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 GERMAN E. AFRICA  
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was open  
 1916  
 3 July  
 Last previous Paper  
 No. 31353j

German East Africa

Telegraphic correspondence as to  
 operations

for Schutzgebiet  
 for Road

... in ... the most important  
 ... being ... that ...  
 ... has been able to ...  
 ... and  
 advance towards the railway.

As regards the possibility of the  
 Germans ... to the Rapids.  
 ... it ... supposed, ...  
 ... that the ... are anxious  
 to raise large numbers of native ...  
 ... in East ...  
 ... of the Rapids ...  
 ... for the ...  
 ... area. Progress is satisfactory but

Part

12th ...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...

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the possible co-operation of Belgian  
forces in the region of Tabora  
open to some serious doubt \*  
It would be out of the question  
to expect the Belgians to take  
over the country bounded by the  
line Mwanza - Tabora - Ujiji.

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H. J. R.

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As. M 47

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## [OPERATIONS]

*From Lieut. General Smuts to Chief of the Imperial General Staff.*

5319)

2nd July, 1916, 11.15 a.m.

The Lake area the situation is rapidly clearing up. We have occupied Bukoba and Uvugwe, while to our south Biaramulo has been occupied by the Belgians. Enemy are falling back everywhere to the south of Lake Victoria Nyanza. As soon as Belgians reach this lake, probably at Niemirembe, it will be possible for us to make better and cheaper provision for their supplies than we have hitherto been able to make by means of porters over hundreds of miles of roadless country. The hostile forces in the Lake area were of small fighting value and Belgian and British troops were able to take Muanza and then proceed south to Tabora. Consequent upon our advance from Handeni the enemy weakened his forces at Kondoa Irangi with the result that Vandeventer in a general attack on 24th June drove the enemy out of all positions before that place. Vandeventer is following up the enemy's retreat in the direction of the central railway.

The bulk of the enemy's force at Kondoa Irangi has probably been moved round to the Handeni column, which will soon have to encounter very heavy opposition. It is from statements and telegrams found in the enemy's camp evacuated on 2nd June that the enemy's intention was, in the event of his position on the central railway becoming untenable, to retire south of the Rufiji and to remain in communication with the coast in the direction of Kilwa. My information as to the effect that the country is a network of rivers, jungles and swamps, and would be difficult to operate in. I shall do my best to prevent this retreat but experience has shown the extreme difficulty of cutting off the enemy's retreat. Bush country is

he relies entirely on porters and has no wheeled transport. If the enemy retires from the central railway it will not be possible to follow him up until Dar-es-Salaam has been occupied and the railway from there has been restored for the transport of supplies. In this country the difficulties of transport are enormous, and from the present railhead in the Usambara it will be just possible for our transport to reach the central railway but that will be the limit.

I regret to have to inform you that the ravages of malaria are extremely widespread especially among the Indian troops. General Hoskins' Division which consists mainly of Indians has lost fully 50 per cent chiefly as a result of malaria since our movements ceased on 22nd May. Our operations may be very seriously hampered if this wastage continues.

I am informed by Colonel General Estenoz Marquez that new Portuguese Commanders has arrived with reinforcements. He proceeds to the front on 1st and with a view to co-operating with me I asked for a plan with which to coordinate this plan with you.