



EAST AFR. PROT.
K.A.R.
22788

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22788
JUL 13

Staff Office

1913

4 July

Last previous Paper

22336

Situation in N. Jubaland

Memo by Staff Office K.A.R. resp. present
unsatisfactory military position & need
for reinforcements

~~Private~~ Dr G. F. Fisher

It is necessary that ~~the~~ Col. Thompson &
Capt. French should show in the series
of private letters, but most very necessary that
^{to series} ~~it~~ should go on so long. If the O.C.
Troops regard the position as ~~unfavorable~~
he can, if his representation to the Gov.
have effect, ask that they should be
forwarded to the S. A. I.

By the way, I must in have received
to believe on some points of detail including
the Lambert raid near Kaddah and Capt.
Hyland's death, you have that branch
- the only source of local reinforcements
cannot even provide a Guard of Honor
for the King's Birthday

Captain Hyland's death is, from the
military point of view, a "side issue" and
right

UNIT FOR USE OF AFRICAN OFFICERS

Last subsequent Paper

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might equally have happened however they
to you as he command. He had 10 KAR
& 3 Transport men with him, and he afforded
the most prominent target for these well-armed
hunters.

As ~~Col.~~ Graham points out, the whole
affair is the real thing, and if it is true
that they were going to get a moon early
in June the question of the adequacy of our
forces may be settled by now. If the statements
continue, it might go on equally long
if our forces were twice as great.

There can be no exact...
led into this. We might telegraph to Gov
saying that the S. of S. is continually hearing
through private channels of disturbing
accounts of the military position on the N. &
NE. frontiers & that he must rely on
the Gov. to let him know if he considers
that any reinforcements from outside
desirable or necessary.

But this ~~may~~ ought not to be necessary
- and on the whole I think we must leave
the Governor to his responsibility?

W.H.S.
7/7/13

H. J. R.
8/12/13

I am inclined to take as proposed at A

Gen. Pottinger.

W. 9.7.13

When were the orders for disarming
the merchant given? Ch 10.9.13

Sir

Mr. Hudson

I find that we had no information

February 1913

The Ahmed Bedd an referred to

Several passages of Appendix G. ^{for} 8397/13

The Italians demanded that action should be taken against them for cattle raiding - the accounts of which however were exaggerated

There is a cattle page table in 8397

The reports of the strength of the various sections are very contradictory. Possibly 200 miles each for ^{each of} them would be under the mark.

Passage tabbed in green

The latest I can find about desertion - amount generally is ^{for} 8398/12. Col. Changer agreed that the time was not ripe for it.

I would add to the proposed telegram our inquiry whether it is the case that orders have been issued for the disarmament of the Machan. ^{If true} is somewhat extraordinary that such orders should have been given without a word to us.

Ch 11713

If the statements in private letters are approx justified we are being kept in the dark most reprehensible extent. I don't like the idea of disarming these people. We can't patrol the frontier & prevent all raids on them except at an enormous cost.

The S.G. Co has agreed on a report, but it is not yet signed. They recommend that

there sh^d continue to be separate S. Gs
for E. & W Africa. If the report is
approved the new S. G. for E. Africa
sh^d be appointed at once. Telegraphs
as proposed E 12. 7. 13.

certainly telegraph as proposed
if I had been told of the intention
to disarm I would certainly
have protested
It is a pity that the
Government has
not done so

REC
JUL 13
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Mr. Bottomley.

I attach extracts from two letters received this morning and which I think you should see. I do not want to be an alarmist in any way but the position in Northern Jubaland is far from satisfactory - I understand that Mr. Belfield says that the Marrehan must be made to comply with our orders and that the question of reinforcements must be settled by the Officer Commanding Troops British East Africa.

But from what I know this question of reinforcement is not one which can be settled by the Officer Commanding Troops - for reinforcements from other parts of British East Africa will mean denuding various stations of troops - simply because we have not a strong enough force anywhere to do more than "carry on".

Although there is no question of reinforcing the troops in Northern Jubaland at once and although I trust the necessity will not arise I think it would be well to be prepared for further developments and some scheme for bringing troops in from Uganda or elsewhere might be drawn up with advantage. To do this I am in favour of consulting the War Office, and in any case would urge most strongly that a decision be arrived at as soon as possible with regard to the question of an Inspector General and a successor to myself.

As regards these Abyssinian raids I agree with Lieutenant Colonel Graham that they are not an immediate or pressing danger - but it remains to be seen whether the Army Constabulary of the Northern Frontier District - 125 strong - will be able to deal adequately with them.

Captain

Captain Aymer's escort was of Armed
Constabulary and not King's African Rifles.

CR

22785

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Recd
HQS 4 JUL 13

EXTRACT from private letter from Colonel Graham
dated Kisumu 10th June, 1913.

"I can hear nothing definite here, but facts are that the Marrahan are not for disarmament, and this may entail our going for them. Once we start Lord knows where we shall end, because if we disarm them we must immediately afterwards take on the Serenli Aulihan, and afterwards the Southern lot, i.e. Mahommed Zubeir. I do not wish to write alarmingly, but things develop extraordinarily quickly.

You will have heard of poor Aylmers death - and there has been another raid on Kulal and another to within 10 miles of Marsabit, but these are side issues, and the immediate problem is Marrahan to be followed by other Somalis.

EXTRACT from private letter from Captain Loder-Symonds
dated Nairobi 11th June, 1913.

"The Marrahan have at last started getting a move on. The following wire being received on 6th June.

"All sections of the Marrahan with the exception of the far Ugas and Bon whose attitude is doubtful have combined to resist the Government order of disarmament issued to Ahmed Wet, Sheik Ismail

is responsible for combination. Will be necessary to be prepared to fight with Marrehan. At present do not anticipate Marrehan taking initiative. Suggest increase of mounted troops. SOAMES".

I'm certain the Marrehan is going to develop into a big show and I don't think the Colonel will take it on with under about 800 men. We can't well back out of it as we've already given the order to disarm. If we do we shall have to vacate the whole of the country and our prestige with the Abyssinians, Somalis and Italians will be? Poor Aylmers death was a awful blow. I told Hope about 3 months ago that I was certain Aylmer would be scuppered before the year was out.

I had a private letter from Aylmer dated January in which he said he had had several encounters with Tigre and didn't like his position as he only had 13 men with him. The Colonel took it down and showed it to Bowring and wrote a very strong official letter but nothing was done to recall Aylmer or send him more men.

This (policy of observation) was of course impossible with the Boran being raided and murdered all round and consequently Berrett and Aylmer had to go after Tigre with one or two men - the chances being 1000 to 1 in favour of the Tigre.



007 22788

East
na R

886

301

Instance appeared absent
15/7/13

DRAFT.

Telegram (Cipher)

Governor
Nairobi

Handwritten vertical text: "Handwritten vertical text"

July 1913

MINUTE.

- Mr. ~~de la~~ 15/7/13
- Mr. ~~Bolton~~ 15/7/13
- Mr. ~~Reed~~
- Sir G. Fiddes 15
- Sir H. Just
- Sir J. Anderson
- Lord Emmott
- Mr. Harcourt

I am constantly hearing
through a private channel

A disturbing account

of military position in

both south and east

of the Protectorate

rely upon you to

keep me fully informed

Handwritten number: 7

of progress of events
to let me know
if you consider

temporary reinforcements
from outside desirable
or necessary. ~~##~~

Is it true that orders have
been issued for the
disarming of the

for a section of them

Marchant [if so
when were they issued.

Marchant