



EAST AFR. PROT
43554

C.O.
43554
1913

Examiner
Conf
161

DEPARTMENT OF WARREN

1913
7th November

The memo by the Chief Secretary detailing and explaining the reasons for action taken by him together with copy of communication from O.C. Trepo. Submits that there is no ground on which exception can be taken to the course followed. Consider that Col. Graham committed a grave error of judgment and that he has not succeeded in justifying his action. State all action suspended pending receipt of I.G.'s report.

43049

Divid comp 2 Jan 1914

Mr G. Fiddes
The paper was yesterday, let I send it to me as it shows that the paper was reluctant to write to force against the machine, or be very temper assume that it was only after mature consideration that he telegraphed yesterday recommending that operations should be begun against the trucks. Apart from this, the deeper case went until the papers are available?
G. J. R.

Rec'd when they return 19/25/13
Pa. 1913

Mr G. Fiddes
Concur in the view

Next subsequent Paper
43953

referred by the gov. in the 3rd part
of his report: 2

H. J. R.

267 x 57 / 13

Dec. 29. 12. 13

Al. 30. 12. 13

E 30. 12. 13.

Sir J. Anderson

Should we not also add "the

S of S. has been glad to receive
Mr. Browning's explanations of his
actions

[The act. somewhat modestly, without
withdrawing our censure]

Dec. 31. 12. 13

no obj.

Off at end

Ch. 1. 1. 14

Col. Graham

Yours via cable to me. J.H.'s notes of
interview with Col. Graham
(annexed)

Recd 31/12/13

Ans. 31. vii. 14

SM

supported by the gov. - the 3rd part
of his report?

H. J. R.

26/12/13

Dec. 29. 12. 13

Al. 30.12.13

30.12.13.

Sir J. Anderson

Should we not also add "the

S of S has been glad to receive

Mr. Brown's explanations of his
actions

[This is somewhat needless, without
withdrawing our censure]

Dec. 31. 12. 13

no obj.

Off at end

Ch. 1. 1. 14

Col Graham

You will find the S of S note of
interview with Col. Graham
(annexed)

Accd 31/12/13

Adt. 31.12.13

PM

by Mr. Belfield himself.
I told Maj. Graham that in that
I would take care to put on those
papers some record of my present
views.

Maj. Graham expressed himself
as satisfied and grateful.

H. 30.7.14

Notes for interview between
Sec. of State & Colonel B. R. Graham

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1. Major (later Lieut. Col.) B. R. Graham,
Queen Victoria's Own Corps of
Guides; Commandant of
the 3rd Battⁿ, A. A. S.; and
O.C. all Troops in the S. A. P.
appointed Commandant
in October 1912.

2. "Col." Graham has just returned
from S. A. on completion of the
operations against the Khyber
The final reports will arrive
shortly, but it may be
noted that in a private letter
the Gov. has stated that Col.
Graham has carried out the
work well. It was undoubtedly
a trying & difficult piece of
work & ~~and~~ in the earlier
stages the Sec. of State
commented in a despatch on
the issue of an ultimatum by

Col. Graham when this offer
must have known that he was
not in a position to take the
offer, if the alternative
were disregarded. I attach
prints of its correspondence. I think
it would be politic that the
Sec. of State should let Col. Graham

(whom, I believe, feels that he has
been unjustly censured in that
matter) talk about this, and
that if he can see his way to do
so, the Sec. of State might, in view
of the very difficult position in which

Col. Graham was placed,
& the misunderstanding as to the
term "alternation", mitigate
the censure.

I attach also (for personal
reference to the War Memoranda
box) a memo. wh. I prepared
for Gen. Sumner ~~regarding~~ giving
the history of the Meruhan patrol.

3. If Major Graham raises the
question of a model for the
Meruhan operations, I do
~~not~~ think that the best reply
would be that this question,

See House
min. r
43554/13

Col. Harkin
very angry
with the
his addition
min. here
he thinks the
censure should
withdraw
unconditional

is hoping to
diff. in ans.
Sunder
remains across.

if rather it is raised officially
by the Governor, will be
referred for consideration of the
Interdepartmental & Awards
Council.

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4. The Sec. of State may like
to mention to Col. Graham,
although no doubt Col. Harkin
has already told him, that
the proposals for the admin. of
the Northern Frontier District
of Jubaland - & for increasing
the military establishment of S.F.
in G/S 2000/14 have been
generally approved & that
the question of recruitment and
remains. The part of
of interest to Col. Graham is
that dealing with the military,
viz. that the military force
will consist of -

- | | |
|------------------------|------|
| 1 Batt. of 5 Companies | 500 |
| of 100 men each | |
| 1 Batt. of 4 Companies | 600 |
| of 100 men each | |
| 2 Flying Column | 502 |
| of 251 men each | 1402 |

that at present there is under
consideration the intention of garrisoning
Zimba, Nyasaland troops
from Nyasaland, and until
this is decided the Gov. has been
told that in so far as the re-
organisation of the R.A.M. in
East depends on the assumption
that the 2 companies now
detached from East for
Zimba will be available for
permanent service in East,
action should be deferred
until the arrangements for
garrisoning Zimba are determined.
In any case, however, the
Nyasaland troops under the
Command of the D.C. Troops
in East (viz. 4 companies)
will be organised as a
separate battalion.

He may also like to
mention that approval has
been given for the mounting
& efficient arming of the
"Armed Constabulary" in

in the N.F.D. of Nyasaland; and
that a civil officer is to be
appointed as Administrator
of the whole N.F.D. (Officer
not yet selected).

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5. It may be of interest to
Col. Graham that the W.O.
have agreed to a £10. for
Lt. Lloyd Jones, who was
wounded at Loiyangalani.

2005

2/1/14

See Col. Hosken's memorandum.

As these papers are evidently
 required at once I will make my
 remarks short though I feel
 strongly on the subject.

Colonel Graham has carried out
 these operations with good judgment
 and discretion and has shown
 considerable ability.

The operations were in most
 difficult country, ^{were} made more
 difficult by prosecution
 and were begun and completed
 while the River was at low.

The operations were forced on
 us by a wrong appreciation
 of the necessities of the situation.
 The real mistake was made by
 those who with a lighter heart
 thought that a Sanate tube in
 such country could be disarmed
 without being thoroughly beaten.

Having found out the mistake the
authorities pursued a lenient policy
which made matters worse.

The disarmament policy had been
started long before Col. Johnson gave the
order to which exception is taken.

This order resulted from the fact
that a military force was sent
to deal with a different administrative
problem without adequate instructions
"They are to be made to comply with
our orders" - that was the extent of
his instructions.

That a military officer should be made
to scapegoat for a failure in policy is
most unjust. I am of opinion that
the Sec. of State is not in full possession
of the facts, and it will be worthy his
recollection that I stated to him my
opinion which I had expressed more
than once to the Gov. of C.S. that Col. Johnson
had been unjustly censured.

Ad. H. 29, 11:16

103534

858

~~AFRICA PROTECTORATE~~

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
Nairobi, Mombasa,
BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

211

19 10 13

14th November 1913.



~~SECRETARY~~

*Yours
2599*

~~SECRETARY~~

~~SECRETARY~~

Sir,

In reply to your confidential despatch of September 25th, 1913, in which you have intimated your disapproval of the action taken by the Government of this Protectorate in the matter of the proposed disarmament of the Marehan tribes, I have the honour to transmit for your consideration copy of a Memorandum by the Chief Secretary detailing and explaining the reasons for the action taken by him as Deputy Governor and Acting Governor, together with a copy of a communication from the Officer commanding the Troops, dated November 1st, 1913, to which reference is made in that Memorandum.

The facts have been so fully set out by Mr Bowring that I am unable to supplement his Memorandum by any information which would add to your comprehension of the situation, but I venture to submit that there is no ground on which exception can be taken to the course which he followed, and that, being wholly dependent upon the

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

LEWIS HARCOURT, F.R.S., M.P.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.

* No 32573

8-12

2.

C. O.
43554 289

the reports supplied and the views expressed by the officers on the spot, he was correct in acting in accordance with their representations in the absence of any intimation which would lead him to conclude that their recommendations were manifestly wrong. Moreover the difficulty of his position was accentuated by the absence of Colonel Graham from headquarters, while the presence of that officer in Jubaland was an additional reason why his views on the position should be accepted.

3. I consider that Colonel Graham committed a grave error of judgment in proclaiming a time limit for the delivery of arms, and that he has in no way succeeded in justifying his action. On his own admission such proclamation was useless, as he states that he had no intention of taking forcible steps on the expiration of the prescribed period and was aware that the force at his disposal was insufficient to enable him to make any effectual move. Further, he must have known that if no steps were taken at the expiration of the time allowed the Somalis would put their own interpretation upon the inaction of the Government, and the difficulties of the future would be thereby enhanced.

4. My approval of the process of disarmament was given in the first instance on the representation of the Political Officer that the time was favourable for such action and that no difficulty would be experienced in effecting it. His suggestion was then made that it would be necessary

C. O.
43554 289

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4. My approval of the proposal of disarmament was given in the first instance on the representation of the Political Officer that the time was favourable for such action and that no difficulty would be experienced in effecting it. No suggestion was then made that it would be necessary

to resort to force, and I should not have entertained the proposal if such possibility had been intimated. The report of the unwillingness of the tribe to accede to our wishes reached Nairobi after Colonel Graham had started for Jubaland, and that officer, having been telegraphically instructed that the question of reinforcements was matter for his consideration, should have limited his action to inquiry into the situation, and to recommendations thereon, and should have refrained from compromising the Government by dictating terms.

5. I sent for the Officer commanding the Troops immediately on his return to Nairobi and received from him a verbal report on the state of affairs together with an expression of his opinion that the disarmament should be effected by force. As I have personally held grave doubts as to the propriety of such a course, I told him that I could not advise that such action be taken unless it were made clear that the immediate seizure of all weapons was essential to the peace of the district and that our object could be attained in no other way. As he appeared disinclined to see matters in the same light as myself, I requested him to record his views in writing but was unfortunately compelled to relinquish my duties on account of indisposition before his communication came to hand.

6. On the arrival of the Inspector General, King's African Rifles, I conferred with him and with the Officer commanding the Troops. I informed them

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I have the honour to be,

etc Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,

H. Conway Bey, cad.

GOVERNOR.

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
etc Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,

H. Conway Bejjani

GOVERNOR.

Encl 1 - Na



*our
Y. H. K. Railway*

In his confidential despatch of September 16th the Secretary of State expresses his disapproval of the manner in which recent affairs in the Mareham country have been handled by this Government and requests further explanations in respect of certain matters to which special reference is made in the despatch.

2. I gather that the Secretary of State is dissatisfied both with my part in the matter as Deputy, and afterwards Acting, Governor, and with the action taken by the Officer Commanding Troops on the spot.

3. Colonel Graham has, in his memorandum of November 1st, recorded the reasons which induced him to pursue the course of action which has now been criticised. It appears to me that possibly the expression "ultimatum" was ill-chosen and has given a wrong impression of what actually took place. No threat was made that the sections of the tribe concerned would be punished on a certain day if our orders remained disregarded by that date. They were told that if, by a certain date, they did not bring in their rifles they would have to take the consequences. They had previously been ordered to hand in their arms but this order had not been accompanied by any intimation that disobedience thereof would lead to any active measures to enforce

enforce

Encl 1 - Na



our
I. H. [unclear]

In his confidential despatch of September 26th the Secretary of State expresses his disapproval of the manner in which recent affairs in the Marshan country have been handled by this Government and requests further explanations in respect of certain matters to which special reference is made in the despatch.

2. I gather that the Secretary of State is dissatisfied both with my part in the matter as Deputy, and afterwards Acting, Governor, and with the action taken by the Officer Commanding Troops on the spot.

3. Colonel Graham has, in his memorandum of November 1st, recorded the reasons which induced him to pursue the course of action which has now been criticised. It appears to me that possibly the expression "ultimatum" was ill-chosen and has given a wrong impression of what actually took place. No threat was made that the sections of the tribe concerned would be punished on a certain day if our orders remained disregarded by that date. They were told that if, by a certain date, they did not bring in their rifles they would have to take the consequences. They had previously been ordered to hand in their arms but this order had not been accompanied by any intimation that disobedience thereof would lead to any active measures to enforce

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4. When Colonel Graham left Nairobi, en route for the Marehan country, the position was that the disarmament of the tribe had been approved on the recommendation of the Civil Officer in charge who had telegraphed that he considered disarmament necessary adding that the opportunity for doing so was most favourable.

5. While on his way to Kisumu Colonel Graham received a telegram from Nairobi informing him that the Marehan were combining to resist disarmament, that the Officer in command of the troops on the spot suggested an increase of mounted troops, that it was not anticipated that the Marehan would take the initiative and that Government had decided that the disarmament should be enforced.

6. On his arrival at Kisumu he telegraphed for sanction to purchase a number of mules to assist in the rounding up of the tribe which sanction was duly accorded in a telegram from this office on June 21st. Colonel Graham then proceeded up the river, arriving at Lolleshid on July 21st, and issued the "ultimatum".

7. The fact that an ultimatum with a fixed date had been issued was not known at Nairobi until after Colonel Graham's return a month later, being recorded for the first time in his memorandum of August 25th.

8. On August 3rd Colonel Graham's telegram of July 29th from Bardera was received at Headquarters. In this telegram he stated that an additional

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additional Company of troops would be essential to carry out the disarmament but added that their departure should be deferred until his own return to Nairobi about August 15th. This was the first intimation received at Nairobi that the troops on the spot were insufficient to carry out the order.

9. As regards my own action in the matter I can only express my very great regret that, at a time when I was temporarily in charge of the Government and when immediate action appeared to me to be necessary, I failed to deal with the situation to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State.

10. When Your Excellency left for the Masai Reserve on June 25th, affairs had arrived at the stage indicated in paragraph 6, supra, i.e. Colonel Graham had been informed that the order for disarmament was to be enforced and had received sanction to purchase the necessary number of mules to assist in the operations.

11. On July 14th I received the Secretary of State's telegram mentioned in paragraph 4 of the despatch. I immediately sent for Captain Loder-Symonds, the Officer Commanding Troops, Nairobi, during Colonel Graham's absence. After discussing the situation with this Officer I replied that there were no grounds for anxiety and that the troops on the spot should be able to deal with any situation which might arise. As the Secretary of State surmises I was not at that time aware that an

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10. When Your Excellency left for the Masai Reserve, on June 28th, affairs had arrived at the stage indicated in paragraph 6, supra, i.e. Colonel Graham had been informed that the order for disarmament was to be enforced and had received sanction to purchase the necessary number of mules to assist in the operations.

11. On July 10th I received the Secretary of State's telegram mentioned in paragraph 6 of the despatch. I immediately sent for Captain Leder-Symonds, the Officer Commanding Troops, Nairobi, during Colonel Graham's absence. After discussing the situation with this Officer I replied that there were no grounds for anxiety and that the troops on the spot should be able to deal with any situation which might arise. As the Secretary of State surmises I was not at that time aware that an

ultimatum

ultimatum with a time limit had been issued, but I do not wish to put this fact forward as an excuse for the terms of my reply for the reason that, on careful consideration, I do not think this additional information would have influenced me to reply differently.

12. The question of reinforcements is different. There was nothing to show that an increase in the number would be required and I had no idea that application for an increase would be made by the Military authorities.

13. The impression which I gathered from the Secretary of State's telegram was that reports had reached England that the Military situation in the Marahan country was, to the least of it, unsatisfactory, whereas I had no reason to believe it to be otherwise than perfectly sound. Both the Civil Officer and the Officer Commanding Troops, Marahan, had telegraphed on April 21st to the effect that the leading Chiefs of the Far Ogas had been captured or had surrendered, that the section was surrendering its rifles and ponies and that no further trouble was anticipated. On May 2nd the Civil Officer applied for sanction to disarm the remaining sections of the tribe and stated that the opportunity for doing so was most favourable. The Military position therefore appeared to me to be quite satisfactory and I felt justified in informing the Secretary of State that there were no grounds for anxiety and that I considered that the troops on the spot could deal with any situation which might arise.

arise. Captain Leder-Symonds concurred in this view.

14. Captain Seames' telegram of June 8th, to which reference is made in paragraph 8, supra, had not caused me to alter my views on the position. It is true that he suggested an increase of mounted troops but authority to purchase the mounts had been granted. The fact that the sections had combined to resist the order for disarmament did not appear to me to be of any importance as I regarded it as the natural sequence of events. I gathered that the disarmament would not be effected with the same ease as had been the case with the Farman section but I had no reason to believe that the military situation was unsatisfactory or that more troops would be required.

15. If, at the time of replying to the Secretary of State's telegram, I had had any idea that a request for reinforcements would be made I should of course have said so, more especially as the telegram contained a direct enquiry as to whether I considered that additional troops were necessary or advisable. I should also have reported Captain Leder-Symonds' views if they had differed from mine on the subject of reinforcements.

16. As already stated the first intimation of reinforcements were necessary was received on August 3rd. I admit that this came to me as a surprise, and as Colonel Graham asked that the order for the move should be deferred

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17. The file was placed before Your Excellency immediately on your return on August 14th and you requested that Colonel Graham should discuss the matter with Your Excellency immediately on his return. I left for Mombasa on August 18th by which date Colonel Graham had not arrived. I believe he arrived in Nairobi the following day. I returned on the evening of August 22nd and an Executive Council Meeting was held at Government House the following morning, at the conclusion of which Your Excellency informed me that you had requested Colonel Graham to prepare a memorandum on the situation. The Secretary of State's telegram of August 15th, drawing attention to the necessity for caution in dealing with the question, had arrived in the meantime.

18. Colonel Graham's memorandum was submitted on August 25th but illness prevented Your Excellency from dealing with it, and I accordingly again found myself in temporary charge of the Government before a reply could be sent to the Secretary of State's telegram.

19. Before despatching my telegram of August 27th and my Confidential despatch No. 111 of August 28th, I discussed the position with Colonel Graham in the greatest detail in the light of his memorandum and came to the conclusion

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19. Before despatching my telegram of August 27th and my Confidential despatch No. 111 of August 28th, I discussed the position with Colonel Graham in the greatest detail in the light of his memorandum and came to the conclusion

conclusion that the order for disarmament must be enforced even if it were necessary to obtain reinforcements in order to do so.

20. The following further telegrams passed between the Secretary of State and myself prior to his despatch of September 25th:-

Secretary of State's telegram of August 29th.	
My telegram	September 1st.
Secretary of State's telegram	" 6th.
My telegram	" 9th.
Secretary of State's telegram	" 18th.
" " "	" 25th.

My confidential despatch No. 112 of September 12th had not, however, arrived in England by that date.

21. I trust that I have now clearly and fully explained the reasons which induced me to deal with the matter as I did and I would be grateful if Your Excellency would forward this memorandum as well as Colonel Graham's memorandum of November 1st to the Secretary of State together with such comments thereon as Your Excellency may deem fit.

C. C. BOYKING

CHIEF SECRETARY.

November 7th 1913.

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl. 2 in No

Encl. **INCLOSURE No. 2**
In *Annexes* No. 761 of 14-11-1912

NAIROBI

1st November 1912

333

The Honourable
the Chief Secretary

Kal

Reference your 2866 Vol. II dated 23rd October
1912 enclosing copy of Colonial Office despatch
of 26th September 1912.

In para 2 of the enclosure the Secretary of State has taken exception to the issue of an ultimatum when I was aware that the Government could take no action on the expiry of the time limit.

Mr. Mure gave orders to the Ahmed Wet to surrender their rifles on the 40th day. No notice was taken of this order and the Ahmed Wet and other tribes moved in a North Westward direction to avoid its enforcement. Mr. Mure had also explained to the tribes that Government had no intention of raiding them (vide his letter of July 19th).

On my arrival at Lolleshia on 31st July the situation was the same, viz the Marchan were still in the vicinity of the Dawa R. I had received His Excellency's instructions the Marchan were to be made to comply with our orders and I considered that it was time that the tribes should realise the Government was in earnest. Two months had already expired since the issue of the original order by Mr. Mure and I respectfully submit that for the sake of our own prestige it was advisable to fix a time limit for the surrender

surrender of the area. They were warned if they did not surrender their arms by the 15th August they must be prepared to take the consequences. I had never any intention of moving out on the 10th August, and I do not now see that any threat of immediate action was conveyed by the fixing of a time limit for the surrender of the area. Government would naturally select its own time and in any case to warn mobile natives like Somalia, one was going to take action against them on a certain date would, I submit, have the one effect of making them still more inaccessible, and moreover would be unsound from a military point of view.

2. With regard to para 3 of the despatch I wish to point out that my memorandum was not intended as an explanation of any action I had taken - on my return to Nairobi His Excellency the Governor wished me to consider if it was possible to avoid the enforcement of disarmament, I asked for a day to consider this and came to the conclusion it would ~~be~~ unwise to withdraw from the position we had taken up, and my memorandum was written on five reasons for the opinion, which I still hold, that we ought to adhere to our expressed policy.

3. My request for reinforcement was despatched by wireless on the 23rd July as follows:-

"To effect disarmament consider one extra company essential and recommend sanction to borrow this company from Uganda be obtained immediately stop orders for this company to move should be deferred pending my return to Nairobi about 15th August."

I could not decide what reinforcements would suffice until I had visited Loleshid, seen the lines of communication and the nature of the country.

My reason for wishing to delay the despatch of
the company was that I was in the best position to de-
cide what baggage, ammunition etc it should take to
Serenli.

B. R. Graham Lieut Colonel

Commanding Troops, S.A. Protectorate.

957 43554 East



S2

DRAFT.

East Conf.

Gen. Sir H. Grey, Millfield, W. York.

(Conf)
Sir,

2nd Jan 1864.

MINUTE
 Mr. ~~W. M. ...~~
 Mr. ~~...~~
 Sir G. Piddell
 Sir H. J. ...
 Sir J. Anderson.
 Lord Emmott.
 Mr. Harcourt.

I enclose herewith to ask: the receipt of your conf. copy of the list of Merchants* on the subject of the disarmament of the Merchants.

2. I have been glad to receive Sir B. ... explanation of his action in this matter.

3. As regards

No 43554

the action of Colonel
Graham, & concern
in the views which you
express in the third
paragraph of your dispatch.

§

Yours etc

J. Hancock