

1935.

Kenya.

No. 38090/1.

(Secret.)

SUBJECT

Co 533
458

Defence Force.

Previous

23118/2/34.

**CLOSED
UNTIL**



Subsequent

1936 file

See 38240/36.

1. Governor Bygone Secret (1) (A.M. Mail) 15 Sept 35

Submits a copy of the Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into matters connected with Defence Force stores furnished above. Thereon. Records the disbandment of the Defence Force & the establishment of a security force & volunteer Rifle Company in Nairobi, possibly a smaller unit at Mombasa.

1. Col. Stopford

16. U.A.R.

Even at the possible risk of swopping horses etc. I suggest that as soon as the U.D.F. disappears and is replaced by something of military value (as a unit) the latter.

I have already offered suggestions for Consom on 23/11/32 Secret - minutes of 15.2.35 and note Haqqes X - and have written further to add

The U.D.F. would have to disappear by disbandment. legislation and the new force by constituting legislation. I do not think there can be any question of reforming & remodelling the present U.D.F.

P.J. Cole

1-10-35

I agree with Major Cole. Even if an emergency should arise at the present time I cannot think that the U.D.F. would be of any value as a military unit, though there would probably be no difficulty in obtaining the services of individual members for specific duties.

One difficulty about introducing the change at the present juncture is that it might throw too much

work on the shoulders of O.C.N. who must already be fully occupied and who may have more trouble coming his way in the near future. This difficulty might, however, be relieved if a "Staff Officer, Local Forces" was appointed from one of the battalions in N. Rhodes as an officer with a knowledge of the problem, the people and the country. In any case I think that this would be preferable to appointing an officer straight from home who had no knowledge of local conditions. The officer selected for the appointment of S.O. Local Forces could, ^{in this} be replaced in his battalion by an officer sent out from England.

Richard Bedford
2.10.35

The Report of the Committee merely gives the reasons, and allocates the blame, for the loss of stores; ^{which} ~~and~~ as a matter of administration, it could be rectified. The Report does not, therefore, contribute towards the arguments for a complete alteration of the character of the Force.

Sir J. Byane remains strongly of opinion that effect should be given to the proposals made by

by him in his despatch of 12.12.34 (No 15. - 23115/2/4 Secret)

I see no reason why the necessary legislation should not be drafted forthwith. When this has been accomplished the international situation should be clearer and the manner and moment for introducing the re-organization can then be determined.

Ch Orman
2.10.35

The report of the Committee on the subject of the loss of stores in Rhodesia is a very interesting one. It is a pity that it is so late in coming out. The Committee has done a very good job and its report is a very valuable contribution to the knowledge of the situation in Rhodesia. It is a pity that it is so late in coming out. The Committee has done a very good job and its report is a very valuable contribution to the knowledge of the situation in Rhodesia.

The report of the Committee on the subject of the loss of stores in Rhodesia is a very interesting one. It is a pity that it is so late in coming out. The Committee has done a very good job and its report is a very valuable contribution to the knowledge of the situation in Rhodesia. It is a pity that it is so late in coming out. The Committee has done a very good job and its report is a very valuable contribution to the knowledge of the situation in Rhodesia.

The report of the Committee on the subject of the loss of stores in Rhodesia is a very interesting one. It is a pity that it is so late in coming out. The Committee has done a very good job and its report is a very valuable contribution to the knowledge of the situation in Rhodesia. It is a pity that it is so late in coming out. The Committee has done a very good job and its report is a very valuable contribution to the knowledge of the situation in Rhodesia.

From paragraph 7 of the despatch the Governor appears to want a direct order from here to disband the Defence Force. Military opinion here is quite decisive that the Kenya Defence Force is no use (see the discussion on the 11th September last year, No. 6 on 23118/34), and having regard to the whole situation, the desirability of having something effective, and the need for organising Kenya's white man power in the best possible way to enable it to assist in the event of war - a contingency which will become more appreciable with increased Italian strength in East Africa - it seems to me that the only thing to do is to accept the Governor's proposals and give him the authority he wants to disband the K.D.F. and replace it by a volunteer unit. The Governor, however, has an idea that there should be what he calls a "security force" on the lines suggested in the discussion of the 11th of September (paragraph 2). In his Memorandum of the 15th of February, Major Cole expressed the view that a security force was a misleading title and that the best thing to do was to institute a Reserve for the Kenya Territorial Force in which everybody could be put if necessary. We should put this point to Kenya and say that the Secretary of State is of opinion that this is a better solution than creating anything separate and calling it a security force.

The late Secretary of State expressed the opinion that a change like this ought to

be

4

be taken to the Cabinet on the ground that it would be an important reversion of policy. I don't think it really is. The policy of having an organisation for the Europeans to join is still maintained - what we are doing is to try to substitute an efficient organisation for an inefficient. The change will, of course, be represented by the wild men among the settlers as an attempt to take away from them the weapon on which they are relying to coerce the Governor, but I do not think that such objections need be very seriously considered.

A

I advise then that a despatch be sent by Air Mail informing the Governor that the Secretary of State accepts his recommendation that the Auxiliary Forces in Kenya should be re-organised, that the Defence Force as now constituted appears to be unsatisfactory in character and not to fulfil its purpose, and therefore ~~the~~^{the} considers that steps should be taken to abolish it in its existing form and to replace it by a volunteer unit which might consist of an infantry unit based on Nairobi and a Coast Defence unit for manning the defences of Mombasa. Say that it will be obviously necessary to get the legislation for the establishment of these bodies in train so that it may be introduced at the same time as the Defence Force Ordinance is repealed and the Force disbanded, and express the hope that the revised Force will enable the best use to be made of the material available among the Europeans in Kenya. We should then go on to say that a security force is not considered to be advisable either as a title or as a body, and enclose a copy of Major Cole's

Memorandum

Memorandum of suggestions regarding the reorganisation of the local forces, saying that these suggestions may prove useful in Kenya and that they are acceptable to the Inspector-General, and suggest the appointment of a staff officer, Local Forces, as put forward by Colonel Stopford. The Governor proposes to submit the legislation in draft and we should accept that and ask to see it.

4.10.35.

I agree.

As to A, it is quite possible that the exposed position of Kenya's local forces will predispose local opinion to have more efficient force. Both points might be put to Sir J. Byrnes so, leaving him to decide whether the moment is propitious for an announcement or not.

[To be today - the file comes through through Col. Stopford] W.S. 7.10.35

I hope a change of this kind - will every armed citizen will

Receipt as being in the interests of military efficiency - in order to create less opposition at a time like this when the ...

W.S.
9/10/35

I should like to discuss this.

W.V.
12.10.35

As the Staff is now away, this will have to wait until after the General Election the paper should be brought up again in the 18th of ~~October~~ November.

Stopford
1.11.35

Mr. Thomas has read Sir Joseph Byrnes's Dispatch and the foregoing minutes. He would like to discuss the Dispatch with the Dept and the Staff Officer at an early date in the next week.

Stopford
23/10/35

W.S. 24/10

3. Mr. Kenya - - Del. Sect. & Personal - - 24/10/35

I expect words like "and I should be glad to know how" have dropped out before "matter stands"

It has not been to the O.D.C. and I don't really think it ever need go. The S. of S's advisers (The I.C. & the Governor) are fully satisfied that the Defence Force as constituted is no use and should be replaced by something on the lines of a Volunteer unit.

I think we can only reply as per draft. herewith.

S.S. Glee

7.1.

The possibility of a volunteer unit of selected defenders of the island... I would suggest that the Governor be authorized to proceed with the formation of a volunteer defence unit.

I have enlarged the letter accordingly

The question of incorporating this unit within the regular volunteer force (if raised) can be considered separately.

The W.O. are very keen and some steps should be taken early in the year for the formation of the unit... at Malakka.

S.S. Glee

7.1.36.

I think we can reply as proposed without going to the O.D.C.

It may perhaps be advisable later when draft legislation has been prepared - if S. of S. approve the proposals - to let the local office know what is going on.

J. J. Howard sp.

W.S. 8/1/36

To Gen. Tel. no 3 & P — 8.1.36.

The Secretary of State discussed this with Sir C. Bottomley, Major Cole and myself on the 16th of January. He agreed that the decision to give up the Defence Force and replace it by an efficient volunteer unit working under the Officer Commanding Northern Brigade was the right one. He felt some misgiving, however, as to how far the abolition of the Defence Force would be accepted by the European unofficials and as to whether the Governor had sounded them informally. Sir C. Bottomley and I expressed our confidence that the Governor had got the unofficials with him and Lord Plymouth referred to the Governor's private letter of the 24th of September, 1934, showing that Major Cavendish-Bentinck had, along with the other unofficials, been perturbed about the Force. It was agreed that the situation which had developed since rendered it still more likely that the Elected Members would be quite willing to see the Defence Force replaced by something more suitable.

It is advisable to inform the Governor as quickly as possible in order that he may proceed to get ahead with the draft legislation as set out at the end of his despatch of the 15th of September. Draft telegram and despatch herewith. Major Cole has seen & agrees.

J.E.W.F.

20.1.36.

I am afraid that I am responsible for having this up for some days. I wanted to discuss with Major Cole whether we should not

See P. 15/1/36

... to the despatch an enquiry
about which arrangements will be
made so far as the permanent
staff of the Const. Reserve
Unit is concerned. This is a matter
in which W.O. take considerable
interest: Lt. here is particularly
anxious to know whether we
shall be asking them for an R.A.
Order of command. Hence, an
enquiry on this point has now
been made by a personal telegram
from Sir C. Bottomley and a Const.
Reserve paper. 27/1

Sir J. Shackleton

Drafts submitted.

I have already circulated a
letter from Sir J. Bottomley in which
he says that he expects that "considerable
difficulties, perhaps prompted by
General Hewitt, the present Commandant,
will endeavour to stir up a
political row when the change is
announced, so we shall have
to go last fully, carefully, but not
to postpone action.

W.O. 29.1.36

Secretary of State.

These drafts (telegram and despatch) have
been prepared on your oral instructions given after
discussion with Sir C. Bottomley, Mr. Flood and Major
Cole.

I have discussed with Sir C. Bottomley
the question whether the War Office ought to be
consulted at this stage. Such consultation seems
clearly desirable before any final decision is
taken. It may strengthen our hands, in the event of
trouble with the non-officials, or any section of
them, over the new policy; and, on broader grounds,
we should lay ourselves open to criticism if we
neglected to take advantage of the War Office
experience in building up and maintaining a
territorial force. But, for the moment, we are merely
at the preliminary stage. The Governor is only
invited to frame concrete proposals for our
consideration. When his proposals have been
received, we shall have something definite to put
before the War Office, and that would seem to be the
appropriate moment for seeking their advice. Sir
C. Bottomley agrees.

? The two drafts may issue.

J.P.
30. 1. 36.

D.
30. 1. 36.

Mr. Thomas agrees.
D. Ford.
4/2/36.

4 To Gov. Tel No 27 — 4.2.36.

5 To Gov Kenya Secret Com (17/2/36) - 5 Feb 1936

The decision to send off the despatch has probably rendered it unnecessary to send out a semi-official letter on the lines originally proposed, since Major Cole's memorandum has been largely embodied in the despatch. It is probably advisable, however, to send something to Sir Joseph Byrne and I submit the draft of one accordingly.

J.E.W. Flood 7.2.

W.D. 8/2 at

6 To Sir Joseph Byrne 8/2 Feb 1936

7 To Col. Leese W.O. 8/2 Feb 1936

CR

Kenya General Notice B46 - 22. 10. 35
DEstroyed UNDER STATUTE

Notice of notice issued by Staff Officer K.D.F. for collection of arms & ammunition

Registered per memo put by C.D. Gammie 18/2/36 above

9 To Col. Dwyer - W.O. 8/2 Feb 1936 - 12. 2. 36.

Looks '07. Will be interesting to know discussion which may arise out of this.

Put by C.D. Gammie 14. 2. 36

major Cole to see J.E.W. Flood 15/2 at one

To Gov Kenya Sec No 51 Secret - 21. 2. 36.

Notes when despatch referred in Note may be expected

DEstroyed UNDER STATUTE

(No 51)
The despatch / was sent by ocean mail of the 6th Feb. & should arrive at Montreal about the 23rd Feb. (It takes 17 days.) Draft tel herewith (Africa) 2-2/136

To Gov Kenya Tel. No. 40. Secret 22/2/36

DEstroyed UNDER STATUTE

12 Gov Kenya Sec 52 - 25. 2. 36

Request permission to publish C.O. secret despatch of 5 Feb 1936 (No 5)

Major Cole Sir J. Shackleton
Sir C. Bottomley

I can see no objection. We can

I think I agree to publication but say the 8. ops. had intended to consult the W.O. & still thinks it most desirable to do so before the legislation is finally settled.

J.E.W. Flood 25.2

I agree & in fact, think that publication of the terms of the despatch will be a good thing. We might say that consultation with W.O. is desirable before legislation is finally approved.
Joseph Cole 26/2 J.E.W.

P.T.O.

LORD PLYMOUTH
Secretary of State

W. Boyd,

I would agree to local publication
of the S. of P.'s despatch (No. 5 in the file);
but anything connected with Kenya is
so controversial that I think that
the S. of P. ought to know what is
proposed.

? Agree to publication as proposed

W.S.

26/2/36

Q.
27.2.36

Mr. Thomas agrees to local
publication as proposed.

Ed. Lloyd

2/3/36

atms

13 To Mr. Kenya. Tel. No. 444. 4/3/36.

14 ^{Exempt from} Sir J. Byrnes S/O to Sir J. Macpherson 11. 1. 36. 9

Para 2 suggests S.O.P. matters be made tentative in
first place to encourage full measure of local co-operation
Proposed to deal with Coast Defence Force under Kenyan Force Act 1936

15 To Sir J. Byrnes S/O 14. Anson. 24 Feb 1936

LP

Extract from a letter to Sir Joseph Byrne from
Sir C. Bottomley, dated 24th February, 1936.

.....

The Secretary of State's despatch on the Kenya Defence Force was quite tentative and gives you ample scope to proceed by Committee as you contemplated. It did not occur to us that you could set up the Coast Defence Force under the Territorial Force legislation but it certainly seems appropriate at a hasty glance.

14
12

Extract from a letter to Sir J. Maffey from Sir J. Byrne.

Dated 11th January, 1936.

In the meantime I fancy I can deal with the Coast Defence Force under the Territorial Force Act, 1921, which is still in the Statute Book: this will remove the need for extreme urgency in respect of the Defence Force.

297
C.O.

~~Telegraph~~
8090

(Received in
Tel Sec. 4/3/36)

Mr. Flood. 2.3

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.


X Sir C. Bottomley. 2.3 f

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.



ho. 444

Your telegram

25th February No.52 Secret.

DRAFT. TELEGRAM.

46 c

GOVERNOR

NAIROBI

I have no objection to the publication of my Secret despatch of 5th February on subject of Defence Force. It should be made clear however that I had intended to seek advice of Army Council before the matter is finally settled and I am sure you will agree that it is desirable to do so.

FURTHER ACTION.

38090/1/35
12 14

COPIES FOR REGISTRATION

RECEIVED
E 25 FEB 1936
C. O. REG.

Telegram from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

Dated 25th February 1936. Received at 1.53 pm. 25th Feb. 1936.

5 No. 52 Secret. It would greatly assist me if I might make public the contents of your secret despatch of the 5th February. This would minimise organised political agitation which I anticipate will quickly die down once your decision and reasons for it are announced. It will also enable me forthwith appoint Committee to advise without delay on the legislative changes necessary.

Ans. (13)



The War Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

SECRET

12 February, 1936.

My Dear Flood

7 Thank you very much for your letter and enclosures, regarding the Kenya Defence Force. We have been very interested about this, and it is extremely kind of you to let us see this copy. As I think you know, I very much hope that something will be settled soon, as I feel that the doubt and uncertainty in Kenya regarding the future of the Kenya Defence Force is not for the best.

5 I shall be very interested to know what the Governor and the Commander, Northern Brigade, suggest as a result of your letter. As far as I remember, from what I saw when I was in Kenya, your suggested organisation seems to cover their ideas on the subject. They specifically referred to an O.T.C., but I should say that your idea is a very much better one than that, as your organisation includes both the fighting units and also the O.T.C. if they wish to form one.

*Yours
O.W.H. Leese*

J.E.W. Flood, Esq., C.M.G.,
Colonial Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

(O.W.H. Leese, Lt. Col., G.S.)

C. O.

DOWNING STREET.

Mr. Flood. J. 2

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

X Sir C. Bottomley. *g/f*

Sir J. Shuckburgh

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

9
7 16
// February, 1936.

DRAFT.

COLONEL O. LEESE, D.S.O.,
WAR OFFICE.

Dear Colonel Leese,

We have often talked about the Kenya Defence Force and what is being done about it so you may like to have the enclosed copy of a despatch, which the Secretary of State has sent to the Governor. The suggestions in the despatch for the future organisation of Kenya's man power were generally approved by the Inspector-General last October ~~but~~ ^{and} have ^{now} been put forward to the Governor as suggestions for his consideration. He may be able to devise something better and he may have to modify his plans if the local people put up opposition, of which there is perhaps more likelihood than we had first thought. When the draft legislation is prepared and sent home we shall invite War Office observations

FURTHER ACTION.

it.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgn) J.W. Hood

C. O.

Mr. Flood. 72

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

x Sir C. Bottomley *CB*

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

Conson

DRAFT.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR JOSEPH BYRNE,
G.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B.,

FURTHER ACTION.

38090/1/35

DOWNING STREET.

For sig by Sir C. Bottomley // February, 1936. 67

My dear Byrne

Just a line to reinforce the secret despatch about the Kenya Defence Force. The matter has been anxiously considered for some time here and was eventually decided by Mr. Thomas. He raised, however, in conversation, the question whether the European unofficals would accept the abolition of the force and whether you had sounded them unofficially. At the time we said we thought the answer was in the affirmative on both points, but I have since received your letter saying that Cavendish-Bentinck might endeavour to make trouble. I am sorry to ^{see} ~~say~~ this but it must be obvious to everyone that the present Defence Force is not very useful as

C. O.

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.
Sir G. Tomlinson.
Sir C. Bottomley.
Sir J. Shuckburgh.
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Secretary of State.

will be required and as you have just
told us by telegram, if it is expected
that the guns are to be fired in the near
future skeleton gun teams will have to be
sent out. We hope this will not be
necessary for many reasons, ^{and no doubt} ~~but as to that~~
^{as do you :}
~~you will be informed officially by~~
telegram.

DRAFT.

*Yours sincerely
W.C. Bottomley.*

FURTHER ACTION.

C.O.

DB

5

Mr. Flood. 20. 1. 36.

38090/1/35. Kenya. Secret.

Mr. Lee

Mr. Howard 27/1

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson

X Sir C. Bottomley 24.1

+ Sir J. Shackburgh 30/1/36

Permt. U.S. of S.

+ Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

C.D.
R 5 FEB
D. 5 "

To go by ~~air~~ Mail.

Downing Street.

5 FEB 1936

January, 1936.

Ans'd 12

Σ 30/1/36

4/2/36 J.S.

Ed'd.

J.S.

Sir,

KENYA.

SECRET.

GOVERNOR.

Copy of Col. Lee's 4/6 80 - 107.

I have the honour to refer to your secret despatch of the 15th of September on the subject of the Kenya Defence Force. I note that in regard to the question of the stores you are taking separate action, and I presume that you will report separately if necessary ^{part on this subject.} In this despatch I propose to deal with the organization of the Defence Force generally.

FURTHER ACTION.

2. As I informed you in my telegram of the 4th of ^{February} January, I have now come to the conclusion that, in the interests of the general

security

security of Kenya, the best, and indeed the only possible, course is to disband the existing Defence Force and replace it by some more suitable ^{military} organization which will enable the potential European man power of Kenya to be utilized in the best possible way.

3. In existing circumstances my opinion

is that the most suitable organization will be ~~that of a Territorial Force regiment.~~

^{appointing} an infantry unit (or units) ^{and} with a battery of

~~heavy~~ artillery ^{for employment} ~~to be used~~ in manning the gun

defences of Mombasa. The establishment of the

infantry unit should be as for a battalion of

the King's African Rifles, with necessary modification

as regards non-combatants. The Officer Commanding

the Northern Brigade of the King's African Rifles

should be appointed to command all local forces

in Kenya and Uganda, and his present style should

be altered by adding the words "and Officer Commanding

Local Forces, Kenya and Uganda". In the Ordinance

constituting the regiment provision should be made

to vest the command in the Officer Commanding Local

Forces, Kenya and Uganda.

C. O.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shuckburgh

Permi. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

FURTHER ACTION.

20
4. As regards the staff, the necessary staff should be supplied from the Northern Brigade, King's African Rifles, the necessary additions to establishment ^{of local force} being made to provide for this. The Staff Officer should be appointed to the staff of the Officer Commanding Northern Brigade with the title of Staff Officer, (Local Forces). In order to make the change as smoothly as possible, I suggest that it would be advisable in the first place to appoint as Staff Officer, Local Forces, an officer now serving in one of the battalions in the Northern Brigade. This will secure that the first incumbent ^{of} ~~in~~ that post will have a knowledge of the problem, the people, and the country, and ^{it} ~~it~~ would be preferable to appointing an officer from this country who had no such local experience. The officer selected for

the appointment of Staff Officer Local Forces
could be replaced ~~in his battalion~~ by an officer

ent from England to ~~complete his term~~

5. - I suggest that a suitable designation
for the proposed Force would be "The Kenya
Regiment (Territorial Force)". The actual
strength of the units can be regulated according
to possibilities, and, in the first instance, I
suggest that the establishment ^{should} aim at one infantry
battalion and one battery of artillery.

6. In your secret despatch of the 12th of
September, 1934, you stated that you were in
agreement with the suggestion that a "security
force" should be organized and maintained. I
think, however, that the title would be somewhat
misleading, though I agree that, in the circumstances
of Kenya, ^{physically} everyone who is fit, should be compulsorily
registered for military service in an emergency.

Since all house-holders will continue to be placed
under liability for military service, it will
probably be better to make them members of some
military organization, which would automatically

place

C. O.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shuckburgh

Perm. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

DRAFT.

FURTHER ACTION.

place them under military or Government
orders when a state of emergency is
declared. This would have the further
advantage of ensuring that, when called
up, they come under military ^{and} discipline
in the emergency, with the responsibility
for carrying out orders given to them.
To secure this end the best course
would appear to be to establish for
the Kenya Regiment (Territorial Force)
a Reserve, and that all house-holders
not being members of the Regiment or
of the King's African Rifles Reserve
of Officers should be required to
enrol in it. The Reserve could be
divided into classes according to age
and obligation for military training.
It would give each man a definite
military status if he is called up
for service, and would probably prove
the most satisfactory course in the
end.

7. I make these suggestions as ^{points} suggestions for your consideration. They had the support of Brigadier Normen when he last considered the matter, and you will no doubt, if ^{have} possible, discuss the whole question with him. In any event, the first thing to do would appear to be to ~~pass~~ ^{prepare} legislation to give effect to the changes, and I request that you will submit it to me in draft as you propose.

I have, etc.

(Signed) J. H. THOMAS

C. O.
R 4 FEB
D 44

Revised about 8.0 pm 4/2/36 4

Mr. Flood. 20.1.36.
Mr. Lee 27/1
Mr. Howard 27/1
Sir C. Parkinson.
Sir G. Tomlinson.

38090/1/35. Kenya. Secret.

X Sir C. Bottomley 29.1
+ Sir J. Shackburgh 30/1/36
Permt. U.S. of S.
+ Parly. U.S. of S. 30/1/36
Secretary of State 4/2/36
Sd. J. H. Thomas

Secret.

Your secret despatch 15th

DRAFT. Telegram.
(Replaces)

GOVERNOR.
NAIROBI.

September. Have now considered question regarding Defence Force and agree with your view that it is desirable that Defence Force should be disbanded. It will be necessary to replace it ^(at once) by suitable organization for utilizing Europeans in the Colony and I agree with proposal to form volunteer or preferably Territorial Force unit of infantry at Nairobi and volunteer ~~heavy~~ artillery unit for

FURTHER ACTION.

Coast Defence at Mombasa. Despatch follows ^{inviting you to submit} ~~by etc.~~ ^{prepar}

? It had better not go by air 1 pm. J.

prepare draft legislation for
my consideration.

C.O.

20090 / 35 Maye

3 23

Mr. Flood 7-1

Major Cole 7-1

Mr. Howard 7-1

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomkinson

X Sir C. Bottomley *of 8/1/36*

Sir J. Shuckburgh

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

DRAFT. *Receipt*
tel

Governor
Nairdi

*Completed Jan 7. 8 pm.
8/1/36
1002*

Secret & personal. Your telegram to Maffey 6 January. Have had proposals regarding Defense Force under consideration but have not yet reached conclusion. Suggest you should take line that ^{organization and} condition of Force not altogether satisfactory for its purpose and that you are proposing to replace it by something in nature of volunteer unit and that you have put forward recommendation to that effect, including proposal for Coast Defense unit at Mombasa. In view of impending installation of guns etc. ^{perhaps} you may I think proceed with all necessary measures for formation of such unit as required for manning defenses without waiting for decision on general question of Defense Force.

FURTHER ACTION.

CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 6th January, 1936. Received in the Colonial Office at 2.58 p.m. on 6th January, 1936.

Secret and Personal. Following for Maffey begins. As a motion has been tabled by Cavendish Bentinck for debate this week regarding Defence Force matter stands. I presume that it is being considered by Overseas Defence Committee and a very early decision is desirable especially as it affects the raising of a unit to man the fixed defences of Mombassa. See particularly paragraph 7 of my secret (1) despatch of the 15th September.

(1)

AIR MAIL

KENYA

No.



GOVERNMENT HOUSE

NAIROBI

KENYA

SECRET (1)

15th September, 1935.

REGY

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your Secret despatch of 15th June, 1935, on the subject of the Kenya Defence Force, and to transmit for your information a copy of the Report of the Committee (presided over by the Solicitor General) which was appointed by me to enquire into matters connected with the Kenya Defence Force Stores.

2. While I am not satisfied that the various Commandants of the Force can fairly be exonerated from all blame, while I recognise that the Staff Officer, Colonel Fitzgerald, may not have been too well served by his subordinates, and while I recognise that certain factors may be urged in mitigation, I cannot but express the view that this officer has failed signally in the execution of an obvious duty and that he cannot be regarded as an efficient Staff Officer.

3. While I am satisfied that the Report is a fair and full record of material facts in so far as the loss of stores is concerned, I have not yet fully considered the question of responsibility or of disciplinary action against any individual or individuals found blameworthy. The Report has not yet been seen by the Commandant or Colonel Fitzgerald.

(1)

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MALCOLM MACDONALD, ESQ., P.C., M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
DOWNING STREET, S.W.1.
LONDON.

4. The grave state of the Kenya Defence Force is, in my view, emphasised by this Report which strengthens me in my opinion that there is only one sound policy to be followed, namely the repeal of the Kenya Defence Force Ordinance and the disbandment of the Force.

5. I entirely concur with the view expressed in the opening paragraph of the "note of discussion" enclosed with your predecessor's Secret despatch of 24th October, 1934, namely that "the Kenya Defence Force as at present constituted, is of negligible military value and is potentially a source of "danger". But for this I should hesitate at the present time, when the international situation is so uncertain, to advocate any immediate change in the organisation.

No 13.

23118/2/34

Secret

6. I have just received a letter from the Acting Commandant reporting that, in spite of the penal provisions the Kenya Defence Force Ordinance has become entirely inoperative in Mombasa where the unit has ceased to exist. To enforce the Ordinance in Mombasa would, I feel not produce a unit there of any greater military value than was the unit now defunct, and the feeling of resentment which any such action would arouse would militate against the success of any ultimate reorganisation of Defence Services in Kenya.

7. Having regard to the considerations outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 above, I have no hesitation in recommending that steps should be taken without delay to establish some effective organisation of the white man power of the Colony, and that, as set out in the final paragraph of my Secret (3) despatch of 12th December, 1934, His Majesty's Government should be asked to order the disbandment of the Kenya Defence Force and the establishment of a security force and of a volunteer Rifle Company in Nairobi, and possibly a smaller unit in Mombasa on the lines set out

No 15.

23118/2/34

Secret

/broadly.....

broadly in that despatch. If you can agree to this proposal and convey to me such instructions from His Majesty's Government, I will arrange for the necessary draft legislation to be prepared and to be sent to you by air mail for approval. I will also arrange for the new organisation to be drafted in detail so that it can be introduced contemporaneously with the disbandment of the Kenya Defence Force.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

10 *J. J. J.*

GOVERNOR.

THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON INVESTIGATION INTO
THE LOSS OF GOVERNMENT STORES IN KENYA
DURING 1964.

Your Excellency,

The Committee appointed by you to enquire into matters connected with the Kenya Defence Force Stores have the honour to submit their Report herewith.

1. The Committee was constituted as follows:-
Mr. T. B. M. Bruce, Solicitor General, (Chairman), Mr. C. B. Littlefair, (Officer in Charge of the Stores Department of the Kenya Police), Captain G. Asplin, (Second in Command of the 5th Battalion of the King's African Rifles), and Lieutenant Colonel A. Dunstan Adams, (District Commandant of the Nairobi District of the Kenya Defence Force).

2. The Committee's terms of reference were as follows:-

- (a) To enquire into the organization of the Kenya Defence Force Stores prior to the taking over by the Staff Officer "G", Kenya Defence Force, in March, 1964;
- (b) To enquire into the control exercised to safeguard Government property, regard being had to the regulations for the time being in force relating to the accounting of Government stores, with special reference to the issue both from Headquarters and Organizations of rifles and ammunition, and the means taken to ensure that such rifles when issued could be traced;
- (c) To enquire into the loss, if any, of Government stores, and, if any loss is proved to have occurred, to report as to the allocation of responsibility of such loss, and to make recommendations for any write-off.

3. The Committee sat to take evidence on the following days, namely, the 17th June, the 18th June, the 19th June, the 16th July, the 20th July, the 22nd July, the 23rd July, the 24th July, the 25th July, the 26th July, the 27th July, the 28th July, the 29th July, the 30th July, the 31st August, the 1st August, the 2nd August, and the 3rd August, 1964. The reasons

for the long interval between the meetings of the 19th June and the 16th July was the interruption of a busy Session of Legislative Council, during which the Chairman was unable to sit. 29

5. Oral evidence was taken from the following persons:- Mr. F.C. Bradish, Clerk in the Central Revenue Office (on two occasions), Col. T.O. Fitzgerald, Staff Officer, Kenya Defence Force (on four occasions), Major Bagley, Staff Quartermaster, Northern Brigade, King's African Rifles (on two occasions), Mr. W.H. Smith, Auditor, (on two occasions), Col. C.S. Durham, Col. Nicol, District Commandant of the Kenya Defence Force, Mombasa, Col. White, District Commandant of the Kenya Defence Force, Naivasha District, Col. Swinton-Home, District Commandant of the Kenya Defence Force, Uasin Gishu District, Col. Matheson, District Commandant of the Kenya Defence Force, Nyanza District, and Mr. P.C.M. Watson, Acting Deputy Treasurer. In addition to this oral evidence, the Committee sent out a "Questionnaire" to the following persons:- Col. Phillips, Lord Francis Scott, Brigadier-General A.C. Lewin, Major Boys Hinderer, Col. Swinton-Home, Col. Nicol, Col. Foster, Col. Durham, Col. White, Col. Griffiths, Col. Truman, Col. Fitzgerald, Col. Matheson, Col. Stenham and Col. Sheldrick.

Answers to this questionnaire were received from Col. Phillips, Lord Francis Scott, Brigadier-General A.C. Lewin, Major Boys Hinderer, Col. Swinton-Home, Col. Nicol (orally), Col. Durham, Col. White, ~~Col. Griffiths~~, Col. Matheson, Col. Stenham and Col. Sheldrick.

The oral evidence taken is appended to the Report as Appendix I, and the Exhibits referred to in the oral evidence (1 to 52, with the exception of Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 22, 23, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46(1), 46(2), 48 and 49, which are ledgers and account books and are too bulky to append)

are appended to the Report as Appendix II. The forms of Questionnaire, with answers received, are appended to this Report as Appendix III.

We should like to say, with reference to the oral evidence taken, that it does not represent verbatim what the speaker said, as a considerable amount of discussion took place round the Committee table which could not be reduced into writing.

6. We will deal seriatim with the terms of reference, giving, in each instance, our conclusions thereon, and will deal first with reference (a) of our terms of reference, which reads as follows:-

(a) To examine into the organization of the Kenya Defence Force Stores in the period 1941 to 1945.

7. The earliest evidence regarding the organization of the Kenya Defence Force Stores which we could get was the evidence of Mr. F.C. Bradish, now a Clerk in the Central Revenue Office, Nairobi, who joined the Force at its inception in 1941. The Force was then a semi-military unit. The Staff at that time consisted of a Staff Officer, a Clerk, a Storeman, and an Armourer. Col. Phillips was G.O. at that time, and the organization was called "the Kenya Defence Force". The Staff Officer was Major Herbert Ward, Mr. F.C. Bradish was the Clerk and the Storeman was E.H. Barge. The Armourer was named Stainton. From 1941 onwards, up to 1945, when he was retrenched, Mr. Bradish appears to have been in practical charge of the Defence Force Stores. Up till 1945, however, when the Defence Force Ordinance came into operation, the activities of the Force were so circumscribed that the Records then in use and, consequently, the Stores organization, may be considered adequate although in our opinion not efficient. With the introduction, however, of the Defence Force

Ordinance, 1938, the necessity for the purchase and issue of stores, including arms and ammunition became greater, and, as a consequence, a re-organisation of the book-keeping system became essential.

8. Col. T.O. Fitzgerald was appointed Staff Officer of the Kenya Defense Force in March, 1938, and the Defense Force Ordinance was brought into force on the 2nd day of July of that year. At the time of Col. Fitzgerald's appointment, the Staff in his office consisted of Mr. F.C. Bradish, as Store-keeper and Clerk, and an Armourer Sergeant. In his evidence, as regards the Stores, Col. Fitzgerald says that he took it that he was in charge as Staff Officer, but that he left the store-keeping to Mr. Bradish, as Mr. (Bradish) knew all about the work. Col. Fitzgerald says that he did not take over the stores from Mr. Bradish, and that there was no formal stocktaking or handing over of papers. Col. Fitzgerald further says that in the beginning he did a lot of travelling in connection with the organization of the Defense Force, and that he gave no personal attention to stores. We would remark, at this point, that, in our opinion, the failure to demand a formal handing-over of the stores and the failure to take stock and see that stores were all in order, showed a lack of appreciation on Col. Fitzgerald's part as to the necessity and importance of that part of his duties. At this time, and up to November 1939 rifles were issued from Headquarters Stores to District Commissioners pending the appointment of District Commandants who subsequently took charge of them and only issued them to individuals for parades or in case of trouble.

But on the 15th November, 1939, a meeting of the Central Defense Committee was held at which demands were made by District Commandants that rifles should be issued to individuals of the Kenya Defense Force and that each

individual should be allowed to retain his rifle. Col. Fitzgerald was present at this meeting, and protested against such a course being adopted, saying that it was not fair for him to be made responsible for the safe custody of the rifles if such a procedure were allowed. That this action was taken by Col. Fitzgerald was corroborated by Col. Durham, who was present at the meeting referred to and also by Col. Swinton-Home in his evidence to the Committee. As a result of Col. Fitzgerald's protest the Central Defence Committee insisted on seeing the then Governor, Sir Edward Grigg, on the following day, the 14th November, when, after a long discussion, it was decided that District Commandants should be authorized to issue rifles to individuals in their discretion.

9. This decision to issue rifles to individuals for their retention, together with the issues of general stores and ammunition to the newly formed units necessitated a complete re-organisation of the books and records. To see that this task was carried out was, in our opinion, the duty of Col. Fitzgerald. Several attempts were made by Mr. Bradish to effect the necessary re-organisation, but without success, owing to lack of proper system. In our view, when Stores were issued to units, and rifles were issued to individuals, an approved system (including the preparation and maintenance of rifle registers at Headquarters and Districts) should have been evolved, and definite and explicit instructions issued to the District Commandants explaining to them the exact procedure to be followed by them both as regards records of stores and the issue of rifles to individuals.

The only evidence of any instructions with regard to stores (including rifles and ammunition) between 1928 and 1961 that we have been able to find is that certain forms (including receipt forms for the rifles) were sent out by

the Staff Officer to District Commandants together with a Circular letter requesting that receipts be obtained when rifles were issued to individuals. In our opinion, these forms and this letter were inadequate to meet the requirements created by the new conditions. Matters went on in this manner until the year 1931 when, as a result of a Board of Survey held at the beginning of that year, certain discrepancies in the stores and delays in postings of the ledgers, were revealed. Following on this, the matter was discussed with the Auditor and Treasurer, and, as a result a new system was evolved by the Treasurer. As a result of the discussion with the Auditor, an inspection of Col. Fitzgerald's books were made. The Auditor found that the books were in a very unsatisfactory state, the main reason for this being that Col. Fitzgerald could not get outside Districts to submit statements. The Auditor goes on to say that it was impossible to reconcile Col. Fitzgerald's books with the stores, and that it was a waste of time to attempt an audit under these conditions. The Auditor further says that Col. Fitzgerald complained of lack of staff, and that he (the Auditor) considered that Col. Fitzgerald was justified in his complaint. Col. Fitzgerald then reported the position to Government (vide Exhibit 15) asking for an increase of staff which letter, however, was not forwarded to Government by the Treasurer on the grounds that economy would not allow of any increase of staff. Instead, the Treasurer sent a representative to the Defence Force Headquarters and instituted new ledgers both for Headquarters and for Districts. It will be remembered that, at this time, the economy campaign was in full swing, owing to depression, and we consider that, in the circumstances, the Treasurer was justified in his action in offering assistance to the Staff Officer in preference to recommending the appoint-

ment of additional staff. Subsequent to this, Col. Fitzgerald sent out instructions to the Districts with reference to the keeping of records. Whilst these instructions, issued in the middle of 1951, were adequate for the purpose intended they could not produce the desired effect inasmuch as the records between 1938 and 1951 were so inadequate as to render it impossible to complete the new district registers. This inadequacy was in our opinion caused by Col. Fitzgerald's failure to issue adequate instructions to districts between 1938 and 1951, which resulted in no proper returns being sent in from the Districts, thus rendering proper central check at Headquarters impossible. This failure to maintain proper and complete district records from 1938 to 1951, thus rendering any reconciliation with books and stores on hand impossible, was the main reason for Major Bagley finding the books in such an incomplete condition in March, 1954, that he refused to take the stores over. We would also observe that, in spite of the opening of the new Ledgers at Headquarters in 1951, with the assistance of the Treasury, the results have not been satisfactory, the reason being that the District Ledger kept at Headquarters has not been kept up to date. This appears to have been partly due to the omission of the District Commandants to submit proper returns, but we consider that the Staff Officer should have brought this unsatisfactory state of affairs to the notice of Government, which he did not do.

10. We now turn to reference (b) of our terms of reference, which is as follows:-

(b) To enquire into the control exercised to
 [REDACTED SECTION]

The Regulations governing the control and safeguarding of Government property are clearly set out in Financial Orders Sections 247 to 267 inclusive, which were issued in 1928. Had Col. Fitzgerald, when he took over the Defense Force in 1928, issued detailed instructions based on Sections 247 to 267 of the Financial Orders, we consider that the control would have been adequate, but, as has already been explained, owing to the complete lack of detailed instructions during the period of 1928 to 1951, any control instituted after that period was rendered nugatory. That there was, in fact, inadequate control during the period from 1928 to 1951 is clearly shown by Col. Fitzgerald's own statement in his evidence given to the Committee, where he says: "I did not consider stores and equipment until 1951, as I did not think it was my particular job." The Committee cannot agree with Col. Fitzgerald's view of his duties in this particular. In their view Col. Fitzgerald was definitely in charge of, and responsible for, all Kenya Defense Force Stores and Equipment from the day upon which he entered on his duties as Staff Officer to the Kenya Defense Force.

11. With regard to the issue both from Headquarters and Outstations of Rifles and Ammunition, and the means taken to ensure that such rifles, when issued, could be traced, we would remark that, although Col. Fitzgerald was cognizant of the difficulties and dangers lying in the issue of rifles and ammunition to individuals, yet he appears to have taken no steps, other than making provision for the obtaining of a receipt for each rifle issued to individuals to ensure that such rifles could be traced. We consider that the obtaining of a receipt only was entirely insufficient; registers recording these issues should have been kept both at Headquarters and in the Districts, thus enabling a check to be kept on

Districts at Headquarters. With regard to the issue of rifles in Districts to outstations, Section Commanders and individuals we consider that even in the absence of instructions from Headquarters, better arrangements might in many instances, have been made by the District Commandants, etc. for properly recording the issues of rifles.

12. With regard to the third term of reference (c), the term reads as follows:-

(c) To examine into the loss, if any, of ~~the rifles issued to the Kenya Defence Force and to ascertain the reasons therefor.~~

We have assumed that "Stores" includes rifles and ammunition, and with regard to rifles Major Bagley has submitted a statement showing the number of rifles originally received by the Defence Force, and the issues made according to records. That statement is appended to this Report as Appendix IV. This statement indicates that there are still 236 rifles unaccounted for. We are unable to say for certain that these rifles are lost, since they or some of them may still be in the possession of members of the Kenya Defence Force, who may yet return them in response to Major Bagley's appeals.

At the present time, it is impossible to say how many, if any, rifles may yet be returned, and in these circumstances, we can only say that from the available records it would appear that 236 rifles are at the present time unaccounted for. These figures do not agree with the figures given by the Auditor (vide his letter to the Colonial Secretary dated the 30th May, 1955). (Exhibit 54).

We are of the opinion that Major Bagley's appeals should be reinforced by a notice in the press giving a time limit for outstanding rifles to be brought in, and drastic action should be taken under Rule 15 of the Defence Force Regulations, 1950, against any person found in possession of a Kenya Defence Force rifle after

the expiration of each period.

13. With regard to ammunition, we append as Appendix V a statement of Ammunition which shows 86,497 rounds still unaccounted for. As the statement is compiled from records which have been inaccurately kept this cannot be taken as a true reflection of the position. The bulk of this ammunition may, however, have been properly expended; the difficulty we have experienced has been that the registers have not been completely posted. We recommend, in the circumstances, that the apparent shortage indicated be written off.

14. With regard to general stores, the same situation arises, namely, that the district registers are incomplete. In this connection we recommend that any apparent deficiency shown in general stores be written off. It is suggested that after Major Bagley has made a physical check of stores in district armouries, the stores actually present should be taken on charge and the discrepancy between the latter figure and the figure required to be accounted for according to the ledgers be written off.

15. With regard to the allocation of responsibility for the stores situation as we have found it, we desire to deal with the various persons concerned as follows:-
~~STAFF OFFICERS.~~ We consider that the main responsibility for the inefficient stores organisation and for any losses in the Kenya Defence Force Stores must lie with the Staff Officer, Col. Fitzgerald. As a paid officer of Government, and, in our opinion, responsible for the stores, he failed to take steps adequately to safeguard Government property under his charge. By failing to issue adequate instructions during the period from 1928 to 1951, he is responsible for the present unsatisfactory

state of affairs, namely, that there is no means of find-
ing out with any degree of certainty where any particular
article
ought to be. We think it only fair to Col. Fitzgerald,
however, to point out that owing to the difficulties of
a physical check of rifles, there could have been no
absolute guarantee that no rifles would have been missing
even if adequate instructions had been issued in the
first instance; and the records complete. In this
connection, we would refer to Brigadier-General Lewin's
evidence in answer to the questionnaire addressed to him
where he says, in the final paragraph of his answer, "I
cannot recollect periodical returns being called for from
Headquarters, but whether they were or not is immaterial,
for it would have been impossible to have complied with
such a request in detail once stores - that is to say,
arms, ammunition and equipment - had been issued. A
proper return could have been rendered, but a return
based on actual inspection, which is the only one of any
use, was not feasible. No Section Commander could
reasonably be asked to furnish such a return, which would
have entailed a great deal of travelling, the expense of
which would have to be paid out of his own pocket."

Mr. Natson gave evidence to the effect that the
financial implications of the carrying out of such a
check from Headquarters were too big to be considered as
a matter ^{of} practical politics. In these circumstances, we
are of the opinion that the practice of issuing rifles
to individuals for their retention was and still is a
practice to be deprecated.

We would also like to place on record our
opinion that Col. Fitzgerald was not as well served as
he should have been by Mr. Bradish, the Stores Clerk.
From the manner in which he gave evidence and from
inspection of the books which he kept, we formed the

the opinion that as far as stores accounting is concerned Mr. Bradish's work did not reach the standard which might reasonably have been expected of him.

THE COMMANDANTS. Under Section 5 (1) of the Kenya Defence Force Ordinance, 1968, the Commandant is made responsible for the discipline and efficiency of the Defence Force. We consider that, although it may be said that the word "efficiency" includes the general supervision of stores, yet a commandant cannot be expected to concern himself directly with the detailed administration of stores, unless and until irregularities are brought to his notice. Col. Fitzgerald has not satisfied us that he made any report regarding the generally unsatisfactory condition of the stores to any of the Commandants.

DISTRICT COMMANDANTS AND THEIR STAFF. We consider that in some Districts the maintaining of records and rendering of returns was far from satisfactory, thereby rendering the task of keeping proper records at Headquarters almost impossible. We consider, therefore, that part of the responsibility for the present position lies with the District Commandants and their staffs. On the other hand, we realize that such irregularities are inseparable from a voluntary force, organized on the lines of the Kenya Defence Force.

We consider that the O.C.3rd King's African Rifles was at fault in not formally handing over the stores to Col. Fitzgerald when the latter was first appointed. Had this been done, it might have had the effect of bringing home to Col. Fitzgerald his responsibility in regard to stores.

40
20

The Auditor has told us in his evidence that he received a number of reports on the Kenya Defence Force Stores from his officers reporting irregularities during the period from March 1933 to September 1933, and that he did not report these irregularities to Government. We consider that, in the circumstances, the fact of his not so reporting was not unreasonable, but, had such a report been made, it is possible that an earlier investigation into the condition of the Stores might have resulted.

We desire to record our appreciation of the services rendered to us by Mr. Wedderburn, our Secretary.

We have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servants,

- .T. D. H. BRUCE.....(Chairman),
- .C. S. LITTLEFAIR.....(Member),
- .C. ASPLIN.. Captain.....(Member),
- .A. DUNSTAN ADAMS, Lt.-Col.(Member).

Nairobi,
31st August, 1935.