

1924

E. AFRICA

C. O.

39920

DATE

21st AUGUST 1924.

61 JUL 24

COLONIAL OFFICE.

OR CIRCULATION:—

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Asst. U.S. of S.

AMALGAMATION OF E. A. DEPENDENCIES.

Confidential memoranda on proposal.

Perm. U.S. of S.

Parl^r. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

Previous Paper

Feb. 30/686

2.6. 39639

MINUTES

Mr. Mackay.

? sent by

A.M.

21/8/24.

Em 22/8/24 at 10 a.m.

sent by

H.A.

Subsequent Paper

605/40/8.A.
420/40/8.A.
Mugabe

Sir H. Reed. No. One by - find 53

I should like to add that it is very important to notice the first sentence of the Preliminary Report - Annex - which I have underlined. It is reiterated in the final Report.

The plain fact is that Mr. Churchill, being generally in favour of amalgamation (he wished to bring about one between Aden and Somaliland) had arrived at the conclusion that a big amalgamation in East Africa was desirable before any of the factors in the problem had been laid before him, and the Departmental Committee were in the difficult position of having to make out a case for a policy which their knowledge of the factors really precluded them from supporting. They did their best, but they were unable to show that any economy would result from amalgamation, and their final recommendations were an effort to reconcile compliance with the wishes of the Secretary of State with a lively sense of the difficulties which would arise if they were carried out.

C.S.

8.1.24.

H. S. R.

872/34

The record of the discussion ^{Link} of the Joint East African Board on September 29th 1923 states that Mr. Ormsby Gore "said it would be desirable that the Joint East African Board should have the opportunity of studying papers on the subject before the question was re-opened for discussion". The agenda proposed for next Thursday's meeting with the Board brings up this question of federation again.

Shortly after the last meeting, I started to make a note on this subject, but was unable to collect copies of all the memoranda prepared during the 1921 consideration of the question. The set which I now annex is, I think, complete, but it will be observed that they are all unregistered memoranda, and that, so far as official papers go, there is nothing between the 1913 protest from Zanzibar against the prospect of absorption of the East Africa Protectorate and a string of protests received in 1922 from the native Government, the Planters Association, and the Chamber of Commerce, in Uganda, and the Indian National Association in Zanzibar.

It will be seen from the memoranda that after a very exhaustive consideration of the question in this Office, it was concluded that there is no magic saving to be obtained out of the federation, and that it was necessary to go carefully into the matter. The recommendation of the Office Committee was, finally, that the Governor of Kenya should be appointed High Commissioner for Uganda and Zanzibar with instructions to report to the

Secretary of State [1] as to the means of effecting a complete amalgamation of departmental services in Uganda and Kenya, while preserving for Uganda the [2] independence of the Kenya Legislative Council, with special reference to finance and legislation; [3] as to placing Tanganyika Territory under the High Commissioner.

It had previously been pointed out that an immediate obstacle to the federation was the fact that the terms of office of the Governors of Kenya and Uganda had some time to run. It was believed in the Department that the Secretary of State had at the time a particular ~~selection~~ in view for the post of High Commissioner or Governor-General, and it is possible that the impracticability of making the appointment immediately was to some extent the reason why (apart from a reference to some way of linking the Governments together at the top which Mr. Churchill made in the Kenya Dinner Speech of January 28th 1922) no other steps were taken after the last memorandum was put forward by the Committee.

I think it must be explained to the Joint East African Board that there are no ~~such~~ papers (apart from protests against federation which we received from East Africa in 1922) which bear on the subject, but that certain memoranda were put forward to the then Secretary of State in 1921, but they are not on official record; and that in any case, they were adverse to any form of federation being rushed through without first a very careful enquiry as to the extent to which a combination of services was possible; and point out that in the case of Nigeria, with very much simpler problems, the process of amalgamation took Sir Frederick Lugard some four years to bring about.

If the Joint East African Board press the matter further I think that it is for them to take some trouble over it, that is to say, they should be invited to submit in writing a detailed policy for amalgamation, with a full explanation of the economies or other benefits which it is supposed would result.

It is of course very possible that their reply would be that such a memorandum has already been submitted by General Sir Hubert Gough in 17833/East Africa. The minutes on that memorandum are worth reading.

N.C.B.

7/5/24

(1) The principle of amalgamation having been decided upon by the Secretary of State, the Committee considered the application of the principle in practice.

(2) As regards the Dependencies to be included in any such scheme, the Committee left out of account Nyasaland, as they understood that the question of amalgamating Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia was receiving separate consideration by a special Committee presided over by Lord Buxton. They therefore confined their attention to Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika.

(3) The conditions prevailing in these Dependencies vary greatly:-

(a) Kenya Colony and Protectorate.

There is European settlement on a considerable scale and there is a large Indian population.⁺

The Colony is fairly well developed; but

(Intd.) H.J.R. it can only just pay its way, and progress has been hampered by lack of funds.

(b) Uganda Protectorate.

It is essentially a native country with a comparatively small number of white planters.

In some ways perhaps it is better developed than Kenya, e.g. road communications; but it can only just pay its way, and progress has been hampered by lack of funds.

(c) Zanzibar Protectorate.

Essentially an Arab State with a large Indian element.

It is well developed and normally prosperous.

(d) Tanganyika Territory.

European settlement hardly exists, and like Uganda it is primarily a native country.

At present it is little developed. The Territory was fought over for four years, and suffered great material damage. It has been necessary to construct an administration in all its branches. For sometime to come it will no doubt require a heavy annual subsidy from the Imperial Exchequer.

It holds a special position internationally inasmuch as it is to be administered by Great Britain under mandate.

(e) The following figures were considered by the Committee to be of importance and interest in comparing the dependencies:-

	Kenya (Colony & Prot.)	Uganda (Protectorate)	Zanzibar (Protectorate)	Tanganyika (Mandated)
Area in sq. miles.	245,000	110,000	1,020	355,000
Population				
Europeans	6,300	950	500	2,200
Indians	15,000	4,500		
Arabs	7,400	-	196,500	10,500
Natives	2,620,000	2,950,000		4,000
Total Revenue	£3,192,327	£888,237	£459,533	£1,000,000
Expenditure do.	£3,192,327	£883,237	£478,414	£1,000,000
do.				

The united area is larger than that of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Austria and Switzerland combined.

(f) In spite of the great difference in local conditions, the Committee do not see any reason to anticipate

* No reliable figures pending new census.

^x Estimated figures for latest year for which available.

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anticipate insuperable difficulties in amalgamating the Dependencies; but it is, in their opinion, a matter for consideration whether it would be better to work by stages towards general amalgamation than to amalgamate all four Dependencies at once under one Administration. In the former event, the first stage would consist of the amalgamation of Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar; the second stage would effect the completion of the scheme by the amalgamation of the Tanganyika Territory with the Dependencies amalgamated in the first stage.

The reasons which suggest themselves to the Committee for postponing the inclusion of the Tanganyika Territory are:-

- (a) The Territory is as yet so undeveloped that it requires time to get organised on proper lines and the work involved will in itself be fully enough for any one man to direct.
- (b) The need for amalgamation with neighbouring British territory is not of such immediate importance as in the case of Kenya and Uganda. The Territory is a self-contained unit with its own seaboard and lateral communications. There is no artificial boundary, as between Kenya and Uganda; and there is practically no possibility of friction with its neighbouring Dependencies, as is apt to occur when one country is dependent on another for its communication with the sea, as Uganda is dependent upon Kenya.
- (c) The exclusion of the Territory would remove for the time being the difficulty of selecting a suitable site for the central Headquarters which would be within reasonable distance of all parts of the area

to be administered.

Admittedly, the difficulty is only postponed. But once the first stage of amalgamation is carried out in the course of which a temporary Central Headquarters could no doubt be found in the Highlands of Kenya, local opinion in Kenya and Uganda (and it is in Uganda that opposition to amalgamation may be anticipated) will probably be more ready to accept the second stage of amalgamation which will almost necessarily remove the Central Headquarters yet further from the present Headquarters of the administration in Uganda.

(d) In any event, the temporary exclusion of the Territory would enormously simplify the actual process of amalgamating the other Dependencies.

(e) As matters now stand, the inclusion of the Territory would involve an annual deficit on the combined budgets, with the result that Kenya and Zanzibar, which are now free of the control of the Treasury, would again come under Treasury control, with all its attendant disadvantages.

(f) While the draft mandate permits a "customs, fiscal and administrative union or federation" with the adjacent territories under British control, it may be thought desirable not to take any action at present which might give rise to the suspicion, however groundless, that His Majesty's Government contemplate the annexation of this huge tract of territory.

(g) The "administrative union" permissible under the draft mandate is subject to the proviso that it does not involve the infringement of the other provisions of the mandate. Most of these provisions only allow an authority which we voluntarily undertake in our other Dependencies, but which are not (such

as the prohibition of the establishment of military or naval bases, the limitation of local forces to local requirements, and equality of treatment to the nationals of all members of the League of Nations), which will necessitate the maintenance of certain features peculiar to Tanganyika. It should be noted that the principal difference between the form of mandate adopted for this territory (Mandate B.) and the form adopted for (say) German South West Africa (Mandate C.) is that the latter allows the mandated country to be administered as an integral part of the mandatory's territory, and the former does not. In any amalgamation of Tanganyika Territory with the neighbouring British dependencies, it would no doubt be necessary to arrange that Tanganyika revenues were not expended outside the territory.

(6) Before proceeding further with their enquiry the Committee would be glad to have the decision of the Secretary of State on the question raised in the preceding paragraph as to the temporary exclusion of the Tanganyika Territory from the scheme of amalgamation.

4th May, 1921.

Sir S. J. D. D. L.

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II
C-1
A few days ago W. Churchill asked me to take up the question of the amalgamation of our S. African dependencies & this memo: (prepared by Mr. Parkinson) is the result of a coffee which I had had with the S. Afr. Dept.

On the whole I am in favour of postponing the inclusion of Tanganyika for the present. In addition to what is stated in para: 5 of the memo: there is the further reason that it will take some time to dispose even of the provⁿ of Kenya + Uganda.

If W. Churchill will give a decision with regard to Tanganyika the Committee will proceed with the enquiry.

H. J. R.
6/7/31

[Redacted]
Mr. Churchill

I don't think the complete amalgamation of even of Kenya + Uganda, w^{ld} be desirable at present. The Kenyans settlers think that they are on too high ground to repossess Govt: and they have shown themselves unfit, so far, to control the destinies of their own nation - still less of Uganda.

Conditions, & problems in Uganda are different from those in Kenya, and Uganda would almost certainly suffer more than an

amalgamation. Above have our treaties
with the Belgians which - as we recently
had demanded the Govt. - must be scrupulously
obeyed.

To attempt, at present, a complete
amalgamation of Tanganyika with the other
wars, I think, be very undesirable. Whether
the returning to the mandate of the references
to "Union" and whether or not in it would
technically justify our action (I think not),
the attempt would almost certainly produce a
great outcry among the League of Nations people.

But there is among the said in favour
of a limited amalgamation under a
Govt² or Govt²-style whereby while preserving
the existing Admin² as separate entities
under the Govt² or Govt² in which have
a common service and a common direction
of local policy. If this is what is in the
S. of Africa mind the C² might usefully
explore the position arising if Kenya Uganda
& Tanganyika were linked up, & consider
what adjustments would be necessary if
Tanganyika were brought in.

P.M. 9.5.21

Sgt. 10.5.

W. H. Crowley

625

If this is to be discussed
by P.S. Wood (etc., before the
report goes to S.Y.L.,
perhaps W. W. Ward will give
a time today: then
discussion fixed for

Bonnefond Holiday ^{Season} will not
do, as Dr. J. Stevenson
will not be there then.

Copy taken
by M. Ward.
1/9/33.
28.

A

I would suggest circulating
copies of all 3 papers
herein to Mr. Ward,
Dr. J. Stevenson ^{Season} & Dr. L. Read
with a view to preliminary
discussion before Governors
come into it. We might
then at least decide whether
or not report should not go
on to S.Y.L. to see.

Sir H. Black

acpt

17.7.33

Is A? - & discuss with
Prof. Murray as close Sir J. Stevenson
as possible. Note that the S.Y.L. should

that we know.

Mr. Leslie should be asked to let
Sir James know that Mr. Charnill
wishes State all the E.A. meetings
next week & that therefore he feels
that Sir James would be available
immediately after the Bank Holiday.

Acct. 28.7.21.

W. Wood.

A. G.R.
28/IV

Sa. 20.7. before.

Copy of both reports received
from Mr. Fiddes' committee
sent to Mr. March.

Acct
2.F.N

III
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON AMALGAMATION
OF EAST AFRICAN DEPENDENCIES.

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MINARY.

(1) The Committee have considered the tentative suggestion as to partial amalgamation of Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar, as directed in Mr. Churchill's minute of the 11th of May.

AL
INITION.
a Scheme. (2) If it should be decided that action is to be taken to give effect to that suggestion, the Committee think that the general scheme of administration would have to be on the following lines:-

System of Government

(a) A governor to be appointed ~~as~~ Governor of Kenya and Uganda and High Commissioner for Zanzibar; Lieutenant Governors or "Administrators" to be appointed in Kenya and Uganda, and a British Resident in Zanzibar.

Councils.

(b) The existing Councils to remain:-

Kenya Executive and Legislative Councils

Uganda -do-

Zanzibar Sultan's Advisory Council.

Legislation.

(c) (i) Each of the three Dependencies to continue to pass legislation, which would run only in the Dependency in which such legislation is passed.

(ii) Assent to all Kenya and Uganda laws, which would be submitted to Secretary of State for non-disallowance, to be given not by the Lieutenant Governors (or Administrators) but by the Governor, to whom legislation would be submitted in draft. This would ensure that the laws in each Dependency would be ⁱⁿ harmony with each other, allowance of course being made for necessary local divergencies.

(iii) Zanzibar Decrees to be made, as at present, by the Sultan, and countersigned by the British

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Resident when necessary, the High Commissioner being consulted beforehand when decrees are being drafted.

Site for Central Government.

(d) Pending final selection of suitable site for Central Government, the Governor to live at Nairobi. A suitable site might be found on the Uganda Railway further up the line than Nairobi - say, at Kabete, but this would be a matter for further consideration.

Functions of Governor.

(e) To exercise general control over policy and all matters of importance; to preside over the Kenya and Uganda Councils, when practicable; and to act as the channel of communication with the Secretary of State except on routine matters.

Central Headquarters Staff.

(f) The Governor to have a Central Secretariat; and in the Governor's absence, the Governor's functions to devolve on the Central Secretary, as is now the case in Nigeria.

Finance.

(g) Each of the three Dependencies to have its own budget with its own revenue and expenditure, as at present, the cost of Central Headquarters being divided between Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar in proportions to be fixed by the Secretary of State.

Establishments.

(h) Each of the three Dependencies to have its own establishment of officials, as at present, provided for in annual Estimates; in the case of Departments which are definitely amalgamated under one Head, the revenue from and expenditure on such combined Departments to be divided between the Dependencies concerned in proportions to be fixed by the Secretary of State.

Maintenance of Departments.

(i) Share of the Departments in Kenya and Uganda

and possibly Zanzibar could be definitely amalgamated. Customs and Postal Departments in Kenya and Uganda are already amalgamated under one Head: others which might be amalgamated would be the Legal, Medical, Agricultural, Veterinary, Forestry, Public Works and Geological Departments.

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Interchangeability of Staff.

(j) All new officials to be liable for service in any of the three Dependencies; but, in effect, senior officials, i.e. Heads of Departments and Deputies, would not be interchangeable (except on definite promotion) owing to differences in salary.

~~OPTIONS
SCHEME.~~
(3) The Committee hesitate however to recommend this scheme for adoption, as they have doubts as to the advisability of such partial amalgamation, even if it be regarded only as a stage to more complete amalgamation. In any event, they do not think that the Tanganyika Territory should be included in such a scheme, for the reasons given in their report of the 4th of May.

(4) In arriving at this conclusion the Committee are influenced by the following arguments:-

- (i) Experience gained in other parts of the Empire.
- (ii) Inherent difficulties.
- (iii) Financial considerations.

Taking these in order:-

(i) Australia and South Africa afford a useful lesson with regard to amalgamation. Australia is a striking example of the evils of super-imposing a government on existing states which having the latter as separate entities with separate governments and legislatures, in fostering jealousies and making for extravagance and inefficiency of administration. It would be wrong to push the analogy between what is suggested for East Africa and Australia too far as in Australia the Governors of States are not subordinate to the Governor General but both the

States and Commonwealth are equally sovereign states, but there can be no doubt as to the disadvantages of the Australian form of amalgamation. The Union of South Africa on the other hand is an example of the benefits to be derived from the amalgamation into a unitary state of four colonies formerly bitterly jealous of each other, in allaying jealousies and in securing economy of administration. With regard to the Union it is interesting to observe that the experiment of an inter-Colonial Council to manage railway affairs was first tried, and it was the breakdown of this experiment which was one of the most important factors in leading to union.

(ii) (a) The main difficulty involved by the scheme is the retention of separate Legislative Councils and separate budgets. With partial amalgamation, this dual organisation appears to be inevitable. Apart from the fact that it is cumbrous, it seems bound to lead to jealousy and bickering between Kenya and Uganda, more especially as regards the Departments which are amalgamated. The Colonial Office has already had experience of this in regard to the Customs Department, which has been for some time amalgamated: each Dependency thinks that its interests are being sacrificed to the other. An extension of the system would mean so many more subjects for inter-Dependency strife.

But in addition to the Councils in Kenya and Uganda the position of the Railways creates a special difficulty; and the Committee are advised that if an Inter Colonial Railway Council, as proposed by Lord Milner, is to administer the Railways (with revenue and expenditure separate from the finances of Kenya and Uganda), a further Council-i.e. a Central Council - under the Government is necessary.

necessary. It would not be practicable to place the Inter-Colonial Railway Council directly under the Governor, outside all legislative control, and such legislative control could only be secured by the formation of a Central Council. The machinery of Government would thus be further complicated, and the question would at once arise as to what other functions should be given to the Central Council, presumably at the expense of the local Legislative Councils - obviously a fruitful source of quarrelling and ill-feeling.

(b) A further difficulty is that the whole process of administration will become slower owing to the necessity of reference in everything except routine matters to the Governor or through the Governor to the Secretary of State. This would apply especially to Uganda, as communication between Entebbe and the Headquarters of the Governor, except by telegraph, would probably take 3 days each way on an average.

(iii) Another serious objection which the Committee see lies in the financial effect. As an instance Headquarters may be considered in detail:-

Present Expenditure:- (excluding High Commission for Zanzibar).

<u>Kenya Governor</u>	<u>£5,500</u>
<u>Uganda Governor</u>	<u>4,000</u>
	<u>£9,500</u>

Expenditure under scheme (excluding High Commission for Zanzibar).

Governor	£8,000
	Governor's personal staff	700 +
Central Secretary	1,800
	Subordinate Staff	800
Office Expenses	200
Lieutenant Governor of Kenya	2,500
Lieutenant Governor of Uganda	<u>2,000</u>
						<u>£16,000</u>

* No corresponding figure appears in the "present expenditure", as it is assumed that the personal staff of the two Governors would be required (after partial amalgamation).

amalgamation) for the Lieutenant Governors or Administrators.

The figure £16,000 is necessarily only 621 approximate it is probably well below the mark. The Headquarters Office would tend to expand, e.g., the Central Secretary would almost certainly want an Assistant, not only to help him but to act for him when on leave: and the salary for the Central Secretary would probably have to be levelled up to that of the Lieutenant Governor.

It may, of course, be argued that with an amalgamated department, e.g. Public Works, the appointment of a highly-paid official as the Head might secure indirect economy; but the actual cost of establishment would in each case apparently be greater, and indirect economies would not result, so far as the Committee can see, from the amalgamation of the majority of the Departments, with the exception perhaps of the Legal Department, in which one Chief Justice could be abolished without the creation of well-paid deputies in each dependency. In short the Committee foresee an immediate increase of expenditure on a considerable scale if the scheme is adopted.

Such an objection seems to be conclusive against the adoption of the scheme, as the financial position is now such that proposals which involves increased expenditure cannot be contemplated, even if the Treasury would consider them.

(5) In any event, no scheme of amalgamation could be introduced until the present Governors of Kenya and Uganda can be disposed of. Sir Robert Coryndon will have held the Governorship of Uganda for five years in February 1923; Sir Edward Northey's period of five years will end in January 1924. Unless therefore one or both can be transferred no steps could be taken until 1923 at

the earliest.

(6) The question of amalgamation is however of great urgency if Lord Milner's proposals as to an Inter-Colonial Railway Council are to be carried out. The present advisory position is anomalous and unsatisfactory. Partial amalgamation without a Central Legislative Council would not solve the difficulty: partial amalgamation with such a Central Council would solve the Railway difficulty, but it would create other difficulties of a troublesome nature.

(7) The presence of Sir E. Northey and Sir R. Coryndon in England will afford an opportunity if the Secretary of State wishes it, to discuss with them the question of amalgamation. The Committee suggest that such a discussion might well take place and that the Governors should be asked to state whether they see any fundamental difficulties in, or serious objection to, complete amalgamation of Kenya and Uganda, which, prima facie would obviate the main difficulties incidental to partial amalgamation, while making for greater efficiency in Administration and resulting in decreased, not increased expenditure.

Mr. Bottsberry
Secy.-M.-Rend.

623

Mr. May.

I should like to put what I think is the Department's view on the attached statement reference amalgamation:-

1. The Governors - especially Sir R.Coryndon - do not profess to have considered this question in detail.

It is a matter requiring very full consideration; to 'think big' on the subject with a disregard for practical details (if there are really details) is dangerous: it will only lead to confusion and difficulty.

2. Neither Governor really answers the question, why should not Kenya and Uganda be immediately amalgamated now?

Sir E. Northey at first seemed to favour this: Sir R. Coryndon's objection in paragraph 5 (v) is invalid, because you have already in Kenya the combination of different conditions, which he applies broadly to Kenya and Uganda - i.e., in Kenya there are European areas plus purely native areas (e.g. Kavirondo and the native reserves generally).

3. A High Commissionery, such as the Governors contemplate, does mean considerable expenditure: how can Kenya and Tanganyika Territory afford this? Treasury surely would be right to argue that we are merely increasing the Administrative machine by the creation of a local

Secretary

Secretary of State, when uniformity can be secured by Secretary of State here, without any resulting economy. If however, you have complete amalgamation of Kenya and Uganda, then you could show a real economy on the combined Kenya and Uganda expenditure.

4. Granted that steps to secure greater uniformity are desirable, why have a High Commissioner with Kenya and Uganda at any rate (between which troubles mainly arise) independent units? Suppose he overrides the views of one or the other: the result can only be an appeal to Secretary of State, and we are no further forward in the effort to secure smooth running.

5. However honest our superman may be, if he turns down the views of Kenya or Uganda, he will be accused in that territory of not being impartial: if you combine these two, the ground for such allegations is cut away.

6. It is useless to say that it doesn't matter where the High Commissioner will be stationed: the moment you appoint a High Commissioner you ~~must~~ give him a headquarters.

7. From what was said, it seems more than probable that there is personal feeling against Sir H. Byatt. If there really is difficulty in getting Tanganyika Territory to conform reasonably to any general East African policy, and if the mandatory states ["] does not give rise to difficulty, then uniformity could be secured by making the Governor of Kenya and Uganda combined also High Commissioner for Tanganyika Territory which would be administered separately

b. There is and can
nothing like the
objection to
Uganda Territory
being a separately
administered unit under
High Commissioner that
there is to Kenya and
Uganda being separate.
A.C.C.P.

separately by an Administrator with an Executive
(but not a Legislative) Council.

A.C.C.P.

6.8.21.

I presume this question will come up
again on Monday and the two Governors can be asked
directly on the question of the fusion of Kenya
and Uganda. The other points which Mr. Parkinson
raises should also be borne in mind but I do not
think that the practical difficulties are
insuperable.

The idea that the High Commissioner
would relieve the Secretary of State of much work
is illusory unless the Treasury will relax a
good deal of their financial control.

W.C.B.

6.8.21.

H.J.R.

6.8.21.

1. The question of amalgamating the East African Dependencies was discussed with Sir E. Northey and Sir R. Coryndon on the 9th of August.
2. The two reports of the Departmental Committee had been circulated beforehand.
3. The general opinion of both Governors was in favour of amalgamation in order to secure uniformity of policy and to override local jealousies.
4. Sir E. Northey's views may be summarised as follows:-
- (i) General control from one man in East Africa required.
 - (ii) Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika Territory should be embraced in the scheme of amalgamation; Nyasaland and Rhodesia might come in later.
 - (iii) The Officer in charge of all these territories should be called High Commissioner: the fact that he is called High Commissioner should avoid difficulties in regard to the mandatory status of the Tanganyika Territory.
 - (iv) Each territory should have its own Legislative Council: the High Commissioner should have a Federal Executive Council to advise him and only a small staff - cf. the High Commissioner for South Africa who has only an Imperial Secretary.
 - (v) There would probably at first be local opposition both in Kenya and Uganda: this should not be allowed to interfere with the scheme.
5. Sir R. Coryndon stated that he had not gone fully into the matter, but his views as expressed at the meeting may be summarised as follows:-
- (i) Agreed with Sir E. Northey generally as in paragraphs (i) to iv).
 - (ii) The revenues of the various territories should be kept separate.

(iii) The Federal Executive Council consisting of the Lieutenant Governors and Chief Secretaries of each Territory should meet every 6 months.

(iv) The question of amalgamating Departments in two or more of the Territories (other than the Customs and Postal Services which are already amalgamated in Kenya and Uganda) should be deferred for consideration of the High Commissioner; there is no hurry to amalgamate Departments - the main thing is to secure uniformity of policy.

(v) Complete amalgamation of Kenya and Uganda might come later: the two territories are so different and their problems are so different that it would be a mistake to do this at once.

(vi) However well the Governors themselves now work together, you cannot avoid jealousies and trouble between the neighbouring Dependencies; if it costs £20,000 or more to secure uniformity of policy, this expenditure is fully justified.

(vii) If a High Commissioner were appointed on the lines contemplated, there would be no need for a Railway Council: the functions of the High Commissioner in co-ordinating policy would be adequate to safeguard the interests of all concerned.

(viii) There is no need to let difficulties as to the headquarters for the High Commissioner stand in the way.

(ix) It is important to make a start with amalgamation at once.

6. The following points arose in the course of discussion:-

(1) How would the functions of the High Commissioner be defined?

(ii) Would not the High Commissioner be driven to acquire more and more power and to have a federal Legislative Council?

(iii)

(iii) If the High Commissioner advised by a federal Executive Council were to take decisions against the recommendations of the local Legislative Councils, would there not be difficulties, having regard to the stronger position of the Legislative Councils?

(iv) Would not the new Administrative machinery involve delays?

(v) Will the High Commissioner tend to identify himself too much with the particular territory in which he is residing?

[Signature]

date
Govt's view - a draft

1. High Commissioner to be appointed for Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

2. No change to be made in the local constitution of the four Dependencies, except that the Governor of Kenya would cease to be High Commissioner for Zanzibar.

3. Functions of High Commissioner:-

- (i) To coordinate policy in 4 Dependencies.
- (ii) To act as channel of communication with the Secretary of State on all matters of importance.
- (iii) To report to Secretary of State after a stated period on practicability of combining Departmental services in two or more of the Dependencies with detailed suggestions for carrying his proposals into effect.

4.

- Constitutional position of High Commissioner.
- (i) He would have the power to direct the Governor to adopt a certain policy, but in general he would effect this by advice.
 - (ii) A Governor who objected to the policy should have the right of appeal to the Secretary of State through the High Commissioner.
 - (iii) Legislation involving any principle of importance would be submitted to him for approval in draft before being submitted to the Legislative Councils or before enactment, where there is no Legislative Council.
 - (iv) The budget in each Dependency to be submitted to him for approval in draft before being submitted to the Legislative Councils - or before transmission to Secretary of State where there

there is no Legislative Council; ultimately the budget would be submitted to the Secretary of State through the High Commissioner.
Administrative Councils.

- (1) Pending receipt and consideration of High Commissioner's proposals (see paragraph 3 (ii)) no changes should be made in the existing administrative machinery - e.g., the Kenya and Uganda Customs, which are now amalgamated, should still be controlled by the Governor of Kenya, subject to any direction in matters of general policy which the High Commissioner might give.
- (ii) The Uganda Railway similarly would be controlled by the Governor of Kenya, subject to any direction in matters of general policy (especially rates) which the High Commissioner might give.

No Railway Council would be required, so far as can be seen, as the High Commissioner would safeguard the interests of all concerned, but before a final decision is taken on this point, Colonel Hammond's report due in October should be awaited.

Financial effect.

- (1) The immediate financial effect will necessarily mean an increase in expenditure:-

High Commissioner	£1,000
Financial Secretary	£1,000
Private Secretary	£1,000
Administrative staff	£1,000
Postage, Stationery etc.	£1,000
Travelling	£1,000
Passages	£1,000

Note. No allowance need be made for housing and office accommodation, as it is assumed that this would be found temporarily in Zanzibar.

- (ii) As against this no immediate saving can be shown. It is true that no Railway Council would be required and so it might be said there would be a saving of £8,000 to £10,000; but this assumes that without a High Commissioner, there must be a Railway Council, and pending decision of Secretary of State after consideration of Colonel Hammond's report this is only an assumption. It would therefore be more correct to say that the appointment of a High Commissioner would make certain a saving of expenditure which may or may not be incurred in the future, according as the Secretary of State decides on Colonel Hammond's report that a permanent Railway Council would or would not be necessary if no change in the administration of the East African Dependencies is introduced.
- (iii) It is however ~~suggested~~^{argued} that by securing greater uniformity of policy in regard to development etc., and co-ordinating effort, there must be a saving although this cannot be stated in figures.
- (iv) Ultimately-and subject to the consideration of High Commissioner's own recommendations (see paragraph 3 (iii))-, a actual saving in recurrent expenditure might be made by the substitution of combined Departments for separate Departments in the Dependencies, such combined Departments being controlled directly by the High Commissioner assuming that a workable arrangement to effect this can be devised.

Savings etc., on High Commissioner's appointment.

9 Bruton Street, W.I.

10th August 1921.

My dear Parkinson,

Attached please find Sir R. Gwynne's suggestions as to possible savings on the appointment of a High Commissioner.

1. I agree that, on the appointment of a High Commissioner, if the present Governorship's of Kenya and Uganda were reduced to Lieutenant Governorships, the holders could be paid less; Uganda £500 a year less, Kenya I ~~would~~ ~~say~~ say £1000 a year less; but then Tanganyika's Governor should also come down £1000 a year.

2. If Uganda doesn't require two Judges, one could be abolished ~~any~~ ^{way} independently of High Commissioner's appointment: this suggestion is therefore ~~not~~ a saving on High Commissioner's appointment.

3. An Inspector of Police is quite unnecessary, and is a superfluous overhead charge, now that each Police force, (and Prisons), is well organised. But the Commissioner of Police of Kenya would have little spare time to supervise Uganda; though perhaps he could do it.

Again this proposal could be carried out independently of post of High Commissioner, and is not a saving on High Commissioner's appointment.

Police and Prison in Kenya are too big to admit of one Chief Administering.

4. Elimination of Railway Council may not be a saving on appointment of High Commissioner. No decision has yet been made as to the permanent appointment of a Railway Commissioner and Council, which Kenya expresses most strongly as a ~~desirable~~ ^{essential} economic change.

6. I cannot see that any saving can be effected in Kenya by High Commissioner's appointment. Heads of departments are already overworked.

7. I think the High Commissioner's appointment should lead to increased efficiency and improved systems and policies in East Africa, but I cannot see that the super imposition of a Central Chief and staff can lead to anything but increased overhead charges.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) E. Werthey.

Sir Edward Hartley,

Herewith brief suggestions as to possible
service in Uganda.

Space is left on first three sheets for any
thing you may be able to add.

(Intd) H.P.C.

19th August, 1921.

White Lion Hotel,
Hartford Bridge,
Basingstoke, Hants.

NEW APPROVALS.

TOTAL
APPROVALS.EXTRA COST
IN U.S.EXTRA COST
IN U.S. COAST

U. S.

U. S.

U. S.

U. S.

U. S.

U. S.

1000

1000

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Postmaster

-

-

-

-

Postage

-

-

-

-

Postal
Administration

-

-

-

-

Public Affairs

-

-

-

-

Property

-

-

-

-

Letter Carriers

-

-

-

-

Customs

-

-

-

-

Post
Marine

-

-

-

-

Post
Unit

-

-

-

-

Post
Police

-

-

-

-

1200

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

-

Increase
to fund
that
remains.

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

-

DEPARTMENT	EXTRA COST	SAVING	TOTAL EXTRA COST	TOTAL SAVING	PERCENTAGE IMPACTED
<i>Police and Prisons are in Department of Finance.</i>					
Prisons					
Medical					
Chemical Research					
Education					
Military					
Post & Telegraph					
Military Council					
Land					
Air Force					
Agricultural Veterinary					
Geodesy					
Army					
Ministry					

16,000

Militia Military Council

16,000

Agricultural Veterinary

16,000

Geodesy

16,000

Army

Ministry

16,000

Geodesy

Army

COUNTRY	DEPARTMENT	ARMED FORCES R.	ARMED FORCES V.	TOTAL ARMED FORCES	TOTAL ARMED FORCES SAVING.	NOT EXPRESSED.
Uganda	municipal	-	-	-	-	-
Uganda	Transport	100	900	1000	800	Ministre des Travaux Publics et de la Transporte. Fonction publique.
Venezuela	Albert Marine Transport	400	1400	1800	1200	Ministre both Marine officers and replace admirer et Superintendent marine can also control Lake Titicaca Marine
Uganda	Coast Agent	-	-	-	-	Ministre du Commerce et de l'Industrie
Uganda	Printing & stationery	-	-	-	-	Ministre de l'Instruction publique
Uganda	Geological	-	-	-	-	Ministre des Mines et de la Géologie

7000 books and 2000 films

5

**Final Settlement of salary of
each Governor for Kharja**

330

The Administration of Railways

210,000

PLATE *various* that may be
obtained by *any* Government.

7

New Cost by Appointment of High Commissioner

Salary of High Commissioner	6,000
+ Imperial Secretary	1,000
+ Secretary's subordinate staff	500
+ Personal Secretary & A.M.O.	500
Travelling High Commissioner and Staff (Annual)	750
Office expenses, telegrams etc.,	500
Travelling High Commissioner & Staff	1,000
Passage	
	<hr/>
	12,000

Initial cost of house for High Commissioner and his Staff	{	✓
Initial cost of house for Vice Regal if this is necessary - he now lives at Ambala	{	+
Initial cost of house for Imperial Secretary and his Staff	{	+
How far can Zamindar assist in building	{	+

Administration of Uganda	12,600
Administration of Kenya	14,200
Administration of Uganda & Kenya	?

Administration of Tanganyika not to be affected in any way, but High Commissioner to exercise similar control over the Governor as he will over Governors of Kenya and Uganda - as to policy

T.M.W.
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FEDERATION OF EAST AFRICA DEPENDENCIES.

Preliminary. This question has been further discussed by Mr. Wood and Sir E. Northey, Sir R. Coryndon, Sir H. Read Mr. Sytachey and Mr. Bettomley.

General Financial Effects. 2. It should be stated at the outset that with the appointment of a High Commissioner for East Africa, no large saving can be effected by linking up what might be regarded as federal services in Kenya and Uganda, as the Railways, the Customs and the Posts and Telegraphs are already amalgamated, the saving on Police would be small, and no saving on Military could be effected.

The figures given in this memorandum are the barest approximations, especially those for possible future savings, as it is not practicable to foresee in detail how schemes of this kind will work out. But whatever the actual figures of expenditure may be, it is believed that by co-ordination of policy, especially in regard to the development of resources, a saving which cannot be shown in £.s.d. would certainly be effected.

Possible Courses of Action. 3. The following are thought to be the possible courses of action:-

First Course. (A) To send out a Special Commissioner for (say) 12 months to visit Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika and report to the Secretary of State on the whole question i.e. the desirability of linking up two or more of these Dependencies under one High Commissioner, the amalgamation of Departmental Services in two or more Dependencies, and methods for carrying out any recommendations submitted.

Financial effect. Immediate non-current expenditure £5,000
 Savings - - - - - Nil.

This course is not recommended:-

(i) The Secretary of State has already decided on the question of principle i.e. that some linking up of the East African Dependencies is desirable.

(ii) It would take the Special Commissioner many months to acquaint himself with the various territories and their problems, while the Governors can adequately represent the position on the information which they already possess.

(iii) It would therefore be a waste of money to send out a Special Commissioner merely to conduct such an enquiry.

(B) To appoint a High Commissioner for all four Dependencies, in order to co-ordinate policy, no change being made in the political status or administrative system of any of the Dependencies (except that the Governor of Kenya would cease to be High Commissioner for Zanzibar) - with instructions to report to the Secretary of State as to the practicability of combining Departmental Services in two or more Dependencies with suggestions for carrying his proposals into effect.

Financial effect Immediate increase in annual expenditure £20,000

Immediate saving in annual expenditure £10,800

Possible future saving in annual expenditure 6,700

The Tanganyika Department at any rate for the present, oppose bringing in Tanganyika, and the East African Department concur in this view. Further it should be observed that there has been no opportunity to consult the Governor of Tanganyika, whose views ought to be obtained and considered before Tanganyika is brought under

a High Commissioner. In support of their views the Tanganyika Department point out:-

(i) The task of directing policy in all four Dependencies, even if routine matters did not come before the High Commissioner, would be too much at present, for one man.

(ii) Tanganyika presents many special problems; at present these are quite enough for the man, i.e. the Governor of Tanganyika, to cope with.

(iii) The administration of Tanganyika is hardly yet organised, and it is desirable that the territory should settle down before any change in its Constitution is considered.

Course. (C) To appoint a High Commissioner for Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar, no change being made in the political status or administrative system of these Dependencies (except that Governor of Kenya would cease to be High Commissioner for Zanzibar) - with instructions to report to the Secretary of State (1) as to placing Tanganyika under the High Commissioner (2) as to the practicability of combining Departmental Services in two or more of the Dependencies with suggestions for carrying his proposals into effect.

Initial effect.	Immediate increase in annual expenditure	£15,000
	Immediate saving in annual expenditure	10,800
	Possible future saving in annual expenditure	6,700

The East African and Tanganyika Departments prefer this course to the preceding one, but they recommend the adoption of the 4th Course suggested below.

Course (D) To appoint the Governor of Kenya as High

Commissioner

Commissioner for Uganda and Zanzibar, with instructions to report to Secretary of State (1) as to the means of effecting complete amalgamation of Departmental Services in Kenya and Uganda while preserving for Uganda independence of the Kenya Legislative Council with special reference to finance and legislation (2) as to placing Tanganyika under the High Commissioner.

If this scheme were adopted, it should be a definite instruction to the Governor of Kenya as High Commissioner that the Legislative Council of Kenya should have control only of the Kenya Colony and Protectorate as at present. Uganda might be administered by a Lieutenant-Governor responsible to the High Commissioner, just as Zanzibar is now administered by a British Resident responsible to the Governor of Kenya as High Commissioner for Zanzibar. Similarly, there might be a Lieutenant-Governor for Kenya, so as to relieve the Governor and High Commissioner of all but the more important Kenya work. As a temporary measure it is suggested that as a means of effecting a considerable economy, the Colonial Secretary in Kenya might be appointed Lieutenant Governor and Colonial Secretary and that a similar course might be followed in Uganda; in Zanzibar, if the present Resident retires, the present Chief Secretary might be appointed Resident and Chief Secretary

cial effect.

Immediate increase in annual expenditure	£4,150
Immediate saving in annual expenditure	16,200
Possible future saving in annual expenditure	8,000

This is the course recommended by the East African and Tanganyika Departments as securing in present circumstances the maximum co-ordination of policy

with

with the maximum economy, and both the Governor of Kenya and the Governor of Uganda favour it. It would follow more or less well-established precedents - e.g. Nigeria and the Gold Coast; it would preserve the independence of Uganda so far as control by the Legislative Council of Kenya is concerned, and it would not prejudice the question of bringing Tanganyika under the High Commissioner at a later date as soon as circumstances permitted.

Finance. (4) Further details as to the financial effect showing how the figures given in this memorandum are arrived at will be found in the attached statement.

(A) I.	<u>EXPENDITURE ON MISSION</u>	
	<u>including Secretary</u>	
	<u>for the Special Commissioner</u>	£,5000
II.	There would be no saving to set against this expenditure	£5,000
(B) I.	<u>Immediate increase of expenditure</u> <u>for first 12 months directly due</u> <u>to appointment of High Commissioner</u>	
(i)	<u>Salaries</u>	
	High Commissioner	£5,000
	Imperial Secretary	1,000
	Private Secretary	300
	Aide-de-Camp	300
	Local allowance at 25% of salaries	2,400
(ii)	<u>Office</u>	
	Clerical Staff (European and Goanese)	2,000
	Equipment, stationery etc.	500
(iii)	<u>Miscellaneous</u>	
	Travelling	2,500
	Passages	700
	Housing for clerical staff	300
		<u>£18,000</u>

N.B. No allowance is made for house accommodation for the High Commissioner, as it is assumed that he would be accommodated in the first instance at Zanzibar: but this might involve the acquisition of temporary new quarters for the British Resident. It would be safer to assume that additional expenditure for this purpose would be required, in which case the round sum of £20,000 may be taken as total immediate increase of expenditure in the first 12 months.

£20,000

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<u>II. Immediate saving for first 12 months</u>	
<u>Directly due to appointment of High Commissioner</u>	
(i) Inter-Colonial Railway Council not required	£10,000
(ii) Saving in existing High Commission for Zanzibar	800

£10,800

N.B. The saving of £10,000 is shown only in the assumption that without a High Commissioner, a permanent Railway Council would be required. This however is an assumption until Secretary of State has received and taken decision on Colonel Hammond's report due in October.

III. Savings which High Commissioner might be able to affect in time, by combination of Departmental Services in Kenya and Uganda or in other ways dependent on arrangement of transfers or retirements of individuals.

(i) Salaries of Governors of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika reduced as responsibility less with a High Commissioner	£3,000
(ii) Legal Departments of Kenya and Uganda	1,000
(iii) Police Departments do.	500
(iv) Agricultural Departments do.	600
(v) Veterinary Departments do.	300
(vi) Forestry Departments do.	300
(vii) Medical Departments of Kenya and Uganda	500
(viii) Public Works Department do.	500

£6,700

(C) I. Immediate increase of expenditure for first 12 months directly due to appointment of High Commissioner.

Assuming salary for High Commissioner at £6,000 instead of £3,000 and allowing for reduction in other items (where practicable) shown in B I

£3,5000

III.	<u>Immediate saving for first 12 months directly due to appointment of High Commissioner</u>	
	as shown in B II	<u>£10,800</u>
III.	<u>Possible ultimate savings as in B III.</u>	<u>£ 6,700</u>
(D). I.	<u>Immediate increase of expenditure for first 12 months directly due to appointment of High Commissioner</u>	
(i)	Additional salary for Governor of Kenya as High Commissioner for Uganda including local allowance at 25%	£1,875
(ii)	Additional salary for Colonial Secretary Kenya and Chief Secretary Uganda acting as Lieut.Governors including local allowance at 25%	1,875
(iii)	Additional salary for Chief Secretary Zanzibar acting as British Resident	400
		<u>£4,150</u>
II.	<u>Immediate saving for first 12 months directly due to appointment of High Commissioner</u>	
(i)	Salary of Governor of Uganda including local allowance at 25%	£5,000
(ii)	Salary of British Resident Zanzibar	1,200
(iii)	Inter Colonial Railway Council	10,000
		<u>£16,200</u>
III.	<u>Savings which High Commissioner might be able to effect in time by complete amalgamation of Kenya and Uganda or in other ways dependent on arrangement of transfers or retirements of individuals.</u>	
		(1)

(i)	Salary of Governor of Tanganyika reduced as responsibility less with a High Commissioner	649
(ii)	Secretariats Kenya and Uganda	1,500
(iii)	Treasuries do.	1,000
(iv)	Audit Departments do.	500
(v)	Legal Departments do.	1,500
(vi)	Police and Prisons Departments do.	500
(vii)	Medical Departments do.	500
(viii)	Printing Departments do.	200
(ix)	Agricultural Departments do.	600
(x)	Veterinary Departments do.	300
(xi)	Forestry Departments do.	300
(xii)	Land and Survey Departments	600
(xiii)	Public Works Departments do.	<u>500</u>

\$9,000