies of the District Commissioners should both be photographed at once and copies sent at first opportunity to Chief of General Staff, India, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and War Office. Please also telegraph to me the text of the replies to the circular that are in your possession.

SECRET

1601
305

[OPERATIONS.]

From Lieut.-General Smuts to Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

(No. G.O.F. 333.)

5th April, 1916, 10.10 p.m.

Nothing to report.

Colonial Office
1787
SECRET

From S.G.C.-in-C., East Africa.

To C.I.G.S.

5th. April 1916.

306

3.50 p.m.

I.S.S. Your 15092 of 4th. April. Copy of reply to circular from Moschi dated 24th. December 1915. Begins:-

"It would appear very difficult to make any regulation which could effectively stop the spread of Islam. The private lives of a people cannot be controlled, and a strict measure forbidding the cult of the religion would only lead to their worshipping in secret and this would be even more dangerous. A good and effective scheme would be to issue a proclamation prohibiting all Government employees from in any way following the tenets of the Mohamedan religion. This would show them that although the Government is neutral as regards Islam it still regards its teachings with a certain degree of suspicion. If they find that the Government suspects Islam but still remains neutral it will probably have the desired effect of stopping the spread of Islamic propaganda. The district commissioner here considers it absolutely essential that a register be kept in every district showing all the mosques and also that all persons authorised to perform circumcision should be licensed and made to undergo official examination and obtain Government permits. The natives in the Part Mountains are breeding pigs but this is not successful as they have no market for the pigs and they only breed for a market and not for their own consumption. It would be difficult to get the Wachagga to breed pigs, and they have no grazing, and stable feeding is impossible". Ends
Copy unsigned. Your other instructions are being complied with.

C.I.G.S.

D.C.I.G.S.

D.M.O.

M.O.S.

M.O.S.S.

D.M.I.

Military Members

Military Secretary

D.S.I.

Foreign Office,

India Office,

Colonial Office.

M.I.I.

M.I.E.

M.I.E.b.

M.I.S.

M.O.S.b.