

1924

KENYA

C.O.
11803 31
12 MAR 24

FROM:
FOREIGN OFFICE.

DATE
11th MARCH 1924.

FOR CIRCULATION TO:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr. S. of S.
See H. P. ...
12/3/24

JUBALAND AND THE DODECANESE.

States as to conversation on 5th March with the Italian Ambassador, during which an undertaking was given that definite instructions as to the proposals of the Italian Govt would be sought, particularly with regard to the cession of some of the islands of the Dodecanese.

Mr. S. of S.
Mr. U.S. of S.
Secretary of State

Previous Taps

17 8/5
07 8/5

MINUTES

So far good

Don't know, Sir. (I can't)

explain the difference between

(a) cutting these islands together

(b) referring to the whole of

Jubaland. I would like to

have an opinion with

regard to the Dodecanese

Kenya

1st of ...
at ...
20 ...

Subsequent Taps

18
19
20

C. O.
11803
12 MAR 24

32

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. A 14 55/15/60

and address—

not to any person by name,

but to—

"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the *Under Secretary of State for the Colonies* and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office.

11th March 1925

Reference to previous correspondence

Description of Enclosure

Name and Date	Subject
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*India Ambassadors
 conversation based on Subala and the ...*

Similar letter sent to

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. He thanked me for my letter in which I had reminded him of his promise to write to the Prime Minister in order to push on with the settlement of the Jubaland-Dodecanese problem.

He desired to explain that all he could do at this moment was "to explain the point of view of the Italian government". This he had abundantly done more than once in his conversations with Lord Curzon, but he saw the value of putting it down in writing and he would do so without delay. In the meanwhile he pressed me in his usual manner for an assurance that Italy might hope for a further enlargement of the territory in Jubaland already offered her, and that in no case would the British government continue to link this question of Jubaland with the Dodecanese. He once more went over the whole ground, with all the old arguments and all the old avoidance of any reference to what Italy herself was prepared to do. I told him that I saw no use in our perpetually saying to each other the same things, and I earnestly begged him to consider whether the time had not come for his government to come into the open and say clearly what it was that they proposed to do as regards the Dodecanese. Seeing that the Ambassador had emphatically declared that he could in no case recommend M. Mussolini to act on the Prime Minister's suggestion that if it was preferred to disconnect the Dodecanese from the Jubaland question, the latter should be treated on the basis of the exact provisions of Article 13 of the Treaty of London, Marquess Torretta once more proposed that the British government should at once, and independently of everything else, cede

Jubaland with the additional territory still demanded by them. If this were done, he would use his best endeavours to induce M. Mussolini to agree that the cession of some of the islands of the Dodecanese to Greece should form the subject of discussion between him and a Greek government at some future date.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that his continuing to make such vague and imprecise suggestions made it really difficult to believe that they were seriously put forward. I reminded him that Lord Curzon had already expressed his willingness to separate the Dodecanese question from that of Jubaland, but on condition that a definite understanding concerning the Dodecanese was arrived at. Surely it was not too much to ask M. Mussolini to tell us precisely what islands he proposed to cede, under what conditions, and when; and I expressed regret that the Ambassador was, as I gathered, not at all prepared to say anything precise in the letter he was about to address to the Prime Minister. Marquis Ferreris admitted that this was so. He said he regretted it himself but he had no authority at present to go beyond M. Mussolini's last proposal, which was the immediate cession of an enlarged Jubaland to Italy, and a vague promise to a possible discussion of the Dodecanese problem thereafter. On my pressing him again he promised to see what he could do to advance matters by inducing M. Mussolini to be more precise as to his intentions regarding the Dodecanese.

5th March, 1934.

(Signed) J. H. ...