

EAST AFR. PROT

635.2

C.O.T.

16355

PRO

122 FEB 1

Governor  
Field

41

## DISTURBANCES IN SOTIK COUNTRY

1913

1 January

Last previous Paper

16  
4258

The copies of corres between Mr Ainsworth and Mr H.R. Montgomery, views as to the latter's action not materially modified. Has however decided that case will be met by a reproof for his error of judgment and a warning that his future dealing with natives must be more tactful.

Enc G. Fielder

Ack: not?

H. J. R.

25/2

alone

P.M. 26

None

Last previous Paper

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,  
NAIROBI,

BRITISH EAST AFRICA

January 23rd, 1913.

No. 41.

Sir,

C.I.O.  
6355  
Recd  
6/2 FEB/13

In continuation of my despatch No. 897

of the 28th ultimo respecting disturbances in the Sotik country I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter addressed by Mr. Ainsworth to Mr. H. P. Montgomery at my request and of the latter's replies thereto.

2. My opinion of Mr. Montgomery's action expressed in paragraph 4 of my previous despatch is not materially modified by perusal of his explanation. I consider that his estimate of the gravity of the situation was based on quite insufficient grounds and that he evinced a want of discretion which might in itself have been the means of causing trouble where none need have been anticipated.

3. However, notwithstanding his failure

to

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

LEWIS HAROURT, P.C., M.P.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,

DOWNTING STREET, LONDON, S.W.

to grasp the real state of affairs I have no  
reason to doubt that he acted to the emergency  
which appeared to him to be in effect and  
have therefore decided that the same will be  
met by administering a reproof for his error of  
judgment with a warning that his future dealings  
with natives must be more tactful and that he is  
expected to make an effort to deal effectively with  
local complications and to resort to appeal for  
outside assistance only when it is beyond doubt  
that the emergency cannot be dealt with by the  
means at his disposal.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,

*H. Lowry Beppie L*

GOVERNOR.

Nyanga Province,

17th December, 1918.

C.O.  
E 1555

In reference to the recent events in Nyanga I have to bring the following matters to your notice and to request you to give me full explanations as early as possible.

1. On your joining Capt. Breck and I during the immediate conduct of affairs; you were, I understand, aware that Capt. Breck had represented to the District Commissioner at Kavango that a very serious state of affairs existed, and that he had stated Military help was necessary: did you ask him for his reasons for forming such conclusion?

2. (I) You report that on the 13th November you proceeded to Nyanga Hill and met Chief Chokolelo who gave you with him the police rifle and his cap. Please say if you considered that this act of Chokolelo was sufficient to allow you to conclude that he was hostile or disloyal? (II) Was there any evidence at this time that you or your party might be molested? (III) Had any hostile demonstration been made up to this time against Capt. Breck or against yourself? (IV) As regards Chokolelo's failure to get more than 10 Elders to attend the baraza, please say if it has not been your experience elsewhere in native districts for barazas to be unsuccessful because the Elders refuse or fail to attend?

H.R. MONTGOMERY, ESQ.,

Asst. Dist. Commissioner,

S.C.F.I.B.

176  
178  
Wyana Province,

17th December, 1918.

6555

In reference to the recent events at Motik,  
I have to bring the following matters to your notice  
and to request you to give me full explanations as early  
as possible.

(i) In your joining Capt. Greek and agreeing the  
immediate conduct or affairs, you were, I understand, aware  
that Capt. Greek had represented to the District Commis-  
sioner at Kericho that a very serious state of affairs existed  
and that he had stated military help was necessary: did  
you ask him for his reasons for forming such conclusion?

(ii) Did you report that on 13th November you  
proceeded to Nyaga Hill and met Chephkolol who had  
with him the Police rifle and his cap: I understand,  
he handed over to you. Please say if you considered that  
this act of Chephkolol was such as to allow you to conclude  
that he was hostile or disloyal? (ii) Was there any  
evidence at this time that you or your party might be  
molested? (iii) Had any hostile demonstration been made  
up to this time against Capt. Greek or against yourself?  
(iv) As regards Chephkolol's failure to get more than 10  
Elders to attend the baraza, please say if it has not been  
your experience elsewhere in native districts for barazas  
to be unsuccessful because the Elders refuse or fail to  
attend?

H. R. MONTGOMERY, ESQ.,

Asst. Dist. Commissioner,

S. C. T. I. G.

attend? (v) Did it not occur to you that the people might be shy or afraid of attending a baraza, and that consequently some tact and patience was necessary?

(vi) Considering that the natives concerned had, I believe, been summoned by cries raised by the owners of the cattle seized by the two Police and accompanying Moran and had rushed out to help their friends and in the excitement that must have been present they refrained from killing or really even hurting the Police, and as it was in every way possible that the rescuing party did not know any of the facts connected with the seizure by the Police, did it not occur to you that the matter might not be of the serious nature it has been represented to be?

(vii) After your interview with Chokoloi you remark that the situation is most serious; "the whole of the people of this location refuse to come to my baraza;" (this does not quite fit in with your statement that Chokoloi and 10 others did turn up); what do you consider was your justification for making these statements?

Up to this point the case would appear to have been one of assault on the Police and the forcible release of property and one prisoner in their possession. You do not, however, appear to have put up any evidence to show that the party concerned in the release knew of the real facts of the case, and that knowing them they took the law into their own hands. Considering these points (viii), what were the reasons that induced you to think that the natives were out of hand and ready to fight, and that a most serious state of affairs existed?

Granted the wages had not come, as they should have done, to the baraza, you might have been able to have commenced the basis of some understanding you might even

proposed

spoken to Chokkol and the 16 Elders. You may have, of course, done so, but there is no evidence to this effect.

(IX) Apart from the police incident in question were any Government people such as porters, other police, messengers, &c., in any way interfered with?

(X) Please state what induced you to vacate the Government station and retire to Mr. Morgan's farm. Was any hostile demonstration made against the station?

(XI) During all this time where did you obtain food supplied from?

(XII) You refer in certain correspondence to "ugly rumour", what did you mean, and who was responsible for them?

(XIII) You say in your letter of the 26th November that a large meeting was held by the Sotik Chiefs in the Reserve. You remark that after some discussion it was agreed that you should not go: Mr. T. C. Morgan appears to have gone instead. I cannot understand your action in this matter. You first of all report a serious state of affairs, because the Elders, &c., will not come to a bazaar and then when there is a bazaar you did not go to it! Surely such action on your part was more likely than anything else to cause the Chiefs and Elders to think that there really was a serious state of affairs but being caused more by the Government than by themselves.

Please explain your attitude in this connection.

All through the case, i.e. so far as I gather, you seem to have been influenced more by what people said or did not say than by what I should have expected. Use your own judgment based on actual observation and contact. There is no evidence that you made any real attempt to get the position smoothed out and settled.

I assume you are quite aware that the calling upon the military to aid the civil power is a serious matter, and should

To: Lewis, V.A.  
Date: 1-27-10  
From: [unclear]  
Subject: [unclear]

卷之三

After you have made changes, as well as added  
features or removed other outstanding  
bugs please say with whom and when (xx)

**THE STATE OF MACHINERY OF STATION IN TAKING SET (LIX)**

• paragraph set in enclosed figure one w/ bleed and unjoined edges

As far as I can see, the best way to proceed would be to have the  
agent among several of the agencies concerned. At the top tier himself,  
there would be a system similar to police that has been developed in  
various countries.

probably did cause the parasite to infect animals in Oregon. It is  
possible that Oregon mink might have escaped a bit more than 1000 miles

and they have no motives from which all of us can be  
stimulated by the efforts of our patients and their families.

and expects to offer up to a new editor and staff which  
will be recruited as soon as possible and will consist

... en deelde een aantal voorbeelden uit en vroeg of iemand een voorbeeld kon geven.

AND SO PLEASE EXCUSE ME FOR TROUBLESOME, I SHOT EVERYTHING.

19 NOV 1961 - 1961 NOV 19

political and economic situation in the country have been

has collected another's property without his consent.

卷之三

natives in this case was apparently due to the fact that Mr. Dulire had sold their stock. Mr. Dulire is a native and he has a large herd which is totally unbranded. He therefore has no remedy for any trespass, so called. His act, therefore, in rounding up native stock is very questionable and might be calculated to lead to serious misunderstandings with the native owners. Mr. Dulire should have complained to the District Commissioner and not taken the law into his own hands.

I have, etc.,

Ms. A. 1. 2 v. John Ainsworth.

#### Presidential Communications

Recd 2

~~Confidential~~

Every kind of response by the tribes

against Kericho and Sotik will

only serve to bring us more trouble

, strengthen our opposition to conceive

of any peace, and cause them to section

off into smaller tribes and native

tribes against a native or

other tribesman. On the

strength of this, one

Salisbury had told me

they could not

allow such a situation

to continue.

On the 18th November I

wrote to Capt. Brook and said

that I would go to Sotik

and see what I could do

about this. I was

not aware that Capt. Brook had

written to the District Commissioner,

Kericho, asking for his

assistance to enforce any penalty imposed.

On the 19th November I

wrote to Capt. Brook and said

that I would go to Sotik

and see what I could do

about this. I was

not aware that Capt. Brook had

written to the District Commissioner,

Kericho, asking for his

assistance to enforce any penalty imposed.

On the 20th November I

wrote to Capt. Brook and said

that I would go to Sotik

and see what I could do

about this. I was

not aware that Capt. Brook had

written to the District Commissioner,

Kericho, asking for his

assistance to enforce any penalty imposed.

On the 21st November I

wrote to Capt. Brook and said

that I would go to Sotik

and see what I could do

about this. I was

not aware that Capt. Brook had

written to the District Commissioner,

Kericho, asking for his

assistance to enforce any penalty imposed.

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. 2843/S/12 of 17th instant received to-day,

I. On 18th November, while camped at the Tabisoni Swamp on the Kericho-Sotik Road, I heard from natives that the party sent by Capt. Brook to capture certain cattle had been raided by Sotik. On 19th November I proceeded to the Sotik Post and found Capt. Brook there. I was not aware that Capt. Brook had then written to District Commissioner, Kericho, asking for his army assistance. I have not got copies of my letters but remember stating that the troops were not required to safeguard Capt. Brook and myself but to enforce any penalty imposed.

II. On 20th November I proceeded to Nyara Hill with Capt. Brook and met Arap Chepkollal with the Police circle and seg. On arrival at 10 a.m. I informed Chepkollal that I wished to meet all the wazee with a view to taking evidence about the matter. In the afternoon he returned and stated that no one would come except 10 wazee who actually lived by our camp; the following day he was also unable to bring any other people to Paraza. From evidence which I sent to the Provincial Commissioner, Kericho, it is evident that Chepkollal knew all about the matter though he denied it before us. On 21st Capt. people would not come to the Paraza, there were a large number congregated about 3 miles off: the message these people gave was a distinct threat, viz: that they would not come but that I might come and try and fetch them (Capt. Brook was informed likewise by another native). I consider this as a hostile demonstration.

III. It is quite possible that the people were afraid to come in to the Paraza, but our attitude was in no way hostile. I told Arap Chepkollal and the few wazee I saw that I wanted was to Provincial Commissioner, P. I. S. T. K. U.

27th January 1912

Sotik Post

25th December 1912

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to meet the people and get at the truth of the matter - threats whatever were made but I wanted production of the people and the cattle taken from the Police.

III. We remained on that camp at Nyaga for 2 nights and practically saw no one, so I considered in the circumstances it was useless staying there.

IV. With reference to para 3 (VI) of your letter, I would again point out that I only asked for the Troops to enforce a collective fine - an offence had been committed and a collective punishment recommended, which I am certain could not have been collected without a show of force.

V. Referring to para 3 (VII) of your letter, I should have said that "the whole of the people of the location except Chopkollal and 10 wazee refuse to come to my Paraza."

VI. Two men Aran Shemosit and Aran Faria came to me from time to time to bring news and reported that any attempt to seize persons or cattle would meet with opposition.

VII. My reasons for thinking this was as follows:

- (1) An offence of assault on Police and forcible release of property and one prisoner had been committed.
- (2) On my arrival to enquire into the matter only the Chief of the location and 10 wazee came to my Paraza (as far as I can remember there are about 2000 huts in the location). From this I inferred that the whole location knew of the offence and abetted it by not producing the offenders.
- (3) Threatening messages as mentioned in paras 3(I) and 3(VI) were received.

VIII. Referring to the last part of your para 3(VII), of course I spoke at length to Chopkollal and the wazee who did come to the Paraza. I explained that they should go to the people and do their best to bring them to a proper frame of mind. I considered the offence most serious and demanded the production of the people who attacked the Police and the return of the cattle and prisoner; and told them that when this was done, the matter of the attack on the Police and the minor offences.

offences of people and cattle being out of their Reserve without permission would have gone into.

I do not consider this demand unreasonable, and it implied no threat, though I cannot say how the demand was delivered to the people by Chopkollal; if they had come to the Faraza the matter would have been plain.

I may add that I have now tried the owners of the 'omas the cattle were taken from and have found, after a personal visit to the spot, that they were in fact inside the boundary marked by Capt: Monckton; and the two men have been discharged.

IV. Referring to para 5(X) of your letter, no persons were molested.

V. The parae 8 (X, XI, XII). On leaving Nyaga on 22nd November we did not go to the Government Post but camped at Mr. Morgan's farm. Food supplies &c. &c. were obtained from the locations of Arap Nyawine, Arap Epita and Arap Murtaret.

My reasons for camping there were as follows - I thought I did not anticipate any attack on ourselves, I considered it advisable to take no risks. The Troops were willing for me to enforce a penalty as the Police I had with us were insufficient and had only five rounds of ammunition each, which would have been little use in the event of trouble. If there had been trouble it would have been when the natives heard the Troops were coming. Therefore, it was obviously better to be in a position to defend ourselves if necessary, which it was easier to do in Mr. Morgan's farm than here.

XI. I am aware that calling on the Military is a serious matter, but on the exigencies I considered that the penalty required could not have been carried out without a show of force. My intention to settle the matter ~~ourselves~~ at first, but the attitude of the people changed considerably after the arrival of Mr. Wolseley-Kourne and a detachment of Police with ammunition on 25th November.

XII. On 26th November I heard a meeting of Chiefs was to be held. This was not an official Faraza but it was evident

that the Cherokees wanted to try to make  
themselves, I had thought - the  
nation decided not to - they  
would be better if they linked

and so

G. S.

PUBLIC RECORD

I see the  
is not the  
help with the  
no action.  
by me,

Sir.

Your obedient servant,

(Sd) H. R. MONTGOMERY

Asst. Dist. Commissioner.

3rd January, 1915.

Provincial Commissioner,

K i s u m u .

Thro' District Commissioner,

K e r i c h o .

Dr. 3  
41 Jany 23<sup>rd</sup> 1915

Reference your 2845/3/12 of 30th December 1912,  
Regarding affairs in Sotik.

I regret that in my reply to your letter of 17th December all your questions were not answered in the order asked asked, but more or less in narrative form.

The following is a list of your paragraphs with reference to my answers:-

Para 2: Answered in my para 2.

" 3 I, vide my para 5 I, Chopkollal was not actually disloyal, but he knew of the whole matter and was incapable or unwilling of doing any thing.

" 3 II, Vide my para 5 I. If we had attempted to do anything we would have been molested.

" 3 III, Vide my para 5 I. the message received was, I considered, a hostile demonstration.

" 3 IV. I have experienced a small Baraza through the slackness of the people, but not through the people refusing to come and holding a rival and hostile meeting a few miles off.

" 3 V, Answered in my paras 3 II and 3 III.

" 3 VI, " " " para 5 IV.

" 3 VII, part 1: Answered in my para 5 V

" 3 VIII, Answered in my para 3 VII.

" 3 VIII part 2: Answered in my para 5 VIII.

" 3 IX, Answered in my para 5 IX.

" 3 X, Answered in my para 5 X.

" 3 XI, Answered in my para 5 XI.

" 3 XII, Rumours received by natives as mentioned in my para 5 VI

" 3 XIII, Answered in para 5 XII.

" 3 XIV, part 3: Answered in para 5 XIII.

" 3 XVII part 3, Answered in para 5 XI.

" 3 XVIII, Answered in my para 5 XVIII.

Govt. 6355/1913

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E.A.P.

A.C.

March 1913

DRAFT

E.A.P.

No 152

To Balkh

MINUTE

Received 27 Feb.

M. Anthony 27 Feb.

Sir J. Fiddes.

Sir D. Scott.

Sir J. Anderson.

Lord Emmott.

Mr. Harcourt.

Sir,

I have the honour to

acknowledge the receipt of

your despatch No. 41

of the 23<sup>rd</sup> January, and to

inform you that transmitting

copies of further copies

on the subject of the

disturbances in the

Soltik country

(Signed) L. HAROURT.