

EAST AFR. PROT



12767

Field Cont 524

1914

17 March.

of previous Paper.

12123

Operations agst. Marsehan

Confirms telegrams re progress of operations & sends letter from O.C. the troops with report by Capt. Honor of operations bet. 19th & 22nd Jan last.

~~W. B. Stansbury~~ W. B. Stansbury W. B. Stansbury W. B. Stansbury

This should be printed at once - copies sent to F.O., I.O. & W.O. for info of F.O. with copies of 12123/14

Much of this is now 'ancient history' as matters have advanced - favourably too - since these reports were written. Have marked some of the more noticeable points -

From the general point of view the most interesting & least satisfactory section is that tabbed in green which deals with the

Copy 12123/14

of subsequent Paper.

12950

the behaviour of the Nyasa (Yao)
troops in Capt. Stour's
engagement on 21st January -
it is the more interesting because
of the demands from Somaliland
for Yao stepping into the
Colonel Constabulary - As
a matter of fact, we cannot
get Yao; but in Capt.
Stour's engagement the
Somalis have amply justified
themselves - & thereby
(if one can judge from a
single fight of their nature)
justified the confidence which
Capt. Stour the Commandant
of the Constabulary in
Soudan has unwisely
placed in Somalis in the
face of strong opinions to
the contrary held by other
Soudan Officers, Civil and
military. The matter
seems sufficiently important
for us to send an extract
from

from this report - I have
marked the suggested
extract 2-2 - to the Gov.
of Nyasaland for info. & ex-
plaining briefly the chief of
the fight & calling his
attention to the remark that
"the few men who behaved well
were of the less known tribes
of the Nyasa Pli..." (p. 10 of
the report).

233

When the operations are over,
the Reward Council will
doubtless consider the grant of
awards - for the gallant
conduct of Effendi Abd Sheiff
Abouid (para 17 p. 10) must
not then be overlooked.

Recd

I don't think we can draw any general
conclusions from the behaviour of
the Somalis & the Yao. The latter,
it is admitted, were a raw company.

This is the first reference by name,
so far as I have seen, to Effendi Abd Sheiff
Abouid

W.C.S.

the behavior of the Nyasa (Yao)
troops in Capt. Stour's
engagement in 21st January.

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Capt. Lawrence the Commandant

of the Constabulary in
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the report).

233

When the operations are over,
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doubtless consider the grant of
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not then be overlooked.

Accl

I don't think we can draw ^{the general} conclusions from the behavior of
the Somalis & the Yao. The latter,
it is admitted, were a raw company.

This is the first reference by name,
so far as I have seen, to King's Butcher's
Council

bound. It is very meagre & there
is nothing bound to his people.

? as proposed

W. 4. 14

~~W. 14. 4. 14~~

W. 15. 4. 14

3

Major Brough

acc. to p. 114

Mr. Pashinson.

No doubt this, with other papers, is intended
to be brought up from T. S. KAR

to be his release - I have

written JA
17. 4. 14

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

NAIROBI,

BRITISH EAST AFRICA

AFRICA PROTECTORATE

March 12th 1914.

Confidential No. 54



Sir,

In continuation of my Confidential despatch No. 48 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to confirm the following telegrams sent since the date of the despatch above quoted which read as follows:-

12/12/14

*Col Graham
12/12/14
Gen. Storer*

No. 82 of the 12th instant

My telegram March 9th No. 75. Following received from Graham. Begins: 'March 8th. Arrived Lugh yesterday. While at Lolleshid Rer Tuina declared intention of surrendering arms, powder. He has been chasing Ahmed Wet unsuccessfully and had small skirmish, enemy's casualties killed and wounded five. Now proceeding along river, large number of Rer Ligab and Rer Ali reported crossing to our side may be used against Ahmed Wet as latter raided Rer Ali stock. General situation similar as Larehan are too busy looking after stock to combine. Farah Ogas ostensibly with us'. Ends."

12/12/14

No. 87 of the 17th instant

Following telegram received from Troops, Serenli. Begins: 'March 12th. Following received from

12/12/14

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

LEWIS HARCOURT, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,

DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.

from Graham dated March 11th. "Returned to Nairobi today. Askel Wet retired on Maua. I have been in communication to Her Ash to enter our territory, claiming they surrender all arms. Askel Wet reported to be at the Maua. I have been in communication with Dedjas Letch Radu to ascertain but he did not come. Returning Lolieshia and Serenhi hope to settle Thina on route. Consider I have not enough troops to effect disarmament and I am ordering two Uganda and one Indian Company to Serenhi after arrival of rations. There is no danger to our forces but enemy's mobility too great to allow me to do spot without holding a large circle of Milana wells. Propose to appoint Senior Service Corps Officer Director of Supply and Transport and I am authorizing him to take charge of all such work. Active and extensive movements must be suspended for two months pending arrival of rations and reinforcements. Will go down to Gbowa to look into details and may come Nairobi as I am very anxious about food supplies". Ends".

2. I have also the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter from Colonel Graham dated the 12th ultimo together with a report by Captain Stonor of the operations between the 19th and 24th January.

3. I have received a telegram from the Inspector General, King's African Rifles, in which he states that he hopes to arrive at Nyeri on the 19th instant so he may be expected to reach

Nairobi

from Granam dated March 11th. "Reference to him today, Amel Wet retired or Dammag with intention to Her Will to enter bay territory. If they surrender all arms. Abyssinians reported to be established. Dedjas was with a direct meeting with Dedjas Hach Hadu to ascertain, but he did not come. Returning Lolicchia to Jerehni hope to settle Quina en route. Consider I have not enough troops to effect disarmament and I am ordering two Uganda and one Indian company to Jerehni after arrival of rations. There is no danger to our forces but enemy's mobility too great to allow me to do good without holding a large circle of militia wells. Propose to appoint Senior Service Corps Officer Director of Supply and Transport. I am authorizing him to take charge of all such work. Active and extensive movements must be suspended for two months pending arrival of rations and reinforcements. Will go down to Goben to look into details and may come Nairobi as I am very anxious about food supplies". Ends".

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3. I have received a telegram from the Inspector General, King's African Rifles, in which he states that he hopes to arrive at Nyera on the 19th instant so he may be expected to reach

Nairobi

(3)

241

Nairobi about three days later.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. C. W. B. B. B.

GOVERNOR.

P.

The King's African Rifles,
Serouli,
12th February, 1914.

To
The Honourable
The Chief Secretary,
Nairobi,

242

Sir,

I have the honour to confirm my telegrams dated 4th February and 10th February and to enclose Captain Stenor's report of the action in the vicinity of Bogolti on 31st January.

The following shows the distribution of our own forces:-

SEROULI.

- 9 British Officers
- 1 Sergeant Major
- 1 Medical Officer
- 1 Assistant Surgeon
- 'A' and 'B' Coys. 1st K.A.R.)
- less details.
- 1 'F' Coy. 3rd K.A.R. }
- Details } 323 Rank and
- 3 Maxim Guns } File

The whole of the S.M.T. Corps.

Garrebahare

GARIBBAHARE.

243

3 British Officers

1 Assistant Surgeon

"A" Coy. 4th K.A.B.

"B" Coy. 3rd K.A.B. 200 Rank and File

Details

4 Maxim Guns.

No Transport whatsoever.

Enemy.

3. (i) The enemy are at the following places:-
 Bil Buk E. of Parnwen, Rer Tulha, Few Rer Hassan
 Bussel and Helomerera. Rer Farah Ogas,

Humballi	Rer Hassan, Rer Ahmed Wed,	} all wells
	Rer Eli Dera	
Makalla	-do- -do- -do-	} No rain water
Dableh	-do- -do- -do-	

Juba River near Hugh. Rer Farah.

(ii) The estimated strength of the enemy is as follows:-

<u>Section</u>	<u>Riflemen</u>	<u>Spearmen</u>
Rer Tulha	190	300
Rer Hassan	100	500
Rer Ahmed Wed	150	250
Rer Eli Dera	50	250
Rer Farah Ogas	?	400
Rer Bon	50	350
Total	540	2,050

(iii) The attitude of the Rer Farah Ogas and Rer Bon is very doubtful. Intelligence shows their

their intention to help the other sections un-
officially while the chiefs declare for peace.

(iv) The attitude of the remaining sections is
openly hostile. They are very confident of cutting
up any force which attempts to travel on the roads.

(v) The enemy's plans appear to be as follows:-

(a) The Rors Hassan, Ahmed Abd and Ali Bera
to watch the for at Garrebahare and attack it if
it moves out.

(b) The Ror Tulha with some of the Ror Hassan
to watch the Sorendi ~~XXXXX~~ Force. This force to
be attacked in some favourable place in tick bush
if it moves out.

(c) Riflemen to open fire from cover. Spear-
men to charge when camels are in confusion. White
officers to be picked off.

(d) In case of reverse to drive all stock to
the River Daua. Fighting men to act as a screen.

4. (a) As you are aware the original plan was to
operate from Garrebahare and to seize the water
supply at Lakilla before the crehan had left the
grazing grounds on the Dilhara Plateau to the West
and thereby cut him off from water. On my arrival
here the enemy had already left the Dilhara and
were in actual possession of the principal inland
watering places.

(b) When Captain Mackenzie left Garrebahare
he brought down a safari of 135 camels to Sorendi
and it has since transpired that the Ror Tulha

had intended attacking him and only refrained owing to the exaggerated estimate of his escort which was assessed at 400 men.

(c) Captain Stonor's action at Bogotti has encouraged the enemy and his subsequent return to Serelli has been magnified by them into a great victory.

(d) Latest information shows numbers opposed to Captain Stonor on 21st January were 300 to 400 and that five hours after his withdrawal these numbers were doubled and my opinion is that encumbered with a large convoy and wounded it is not improbable that his small force would have been almost annihilated had he decided to try and push on to Garrebahare.

(e) The great handicap under which I am labouring is that the Garrebahare garrison owing to their being without transport cannot co-operate with me. A garrison of 50 men would have sufficed for that place and I should have had another 150 fighting men.

(f) To achieve any good I must first and foremost inflict such a severe defeat on the Rer Tulha as to force him to retire or enable me to round up his stock, further I must get to Garrebahare with sufficient transport to move not only my own force but also 150 men from Garrebahare as without such transport the existing immobility at that place would only be considerably increased.

5. When I despatched my message of 4th February I had instructed Mr. Elliot to procure 100 Aulihan

"illaloes" for stock rounding and a few more to "illalo" for my own force and give notice of enemy's whereabouts and possible ambushes. The alternatives there were:-

(a) Postponing action pending arrival reinforcements from Yeinti which could not be before break of rains about 15th March.

(b) Postponing action till next dry season in August to September.

(c) Attacking with a very small force.

As regards (a) Once the rains broke the enemy would drive off all his stock and either disperse or having left his stock in charge of the women and children, himself concentrate.

(b) The effect of postponing action till September would create a very grave risk of the Aulihan and Mohamed Zubair joining the Marehan.

(c) I was therefore left with the 3rd alternative which had some chance of success provided I had "illaloes".

The attitude of Aulihan being doubtful I have had to modify my plans as without "illaloes" I am further handicapped.

6. In asking for reinforcements in my message of 10th February I have had to consider the whole question not only from a Marehan but from a Jubaland point of view and the following points had to be considered:-

(i) The

(i) The attitude of the Aulihan towards Government is not satisfactory, the Her Afwa are in communication with the enemy, the remaining sections profess friendship and will doubtless remain friendly so long as the necessity for watering their stock on the river remains.

On the advent of the rains the tribe will return to the interior and they may then give trouble unless I can succeed in definitely committing them against the Merhan by inducing them to join us.

(ii) Mr. Willoul who arrived here on 9th February reports that the Talamuga Ogaden have retired to the River Tana. This frees the Bahalla tribe Mohamed Zubeir from any fear of attack on their "kurias" and will permit their young warriors to join the Merhan if they so desire. It should be remembered the Merhan gave substantial help to the Mohamed Zubeir during their fights with the Aulihan.

(iii) Any further fighting which could possibly construct into a Merhan success would have a very serious effect and would probably change the present Aulihan attitude of doubtful friendliness into open hostility.

(iv) There are unconfirmed reports of the entry of considerable numbers of Merhan into Jubaland lately. They are reported to be ex-Dervishes armed with rifles and are said to have crossed the river south of Lugh.

(v) Of the Merhan chiefs Haji Mohamed has

most influence. He is said to be an ex-follower of the Mallah and spent a considerable time in Mecca. He is working with a view to effecting a general rising in Jubaland.

(vi) That the long line of land communications should be kept clear.

(vii) The carriage of casualties. After a very hard day it took 16 soldiers to carry Lieutenant Dentinck.

conclusions. 7. I am now doing my utmost to commit the Aulihan to our side and if I can see any plan which offers a reasonable chance of success shall at once adopt it, but the situation here alters almost from day to day and it is impossible to give you any definite idea of my intentions.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

sd. B. R. GRAHAM, Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding Merchant Force.

MERENAN FOREST

Report of Operations between 19th to
24th January 1914

In taking action against the Merenan it seemed to me necessary to deal first with the Ber Tulna section for the following reasons:-

(a) They were nearest to Serenli

(b) They had made an unprovoked attack on the Adalie Signalling Post on the 14th December last, and had shot a man of the Camel Corps.

(c) They were on the flank of our line of communication with the Advanced Base at Garebehare Camp and were a menace to the Line of Communication.

(d) As their existing watering places to the West dried they would force still more to the East and would eventually cut the Line of Communication at Farnwen our most important water supply for convoys.

(e) It was reported they had armed scouts on the Serenli - Garebehare road to intercept runners and messenger parties and thus prevent the transmission of messages.

(f) It was also reported that these scouts were living in 'kurias' off the Wafata Aulinan.

(g) According to Intelligence Officer, Merenan Patrol, they intended attacking Captain Mackenzie's Column on 30th or 31st ultimo when on its way from Garebehare to Serenli but were deterred by its numbers being exaggerated to 400 rifles.

2. As information of any force moving out to attack them would be speedily known to the enemy through their scouts

Preliminary
remarks.

Preliminary
remarks.

scouts and spies it was necessary to advance against them without exciting suspicion. I accordingly arranged for my force to move from Serenti as follows:-

On the 18th January the Camel Corps moved to Dar Zariba with 10 days rations, transport and baggage to join the Column.

On the 19th January the convoy under escort of 100 rifles moved out to Galatio, thence to Dar and Katakawasis on 20th.

At Dar the Camel Corps followed the column and bivouaced with it at Katakawasis on night of 20th to 21st.

3. The need for disguising the objective of the fighting force is illustrated by the following incident. The son of Faran Got (an alleged friendly) had been visiting Serenti and was returning with the column to Garabehare. He however left at Galatio on night 19th to 20th and no doubt gave information of his advance. As this information would be of very peculiar value as the real objective was not known to anybody in the column no means were taken to restrict his movements.

4. My intention was to move upon Bogatti with a small fighting column free of transport acting as a strong Left Flank Guard to the convoy which would proceed along the cut Katakawasis - Farnwen Dar road. Orders for the division of the force were only issued at 3 p.m. at Katakawasis. The objective of the fighting force was only given out to the scouts who were to guide it along the track to Bogatti at 2 a.m. on the 21st when the march commenced.

The Supply Column left zariba 15 minutes after the fighting force and were ignorant of the division of the force for some time. This secrecy prevented Camel drivers &c from talking or information leaking out.

Intentione
 Fighting Force
 Flank Guard
 100 Rifles (1
 Coy.)
 1 Corps 42
 Coy. 50
 100 Rifles
 Camels 56
 Mtn. Camel 1
 Mules & Mules 2
 Convoy
 Officer 1
 Coy. 50
 Mules 10
 158
 1

5. The Left flank guard proceeding by the track past Adallie Hill, arrived at Bogalti at 5.40 a.m. and hid in the bush whilst the nearer watering places were reconnoitred. No enemy and no tracks were seen. Lieut. Hughes and small party climbed Hill N of the river to see how incursion of large herds to the westward. About 6.30 a.m. Camel corps scouts reported 12 camels moving towards Adallie by a parallel road to which the column had come. It was likely these men were going to snipe the convoy, news of which had no doubt reached the enemy. The Camel corps scouts followed and surprised the enemy killing three and getting their grass rifles and bandoliers. The latter each contained 6 cartridges. At 7 a.m. Lieut. Tilly who had posted an observation post on the hill previously referred to reported that a herd of camels protected by two riflemen were being brought down to water about 1 mile to West. I ordered Lieut. Tilly to take the half "A" Company and to try and round up the stock. I proceeded myself with this party. The stock was surprised, the few men with it bolting after firing a couple of shots. Owing to the inexperience of the troops the camels were frightened and took to the bush. One of the enemy and two camels were killed.

As the enemy was now thoroughly alarmed and it seemed unlikely that any more surprises would be effected and as the Infantry had been 24 hours since getting water, I decided to bivouac for the day, graze camels, &c. A suitable bivouac was found near the place where we had first halted in the morning. About 200 yards E. from this were some holes in the rocky river bed which supplied small quantities of water. The water parties and also the camels grazing were sniped. Fire was returned by a few selected shots and two of the enemy being hit

quietened

5. The Left flank guard proceeding by the track past Adallie Hill, arrived at Bogalti at 5.40 a.m. and hid in the bush whilst the nearer watering places were reconnoitered. No enemy and no tracks were seen. Lieut. Hughes and small party climbed Hill N of the river and saw indications of large herds to N. N.W. about 6.30 a.m. Camel corps scouts reported 12 riflemen moving towards Adallie by a parallel road to which the column had come. It was likely these men were going to snipe the convoy, news of which had no doubt reached the enemy. The Camel corps scouts followed and surprised the enemy killing three and getting their grass rifles and bandoliers. The latter each contained 5 cartridges. At 7 a.m. Lieut. Tilly who had posted an observation post on the hill previously referred to reported that a herd of camels protected by two riflemen were being brought down to water about 1 mile to West. I ordered Lieut. Tilly to take the half "A" Company and to try and round up the stock. I proceeded myself with this party. The stock was surprised, the few men with it bolting after firing a couple of shots. Owing to the inexperience of the troops the camels were frightened and took to the bush. One of the enemy and two camels were killed.

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quietened them a little, and sniping ceased at 11 a.m.

During this time stock was evidently being driven away from the ponds of which, observed in the air, and the enemy were collecting.

6: At 2 p.m. the march to join the convoy at Farnwen Dar was commenced. The road was unknown but the general direction indicated was N.E. so a track leading in this direction was followed. The order of march was: 1 section Infantry, Camel Corps leading camels, 1 section Infantry (Lieut. Tilly commanded the rear guard). The column kept as well closed up as the bush would permit. The water picket reported that the enemy had collected in large numbers some distance away. About 2.30 p.m. a determined attack was made on the rear guard eventually enveloping both flanks. Effendi Addi Sheriff Ahmed was wounded here, he went to cover the camels as they closed up to the front. There was some delay in moving off when the enemy's fire had been silenced as the wounded had to be dressed. Attacks by the enemy, chiefly on the flanks continued until 3.30 p.m. during which time progress had been very slow and only about 4 miles covered in the 3 1/2 hours. Two privates were wounded and about 3.15 p.m. a small bore bullet coming over the square dangerously wounded Lieutenant Bentinck who was leading up some men to reinforce the Left face. The final attack by the enemy was then in progress and was chiefly directed against the Left face, from a well selected position bordering on the Farnwen river bed. The square was somewhat extended at this time as the Left face had moved forward to seize a fire position, and to avoid vulnerability. On the Right face and rear there was some thick

bush from which occasional firing took place and which had to be closely watched. There was always the eventuality of a charge by spearmen to be considered. The enemy's last attack died down about 3.30 p.m. their ammunition probably being exhausted. Just before this a man called out in Swahili "Leave your rifles and take to your spears" but this seemed bluff and shortly afterwards firing ceased. There was some delay in improvising a "mac 'la" for Lieutenant Bentinck as poles had to be cut, but the column was able to move again at 5.40 p.m. Lieutenant Bentinck was carried by 16 men of the 1st Battalion and the rear was now, and had been since almost the first attack, been protected by the Somali section of the Camel corps.

About 6 p.m. the road led into the bed of the Farnwen river and as this was a certain road in the dark, compared with an unknown bush path, the column was proceeded by the river bed to Farnwen Dur sariba which was reached at 9.30 p.m. The column was followed but was not molested.

Two figures were seen approaching the sariba from the East at 4 a.m. next morning and were fired at.

7. Lieutenant Phillips with the convoy had left Matawasia at 2.15 a.m. and reached Farnwen Dur at 9 a.m. After arrival Lieutenant Phillips proceeded with a patrol of 16 men towards the Bogaiti - Jennadin road and then to Farnwen Dur hill at 11 a.m. He saw nothing except clouds of dust to the W and N.W. about 8 miles distant. A discharged syce following behind the convoy reported he had been stopped by some men

(6)

of the Rer Tulha but had been let go.

Return to
Serenli

8. On Thursday, 22nd January, I decided to halt for the day as it was necessary to water and graze camels. It was also necessary to obtain information. Here the want of Bilaloca or Mabatla men was again felt. The wounded had to be sent into Serenli and Lieutenant Bentinck's condition gave some anxiety. There was only one Medical Officer in the force; and the sick convoy would have to be strongly guarded. In view of the temper and determination of the enemy and with the large convoy that had to be guarded I considered my force too small to divide (there was also an additional reason which will be alluded to later). I therefore decided to return to Serenli with my whole force.

Information to the effect was sent by runners both to Garebehare and Serenli. To avoid the heat and for the convenience of the wounded I decided, although there was no moon, to march by night. This also had the advantage of disguising the direction taken from the enemy and as a further safeguard it was given out when the column marched that the destination was Farnwen Hos. The column reached Serenli at 9.40 a.m. 24th instant. The forty-one miles from Farnwen Dur being covered in under forty hours.

9.

① According to information subsequently obtained the enemy were reinforced by some 300 men a few hours after the convoy marched from Farnwen Dur to return to Serenli.

Strength of enemy.

9. It is difficult to estimate the strength of the enemy on the 21st but it seems obvious from their determination that they were in considerable force. In the early morning parties seen by Lieutenant Tilly when protecting the water picquet at Bogalti numbered 30 to 40 and they were collecting in bush from a large area during the whole forenoon. A Somali of the Camel Corps suggested 40 riflemen with about 10 rounds each[ⓐ] but in view of the intensity of the enemy's fire and that it lasted four attacks and continued intermittently for 3 hours this estimate, although accepted at the time and mentioned in my short report dated 22nd January, seems a very modest one. Although few of the enemy were seen a considerable number of spearmen were no doubt also present and in view of experience in N. Somaliland a charge by these had always to be reckoned with.

The square hampered by the camels of the Camel Corps was particularly conspicuous and vulnerable in the open glades and spaces that the enemy selected to attack in but fortunately only 3 camels were killed. The carriage of the wounded was also an additional anxiety.

Their determination.

10. The tenacity and determination of the enemy was quite unexpected suggesting that the temper of the Marehan has been hitherto quite misjudged.

Enemy's tactics.

11. The enemy's tactics deserve mention. Their riflemen seemed to avoid the column when it was in thick bush, but selected good fire position giving a field

[ⓐ] Recent intelligence obtained show that some 400 of the enemy were present, including 150 riflemen. Some of the Rer Hassan were with the Rer Tulha.

a field of fire of some 200 yards. They were apparently controlled for a whistle was heard sounding amongst them on several occasions. In view of Lieutenant Hartwick's wound they would seem to be in possession of small bore rifles.

Although an attack by spearmen was threatened as previously mentioned no such attack actually took place, but in thick bush this always had to be provided against which added considerably to the vulnerability of the square.

Camel Corps.

12. The conduct of the 42 men of the Camel Corps ("F" Company 8rd King's African Rifles), although hampered by their camels, was admirable and the Somali section invaluable. These men knew the tactics of the enemy and played up to them and were most thoroughly at home in the bush. This only emphasises the need for "illaloes" and local scouts and I am only quoting from "Official History of operations in Somaliland 1901-04" when I say "no operation can be conducted in this country without the aid of Somalis".

Enemy's flocks.

18. Very large herds of cattle &c., must have been in the vicinity of Bogalti and towards Farnwen Dur as numerous tracks of these were crossed on the afternoon of 21st January. Pony tracks were also seen, probably of some 10 or 12, but no mounted men were seen. This is not remarkable however as the enemy took excellent cover very few showing themselves. Only one was seen to be hit.

Casualties amongst Officers.

14. That casualties occurred amongst the officers

is probably due to the fact that they necessarily had to expose themselves considerably whilst most of the men were able to fire lying.

To prevent any possibility of the ammunition camel being stampeded I issued some of the reserve ammunition during the first attack and at every subsequent opportunity.

Ammunition expended.

15. The total amount of rounds fired was 3,980 an average of some 40 rounds per rifle; had fire discipline been a little better it might have been less.

Moral of Nyasa troops.

16. I regret I have to mention that the moral of some of the troops left much to be desired. After the first attack they became almost useless as scouts and as previously mentioned the rear guard duties devolved chiefly upon the Somali section of the Camel Corps.

From what I had observed at Serenli on a few parades held there I did not consider the men of 'A' Company 1st Battalion up to the standard of Nyasa troops. I purposely included them in the fighting force taken to Bogalti to give them an opportunity of proving their mettle. It also allowed Officer Commanding Convey (Lieutenant Phillips) to have his own unit of 'B' Company 1st Battalion for the defence of the vulnerable convoy. I must however record that I was much concerned at the conduct of the men of 'A' Company under fire. With 5 years previous experience of Nyasa troops including

Somaliland

Somaliland 1908-04 their conduct on this occasion was more a matter of surprise to me than even the unexpected temper of the enemy.

A few men were conspicuously good especially in view of the behaviour of the remainder. But the conduct of the majority was the cause of considerable anxiety to me until Serenli was reached, in fact it considerably influenced my decision to return to Serenli with the wounded. The men of 'A' Company had certainly not had much food or water during the 22nd a disadvantage not shared by the Camel Corps, but this can hardly be accepted as sufficient reason for their conduct.

I understand this Company was hurriedly recruited in Nyasaland for service in East Africa and had little time for training and weeding out. It is most necessary in recruiting native troops to take time and carefully select them, and it is only by constant training that their best characteristics as soldier can be developed.

The men of 'A' Company are chiefly from a tribe (Yao) that has produced excellent soldiers who have hitherto borne a reputation second to none in Africa, but it is worth recording that the few men who behaved well were of the less known tribes of the Nyasa Protectorate, members of which are frequently recruited and classified under the general term "Yao" 17. In conclusion I would bring to notice the very gallant conduct of Effendi Abdi Sheriff Ahmed 'F' Company (Camel Corps) 3rd K.A. Rifles.

This Native Officer, when the heavy firing was opened upon the rear guard, immediately rushed back

and

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✓
Gallant conduct
of Effendi Abdi
Sheriff Ahmed.

and joined Lieutenant Tilly and the infantry section detailed for the rear guard. He was then hit through the shoulder with a heavy gas bullet his shoulder being smashed. He still however assisted Lieutenant Tilly getting back men from the Camel Corps to close up the rear face of the square, and only ceased from loss of blood.

When his wound had been dressed and he was able to sit up again he continued, despite the pain he was suffering, giving advice and encouragement to the men during each successive phase of the fight, and on one occasion I was personally glad to act upon a suggestion he made.

Sd/- W.G. Stonor, Captain,

1st King's African Rifles,

Commanding Troops, Jubaland.

Sereniti,

21st January, 1914.

Gen 12767 Cal

261

DRAFT.

Agreement ~~to~~ Confidential

Gov Smith

Archie 20642

MINUTE

23 April 1916

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Sir G. Fiddell

Sir H. Jüst

Sir J. Anderson

Lord Emmott

Mr. Harcourt

Dear Sir,

I have the honor to
 transmit to you, for your
 info, an extract from
 a report furnished by
 Captain W.G. Stonor,
 1st Batta, K.A.R.,
 in certain operations
 in the Mercha country,
 E.A.P., between the 17th
 & 24th of January.

19. to see papers
on return

Para 16 of last incl.
12787/114

Gov 12767 Cal

261

DRAFT.

Agreement ~~to~~ Confidential

Gov Smith

Ans. 25642

MINUTE

23 April 1914

- Mr. [unclear]
- Mr. [unclear]
- Mr. [unclear]
- Sir G. [unclear]
- Sir H. [unclear]
- Sir J. Anderson
- Lord Entmott
- Mr. Harcourt

2

Have the honor to
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 inf. on recent
 a report furnished by
 Captain W.G. Stonor,
 1st Batta, K.A.R.,
 in certain operations
 in the Murchison country,
 E.A.P., between the 17th
 & 24th of January.

19. to see papers on return

para 16 of last ind. 12767/144

The extract is
of interest as indicating
that in this case
at any rate ~~the~~

the Nippon troops ('A' Company)
failed ~~as~~ as a whole

when under fire,

that those of the

Company ~~and~~ who

behaved well were of

the "less known tribes"

of Nipponland