

EAST AFR. PROT.  
2829

C O  
2829  
REC'D  
Frg 28 JAN 10

Colonial

1910

28 Jan

Last previous Paper.

5/10  
10585/9

Military & Police Expts

Extract from Sir P. Grouard's report in C.M.  
39400/09

W. Read

See also C.O.  
2830 regarding

I have had these extracts from Sir P. Grouard's report (39400/09 E.A.P.) registered for record. He has promised in his despatch covering the E.A.P. estimates for 1910-11 to go into the question of military & police expenditure in the course of that year. These extracts will be useful in considering his recommendations, when they arrive.

Wait till then

Chas. Stanger to see

at once  
Feb. 2

Dispatch of 20/1/10  
2/1/10  
2/1/10

subsequent Papers.

10  
2830/10

Mr Butler

I have attached some notes on the main  
points brought forward. The policy of  
small military detachments has  
already commenced. One office is  
now in Boron (W. of Bader) two  
offices in Masahit & one office  
is now in Tarkand country.

4th Feb 1841

Mr Read

These comments will be useful  
when we get on P. Croshaw's  
detailed proposals

Harb

Feb 11

Mr Fuller

Wait ?

4. 2. 41

21/2

at home

13

Notes on extract from Sir P. Girouard's report  
2829 E.A. and 2830 Uganda.

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1. Apparently in the 1600 K.A.R. the Volunteer Reserve is included. I make

2nd Bt. 425

3rd Bt. 790

Total 1,215 out of which two companies are at Zanzibar.

2. I agree that the military situation may be regarded as safe. The danger spot is of course Jubaland. In the scheme drawn up by Colonel Gaugh for dealing thoroughly with the Jubaland Somalis he estimates the force acquired as 2225, and this presupposes that these are highly trained regulars. This scheme is attached to 35166 E.A.P.

In considering the situation in comparison with Northern Nigeria it must I think be borne in mind that in Northern Nigeria there are no white settlers on the land in the ordinary acceptation of the word, and practically speaking no white women outside Zungura and Loko. In East Africa on the other hand there are, by Colonial Office list, 400 farmers and the future of the country depends largely on its attracting white settlers. It is therefore essential that there should be no question of the safety at any

25

rate of the civilized portion of the country. This I take it to be the chief reason for keeping a concentrated force somewhat larger in proportion to the whole, than is considered necessary in less civilized communities.

3. On page 3 complaint is made of the Military not supporting the Civil administration, it would seem most unfortunate that such accusations should be put forward unless they can be proved, it can only lead to friction and prevent that cordial co-operation between the military and civil administration which ~~would seem~~ so essential.

4. If a wider distribution of the troops is considered necessary it can be done, but it will be necessary to consider certain details which must be taken into account.

a. As a general rule it is undesirable to detach smaller units than a company. If small units below this, deterioration in both training and morale must occur and this deterioration rapidly increases in proportion to the number of small detachments.

b. If detachments are formed a larger proportion of officers and possibly white non-commissioned officers will be necessary. Very few officers can remain, single handed on detachment, living alone, without serious risk of deterioration in themselves as regards work, keenness and health.

I consider three officers for a company on detachment

detachment the minimum taking into consideration leave, sickness &c.

In Northern Nigeria we find approximately one officer to every 32 natives. In East Africa one to every 40. There are also 65 white Non-Commissioned Officers in Northern Nigeria.

5. If any disaster occurs to any detachment of regular troops retribution must follow quickly and thoroughly, it is therefore desirable before pushing them out to have a definite policy which will be carried out cost what it may, it is a serious thing to find out too late that the country is not worth fighting for.

6. With reference to the question of the Indian Contingent, as the new Contingent is just due the matter can well remain over for the present. I propose to take the matter up after I have been out there. It is obviously desirable to try and run our own show, but the military authorities I have consulted on the subject do not consider the time yet ripe to do entirely without them.

L1-2-10

*J. P. ...  
I have ...  
Reflected*

# East Africa Protectorate

## (IV) DEPARTMENTS.

### (a) MILITARY AND POLICE.

C O  
2829

Recd  
28 JAN 10

The existing Military and Police forces are:

1600 King's African Rifles, costing £50,000

2300 Police " " £55,000

3900 " " £103,000

The territory actively administered is about 100,000 square miles out of 220,000. The native Governments, such as they are, take no active part in politics.

Northern Nigeria, which has a more difficult situation, has:-

6,400 W.A.F.R.

700 Police

£,100,

the actively administered territory being about 200,000 square miles. The Mohammedan native Governments police their own areas.

The military situation must be characterized as particularly safe, and possessing almost unrivalled communication throughout the closely administered portions. Five of the provinces are along the railway with none of their out-stations 48 hours from it for forced marching. The Tanaland province is 24 hours steaming from Mombasa, and Jubaland three days from Mombasa. In Jubaland and along our northern boundary lie the bulk of the unadministered portion of the country. There is little to be feared from any combination

ination

combination of the native tribes within our administered areas, though differences with a particular tribe might arise. The northern frontier has hitherto been watched by a British agent from Adis Abeba, who has just been relieved by your orders by a British East African officer. In this regard I have read with interest Major Gwynn's report to the Foreign Office dated \_\_\_\_\_ and his conclusions. I am addressing you separately on the subject.

My conclusion, and that of my advisers, is that the only serious military situation which can arise is in the north from our own Somalis, the Tigrae hunters from Abyssinia, or from Abyssinia itself on the death of the Emperor Menelik.

Today the bulk of our military force is absent on Somaliland duty, apparently at the expense of the Protectorate. Normally they are mainly concentrated in Nairobi, where six companies out of a total of eight are stationed. In Northern Nigeria, with a somewhat dangerous position as to the possibility of a rising and combination of the Mohammedans forming the bulk of the native inhabitants, we had 21 companies to deal with the situation. Of these, six were stationed as a maximum at the depôts Zungeru and Lokoja, and 15 were spread out in companies or half-companies over the whole Protectorate, and frequently from 15 to 20 days march apart.

In British East Africa, Bombay, and the Indian Army

Army are only ten days away: the Aden garrison six; and Zanzibar two. There is moreover a British Volunteer reserve of 400 men. In Northern Nigeria the nearest reinforcement was the two weak battalions in Lagos and Calabar, until recently 20 days distance from Zungeru, and the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone West African Bataalions - 20 to 25 days distant.

Moreover the situation in Nigeria was rendered all the more difficult from the fact that the bulk of the troops was drawn from the communities which might combine against us - the Hausas, Kanuris, and Nupe. In British East Africa the bulk of the troops are Sudanese or Yaos, Anjals, etc., who have no sympathies with the indigenous inhabitants.

It is only this year that two troops have in any way come into touch with our administered areas or northern frontier, and the policy pursued generally does not tend towards the security of administered areas or a reduction of the Police force, which is very large for the country under control. The military forces do not give the assistance in the carrying on of the civil administration as I have been accustomed to witness, and I regret to say that a feeling obtains amongst provincial officers that there is a desire, on occasions when quartered at out-stations, to accentuate political situations in order to necessitate reprisals. Such views or desires have, I trust, become past history in British West Africa, and



it will only be by a wider distribution of the troops here that it will be possible to eradicate such ideals if they exist.

It has been suggested that the whole of our Colonial Military service might be increased in efficiency by the establishment of a Colonial Staff Corps on the lines of the Indian Staff Corps. There are, I believe, to-day over 300 British officers directing the Military forces controlled directly by the Colonial Department. It appears to me that the suggestion has many merits.

Wider distribution of the troops is necessary, and will result in crises under control by peaceable means the whole population; it would allow of the troops being more actively employed, and permit active administration on our northern frontier without entailing the creation of dangerous situations with our northern neighbour. In fact dangerous situations may be engendered if we do not obviate them.

Incidentally I think large savings in the Police will accrue. I do not wish to indicate that a Police force should be imposed upon the K.A.R., but at present large bodies of police are being maintained in certain Provinces as "garrisons", and this is a duty I consider should devolve on the Military forces. The northern frontier districts might with every advantage to-day be carried on by semi-military administrations. Their occupation will not justify the usual large civil outlay entailed here.

establishment

establishment of a purely civil province, and is moreover one more of military necessity than civil development. I have further considered the defence question as a whole in the Uganda Report.

I may say in conclusion that the bearing of the troops I have seen, very few in number, appears to denote a very satisfactory condition as to training.

(b) POLICE

The Inspector General of Police has submitted a scheme for the reorganisation of this force. Captain Edwards has based his reorganisation upon existing conditions of the force and not upon the general policy of the Protectorate - of which he could not be cognisant as it was hardly existent.

My previous remarks upon the condition of native administration will not allow of my accepting this fresh reorganisation until I have gone into the whole question of policy and further reported to your Lordship. The Inspector General's Report emphasises the somewhat purely military character of the force, and labours in the production of details of drill, musketry and stigmets. We already have such details worked out for the K.A.R., and it would appear possible to have laid down a shortened or amended course of instruction for the Police without the production of special drill and musketry manuals.

I have been much impressed with the bearing of the force, though I know little as yet of its internal organisation or detailed working.