1933

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\end{gathered}
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boincohondencer dio cusoconswith Loud firances beott.


1. Snd Ahaneo Scatt $\qquad$
 Thancher news on vaciois matters ifr cons iduation adiscusocon.
2. Tpolad frencio Scott - iamuod $\qquad$ 26 Tane 33 Land PIFmertt.

Mes is a note whil Imale
$3^{x}$
of what wes rand at oar<lesoidion with Lad Arencés bertr. yree witt it, herkaphye- oous mank uf $t$ bec of Blikic so ther le cen ase!

PAPARe
Yow vilh lik lo sue.
The aneon or hão addi: tinil pounis ther I didect muntris $n^{-}$me cincusatisi L-day

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Teluwat fins, a tan bini sank on separate.
? Shin may br pact by (Sin
C. Bststomby $L$ sue. on selim)

yes.

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San.
In C. N. Lewis is Apicen
Rivcitor of preceayi Douras prink, $r$ th i $\rightarrow$ cucxurakeses

 molders of pusienfaic.... Te hies viclevies, when fanon lain, 6 sing the the other Swale, cone) gridenenantorerin. $\rightarrow+N^{N}$ LSSWern

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tutor bree.

$\frac{4}{20}$ rotor $\operatorname{cose}^{2}$

$S_{i v} C \cdot$ Busconers
memorandum on 3246 I wrote to kr . Lewis weimar. his: to set me when he returned to London, ald he called this morning.

As to banks foreclosing. Ar. Lewis
4 said that there was no prospect of this as the banks... were not anxious to have farms on their hands. Of course it was impossible to rive any undertaking not to foreclose ard so take away any incentive to real industry on the part of the farmer. ...r. Ae m is pointed out, howe v, that if better tate duse and land values improved and a farmer. sold his lard, the mortoraree would necessarily have to recoup himself out of the selling price little nim? be left for the farmer. Also in such circumstances the Sale might improve the value of telommornar mortraged lads, in which case the morlagaee alula te justified in putting the screw on the owners ot those torus.
as regards the refutal :osithor:

1. There were a rect allay laracre, arilealany
$x_{0}$ assuming
th rougher, lC the in 40 recovery an coumedicy price. the maize farmers, who soult not of able to need going. Gite apart from their mortgage interest they would not be able to keep themselves alive without additional help. [It is no doubt because of this that there is such a strow tendency to seek to divert Land Bank money to agricultural credit purposes.]

Coffee was not in so bad a position. The man who established coffee could (apart from accidents of drought, etc.) find a respectable margin at present prices. The same applied to tea, but there were cases where help was needed. Mr. Lewis mentioned a man who had put $£ 15,000$ of his own money into tea and then made satisfactory arrangements for marketing
with

## LORD FGANCIS SCO2

 provide a factory. The Banks were perfectlyLor Plymouth saw Sir Frencis Scot hing ning term loans are outside their scope. I said that 1 thought that this was exactly the sort of case where the increased capital of the Land Bank might be used.

As regards" mixed farmers the good ones are not doing too badly, but there are a great many amateurs who may not be able to carry on.

Sisal has benefited by the recovery of prices and there is no company which should not be able to keep itself proino.
-w. Co. 22.83.
Lord Francis Scott firet or all r iset the yestion of the Lind Bna. He knew thet $£ 60,000$ had benn proved and thet steps were beine trken to rize Ionn of £ 300,000 , but he pointer out thet the notrer half million would be neces ry. I rus :o ly art of the letter which was drafted for me just bou ine of -ands3 his operation; but I never sent it owin to ins il miss. In this letter it is nointel out to him thrt there oul bc very little chance of gettin the Trensury to aree to increase the loan to ns much as $£ 750,000$ for this purpose, in viev of the present Cinoncial position of Kenys.

The next point discussed was the wetion of the possibility of the Banks egrecing to giv some rort of moratorium on lons, overdreits, etc. Lor: Plymouth pointed out that there was, so frr as we coul see, no chance whatever of beinz : ble to arrage this. Whereon the conversation turned to the uestion of thet cr nee rioce
 was of the Banks foreclosing. Lord Francis Scott s. is that a well-know Banker, Mr. C. N. Lewis, ould shortly be
in London, and I agreed that I, or someone else in the Or ice, would arrange to see him and hear his vievs on the fincrcial position in Kenya generally.

The proposal of Lord Francis Scott to substitute a Police Force for the K.A.R. ...n next discussed. I
explained to Lord Francis Scott the objections mich had been raised by the O.D.C. when this matter was last brought before them and that I thought there was very little chance of the Service Departments changing their minds. Lord Francis Scott said that he had he rd that a young officer of the K.A.R. had told someone that the Force vas uite Inefficient and was so bad that some oi the units had to be disarmed at night. I nointed out to him that I
could not belleve that there was any truth in this, and I promised to arrange for him to have a t : Ik : ith Brigedier Norman generally on his proposals. Lord Francis asked me if we had yet appointed a successor to Colonel Wilkinson. I said that the matter had not, so far as I could remember, come up to me. We asked if there 7.3 any chance of Lieut.Calonell Mithened being ppointed, as it was generally thought he would be suitable.

Itws pointed out to Lord Francis Scott that the Secretary of State in his despatch to Kenye had
specifically stated that it should no longer be necesssry 43 for the natives to be represented by a Mission ry on the Legislative Council. Lord Francis Scott said that it was still the law of the land the they should be =nd that nothing had been done.

It was explained to Lord Francis Scott that the petition from the Afro-Asian Association which he had given to Lord Passfield, had been sent to the Governor of Kenya, and that it was incorrect to say that/no action had been taken. As a matter of fact the matter had
recently been under the consideration of the Conference of Law Officers in East Africa.

Lord Francis Scott raised the auestion of the Unofficial element in Kenya having more say in finenclal? control. Lord Plymouth explained to him the Secretary of State's attitude, and pointed out that Sir Philip was not prepared todepart from the recammend tions of the Joint Committee on East Africa, which had received the unanimous approval of the House of Commons. Lord Frencis Scott said that he was not personaily goin to press the Secretary of State on this point, as he fully realised Sir Philip's position. He reminded us, however, that a Conference in East Africa was at the moment considering the question and he (Lord Francis) had suggested to the Conference that instead of making impossible demands they shouls put up a fully considered case giving their arguments why some concession should be made to them in this respect. He added that it was quite possible that the more extreme elements might make unreasonable demands, and if they did this he would have to consider seriously on his return whether he should not split up the party and form a new constitutional party of his own.

In connection with the Secretary of State's
decision that he would not depart in any way from the recommendations of the Select Committee, Lord Francis -Scott asked if we had not already done so in adopting Lord Moyne's recommendation for the setting up of a Native Betterment Fund.

During the course or this discussion forest
Francis Scott expressed theiview that the future of Kenya was dependent on fyether white settlement nd tho consequent strengthening of the position of the white settler. In existing oircurstances he said it was all "bunkum" that anyone should talk bout self-government.

## path <br> 1.\%.33

Ma. Herrono Tyon wier houn to been tani.
typark
2\%101,

Situctingin 319 obs Kanji
Confidential

In 7 ans d. Risitwism 26 th June 1933. The dear fort. Many thank for your letter.

In the ordinary course I should have wished to have a full talk with you at pace. Ie it is, the Economic Conference makes that impossible. I ag engaged there from ten in the morning until half past six or seven at night. I an in charge of one of the most important sections of the work - that defining with the whole question of raising price levels by co-ardination of production and marketing. The Conference is working on detailed proposals of my own, and I find I cannot be away even for the shortest time from the meetings of the main Economic Comiseion and the Sub-Coamittees. This looks like going on tan woe reeks. I think it is very important that you should have a tull talk at once with Plymouth and Wilson, whoa are tatty seized of my views and of the whole position, and I am asking
asking them to arrange this with you as soon as possible. I have already discussed with you the constitutional position, and I told you from ply that it rould be quite impossible for me or any other Minister in any Government to reverse the findings of the Joint Select Comrittee on which the views of His Majesty's Government vere given in my published despatch, and you will have seen the definite answer which I was bound to give in the House as soon as the question was raised in that form.

(Sgd.) P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

## PRIVATE.

GAMBLEDON,
GOTALMING, Surrey. 23rd June 1533.

Dear Cunliffe-Lister,
I am writing this line about various matters ry in I think are worth consideration, eapecielly as sir J. Frame Will soon be home, and presumably you will be seethe him. troubles Kenya has been afflicted by a very "ec eroukt, the worst since 1913. Ny last mail told ar that it meant a loss in coffee alone of half a million sterling, whilst in the pert of the country where I live, they hov n erin at alt and Enhact-fd 1 s: our crop are non existent. is $y$ can $u$ ell imagine, this,
on $3018 / 33]$ on the top of the pest bed years due $t$ lon or l rices and locusts, will just grout finish off the op r forme:. I eve you are anxious to hel the rf, on then fort a ever much the you rill be able to et us ore money for the Lend an, mich nay help to save many framers.

If this dou at hes the elect of firis.ins off the
locusts and greatly decreasing native stock i the rares, it may be of some use in the $10 n_{8}$ ron, hut the imp a date future is bound to be a very serious one. As a suesestine, woolen it be possible to induce the Banks to give some sort of moratori: $3255 / 33$ on loans, overdrafts and mortgages? It may very I likely be impossible, but if the Bank insist on repayment it must mean their being landed with half the farms in the country, which presume they cannot wish for.

The pasic cause of our present financial
depression has been the lov world price of commodities, As all the netions of the vorld ere now trying to find some method by which these may be raised, we should not be unduly optimistic if we presume thet an improvement in this way will teke place in the not too distant future, and so it does seem important that everything possible should be done to try and help tide the farmers over the immediate future.

Fith this viev I am sure xx you are in gympathy, but the best method is, of course, the difficult question. All I want to do is to emphasise how serious the position is. I think many people do not realise what wide repercussions the success or failure of the British farmers has on all other activities in the Colony, and especially on the Watives. Normelly $£ 2,000,000$ is distributed in a year in the way of native vages, and if this is seriously diminished, zs of course it is when the farmers are losing money, the native population not only can purchase duod less, but find it difificult to pay their taxes.
This was well. illustrated 1 tst yeer, when their returns to revenue were the lovest for lin years.

There is one adter hiere possibly you could
take action nov. Thet is the guestion of the contingent liability on the Colony for the building of the original Uganda Railvay. As you know, this Failway was originally An ruilt for political purposes by the Imperial Government, when they undertook the government of Ugands. Harcourt was Liberal Secretary of State for the Coleniep
he did say the Colony would never re called on to pay, but apparently his statement was not écceted els final, as the last decision was thet the metter hourhata depided in 1984. Now when we have a Mational Coverumbnt inclayedeg all parties, when the policy is enanire ent the figoire in every way possible, and the general view secme to be in fevour as far as possible of cancelling old $1 n_{e}-$ stoneing deht, it does seem a favoureble moment to have the matte eet $t$ lud, nd leave us free of this contingent liebility for something over which we koxe had no contril at tre time. I shoulr have thought the Impe ial Government rould aave to rixe tais out sooner or later, and so why showld not you gein th erit for getting it done nor?

Anotner matter which hos evercisé as consiferably, and which I would like $t$ ? rin to your attentin, is that of the Defence of Kenya, un the cast thryeof. I am not at all napy about it, acl ielieve no could make considerable economies with increcenc ef:iciency. Plerse believe that at heart 1 er more of a salcier tion a politician, and at first I wes incliner to opose the proposals I am nove coing to put up, due, I confess, to a certain military prejudice.
$3256 / 33$
At present we have a small number of troass in
the K.A.K. who cost a very great deal of money per nead. I am not at all happy from what I have heard from K.A. F. officers tbout the efficiency of these troops, and I an quite sure we have of late hed the mrone tvee of men in command, At the same time, thare is considereble overlapping in the erontier Provinces between civil ap- forif ministretion, the police, and the militery. I heve come, fimily to the opinion that se should do far better if ve
stead. The native rank and file would be practically the same-in both cases, and even now the police askaris are just about as smart and efficient as the K.A.R: askeris. In Spicer's time I think they were even more so. I should have all the police in the Colony under one head, who might be called O.C. Defence or whatever you liked, but civided inta two divisions of Military and Civil Police. Certainly in the early years, and probably for a considerable time, the Military Police would have to nave regular military officers of experience in the higher posts, but the junior positions could be filled by locel boys, or specially recruited young men from home, instead of the present system, where they consist of subalterns from the Army who come out, either because they have loved unvisely or are in debt, and who, as soon as they become of some use, go home again.

My idea is to build yp a service with its own esprit de corps, and with young officers who, belonging to the country, will make it their whole career, will know the natives and their customs and the geography of the country intimately, and, in fact, will become like the nem on the North fest Frontier of India.
One vould live to heve a good depot In Nairobi
 instruction before caing granted their compigsions, and We should probably have to have as large a total number of troops as. we have now. Ve should, hovever, get them at greatly reduced cost, as the cost to the country of the officers of the K.A. R., including their frequent leaves, passages, etc. is very High. Also we should have on feadquarters of Police and uilitary instead of tro.
the most expensive items is the opesent .f.i. trangort, which is so expenoive that no civil ajperten at went to it, and if they do not.use it ith coot to the Goveriment, higher still!

I helieve thet it this beimon, wien I have putIned, were adopted, well cain bly cheapent rast of anminiatixing the northan Frontior sn* Turkane, as it F cold then to ministerel by the ailitry 1 ic force, wita politicel officers atieched, quan pry ing tna
 are attracted to this scneme, yo vil opposition from the far oficice an? In Fide Det ne, Committee, but I am sure they are wrang, 2 ? the fon an
Imperial Defones point of viev, this sonem a a 1 A
strengthen our et icicncy. The har offica, i raieve,

officers. Wy informition fion young of icet: is thet from a military point of vier their treining is negligile es their work really is police work.
lesse do not turn this ides soun ritoout sexioud consideration, as I do not put it $u$ light-heartelly. You, spoke very hignly of Spicer's wark in Palestine. is be is now at home on leave, so ask him his view on this. is I know he had given a lot of thought to it. I am certsin big economies could be effected, but 1 should not edvocete such econonies if I felt it vould decrease efficiencjig but I an pretty sure one could set a chaper and wore efficient machine. Behind $1 t_{\text {. ae }}$ \& reaerve, we shoule heve our British Defence Force.

Two saaller petters. I da hope you whll $\frac{1}{4}$

Gative on the Legisiative Cauncil must be a. Miseionary. Qll meaning as they are, the stupicity of these masionaries almost enounts to dishonesty! Besides which, they usually only know one small part of the country and the inhabitonts thereof, wherces 5 retired Civil Servant *usually knows uch nore end hes a bigger outlook altogether.

When I ceme home two years ego to give evidence before the Joint Comittee, I and wy colleagues vere entrusted by the Afro asiec Soeiety of Hombese with a petition to the Eecretarg of Stete, puting forverd their grievances, sno asking for an impertiel enquiry. Ve duly presented the petition to Lord Passfield, who pronised to onquire into the whole matter, but epparently did nothing further. I heve been asked once zors to bring it to your notice. These people are alco known as the 18 Tribes, ond are the descendants of some of the original Arebs who settled at the coust centuriea ago. No doubt your Becretary conld look the ille concarning then, but y) $301{ }^{33}$ their chief grievances, os far as I remenber, were that they pay nan-native poll wex but do not have votes as nononatives, and that some ald financial greement sith the Hovernment ts not now osrried out. I do not pretend It is a vent big question bet I aiwas think that shen
 to satisfy thet by et lecte erguining into the aliugs frievances.

If you vanted in independent wan to serve on eny such enquirty should you dedide to appoint one, I should like to sugees the neme of rif. lssac. He wes a Proviacial Comilasioner and a very eble man, and knet the const and the Arabs well. He liviou poltred 4

I an quite avare of the difficulties, and do not propose to put up any concrete propozel at the moment. la you probobly know, a Conference is to be held in Weirobi on this subject on srd July. I have implored thetik not to the themselves to samethine which you must refuse, but to put up an argued ease wion bopes the matter Wen for discussion. St the same time, , here a left Wing out there who will probahif went to foree the issue. This may leed to $s$ division amongst us of extremiats and moderetes. For this resson, I hope you will not bang, ber, or bolt any doors, ea I feel ways cen be fo nè of sotisfying ressonable demands vithout impairing the resonsibllity of $\qquad$ the Government. I taink you con reazise that unleas the osition of llected hembers means sonething real the best people will not ome forvard ond of themselver for mection, as it does meen a very considerable sacrifice to do eo.

Nov, lestly: Con't you think you coulderreage to fly out and vialt us next Christmes vacstion? If you oould d. thest, it mould he worth overything It only tokes six deys now to wifrobi, od I expect phen the time ceme you would be eled to lesve the foe and coll of England for our sanshine! Do please try gind do thll. I know you would think it well worth shile artemtinds, in the

 Thet is to put an unofficial in charge of a Goverolint Department, If covernment \&Aoft the recomendetions of our oxpenalturo Advisory bonaittee, es I belleve thoy intent to do. 1an' form a depurtment fealing vith all the chlef zettler
questions, such as Local government, Lands, Settlement,
O Surveys and Mines, it does give a speciolly feroumable
opportunity of putting in an unofficias as hesd of this
Department. It kill not be tooeasy $t$ find an officint for this post, as one wants a men wo is really keen on a do the promotion of these subjects. I nave en viaffieis in my mind, who hight do it vell, should you so decide. If. you did; such a person's status woule heve to bu defined. I suegest $h$ should be responsible to the uovernor, should be a member of Executive Council and Le islative Council, but should not vote in Legiclative Council. I put this us for consideration, as it has been ?roooe before, ane was favourably considered by Ormsby core.

I should like to sey that I did not instigate Guest's ouestions two deys ago.

- This letter comes from me a a private individual
and not as representing my compunity officielly.
Yours very stncerely,
(SD.) FR/NCL SCOTT .

