

EAST AFR PROT  
11441

11341  
REC'D  
MAR 9 1915

Admiralty  
1915  
6 March  
Last previous Paper.  
Germans  
No. 11272 S

German East Africa and  
East Africa Protectorate  
Naval Operations

Correspondence as to  
August 1914 - January 1915

M<sup>r</sup> <sup>Robert</sup> ~~Colman~~ Dr. J. Fiddler

Dr J. Fiddler gave instructions for the  
to be registered and sent on

18/3/15 R.F.D. 10.3.15  
to J. F.  
18/3/15

→  
P. 1738

The above is a file of the German  
the being part of the present. A few  
details are now to be seen.

Dr. 10.3.15

18.3.15

J  
11.3.15

11.3.15

Next subsequent Paper  
No. 1738 S

Copy.

19

Downing Street,

12 March, 1915.

Dear Masterton Smith,

Mr. Harcourt has seen a copy of a Secret document entitled "Naval Operations in East Africa, August 1914 to January 1915". He would be very glad to have a copy for his private use, and he would like to know whether the Admiralty have produced a similar document relating to operations in West Africa.

*J*  
F. G. A. Baker

---

Secret

I beg to enclose for the information of the  
Secretary of State for the Colonies a copy of informa-  
tion received at [redacted]

*H. W. Jackson*  
Admiral

~~From [redacted]~~  
~~to [redacted]~~

*Diary of Naval operations East Africa  
August 1914 to January 1915.*

The Secretary of  
State for the Colonies

SECRET.

21

# NAVAL OPERATIONS

IN

## EAST AFRICA.

---

AUGUST 1914 TO JANUARY 1915.

---



## Diary.

## THE LOSS OF THE PEGASUS.

18th September.—The PEGASUS arrived at Zanzibar after cruising in the vicinity of Mafia Island and Dar-es-Salaam, and decided to remain in harbour for two days in order to undertake minor repairs and adjustments to her machinery and boilers. She was anchored at a position N. 40° W., 2½ cables from the red light on the Hospital Pier, Shangani, and her head was approximately south-east.

Steam was ordered to be kept at two hours' notice, although the C-in-C, Cape, had directed that all ships were to be ready for instant action.

No warships were in the immediate vicinity, the greater number being employed on convoy duties from Bombay to the Red Sea, as the KÖNIGSBERG had not yet been located.

19th September.—The liner GASCON was expected to arrive at Zanzibar on the 20th September with stores and ratings for the PEGASUS.

A tug, the HELMUTH, was patrolling the southern entrance from dark until daylight, and about midnight the CUPID sailed for Dar-es-Salaam.

At 5.23 A.M., when steaming south-westward from the red buoy to the northward of Chumbi Island, the HELMUTH sighted a vessel to the west-south-west, which was at first taken to be the CUPID waiting till daylight to proceed to Dar-es-Salaam.

It was soon noticed that she was too large for that vessel, and being of a light colour she was mistaken for the GASCON.

She was coming up at great speed, and on slightly altering her course and hoisting her colours was identified as the KÖNIGSBERG.

The Captain of the HELMUTH stated in his report that before he had completely turned his ship the KÖNIGSBERG fired two blank rounds in his direction, and that, as it was broad daylight, his only means of communicating with the PEGASUS was by firing a rocket.

He did not fire one, as he deemed it too late to warn her.

The KÖNIGSBERG then went dead slow, and opened fire on the PEGASUS at a range, estimated by the latter ship to have been 9,000 yards, but according to the position given by the HELMUTH it was 12,000 yards. The maximum range of the PEGASUS' guns, being worn, was probably 8,500 yards.

The morning was calm but hazy, with heavy clouds to the southward, and the visibility at 5.30 A.M. was about 5 miles.

At the speed at which the KÖNIGSBERG came up it was computed that she was closing the PEGASUS at about 2,000 yards in three minutes, so that, with the best "look-out," the warning at that hour of the morning would have been short.

The Signalman of the PEGASUS sighted her just before she opened fire, but before he had reported her the first rounds had fallen short.

The KÖNIGSBERG found the correct range at the second salvo—before the PEGASUS had time to reply—and her shooting was very accurate.

The PEGASUS opened at 7,000 yards, but all her shots fell considerably short, and within eight minutes every gun on her engaged broadside—all of which were bearing—was disabled, and her fire ceased.

Some fifty rounds in all were fired by the PEGASUS before the white flag was hoisted and the ensign struck. The KÖNIGSBERG also ceased firing for five minutes, whilst she turned, and then opened again for a period of five minutes.

The casualties were 24 men killed in action, 7 died of wounds, including 2 officers, and 55 were wounded. Nearly all occurred round the guns on the upper deck and on the Stokers' mess deck.

The ship was badly holed on the water-line and listed considerably in consequence, but no damage was done to the engines or boilers, and the main engines were ready by 6.15 A.M.

A tug was procured to tow her into shallow water, but she was never properly beached, and subsequently the tide and wind drove her into deeper water where she sank at 2.30 P.M.

The conduct of the ship's company, under very trying circumstances, was excellent, and the invaluable work of Staff Surgeon A. S. Hewitt and his sick-berth steward in tending the wounded evoked high expressions of praise.

The steamship BANFFSHIRE also performed valuable services in promptly lowering her boats and assisting in landing the wounded.

## CONTENTS.

	Page
I.—Diary of Events—	
1. The Loss of the PEGASUS .....	1
2. The Operations against the KÖNIGSBERG .....	2
3. The Combined Naval and Military Operations at TANGA .....	10
4. The Operations against DAR-ES-SALAAM .....	13
5. Naval Co-operation on the Lakes .....	16
II.—Alleged Breach of Truce at DAR-ES-SALAAM—	
Correspondence, and Minute by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson ..	18
III.—Naval Operations at DAR-ES-SALAAM, November 30, 1914—	
Reports, and Minute by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson ..	23

## PLANS.

Tanga.  
Rufiji Delta.  
Dar-es-Salaam.

## THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KÖNIGSBERG.

TOWARDS the end of October the naval operations in progress in East Africa were the search for the EMDEN and KÖNIGSBERG; for the former in Indian waters and to the south, and for the latter in East African waters. Preparations were also being made to assist the military expedition from India.

The CHATHAM, DARTMOUTH, and WEYMOUTH were employed in the search for the KÖNIGSBERG, while the FOX had been detailed to assist the G.O.C. Military Expedition.

19th October.—The CHATHAM arrived off Lindi early in the morning, with the intention of making a thorough examination of the inner harbour and the river.

The FOX and the WEYMOUTH had visited the outer anchorage on previous dates, but the bend of the river to the westward, and the thick trees on the mainland, and on Kisiva Nungi, prevented any view from being obtained of the inner harbour.

It was decided to send in a steamboat with a Maxim, so the CHATHAM was anchored in the best position for covering her.

Much activity was observed on shore, and as some 50 German troops collected at the small fort near the town, all the guns that could bear were laid on that point.

The PRÉSIDENT was found about 3½ miles up the river, moored close in to the northern shore, and apparently empty of coal. She was flying a Geneva Cross, but was not painted in accordance with The Hague Convention.

A white flag was hoisted at the fort and also by the CHATHAM, and an exchange of notes with the Governor was effected. The latter stated that since the outbreak of war the PRÉSIDENT had been converted into a hospital for the sick and a place of safety for the women, and as the engines were not entire he was unable to bring the ship out as directed.

The Captain of the CHATHAM replied that he could not recognise her as a hospital ship, and that he was sending in an armed party, either to bring her out, or if that were impossible—to disable her.

The ship was found to contain no hospital or medical fittings whatever, nor were there any sick or women on board; but papers were captured which showed that she had supplied coal to the KÖNIGSBERG.

Her engines were therefore disabled, and her compasses, charts, &c., were removed. During the afternoon the CHATHAM sailed.

30th October.—The KÖNIGSBERG was located by the CHATHAM at Sarari, 6 miles up the Simba Urunga channel of the Rufiji River, in company with the SOMALI and three small steamboats, but the CHATHAM was unable to approach within 3 miles of the Simba Urunga mouth.

31st October.—The CHATHAM proposed to the Admiralty to employ two small steamers from Mombasa and Zanzibar, armed with Vickers 3-pr. Q.F., to attack the trenches at the mouth of the Rufiji River, and that troops should co-operate by landing at Kionboui, 3 miles south, at the entrance of another mouth of the river.

The DARTMOUTH and WEYMOUTH were recalled from patrolling, and the FOX was asked for when she could be spared from the military operations in the north.

During the morning the CHATHAM fired 4-inch lyddite shells at the signal stations on Mafia, Choloa, and North Fajori Islands.

On the same day the Admiralty despatched a telegram that the CHATHAM and FOX were to hold, capture, or destroy the KÖNIGSBERG. The GOLIATH might stand by for a few days, but was to be prepared to proceed with all despatch to the Cape, when ordered, one of her picket boats with dropping gear and torpedoes might be left, if required.

The HARDINGE, which was escorting an Indian battalion from Mombasa to Mauritius, was to guard the military expedition; she had, however, sailed and therefore proceeded with the transport to Mauritius. The DARTMOUTH and WEYMOUTH were to operate against the EMDEN, proceeding, via Diego Garcia and the Maldivé Islands, to Colombo.

The ALERT was ordered to be commissioned at Bombay with ratings from the SWIFTSHIRE to aid the CHATHAM.

1st November.—The C-in-C, East Indies, replied that ratings could not be spared for the ALERT, but that the LAURENCE could be armed with 4-inch guns in a few days.

The CHATHAM fired 6-inch lyddite shells at the steamship SOMALI at maximum range, and at the shore positions at 9,200 yards.

3rd November.—The C-in-C, East Indies, requested the G.O.C. military expedition to co-operate at the earliest moment with the CHATHAM. The CHATHAM reported that the KÖNIGSBERG had moved 6 miles up the river, and that he could not approach within 4,000 or 40,000 yards of her.

Later, the CHATHAM, at the top of high water springs, approached within 1 and 1½ miles of the entrance and 14,000 yards of the KÖNIGSBERG, and bombarded her for half-an-hour by listing to port. It was impossible to judge the result. Moving ¾ miles further out she shelled the SOMALI at 14,000 yards, and also the trenches. Meanwhile the WEYMOUTH bombarded the defences at the entrance to the river. The DARTMOUTH approached closer and shelled the trenches guarding the entrance.

Every indication showed that the KÖNIGSBERG was short of coal. The CHATHAM proposed to obtain steamers to sink in the narrow part of the channel at the first bend, and to cut off the KÖNIGSBERG from all communication by occupying the mainland with troops.

The G.O.C. stated that no troops could be spared for ten days. When, however, they were available, the CHATHAM proposed to hold the banks of the river, and that an attack with torpedoes from steamboats should be made.

The GOLIATH at Mombasa reported defects, necessitating steam down for ten days.

4th November.—The Admiralty telegraphed that there were two branches of the Simba Urunga River, joining 7 miles up, and that these joined the Msala and Kiomboni channels 3 miles higher; so that possibly all might have to be blocked.

The C-in-C, Cape, informed the CHATHAM that he was sending the KINFAUNS CASTLE with a hydroplane and bombs.

5th November.—The FOX was ordered to aid the CHATHAM at once, and Zanzibar was to secure merchant ships or dhows to block the channels. The FOX, however, remained at Tanga with the expedition to aid in the re-embarkation, owing to the critical situation.

News of the Tanga reverse having been received, the Admiralty informed the CHATHAM that no military consideration, however urgent, was to divert him from blocking in the KÖNIGSBERG.

6th November.—The CHATHAM reported having German charts and sailing directions and much information about the channels; that the KÖNIGSBERG was up the Sauninga branch, which was the only one navigable by her even at high water. She was 5½ miles up the river, and had struck her foremast.

The CHATHAM considered that a light-draught vessel with 6-inch guns would be useless, as the KÖNIGSBERG could not be seen at a range of over 2 miles—even if there were from the trees. He therefore proposed to make the KÖNIGSBERG'S escape impossible by blocking the Sauninga entrance with a merchant steamer and destroying her with bombs from a hydroplane.

The FOX remained off Tanga covering and assisting in the re-embarkation of troops.

The GOLIATH received orders to remain in East African waters to assist in the operations on the coast.

The CHATHAM considered half a battalion, reinforced by FOX'S, CHATHAM'S, and GOLIATH'S detachments, sufficient to destroy the enemy on shore at the Rufiji mouth, but had telegraphed for a General to come down in the FOX to advise. He hoped to block the entrance on the 10th November.

An attack was made on the SOMALI, lying halfway up the river to the KÖNIGSBERG by picket boats with torpedoes and by armed steamboats, supported by fire from the CHATHAM. The boats were driven back by machine gun-fire, which it was impossible to locate, but the barbed wire and stockade defences at the entrance were much damaged by the ship's fire, and were abandoned.

The SOMALI was hit by the CHATHAM and set on fire.

8th November.—A light-draught steamer, the DUPLEX, was being examined with a view to mounting a 6-inch gun in her. The GOLIATH was reported broken down and not ready for sea before the 15th November. The FOX arrived at Mombasa with the convoy from Tanga.

9th November.—The FOX sailed from Mombasa with Brigadier-General Tighe to advise on operations against the KONIGSBERG.

The HARDINGE arrived at Zanzibar. The GOLIATH was reported not ready for sea before the 15th November, while to tow her would be risky in the vicinity of Tanga.

10th November.—The HARDINGE left for Colombo for convoy duty between Calcutta and Rangoon.

The collier NEWBRIDGE was sunk one mile two cables up the Ssuanga branch of the Rufiji River, and apparently blocked the passage successfully.

The operation was covered by ship a fire, the small steamer DUPLEX, with 3-pr. Q.F. Hotchkiss gun, and plokot and steamboats of the squadron. After rounding the entrance and out of sight of the ships, the flotilla came under very heavy Hotchkiss and Maxim fire at close range from each side of the river. (For full details, see CHATHAM'S despatch, forwarded by C.-in-C. E. Indies, Admiralty 019, 1.1.15.)

The FOX had arrived early with Brigadier-General Tighe. A report of the EMDEN'S destruction having been received, the DARTMOUTH and WEYMOUTH left after the action—the former for Capetown, and the latter for Zanzibar with the wounded, and then to Mombasa for coaling and stores, where she was to await orders.

The Admiralty suggested to the S.N.O. the possibility of burning the KONIGSBERG with pitch, oil, &c., on the flood stream. The reply was that such an operation was 'impracticable owing to the winding stream and distance of the KONIGSBERG.'

11th November.—The FOX was watching off Simba Urauga, the CHATHAM having gone to Mombasa to coal, returning to meet the KINFAUNS CASTLE with seaplane off Mafia Island about the 14th. The SOMALI was observed to be still on fire.

12th November.—The Admiralty ordered the CHATHAM and WEYMOUTH to Gibraltar with all despatch; Captain Drury Lowe, remaining as S.N.O., was ordered to submit a definite plan for more active operations, to include the bombardment of Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam, provided that they were fortified in any way or that there was a military force opposing a landing.

The CHATHAM represented that owing to greater draught, 5 feet, the FOX was not so suitable as the WEYMOUTH to assist in the operations, and the range of her guns was less. The C.-in-C. East Indies, recommended above to the Admiralty, and that the CHATHAM should also be retained.

14th November.—The WEYMOUTH sailed for Simonstown.

The result of the conference with Brigadier-General Tighe was that the following plan of operations was recommended:—

At least one battalion of most reliable troops were needed to land and hold Kiomboni Point and Ssuanga and Simba Urauga Islands. These were to be assisted by two tugs, armed with 3-pr. or 42-pr. guns, to engage the hostile guns near the entrance. The landing was to be covered by fire from one light cruiser off Simba Urauga Island, and one light cruiser off Kiomboni, but a preliminary heavy bombardment of the entrenched positions was indispensable. The troops were not to be employed beyond the immediate entrance until full information of the land communications had been obtained, as these were reported to be chiefly mangrove swamps, with an occasional narrow path. Under cover of the troops, a light cruiser might enter the river and shell the KONIGSBERG, fire being directed from her mast-head above the trees. Such fire control was considered to be impossible from the trees so that a small light-draught vessel, mounting 6-inch guns, was not recommended.

Preparations, however, to strengthen the DUPLEX to carry a 6-inch gun of the GOLIATH proceeded.

15th November.—The KINFAUNS CASTLE arrived from the Cape with a hydroplane, accompanied by the FOX.

The G.O.C. troops replied that he could not supply the troops needed for operations against the KONIGSBERG.

17th November.—The CHATHAM asked the G.O.C. if he could spare 400 reliable troops to reinforce the ships' Marines.

The G.O.C. replied that he could not spare any men at all for operations against the KONIGSBERG.

There was a delay in the seaplane flight owing to engine defects and leaking hull. Arrangements were made at Mombasa for two tugs to be armed with light guns, and fitted up with sweeps to clear the approaches to the entrance. The FOX sailed.

19th November.—The first seaplane flight of two hours took place. The airman lost his way in the clouds, and after a long search by the CHATHAM and KINFAUNS CASTLE, he was found on an island south of Mafia Island.

A telegram from the C.-in-C. Cape, stated that there were no suitable shallow-draught vessels at Durban, but that a Government tug at Cape Town drawing 9 to 70 feet, and with a speed of 10 knots, was being strengthened and would be ready in about a fortnight.

20th November.—Hydroplane reconnaissance was impossible owing to bad weather and heavy rains. The FOX and KINFAUNS CASTLE were watching off the river. The CHATHAM'S evaporator broke down.

21st November.—Hydroplane reconnaissance was again impracticable.

The DUPLEX was found to be too weak for strengthening, so work was abandoned.

A similar communication was received from Cape Town as to the vessel there. The CHATHAM sailed for Zanzibar to repair her evaporator.

22nd November.—Preliminary arrangements were made for sinking the oldest transport ASSOUAN, near the NEWBRIDGE. Action was postponed until after the seaplane reconnaissance report.

The CHATHAM further reported that if troops were only available for landing, as proposed, any blocking operations could be carried out with more certainty and much less risk. As, however, no troops could be spared, if further blocking were necessary, the DUPLEX and two small tugs, which had been armed with 12-pr. 18-cwt., and 8-pr. Q. F. guns, would be used to engage the enemy's guns on the river banks.

The seaplane made a flight at high water, with pilot only as observer, owing to weakness of the hull, so that the exact position of the KONIGSBERG, some 7 or 8 miles from the entrance, was impossible to identify, and a flight must be made at low water to do so accurately, and before deciding if another block ship was necessary. The NEWBRIDGE was in the position previously reported, lying directly across the fairway; the SOMALI about 2 miles higher up, and a small steamer covered with bushes still further. Natives were sure that the Simba Urauga branch was not navigable owing to numerous shoals.

The KONIGSBERG was lying close to the bank of a small island, and hidden by high trees, so that she was invisible until the seaplane was almost over her. For this reason bombardment at a distance was impracticable, and operations against the entrances useless.

23rd November.—The Admiralty asked the CHATHAM if the first block ship closed the channel effectually, and would it prevent a light-draught gunboat like the French STYX from going up near enough to destroy the KONIGSBERG. If any attack by ships must be definitely abandoned, and other ships should be sunk to ensure that no egress was possible. They also ordered that no more ships were to be sunk until any arrangements that might be suggested for blocking with a ship, which the FOX could guard and enable the CHATHAM to leave, had been considered by the Admiralty.

The CHATHAM replied that it was probably impossible for a light-draught gunboat to reach near enough.

If another block ship was decided on the FOX could guard the entrance, retaining the KINFAUNS CASTLE for occasional reconnaissance by hydroplane, and allow the CHATHAM to leave.

The CHATHAM left Zanzibar for Mafia Island, and on her arrival the KINFAUNS CASTLE, which had been ordered to leave for Durban, to obtain a new hull for the seaplane and some bombs, sailed. The CHATHAM remained off the river until her return on the 3rd December.

24th November.—The FOX left for Mombasa.

The GOLIATH remained at Mombasa, superintending the completion of the armament of a small vessel for patrol work.

27th November.—A native of Kiomboni, who had been landed at Ras Twana on the 25th instant, to report on the KONIGSBERG, returned. Her position, to which she had moved at high water spring tide on the 18th instant, agreed with that reported by the seaplane. She had struck her topgallant mast and did not swing to the tide. He went on board each day with wood fuel, and stated that she had no coal on board. The SOMALI carried foodstuffs, clothing and wood, most of which was destroyed when she was set on fire by the CHATHAM'S lyddite shell on the 7th instant. Owing to her loss and the fact that all dhow traffic was stopped, all the food supply was obtained from the mainland. There was no room on either side of the NEWBRIDGE for ships to pass. The river banks were still guarded by troops from the mainland, among whom the casualties from shell fire on the 10th instant numbered about 35.

28th November.—A native, from a dhow captured by the CHATHAM, corroborated the above statement. He was at Salali from the 1st to the 4th instant, and added that the Saminga was the only branch of the Delta navigable by ships, owing to banks and shoals, which dry at low water; and that the KONIGSBERG was hit aft by three of the CHATHAM'S shells on the 3rd instant.

1st December.—The CHATHAM arrived at Zanzibar and left again on the 3rd instant.

5th December.—The CHATHAM reported the result of two hydroplane reconnaissances on the 3rd and 4th December with a passenger as observer.

The KONIGSBERG had moved a little higher up the river, approximately lat. S. 7° 53'; long E. 38° 16' N.N.W. of Watausa Head (reference to German chart). Her topmast was struck, she was upright, but her awnings being spread it was impossible to see her guns.

The SOMALI appeared to be burnt out.

Conspicuous camps were noted at Kiomboni, Betja, Simba Uranga promontory, Saminga Island, and Salali. The flight was the first at low water springs, and revealed the fact that the German chart was inaccurate as regards the channels and the breadth and shape of the creeks, which appeared to be broader at low water than was considered possible from the chart. The Kiomboni and Masia branches seemed impracticable, but in the Simba Uranga and Kikunja, although numerous banks exist in the upper reaches, there appeared to be sufficient breadth remaining covered by water—very shallow in places—to allow a ship to pass at high water springs. Navigation would, however, be extremely slow and difficult, and the river would require to be buoyed for a considerable distance. To block these two channels effectively would require a large number of ships and considerable difficulty would be experienced in sinking them correctly.

As regards the Saminga branch, it was considered that, although the NEWBRIDGE lay directly across the centre channel, another block ship appeared necessary between her and the north bank, and possibly one on the other side of her. Also that it was probably impossible for the KONIGSBERG to move, in this branch, South of S. lat. 7° 50', owing to sand banks in the channel, except at high water springs, as it was only during these tides that she had moved from her original position.

The CHATHAM, therefore, concluded that, as all these three branches were probably practicable at high water springs it was useless to attempt to block all the channels by sinking more ships, and that an occasional seaplane reconnaissance during these tides would be the best method of watching the KONIGSBERG.

The CHATHAM further submitted that the only possible way of effecting the destruction of the KONIGSBERG was by means of an armoured light draught vessel, similar to a monitor, and mounting one or more 6-inch guns. Bombs from aeroplanes were useless, and long range bombardment was impossible, as already reported. A vessel was required which could approach to close range, and pass up between river banks held by the enemy.

The French Naval Attaché in London asked his Admiralty whether the STYX was available for this service, and could undertake the operation. The reply was in the negative.

6th December.—The CHATHAM left to coal at Zanzibar, and to replenish her ammunition at Mombasa.

7th December.—The CHATHAM reported that she required docking, and that her feed tanks were in a bad way. Also that the KINFAUNS CASTLE had intercepted wireless telegraph messages between a station quite close and a more distant one. The latter was thought to be a German merchant vessel, endeavouring to land stores.

The Admiralty ordered the messages to be reported to London and to the Navy Board, Melbourne.

9th December.—The GOLIATH sailed for Simonstown.

11th December.—The FOX reported that the aeroplane came down over the Kikunja entrance, but was gradually recovered under heavy fire by Midshipman Gallehawk, R.N.R., in a motor boat, supported by Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood in the HELMUTH.

Unfortunately, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Cutler, who was a most intrepid aviator, was missing, and the aeroplane was damaged beyond repair. A new aeroplane, pilot, and mechanic, were requested.

12th December.—The Admiralty approved the proposal that the KINFAUNS CASTLE should remain to guard the DELTA, as the CHATHAM was likely to break down at any time.

During the night a great deal of signalling with white and coloured lights was noticed on both sides of the Rufiji River, on Mafia Island, and apparently on Kwale Island, but no result was seen by the FOX or either of the tugs.

Several men in the DUPLEX, on dhow patrol in the vicinity of Dar-es-Salaam, reported having seen a four-funnelled ship lighted up for a few seconds, steering in the direction of Mafia Island.

The S.N.O. stated that the KARLSRUHE was the only enemy ship at large answering this description, and that perhaps she was waiting for daylight to enter Dar-es-Salaam.

13th December.—The CHATHAM reported that wireless messages between German shore stations were constantly being intercepted, and decoded by our station at Entebbe, and that they generally referred to movements of troops and stores.

The C-in-C, East Indies, suggested that the CHATHAM should be relieved by another fast light cruiser, and that a seaplane with bombs, or better still, that a suitable light draught armed vessel should be sent out for the destruction of the KONIGSBERG.

17th December.—The CHATHAM received orders to proceed to Simonstown for refit on relief by the WEYMOUTH. She reported that her condition was worse than ever, but that she was remaining off the Rufiji until the arrival of the KINFAUNS CASTLE, about the 19th instant.

18th December.—During the night searchlights—presumably of the KONIGSBERG—were flashed in the air towards Mafia Island.

19th December.—The C-in-C, East Indies, submitted that on the departure of the CHATHAM, the Captain of the FOX should assume the duties of S.N.O. East Africa.

20th December.—The FOX left Zanzibar to relieve the CHATHAM off Mafia Island.

21st December.—The FOX, KINFAUNS CASTLE, and the armoured tugs were watching the Rufiji River.

The KINFAUNS CASTLE and the DUPLEX searched the coast to the southward, shelling troops in Kikunja near the Kiassi mouth and Ras Dina, and destroying the look-out station and signal staff near the latter place.

It was reported that the Germans had removed all the natives from Koma and Kwale Islands—a few miles north of the Rufiji Delta—and had taken them to the mainland on suspicion of communicating information. Our fleet had destroyed the German signal stations on all the islands except Mafia.

Natives reported that food supplies were short everywhere. One of the armed tugs was used, whenever available, to isolate the KONIGSBERG as much as possible, by cutting off her supplies and communications by sea.

The CHATHAM considered that, as soon as the G.O.C. could spare troops, it was most desirable that Mafia Island should be occupied. Supplies and communications would then be permanently cut off between the Rufiji and the island, and the latter



The GOLIATH remained at Mombasa, superintending the completion of the armament of a small vessel for patrol work.

27th November.—A native of Kiomboni, who had been landed at Bas Twana on the 25th instant, to report on the KÖNIGSBERG, returned. Her position, to which she had moved at high-water spring tide on the 18th instant, agreed with that reported by the seaplane. She had struck her topgallant mast and did not swing to the tide. He went on board each day with wood fuel, and stated that she had no coal on board. The SOMALI carried foodstuffs, clothing and wood, most of which was destroyed when she was set on fire by the CHATHAM'S Lyddite shell on the 7th instant. Owing to her loss and the fact that all dhow traffic was stopped, all the food supply was obtained from the mainland. There was no room on either side of the NEWBRIDGE for ships to pass. The river banks were still guarded by troops from the mainland, among whom the casualties from shell fire on the 10th instant numbered about 35.

28th November.—A native, from a dhow captured by the CHATHAM, corroborated the above statement. He was at Salafi from the 1st to the 4th instant, and added that the Suingu was the only branch of the Delta navigable by ships, owing to banks and shoals, which dry at low water; and that the KÖNIGSBERG was hit aft by three of the CHATHAM'S shells on the 3rd instant.

1st December.—The CHATHAM arrived at Zanzibar and left again on the 3rd instant.

5th December.—The CHATHAM reported the result of two hydroplane reconnaissances on the 3rd and 4th December with a passenger as observer.

The KÖNIGSBERG had moved a little higher up the river, approximately lat. S. 7° 53'; long. E. 38° 16' N.N.W. of Watassa Head (reference to German chart). Her topmast was struck, she was upright, but her awnings being spread it was impossible to see her guns.

The SOMALI appeared to be burnt out.

Conspicuous camps were noted at Kiomboni, Betja, Simba Uranga promontory, Suingu Island, and Salafi. The fight was the first at low water springs, and revealed the fact that the German chart was inaccurate as regards the channels and the breadth and shape of the creeks, which appeared to be broader at low water than was considered possible from the chart. The Kiomboni and Msala branches seemed impracticable, but in the Simba Uranga and Kikunja, although numerous banks exist in the upper reaches, there appeared to be sufficient breadth remaining covered by water—very shallow in places—to allow a ship to pass at high water springs. Navigation would, however, be extremely slow and difficult, and the river would require to be buoyed for a considerable distance. To block these two channels effectively would require a large number of ships and considerable difficulty would be experienced in sinking them correctly.

As regards the Suingu branch, it was considered that, although the NEWBRIDGE lay directly across the centre channel, another block ship appeared necessary between her and the north bank, and possibly one on the other side of her. Also that it was probably impossible for the KÖNIGSBERG to move, in this branch, South of S. lat. 7° 50', owing to sand banks in the channel, except at high water springs, as it was only during these tides that she had moved from her original position.

The CHATHAM, therefore, concluded that, as all these three branches were probably practicable at high water springs it was useless to attempt to block all the channels by sinking more ships, and that an occasional seaplane reconnaissance during these tides would be the best method of watching the KÖNIGSBERG.

The CHATHAM further submitted that the only possible way of effecting the destruction of the KÖNIGSBERG was by means of an armoured light draught vessel, similar to a monitor, and mounting one or more 6-inch guns. Bombs from aeroplanes were useless, and long range bombardment was impossible, as already reported. A vessel was required which could approach to close range, and pass up between river banks held by the enemy.

The French Naval Attaché in London asked his Admiralty whether the STYX was available for this service, and could undertake the operation. The reply was in the negative.

6th December.—The CHATHAM left to coal at Zanzibar, and to replenish her ammunition at Mombasa.

7th December.—The CHATHAM reported that she required docking and that her feed tanks were in a bad way. Also that the KINFAUNS CASTLE had intercepted wireless telegraph messages between a station quite close and a more distant one. The latter was thought to be a German merchant vessel, endeavouring to land stores.

The Admiralty ordered the messages to be reported to London and to the Navy Board, Melbourne.

9th December.—The GOLIATH sailed for Simonstown.

11th December.—The FOX reported that the aeroplane came down over the Kikunja entrance, but was gallantly recovered under heavy fire by Midshipman Gallehawk, R.N.R., in a motor-boat, supported by Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood in the HELMUTH.

Unfortunately, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Cutler, who was a most intrepid aviator, was missing, and the aeroplane was damaged beyond repair. A new aeroplane, pilot, and mechanic, were requested.

12th December.—The Admiralty approved the proposal that the KINFAUNS CASTLE should remain to guard the DELTA, as the CHATHAM was likely to break down at any time.

During the night a great deal of signalling with white and coloured lights was noticed on both sides of the Rufiji River, on Mafia Island, and apparently on Kwale Island, but no result was seen by the FOX or either of the tugs.

Several men in the DUPLEX, on dhow patrol in the vicinity of Dar es Salaam, reported having seen a four-funnelled ship lighted up for a few seconds, steering in the direction of Mafia Island.

The S.N.O. stated that the KARLSRUHE was the only enemy ship at large answering this description, and that perhaps she was waiting for daylight to enter Dar-es-Salaam.

13th December.—The CHATHAM reported that wireless messages between German shore stations were constantly being intercepted, and decoded by our station at Entebbe, and that they generally referred to movements of troops and stores.

The C-in-C, East Indies, suggested that the CHATHAM should be relieved by another fast light cruiser, and that a seaplane with bombs, or better still, that a suitable light draught armed vessel should be sent out for the destruction of the KÖNIGSBERG.

17th December.—The CHATHAM received orders to proceed to Simonstown for relief by the WEYMOUTH. She reported that her condition was worse than ever, but that she was remaining off the Rufiji until the arrival of the KINFAUNS CASTLE, about the 19th instant.

18th December.—During the night searchlights—presumably of the KÖNIGSBERG—were flashed in the air towards Mafia Island.

19th December.—The C-in-C, East Indies, submitted that on the departure of the CHATHAM, the Captain of the FOX should assume the duties of S.N.O. East Africa.

20th December.—The FOX left Zanzibar to relieve the CHATHAM off Mafia Island.

21st December.—The FOX, KINFAUNS CASTLE, and the armoured tugs were watching the Rufiji River.

The KINFAUNS CASTLE and the DUPLEX searched the coast to the southward, shelling troops in khami near the Kiassi mouth and Mas Dina, and destroying the look-out station and signal staff near the latter place.

It was reported that the Germans had removed all the natives from Koma and Kwale Islands—a few miles north of the Rufiji Delta—and had taken them to the mainland, on suspicion of communicating information. Our fleet had destroyed the German signal stations on all the islands except Mafia.

Natives reported that food supplies were short everywhere.

One of the armed tugs was used, whenever available, to isolate the KÖNIGSBERG as much as possible by cutting off her supplies and communications by sea.

The CHATHAM considered that, as soon as the G.O.C. could spare room, it was most desirable that Mafia Island should be occupied. Supplies and communications would then be permanently cut off between the Rufiji and the island, and the latter

The GOLIATH remained at Mombasa, superintending the completion of the armanent of a small vessel for patrol work.

27th November.—A native of Kiomboni, who had been landed at Ras Twana on the 25th instant, to report on the KÖNIGSBERG, returned. Her position, to which she had moved at high-water spring tide on the 18th instant, agreed with that reported by the complete. She had struck her topgallant mast and did not swing to the tide. He went on board each day with wood fuel, and stated that she had no coal on board. The SOMALI carried foodstuffs, clothing and wood, most of which was destroyed when she was set on fire by the CHATHAM'S 14-ditto shell on the 7th instant. Owing to her loss and the fact that all dhow traffic was stopped, all the food supply was obtained from the mainland. There was no room on either side of the NEWBRIDGE for ships to pass. The river banks were still guarded by troops from the mainland, among whom the casualties from shell fire on the 10th instant numbered about 35.

28th November.—A native, from a dhow captured by the CHATHAM, corroborated the above statement. He was at Salahi from the 1st to the 4th instant, and added that the Saininga was the only branch of the Delta navigable by ships, owing to banks and shoals, which dry at low water; and that the KÖNIGSBERG was hit aft by three of the CHATHAM'S shells on the 3rd instant.

1st December.—The CHATHAM arrived at Zanzibar and left again on the 2nd instant.

5th December.—The CHATHAM reported the result of two hydroplane reconnaissances on the 3rd and 4th December with a passenger as observer.

The KÖNIGSBERG had moved a little higher up the river, approximately lat. S. 7° 53'; long. E. 38° 16' N.N.W. of Watassa Head (reference to German chart). Her topmast was struck, she was upright, but her awnings being spread it was impossible to see her guns.

The SOMALI appeared to be burnt out.

Conspicuous camps were noted at Kiomboni, Betja, Simba Urauga promontory, Saininga Island, and Salahi. The fight was the first at low water springs, and revealed the fact that the German chart was inaccurate as regards the channels and the breadth and shape of the creeks, which appeared to be broader at low water than was considered possible from the chart. The Kiomboni and Mada branches seemed impracticable, but in the Simba Urauga and Kikunja, although numerous banks exist in the upper reaches, there appeared to be sufficient breadth remaining covered by water—very shallow in places—to allow a ship to pass at high water springs. Navigation would, however, be extremely slow and difficult, and the river would require to be buoyed for a considerable distance. To block these two channels effectively would require a large number of ships and considerable difficulty would be experienced in sinking them correctly.

As regards the Saininga branch, it was considered that, although the NEWBRIDGE lay directly across the centre channel, another block ship appeared necessary between her and the north bank, and possibly one on the other side of her. Also that it was probably impossible for the KÖNIGSBERG to move, in this branch, South of S. lat. 7° 50', owing to sand banks in the channel, except at high water springs, as it was only during these tides that she had moved from her original position.

The CHATHAM, therefore, concluded that, as all these three branches were probably practicable at high water springs it was useless to attempt to block all the channels by sinking more ships, and that an occasional seaplane reconnaissance during these tides would be the best method of watching the KÖNIGSBERG.

The CHATHAM further submitted that the only possible way of effecting the destruction of the KÖNIGSBERG was by means of an armoured light draught vessel, similar to a monitor, and mounting one or more 6-inch guns. Bombs from aeroplanes were useless, and long range bombardment was impossible, as already reported. A vessel was required which could approach to close range, and pass up between river banks held by the enemy.

The French Naval Attaché in London asked his Admiralty whether the STYX was available for this service, and could undertake the operation. The reply was in the negative.

6th December.—The CHATHAM left to coal at Zanzibar, and to replenish her ammunition at Mombasa.

7th December.—The CHATHAM reported that she required docking and that her feed tanks were in a bad way. Also that the KINFAUNS CASTLE had intercepted wireless telegraph messages between a station quite close and a more distant one. The latter was thought to be a German merchant vessel, endeavouring to land stores.

The Admiralty ordered the messages to be reported to London and to the Navy Board, Melbourne.

9th December.—The GOLIATH sailed for Simonstown.

10th December.—The FOX reported that the aeroplane came down over the Kikunja entrance, but was gallantly recovered under heavy fire by Madshipman Gallehawk, R.N.R., in a motor-boat, supported by Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood in the HELMUTH.

Unfortunately, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Cutler, who was a most intrepid aviator, was missing, and the aeroplane was damaged beyond repair. A new aeroplane, pilot, and mechanic, were requested.

12th December.—The Admiralty approved the proposal that the KINFAUNS CASTLE should remain to guard the DELTA, as the CHATHAM was likely to break down at any time.

During the night a great deal of signalling with white and coloured lights was noticed on both sides of the Rufiji River, on Mafa Island, and apparently on Kwale Island, but no result was seen by the FOX or either of the tugs.

Several men in the DUPLEX, on dhow patrol in the vicinity of Dar-es-Salaam, reported having seen a four-funnelled ship lighted up for a few seconds, steering in the direction of Mafa Island.

The S.N.O. stated that the KARLSRUHE was the only enemy ship at large answering this description, and that perhaps she was waiting for daylight to enter Dar-es-Salaam.

13th December.—The CHATHAM reported that wireless messages between German shore stations were constantly being intercepted, and decoded by our station at Entebbe, and that they generally referred to movements of troops and stores.

The C.-in-C., East Indies, suggested that the CHATHAM should be relieved by another fast light cruiser, and that a seaplane with bombs, or better still, that a suitable light-draught armed vessel should be sent out for the destruction of the KÖNIGSBERG.

17th December.—The CHATHAM received orders to proceed to Simonstown for relief by the WEYMOUTH. She reported that her condition was worse than ever, but that she was remaining off the Rufiji until the arrival of the KINFAUNS CASTLE, about the 19th instant.

18th December.—During the night searchlights—presumably of the KÖNIGSBERG—were flashed in the air towards Mafa Island.

19th December.—The C.-in-C., East Indies, submitted that on the departure of the CHATHAM, the Captain of the FOX should assume the duties of S.N.O. East Africa.

20th December.—The FOX left Zanzibar to relieve the CHATHAM off Mafa Island.

21st December.—The FOX, KINFAUNS CASTLE, and the armoured tugs were watching the Rufiji River.

The KINFAUNS CASTLE and the DUPLEX searched the coast to the southward, shelling troops in khaki near the Kiassi mouth and Ras Dima, and destroying the look-out station and signal staff near the latter place.

It was reported that the Germans had removed all the natives from Koma and Kwale Islands—a few miles north of the Rufiji Delta—and had taken them to the mainland, on suspicion of communicating information. Our fleet had destroyed the German signal stations on all the islands except Mafa.

Natives reported that food supplies were short everywhere. One of the armed tugs was used, whenever available, to isolate the KÖNIGSBERG as much as possible, by cutting off her supplies and communications by sea.

The CHATHAM considered that, as soon as the G.O.C. could spare troops, it was most desirable that Mafa Island should be occupied. Supplies and communications would then be permanently cut off between the Rufiji and the island, and the latter

would be valuable as a base for a tug or small steamer, in any operations against dhows, coasting with supplies, or for any future seaplane operations.

The capture of the island would have considerable moral effect, especially among the natives, and the stoppage of supplies along the coast would indirectly assist the military operations.

The details of the size of the expedition and the transport arrangements were being considered at Mombasa by the S.N.O., in consultation with the G.O.C.

22nd December.—The CHATHAM arrived at Mombasa from Zanzibar.

The KINFAUNS CASTLE reported having heard a large number of explosions at intervals of one minute in the direction, as far as could be judged, of the sunken collier NEWBRIDGE.

23rd December.—A reconnaissance up the river was made by the DUPLEX and ADJUTANT, under the orders of Lieutenant-Commander Wilkinson of the KINFAUNS CASTLE, the FOX covering the entrance to the river.

Heavy fire at close range from approximately five Maxim guns and at least one pom-pom was opened on the two vessels when entering the river, but the volume of rifle fire was not great. Both sides of the entrance, as well as Ssuminga Island, were still held.

The NEWBRIDGE was found to be upright and intact, submerged to her bulwarks, which were undamaged, and, as far as could be judged, in the exact position in which she was sunk, with her stern about 50 yards from the Kiomboni bank. Some small pulling boats were seen moored near her, and several guns were silenced, although neither they nor the troops could be seen owing to the thick scrub.

During the reconnaissance one man was killed and another seriously wounded.

In the afternoon, the KINFAUNS CASTLE proceeded to Kijwa Kivunge, 40 miles south of Mafia Island, and destroyed the dhows on the beach. She was opposed by gunfire from small field guns, whereupon she destroyed Government House and caused considerable damage to the town.

The Admiralty called for a report from the C-in-C, Cape, as to small steamers, tugs, or trawlers, which would carry 3-pr. guns, and be suitable for blockade work.

24th December.—The KINFAUNS CASTLE arrived at Zanzibar with wounded from the Rufiji.

The Admiralty ordered the PYRAMUS, which was at Goa, to relieve the FOX, for refit at Bombay. The WEYMOUTH was to relieve the CHATHAM—to refit at Malta—and become S.N.O., East Africa, and the PIONEER was to proceed from Australia to East Africa.

26th December.—Approval was given to the request of the KINFAUNS CASTLE to purchase a 28-ft. motor boat, which she considered essential to her present duties on the coast.

Four steam whalers, which were reported from the Cape as obtainable and suitable for blockade work, were also to be taken up. They were to be provided with light guns and guns' crews from the GOLIATH, and a junior officer or a R.N.R. officer was to take command.

29th December.—The G.O.C. sent a Staff Officer to Mafia Island to reconnoitre; the troops having been reported as ready to leave Mombasa about the 9th January.

3rd January.—The Admiralty telegraphed to the Navy Board, Melbourne, that as they desired to employ the PROTECTOR in an attack on the KONIGSBERG, her armament and condition should be reported.

She must be capable of mounting guns of 6-inch calibre or above, and her vital parts and conning position would require protection against the KONIGSBERG'S 4.1-inch guns.

The additional protection was to be removable for the sea passage, and replaceable without having to dock the ship. She was to be towed to Mombasa.

The reply was, that she was efficient and available, but that modern 6-inch guns could not be mounted in her, and that her old 6-inch guns and mountings had been broken up.

The project was, therefore, abandoned.

The C-in-C reported that he had requisitioned two whalers, prizes detained at Cape Town, and two others of a fishing company, and had ordered them to Simon's Bay to commission as tenders to the GOLIATH. Six 3-prs. from the ALBION, and two from the GOLIATH were to be mounted in them.

7th January.—The S.N.O. reported that the KINFAUNS CASTLE was badly in need of a refit, and that as she was unsuitable for the East Coast, owing to her draft, he considered she should leave the station on the arrival of the PIONEER, unless she was required for seaplane accommodation.

The Admiralty replied, that she would be required for this service, and that the date that she would reach Aden to meet the new aeroplanes should be reported, on the supposition that she first went to Bombay to refit.

8th January.—The S.N.O. reported that the KINFAUNS CASTLE would be able to reach Aden on the 9th February, and that she needed two Maxim guns for boat use, which he was trying to obtain for her from Bombay.

10th January.—The PYRAMUS arrived at Mombasa.

The expedition against Mafia Island sailed from Mombasa in the KINFAUNS CASTLE, on the 9th January; and was successfully landed at Kisimani in the vicinity of the S.W. extremity of the island, at 7.30 A.M.

The landing was covered by shell fire from the FOX, but no opposition was met with.

The FOX reported that the disembarkation was carried out expeditiously, and without a hitch, reflecting great credit on the officer commanding KINFAUNS CASTLE.

In order to prevent the possible escape of the enemy in dhows, the bay and the possible loopholes round the coast were guarded by the WEYMOUTH, DUPLEX, and ADJUTANT, assisted later by the FOX.

The natives showed themselves very friendly, and many were seen coming towards our troops.

The Officer Commanding reported that a reconnaissance some distance inland had been unproductive of information. He expected, however, to occupy Ngombeni, 3 miles due east of Kisimani, on the 11th, and would despatch a column thence to occupy Kilindoni, 3 miles north of Ngombeni, and another to Chole, 10 miles from Kisimani, on the south-east shores of the island.

11th January.—Ngombeni was attacked and occupied during the morning. The British casualties—all of the King's African Rifles—were three officers wounded, including two severely, one man killed and seven wounded. The German Commander was severely wounded, and one native soldier was killed and another wounded.

Several dhows were captured at Mafia Island, and armed with Maxim guns.

12th January.—Kilindoni was occupied without resistance, but opposition was expected at Chole. The squadron guarded the various outlets for dhows, and the armed dhows patrolled Chole Bay, and inside the reefs.

During the afternoon the representative of the German Government surrendered Mafia Island unconditionally to the Officer Commanding the military expedition.

The Admiralty telegraphed to the C-in-C, Cape, that, owing to the military operations that were pending on the East Coast, and the necessity of liberating the WEYMOUTH should the DRESDEN cross the Pacific, the HYACINTH was to be sent to Mombasa.

13th January.—The HYACINTH sailed for Durban en route for Mombasa.

The PYRAMUS arrived at Mafia Island to relieve the FOX on the station.



## THE COMBINED NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS AT TANGA.

WHILE the operations were in progress against the KÖNIGSBERG in the Rufiji River, hostilities had begun against Tanga.

**31st October.**—The military expedition from India, consisting of two infantry brigades, a mountain battery, and other units, arrived at Mombasa under escort of the GOLIATH and HARDINGE.

At a conference at Mombasa the Governor and G.O.C. discussed the question of the temporary truce approved by the C-in-C. Cape, in August. The decision arrived at was that the Government had not ratified this truce, but that before the expedition landed at Tanga the FOX should first enter the port to give notice to the authorities there. (For further information on this question see page 13.)

**2nd November.**—At dawn the FOX arrived off Tanga, having left the transports out of sight of the town. She proceeded, through the northern entrance and by unused channels, to the outer anchorages, with a flag of truce flying at the masthead.

The Deputy Governor of Tanga came off and was handed a letter informing him that H.M. Government had not ratified the truce, sanctioned by the C-in-C. Cape Station, in August last, that it was thus merely of a temporary nature, and was now at an end.

The Deputy Governor enquired as to terms of surrender, and was informed that they were unconditional. One hour was granted for a decision, and as the German colours were then still flying on shore, the FOX rejoined the convoy.

All tugs and lighters were sent into the outer harbour, and the FOX, with the three leading transports, anchored there at 4.30 P.M.

The S.N.O. reports that the absence of the GOLIATH (which was broken down at Mombasa, and which the C-in-C. East Indies, intended should assist in the operations), was keenly felt throughout all the operations of disembarkation, sweeping, covering, and the re-embarkation.

The preliminaries to the disembarkation began at once, but, by order of the G.O.C., no troops landed until 9 P.M., during a clear and fairly light night, the full moon being hidden by fleecy clouds.

Sweeping operations were also commenced and continued during the night.

The disembarkation from three transports took place at the foot of the Red House, about 1½ miles east of Tanga town, on a small sandy beach, which was the only break in the long range of mangrove trees along the coast. From the beach a flat reef extends some 500 yards seawards, and on its edge the lighters were grounded.

Hostile fire was opened from the low cliffs and neighbouring houses, but the FOX silenced it with a few rounds of 47-inch lyddite, and the landing was effected without any casualties.

**3rd November.**—Shortly after day-break, as firing on shore increased in intensity, the FOX weighed and proceeded by a swept channel into the inner harbour, to cover the right flank of the advance on Tanga.

Between 8 A.M. and 10 A.M. rifle fire on shore was very heavy, but, owing to the dense bush and masses of trees through which there were only occasional small clearings, it was extremely difficult to distinguish between the positions of friends and foe.

Some Indian troops were observed near the beach, evidently retiring, and at the request of one of their officers, through a megaphone, the FOX fired into the tangle close to the hospital buildings, with excellent result, as the enemy's fire in this locality ceased almost immediately, and later it was ascertained that the FOX'S action was most opportune, and that the Germans interpreted it as a turning movement from that flank.

The remainder of the convoy was brought into the inner anchorage during the day, and all the troops were ashore early on the morning of the 4th. Two new landing places had been found, one (B) near the signal tower of Ras Kasana, and the other (C) inside the bight formed by that headland. Both were good, but the G.O.C. did not dare use them during the night, when it would have been impossible for the FOX to give covering fire.

**4th November.**—A general advance on Tanga was made, when the FOX endeavoured to support by shelling the eastern part of the town, but, owing to the intervening high ground and the large hospital buildings in the direct line of fire, shells could not be directed on the desired area.

About 4.30 P.M. the FOX received an order from the G.O.C. to bombard the town generally, but for the above reasons the support was not very effective, although considerable damage was done to many of the buildings.

Firing ceased at sunset, and at 7 P.M. the S.N.O. received a message from the G.O.C. to meet him at the "White House," where he learnt of the failure of the attack, and the decision to re-embark the whole force at the earliest possible moment.

The embarkation scheme was elaborated in consultation with the Marine Transport Officer and handed to the G.O.C. at 5.15 A.M. on the 5th.

Its main features were that no transport was to be moved from the inner harbour until the last moment, and that no troops were to be embarked there. Six steamers, with a lighter secured on each side and one made fast astern, were to anchor abreast of the Red House landing place (A) at a distance from the reef sufficient to prevent the lighters astern from touching the reef at dead low water. The embarkation was to take place only at (A), out of sight of Tanga and simultaneously, provision being made for 7,200 men in the steamers and lighters, which were to be towed out of rifle range before going to the transports.

In order that the embarkation might be carried out independently of the state of the tide, thirty ordinary ships' boats were to be used between the beach and the lighters, but at very low tide, troops would have to wade out a considerable distance across the reef.

**4th November.**—During the whole of the time the FOX was in the inner harbour, from the 2nd to the 5th November, she was constantly sniped at by rifle fire. The transport LAISANG, which was anchored at the top of the harbour, had her funnels riddled and two 3-pr. shell holes in her side, so that she was forced to leave the harbour.

**5th November.**—At 8 A.M. the BHARATA, which was transporting the mountain battery and had been anchored up the harbour next the LAISANG, was ordered to the outer anchorage next the BARJORA, which was covering the Red House landing with her 3-pr. guns.

The FOX moved into the BHARATA'S billet, where she was so heavily sniped that the ship's side was manned by the ship's company with rifles. She also fired, and silenced with 3 rounds of 6-inch lyddite a 3-pr. gun, which opened fire on the beach party as they were landing.

This party consisted of 8 officers and 132 men from the FOX, together with 30 or 40 volunteers, chiefly military and Merchant Service officers from the various transports.

Great praise is due for the splendid work performed by this body of officers and men, who, with the best co-operation of the military authorities on shore, succeeded, between noon and 3.30 P.M., in embarking nearly 7,000 men under most trying circumstances. At times they were working up to their necks in water, and had to threaten, beat, drive, and lift the natives to the boats.

The re-embarkation was entirely unexpected, it is believed, by the Germans, and the landing of the FOX'S beach party, and the return of a steamer that had been sent to buy the northern channel entrance, deceived them into the belief that reinforcements had arrived. An armistice to collect the wounded was arranged from sunset, when the FOX and all the transports in the inner harbour weighed and proceeded to the outer anchorages.

**5th November.**—During the embarkation of wounded, the troops were redistributed to their own transports.

The G.O.C. had decided to leave next day, but on a peremptory message from the German Deputy-Governor to the effect that unless the whole force was clear of the harbour before daylight it would be fired on by heavy guns which were being mounted on shore, the convoy weighed at about 5 P.M.

The guns were said to be 4-inch, and were presumed by the S.N.O. to be from the KÖNIGSBERG.

As half of the transports were muth strung out and were towing lighters full of troops or stores, and as it was considered inadvisable for ships encumbered in this



manner to spend the night at sea, the FOX anchored at 7.15 P.M. to the northward of Kwale Island, and by 9.30 P.M. the rear transport had come up.

7th November.—The convoy sailed at noon from Mombasa, but a choppy sea compelled speed to be reduced to 3½ knots, and the idea of reaching port by daylight was abandoned.

8th November.—At daybreak the FOX and convoy anchored at the harbours of Kilindini and Port Reitz.

10th December.—As a support for military operations, on the 19th and 20th December, against Vanga and the Umba River, the FOX, accompanied by the KINFAYNS CASTLE, SUMATRA, and DUPLEX, representing transports, demonstrated off Tanga on the afternoon of the 18th December.

The convoy anchored in the outer roadstead shortly before sunset, and after sweeping operations, the FOX shelled the low cliffs, southward of Ras Kasong, with a view of drawing the fire of guns reported to have been mounted in the vicinity, but without result.

21st December.—General Wapshere reported to the War Office that General Tighe had reoccupied Vanga and had established himself on the Umba River, having met with only slight opposition.

2nd January.—The CHATHAM sailed from Mombasa for Aden.

The G.O.C. reported to the War Office that he was now firmly established in four posts along the Umba River. Jassin, in German territory, had been taken and was held; and Vanga, which had been in the possession of the Germans since the beginning of the war, had been reoccupied.

The enemy had suffered severely, and, owing to their rapid retreat, had failed in their attempt to destroy the bridges over the River Umba.

The advance was rendered very difficult by want of water and the impossibility of rapid transport through dense bush. Commander Healam, however, rendered great assistance by means of a demonstration of effecting a landing with transports in Mowa Bay, and thus drew off the enemy from the real advance.

6th January.—General Wapshere, the G.O.C., British Forces, East Africa, informed the War Office that, provided reinforcements arrived within a month, he proposed to attack Tanga. He considered that the attack should be supported by the GOLIATH and another warship; and that, until the decisive advance had taken place, the former should remain permanently in attachment at Tanga, after the capture of the town.

12th January.—The G.O.C. again telegraphed that he wished it to be clearly understood that he depended on the GOLIATH to cover the landing at Tanga, and that he also hoped that the landing force would be strengthened by 150 Royal Marines from that ship.

14th January.—The Admiralty drew the attention of the War Office to two points in General Wapshere's requirements, which they could not guarantee, namely, that the GOLIATH should be available, and that the landing force should be strengthened by a reinforcement of 150 Royal Marines.

If, however, the G.O.C.'s proposals were approved in due course, an endeavour would be made to ensure the presence of a cruiser with 6-inch guns for this purpose. As to the Marines to provide such a force would require special arrangements, and would probably not be feasible.

## THE OPERATIONS AGAINST DAR-ES-SALAAM.

ON the 8th August the ASTREA attacked Dar-es-Salaam, destroyed the wireless telegraph installation there, and imposed certain terms on the Governor. Among these was that the dock, which had been scuttled in the mouth of the harbour, should not be raised, that all Government and merchant vessels then lying in the harbour should be considered as prizes of war, and that a guarantee should be given that the masters should make no attempt to take their vessels out of the harbour.

Later, the Government informed the S.N.O., Zanzibar, that the terms of the truce were not ratified, and that their decision should be communicated to the authorities at Dar-es-Salaam before any offensive action was taken.

On the 21st October the CHATHAM informed the Governor, that, owing to the sinking of the PEGASUS by the KONIGSBERG, and since the latter ship had been using the harbour, the truce arranged at Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga was at an end.

The masts of two ships were observed over the trees, and as one had the appearance of the KONIGSBERG, fire was opened on her. A white flag was soon hoisted on shore and two officials came off in a boat. They were informed that unless the W/T aerials were taken down in both ships, fire would be reopened next day. This demand was complied with, and on the 22nd two officers, who were sent in to search the harbour, discovered the ship fired at was the FELD-MARSCHALL and the other the TABORA.

9th November.—The Admiralty called for a report on the desirability of bombarding Dar-es-Salaam. In reply the S.N.O. stated that he proposed to meet the Resident at Zanzibar that afternoon and obtain his opinion as to the moral effect on the natives generally of bombardment without occupation of Dar-es-Salaam. He also would report fully, as soon as possible, whether a similar bombardment of Tanga, as proposed by the Admiralty, was either practical or desirable.

10th November.—The FOX reported to the Admiralty that, after very thorough discussion with the Resident at Zanzibar and others, opinion was unanimous that bombardment of either Tanga or Dar-es-Salaam, unless followed up by occupation, would be prejudicial in its ultimate moral effect on the natives, and would lower British prestige.

12th November.—The Admiralty ordered the S.N.O. to submit a definite plan, after consultation with General Tighe, for more active operations, to include the bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga, provided that these places were fortified in any way or that there was a military force opposing a landing.

26th November.—The FOX reported to the Admiralty that it was believed that the sunken dock in the entrance to Dar-es-Salaam had been raised, or that it did not block the entrance; and that an interned merchant vessel, coal lighters, and small craft might endeavour to escape and block Mombasa and other harbours, or attempt to help the KONIGSBERG. It was necessary to cut them out. This operation was to be carried out by one armed tug, the HELMUTH, and a light-draught steamer, the DUPLEX, on the 27th, under cover of the FOX and GOLIATH. The FOX sailed from Mombasa, having arrived on the 25th.

27th November.—The operations were postponed owing to the temporary breakdown of the machinery of the DUPLEX. A white flag was flying from the masthead ashore.

28th November.—The FOX and GOLIATH anchored outside Mikatumba Island at 6 A.M. and at 8.45 A.M. the Acting Governor of Dar-es-Salaam came off to the ships. He was informed that His Britannic Majesty's Government had accepted the terms of the temporary truce arranged by the ASTREA in August, that it was proposed to inspect the various prizes then captured, to take the necessary steps to ensure their displacement, and also to put out of action or withdraw any small craft and floating stores that might be made use of against us; that no injury would be done to the town or the inhabitants, provided that no opposition was shown to the boats or their crews; but that any opposition to same would result in an immediate

bombardment. He was obviously nervous, and requested further time for consultation with the military authorities. This request was refused, but the boats were purposely held back for over an hour from demonstrative operations.

The Governor landed near the flagstaff, at East Ferry Point, and held a consultation with some of the authorities, and shortly afterwards re-embarked and proceeded into the harbour.

The white flag was flying at the mast, when the only two steam-craft available—the HELMUTH and the GOLIATH'S steam pinnace—which had both been armed and protected, entered the harbour. The channel had previously been buoyed by the FOX'S steam cutter. The S.N.O. proceeded with the DUPLEX and anchored at the spot marked "View B, Chart 674."

At 12.15 P.M., as everything was apparently peaceful, a lady driving a carriage and pair, and the white flag still flying, the S.N.O. took his Navigating Lieutenant and the O.S.O. of the military expedition with him in the FOX'S steam cutter, to verify the position of the sunken dock and to observe generally.

When roughly opposite the flagstaff, and just beyond the sunken dock, which was clearly visible below the water, heavy rifle fire suddenly opened on the boats from both sides of the channel. The helm was put over, and all hands lay down in the bottom of the boat. A stoker was badly wounded, and the coxswain, Thomas A. Gallagher, although also wounded, pluckily remained at the tiller. Steam began to run down, but the Navigating Lieutenant, Lieutenant Orson, with great courage, went forward and kept the fire going.

The escape of the boat was largely due to their pluck and coolness. At 1.30 P.M. the HELMUTH emerged from the harbour towing two life-boats filled with prisoners, and was at once the centre of a hail of fire. The DUPLEX returned the fire with her 12 pr. 18-cwt. guns.

The hull and funnel of the HELMUTH were completely riddled with rifle and machine-gun bullets, and with some 1-pr. or 2-pr. projectiles. Steam was escaping from her boilers, and she was rapidly losing speed, but she was just able to reach the DUPLEX before being compelled to draw her fires.

The prisoners were taken on board the DUPLEX, and the wounded to the GOLIATH. Among the latter were Lieutenant Orde and five men, and a German prisoner—a chief engineer.

At 4.45 P.M. the GOLIATH'S steam pinnace was sighted coming out of harbour, with one lighter on each side and three towing astern. She, in her turn, became the centre of severe fire, and was compelled to slip the three lighters astern, which caused her to yaw badly and progress was slow, but she managed to keep the two alongside for protection.

The GOLIATH, FOX, and DUPLEX opened fire to cover their retreat, and the Governor's palace and many other buildings were demolished.

Shortly after 5 P.M. the steamboat fired four rockets, and as she was stationary it was evident she was aground. Before assistance could be rendered, she floated off, out of her two lighters, and steamed back to the GOLIATH, to which her wounded (Commander Ritchie and two men of the GOLIATH and Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd of the FOX) were transferred.

The demolition operations were successfully accomplished, and included the permanent disablement of the three ships—the KONIG, FELDMARSHALL, and KAISER WILHELM II.—the destruction of a crane, and the sinking of one lighter, containing pumping gear, and one small and two large water tanks, and the capture of thirty-five prisoners.

The positions of the sunken dock and the ships in harbour are marked in the attached chart. The dock, which was lying approximately S.E. by E., and N.W. by W., rendered egress of large ships practically impossible.

Unfortunately owing to the abuse of the white flag and the treacherous action above described, four officers and eight men were found to be missing, and are thus accounted for.

The HELMUTH received orders from the officer in charge of the operations to tow the prisoners taken from the ships, to the DUPLEX, and then to return for the purpose of towing out the sunken dock and picking up the demolition party when their work was done.

The events above narrated explain the unexpected impossibility of carrying out this order, and the HELMUTH'S inability to return.

At about 4 P.M. Commander Ritchie, the officer in charge of the operations, on his way back from the head of the creek in the steam pinnace, observing no one on

deck when passing the two ships, nor in the TABORA, concluded that everyone had left, so did not pick these men up.

The total casualties were one man killed (Stoker H. T. Lacy, FOX), three officers and ten men wounded, and four officers and eight men missing. The wounded were taken to Zanzibar by the FOX and the GOLIATH; the former towing the HELMUTH and the latter the DUPLEX, which was disabled.

The Captain of the FOX reported that "the conduct of the officers and men in the boats, under heavy and exasperating fire, was beyond praise."

The S.N.O. further reported that as the casualties were due to the abuse of the white flag, he proposed further punishment by a systematic bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam at close range on the 30th November. The Admiralty approved the proposal.

In a later telegram he expressed his intention of abandoning the bombardment, if on arrival the enemy suggested same as a condition to handing over the missing officers and men.

The Admiralty replied that he was to bombard severely, and then offer not to bombard if the officers and men were surrendered.

20th November.—The FOX, GOLIATH and two sweeping-tugs, the ADJUTANT and HELMUTH, anchored off Makatube during the morning. The FOX hoisted a flag of truce and signalled that she was sending a boat. No white flag was seen on shore, but the steamboat flying a flag of truce, went in as close to the entrance as safety permitted.

No action was taken till 1.30 P.M., when the FOX hauled down her flag of truce and proceeded with a view to bombarding the town.

The FOX fired two blank charges at an interval of five minutes, and two minutes later a projectile, which struck the water well short of the signal station.

Half-an-hour later a systematic bombardment, according to a previously arranged plan, was opened on Dar-es-Salaam, but owing to the fire being indirect it was impossible to state accurately the result.

The operations were also considerably handicapped by the numerous hospitals, churches, and the hospital ship TABORA, which were in the direct line of fire, but the damage to the town appeared to be severe, as many buildings were observed to be blown into the air.

The bombardment ceased at 4.30 P.M., having lasted 1 1/2 hours, and during that time 17 12-inch, 373 6-inch, and 165 4.7-inch shells were fired.

The FOX then hoisted a flag of truce, and sent the tug ADJUTANT, also flying a flag of truce, close in to the entrance, where she remained until 6.30 P.M., but no one but natives was seen.

From time to time a light was shown from Makatube lighthouse, presumably to assist dhows in entering Dar-es-Salaam before daylight; consequently the GOLIATH was ordered to disable it by removing the vital parts and conveying them to Zanzibar.

2nd December.—The Admiralty called for a report from the FOX as to what steps, if any, had been taken to ascertain the result of the bombardment on Government property in Dar-es-Salaam; and whether guns had been used on shore and located during either attack. She was also told that, if a swept and marked channel was obtainable for the FOX to pass the sunken dock, it was desirable that the railway terminus and stock should be destroyed. That if the bombardment was repeated, it was most essential that fire should be directed by searchers, and that possibly the DUPLEX could do this. The Admiralty added that too much dependence had apparently been placed on the enemy's flag of truce whilst offensive operations were in progress in the same locality, and asked what future operations were proposed.

The Captain of the FOX succeeded, by means of a dhow flying a flag of truce, in delivering a letter to the Governor of Dar-es-Salaam, protesting in strong terms against the abuse of the white flag and other treacherous acts on the 25th November.

4th December.—Some female prisoners were also landed by the same means, but the information gleaned was of little value as the dhows were not allowed to approach within sight of the harbour and town.

About fifty European troops in khaki were seen near the entrance to the harbour, and twenty-five tents pitched near Upanga village.

The Acting Governor's reply to the FOX'S letter of protest was received. It contained no sort of apology but many inaccurate statements.

## NAVAL CO-OPERATION ON THE LAKES.

14th August.—The Governor of Nyasaland reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the British steamer GUENDOLEN had completely surprised the German steamer WEISSMANN in Sphinx Haven, Lake Nyasa. There was no resistance, and the engines and guns were removed and the crew taken prisoners.

5th November.—The Governor of the East Africa Protectorate reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the British steamer SYBILL, on Lake Victoria Nyanza, had been mined and beached in the Magita Passage near Mwanza. No casualties had occurred.

The ship was being protected by her crew of volunteers, who remained on board. An additional guard of 70 men of the King's African Rifles, with 3-pr. guns, had been despatched.

16th November.—The Governor of East Africa informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the SYBILL had been totally abandoned by direction of the military authorities, who would not undertake to protect her during the salvage operations, since she was beached about 100 miles south of the border on German territory, and in close proximity to a position which was held by a large force of the enemy.

4th December.—The Admiralty informed the S.N.O., East Africa, that our command of the waters of Lake Victoria Nyanza must be ensured by arming, if necessary, the steamers on the Lake to meet any armed German vessels, if such were in use there.

He was to consult with the G.O.C. as to the steps necessary, and was granted permission to detach an officer with an artificer to examine the steamers and to report what was required. He was also to endeavour to ascertain the German resources in this regard, since it was possible that the KÖNIGSBERG had sent some of her light guns to the Lake to arm the steamers. He was further authorised to lend 6-pr. guns for the purpose if the Lake steamers could mount them, but only if no other guns were available.

23rd December.—The S.N.O. telegraphed to the Admiralty that the G.O.C. had made a special application for an experienced officer to command all the armed vessels on Lake Nyanza, and generally to organize naval operations in these waters. No suitable officer was available from H. M. ships on the station.

The loan was also requested of three 6-pr. guns for arming the lake craft. The S.N.O. proposed to send up two from the FOX.

23rd December.—The Governor of Nyasaland asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether any Royal Naval Officer could be spared to take charge of the Government vessels on Lake Nyasa, as two Colonial officers had been invalided; and added that some R.N.R. men would also be useful during the war.

23rd December.—Lieutenant-Commander G. S. Thornley, R.N., of H.M.S. LONDON, was selected by the Admiralty to take command of the craft on Lake Victoria Nyanza, and was to sail about the middle of January.

6th January.—Lieutenant-Commander G. H. Donnistoun, R.N., was appointed by the Admiralty to take command of all the steamers and other craft on Lake Nyasa; and Lieutenant C. G. Tonge, R.N.R., and Acting Sub-Lieutenant R. George, R.N.R., were also appointed for service on the lake.

Arrangements were also made for six men, late of H.M.S. PEGASUS, to proceed to Nyasaland.

8th January.—Mr. Rhoades, who captured the German steamer WEISSMANN, on Lake Nyasa, called at the Admiralty, and reported that both the guns and ammunition, at present in use in the lake steamers, were out of date and very defective. He was of opinion that the KÖNIGSBERG might send a repairing party and guns to re-fit the WEISSMANN.

The Admiralty decided to send out five 6-prs., and ammunition.

11th January.—The Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Governor of Nyasaland that the Admiralty had selected officers for the lake steamers and asked what guns were available.

12th January.—The reply was:—

One effective 3-pr. Hotchkiss.  
Three Nordenfelts.  
Two old 7-pr. M.L.

21st January.—Five 6-prs., with mountings and ammunition, sailed in steamship MATIANA, consigned to the Lake Nyasa gunboats.





(b.) The papers have been submitted by the Officer Commanding Zanzibar without comment, although their contents are of a nature to render some "remarks," if not "immediate action," most desirable.

The information at X should have been reported to the Senior Naval Officer by wire immediately, seeing that it is within the bounds of possibility for one of the interned steamers to escape.

The following information is required regarding the reported capture of a German dhow off Bagamoyo:—

1. Name of the armoured steamer.
2. Nature of her orders.
3. Circumstances generally under which dhow was captured, and reason for taking her to Dar-es-Salaam.
4. Any other information bearing on the incident. To be returned.

F. W. CAULFEILD, *Captain, R.N.,  
Senior Naval Officer, East Coast of Africa.*

H.M.S. "Fox," November 20, 1914.

## IV.

Senior Naval Officer.

(No. 21/2.)

Submitted. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Minute II have been noted.

2. The DOULATIN was used in connection with the capture of the German dhow off Bagamoyo, and her orders were to go over to the German coast at daylight and capture a dhow, which had been repeatedly seen anchored within sight of Chumbi lighthouse, apparently seeking information.

3. Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood, R.N.R., was in charge of the craft, and he chased this dhow towards Bagamoyo, where he captured her about 2 miles from the coast, and towed her to Zanzibar, not Dar-es-Salaam. The dhow acknowledged that they had taken seven days to sail from Pangani to Bagamoyo, and had anchored as we had noticed. Seven days was a long time, and I considered that if she had been trading legitimately she could not have taken this time. I thought that an excuse was made of sending this dhow to Dar-es-Salaam to observe as much as possible on the way. I therefore detained the dhow and her crew at Zanzibar, and confiscated the cargo.

4. This protest arrived ten days later, and by that time CHATHAM had violated the truce. I considered that no explanation to the Governor of German East Africa was necessary or desirable.

JOHN A. INGLES,  
*Officer Commanding, Zanzibar.*

November 27, 1914.

## Y.

The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station.

(No. 105.)

The attached correspondence from the Acting Governor of Dar-es-Salaam is submitted.

Your attention is respectfully drawn to (X), (Y), and (Z) of Acting Governor's letter of the 29th October 1914.

F. W. CAULFEILD, *Captain and  
Senior Naval Officer, East Coast  
of Africa.*

H.M.S. "Fox," December 7, 1914.

Enclosure No. 2.

(No. 170.)

H.M.S. "Chatham" at Sea, December 4, 1914.

Sir,  
WITH reference to my letter No. 154, dated the 26th October, 1914, forwarding report of conversations held off Dar-es-Salaam on the 22nd October, 1914, I have the honour to forward the attached copy (received in CHATHAM on the 1st December) of a letter from the Acting Governor of Dar-es-Salaam, addressed to the British Resident, Zanzibar, dated the 29th October, 1914, and to submit the following remarks regarding some of the statements contained therein:—

2. As regards (A), there is no mention in the terms of truce between ASTRÆA and Dar-es-Salaam that the wireless aerials might be allowed to remain up in place in the three ships concerned.

Article 2 of the truce states distinctly that I shall be allowed to remove and render ineffective the wireless installation of all ships lying in harbour. If Lieutenant-Commander Turner agreed to the aerial remaining up, it was a verbal agreement, and this officer was subsequently killed in the PEGASUS.

3. As regards (B), I purposely refrained from bombarding the town. The ship fired at, and which I suspected was a man-of-war, was over 2 miles S.E. of the town, and there was consequently no possibility of the latter being endangered. The question of bombarding an unfortified town does not therefore arise, and was never even alluded to by the German official at the time of my conversation.

4. As regards (C), international law allows a ship of war in an undefended harbour to be bombarded without notice if the exigencies of war demand immediate action, provided the guns are not had deliberately on certain buildings, &c. (See page 542 of "The Principles of International Law," by Professor T. J. Lawrence, M.A., LL.D., 4th edition, 1913.)

In this case I allowed forty minutes from the time the signal to send a boat was made, and blank round fired before I opened fire. From no point of view was there any "breaking of international law."

5. As regards (D), the statement that Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga are defenceless harbours is completely at variance with the strongly defended state in which Tanga was found to be in when the British Expeditionary Force attempted to land there on the 3rd November, 1914.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,  
S. R. DRURY-LOWE, *Captain.*

The Commander-in-Chief,

H.M. SBIs and Vessels, East Indies.

Minute by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson.

(M. 0704.)

The reports given by CHATHAM for bombarding vessels at Dar-es-Salaam on the 21st October are in telegram of the 23rd October, and are primarily that she thought a vessel in the harbour was the KONIGSBERG.

Subsequent investigation proved this was not correct, but that the vessel was the FELD-MARSCHALL, a vessel claimed as an English prize by PEGASUS.

The town was not bombarded.

The truces between the Governors of Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga and the British warships were subsequently declared void. This the Governor acknowledges.

Though a longer time for communication with the local authorities might well have been allowed, in order to give them a chance of explanation of any breach of the truce on their side (which is not at all evident), it was not blinding on the CHATHAM to do so, and the Commander-in-Chief's remark that there was no special violation of international law is concurred in. It is, however, considered that the CHATHAM'S action—even if justified under the circumstances—was a mistake, though, perhaps, an excusable one. She was acting on faulty information, and being pressed strongly to destroy KONIGSBERG at practically any cost.

A point of importance is the annulling of the terms of truce, at both Dar es Salaam and Tanga on the day following the firing at the FELD-MARSCHALL. This had its effect later, and will be dealt with on other papers.

Presumably the fact was reported to the local Senior Naval Officer, FOX, and to the colonial authorities; if not, it should have been so reported. FOX is being asked as to this.

January 26, 1915.

H. B. JACKSON, Admiral.

III.

Naval Operations on November 28, 1914, and Bombardment on November 30, 1914.

The Secretary of the Admiralty

(656/1062.)

Submitted.

January 9, 1915.

THE gallantry displayed by all officers and men on this occasion under heavy fire appears to have been of the highest order, and I would recommend for their Lordships' favourable consideration that Commander H. P. Ritchie should be awarded the Distinguished Service Order and that the Medal for Conspicuous Gallantry may be bestowed on Leading Seaman T. Gallagher and Petty Officer 1st Class T. Clarke, who, in my opinion, have well earned these distinctions.

The loss of Lieutenant-Commander Peterson and the demolition party is greatly to be deplored.

R. H. PEIRSE, Vice-Admiral,  
Commander-in-Chief.

SCHEDULE OF ENCLOSURES.

Senior Naval Officer, East Africa's letter No. 149 of December 6, to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

Sub-Enclosures :-

1. GOLIATH'S report to Senior Naval Officer, dated the 1st December.
2. Commander Ritchie's report, dated the 29th November.
3. Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood's report, dated the 29th November.
4. Mr. Egan's, Gunner (T.), report, the 2nd December.
5. Map of Dar-es-Salaam.
6. Tracing showing position of ships.
7. Senior Naval Officer's order for searching and demolition operations, the 28th November.
8. List of killed, wounded, and missing.
9. Copy of Senior Naval Officer's letter of protest to Governor of Dar-es-Salaam.
10. Governor's reply to No. 9, dated the 2nd December.
11. Senior Naval Officer's report of bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam on the 30th November.

Enclosure.

(No. 149. Confidential.)

Sir, H.M.S. "For," East Indies Station, December 6, 1914.  
IN amplification of my telegrams of the 28th and 30th November, 1914, I have the honour to attach the following report, in narrative form, of the searching and demolition operations which took place at Dar-es-Salaam on Saturday, the 28th November, 1914.

My final orders in above connection (see copy attached) were issued at Zanzibar on Friday, the 27th November, to officers concerned, and a meeting subsequently held in my cabin to discuss details and any outstanding points.

The basis of the scheme of operations in inner harbour was a number of small but efficient demolition parties acting as nearly as possible simultaneously.

DUPLER was armed with three 12-prs. and four 3-prs., HELMUTH with one 8-pr. and two Maxim's (GOLIATH's steamboat protected and with service armament).

All four vessels, FOX, GOLIATH, DUPLER, and HELMUTH, arrived off

Makumbe Island about 6 A.M. the 28th November, the German flag flying at light-house being quickly replaced by a white flag.

FOX and GOLIATH anchored close to northward of island, DUPLEX with HELMUTH in the position marked view "B" chart 61A.

DUPLEX, after anchoring, reported serious engine defect, reducing her maximum speed to less than 4 knots. Under these circumstances I was forced to abandon all idea of employing her for active operations, and she remained at anchor as a purely covering force.

FOX fired a gun, hoisted signal "Send boat," and ordered GOLIATH's picket boat, with flag of truce, to close the shore as near as safety permitted. All buoys had been removed, and the picket boat, although supplied with chart, found navigation difficult. She touched on the edge of the reef on east side of entrance channel, disabled her rudder, and was forced to return to GOLIATH to be hoisted in for repair. Her place was taken by GOLIATH's steam pinnace, the only steam boat of adequate size now left.

At approximately 7.30 A.M. a white motor-boat, flying German flag and flag of truce, emerged from inner harbour, but with slow and uncertain movements, which at times appeared to indicate a desire to return to harbour in spite of FOX flying flag of truce at her masthead.

It was after 8.30 A.M. before the motor-boat came alongside, and its four German officials, including the Acting Governor (Mr. Humain), the District Commissioner, and Captain of Port, were conducted to my cabin.

Mr. King, late Consul at Dar-es-Salaam, acted as interpreter; he is a fluent German scholar, and his services were of greatest value. My Executive Officer Lieutenant C. H. Petrie, R.N., was present throughout the interview.

I informed the Acting Governor, according to Admiralty order received by Senior Naval Officer towards the end of August, that His Britannic Majesty's Government had not ratified the terms of the temporary truce arranged shortly after outbreak of war between Captain of H.M.S. ASTREA and Governor of Dar-es-Salaam; that I had come for the purpose of inspecting the various prizes then taken, of taking necessary steps to ensure their disablement, and also of putting out of action or withdrawing any small craft and floating stores that might be made use of against us.

With regard to steamship TABORA, I reminded him that my predecessor, under whose responsibility the temporary truce terms had been arranged, had refused to recognise her as anything but a prize of war (on same footing as KONIG and FELDMARSHALL), and that in any case she could not be looked on as a properly accredited hospital ship, the international regulations on the subject not having been complied with. I added, however, that as it was not my desire to cause injury by shock to any sick persons that might be on board her, any demolition operations that might prove to be necessary would be carried out with the approval of a British medical officer whom I would send on board for the purpose.

I further informed the Acting Governor that my operations would be confined to the water, and that no damage would be done to the town or its inhabitants, provided I met with no opposition, but that if opposition were met with, the strongest measures would be taken and the town subjected to bombardment. He appeared very nervous, said he could give no guarantee, and finally asked for time to consult the military authorities. He was at once informed that this could not be granted, and that too much time had already been wasted.

At his special request, however, I arranged that the operating boats should not enter harbour until a reasonable interval after his reaching the shore. (This interval was, as a matter of fact, well over half an hour.)

Before leaving the ship at 9 A.M. the Acting Governor, to my surprise, asked me whether our boats would carry on their operations under the white flag, to which I returned an answer in the negative.

After leaving H.M.S. FOX, the Acting Governor landed near East Ferry point and close to flagstaff from which flew most conspicuously three white flags. After a short consultation with someone on shore—presumably a military authority—he re-embarked, and his motor-boat soon disappeared behind West Ferry point en route to Dar-es-Salaam. The white flags were not hoisted down.

After due consideration I decided to commence operations, and sent FOX's steam cutter in to sound and buoy the channel.

Seeing the white flags still flying, and no one near flagstaff, I then ordered HELMUTH to proceed in execution of previous orders, and she entered harbour and was lost to sight about 10.15 A.M.

Accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Sheppard, Chief Staff Officer "B" force, I then proceeded in GOLIATH'S steam pinnace to DUPLEX to be in a more central position. GOLIATH'S steamboat then proceeded in execution of previous orders.

Observing a lady driving about in a carriage and pair, three white flags still flying, no one near flagstaff, and everything apparently peaceful, I decided to personally inspect the position of sunken dock close to flagstaff, and to this end embarked about 12.15 in FOX'S steam cutter, just returned from buoying channel, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Sheppard, Chief Staff Officer "B" force; Lieutenant E. R. Orson, Navigating Officer of H.M.S. FOX; and Midshipman T. H. L. McLeod, temporarily lent from GOLIATH to DUPLEX.

Having ascertained position of dock (thanks to bright sun, clearly visible about 10 feet below surface) I had just given orders to go ahead, when we were suddenly assailed by rifle fire from both banks, a considerable volume coming from close vicinity of flagstaff whence still flew the three white flags.

"Lie down everyone! Hard a port!" but steering was difficult under the circumstances; moreover, speed soon slackened, and it was found that the stoker forward was lying in fore peak dangerously wounded.

Bullets were raining over and into the boat, and through and against the thin iron plates rigged on either side boiler and round the coxswain in stern sheets, but Lieutenant Orson, with great pluck, ran forward and kept fires going.

Very soon the after seaman was hit in the head and collapsed, and then the coxswain, with blood running from his mouth, was shot in the leg. His conduct was splendid. He never flinched, but stuck to his post saying, "That's nothing, Sir; I'm all right. We shall soon be out of channel, and so on. It was very largely due to the coolness and pluck of this leading seaman (by name Thomas A. Gallogher) that the boat safely emerged from the danger zone, and eventually reached FOX about 1.30 P.M.

Almost immediately afterwards my attention was drawn to harbour entrance by the sound of heavy firing, and HELMUTH came into sight towing two lifeboats full of men (they proved later to be the crews of KONIG and FELDMARSHALL). She was the centre of a hail of rifle, Maxim, pom-pom (or small field gun) fire.

I at once ordered fire to be opened, first for covering purposes, DUPLEX assisting with her 12-prs, and then for bombardment, in which operation the Governor's palace on sea front was first picked out and set on fire by two or three 12-inch shells, and soon reduced to a ruin.

A small cloud of steam was seen to issue from HELMUTH'S engine-room. Her speed rapidly decreased, and for some minutes her fate seemed to hang in the balance. She was able, however, to get clear of channel and to reach DUPLEX before being compelled to draw fires. Her hull and funnel were riddled with holes, several made by 1-pr. (or 2-pr.) shot, but most by 45 machine-gun bullets. So numerous indeed were the holes in her side that when all had been plugged (temporarily) with wood spigots her resemblance to a porcupine was noticeable. That the main steam pipe held out, although hit by one or two shots within an ace of penetration, is an extraordinary as the remarkably small number of casualties, viz., Lieutenant Orde (in command) and four men wounded—none seriously.

(Note.—One German prisoner, a chief engineer, was also wounded, but he was in one of the lifeboats towing astern.)

In view of her commanding officer having been wounded, I ordered Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood, R.N.R., second in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH, to draw up a "Report" of proceedings, a copy of which is attached. (It has been seen and concurred in by Lieutenant Orje, now in hospital at Zanzibar.)

About 4.40 P.M., and when I had abandoned all hope of recovering GOLIATH'S steam pinnace, fresh firing was heard at harbour entrance, and very shortly afterwards she appeared round a bend with a lighter made fast each side and three towing astern. These three last were slipped, and in consequence the boat ran the gauntlet of the hail of fire with considerably increased speed. Unfortunately, the loss of these three lighters caused her to yaw, and she evidently touched the reef once or twice on either side of the channel. Covering fire from FOX and GOLIATH was kept up on both banks of entrance. Eventually, when clear or nearly clear of the danger zone, the steam pinnace was observed to be stationary, and that one by one in quick succession were fired four rockets. Assistance, in the form of pulling cutter from GOLIATH and steam cutter from FOX, was despatched as soon as possible, but long before they reached the spot GOLIATH'S steamboat had floated off, regretfully cast adrift the two lighters and

Makatimbe Island about 6 A.M. the 28th November, the German flag flying at light-house being quickly replaced by a white flag.

FOX and GOLIATH anchored close to northward of island, DUPLEX with HELMUTH in the position marked view "B," chart 674.

DUPLEX, after anchoring, reported serious engine defect, reducing her maximum speed to less than 4 knots. Under these circumstances I was forced to abandon all idea of employing her for active operations, and she remained at anchor as a purely covering force.

FOX fired a gun, hoisted signal "Send boat," and ordered GOLIATH's picket boat, with flag of truce, to close the shore as near as safety permitted. All buoys had been removed, and the picket boat, although supplied with chart, found navigation difficult; she touched on the edge of the reef on east side of entrance channel, disabled her rudder, and was forced to return to GOLIATH to be hoisted in for repair. Her place was taken by GOLIATH's steam pinnace, the only steam boat of adequate size now left.

At approximately 7.30 A.M. a white motor-boat, flying German flag and flag of truce emerged from inner harbour, but with slow and uncertain movements, which at times appeared to indicate a desire to return to harbour in spite of FOX flying flag of truce at her mast-head.

It was after 8.30 A.M. before the motor boat came alongside, and its four German officials, including the Acting Governor (Mr. Humano), the District Commissioner, and Captain of Port, were conducted to my cabin.

Mr. King, late Consul at Dar-es-Salaam acted as interpreter; he is a fluent German scholar, and his services were of greatest value. My Executive Officer, Lieutenant C. H. Petrie, R.N., was present throughout the interview.

I informed the Acting Governor, according to Admiralty order received by Senior Naval Officer towards the end of August, that His Britannic Majesty's Government had not ratified the terms of the temporary truce arranged shortly after outbreak of war between Captain of H.M.S. ASTREA and Governor of Dar-es-Salaam; that I had some for the purpose of inspecting the various prizes then taken, of taking necessary steps to ensure their disablement, and also of putting out of action or withdrawing any small craft and floating stores that might be made use of against us.

With regard to steamship TABORA, I reminded him that my predecessor, under whose responsibility the temporary truce terms had been arranged, had refused to recognize her as anything but a prize of war (on same footing as KONIG and FELDMARSCHALL), and that in any case she could not be looked on as a properly accredited hospital ship, the international regulations on the subject not having been complied with. I added, however, that as it was not my desire to cause injury by shock to any sick persons that might be on board her, any demolition operations that might prove to be necessary would be carried out with the approval of a British medical officer whom I would send on board for the purpose.

I further informed the Acting Governor that my operations would be confined to the water, and that no damage would be done to the town or its inhabitants, provided I met with no opposition, but that if opposition were met with, the strongest measures would be taken and the town subjected to bombardment. He appeared very nervous, said he could give no guarantee, and finally asked for time to consult the military authorities. He was at once informed that this could not be granted, and that too much time had already been wasted.

At his special request, however, I arranged that the operating boats should not enter harbour until a reasonable interval after his reaching the shore. (This interval was, as a matter of fact, well over half an hour.)

Before leaving the ship at 9 A.M. the Acting Governor, to my surprise, asked me whether our boats would carry on their operations under the white flag, to which I returned an answer in the negative.

After leaving H.M.S. FOX, the Acting Governor landed near East Ferry point and close to flagstaff from which few most conspicuously three white flags. After a short consultation with someone on shore—presumably a military authority—he re-embarked, and his motor-boat soon disappeared behind West Ferry point en route for Dar-es-Salaam. The white flags were not hauled down.

After due consideration I decided to commence operations, and sent FOX's steam-cutter in to sound and buoy the channel.

Seeing the white flags still flying, and no one near flagstaff, I then ordered HELMUTH to proceed in execution of previous orders, and she entered harbour and was lost to sight about 10.15 A.M.

Accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Sheppard, Chief Staff Officer "B" force, I then proceeded in GOLIATH's steam pinnace to DUPLEX to be in a more central position. GOLIATH's steamboat then proceeded in execution of previous orders.

Observing a lady driving about in a carriage and pair, three white flags still flying, no one near flagstaff, and everything apparently peaceful, I decided to personally inspect the position of sunken dock close to flagstaff, and to this end embarked about 12.15 in FOX's steam-cutter, just returned from buoying channel, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Sheppard, Chief Staff Officer "B" force; Lieutenant E. R. Corsou, Navigating Officer of H.M.S. FOX; and Midshipman T. H. L. McLeod, temporarily lent from GOLIATH to DUPLEX.

Having ascertained position of dock (thanks to bright sun, clearly visible about 10 feet below surface) I had just given orders to go ahead, when we were suddenly assailed by rifle fire from both banks, a considerable volume coming from close vicinity of flagstaff whence still flew the three white flags.

"Lie down everyone! Hard a port!" but steering was difficult under the circumstances; moreover, speed soon slackened, and it was found that the stoker forward was lying in fore peak dangerously wounded.

Bullets were raining over and into the boat, and through and against the thin iron plates rigged on either side boiler and round the coxswain in stern sheets, but Lieutenant Corson, with great pluck, ran forward and kept fires going.

Very soon the after seaman was hit in the head and collapsed, and then the coxswain, with blood running from his mouth, was shot in the leg. His conduct was splendid. He never flinched, but stuck to his post saying, "That's nothing, Sir; I'm all right. We shall soon be out of channel," and so on. It was very largely due to the coolness and pluck of this leading seaman (by name Thomas A. Gallagher) that the boat safely emerged from the danger zone, and eventually reached FOX about 1.30 P.M.

Almost immediately afterwards my attention was drawn to harbour entrance by the sound of heavy firing, and HELMUTH came into sight towing two lifeboats full of men (they proved later to be the crews of KONIG and FELDMARSCHALL). She was the centre of a hail of rifle, Maxim, pom-pom (or small field gun) fire.

I at once ordered fire to be opened, first for covering purposes, DUPLEX assisting with her 12-prs., and then for bombardment, in which operation the Governor's palace on sea front was first picked out and set on fire by two or three 12-inch shells, and soon reduced to a ruin.

A small cloud of steam was seen to issue from HELMUTH's engine-room. Her speed rapidly decreased, and for some minutes her fate seemed to hang in the balance. She was able, however, to get clear of channel and to reach DUPLEX before being compelled to draw fire. Her hull and funnel were riddled with holes, several made by 1-pr. (or 2-pr.) shot, but most by .45 machine-gun bullets. So numerous indeed were the holes in her side that when all had been plugged (temporarily) with wood spigots her resemblance to a porcupine was noticeable. That the main steam pipe held out, although hit by one or two shots within an ace of penetration, is as extraordinary as the remarkably small number of casualties, viz., Lieutenant Orde (in command) and four men wounded—none seriously.

(Note.—One German prisoner, a chief engineer was also wounded, but he was in one of the lifeboats towing astern.)

In view of her commanding officer having been wounded, I ordered Sub-Lieutenant Charleswood, R.N.R., second in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH, to draw up a "Report" of proceedings, a copy of which is attached. (It has been seen and concurred in by Lieutenant Orde, now in hospital at Zanzibar.)

About 4.40 P.M., and when I had abandoned all hope of recovering GOLIATH's steam pinnace, fresh firing was heard at harbour entrance, and very shortly afterwards she appeared round a bend with a lighter made fast each side and three towing astern. These three last were slipped, and in consequence the boat ran the gauntlet of the hail of fire with considerably increased speed. Unfortunately, the loss of these three lighters caused her to yaw, and she evidently touched the reef once or twice on either side of the channel. Covering fire from FOX and GOLIATH was kept up on both banks of entrance. Eventually, when clear or nearly clear of the danger zone, the steam pinnace was observed to be stationary, and that one by one in quick succession were fired four rockets. Assistance, in the form of pulling cutter from GOLIATH and steam cutter from FOX, was despatched as soon as possible, but long before they reached the spot GOLIATH's steamboat had floated off, regretfully cast adrift the two lighters and



Makatumba Island about 6 A.M. the 28th November, the German flag flying at light-house being quickly replaced by a white flag.

FOX and GOLIATH anchored close to northward of island, DUPLEX with HELMUTH in the position marked vice "B", chart 674.

DUPLEX, after anchoring, reported serious engine defect, reducing her maximum speed to less than 4 knots. Under these circumstances I was forced to abandon all idea of employing her for active operations, and she remained at anchor as a purely covering force.

FOX fired a gun, hoisted signal "Send boat," and ordered GOLIATH's picket boat, with flag of truce, to close the shore as near as safety permitted. All buoys had been removed, and the picket boat, although supplied with chart, found navigation difficult; she touched on the edge of the reef on east side of entrance channel, disabled her rudder, and was forced to return to GOLIATH to be hoisted in for repair. Her place was taken by GOLIATH's steam pinnace, the only steam boat of adequate size now left.

At approximately 7.30 A.M. a white motor-boat, flying German flag and flag of truce emerged from inner harbour, but with slow and uncertain movements, which at times appeared to indicate a desire to return to harbour in spite of FOX flying flag of truce at her mast-head.

It was after 8.30 A.M. before the motor-boat came alongside, and its four German officials, including the Acting Governor (Mr. Humann), the District Commissioner, and Captain of Port, were conducted to my cabin.

Mr. King, late Consul at Dar-es-Salaam, acted as interpreter; he is a fluent German scholar, and his services were of greatest value. My Executive Officer Lieutenant C. H. Petrie, R.N., was present throughout the interview.

I informed the Acting Governor, according to Admiralty order received by Senior Naval Officer towards the end of August, that His Britannic Majesty's Government had not ratified the terms of the temporary truce arranged shortly after outbreak of war between Captain of H.M.S. ASTREA and Governor of Dar-es-Salaam; that I had come for the purpose of inspecting the various prizes then taken, of taking necessary steps to ensure their disablement, and also of putting out of action or withdrawing any small craft and floating stores that might be made use of against us.

With regard to steamship TABORA, I reminded him that my predecessor, under whose responsibility the temporary truce terms had been arranged, had refused to recognise her as anything but a prize of war (on same footing as KONIG and FELDMARSHALL), and that in any case she could not be looked on as a properly accredited hospital ship, the international regulations on the subject not having been complied with. I added, however, that as it was not my desire to cause injury by shock to any sick persons that might be on board her, any demolition operations that might prove to be necessary would be carried out with the approval of a British medical officer whom I would send on board for the purpose.

I further informed the Acting Governor that my operations would be confined to the water, and that no damage would be done to the town or its inhabitants, provided I met with no opposition, but that if opposition were met with, the strongest measures would be taken and the town subjected to bombardment. He appeared very nervous, said he could give no guarantee, and finally asked for time to consult the military authorities. He was at once informed that this could not be granted, and that too much time had already been wasted.

At his special request, however, I arranged that the operating boats should not enter harbour until a reasonable interval after his reaching the shore. (This interval was, as a matter of fact, well over half an hour.)

Before leaving the ship at 9 A.M. the Acting Governor, to my surprise, asked me whether our boats would carry on their operations under the white flag, to which I returned an answer in the negative.

After leaving H.M.S. FOX, the Acting Governor landed near East Ferry point and close to flagstaff from which flew most conspicuously three white flags. After a short consultation with someone on shore—presumably a military authority—he re-embarked, and his motor-boat soon disappeared behind West Ferry point en route for Dar-es-Salaam. The white flags were not hoisted down.

After due consideration I decided to commence operations, and sent FOX'S steam-cutter in to sound and bugle the channel.

Seeing the white flags still flying, and no one near flagstaff, I then ordered HELMUTH to proceed in execution of previous orders, and she entered harbour and was lost to sight about 10.15 A.M.

Accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Sheppard, Chief Staff Officer "B" force, I then proceeded in GOLIATH'S steam pinnace to DUPLEX, to be in a more central position. GOLIATH'S steamboat then proceeded in execution of previous orders.

Observing a lady driving about in a carriage and pair, three white flags still flying, no one near flagstaff, and everything apparently peaceful, I decided to personally inspect the position of sunken dock close to flagstaff, and to this end embarked about 12.15 in FOX'S steam cutter, just returned from buoying channel, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Sheppard, Chief Staff Officer "B" force, Lieutenant E. B. Corson, Navaljuting Officer of H.M.S. FOX; and Midshipman T. H. L. McLeod, temporarily lent from GOLIATH to DUPLEX.

Having ascertained position of dock (thanks to bright sun, clearly visible about 10 feet below surface) I had just given orders to go ahead, when we were suddenly assailed by rifle fire from both banks, a considerable volume coming from close vicinity of flagstaff whence still flew the three white flags.

"Lie down everyone! Hard a port!" but steering was difficult under the circumstances; moreover, speed soon slackened, and it was found that the stoker forward was lying in fore peak dangerously wounded.

Bullets were raining over and into the boat, and through and against the thin iron plates rigged on either side boiler and round the coxswain in stern shafts, but Lieutenant Corson, with great pluck, ran forward and kept fires going.

Very soon the after seaman was hit in the head and collapsed, and then the coxswain, with blood running from his mouth, was shot in the leg. His conduct was splendid. He never flinched, but stuck to his post, saying, "That's nothing, Sir; I'm all right. We shall soon be out of channel, and so on." It was very largely due to the coolness and pluck of this leading seaman (by name Thomas A. Gallagher) that the boat safely emerged from the danger zone, and eventually reached FOX about 1.30 P.M.

Almost immediately afterwards my attention was drawn to harbour entrance by the sound of heavy firing, and HELMUTH came into sight towing two fireboats full of men (they proved later to be the crews of KONIG and FELDMARSHALL). She was the centre of a hail of rifle, Maxim, pom-pom (or small field gun) fire.

I at once ordered fire to be opened, first for covering purposes, DUPLEX assisting with her 12-prs., and then for bombardment, in which operation the Governor's palace on sea front was first picked out and set on fire by two or three 12-inch shells, and soon reduced to a ruin.

A small cloud of steam was seen to issue from HELMUTH'S "engine-room." Her speed rapidly decreased, and for some minutes her fate seemed to hang in the balance. She was able, however, to get clear of channel and to reach DUPLEX before being compelled to draw fires. Her hull and funnel were riddled with holes, several made by 1-pr. (or 2-pr.) shot, but most by 45 machine gun bullets. So numerous indeed were the holes in her side that when all had been plugged temporarily with wood splinters her resemblance to a porcupine was noticeable. That the main steam pipe held out, although hit by one or two shots within an ace of penetration, is as extraordinary as the remarkably small number of casualties, viz. Lieutenant Orde (in command) and four men wounded—none seriously.

(Note.—One German prisoner, a chief engineer, was also wounded, but he was in one of the fireboats towing astern.)

In view of her commanding officer having been wounded, I ordered Sub Lieutenant Chaplewood, R.N.R., second in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH, to draw up a "Report" of proceedings, a copy of which is attached. (It has been seen and concurred in by Lieutenant Orde, now in hospital at Zanzibar.)

About 4.40 P.M., and when I had abandoned all hope of recovering GOLIATH'S steam pinnace, fresh firing was heard at harbour entrance, and very shortly afterwards she appeared round a bend with a lighter made fast each side and three towing astern. These three last were slipped, and in consequence the boat on the gantlet of the hail of fire with considerable loss of speed. Unfortunately, the loss of these three lighters caused her to yaw, and she eventually touched the reef once or twice on either side of the channel. Covering operations by FOX and GOLIATH was kept up on both banks of entrance. Eventually, when clear of nearly clear of the danger zone, the steam pinnace was observed to be stationary, and that one by one in quick succession were fired four rockets. Assistance in the form of pulling cutter from GOLIATH and steam cutter from FOX, was despatched as soon as possible, but long before they reached the spot GOLIATH'S steamboat had floated off, regrettably cast adrift the two lighters and

shaped course for GOLIATH, which ship she reached safely about 5.30 p.m. Commander Ritchie (in eight places), Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd, and five men being wounded, Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd dangerously.

It was then, to my surprise and deep regret, reported to me that certain officers and men—the greater part of the demolition parties—were missing, viz. —

Lieutenant-Commander Paterson,  
Lieutenant Sankey,  
Surgeon Holton,

and four men of GOLIATH.

Mr. W. E. Turner, Chief Artificer Engineer,

and four men of FOX.

It is not clear how the above came to be left behind, but it appears that each of the two boats thought the missing parties were in the other boat.

I have discussed this matter with several officers who took part in the operations, and the following are two possible solutions:—

(a.) The whole party was left in KONIG and FELDMARSCHALL (alongside one another), or

(b.) Shortly after HELMUTH towing out the two boat loads of prisoners, had left KONIG and FELDMARSCHALL, the demolition parties on board, having finished, decided not to wait for HELMUTH'S return, but to pull themselves in heliways to steamship TABORA and any small craft which they had marked down for demolition.

Officers and men are unanimous in stating that the continued presence of the three white flags at flagstaff undoubtedly tended to give all hands a certain feeling of security, and it is conceivable that some of the party went on board steamship TABORA, whence the white flags were plainly visible, and, without due caution, proceeded below to engine room, whilst Surgeon Holton inspected any sick on board.

Under such circumstances it would not have been difficult for a treacherous enemy to have clapped down the hatches and closed doors on them without a shot being fired or any chance of the party being able to make known their whereabouts.

Had it not been for the sad, unexpected, and most regrettable loss of these twelve officers and men, the operations under the plucky and resolute leadership of Commander Ritchie would have been brought to a successful conclusion.

As it was, the work done includes:—

Three ships—KONIG, FELDMARSCHALL and KAISER WILHELM II\* (possibly also TABORA)—permanently disabled.

Note.—With reference to KAISER WILHELM II, a private note-book belonging to its Captain was found in a de-patch box left on board. An apparently recent entry, having reference to the navigation of the Rufiji delta, would seem to point to her intended resumption of German East Africa coasting duty in the near future, and especially to duty in connection with KONGOSBERG.]

Sunk—One floating steam crane.  
One lighter containing pumping machinery.  
Two large water tanks and smaller lighters.

Position of sunken floating dock ascertained.  
It makes ingress for large ships practically impossible.

Thirty-five prisoners taken.

It has been my intention to commence a thorough and systematic bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam as early as possible the following day (29th November), but owing to the number of wounded and also of serious condition of DUPLEX (engine) and HELMUTH (hull) it was considered desirable to proceed to Zanzibar at once. FOX towing HELMUTH and GOLIATH towing DUPLEX (with thirty-five prisoners, including one female), weighed and proceeded shortly after 6 p.m.

Herbert T. Lacy, Stoker, 1st Class (Official No. K/5563), shot whilst on duty in

steam cutter, and who died shortly after return to FOX, was buried at sea with all honours at 6.30 p.m.

In conclusion, I desire to bring to your notice the excellent conduct, under a galling fire, to which reply was impracticable, of officers and men who took part in the above operations, especially of the following, whose names are submitted as being those of officers and men deserving of some mark of their Lordships' favour:—

Commander Henry P. Ritchie, H.M.S. GOLIATH, officer in charge of the operations, was an inspiring example to all under him. His coolness and gallantry at the critical moment, when he struck to his post alongside the coxswain until his eighth wound rendered him physically incapable of doing so, was beyond praise.

Lieutenant E. R. Corson, H.M.S. FOX, in FOX'S small steam cutter first sounded and hid out buoys in narrow channel right up to bottle-neck harbour entrance, an operation in which he could not avail himself even of the small protection afforded by the thin steel plates rigged up round coxswain and on either side of boiler; second, when under a close and heavy fire from both sides of channel he climbed forward to relieve the stoker mortally wounded, and by his exertions kept fires going and steaming at the most critical moment.

Lieutenant H. W. J. Orde, R.N., in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH, was wounded but brought his ship, under exceptionally heavy fire and with dangerous escape of steam, safely out through narrow channel to DUPLEX.

Sub-Lieutenant Clement J. Charlewood, R.N.R., (late of H.M.S. PEGASUS, second in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH), ably assisted Lieutenant Orde in the above operation.

Leading Seaman Thomas A. Gallagher, Official No. 222943, H.M.S. FOX, coxswain of FOX'S steam cutter, when twice wounded and under a galling fire from both sides struck to tiller, kept his head, and with utmost coolness and cheerfulness steered his boat safely through the danger zone.

Petty Officer, 1st Class, Thomas J. Clarke, R.F.R., Official No. B/1535, H.M.S. GOLIATH, was coxswain of GOLIATH'S steam pinnace. He was wounded, but gallantly returned to wheel, to which he stuck until boat was out of gunfire.

Able Seaman George Upton, Official No. 190145, H.M.S. GOLIATH, gallantly pumped to help Petty Officer Clarke above mentioned, and undoubtedly saved steam pinnace when off Ras M'wabeh point from running on shore.

With regard to work performed by the demolition parties—Lieutenant-Commander John C. S. Paterson and Lieutenant V. J. Sankey, of H.M.S. GOLIATH, and Chief Artificer W. E. Turner of H.M.S. FOX—this is known, so far as KONIG and FELDMARSCHALL are concerned, to have been successfully carried out.

The fate of these three officers of the night mail, working under them, and also of Surgeon Ernest O. Holton is shrouded in mystery. Although, in company with every officer and man of His Majesty's Service present at Dar-es-Salaam on the 28th November, I deplore their loss, yet I am fully convinced that they met their fate, whatever form it may have taken, with unflinching courage, and in consonance with the best traditions of His Majesty's Navy.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

F. W. CAULFIELD, Captain and  
Senior Naval Officer, East Coast  
of Africa.

The Commander-in-Chief,  
H.M. Ships and Vessels,  
East Indies Station.

Enclosures.

1. REPORT of Commanding Officer of H.M.S. GOLIATH.
2. Report of Commander Ritchie of H.M.S. GOLIATH, officer in charge of searching and demolition operations.
3. Report of Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood, R.N.R., second in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH.

shaped course for GOLIATH, which ship she reached safely about 5.30 P.M., Commander Ritchie (in eight places), Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd, and five men being wounded, Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd dangerously.

It was then, to my surprise and deep regret, reported to me that certain officers and men—the greater part of the demolition parties—were missing, viz.:

Lieutenant Commander Paterson,  
Lieutenant Barker,  
Surgeon Holton,

and four men of GOLIATH;

Mr. W. E. Turner, Chief Artificer Engineer,

and four men of FOX.

It is not clear how the above came to be left behind, but it appears that each of the two boats thought the missing parties were in the other boat.

I have discussed this matter with several officers who took part in the operations, and the following are two possible solutions:—

(a.) The whole party was left in KONIG and FELDMARSCHALL (alongside one another); or

(b.) Shortly after HELMUTH towing out the two boat-loads of prisoners, had left KONIG and FELDMARSCHALL, the demolition parties on board, having finished, decided not to wait for HELMUTH'S return, but to pull themselves in the boats to steamship TABORA and any small craft which they had marked down for demolition.

Officers and men are unanimous in stating that the continued presence of the three white flags at the staff undoubtedly tended to give all hands a certain feeling of security, and it is conceivable that some of the party went on board steamship TABORA, whence the white flags were plainly visible, and, without due caution, proceeded below to engine room, whilst Surgeon Holton inspected any sick on board.

Under such circumstances it would not have been difficult for a treacherous enemy to have clapped down the hatches and closed doors on them without a shot being fired or any chance of the party being able to make known their whereabouts.

Had it not been for the sad, unexpected, and most regrettable loss of these twelve officers and men, the operations under the plucky and resolute leadership of Commander Ritchie would have been brought to a successful conclusion.

As it was, the work done includes:—

Three ships—KONIG, FELDMARSCHALL and KAISER WILHELM II\* (possibly also TABORA)—permanently disabled.

Note.—With reference to KAISER WILHELM II, a private note-book belonging to its Captain was found in a despatch box left on board. An apparently recent entry, having reference to the navigation of the Bahji delta, would seem to point to her intended resumption of German East Africa coasting duty in the near future, and especially to duty in connection with KONIGSBERG.

Sunk: One floating steam crane,  
One lighter containing painting machinery,  
Two large water tanks and smaller lighters.

Position of sunken floating dock ascertained.  
It makes egress for large ships practically impossible.

Thirty-five prisoners taken.

It has been my intention to commence a thorough and systematic bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam as early as possible on the following day (29th November), owing to the numbers of wounded and also of serious condition of DUPLIX (engines) and HELMUTH (hull) it was considered desirable to proceed to Zanzibar at once. FOX towing HELMUTH and GOLIATH towing DUPLIX (with thirty-five prisoners, including one female), weighed and proceeded shortly after 6 P.M.

Herbert T. Lacey, Stoker, 1st Class (Official No. K/6663), shot whilst on duty in

steam cutter, and who died shortly after return to FOX, was buried at sea with all honours at 6.30 P.M.

In conclusion, I desire to bring to your notice the excellent conduct, under a galling fire to which reply was impracticable, of officers and men who took part in the above operations, especially of the following, whose names are submitted as being those of officers and men deserving of some mark of their Lordships' favour:—

Commander Henry P. Ritchie, H.M.S. GOLIATH, officer in charge of the operations, was an inspiring example to all under him. His coolness and gallantry at the critical moment, when he stuck to his post alongside the coxswain until his eighth wound rendered him physically incapable of doing so, was beyond praise.

Lieutenant E. R. Corson, H.M.S. FOX, in FOX'S small steam cutter first sounded and laid out buoys in narrow channel right up to bottle-neck harbour entrance, an operation in which he could not avail himself even of the small protection afforded by the thin steel plates rigged up round coxswain and on either side of boiler; second, when under a close and heavy fire from both sides of channel he climbed forward to relieve the stoker mortally wounded, and by his exertions kept fires going and steam up at the most critical moment.

Lieutenant H. W. J. Orde, R.N., in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH, was wounded but brought his ship under exceptionally heavy fire and with dangerous escape of steam, safely out through narrow channel to DUPLIX.

Sub-Lieutenant Clement J. Charlewood, R.N.R., (late of H.M.S. PEGASUS, second in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH), ably assisted Lieutenant Orde in the above operation.

Leading Seaman Thomas A. Gallagher, Official No. 222943, H.M.S. FOX, coxswain of FOX'S steam cutter, when twice wounded and under a galling fire from both sides stuck to tiller, kept his head, and with utmost coolness and cheeriness steered his boat safely through the danger zone.

Petty Officer, 1st Class, Thomas J. Clarke, R.F.R., Official No. B/1535, H.M.S. GOLIATH, was coxswain of GOLIATH'S steam pinnace. He was wounded, but gallantly returned to wheel, to which he stuck until boat was out of gunfire.

Able Seaman George Upton, Official No. 190145, H.M.S. GOLIATH, gallantly jumped to wheel when Petty Officer Clarke (above mentioned) was wounded, and undoubtedly saved steam pinnace when off Ras M'kate point from running on shore.

With regard to work performed by the demolition parties—Lieutenant Commander John C. S. Paterson and Lieutenant V. J. Sankey of H.M.S. GOLIATH, and Chief Artificer W. E. Turner of H.M.S. FOX, this is known, so far as KONIG and FELDMARSCHALL are concerned, to have been successfully carried out.

The fate of these three officers, of the eight men working under them, and also of Surgeon Ernest C. Holton is shrouded in mystery. Although, in company with every officer and man of His Majesty's Service present at Dar-es-Salaam on the 28th November, I deplore their loss, yet I am fully convinced that they met their fate, whatever form it may have taken, with unflinching courage, and in consonance with the best traditions of His Majesty's Navy.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

E. W. CAULFEILL, Captain and  
Senior Naval Officer, East Coast  
of Africa.

The Commander-in-Chief,

H.M. Ships and Vessels,  
East Indies Station.

Enclosures.

1. Report of Commanding Officer of H.M.S. GOLIATH.
2. Report of Commander Ritchie of H.M.S. GOLIATH, officer in charge of searching and demolition operations.
3. Report of Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood, R.N.R., second in command of H.M.S. HELMUTH.

4. Report sent in by order of Senior Naval Officer) of Mr. J. Egan Gunner (T), H.M.S. FOX, showing positions from which enemy opened fire.

Commander Ritchie concurs as to approximate correctness of these positions.

5. Plan (reprinted in English from recent German plan) of Dar-es-Salaam town and inner anchorage, showing position of TABORA and approximate positions from which fire was opened by the enemy.

6. Tracing of chart No. 674, showing positions of KONIG, FELDMARSCHALL, and TABORA, of sunken dock, and DUPLEX, also of FOX and GOLIATH on the 28th and 30th November.

7. Copy of Senior Naval Officer's orders dated the 27th November.

8. List of killed, wounded, and missing.

9. Letter of protest, including ultimatum re bombardment on the 30th November, sent by Senior Naval Officer to Governor of Dar-es-Salaam.

10. Reply of Governor of Dar-es-Salaam to above.

11. Report of bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam on the 30th November.  
F. W. CAULFIELD, Captain and  
Senior Naval Officer, East Coast  
of Africa.

H.M.S. "Fox," December 7, 1914.

Sub-Enclosure 1.

CAPTAIN OF "GOLIATH'S" REPORT.

H.M.S. "Goliath," December 1, 1914.

Sir,  
I have the honour to submit report regarding the search and bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam on the 28th November, 1914.

2. In accordance with your directions, I anchored in 15 fathoms at daylight, 6.5 A.M., with Outer Makatumbi Light bearing S.E. 1 mile 1 cable, Ras Upanga S. 69° W.

3. I hoisted out the picket-boat armed with 3-pr. and Maxim guns, and sent her, in accordance with your orders, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander John C. S. Paterson to bring off the German Governor if it was necessary. She then proceeded under your orders, and was seen by GOLIATH to be duly entering harbour. At 7.30 A.M. she signalled from the entrance that her rudder was disabled. She managed, however, with the tug HELMUTH'S assistance, to steam back to the ship, and was hoisted in.

4. The steam-pinnace was then hoisted out, armed with the Maxim, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander John C. S. Paterson, who proceeded to the DUPLEX in accordance with your orders. His crew consisted of—

Surgeon Ernest C. Holton, and the following ratings:

Coxswain P.O. Clarke, R.F.R., B/1335.

Able Seaman James Kelso, O.N. J 8992.

" Hadley, R.N.R., D/1492.

" Neil, R.N.R., A/5645.

" Thomas C. Kemp, R.F.R., B/8200.

" Ernest Yorke, O.N. 230888.

Signalman Ernest H. Webb, J/15475.

E.R.A. 4th Class, Arthur A. Mason, M/6189.

Leading Stoker Alfred R. Baker, K/2491.

Stoker, 1st Class, Albert Blatchford, K/10989.

5. The demolition party, consisting of:

Lieutenant Villiers J. A. Sankey;

C.P.O. Francis Daw (T.G.M.), O.N. 164941;

Able Seaman Edward Davis, J/1166;

land gone on board tug HELMUTH when she went to the picket-boat's assistance.

6. When HELMUTH was observed at 1.40 P.M. proceeding out of harbour under heavy fire, with lighters in tow, I at once opened fire, in accordance with your instructions to bombard if opposition was offered. The second shot demolished the

Governor's house. Systematic 6-inch and 12-inch bombardment was continued until DUPLEX, who had gone to the assistance of HELMUTH, came alongside with the wounded at 3.25 P.M. The 12-inch then ceased fire, bombardment being continued with the 6-inch guns.

7. At 4.30 P.M., in accordance with your further orders, I ceased fire, all likelihood of the steam-pinnace being able to come out having been abandoned. At 4.45 P.M., however, the steam-pinnace was seen coming out of harbour under heavy fire. Fire was again opened by 6-inch guns on the points West Ferry and East Ferry, from which the fire was proceeding. At 5.50 P.M., the fire on shore having ceased for some time, GOLIATH ceased fire.

8. The steam-pinnace came alongside, and, having hoisted in the wounded and the boat, the DUPLEX was taken in tow and GOLIATH proceeded to Zanzibar.

9. I desire to bring to your notice the steady behaviour of the officers and men under heavy fire.

10. Especially do I bring to your notice the behaviour of Commander Henry Peel Ritchie, of this ship, who, though wounded in eight places, continued to steer the boat, at the same time commanding and controlling his men. His gallantry is equalled by his modesty.

11. I also would bring to your notice the gallantry of Petty Officer, 1st Class, Thomas John Clarke, R.F.R., B 1535, who continued at his post although considerably wounded and faint through loss of blood.

12. I also bring to your notice the behaviour of Lieutenant Herbert W. J. Orde, also of this ship, in command of the HELMUTH, who, though wounded, brought his small tug through a heavy fire, with a burst steam-pipe, into safety.

13. I am glad to report that, so far, the wounded officers and men belonging to GOLIATH are doing remarkably well.

14. I have already supplied you with a list of the wounded and missing, a loss which I deeply deplore.

15. This is the fifth time that Lieutenant-Commander John C. S. Paterson has been employed in operations on this coast, the previous times under fire. His conduct in the blocking operations has already formed, I understand, the subject of a letter of recommendation from the Captain of H.M.S. CHATHAM, under whose orders he then was acting. From the accounts which have reached me from the survivors, his conduct on this occasion upheld his reputation.

16. Attached herewith are copies of signal and ship's logs, and also copy of Commander Henry P. Ritchie's report.

17. Report from Lieutenant Herbert W. J. Orde not yet received.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

T. L. SHELFORD, Captain.

Captain F. W. Caulfield, R.N.,  
Senior Naval Officer, East Coast of Africa,  
H.M.S. "Fox."

H.M.S. "GOLIATH."

Remarks	Time	From—	To—	Signal	Signification
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1914.					
5.45 Fox anchored	5.10 5.26	Goliath Fox	Stranger Goliath	M	Challenged and answered correct. I am anchoring to south-eastward of your light (0520).
6.5 anchored	6.20	Duplex	Passed to Fox	E	Main feed tanks leaking badly, cannot be retained by us; am using salt water for boilers.
6.55 Fox fired blank	6.55	Goliath	Fox	A	Captain to Captain. Is there any Engineer officer in Duplex? Reply: None has been sent from Fox.



Remarks	Time	From—	To—	Signal	Signification
Holsted Mudge	S.O.	H.M.			
	7.15	Goliath	Fox	E	Is Captain of Fox in Goliath's picket-boat, please? Reply: No.
	7.20	Fox	Goliath	"	I am sending in picket-boat to bring off German Governor if necessary.
	7.45	Picket-boat	"	"	Rudder disabled.
	7.55	Goliath	Fox	"	May Helmut be sent to assist picket-boat whose rudder has become disabled?
	7.58	Fox	Goliath	"	Reply: Yes; I am just giving her orders.
	8.0	"	"	"	Pass to Duplex and Helmut. Proceed very cautiously to assist picket-boat whose rudder is disabled.
	8.0	"	"	"	Have you got steam in your steam-pinnace? Reply: Yes.
	8.10	Duplex	"	"	Picket-boat coming out. (Passed to Fox.)
	8.20	Helmut	"	"	Governor is away off in motor-boat; is it necessary for me to escort him? Reply: No; go alongside Duplex.
	8.20	Fox	"	"	Tell Helmut to haul down white flag.
	8.35	Goliath	Fox	"	Lieutenant Paterson reports he touched a coral reef, will let you know extent of damage when I look at boat (0834).
	8.45	Fox	Goliath	"	Is damage to picket-boat repairable in reasonable time? If not, turn over everything to steam-pinnace. When will latter be ready to leave (0823)? Reply: All explosives and parties were turned over to Helmut by picket-boat before coming out of harbour. Torpedo-gunner remained in Helmut. Lieutenant-Commander Paterson is the only officer who brought picket-boat back (0847).
	9.15	Goliath	Fox	"	Picket-boat will take a day to repair. Steam-pinnace will be ready in half-an-hour (0915).
	9.17	Fox	Goliath	"	I should like to see you as soon as possible (0910).
	9.45	"	"	"	Pass following to Duplex. Tell Fox's steam-cutter to proceed after white motor-boat has passed.
	9.54	S.N.O.	Duplex	"	Stand by to co-ordinate operations with your guns. There may be opposition. Cover Fox's steam-cutter to the best of your ability. After Governor has landed in wire motor-boat Helmut is to proceed in execution of orders. She is to go alongside König with demolition party, and, if no opposition from ship or shore, Helmut can then proceed to capture tags and tow them out while demolition party work in the two ships is in progress (0920).
	9.58	Fox	Duplex and Helmut	"	Observe carefully route taken by motor-boats, it is probably the quickest way in.
	9.59	"	Goliath	"	Please report when these are through.
	10.0	Goliath	Fox	"	All signals passed to Duplex.
	10.5	"	"	"	Please pass signals to Duplex direct. Have you sent anyone to assist signalman in Duplex? Reply: Yes. Fox sent one signalman to Duplex yesterday.
	12.45	"	S.N.O.	"	Signal fires spreading inland have been sighted from my top.
	1.40	"	Fox	"	Helmut is being fired upon.
	1.42	"	Goliath	Flags	Permission to open fire.
	1.44	Fox	Goliath	E	Open fire if you can.
	2.10	Duplex	"	"	Please send doctor at once. (Pass to Fox.)
	2.15	Fox	"	"	Unable to read signal; we have not got the code.
	2.16	Fox	"	"	Duplex has been ordered to go alongside Goliath port side to disembark wounded.
	2.20	Goliath	Fox	"	Is there any news of steam-pinnace?
	2.20	Fox	Goliath	"	If you can get Duplex, please pass following. Has anyone been left in harbour?
	2.25	Goliath	Fox	"	Is there any news of our steam-pinnace?
	2.35	Fox	Goliath	"	Reply: I have been trying for sometime to get a reply from Duplex re steamboat.

Remarks	Time	From—	To—	Signal	Signification
	H.M.				
	2.50	Goliath	Fox	E	Can you signal enemy? I cannot be responsible for safety of hospital ship.
	2.52	Fox	Goliath	"	Both inspectors are busy at present, but I will send one to Duplex when she goes alongside you; also carpenter to repair Helmut's, I have word for Adjutant, and will have channel swept so that Goliath and Fox can carry out systematic bombardment tomorrow of the whole from shortest range possible, meanwhile discontinue firing, and I should like to see you when convenient (1035).
	2.55	Goliath	Fox	"	Submit: I have the absolute range of coal depth, request I may continue bombardment from present position as soon as Duplex is clear.
	3.0	Fox	Goliath	"	In view of your signal re coal depth can I any orders re cease firing (1545).
	3.10	Duplex	"	"	Submit: Am I to come alongside or transfer wounded in boats?
	3.15	Goliath	Duplex	"	Reply: Come alongside port side; report number of wounded. Have you any news of Goliath's steam-pinnace?
	3.20	Duplex	Goliath	"	Reply: Four wounded. When last seen your steam-cutter was making her way to upper creek. No further news. Submit: Have no lines to secure ship, they are all on shore.
	3.23	Fox	"	"	Tell Helmut to go alongside Goliath.
	3.24	"	"	"	Duplex is to go port side of Goliath to disembark wounded.
	3.26	Goliath	Fox	"	As soon as wounded are on board I shall tell Duplex to shove off on account of the swell. Where do you wish her to go?
	3.15	"	"	"	My Commander, Lieutenant-Commander Paterson, Lieutenant Sankey, and Sub-Lieutenant of Duplex are all in steam-pinnace up the creek when last seen. My doctor is on board the Lolawa.
	3.20	Duplex	Goliath	"	One seriously wounded and three badly wounded.
	3.24	Goliath	Fox	"	One white woman, fourteen white men, and twenty native prisoners in Duplex.
	3.25	Fox	Goliath	"	Tell Duplex to anchor midway between Fox and Goliath (1025).
	3.30	"	"	"	Captain to Captain. I am coming to see you now.
	3.40	"	"	"	Reply: Hebam, Signalman Body, Milford, O'Shannon, Jordan, C. G.
	3.50	Goliath	Fox	"	Duplex is shoving off now.
	4.45	"	Duplex	"	Have you got the flotilla signal book that I issued to Commander. Reply: Yes. Flotilla still on board.
	4.50	Fox opened fire	Goliath	"	Steam-pinnace coming out of creek being fired on.
	5.10	Goliath	Fox	"	Steam-pinnace seems to be stopped.
	5.20	"	S.N.O.	"	Steam-pinnace has signalled for assistance.
	5.32	"	Duplex	"	Can you raise steam? Reply: We are raising steam now.
	5.35	Steam-pinnace	Goliath	"	Commander, Sub-Lieutenant, and two others seriously wounded.
	5.40	Goliath	S.N.O.	"	No dead.
	5.45	Fox aweigh	Goliath	"	Please have Helmut ready on port side, and Fox will circle round and send her a grass line. Would you like me to send a doctor? Reply: No doctor. Yes.
	5.47	Goliath	Fox	"	Please let me know when I am to cast off Helmut. I am getting in wounded.
	5.50	"	"	"	Submit: Ships proceed to Zanzibar to land wounded, returning here Monday to complete the business.
	5.51	Fox	Goliath	"	Cast off Helmut, our steamboat will bring her over here.

32

Remarks.	Time.	From	To	Signal	Signification.
	11.51	Fox	Goliath	E	Reply: Yes; it is now necessary Goliath to row Duplex and Fox Helmuht to Zanibar. Has anyone been left behind in harbour (1714)?
	6.57	"	"	"	S.N.O. to Commander. Well done, Goliath's steamboat. You had very bad luck in having to drop your lighters after being so near through.
	6.5	Goliath	Fox	"	Lieutenant-Commander Paterson, Lieutenant Sankey, torpedo ratings of demolition party have not yet returned.
	6.10	"	"	"	Dr. Holton is not dead; he is on board Tabora. Lieutenant-Commander Paterson, Lieutenant Sankey, and six torpedo ratings last seen on board König.
	6.12	"	S.N.O.	"	May Zanibar lights be lit? Reply: An act signalling Zanibar.
	6.16	"	Fox	"	Is south channel available? Reply: Yes. I always use it.
	6.18	"	Duplex	"	Get your ship ready for towing at once. How many signalmen have you got?
	6.20	"	"	"	Issue ordinary standard ration to prisoners, but no spirit. Take a list of their names and ratings and ships.
	6.28	"	"	"	Have you any steam? If so, weigh and come under my stern to save time.
	6.30	Fox	Goliath	"	Half-mast colours.
	6.30	Duplex	"	"	Reply: Submit: Port cable ready for towing. Have no wire. Two signalmen on board.
	6.35	"	"	"	Reply: Have sufficient steam; am weighing now.
	7.20	Goliath	Duplex	M	Am sending marine guard for prisoners.
	7.25	"	"	"	I shall signal to you when I intend to veer.
	7.40	"	"	"	I am going to weigh. Use engines as necessary. When you have veered to full length of tow let fires be out.
	7.50	Duplex	Goliath	"	Submit: I may have sufficient steam to work steering engine, as hand-wheel is out of order. Reply: Approved.
	8.50	Goliath	Duplex	"	Is steam for working steering engine on donkey boiler; if not, why not? Reply: Submit: Donkey boiler cannot be used as tubes are leaking badly.
	9.15	"	"	"	Can steering engine be used without danger? Reply: Yes.
	9.40	"	"	"	I am altering course to N. 35 W.
	9.48	"	Stranger	"	Made challenge. Current reply:
	9.50	"	Duplex	"	Submit: Board your helm.
	9.52	"	"	"	What is the matter with your helm that you do not follow?
	9.55	"	"	"	I am now altering course to N. 36 W.; follow.
	10.0	Duplex	Goliath	"	Reply: Submit: On receiving your signal to alter course to starboard, helm was put hard a-port, but owing to the fact of cable surging, ship did not at once answer her helm. All is now secure.
	10.11	Goliath	Fox	"	Which berth am I to take? I expect to arrive 1 A.M.
	10.25	"	Duplex	"	I am altering course to N. 24 W.
	11.50	"	"	"	I am arriving at 1 A.M. Can you have steam so that I can slip you before entering; if so, what time? Reply: Re steam. Yes.
	11.55	"	"	"	I am altering to N.W.
	12.0	"	"	"	Have steam in half-an-hour's time. How long will it take to unshackle? Use guard of marines to assist.

33

Remarks.	Time.	From	To	Signal	Signification.
SUNDAY, 29TH NOVEMBER, 1914.					
	12.30	Goliath	Duplex	M	Pay great attention to my movements. Can instant relief all goes well in a quarter of an hour.
	12.30	Duplex	Goliath	"	Prepare to cast-off.
	12.40	Goliath	Duplex	"	Cast off tow.
	12.50	"	"	"	Evolution well performed. Anchor as convenient; keep clear of No. 1 berth.
	1.20	"	"	"	

Sub-Enclosure 2.

COMMANDER RITCHIE'S REPORT.

Sir, H.M.S. "Goliath," November 29, 1914.

I have the honour to report that in accordance with your orders, I anchored H.M.S. DUPLEX on position, view (B) on the chart, at the mouth of Dar-es-Salaam, on Saturday, the 28th November, 1914, and on receipt of your further instructions, I proceeded into harbour in charge of H.M.S. HELMUTH, having previously sent FOX'S cutter to sound and lay buoys. No opposition was experienced on the way in: two white flags were flying from the flagstaff at the entrance. On arrival in the harbour we rounded Ras Makabe Point, off which the TABORA was lying, and proceeded up the creek bearing to the right, and found the KONIG and FELDMARSCHELL lying off the point opposite the word "beach" on the chart, and just inside the sounding 6-9. Disembarked demolition party, and destroyed the engines by placing a charge under the low-pressure cylinder and a second charge inside the cylinder, through the hole caused by the first explosion. This took some time to effect. I found a crew of about fifty on board, and Chief Engineer and Fourth Officer, who informed me that the rest of the crew were on shore. I ordered them down into the ship's boats and informed them that they were prisoners. The greater portion of the crew were Masars.

Whilst doing this Lieutenant-Commander Paterson arrived with remainder of demolition party. Leaving him on board to complete the work, I proceeded with HELMUTH and pulling boat further up the creek and round to the left on chart, between two points marked from 60 to 70 feet high, not on Mtuni side.

HELMUTH grounded at mouth of creek and was only got off by transferring stores to pulling boat, after which I returned to FELDMARSCHELL and KONIG, and told Lieutenant-Commander Paterson to take the HELMUTH (when he had completed his work on board KONIG) and proceed to mouth of harbour with prisoners in tow, whilst I took steam-pinnace, with small demolition crew in pulling boat, and made a second attempt for the creek. This was successful, and I got alongside KAISER WILHELM II. I found a high and intermediate cylinder cover removed, and lying on top of the cylinder with the nuts alongside, but no other signs of disablement; the whole could have been replaced in a quarter of an hour by two artificers. I proceeded to disable the engines in a similar manner to the KONIG. I also found several Mauser clips on the upper deck, evidently only recently been handled; and in addition one of the seamen found a Mauser clip with three bullets in it, with the points of the lead sawn down. The ship was nearly ready for service; the ship's boats were on shore. It was decidedly suspicious; the crew had evidently gone to take up arms. I seized the ship's papers, and also any German charts I could find.

I then blew up and sank one crane lighter, one lighter containing pumping machine, two large water tanks, and one small tank.

Sub-Lieutenant L. V. Lloyd and Mr. J. Egan, Gunner (T), of H.M.S. FOX, assisted in the operations. I then collected five lighters and placed one on either side of steam-pinnace, and towed the other three, the shallowest of the water up this creek increased the efficiency of operations.

Steading down the creek past KONIG and FELDMARSCHELL within about fifty yards, I could see no signs of anyone on board with my glasses; as the HELMUTH had gone I concluded that no one was on board.

Owing to the heavy lighters astern, progress was very slow (about 1 1/2 knots), and to ensure clearance through at all times, the lighters I was towing at the mouth of the creek had barely done this when Surgeon Holton shoved off from the TABORA and attempted to come alongside, when fire was instantly opened on the boats from both sides of the creek from positions marked railway on the chart. It is said by the crew that fire was opened from the TABORA; this I did not see. I could not get alongside of Surgeon Holton owing to the difficulty of steering and the boat swinging round on its own axis. Surgeon Holton could not get alongside steam-pinnace as the crew insisted in paddling for the TABORA. I went on with the object of drawing all the fire on the steam-pinnace, and on rounding Ras Makabe Point two men were hit, including the coxswain, fire being opened on us from all around the harbour, which included 12-inch field gun. The coxswain, Petty Officer T. J. Clarke, R.F.R., was relieved by Able Seaman G. Upton, who was also very soon hit. Clarke's wound having been dressed he went back to steer, but collapsed backwards. I then took the wheel and brought the boat outside of East Ferry Point assisted by Petty Officer Clarke, who collapsed several times during the run. Firing continued all the time from both sides.

Arriving at the mouth of the harbour I was shot in the leg, and in consequence of this and previous wounds I had to leave the wheel.

Shortly after the lighters grounded on a sand bank on the western side of the channel, the lighters then had to be shipped, being no longer required for protection and the boat proceeded for GOLIATH.

I would respectfully bring to your notice the gallant conduct of Petty Officer Clarke, who manfully returned to the wheel after being wounded, and stuck to it until the boat was in safety, and also of Able Seaman Upton, who, by jumping to the wheel when Clarke was first wounded, undoubtedly saved the boat at Ras Makabe Point. Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd was one of the first to be wounded. On passing East Ferry Point both white flags were still flying.

Great assistance was given by the buoys laid by Lieutenant (N) of H.M.S. FOX.

I have the honour to be,  
 Sir,  
 Your obedient Servant,  
 H. PEEL RITCHIE, Commander,  
 H.M.S. "Goliath."

The Senior Officer, H.M.S. "Fox"  
 (through Captain T. Shelford, H.M.S. "Goliath").

Forwarded:  
 T. C. SHELFORD, Captain.

Sub-Enclosure No. 3.

SUB-LIEUTENANT CHARLEWOOD'S REPORT.

Captain F. W. Caulfield, R.N.  
 Sir,  
 H.M.S. "Fox," Zanzibar, October 29, 1914.  
 I have the honour to submit the appended report on events that occurred at Dar-es-Salaam on Saturday, the 28th November, 1914, solely from my own point of view.

I have the honour to be,  
 Sir,  
 Your most obedient Servant,  
 A. J. CHARLEWOOD, Sub-Lieutenant,  
 O.C. Tug "Helmut."

REPORT ON EVENTS AT DAR-ES-SALAAM ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1914, BY OFFICER SERVING IN TUG "HELMUTH."

On Friday, the 27th November, the tug HELMUTH with officers Lieutenant Orde, R.N., and Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood, R.N., the former in charge, left Zanzibar under instructions to proceed to a position 20 miles S. 20° E. of Chumbe Lighthouse. The HELMUTH arrived at that position at 0.30 a.m. on the 28th November and then proceeded with H.M.S. FOX to Makatumba, arriving off that island at dawn.

The DUPLIX, in charge of Commander Ritchie, R.N., reached this position shortly after, when with the HELMUTH leading she proceeded towards the entrance of Dar-es-Salaam harbour.

The DUPLIX anchored in a position between Makatumba Lighthouse and the Signal Station, the HELMUTH going alongside her for orders.

Two white flags were observed to be flying from the port flagstaff. While these two vessels were in this position the Governor of Dar-es-Salaam proceeded in his motor-boat, which wore a German ensign and a white flag, under escort to H.M.S. FOX to visit the Senior Naval Officer. On the return journey the motor boat was seen to communicate with the signal station and then proceed towards the town. The FOX'S steam cutter with the navigating officer in charge then laid the buoys in the outer harbour. As soon as two or three buoys had been laid the HELMUTH, with Commander Ritchie and Lieutenant Sankey in addition to her original officers, proceeded into the harbour. The HELMUTH carried a quantity of high explosives, which were later passed into the GOLIATH'S steam cutter and on board the German steamer KONIG for demolition purposes. In entering the harbour the HELMUTH met with no opposition, and proceeded to the top of the inner harbour where the KONIG and FELDMARSHALL were moored, making fast alongside the former vessel.

The German steamer TABORA, with red crosses on her sides and wearing red cross flags, was lying in the inner harbour opposite the town.

Doctors, nurses, and several wounded were visible on her promenade decks. Commander Ritchie and Lieutenant Sankey with a guard and demolition party boarded the KONIG. All members of the crew found on board the two ships were made prisoners and placed into lifeboats under guard.

The Governor's motor-boat, which had followed the HELMUTH from the town, arrived alongside.

A consultation was held on board the KONIG between the officer in charge of the motor-boat, the Captain of the KONIG, and Commander Ritchie. The motor-boat then departed and returned to the town.

Commander Ritchie then boarded the HELMUTH and proceeded further up the harbour with the object of investigating a small steamer and capturing tugs and lighters.

It was found, however, that the HELMUTH drew too much water to enter the creek where the lighters were moored, so she returned to the KONIG. Commander Ritchie transferring to the GOLIATH'S steam cutter, and taking with him Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd.

The HELMUTH was ordered to go to the DUPLIX with the prisoners, place a medical officer on the hospital ship TABORA to make an examination, and return to tow off any available tugs and lighters.

Lieutenant-Commander Paterson had boarded the KONIG to superintend the work of demolition, and had arranged to return with his party in the GOLIATH'S cutter on her return from the creek.

The HELMUTH left the KONIG with two lifeboats containing prisoners in tow.

At the same time the steam cutter left for the creek.

On passing the TABORA the HELMUTH stopped and dropped a surgeon in a dingy. Lieutenant Orde having agreed to pick him up on returning to the harbour. As the HELMUTH proceeded out of harbour it was noted that white flags were still flying from the signal station. As she was passing through the narrow entrance the

\* Note by Senior Naval Officer.—I have since learned from Commander Ritchie that this official was the Captain of the Port. He had been present at interview in my cabin, and had come to see what operations were to be carried out. Commander Ritchie, after reminding him that we were at war, informed him as to the nature of the operations about to be carried out. Captain of Port left ship shortly afterwards.—F. W. CAULFIELD, Captain, R.N., and S.N.O. December 4, 1914.

HELMUTH became the object of tremendous Maxim fire from the north shore. With great difficulty she was steered out of harbour, two coxswains being wounded in quick succession. Shots punctured the steam pipes, and as volumes of steam escaped the speed slackened. However, her engines were kept going until she reached the DUPLEX, when fires were drawn. The HELMUTH was unable to return fire, as her 3-pr. was placed out of action by a rifle bullet striking the breech block. The DUPLEX, FOX, and GOLIATH bombarded while the HELMUTH was under fire. Many shells were seen to explode in the neighbourhood of the trenches, but although at times the density of the enemy's fire appeared to slacken, constant fire was kept on the HELMUTH till out of range. Lieutenant Orde and three of the HELMUTH'S crew were wounded. One seaman and one prisoner were wounded, but as further casualties occurred in the boats being towed.

The wounded and prisoners were placed on board the DUPLEX and conveyed to H.M.S. GOLIATH.

The above is a true statement of the events that occurred at Dar-es-Salaam on Saturday, the 28th November, 1914, solely from my own point of view.

A. J. CHARLEWOOD, Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.R.

I concur.

H. W. J. ORDE, Lieutenant, R.N.

European Hospital, Zanzibar, December 4, 1914.

Sir, I have the honour to report that Lieutenant Orde has shown me the enclosed report by Sub-Lieutenant Charlewood, R.N.R., on the HELMUTH'S work at Dar-es-Salaam.

I regret I am not in agreement with lines 4, 5, 6, on page 3 of the report, and am unaware of Mr. Charlewood's authority for the statement.

On turning the HELMUTH over to Lieutenant-Commander Paterson, he told me he would not be long, as he had only one more charge to fire, and I clearly understood he would go down the creek with the HELMUTH.

Lieutenant Orde states there was a dingy alongside the KÖNIG when he left, but to the best of my recollection it was not there when I passed the KÖNIG later in the day.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

H. PEEL RITCHIE, Commander.

To Captain F. W. Caulfield, H.M.S. "Fox."

Sub-Enclosure No. 4.

MR. EGAN'S REPORT.

Sir, H.M.S. "Fox" at Sea, December 2, 1914.  
IN compliance with your order, I have the honour to report as follows:—

At 4.30 P.M. on the 27th November, 1914, whilst ship was at Zanzibar, a demolition party, consisting of one L.T.O. and two S.T.s, left H.M.S. FOX for DUPLEX, taking with them four 164 lb. tins of wet gunpowder and four 24-lb. fitted primers, a 10-cell battery, 500 yards of wire, tools, &c.

At 8.30 P.M. I left in HELMUTH, taking with me thirty-six fitted 24-lb. primers, and proceeded to Dar-es-Salaam.

On arrival, at daybreak on the 28th November, closed FOX and were ordered by S.N.O. to close DUPLEX, which was done.

HELMUTH then proceeded ahead of DUPLEX towards the harbour, taking soundings and reporting to DUPLEX. Later, the DUPLEX anchored by the stern. HELMUTH then went alongside for orders.

The picket-boat of H.M.S. GOLIATH then came alongside, flying a white flag, with Lieutenant-Commander Paterson in charge, and conveyed an order that nothing was to be done until the Governor had been on board H.M.S. FOX.

The picket-boat then proceeded towards the shore, but shortly afterwards returned, and reported that she had run ashore and damaged her steering gear, and suggested that HELMUTH should go in for the Governor.

The picket-boat then turned over to HELMUTH two officers—Lieutenant (E) and Mr. W. E. Turner, Chief Artificer Engineer—GOLIATH'S demolition party, with charges, &c., and returned to GOLIATH.

The Governor's boat was then seen approaching DUPLEX, and on arrival, was asked to proceed to H.M.S. FOX.

The steam-cutter of H.M.S. FOX arrived with Lieutenant Corson and sounding party on board, and, after consultation with Commander Ritchie, proceeded towards the harbour, taking soundings and laying mines, &c.

I then left DUPLEX in HELMUTH, Commander Ritchie in charge, demolition party belonging to GOLIATH and FOX, with Lieutenant (E) of GOLIATH, Mr. W. E. Turner, Chief Artificer Engineer of H.M.S. FOX, and about twelve men with rifles from DUPLEX.

Proceeded into Dar-es-Salaam, passed close to TABORA, but did not stop.

Proceeded up the southern harbour to the KÖNIG and FELDMARSCHALL, went on board with demolition party, and proceeded to damage the KÖNIG'S cylinders. Charges used were:—

*First Charge.* A 24-lb. tin directly under H.P. cylinder, another about 4 feet away from it and close to the piston, the same in both engines. The four charges were then fired, the result being holes a foot in diameter in the lower part of each H.P. cylinder and several charges, with all small gear, pipes, &c., broken up.

*Second Charge.*—A 24-lb. tin was then placed inside the hole in each H.P. cylinder and fired. Result: bottom of both cylinders completely shattered.

*Third Charge.*—The two caps were taken off both I.P. cylinders, a 24-lb. charge placed inside each and fired, with the result that both were completely shattered.

The same procedure was carried out on board FELDMARSCHALL.

About a quarter-of-an-hour before the first charge was fired, the Governor arrived in his boat and came on board KÖNIG. GOLIATH'S steam-pinnace also arrived with Lieutenant-Commander Paterson.

While the last charge was being placed in FELDMARSCHALL, I was ordered by Lieutenant-Commander Paterson to go with Commander Ritchie. Taking one L.T.O. and one S.T., with charges, &c., with me, I proceeded in a ship's boat in tow of GOLIATH'S steam-pinnace, with Commander Ritchie and Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd on board, up the harbour to the KAISER WILHELM II.

KAISER WILHELM II was disabled in the same way as the other steamers.

In succession were sunk a floating sea-crane, two water tanks—one of 200 tons and one of 150 tons—and at least two lighters. We then took in tow two small iron lighters—one each side for protection—and a ship's boat, a large water tank of about 200 tons, and two smaller lighters astern, and proceeded out of harbour, passing close to the KÖNIG and FELDMARSCHALL, their flags still flying, but apparently no one on board.

When we arrived at "a" (see chart), and seeing shells bursting on shore at "b" and apparently enemy's guns firing to seawards from "b", Commander Ritchie decided to slip lighters and water tank astern. This was done.

Then observing white flag still flying, it was decided to pick up water tank, &c. again. The helm was put "hard a-starboard," but seeing a small boat approaching manned by natives in uniform, with a white officer standing up in the stern (apparently from TABORA), we altered course to pick him up, but the enemy opened fire with small Q.F. and machine guns and rifles from "c," "d," "e," "f." The officer and boat's crew were apparently hit, and our course was altered and proceeded out of harbour under heavy fire close to TABORA, leaving her on our port hand.

Sub-Lieutenant Lloyd and two men were also wounded here. On passing TABORA the firing ceased from "c" and "f," but opened from "g," "h," "i," and "j."

The coxswain was next wounded, but continued steering. Commander Ritchie went to his assistance, but was wounded himself several times; they succeeded, however, in bringing the boat through the worst part of the fire.

Later, Commander Ritchie and coxswain were both compelled to leave the helm owing to injuries, and Leading Seaman Wilcox then took it over. Owing to not knowing the direction to take, we ran aground twice and nearly a third time. The



third time it was decided to get the wounded into steam-pinnace from the lighters and slip lighters and ship's boat, which was accordingly done.

The steam-pinnace then proceeded to GOLIATH, and discharged wounded, &c. I then rejoined H.M.S. FOX, with L.T.O. and S.T. in FOX'S cutter.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. EGAN, Gunner (T), H.M.S. "Fox."

Captain F. W. Caulfield, R.N.,  
Senior Naval Officer, East Coast of Africa.

Sub-Enclosure No. 7.

ORDERS FOR SEARCHING AND DEMOLITION OPERATIONS, &c., AT DAR-ES-SALAAM,  
NOVEMBER 28, 1914.

(Secret.)

CANCEL and destroy my written orders of the 26th November, 1914, and substitute—

DUPLEX and HELMUTH to leave Zanzibar at 5 P.M. on the 27th November, and proceed at 8 knots to rendezvous (10 miles S. 22 E. true from Chumbe, and 24 miles from Makatumba), whence FOX, with both ships in company, will proceed to anchorage outside Makatumba.

DUPLEX and HELMUTH (with FOX'S steam-cutter in tow) will then proceed towards entrance, DUPLEX anchoring in spot marked view "B" on chart 674, and HELMUTH going alongside her.

DUPLEX to have all gear, explosives, explosive party, &c., ready to put on board GOLIATH'S picket boat.

S.N.O., with flag of truce, will proceed in GOLIATH'S picket-boat close to entrance to await arrival of German Governor. On termination of interview, and after Governor's departure for the shore, subsequent procedure will depend on circumstances, but unless otherwise ordered will be as follows:—

Lieutenant (N) of FOX, in FOX'S steam-cutter, will proceed to lay buoys, first proceeding straight in to verify reported position of sunken dock and marking same if possible.

GOLIATH'S picket-boat to take on board demolition gear and party, Lieutenant-Commander Paterson going in charge.

HELMUTH, Commander Ritchie in command, will proceed up harbour as far as possible, and tow off all tugs, lighters, &c. making them fast astern of DUPLEX; latter in temporary command of Lieutenant Gordon, R.I.M.

Any crew found on board KONIG or FELDMARSCHALL are to be taken prisoners.

HELMUTH and picket-boat to keep in communication as far as possible in case either wants assistance from the other.

Greatest care must be exercised in entering harbour, and speed should not be greater than necessary to control vessel on flood tide.

I wish to impress on commanding officers the necessity for being prepared for any possible contingency, navigational obstructions, mine explosions, bombs thrown from steamers, and so on.

If searching and demolition operations are opposed by heavy and accurate gun-fire commanding officers are to return to DUPLEX.

If opposition does not appreciably endanger life or progress of operations, the work is to go on.

Any of H.M. boats or vessels fired on from shore are to hoist red flag at masthead, and this red flag is to be repeated by DUPLEX.

Detailed instructions for individual officers will be given verbally.

F. W. CAULFIELD, Captain, R.N.,

Senior Naval Officer, East Coast of Africa.

November 27, 1914.

Sub-Enclosure No. 8.

List of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, November 28, 1914.

Ship.	Name.	Rating.	O.N.	Remarks.
KILLED.				
Fox	Herbert T. Lacy	Stoker, 1st cl.	K 6663	
WOUNDED.				
Fox	Edmund V. Lloyd	Sub-Lieutenant	J. 506	Seriously.
	William Blackburn	A.B.	J. 6214	
	Albert Brabant	Signalman	222945	
	Thomas A. Gallagher	Leading Seaman		
	H. Peel Ritchie	Commander		
	H. W. J. Orde	Lieut.-Commander		
	Jaa. Field	P.O., 1st cl., R.F.R.	A 4929	
	Thomas J. Clarke	P.O., 1st cl., R.F.R.	B 1356	
Goliath	George Upson	A.B.	120145	
	Ernest York	A.B., R.F.R.	B 3686	
	James Mason	A.B.	A 5645	
	Charles Neil	A.B., R.N.R.	J. 2068	
	Arthur W. Frost	A.B.		Late Pegasus.
	Frank Puleston	Stoker, 1st cl.	K/14406	" "
MISSING.				
Fox	W. E. Turner	Chief Art. Eng.		
	Christopher Ryan	S.P.O.	231459.	
	Vladimir Reedy	Leading Stoker	302476.	
	Edward W. Gibson	Stoker, 1st cl.	K/36074.	
	Charles Black	A.B.	233029.	
	John C. S. Paterson	Lieut.-Commander		
	V. J. H. E. Sankey	Lieutenant (E.)		
	Ernest C. Holton	Surgeon		
Goliath	Francis Daw	P.O., 1st cl.	164941	
	William J. Pulling	P.O., 1st cl.	206709.	
	Percy Tizard	A.B.	J. 13471.	
	Edward Davis	A.B.	J. 1166.	
PRISONER (GERMAN).				
	Henry Kopke	Chief Engineer		

F. W. CAULFIELD, Captain and  
Senior Naval Officer, East Coast of Africa.

Sub-Enclosure No. 9.

His Britannic Majesty's Ship "Fox," off Dar-es-Salaam,  
November 30, 1914.

I desire to enter the strongest and most emphatic protest against the following gross breach of the laws of international warfare committed at Dar-es-Salaam on the 28th November, 1914.

In spite of the fact that two white flags, visible for miles around, were flying and continued to fly during the whole day, from the flagstaff at the entrance to the harbour, a heavy and sustained fire from guns, machine-guns, and rifles was suddenly opened by the German forces upon the British boats and their crews belonging to His Britannic Majesty's ships.

The inhumanity of the act was accentuated in the present case by the fact that a

large volume of this murderous fire was most obviously coming from the immediate vicinity of the flagstaff in question.

I have now to give you due warning that at any time after 10.30 A.M. to-day, 30th November, your town will be subjected to punitive bombardment, the signal for commencement of which will be two blank rounds fired from one of my guns. As I believe there are sick persons on board steamship TABORA, I will endeavour to avoid injuring her, but, as I have already notified you, I do not regard her as a properly accredited hospital ship, nor shall I hold myself in any way responsible for the safety of those on board her.

F. W. CAULFEILD, Captain in His Britannic Majesty's Navy, and Senior Naval Officer, East Coast of Africa.

The Governor, Dar-es-Salaam.

Sub-Enclosure No. 10.

(Translation.)

Dar-es-Salaam, December 2, 1914.

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 30th November, 1914, re the consultation held on the FOX on the 28th November. I made the following agreement with the Commander, viz. that a pinnace (of the ship), with a few officers or a few men, should follow my pinnace to assure themselves concerning the condition of the ships in harbour. It was only agreed that the ships should be visited; there was no talk of taking steps to immobilize them. After this arrangement, two pinnaces full of armed men came into the harbour, whilst a third pinnace steamed into the outer harbour laying buoys; without permission of the German authorities the machinery of these ships was blown up, crews, and even a stewardess, taken prisoners. In consequence of this breach of faith our Military Governor decided to take active measures. For a time the white flag was kept flying to show that no action was about to be taken against the one pinnace which was agreed to allow in the harbour. As the fight grew more intensive there was no possibility of lowering the flag. I am therefore unable to listen to your Excellency's protest, and consider it without reason. On my side I protest against the breaking of the arrangement which was made by the British naval authorities.

HUMANN, Acting Governor.

Commander of H.M.S. "Fox,"  
Senior Naval Officer,  
Commanding the British Squadron  
in British East African Waters.

Sub-Enclosure No. 11.

REPORT OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF DAR-ES-SALAAM ON NOVEMBER 30, 1914.

Sir,

H.M.S. "Fox," East Indies Station, December 7, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to report the following proceedings in connection with the bombardment, on the 30th November, 1914, of the town of Dar-es-Salaam by H.M.S.S. FOX and GOLIATH.

H.M.S. FOX, accompanied by two sweeping tugs, ADJUTANT and HELMUTH, anchored off Mahatumbi Island about 5.30 A.M. on the 30th November, H.M.S. GOLIATH arriving two hours later.

H.M.S. FOX hoisted white flag and also signal "Send a boat." A steamboat flying flag of truce was also sent as close to harbour entrance as safety permitted.

No white flags were flying from flagstaff and no one, except a few natives, could be seen. Having waited until 1.30 P.M. FOX and GOLIATH weighed and proceeded to bombardment positions (see enclosed tracing of chart 674).

At 2.30 P.M. and again at 2.25 P.M. FOX fired a blank round, and at 2.27 P.M. a shotted round purposely short and parallel to shore line.

At 2.23 P.M. commenced systematic bombardment by indirect fire, according to plan previously arranged with GOLIATH, GOLIATH'S targets being the Government buildings, warehouses, both railway stations, custom-house, barracks, &c., comprised in

the area bounded by the shore, Bismarckstrasse, Ringstrasse, Sultanstrasse, and so on to the shore again; FOX'S targets being the Government buildings, offices, casino, &c., in the area between Bismarckstrasse and Evangelical Mission.

A look-out and spotting officer was tried up to the masthead, but owing to trees, hospitals, churches, and other buildings intervening it was not possible to mark fall of shot with any degree of accuracy, whilst owing to the peculiarly sheltered and screened position of inner harbour it is not possible for a vessel to get close enough in to be able to mark and act at the same time signal out results.

On many occasions debris was seen blown into the air, and one or two small fires were started.

The buildings are constructed as a rule of coral slag and do not burn. The Governor's palace, destroyed on the 28th November, was an old building and constructed largely of wood.

The total number of rounds fired against Dar-es-Salaam (including those fired on the 28th November) were:—

42-inch	17 rounds.
6 inch	373
47 inch	163

At 4.30 P.M. I ordered bombardment to cease and hoisted white flag, whilst ADJUTANT (also flying flag of truce) was sent in close to entrance, and remained there until 6.30 P.M.

As no communication with shore was possible, my warning of bombardment, which was incorporated in my letter of protest addressed to the Governor of Dar-es-Salaam, and which I had intended to send on shore before I commenced bombardment, was not delivered on the 30th November.

The return of a female prisoner captured on the 28th November, afforded me, however, an opportunity, and on the 2nd December my letter was conveyed by this lady and delivered under flag of truce to Acting Governor, a copy of whose reply I enclose.

This reply is inaccurate, misleading, and unsatisfactory. It contains no kind of apology or excuse for the treacherous conduct of the enemy in opening fire from under the white flag.

At 6.30 P.M. FOX, GOLIATH, ADJUTANT, and HELMUTH weighed and proceeded out of Dar-es-Salaam bay in execution of previous orders.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

F. W. CAULFEILD, Captain and Senior Naval Officer, East Coast of Africa.

The Commander-in-Chief,  
East Indies Station.

MINUTE BY ADMIRAL SIR HENRY JACKSON.

(M. 0701.)

The remarks of C-in-C. are fully endorsed in. The behaviour of these wounded officers and men in sticking to their posts evidently saved many further casualties.

The operations were carried out under a misapprehension of the situation. The dock was still in place, and barred the entrance to any but small vessels, though the truce had been already denounced, and the German authorities were not barred in any way from using force to defend the contents of their harbour. The ships claimed as prizes by the ASTREA remained in the harbour, and may be considered to have reverted to the enemy.

Their destruction on our part in any case was, therefore, a legitimate act of war, and the notice to the Governor that if he refrained from action the town would not be bombarded was humane.

The S.N.O., however, seems not to have been aware that the truce had been denounced by the CHATHAM, as he again informed the Governor that His Majesty's Government had not ratified it. (Further information on this point is being asked for.)

\* Apparently he had been informed, but acted as if he had no knowledge.

The Governor was informed the operations would not be carried out under the white flag, and he had previously stated he would give no guarantee that opposition would not be encountered.

It is difficult to understand why opposition should not have been expected, but apparently the non-hauling down of the white flag led the parties to think they could complete their operations unmolested. The excuse given by the Governor is sophistical. This error in judgment was probably the cause of the loss of the party who were not packed up; but all had been warned to be ready for such contingencies.

The difficulties were much accentuated by the defects in the DUPLEX and the grounding of the GOLIATH'S packet-boat, and it would have been better to have repaired them before starting the operations in the inner harbour with only weak and slow ship's boats, which made the attack a rash one.

Neither this nor the CHATHAM'S attack on the 21st October were actually necessary, and apparently have not resulted in any military advantage; the punitive bombardment subsequently was practically obligatory.

H. B. JACKSON.

January 27, 1915.

The Governor was informed the operations would not be carried out under the white flag, and he had previously stated he would give no guarantee that opposition would not be encountered.

It is difficult to understand why opposition should not have been expected, but apparently the non-hauling down of the white flag led the parties to think they could complete their operations unmolested. The excuse given by the Governor is sophistical. This error in judgment was probably the cause of the loss of the party who were not packed up; but all had been warned to be ready for such contingencies.

The difficulties were much accentuated by the defects in the DUPLEX and the grounding of the GOLIATH'S picket-boat, and it would have been better to have repaired them before starting the operations in the inner harbour with only weak and slow ship's boats, which made the attack a rash one.

Neither this nor the CHATHAM'S attack on the 21st October were actually necessary, and apparently have not resulted in any military advantage; the punitive bombardment subsequently was practically obligatory.

H. B. JACKSON.

January 27, 1915.

The Governor was informed the operations should not be carried out under the white flag, and he had previously stated he would give no guarantee that opposition would not be encountered.

It is difficult to understand why opposition should not have been expected, but apparently the non-hauling down of the white flag led the parties to think they could complete their operations unfoiled. The excuse given by the Governor is sophistical. This error in judgment was probably the cause of the loss of the party who were not picked up; but all had been warned to be ready for such contingencies.

The difficulties were much accentuated by the defects in the DURLEX and the grounding of the GOLIATH'S picket-boat, and it would have been better to have repaired them before starting the operations in the inner harbour with only weak and slow ship's boats, which made the attack a rash one.

Neither this nor the CHATHAM'S attack on the 21st October were actually necessary, and apparently have not resulted in any military advantage; the punitive bombardment subsequently was practically obligatory.

H. B. JACKSON.

January, 27, 1915.

The Governor was informed the operations could not be carried out under the white flag, and he had previously stated he would give no guarantee that opposition would not be encountered.


It is difficult to understand why opposition should not have been expected, but apparently the non-hauling down of the white flag led the parties to think they could complete their operations unmolested. The excuse given by the Governor is sophistical. This error in judgment was probably the cause of the loss of the party who were not picked up; but all had been warned to be ready for such contingencies.

The difficulties were much accentuated by the defects in the DUPLEX and the grounding of the GOLIATH'S picket-boat, and it would have been better to have repaired them before starting the operations in the inner harbour with only weak and slow ship's boats, which made the attack a rash one.

Neither this nor the CHATHAM'S attack on the 21st October were actually necessary, and apparently have not resulted in any military advantage; the punitive bombardment subsequently was practically obligatory.

H. B. JACKSON.

January 27, 1915.



TANGA

Bharata (b)  
Mountain Battery

Borjara  
(3 Piers)

5 fathom line

MANGROVES

CORAL LEDGES

Dry at Low Water

White House

NAIRUNG  
O 6

FOX (a)  
O 5

KHOSRU  
O 4

ASSOUAN  
O 3

BHARATA (a)  
O 2  
 FOX (b)

LAISANG  
O 1

Landing place

Gross, Trees  
AND  
Thick Scrub & Bush

Embarkation  
place  
Red  
House

Fox's shells

Hospital  
Buildings

PIER

TANGA TOWN

Railway

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Yards  
Approximate Scale

39° 15' E

# RUFUJI DELTA

Tracing from German Chart  
to illustrate  
Reconnaissance carried out  
December 23rd, 1914.


39° E



MILES

39° 45' S

"D" = Duplex.  
"A" = Adjutant



8° 0' S







