

1925

353

KENYA

C. O.

8256

20 FEB 25

Date

20th January 1925.

GVERNOR CORYDON.

CONF 10

RECOMMENDATIONS OF FRONTIER CONFERENCE.

Represents desirability of early conclusion of Sudan-Abyssinian boundary and submits proposals with view to securing (a) An agreed working boundary between Abyssinian and British Territory, and (b) Stable administration on both British and Abyssinian sides of that boundary.

U.S. of S.

U.S. of S.

U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

Previous Paper

MINUTES

Mr. B. H. ...

No. 8255

Mr. Allen and I have collaborated in typed minute annexed.

Edw. 15/1/25

I agree as to Mr. Machtig's A. and B. within.

As regards C., I also agree as to the proposed action, but I think that we should telegraph saying that in his further despatch the Acting Governor should definitely tell us what adjustments he desires if, as is practically certain, the Kittermaster proposals cannot be carried.

It is very difficult to see why Sir R. Corydon wished to give this boundary, which

has

Copy sent to ... 4 MAY 1925

Received copy (with copy) 27 May 25
on 24/2/25
before para - U.S. of S. to the ...
on 18/2/25

Subsequent Paper

effective administration in this area. Go on to point out that we understand that for political reasons the Govt. of the Sudan is opposed to the suggested transfer of the triangle to Kenya, and say that in these circumstances the Secretary of State hopes that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will urge the Sudan Government to institute a more effective administration in the area in question. And ask to be informed of any action taken in the matter.

(It seems unnecessary to wait for Uganda's reply before writing to Foreign Office as (1) Uganda is only indirectly concerned and (2) the transfer is not really practical politics at the moment, and we may as well take up at once the question of trying to get better administration).

C. THE KENYA-ABYSSINIA BOUNDARY.

It is unnecessary to go back into the history of this further than P.O. 44174, in which Foreign Office in a sense, re-opened the question with us, as a result of a talk which Mr Ramsey MacDonald had with Ras Tafari about Abyssinian boundaries generally. We consulted Gov. (F.O. 48926) who has now replied (Gov. 8256) that (i) he wants the boundary delimited (ii) that he inclines to the Northey-Kittermaster proposals as regards the line, but will write further when he has further reports from the local officers (iii) that the delimitation, if agreed to might be carried out as a preliminary to the delimitation of the new Italian Jubaland boundary.

Of course, the proposed delimitation of this boundary raises important questions of policy. The Gov. presses for the Northey-Kittermaster proposals, but there seems little prospect of our getting the Abyssinian Government to accept these as a preliminary

(see
enclos. in
10708/24)

see map on
tracing paper
in attached
envelope.

see Mr Ramsey

(as would be necessary) to the appointment of a boundary commission. On the contrary, they are likely to insist on adherence to the Maud line which both they and we have actually accepted, and if they do we might find ourselves in a difficulty, as we are at present in occupation of various posts like Moyale which are on the Abyssinian side of the Maud line, but which we regard as essential to us for the proper administration of our side of the frontier. It is a question, whether, when sending copy of 8256 to the Foreign Office for information pending the receipt of the C.A.G.'s definite recommendations, something might be said in the above sense. As to para. 4 of Governor's despatch, it is really ^{rather} ludicrous to suppose that, having regard to the difficulties involved and the past history of the question, the delimitation of this boundary could be done before the new Jubaland one. Perhaps we should say so to Foreign Office.

8255

KENYA.

No. 10.


 GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
 NAIROBI,
 KENYA.
CONFIDENTIAL.

256

20 FEB 25

10th January, 1925.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Colonial Office Confidential despatch (2) of September 10th with particular regard to the second and third headings under which the recommendations of the Kitum Conference may be grouped.

2. My aim in this matter is a settled peace in the North West of this Colony, and the essential conditions which must first come into existence before such a consummation appear to be:

(a). an agreed and working boundary between Abyssinia and British Territory.

(b). stable and responsible administration on both the British and the Abyssinian sides of that boundary.

3. As you are aware, in 1907 what is known as the Austin Line was drawn between Sudanese and Abyssinian territory, but while the British have since that time regarded this as the Frontier, it has never been so recognized by the Abyssinians. Indeed, Abyssinian parties frequently cross this line in order to raid tribes which they pretend to regard as under their suzerainty, on the plea of tribute

collection.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL L.C.M.S. AMERY, P.C., M.P.,
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
 DOWNING STREET,
 LONDON, S. W.

l.w. 37414
 2/25

collection. Another indication of their attitude is that recently the Abyssinian Government claimed that in 1920 Major Dodds promised that Great Britain would cede the area in dispute (vide the Charge d'Affaires letter to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald of August 19th last); there is indeed reason to believe that in Abyssinian eyes the area of their sovereignty extends to our most northerly post in Turkana, viz. Kakuma. I cannot of course agree to this assumption for a moment.

4. It follows from this indefinite position that any movement of the Kenya forces directed towards repelling or preventing attacks on the Turkana runs a risk of creating unpleasant complications with the result that, as will be observed from the annexure to this despatch, I consider it inadvisable to establish a new post, even though well south of the present Sudan Kenya boundary, without first ascertaining how such a step will be regarded at Addis Ababa, and in effect I am precluded from affording protection, which must of course precede pacification, to the Northern Turkana. This tribe in turn, smarting under its losses and its defeats, revenges itself on its Southern neighbours the Suk and Karamojong.

5. The lack of a definite border moreover renders it impossible to bring home to the Abyssinians their frequent undoubted complicity in the raids which afflict the Northern Turkana.

6. It is clear that our first step towards peace

H. B. M. Minister
Addis Ababa
1920

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6. It is clear that our first step towards
peace

H.B.W. Minister
Addis Ababa
14.1.22

peace in this quarter must be a definite understanding with Abyssinia as to the spheres of British and Abyssinian Administration, and I trust that you will be able to persuade the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, failing an attempt to obtain a definite ratification by Abyssinia of the Austin line, to initiate early negotiations as to a Boundary Commission in this area. There is a great need for such a Commission also to the east of Lake Rudolf, but as to this I am addressing you in a separate despatch.

Apr. 8/15/25

7. Turning to the third head of the despatch under reply, I would like to make it quite clear that I have the strongest objection to any extension of this Colony's responsibilities and liabilities, nor would I in any circumstances consent to any such expansion unless assured that Kenya would be fully reimbursed her expenses. The present position however is as follows.

The principal raiders of the Turkana are the Marella who live in Abyssinia and the Dabessa who inhabit the Sudan triangle, and until peace has been enforced upon these two tribes it will not be obtainable for their Southern neighbours. I make mention of the former tribe in a subsequent section of this despatch. With regard to the latter I regret to say that the Sudan Government has hitherto refused to take any steps which would reduce the tribes inhabiting this corner of the Sudan to order. It is, of course, the case that their unruly behaviour reacts not on the Sudan but on Kenya and Uganda, and it is presumably the former's indifference, resulting from this immunity which

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Gen. 8155/25

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has given rise to the suggestion that Kenya should in her own defence take this area under her control. Northern Turkana is already sufficiently remote from Headquarters at Nairobi, and I do not at all like the idea of assuming responsibility, and consequent heavy financial obligation, for still more remote and difficult areas.

8. It is here that the second condition comes into play viz. stable and responsible Government on the British side, and I hope that you will do your utmost to insist that the Sudan Administration supports the Kenya Government in these areas. Sir Geoffrey Archer, at whose suggestion the Kitgum Conference was held is, of course, familiar with the problem and I trust that he will support the arguments here put forward.

9. Moreover, firm administration on the British side of the frontier alone can bring about a better state of affairs on the other - I think that the history of Moyale is irrefutable proof of this.

10. I have written at some length on this important subject and will therefore recapitulate my argument.

Peace in Turkana cannot be secured until a definite boundary with Abyssinia has been recognized by both sides and until the areas, both those in British and Abyssinian hands to the north of Turkana, have been pacified. Until these two are secured the present distressing circumstances

circumstances of raid, rapine and murder must continue among the peoples whom we profess to protect, while heavy expenditure is incurred on continuous and only partially effective military effort.

Gov 40238/24

11. In Kenya despatch No. 186, Confidential, of the 25th July, 1924, I have laid stress on the position of Abyssinia as a member of the League of Nations, and I feel sure that her added responsibilities as such for the good behaviour of her own people will be recognized and if necessary, strongly impressed upon her.

12. It should further be recognized that this young Colony is annually put to the expense of approximately £170,000 on account of the protection of the tribes within its areas from raids from Abyssinia.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

R. C. Compton

G O V E R N O R.

S. 11002/12

14th January, 1925.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that this Government is contemplating the establishment of a post at a place to be selected in the neighbourhood of the Labar and Marueric Mountains, possibly at Lokatian Springs. The post proposed will be south of the existing frontier between the Sudan and Kenya, and will be within the zone recognized as in British jurisdiction.

2. This is in response to the urgent representations of the Officer Commanding Troops and has the concurrence of the Inspector General, King's African Rifles, who has returned recently from a tour in the Turkana area; it is necessitated by the constant raids of the Marilley (or Gellaba) and the Maji "Shiftas" on the Turkana grazing between Lake Rudolf and Mount Pelegetch.

3. Before taking action in this respect, however, I shall be glad to learn your opinion as to how such a step is likely to be received by the Abyssinian Court and in particular whether it will affect the prospect of an amicable settlement of the British-Abyssinian Border to the west of Lake Rudolf.

4. I should be grateful if an answer by telegram could be sent, if possible.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

R. T. CORRY

GOVERNOR

1471 894.

Bottomley / Force

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J. Shackburgh

O. Davis

G. Grindle

H. Lambert

W. Montagu Simons

Ormsby-Gore

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~~SC~~

Downing Street,

4 May 1925

RAFT.

Under Secretary
State
Foreign Office.

Sir,

I am etc., to refer to your

letter No.H.8727/2509/1 of the 18th of October, 1924, and to request you to inform Mr. Secretary Chamberlain that he has now received the observations of the Government of Kenya on the subject of the demarcation of the boundaries between (a) Abyssinia and the Sudan in the neighbourhood of Lake Rudolf, (b) Kenya and the Sudan and (c) Kenya and Abyssinia.

(a) Abyssinia-Sudan Boundary

2. (1) The aim of the Colonial Government in this matter is a settled peace in the North-West of Kenya, and the essential conditions precedent to the attainment

48926/24
copy to Mr. Koga 21/5/25
copy to Mr. Koga 21/5/25
copy to Mr. Koga 21/5/25

attainment of this object are stated to be

(a) an agreed and working boundary between Abyssinian and British Territory.

(b) Stable and responsible administration on both the British and Abyssinian sides of the boundary

(11) The Colonial Government points out that, in 1907, what is known as the Austin line was drawn between Sudanese and Abyssinian territory; but while the British Government have since regarded this line as the frontier, it has never been so recognized by the Abyssinian Government, and Abyssinian parties indeed frequently cross this line in order to raid tribes which they pretend to regard as under their suzerainty, on the plea of tribute collection. Another indication of the Abyssinian attitude is that recently the Abyssinian Government claimed that in 1930 Major Dodds promised that Great Britain would cede the area in dispute. (vide the Chargé d'Affaires despatch to Mr. Ramsay

(44174/24)

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(b) Stable and responsible administration on both the British and Abyssinian sides of the boundary

(ii) The Colonial Government points out that, in 1907, what is known as the Austin line was drawn between Sudanese and Abyssinian territory; but while the British Government have since regarded this line as the frontier, it has never been so recognised by the Abyssinian Government, and Abyssinian parties indeed frequently cross this line in order to raid tribes which they pretend to regard as under their suzerainty, on the plea of tribute collection. Another indication of the Abyssinian attitude is that recently the Abyssinian Government claimed that in 1920 Major Dodds promised that Great Britain would cede the area in dispute, (vide the Chargé d'Affaires despatch to Mr. Ramsey

(44174/24)

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(44174/24)

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frequently cross this line in order to raid

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their suzerainty, on the plea of tribute

collection. Another indication of the

Abyssinian attitude is that recently the

Abyssinian Government claimed that in 1920

Major Dodds promised that Great Britain

would cede the area in dispute. (vide the

Chargé d'Affaires despatch to Mr. Ramsey

(44174/24)

McDonald No. 67 of August 19 last).

Indeed

Indeed there is reason to believe
301
that in Abyssinian eyes the area of
their sovereignty extends to the most
northerly British post in Turkana, viz
Kakuma; an assumption to which the
Colonial Government cannot for a
moment agree.

(iii) From this indefinite position
it follows that any movement of the
Kenya forces directed towards
repelling or preventing attacks on the
Turkana runs the risk of creating
unpleasant complications, with the
result that the Government considers it
inadvisable to establish a new post,
even though well south of the present
Sudan-Kenya boundary, without first
ascertaining how such a step will be
regarded at Adis-Ababa. In this
connection I am to enclose a copy of
a letter which the late Governor
addressed to His Majesty's Minister
at Adis Ababa on the 14th of January
last

(encl. to 2256/25)

3. The Secretary of State concurs in the Governor's view, and he will be glad to be kept informed of the progress of negotiations in this matter.

[Kenya-Sudan Boundary]

4. (i) As regards the boundary between Kenya and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the proposal made at a Conference held at Kitgum in Uganda on the 15th-17th April 1924, that a portion of territory at present included in the Sudan should be transferred to Kenya, the Colonial Government has the strongest objection to any extension of the responsibility and liabilities of Kenya, and could not in any circumstances consent to such an expansion unless assured that any expenditure incurred by Kenya would be reimbursed.

(ii) The present position in this matter is stated as follows. The principal raiders of the Turkana are the Marelle, who live in Abyssinia, and the Dabessa, who inhabit the Sudan triangle, and until peace has been enforced upon these two tribes it

*of parts
required
by the Uganda
Govt*

as Sir Geoffrey Archer, at whose suggestion the Kitgum Conference was held, is familiar with these problems, he will support the arguments which are now put forward.

5. Mr. Chamberlain will observe that the Government of Kenya is unwilling to add to its responsibilities in this matter and would prefer that the Sudan Government should take steps to introduce more effective administration in this area. The Secretary of State understands that for political reasons the Government of the Sudan is opposed to the suggestion of transfer of the Ilambe triangle to Kenya, and in these circumstances, he hopes that Mr. Chamberlain will urge the Sudan Government to institute a more effective administration in the area in question. The Secretary of State will be glad to be informed of any action which may be taken in the matter.

7. The Secretary of State has no doubt that Mr. Chamberlain will concur in his view that there is little prospect of the Abyssinian Government agreeing to accept these proposals as a preliminary to the appointment of a Boundary Commission and that it is on the contrary, most probable that they would insist upon adherence to the "Maud" line, which has been actually accepted both by them and by His Majesty's Government. In such case a difficult situation would arise, as the Government of Kenya are at present in occupation of various posts, such as Moyale, which although situated on the Abyssinian side of the "Maud" line, are regarded by the Colonial Government as essential for the proper administration of the British side of the frontier.

8. With regard to paragraph 4 of the Governor's despatch, the Secretary of State does not regard as practicable the

suggestion that the demarcation of the
Abyssinia-Kenya frontier should be
undertaken before that of the new Anglo-
Italian boundary, consequent on the cession of
Jubaland.

I am etc.,

(Signed) W. C. BOTTOMLEY.

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Abyssinia-Kenya frontier should be
undertaken before that of the new Anglo-
Italian boundary, consequent on the cession of
Jubaland.

I am etc.,

(Signed) W. C. BOTTOMLEY.

Mr. Seal 26

Mr. Allan 30

Mr. Bottomley 1.5.25

Mr. Stacey

Mr. J. Shackburgh

Mr. O. Davis

Mr. G. G. G.

Mr. J. J. J.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore

Mr. Amery

Gen. 8256/25 Kenya

S.A.

~~See for dft.~~

April

1925

DRAFT.

U.S. 75

FO

Sm

46926/4

I am etc. to refer to the your letter No. E8727/2509/1 of the 16th of October, 1924 and to request you to inform the Secretary Chamberlain that he has now received the order of the Governor of Kenya on the subject of the demarcation of the boundary

between ^(a) Abyssinia and the Sudan in the neighbourhood of Lake Rudolf; (b) Kenya

The Governor of Abyssinia - Sudan boundary is the same as the last demarcation in this matter is a settled peace in

of the Sudan & Kenya
Abyssinia

2aps

The North-west of Kenya.

and the essential conditions precedent to the attainment of this object are stated to be ~~existence before this can be attained and in his opinion,~~

(a) an agreed and working boundary between Abyssinian and British Territory

(b) stable and responsible administration on both the British and Abyssinian sides of the boundary.

2/11/ The ^{1st} ~~Sov's~~ ^{despatch} ~~points~~ ^{out} ~~recalls~~ that, in 1907, what is known as the Austin line was drawn between Sudanese and Abyssinian territory; but while ^{the British} ~~the British~~ ^{Govt.} have since regarded this line as the frontier, it has never been so recognised by the Abyssinian Govt., and Abyssinian frontiers indeed

the North-west of Kenya.

and the essential conditions precedent to the attainment of this object ~~which must first come into existence before this can be attained and in his opinion,~~ are stated to be

(a) an agreed and working boundary between Abyssinian and British Territory

(b) stable and responsible administration on both the British and Abyssinian sides of the boundary.

3/11/ The ^{Col. Salt's} ~~Salt's~~ despatch

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and Abyssinian Territory;

but while ^{the British} ~~the British & H.A.'s~~

Gov^t. have since regarded this line as the frontier, it has

never been so recognised by the Abyssinian Gov^t. and

Abyssinian parties indeed

(iii) 4. From this indefinite

position it follows that any movement of the Kenya forces directed towards repelling or preventing attacks on the Turkana runs the risk of creating unpleasant complications, with the result that the Gov. considers it inadvisable to establish a new post, even though well south of the present Sudan-Kenya boundary, without first ascertaining how such a step will be regarded at Addis Ababa. In this connection

I am to enclose a copy of a letter which the Gov. addressed to H. H. Minister at Addis Ababa on the 14 8/25 last. ^{late} Colbot states that if the necessary steps are taken, it is in effect precluded from affording protection which must of course precede pacification to the Northern

(end to 9256/25)

Turkana. The tribe in turn smarting under its losses and its defeat, reverts itself on its Southern neighbors the Suk and the Karamojos.

(v) The ~~lack~~ lack of a definite border wire over renders it impossible to bring home to the Abyssinians their frequent undoubted complicity in the raids which afflict the Northern Turkana.

(vi) In the view of the Gov. ^{of} it is conceived that the first step towards peace in this quarter cannot be a definite understanding with Abyssinia as to the spheres of British and Abyssinian administration, and he urges that failing an attempt to obtain a demarcation of the

Austin line, early negotiations should be initiated as to a Boundary Commission in the area to the west of Lake ~~Victoria~~ Rudolf.

(3) ~~The~~ The S. & S. concurs in the Governor's view, and he will be glad to be kept advised of the progress of negotiations in this matter.

Kenya - Sudan Boundary

~~The~~ The Acting Governor also refers in his despatch to the question of the boundary between Kenya and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, ~~in~~ which the proposal has been made at a Conference ~~held~~ at Kitgum in Uganda on the 15th-17th April, 1924, that a portion of territory at present included in the Sudan should be transferred to Kenya. ~~On~~ ~~this question~~ ~~the~~ ~~Governor~~ ~~expresses~~ that he has the strongest objection to

any

any extension of the responsibility and liabilities of Kenya, and that he would not in any circumstances consent to any such expansion unless assured that any expenditure incurred by Kenya would be reimbursed.

(ii)

The Acting Governor describes

the present position in this matter ~~as follows~~

as follows. The principal raiders

of the Turkana are the Mareille, who live

in Abyssinia, and the Da'abessa, who

inhabit the Sudan triangle, and until

peace has been enforced upon these two

tribes it will not be obtainable for

their southern neighbours. ~~The~~

Acting Governor remarks that with regard

to the Da'abessa the Sudan Government has

hitherto refused to take any step which

would reduce to order the tribes

inhabiting this corner of the Sudan, and

he points out that the unfriendly behaviour

of these tribes reacts not on the

Sudan

^{The} Sudan but on Kenya and Uganda. He is disposed to consider that the proposal that Kenya should, in its own defence, take this area under control has arisen from the immunity from the attacks of these tribes which is enjoyed by the Sudan. In view of the fact that Northern Turkana is already sufficiently remote from the headquarters at Nairobi, ^{the Govt} the Governor is unwilling to assume responsibility, and consequent heavy financial obligation, for still more remote and difficult areas.

^{Colbat} ^{importance} The Acting Governor therefore urges the impossibility of the establishment of stable and responsible government on the British side of the Abyssinian frontier; He ~~expresses the hope that as~~ refers to the fact that Sir Geoffrey Archer at whose suggestion the Kitgum Conference was held, is familiar with the problems, and ~~expresses the hope that~~ he will support the arguments which are now put forward.

⁵ Mr. Chamberlain will observe that the

the Government of Kenya is unwilling to add to its responsibilities in this matter and would prefer that the Sudan Government should take steps to introduce more effective administration in this area. The Secretary of State understands that for political reasons the Government of the Sudan is opposed to the suggestion of transfer of the ^{Wanjo} Ilembe tribe to Kenya, and in these circumstances, he hopes that Mr. Chamberlain will urge the Sudan Government to institute a more effective administration in the area in question. The Secretary of State will be glad to be informed of any action which may be taken in the matter.

Kenya - Abyssinia Boundary

^{to the American} ⁶ re. I am to take this opportunity to refer to your letter No. E. 8727/2509/1 of the 16th of October, 1924, on the subject of the demarcation of the boundary between Abyssinia and the Sudan, and to transmit to you, for Mr.

(48926/24)

Chamberlain

Chamberlain's information the accompanying
 copy of a Confidential despatch No. 9 of the
 19th of January, 1926, which has been received
 from the Acting Governor of Kenya on this
 subject. The ^{rather} ~~various~~ recommendations
 promised by the Acting Governor in this ~~despatch~~

despatch will be communicated to you ^{and} ~~in due~~
 course; ^{in the meantime, the Govt of Kenya has been careful}
^{to let the Govt know in the latter part of the despatch that}
^{adjustments will be desired if, as in practically all cases, it is desirable}
 to carry out the ^{desires} ~~proposals~~ of Mr. Kellard ^{in the}
 despatch that the Government propose to the

which ^{has} ~~was~~ supported by
 proposals which were put forward in Sir
 Edward Northey's Confidential despatch
 No. 236, of the 16th of December, 1926.

Secretary of State ^{has no doubt} ~~has no doubt~~
 that the Chamberlain will ^{concur in the view that there is} ~~concur in the view that there is~~
 little prospect of the Abyssinian Government

agreeing to accept these proposals as a
 preliminary to the appointment of a
 Boundary Commission; ^{that is} ~~that is~~ ^{is} ~~is~~, on the
 contrary, most probable that they would
 insist upon adherence to the "Maud" line,
 which has been actually accepted both by them
 and by H.M.G. In such case a difficult
 situation

*A copy of this
 accompanied the
 letter from the Govt
 of Kenya
 9/21 (2031/21)*

situation would arise, as the
 Government of Kenya are at present in
 occupation of various posts, such as
 Moyale, which ^{though situated} ~~are~~ on the Abyssinian
 side of the "Maud" line, but which
 are regarded as essential by the ^{Col} ~~Col~~
 Government of Kenya for the proper
 administration of the British side of
 the frontier.

8. With regard to paragraph 4
 of the Governor's despatch, the
 Secretary of State ^{does not} ~~regards~~ ^{as practicable} ~~the~~
 suggestion that the demarcation of the
 Abyssinia-Kenya frontier should be
 undertaken before that of the new
 Anglo-Italian boundary, consequent on
 the cession of Jubaland, as
 impracticable.

I am, etc.,