

EAST AFR. PROT.

14124

Recd 15 Jan 17

14124

4.00

1917

16 March

VACANCY FOR ASST CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, POST OFFICE

Last previous Paper:

8434

Recommends Mr B. Lewis

To Lewis covering file 7781
after above info

~~Handwritten notes~~
The above
offer
! Offer etc app 8 co
Mr Lewis up to G.P.O. in name
Lewis also Mr Tolson 1/15/17.
(It is possible, however, that he
would be passed as fit for military
service now if he were re-examined)
G.P.O. has keeping him in
by letter him 8)

W.C.D. 19/3/17
19.2.17

at once
H. J. L.

19/3/17

Next subsequent Paper:

File 7781

fuel, and ammunition".

In a later communication he observed:

"It seems to me inconceivable that the German Colonies should be given back to them except as the result of the complete defeat of the Allies".

(Incl) V.H.L.

14.2.17.

for Indian migration could be found in a country which, as in the case of German East Africa, is of large extent, is thinly populated, and is in parts apparently suited for Indian settlement.

Another point to be borne in mind is that both Belgium and Portugal will certainly raise the strongest objections to the reoccupation by Germany of territory adjacent to theirs in Africa, as they would in that event be exposed to retaliation from their formidable neighbour, whose attitude towards them was by no means conciliatory even before the war.

Finally a reference should be made to the naval aspects of the case.

In a memorandum dated 15th September 1916, the Admiralty representative on the Territorial Changes Committee, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir A. K. Wilson, stated as follows:-

"The German bases in Africa also added very much to our difficulty of disposing of their cruisers. The "Königsberg" managed to keep a considerable number of cruisers watching her for nine months by merely sheltering in a river where she could not be got at. The capture of these Colonies proved to be much more difficult than was expected before the war. Namibia, S.W. Africa, Cameroons and East Africa, all required operations, on a large scale to capture them, and the work is only now approaching completion after two years of war.

If these Colonies are given back they will be made into a much more serious threat to our commerce in any future war by becoming bases for submarines as well as cruisers, and keeping such vessels well supplied with fuel

to attack from that quarter. The General Staff agree that this is a matter of great importance, and it may be pointed out that, although many successful attacks were made on the section of the line between Mombasa and Nairobi, with considerable damage to rolling stock and permanent way, the injury done was trifling compared with what might have resulted from attacks on the section between Nairobi and Lake Victoria. In the former section there are no viaducts and no important bridges, but in the latter there are no less than twenty-seven steel viaducts, many of which are of considerable magnitude. If one or more of these were seriously damaged in time of war, repairs would be very difficult to execute, and the consequences both from a military and economic point of view, might well be serious.

There are some additional points to which attention should be called.

In a telegram of the 8th September, 1918 from the Indian Government to the India Office it is stated that "As regards German East Africa, whatever may be its eventual administration, we trust arrangements to admit of Indian emigration on equitable lines may be made".

There is no need to enlarge on the serious difficulties connected with the emigration of Indians to the Colonies. Both the Imperial Government and the Government of India have for years been endeavouring to find some solution of the question and, in view of the part played by India during the war, it is more than ever important that a solution should be arrived at as soon as possible. There can be no doubt that the situation would be greatly relieved if an outlet

probably be stigmatised as base ingratitude by public opinion here.

It is also necessary to call attention to the competition in armaments which will ensue between the British Protectorates in East Africa and German East Africa if the latter is retransferred at the end of the war. Both the East Africa Protectorate and Uganda are new and imperfectly developed countries, and it is of the highest importance, not only in their own interests but in those of the Imperial Government that as large a portion as possible of their funds should be devoted to productive work, such as the development of communications, &c. and that they should be placed at an early date on a permanently self-supporting basis. If they are burdened with largely increased military expenditures their position will become a difficult one, and they will probably require large grants-in-aid from the Home Government. During the present campaign in German East Africa we must already have employed from first to last some 35,000 men, and the transport of troops and stores has occupied a great number of ships which would have been very valuable elsewhere. In the early stages of the campaign British East Africa defended its own territory with difficulty from German attacks and after two and a half years of war the campaign is still unfinished. In another war, if German East Africa were given back, we should have a still harder task.

Then there is the question of the vulnerability of the Uganda Railway which for its entire length of 584 miles runs in proximity to the northern frontier of German East Africa and is therefore specially open

practically all porters required for transport were recruited by the following simple process. Parties of soldiers were sent out into the villages (they were generally timed to arrive at night when the people of the village were likely to be caught in bed) to seize all the young men. They fastened them together somewhat in the fashion of the Arab slave raiders of older days and drove them to the nearest fort. They were confined in the fort, or, more frequently in a camp, and were told that any attempt to escape would be punished with death.

The porters engaged in transport work were consistently treated with the greatest brutality. When a man fell exhausted under the weight of his load, he was flogged until he staggered to his feet and stumbled on again. Those who were too weak to do this were shot as they lay. For example, one of the German officers (with the column retreating from the Ruanda country before the advancing Belgians, wrote in a private letter: "our road is paved with the corpses of the natives we have been obliged to kill". This is only a portion of Mr. Stanton's case, and Mr. Stanton is only one of many British civilians who were taken prisoners by the Germans. When the whole indictment is presented to the public it will prove a very serious obstacle to the retrocession of German East Africa.

In this connection it is to be noted that the surrendered German askaris are being enrolled by General Smit and if we are to hand them back to the tender mercies of their former masters our action will not only be keenly resented by the natives, but will probably

It is also to be borne in mind that there is undoubtedly a very powerful body of public opinion in this country which, on humanitarian grounds alone, is strongly opposed to the retransfer of the German Colonies to their former owners and, in the case of German East Africa, this opposition is likely to be especially bitter as the British missionary and other prisoners who have recently returned from that country are taking steps to produce evidence with a view to showing the brutality of German methods and the undesirability of allowing the natives to be subjected to them again.

One of these prisoners, the Reverend E. F. Spanton, Principal of St. Andrew's College, Zanzibar, gave evidence before Sir R. Younger's Committee regarding the ill-treatment which he and his fellow prisoners had received and subsequently furnished memoranda of a more general nature to the Colonial Office from which the following passages are taken:-

"The Germans have shown themselves incapable of ruling the African people, they have treated them with brutal cruelty and injustice. The natives have had a foretaste, on more than one occasion, during the last year of what they would have to expect if they were made subject to the Germans when the war is at an end. German forces have retired before British advance guards, and have, subsequently, again occupied their previous position, as the British fell back upon their main body; when this has happened the natives have been massacred by the returning Germans for having sold food to the English while they occupied the district, and certainly in one case, for having been glad that the English came".

And again:- "Many of the German settlers and

practically

Greater sacrifices in connection with the war than the white community of that country. After years of struggle and disappointment the settlers had recently attained a certain measure of prosperity, but, on the outbreak of war, the majority of the men of military age left their farms and businesses without hesitation and enrolled themselves in the local forces. Compulsory military service was spontaneously adopted by them at an early date - before indeed, it had been adopted in this country - their whole weight was thrown into the struggle and, from their knowledge of local conditions, their assistance has been of the utmost value. There can be no doubt that they confidently expect that German East Africa, for the conquest of which they have made such heavy sacrifices, will be retained by this country. Should this expectation not be realized the effect on the white population would be deplorable, and the difficulties of the local administration, at all times considerable, would be greatly increased.

There can be no doubt whatever that the return of the Germans to German East Africa would be a very severe blow to British prestige among the natives throughout the Protectorates of British East Africa, Uganda and Nyasaland. The natives are not accustomed to see conquered territory handed back by the conqueror and the general opinion would be that, whatever we might say, we had been beaten by the Germans. As there are no white troops in our East African Protectorates and only small native forces, we depend there largely on prestige; and should German East Africa revert to Germany we must be prepared for grave unrest among the natives, involving a reconsideration of the whole military policy in our Protectorates and a greatly increased expenditure.

reserve power, like Asia, and that therefore it was a special call to, and the clear duty of, the Union to see territory in Southern Africa inviolate against the designs found in a "Greater Germany".

General Smuts and the South African troops have in fact taken a leading part in the conquest of German East Africa. The credit and reputation of General Botha and his Government have been staked, though it may be less obviously than in South-West Africa, on the conquest of East Africa, and a conquest followed by a retrocession would be regarded by public opinion in South Africa as an expensive failure, for which it would be very difficult to find adequate justification.

His Majesty's Government must, in short, having invited the assistance of the Union, abide the result of their action. It is morally impossible for them to give up German East Africa without obtaining the consent of the Union, and that consent, it is safe to say, would only be given under the pressure of necessity. If given, for whatever reason, it would gravely prejudice the position of General Botha's Government and thereby endanger the British connection. Further, the other Dominion Governments are watching anxiously our action; even the surrender to the French of the greater part of the Cameroons has elicited unfavourable comment, and these Governments would resent the evacuation of German East Africa hardly less keenly than the Union.

So far as British East Africa is concerned there is probably no section of the Empire which in proportion to its numbers and resources has made

greater

Objections to retrocession of German East Africa to Germany

It is clear that public opinion, both in South Africa and British East Africa, would be strongly opposed to any handing back of German East Africa.

So far as South Africa is concerned, it is necessary to recall the circumstances in which troops were sent from that country to East Africa. After the reverse at Tanga in 1914 the British forces in British East Africa were compelled to evacuate the territory and the Protectorate was for over a year in jeopardy from the danger of invasion by the Germans. During the heavy demands were made on our military resources by the campaigns in other countries, there was no prospect of obtaining further assistance for British East Africa except possibly from South Africa. In spite of the difficulties with which the Union Government were faced in their own country General Smuts engaged in a vigorous recruiting campaign, and eventually raised a large force of South Africans. In his opening speech, delivered to a mass meeting at Cape Town on the 23rd November, 1915, he emphasized the need for South African assistance in order to complete the task of driving the German flag from South Africa, and pointed out that South Africa was not protected by the Monroe Doctrine, like America, by distance, like Australia, by forces of

reserve

before the war, - Kiaochoo, S.W. Africa, Cameroons and East Africa, all required operations, on a large scale to capture them, and the work is only now approaching completion after two years of war.

If these Colonies are given back they will be made into a much more serious threat to our interests in any future war by becoming bases for submarines as well as cruisers, and keeping such vessels well supplied with fuel and ammunition".

In a later communication he observed:

"It seems to me inconceivable that the German Colonies should be given back to them except as the result of the complete defeat of the Allies".

(Int) H.J.R.

10/11/17

endeavouring to find some solution of the question and, in view of the part played by India during the war, it is more than ever important that a solution should be arrived at as soon as possible. There can be no doubt that the situation would be greatly relieved if an outlet for Indian emigration could be found in a country which, as in the case of German East Africa, is of large extent, is thinly populated, and is ^{in part} apparently suitable for Indian Settlement.

Another point to be considered is that Both Belgium and Portugal will certainly raise the strongest objections to the reoccupation by Germany of territory adjacent to theirs in Africa, as they would in that event be exposed to retaliation from their formidable neighbour, whose attitude towards them was by no means conciliatory even before the war.

Finally a reference should be made to the naval aspects of the case.

In a memorandum dated 15th September 1916, the Admiralty representative on the Territorial Changes Committee, ^{*of the Staff*} Admiral Sir A.K. Wilson, stated as follows:-

"The German bases in Africa also added very much to our difficulty of disposing of their cruisers. The "Konigsberg" managed to keep a considerable number of cruisers watching her for nine months by merely sheltering in a river where she could not be got at. The capture of these Colonies proved to be much more difficult than was expected before

to last some 35,000 men and the transport of troops and stores has occupied a great number of ships which would have been very valuable elsewhere. In the early stages of the campaign British East Africa defended its own territory with difficulty from German attacks and after two and a half years of war the campaign is still unfinished. In another war, if German East Africa were given back, we should have a still harder task.

Then there is the question of the vulnerability of the Uganda Railway which for its entire length of 584 miles runs in proximity to the northern frontier of German East Africa and is therefore especially open to attack from that quarter. The General Staff agree that this is a matter of great importance, and it may be pointed out that, although many successful attacks were made on the section of the line between Mombasa and Nairobi, with considerable

This is only a portion of Mr. Stanton's case, and Mr. Stanton is only one of many British civilians who were taken prisoners by the Germans when the whole indictment has been presented to the public ~~It is not probable that it will be found to offer~~ ^{surely} a very serious obstacle to the retrocession of German East Africa. ~~In this~~ connection it may be added that many of the surrendered German askaris are being enrolled by General Smuts and if we are to hand them back to the tender mercies of their former masters our action will not only be keenly resented by the natives, but will probably be stigmatised as a base ingratitude by public opinion here.

It is also necessary to call attention to the competition in armaments which will ensue between British Protectorates in East Africa and German East Africa if the latter is ~~handed over~~ ^{retained} at the end of the war. Both the East Africa Protectorate and Uganda are new and imperfectly developed countries, and it is of the highest importance, not only in their own interests but in those of the Imperial Government that as large a portion as possible of their funds should be devoted to reproductive work, such as the development of communications, &c, and that they should be placed at an early date on a permanently self-supporting basis. If they are burdened with largely increased military expenditure their position

will become a difficult one & they will probably require large grants - a - aid from the Home Government. During the present campaign a former test officer has most ably been employed for part

brutal cruelty and injustice. The natives have had a foretaste, on more than one occasion, during the last year of what they would have to expect if they were made subject to the Germans when the war is at an end. German forces have retired before British advance guards, and have, subsequently, again occupied their previous position, as the British fell back upon their main body, when this has happened the natives have been massacred by the returning Germans for having sold food to the English while they occupied the district, and certainly in one case, for having been glad that the English came".

And again:- "Many of the German askaris and practically all porters required for transport were recruited by the following simple process. Parties of soldiers were sent out into the villages (they were generally timed to arrive at night when the people of the villages were likely to be caught unawares) to seize all the young men. They fastened them together somewhat in the fashion of the Arab slave raiders of yore and drove them to the nearest fort. They were confined in the fort, or, more frequently in a camp, and were told that any attempt to escape would be punished with death.

The porters engaged in transport work were consistently treated with the greatest brutality. When a man fell exhausted under the weight of his load, he was flogged until he staggered to his feet and stumbled on again. Those who were too weak to do this were shot as they lay. For example, one of the German officers with the column retreating from the Ruanda country before the advancing Belgians, wrote in a private letter:- "our road is paved with the corpses of the natives we have been obliged to kill."

This

There can be no doubt whatever that the return of the Germans to German East Africa would be a very severe blow to British prestige among the natives throughout the Protectorates of British East Africa, Uganda and Nyasaland. The natives are not accustomed to see conquered territory handed back by the conqueror and the general opinion would be that, whatever we might say, we had ~~not~~ ^{been} ~~beaten~~ ^{by} the Germans. As there are no white troops in our East African Protectorates and only small native forces, we depend there largely on prestige; and should German East Africa revert to Germany we must be prepared for grave unrest among the natives, involving a reconsideration of the whole military policy in our Protectorates and a greatly increased expenditure.

It is also to be borne in mind that there is undoubtedly a very powerful body of public opinion in this country which, on humanitarian grounds alone, is strongly opposed to the retransfer of the German Colonies to their former owners and, in the case of German East Africa, this opposition is likely to be especially bitter as the British prisoners who have recently returned from that country are taking steps to produce evidence with a view to showing the brutality of German methods and the undesirability of allowing ~~them to return to German East Africa.~~ ^{the natives to be subjected to them again}

One of these prisoners, the Reverend A. F. Stanton, Principal of St. Andrew's College, Zanzibar, gave evidence before Sir R. Younger's Committee regarding the ill-treatment which he and his fellow prisoners had received and subsequently furnished Memoranda to the Colonial Office from which the following passages are taken:-

"The Germans have shown themselves incapable of ruling the African people, they have treated them with

brutal

83

prosperity, but, on the outbreak of war, the majority of the men of military age left their farms and businesses without hesitation and enrolled themselves in the local forces. Compulsory military service was spontaneously adopted by them at an early date - before indeed, it had been adopted in this country - their whole weight was thrown into the struggle and, from their knowledge of local conditions, their assistance has been of the utmost value. There can be no doubt that they confidently expect that German East Africa, for the conquest of which they have made such heavy sacrifices, will be retained by this country. Should this expectation not be realized the effect on the white population would be deplorable, and the difficulties of the local administration, at all times considerable, would be greatly increased.

There

reserve power, like Asia, and that therefore it was a special call to, and the clear duty of, the Union to see territory in Southern Africa inviolate against the designs found in a "Greater Germany".

General Smuts and the South African troops have in fact taken a leading part in the conquest of German East Africa. The credit and reputation of General Botha and his Government have been staked, though it may be less obviously than in South-West Africa, on the conquest of East Africa, and a conquest followed by a retrocession would be regarded by public opinion in South Africa as an expensive failure, for which it would be very difficult to find adequate justification.

His Majesty's Government must, in short, having invited the assistance of the Union, abide the result of their action. It is morally impossible for them to give up German East Africa without obtaining the consent of the Union, and that consent, it is safe to say, would only be given under the pressure of necessity. *If given for certain reasons*

So far as British East Africa is concerned there is probably no section of the Empire which in proportion to its numbers and resources has made greater sacrifices in connection with the war than the white community of that country. After years of struggle and disappointment the settlers had recently attained a certain measure of prosperity

*2° greatly prejudicial
to the interests of the
Union of South Africa
and thereby endangers
British Commonwealth.
The, the other side is
not walking
only on their own
resources & the Union
to make part of
the Union's
the information
is not, and the
is a great
to the
the Union's
the Union's*

Objections to ~~the~~ retrocession of
German East Africa to Germany.

It is clear that public opinion, both in South Africa and British East Africa, would be strongly opposed to any handing back of German East Africa.

So far as South Africa is concerned, it is necessary to recall the circumstances in which troops were sent from that country to East Africa. After the reverse at Tanga in 1914 the British forces in British East Africa were compelled to remain on the defensive, and the Protectorate was for over a year in considerable danger of invasion by the Germans. Owing to the heavy demands which were being made on our military resources by the campaigns in other countries, there was no prospect of obtaining further assistance for British East Africa except possibly from South Africa. In spite of the difficulties with which the Union Government were faced in their own army General Smuts engaged in a vigorous recruiting campaign, and eventually raised a large force of South Africans. In his opening speech, delivered to a mass meeting at Cape Town on the 22nd November, 1915, he emphasized the urgent need of South African assistance in order to complete the work of driving out the German flag from South Africa, and pointed out that South Africa was not protected by the Monroe Doctrine, like America, by distance, like Australia, by forces of
reserve

11298

The in print I wish
amirably forward it to the
Lionel Robinson & Co
no attention to support
I offer for forwarding
calculations local 85
13 in 7

Lambert
Head

The soft bones & glass than an iron
penetration the heads of a man and then
with he could calculate to the Cabinet
ring because why glass cannot be
used back to the front

We collected the arguments in T.C. 18. which
expressed T.C. 5. I think the point should be
emphasized that after 2 1/2 years of war he was still
compelled to front men & transport to E.G. - 2 in
the car if it is given back will have to be the same
or more.

For G. J. ... since we arrived ...
which I had ...
long ...
H. J. R.
12/17/17