

1935.

Kenya

No. 38066

(Secret.)

SUBJECT

CO 533/457

Situation in Abyssinia

(Part 1.)

Previous

Subsequent

Part 2.

- 2
- 1 To Gov. Kenya Tel 56 Secret ——— 27 Feb '35.
 (Copy original on 46011/55 Sulu Secret)
- 2 Governor Kenya Secret ——— 16 Feb '35.
- 3 Your Kenya
 Tel about 11.15 ———
 Repl to No 1 left by
 in usual way

Mr. Freeston.

1. I have sent forward separately the Somaliland papers on which the original of our telegram of the 27th February is registered. On that paper I have suggested that there is no need to ~~have~~ convene any meeting of the O.D.C. at present, at any rate pending the receipt of the despatch promised in No.3 - and the receipt of further recommendations which Sir Arthur Lawrence is to make concerning the strengthening of the R.A.F. Detachment in Somaliland in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.

2. Sir Joseph Byrne is apparently anxious to know whether H.M.C. agree with his view that a policy of excluding any mass incursion of refugees into Kenya in the event of hostilities would not be contrary to the obligation in the 1907 Treaty with Ethiopia to allow Ethiopian tribes to use their grazing grounds in Kenya "as in the past", subject to their coming under the jurisdiction of the territorial authority in Kenya. I think that the answer on this point is clear - namely that, as Sir Joseph Byrne himself says, the provision of the 1907 Treaty was not intended to cover a contingency of the kind contemplated in this despatch - a mass incursion of
 refugees

refugees because of warlike operations across the frontier. As you know, under a Treaty of 1897 Ethiopian tribes have the right to use freely their additional grazing grounds in British Somaliland; but we have never regarded that provision as precluding the right of the Somaliland Administration to close the frontier against the incursion of Ethiopian refugees in the event of fighting across the border.

The despatch reads also as if Sir Joseph Byrne wishes to warn us that any measures which may be necessary to close the frontier against such refugees will involve special administrative and military preparation which would be expensive and which Kenya may well be unable to bear in the present state of its finances. On this point it seems to me that if the consequences of any mass incursion of tribes into Kenya would be as unfortunate as is indicated in this despatch, then there can be no doubt but that, despite the cost, the policy of closing the frontier and preventing such incursions must be followed as effectively as possible. ~~and~~ It is possible that when we get the further despatch ^{from} Sir Joseph Byrne we shall be able to see what special measures would probably be necessary, and to have some idea of what they would cost. I suggest, therefore, that we need take no action on this particular point at present.

3. I may add that the view of the War Office is that if there is a war between Italy and Ethiopia there would be comparatively

little

little fighting in the areas adjacent to the Kenya frontier and that the main fighting (in so far as this did not take place in the areas near Eritrea) would take place in the areas to the north of the Webbe Shibelli. I might add also that the general Italian-Ethiopian situation is for the moment perceptibly easier, thanks largely to the fact that an agreement as to the neutral zone has been satisfactorily concluded, but a great deal of water has still to flow under the bridge and it would not, I think, be safe to assume that there is no possibility now of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia in the present year. If Italy really means business it will not be difficult for her when she is ready to find a suitable pretext.

4. So far as immediate action is concerned I think that all we need do is to send a copy of this despatch to the Foreign Office (reference our letter on the Somaliland file about the special measures to be taken in Somaliland) asking the Foreign Office to confirm our view as to the Treaty question - and saying that on the more general questions it is proposed to await the air mail despatch which is on its way. I suggest also that if a suitable opportunity arises we might ask Mr. Glenday to come here to give us his views as to what the situation would be on the border in the event of hostilities.

The report to be had from Norway on 20th March
SP

The air-mail despatch should arrive in two days time. Await its arrival

*JP
6/5.*

As regards the legal position there can, I think, be no doubt that the Govt. of Kenya has the right, if it chooses, to close the frontier against refugees from Abyssinia or Italian Somaliland. Any kind of general taking refuge in the country would not be governed by the ordinary migrations in search of grazing or by the provision with regard to access to wells. P Though, however, Kenya may have this right could it or should it be enforced in practice? I am quite certain that it could not be enforced and that it would be most inhumane even to attempt to do so. The position of a British political or military officer up on the frontier faced with a crowd of terrified refugees, men, women and children, all in a state of panic and in complete ignorance of what it was all about, would be impossible if he had to turn them back again. On grounds of common humanity I do not think that any British officer would attempt to deny such unfortunates an entry into Kenya. It would be his job, and a hard job it would be too, to see that they did not interfere too much with the organisation of the native population actually domiciled in Kenya and arrangements would have to be made to disarm them as far as possible, but I do not think that the idea of turning them back or trying to keep them on the far side of a very ill-defined frontier could be entertained. For one thing it would probably mean sentence of death on a large proportion of the refugees

4
in view of the inhospitable conditions of ^a the large part of the frontier.

If there is a war between Italy and Abyssinia Kenya will almost certainly have to concentrate troops upon the frontier in order to watch the situation. There may be trouble in several directions. On the one hand, Abyssinians may endeavour to take refuge in Kenya in order to avoid the exactions of their own Govt. Italian natives may also do the same. On the other hand, if Abyssinia is engaged in war it would be inevitable that what central authority exists over the frontier tribes will be relaxed. The leaders and some of the men may be called off to join the Abyssinian forces and may go, tempted by the prospect of loot. They may, however, not go and think that now is the day to raid Kenya. In the latter event they would not be refugees but would have to be opposed by force of arms and for that reason at any rate re-inforcement of the frontier would be necessary.

If so, there would be a considerable amount of expense thrown upon Kenya which that Govt. can very ill afford. To ask for financial assistance from this country would be awkward and would probably be resisted by the Service Departments and the Treasury as being contrary to the principle that each colony is responsible for its own defence measures. At the same time if a war breaks out it is not a case for standing on ceremony and if it does happen and if there is a large bill I think that the possibility of financial assistance will have to be carefully considered on the ground that it is a new and unprecedented situation which

understandings and principles do not cover.

I agree with the action proposed but as the new despatch is due to arrive at any moment we had better wait for it.

J. E. W. Flood
F. 1.

*Yes - but
we'd better wait*

4. Gore Kenya Secret(2) - 28.2.35

*Indicates what action he
considers will be necessary in the
event of hostilities between Ethiopia
and Italy.*

Mr. Flood.

1. I have not sent this file forward before since I thought that we might receive a despatch from Uganda, ~~and~~ ^{as} our original telegram was sent to the Government of Uganda also.

2. It will be seen that the Government of Kenya has already taken preliminary precautionary measures - namely, the Meru Battalion of the Northern Brigade has been concentrated at Wajir, with a view to the occupation of Moyale, Mandera and El-Wak should this prove necessary later. In addition, the Police force in the area in question is being reinforced by forty men drawn from forces available outside the area.

3. It is clear that the local authorities are fully alive to the requirements of the

situation

situation, and they can be relied upon to have taken all the necessary preliminary measures. The question is what action, if any, we must take at this end.

I suggest that, in the first place it will be necessary to decide, in consultation with the Foreign Office, whether we are to ask the Governor to consider a modification of the "closed frontier" policy on the lines suggested in the first paragraph of your minute of the 8th March. If it is decided to proceed on the lines suggested in that minute we should presumably obtain Foreign Office concurrence in a despatch to the Governor, saying that while the legal position is that the Government of Kenya would have the right to close the frontier against refugees, it is doubtful how far it should exercise that right, for the reasons which have already been set out. We should take the opportunity of saying that the War Office view is that if hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia actually break out the main fighting (in so far as this did not take place in the areas near Eritrea) would take place in the areas to the north of the Webbe Shibelli.

We must also send copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Service Departments and to the Secretary of the Overseas Defence Committee. I do not think that there is any need to suggest that a meeting of the O.D.C. should be convened; but we should draw the attention of the Air Ministry to the fact that the Governor may have to ask for two Vickers Victoria troop carrying aircraft to be sent to ^{Nairobi} ~~Kenya~~ - and we should ask for the Air Ministry observations on this point. (At the O.D.C.

meeting

*(The question of
responsibility for
preparatory measures
is being considered and
will be dealt with
separately)*

*(Please take note
see)*

meeting last month the Air Ministry representatives said that they could certainly send aircraft to Kenya in the event of emergency if they were given adequate notice).

4. I may say that the general Italian-Ethiopian situation still remains easier than it was; but the latest development is that the Ethiopians have, in effect, declined to go on with the local negotiations in Addis Ababa and propose to take the matter to the League Council again. It is very difficult to see what the immediate outcome of this will be; and there is still danger that when Italy thinks that she has concentrated enough troops in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland she may make some forward move. There is also the alternative that Italian agents may stir up internal trouble in Ethiopia in the hope of replacing the present Emperor by an Italian puppet, i.e. in the hope of making Ethiopia a second Albania. This might, of course, be done without any actual hostilities between the Ethiopian and Italian armies, but there would almost certainly be a period of prolonged unrest which would have repercussions on the Ethiopian frontiers.

M. H. C.

18.3.35.

With regard to A. C. M., a telegram just received from Sir S. B. states, etc. etc. I fear that the situation has worsened and that nothing short of a League Council intervention in accordance with General Assembly will improve it.

See. In proposed military measures to be taken in
Kenya, meet in discussion

6

S. J. C. C.
19.3.35.
Mr. Flood has seen

Sir J. Murray.

I agree that Kenya cannot maintain a land frontier, not only because of considerations of economy but also because, in a generally inhospitable region there are undoubtedly more crossing places than we could guard.

As before, however!

Webb
19.3.35

I agree. Sir S. should see the
minutes. The Kenya Govt. have made
their plans in good time. There is
the main thing. It is impossible to
prevent the situation in the
border but develop if liaison between
Italy - Ethiopia grows worse. There
may be a number of refugees coming out
there may be armed bands coming
out.

M. H. C.
20/3/35

P.V.
21/3

5. To FO - Secret 26. 3. 35
(with copies 2 & 4)

6 To No
7 " Admny } Secret with 26th
8 " Air Min } Copies 21.4.35 March
9 " O.D.C. }

gpx

(An Glendon called yesterday and
has shown the cover on this file.
He had a personal conversation with
Officer with 3/4/35.
He also has seen the papers
on the general frontier)

10 Foreign Office - 10. 4. 35.

Agree that in event of
hostilities the Kenya Govt should be
asked to consider whether it would not
be preferable to arrange for refugees
to be concentrated or rather than to
close the frontier

T. Frester

Captain

I have spoken to Group-Commander

Harris (A/M) who tells me that

in long refs to us & - gives

the A/M views on the situation in the

necessary measures in Kenya - is a

large scale is also essential in the

opinion of the C.A.S. before this

sent to me.

Should be advised before

writing to Kenya: to G.O. on Wednesday

need of nothing in. *Frester*
12/4/35

Mr Frester
nothing in page 7

Mr A/M
nothing in page 7
17. 4. 35

B.O. in another week.

Frester
17 April

Mr Frester
nothing in page 7
12/4/35

11 Air Ministry - 24 April 1935
{ use of R.A.F. planes on the
Kenya-Somalia boundary }

The frontier from Lake Rudolph to Mandera
stretches for about 440 miles. From Moyale to
Mandera - the sector where trouble is most likely - is
about 260 miles. The forces immediately available
in this latter sector appear to be 137 Police and
a Company of K.A.R., giving a total strength of less
than one rifle per mile. There is another Company
in support at Wajir, 150 miles behind the frontier.

The Governor proposes to rely for
reinforcements on a couple of troop-carrying planes
which could rapidly convey additional troops from
Nairobi to any threatened point. The Air Ministry,
however, point out that there is no landing ground
suitable for a troop carrier between Moyale and
Mandera; the radius of prompt and effective action
by such reinforcements would, therefore, not be
extended beyond a few miles from each of the terminal
points.

The Air Ministry suggest as an alternative
the provision of an adequate detachment of aircraft
for (a) reconnaissance, (b) "direct action suitably
tempered to the occasion", which means, I understand,

anything

anything between megaphone cajolery from a low-flying plane and bombing. Nothing is said about the number of planes which would be required, and could be spared from Khartoum, or of the probable cost, which Kenya would not

surely, be asked to meet.

To a layman it looks as though aerial assistance of this type might be of considerable value for reconnaissance purposes. There is only a limited number of points at which large bodies of refugees or stragglers could disembark from Ethiopia; if a patrolling plane could be relied on to watch such points, and the tracks leading to them, it would presumably release the Police or K.A.R. detachments which would otherwise be required for that purpose.

It has been decided that the would-be immigrants (other than armed bands) are not to be turned back at the frontier but shepherded to selected areas in the Kenya hinterland. An aeroplane is not a sheep-dog and would be of little assistance in this part of the task.

It may be noted that since Nos. 2 and 4 were written the Officer Commanding the Northern Brigade (accompanied by Mr. Juban Barton) has visited the Moyale District and will therefore have first-hand knowledge of the terrain.

In replying to Kenya we should

- (a) approve the action already taken and reported in No. 4;
- (b) enclose a copy of Nos. 5 and 10

from

from which the O.A.G. will observe that the interpretation of the Treaty position set out in No. 2 is endorsed; but that it is thought preferable to substitute for closing the frontier a scheme for concentrating refugees and stragglers (after they have been disarmed) in appropriate areas in the rear of the frontier district:

(c) enclose copy of the Air Ministry correspondence (Nos. 8 and 11) drawing attention to the Air Council's alternative suggestion for the employment of aircraft, and ask that the O.A.G. will furnish a revised appreciation of the situation in the light of the change of policy suggested, the Air Ministry's proposals and the recent visit of the O.C. Northern Brigade to the frontier:

Copy above to Foreign Office, the Service Departments, the O.D.C., and the Governor of Uganda, Secret, lff.

PA... 29/4
22-86

Of course it was not to be expected that the R.A.F. would favour any proposal which regarded them as purely a rapid means of transportation. I cannot imagine that the question of landing the transported troops was not present in the minds of the Governor and the O.C. Troops when the situation was considered.

It will be noted that they proposed to obtain the services of an airplane, locally, for reconnaissance purposes, if required. But for such a purpose I think the trained Air Force would be much more efficient, and reliable.

With such a long frontier & scattered small detachments of land forces, the co-operation of the Air force would be invaluable, and it would be a situation where rapidity in information, and action, would be necessary. Apart from the refugee problem, the Frontier will want watching very closely so as prevent any tendency to take advantage of the situation on the part of raiders.

I think the Air Staff views give food for thought and I agree that they should be communicated to the Governor who may, or may not, wish to revise his appreciation of the situation. If he still adheres to his original view of using, if need ~~have~~ be, troop-carrying air-raft to re-inforce the frontier detachments, he will no doubt amplify the previous appreciation by saying how it is proposed to do this and what, if any, steps are being taken to over-come the landing difficulties.

I am convinced of the necessity of the R.A.F. for reconnaissance work; of their usefulness in rapid transport; but I am not yet convinced of their value in shepherding and controlling refugees in spite of the wonderful stories told to me by a R.A.F. Staff Officer of what they did in Iraq with a megaphone. But I do think this is just a case where the services can co-operate for united effort, each doing that part of the job for which it is fitted, and getting on with it without bickering.

N. Cole
 29. 11. 31

The Governor of Kenya, in his second despatch (No. 4 on the file) said that he might have to ask for two Vickers Victorias to be stationed at Nairobi so as to facilitate the rapid movement of troops to any areas affected. The Air Ministry have, with commendable promptness, undertaken to hold two suitable aircraft ready in case anything turns up, and suggest that it would probably be just as well to have a third one in case of need. This is all to the good, and will set the Governor's mind at ease since it gives him all he asked for. It is difficult to say for certain but I am quite sure in my own mind that the Governor never contemplated that aircraft should be used to fly troops rapidly up from Nairobi to the precise points affected, but only intended that aircraft should be used as a swift means of getting troops and ammunition and so on into the "theatre of operations". The Governor

Governor must know perfectly well that there are no landing grounds except in a few odd spots and he cannot have contemplated landing large machines like Victoria troop-carriers (which will take 25 men) in odd spots in the bush or even on casual clearings. I think, myself, that the use of troop-carrying planes would have to be limited to something of the kind that I have suggested and as we do not contemplate that there will be any fighting, this would probably prove sufficient. If it were a question of fighting, then it would be another story.

There can be no doubt that aerial reconnaissance would be very useful but here again the lack of proper landing grounds would militate against anything like a continuous patrol of the whole frontier affected. In particular, I am not sure how the shepherding of refugees would be worked. As I understand it, the country round the frontier for miles on both sides is scrub and in that case there is plenty of cover. In the open deserts of Iraq and Arabia, it is another story, and a party on camels can be seen for miles and miles, and is very hard to lose once it is picked up. Looking after black men in scrub country would be a much more awkward proposition. I don't think, myself, that any attempt should be made to coerce refugees by dropping bombs on them even to frighten them. After all, a refugee is a refugee, and when he comes to throw himself on your mercy, a large bomb from an aeroplane is not the most hospitable form of greeting. I agree with the action proposed. It seems the only thing possible.

It might even be possible if the refugees were a desert

J. G. Hood
 30. 11. 31

Snij happy.
J. G. Hood
30. 11. 31

and, of course, I am inclined to agree with him insofar as that supporting an aircraft would help to solve the problem in the best way I'd like to have both reconnaissance and troop-carrying planes available

- 12 To Col. Kenya - secret - 4 May 1935
(Enclosing copies of 5, 10 & 11)
- By air mail on 4/5 13 To four islands - secret - 4 May 1935 - A
(Enclosing copy of 12)
- 14 To War Office - B/12 - secret
- 15 To Admiralty " " }
- 16 To O. D. Cttee - B/12 " } 4 May 1935
- 17 To Foreign Office - B/12 " }
- 18 To Air Ministry - B/12 " }
(Enclosing copy of 12)
in each case.

19 To Mr. Glenday O.B.E. - secret - 16/5/35

DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE

Mr. Glenday went through the enclosures to No. 15 with Sir Joseph Byrne yesterday and at the latter's request, came round to the Colonial Office afterwards. They feel:-

(a) That there has been some misunderstanding as to what is meant by "closing the frontier". While it is neither possible nor desirable to create a barrier impassable to individual refugees, it is vitally important to turn back at the border any mass movements of tribesmen and/or stock; and in this latter sense the frontier ought to be closed forthwith.

(b) Mr. Glenday is concerned (and I gathered that Sir Joseph Byrne shared his anxiety) at the removal (reported in No. 4) of police from Marsabit-Isiolo to the Moyale-Mandera front. He fears that this may leave a wide-open corridor down which the bandits, who are sure to become active when trouble starts, can penetrate far into Kenya.

Just before Mr. Glenday called I had learnt

learnt from P.P. Dept. that, according to the latest War Office appreciation, active hostilities may be expected in mid-August. (In our despatch of the 4th of May we said "The contingency does not appear, so far as can be judged at the moment, to be imminent"). Mr. Glenday felt that this put a different complexion on the matter, and that it would be advisable for him to return to the Northern Frontier District (at present in charge of an officer who is not too competent) as soon after June 1st as could be arranged. Sir Joseph Byrne, whom I then consulted by telephone, agreed, and thought that Mr. Glenday should fly out on, say, May 29th or June 2nd.

Sir Joseph is hoping to see Sir John Maffey next week, possibly Wednesday, and wishes nothing to be finally decided until he has had that interview. But he agreed that we might telegraph at once on the lines of the accompanying draft, and that it would be very useful if Mr. Glenday could be put in touch with the appropriate officers at the War Office and the Air Ministry. ~~Mr. Lee~~ Mr. Lee arranged for Mr. Glenday to see Major Arnold at the War Office and Group-Captain Pirrie at the Air Ministry this morning.

If the telegram is approved, the papers should be re-circulated as soon as a copy of the new appreciation (which is expected to arrive from the War Office on Monday) is available, and they should then be sent on to Sir John Maffey to see before his talk with Sir Joseph Byrne.

Handwritten initials and date
18/5

Handwritten note: If the telegram can go in order to prevent Kenya being unnecessary work.
1207.18.5

20 Tel. Gov Kenya No 126 Lte 18/1/35

Mr. Frester.

21 Now see the copy in the S.S. Association
Abstract. Sir J. Duffus has still to
see this.

W. Lee 20/5

Dr. for today: Air mail - Review
quintly

J.P. Frester
21/5

By airmail 22. To O.C. Kenya - Secret - 21st May 1935
DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE (Copy copy of 21)

23. Copying forward Kenya Secret - 24th April 1935
{ The taking of a view in the Northern Frontier
District by Mr. Barton & a list of the
Northern Frontier District Intelligence
Report for February }

I have sent the duplicate of 23 to
W.D. under cover to Major Arnold.
When the papers can be released -
copy shd. be made & sent to
F.O. LF.

Sir J. Duffus shd. now see the
minutes & correspondence (No. 19 number).
The I.C. shd. also see

W.D. 21/5 25
J.P. Frester 21/5
22/5

Discussed between Sir J. Duffus, Sir J. Byrne
& Mr. Glendon today.

Dr. let me know. (The
arrangements for Mr. Glendon's return
by air are being disposed of on
his personal file)

J.P. Frester
22/5

The Dr. from Nairobi (No. 118) arrived
after the decision, but was shown to Sir
J. Byrne before he left the office.

Sir J. Botchley

you shd. see

W.D. 23/5

25 Tel. to Gov. No. 130 Secret - 24th and - Com. 23/5/35

26. To Air Ministry - Secret - 25th May 1935
(W.D. copy of 24)

See J.I. Gov - 20/5

18. Not done

Shd. let Frester, who agrees that a
copy of 24, 25 etc shd. be sent to Sec.
O.D.C. for circ.

See O.D.C. will you kindly circulate to
4, 10 etc. -
22/5

Mr. Howard

Nos 16, 24, 25, & 26 have been circulated to the Oversea Affairs Committee (O.D.C. No 1040)

H.R. Downall Secretary,
30/3/55 O.D.C.

27 O.D.C. No 1040 — 29 May.

No. 24 refers (as does No. 2)

— the report for the reading of the

O.D.C. to be held on

13th June 1955 at 3.30 p.m.

27A. To O.D.C., Kenya Secret. - 6.6.55
Reporting developments up to date (1955)

18. Foreign Office
Enclosed, for observations, copy of the graphic correspondence between H.C. Representative, Eddie White and Acting Governor, Kenya, on the question of the evacuation of Kenya Consulate.

Sir C. Bottomley

Do you know Kenya has asked that P.O. should take over the Kenya Consulate, but that is only an economy move. This relates to possible action if hostilities break out.

Kenya suggest that withdrawal should be contemplated & that the evacuation should be arranged to proceed forthwith, by gradual stages.

I gather from Mr Lee that it is much worse - indeed almost hopeless.

12
Sir S. Barton thinks not, & has asked Kenya to hold up action especially in view of the impending 1956-57 situation. The situation has probably worsened since in view of the last reported "incident" on the frontier.

What Kenya has replied we don't know.

Now I suggest that in view of the geographical situation Kenya is better able to judge than is Sir S. Barton at Addis Ababa. Mr Reese is then officer and his personal safety must be considered.

Premature withdrawal might well be unfortunate but Kenya & Mr Reese are better able to say when the time has come for withdrawal.

? Reply to P.O. that the S. of G. is disposed to agree with the view of the Kenya Govt. and while inclined to agree that premature withdrawal would be unwise, thinks that it is for Kenya & Mr Reese to decide when evacuation of the Consulate should be carried out. And say we have not heard what reply has been returned to Sir S. Barton.

and tell Kenya so by telegram asking them to let us know what reply is returned to Sir S. Barton.

S.S.O. Flood
6.6.55

Mr Howard
I understand that you

went the other way.

I am inclined to agree with Mr. Flood, but if observations are made before the 25th there is no great urgency &

Mr. Reese might be very useful in the interim.

S.S.O.
6.6.55

Mr. Freeston.

I asked for the return of these papers in view of the meeting of the Oversea Defence Committee on the 13th June when No. 27 will be considered.

You will remember that I mentioned to you that the War Office took exception to our sending out to Kenya (enclosure No. III to (27)) a copy of the Air Ministry letter of the 24th April (enclosure No. II to (27)) without consulting them, as they took the line that the Air Ministry suggestion in paragraph 6 was a new policy which had not been considered by the Oversea Defence Committee. I understand they will ventilate their grievance on the 13th June. I think our reply to this is that the matter was one of considerable urgency at the time, and that all that we were doing was to get further local information so that, had the Governor concurred in the Air Ministry suggestion, the Colonial Office would have been in a position to put his views also to the O.D.C. There was no intention of shelving either the War Office or the O.D.C. As it happened, the Governor asked that the arrangements for Vickers Victoria aircraft should stand (enclosure No. IV to (27)).

I think it is very desirable that you (or ? Mr. Flood) should attend the meeting. Perhaps you will let me know if this is convenient so that I can reserve accommodation for you.

Sir C. Bottomley

Sir C. Bottomley may wish to send on these papers to Sir J. Maffey as regards the proposed action with the Foreign Office, etc. But I shall be glad to have the papers back by the 11th June.

J. Howard
7/6.

Sir J. Maffey

Encl. 27

The immediate question is as to the execution of Kenya. Sir S. Barton wishes to put it off till Ethiopia case is settled. That they can't move safely. Kenya follows that the Council should see his own direction. Mr. Flood, as far as his committee believes that we should call the F.O. that he thinks the matter should be left to the Council. The fact of Kenya & Japan. I feel that as going on (18) institutions break out the Southern area will go off pieces before the other nations. What is happening there.

C.S.B. 7.6.35

I would suggest to F.O. that the
 Kenya proposal should be approved and
 that the border protection committee
 should be advised in that effect and
 to act upon it as soon as possible
 unless circumstances permit a reply
 should be made to the British before
 the decision is finally announced. The
 latter shall deal with the case for
 granting of the current approval
 during the period at once

After
 Hh

29 To F.O. (28 June 1935)

17 JUN 1935

30 To Kenya - Sec. (29 June)

DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE

- 31 Report on the situation in the Italian colonies and suggest to the Govt. to take up for info. C.F. Committee at once. (in 2/10/35)
- 32 To the Office (2/10/35)
- 33 To Foreign Office (2/10/35 and 31) 3/12 11 June 35
- 34 To the Ministry
- 35 To Design Office (2/10/35 small) 3/12 11 June 35

36 Acting Governor, Kenya - Secret - 13 June, 1935 14
 { Considers that instrument policy should be adopted only if the closed frontier policy proves impracticable }

We have not yet had a reply to No. 26 and I suppose the Air Ministry are waiting for this despatch.

It appears now that Kenya is not at all keen on concentrating stragglers or refugees behind the frontiers and wishes to adhere to the original proposal which is to prevent any sort of mass migration across the frontier and only intern refugees if the proposal to keep them out proves impracticable.

I am not sure that either Italy or Ethiopia could reasonably be embarrassed if refugees came into Kenya. There is no duty that I am aware of on any Govt. to prevent refugees getting over a frontier in order to escape from hostilities and in the recent war if the entire population of Belgium had flocked into Holland I do not suppose that the Dutch would have tried to keep them out.

The whole thing really depends upon what it is possible to do. Kenya thinks it may be possible to keep the frontier closed and if so it is probably the best thing to do. At the same time as I pointed out, it may be very difficult in practice to keep people from crossing a frontier and if they do cross it would probably be inhuman to turn them back.

I know that the Governor is very anxious about the policy which is to be adopted in regard to the frontier and he spoke to me about it at the Corana Club Dinner. Neither of us, however, could suggest anything on the spur of the moment and I think the whole future turns upon what Mr. Glenday thinks possible when he gets back, if the situation proceeds

proceeds to develop as we expect it will.

The action to be taken on this despatch appears to be to send copies to the Foreign Office, War Office and Air Ministry and say that in the circumstances set out the Secretary of State proposes to accept the view of the Acting Governor.

J.S.O. Hand
21.6

I have shown this to Mr. Glenday who returns by air on Sunday 23rd. He will go to Moyale as soon as he can & size up the situation.

Mr. Norman

This question and I think how to associate it with the Somaliland problem, Mr. Norman should see.

I agree that we should send this to Mr. Glenday. The question is whether any further should be explained at this stage.

C. 22.6.35

I shall be inclined to send 36 to 40, W.O. etc. with short letter asking for their views & expressing no opinion at this stage. The views of the Acting Governor are clearly expressed & Mr. Dyer would have to give their reasons for opposing his views which we could then consider.

Robertson

I have nothing to add to the views already expressed in my memorandum of 21.6.35 in connection with the situation which is likely to develop on the frontiers of B² Somaliland and Kenya in the event of an Italian-Abyssinian war, the policy of closing the frontiers in that eventuality and the military measures for dealing with such a situation.

As a minor point in regard to the military measures, it will be equally necessary in Kenya, as has already been foreseen in Somaliland, to obtain additional officers ^{or B.S.O.} for service with A.R. battalions on the frontier, since the peace establishment of these battalions is below the number necessary for active duties of this nature.

Mr. Norman

25.6.35

Sir J. Maffey

As at 4.4.35

Regarding the general consideration of the problem on the J.G. memo: - Mr. Glenday's impressions on the spot, my only comment is that Kenya is too hard up to finance any extensive measures on its own account. In the case of Somaliland, of course, the fact that the home

foot will be 5 days as
too obvious to read anywhere.

Used
25.6.35

to prepare at an

Am
26/6/35

DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE

DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE

DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE

Foreign Office }
War Office } Secret - 27 June '35.
Air Ministry }
(See copy of 36 for obvious.)

40. Extract from minutes of
meeting of Overseas Defence
Ctee on 13th June, 1935.

41. Foreign Office (J. 2250/11) - Secret - 21st June '35.
{ No copy tel. to H.M. Rep. at Addis
Ababa regarding evacuation of
H.M. Consulate in Abyssinia }

42. Ceding Juma Kenya - 18 June '35.
{ No copy tel. to H.M. Rep. at Addis Ababa
regarding evacuation of Consulate at
here. } ~~Handwritten~~ & ~~Handwritten~~

43. Ceding Juma Kenya - Secret - 4 July '35.
{ No copy in event of evacuation of Italian
troops marching through Kenya and in regard
to subsequent aircraft }

No 27 on this file + also nos 83 +
94 on 46011/1/35. Lomuland appear
(as item 2) on the agenda for the
O.D.C. meeting to be held on 18th July
at 4 pm.

No 43 is also being circulated

Major Cole

To see, please

Ed Dpt

Will
Approves
15

Will you kindly say who will
represent you at the meeting in
Kenya?

Howard
17/2/35

The prohibited area in Kenya consists
of the whole of the Northern Frontier District,
the district of Turkana & the district of the
Tana River, i.e. the whole of Northern Kenya,
and subject to any views which the A.M. or other
Dept may express at the meeting I think that
this prohibition should be maintained against
both Italian + Abyssinian aircraft

Th. Howard

I presume the minutes of yesterday's

O.D.C. meeting with in am comm. Dr
attended to this paper.

J. P. ...
19/10

Mr. Director.

Yes. It is probably they
will be sent over in draft
for concurrence first & we
will let you see them at
that stage.

J. P. ...
19/10

43a to to. sent - 26 July '35
(with copy of 43)

44. Acting Governor, Kenya. sent. 11th July '35

{Reinforcement of K.A.R. in Kenya by
troops from the Sudan. Requests reply by
telegram.

Now. Consideration of this should
presumably await the receipt of
the minutes of the O.D.C. meeting
of the 16th July. The 16th's command
which was considered at last
meeting provides for the dispatch
of troops.

No. 41 & 42.

Now. ? Copy to Mr. Kenya of
sent. Ref 42.

Now. It will be seen that the
question of Mr. Rees's leave will
have to be considered. The ball
is now with Sir S. Barton.

? Copy to Mr. Kenya of sent. 17
Ref. 41. C.A. ...
27/11

A. proposed on 41 & 42

L. B. ...
27/7

45 to Acting Governor, Kenya. sent. A - 23 July '35
(with copy of 41 sent.)

46. to Foreign Office. sent. 19/7. 29 July '35
(with copy of 42 & sent.)

47. to Acting Governor, Kenya. sent. 19/7. 24 July '35
(with copy of 42 & sent.)

48. Air Ministry. sent. 26 July '35
(Comments on 36)

See No. 36 & 36

I spoke to Mr. Lee about No. 48 and I
think he is inclined to agree that the question of
whether the two Vickers Victoria troop carrying
aircraft asked for by Kenya are sufficient to meet
the circumstances on the Kenya frontier must be
considered in the light of Mr. Glenday's report
which should arrive in about a week's time. We
cannot, therefore, answer the Air Ministry's
question "What demands for aircraft are likely
to be received?"

As regards the two Victorias, the Air
Ministry want to know the precise duties which they
may be called upon to perform, and the loads to be
carried. We have been told that the Victorias
are required for troop carrying. Presumably, then,
they will not be used for frontier reconnaissance
or require to be fitted with loud speakers for

warning

Now see
copy sent to
Kenya on
29 July. No 47

warning refugees, etc. Incidentally, the Air Ministry must know the carrying capacity of the Victorias.

The Air Ministry also want to know the date on which the two Victorias should arrive in Kenya, to enable fuel and other supplies (spare engines) to be sent by sea. (It will take a month to get the supplies delivered in East Africa and transported to the landing grounds). The answer to this must depend on whether the time has come to take the necessary steps to safeguard the frontier. Certain preliminary steps are being taken in the case of British Somaliland. But, presumably, we must be fairly certain that the Victorias are going to be definitely required before we involve Kenya, or R.M.G. as the case may be, in expense on account of the Victorias.

It has also to be borne in mind that the Air Ministry want another landing ground between Moyale and Lake Rudolf. According to No. 23 on the file work has been started on full-sized aerodromes at Moyale, Mandera and Isiolo. But evidently another would be required west of Moyale.

It is for reasons whether we should telegraph to Kenya asking when Mr. Gleaney's report may be expected; and explain the position to Air Ministry by telephone.

C. G. Smith

30.7.35.

Mr. Gleaney arrived in Kenya at the end of June, & started off at once for the N. frontier. Unfortunately he had a bout of fever at Isiolo, which has delayed matters. But his report should arrive ^{next} by ~~Monday~~; Airtel (if it doesn't we can telegraph); & I wd. suggest that further concern of this letter can safely wait till then.

A. G. Gleaney
30/7

I agree that we can defer considering this letter for the present - indeed, it may well be of advantage to do so since we shall perhaps know by Monday whether there are any hopes of a settlement following the meeting of the League Council.

I would however like to say that unless there is a radical change in the general situation it would be desirable before considering the general question of the use of aircraft on the Kenya frontier to clear up the points outstanding about the two Victorias. If it is the case that the Air Ministry need a month to get supplies and spares delivered in East Africa there will not be too much time left before hostilities break out, even if, as seems possible, hostilities begin immediately at the end of the rains. I know from

53

discussion should be referred to the Abyssinia Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. in the first instance. I have accordingly attached to the file a copy of the paper circulated to members of that Committee - which contains a summary of the discussion on the 7th August, and a note circulated to the Committee on behalf of the Department.

No action need be taken at present pending receipt of the Committee's recommendations. I may say that I intend to raise at the Committee the other outstanding question as regards Kenya - namely, that raised in paragraph 2 of No. 43.

A

Whee

9.8.35.

Drafts had to regard A.
referred to consideration with N.
Fresha Resin. or the other question.

Whee

3/1

- 54 To Col. Sir R. Cran, W.O.
 - 55 To P.S. Scrivenor, 70, (with draft reply to 43)
- } 10 August 35. 1718

20

56. Treasury (L. Speed) — 10 August '35
(Precedence of cost of protective measures)

57. To O.A.G. Henrys - Tel. no. 211 — 12 August '35
(Air co-operation & incidence of cost)

58. To Sir Joseph Byrnes — 13 August '35
(with copy of 57)

59. To the Air Ministry — 13 August '35
(with copy of 67)

- 60. To Foreign Office
 - 61. " War Office
 - 62. " Oversea Defence Ctee
 - 63. " Abyssinian Sub-Com. of Ctee. of I.D. (Major Lubbock)
- } Secret LF - 13 August '35

64. War Office (C.A. Osborne) — 13 August '35
[Answering no. 54 concerns in terms of draft to Kenya but think that 70 should include a station & telephone for what we consider to be the Kenya frontier.]

- 65 To Gen. Tel NO 213 — 14.8.35
- 66 To Air Ministry } Secret. B.F. - 15 August '35
- 67 To Major Lubbock } (with copy of 55)

68/ O. G. G. Harney - Tel. 190 - 14 August '35
Announces the detachment of R.A.P.
will come under Brigade Commander
R.A.P. local press received some intimation
of proposal in both tel 211 before it
was despatched.

The first sentence in the telegram
has been answered by No 67.

The answer to the second sentence
is Yes but? Air Ministry's
concurrence should be obtained
before replying to the R.G. for.

The leakage of information is
unfortunate but not disastrous.

Proved as at K. This may
be done by telephone.

C. J. [Signature] 1935

I have talked to Lieut. Colonel
Stopford about this and we have no doubt but
that the Air Ministry will readily agree that
the R.A.P. detachment should come under the
general command of the Brigade Commander; but,
as the point may conceivably be one of some
importance, I think that it would be well to have
Air Ministry concurrence on written record
here. I have accordingly written semi-
officially to Wing Commander Pirie on the point
- see filing of letter attached to the file.

W. H. [Signature]
15

70 Air Ministry (Wing Commander Pirie) - 17 August '35.
(Suggesting reply to 68)

71 Extract from minutes of 3rd meeting of
Abyssinian Cttee. of C. S. D. on 9th August '35
{ fair co-operation on various fronts of
Harney; + maintenance of Abyssinians
or Italian troops through Harney }

72 Sir Joseph Byrne - 16 August '35
(in co-operation; incidence of cost)

Lieut. Colonel Stopford.

Mr. Freeston.

You have already seen No. 70. There is, I
think, very little reason to anticipate that the Air
Ministry will think it necessary not to agree in the
case of Kenya to the arrangement to which they have
agreed in the case of Somaliland; and, that being so,
there seems the less objection to our agreeing to
temporize in the manner which Wing Commander Pirie
has suggested. He has told me on the telephone
that while it is not yet definitely known when
Squadron Leader Gibbs will go to Kenya, it is thought
probable that he will leave - by air from Khartoum -
on the 21st of August. It is thought that the Air
Ministry will get a report from him within about ten
days from that date. We should therefore be in a
position to send the Acting Governor a definite
decision within a fortnight - the file should
re-circulate if nothing has been decided before.
I submit for consideration a draft interim reply to
the Acting Governor together with a draft letter to
Wing Commander Pirie.

No. 71, is old history and can be put by.

No. 72. We can consider later how far it
will be possible to quote from or use the arguments
set

set out in this in the proposed letter from
the Secretary of State to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer.

Whee
20/8
Lil [unclear]
20/8

73 To 4/6, Kenya tel to 21st level - 20 August

74 to [unclear] [unclear] (A.H.) (10 [unclear]) 21st August

75 To Air Ministry - sent 19/8 - 22 August
(will copy of 684 73)

76 Foreign Office (P.L. [unclear]) - 22 August '35
(copy with draft tel. [unclear] with
SS notes will [unclear] in 64)

Draft has

Whee
26/8

77 To [unclear] [unclear] - 22-8-35

78 To Foreign Office, [unclear]

79. [unclear]

80. Air Ministry - 19/8

(will copy of 77)

sent 26 August

81. Air Ministry - 21 August '35 22
(air co-operation in Kenya)
Kenyan leader Gibbs

77. Rec.

Lil [unclear]
26/8/35

Mr. Freeston

81 can be put by.

I have reviewed the F.O. 7454.

The instructions given now in the
letter from the S/S to the C/E, show
that there is no real objection
should we [unclear] a draft copy?

Whee
27

82 To Sir Joseph Byrne - 28 August '35
(answering no 72)

83 [unclear] Kenya - Tel. No 711 - 9th Sept '35
(Spec. will proposal in 77)

Mr. Freeston.

83. ? Action as in draft herewith.

Action on 43A has already been taken on other
papers.

Re-circulate for preparation of letter to
the Chancellor.

84 To Foreign Office - 11th Sept '35
(Action in [unclear] [unclear] [unclear])
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] Kenya

85. To War Office

86. To Air Ministry } sent 11/9/35
(will copy of [unclear])

87. Governor, Kenya - Tel. 214 - 11th Sept '35

{ R.A.F. machines should be
sent with least possible
delay.

Proposed to Garrison Messengers
and Troops.

Drift has also discontinued.

Three

12
minutes

88. To Kenya - Tel. 243 - 12th Sept '35

89. To G.O.

90. " W.O.

91. " C.M.

92. " Army

93. " Major Gen. G.O.

Recd. M.O. - 13 Sept '35

(with copies of 87 & 88)

Migadici korua

You should see 87 and
88. In your absence I informed
Mr. Kee that I felt as you
would have no objections to
offer regarding the proposal
to send platoons to messengers
& troops as matters of this kind
used to be left to the Commanders
on the spot.

W.H. Stafford

15.9.35

24
84

The Director

17 Sept

(No copy telegraph cover via Headqrs. R.A.F.
Middle East regarding despatch of Flight Lt Kenya) 23

M. Freeman

The A.C.C. Middle East, will have
communicated details of this flight
direct to Sir J. Byng, so we need
take no action. I have reminded
Wing Commander Price about 74 and he
has promised to let me have
A.M.'s despatch news before the end
of the week.

Three 18/5

Seen
W.H. Stafford
20.9.35

They started yesterday

and should arrive on 25/9

J.E.W. Hunt

J.A. Hunt
19

~~M.H. ...~~

Seen
P.L. Cox
21.9

Seen

W.H. Stafford
20.9.35

95. To Gen. Kenya Tel. 221 — 17 Sept.

(Possibility of gas attacks on formation
of Kenya) Original on 6214/27/35 General

96. To Gen. Kenya - Tel. 221 — 20 Sept. '35

(Refr. 95 reports statement by witnesses
a Lt. aeroplane heard over Mombasa on
13.9.35. Sept.)

97. To Gen. Kenya - Tel. 221 — 20 Sept. '35

(No indication locality of danger from gas
but numerous N.A.R. and air mail to equipped
with masks, also action Police & local officers in
parties to handle. Total number of masks required
2000.)

R. Frester.

97 is being transferred to General
Papers.

96 We can look forward to
the signature of these studies. I
suggest that we should have
written to the staff here. Col. [unclear]
to see if [unclear]

Three 2/4

98. [unclear] G.C. [unclear] [unclear] 21/9

Brigadier Hornum

I think that you should see

26428

W. [unclear]

23.9.35

Been

Hornum [unclear]
19/9/35

W. Frester wishes this file brought
up on 14th Oct. in connection with the
evolution of the incidence of cost 24
of air measures, etc. in Kenya.

N.H. Burt
20/9/35

99. Air Ministry (Wing Commander Pine) - 30 Sept '35
(Comments on 96)

R. Frester would use no
objection to Kenya [unclear]
Some [unclear]

Three

yes better [unclear]. They are [unclear] to get all [unclear] of
in 1914 [unclear] were seen in various places
the bold [unclear] and the [unclear] [unclear] force was [unclear] out one
night [unclear] of a [unclear] [unclear] in the roads" a good many
flying [unclear] might become an [unclear] after dark

100. Tel to Gen. Kenya no 264 Secret
(96 and) 1/10/35

101. To Air Ministry (A/C 95, 96 (100)) 8/10 24 October 1935

Secy. [unclear]
2.10.35.

102. Foreign Office - 5 Oct 35

(Action to be taken in the event of
Italian & Ethiopian troops entering Kenya)

P.T.D.

N. Fresson

F.O. agree that in view
of the explicit claims of the
Colonial Service to Kenya yesterday
we must take up with the
press - 4 of this letter

As regards para 5 & 6,
we can refer to the British
Empire in para 6. Some of
these matters (Shuttle & Crawley
N. Glouster) are covered under
long class description of the
British Empire since - the 1907
Crawley

If there is any need for
further explanation the position briefly
& Kenya ref. 77-83

Phae
9/10.

Jh.
Phae
9/10

Phae
9

J.F.O. 9/10
Phae

103

Tel to Gov Kenya M283

94 October 1955

In Foreign Office: 31.10.55

10 27-85

Mr. Flood

Please see Nos 56, 57, 58, 72 & 82 on this
file. We have not yet re-opened with
the Treasury the question of incidence of
cost. 25

I submit that it is inopportune to do
so, for two reasons

(a) We have no figures to quote. We don't
know what the additional defensive
measures are costing Kenya (it is
doubtful whether even the Government
could tell us if we asked), nor have
we any clear idea of what the 1955
Budget surplus will be (Forecast was
optimistic up to the end of June, but
the Government's latest estimate is that
the 1955 surplus will be very small
& that can be based only on a
revised estimate of the 1955 out-turn)

(b) If it is the Indo-Ethiopian border
have brought substantial benefit to
Kenya in the way of largely increased
domestic and re-export exports to
Somalia. This benefit to the programme
& trading communities must sooner

or later be reflected in Government revenue.
To ask These facts are known to the
Treasury - they have appeared in the
Press, & have been referred to in
S. G. P.'s memoranda to the Cabinet.

To invite the Chancellor to agree to a
breach of time-honoured doctrine ("every
Colony is responsible for its own defence"),
on behalf of a Colony which is
actively benefiting from the state of
international affairs, would merely be
to court a rebuff.

If this view is accepted, the position
must be explained to S. Joseph Byrne
(ref. 82)

B. B. B. B.
15/10

If Treasury go in for hair splitting then there would
be much chance. But the Kenya settlers argue that
all defence in Kenya is a matter of Imperial responsibility
and that H.M.G. ought to pay for it, and they will make
a grievance out of it if they get a chance.

Mr. Macleod's view was my own till to-day, but
if it is necessary to reinforce Kenya from W. Africa
as is now proposed there will be a big bill and I
do think that Kenya ought to be helped to pay it.
The time to take up that will be when the Cabinet is
being asked to agree to the despatch of troops from W. A.
to Kenya and a strong argument will be that the troops
are not really needed by Kenya but are being put in Kenya
as a sort of strategic reserve.

It would be just as well to warn the Treasury
that we shall have to make a claim on them

and it might be as well to do so now. We need try to
give figures but might simply tell Treas what is in the wind
say that Kenya is unhappy over its Budget and that H.M.G.
will have to expect to be called upon for the "over expenditure"
That must wait, however, till the reinforcements
orders have got further.

22.10.35
25.10

I am not sure that A will work -
Sir R. Adam was inclined to
minimize the Kenya side of the
matter. We shall do more
strongly than have the funds
appropriation which has been
preparing.

To action
taken see
4/10/11/23/35
Somerville

2/11
4/10/35

sent
16.10.35

105, Journals of Kenya - Vol. 251 - 19 Oct. '35
Reports from Officer in charge of Southern
Frontier District regarding movements
of Ethiopian troops

106 2 70. -
107 40. -
108. -
} 1012 - 2/11/35
(with copy of 105)

No 105 has been distributed off.
The Abyssinian appears to have retired
from Dolo about 48 miles to
Walena. Ras Dosta is at
Mipeli with a large force
Put by A. G. Smith 2/11/35.

see
Ph

(The ltr shd. also see the minutes
under 10/10)

Shankar
2/10

Phoe
2/10

J. G. P. →
22/10

see S. L. G.
22/10

W. H. P.
23/10/35

Moiman
24/10/35

109 — His Ministry S/O — 22 Oct 1935
State Montasa is within the Karoti in
outside, extreme ^{banking} ridge for airbase from
Italian Somaliland

Mr. Flood

I do not think we ought to

38066/35
Kenya

send the whole letter. D. V. Ball

can be done in a less than a day a record
of the meeting of Oct 15th

A. S. G. L.
24/10

By way 110 To a de V. Esade o/o 24/10/35
(at Nairobi)

Continued in Part II

C. O.

- Mr. Cohen 24/10
- Mr. Lee 24
- Mr. Flood 24/10
- Sir C. Parkinson
- Sir G. Tomlinson
- Sir C. Bottomley
- Sir J. Spence
- Permt. U.S. of S
- Parly. U.S. of S
- Secretary of State

Ocean
Today's Rec. L 24/10

110
s/o for the Flood 21

24 OCT 1935

Dear Wade

DRAFT.

A de V. Wade Esq.
CNG. OBE

With reference to the
Secretary of State's telegram
Nos 251 and 269 about
the possibility of air roads
in Malakka and Naniok
if boat lines broke in the
Malay, you will be interested
to see the enclosed extract
from a letter ^{sent for approval} from the
Air Ministry. You will see
that they have no doubt
that Malakka is within extreme

As at A in
attached letter

FURTHER ACTION

Range of aircraft at present
known to be in Italian

Some of them and then think that
is the kind of us looking at

the Italian might be expected
to ~~make~~ undertake some attacks
on it. We are not

telegraphed because we feel that
there is no cause for alarm.

The situation has a very likely
few days completely easier in the
last few days

Yours sincerely,
G. S. G. G.

22nd October, 1935.

Dear Cohen,

1. Confirming our conversation last night I attach a note on some suggested amendments to your notes of our discussion as to the position which would arise in Kenya and Somaliland in the event of hostilities.

2. With regard, in particular, to the point in para. 6 on page 11, there is no doubt that Mombasa is within extreme range of aircraft at present known to be in Italian Somaliland. It should perhaps be explained with reference to our letter to Lee of the 30th September that there is a distinction between "effective" bombing range which would make attacks regularly possible in all average conditions of wind, leaving an adequate margin of fuel, and extreme range, which would be possible under favourable conditions.

3. In view of the fact that Mombasa is within extreme range, the Italians, in my view, might be expected to undertake some attacks on it.

4. With regard to Nairobi, it is outside extreme range with standard tankage. It could therefore only be reached if the Italians decided to endeavour to attack it as a spectacular effort and if they possess local workshop facilities for embodying the extra fuel tankage required which would be carried by means of a reduction of part of the bomb load.

5. I think the above points will give you a good idea of

A

of what the chances are either way and I am sure you will appreciate how difficult it is for us to be more definite on these sort of border-line cases.

Yours, etc.

(sgd) RICHARD PECK.

38181/35
105
30

CYPHER
Telegram from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies.


Dated 19th October 1935. Received 11.43 a.m 19th October 1935

No 251 Secret.

Officer in charge Northern Frontier District reports .
Begins. "Certain activities in Southern Ethiopia after the
fall of Dolo. Ethiopian retreat to Walena up the Daua river.
Desta reached Mugeli four days ago with troops. Number reported
large. Situation being watched" ends. See map enclosed in
Colonial Secretary's 3 p.m to the Under Secretary of State
3./A /Mil.90/3/5/48 of 10th September.

38181/35 Kenya

Copy to / No. 108 /
/ No. 107 /
/ No. 108 /



C. O.

Mr. Hunter 9/10

Mr. Lee 9/10

Mr. Flood 9.10 at once

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

Sir C. Bollenby.

Sir J. Shackburgh

Permt. U.S. of S.

Party. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

38.66/55


Keye

31

Reception + del

11h

9/10/35



DRAFT. Tel (recypher)

Gov. Marsh

77)

N^o 283 Secret. ~~Instruction~~ in

para. 1 of my let 224

Secret ^{is} ~~an~~ of course

suspended for the present by
instruction in my let. 277

Secret. As regards para.

2 of my let. 224, on

reconsideration it has been

thought unnecessary to address

formal communication to

either Govt, who must may

be presumed to be aware

of boundary definition in

Treaty of 1907.

SECEP

1001 on 10/10/35

FURTHER ACTION.

cdm L70.
L.F.

7116/3/35

CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governors of Somaliland and Kenya.

Sent 6.45 p.m. 8th October, 1935.

IMMEDIATE

No. 114
No. 277

Secret

My telegram No. 106
My telegram No. 270

Although no formal
declaration of war has been made by either side, it is clear,
in view of Abyssinian application to the League under
Article 16 of the Covenant, that Abyssinia considers that
Italy has made war on her and that she is therefore at war
with Italy.

General considerations arising from present position
are (1) Although in view of League Council's finding that
Italy has violated the Covenant laws of neutrality do not
apply, your action vis-à-vis the belligerents must be based on
de facto application of those rules except in so far as
express decisions to the contrary are reached in respect of any
particular matter.

(2) Italy can in no case be afforded more favourable
treatment than she would get under application of laws of
neutrality, and question of whether in any particular matter
(e.g. as regards troops crossing the frontier) Abyssinia
should be treated on a more favourable basis than Italy is
at present under consideration.

In the meantime you are authorised to take action
on following lines in regard to matters likely to arise in
Somaliland
Kenya as a result of hostilities:

(a) Refugees Frontier can be closed and refugees
refused admission in accordance with general policy already
approved.

(b)

(b) Military forces crossing frontier. Any forces crossing frontier should if practicable be detained (not interned) and immediate report sent with request for instructions.

(c) Military aircraft. Aircraft crossing frontier should not be fired at, but incident should be at once reported. Aircraft landing in British territory should be detained pending reference here for instructions.

If in pursuance of general statement made at (1) of second paragraph of this telegram it appears desirable to take action against either belligerent in a sphere not covered by above specific instructions please report to me before such action is taken.

SECRET.

102

34

In any further communication
on this subject, please quote
No. J 4672/1/1.
and address—
not to any person by name.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

S.W.1.

6th October, 1935.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Supplemental 303

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare to refer to your secret letters under reference 38066/36 of the 26th August and the 11th September concerning the question of the action to be taken to protect the Kenya frontier in the event of a war between Italy and Ethiopia.

2. I am to state that Sir Samuel Hoare has given further consideration in the light of subsequent developments to the telegram which formed the enclosure of the first letter under reference and which was addressed to the Government of Kenya with the concurrence of this department, and that he now feels that the terms thereof do not state the position with sufficient accuracy. He considers that the first paragraph "It is a recognized obligation on a neutral power to disarm and intern armed forces of a belligerent that violate that neutral's frontier" is almost equivalent to an instruction to the Government of Kenya that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be neutral in the event of a war between Italy and Ethiopia, and implies that should either Ethiopian or Italian troops cross over into Kenya they are to be interned because it is a recognized obligation arising out of neutrality.

3. The question of the exact position of His Majesty's Government

The Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

Government in the event of a war between Italy and Ethiopia is, of course, a matter which has not yet been decided, and I am to suggest for the consideration of Mr. Secretary MacDonald that a further telegram should be addressed to the Government of Kenya informing them that the previous telegram was based upon the assumption that His Majesty's Government would act as neutrals in the event of such a war, (an assumption which is not necessarily well-founded) and that as the matter will require some consideration further instructions will follow.

4. I am to add that even if His Majesty's Government are not neutral but in the position of a Member of the League imposing economic sanctions against Italy there is no reason why they should allow Kenya to be overrun either by Ethiopian or by Italian troops. Sir Samuel Hoare considers that in any circumstances Italian troops who cross the frontier into Kenya should be detained and that it remains to be decided on grounds of policy whether in the circumstances His Majesty's Government should instruct the Government of Kenya to detain Ethiopian troops or merely to send them back to their own country.

This is not official letter form

5. With reference to the suggestion made by the Colonial Office in their second letter under reference that a note should be addressed to the Governments of both Italy and Ethiopia stating what are considered to be the exact limits of British territory to the south of Ethiopia, which note should be based on the description of the Kenya frontier given in the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement of the 6th December, 1907, I am to state

that

C. O.

Mr. Lee 4/10

Mr. Franklin

Mr. Howard 1-10 *atms*

Sir C. Parkinsson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

Sir F. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shackburgh.

Parad. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

Tel. Receipts

Screened

Naval Air

70/96

(95)

FURTHER ACTION.

*Copy, 5 A/M
LF.*

with copies 745096.

*see tel. 11/10/35
8 etc.*

*38066/35
C. D.
2-070
11/10/35
Receipted
8.5.35
sent*

No 269 series

Your telegram no

221 Air Ministry

states that though

there is a landing

ground at DICK'S HEAD

general statement in

last paragraph of no

telegram no 251 still

holds good.

See.

AIR MINISTRY,

ADASTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY, W.C.2. — 38

S.35493.

30th. September, 1935.

Dear Sir,

With reference to your letter 38066/35 of the 21st September, I write to say there actually is an Italian landing ground at Dick's Head (Rasfiambone), and the present type of Italian aircraft could, according to their paper performance, reach Mombasa from there. It is, however, still true to say that Mombasa is not within effective bombing range from Italian Somaliland, even using Dick's Head as an advance landing ground. Of course, it is always possible to make long distance flights by fitting extra fuel tanks, but it is doubtful if the facilities for carrying out this work exist in Italian Somaliland, although as some of their aircraft are of the cabin type they could carry fuel with them and refuel in the air if they wished to reach Mombasa. I do not think even with extra tanks they could reach Nairobi at present.

Yours sincerely,
F.C. Purie

F.G. Lee Esq.,
Colonial Office,
London, S.W.1.

C. O.

Secret

39

Mr. Lee 2/19

Mr. Frederick ref.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson

Sir C. Bottomley

Sir J. Shuckburgh

Permt. U.S. of S.

Partly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State

ansd by 99
Hester

no for n free

DRAFT

Wing Commander

B. C. Pirie

M.C., D.F.C.

From Gen. 221.

New ~~to~~ Pirie

Some days ago

we received in a
telegram to King's
account of information
from the Secretariat
Nairobi was beyond
the effective bombing
range of any British
aircraft in present
British territories.

I now enclose

a copy of a telegram
recently received from
the Governor Cameroon

alleged reports of
which I have been
informed and which I have

FURTHER ACTION.

We doubt in the
13th and 14th September. We
naturally attach little
importance to these
reports, but we should
be glad to know whether
you have any information
about the landing ground
which is said to exist near the
Mediterranean - (Kang. frontier
(Kang. and the whole)
land whether, if such a
landing ground exists, the
State would be interested in
the first instance, & this
letter still holds good as
regards Japan.

Yours sincerely,

RECEIVED
COPY FOR REGISTRATION
F 20 SEP 1935
C. O. REGY

96
40

CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 20th September, 1935. Received in the Colonial Office at 10.16 a.m. on 20th September, 1935.

No. 221. Secret.

Your No. 251 last paragraph. Two witnesses report hearing aeroplanes over Mombasa about 22 hours (on the) 13th September. One witness claims to have heard an aeroplane flying very high 11 hours (on the) 14th September. Information at present available is that no local aeroplane was in the vicinity. Whilst I cannot vouch for reliability of statements I feel I ought to report them. Mombasa only about 230 miles from Italian frontier where landing ground is believed to exist.

Copy to the Ministry 24 Oct '35

6214/27/35.

95
41

CYPH R TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governor of Kenya.

(Sent 7.0 p.m., 17th September, 1935.)

Consolidated 6497

No.251. Secret.

It has been suggested that if hostilities arose
with Italy attacks might be made from Italian Somaliland on
forces in north of Kenya possibly involving gas shelling by
artillery or gas attack from the air. Should be glad if views
could be telegraphed as soon as possible as to (i) likelihood
of attacks involving use of gas in light of any information
available locally (ii) whether supply of gasmasks desired
and if so what number.

I am informed by Air Ministry that Mombasa and
Nairobi are beyond effective bombing range of any Italian
aircraft at present in Italian Somaliland.

*Copy to Air Ministry
2. Oct 35
no. 1019*

35493

~~SECRET~~ 89
94

Air Ministry,

17 9. 35.

A2

Forwarded with compliments
of Wing Commander Price

F. G. Lee, Esq.
Colonial Office

PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from Headquarters, R.A.F. Middle East to Air Ministry.

Time of origin 1932 hours }
Time of Receipt 2026 hours } 14.9.35.
G.M.T.
.....

G.S.96. 14/9. Your X.992. 13/9.

Flight will depart for Nairobi from Helwan on September 18th. It will not arrive at Nairobi before the date requested by Governor (September 25th). No reason for delay apart from weather risks in Soudan which must be accepted. Flight will be accompanied by four ^{transport} aircraft of which two are needed in Kenya; the other two will return at once.

Despatched Reg (Tel)
300 has 129

SECRET.

X.992 **44**

PARAPHRASE OF CYPHER MESSAGE.

This message must be circulated under cover and must be looked up when not in use. It must not be placed on a secret file and all drafts or copies of the original which may have been retained by the originator must be burnt on receipt of this copy. This message must not be referred to in clear or code messages or in any non-secret correspondence.

To—	Date	Receipt	Despatch
Headquarters, Middle East.			
From—	Time of		
Air Ministry.		System	

X.992 13/9. Your G.S.67 of 11/9. Despatch of Flight to Kenya for preliminary training in role assigned to it in the event of Italo-Abyssinian hostilities, namely, assistance in tribal control on the Frontier is agreed to. As hostilities between Italy and Abyssinia may break out at an early date we consider it most important that pilots should become acquainted with topography and local conditions in Kenya as soon as possible. Therefore, unless there are strong reasons for delaying movement of Flight until October 1st it should be despatched as soon as practicable.

The 2 bomber transport aircraft earmarked to proceed to Kenya may also be despatched now if you consider they would be of value in transporting personnel of Flight to Kenya, but if not required there for ^{fl} flight maintenance duties they should return to Heliopolis to await developments.

It should be understood that present object in despatching Flight is solely to enable the pilots to become acquainted with local conditions and to practice co-operation with local forces. When this object has been achieved it is possible that detachment may be recalled if hostilities have not by then broken out.

Keep Governor, Kenya and Air Ministry informed as to the movements of Flight.

File S.35493 refers.

(Sgd).

Copies to :-

- Air Council
- Deputy Secretary
- D.C.A.S.
- D.D.O.I.
- F.O.3
- A.I.5
- S.6
- Fl and P. R.

A.M. Form 683.

A 952 ✓

SECRET.

45

CYPHER MESSAGE.

Serial No. X.1819.

This message must be circulated under cover and must be locked up when not in use. It must not be placed on any but a secret file and all drafts or copies of the original which may have been retained by the originator must be burnt on receipt of this copy. This message must not be referred to in clear or code messages or in any non-secret correspondence.

To—	Air Ministry.	Date	
From—	Headquarters, R.A.F., Middle East.	Time of Receipt	
		Time of Dispatch	
		System	

Time of Origin 1932 hours

14.9.38.

Time of Receipt 2028 hours
G.M.T.

T.C.

G.S.96 14/9. Your X.992 13/9.

will depart
Departure of Flight from Helwan for Nairobi *on Sept 17th* will be 18/9.
It will not arrive at
Date of arrival Nairobi not before ~~the~~ the date requested

by Governor. *(Sept 25th)* Apart from weather risks in Soudan which must be accepted *Flight will be accompanied by two* no reason for delay. Four transport aircraft

accompanying flight two of which return at once remainder being *of which two are* needed in Kenya, the other two will return at once.

Registry (Telegrams)

- Copies to:-
- Air Council
- D.C.A.S.
- Dep. Secretary
- D.D.O.L.(2) (action copy)
- S.G.
- A.I.S.
- E.O.S.
- F.I.
- F.E.
- D.D.P.O.

No action is to be taken on this telegram without reference to the holder of the action copy.

8201

C. O.

Mr. Lee 12/9
Mr. Freshfield atom
Mr. &

Mr. Parkinson
Sir G. Tomlinson
Sir C. Bottomley
Sir J. Shuckburgh
Parlt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Secretary of State.

38066/35
46 88
12/9
6

Rec^d sent 7/ 12/9
No. 243 Secret

Your telegram no 214
his Office Commanding
Middle East is being

DRAFT.

Tel Memphis

&
Immediate
General
Nividi.

instructions to arrange for
(to Kenya for Egypt)
immediate despatch of
one figure of general
purpose aircraft @ American
battered troop convoys
shown to send immediately
is being left to his
discretion @

I.G. K.A.A. Command.
Wing Com. Pire

Reason & Col. J. J. J. J.

200
20. (10.09)
20. (10.09)
20. (10.09)
20. (10.09)
20. (10.09)
20. (10.09)

FURTHER ACTION.

Copies, with copies
987 &

F.O.
H/M.
W.O.
Adms.

Pages 1000
(C.I.D.)

Proposed movement
of ground troops approved.

Secret

FOR RECORD

87
47

CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 11th September, 1935. Received 10.52 a.m., 11th Sept.

IMMEDIATE.

No. 214⁺ Secret. (4)

Reference my despatch secret (2) of 28th February regarding measures to be taken in the event of hostilities between Ethiopia and Italy, and to your secret telegram No. 211 regarding aircraft co-operation. As result of conference with my civil and military adviser at which Squadron Leader Gibbs was present I consider machines referred to in your telegram should be sent with least possible delay to enable personnel to acquire knowledge of area(s) and local conditions if possible in advance of eventualities. Gibbs in full agreement and shall be glad if earliest arrangements can be made. I have also decided on advice of Brigade Commander, unless you see any objection, immediately to garrison Mandera and Moyale with one platoon each King's African Rifles as a precautionary measure in view of possible disturbances on frontier. Grateful if you will confirm immediately by telegram.

(57)

copy to
 Mr. (Mr. 50)
 Mr. (Mr. 51)
 Mr. (Mr. 52)
 Mr. (Mr. 53)

Mr. (Mr. 50) (Mr. 51)

C. O.

Mr. Leo. 11/9

Mr. *Freda* 11/9

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shuckburgh

Permt. U.S. of S.

Partly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State

C.D.
R 10SEP
D

85
48

Downing Street,

11th September, 1935.

Secret

Sir,

I am etc. to refer to the

letter from this Department of the 26th of August with which was forwarded a copy of a telegram sent to the Acting Governor of Kenya concerning the question of what action should be taken if armed belligerent forces endeavour to manoeuvre through British territory in the event of a war between Italy and Ethiopia.

2. In the second ^{part} ~~paragraph~~ of ^{the} ~~that~~ ~~below~~ ^{telegram} it was suggested that it might be advisable if war breaks out to notify ~~them~~ ^{with} the Govts. of Italy and Ethiopia of what are considered to be the exact limits of British territory ^{Kenya - Ethiopia} i.e. where the undemarcated frontier ~~is~~ ^{is} considered to run. It was

78.

DRAFT.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

FURTHER ACTION.

W.O.

Copy to Air Min. 1.f

suggested

suggested that any note that might be sent to the Govts. concerned should be based on the description of the frontier in the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of the 6th of December, 1907, (Hertslet Volume II, page 445).

A telegram has now been received from the Governor stating that he concurs in the action proposed and, in particular, agrees that any note addressed to the two powers concerned should be based on the description of the frontier given in the 1907 Treaty. If, therefore, hostilities ~~break out~~ break out between Italy and Ethiopia the Secretary of State would be ~~able~~^{able} if a communication could be addressed to the two Govts. concerned in the sense indicated above. \int ⁴ ~~a~~ ^{an} copy of this letter ~~is~~ being sent to the W.O. and the Air Ministry.

I am, etc.

(Sgd) J. E. W. Flood.

RECEIVED

10 SEP 1935

C. O. REGY

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

38002/ 49
83

CYPRUS TELEGRAM from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 9th September, 1935. Received in the Colonial Office at 3.23 p.m. on 9th September, 1935.

No. 211. Secret.

(no. 77)

Reference your 224 I agree that note should be based on description of frontier in 1907 Treaty.

82
50

SECRET.

Downing Street,
28th August, 1935.

My dear Byrnie

(72)

I have let too many air mails go off without replying to your letter of the 16th of August about air precautions in Kenya.

I am glad you have drawn attention to the phrase in the telegram to Wade (No. 211) "As a matter of principle Kenya should bear the cost of these measures". Here "should" ought to have been "ought to", so as to distinguish between the principle and what we hope may be arranged.

There is no doubt about the principle that a colony is expected to bear the cost of its own defence. I have not troubled to look up any legal classics (though I believe it has been accepted in all sorts of defence papers), as I have had ample experience of its application. It was only about three months after the beginning of the War that I went to the then Permanent Under Secretary and told

him

BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR JOSEPH BYRNE, G.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B.

TEL. NO. HOLBORN 3434

Any communications on the subject of this letter should be addressed to—

THE SECRETARY,
AIR MINISTRY,
ADASTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY,
LONDON, W.C. 2

and the following number quoted—

8.35493/S.6.



81
51
AIR MINISTRY,
LONDON, W.C. 2.

2 / August, 1935.

Sir,

591
With reference to Colonial Office letter, 38066/35, of the 13th August and to subsequent oral discussion, regarding the question of air co-operation on the Northern frontier of Kenya in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Abyssinia, I am commanded by the Air Council to acquaint you, for the information of Mr. Secretary MacDonald, that arrangements have been made for Squadron Leader G.E. Gibbs, M.C., Officer Commanding, No. 47 (Bomber) Squadron, Khartoum to proceed to Kenya forthwith.

Squadron Leader Gibbs, who has been fully instructed, will travel to Nairobi by Imperial Airways, and the date of his arrival will be communicated direct to the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya by the Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Middle East.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,

S.V.L.

I am to add that the Air Officer Commanding has been instructed to arrange for the despatch by sea of the necessary stores to Kenya.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. W. Handley

38066/35
O. D.
24 AUG
77
52
R. Lee 23/8.
R. Fraser 23/8
Rephotographed 23/8
11.0pm
22/8/35

STATE GENERAL Receipt.

GOVERNOR.

NAIROBI.

Cons by 83

No. 224 Secret

Your despatch of 4th July Secret

paragraph 2. It is a recognized

obligation on a neutral power to

disarm and intern armed forces of a

sovereign that violate that neutral's

frontier. Such a contingency is

considered extremely remote in Kenya,

but if it should arise action should

be taken in conformity with above

principle.

SECRET.

It has been suggested

that owing to absence of

physical demarcation of

boundaries it would be

advisable on outbreak of

hostilities to notify

Governments of both our

territories when we consider

*Copies to F.O.
W.O. LF. W.
A/M*

ho. Col. Sec. for use

*Copy to
40. (No. 76)
60. (No. 75)
62. (No. 80)*

to be exact limits of our
territory & in order to
avoid local misunderstandings
subject to your assumptions &
propose to ask Foreign Office
to provide accordingly having their
note on description of frontier
in 1907 boundary ©

See.

76
53
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
22nd August, 1935.

(J 3695/1/1)

Dear Lee,

(55)
We agree with the draft telegram, enclosed in
your letter of the 10th August, to the Government of
Kenya in regard to the action to be taken if armed
belligerent forces endeavour to manoeuvre through
British territory. We should, further, see no objection
to making to the Italian and Ethiopian Governments the
communication suggested in Osborne's letter of the
(64)
13th August if you agree that this is desirable.

I am sending copies of this letter to Osborne
and Pirie.

Yours sincerely,

F. G. Lee

F. G. Lee, Esq.

C. O.

74
54

Mr. Lee. 20/8

Handwritten note: *Handwritten signature* 20/8

Mr. ~~Freeman~~ *20/8* Semi-official for Mr. Lee's signature.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

Downing Street,

21st August, 1935.

My dear Pirie,

Many thanks for your

DRAFT.

70.

letter of the 17th of August about the air reinforcements for Kenya and Somaliland.

WING COMMANDER G.C. PIRIE, M.C., D.F.C.

We note what you say about the position in Somaliland if a flight is sent there. As regards Kenya, we agree that a definite decision should be deferred until after you have received Gibbs's report, and we are accordingly telegraphing to the Acting Governor on the lines suggested in the last paragraph of your letter. (Copies of the Acting Governor's telegram and of our reply are being sent to you

officially.)

FURTHER ACTION.

officially.) As I said to you on the telephone, we hope that in point of fact no difficulty will arise in the matter and that you will be able to agree without hesitation

to placing the flight under the orders of the ^{location} Brigade Commander. I might perhaps remind you

that Campbell is p.s.c. and ~~has therefore~~ ^{having held various General Staff appointments both during & since the war has, presumably, had ~~some~~ ^{some} experience in the matter}

of co-operation with aircraft.

Yours sincerely,

(copy) J. G. Lee

38066/35 Kenya: Secret

C. O.

Mr. Lee. 20/8

Feb. Col. 20/8/35
Mr. Freedom 20/8/35

Mr. Tomlinson.

Sir C. Blomley.

Sir J. Shackburgh.

Sir G. Grindle.

Genl. U.S. of S.

Genl. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

DRAFT. TELEGRAM (RE-CYPHER)

GOVERNOR,

NAIROBI.

C. D. 7B
R 22 AUG
D 22 "

August, 1935.

55

Secret
No. 218

Your telegram No. 190, second

sentence. I anticipate no

difficulty but am seeking views

of Air Ministry.

Secer.

*Copies of GB
of this ref to
AIR Lt. of*

Marseilles
16th August, 1935.

72
56

Union-Castle Line,
s.s. "Llandaff Castle".

cust. by 82
Secret

My dear Bottomley,

(58)
I have just received your "secret" letter of the 13th August. Without doubt the proposals contained in (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of the telegram to the Governor must be carried out: the remaining question is that of expense.

I'am afraid I cannot agree with the statement "as a matter of principle Kenya should bear the cost of these measures".

Our Northern Frontier Province in normal times is not an asset but a definite liability. To prevent it being overrun by the wild and uncontrolled tribes, who in fact are not true Ethiopians but who are domiciled within the very undefined boundaries of Abyssinia, has, during past years, been a heavy drain on Kenya's very limited resources. Uganda has of course borne a share of this expenditure. I have always felt that even in peace time Kenya should have been relieved of some of this unproductive expenditure: an expenditure incurred not only in the interests of

East

East Africa as a whole but indeed of the Empire.

Should hostilities unfortunately break out I consider it most unfair that the extra expenditure caused by a war of this peculiar nature in which Kenya is in no way concerned except in safeguarding the Empire's interests, should be thought a just charge against this small and struggling Colony.

I feel sure that this view will in the end be taken by H.M. Government and our immediate task, as I see it, must be to prevent any local public discussion or reference to the matter.

I do sincerely hope that when Ministers return to London a decision favourable to us will be arrived at without delay.

I am writing this hurriedly in order to post from Marseilles instead of from Genoa.

Yours sincerely,

J. Byrne.

Marselles 16 August

UNION-CASTLE LINE

S S "LLANDAFF CASTLE"

1931

72

58



Secret

My Sea Bottomly

I have just received your "Secret" letter of the 13th August.

Without doubt the proposals contained in (a) and (b) of para 1. of the telegram to the Governor must be carried out: the remaining question is that of expense.

I'm afraid I cannot agree with the statement "as a matter of principle Kenya should bear the cost of these measures".

Our northern Frontier Province
in normal times is not an 5th
area but a definite liability.
To prevent it being overrun
by the wild, uncontrolled tribes,
who in fact are not true
Ethiopians but who are descended
within the very undefined
boundaries of Abyssinia, has,
during past years, been a heavy
drain on Kenya's very limited
resources. Uganda has of course
borne a share of this expenditure.
I have always felt that
even in peace time Kenya should
have been relieved of some of this

expensive expenditure: an expenditure means not
only the interests of East Africa as a whole
but also of the Empire.

Stones believe unfortunately that it is merely
of good opinion that the other expenditure could
by a war of the present nature in that
Kenya is in a very concerned respect in

regarding the Empire's interests, Stones the Mayor
as a just charge against this small - shipping
Colony.

I feel sure that this view will in the end be
taken by HM Government & our immediate help,

as I see it, must be to
prevent any local public discussion
or reference to the matter.

I do sincerely hope that Mr
Merrick's return to London
a decision favourable to us
will be arrived at without
delay

I am writing this hurriedly
in order to get from
Marseilles instead of from
Geneva

Yours sincerely

H. Lysons

2. CO-OPERATION OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN MEASURES ON
THE KENYA FRONTIER IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES.

71

THE SUB-COMMITTEE had under consideration a Memorandum by the Colonial Office (Paper No. A.C. (0) 5).

60

THE CHAIRMAN referred to the proposal to reinforce Kenya by two troop-carrying aircraft and a flight of general-purpose aircraft and asked Group Captain Peck whether he could give an estimate of the probable cost.

GROUP CAPTAIN PECK said that the cost of shipping preliminary supplies and heavy stores as far as Mombasa would be about £1,500. There would be additional charges /
wards.

MR. LEE said that these additional charges could be waived.

GROUP CAPTAIN PECK said that in that case the total cost would not amount to more than approximately £2,000.

THE CHAIRMAN then asked whether these charges would be borne by Imperial funds.

61

MR. BARLOW stated that as Kenya was responsible for her own defence she must pay her own defence charges. as a result of these additional defence measures, there was a budgetary deficit, the matter could be investigated afterwards. As a matter of principle it was not possible to agree to pay for these measures in advance.

MR. LEE said that the acceptance of the arrangements by the Governor of Kenya had been made on the understanding that Kenya would not be called upon to pay the charges involved. If the Treasury view prevailed, it might be necessary to do without the additional aircraft and, in such an event, the ultimate expense might well be heavier if the situation deteriorated.

MR. BARLOW asked what was the nature of the dangers against which it was necessary to guard.

MR. LEE replied that, while it was not anticipated that there would be any serious fighting between Italians and Abyssinians in the area near the Kenya frontier, the Abyssinian tribes near that frontier were much less under effective control than those near the British Somaliland frontier (except for the Ogaden). Consequently, anything that weakened such hold as the Abyssinian authorities had over those tribes might result in a state of chaos across the frontier. Thus, in the years immediately following the war (during which there had been serious internal disturbances in Abyssinia) the tribes in the frontier area became out of hand and defences had to be increased on the northern frontier; a similar situation might well arise in the present case, should the Abyssinian Government collapse.

MR. FRESTON raised the question of the financial assistance which had been promised for the present emergency to British Somaliland.

MR. BARLOW pointed out that the status of the two territories was not the same. If the Treasury accepted the responsibility for financial provision for the aircraft now contemplated for Kenya, the latter would relapse into the position of a grant-aided territory.

MR. LEE pointed out that it was only in respect of aircraft that financial assistance was being asked. Kenya was herself at present bearing the cost of other measures due to the present emergency.

MR. BARLOW asked why it was proposed to send two troop carriers and a flight of four general-purpose aircraft when the Governor of Kenya had only asked for two troop carriers and two general-purpose aircraft.

GROUP CAPTAIN PECK explained that although the Governor of Kenya had asked for two general-purpose aircraft, he had not related his requirements to the tasks these aircraft would have to carry out.

It was not desirable to send out single reconnaissance aircraft over this territory. Aircraft were usually sent in pairs - one being equipped with W/T. If a total of two general-purpose aircraft only were despatched, the amount of reconnaissance work which could be carried out would be very limited. If necessary the Air Ministry were prepared to break up formations and send only three aircraft, but in this particular instance they considered four aircraft to be the minimum necessary for the task.

MR. BARLOW appreciated the necessity for despatching a flight of four general-purpose aircraft, but repeated his opinion that the attitude of the Government of Kenya regarding finance was unreasonable.

MR. PRESTON pointed out that this was hardly a fair criticism because the Government of Kenya had stated several months ago that if a major crisis arose and additional defence measures were required Kenya would not be in a position to pay.

THE CHAIRMAN suggested that the Government of Kenya were clearly under an obligation to see that their frontiers were safe, apart from the financial aspect, and that any Government should be prepared to make sacrifices in other directions to this end.

In reply to a question by the Chairman MR. BARLOW said that the Government of Kenya need not wait until the end of the financial year (which was the calendar year) if she decided to apply for financial assistance because a budgetary deficit would result from the extra expenditure, but if she wished to avoid relapsing into the position of a grant-aided territory she must not expect to be given financial assistance before the defence expenditure had been incurred.

THE CHAIRMAN asked whether the Governor could not be informed that His Majesty's Government were unable to assume responsibility for the cost of the aircraft required to co-operate on the Kenya frontier, but that if as a result of assuming this expenditure the Government of Kenya found themselves with a budgetary deficit His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give assistance at that stage.

MR. LEE pointed out that the defence of the northern frontier was a permanent heavy liability for Kenya.

64

The Colonial Office would put the question to the Governor again, but he felt that he should warn the Committee that the Government of Kenya might not be able to defray the necessary expenditure and would have to face the risks involved.

MR. BARLOW pointed out that there were other alternatives to the grant-in-aid, such as, for example, a financial advance.

CONCLUSION.

IT WAS AGREED:-

That the Colonial Office should be invited to inform the Governor of Kenya that in principle the cost of the despatch of the two troop-carrying aircraft and a flight of general-purpose aircraft to Kenya could not be accepted as a charge on Imperial funds, but that the Treasury would be prepared to re-examine the matter if the cost of co-operation of the Royal Air Force in measures on the Kenya frontier in the event of hostilities resulted in a budgetary deficit for the Government of Kenya.

3. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY KENYA IN THE EVENT OF ITALIAN OR ABYSSINIAN FORCES MANOEUVRING ACROSS BRITISH TERRITORY.

MR. LEE said that the Government of Kenya had recently asked what action they were to take if forces of either Italy or Abyssinia manoeuvred across British territory. The Oversea Defence Committee had considered this question but had taken no decision pending the receipt of a report from Mr. Glenday. At the meeting, however, at which this matter had been considered, it had been suggested that the policy proposed by Somaliland for dealing with belligerent troops and aircraft should apply also to Kenya. That policy involved the disarming of any land forces which might enter British territory and putting them into internment camps. If

the belligerents refused to disarm on entering British territory there was no alternative but to repulse them by force.

CONCLUSIONS.

IT WAS AGREED:-

- (a) That the Colonial Office should be advised that the measures to be undertaken by Kenya in the event of Italian or Abyssinian forces manoeuvring across British territory should be similar to those proposed by Somaliland, and referred to in the Minutes of the 342nd meeting of the Oversea Defence Committee.
- (b) That the Colonial Office, after consultation with the Foreign Office and the War Office, should take the necessary action to inform the Government of Kenya to the above effect.

0
66

17th August, 1935.

My dear Lee,

With reference to your letter of August 15th in regard to air reinforcements for Kenya and British Somaliland, the news contained in the last sentence of the Acting Governor's telegram is rather amusing! I am inclined to agree with you, however, that the East African Standard was bluffing the local authorities, as, in this instance, a leakage of information is almost out of the question.

and 7/4 - 2/10/35

In regard to the last paragraph of your letter, you are quite right in assuming that the Flight to be despatched from Aden to Somaliland in the event of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia will operate under the orders of the Officer Commanding Somaliland Camel Corps. We are quite happy about this arrangement as there is an excellent liaison between the Camel Corps and the Royal Air Force at Aden, and both understand each other very well. The officer who will command the Flight is an experienced Flight Commander and is to act as air adviser to Bennett who we know will be guided by him in air matters and will employ the aircraft placed under him to the best advantage.

Had similar conditions, i.e., an already existing and satisfactory liaison, prevailed in Kenya, I am certain we should have had no hesitation in at once agreeing to the Flight earmarked to operate there being placed under the orders of the local Brigade Commander. Campbell however has no experience in the handling of aircraft under the conditions envisaged, and though we have every reason to believe that Gibbs and he will get along splendidly together and that Campbell will be prepared to be guided by Gibbs' advice on air matters you will no doubt appreciate that we should like to be assured of this before we agree to place the Flight under his orders.

F.G. Lee, Esq.,
Colonial Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

For these reasons we should be grateful if in replying to Kenya's telegram you could temporise, possibly on the lines that you "anticipate no difficulty in this connection but that you are seeking the Air Ministry's views". We will then let you have a definite reply as soon as we have received our A.O.C.'s report on Gibbs' visit to Kenya. If (as we confidently expect) we are satisfied that there will at least be no mis-employment of aircraft and that relations between Campbell and Gibbs are well established we will readily agree to the aircraft being placed under the orders of the Brigade Commander.

Sincerely yours

E. C. Pirie

6967

Downing Street,

15th August, 1935.

Dear Pirie,

I enclose a copy of a telegram which has been received from the Acting Governor of Kenya about the question of possible air reinforcements for that Colony in the event of war across the frontier.

There is nothing to send in reply to the first sentence of the telegram, since the Acting Governor will by now have received the telegram which we sent yesterday about the forthcoming visit by Squadron Leader Gibbs. Now, I think, is there anything that we can say about the last sentence; probably, I don't think there was any actual leakage of information; I am inclined to think that it was a case of an ordinary journalist's intelligent anticipation of possible events. In any event nothing classified has appeared and there is nothing that we can do about it now.

We

We should, however, be glad of your concurrence in the reply which we propose to send to the second sentence of the telegram - which is to the effect that the detachment of the R.A.F. will come under the general command of the O/C, Northern Brigade. A similar question will arise, of course, if a flight of aircraft is sent to Somaliland; here again we assume that the detachment will come under the general orders of the O/C Troops, Somaliland. Would you be so good as to let me know if you concur in the above.

Signed J. F. Lee

Mr. Lee. 14/8.

Mr. Freeston. 14 at once.

A. M. 3 hour.

38066/38.

65.

69

CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya.

(Sent 3.30 p.m., 14th August, 1935.)

No.213 Secret.

My telegram No.211. Officer selected is
Squadron-Leader Gibbs commanding 47th Squadron Khartoum
who would be in command of any Royal Air Force ^{de} attachments
sent to Kenya. Date of his arrival will be communicated
direct to you by Air Officer Commanding Middle East. He
has been given full instructions by Air Ministry and will
be familiar with particulars as regards stores.

Copy to A/M LF. Secret.

Copy to Major Webb
Abyssinia Sub. Cttee.

*Copy to Air Ministry (no. 66)
Major Webb (no. 67)*

64
—
40
THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

13th August, 1935.

Draft Let.

(54) We concur in the terms of the draft telegram to the Government of Kenya enclosed with your D.O. letter of August 10th, addressed to Colonel Sir Ronald Adam.

We still think, however, that unless rather more than this is done, difficulties may arise in the interpretation of these instructions. As you know, the Northern frontier of Kenya has never been properly defined, although our administration up to the line shown on our maps has been a matter of fact for many years.

We are inclined to think that if hostilities break out, the Foreign Office should indicate to the Italian Government exactly what we consider to be our territory, which must not be violated. If some such action is not taken, there might be a danger of a fracas within Kenya with Italian troops, who might deny that they had crossed the frontier into our territory.

It might be worth while sending a similar communication to the Ethiopian Government, but their people in this area would probably be quite irresponsible.

I am sending copies of this letter to Scrivener and Pirie.

Yours sincerely,
C.F. Osborn

F.C. Lee, Esq.,
Colonial Office,
S.W.1.

C. O.

38066/35/Kenya

39

Mr. Lee. 12/8
Mr. Fraser 12.
Mr. Flinn 12.8

71

DOWNING STREET.

Sir C. Parkinson.
Sir G. Tomlinson.

Immediate and Secret. 13th August, 1935.

X Sir C. Bottomley. 12. f

Sir J. Shuckburgh.
Permt. U.S. of S.
Partly. U.S. of S.
Secretary of State.

Sir,

I am etc. to refer to your letter No.S.35493/S.6 of the 26th of July and connected correspondence concerning the question of air co-operation on the Northern frontier of Kenya in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia.

51.

DRAFT.

THE SECRETARY,
AIR MINISTRY.

2. The Air Council will be

aware that this question was recently discussed between the Governor of Kenya and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff ; ~~and that it was agreed at the discussion~~ who agreed (that it would be prudent if ^{such} there can be available in the colony, in the event of hostilities, one flight of general purpose aircraft (to be used primarily for reconnaissance) in addition to the two troop carriers already earmarked for possible service ⁱⁿ Kenya.

Telegram to Acting
Governor, Kenya.
Draft herewith.

70. (no. 60)
70. (no. 61)
D.C. (no. 62)
Major Giff (no. 63)
Copy to

FURTHER ACTION.

Copy with enclosure
to F.O.
W.O.
D.A.C.
Major Giff
for Abyssinia
Subloom 7 C.I.D.

It was further agreed that it would be desirable for the Air Ministry to arrange at once for a visit to Kenya by an R.A.F. officer from Cairo or Khartoum to discuss with the local authorities ^{plans for cooperation between the} details of ~~the~~ ^{his arrangements to land the} ground troops, and to obtain information as to the adequacy of wireless communications, landing grounds etc. on the frontier; while, at the same time, arrangements should be made for a supply of stores and spare parts to be sent to Kenya forthwith by sea.

3. The arrangements proposed as a result of this discussion were endorsed generally by the Abyssinia Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence at a meeting on the 9th of August, but the question of the incidence of the cost of these measures was left over for discussion between the Colonial Office and the Treasury. This aspect of the matter has now been ^{considered} settled; and I am to enclose, for the information of the Air Council, a copy of a telegram ^{which has now been} sent to the Acting Governor of Kenya ^{and} which sets out the arrangements contemplated.

C. O.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

FURTHER ACTION.

4

72
The S. of S. would be obliged if the Air Council could now give the necessary directions for the action indicated in that telegram, i.e., for an R.A.F. officer from Cairo or Khartoum to visit Kenya forthwith, and for the necessary stores and spare parts to be despatched to Kenya by sea. It is assumed that the officer selected to visit Kenya will be given full instructions ^{by the Air Council} prior to his departure and will, in particular, be furnished with a list of those matters (e.g., the adequacy of landing ^{the land} grounds and of wireless organization) in regard to which further information is desired by the Air Ministry.

5.

It will be convenient if the Acting Governor of Kenya could be ^{informed} notified by telegram as soon as possible of the name of the officer who is to visit Kenya and the date of his probable

arrival in the colony. ~~No doubt,~~ The necessary
no doubt
information could be communicated semi-officially
to this Department in advance of an official
reply to this letter.

I am, etc.

(Signed) J. S. W. Flood.

C. O.

38066/35/Kenya.

58

73

Mr. Freeston. 12/8

Mr. ~~Lee~~ 12/8

Mr. Flood 12.8

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

X Sir C. Bottomley. 12.8

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Party. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

For Sir Cecil Bottomley's signature.

DOWNING STREET.

13th August, 1935.

Amended by 72

My dear Byrne,

On the day of your departure there was a meeting of the Abyssinia Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to consider the arrangements for R.A.F. co-operation which were provisionally agreed between you and Air Vice-Marshal Courtney. Everything was approved, except that the Treasury representative displayed a not unexpected reluctance to accept the bill as a charge against the Imperial Exchequer.

As a result of subsequent discussion with the Treasury, they have agreed on a formula, for publication if necessary, in the following terms:-

DRAFT.

Joseph
Brig. Sir James Byrne,
G.C.M.G., K.C.M.G.,
K.A.E., C.A.

~~Telegram~~

FURTHER ACTION.

Kenya will be required to pay the excess cost of the protective measures which may turn out to be necessary, including the despatch of troops from Tanganyika if such a step should be required.

(b) His Majesty's Government will be prepared to consider sympathetically to what extent it is necessary for the Imperial Exchequer ultimately to refund the cost of the protective measures occasioned by the Italian-Ethiopian dispute."

I am further authorised to say, but not for publication, that we feel some confidence that the Treasury will accept the whole of the cost provided that it is quite clear that the out-turn of Kenya's current financial year is not sufficiently better than the estimate to enable the colony to pay.

When our respective Ministers return to London, i.e., in about a month's time, it will, I hope, be possible for this latter assurance to be clarified and endorsed. I anticipate that

/it

C. O.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shackleton.

Parlt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

FURTHER ACTION.

74

it will be unnecessary for the question to be raised in Legislative Council until a session towards the end of the year.

Time presses, so we have telegraphed to Wade as in the enclosed copy. If you have time and opportunity to drop me a line from ^{Genoa} Genoa I shall be ~~glad~~ ^{interested} to receive it. *W. C. Bottomley*

Yours sincerely,

Genoa, you may find it difficult to get the Council to begin in his bag.

Your sincerely

(Signed) W. C. Bottomley

57

PARAPHRASE telegram from the Secretary of State
for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the
Government of Kenya.

Sent Part I 5.30 p.m.
Part II 5.50 p.m. 12th August, 1935

Mr. Lee 12.8.
Mr. Freeston
J.E.W.F. 12.9.
Sir C. Bottomley
12.8. at once.

Secret.

No. 211.

Sir Joseph Byrne discussed before sailing from England scope and extent of aircraft co-operation with Deputy Chief of Air staff (see your secret telegram 4th August). He agreed that in the event of hostilities it would be prudent to have available in Colony, in addition to the two troop carriers, one flight (four machines) of general purposes aircraft which would be used primarily for reconnaissance. The desirability was further agreed of immediate arrangements by the Air Ministry for (a) immediate despatch by sea of supply of stores and spare parts (b) an R.A.F. Officer to be sent to Kenya from Egypt or the Sudan to discuss details of wireless communications, liaison with ground troops, landing grounds etc.,

The above proposals were accepted by the Governor on the understanding that Imperial Exchequer would bear the cost. Since Sir Joseph Byrne sailed discussions have taken place with Treasury regarding the whole question of incidence of cost of precautionary measures in Kenya; these include not only cost of air reinforcements but also expenditure arising from possible reinforcements of ground troops by Battalion from Tanganyika. Following conclusions have been reached: (a) As a matter of principle Kenya should bear cost of these measures. (b) His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider sympathetically to what extent it is necessary for Imperial Exchequer ultimately to refund such cost; i.e. excess cost over normal establishment charges.

Handwritten notes:
Sir J. Byrne (No. 58)
Air Ministry (No. 59)
To (No. 60)
W.P. (No. 61)
O.D. Clew (No. 62)
Major Webb (No. 63)

Copy 2
Copy to Sir J. Byrne in acc. dft.

EXCESS COST
 charges. ~~These means, e.g.~~ in case of R.A.F. detachments that Kenya would be charged only with the additional expense of maintaining aircraft in Kenya instead of elsewhere and of any flying in excess of normal training flights. I am advised that assuming that stores are carried free on the Kenya-Uganda Railways expenditure on (a) and (b) above should not exceed £2,000 and that it is improbable that unless emergency necessitates more than normal flying any excess cost will fall on Colony on account of R.A.F. detachments. A ten per cent increase in flying would probably involve expenditure at the rate of about £300 a month.

A letter dealing more fully with incidence of cost is being sent to the Governor at Marseilles. Meanwhile, on the assumption that you would see no objection to my taking immediate action under (a) and (b) above, I am arranging with Air Ministry accordingly and will telegraph particulars shortly.

Financial arrangements should not be disclosed if you can avoid doing so, until after Governor's return to Nairobi.



TREASURY CHAMBERS,
WHITEHALL, S.W. 1

Telephone No.: WHITEHALL 1234

In any reply
please quote Regd. No.

S: 39737.

10th August, 1935.

Dear Freeston,

You and Lee came to see me today about the question of the excess cost of protective measures necessitated in Kenya by the Italian-Abyssinian dispute.

We regard it as of some importance that we should maintain the principle that Colonies are responsible for their own protective measures and we agreed that Kenya should be required to pay the charges in the first instance just as Somaliland ~~is~~ paying them.

You told me however that at a meeting of the Abyssinian Committee yesterday Barlow announced that he fully recognised the difficult financial position in which Kenya finds herself and that he was prepared to say that the Treasury would sympathetically consider the possibility of the Imperial Exchequer ^{ultimately} bearing part or all of this abnormal charge if it appeared in the upshot that Kenya was unable to afford to do so herself.

We

L. B. Freeston, Esq., O.B.E.,
Colonial Office.

We therefore agree to your telegraphing to the Acting Governor and telling him that

(a) Kenya will be required to pay excess cost (defined) of the protective measures which may turn out to be necessary including the despatch of troops if that is necessary.

(b) That His Majesty's Government will be prepared to consider sympathetically to what extent is necessary for the Imperial ^{defence & welfare} ~~defence~~ the cost of the protective measures occasioned by the Italian-Ethiopian dispute.

I agreed that (b) above might form the text of a public announcement if such an announcement must be made.

I also agreed that there was no objection to your writing privately (i.e. not for public announcement) to the Governor to the effect that you felt some confidence that the Treasury would accept the whole of the cost provided that it was quite clear that the out-turn of Kenya's financial year was not sufficiently better than the estimate to enable Kenya to pay.

Yours sincerely,

L. A. Reed

C. O.

38066/55
54-55

Mr. see 9/8/55.

Mr.
Mr.

Mr. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Perm. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

for us vs.

54 and by 64
55 and by 76

C. O.
R 9 AUG
D 10

New Adam

New Services,

You will

remember my rising
as the last meeting

of the Abyssinian

Committee the question

of what ~~advice~~ should
be given to the House
to ~~be~~

Gov. about the action

to be taken if armed
rebellious forces
emerged to ~~disturb~~ ^{menace}

through British Committee.

When you be

sure enough to let

me know whether

DRAFT.

34 Col. Sir Arnold Adam
Bar.

W.O.

55, P.S. Services by

F.O.

~~Handwritten signature~~

FURTHER ACTION.

To go to $\frac{W.D.}{20}$ - 1914

C. O.

- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr. Parkinson
- Sir G. Tomlinson
- Sir C. Bottomley.
- Sir J. Shuckburgh
- Parly. U.S. of S.
- Parly. U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

Gwen
Naidli.

FURTHER ACTION.

you know in the terms
 of the business and of the
 telegram since it is
 proposed to send to
 Kenya on this point?

I am writing
 similarity to Adams
 Liverpool

Yours sincerely,
 (Signed) F. J. Lee

No secret

Your despatch of 4th July

sent per 2

~~Business policy~~

It is a recognized
 obligation on a neutral
 power to discontinue
 intern armed forces of
 a belligerent that
 violate ^{that neutrality} of frontiers
 and a continuing
 considered extremely
^{in Kenya} ~~unpleasant~~, but if it
 should have ~~any~~
~~any~~ action should be
 taken
 in conformity with what
 the principle

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

S E C R E T.

A.C. (O) 5.

COPY NO. 26

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE ON AETHIOPIA.

Note by the Joint Secretary.

The undermentioned papers are circulated to the Sub-Committee by request of the Colonial Office -

- (i) Note by the Colonial Office dated 7th August, 1935.
- (ii) Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya.
- (iii) Paraphrase of Telegram from the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
- (iv) Note of discussion held on the 7th August between the Governor of Kenya and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

(signed) F.B. Webb.

Joint Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

8th August, 1935.

NOTE BY THE COLONIAL OFFICE.

The Committee will recall that the question of how far aircraft should be used in co-operation with the ground forces on the Kenya frontier in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia had been left over for further examination.

2. Copies of recent telegraphic correspondence with the Acting Governor of Kenya on this subject are now circulated for the Committee's information, together with a note of a discussion in the Colonial Office between the Governor of Kenya (Sir Joseph Byrne) and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice-Marshal Courtney).

3. Reference is particularly invited to what is said in the last paragraph of the note regarding the proposed use of aircraft on this frontier. It will be seen that the Governor now welcomes the prospect of having available in the Colony in case of need not only the two troops carrying aircraft for which he asked in February last, but also a flight of general purpose aircraft. The Governor has, however, made it clear that the cost of using these aircraft, and the cost of any preliminary arrangements in connection with their use (other than provision of additional landing grounds) cannot be met from Kenya funds, but must be borne by the Imperial Exchequer.

4. The Committee is accordingly invited, -

(a) To recommend that the general measures proposed by the Governor and Air Vice-Marshal Courtney, as regards the use of aircraft on this frontier in case of need, should be approved.

(b) to recommend that the immediate measures which it would be necessary to take (viz. the despatch of a Royal Air Force Officer to Kenya, for the purpose of consultation with the local authorities, and the transmission to Kenya by sea of various stores, spare parts etc.) should be undertaken forthwith.

It should be clearly understood that the Committee is invited to make these recommendations on the understanding that no part of the cost of using the aircraft or of the preliminary arrangements necessary other than the provision of landing grounds could be borne by Kenya funds.

5. It is hoped that the Air Ministry representative at the Committee meeting will be able to give an estimate of the cost of (b) above.

COLONIAL OFFICE,

7th August, 1935.

38066/35.

PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya.

Sent 4.15 p.m., 1st August, 1935.

IMMEDIATE

No. 201. Secret.

A further expression of your views in regard to measures to be taken on Northern frontier in light of Glenday's visit is anxiously awaited. Please inform me by telegraph when this may be expected.

I am in any case anxious to know by the 6th of August whether you have modified your opinion as expressed in the second paragraph of your secret despatch of the 13th June regarding the use of aircraft.

If Royal Air Force machines are required for purposes other than troop-carrying (e.g., reconnaissance) it is essential that I should be furnished with details of requirements by next Tuesday.

PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 4th August 1935. Received 10.43 a.m. 4th August.

4th August. In reply to your telegram No. 201 I have referred to Glenday and consider that possibly some increase in strength of outposts may be necessary. Otherwise I have nothing to add to views already expressed. Shall be grateful if in addition to the two troop carriers one reconnaissance machine can be kept available.

84

NOTE OF DISCUSSION HELD AT THE COLONIAL OFFICE
BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR OF KENYA AND THE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF.

1. The question of how far use could be made of aircraft in connection with protective measures to be undertaken on the Kenya frontier, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia, was discussed by Sir Joseph Byrne and Air Vice-Marshal Courtney at a meeting at the Colonial Office on the 7th August, when Mr. Freeston and Mr. Lee of the Colonial Office, were also present.

2. AIR VICE-MARSHAL COURTNEY explained that while it had been decided that in the event of hostilities across the frontier of British Somaliland, a flight of the Royal Air Force should co-operate with the ground troops and police in reconnaissance and other work, the Government of Kenya had hitherto only asked that the services of two troop-carrying aircraft should be made available if an emergency arose, although the Acting Governor had now suggested that one reconnaissance machine might also be sent.

Air Vice-Marshal Courtney suggested that aircraft reconnaissance was certainly advisable in order to provide timely information of the movements of tribesmen across the frontier and he also thought that general purpose aircraft might under certain circumstances be brought to the support of the police detachments anywhere on this long and desolate frontier with greater rapidity and certainty than could troops transported in aircraft to one of the three landing grounds now available and thereafter dependent on motor transport. He did not suggest that these aircraft should necessarily be used in substitution for troops but that the two arms should co-operate together in accordance with the situation at the time, as indeed was contemplated in the case of British Somaliland. Further, he was not clear

as to the exact role which it was proposed that the troop carrying aircraft should play, i.e. as to what numbers of men they would probably be asked to convey and over what distances. For these reasons it appeared to him desirable - if indeed it were decided to make the more extended use of aircraft that he now suggested - that a Royal Air Force Officer should visit Kenya as soon as possible in order to consult with the Officer Commanding, Northern Brigade, King's African Rifles and other local authorities with a view to making the necessary preliminary arrangements as regards the provision of stores and spares, as regards co-operation between the ground forces and whatever air detachments were sent.

3. SIR JOSEPH BYRNE explained that the measures which he had recommended were designed to deal with the situation across the frontier as it appeared likely to him and his advisers to develop during the early months of hostilities. In other words, they did not anticipate that any really serious problem would arise; although he readily admitted that it was impossible to predict with certainty what would actually happen, and that a position might clearly arise in which the steps which, as at present contemplated, would be taken on the outbreak of hostilities would prove to be quite insufficient. In devising arrangements on the frontier he had naturally been influenced by a desire to keep these as simple and as unexpensive as possible; this was the real reason why he had not asked for more aircraft. He entirely agreed that the provision of a flight of general purpose machines primarily for reconnaissance purposes (he understood that the Air Ministry would prefer to send a complete flight rather than one or two machines) would greatly facilitate the task of those responsible for the security of the frontier, and would be a most valuable

insurance in the event of a deterioration in the situation. He wanted to make it quite clear, however, that there could be no question of the cost of operating such a flight (or of operating the two troop carrying aircraft) falling on the Government of Kenya; that Government simply could not afford to pay for such a service. To sum up, his attitude was that, if the need arose, he would welcome the provision of additional aircraft primarily for reconnaissance purposes and would regard them as a most valuable insurance against serious trouble - it being understood that the cost of such aircraft, together with the cost of the troop carriers, would have to be borne on Imperial Funds. He agreed that an immediate visit by a Royal Air Force Officer to Kenya would be helpful. Such a visit would enable operational plans to be discussed and information to be obtained on a number of points in regard to which the Air Ministry were still in doubt, e.g. the probable loads to be carried and distances to be flown by the troop carriers, the adequacy of the ground wireless organisation, and of landing grounds etc. He emphasised, however, that it was clearly impossible for him to say with any precision what the ultimate cost of these measures would be if the aircraft were sent to Kenya - that would naturally depend on how serious the situation near the frontier was and how long that situation lasted.

4. After further discussion it was agreed that, having regard to the possibility that the situation in Kenya might well become unexpectedly more serious than could be foreseen at present, it would be well to make preparatory arrangements to enable not only the two troop carrying aircraft but also a flight of four general purpose aircraft to be despatched to the Colony and to commence operations at short notice on the understanding that the

cost of the services of these aircraft, and of the necessary preliminary arrangements (other than the provision of landing grounds) would have to be met from Imperial Funds. It was agreed also that it would be desirable to obtain authority for these preparatory measures, i.e. the despatch of a Royal Air Force Officer either from Cairo or Khartoum to Kenya for the purpose of consultation with the local authorities, and for the despatch to Kenya of certain stores, spare parts (and possibly petrol) which would be required if the aircraft are to operate there. It was thought that while it was improbable that any estimate, however rough, could be made of what the cost of using the aircraft would be in an actual emergency (since this would naturally depend upon the actual flying that they would be called upon to do), it should be possible for the Air Ministry to prepare an estimate of the cost of the necessary preliminary measures mentioned above.

COLONIAL OFFICE.

7th August, 1933.

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

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PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 4th August 1935. Received 10.43 a.m. 4th August.

(49)

4th August. In reply to your telegram No.201 I have referred to Glenday and consider that possibly some increase in strength of outposts may be necessary. Otherwise I have nothing to add to views already expressed. Shall be grateful if in addition to the two troop carriers one reconnaissance machine can be kept available.

Copy to H.M. 52

C. O.

38066/55.50

89

Mr. Lee 1/8

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

X Sir C. Bottomley. 1-8

Sir J. Shackburgh.

Parnt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

Semi-official for Sir C. Bottomley's

signature.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten mark]

DOWNING STREET,

1st AUGUST, 1935.

DRAFT.

SIR J. SIMON, G.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B.

The Secretary of State has

asked me to let you know that this morning Cunliffe-Lister talked to him about the question of the use of aircraft on the Northern Frontier in the event of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia. You know what the general position is about this. You asked in February that two Victoria troop-carriers should be made available to facilitate the rapid movement of troops and supplies; the Air Ministry promised

FURTHER ACTION

[Handwritten note: the Victoria troop-carriers]

to have these machines available but urged strongly that much more extended use could be made of aircraft for reconnaissance and other purposes (shepherding refugees etc) on the frontier. We passed on the Air Ministry suggestions to the Government of Kenya but Wade telegraphed on the 2nd May to say that he did not consider the use of aircraft as proposed by the Air Ministry to be practicable under local conditions "for other than purposes of reconnaissance". The Air Ministry have returned to the charge with considerable emphasis, and I gather that the ~~Head~~ Chief of the Air Staff this morning expressed the view that to send ~~group~~ carriers alone would be really of little value. We had intended to discuss the question further with the Air Ministry in the light of the ~~Further~~ despatch which we are expecting from Wade giving Glenday's appreciation of the situation and outlook. We are hoping to get ~~reply~~ this at the beginning of next week but the Secretary of State is anxious that in any case you should have a talk with the Chief of the Air Staff (or his Deputy)

next

C. O.

- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Sir C. Parhiason.
- Sir G. Tomkinson.
- Sir C. Bottomley.
- Sir J. Shuckburgh.
- Permt. U.S. of S.
- Perby. U.S. of S.
- Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

FURTHER ACTION.

next week and he wondered whether ^{it was} 12.30/on Wednesday (i.e. after your talk with him at 11.30.) would be convenient *Will you please* for you. I ~~wonder whether you~~ would be good enough to let me know as soon as possible whether this would ~~be possible~~ We would then arrange matters with the Air Ministry. I may mention that we have telegraphed to-day to Wade to ask when we may expect his despatch. We have also asked him to let us know by telegraph whether he has modified in any way the views which he previously expressed ~~on~~ ^{by reply} the use of aircraft. We will of course let you know what he says as soon as we get his reply. I might add that there are still one or two matters which I

myself

myself would like to clear up with you. Would it be

asking too much of you to suggest your coming here, say

at 10.30. on Wednesday so that we can dispose of them. ?

Alternatively 11 a.m. on Tuesday would suit me well.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) W.C. Bottomley

38066/35. 91

Mr. Lee 1/8.

Sir C.
Bottomley.
1/8. at once.

PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya.

Sent 4.15 p.m. 1st August, 1935

Recd by 51
IMMEDIATE
No. 201. Secret.

A further expression of your views in regard to measures to be taken on Northern frontier in light of Glenday's visit is anxiously awaited. Please inform me by telegraph when this may be expected.

I am in any case anxious to know by the 6th of August whether you have modified your opinion as expressed in the second paragraph of your secret despatch of the 13th June regarding the use of aircraft.

If Royal Air Force machines are required for purposes other than troop-carrying (e.g. reconnaissance) it is essential that I should be furnished with details of requirements by next Tuesday.

Copy to AM 52

Reference is made to the subject of this letter as mentioned to

THE SECRETARY
 AIR MINISTRY
 AIRMAIL HOUSE
 NEWCASTLE
 LONDON, W.C.2



AIR MINISTRY
 LONDON, W.C.2

S.35493/S.6.

SECRET.

26 July, 1935.

Sir,

(19) I am commanded by the Air Council to refer to Mr. Flood's letter 38066/35 of the 27th June, 1935, enclosing a copy of a despatch of the 13th June from the Acting Governor of Kenya. The Air Council do not feel able to comment on the contents of Mr. Wade's despatch (so far as it refers to the use of aircraft) in the absence of a more detailed statement from him on the reasons supporting his conclusion "that the use of aircraft in the manner proposed by the Air Council is not considered practicable under local conditions".

2. The Air Council appreciate that Mr. Wade speaks with special authority in regard to "local conditions" in Kenya, but in the absence of any statement of those reasons they find it difficult to reconcile his conclusions with the very different conclusions reached by the civil, military and air authorities, who investigated local conditions in connection with the preparation of the Newall-Norman Report, also by the East African Governors, who unanimously endorsed the provisions of that report as it affected operations on the Kenya-Abyssinia frontier, and by the Inspector General, K.A.R., and R.W.A.F.P. in the appreciation and plan which he has recently prepared.

It may be observed that the preparations approved to meet similar circumstances in Somaliland are also in general accord with the recommendations in the Air Council letter referred

to 24 April

(11)
 The Under-Secretary of State,
 Colonial Office,
 Downing Street,
 S.W.1.

3. The Air Council have no observations to offer on the contents of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the despatch forwarded with Mr. Flood's letter.

4. I am to refer to the short time remaining for the completion of preparations and to request that the Air Council may be informed at the earliest possible date of what demands for aircraft are likely to be received. The two Victorias requested by the Acting Governor will be held available subject to conditions elsewhere permitting, but, in the meantime, to enable the adequacy of the suggested provision to be investigated, fuller information is desirable as to the precise duties which these aircraft may be called upon to perform and the loads to be carried. Early intimation as to the actual date on which these or any aircraft may be required in Kenya is also essential to enable fuel and other supplies to be despatched in good time. These supplies would have to be sent by sea and at least a month will elapse before they can be delivered in East Africa and transported to the landing grounds.

5. I am to add that the question whether any financial charge will lie against the Government of Kenya must be left for decision by His Majesty's Government in the light of actual events.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. H. Thompson

47
93
48011/1/35.

PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya.

Sent 8.30 p.m. 24th July, 1935.

No. 191 Secret.

(4-4)
Your Secret despatch of July 11th. It is now contemplated that the reserve battalion in Tanganyika should be sent to Kenya if reinforcements are needed there, Somaliland being reinforced by a battalion from Nigeria. Warning is being sent accordingly to the Acting Governor of Tanganyika.

SECRET

O.D.C. 342nd Minutes (Draft).

Mr. Seest 94

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

OVERSEA DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

A copy of the draft Minutes of the 342nd Meeting of the Oversea Defence Committee, held at No. 3, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1, on Thursday, 18th July, 1936, is forwarded for approval or amendment.

The conclusions recorded have been approved by the Chairman.

It is requested that this copy may be returned as early as possible.

(Signed) H. R. POWELL

Secretary,
Oversea Defence Committee.

3, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

18th July, 1936.

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.)

S E C R E T.

O.D.C. 342nd Minutes (Draft).

COPY NO. 16COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.OVERSEA DEFENCE COMMITTEE.Minutes of the 342nd Meeting, held at No. 2, Whitehall
Gardens, S.W.1, on Thursday, 18th July, 1935, at 4.0 p.m.P R E S E N T:Sir John Haffey, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.V.O.,
C.S.I., C.I.E. (Chairman)Captain J. H. Godfrey, R.N.,
representing Director of Plans,
Admiralty.Colonel T. J. Hutton, M.C.,
representing Director of
Military Operations and
Intelligence, War Office.Group Captain A. T. Harris, O.B.E.,
A.F.C., R.A.F., representing
Director of Operations and
Intelligence, Air Ministry.Mr. E. E. Bridges, M.C.,
Treasury.Mr. G. H. Thompson, C.M.G.,
representing the Foreign Office.THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-Sir Cecil Bottomley, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
C.B.E., Colonial Office.Brigadier C. C. Norman, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., Inspector-General,
R.A.F.F. and K.A.R.,
Colonial Office.Squadron Leader H. B. Russell,
D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F.,
Operations and Intelligence
Directorate, Air Ministry.Major S. J. Cole, O.B.E.,
Staff Officer to Inspector-
General R.W.A.F.F. and K.A.R.,
Colonial Office.Mr. L. H. Freeston, O.B.E.,
Colonial Office.Captain E. G. Pemberton,
Military Operations and
Intelligence Directorate, War
Office.Mr. F. J. Howard, O.B.E.,
Colonial Office.Captain E. K. Arbuthnot, M.C.,
Military Operations and Intelli-
gence Directorate, War Office.Mr. F. G. Lee,
Colonial Office.Captain J. M. Fuller, R.M.,
Plan. Division, Admiralty.Mr. A. E. Cohen,
Colonial Office.

Colonel H. R. Pownall, D.S.O., M.C. Secretary.

SOMALILAND (AND KENYA). REINFORCEMENT IN CASE OF NECESSITY.

(O.D.C. Papers Nos. 1050, 1054, 1045 and 1040.)

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THE COMMITTEE had under consideration the following papers:-

- O.D.C. Paper No. 1050 - A Note by the Secretary circulating a Memorandum by the Inspector-General, and also an appreciation of the situation by the Governor of Somaliland.
- O.D.C. Paper No. 1054 - A despatch from the Acting Governor, Kenya, asking for instructions in certain eventualities.
- O.D.C. Paper No. 1045 - Interchange of telegrams between the Colonial Office and the Governor of Somaliland.
- O.D.C. Paper No. 1040 - Correspondence regarding steps to be taken by Somaliland and Kenya.

THE CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should, in the first instance, give consideration to O.D.C. Paper No. 1050. The Memorandum by the Inspector-General and the appreciation of the situation by the Governor of Somaliland varied somewhat in their outlook. The latter was optimistic that he had sufficient resources for his task; the Inspector-General, taking a rather longer view, foresaw the possibilities of having to bring a battalion from Tanganyika and one from West Africa, and put forward a scheme for rounding up intruders entering Somaliland.

BRIGADIER NORMAN said that he did not contemplate that troop movements from other territories would take place until war broke out, but he thought that when that occurred, reinforcements for Somaliland and Kenya would probably be necessary. That being so, preparations for their despatch and reception should be put in hand at an early date, and the Governments concerned should be warned of the possibility so that the battalions should be ready to move at short notice.

COLONEL HUTTON, requested by the Chairman to give his observations on the paper under consideration, said that he considered that the plan proposed by the Governor seemed to be suitable, except for the possibility of shortage of troops. He agreed with the suggestion of the Inspector-General that warning should be given that troop movements might be necessary, so that preliminary arrangements could be taken in hand. He questioned, however, whether it was advisable to postpone all precautionary measures until war had actually broken out.

MR. LEE said that the Colonial Office did not contemplate waiting for the outbreak of war before any precautionary action was taken. For example, the despatch of additional officers to the Somaliland Camel Corps and the formation of an extra company of the Corps would be carried out as soon as the necessity for it appeared clear, and not necessarily delayed until the outbreak of war. But the Colonial Office were unwilling to act while there was still any hope that the conflict might be avoided.

GROUP CAPTAIN HARRIS said that the Air Ministry agreed in principle with the proposals put forward by the Inspector-General for the safeguarding of the Somaliland frontier. The arrangements contemplated for Kenya, however, which had been considered at a previous meeting, the Air Ministry did not agree with, as the Committee were aware. He wished to remind the Committee that if aircraft were to be employed in Kenya, an extra landing ground would be required somewhere between Moyale and Lake Rudolf, and if aircraft were to operate on the northern frontier of Kenya, the Air Ministry would require adequate notice in advance so that stocks of fuel and ammunition might be collected in that neighbourhood.

A suggestion was made by the Inspector-General that aircraft fitted with loudspeakers should assist in reconnoitring the frontier of Somaliland and order intruders to return to their own country by word of mouth. If that were thought necessary, the Air Ministry would need warning in advance, as they had no aircraft equipped for the purpose.

He agreed with the suggestions made by the Governor of Somaliland for the employment of the flight to be detached from Aden. If more than one flight were later to be required, it would probably be necessary for Aden to be reinforced from Egypt.

MR. BRIDGES enquired whether the steps proposed to be taken by the Governor of Somaliland were covered by the sum of £15,000 which the Treasury had agreed to.

MR. LEE said that these steps fell within that financial provision.

MR. THOMPSON said that he thought it important that all precautionary steps necessary should be taken before the outbreak of hostilities. Although it might not be necessary now to embark on these measures, it ought to be fairly clear before long whether or not war was inevitable, and at that time the necessary steps should be put in hand.

THE CHAIRMAN thought the Committee were in agreement that the proposals of the Governor were suitable, at any rate for the early stages of the conflict between Italy and Abyssinia, but he suggested that the Inspector-General's memorandum should be sent to the Governor of Somaliland for his examination as it might be that in some later stage the proposals of the Inspector-General would have to be put into effect. He thought it

important that the necessary precautionary measures should be put in hand as soon as it became quite clear that hostilities would occur. That was a responsibility which lay with the Colonial Office. In the meantime, he thought Tanganyika and West Africa should be warned that it might be necessary to move troops from those territories to Kenya and Somaliland.

He then asked the Committee to consider O.D.C. Paper No. 1054, in which the Acting Governor of Kenya asked for replies to two questions:-

- (i) What to do if belligerents move through British Territory.
- (ii) What to do if belligerent aircraft fly over British Territory.

SIR CECIL BOTTOMLEY said that the Colonial Office were awaiting a final Report from Mr. Glendarua to the measures which should be taken to safeguard the northern frontier of Kenya. Whether belligerent troops and/or aircraft would infringe the Kenya frontier depended largely on the Italian line of advance.

COLONEL HUTTON said that the policy proposed by Somaliland for dealing with belligerent troops and aircraft seemed to be the only possible one, and should apply also to Kenya. That policy involved the disarming of any land forces which might enter British territory and putting them into internment camps. If the belligerents refused to be disarmed on entering British territory there was no alternative but to capture them by force.

MR. THOMPSON said that in theory the procedure was, first, that troops or aircraft violating a country's neutrality should be warned and second, if they ignored that warning, engaged by force. Whether it was desirable

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to proceed to the employment of force depended, in practice, on expediency, and it was of no use to issue a warning if there was no adequate force to back it up. It was a question of some importance in this particular connection since it might well be that our relations with Italy in the event of an Abyssinian war would not be of the best.

GROUP CAPTAIN HARRIS said that so far as Somaliland was concerned, the Air Ministry were in correspondence with the Foreign Office regarding the action that should be taken to warn belligerent aircraft from flying over British territory. They were not considering the case of Kenya where, up to the present, the employment of British aircraft was not contemplated. He agreed that if aircraft crossed the frontier they could be engaged, provided they had first been warned and that any belligerent aircraft which landed in British territory, if armed, could be interned. These questions were, however, at the present time under examination by the legal section of the Air Ministry. He thought there might be difficulties at the northern frontier of Kenya which, he understood, had not been accurately defined and which aircraft might not be able to identify.

SIR OSCIL BOTTOMLEY said that although the northern frontier of Kenya had not been demarcated, a line of Administrative Posts had been established which, together with the natural features of the ground should make it reasonably clear where the approximate frontier lay.

COLONEL HUTTON said that he felt sure that considerable latitude would have to be given to the "man on the spot" although it was essential that he should be provided with

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clear instructions in advance as to what he was entitled to do.

THE CHAIRMAN suggested that the question was largely a matter for the Colonial Office to determine, in conjunction with the Foreign Office, with any necessary references to the Service Departments. If necessary, another meeting of the Committee could be held.

CONCLUSIONS.

THE COMMITTEE agreed -

I. Somaliland.

- (a) That the measures proposed by the Governor for the event of a war between Italy and Abyssinia were suitable, at any rate for the early stages of such a war.
- (b) That, as the problem might become increasingly difficult in later stages of that war, action on the lines suggested by the Inspector-General might become necessary and consequently that a copy of his Memorandum should be forwarded to the Governor, Somaliland, so that he would know in advance the supplementary measures suggested and could comment on them if he so desired.
- (c) That the responsibility for informing the Governor when the threat of war became so acute as to necessitate taking special precautionary measures naturally lay with the Colonial Office.
- (d) That a preliminary warning should be sent to the Governments concerned that, in certain circumstances, the 1st Battalion, King's African Rifles, stationed at Tabera, and a Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force, might be required to reinforce Kenya and Somaliland respectively, so that the Battalions concerned should be ready to move at short notice, and Kenya and Somaliland should be prepared to receive them.

II. Kenya.

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- (a) That the advice to be given to the Governor regarding the action which should be taken in the event of belligerent troops manoeuvring through, or belligerent aircraft flying over, British territory was primarily a matter for consideration by the Colonial Office in conjunction with the Foreign Office, reference being made to the Service Departments as necessary.
- (b) That in this connection the action to be taken in Kenya would necessarily follow the same lines as that in Somaliland.
- (c) That instructions sent to local authorities must be as clear and definite as possible although latitude would necessarily be allowed to those authorities in carrying out these instructions.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

19th July, 1936.

AIR MAIL

KENYA
No.

SECRET.



103 44
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
NAIROBI
KENYA

11/2 July, 1955.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 28(e) of the General Staff Appreciation of the Italo-Ethiopian situation enclosed in Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister's Secret despatch of the 21st May, from which it is observed that, should military re-enforcements become necessary for Somaliland, the reserve battalion of the King's African Rifles for Tanganyika has been earmarked for that purpose.

(22)

2. While it is impossible at this stage to foresee whether the military forces at the disposal of this Government would prove sufficient to deal with any situation which might arise in the neighbourhood of this Colony's frontier with Italy and Ethiopia, see my Secret despatches of the 15th June and 4th July, you will appreciate that the possibility must not be overlooked of the situation in the Northern Frontier District of this Colony, which would be the nearest area to the possible spheres of military operations, developing on such a scale as to necessitate the withdrawal of the detachment of the 4th battalion, the King's African Rifles, from the Turkana District to re-enforce the troops in the Northern Frontier District.

4
36
43

(36)
(43)

3. In such an event, as there would be no re-enforcements available from the Tanganyika Territory, it is suggested the most convenient arrangement would be that troops should be made available by the Government of the

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
MALCOLM MACDONALD, P.C., M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA
Nairobi, Kenya

of the Sudan, where it is possible that there would not be any serious reaction, see paragraph 29 of the General Staff Appreciation, for the control of Sudan territory in the Ilemi "triangle" and of the area in Kenya now garrisoned by the King's African Rifles at Lokitaang.

4. In addition the Commander, Northern Brigade, has suggested that, in order to facilitate communications, it would be desirable for the Sudan Government to extend the existing Kapoeta-Lolimi road to the Kenya-Sudan boundary at Makonnen Cherosh.

5. In view of the fact that it is anticipated that, failing a settlement of the differences between the Italian and Ethiopian Governments, hostilities may commence in less than three months' time, I trust that it will be possible to secure an early decision as to the source from which assistance may, if required, be obtained by this Government.

A telegraphic reply to this despatch would be appreciated.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

A. W. Wade

ACTING GOVERNOR.

105
Mr Howard

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.)

S E C R E T.

O.D.C. No. 1054.

COPY NO. 15

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

OVERSEA DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

KENYA. REINFORCEMENT IN CASE OF NECESSITY.

(Reference O.D.C. 340th and 341st Minutes,
and O.D.C. Paper No. 1040.)

The Colonial Office have referred to the Oversea Defence Committee for consideration the attached despatch from the Acting Governor of Kenya, dated 4th July, 1935.

2. The question will be considered at the next meeting of the Committee. A revised Agenda paper will be issued.

(Sgd.) H. R. POWNALL,

Secretary,
Oversea Defence Committee.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

12th July, 1935.

ANNEX I.

Despatch from Acting Governor, Kenya, to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

KENYA.
SECRET.

4th July, 1938.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to correspondence concluding with my Secret despatch of the 13th June regarding the action to be taken by this Government in regard to immigrants in the event of developments in the situation between Ethiopia and Italy.

2. You will observe that, though dispositions have, in so far as is possible, been made to deal with incursions of Italian or Ethiopian tribes into this Colony, consideration has not yet been given to the possible contingency of the troops of either Power attempting, in the event of hostilities, to manoeuvre through British territory, see in this connection paragraph IV (b) 3 of the first enclosure in my secret despatch of the 24th April.

It will be appreciated that, more especially in view of the indefinite nature of the frontier between this Colony and Ethiopia in the North East corner of the Northern Frontier District, this contingency is one which must not be overlooked.

3. There is also the possibility both before and after hostilities commence of Italian or Ethiopian aircraft using the aerodromes at such places as Wajir, Mandera and Moyale for reconnaissance or other purposes. I presume in this contingency I should refuse to allow any such aircraft to fly over, or to land in, the Prohibited Areas, see Section XI of the Air Navigation Directions, 1931.

Copy attached.
* Copy of this paragraph attached.

4. It will therefore be appreciated if you will furnish me with an early indication of the policy which, in such an event, it is desired should be adopted by this Government.

I have, etc.

(Signed) A. D. V. WADE.

Acting Governor.

ENCLOSURE.

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EXTRACT FROM ENCLOSURE TO KENYA DESPATCH DATED
24TH APRIL, 1935.

Notes of a Tour in Northern Frontier
District 27th February 1935 to 11th
March, 1935, by Mr. C.J.J.T. Barton.

* * *
A third possible danger is that if the Italian main advance is from Eritrea, the soldiery of the Southern Abyssinian Provinces may attempt to attack Italian Somaliland by crossing British territory in the North-east of this Colony.

In this event presumably the Italians would also seek to enter neutral territory.

The contingency seems unlikely at present but I suggest it should be kept in view.

* * *

ANNEX II.

109

DESPATCH FROM ACTING GOVERNOR, KENYA, TO
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

13th June, 1935.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister's Secret telegram No. 130 of the 23rd May, regarding the action to be taken by this Government in regard to immigrants in the event of developments in the situation between Ethiopia and Italy and now that I have received Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister's Secret despatch of the 21st May my views are as follows in this despatch.

2. In regard to the revised appreciation requested in Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister's despatch of the 4th May, I have already informed you in my Secret telegram No. 118 of the 22nd May that the use of aircraft in the manner proposed by the Air Ministry is not considered practicable under local conditions for other than purposes of reconnaissance, and I have asked that the arrangement stated in the first paragraph of Air Ministry letter No. S.35495/S.6 of the 24th April to hold in reserve two troop-carrying aircraft for use in this Colony should stand for the present.

3. The alternative to a closed frontier policy proposed in paragraph 3 of Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister's despatch has been discussed with my advisers.

You will appreciate that the concentration of refugees and stragglers behind the frontier, apart from the probability that any such movement would cause unrest amongst Kenya tribes, many of whom are already inimical to the immigrants, would impose a severe strain on the administration of the Northern Frontier District and on the water and grazing available for British subjects.

✓ O.D.C. 1040, Enclosure V.
✓ O.D.C. 1040, Enclosure III.
✓ O.D.C. 1040, Enclosure IV.
+ O.D.C. 1040, Enclosure II.

110

There is also the possibility referred to in paragraph 6 of Sir Joseph Byrne's Secret despatch of the 16th February, that any acquiescence in the movement of Ethiopian or Italian tribes into this Colony would seriously embarrass this Government with one or other of the Governments concerned.

In all the circumstances I consider, and I trust you will agree, that the arrangements originally made by Sir Joseph Byrne should stand, and that an Internment Policy should be regarded only as an alternative to be adopted in the event of the original arrangement proving impracticable.

4. With such a contingency in view provisional plans have been prepared for the accommodation of refugees crossing the frontiers in any numbers which involve their division, provided armed resistance does not occur, into two tribal groups:-

(1) Degodia, Gurreh and Boran:

To allow these people to live under special written permits under the related tribal Headman in Kenya and in his area, at the discretion of the District Commissioner concerned and provided there is sufficient water and grazing available.

(2) Berod (Ogaden, W. Bahan, Herti and Bartirri) Somalis:

To them, temporarily, these people in an area which is described as follows:-

"between a line running from the Ngombe Grotto to Charlers Falls and the Isalo River including the uninhabited portion of the Meru Reserve."

These people would be escorted to the area mentioned by augmented Tribal Police and under the control of an

Administrative Officer, or Officers, specially detailed
for internment work.

This is considered necessary in order to leave
armed Military and Police Officers and men free for
their duties; and in order to enable Administrative
Officers to continue their own work.

I have etc.,

(Signed) A. DE. V. WADE.

ACTING GOVERNOR.

Downing Street,
26th July, 1935.

copy letter on

46011/1/35.

SECRET.

Sir, *Somaliland*

With reference to previous correspondence concerning the measures to be taken to ensure tranquility in Kenya and British Somaliland in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia, I am directed by Mr. Secretary MacDonald to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare, a copy of a despatch from the Governor of Somaliland, with enclosures, in which he refers to the question of the action to be taken in the event of belligerent aircraft crossing the frontier and flying over British Somaliland. A copy of a despatch from the Acting Governor of Kenya, in which reference is made to the same question in so far as the Kenya frontier is concerned, is also enclosed.

26.6.35.

4.7.35.

2. The Secretary of State understands that this particular question has already formed the subject of correspondence between the Air Ministry and the Foreign Office. He would accordingly be glad to learn, at the earliest possible date, what instructions should, in Sir Samuel Hoare's view, be sent to the authorities in British Somaliland and Kenya on this matter. The following questions appear to need decision:-

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

(a) Whether, if belligerent aircraft cross the frontier and fly over Kenya or British Somaliland, the general policy should be to open fire upon them.

(b) Whether before fire is opened a signal should be made (either from the ground or from British aircraft) in order to warn the foreign aircraft that the frontier had been crossed, and no firing should take place unless such a warning were disregarded.

(c) If (b) is agreed to, what form the warning should take.

(d) What action should be taken if Italian or Ethiopian aircraft endeavour or are compelled to use aerodromes in either Kenya or British Somaliland during hostilities.

3. The Secretary of State proposes to defer consideration of the other matter raised by the Acting Governor of Kenya - namely the question of what action should be taken if belligerent forces manoeuvre through British territory - until he has received the general appreciation of the situation and outlook on the Kenya frontier which is now expected from Mr. Glenday, the Officer-in-Charge of the Northern Frontier District.

4. Copies of this letter and its enclosures are being sent to the Air Ministry.

I am, etc.,

(Sgd.) F.G.LEE.

AIR MAIL

KENYA

No. SECRET.



GOVERNMENT HOUSE
NAIROBI
KENYA

43
114

RECEIVED
17 JUL 1936
C. O. REGY

4th July, 1935.

Sir,

(36)
Copy with it 80. - 104 on 46011/135 (some letters)
23
copy with it 80. - 104 on 46011/135 (some letters)
23
copy with it 80. - 104 on 46011/135 (some letters)
23

I have the honour to refer to correspondence concluding with my Secret despatch of the 18th June regarding the action to be taken by this Government in regard to immigrants in the event of developments in the situation between Ethiopia and Italy.

2. You will observe that, though disposition have, in so far as is possible, been made to deal with incursions of Italian or Ethiopian tribes into this Colony, consideration has not yet been given to the possible contingency of the troops of either Power attempting, in the event of hostilities, to manoeuvre through British territory, see in this connection paragraph IV (b) 5 of the first enclosure in my Secret despatch of the 24th April.

It will be appreciated that, more especially in view of the indefinite nature of the frontier between this Colony and Ethiopia in the North East corner of the Northern Frontier District, this contingency is one which must not be overlooked.

There is also the possibility both before and after hostilities commence of Italian or Ethiopian aircraft using the aerodromes at such places as Wajir, Mandera and Moyale for reconnaissance or other purpose. I presume in this contingency I should refuse to allow any such aircraft to fly over, or to land in, the

Prohibited

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

MALCOLM MACDONALD, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,

DOWNING STREET,

LONDON, S.W. 1

2.

Prohibited Areas, see Section XI of the Air Navigation Directions, 1951.

4. It will therefore be appreciated if you will furnish me with an early indication of the policy which, in such an event, it is desired should be adopted by the Government.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

[Handwritten signature]

GOVERNOR.

AIR MAIL

KENYA
No.



42
GOVERNMENT HOUSE 116
NAIROBI
KENYA

18th June, 1935.

C
Sir,

(30)
I have the honour to refer to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister's Secret despatch of the 7th June regarding the proposals for the evacuation of the British Consulate at Mega, and to enclose, as requested, a paraphrase of a Secret telegram, No. 568 of the 6th June, which has been sent to Sir Sydney Barton.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Admiral
ACTING GOVERNOR.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

MALCOLM MACDONALD, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,

DOWNING STREET,

LONDON, S.W. 1

117

PARAPHRASE of SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM NO. 568 of the
6th JUNE, 1955, to HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER, ADDIS ABABA.

The Consul, who is very familiar with the situation, would be the last person to abandon his difficult post until compelled, and I am unwilling to accept any share of the responsibility for his staying at the Consulate after hostilities have commenced. I propose, therefore, the question should be left to his discretion up to the commencement of hostilities. The instructions given him on May the 22nd, previous to the Geneva Agreement made on night of 24th, did not direct the immediate evacuation of the Consulate, but only the removal, as unobtrusively as possible, of his archives to Moyale. He was instructed to move to Moyale himself as soon as he thought circumstances justified, and in any event to move there before hostilities began.

He could continue to watch events from Moyale, where he has office and living accommodation which he frequently uses, until he considered he could go back to the Consulate.

I see no justification for thinking that conditions in the Borana Province will show any improvement in the event of war over those obtaining during the past few years, and paragraph IV of the first enclosure in my Secret despatch of 24th April, see note to you dated 22nd May, shows that in early March last the Consul requested instructions regarding the abandonment of the Consulate.

Reece would normally proceed on leave in June, and has now been at Moyale and Mega for three years all but one month without a change, and I shall be glad to

learn

learn your views on the question of his going on leave.

My telegram dated the 22nd May was recalled as it had been wrongly cyphered.

The reference is to your Secret telegram dated 30th May.

ACTING GOVERNOR.

IMMEDIATE

119 41

SECRET

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
 No. **J 2250/11**
 and address—not to any person by name, but to—
 "The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
 compliments to *the Under Secretary of State for the*
Colonies and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
 transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office.

21st June, 1935.

Reference to previous correspondence:

(17) 29) Colonial Office letter no. 38066/35 sent to
 7th June 1935

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<p><i>Addis Ababa,</i> <i>No 152 20th June 1935</i></p>	<p><i>Italo-Ethiopian dispute;</i> <i>question of vacuation of</i> <i>His Majesty's consulate in</i> <i>Ethiopia</i></p>

Similar letter sent to W.O., Air Reg.

MEMORANDUM

██████████ telegram to Sir C. Barton (Addis Ababa),
Foreign Office, 20th June, 1935. 6.35 p.m.
No. 152.

Your telegrams Nos. 137, 138 and 139 (of day 29th:
question of evacuation of His Majesty's Consulates in
Abyssinia).

We feel that the consular officers at Meqa, Maji and
Harar should remain at their posts so long as in their
opinion they can do so without danger to their own lives
and those of their staffs. The risk of an anti-European
outbreak will no doubt increase in proportion as the
probability of war increases and as far as the provinces
are concerned, a great deal will depend upon the attitude
and authority of the district governors and their local
subordinates. We doubt whether it will, in fact, be
possible to say beforehand with any certainty at what
particular moment such danger will arise. On these points
the officer on the spot will surely best be able to form
opinion?

Our view therefore is that the consular officers should
be given a wide discretion as regards the moment to be chosen
for withdrawal from their posts, subject, of course, to
their notifying beforehand yourself and the colonial
governments concerned.

The removal of such archives as cannot be quickly
destroyed or taken with the officers at the moment of evacua-
tion, seems to us a useful precautionary measure, which might
well be taken unobtrusively now as soon as opportunity offers.
You should be guided by the above views in which
the Colonial Office concurs.

Extract from the Minutes of the O.D.C. Meeting held 40.

13 JUNE 1935

121

2. SOMALILAND (AND KENYA). REINFORCEMENT IN CASE OF NECESSITY.

(O.D.C. Paper No. 1040.)

THE COMMITTEE had under consideration a Note by the Secretary covering correspondence on the reinforcement of Somaliland and Kenya in the event of war between Italy and Abyssinia (O.D.C. Paper No. 1040).

THE CHAIRMAN asked whether the Service Departments had any observations to make on the correspondence.

COLONEL HUTTON said that he wished to raise one question regarding procedure. At their 3:0th Meeting the Committee had discussed certain proposals for the reinforcement of

Kenya, and had approved the suggestions put before them, 122
including a request made by the Governor of the Colony for
two troop carrying aircraft. Conclusion (ii) of that
discussion read as follows:-

"To ask the Air Ministry, in their reply to
the Colonial Office, to bring up the various
considerations affecting the employment of
aircraft which had been mentioned, and to
ask the Colonial Office to make the necessary
representations to the Local Authorities
concerned."

The subsequent letter from the Air Ministry to the Colonial
Office had, in his opinion, gone further than the ground
covered by that conclusion, and had raised the whole principle
of the methods by which the northern frontier of Kenya should
be controlled in the event of war between Italy and Abyssinia.
For example, it was stated -

(No. 11)
- on file

"The emergencies now envisaged, which do not
appear adequately to be met by the plan at
present proposed, lend themselves more
readily to solution if the Police detachments,
in whose hands the initial responsibility
must always remain, are directly supported
by an adequate force of aircraft, both for
reconnaissance duties and, in the last resort,
for direct action....."

He was of the opinion that if the Air Ministry had wished to
raise questions of this kind, the proper procedure would have
been to do so in the Committee in the first instance. He also
observed that the recommendation now made by the Air Ministry
was contrary to the proposals for troop carrying aircraft
embodied in the Norman-Newall Report.

There was an important question of principle involved in
the matter; the situation on the northern frontier of Kenya
might well become serious within the next few months, and he
thought it extremely desirable that it should be dealt with
on the co-ordinated advice of the Oversea Defence Committee.

WING COMMANDER FIRIE said he regretted that the Air Ministry
letter had been regarded as going beyond the intentions of the
Committee; it had been put forward in good faith to make

suggestions for what was in the opinion of the Air Council the best use of the available Forces in the event of emergency in Kenya, and the first point which had been made was that it was considered that two troop carrying aircraft might not be sufficient for the Colony's needs if the Governor's plans were put into effect. Consequently the recommendation had been made that a flight of General Purpose aircraft should be made available and should be used in support of the Police. He read the conclusions of the 340th meeting as being sufficiently wide to cover the points dealt with in the Air Ministry letter, but he pointed out that in any event that letter had been transmitted to the Colonial Office in reply to a definite request from them for an expression of the Air Ministry's views on the Governor's proposals, and dealt only indirectly with the conclusions of the 340th Meeting.

COLONEL HUTTON replied that, in effect, a new scheme had been put forward by the Air Ministry. In fact their letter had criticised the proposed plan and put up an alternative. It had not, moreover, referred to the use of troops, as distinct from Police, which was an integral part of the plan.

THE CHAIRMAN agreed that an important question of principle had been raised. He did not think that it was necessary to go into a close analysis of the case, but he felt sure that all members would realise the undesirability of any one Department taking too wide an interpretation of the conclusions arrived at by the Committee. On this particular issue he did not think any harm had been done, and so far as the Colonial Office were concerned they had felt it necessary to act at once on receipt of the Air Ministry's letter, but in doing so they had asked the Governor for an appreciation only, and had not suggested that any action should be taken on views which would not represent the considered opinion of the Committee.

MR. MICHEL BOSTOMLEY drew attention to certain papers which had been circulated to interested Departments under Colonial Office No. 45011/3/35 of the 11th June and of the 13th June.* In these papers the Governor of Somaliland had made certain proposals on which the Colonial Office would be glad to have the Committee's advice. The Colonial Office were chiefly concerned that the Governor should have the facilities which he had asked for in the way of stores of various kinds, but the Governor had also suggested road construction and the building of an internment camp. He had, moreover, asked whether he would be legally justified, if war broke out between Italy and Abyssinia, in refusing permission to all Ethiopian and Italian Somalis to go through British Somaliland. The proposal for an internment camp and for refusing permission for tribesmen to enter British Somaliland seemed, to some extent, to be contradictory, but no doubt, whatever steps were taken to prevent entry, a certain number of tribesmen would be able to filter through and might have to be interned.

MR. ADAM NORRIS said that he had been considering this question from the long range point of view. If hostilities took place between Italy and Abyssinia they might be of considerable duration. Although an early Italian victory was possible there would remain a large tract of Abyssinian territory inhabited by subject nomadic tribes who would have to be brought under control. These tribes were nomadic, were accustomed to raiding and were dependent for their existence on their stock and on the water supplies. They had never been under the close control of the Central Government of Abyssinia, and if that country were defeated they would, at any rate for some time, be under no control at all. They would not submit willingly to Italy, and the process of

* Subsequently circulated as O.D.C. Paper No. 1045.

disarming them and bringing them under control would take a long time. To bring them to heel, Italy would have to seize their stock and control their water supplies, and when so treated the tribes concerned would attempt to seize stock from elsewhere and to look for water in other territories. It was, therefore, extremely likely that they would cross over into British territory with these objects in view: the Somaliland frontier was the one most likely to be affected.

Our only remedy would be to close our own frontier absolutely, and a common policy was needed as between Somaliland, Kenya, the Sudan and, if possible, French territory. We had every right to take steps of this kind to protect our own nationals.

Although he had not had the opportunity, as yet, to study the subject very closely, or to put his views on paper, he felt that combined action on land and in the air was needed. It would be necessary in the first place to warn the tribes concerned on the border, and to organize an efficient Intelligence System as, indeed, already existed in Somaliland. But this Intelligence System would have to be backed up by mobile W/T installations for communication both on the ground and to the air. He had in mind a plan by which our mobile forces should be established some 20 to 30 miles behind the frontier. When information was received of any considerable number of tribesmen crossing into our territory, a strong air demonstration would be made at once. Aircraft might be equipped with loud-speakers to warn the intruders that they must go back, failing which action would be taken against them. If that were not sufficient, bombs might be dropped as a further warning. This would probably have sufficient deterrent effect, and would turn back the intruders, but they would have to be closely watched and, if necessary, engaged by mobile troops if they disregarded air

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action. The object of keeping troops at some distance from the frontier was to avoid the difficulties and doubts which a small penetration might give rise to, and to make sure that action, when taken, was fully justified.

MAJOR HOLT pointed out the effect on our own Somali tribes if hostilities took place south of our border. We had grazing in our own territory only for our own tribes, but it is not sufficient to satisfy their requirements and in consequence tribes cross the frontier. Broadly speaking, the Abyssinians had the majority of the grazing, whereas we had the water. He thought that trans-frontier tribes might well come into our territory in order to get the water, but as that water was some way within our border they would use up a good deal of our grazing in getting to and from it.

MR. COHEN said that so far Italian tribes had not crossed the border and that the recent Boundary Commission had established that Ethiopian tribes had only crossed it at the western end of the frontier. On the other hand British tribes were in the habit of crossing into Ethiopian Territory at certain seasons of the year, and the Governor regarded it as essential to their welfare that they should have access to the wells and grazing areas south of the frontier. At present an attempt was being made to reach an ad hoc agreement with the Italian Government under which British tribes would be allowed to visit wells and grazing areas now in Italian occupation west of the 47th meridian. If the British Somaliland frontier were to be closed the Italians would no doubt retaliate by denying British tribes access to Territory which they occupied, and the policy of closing it would be a reversal of the policy hitherto followed by the British Somaliland Government.

THE CHAIRMAN observed that the suggestions made by Brigadier Norman were based on the idea of forcing the Abyssinian tribes back into their own country in order to compel them to come to terms with the Italians. He had no doubt that the Italians would be glad for our frontier to be closed in time of war. He noted that the Governor was forwarding a despatch giving further details, which would arrive in England on the 29th June.

SIR CECIL BOTTOMLEY said that it was desirable, if possible, to give the Governor some lines to work upon as a result of the discussion, but so far the problem had not been considered beyond the immediate position which would arise on the outbreak of hostilities. Brigadier Norman's suggestions covered the period up to the ultimate pacification of the Abyssinian tribes which was a much bigger problem.

COLONEL HUTTON said that the whole question would require very close examination, and the War Office would wish to consider the Governor's despatch and the proposals made by Brigadier Norman before formulating their own views.

MR. ROBERTS drew attention to the first sentence in the Governor's telegram of the 10th June -

"Should I be legally justified, if war breaks out, in refusing permission to all Ethiopian and Italian Somalis and the like to come into British Somaliland?"

This question raised the Treaty position as defined in the Treaty of 1897. So far as Italy was concerned, we were under no obligation to keep the frontier open. But as regards the Ethiopian tribes, Annex III of the Treaty provided that these tribes had the right to grazing within the Somaliland border, and this provision would not be affected by the existence of a war between Abyssinia and Italy. It applied, of course, to "civilian" tribesmen, but should not be held to affect men engaged as part of the armed forces of Abyssinia. So far as the latter were concerned, we should be justified in preventing their incursion into Somaliland territory and in interning them if they entered. There was, of course, a difference between war conditions and peace conditions, to meet which latter the Treaty had been drawn up, and it was clear that the right to cross the border applied only to tribes who normally use our grazing grounds, and not to those from other areas at a distance who might be driven towards our border under war conditions. On the other hand, it might be very difficult for the authorities on the spot to distinguish which tribes came from the neighbourhood of our border and

which came from a greater distance.

SIR CECIL BOTTOMLEY referred to a similar question which had been raised regarding the closing of the Kenya border, and read extracts from a letter from the Foreign Office on this subject.

THE CHAIRMAN suggested that further discussion should be deferred until the Committee had had time to consider the matter in all its aspects and asked Brigadier Norman to circulate his proposals, in writing, for consideration.

CONCLUSION TO ITEM 2.

THE COMMITTEE agreed--

To defer further discussion until a later meeting, and to ask Brigadier Norman to circulate a paper stating his proposals, for the consideration of the interested Departments.

O. D.
R 20 JUN C. O.

In Mr. Howard's sig.

Mr. Smith 20/6/35
Mr. Howard H 20/6
Mr.

Mr. Parkinson.
Sir G. Tomlinson.
Sir C. Bottomley.
Sir J. Shuckburgh
Permt. U.S. of S.
Perly. U.S. of S.
Secretary of State.

Secret.

24 June, 35.

DRAFT.

H. Col. H. H. Powell,
R.S.O., M.C.

Dear Powell,
Many thanks for your
letter of the 19th of June, about
the draft conclusions to items
2 and 4 of the last meeting
of the A.C.C.

The fact that these
conclusions will appear in the
final version of the minutes
will be sufficient for the
necessary action to be taken
in these particular cases.
(Sgd) D. D. Howard. Your sincere

2 drafts

FURTHER ACTION.

19th June, 1935.

- S E C R E T -

Dear Howard,

With reference to the 341st Meeting of the O.D.C. the draft conclusions on the following items were as follows:-

Item 2. Somaliland and Kenya. Reinforcement in case of necessity.

"To defer further discussion until a later meeting and to ask Brigadier Norman to circulate a paper stating his proposals for the consideration of the interested Departments."

Item 7. Sarawak and Brunei. Defence of the Miri and Seria Oilfields.

"(ii) To ask the Colonial Office to invite H.M. the Rajah of Sarawak, during his stay in this country, to meet representatives of the Committee to discuss the defence problems of Miri."

Would you like me to issue a formal Minute recording the above conclusions, or will the fact that they will appear in the final version of the Minutes be sufficient for the necessary action to be taken? I shall be quite happy to send out a Minute if you wish it, but if it is unnecessary I don't want to add to the ever increasing volume of paper.

Yours sincerely,

W.R. Downall

F. J. Howard, Esq., O.B.E.,
COLONIAL OFFICE.

*Copy Hand
6/24/35
General
(5)*

AIR MAIL

KENYA

No.

SECRET.



GOVERNMENT HOUSE

NAIROBI

KENYA

13th June, 1955.

Sir,

(25) I have the honour to refer to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister's Secret telegram No.130 of the 23rd May, regarding the action to be taken by this Government in regard to immigrants in the event of developments in the situation between Ethiopia and Italy and now that I have (22) received Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister's Secret despatch of the 21st May my views are as follows in this despatch.

2. In regard to the revised appreciation requested in Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister's despatch of the (12) 4th May, I have already informed you in my Secret telegram (24) No.118 of the 23rd May that the use of aircraft in the manner proposed by the Air Ministry is not considered practicable under local conditions for other than purposes of reconnaissance, and I have asked that the arrangement stated in the first paragraph of Air Ministry (11) letter No.S.36485/S.6 of the 24th April to hold in reserve two troop-carrying aircraft for use in this Colony should stand for the present.

3. The alternative to a Closed Frontier (12) policy proposed in paragraph 5 of Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister's despatch has been discussed with my advisers.

You will appreciate that the concentration of refugees and stragglers behind the frontier, apart from the probability that any such movement would cause unrest amongst Kenya tribes, many of whom are already inimical to the immigrants, would impose a severe strain on the administration of the Northern Frontier

District

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

MALCOLM MACDONALD, P.C., M.P.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,

DOWNING STREET,

LONDON, S.W. 1

District and on the water and grazing available for British subjects.

(2)

There is also the possibility referred to in paragraph 6 of Sir Joseph Byrne's Secret despatch of the 16th February, that any acquiescence in the movement of Ethiopian or Italian tribes into this Colony would seriously embarrass this Government with one or other of the Governments concerned.

In all the circumstances I consider, and I trust you will agree, that the arrangements originally made by Sir Joseph Byrne should stand, and that an Internment Policy should be regarded only as an alternative to be adopted in the event of the original arrangement proving impracticable.

4. With such a contingency in view provisional plans have been prepared for the accommodation of refugees crossing the frontiers in any numbers which involve their division, provided armed resistance does not occur, into two tribal groups:-

(1) Degodia, Gurreh and Boran:

To allow these people to live under special written permits under the related tribal Headman in Kenya and in his area, at the discretion of the District Commissioner concerned and provided there is sufficient water and grazing available.

/(2) Darod

- (2) Darod (Ogaden, Marchan, Herti and Bartirri)
Somalis:

To intern, temporarily, these people in an area which is described as follows:-

"Between a line running from the Ngombe Crater to Chanlers Falls and the Isiolo River including the uninhabited portion of the Meru Reserve."

These people would be escorted to the area mentioned by augmented Tribal Police and under the control of an Administrative Officer, or Officers, specially detailed for internment work.

This is considered necessary in order to leave armed Military and Police Officers and men free for their duties; and in order to enable Administrative Officers to continue their own work.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Am. head

ACTING GOVERNOR.

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

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134

PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 6th June. Received 4.52 p.m. 6th June, 1935.

Secret.

No. 124.

It is reported that Abyssinians have made large camp north of Labeshelindi at Serer about 80 miles north of Mele. Reported by Consul at Mege that preparations for mobilization have been discontinued owing to the Ethiopian Government's desire to avoid giving grounds for Italian contention that hostile preparations are being made. Reference to your secret telegram No. 120.

(25)

copy
to
C. C. M.
A. M.
C. C. M.
A. M.

C. O.

29
35

Mr. Grossmith.

P. 6.35.

38066/35. Secret.

Mr. *Flood* 8/5.

Mr

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson

Sir C. Bottomley

Sir J. Shuckburgh

Permi. U.S. of S

Party. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

Downing Str et.

7 June 1935.

It is noted 7th June.

Immediate

DRAFT.

1
8/5

Sir,

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

... to acknowledge

the receipt of your Secret letter

(28)

of the 31st ^{of} May (No. J.2110.1/17),

including ~~transmitting~~ a copy of a telegram

from His Majesty's Representative at

Addis Ababa regarding the ~~recognition~~

Majesty's Consul at Moga, ~~in~~

~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~vicinity~~ of the

consulate.

To O.A.G. Kenya.
(accompanying draft).

Copy to Kenya (30)

FURTHER ACTION.

inform Secret ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~means~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~above~~ ~~mentioned~~ ~~letter~~

via Philip ~~Commissioner~~

considered the ~~matter~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~above~~ ~~mentioned~~ ~~letter~~

to the view that the Government of Kenya

is in the best position to judge of the

expediency of evacuating the Consulate *having regard to the particular area in which it is situated.*

At the same time, he considers that premature

evacuation should be avoided as its effect

might be most unfortunate, and that, if

~~circumstances should arise~~

made to His Majesty's Representative at

Addis Ababa before withdrawal is finally

authorized. But ^{in any event} ~~Sir Philip Qualife Lister~~

~~is of the opinion that~~ nothing should deter

the Consul from quitting Mega if that appears

to him to be the ~~best~~ course ~~in the circumstances~~ *in any event*

3. I am to request that if Sir John Simon

sees no objection, Sir Sidney Barton may be

informed accordingly.

4. ^{As mentioned} ~~Sir Philip Qualife Lister~~ is not

aware whether any reply has been returned

by the Acting Governor of Kenya to Sir Sidney

Barton's telegram No. 10 of the 28th May, and

in

C. O.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir C. Tomlinson.

Sir C. Battenley.

Sir J. Shackleton.

Pres. U.S. of S.

Pres. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

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in this connection I am to transmit
to you a copy of a despatch which
is being sent to the Acting Governor.

I am, etc.

~~(Sd/-) P. CONRIFFE LISTER.~~

~~1952~~

FURTHER ACTION

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. *19119/111*

and address—not to any person by name, but to

"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1

311
137
[Stamp]

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to *the Under Secretary of State* and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper for such observations as *his P. P. [unclear]* may desire to offer

Foreign Office,

1935.

RECEIVED
1935
EG

Reference to previous correspondence

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.

Subject

<i>on 12/11/34</i>	<i>on 12/11/34</i>
<i>on 12/11/34</i>	<i>on 12/11/34</i>
<i>on 12/11/34</i>	<i>on 12/11/34</i>
<i>on 12/11/34</i>	<i>on 12/11/34</i>

Similar letter sent to

20
to [unclear]

NO DISTRIBUTION.



Sir S. Barton (Addis Ababa).

May 28th 1935.

D. Wireless.

May 29th 1935.

R. 4.30 p.m.

May 29th 1935.

Nos. 137, 138 and 139.

SECRET.

Following telegram from Nairobi c. 32nd May 24th was received here last night.

Begins:

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

Secret.

My telegram of (? 22nd May) (? sent in) wrong order.

Following is message, begins:

32nd Secret. In existing circumstances consider it desirable arrangements should be made for possibility of evacuation of Mega Consulate. I have informed Consul that he should unobtrusively evacuate archives to Loyale now and move there himself when he considers situation warrants and in any case before outbreak of hostilities. Am communicating with Khartoum regarding Consul at

Maji.

Acting Governor.

Ends.

Following telegram was sent to Nairobi c. 10 May 23th.

Begins:

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding

preceding telegram.

Secret.

Your telegram No.328.

Your telegram of May 22nd was not received here. I am repeating to the Foreign Office your telegram No.328 together with this reply with a request for instructions.

In the meanwhile I should be glad if you could see your way to suspend instructions given by you to Consul at Mega especially in view of improvement in the situation which may be expected to result from resolution adopted at Geneva May 25th.

In my opinion evacuation of any of His Majesty's Consulates in this country unless and until Ethiopian government have expressed inability to accept responsibility for their protection would be prejudicial to British interests generally and to maintenance of order on the frontier in particular.

ends.

I do not anticipate any danger to His Majesty's Consulate but would propose in the event of hostilities to address formal reminder to Abyssinian government on the subject of protection.

Advice of His Majesty's Consul is likely to be eagerly sought by local Ethiopian authorities in connexion with protection of British subjects and the maintenance of order on our frontier and any premature withdrawal would do more harm than good.

I should be grateful for instructions on Nairobi proposals.

Note by Communications.

These messages have been delayed owing to part being received undecipherable.

Downing Street,

18 May, 1935.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my secret despatch of May 21st regarding the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and to transmit for your information an extract from Hansard of May 27th containing replies by the Lord Privy Seal and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to questions on this subject in the House of Commons, together with the texts of two resolutions adopted by the Council of the League of Nations in the early hours of May 25th. A copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Geneva containing Mr. Eden's appreciation of the results achieved is also forwarded for your information.

2. The value of these results is not to be minimised. The Italian Government have acknowledged the right of the Council of the League and to keep in touch with the proceedings of the Conciliation Commission and to intervene should it be necessary. They have also agreed to raise no objection to the appointment of foreign arbitrators by the Ethiopian Government, and they have accepted a time schedule within which to complete the phases

phases of conciliation and arbitration specified in the 1923 Treaty. The undertakings given at Geneva will add to the difficulty of the Italian Government justifying any attempt to resort to force; and at the same time an open rupture between the Italian Government and the League has been avoided at least for the time being.

2. On the other hand while the immediate crisis has been satisfactorily surmounted, and a definite advance towards a friendly solution has been made, it cannot be maintained that the Council's resolutions dispel of the danger that hostilities will ultimately break out since it is unlikely that the findings of the Conciliation Commission, even if it should be able to produce an unanimous report, will be of such a nature as to enable the Italian Government to achieve the aims in Ethiopia which they are believed to entertain and the achievement of which would alone justify, in Italian eyes, the obstacles and expensive measures which have been taken in the last few months.

4. I will not fail to keep you informed of any further important developments which take place.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,
Your most obedient
humble servant,

(Sgd.) P. GUNLIFE-LISTER

SECRET.

O.D.C. No. 1040.

COPY NO. 2.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

OVERSEA DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

SOMALILAND (AND KENYA). REINFORCEMENT IN CASE OF NECESSITY.

(Reference O.D.C. Paper No. 1022 and O.D.C. 340th Minutes, Item 3.)

Note by the Secretary.

The following correspondence, dealing with measures which it may be necessary to take on the Kenya frontier, is circulated for the information of the Committee in continuation of O.D.C. Paper No. 1022 :-

- I. Letter from Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, to Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, dated 10th April, 1935.
- II. Letter from Secretary, Air Ministry, to Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, dated 24th April, 1935.
- III. Despatch from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Officer Administering the Government of Kenya, dated 4th May, 1935.
- IV. Telegram from Officer Administering the Government of Kenya to Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 22nd May, 1935.
- V. Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Officer Administering the Government of Kenya, dated 23rd May, 1935.
- VI. Letter from Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, to Secretary, Air Ministry, dated 25th May, 1935.

(signed) H. M. POWNALL,
Secretary,
Oversea Defence Committee.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

29th May, 1935.

I.

Letter from Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office, to Under-Secretary of
State, Colonial Office.

FORLIGN OFFICE,

S.W.1.

10th April, 1935.

No. J. 1201/1/1.

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir John Simon to
acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 18066/35 of
26th March last enclosing copies of two despatches from
the Governor of Kenya concerning the measures which it
will be necessary to take on the frontier of that colony
in the unhappy event of the outbreak of hostilities be-
tween Ethiopia and Italy.

2. The Secretary of State, who concurs in the inter-
pretation of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1907 set out
in paragraph 4 of your letter under acknowledgment, agrees
with Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister's proposal to invite the
Government of Kenya to consider whether it would not be
preferable not to adopt a policy of closing the frontier
to refugees, but to arrange for such refugees to be
temporarily concentrated and accommodated in an area where
their presence would involve the least possible interference
with the local inhabitants.

I am, etc.

(Signed) MAURICE FELTHERSON.

II.

Letter from Secretary, Air Ministry,
to the Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

AIR MINISTRY,
LONDON, W.C.2.

24th April, 1935.

S. 35493/S.6.

Sir,

I am commended by the Air Council to refer to Mr. Flood's letter^{*} 38066/35 of the 26th March, 1935, regarding the measures which it will be necessary to take on the Kenya frontier in the event of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia and to acquaint you, for the information of Secretary Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister that arrangements have been made to hold in readiness two bomber transport aircraft against the apprehended emergency.

2. The Air Council observe, however, that the nature of the defence preparations proposed on the Northern Frontiers of Kenya will necessitate both these aircraft being continuously ready for operation at the shortest notice. Under such conditions it is doubtful if reliance can be placed on so high a degree of day-to-day service-ability over an unknown period, and it is considered that in order to implement the scheme at present proposed, at least one spare aircraft additional to foreseeable requirements would be required. In the absence of any precise information as to the loads to be carried and the probable incidence of work on these aircraft, it is not possible precisely to determine the number of aircraft

* O.D.C. Paper No. 1022 (III).

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required to implement the scheme proposed, but, should it become obvious in the light of more complete information that a greater number of bomber transport aircraft than the two asked for is, in fact, necessary, some difficulty may be experienced in providing them in view of a possibly concurrent commitment for the evacuation by air of the British subject population from Addis Ababa.

3. In regard to the defence arrangements for the frontier outlined in the despatches from the Governor of Kenya, as Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister is aware, it was agreed, as the result of discussion in the Oversea Defence Committee on the 10th April, 1935, that the Air Ministry views should be represented to the Colonial Office direct with a view to their being forwarded, if considered desirable, in the form of a despatch to the local authorities concerned.

4. The Air Council note that the plan outlined at the Conference in Nairobi on the 22nd February, 1935, and referred to in the Governor's covering despatches, postulates the immediate despatch of troops by air to threatened portions of the frontier for the purpose of supporting local police detachments should the necessity arise. In this connection it is necessary to observe that no landing grounds appear to exist on the frontier for the deplaning of these troops, apart from those at Mandera, Moyale and Lokitsung. It would not, therefore, seem possible to rely upon the suggested method of reinforcing the police, because the inherent immobility of the troops after their arrival at any one of these widely separated landing grounds leaves unsolved the problem of rapidly reinforcing any threatened

* O.D.C. 340th Minutes.

* O.D.C. Paper No. 102s (III, Enclosure No. 2).

point on a frontier which is described by His Excellency the Governor as "long and desolate". In these circumstances the Air Council entertain the gravest doubts of the probable efficacy of the methods proposed to meet the emergencies apprehended.

5. On the other hand it was, as Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister is aware, at his suggestion that a detailed investigation of defence requirements on this frontier was recently carried out by the Air Officer Commanding, Middle East Command, and the Inspector-General of the King's African Rifles, with the assistance of the local civil and Military authorities. The problems then investigated were similar to those now under consideration, and the views expressed in the Report, to the effect that the proper use of aircraft on this frontier offered the best solution, were unanimously endorsed by Their Excellencies the Governors of the East African territories.

6. In these circumstances the Air Council wish to put forward their view, for the consideration of Secretary Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, that the emergencies now envisaged, which do not appear adequately to be met by the plan at present proposed, lend themselves more readily to solution if the police detachments, in whose hands the initial responsibility must always remain, are directly supported by an adequate force of aircraft, both for reconnaissance duties and, in the last resort, for direct action of a degree suitably tempered to the occasion. Such a force would be able not only to keep the administration and the frontier detachments speedily informed of movements across the frontier, but also quickly to reach and, if necessary, take effective action in any part of

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the vast and desolate regions involved. Many precedents could be quoted regarding the efficacy and humanity of this method of controlling tribal migration and opposing armed incursion.

7. If the Secretary of State is favourably disposed towards these suggestions, and if the local authorities are willing to accept the solution now suggested to their problems, the Air Officer Commanding, Middle East Command, will be instructed to hold in readiness a detachment of aircraft adequate for the purpose. It is necessary to point out, however, that in the event of disturbances being apprehended on the frontier more than 150 miles to the West of Moyale, an additional landing ground would be necessary about half way between that place and Lake Rudolf; also that although the aircraft detachment would arrive suitably organised to operate for one month, as much notice as possible is desirable in order to allow time for the despatch of certain supply requirements by sea.

8. The question of what financial adjustment, if any, will be necessary in the event of the aircraft being required, will be a matter for subsequent consideration in the light of all the relevant circumstances.

9. Finally, I am to add that the plan recommended above appears to approximate more closely to the preparations being made to meet a precisely similar situation in Somaliland.

I am, etc.

(Signed) J. M. SPAIGHT.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for the
Colonies to the Officer Administering the
Government of Kenya.

DOWNING STREET,

4th May, 1935.

K E N Y A.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir Joseph Byrne's Secret despatches⁺ of the 16th and the 28th of February, regarding the action to be taken by the Government of Kenya in the event of hostilities between Ethiopia and Italy.

2. The precautionary measures reported in the later despatch under reference meet with my full approval.

3. You will observe from the enclosed copy of correspondence with the Foreign Office that, while the interpretation of the Treaty position advanced in Sir Joseph Byrne's despatch of 16th February is endorsed, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs shares my view that any attempt to close the frontier completely would actually be neither prudent nor practicable; and the alternative is suggested of arranging for the concentration of refugees and stragglers, after they have been disarmed, in suitable areas behind the frontier. You will no doubt cause preliminary consideration to be given to the details of such arrangements, in the light of the forces available for intercepting, disarming, and shepherding the immigrants to the area or areas selected for their concentration.

+ O.D.C. Paper No. 1022 (III).

§ O.D.C. Paper No. 1022 (III, Enclosure No. 3).

* No. I to this Paper

To Foreign
Office 26th
March.

Fr. do. 10th
April. *

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Air
Ministry
24th April.

4. The possibility of co-operation by the Royal Air Force has been under discussion with the Air Council; and in the letter of the 24th April, of which a copy is enclosed, they suggest that the rôle played by the Force should be that of reconnaissance and deterrence rather than the rapid transport of ground forces.

5. The contingency against which these various plans are intended to provide does not appear, so far as can be judged at the moment, to be imminent. I shall look with interest to receiving from you a revised appreciation of the situation, framed in the light of the policy suggested in paragraph 3 above, the Air Ministry's proposals for co-operation, and the recent visit paid to the frontier by the Officer Commanding the Northern Brigade.

6. A copy of this despatch, with enclosures, is being sent to the Governor of Uganda.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

+ Vide No. II.

IV.

Paraphrase telegram from the Officer Administering
the Government of Kenya to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies.

Dated 22nd May. Received S. 31 p.m. 22nd May, 1935.

No. 118. 22nd May. Secret.

Assume that the existing arrangements continue and that internment is regarded as an alternative. Under local conditions I do not consider that use of aircraft as proposed by the Air Ministry is practicable for other than purposes of reconnaissance. I should be glad if arrangements for Vickers Victoria aircraft stated in first paragraph of the secret letter⁺ from the Air Ministry of 24th April No. S. 35493/S.6. may stand.

Reference your secret telegram of 18th May, No. 126.

+ Vide No. II.

38066/35.

Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya.

Sent 3.30 p.m. 23rd May, 1935.

No. 130. Secret.

The assumption in your secret telegram No. 118 is correct. It has now been decided that provided no unforeseen developments arise Glenday will return on the 23rd June by air. Will you please forward as soon as possible after receiving my secret despatch of the 21st May, the appreciation asked for in my secret despatch of 4th May? Grateful if you will also keep me informed of any reports of Italian activities in neighbourhood of Dol and Lugh.

+ Vide No. III.

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