

1937

Kenya

No. 38003/3

SUBJECT

C0533/476

Ethiopian - Sudanese Frontier

Situation at Mamburpus.

Previous

3015/3/33

Subsequent

See 38066/15/38

C.I.

ETHIOPIAN FRONTIERS
SUBANESSES

1. ACTING GOV., KENYA. No. 17 CONF. 21.1.37.
Considers it may be desirable to invite the attention of the Italian Government to the fact that Namurupus is in British territory and to the circumstances in which its occupation by the Ethiopians has been countenanced.

The summary of the correspondence is accurate.

From 1930 until 1933 Kenya pressed for the removal of the Ethiopian garrison at Namurupus, but the Foreign Office hesitated to insist because of the views expressed by Sir S. Barton and the Consul at Maji, that (a) Namurupus was the only place near the frontier at which the Abyssinians could maintain a post with any degree of confidence and comfort, and (b) evacuation of the post would mean the complete withdrawal of the Ethiopian Administration from the frontier district, which would result in complete chaos. These, so far as I can trace, were the only reasons why the Foreign Office did not act on Kenya's emphatic protest of the 21st of July, 1933 - see Nos. 1 and 2 on 3105/3/33.

According to Mr. Reece's map, Namurupus is south of the Treaty line and is therefore in Kenya territory. The Gwynn line in that area was never very clearly defined (see Note 3a on 16008/30).

Although the Italians may seize on the fact that the Ethiopians have always regarded Namurupus as in Abyssinia, they will have a difficult task to establish that it is north of the Treaty line.

? Send copy of the despatch to the Foreign Office, reference No. 11 on 3015/3/33, and ask that, if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs concurs, His Majesty's Representative at Rome may be instructed to invite the attention of the Italian Government to the fact that Namurupus is in British territory and to the circumstances in which its occupation by the Ethiopians has been countenanced.

See 10/11
3065/32

if the map
appended to
the Treaty
- v. Cd. 4318

J.P.P.

* and can't be
defined on the ground
now as the Lake has
retreated

W.C.P.
9.7.37
N.E.W. 7/2
18/2

C.A. Rosenthal
4/2/37
4/2

2 So F.O. (W/O No. 1) - 12 FEB 1937

F.O. (J. 659/229/1) 5.3.37
Comments on situation and hopes that S. of S. will agree in thinking that the only safe course to pursue is to disarm the garrison and allow the men to remain in Kenya Territory.

The course proposed by the F.O. is a
fair way towards creating a
friendly frontier incident with
the Italians. Early the
disarming of the Ethiopian garrison
would have to be followed by
occupation by British troops. The
operation could not be kept
secret from the Italians and
those inconvenient discussions
mentioned by the F.O. would be
sure to ensue.
But? We might write the
O.A.'s views by telegraph.
A. G. Smith
(19/3/37)

I should be inclined to accept
the F.O. view that the Ethiopian
garrison must be turned out of
this post.

But as regards the suggestion
that they should be disarmed &
allowed to remain in Uluoga, there
is no obvious reason why if the
Ethiopians are still a considerable
distance from this point on the frontier,
they may not be in any

immediate danger, if they were required
to return to Kiligomwa; and I should
be inclined to leave it to the
discretion of the local authorities,
according to the situation in the
neighbourhood, whether they were
required to go back to their country
or be allowed to remain.

Of course, quite apart from
the question of danger from the Italians,
there is a possibility that if these men
were disarmed & pushed across the
frontier, they might be in danger
from the local tribes. But I am
of the opinion that the F.O. would never agree
to their being allowed to go back
armed. In fact, to allow them to do
so, would be contrary to the settled policy
of the Government.

2. Reply in the

A. G. Smith
18/3

Whatever may have been the position in 1930 we
must face the fact that the situation is changed
now when Italy and Ethiopia are at war.

If we claim Namurupus as being within British
Territory I do not see how we can countenance the
continuance of an armed post of one of the belligerents
within a neutral territory. We can hardly
expect the other belligerent to respect our frontier
with an enemy post on the other side.

I agree with the F.O. view that the Ethiopian
garrison should be told to evacuate the post.

And I should warn them that if they were not out of it within a given period, say 24 hours, they will be treated as belligerents taking refuge in a neutral country and disarmed and interned.

I agree with F.O. that, knowing what we do, to push these men back into Ethiopia would be callous and open to grave criticism.

For the above reasons, I would tell Kenya to call upon the garrison to evacuate the post and to disarm and intern them if they did not do so within the given time.

A. J. G. G.
11.3.37.

I agree with Major Cole's view. It is quite obvious that to leave the Abyssinians in Namrupus could only cause uncertainty in the minds of the Italians and I think the only thing to be done now is to treat this Ethiopian detachment as part of the Ethiopian Forces straying into our territory. In any case the whole reason for their being there has now vanished with the collapse of the Ethiopian Government. As the ~~case is now~~ ~~becoming~~ ~~it~~ ~~is~~ ~~advisable~~ ~~to~~ ~~give~~ ~~them~~ ~~the~~ ~~choice~~ ~~of~~ ~~going~~ ~~back~~ ~~home~~ ~~if~~ ~~they~~ ~~want~~ ~~to~~ ~~D.K.~~

D.K.
12.3.37.

Sir J. Maffey.

I annex two maps, one of which shows the Treaty position with regard to the Bay of Berbera, Lake Rudolf and one showing the present position. They are so unlike, owing to the silting up of the Sanderson Gulf, that I have marked A on each map points which appear to correspond. Namrupus is marked on Mr. Recco's map and would appear on the Treaty map near

2/23/37
11-190

near the head of the southern promontory of the Gulf. It is certainly undesirable that by having left the Abyssinians in occupation of Namrupus, largely in the hope of better administration as a result we should be regarded as resigning to Italy the whole of what was the Sanderson Gulf and I therefore agree that we should proceed as in Mr. Flood's draft.

Wes.

15.3.37.

Handwritten notes and signatures:
Main copy
15/3
16/3

air mail 18/3
4. In Namrupus (1902-3) (Kanso) - 18/3/37

4 to 50/100
5. In F.O. (1902-4) - 20/4/37

6. O.A.G. Kenya (Tel. No 75. Consul) 2/4/37

(States that it is probable that Namrupus will be abandoned & that garrison will proceed to join Zaire (Asala))

O.A.G. KENYA... TEL. NO. 78 CONF... 5.4.37.
Ethiopian garrison evacuated Namurupus night of
March 30th. Post occupied by Kenya Govt. without
incident April 3rd and flag hoisted.

Very satisfactory.

(On reading No 6 Mr Lambert
replied telephonic saying that he
had been through by the post
this morning and not to attempt
to return to telegram, advised
No 7 arrived immediately after
this communication (no action
was necessary).

Distributed as usual etc

J.J. Brown
3/4
at home

Major Cole to see

See 187
P. W.

8 To F.O.
19 To AM
10 To WO

3 MAY 1937

Memo Book
Extract from Military Intelligence Summary No 31
Extract from Military Intelligence Summary No 32

B. THOMPSON (3/0 To Mr Flood) 17.6.37
DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE
of a protest from Italy against the occupation
of Namurupus.

This is the letter mentioned in No 12.
Having regard to the earlier copies
it is noted the Italian claim was
not reported by the Gen. direct
Mr Lambert (F.O.) mentioned
yesterday that they have
received a note from the Italian
Embassy about it, which will reach
us shortly. Until it arrives there is
nothing to be done but
see 13 as in 30.

J.J. Brown
19/6

J.J. Thompson (approved serial 15) 24 JUN 1937
DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE

- 15. F.O. (J. 2824/229/1)..... 25.6.37.
Details Italian Govt's protests against British
occupation of Namurupus and requests C.O. views with
regard to the question.
- 16. KENYA..... TEL. No. 136 Conf..... 26.6.37.
Details position at Namurupus and states that he may
have to request the matter be taken up through
diplomatic channels.

I have given a copy of No.16 to Mr Lambert
of the Foreign Office, and discussed the position
with him. Mr Lambert has, however, now gone on
leave for six weeks and it will fall to someone else
to deal with this matter.

As regards the informal request of the
Italian Government (end of paragraph 3 of No.15)

that

that in any case in which a frontier question had remained a matter of discussion between H.M.G. and the former Ethiopian Government and had not been decided, H.M.G. should do nothing to alter the status quo pending eventual negotiations with the Italians. Mr. Lambert explained that this request had reference not only to the Kenya frontier but also to the Sudan frontier (e.g. the Boma Plateau). The Foreign Office had telegraphed to Khartoum and had ascertained that the Government of the Sudan would have no objection to the Italians being given an assurance in the sense desired, and I understand that the Foreign Office would wish to give such an assurance if the Colonial Office sees no objection. Mr. Lambert anticipated that we should wish to consult the Governor of Kenya on this. And although he was at first inclined to ask that we should do so by telegraph, I understood that he was prepared to agree to its being done by air mail despatch.

I asked Mr. Lambert how such an assurance could be squared with our intention to remain at Namurupus. He said that the Foreign Office assumed that the Italian Government had no expectation that we should be prepared to give up that place, and that their request really amounted to asking that we should take no similar action in relation to any other place on the frontier in the future.

Mr. Lambert agreed that their reply to the Italians will have to wait until we know definitely whether the post which they have now established North-West of Namurupus is actually

in

(Enclosure in
No. 13.)

in British territory, but he asked that we should get this information as soon as possible. Moreover, in view of the circumstantial reference to the three men alleged to have been captured at Namurupus, (in the letter of the 26th of April from the Italian Commander at Maji giving their names and stating that they were being detained at "Todegnak's fort", which no doubt means Todenyang) the Foreign Office would like to be able to deny this, and he asked that we should get something definite on this point from the Governor.

Mr. Lambert then proceeded to criticize the telegram from the Governor from two points of view. He said that the Italians are quite definitely trying to avoid any serious incidents, and that it was quite certain that they would not attempt to turn us out of Namurupus by force if they thought we were prepared to defend it. He considered, therefore, that the instructions given to the police post now in occupation of Namurupus that they should retire in the event of a large Italian force appearing and demanding its evacuation, was most ill-advised. In the second place, it was even more ill-advised for the Governor to have told us that he had issued these instructions in an ordinary code telegram which could easily be tapped by the Italians. The combined effect of these two indiscretions, if they should come to the notice of the Italians, would be almost to invite them to make a demonstration with a view to causing our post to retire from Namurupus, which they would then occupy. Mr. Lambert observed that there would be serious trouble in Parliament if it became known that we had given up to the Italians, without

resistance,

resistance, a post which we claim as British. He thought, therefore, that there might be a case for re-establishing an even stronger military garrison at Namurapus instead of entrusting it to a weak police post.

We can, I think, allow the Foreign Office to make this point officially, and I have accordingly not made any reference to it in the drafts submitted herewith.

J.P. Parker
3/7/37.

I have one comment to offer upon the military point of view. I suggest that in view of the conditions prevailing in the vicinity of Namurapus the post should be commanded by a European officer and should be military and not police.

I have discussed this with Mr. Parker who agrees regarding the officer but points out that - if we had to retire from Namurapus - this might be accomplished with less loss of prestige if the post were police than if it were military.

I am not sure, however, that the local Italian authorities would be in a position to differentiate between K.A.R. and Police asharis; they probably

look on them all as soldiers. I do feel that the garrisoning of Namurapus under present conditions is more a military than a police duty.

Might this file be manipulated after return for General Giffard to see in his return (July/37)?

W.H. Bishop

5 Oct 37.

I think that what the Italian Counsellor has in mind is that where we have an actual dispute as to the line of a boundary we should not take advantage of the present situation in order to occupy what we think fit and regard the matter as settled. In this case, from our point of view, there is nothing of the kind at issue since we have always considered that the boundary runs well to the north of Namurapus, and that we have only allowed the Italians to live there for the sake of mutual convenience. The fact that the frontier has not been adjusted in this neighbourhood and that the Ethiopians have been making strange claims is not in point.

The Italians are obviously inventing parables when they talk about capturing the post from their people and holding them in custody.

With regard to Mr. Lambert's remarks, I cannot suppose that he really wants a collision to take place between our troops and police and the Italians,

and

was.

and if the Italians turn up in force and insist on occupying the place I think it would probably be better to withdraw quietly under protest than to endeavour to resist. I am inclined to agree with Major Bishop that the post ought to be a military one and not police, and have added accordingly to the letter.

S.S.D. 7/27

5.7.37.

I have been thinking they should be cleared off in time for good. I have been thinking of them on Thursday, and they should then go forward into the mountains. The position of the post is somewhat one to be cleared off in time for good.

W.C.S. 6/27

17 To W.C. (150) - also - 6/27

18 To Kenya - (19/15 + 19/20) - 7/1/37

19 To P.O. (Chapman 2/1/37) - 7/1/37
7 - JUL 1937

20 To W.C. (19/19 & rec'd) - 8/7/37

I agree with Major Bishop's opinion that the post at Namurupus should be a military one commended by a European.

In the course of diplomatic discussions I agree with Mr. Hood that, if the Italians turn up in force and insist on occupying the place, we should withdraw under protest.

W.C.S. 8/1/37

Sir C. Bottomley

? You want to send this on: we shall I think have to wait to hear from the Gov what he proposes to do. He has been asked to consider making it a military post & presumably will do so. There may be difficulty in finding a detachment of the 1st Div. for Police. The P.O. idea of being useful has not yet found a verbal statement & has not been passed on to Kenya as this is in fear of an incident since the intention to clear out in the face of force had gone.

S.S.D. 7/27

21. GOV. KENYA TEL. 143 CONF. 9.7.37
Gives particulars of the occupation of Namurupus and states that copies of agreement with Italian authorities follow by mail.

also mentioning 3 woolly telegrams for the purpose for which it was required a possible protest to the Italians about the establishment of the post.

How can they have pointed out to the Italian the actual boundary of the station post which is 50' within that boundary is only "believed" to be in British Territory?

what they mean (I suppose) is

that the Italian post is definitely 50
on the Kenya side of the line which
Kenya regards as the boundary,
though as ~~seen~~ (in our usual
language) the boundary has
never been the subject of an
agreed delimitation, the line remains
merely as what Kenya regards as the
frontier.

For the rest there can hardly
be any doubt that the case was
alleged by the Italians to have
been captured ^(on the 31st of March) ~~in the~~
in four men ~~in~~ ^{in the} ~~same~~
3rd of April) & subsequently released.

As regards the Italian post,
I have indicated in paras 4-6
of the report ~~submitted~~
herewith but for it seems to me
to be possible to find the matter
of representation.

Since preparing the report
it has occurred to me that it
might perhaps be worth while
to get Mr. C. B. Thompson (Coffee
Change, Turkana) ~~in~~
to come back to the station to
talk about it ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~
to add a sentence to the letter to
the F.O. indicating that intention, &
saying that in the meantime the
views expressed in paras
are to be regarded as provisional.

J.J. Cassin
107

and as the
country in
this area has
been so much
changed
the setting up
of the lake.

P.S. as regards the reply wh.
the Post. of the Sudan ^{suggested} ~~to~~
returned to the ~~concerning~~ Italian
post against the occupation of
the Boma plateau see No. 50
38066/15/37 It will be seen
that they suggest that the Italian
post be ~~attacked~~ ^{abandoned} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~
the Treaty line ~~but~~ ^{the} ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~the~~
area & further south to Lake Rudolf.
Having regard however to the
circ. to wh. I have drawn
attention - para 4 of the report to
the F.O. I do not see how we
can be so categorical at
any rate without prior discussion
with Mr. Thompson.

J.J. Cassin
1947.

Mr. Thompson, I think that it will
be well to indicate the place post. at
Maddis after that it has a military character.
The latter procedure is well to indicate in
position on a map of the Nile basin and a boundary
policy discussion can be conducted.
The withdrawal of a police post under protest
of the Italian post or occupation is not well
but the object of a military withdrawal is

...
William Kenya ...
I agree with ...

I was in the situation as now described
in the Governor's telegram, I agree that the
police might remain at Namurupus
paper with the draft.

I think it is all right really. The Italians
have been making a demerit on help information.
The telegram dispairs of their allegations which is the
main thing.

I have forwarded the ...
time with ... but the files
won't go forward for ...
Wed.

17.7
ms

Sir C. Parkinson

I send this file on for your information.
It went on to the Secretary of State last March.

As you will remember, when the Abyssinians
established a post at Namurupus, well on our side of
what we regarded as the boundary, we allowed them to
stay in the hope that it would lead to better
administration of their territory. When the post
was evacuated we took possession of it and now the
Italians allege that we have turned out the
Abyssinian garrison by force, and that the place is
at all events in doubtful territory, and they have
established themselves just opposite Namurupus at a
spot which Kenya regards as just inside our territory.

The position is that we state our case
to the Italian Government and the British and Italian
forces remain looking at each other on the spot.

Wed.

16.7.37.

Read with interest.

Put by. ocd.

17.7.37
oacd

W
CONS-13
17/5/37
W.O. (W/O 22 & 21) 1/1A - 15.7.37

25. GOV. KENYA... CONF. No. 106... 30.7.37
Trs. with comments, copies of correspondence which has taken place with the Italian Authorities in connexion with occupation of Namurupus and establishment by Italians of a post in British territory north west of Namurupus.

No 24. is somewhat out of date it being the report of a talk with Ethiopian leaders at Lokitany on the 22nd of May.

No 25. Mr Izard's account of the meeting with the Italians on the 10th of July is particularly interesting. (Mr Flood will no doubt remember Mr Izard. He has been in Turkana a short time only and except for about a year at Kibamu, has been continuously in settled areas.)

It is quite clear that the Premier does not wish any representations made with a view to moving the Italian post which is said to have been established 50 yards inside the line recognized claimed to be the boundary of Kenya, and this leaves very little to be added to our letter to the F.O. of the 13th of July.

The statement by two Italian officers in the field that assurance of immunity will freely be given in

(No 22)

in the case of returning refugees can hardly be regarded as even a semi-official statement of the views of His Majesty's Government and can be noted on the refugee file.

This still leaves in the air the informal request of the Italians that no action be taken by the Kenya Govt to compromise the position at any other part of the frontier which has been the subject of inconclusive negotiations with the former Ethiopian Govt.

In sending a copy of No 25 to the F.O. it might be pointed out that the information contained therein does not in any way affect the views expressed in No 22, and that as regards para 6 of that letter the F.O. would prefer that the Italians be informed that note has been taken of their representation.

C. R. Williams
19/7/37

I mentioned the subject of the...
(No) who had...
... was being held of...
has sent a reply to No 18.
? send copy to F.O. with 22.
+ copy of the letter to F.O. to Govt.
of course (to act on... to No 18).
P.T.O.

DES. ED UNDER STATUTE

On 46598/37, a draft has been
given to start a print of cases
which will be useful for reference
when negotiations are started with
the Italians for the rectification
of the Kenya-Italian frontier.
I am a list of 14 on this
file which should be included in
the print.

X above No 30

J.J. Cassini
16/8

P.J. Cox
16/8

The letter of 20 April is very much like the
communications seem to have been well handled

16-19, 20-21, 22-23, 24-25, 26-27, 28-29, 30-31

27/8

17.8.37

28 to W.O. (wks 25, 26, 27) 20.8.37

29 to Kenya - (wks 28, 29, 30) 21/8/37

Recie. to P.D.
for printing as in
list above No 30.
Regy action as at
X in mem. of 10/8.

Mr. Chown is the draft of
a note regarding Memorandum which
they propose to hand to the Italian
Embassy. The draft had been
agreed to by Mr. Parker but two
slight amendments had been made
since he saw it. Recommendations
The amendments were purely verbal
to I expect. Mr. Chown send us
a copy of the note. It is not
proposed to give the assurance
mentioned in the P.D. to No 27 in
writing, but this will be given
orally when the note is handed
over.

C. Rossini
25/8

Handwritten initials and scribbles

R. 297
10.8.37
M. Hart
at once 25/8/37

31. F.O. 33616/299/1

30.8.57

In copy statement handed to Signor Crolli, Counsellor of the Italian Embassy, describes what took place at interview.

32. F.O. 33618/229/1

31.8.57

and copy despatch to HQR Rome transmitting copies of encl. on No. 27 (on main file)

EUROPEAN UNDER STATUTE

Para (a). The oral assurance given by the FO seems to agree to the maintenance of the status quo only in so far as Namurupus is concerned, whereas we told the FO that the Gov. Kenya saw no objection to an assurance being given that nothing will be done to alter the status quo on the written frontier of Kenya pending negotiations with the Italian Govt.

Ref. the despatch in July.

to Gov. Kenya
However? send copies of the above, together with a copy of our letter to FO of the 12th of August.
(See stamped cover herewith)

(The letter from A. Gornuth - FO should be printed) 13/9/57

It is unfortunate that the FO statement as to the observance of the status quo on the frontier was confined to Namurupus i.e. to the one place at wh. so far as

action by Kenya is concerned, the
status of the matter has been disturbed.
This mission on the part of the
will mean it has been a preliminary
the intention to be reasonable in
the matter of 1947, and for
the further talks, as to which a last
sentence of Kenya Rel No. 3 of 1947
copy h.w.

However it is not to call a
man an effective use of the
assurance, to which Kenya had agreed,
in relation to the rest of the frontier,
no doubt something of the sort will
be said in connection with the
representations which the F.O. have been
asked to make on the grazing etc.,
but it wd. have been more
effective to have been able to
refer to an assurance already given.

However so far as this file is
concerned, the only action required is
that proposed by Mr. Grossmith.

[On copying the cover, to send
to Kenya, C.D. etc. main action
copies to go to P.D.]

J.P. Baker
13/5

Yes. S.W. Hunt
13/5

100 31.1.53
P.D. for action
13/5

Kenya (Secret) - (Draft as on) - 16/9/57

(Copy number 31) Extract from Intelligence Report dated 21.2.57
with instruction - 3008/53

(Orig. ref. 38053/53)

(Copy number 35) Extract from Intelligence Summary for period 6.12.56-10.2.57
with instruction - 3008/53

(Orig. ref. 34099/53.12.10)

6

Extract from Military Intelligence Summary for
period 16.12.37 - 12.2.38. (Ref. no 34099/35 K.A.R.)

ITALO-ETHIOPIAN SITUATION

Turkana - Events on the Kenya Border.

Local Tribesmen - Relations with Italians.

3. The Namaraputh fishermen have complained that the Italians interfere with their fishing on Toipen beach. It is considered this is due to the fact that the fishermen run away as soon as Italian askaris appear in sight, and the latter assume they have been smuggling millet. (In actual fact small quantities of millet are smuggled across the border at night).

4. On 3-12-37 two Janderobo fishermen were surrounded and beaten by seven Italian askaris, on Toipen beach 1,000 yards north of Namaraputh, well within our boundary. The Administration has informed the Italian Commander at Kafama if further similar incidents occur Italian troops will be refused permission to shop at Namaraputh.

16
34

Excerpt from Intelligence Report dated 21.12.37

(Rec. under cover of King's 3rd of 22.12.37 - ref. 38023/52)

SECRET.

Headquarters, Northern Brigade,
King's African Rifles and
Local Forces.

21st December, 1937.

REPORT OF CONTACT BETWEEN BRITISH OFFICERS AND ITALIAN
FORCES IN NORTHERN TURKANA.

During October and November 1937 some six letters were exchanged between Italian officers at KALANA and the British officer in charge of the King's African Rifles platoon at TODENYANG (PORT WILKINSON) on Lake Rudolf. These all originated with requests from the Italians for odd stores & more particularly fishing tackle, and in one case a medical syringe. In all instances paper liras were sent in payment of the stores in question. All the letters were written in a very friendly spirit, and expressed a desire to meet the British officer. Two letters dated 2nd. October and 25th. November are attached as examples of the correspondence which was passed. The Italian officers concerned are -

- i. Captain Giuseppe Vignatello, 1st Battalion,
Eritrean Regiment.
- ii. Lieut. S.G.A. Galani, -do-
- iii. Lieut. (Doctor) Oromondo Granata.

Lieut. Galani writes good English.

2. Lieut. Oromondo Granata actually visited the Italian post at NAMARAFUTH and asked the British officer at TODENYANG to call on him. However, owing to the two posts being four miles apart, and also on account of the delay in receiving the message, he had left before the British officer arrived at the Italian post. He left a friendly note saying he was unable to stay any longer. This occurred on 1st. October, 1937.

3. The British officer found the Italian post at NAMARAFUTH consisted of 10 men under a corporal; all appeared to be Ethiopians and not Eritreans. They knew no Italian or Arabic and conversed in Amharic. The officer in question had recently spent three months looking after an Ethiopian refugee camp, and being able to speak French had picked up quite a smattering of Amharic. This officer is Lieutenant Frittle of the Rifle Brigade, attached 4th. King's African Rifles.

G. O.

3 P002/3/37

30

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Sir H. Moore.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Patry. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

14/9.
14/9 f.

Grossmith
Parkin

G. O.
REFUSED
D 7/5

16 SEP 1937

DRAFT

Kenya
Secret.
Pr.

TH

Sir

I have etc to transmit to you
 with reference to your Confidential
 despatch of the 20th of July
 and your secret telegram
 No 761 of the 16th of August
 a copy of correspondence
 with the Foreign Office
 regarding the representations
 made by the Italian first
 concerning the occupation
 of Kenyan **NAMURUPUS**

I have etc

(Signed) W. ORMSBY GORE.

(See Serial 1160)
 17/9/37
 18/9/37
 21/9/37

FURTHER ACTION

CS
 Extra copies
 of the letters
 from P.D.
 to be sent
 R.T.M.

31-18



RECEIVED
31 AUG 1937
C. O. REGY

FOREIGN OFFICE.

S.W.1.

30th August, 1937.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. J 3618/229/1.

and address not to any person by name but to

"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

*take with P.D.
some 15 days
then see for
will not be back for
about a week*
J. 27
3/16

Sir,

19.22-27

With reference to your letters Nos. 38003/3/7 of the 7th July, 13th July and the 17th August, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Ormsby-Gore, that the Counsellor of the Italian Embassy having called at this department on the 27th August to discuss Ethiopian matters, the opportunity was taken to hand him a written statement (a copy of which is enclosed) regarding the re-occupation of Namurupus by the authorities of Kenya Colony. At the same time it was explained to Signor Crolla verbally that in the matter of Namurupus His Majesty's Government were prepared to accede to the request of the Italian Government that the status quo should be maintained pending eventual negotiations with them - on the understanding, of course, that it was similarly maintained on the Italian side. In reply to a question from Signor Crolla, it was made plain to him that this undertaking by His Majesty's Government implied that the eventual negotiations would be engaged on the present basis, that is to say, with Namurupus in the occupation of the British authorities.

2. It transpired that one of the purposes of Signor Crolla's call was to make to His Majesty's Government a further communication precisely regarding Namurupus. The Italian Government, Signor Crolla said, had received

various/

The Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

33
Kenya -

19

various reports from Italian officers on the spot to the effect that the village of Namurupus was in Ethiopia. It represented, he said, "the only Italian centre on Lake Rudolf". The Italian Government maintained that the recent occupation of Namurupus by the Kenya authorities was an "act of force"; that is to say, that those authorities had profited from the interval between the disappearance of Ethiopian authority and the arrival of Italian forces in the territory concerned to occupy Namurupus with British troops. The Italian Government must request that the post should be evacuated by the British authorities, in order that, without prejudice to the eventual settlement of the question to whom the post belonged, negotiations for this purpose could take place on the basis of the status quo as it existed before Namurupus had been occupied by British forces.

5. Signor Crolla was inclined to complain that the Italian authorities had been less well treated by His Majesty's Government than the Ethiopian in the matter of Namurupus; but exception was taken to this statement. It was also represented to Signor Crolla that the British re-occupation of Namurupus could hardly be described as an "act of force". No violence had been used; the Kenya authorities had simply occupied the post when they found that the Ethiopian garrison had abandoned it. It was further pointed out to him that, according to the new Italian map "Africa Orientale Italiana" N.724-bis of 1936, Namurupus was shown as being, if not in Kenya, at any rate

in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan - at all events, in British-administered territory.

4. Signor Crolla was invited to transmit the reply of His Majesty's Government, as described in the first paragraph of this letter, to the Italian Government and was informed that if, after consideration of it, the Italian Government still wished to make a démarche of the sort indicated in paragraph 2 above, it would be appreciated if this could be done in the form of a written communication. To this course Signor Crolla agreed.

5. A copy of this letter is being sent to the War Office.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

W. C. ...

to

MEMORANDUM

The statement left at the Foreign Office by the Councillor to the Italian Embassy on the 16th June has been referred to the Governor of Kenya, who has reported that there is no foundation for the assertion that the post

at/

at Hamarupus was occupied by surprise by British forces on the night of the 31st March, of that three of the Ethiopian guard of seven were captured; but that, on the other hand, the facts were as follows:

On the 1st April, it was reported, and subsequently confirmed, that the Ethiopian garrison had evacuated the post on the night of the 30th March. On the 3rd April at midday the Chief Native Commissioner, accompanied by the Officer Commanding, 4th King's African Rifles, entered Hamarupus without incident and established a small military guard there, which has since been replaced by a police guard. The allegation that three men of the Ethiopian garrison had been captured may possibly be based on the following circumstances; when Hamarupus was occupied by the British authorities on the 3rd April, it was found that, in addition to the local inhabitants, there were twenty two armed Ethiopians there, who represented themselves to be traders; as, however, they were armed, they were informed that they would be regarded as Ethiopian soldiers and must either return to Ethiopian territory or be disarmed and interned; eighteen returned to Ethiopian territory but four elected to be disarmed and interned; subsequently, at their own request, these four men were permitted to return to Ethiopia.

While the boundary in this area has never been the subject of an agreed delimitation, Hamarupus is well south of the frontier marked on the map annexed to the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of the 6th December, 1907, and since that/

that date His Majesty's Government have regarded it as being in British territory. At the time when the post was established by the Ethiopian authorities in 1950, the frontier was in a very disturbed state; trans-frontier raids were frequent; and negotiations were proceeding with the Ethiopian authorities for the establishment of an arbitration board to settle inter-tribal disputes and other measures which were designed to reduce inter-tribal friction which, in the past, had been the constant cause of trans-frontier raids. It was feared that if His Majesty's Government insisted on the withdrawal of this post, the effect would have been that the Ethiopian authorities would have given up any attempt to exercise any restraining authority in that area, with the result that trans-frontier raids would have become of even more frequent occurrence.

In the circumstances, especially as it appeared that there was no other place in the neighbourhood suitable for the maintenance of a post of Ethiopian troops, it was thought to be better to acquiesce in the occupation of Hamarupus by a small Ethiopian garrison pending the completion of the negotiations then in progress and the eventual joint demarcation of the frontier. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian authorities were left in no doubt as to the view of His Majesty's Government that this place was in British territory, and that His Majesty's Government acquiesced in its continued temporary occupation by the Ethiopians only on the following conditions:

(1) that the measure was a temporary one and an act of grace on the part of His Majesty's Government in order to facilitate the operation of the arbitration board and

and to promote friendly relations;

(ii) that British claims to the territory on which the post was situated were not affected in any way; and

(iii) that the Ethiopians refrained from interfering with the fishing rights of British subjects in the area and from all other actions calculated to prejudice the rights of the local inhabitants or to disturb the peace;

(iv) that the Government of Kenya reserved the right to reoccupy Hamrupus should the Ethiopians fail to observe the above conditions, and, at any rate, after any refixing of the boundary.

The Governor of Kenya has also reported that on the 31st June an Italian officer made a hurried visit to Hamrupus from Kalama and left twelve native troops and an Italian flag at a point one thousand yards north-west of Hamrupus and fifty yards within the line which is regarded as the frontier; and that on the 1st July, the line which is so regarded was pointed out to the Italian officers on the spot. His Majesty's Government are not to be regarded as accepting the view that the post thus occupied by the Italian native forces is not in British territory.

and to promote friendly relations;

(ii) that British claims to the territory on which the post was situated were not affected in any way; and

(iii) that the Ethiopians refrained from interfering with the fishing rights of British subjects in the area and from all other actions calculated to prejudice the rights of the local inhabitants or to disturb the peace;

(iv) that the Government of Kenya reserved the right to reoccupy Hamurapus should the Ethiopians fail to observe the above conditions, and, at any rate, after any refixing of the boundary.

The Governor of Kenya has also reported that on the 28th June an Italian officer made a hurried visit to Hamurapus from Kalama and left twelve native troops and an Italian flag at a point one thousand yards north-west of Hamurapus and fifty yards within the line which is regarded as the frontier; and that on the 1st July, the line which is so regarded was pointed out to the Italian officers on the spot. His Majesty's Government are not to be regarded as accepting the view that the post thus occupied by the Italian native forces is not in British territory.

C. O.

- Mr. Paekin. 12/8
- Major Cole. 14/8
- Mr. Flood. 16/8
- Sir C. Parkinson.
- Sir G. Tomlinson.
- Sir C. Bottomley.
- Sir J. Stuchburgh.
- Permt. U.S. of S.
- Parly. U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State.



Downing Street.

17th August, 1937.



Sir,

With reference to the letter from this Department of the 13th of July, I am etc.

(to be laid before the Sec. of State)

DRAFT.

(22)

to transmit to you a copy of a despatch from the Governor of Kenya on the subject

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

of the occupation of Namurupus.

2. It will be observed that, in the letter of the 8th of May from the District Officer to the Italian Commander at Maji, and in the course of the interview on the 1st of July between the Officer in Charge, Turkhan and two Italian officers, the local Italian authorities have been informed of the

circumstances in which this post was occupied by the Government of Kenya and of the reasons why the previous occupation of the post by Ethiopian forces had been tolerated, in substantially the same terms as it was suggested, in the letters

from

Gov. 50/11 (No. 25)
16/8

Gov. Tel. 16/8 (No. 26)

Gov. 50/11 (No. 25)
16/8

FURTHER ACTION.

Print (with list annexed to file)

from this Department of the 7th and 18th of July, (19 and 22)

should be employed in replying to the representations made by the Counsellor of the Italian Embassy on the 15th of June. There is nothing in the correspondence (15)

now forwarded by the Governor which renders it necessary to suggest any modification in the terms of the reply to be made to those representations.

3. It is understood that the reply is being

deferred until it is known whether the Governor of Kenya sees any objection to an assurance being given to the Italian Embassy that no arbitrary action should be taken by the Government of Kenya to disturb the status quo

in any further case in which a frontier question had remained a matter of discussion between His Majesty's Government and the former Ethiopian Government. A copy of this letter is accordingly being sent to the Governor

of Kenya with a request that his reply to Mr. Ormsby Gore's despatch of the 7th of July should be sent as soon as possible. (18)

I am, etc.
(Sgd.) J. E. W. FLOOD

P.S. Since the draft of this letter was prepared, a further telegram, of wh. a copy is enclosed, has been received from the Gov. of Kenya, from wh. it will be observed that he sees no objection to an assurance being given to the Italian Govt. that nothing will be done to alter the status quo pending negotiations with the Italian Govt.

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 16th August, 1937.

Received 12 noon, 16th August 1937

No. 161. Secret.



My telegram No. 160, Your despatch secret of the 7th July Kenya northern frontier. No place except Namurupus was occupied by Ethiopian Government forces.

I have no information that any place near the frontier and claimed with certainty to be in Kenya except for new post opposite (group omitted ? Namurupus) has been or is now occupied by Italian forces. Jara incident referred to in your despatch secret of the 22nd June took place in the Colony and though this area was never occupied by Italians it was evacuated by this Government under protest to avoid further friction and pending definite recognition of neighbouring frontier by Italy.

Withdrawal of this Government's police post from Furo notified in my telegram No. 24 of 22nd February was without prejudice to subsequent delimitation. Italians may be occupying British territory on the East shore of Lake Rudolph but their exact disposition in this area is unknown. Similarly Italian forces may be patrolling Illeweri triangle north of red line in Sudan and are likely to claim this area in which Gelubba or Merille tribesmen habitually herd stock. Little information is available however regarding activities in this area.

I see no objection to informal assurance being given to the Italian Government that nothing will be done to alter the status quo pending eventual negotiations.

* No. 38003/3/37 [N. 18]
No.
No.

Egypt to F.O. No. 27 (38) 27
byssinian frontiers (K+S)

(C 26803-30) 24

38003 [Handwritten marks]

25 [Handwritten number]

AIR MAIL

KENYA

No. 106



GOVERNMENT HOUSE
NAIROBI
KENYA

RECEIVED
- 9 AUG 1937
C. O. REGY

CONFIDENTIAL.

30 JULY, 1937.

Sir,

21.

With reference to my Confidential telegram No. 145 of the 9th July on the subject of the occupation by this Government of the former Ethiopian post at Namurupus, and the establishment by the Italians of a post in British territory north-west of Namurupus, I have the honour to enclose, as requested in your Confidential telegram No. 150 of the 6th July, copies of the undernoted correspondence which has taken place with the Italian Authorities:-

17.

- (i) Letter of the 20th April to Ganyamach Syefou.
- (ii) Letter of the 26th April from the Italian Commander of Maji.
- (iii) Letter of the 8th May from the District Officer Lokitaung, to the Commander of Maji.
- (iv) Letter of the 22nd May from the Officer in Charge, Turkana District, to the Commander of Maji.

2. In this connection I enclose a copy of a report by the Officer in Charge, Turkana, on his discussions of the 1st July with Italian officers reported in my telegram of the 9th July.

It will be seen from the record that a conciliatory attitude was adopted by the Italians

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
W. ORMSBY GORE, P.C., M.P.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
DOWNING STREET,

LONDON S.W. 1

1. No. 38003/3/37 [Handwritten notes]

Abyssinian Frontiers (KOS)

2.
Italians throughout the negotiations, and in all the circumstances the Officer in Charge has been instructed that for the present no written protest should be made, at any rate until the results of his verbal representations are known.

Although it may be considered desirable to inform the Italian Government of the position in order that this Government's claim that the site of the post now occupied by their troops, in British territory may be on record when the question of the delimitation of the boundary arises, I do not propose for the present to ask that any representations should be made in the matter through diplomatic channels, as it will be observed that the Officer in Charge sees no reason to suppose that there will be any interference with the fishing rights of the Turkana tribesmen in the area.

3. Reference is invited to paragraph 8 of Mr. Izard's report from which it will be seen that the Italian officers stated that the Italian Authorities are anxious that Ethiopian refugees should be returned to Ethiopia, and that guarantees of immunity would be freely given for the purpose.

Should the time be considered appropriate to approach the Italian Government in the matter, a confirmation of this statement of policy might go some way towards relieving the increasing refugee problem with which this Government amongst others is at present faced.

This verbal assurance will be borne in mind in connection with separate correspondence

on

3.

on the refugee question.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient,
humble servant,

P. Brooke-Popham
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL,

G O V E R N O R .

COPY.

NAMAROPUTH, D

April 20th., 1937.

Let it reach:

Keyasmatch Syefou,
and
Balambarus Hapte Walde,
at Mayen.

After Greetings, I have received your letter which you sent to me, in which you ask me to tell you the reason for our having occupied Namaroputh.

As you doubtless know, the Kenya Government have for many years claimed that the Abyssinian post was built on our side of the frontier.

Until now we have been content to await a boundary Commission who would determine exactly where the frontier runs. We have waited thus as the result of an agreement between the Kenya Government and the Government of Ethiopia that a boundary Commission would be appointed and each Government would abide by its decision.

Since the post was abandoned by the garrison on 31/5/1937 we have occupied it in order to show that we still claim it to be in Kenya territory.

We intend to remain in occupation until a boundary Commission is appointed. In such case we will abide by its decision.

I take this opportunity of assuring you of the esteem in which I hold you and to assure you that I shall be glad to meet you at any time.

P/To A. Melic. (E.S.A. 1/20/37)

DISTRICT OFFICER.

on the refugee question.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient,
humble servant,

P Brooke Popham
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL,

GOVERNOR.

COPY.

NAMAROPUTH,

April 20th., 1937.

Let it reach:

Keyasmatch Syefou,
and
Balambarus Hapte Walde,
at Mayen.

After Greetings, I have received your letter which you sent to me, in which you ask me to tell you the reason for our having occupied Namaroputh.

As you doubtless know, the Kenya Government have for many years claimed that the Abyssinian post was built on our side of the frontier.

Until now we have been content to await a boundary Commission who would determine exactly where the frontier runs. We have waited thus as the result of an agreement between the Kenya Government and the Government of Ethiopia that a boundary Commission would be appointed and each Government would abide by its decision.

Since the post was abandoned by the garrison on 31/5/1937 we have occupied it in order to show that we still claim it to be in Kenya territory.

We intend to remain in occupation until a Boundary Commission is appointed. In such case we will abide by its decision.

I take this opportunity of assuring you of the esteem in which I hold you and to assure you that I shall be glad to meet you at any time.

F/To A. Melic.

DISTRICT OFFICER.

TRANSLATED. from Italian.

COPY.

COMMAND SECTION of MAJI.

26 April 1937. /XVo.

To the Honourable Command

Lokitaung's District.

The 18 april winning a patrol of band sended by this Command for substituting the guard, dislocated on the place of Namaroputh, found the same place occupied by English subjects of Kenya's Colony, that there had hoisted the English Flag after having made in the night of 31 last March a surprise's action against that guard, capturing three elements and putting to flight the others.

To the prohibition of retaking possession of the place, the Band's patrol's chief sended protest written to the Britannic present Authority.

To the protest the District English Officer of Namaroputh answered the 20 april with letter, like this annexed copy.

Greatly astonished for the reasons, that the Namaroputh District's Officer is bringing for justifying his arbitrary act of foreign territory's occupation, I expose to the known correctness's judgment of this Command formal protest against the illegality of the same occupation.

In fact:

1. The Namaroputh's place appertains to the ethiopian territory and was guarded by a custody, that with his chief the fitamrari Ailemariam was already submitted to Italian Government.

2. The place was not abandoned by the guard, but was occupied by surprise with a nocturnal operation by subjects equipped of the Kenya's Government.

3. The three signed elements of the guard have been captured on the place and they are still entertained at the Todignak's fort; namely the natives: Iadosa, Faisa, Arderu.

4. The others withdrew themselves with the flight to the capture.

5. The temporal abandonment of a place besides, to foreign elements give not reason for occupation.

6. Analogously only the desire of a place's occupation gives not the right to the same occupation, for party of whom that desires.

7. The place was occupied the 31 march, 1937,

when already from the 18 march of same month the Italian Government's Army had taken possession of Maji's territory, of whom the place in question was and is a party.

7. Whenever of that reason the Kenya's Government might be obliged to revenge rights to the place's occupation, these rights already would be regularly clarified by the last Ethiopian Government or by the Italian Government, that from about an year He has declared his sovereignty upon all the territory of the Ethiopian passed empire.

8. Whenever the Kenya's Government might have purposed to insist upon the oportunity of discussion on the place's locality and on the desire of eventual rectifications, He would requested for that the Italian Government.

9. From the relation of same commander of the band's patrol is clear moreover that English avions surpass frequently the Galep, pushing on often until the Bime's highness and more than, without the Italian Government's preventive authorization.

10. For that the above, while I take express reserve of notifying every circumstance my Superior Command what has happened I formally demand to this Command:

- 1. The polite removing of the Namaruputh place, that I will get immediately reoccupy by my elements.
- 2. The restitution of my three guards equipeds, Italian subjects, captured upon the place.
- 3. The suspension of the aerial English flights over the Italian territory.

In the certainty of obtaining quick from the judgment of illuminated comprehension of this Command that above I have requested, I present to the same Command the expressions of my best consideration.

The sector's Commander of Maji,
(T. Colonel Corrado Ragazzi)

(Sgd.) CORRADO RAGAZZI.

May 8th., 1937.

COPY

To the Hon'ble
Il Comandante del Settore
di Magi.
Maji.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Memorandum No. W.241. Twf. of April 26th., 1937.

I am forwarding this immediately to the Officer-in-Charge, Turkana District, who will make such reply as he deems necessary as soon as possible.

2. In the meanwhile I must repeat the explanation contained in my letter of April 20th to Kenyasmatch Seyfou of which you seem to possess a copy.

In the past Namaruputh was occupied by the Ethiopians under protest from the Kenya Government who maintained that the site lay in Kenya territory. In this connection negotiations through the proper channels had been begun with the last Ethiopian Government but they were not completed. Representatives of the Government of Kenya have now occupied Namaruputh and will remain there pending a discussion of the whole question of frontier demarcation with the Italian Government. The Government of Kenya is quite willing to enter into such a discussions.

5. In the meanwhile I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to correct certain misunderstandings to which you appear to be subject.

The occupation of Namaruputh was carried out in an entirely peaceful manner at midday on April 5th by order of the Government of Kenya. The Abyssinian Commander, Ato Tefera Isiye, and such members of the guard as remained loyal to him, abandoned the post during the early hours of March 31st.

Upon our arrival at Namaruputh on April 3rd., twenty-two Ethiopian subjects were found there. The position was explained to them as I have explained it to you above. They were given the opportunity of withdrawing into their own territory or of being detained in Kenya. All but four of them withdrew before evening, taking their possessions with them. The remaining four remained at Namaruputh since they considered that they would be in danger from the Gelubba tribesmen if they left the protection of the post. On April 13th these four also returned to their own territory after they had seen that the Gelubba remained entirely peaceful.

4. It is true that British aircraft have been operating over Gelubba and Bume country. They have, however, confined their activities to those portions of these countries which lie within the borders of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. As you are doubtless aware, the frontier between Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan runs from a point near Namaruputh northwards along the line of the KIBISH River, passing near to NAKUA Hill in Bume country.

5. In view of the explanation given above, I must decline to comply with your request to withdraw from Namaruputh until such time as my Government have reached a satisfactory agreement with your Government regarding the whole question of frontier demarcation.

I greatly appreciate your courtesy in attaching an English translation to your Memorandum and regret that the absence of a qualified linguist prevents my showing a like courtesy to you.

Assuring you of my best consideration,
I have the honour to be,
Sir,

(Sgd.) E. J. A. LESLIE.

COPY.

Office of the Officer-in-Charge,
Turkana District,
KAPENGURIA.

May 22nd., 1937.

To
The Honourable
Il Commandante del Settore di Magi,
MAGI.

Dear Sir,

With reference to paragraph 1 of letter
No. A/2/37, addressed to you by the District Officer,
Lokitaung and dated 8/5/37, I have the honour to inform
you that I have nothing to add to the District Officer's
letter under reference except to state that should a
meeting between us in the near future prove to be
possible I shall be pleased to explain to you personally
the present position and past history regarding
Namarous.

Assuring you of my best consideration,

I have the honour to be
Sir,

Sd. H. IZARD

Officer-in-Charge,
Turkana District.

SECRET.

Office of the Officer-in-charge,
Turkana.
At Lokitaung.

8th. July, 1937.

Hon. Colonial Secretary,
Nairobi.

ITALO - ETHIOPIAN SITUATION.

OCCUPATION OF WAMAROPUS.

INTERVIEW WITH ITALIAN OFFICERS JULY 1ST.

With reference to correspondence terminating with your telegram Secret NO.450 of June 26th 1937, I have the honour to report as follows.

June 28th.

-At about 11.a.m. on the 28th June I received a telegram from the District Commissioner at Lokitaung stating that the Italian Commander would be at the outpost (which they had established at the extreme end of the sandspit at Sanderson's Gulf on June 22nd) on July 1st. I presumed this to be the result of my letter of May 22nd addressed to the Italian Commandant at Haji. I immediately left for Kitale and, through the good Offices of Mr. Swain, Director of O'Keefe & Co, Kitale, Motor Engineers, was able to obtain permission for Mr. Furio Talatin, their chief mechanic, who, though an Italian subject, has an English wife and has been in Kenya a number of years, to accompany me to Lokitaung and to interpret at the meeting with the Italians.

June 29th.

I left Kapenguria at dawn accompanied by Mr. Furio Talatin and reached Lodwar at 4.p.m.

June 30th.

We left Lodwar at 7.a.m. and arrived Lokitaung at 2.15.p.m. On arrival I was shown a note from the Italian Commander stating that he would be pleased to get into personal contact with us about midday on July 1st.

July 1st...

July 1st.

I left Lokitaung at 9 a.m. with Mr. Ryland, D.C. Captain Hay, Mr. Leslie, D.C. and Mr. Furio Talatin.

Interview with the Italian Officers.

On arrival at Todenyang a note drafted in Italian was sent to the Italian Officers intimating that we would be pleased to meet them at Namropua during the afternoon and adding that their company at lunch would be welcomed. An hour later two Italian Officers, a Captain Queiroblarlo and Lieut Rappallo, arrived at Todenyang for lunch. On their arrival I formed the opinion that they were very nervous as to what our attitude towards them would be. During lunch I advised the Italians that I wished to point out the Kenya boundary to them on the spot. They readily agreed. In view of the fact that there were four of us and only two of them, I asked them if they would prefer that only two of us and the interpreter should go with them to inspect the boundary. To this they at once replied that they had no objection to the 4 of us going over with them. At three P.M. we all left together for the boundary. Captain Queiroblarlo, who had seen fighting continuously since the outbreak of the War in Ethiopia was an extremely agreeable person with a great sense of humour. His junior appeared to find it more difficult to adjust himself to his surroundings. We pointed out to them on the spot what we claimed to be the Kenya boundary, namely, a line drawn East and West running through the northern extremity of the Southern sandspit of Sanderson's Gulf, and

that...

- 3 -

that, in accordance with our claim, their post was some fifty yards inside our boundary. They replied that they were extremely sorry if this were so but that they had no maps with them and could not check their position with accuracy. They were not aware that Sanderson's Gulf had dried up. They said they hoped that we would understand that they were acting under orders and would have to refer to Maji for directions. In answer to my question as to how they happened to pick on a point almost exactly on our boundary they replied that they had been shown the spot by the Abyssinians who had accompanied them on their first visit when they planted the Italian flag. I then produced the Italian map forwarded to me by you under cover of your S.A. IAF. 42/1/2/1/30 of May 25th 1937. With the aid of this map I pointed out that should they not agree that their post was just inside the boundary of Kenya as pointed out to them by us, nevertheless in accordance with this Italian map they were undoubtedly in British territory as, on the showing of this map, if they were not in Kenya territory they must surely be within the territory of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

I then pointed out to them what I believed to be the southern extremity of the northern sandpit of what used to be the gound of Sanderson's Gulf, which is marked on our map as "sand cliffs," and advised them that in my opinion that should they agree to remove their post to these sand cliffs they would certainly be outside the Kenya boundary and almost certainly outside the Sudan boundary also.

but...

but that I myself was able to speak for the Kenya Government only and that any question they might wish to raise concerning the boundary with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan should be taken up direct with representatives of the Sudan Government.

At this point the Italian Lieutenant suggested that possibly the Italian map was not correct. He also pointed out that on our map Namaropus was shown as an Abyssinian post. This was exactly the opening required and enabled me to enumerate the reasons for the presence of the Abyssinian post at Namaropus in the past namely:

- (a) That the Ethiopian occupation of the post was allowed as a temporary measure.
- b. As an act of grace.
- c. For the sole purpose of the maintenance of order among the unruly tribes inhabiting Ethiopian territory just to the North of our boundary; and
- d. subject to the provision that the Ethiopians refrained from interfering with the fishing rights of British subjects in the area and to emphasize:
 1. that our territorial claim to Namaropus is and has always been unconditional and
 2. that the right was reserved by the Government of Kenya to re-occupy Namaropus at any time should the Ethiopians fail to observe any of the conditions to which their occupation was made subject.

I may add that by this time the value of Mr. Furio Malatin's services in interpretation were fully appreciated.

At the request of the District Commissioner the Italian Officers were asked if they would be good enough to avoid as far as possible any restriction being put by them on the old-time customary trade...

trade between the Turkana and the Merille across the border, and to this they replied in the affirmative.

It was explained to them that the nature of the trade is as follows. The Turkana catch the Lake fish and dry it. They barter this fish at the Somali shop at Todenyang and exchange the loin-cloths so obtained for the Merille grain. During the interpretation regarding the fish Mr. Furio Talatin unwittingly broke into English and was chided by the Lieutenant with being a bad Italian subject and pro-British.

Finally I explained to the Italian Officers as courteously as possible that it was my duty to make a formal protest against the establishment of an Italian post in British territory and to request them to withdraw their post from inside the Kenya boundary.

Throughout the interview Captain Quicriobarlo had been taking notes of our conversation. In reply to my protest he re-iterated that all he could do was to take notes of our wishes and report to his headquarters for directions. He hoped we would understand that he was unable to act on his own initiative and promised to get in telephonic communication with his headquarters at Maji from Kalama in the morning (July 2nd). He pointed out the extreme difficulty of identifying exact positions in country such as this without the aid of a experienced Surveyor equipped with the necessary instruments, a statement with which I was in entire agreement. He then went on to state that, in his opinion, before finality...

finality on the question of boundaries could be reached it would be necessary for the Governments concerned to appoint a boundary commission. After the interview the Interpreter told me that in his opinion had Captain Queiroblario been alone he would have withdrawn the post there and there. I record this for what it is worth.

The possible desirability of leaving with the Italian Officers a formal protest in writing, in addition to the formal protest that had been made verbally was not overlooked - indeed I went armed with a preliminary draft of such a protest which I intended to implement in the light of information obtained at our interview should the turn of events make it desirable.

I was particularly anxious that nothing should be done nor any incident take place that might possibly mar the atmosphere of courteous friendliness and co-operation which had been created by this first meeting. I therefore decided that any written protest might well be held over at any rate until a reasonable time had elapsed for the notes on our meeting to be communicated to Maji by telephone and directions thereon received, particularly as those directions when received might conceivably result in the withdrawal of the Italian post. I was hopeful that a formal protest in writing would not be necessary.

It was impossible not to have every sympathy with these Officers; the conditions under which they were living were appalling and it was obvious that they could do nothing without reference to their headquarters.

We then took our leave of them at their camp, but they insisted on walking with us to the lorries which were waiting for us some 300 yards from the end of the sandpit. The Italians thanked us profusely for our hospitality, expressed their distress at having nothing to offer us in return at the moment, and the hope that it would not be long before they were able to re-pay the hospitality and courtesy they had received from us that day.

We then returned to Jodenyang for the night.

Information obtained in the course of informal conversation.

The two Officers whom we met belong to the 1st Battaglione di Eritrea. The full name of the Captain was Giuseppe Quirobiario, whose address was Via Paolo Giacomatti, Genova; that of the Lieutenant Frank Rappallo, and his address Palazzo Reale di Roma. He is the son of the doctor to the Royal Family.

There is a telephone line from Kalamo to Haji and wireless communication between Haji and Addis Ababa.

The road between Addis Ababa and Massaua is constructed of concrete and asphalt, and the 870 miles can be done by lorry in 24 days. The road between Addis Ababa and Haji is constructed in asphalt for half the distance.

At the moment there is a battalion at Kalamo. There were two Officers and thirty men at the post on the sandpit. The post is armed with seven Fiat machine-guns. Two more Officers and more troops were expected to arrive on the evening of our interview.

A road.....

A road from Kaji to Kalama is being constructed with European labour. According to the Interpreter this is to help solve the unemployment problem in Italy.

The Italians are anxious to prevent the escape of any more refugees to British territory. They intend to make posts all along the boundary from Kalama to Hoyalé to prevent this. They desire that the Abyssinian refugees should be returned to Ethiopia. They state that now the revulsion of feeling against the attack on Graziani is a thing of the past, guarantees of immunity will freely be given.

General Observations.

(1) Our records show that there is some doubt as to the exact position of the boundaries. The Surveyor-General admits this.

(2) A qualified Surveyor will have to be employed.

(3) The Italian post on the Sandspit is not more than 60 yards inside the line, which we claim to be the Kenya boundary.

(4) Owing to the drying up of Bandersén's Gulf and the shifting of the sand it is not improbable that we have claimed more than our due.

(5) The Sandspit is the only reasonable site for a post for some miles around, being the only piece of ground above the level of the surrounding marshes.

(6) It is doubtful if there is water in the neighbourhood of the Sandspit at the southern extremity of the northern sandspit.

(7) The proximity of an Italian post is desirable for facility of intercommunication.

(8) So long as the post remains and the line Kalamu - Sakun - Kaji is maintained in sufficient strength, the entry into Kenya via the west side of Lake Rudolf is closed to refugees.

(9) There is at the moment no reason to suppose that the presence of the Italian post on the sandspit will interfere with the fishing rights of the Turkana fishermen nor with their village which is situated on the Kenya side of Hamaroputh. On the other hand it might be convenient to have this post ready to deal with a sudden influx of Herille.

(10) Should there prove to be no other possible site for an Italian post within reasonable distance of the Kenya boundary, the District Commissioner, Lodwar, the District Officer, Lokitaung, and myself are unanimous in recommending that the question of allowing the Italians to occupy Hamaroputh should be kept in view as a bargaining factor when the time comes for final settlement of the boundaries, the right of occupation being kept in reserve as a quid pro quo for an assurance that no restriction will be placed by the Italians on the customary grain trade between the Turkana and the Herille, and for a guarantee of non-interference with the Turkana fishing rights.

(11) There is no external evidence of the Sudan Government taking any interest in events at this corner of Sudan territory. The refugees who have crossed into Kenya via Hamaroputh have crossed Sudan territory to do so. Had there been a representative of the Sudan Government on the spot, presumably it would have been his duty to deal with them the moment they entered the Sudan and, if he decided...

decided to admit them, to intern them somewhere in the Sudan.

July 4th.

A message was received stating that the Italian Officers had withdrawn from the post at the end of the Sandspit leaving it in charge of a Native H. C. O.

I remained at Lokitaung till the 8th of July to watch developments. None took place and on the morning of ^{the} 9th July I left to return to Kapenguria.

OFFICE - IN-CHARGE, TURKANA.

25.45'

26.00 to

KIRISH R.

4.45'

~~Kirish R. to the west~~

SANDARSON
GOLF
Diy mud
Klabi


Manatupark
Abayastina Park

Tadonyang

4.30'

LAKE
RUDOZF

To Tadonyang



E 24

EXTRACT FROM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PERIOD:

29.5.37 TO 28.6.37 (REGD. ON 34099/37 K.A.R.)

*(Interview with Italian Consul at Lokitang
on 22.5.37)*

6. In Zaude's opinion, the Italians might be expected to make a gradual advance towards NAMARAPUTH, but their first tactical objective would be the River Omo, after attaining which they might send a detachment towards the outpost. He said he admitted that he was aware of negotiations between the Governments of Kenya and Ethiopia concerning the post at NAMARAPUTH. Fit Haile Mariam had been summoned to ADDIS ABABA to advise the Emperor of the position. He was quite aware that the ownership of NAMARAPUTH was in dispute and that a boundary commission was pending, as he had had orders to suppress all disputes till its arrival. He was cognisant of the British claim that the Kibish river formed the international boundary, but he himself would have claimed territory to the west of this river. Immediately prior to the Italo-Ethiopian war, he had been furnished with details of the Ethiopian claim signed by the Foreign Minister, but could not now recollect the names of the places involved.

38003/3/37.

C.D.

13 JUL 1937

175

C. O.



DOWNING STREET.

3 July, 1937.

Mr. Paskin. (0/7)

Major Bishop

Mr. Flood
Sir C. Parkinson (11 June 1937)

Immediate. *St*

Sir G. Tomkinson.

* Sir C. Bottomley. 10.7 *f*

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Perm. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

Sir,

With reference to the letter from
(19) this Department of the 7th of July, I am,
etc., to transmit to you, to be laid before
Mr. Secretary Eden, a copy of a further
telegram from the Governor of Kenya in
regard to the occupation of Namurupus.

2. So far as this incident is concerned,
it is suggested that the reply to the
statement left at the Foreign Office by
the Counsellor to the Italian Embassy on the
15th of June should be to the following
effect:

"The statement has been referred to
the Governor of Kenya, who has reported
that there is no foundation for the assertion
that the post at Namurupus was occupied by
surprise by British forces on the night of
the 31st of March, or that three of the

Ethiopian

DRAFT.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

Kenya Tel. No. 143.
(21)

Copy to W.O. (23)
Kenya (15)

FURTHER ACTION.

Copy with Encl.
to W.O. 1f.

Ethiopian guard of seven were captured; but that

On the other hand, the facts were as follows:

On the 1st of April it was reported, and subsequently confirmed, that the Ethiopian

garrison had evacuated the post on the night of

the 30th of March; on the 3rd of April at midday

the Chief Native Commissioner, accompanied by the

Officer Commanding, 4th K.A.R., entered Namurupus

without incident and established a small military guard there,

which has since been replaced by a police guard; that

the allegation that 3 men of the Ethiopian garrison

had been captured may possibly be based on the

following circumstances: when Namurupus was occupied

by the British authorities on the 3rd of April, it was

found that, in addition to the local inhabitants, there

were 22 armed Ethiopians there, who represented themselves

to be traders; as, however, they were armed, they were

informed that they would be regarded as Ethiopian soldiers

and must either return to Ethiopian territory or be

disarmed and interned; eighteen returned to Ethiopian

territory but four elected to be disarmed and interned;

subsequently, at their own request, these four men were

permitted

G. O.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson

Sir G. Tomlinson

Sir C. Bottomley

Sir J. Shuckburgh

Perm. U.S. of S.

Party U.S. of S.

Secretary of State

DRAFT.

(19)

permitted to return to Ethiopia".

3. As regards the Italian suggestion that

this is "doubtful territory" which has been

the subject of inconclusive negotiations

with the former Ethiopian Government, it

is suggested that the reply should be on

the lines indicated in paragraph 8 of the

letter from this Department of the 7th of

July.

4. As regards the Italian post which has

been established north-west of Namurupus,

I am to observe (a) that the boundary has

never been the subject of an agreed

delimitation, (b) that since the date of the

Treaty of 1907, the configuration of the

land in this area has been ^{much} changed by

the silting up of the Sanderson Gulf, and (c)

that, in his telegram of the 9th of July, the

Governor has again not found it possible to

be more definite than to say that this post

is "believed to be" in British Territory.

In the circumstances there would not appear

FURTHER ACTION.

to

to be sufficient grounds for a strong protest to the Italian Government. It is, however, suggested that the Italian Government should be informed that the place where this post has been established is 50 yards within the line which is regarded as the frontier, and that on the 1st of July the line which has been so regarded was pointed out to the Italian Officers at the post.

5. Mr. Ormsby Gore assumes that it can be taken for granted that the Italian Government would not be prepared to accede to a request by His Majesty's Government that this post should be withdrawn, and that, in the circumstances, it would be preferable not to make such a request. It is, however, for consideration whether it would not be desirable to enter a caveat to the extent of informing the Italian Government that, in acquiescing in the continued occupation of this post by the Italians, His Majesty's Government are not to be regarded as accepting the view that the post is not in British territory.

6. As regards the desire of the Italian Government, conveyed informally by the Counsellor

C. O.

- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Sir C. Parkinson.
- Sir G. Tomlinson.
- Sir C. Bottomley.
- Sir J. Shuckburgh.
- Parol. U.S. of S.
- Parly. U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

of the Italian Embassy, that no action should be taken to compromise the position at any other part of the frontier which has been the subject of inconclusive negotiations with the former Ethiopian Government. It is not clear whether the Counsellor expected to receive any assurance, or whether he was satisfied to have represented the wishes of his Government. It is, however, suggested that no such assurance should be given before the receipt of the reply from the Government of Kenya to Mr. Ormsby Gore's despatch of the 7th of July.

(18)

3. A copy of this letter is being sent to the War Office.

I am, etc.,

FURTHER ACTION.

It will be observed that the Gov. prefers not to adopt Mr. Ormsby Gore's suggestion that a military post should again be established at Naurupur. It is suggested that a military officer should be stationed there.

38003/3/37 [No 21]

51
21

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

CYBER TELEGRAM from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 9th July, 1937. Received 1.21 p.m. 9th July.



No.143. Confidential.

Reference to your telegram No.150 confidential

17
/ 4

As reported in my telegram No.76 confidential Ethiopian garrison evacuated Namurupus before its occupation by this Government and this fact was verified before actual occupation. Twenty-two Ethiopians who claimed to be traders were found there and as they were armed were told that they would be regarded as Ethiopian soldiers and must either return to Ethiopian territory or be disarmed and interned. Eighteen returned to Ethiopian territory and four elected to be disarmed and interned, but subsequently were allowed at own request to return to Ethiopia. Party of 40 Ethiopian soldiers who had accepted service with the Italians arrived with instructions to occupy Namurupus after our occupation of it but subsequently withdrew. There has been no incident to afford basis for allegation of detention of 3 Italians. Post established by Italians is believed to be about 50 yards within British territory, and officer in charge of Turkina has reported that he established friendly relations with Italian officers on 1st July when actual boundary was pointed out and verbal protest made which the Italians promised to refer to their headquarters. In all circumstances, particularly as present relations with Italians are friendly, I should prefer to maintain existing dispositions at Namurupus which is but 8 miles from military garrison at Fort Wilkinson and is within sight of that post. Copies of correspondence with Italian authorities follow by mail.

NO

(B26503-29) 24 * No 38003/3/37 [No 17]
No 38003/3/37 [No 7]

Abyssinian Frontier (K.B)

13003/137
COPY

Command Sector of Maji.

241. Tvl. 26 April 1937/zy.

To the Honourable Command,
Lokitang's District.

The 18 April running a patrol of band sended by this Command for substituting the guard, dislocated on the place of Namaroputh, finding the same place occupied by English subjects of Kenya's Colony, that there had hoisted the English Flag after having made in the night of 31st last a surprise's action against the guard, capturing three elements and putting to flight the others.

To the prohibition of retaking possession of the place the band's Patrol's chief sended protest written to the Britannic present authority.

To the protest the District English Officer of Namaroputh answered the 20th April with letter like this annexed copy.

Greatly astonished for the reasons, that the Namaroputh District's Officer is bringing for justifying his arbitrary act of foreign territory's occupation, I expose to the known correctness's judgement of this command formal protest against the illegality of the same occupation.

In fact:

1. The Namaroputh's place appertains to the Ethiopian territory and was guarded by a custody, that with his chief Fitaurari Ailemariam was already submitted to the Italian Government.
2. The place was not abandoned by the guard but was occupied by surprise with a nocturnal operation by subjects equiped of the Kenya's Government.

Copy to Wi O. 20

3. The three signed elements of the guard have been captured on the place and they at the Todegnak's fort, namely the natives: Iadega - Faisa - Arderu.

The others withdrew themselves with the flight to the capture.

4. The temporal abandonment of a place besides, to foreign elements give not reason for occupation.

5. Analogously only the desire of a place besides, to foreign elements gives not the right to the same occupation, for party of whom that desires.

6. The place was occupied the 31 March 1937, when already from the 18th March of the same month the Italian Government's Army had taken possession of Maji's territory, of whom the place in question was and is a party.

7. Whenever of that reason the Kenya's Government might be obliged to revenge rights to the place's occupation, these rights would already would be regularly clarified by the last Ethiopian Government or by the Italian Government, that for about a year He has declaimed his sovereignty upon all the territory of the Ethiopian passed Empire.

8. Whenever the Kenya's Government might have proposed to insist upon the opportunity of discussion on the place's locality and on the desire of eventual rectification He would requested for that the Italian Government.

From the relation of same commander of the band's patrol is clear moreover that English avions surpass frequently the Galep, pushing on often until the Bime's highness and more than, without the Italian Government's preventive authorisation.

For that the above, while I take express reserve of notifying every circumstance my Superior Command what has happened I formally demand to this Command.

54

1. The polite removing of Hamaroputh's place that I will get immediately reoccupy by my elements.

2. The restitution of my three guards equiped Italian subjects; captured upon the place.

3. The suspension of the aerial English flights over the Italian territory.

In the certainty of obtaining quick from the judgement of illuminated comprehension of this command that above I have requested, I present to the same Command the expression of my best consideration.

The sector's Commander of Maji.

T. Colonel Corrado Ragazzi.

Sgd.

11



38005/3/37.

19 45 55

C. O.

N.B. The best spelling appears to

Mr. Paskin. 3/7/37
Major Ople. away
Mr. Flood. 5-7

C.D. NAMURUPUS
R - 6 JUL
D

Downing Street.
July, 1937.

Sir C. Parkinson.
Sir G. Tomlinson.

Immediate.

C.D.
R - 6 JUL
D 7

X Sir C. Bottomley 6-7-37

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Sir,

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

I am, etc., to acknowledge the

(15)

receipt of your letter No. J.2824/229/1 of

the 25th of June in regard to the Italian protest against the occupation of Namurupus,

by British forces and to transmit to you, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Eden, the

accompanying copy of a telegram from the Governor of Kenya reporting further developments in this area. In this connection, I am

also to invite reference to paragraphs 6 and (11) of Military Intelligence Summary No. 31 and (12) paragraphs 9 and 10 of Military Intelligence

Summary No. 32 (of which copies were sent to the

Foreign Office on the 14th and 29th of June 37. K.A.R.) respectively under Colonial Office reference No. 34099/37. I am also to enclose a copy of

the letter dated the 26th of April, referred

to

DRAFTS

The Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office.

Kenya Tel. No. 136. (16)
From Italian Commander,
Mail. 26.4.37.

To Kenya Tel. (D.F. hrwth) (10)
To Kenya Dep. (5-7-37)

Copy of enc. to W.O. 10
Copy of enc. to W.O. 10

FURTHER ACTION.

Copy (with encl.) to W.O. If.

to therein, from the Italian Commander at Maji, which has been furnished by Mr. C.B. Thompson, Officer in Charge, Turkana District, who is now on leave in this country.

2. It will be observed that the allegation that this post was occupied "by surprise", and that three men were captured, the remainder of the garrison being put to flight, is ^{altogether} inconsistent with the statement in the telegram No.76 of the 5th of April from the Governor of Kenya that the post was occupied without incident. Moreover in the letter from the Italian Commander, Maji, it is alleged that the "surprise action" by British forces took place on the night of the 31st of March, whereas in paragraph 6 of Military Intelligence Summary No.31 it was stated that information that the post had been evacuated was received on the 1st of April and that the Chief Native Commissioner, accompanied by the Officer Commanding, 4th K.A.R. entered Namrupus at midday on the 3rd of April.

(7)

3. There is no mention, in the Military Intelligence Summaries, of any other incident on the 31st of March which might

- C. O.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Sir C. Parkinson.
- Sir G. Tomlinson.
- Sir C. Bollowley
- Sir J. Shuckburgh.
- Perm. U.S. of S.
- Party U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

FURTHER ACTION.

might possibly have accounted for these discrepancies. Having regard, however, to the fact that in the letter from the Italian Commander the names of the three men alleged to have been captured were given and it was stated that they were at "Todegnak's fort" ^{Presumably} (See Todenyang), the Governor is being asked to report by telegraph whether there has been any other incident which might possibly have given rise to these statements. As regards the reference to Namrupus having been held by an "Italian" local chief, it will be seen from the letter from the Italian Commander that this is based on the assumption that the garrison were adherents of Haile Mariam who had already submitted to the Italians. In this connection, however, it is of interest to recall that in his secret telegram No.75 of the 2nd of April (which was sent before the Governor was aware that Namrupus had been abandoned), the Governor stated that

(6)

It was probable that this garrison would go to Bako to join Ismael (who was then still in active opposition to the Italians).

As regards the informal intimation by Signor Crolla of the request of the Italian Government that no arbitrary action should be taken by His Majesty's Government in any case in which a frontier question had remained a matter of discussion between His Majesty's Government and the former Ethiopian Government, I am to observe that the written communication left by the Counsellor did not include a request that Namrupus should be evacuated. From this fact and from the fact that the Italians have themselves established a post, which is thought to be in British territory, 1000 yards N.W. of Namrupus, it is assumed that the Italian Government have no expectation that His Majesty's Government have any intention of evacuating that place, and that their informal request, conveyed orally by the Counsellor, is to be interpreted as a request that no similar action should be taken in the future at any other place which has hitherto been occupied by Abyssinians. So far as

Mr. Ormsby Gore

C. O.

- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Sir C. Parkinson.
- Sir G. Tomlinson.
- Sir C. Bellamy.
- Sir J. Shuckburgh.
- Perm. U.S. of S.
- Party U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

Mr. Ormsby Gore is aware there is no other place on the frontier where a situation similar to that at Namrupus exists, so that the contingency contemplated by the Italian Government is unlikely to arise. A copy of this correspondence is, however, being sent to the Governor of Kenya who is being asked for his observations on this point.

6. As regards the case of Namrupus, I am to observe that while the historical summary of the negotiations in regard to the occupation of this place by Ethiopian forces, which was given in the Acting Governor's Confidential despatch No. 17 of the 21st of January, was accurate so far as it went, it omitted to state that on the 17th of April, 1932, the then Governor of Maji addressed a letter to the Provincial Commissioner, Turkana

(1)

(No. 10. m
12065/32)

FURTHER ACTION:

reply to the letter setting out the conditions on which His Majesty's Government were prepared to allow the Ethiopian post to remain at Namrupus. A copy of that letter was appended

categorically claiming Namrupus to be in Ethiopian territory.

to the report of Mr. A.R. Champion which formed the enclosure to the despatch from the Governor of Kenya No. 100 Confidential of the 10th August, 1932, of which a copy was sent to the Foreign Office on the 4th of October, 1932, under Colonial Office

reference 18065/32. The attitude of the Ethiopian Authorities was ^(apparently) not modified in the course of the subsequent discussions and correspondence.

7. It will also be recalled that the Ethiopian post at Namurupus was established in 1930 by Haile Mariam himself, and that he is of course in a position to inform the Italian Authorities fully as to the attitude consistently maintained by the Ethiopian Authorities on this question. The Italian Authorities are therefore to be presumed to be aware that the Ethiopian Authorities have never ^(formally) accepted the contention of His Majesty's Government that Namurupus is in British territory.

8. It was pointed out in Foreign Office letter No. 659/229/1 of the 5th of March that the Italian Government will be ^{likely} to believe that the occupation of this place by Ethiopian garrison would have been tolerated by H.M.G. for so long had the national status

(No. 10 on 18065/32)

but no valid argument as to the post can be based upon this

C. O.

- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Sir G. Parkinson
- Sir G. Tomlinson
- Sir C. Bellamy
- Sir J. Shackburgh
- Perm. U.S. of S.
- Perm. U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State

DRAFT.

FURTHER ACTION

of the post in question not been in dispute. Nevertheless it is assumed that it will be considered desirable to give some explanation of the circumstances in which H.M.G. have continued to tolerate this occupation, and it is suggested that the explanation might be on the following lines:-

While the boundary in this area has never been the subject of an agreed delimitation, Namurupus is well south of the frontier marked on the map annexed to the Treaty of 1907, and since that date H.M.G. have regarded it as being in British territory. At the time when the post was established in 1930, the frontier was in a very disturbed state, trans-frontier raids were frequent, negotiations were proceeding with the Ethiopian Authorities for the establishment of a Border Court to settle inter-tribal disputes and other measures which were designed to reduce inter-tribal friction which

which, in the past, had been the constant cause of trans-frontier raids; that it was feared that if H.M.G. insisted on the withdrawal of this post, the effect would have been that the Ethiopian Authorities would have given up any attempt to exercise any restraining authority in that area, with the result that trans-frontier raids would have become of even more frequent occurrence; ^{that,} in the circumstances, it was thought to be better to acquiesce in the occupation of Namurupus by a small Ethiopian garrison pending the completion of the negotiations then in progress, and the eventual joint demarcation of the frontier; nevertheless, the Ethiopian Authorities were left in no doubt as to the view of H.M.G. that this place was in British Territory, and that they acquiesced in its continued temporary occupation by the Ethiopians only on the conditions ^{understood} contained in paragraph 2 of the Governor's despatch of the 21st of Jan. (1)

9. It is, however, assumed that the reply to the representations of the Italian Embassy will be deferred until it is known definitely whether the post ^{is} established by the ^{to the} Italians North-West of Namurupus is in British territory, and that

(see memo in 18065/12/110A for this)

Especially as it appeared that this was no other place in the neighbourhood suitable for the maintenance of a post of large dimensions.

G. O.

- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Sir C. Parkinson
- Sir G. Tomlinson
- Sir C. Boltonley
- Sir J. Shuckburgh
- Parlt. U.S. of S.
- Parly. U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State

that if so Mr. Eden will be prepared to make strong representations to the Italian Government in the matter.

10. ^{Copy of a despatch which has been} Copies of the telegram sent to the Governor of Kenya ^{are} is enclosed.

11. A copy of this letter is being sent to the War Office.

DRAFT.

I am, etc.,

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

FURTHER ACTION

18

C. O.



- Mr. Paskin 3/4/37
- Mr. Flood 5/7
- Mr. C. Parkinson
- Mr. G. Tomlinson
- Mr. C. Bottomley 6/7/37
- Mr. J. Shuckburgh
- Permt. U.S. of S.
- Parly. U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State

7 July, 1937.

Sir,

3 DRAFTS

KENYA

(a/h)

SECRET

Governor

With reference to my Secret telegram No. ... of the ... of July, I have etc. to transmit to you the accompanying copies of correspondence with the Foreign Office in regard to the Italian protest against the occupation of Namurupus

and to invite your attention in particular to paragraph 3 of the letter of the 25th of June from the Foreign Office and to paragraph 6 of the Colonial Office reply.

I request that I may be informed by telegraph as soon as possible whether there is any other place near the Northern frontier of Kenya which

Fo. 2576 (No. 15)
 To Fo. (12)
 (without encl.)

FURTHER ACTION.
 Copies to Fo. (with 5/7)
 W.O. 1/2 (of encl. to 5/7 to Fo.)

Copy to W.O. 1/2
 5/7 - 1/2
 (20) O.P.

is definitely claimed as British,
 but which has hitherto been occupied
 by Ethiopian or Italian forces.
 I also request that I may be informed
 whether you see any objection to an
 informal assurance being given to the
 Italian Government in the sense desired
 by them, as indicated in the last sentence
 of paragraph 3 of the letter from the
 Foreign Office.

I have, etc...
 (Signed) W. ORMSBY GORE.



38003/3/37

C.D.
 16-JUL
 1947

Received 12 15pm
 6/15/47

G. O.
 Mr. Flood
 Mr. Flood
 Sir C. Parkinson
 Sir C. Tomlinson
 Sir C. Bottomley
 Sir J. Shuckburgh
 Permit. U.S. of S.
 Parly. U.S. of S.
 Secretary of State.

(14)
 (15)

Your tel. No. 136 Conf
 On 15th June Councillor of
 Italian Embassy called at
 F.O. left with statement
 on the general basis your
 letter dated 26th April from
 Italian Commander MAJI
 of whom I have received
 copy from THOMPSON. In
 view of your tel. No. 76
 para 6 of Military Intelligence
 Summary No 31
 is no foundation for statement
 that 3 were captured
 & detained at TOBENYANG
 but I should be glad
 to know whether there has
 been any other incident
 which may possibly have

3 DRAFT. Tel. (Ciphan)
 Gov.
 Nairobi

FURTHER ACTION:
 Copies to F.O. ind. 13
 W.O. 14/1/47
 12/10/47

Copy to F.O. 13
 W.O. 14/1/47
 12/10/47

offered been for the settlement of
Please also telegraph as soon as
possible whether post established
by Italians is in British Territory ^{actually}
and send by ~~surface~~ mail
copies of all correspondence with
Italian authorities.

The view of fact that border dispute has
arisen ^(suggest that it will be a political)
of ~~long~~ ^{long} history (NAMURUPUS) and of conditions
in neighbourhood

will be settled by military and in any case
it would be well to put European
Council of possible

RECEIVED
38003/337 No. 16
26 JUN 1937

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

1662

C. O. REGY
C. O. Telegram from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies.

Dated 26th. June, 1937. Received 12.13 p.m. 26th. June.



No. 136 Confidential.

Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
repeated to the Governor-General Khartoum. Your despatch
of 19th. March confidential. Namurupus Post. Small police
post replaced military garrison 10th. May when instructions
issued that in the event of large Italian force appearing
before the post and demanding evacuation non-commissioned
officer in charge should register protest and retire and that
in no circumstances should armed resistance be offered.
Explanation of occupation was sent to the Italian Commandant
Maji by the District Officer on receipt of protest and claims
that the post situated in Ethiopia. I now learn on the 22nd.
June an Italian officer made hurried visit from Kalama and
left the post 12 native troops and Italian flag at a point
1,000 yards N.W. of Namurupus and believed to be 50 yards
within the British territory and withdrew before the District
Officer could get into touch with him. Unlikely that Italian
post would interfere with the fishing rights of Turkana
natives at Toppen Beach immediately north of Namurupus but
instructions have been issued that if the post is definitely
in British territory protest is to be handed to the non-
commissioned officer in charge for transmission to the Italian
officer. In the event of refusal to withdraw or interference
with fishing rights I may have to request you to take up the
matter through diplomatic channels.

4

18th

3
2
1

* No. 38003/337 No. 16

RECEIVED
38003/337 [No. 16]
28 JUN 1937

REGY
C. O'Connell

from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies.

Dated 26th. June, 1937. Received 12.13 p.m. 26th. June.



No. 134. Confidential.

Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
repeated to the Governor-General Khartoum. Your despatch
of 19th. March confidential. Namurupus Post. Small police
post replaced military garrison 10th. May when instructions
issued that in the event of large Italian force appearing
before the post and demanding evacuation non-commissioned
officer in charge should register protest and retire and that
in no circumstances should army resistance be offered.

Explanation of occupation was sent to the Italian Commandant
Maji by the District Officer on receipt of protest and claims
that the post situated in Ethiopia. I now learn on the 22nd.
June an Italian officer made hurried visit from Kalama and
left the post 12 native troops and Italian flag at a point
1,000 yards N.W. of Namurupus and believed to be 50 yards
within the British territory and withdraw before the District
Officer could get into touch with him. Unlikely that Italian
post would interfere with the fishing rights of Turkana
natives at Toppen Beach immediately north of Namurupus but
instructions have been issued that if the post is definitely
in British territory protest is to be handed to the non-
commissioned officer in charge for transmission to the Italian
officer. In the event of refusal to withdraw or interference
with fishing rights I may have to request you to take up the
matter through diplomatic channels.

4

1811

38003/337

* No. 38003/337 [No. 4]

38003/3/37

15



In any further communication on this subject, please quote No. J 2824/229/1 and address— not to any person by name but to—

The Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

284
15 FOREIGN OFFICE S.W.1.
25th June, 1937.

IMMEDIATE.

Sir,

No distribution
- 7

With reference to the correspondence ending with the semi-official letter from the Colonial Office of the 5th April, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Ormsby-Gore, that the Counsellor to the Italian Embassy, on instructions, called at this department on the 15th June to discuss the recent occupation by the Kenya authorities of the post of Namurupus.

2. Signor Crolla brought with him a written statement to the effect that it was understood that an Italian patrol which was recently sent out to occupy Namurupus (a post which, the statement alleged, was being held by an "Italian" local chief and six of his men)-found that the place had been occupied "by surprise" by British armed forces, who had furthermore captured three of the seven men stationed on guard. In reply to a protest lodged by the Italian Commander of the Military Sector at Maji, the British authorities (the Italian statement continued) replied that the locality of Namurupus had been erroneously considered as pertaining to Ethiopian territory; that His Majesty's Government had for many years protested about the matter; that they had accordingly occupied the locality; and that they intended to keep it pending the appointment/

Copy in file (16)

The Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

Unnumbered
* Semi-official distribution
No. 38003/3/37/A. 57

Abysinnian Frontiers (K.O.S)

(C26803-24) 24

64
appointment of a commission which would decide the question.
To this answer Colonel Ragazzi replied with a new protest.

3. In leaving his written statement Signor Crolla said that he had been instructed to point out that where Italian military detachments had occupied "doubtful territory" on the frontiers between Ethiopia and British or British-administered territory and His Majesty's Government had called attention to the matter, the Italian Government had always requested their local authorities to supply immediate information and a report. They hoped that in the present case His Majesty's Government would act similarly. From further conversation, which Signor Crolla asked should be regarded as informal, it emerged that what the Italian Government were requesting was that in any case in which a frontier question had remained a matter of discussion between His Majesty's Government and the former Ethiopian Government and had not been decided, the question should not now be treated by His Majesty's Government as if it had been settled in their favour. The Italian Government in fact requested that His Majesty's Government should do nothing to alter the status quo pending eventual negotiations with them.

4. I am to ask that Mr. Eden may be favoured with an early expression of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's views with regard to the matters mentioned in this letter.

5. A copy of this letter is being sent to the War Office.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Donald Jamieson

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the Cabinet. November 1938

SECRET

Copy No. 117

C.P. 267 (38)

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

CABINET

ABYSSINIAN FRONTIERS

[WITH THREE MAPS]

Joint Memorandum by the Secretaries of State
for Foreign Affairs and the Colonies

Printed for the Cabinet. November 1938.

SECRET

Copy No. 117

C.P. 267 (38)

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

CABINET.

ABYSSINIAN FRONTIERS.

[With Three Maps.]

Joint Memorandum by the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and the Colonies.

THE coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement will necessitate the opening of negotiations with the Italian Government for the delimitation of the frontiers between Italian East Africa on the one hand, and the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland on the other hand. The purpose of this memorandum is to seek authority to ask the Italian Government to grant us certain territorial concessions on the frontiers of Italian East Africa, and to indicate what compensation might be offered to the Italians in return for these concessions. For the purposes of the Abyssinia-Sudan frontier, it will be necessary for the Egyptian Government to be associated with these negotiations, and steps are being taken to obtain the concurrence of the Egyptian Government to our proposals.

2. The frontiers between the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland on the one hand and Italian East Africa on the other hand are very unsatisfactory. In some areas they cut across tribal boundaries, and in others they are necessarily crossed, at certain seasons of the year, by large numbers of tribesmen who have to migrate in order to obtain grazing and water for their herds. In each of these cases effective administration of the tribes by the authorities on either side of the frontier is very difficult. On the one hand, the tribes are unwilling to recognise what they regard as artificial barriers erected across their lands, and on the other hand they are in some cases very ready to take advantage of their freedom from the control of the authorities during the periods when they are beyond the frontier. Moreover, these seasonal migrations have always been a constant source of disputes between hostile tribes which have frequently led to feuds and bloodshed. This state of affairs was a fruitful cause of friction with the Abyssinian authorities in the past. In the interests, therefore, not only of the effective administration of these frontier regions, but also of the preservation of good neighbourly relations with the Italian authorities, it is very desirable that these artificial boundaries should be rectified on more logical and scientific principles.

3. More detailed particulars of the situation on these frontiers and of our proposals for rectifying them are given in Appendices I, II and III and are illustrated on the maps A, B and C annexed thereto. A summary of our proposals is given in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 below.

The Sudan-Abyssinia Frontier (Map A).

4. It is proposed to ask the Italian Government to surrender the Baro Salient, between Gambella and the present frontier traversed by the River Baro, in exchange for the Ilemi Triangle, where the present frontiers of Kenya, Ethiopia and the Sudan meet (less the Turkana grazing grounds, which are now to be attributed to Kenya—these grounds form the area on the annexed Map A immediately to the north of the previous straight line Kenya-Sudan frontier, and have recently been surveyed by a joint Sudan-Kenya Commission). The Baro Salient and Ilemi Triangle are roughly equal in area—about 6,000 square miles each. However, it is possible that the Italian Government will maintain that the Baro Salient is a more important cession of territory than the Ilemi Triangle, and will, in addition, ask for transit facilities through the Sudan.

The Abyssinia-Kenya Frontier, East of Lake Rudolf (Map B).

5.—(a) In consideration for the rectification of the frontier desired by Kenya in the Moyale-Gaddaduma sector, it is proposed to cede to the Italians the areas marked A and B, and if necessary the area marked C, on Map B. The cession of these areas would not involve the transfer of any British subjects.

(b) As part of the price for a satisfactory settlement on the British Somaliland frontiers, it is also proposed to grant the Italians transit facilities along the Kenya section of the Kismayu-Moyale road. If, however, the Italians wish this road to be constructed to an all-weather standard, it is proposed, according to circumstances, either to offer to make a 50 per cent. contribution from the British Treasury towards the cost of building this road (the total cost is estimated tentatively at £65,000), or to agree to build the road if the Italians are prepared to bear the capital cost. In any event, it is proposed to stipulate that the road should not be used for military traffic, and that the Italians should make a substantial contribution towards the maintenance of the road.

(c) While, for the reasons explained in paragraph 4 of Appendix E, it is hoped that it will not be necessary to cede the area marked D on Map B, it may be necessary to reconsider this question when we receive the Italian counter-proposals.

The British Somaliland Frontiers (Map C).

A. Southern Frontier.

6. It is proposed to ask the Italians to agree to a rectification of the Southern frontier of British Somaliland so as to take into the Protectorate the grazing areas of the British tribes up to the limits agreed upon by the Anglo-Abyssinian Boundary Commission of 1935, subject to two modifications:—

(a) At the Eastern end of the frontier, as it is unlikely that the Italians would agree to the transfer of Walwal and Wardair and the immediately surrounding area, it will be necessary to aim at a boundary coinciding with the limits of grazing recognised in the Rome Agreement of January 1937 (Cmd. 5775); and

(b) At the Western end of the frontier, as the grazing areas recognised by the Boundary Commission of 1935 and in the Rome Agreement of 1937 extend to the west of the Jibuti Railway, and as it is assumed that the Italians would not countenance the transfer of any territory to the west of, or abutting on, this Railway, it is not proposed to ask that this part of the grazing area should be included in British Somaliland. It is suggested therefore that in this area the frontier should follow the existing frontier from the tri-junction point with French Somaliland to Samadu at the south-western corner of British Somaliland, extending from that place to Gialdessa and then running eastwards along the limit of the grazing areas as already indicated.

The area which we hope to obtain is coloured blue on Map C, and the line from Samadu to Gialdessa is shown in red.

B. Eastern Frontier.

It is proposed to ask the Italians to agree that the Boundary demarcated by the Anglo-Italian Boundary Commission of 1929-30 should be confirmed by the British and Italian Governments, and that it should be agreed that British and Italian tribes should be free to cross the boundary on a basis of reciprocity up to the limits of the grazing areas recognised by the Boundary Commission. The grazing areas of the British tribes are hatched in green on Map "C". The arrangements to be made for British and Italian tribesmen to cross the frontier should be the subject of negotiation; and provided that a satisfactory agreement is reached, the Italians would be informed that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to accept the boundary line proposed by the Italian Commissioner in the neighbourhood of Banda Ziada, with regard to which the Boundary Commission found it impossible to reach agreement.

7. It may be assumed that the Italians will not readily accede to our demands in respect of the Southern Frontier of British Somaliland. As an inducement towards acceptance of these demands or as concessions towards Italian counter-demands, it is suggested that we should—

- (1) In addition to making our offer of the Italian line at Banda Ziada, agree to confirmation of the Eastern Frontier Boundary as a closed frontier, i.e., without provision for grazing facilities in Italian territory for our tribes.
- (2) Offer the Italians a permanent Transit Traffic Agreement in place of the two years' Agreement which is due to expire at the end of February 1939 and meet such Italian desiderata for the improvement of transit facilities as may appear acceptable.
- (3) Offer to withdraw, in favour of the Italians, from an area on the Eastern Frontier. The limits of this area are under discussion, but it would not be less than the area bounded by a straight line from the frontier to Buran (excluding Buran), thence by a straight line to Taleh (including Taleh), thence due east to the frontier. This area, coloured red on Map C, is about 2,088 square miles in extent. It consists of seasonal grazing grounds and no British-Protected Persons are permanently domiciled in it.
- (4) If the three previous concessions should prove insufficient, offer to share the cost of the transit traffic roads from Berbera and Zeila to the frontier up to a maximum of 50 per cent. of the capital and maintenance. This concession might involve the Somaliland Government in expenditure of between £50,000 or £100,000; and, as the Protectorate is a grant-aided territory, the burden would have to be borne by the United Kingdom Exchequer.
- (5) If necessary, also offer the Italians a transit agreement for the use of the Kismayu-Moyale road in Kenya and for a financial contribution in connection therewith (see preceding paragraph 5).
- (6) In the last resort, offer the Italians the area marked D on Map B and referred to in the preceding paragraph 5.

Should the Italians, despite all these concessions, refuse to cede the Territory which we want on the Southern Frontier, it will be necessary to fall back on the much less satisfactory expedient of converting the existing Grazing Rights Agreement into a permanent arrangement, and to this end it would be essential to make the present Transit Traffic Agreement more attractive to the Italians. Both the Grazing Rights and Transit Traffic Agreements lapse at the end of February 1939, and the Italian authorities have intimated that, unless the Transit Traffic Agreement can be made to operate more satisfactorily, they will be disposed to terminate both Agreements.

The termination of the Grazing Rights Agreement without any provision for the future for safeguarding the grazing and watering rights (acquired by Treaty with Ethiopia) of our tribesmen would be a calamity for Somaliland, and in order to avert it, it might prove advisable to put forward the offers outlined in sections (2) and (4) of this paragraph, even though there should be no possibility of securing a cession of territory in exchange.

8. Although we have summarised our proposals separately in relation to the various British territories concerned, it is to be anticipated that, from the point of view of satisfying Italian public opinion, it will be necessary for the Italian Government to strike a balance between what they regard as the advantages which they receive in return, over the whole field of these negotiations, and we have kept this point in mind in formulating our proposals.

An attempt has been made to anticipate the requests that are likely to be put forward by the Italians in the course of these negotiations, and our conclusions on this aspect of the matter are set out in paragraphs 7 and 9-13 of Appendix II, and paragraphs 10-15 of Appendix III.

H.
M. M.

November 25, 1938.

APPENDIX I.

SUDAN-ETHIOPIAN FRONTIER.

THE southern part of the frontier between the Sudan and Italian East Africa (or previously Ethiopia) has never been demarcated south of Jokau, and it has long been recognised that the undemarcated part of the frontier south of Jokau as provisionally administered hitherto, as well as the southernmost part of the demarcated frontier from Jebel Gemi (latitude 9° North) to Jokau, is most unsatisfactory in many ways. It ignores all physical and ethnographical features. It parts company from the escarpment of the Ethiopian table-land and, by following the Baro, Pibor and Akobo rivers, constitutes a salient projecting into the Sudan. In this way it runs through country which is low-lying and, to a great extent, swamped during the rainy season. Its chief disadvantage, however, is that it divides the areas inhabited by the Nilotic Nuer and Anuak tribes, which in colour, race and customs, are entirely distinct from the tribes inhabiting the Ethiopian table-land further east. These two Nilotic tribes are really Sudan natives and have their centres of Government in the Sudan and in the portion of Nilotic swamped lands now shown on the map as being in Italian East Africa. The Nuer tribe, moreover, live for the greater part of the year in the Sudan and are protected by the Sudan Government. As long, however, as the present frontier is maintained, the effect is that one small section of this tribe live in Italian East Africa and other sections cross over into that territory for grazing and watering during the dry season, which lasts roughly from November to April of each year.

2. A further problem is presented by the Anuak tribe, which occupies a belt of territory immediately to the south and east of that occupied by the Nuer. About half the Anuak (the Chirru and the Adonga section) live, as the frontier is now observed permanently in the Sudan on the west bank of the river Akobo and Pibor and south of Akobo post, but many of their relatives live on the rivers Baro and Gila. This state of things has in the past caused much administrative inconvenience and even bloodshed.

3. So far as the Nuer are concerned, the effective control of the whole tribe by the Sudan Government is essential to any orderly administration of the region in question and is in the best interests of the tribesmen themselves. Such control can only be secured by means of a modification of the frontier, which would bring the whole Nuer tribal grazing grounds within Sudan territory. At the same time the cession of the whole of the Anuak to the Sudan should be effected. Any frontier drawn through the Baro salient itself would have the effect of cutting through a tribal area and would hence be open to the same objection as the present frontier. The only really logical and practical boundary would be one which followed the western base of the Abyssinian escarpment and hence gave the whole of the Baro salient to the Sudan.

4. The Italian Government may be willing to agree to this cession provided that they are adequately compensated elsewhere, and that regard is had to the position which they have already built up at Gambella, where they have erected buildings and other structures of a permanent or semi-permanent character. It would be preferable that the new frontier should run to the east of Gambella, but if, as is probable, this cannot be obtained, it is proposed that the new frontier should run through Gambella itself, leaving on the Italian side the former Abyssinian customs station, which is now in the hands of the Italians, and on the Sudan side the Sudan trading station, which is at present administered as an enclave by the Sudan authorities.

5. As regards compensation for the cession of the Baro salient, it is proposed that the Italian Government shall be offered in return for this a block of Sudan territory lying immediately to the south of this salient and roughly equal to it in area (6,000 square miles). This could be effected if the new frontier, crossing the old frontier at Ilambi, continued, generally speaking, to follow the base of the escarpment, leaving on the Italian side the Boma plateau and, generally speaking,

all the area inhabited by the "hills" Murle (Beir) tribe. The proposal can be more clearly understood by reference to the attached map where the proposed changes have been marked.

6. The territory which it is proposed to offer to Italy in exchange for the Baro salient is largely unadministered by the Sudan authorities, and is used as the seasonal grazing grounds by tribes coming from the Italian side of the present frontier. The whole proposal is designed to facilitate the administration of Italian East Africa and the Sudan respectively by including in the territories of each State areas used for seasonal grazing by tribes normally resident in and subject to that State.

APPENDIX II.

KENYA-ABYSSINIAN FRONTIER (EAST OF LAKE RUDOLF).

THE only description of this frontier which has been embodied in any formal international agreement is that contained in the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of the 6th December, 1907 (Cd. 4318). This description of the frontier, which is marked on the annexed map (B), was drawn up as a result of a survey made by Captain F. Maud, R.E., who was a member of an expedition under Mr. A. Butter, which visited the frontier region in 1902. This expedition was also accompanied by Count Colli of the Italian Legation at Addis Ababa. This boundary was not regarded as definitive since it was provided in the Agreement that Commissioners should be appointed by both of the Governments concerned to delimit the exact line of the frontier, and in particular to settle the frontier of the Borana and the Gurre in concert with the heads of those tribes and in accordance with their customs.

2. In spite, however, of repeated representations by His Majesty's Government, it was never found possible to induce the Emperor of Abyssinia to appoint Commissioners for this purpose and the frontier has consequently never been the subject of an agreed delimitation.

3. When the administration of the northern frontier region of Kenya was begun it was found that the line drawn by Captain Maud was most unsuitable in several respects. It lies tangentially along the southern extremities of the spurs of the Borana escarpment, and thus excludes from British territory almost all the permanent water, which lies at the heads of the valleys. At certain seasons of the year, the wells and grazing grounds south of this line dry up and it is then necessary for the tribes to move into the valleys north of the "Treaty" line, in order to obtain water and grazing for their stock. While it is true that provision for these seasonal trans-frontier movements had been made in the Agreement of 1907, their occurrence has always rendered the administration of this area extremely difficult. They have been a constant source of disputes and bloodshed between the turbulent tribes in that area, and of disputes with the Ethiopian authorities.

4. In 1908 a Commission under Major C. W. Gwynn, R.E., was sent to Addis Ababa with a view to undertaking, jointly with members to be appointed by the Emperor, the agreed delimitation of the frontier as provided in the Agreement in 1907. After waiting in vain for some months for the appointment of the Abyssinian members of the Commission, Major Gwynn and his party were authorised to proceed to the frontier alone. He found that there was no permanent water on the British side of the Treaty line for some 100 miles to the East and some 130 miles to the West of Moyale, and he formed the definite opinion that the principles on which Captain Maud had proceeded, in drawing the line proposed by him in 1902, were incorrect, probably as a result of his ignorance of the necessity for the northwards migration of the Kenya tribes during the dry seasons. Major Gwynn therefore proceeded to survey a new line (hereinafter referred to as the "Gwynn line") which is also marked on the annexed map, which by leaving some permanent water on the British side was intended to avoid the administrative difficulties of the Treaty line, in the area East and West of Moyale. He also proposed various other modifications of the Treaty line which it is unnecessary to mention here.

5. In the light of subsequent experience in the administration of this territory it became apparent that, although the Gwynn line, in the Moyale area, would be a great improvement over the Treaty line, it would itself be unsatisfactory since it would leave, on the British side, barely sufficient water to make possible the administration of the area, and it would still leave the greater part of the customary dry season wells and grazing grounds of the Kenya tribes on the Abyssinian side of the frontier. Further investigation has shown that the essential requirements of the Kenya tribes would be met, and the necessity for

seasonal trans-frontier migrations would be avoided by a modification of the Gwynn line, as shown by the red line on the annexed map. The Government of Kenya is satisfied that this adjustment of the frontier would leave sufficient permanent water for the use of the tribes residing to the North of this line. Moreover, by this rectification, the Italian administration, equally with the British administration, would be relieved of the difficulties which are inherent in the existing situation arising from the interposition of the frontier line between the wet and dry season grazing grounds of the tribes which inhabit this area.

6. The effect of the adjustment of this section of the frontier, as suggested, would be to transfer to Kenya a small area of territory, together with a certain number of tribesmen who reside there. It is proposed, in exchange, if necessary to cede to Italy the areas marked A, B, and C on Map B, in that order of preference. The cession of the areas A and B would confer on the Italian administration advantages similar to those that we hope to acquire by the rectification of the boundary in the Moyale area. Area A includes the southern portion of the wet season grazing of the Gurra Huruffi from the Gullullo district of Abyssinia, and, moreover, this section of the Gwynn line would provide an easily recognisable frontier—a matter of difficulty in a featureless area. The acquisition of area B would provide the Italian administration with a permanent lateral line of communication by means of the track through Bahul, Malka Ade and Dakka Dima to El Der. Moreover, the best well in this area, namely, Eil Roba, would also then be in Italian territory.

7. The cession of area C would to some extent serve the same purpose, as the shores of Lake Rudolf are visited periodically by tribesmen living to the north of the Treaty line. It is, however, understood that the Italians are very anxious to acquire this area for quite another reason, *viz.*, in order to give them access to deep water on Lake Rudolf, thus enabling them to establish a seaplane base there. For this reason, and also because of the value of Lake Rudolf as a source of water supply in military operations, the Service Departments consider that this area should not be ceded to Italy unless it is otherwise impossible to secure the rectification of the frontier desired by Kenya in the Moyale-Gaddaduma section. It is, however, our considered opinion that the cession of the areas A and B would be insufficient for this purpose, and that it will accordingly be necessary to contemplate the cession of area C.

8. The cession of areas A and C would not involve the transfer of any British subjects, as there is no permanent British population in these areas. They are used solely by tribesmen living to the north of the frontier as wet season grazing grounds. In the area B, however, there are a few permanent but inconsiderable wells, and a small British population, of whom, however, the majority normally move to the Gaddaduma area in the dry season. In a bad dry season practically all the population have to leave this area. The transfer of this area to Italy would therefore only affect a very small number of tribesmen, who could easily be accommodated in the Gaddaduma area which, *ex hypothesi*, we should get if we surrender this area. The transfer would, in fact, be to the advantage of these natives.

9. In addition to the desire of the Italians to acquire the area on the Eastern shore of Lake Rudolf (*v.* paragraph 7 above), there have been clear indications that the Italians are also likely to ask for the cession of that part of Jubaland, in the North-eastern region of Kenya, which they wished to acquire, and which we declined to cede to them, as part of the bargain in respect of the distribution of colonial territories at the end of the last war. It appears that the Italians are anxious to develop a further line of communication with Southern Abyssinia through the port of Kismayu, and thence along the road which enters Kenya on its Eastern frontier at Dif, and then proceeds North-westwards through Moyale; and it is therefore probable that they will ask for the cession of an area which would include this road. There are, however, many objections (strategic and administrative, apart from the more general objections) to the cession of such a large area, but after consultation with the Government of Kenya, it would appear that the area marked D on Map B might be ceded to Italy, without giving rise to any serious strategic or administrative objections. In fact, from the administrative point of view the cession of this area would have some advantage in creating a

frontier which is readily recognisable, and across which there are no seasonal migrations. Moreover, the population of this area belong to the same tribes as the population north of the Daua River, so that the whole of these tribes would be brought under one administration.

10. We did not think it necessary to consider the cession of this area in connection with the rectification of the Northern frontier of Kenya, as the cession of the areas A, B and C ought to be sufficient compensation to the Italians for that rectification. In the case of the Somaliland frontiers, on the other hand, (*vide* Appendix III) we shall be asking for a very large accretion of territory, and we have very little to offer the Italians in return. We therefore considered the possible cession of area D in Kenya as part of the bargain in respect of what we want for Somaliland.

11. On reflection, however, the Secretary of State for the Colonies would be very unwilling to have to agree to the cession of this area, for the following reasons:—

- (a) The objections (Parliamentary and other) to agreeing to the cession of a part of a British Colony which would probably involve the transfer with it of some five thousand British subjects.
- (b) The fact that it would not be possible to consult these tribesmen until after an agreement had been reached with the Italians for the cession of their land.
- (c) The element of doubt (though admittedly slight) whether they would elect to become Italian subjects and remain in the transferred area, or whether they would wish to move into another area of Kenya where it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to find accommodation for them.
- (d) The fact that it might be decided not to defend Somaliland in war.
- (e) The doubt whether even the cession of this area of Kenya would, in fact, be a sufficient inducement to the Italians to agree to the desired rectification of the Somaliland frontier. If this were found not to be the case, we should then be in a worse position than we are at present, in that we should have disclosed to the Italians the fact that we have no absolutely insuperable objection to the cession of the north-eastern corner of Kenya, which the Italians had coveted at the time of the cession of Jubaland.

It may, however, be necessary to reconsider the question of the cession of this area when we have received the counter-proposals of the Italian Government.

12. Having regard to the indications that the Italians have in mind the development of the Kismayu-Moyale route, we have also considered whether it would be worth while offering to improve that route so as to make it suitable for moderately heavy traffic throughout the year. The section from Wajir to Moyale is in fairly good condition, though it is not an all-weather route, but the section from Wajir to Dif is practically non-existent, and it is estimated that it would cost at least £85,000 to construct the Kenya section of this road to an all-weather standard. This estimate is based on the assumption that the work could be carried out for £200 per mile, with provision for contingencies of £5,000. The standard of construction contemplated would not be high, and if the traffic were at all heavy, the annual maintenance charges would be considerable. As Kenya would not wish to undertake this work for its own purposes, and as the construction of this road would be part of the bargain in respect of Somaliland, it would not be reasonable to expect Kenya to bear any part of the cost of construction. If, however, it should appear, in the course of the negotiations, that the construction of this road would materially assist us in obtaining a satisfactory settlement on the Somaliland frontier, it is suggested that it would be reasonable (as in the case of the roads in Somaliland—*v.* Appendix III, paragraph 14) to offer to contribute half the cost from the British Treasury, if the Italians would bear the other half. This offer would, of course, not be made unless it were likely to produce commensurate advantages. If, nevertheless, the Italians should desire transit facilities along this route, and if they wanted something better than the existing road, we might offer to construct it to an all-weather standard if they were prepared to pay for it. In either case it is thought that it should be

stipulated that the Italians should contribute substantially to the cost of maintenance, which would be very heavy if the road were used to any considerable extent.

13. The construction of this road would assist an Italian advance into Kenya to a certain extent, though this consideration is of insufficient importance to rule out the project if it was found that the construction of the road (with or without a contribution from British funds) would materially assist us in obtaining a satisfactory settlement of our frontier problems. It would, however, be necessary to stipulate that this road should not be used for the transit of troops or munitions.

APPENDIX III

THE SOMALILAND FRONTIERS.

THE frontier line between British Somaliland and Abyssinia as defined in the Anglo-Abyssinian Treaty of 1897 had the disastrous effect of bisecting the traditional grazing areas of British Somali tribes. Moreover, it left within British territory areas of poor grazing, while at the frontier there begins an area of superior grazing.

One of the provisions of the 1897 Treaty was that tribes on either side of the frontier were to be free to make use of their traditional grazing grounds on the other side. The position was becoming more difficult as the Abyssinians developed a more efficient administration in the frontier areas, and the Somaliland Government found an embarrassing problem in the administration of tribes which were accustomed to spend part of each year in territory to which a British officer had no right of access. In the early days this did not matter as British officers were accustomed to cross the undemarcated frontier and, in effect, to administer tribes in what was really Abyssinian territory. The demarcation of the frontier in 1933-34 put an end to that state of affairs.

2. The position in the Somaliland frontier areas can be summarised as follows:—

- (a) At least three-fifths of the inhabitants of Somaliland, *i.e.*: up to 200,000 people, have for years crossed and recrossed the frontier freely in search of water and grazing. To close the frontier to them would cause bitter resentment and would result in severe hardship, since the grazing and water available in British Somaliland are inadequate to maintain the population and stock. Successive Governors of Somaliland have stated that a very difficult position indeed, threatening the internal security of the Protectorate, would arise if British-protected tribes were debarred from the use of the trans-frontier grazing grounds. Any attempt to divide the tribes so as to leave a proportion in British territory and the balance in Italian territory would affect our prestige and would be difficult to carry out in practice.
- (b) The difficulty of administering the nomadic tribes of the Protectorate can only be effectively eased if these are all brought within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Government of British Somaliland.

3. The desirability of adding the trans-frontier grazing areas to the Protectorate has long been recognised, and negotiations were about to begin with the Emperor of Abyssinia with a view to an exchange of territory whereby Abyssinia would be given the port of Zeila and a corridor linking it to Abyssinian territory in return for the acquisition of the grazing areas by British Somaliland. These negotiations had, however, to be suspended following the Walwal incident. It will be recalled, however, that the offer to Abyssinia of the port of Zeila and the corridor was revived both immediately before the Italian-Abyssinian war (the "Zeila offer") and also in the later proposals following the discussions between Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval. It was not contemplated, however, under either of these latter arrangements that British Somaliland should acquire the grazing areas.

4. With the Italian occupation of Abyssinia it became necessary to negotiate a *modus vivendi* whereby British-protected tribes would be free, despite the Italian occupation, to cross the frontier to the grazing areas as heretofore. Accordingly, an agreement, effective for two years, was signed in Rome in January 1937 (Cmd. 5775). The agreement provides generally that British-protected tribes will be free during that period (*i.e.*, until the end of February 1939) to cross and water up to the traditional limits of their grazing areas across the whole length of the British Somaliland-Abyssinian frontier—*i.e.*, the limits indicated by the Anglo-Abyssinian Boundary Commission of 1935—subject to the withdrawal of those limits some miles northwards in the immediate neighbourhood of Wardair and Walwal. The right of the tribes to cross the frontier is subject

to the observance of certain conditions which have not so far proved onerous in practice. Generally speaking, the agreement has worked satisfactorily and there has been no serious interference with British tribes during their periodic migrations.

Reports received from the Governor indicate, however, that neither the Somaliland Government nor the Italian authorities regard the existing arrangement as an ideal one or one that should be made permanent. These reports confirm the opinion expressed by the British representatives who signed the Rome Agreement of 1937:—

It is not possible to be confident as to what may happen after two years. The Italians readily agreed that the southern frontier of British Somaliland was an artificial one drawn through the territory of British-protected nomadic tribes, and that it was at present essential for these tribes to be able to graze and water across the frontier. But it is clear that the Italians have no real liking for a state of affairs in which large numbers of British tribesmen cross annually into territory under Italian control. They realize that, for the moment, no other arrangement is feasible and that it is to their advantage to have our co-operation in controlling trans-frontier movements. But it appears very doubtful whether they will be prepared to contemplate any such arrangement as permanent, and this doubt is confirmed by their attitude over the eastern frontier of the Protectorate as described in the following paragraph. It must be admitted that there is much to be said for the Italian point of view: the bi-annual crossing of the frontier by large numbers of alien nomadic tribesmen will be felt as still more of an inconvenience and anomaly as Italian administration of the frontier areas becomes more complete. The only effective permanent solution of this question remains, therefore, in our view, a rectification of the frontier so as to include the grazing areas in British Somaliland, and if general negotiations take place with Italy in regard to the Abyssinian frontier, we would urge this as a desideratum of the first importance. We would hazard a guess that (always provided that some territorial *quid pro quo* could be found) the Italians will be prepared to agree to such a rectification, at any rate so far as concerns the territory across the frontier in which the Ibbah and Dolbahanta graze.

5. Our prestige in Somaliland has not unreasonably suffered on account of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and their lavish expenditure in areas across the frontier. If Britain fails to obtain the grazing areas for the Protectorate, our prestige with the Somali tribes will be seriously affected. A renewal of the existing agreement provides no effective solution: the Italians dislike it, the tribes resent having to go into what they regard as their country on sufferance instead of by right; and the Somaliland Administration would still be faced with the difficulty of administering tribes who spend large parts of the year outside British control.

It is proposed, therefore, to ask the Italians to agree to a rectification of the Southern frontier of British Somaliland so as to bring into the Protectorate the grazing areas of the British tribes up to the limits agreed upon by the Anglo-Abyssinian Boundary Commission of 1935, subject to two modifications:—

(a) At the Eastern end of the frontier, as it is most unlikely that the Italians would agree to the transfer of Walwal and Wardair and the immediately surrounding area, it will be necessary to aim at a boundary coinciding with the limits of grazing recognised in the Rome Agreement of January 1937; and

(b) At the Western end of the frontier the grazing areas recognised by the Boundary Commission of 1935 and in the Rome Agreement of 1937 extend to the west of the Jibuti Railway. As it is assumed that the Italians would not countenance the transfer of any territory to the west of, or abutting on this Railway, it is not proposed to ask that this part of the grazing area should be included in British Somaliland. It is suggested, therefore, that in this area the frontier should follow the existing frontier from the tri-junction point with French Somaliland to Samadu at the south-western corner of British Somaliland, extending from that place to Galdessa and then running eastwards along the limit of the grazing areas as already indicated.

The area which we hope to obtain is coloured blue on Map "C," and the line from Samadu to Galdessa is shown in red thereon.

Eastern frontier situation.

6. The Governor of Somaliland has expressed the hope that in the course of negotiations with Italy about the Abyssinian frontiers, it will be possible to secure a settlement of outstanding questions on the eastern frontier of the Protectorate, i.e., that between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland proper.

7. Two questions arise here—

(a) The location of the frontier at its northern end. The Anglo-Italian Boundary Commission of 1931, which demarcated this boundary, failed to agree on the location of the boundary near Banda Ziada, a tiny port on the Gulf of Aden. No vital interest is at stake here, and the Government of British Somaliland has always been prepared to use this as a bargaining factor, i.e., to accept the Italian line if an advantage elsewhere might be facilitated by this course.

(b) The Italians have for some years closed the eastern frontier and have refused to allow British-protected tribes to cross to their grazing grounds on the other side. The Boundary Commission demarcated the frontier line and surveyed the tribal areas on either side, but no formal negotiations with Italy concerning this agreement have ever been undertaken. Many attempts have been made (the last being at Rome in January 1937) to persuade the Italians to raise the ban on trans-frontier migration without prejudice to the question of future permanent arrangements. The Italians have, however, consistently declined to entertain any such proposal. In the circumstances, the question has been considered whether it would be possible to negotiate a territorial adjustment of this boundary so as to obtain a more suitable line which would bring under British protection the grazing areas in Italian territory normally occupied by British tribes and *vice versa*. The present Governor of British Somaliland has, however, opposed any such arrangement; in his view the absence of clear-cut tribal limits in this area would render such a territorial adjustment difficult. Thus, the ideal solution remains that which we have consistently advocated for many years, viz., the retention of the present frontier line with free migration across it for British and Italian tribes alike. It is doubtful whether it is worth while attempting to secure such an arrangement in the course of the new negotiations. Although British tribes in this area have suffered on account of the closing of the frontier, the position here is by no means as difficult as it is on the southern frontier, since the number of tribesmen concerned is much smaller, while, with the exclusion of Italian tribes from British Somaliland, there is more grazing for British tribes on our side of the frontier. Nevertheless, there may be some advantage in making an effort to secure freedom of migration, on a basis of reciprocity, up to the limit of the grazing areas of our tribes as recognised by the Boundary Commission, and coloured green on Map "C." But, if the Italians resist this claim, it is suggested that the retention of the present eastern frontier as a closed frontier should be the first concession to be offered them in exchange for the trans-frontier grazing areas to the south of the Protectorate.

Transit Traffic Arrangements.

8. Simultaneously with the Grazing Rights Agreement negotiated at Rome last year, another Agreement was concluded to provide for Italian traffic across Somaliland to Abyssinia (Cmd. 5775). Like the Grazing Rights Agreement, it came into force on the 1st March, 1937, and is valid for two years from that date, at the end of which period it may be renewed by mutual consent. The Italians had been anxious to obtain facilities for the transport of goods from British Somaliland to the Harar district, and the Agreement granted these facilities subject to certain conditions; e.g., the Italian Government undertook to reimburse the Government of British Somaliland for the cost of the roads required for the

to increase from year to year, and even in the first year it is higher than it would be in the case of an all-weather road, but it is obvious that even the most favourable estimate of the amount of traffic likely to pass over the roads, could not justify the expenditure involved in constructing all-weather roads, except in the unlikely event of the Italians agreeing to defray the entire cost. It must be realized, however, that the life of the new roads with the normal rate of maintenance will be limited, and the local Public Works Department estimate it at five years, after which more construction would be required. The possibility of offering the Italians some financial assistance is now under consideration, and it is understood that the Treasury agree that it would be reasonable to offer to bear a proportion, not exceeding half, of the capital cost as well as a similar proportion of the cost of maintenance of the roads from Berbera and Zeila to the frontier. On the basis of the most recent estimates this expenditure would amount to £47,000 capital, and £8,000 recurrent, assuming that the Somaliland share was 50 per cent. of the whole.


15. There is also the possibility of our offering a transit agreement on the Kismayu-Moyale road in Kenya, if necessary with a financial contribution to construction and maintenance (*vide* paragraph 12 of Appendix II).


In the last resort, it may be necessary to reconsider the question of the cession of the area marked D on Map B (*vide* paragraphs 9-11 of Appendix II).

SECRET

MAP OF SOUTH EASTERN SUDAN

Map A






Reference

- Boundaries, International
- Provincial
- Motor roads, all weather
- Motor roads, dry
- Motor roads, proposed
- Tracks
- Tracks, proposed

Scale 1:1,000,000

Hydro Dept

BRITISH SOMALILAND



Scale = 1:2,000,000 or 1 inch to 31.56 miles
 Miles 20 40 60 80 100 120

- REFERENCE
- Railways (Tramways)
 - Tracks for mule carts and camels
 - International Boundaries
 - District
 - Station
 - Wells, Billah
 - Italian Posts

Area which it is proposed to ask the Italians to cede.
 Area which it is proposed to offer to the Italians.
 Additional Area, the offer of which to the Italians might be further considered.
 Grazing lands of British Protected Tribes in Italian territory beyond Eastern Frontier



No. 32

Extract from Military Intelligence Summary for Period

22/4-37 to 29/5-37 (Regd. at (15) on 34099/37 K.N.R.)

ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR.

EVENTS ON KENYA BORDER WESTERN.

Occupation of NAMARAPUTH.

9. With reference to Intelligence Summary No. 31, para 6; On 8-5-37 the District Officer, LOKITAUNG, received a letter of protest from the Italian Commander of MAJI Sector (Tenente Colonel Corrado Ragazzi). This letter was dated 26-4-37 and it stated that on 18-4-37 a patrol sent by him to replace the Ethiopian guard at NAMARAPUTH found it occupied by the British, who were alleged to have made a surprise night-attack on 31-3-37 on the Ethiopian post, capturing three men and putting the remainder to flight. The letter further claimed NAMARAPUTH was in Ethiopian territory; that it had been guarded by Fitabrui Haile Marian who had already submitted to the Italians, and that it formed part of Maji Territory, already occupied by the Italian Government. In addition, allegations were made that British aeroplanes frequently fly over Bume and Gelubba. The letter concluded by making the following demands:-

- (a) The evacuation of NAMARAPUTH by the British.
- (b) The restitution of the three Italian subjects alleged to have been captured, and
- (c) the suspension of aerial flights over Italian territory.

This letter was brought to the District Officer by an Italian native lance-corporal (Mtaz) with an escort of six men.

10. On 10-5-37 the District Officer gave his reply to the above-mentioned lance-corporal, for delivery to the Italian Commander at MAJI, and the former and his party left the same afternoon. In his reply the District Officer stated the Italian Commander's letter was being forwarded to the Officer-in-Charge for action. The Italians have now been informed that should the local Italian authorities refuse to accept the fact that NAMARAPUTH is in British territory and wish to pursue the matter further, they should do so through the usual diplomatic channels.

No. 34003/37/3/1 No. 11

Fraters (KHS)

(B26803-23) 24



Extract from Military Intelligence Summary No. 31

(Regd. at No. 72 on 34099/37 K.A.R.)

Occupation of NAMARAPUTH.

6. On 1-4-37 it was reported, and subsequently confirmed, that the Ethiopian post at NAMARAPUTH had been evacuated. At the same time information was received that the Italians were advancing rapidly southwards from KATA Province through HAJI and had already reached NAKUA. It is necessary to explain that NAMARAPUTH is definitely in British territory, and the presence of an Ethiopian post there was only a temporary measure pending the demarcation of the boundary by a boundary commission. Unfortunately, however, this commission never sat. In view of the above unsatisfactory position it was decided that, in order to avoid a misunderstanding on the arrival of the Italian troops, NAMARAPUTH should be occupied by the Civil Administration in co-operation with a detachment of the 4th. King's African Rifles and the Royal Air Force. Accordingly, orders were issued to this effect and the Chief Native Commissioner, accompanied by the Officer Commanding 4th. King's African Rifles, who had arrived from BOLEBO, entered NAMARAPUTH at midday on 3-4-37. The Chief Native Commissioner explained to the local inhabitants that NAMARAPUTH was in British territory and informed them they had nothing to fear from the British and that they could carry on with their normal duties. There were also 22 armed Ethiopians present who gave themselves out as traders; they were informed they must return to their own country, or alternatively they would be disarmed and interned. They subsequently returned to Ethiopia without incident. On the conclusion of the address, the 4th. King's African Rifles detachment occupied the village, the Union Jack being hoisted with due ceremony.

7. Up to the present there have been no repercussions since the occupation of NAMARAPUTH, the Turkanā and the local Merille (including Chief Tapo who lives just over the Sudan border) being definitely in favour of British occupation. It is possible, however, that inconvenience may be caused by an influx of refugees and/or the Merille may cross over the boundary if the Italians commence commandeering their stock: should this occur complications in regard to grazing, water etc. would no doubt arise. In the meantime, it has been decided that as soon as the District Commissioner and the military can be withdrawn, arrangements will be made to replace them by a small Police Post.

Abyssinian Frontier (K.O.S.)

5 APR 1937
C. O. REG

sc 7/4679

Telegram from the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 5th. April, 1937. Received 12.27 p.m. 5th. April.



No. 76. Confidential.

4

Your despatch of 18th. March confidential*
Ethiopian garrison evacuated Namurupus night of March 30th
without request from this Government probably owing to
report that Italians advancing from Nakhua. Post
occupied by this Government without incident April 3rd
and flag hoisted. Civil and Military Posts established.

Copy of Report (M.O.)
to the Secretary of State (M.O.)
17th. April 1937 (M.O.)
18th. April 1937 (M.O.)
19th. April 1937 (M.O.)

* No. 28003/3/37 [N. 4]

Albion Frontier (K. 15)

(E21803-21)



CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 2nd April, 1937. Received 3.43 p.m., 2nd April, 1937.

No. 75. Secret.

Addressed Secretary of State for the Colonies

repeated Governor General Khartoum. Report from Lokitaung dated 30th March begins: B Eritreans arrived at Namurupus 27th March report that battle with Italians was fought near Maji about 19th March. Zaude Ayela and defeated army have gone to Bako but Eritreans have come to Lake. Haile Mariam deserted to Italians. Many Abyssinians remained at Maji intending to submit on arrival of Italians. I understand it is probable Namurupus will be abandoned garrison going to Bako to join Zaude. Smallpox is reported in Maji. Ends.

Abyssinia Frontier (KHS)



A.M. MAIL

4

C. O.

Mr. Flood 12/3/37

Major Cole 13/3/37

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

Sir C. Bottomley 15/3

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Early. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State. 16.3.37

Stamp: 11 MAR 17

Downing Street,
18 March, 1937.

Sir,

I have etc. to acknowledge the receipt of your Confidential despatch No. 17 of the 21st of January and to enclose copies of correspondence with the Foreign Office. It will be observed that in the opinion of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the only safe course is to disarm the garrison and to allow them to remain in Kenya territory, presumably being added to the other refugees. ~~In my opinion this is the only course to adopt.~~ Circumstances have entirely altered since the establishment of the Ethiopian post at Namurupus was first allowed and the garrison can only be regarded as an armed post of a belligerent established within neutral territory

DRAFT

KENYA.

CONFIDENTIAL

O.A.G.

FURTHER ACTION.

copy A.D. / LF

Handwritten notes: (5), 16/3/37, and other scribbles

territory. I therefore consider that the garrison

should be directed to evacuate the post forthwith

and warned that if they do not do so within ~~24~~ ^{a reasonable short time - say 48 hours} ~~hours~~

hours they will be treated as belligerents taking

refuge in a neutral country and ^{by} disarmed and interned.

If on receipt of this instruction the garrison

prefer to return to Ethiopia, there is no reason why

they should not be allowed to do so, but if they do

not wish to return it would, I think, be inhuman to

compel them to go, ^{and they should then be disarmed & placed}

with the other refugees.

I have, etc.

(Signed) W. ORMSBY GORE.

Note
We can leave the
time of the ultimatum
to the local Gov. We
cannot know the
detailed circumstances
(see)
WJG

In any further communication
on this subject, please quote


No. J 659/229/1

and address—

not to any person by name

but to—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.



FOREIGN OFFICE,

S.W.1.

5th March, 1937.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 38003/3/37 of the 12th February regarding the occupation by an Ethiopian military garrison of a post at Namurupus, in Kenya Colony.


2. Mr. Eden realises that some action in this matter is necessary, since if the present state of affairs is allowed to continue the Italian authorities will naturally assume, when their forces arrive on the spot, that Namurupus is in Ethiopian territory. He fears, however, that if the course suggested by Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore (namely to inform the Italian Government of the fact that Namurupus is in British territory and to draw their attention to the circumstances in which its occupation by the Ethiopians was countenanced) is followed, the Italian Government will, despite such an explanation, be loth to believe that this occupation would have been tolerated by His Majesty's Government for so long had the national status of the post in question not been in dispute; and that it would, therefore, be impossible eventually to avoid inconvenient discussions with the Italian authorities as to whether Namurupus lay in British or in Ethiopian territory.

3. In these circumstances one solution might have been for the Government of Kenya to take steps to remove the Ethiopian garrison/

The Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

2
C.M. to Kenya (4)

82
3



FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.
5th March, 1937.

In any further communication
of this subject, please quote
No. J 659/229/1
and address
not to any person by name
but to
"The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1."

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.38003/3/37 of the 12th February regarding the occupation by an Ethiopian military garrison of a post at Namurupus, in Kenya Colony.

2

CSM to Kenya - (14)

2. Mr. Eden realises that some action in this matter is necessary, since if the present state of affairs is allowed to continue the Italian authorities will naturally assume, when their forces arrive on the spot, that Namurupus is in Ethiopian territory. He fears, however, that if the course suggested by Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore (namely to inform the Italian Government of the fact that Namurupus is in British territory and to draw their attention to the circumstances in which its occupation by the Ethiopians was countenanced) is followed, the Italian Government will, despite such an explanation, be loth to believe that this occupation would have been tolerated by His Majesty's Government for so long had the national status of the post in question not been in dispute; and that it would, therefore, be impossible eventually to avoid inconvenient discussions with the Italian authorities as to whether Namurupus lay in British or in Ethiopian territory.

3. In these circumstances one solution might have been for the Government of Kenya to take steps to remove the Ethiopian garrison/

The Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

garrison from Namurupus and oblige them to return to Ethiopian territory. In view, however, of recent instances of the inhuman treatment of Italian native levies by the Italian authorities, as recorded in despatch No.270 from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Addis Ababa enclosed in Foreign Office letter No.J 151/45/1 of the 25th January, Mr. Eden could only view such action with grave misgiving. He hopes, therefore, that Mr. Ormsby Gore will agree in thinking that the only safe course to pursue is to disarm the garrison and allow the men to remain in Kenya territory.

(3) ^{orig}
46597/1/57 F.A.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Ronald Campbell



30/12/33

2

C. O.

Mr. *Swain* 9/4/37
Mr. *Parkin* 2/12 f.s.

- Mr. Sir C. Parkinson
- Mr. Sir G. Tomlinson
- Mr. Sir C. Bottomley
- Mr. Sir J. Shuckburgh
- Permt. U.S. of S.
- Parly. U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State.

12 February, 1937

DRAFT.

The U.S.A.
Foreign Office

No 11
30/12/33

I am etc to refer to ~~the~~ FO
 Letter of the 11th of October,
 1933, No. J. 2351/35/1 and
 the connected correspondence
 regarding the occupation by
 an ^{Arabic} Ethiopian of a
 post at NAMURUPUS in Kenya,
 and to transmit to you, to
 be laid before Mr Secretary
 Eden, a copy of a
 despatch from the O.S.G. of
 Kenya in which it is
 reported that Namurupus
 is still occupied by an
 Ethiopian Garrison.

Kenya 2/1/37

Kenya

FURTHER ACTION

2 ~~In Draft for Home~~
 the view expressed by
 Mr Wades that the
 discovery by Station force

2

The journal may lead to a
false interpretation being
placed on the King's
Government's attitude in
the matter. He would be
obliged, therefore, providing
Mr Eden sees no objection,
if H.M.'s Representative at
Rome might be instructed to
call the attention of the
Italian Government to the
fact that Namarupa is
in British territory and
to the circumstances in which
its occupation by the Ethiopians
has been countenanced, ~~as~~
^{as} described in pages 3 and 4
of Mr Wade's despatch.

appears to be
justified.
M: O'maly Gae

Sam etc

(Signed) J. E. W. FLOOD

AIR MAIL

KENYA.
No. 17

RECEIVED



GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
NAIROBI,
KENYA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



21 January, 1937.

Sir,

(12) on 3015/3/33

I have the honour to refer to a Confidential despatch of the 17th October, 1935, from Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (now Lord Swinton) and relative correspondence on the subject of the occupation by an Ethiopian military garrison of a post at Namurupus in this Colony.

2. For ease of reference, the following brief summary is given of the negotiations which have taken place on this question and which, as you will be aware, resulted in the decision that, for purposes of political expediency, the Ethiopian evacuation of the post should not be insisted on.

In February, 1930, the Provincial Commissioner, Turkana, discovered that an armed party of Ethiopians, acting under the directions of Fitaurari Haile Mariam, had established themselves at Namurupus about two miles to the North of the King's African Rifles post at Todenyang.

The Provincial Commissioner immediately represented to the Fitaurari that the site of the post was in British territory, but received the reply that the post was regarded by the Ethiopians as being in Ethiopian territory and, in any case, could not be evacuated without orders from the Emperor.

In

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
W. ORMSBY GORE, P.C. M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
DOWNING STREET,
LONDON, S.W. 1

Copy to F.C. (2)
Amud

2.

In March of the same year His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa was informed of the position and asked to make urgent explanatory representations to the central Government with a view to securing the removal of the post from British territory where it was feared its continued existence might give rise to incidents causing a collision between the King's African Rifles and Ethiopian Tribes, see Kenya telegram No. 65 - Confidential of the 1st March, 1930.

(2) on 16008/30

Despite the fact that the Director-General of Foreign Affairs undertook in March, 1930, in consequence of representations made by His Majesty's Minister, to issue immediate instructions for the withdrawal of the post, the position in November of that year was that the Ethiopian garrison was still in occupation and further was interfering with the fishing rights of the Turkana in the locality.

In view of the failure of more direct representations, your predecessor Lord Passfield was in Kenya Confidential despatch No. 159 of the 20th November, 1930, asked to make similar and urgent representations through the usual diplomatic channels. Further action in the matter was then deferred, on representations made by His Majesty's Minister, pending an examination of the situation on the spot by Captain Whalley, His Majesty's Consul at Maji, early in 1931, see Lord Passfield's Confidential despatch of the 31st January, 1931.

(16) on 16008/30

(3) on 17044/1/31

At a meeting held at Government House in April, 1931, to discuss the proposed establishment of

an

an Arbitration Board for Merille-Turkana affairs, Captain Whalley was anxious that the Ethiopian garrison should be allowed to remain as its existence would facilitate border arrangements. This Government was, however, unable to concur and, in Sir Joseph Byrne's Confidential despatch No.66 of the 1st May, 1931, it was stated that, though willing to study the convenience of Fitaurari Haile Mariam by agreeing to the utilization of the buildings at Namurupus during sessions of the Arbitration Board, this Government in no way modified its attitude towards the major question and desired the strongest representations to be made for the evacuation of the post.

(3) on 17041/C/31

In July, 1931, Lord Passfield, in his Confidential telegram No.222 of the 25th July, 1931, in deference to the view expressed by Sir Sidney Barton when in England that the insistence on the evacuation of Namurupus would be likely to result in the complete withdrawal of Ethiopian administration from the frontier district and that chaos would ensue, suggested, after discussion with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that this Government should agree to allow the post to remain on the understandings that -

(21) on 17041/A/31

- (i) the measure was a temporary one and an act of grace on the part of His Majesty's Government in order to facilitate the operation of the Arbitration Boards and to promote friendly relations;
- (ii) British claims to the territory on which the post was situated were not affected in any way; and

(iii)

4.

(iii) the Ethiopians refrained from interfering with the fishing rights of British subjects in the area and from all other actions calculated to prejudice the rights of the local inhabitants or to disturb the peace.

(10) or 18065/32

As stated in Mr. Moore's Confidential despatch No.100 of the 10th August, 1952, the further condition was added by this Government that the right was reserved to reoccupy Namurupus should the Ethiopians fail to observe the conditions in question, and, at any rate, after any refixing of the boundary.

5. The present position is that the post at Namurupus is still occupied by a small Ethiopian garrison.

Although, as far as is known here, the Italians are still some 120 miles from the Eastern shore of Lake Rudolf, reports generally indicate an intention to advance Westwards; and it has been reported that armed tribesmen accompanied by a nucleus of Italian "banda" have already been in contact with the Gelubba.

I am apprehensive lest, should Italian regular, or even irregular, forces find Namurupus occupied by an Ethiopian garrison, a false interpretation may be put by the Italian Authorities on this Government's attitude in the matter; and, in any case, in such an event, the establishment of this Colony's territorial rights in subsequent negotiations would be likely to be a matter of some difficulty.

In

87
END

5.

In these circumstances it may be considered desirable to invite the attention of the Italian Government to the fact that Namurupus is in British territory and to the circumstances in which its occupation by the Ethiopians has been countenanced.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

A. S. W. Adams

ACTING GOVERNOR.

(5)