

EAST AFR. PROT

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REG. 20 116-15

38548 *copy*

In
Briefed

Tel.

German East Africa

1915

19 Aug

Replies to the Secretary of State's telegram of August 15th and gives the views of the G.O.C. and himself as to the situation.

Last previous Paper.

HO
38379.5

Mr. B. B. ...
Sir G. ...
It must be admitted, I think, that Sir A. B. ...'s reputation of the charges (a) of lack of co-operation with the G.O.C. (b) of failing to encourage the soldiers to exhibit the ring of sincerity, and it may be hoped that the impressions which Lord Delamere brought away with him are erroneous.

As regards the military situation this telegram only confirms what we have heard from many sources during the last few days.

copy to G.O. 19/10 23 August

Next subsequent Paper.

HO
39286

Emphasizes the need of action
than than defensive. I sincerely
hope that it may be possible
to effect something in this
direction especially as with the
accession of the S. African troops,
it seems to be a question of
now or never. It would appear
that the Union Govt. originally
hoped to send a contingent of
two or three brigades but that
the contingent for Europe had
to be reduced to one brigade in
view of the heavy monthly
re-inforcements which the U.S.
requires. Heavy re-inforcements
of this nature w^d not be required
in S. Africa where the casualty
percentage is low, and if the whole
S. African ^{force} for Europe is to
go to S. Africa to finish off the
Germans there, two brigades or even three
instead of one w^d presumably

be available, a force of the
size mentioned should be able
to deal with German East Africa
in a few months and would then
be available for service in Europe.

See also for the aspect of the
question from the other side of
P. East Africa Gov 38228 v. Maraland
below

? copy of this and the tel
to which it replies should be
sent to the War Office

Gen 26/8/15
Lord Selkirk has done accurately reflects
what the settlers think, and that is a matter
of importance. It emphasizes the desirability
of getting additional troops.
As regards a South African brigade or
brigades, there are a good many points - evidence
of cost, provision of material etc. - which will
have to be taken up as soon as the main question
is settled.

Gen 29/8/15
P. 20. P. 15

AS-12-20.8.

Am 21.8.

has minute and
memo attached.

38548

PARAPHRASE

TELEGRAM. The Governor of the East Africa Protectorate to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

(Received Colonial Office 1.30 a.m. 20th August, 1915)

No. 257. August 19th.

With reference to your cypher telegram of August 15th the General Officer Commanding and I desire to contradict emphatically the statements made to you as to the condition prevailing here. Since the outbreak of war the military authorities and the civil Government have maintained consistently cordial relations and have co-operated heartily in maintaining the interests of the Protectorate and community. The General Officer Commanding has never been dissatisfied with the settlers, who continue to render valuable service in various units - mounted rifles, maxims, intelligence, scouts, transport. He has considered it advisable from time to time for reasons of military policy to disband or reorganise units but is ready to find employment for all resident applicants who show promise of efficiency, and he is now about to call for as many more recruits as can be obtained locally to reinforce mounted rifles. When at commencement of war volunteers were called for I intimated that as far as possible dislocation of business should be avoided and that recruitment of younger men would be preferable to that of seniors in responsible positions but no enlistment was discouraged other than that of civil servants who could not be spared by departments.

No. 35755

Corroboration

Corroboration can be given by Colonel Ward. Recognition of the services of the settlers was made publicly in address to Legislative Council, see supplement No. 5 to Gazette of March 10th, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. On the conclusion of operations further acknowledgment may properly be made but we consider that it will be sufficient if allusion to the value of services is made now in the notice calling for additional recruits. It is understood that constant attention is being given to the position here but we desire to emphasize the fact that the situation is being aggravated by delay as the enemy appears to have received substantial augmentation of men and munitions of war, and is, therefore, probably now strong enough to launch the offensive. The sufferings of our imported troops from sickness and other causes have been so severe that there is probably not one reliable infantry regiment of adequate strength among them. In the absence therefore of additional assistance the situation may easily become serious shortly. The General Officer Commanding is in agreement with contents of this telegram.

BELFIELD.

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General Officer Commanding is in agreement with

contents of this telegram. It is suggested that

as can be obtained locally. **REPLY**

times. That if commencement of hostilities

called for, I indicated that the

located in the base should be

requirements of supplies and

limit of supplies is

unlimited. It is suggested that

be given.

Chonathies are less ... the need for drafts.

If only therefore the European position allows
we can instead of one brigade for Europe
of troops not most killed for European fight
get possibly 3 brigades for S. Africa and
who can go on to Europe after the African phase
Only two points arise

- (1) fly with horses. The doubtful of this
nearly a two. The thing ascertained (all)
- (2) willingness to serve in S. Africa. Doubt
they w/ sooner come to Europe. But
I imagine they w/ consent to go to
S Africa first.

Of course you know the European
situation last, so as to estimate the
alternatives and where - and how. But
I believe Lord R would not so much
to S. African going but to S. Africa
AS 12. 20. 8.

East Africa
Nyanza and
Uganda

At the outbreak of war the
only military forces in the E. A. P.
and Uganda consisted of King's
African Rifles (native soldiers with
European officers), but steps were at
once taken locally to raise a body
of mounted and unmounted European

volunteers. It was also decided, ^{by}
with recommendation of a sub C^o of the C^o
of Imperial Defence, ~~the~~
~~Australian Defence Committee~~

troops from India should be brought to
East Africa both for defensive and
for offensive purposes.

Towards the end of August and
during September the enemy were
continually making attempts to raid
British territory and to cut the Uganda
Railway, but in every case were raiding
parties were defeated and forced to
retire. By October 30th the whole

of two "defensive" force from India had arrived in the Protectorate.

On November 1st the "offensive" force under Major General Sither arrived. It was arranged that he should sail to Tanga and attack that port while the E.A.P. forces were to deliver a simultaneous attack upon the German outpost of Longido in the Kilimanjaro region.

Objective of these attacks succeeded. The attack upon Tanga (Nov. 3rd) resulted in complete failure [owing to the heavy resistance encountered & the difficult nature of the country] after suffering very heavy losses the force re-embarked and proceeded to Mwan Gasa where it became part of the force engaged in the defence of the 2nd P.

The failure of the attack upon Tanga meant the abandonment of an offensive against German East Africa for the time being.

One policy has [since then] been

539
to maintain a defensive attitude owing to the impracticability of sending out sufficient European reinforcements for a time. Successive G.O.C.'s have expressed the opinion that for a successful offensive at least 2 brigades of good troops with heavy artillery are necessary and that August and the six months following August are the only time of year suitable for operations on a large scale. It has been found impossible to obtain a first scale of three different bodies of troops have at various times been despatched to E. Africa since the main "offensive" force was sent from India.

- (1) additional Indian troops (130th Baluchis and 46th Punjabis) -
- (2) The second Rhodesian contingent (400 to 500 men)
- (3) A corps of over 1000 "non-regular" sent from England. Some of these are over military age without military experience.

Recent reports from the G.O.C. have shown that the situation is becoming increasingly unsatisfactory and serious. The main factors in the situation are:

(1) Our forces amount to about a division, but a considerable number of these consist of Indian troops who have been found to be of little value from a military point of view. Moreover, the sickness among our troops has been considerable and this has had a discouraging effect. The prolonged inaction has ^{also} reacted unfavorably on the white volunteers who are losing interest and wishing to be repatriated. The course of the operations hitherto has had the effect of lowering our prestige in the eyes of the natives.

(2) It is believed that in the early days of the war the Germans would

540
have been prepared to surrender if bearing attached. But they have now gained time and are reported to have raised numerous fresh native troops bringing their numbers up to 20,000. Arms and ammunition for these new levies are stated to be what might be described as second hand. It is reported that they have been introduced into G.P.O. by sea. The Germans are reported to be very well equipped with guns and machine guns, and experience has shown that they are always ready to assume the offensive where possible.

The present position is that the G.O.C. considers that an enemy invasion of the E.A.P. and advances on Nairobi and Mombasa are quite possible. In that case the situation would probably be a serious one.

Maland B In Nyasaland we have throughout maintained a defensive and the military situation

has always been one of great anxiety in view of the ~~inferiority~~ inferiority of our forces to those of the enemy and the impracticability of quite readily obtaining reinforcements for the Protectorate. By disabling the German armed steamer 'Van Wismann' we secured command of Lake Nyasa and at Karonga (Sept. 8th) we repulsed the attack of a superior invading force. ^{are} these ~~same~~ ^{are} ~~been~~ the only incidents to record.

In Rhodesia the Germans have from time to time taken the offensive but their attacks on Abercorn, Fife and Saisi have fortunately all miscarried. Recently movements of strong German forces have been reported in this region. The situation in Rhodesia is complicated by the fact that the Belgians who are anxious

for an early offensive against S. S. Africa in cooperation with us ~~have~~ decided to withdraw their troops from the Katanga frontier on being informed by H. M. Govt. that immediate offensive operations against the Germans were not in contemplation.



Nyasaland

It is in Nyasaland that the question of native unrest has been most acute. In January last, a native rising which had been fomented by the teaching of a quasi-religious society, the Ethiopians or Seventh Day Adventists, took place. For some days the position in the Zomba and Blantyre districts was serious in view of the fact that the regular forces of the Protectorate were away on the Northern frontier watching the Germans. However the energetic steps taken by the local Govt. to suppress the rising were successful, and the rising-leaders were rapidly hunted down & killed.

Enquiries into the causes of the rising revealed the existence of a wide-spread disaffection among the natives and recent reports from the Governor have given grounds for much uneasiness as to the safety of a

the white population in a Protectorate
where the natives outnumber the
Europeans by about a thousand to
one. Moreover, it has now been
definitely established that the Germans
in German East Africa have been
endeavouring to stir up disaffection
among the natives, and a German
emissary carrying dynamite and
incriminating literature has recently
been arrested in Nyasaland.

In a despatch relating to this
question, the Governor of Nyasaland
attributes the attitude of the natives
largely to the already long duration
of the war and the uncertainty in
their minds as to how it will end,
and he adds that if steps could
be taken to deal satisfactorily with
the enemy in German East Africa, it
would in his opinion, put an end
to the native unrest which has arisen
out of the present war and which
will probably continue only so long

Madagascar

East Africa
Protectorate.

as it issue appears uncertain.
In Rhodesia native unrest has also
been reported and here too information
as to German emissaries has been
received.

In the East Africa Prot. the question of
native disaffection (except for the
revolt of the Giviana tribe in
August last) has not been so
much to the fore. Here can
however, be no doubt that the
attitude of the tribes on both sides
of the E.A.P. & S.E. Africa border has been
gravely affected by the incidents of
the war. Since our reverse at Tanga
we have maintained a defensive attitude,
a difficult matter where an enormous
native population is concerned. It is
believed that at the beginning of the
war the bulk of the native population
in German East Africa would gladly have
come over to the British. However the

fact that a year has passed without
our making any appreciable progress
has effected a change in this direction,
and reports state that our prestige
in East Africa has suffered considerably
in the eyes of the natives. If we
refrain from taking the offensive
in E. Africa and Germany retains
her Protectorate at the end of the
war, it is likely that the positions
of Germany & Britain in E. Africa
will have entirely changed from what
they were before the war, and
that what the Germans will
have gained in prestige we shall
have lost.

Myasaland

Present position as to the question
of S. African reinforcements for East
Africa. (on 20/8/1915)

541

A view of disquieting reports from the
Governor of Nyasaland both as to
the attitude of the natives in the
Protectorate and as to the military
position on the Northern frontier, the
S. of S. telegraphed on July 9th to the
Gov. Gen. of the Union of South Africa,
asking that about 2000 S. African troops
might be sent to Nyasaland, as a
temporary garrison. The Union Govt. agreed
to do this, and a contingent of 260
has been recruited. They are now on
their way to Nyasaland, having left
it is believed, about August 11th.

E. Africa.

been frontier

man East

In a telegram of August 7th, the
Union Govt. stated that owing to the
scale of monthly reinforcements required
by the Army Council for the S. African
contingent in Europe, they agreed to send
in all (to Europe) one infantry
brigade with heavy artillery batteries etc.
The telegram added: "They (Union Govt.)

must however, that before long it may be possible for U. K. Gov. to utilize the Union's military resources in other directions in Africa.

To this the S. of S. replied in a private and personal telegram to Lord Buxton: "Do I understand last paragraph of your telegram to mean that there is some prospect of a contingent offering for service in East Africa? I believe G. O. C. has had suggestion before him. Help is wanted there and larger force would be very useful. It is to be remembered, however, that on account of fly troops must be maintained in East Africa."

On August 10th Lord Buxton telegraphed that the G. O. C. East Africa had consulted him semi-officially with the object of obtaining for East Africa reinforcements from South Africa. The alternative proposals of the G. O. C. were: (a) for defensive purposes - send Rhodesia contingent now in East Africa to be reinforced by 600

to 700 men (b) for offensive purposes - at least 2 brigades of fully equipped infantry and battery of four howitzers to be sent. Lord Buxton stated that the Union Gov. was prepared to encourage recruiting for (a). As regards (b) it was impossible for South Africa to provide a contingent for E. Africa at present, having regard to the fact that one brigade and infantry reinforcements, as decided by the War Office were to be sent to Europe.

This telegram has been forwarded to the War Office and is at present under the consideration of the Army Council.

Nyasaland -
Rhodesian
Frontier
No somewhat serious situation in Rhodesia brought about by the German attack in Saisi led the Commandant-General, Rhodesia, to suggest that a S. African contingent of 1000-1500 men (in addition to the 250 men being sent to Nyasaland) should be despatched to the Rhodesia-Nyasaland frontier. Lord

Buxton telegraphed on August 13th that
the Union Govt. would be willing
if desired, to raise a contingent of
1000 - 1500 men for service on the
Nyasaland - Rhodesian border & were
prepared to arrange to recruit it
and pay the cost until date of
embarkation.

The S. of S. replied on August 16th;
"H. L. Govt. would be pleased if a
contingent of 1000 men from South
Africa for service on the
Nyasaland frontier could be
recruited as proposed. Union rates
will be paid."