

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI  
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH PUBLIC PARTICIPATION:**

**A CASE STUDY OF KENYA**

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
**A Research Project Submitted In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award  
of Masters Degree in International Studies from the Institute of Diplomacy and  
International Studies, University of Nairobi**

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## DECLARATION

I **Solomon Akadake Abwaku** hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for academic award or qualification in any other institution of higher learning.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the assigned university supervisor.

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Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## **DEDICATION**

To my loving wife and family for their support during the entire course

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## ABSTRACT

With the increasing rate of international terrorism and violent extremism, many countries especially in Africa have sought to find all the possible solutions to counter violent extremism. It is for this reason that I embarked on a research study to examine and analyse the role of public participation in Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) in Kenya. I was guided by the following set of questions: What are the existing initiatives, strategies and challenges for CVE globally; what has been the role of public participation in countering violent extremism in Africa; what are the challenges and opportunities for effective public participation in countering violent extremism in Kenya. Which were used to formulate study objectives as follows: To examine the existing initiatives, strategies and challenges for countering violent extremism globally; to examine and assess the role of public participation in countering violent extremism in Africa and to establish and analyse the challenges and opportunities for effective public participation in countering violent extremism in Kenya. Relative Deprivation and Liberal theories were used as analytical tools to examine political, socioeconomic and structural conditions that predispose individuals into radicalization resulting into violent extremism. I proceeded with these set of testable indicators: There are inadequacies in the existing global counter violent extremism initiatives and strategies; public participation in countering violent extremism is a new phenomenon and exclusion from political, economic and social life increase susceptibility of individuals to radicalization in Kenya. The study employed both qualitative and quantitative methods.

The study found out Kenya is among the first countries in Africa to pursue national level coordination of all CVE efforts but the aspect of public participation in CVE has been applied by NGOs, CSOs and community initiatives, with less application by government institutions. There is need for Kenya to pursue and strengthen mutually beneficial partnerships between the state, non-state actors and the community to develop and foster resilience against radicalization. The study thus, from the findings recommended on the need of building the capacity of local initiatives to design and deliver community-owned, sustainable CVE programs. The study also found the need for Kenya to enhance rehabilitation of returned fighters, constructing effective counter-narratives, developing community resilience and, especially, harnessing the power and influence of women, men and families in communities in combating extremist ideologies. The resultant synergy between the state and partners create harmony and unity of purpose leading to a coherent national strategy that combines hard and soft national power in a complementary onslaught to counter violent extremism. The researcher suggest the following areas for further research: Examining and assessing the key drivers of radicalization and violent extremism and countering violent extremism through a comprehensive framework of both state and non-state actors.

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

Over the last twenty years, national, regional and international community have gained momentum in a bid to counter terrorism, through military and non-military means. There has been a steady increase in efforts towards developing effective measures to counter terrorism and violent extremism, so as to reduce levels of radicalization of individuals into terrorist networks, and to minimize its effects. These efforts are made by both states and non-state actors, who are continually embracing less combatant measures that work towards addressing violent extremism. This observation is noted by Aldrich<sup>1</sup> who acknowledges a “shift from (traditionally) narrow hard security measures to a broader strategic approach that includes softer measures to CVE”. The ‘softer’ responses are not new, though have increasingly gained prominence in government and non-state responses.<sup>2</sup>

This study adopted Khan’s definition of Counter Violent Extremism as the “use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives.”<sup>3</sup>

The notion behind CVE is that violent extremists ought to not be fought absolutely with intelligence, police force, and armed means. The structural sources of violent extremism must also be undertaken, including intolerance, government failure, and political, economic, and social marginalization. This means that CVE approaches apply multilateral perspectives such as those in the field of criminology, sociology among others as they prevent and counter recruitment and radicalization of potential terrorists as well as building the public’s resilience to CVE.

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<sup>1</sup>Aldrich, D. P. (2012, June, 26). First Steps towards Hearts and Minds? USAID’s Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa. (*GPRI Digital Library*, 26 June 2012) Paper 8

<sup>2</sup>Ibid

<sup>3</sup>Khan, H. “Why Countering Extremism Fails: Washington’s Top-Down Approach to Prevention Is Flawed,” *Foreign Affairs*, 18 February 2015

For this study, CVE “is the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives”,<sup>4</sup> while “Public Participation is the deliberative process by which interested or affected citizens, civil society organisations, and government actors are involved in policy-making before a political decision is taken, by recognizing the pluralism of aims and values, and enables collaborative problem-solving designed to achieve more legitimate policies”.<sup>5</sup>

The study also uses Horgan’s definition of radicalization to mean “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political and religious ideologies”,<sup>6</sup> and “violent extremism as the advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives”.<sup>7</sup>

Since 11th September 2001 (9/11), law enforcement in different states globally, has occupied on a vital role in averting and responding to future instances of violent extremism. States have taken these roles while facing different challenges. One of these challenges is the nature of contemporary warfare as espoused by Mary Kaldor,<sup>8</sup> as the increasing involvement of non-state actors (such as individuals and the public) in countering violent extremism.

Due to the dynamics of contemporary warfare such as the direct target of civilians by combatants and the increased involvement of non-state actors in war and conflicts, there is an increasing appreciation that the larger public and specific communities are stakeholders in countering terrorism, rather than merely the passive object of law enforcement undertakings. These tactics contain of locally custom-made and focused initiatives that draw on corporations among a wide variety of actors, further than traditional security practitioners, to

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<sup>4</sup>Humera Khan, “Why Countering Extremism Fails: Washington’s Top-Down Approach to Prevention Is Flawed,” *Foreign Affairs*, 18 February 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-02-18/why-countering-extremism-fails>.

<sup>5</sup>Cohen J, Fung A, *Radical Democracy*, *Swiss Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2004), 2004a

<sup>6</sup>Horgan, J. *Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from radical and Extremist Movements*, (London: Routledge,2009)

<sup>7</sup>USAID, *The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency*. (USAID Policy. Washington D.C.: USAID, 2011)

<sup>8</sup>Kaldor, Mary, *New and old wars: organized violence in a global era*. (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999)

embrace other stakeholders in the community domain, in order to resolve the underlying causes of radicalization into violent extremism.<sup>9</sup>

This study seeks to explore the use of ‘soft power’ to counter violent extremism by engaging the public as a crucial stakeholder, benefactor and indispensable component in the CVE strategies.

## **1.2. Statement of the Research Problem**

Violent Extremism is a global security problem that has picked momentum in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The international arena is replete with terrorist activities that are transnational in nature as a result of globalization. Radicalization has become widespread resulting in the international community to re-examine existing security strategies in order to address emerging threats that have challenged state monopoly of the legitimate instruments of violence. The emergence of non-state actors as drivers of transnational crime such as violent extremism, demands designing of new strategies to address emerging crime paradigms.<sup>10</sup>

As elsewhere in the world, Africa has had its share of violent extremism by local cells with ideological connections to international terrorist groups.<sup>11</sup> Development of effective counter violent extremism strategies and initiatives is a matter of grave priority. These strategies should address the structural issues in society that drive individuals into radicalization with a view to eliminating the drivers and integrating communities in the fight against violent extremism.

Kenya has been a victim of violent extremism and continues to face real threats and therefore in dire need for effective counter violent extremism strategies. The country has not formulated and developed policies that specifically address and guide on how to counter violent extremism. Lack of deployment and utilization of locally tailored strategies that

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<sup>9</sup>Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: The Role of the United Nations Today and the Impact of Security Council Resolution 2178,” Global Center on Cooperative Security, November 2014, [http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Nov2014\\_UNSCR2178\\_CVE\\_NCF.pdf](http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Nov2014_UNSCR2178_CVE_NCF.pdf)

<sup>10</sup>Aldrich, D. P. (2012, June, 26). First Steps towards Hearts and Minds? USAID's Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa. Paper *GPRI Digital Library*, 26 June 2012

<sup>11</sup>Ibid

inculcate public participation in policy formulation and implementation creates gaps in the war against violent extremism.

Kenya is lacking a national counter extremism strategy that utilizes public engagement in preventing and managing radicalization into violent extremism such as addressing local grievances, community safety and protection, youth empowerment programmes, building community resilience, awareness creation among other strategies. Though there is literature on the CVE measures, there is inadequate literature on the engagement of the public, their roles in preventing and countering violent extremism. This study aims to fill that gap by exploring this strategy as a proactive solution to violent extremism menace.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

1. What are the existing initiatives, strategies and challenges for CVE globally?
2. What has been the role of public participation in CVE in Africa?
3. What are the challenges and opportunities for effective public participation in CVE in Kenya?

### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

The overarching objective of the study is to examine the role of public participation in CVE in Kenya. More specifically, the study seeks;

1. To examine the existing initiatives, strategies and challenges for CVE globally.
2. To examine and assess the role of public participation in CVE in Africa.
3. To establish and analyze the challenges and opportunities for effective public participation in CVE in Kenya.

## **1.5 Justification of the Study**

>*Academic justification*-There is inadequate research and current literature on the role and strategic importance of public participation in CVE, radicalization and terrorism in Kenya.

The study sought to add to the existing knowledge and propose areas for further research.

>*Policy justification*-From its findings, the study sought to generate policy actions for designing effective policies for CVE in Kenya.

## **1.6 Literature Review**

This part of the study reviewed existing literature on CVE, the role of public participation and how globalization has changed the dynamics of modern warfare and responses of states thereof in dealing with radicalization and violent extremism.

### **1.6.1. The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism**

“In 2014 the UN Security Council adopted the language of CVE for the first time in a resolution, as part of its response to the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) volunteering to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq”. “The Security Council also charged its counterterrorism-related subsidiary organs to advance work streams in the area”.<sup>12</sup>

“Governments across the world encounter multifaceted dynamics of extremism and revolt, particularly in the emerging world, alongside homegrown threats, violent terrorists, and growing right-wingers, all of which need effective together with practical counter strategies”.<sup>13</sup> Thus, CVE is the utmost important progress in counterterrorism in the last years and will continue to be top on the program for future counterterrorism practices. “Notably, governments will continue to invest on CVE programming, thus the role of civil society actors will be extended and refined over time”.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>UN Security Council, S/RES/2178, 24 September 2014; Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: The Role of the United Nations Today and the Impact of Security Council Resolution 2178,” Global Center on Cooperative Security, November 2014, [http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Nov2014\\_UNSCR2178\\_CVE\\_NCF.pdf](http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Nov2014_UNSCR2178_CVE_NCF.pdf).

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Peter Romaniuk, and Rafia Barakat, “Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress,” Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), September 2013,

According to Khan<sup>15</sup> CVE is “use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives.”

McCants and Watts<sup>16</sup> emphasize the aim of CVE is to “reduce the number of terrorist group supporters through non-coercive means.” Neumann<sup>17</sup> “captures the potentially unlimited range of activities that governments and others may pursue to prevent radicalization, which generally includes messaging, such as speeches, television programs, leaflets, and social media; engagement and outreach, such as town halls, roundtables, and advisory councils; capacity building, such as youth and women’s leadership initiatives, community development, and community safety and protection programs; and education and training, such as those of community leaders, public employees, and law enforcement”.

Neumann<sup>18</sup> suggests “CVE should be considered as a policy theme rather than a substantive policy domain”.

Absence of a flawless definition of CVE has resulted to contradictory results of the agendas set in place. Initiatives on CVE tend to be inclined to aim addressees at diverse levels (such as, to address helpless persons or communities or transmission to the overall public). Regularizing understanding of CVE and the tactic to developing, applying, and assessing its procedures holds the key to refining results and improving the ability to decide what can work.

### **1.6.2 The Concept of Public Participation**

Indirect participation and direct participation describe the two wide dimensions of public participation. “Indirect involvement concedes that electoral officers and expert managers

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<sup>15</sup>Humera Khan, “Why Countering Extremism Fails: Washington’s Top-Down Approach to Prevention Is Flawed,” *Foreign Affairs*, 18 February 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-02-18/why-countering-extremism-fails>.

<sup>16</sup>Will McCants and Clinton Watts, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes*, December 2012, [http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/McCants\\_Watts\\_-\\_Countering\\_Violent\\_Extremism.pdf](http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/McCants_Watts_-_Countering_Violent_Extremism.pdf)

<sup>17</sup>Peter Neumann, “Preventing Violent Radicalization in America,” *Bipartisan Policy Center National Security Preparedness Group*, June 2011, p. 18.

<sup>18</sup>*ibid*

should act on behalf of the people in a representative democracy”.<sup>19</sup> “Direct involvement suggests that citizens are the owners of the government and should be involved in the decisions of the State”.<sup>20</sup> “This simply means that it focuses on the role of the public in the process of administrative decision-making or their involvement in decision-making related to service delivery”.<sup>21</sup> “Political participation includes but is not limited to voting in elections, contacting elected officials and campaigning for political candidates”.<sup>22</sup> “The imperative for citizen participation is also drawn from their statutory duty to pay taxes for service delivery”.<sup>23</sup>

“Public participation in administrative decision making is thus inclusive of goal setting, determination of strategies, policies, and monitoring and evaluating government services”.<sup>24</sup>

“The techniques include but are not limited to public hearings and sittings, citizen advisory councils and citizen panels, neighbourhood or resident association meetings and citizen surveys among others”.<sup>25</sup> “The functional or practical areas for citizen involvement are economic development, education, security, environmental protection, public health and policing and public safety amongst others.”<sup>26</sup>

“Three things can be identified in regards to public participation in countering violent extremism: closing the widening gap between security professionals and the general public; increasing public awareness to new terrorism threats and greater public participation in counterterrorism and emergency preparedness of the public”.<sup>27</sup> “Public-oriented approaches to countering terrorism aim to strengthen public confidence in, and support for,

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<sup>19</sup>[www.tisa.or.ke](http://www.tisa.or.ke)

<sup>20</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>22</sup>Yang, K and Callahan, K. Assessing Citizen Involvement Efforts by Local Governments. *Public Performance and Management Review* Vol 29 (2), 2005

<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>[www.tisa.or.ke](http://www.tisa.or.ke)

<sup>25</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>Yang, K and Callahan, K. Assessing Citizen Involvement Efforts by Local Governments. *Public Performance and Management Review* Vol 29 (2). 2005

<sup>27</sup>[www.tisa.or.ke](http://www.tisa.or.ke)



counterterrorism policies and measures, including police action, thereby contributing to their legitimacy in the eyes of the public at large and certain communities in particular”.<sup>28</sup>

“Such approaches emphasize effective accountability of state authorities in their counterterrorism efforts to the public in general and, in particular, to those individuals and communities most directly concerned with counterterrorism policies and measures”.<sup>29</sup>

### **1.6.3 The Importance of CVE Initiatives to the Community**

“Communities have increasingly emerged as the point of focus in the formulation and implementation of counterterrorism policies”.<sup>30</sup> “A community consists of individuals, groups and institutions based in the same area and/or having shared interests”.<sup>31</sup> “This can be interpreted in the sense that a community is a stakeholder group, concerned about particular issues, measures or policies”.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, community cohesion can be agreed as the magnitude to which people link around common welfares and objectives, shared information, a logic of communal identity and belonging, mutual understanding and trust.

“Terrorists aim to inspire fear in all, or parts, of the public in order to draw attention to themselves, their grievances and goals, and to impose their demands on society and the state”.<sup>33</sup> “Such attacks and the narratives they convey can have a very divisive impact on society”.<sup>34</sup>

“An essential aspect of resilience to terrorism, especially in the immediate aftermath of attacks, is for state officials and political leaders to encourage cohesion and solidarity in society, to reaffirm their commitment to democracy and the rule of law and to reject violence and divisive ideas and stereotypes”.<sup>35</sup> “Communication in such times of crisis is

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<sup>28</sup>Mackenzie, S. and Henry, A., “Community Policing: a Review of the Evidence”, Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2009

<sup>29</sup>Ibid

<sup>30</sup>Audette, N. The New Face of Citizen Engagement. Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, v. 4, p. 49-60, fall 2013.

<sup>31</sup> Sean Kay, ‘Globalization, Power and Security’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No.1, 2004, p. 10

<sup>32</sup>Ibid

<sup>33</sup>Ibid

<sup>34</sup>Murray, J., “Policing Terrorism: a threat to community policing or just a shift in priorities?”, Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, Vol.6, No. 4, 2005, pp. 347–361.

<sup>35</sup>Mackenzie, S. and Henry, A., “Community Policing: a Review of the Evidence”, Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2009, <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/292465/0090209.pdf>

indispensable, yet delicate, and needs to be carefully prepared, as the public will be expecting information, statements and other interventions from state officials and political leaders”.<sup>36</sup>

“National counterterrorism policies, therefore, aim to build resilient communities that reject violent extremist, terrorist ideologies and propagandists, as well as to mobilize citizens, individuals and groups in society in support of counterterrorism goals”.<sup>37</sup> “While counterterrorism policies have traditionally focused on developing technical resilience, for instance, by protecting critical infrastructure and strengthening emergency response, there is growing recognition that insufficient emphasis has been placed on fostering resilience at the level of ideas to counteract the appeal of violent extremism and terrorism”.<sup>38</sup>

“Acts of violent extremism not only impact communities and their members, but terrorists also need and seek support, sympathizers and recruits from the public to be able to carry out their plans”.<sup>39</sup> “In this light, different states all over the world continue to put the community at the centre of their counterterrorism policies and measures, and to develop community-based approaches, with a particular emphasis on prevention and development of partnerships with the public”.<sup>40</sup> “However, the state needs to seek the support of civil society, the media, the private sector, and the business community to successfully counter violent extremism”.<sup>41</sup>

One of the most applied community-based strategies by governments is community policing. “Community policing was introduced in the 1960s as an alternative to the traditional paramilitary policing model that soured relations between law enforcement and communities”<sup>42</sup> Community policing’s popularity is based on the premise that in a democratic society, police need the assistance and resources of residents to effectively

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid

<sup>37</sup>Bill Durodié, “Terrorism and Community Resilience – A UK perspective”, Chatham House, ISP/NSC Briefing Paper No. 05/01, July 2005, pp. 4-5, <http://www.durodie.net/pdf/ChathamHouse.pdf>

<sup>38</sup>[www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org)

<sup>39</sup>Basia Spalek (ed.), Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terrorism Crime (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

<sup>40</sup>Ibid

<sup>41</sup>Basia Spalek (ed.), Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terrorism Crime (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

<sup>42</sup>Ibid

address crime”.<sup>43</sup> “In theory, community policing is intended to empower communities to define policing priorities and, accordingly, better serve their safety and socio-economic needs ”.<sup>44</sup> “The approach teaches communities to engage in self-help by acting and engaging in partnership with law enforcement agencies in a proactive manner to combat crime in their locality”.<sup>45</sup>

As Trojan<sup>46</sup> describes it, “community policing is a philosophy of full-service personalized policing where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with its citizens to identify and solve problems.” “Community policing also facilitates two way communications between the police and the public, encourages police to work with social services agencies to prevent crime before it occurs, and creates new channels for the police to learn more about neighbourhood problems”.<sup>47</sup>

“Nonetheless, community policing remains a work in progress that has produced mixed results”.<sup>48</sup> Although it took nearly three decades for police departments to earnestly adopt community policing globally, it is now hailed as one of the most effective means to prevent crime by combining law enforcement’s and communities’ unique skills and resources.<sup>49</sup> Thus, it was only a matter of time before community policing was introduced into countering violent extremism, particularly in light of the massive decentralized allocation of resources into countering violent extremism.

The European Union STRIVE program works with various stakeholders such as civil society organizations, research organizations, as well as policy makers and public bodies engaged in counter-terrorism work with the aim of fostering more effective global CVE efforts. “It

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<sup>43</sup>Skogan & Hartnett, Community policing, Chicago style, 5; Mitch Carr, Greensboro Police release 2012 crime statistics, Fox 8 WGHP (Feb. 4, 2013)

<sup>44</sup>Ibid

<sup>45</sup>Ibid

<sup>46</sup>Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Community Policing: How To Get Started 3 (1994)

<sup>47</sup>Ibid

<sup>48</sup>John Murray, Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities, Police Practice And Research 347, 352 (September 2005)

<sup>49</sup>Ibid

promotes effective non-coercive responses to terrorism, with the understanding that traditional coercive approaches could be ineffective and even counter-productive, and widening the pool of people involved in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) activities by raising the awareness of state and non-state actors; and building the capacity of credible voices within communities”.<sup>50</sup>

In Africa, there are several CVE initiatives. “Such programmes have principally been led and financed by donor governments – the UK, Denmark, the US – or intergovernmental organisations- UN, EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD) or the East African Community (EAC) – that rely on the experience and expertise of international and local practitioners or civil society organisations (CSOs) for their implementation”.<sup>51</sup> “This approach, aimed at mitigating the risk of antagonising specific communities, was then extended to SEED II, which adjusted its focus into reducing conflict proneness and fostering stability in and around Mogadishu, notably through job creation initiatives”.<sup>52</sup>

“In Kenya, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has adopted a policy which acknowledges the essential role of development in addressing grievances that drive violent extremism”.<sup>53</sup> “Also in 2011, USAID’s Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) was extended to include a CVE component with a focus on the infamous Nairobi neighbourhood of Eastleigh (KTI-E)”.<sup>54</sup>

## **1.7. Theoretical Framework**

The study was guided by two theoretical approaches: perspectives of the liberal state and relative deprivation. The perspective of liberal state recognizes, respects and gives priority to the rights of citizens to participate and influence the policy direction and orientation of the

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<sup>50</sup> Hedaya Center, The EU STRIVE Program, available at <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/admin/Content/File-1892016125218.pdf>

<sup>51</sup>José Luengo-Cabrera and Annelies Pauwels. Countering violent extremism: The Horn of Africa. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Issue No.14 April 2016, p.1-4

<sup>52</sup>Ibid

<sup>53</sup>Ibid

<sup>54</sup>José Luengo-Cabrera and Annelies Pauwels. Countering violent extremism: The Horn of Africa. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Issue No.14 April 2016, p.1-4

state.<sup>55</sup> “Liberal state theory presupposes the existence of many groups and organizations whose interests should be incorporated in decision making by the state in order to elicit their cooperation as stakeholders”.<sup>56</sup>

The theory of relative deprivation is a theory of political violence. According to Gurr,<sup>57</sup> “the gap between expected and achieved welfare creates collective discontent”. “He explains political violence as the result of collective discontent caused by a sense of relative deprivation”. Gurr<sup>58</sup> also writes that, “relative deprivation’ is a term used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence”. Gurr,<sup>59</sup> states that “frustration is caused by relative deprivation, and the resulting aggression is manifested as violent extremism”.

Frustrations are among some of the signs of individuals at risk of radicalization, therefore understanding the signs and creating awareness and involving the public can be effective. The two theories are useful to the study in that they complement each other. The liberal state theory presupposes cooperation among stakeholders who in the case of the study are the state and the public in alleviating feelings of relative deprivation in society. The study proceeded in the premise that public participation in proffering interventions that eliminate predisposition of individuals to radicalization is a proactive solution to countering violent extremism.

## **1.8 Hypotheses**

1. There are inadequacies in the existing global CVE initiatives and strategies.
2. Public participation in CVE is a new phenomenon in Kenya
3. Exclusion from political, economic and social life increase susceptibility of individuals to radicalization in Kenya.

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<sup>55</sup>Boas T and Gans - Moore J (2009) Neo - Liberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti Liberal Slogan. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44(1): 137 – 161.

<sup>56</sup>Brown W (2003) Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy. *Theory and Event* 7(1): 1 – 29.

<sup>57</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* ( Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

<sup>58</sup> Ibid

<sup>59</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* ( Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

## **1.9. Research Methodology**

This section will provide research methodology and area of study including such items as the research design, data collection procedures and techniques.

### **1.9.1 Research Design**

The study design used interviews and direct contact questionnaires to gather qualitative descriptions. Each questionnaire addressed a specific objective and administered to the respondents from the sampled groups. By using qualitative techniques, the design enabled the researcher to obtain valuable insights into the attitudes/or feelings.

### **1.9.2 Study Sites**

The study was conducted in Nairobi County in Kenya among Majengo and Eastleigh communities which are vulnerable to radicalization, as well as research institutes and CVE stakeholders in the vicinity of Nairobi County. This provided broad perspectives and a triangulation that illustrated various factors that motivate radicalization. The study also reviewed previous works on data collected by previous studies.

### **1.9.3 Study Population**

The study population of 113 respondents consisted of stakeholders in counter terrorism and counter radicalization, civil society, targeted vulnerable groups, security agencies and researchers.

### **1.9.4 Sample Size**

This involved using more than one individual and institutions from different areas and spreading the figure in all the sites to gather data. The interviews cut across the study population which included: community leaders, religious leaders, security agencies, both public and private, the youths among others. The study used a sample of 113 respondents.

### **1.9.5 Data Collection Methods**

The interviews were conducted using pretested interview guides and questionnaires that were administered to the study population.

### **1.9.6 Ethical Considerations**

The study objectives and methodology was explained to those who participated in the study. The principle of voluntary participation and the requirement of informed consent were emphasized to ensure confidentiality. Any information collected was handled confidentially. To protect interviewee's confidentiality, the timing and the location of the interview was not disclosed to anybody else. Their personal details and identification were kept confidential. This helped to stimulate the interviewees to participate in the research. All permits needed to be able to conduct the interviews were attained beforehand.

### **1.10 Chapter Outline**

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: The existing initiatives, strategies and challenge for CVE globally

Chapter Three: The role of public participation in CVE in Kenya

Chapter Four: The challenges and opportunities to effective public participation in CVE in Kenya.

Chapter Five: Data Analysis and Interpretation

Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations

## CHAPTER TWO: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CVE INITIATIVES AND STRATEGIES

### 2.1 Introduction

The impact of violent extremism and capacities for response and intervention varies from region, country and community. Capacity is largely shaped by the political, economic, social and security contexts.

“The overall objective of these initiatives is to stop, eliminate and counterbalance radicalization. Therefore different CVE strategies are necessary for different stages of the radicalization continuum”.<sup>60</sup> This chapter looks at different initiatives that focus on countering violent extremism.

### 2.2 CVE Initiatives by the U.S.

“Countering violent extremism in the United States of America (US) received a renewed focus after the April 2013 Boston marathon bombing and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).” “Revamped CVE efforts in Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis-St.Paul called ‘Three City Pilot’ begun in 2014 aimed at ISIS radicalization”.<sup>61</sup>

“Boston’s plan, A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies, identifies seven focus areas ranging from addressing community isolation to foreign policy concerns to cultural competency and was launched in White House during a three day event in 2015”.<sup>62</sup> It emerged that “Providing services to individuals before mobilization toward violent extremism is challenging when there is a lack of understanding regarding violent extremism and with limited intervention programs”.<sup>63</sup>

The Los Angeles Framework “focuses primarily on enhancing existing community engagement events and building networks of public and private sector programs to address

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<sup>60</sup>Steven Heydemann, “Countering Violent Extremism as a Field of Practice,” USIP Insights, Issue 1, Spring 2014.

<sup>61</sup> Speech by Attorney General Eric Holder, September 15, 2014. Available at: <http://www.justice.gov/opa/video/countering-violent-extremism>

<sup>62</sup>A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies, February 2015. Available at: <http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/03/27/framework.pdf>

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.



violent extremism”. “The policy document also calls for the creation of intervention programs, called off-ramps”. “While lacking the granularity of the Boston framework, the Los Angeles plan does identify potential concerns of any intervention program, such as the need to consider legal liabilities for interveners”.<sup>64</sup> “Minneapolis-St Paul has yet to publicly release its strategy but a fact sheet presented at the White House CVE Summit indicates a heavy focus on perceived drivers of radicalization, such as lack of economic opportunity and difficulty in school”.<sup>65</sup>

In 2012, “the U.S. Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) urged the executive branch to create a system to deal with radicalized individuals who have not mobilized to violence, highlighting the dearth of tools available to law enforcement agencies besides arrest:”

*“The U.S. Government needs to develop options within Constitutional and statutory constraints for situations in which federal law enforcement, such as the FBI, comes in contact with an individual who is radicalizing. It is not law enforcement’s or the Intelligence Community’s role to seek to change an individual’s beliefs protected by the First Amendment, as opposed to focusing on criminal conduct. An individual’s family, friends, and local community and religious leaders are best suited to dissuading the individual from criminal activity as well as rolling-back the radicalization. The U.S. Government needs to resolve the extent to which federal law enforcement can share information concerning radicalized individuals with family, friends, and local community and religious leaders”.*<sup>66</sup>

A year after the Boston Marathon bombing, Lisa Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, spoke at Harvard University on this topic:

*“Parents might see sudden personality changes in their children at home—becoming confrontational. Religious leaders might notice unexpected clashes over ideological differences. Teachers might hear a student expressing an interest in traveling to a conflict zone overseas. Or friends might notice a new interest in watching or sharing violent material. The government is rarely in a position to observe these early signals, so we need to do more to help communities understand the warning signs, and then work together to intervene before an incident can occur”.*<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism, February 2015. Available at: <http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los%20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVEFull%20Report.pdf>

<sup>65</sup>Building Community Resilience: A Minneapolis-St Paul Pilot Program. Available at: <http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MinneapolisSt%20Paul%20Building%20Community%20Resilience%20Program-Pilot%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf>

<sup>66</sup> Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism, U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 2012

<sup>67</sup>U.S. vs. Shannon Maureen Conley, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, July 2014

The U.S. government has increasingly been paying more attention on the individuals within the state and embraced domestic terrorism and radicalization.<sup>68</sup> “Nonetheless, the use of targeted interventions so far has been unsystematic and lacks a clear framework”.<sup>69</sup> “It is deployed at the whim of local authorities rather than via an articulated and tested methodology”.<sup>70</sup> “The models that provide particularly relevant and replicable lessons for U.S. authorities are those of other democratic societies with relatively similar cultural, political, and social characteristics”.<sup>71</sup>

### **2.2.1 USAID CVE Initiative**

It was in 2006 when the United States Agency for International Development started efforts on CVE partnering with Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism a very key interagency on matters associated in preventing and countering violent extremism. This was followed by the release of a framework provided in two documents that laid out how to understand the key drivers of Violent Extremism and the response mechanisms.

“In 2011 a USAID policy on violent extremism and insurgency was approved, recognizing the role development can play in addressing the social, economic and governance grievances that drive violent extremism”.<sup>72</sup> The policy put together a framework that identifies the key drivers and factors that lead individuals to succumb to radical recruitment locally and provides ways to address these conditions that lead individuals to join these terrorist groups. CVE has also been institutionalized in all the areas through an internally coordinated secretariat.

“USAID has coordinated closely with the U.S. Department of State and other U.S. agencies to design and implement programming focused on youth empowerment, social and economic

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<sup>68</sup>bid

<sup>69</sup>bid

<sup>70</sup>bid

<sup>71</sup>bid.

<sup>72</sup>A common and safe future, Government of Denmark, January 2009

inclusion, media and messaging, improved local governance, reconciliation, and conflict mitigation”.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, the importance of development assistance and stabilization efforts in preventing and CVE were highlighted in 2015 during a White House Summit on CVE where an action agenda was agreed by international leaders. The creation of a global CVE network for the youth is together with a network for CVE research among other things that will reflect on the nexus between CVE and development.

### **2.3 Countering Violent Extremism in European Countries**

Within the European countries, Great Britain was the pioneer in the field of CVE in 2003 when they launched PREVENT an initiative meant to implement a comprehensive domestic CVE strategy. “Despite its many revisions and widespread criticism, Prevent remains a model from which the European Union and most European governments draw inspiration”.<sup>74</sup> Largely motivated by the dramatic growth of the phenomenon of European foreign fighters travelling to Syria, many other European countries have introduced CVE measures over the years. Most of their strategies are not limited exclusively to the issue of radical Islamist-inspired violence. Yet, in reality, the vast majority of initiatives and resources are devoted to stemming Islamist extremism.

“European CVE programs differ greatly from one another in terms of aims, structure, budget, and underlying philosophy, and each individual program is deeply shaped by the host country’s unique political, cultural, and legal elements”.<sup>75</sup>

A plan named “Principles Governing Danish Development Assistance for the Fight against the New Terrorism,” was launched by Denmark in 2004. “The Danish principles establish that security is necessary for development and that ensuring stability and security can be

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<sup>73</sup>Daniel Koehler, “Family Counseling as Prevention and Intervention Tool against ‘Foreign Fighters.’ The German ‘Hayat’ Program,” Journal EXIT-Deutschland, Issue 3/2013

<sup>74</sup>Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, Countering Radicalization in Europe, International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, King’s College London, December 2012

<sup>75</sup>Preventing Radicalization to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response, RAN (Radicalization Awareness Network) Collection: Approaches, Lessons Learned and Practices, First Edition, January 15, 2014.

investments in poverty reduction and economic growth”.<sup>76</sup> “Denmark’s early adoption of this stance indicated its commitment to traditional development goals and all the factors that can affect them, as well as its acknowledgment that Denmark’s own security could be improved by integrating the two fields”.<sup>77</sup> “

An action strategy “detailing its efforts to improve preventive measures to counter violent extremism”, was launched in 2014 in Norway. “The action plan acknowledges that broader prevention encompasses reducing poverty, improving conditions for youth, and fighting marginalization”. “Norway is also documenting lessons learned from other countries”.<sup>78</sup> “The issue of violent extremism is fluid and rapidly changing and has consequently designated the action plan as dynamic and subject to updates as situations evolve”.<sup>79</sup>

## **2.4 European Union**

“The European Security Strategy of 2003 acknowledged that security is a requirement of development. In a 2011 development policy document, the European Commission argued that the European Union’s” “development, foreign and security policy initiatives should be linked so as to create a more coherent approach to peace, state-building, poverty reduction and the underlying causes of conflict”.<sup>80</sup>

“This has spurred a harmonization of EU development and external policies, including development approaches that aim to strengthen the resilience to violence and extremism of communities around the world”.<sup>81</sup> “For example, the EU has taken an integrated approach to the Sahel region by identifying that security and development are interwoven in this region and therefore must be treated as one entity”.<sup>82</sup> “In order to achieve sustainable security in the Sahel, the EU strategy dictates that development processes, promotion of good governance,

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<sup>76</sup>Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfellow, and James Putzel, “Introductory Article: On the Discourse of Terrorism, Security, and Development,” *Journal of International Development* 18, no. 1 (January 2006): 51–6

<sup>77</sup>Ibid

<sup>78</sup>Ibid

<sup>79</sup>Ibid

<sup>80</sup>European Commission, “Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change,” COM(2011) 637 final, 13 October 2011, p. 11

<sup>81</sup>European Commission, “STRIVE for Development,” 2015, Available [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/strive-brochure20150617\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/strive-brochure20150617_en.pdf).

<sup>82</sup>Ibid

and improvement of the security situation need to be conducted in a coordinated manner”.<sup>83</sup>

“The EU ultimately recognizes the role it can play in encouraging economic development and helping the Sahel achieve the stability necessary to sustain it”.<sup>84</sup>

## **2.5 Pakistan CVE Initiatives**

### **2.5.1 De-radicalization Programmes**

“Pakistan’s first de-radicalization programme started in September 2009, after completion of Pakistan army’s counter-terrorism offensive against the Pakistani Taliban in Swat”.<sup>85</sup> “Most of the militants apprehended during the operation were teenagers and young kids who were trained as suicide bombers”.<sup>86</sup> “The overwhelming presence of youth among the detainees forced the security forces to revisit the traditional counter-terrorism approaches”.<sup>87</sup> “A need was felt to introduce a militant rehabilitation programme”. “To start the programme, Pakistan army converted four-large school buildings in Swat into de-radicalization centres”.<sup>88</sup> “The programme in Swat aimed to rehabilitate the militant detainees who worked with the Taliban”.<sup>89</sup> “The idea was to provide them with a second chance by restoring their self-worth and make sure they do not return to terrorism. So far, 2500 Taliban militants have been rehabilitated”.<sup>90</sup> “The Swat de-radicalization programme comprises Sabaoon for kids between 12-18 years), Rastoon (for youth between 19-25 years) and Mishal centres (for militants families to create awareness to look after the rehabilitated individuals)”.<sup>91</sup> “The overall management and supervision of the programme is in Pakistan military’s hand;” “however, an umbrella body of local civil society and non-governmental organizations, Hum Pakistan Foundation (HPF) is involved in different activities inside the centres”.<sup>92</sup> “Since 2009,

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<sup>83</sup>Ibid

<sup>84</sup>Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, “Action Plan Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” G-0433 E, 2014

<sup>85</sup>Ibid

<sup>86</sup>Jason Burke, “Fighting Terrorism: Do De-radicalization Camps Really Work,” Guardian, June 9, 2013,

<sup>87</sup>Ibid

<sup>88</sup>Hassan Abbas, “The Roots of Radicalization in Pakistan,” South Asia Journal, Issue 9, Summer 2013

<sup>89</sup>Ibid

<sup>90</sup>Ibid

<sup>91</sup>Ibid

<sup>92</sup>Ibid

Sabaoon has rehabilitated around 200 militants, while the Rastoon has rehabilitated 1196 militants”.<sup>93</sup>

### **2.5.2 Punjab De-Radicalization Programme**

“In 2011, another de-radicalization programme was initiated in eastern Punjab under the joint management of police’s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and Technical Vocational Training authority (TEVTA)”. “The de-radicalization programme in Punjab was shelved in 2012 by the Punjab government due to funds scarcity. Around 1300 more militants, who had to undergo rehabilitation in different batches, could not be taken on board because of the closure of the programme”.<sup>94</sup>

“The Punjab rehabilitation programme focused on ex-militants of the Kashmiri Jihadi groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad and antiShia militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan)”.<sup>95</sup> “The programme was based on a three-pronged strategy of prevention, rehabilitation and after-care”.<sup>96</sup> “It had three modules: psychological assessment, religious rehabilitation and vocational training”. “Three batches of around 311 participants completed the training”. “The training and rehabilitation were organized at various regional and district headquarters to make it convenient for participants to attend”.<sup>97</sup> “The country’s first National Internal Security policy (NISP) adopted a five-pronged counter-terrorism approach to dismantle, contain, prevent, educate and reintegrate. NISP has given Pakistan the institutional structure which was required to manage the competing demands of different security and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) for countering terrorism”.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>93</sup>Shehzad H, Qazi, “A War without Bombs: Civil Society Initiatives Against Radicalization in Pakistan,” Policy Brief no. 60, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, February 2013

<sup>94</sup>“Rehabilitation and integration: 47 ex-militants freed after they receive vocational training,” Express Tribune (Islamabad), October 13, 2013

<sup>95</sup>Zill-e-Huma Rafique and Mughees Ahmed, “De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts: Analysis of Anti-terrorism Activities in Pakistan,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 2, Issues, February 2013, 115-124

<sup>96</sup>Ibid

<sup>97</sup>Ibid

<sup>98</sup>Ibid

“According to NISP, National Counter Terrorism Authority (NCTA), created in 2009 is the central agency to coordinate and implement counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan”.<sup>99</sup>

## **2.6 Albania Government CVE Initiatives**

Given the rich multi-religious tradition, and the commitment to secularism of Albania, extremism among any one group could lead to growing extremism in other parts of society. The Albanian National Strategy was adopted in the first half of 2016. The Albanian government started to seriously discuss this issue after the White House Summit in 2015, starting their own effort to develop a Strategy and Action Plan for CVE. The decision was made to separate CT and CVE strategies as they see them as two different issues and challenges.

The strategy sought to look beyond just the law enforcement agencies (LEAs), instead including all national capacity - schools, teachers, and social workers, religious communities - to mobilize everyone to work together in support of prevention. There are four Strategy focus areas. “The first is education which aims to explain the issue and dangers and “vaccinate” students against extremism; develop modules for teachers and students; consider introduction of a culture or history of religions approach; the Ministry of Education as the lead”.<sup>100</sup>

“The second is engagement with religious leaders: ensure imams participate in implementation and can play a constructive role; improve the education system of imams to ensure support and continuation of Albanian values”.<sup>101</sup> “The third is considering the social aspects by engaging teachers who are in a position to reach out to their students; as Albania is a centrally organized state, and the central government is represented in all communities through the medical system, schools, social welfare, use the social welfare system to reach out to additional thousands of people, including the unemployed, the marginalized, youth,

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<sup>99</sup>Zill-e-Huma Rafique and Mughees Ahmed, “De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts: Analysis of Anti-terrorism Activities in Pakistan,” *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol. 2, Issues, February 2013, 115-124

<sup>100</sup>Ibid

<sup>101</sup>Ibid

and offer a new perspective through jobs, training; the Ministry of Social Welfare and Youth is the noted lead”.<sup>102</sup>

“Lastly academia and media, which engages academics to provide facts via studies and research to ensure a better systematic understanding of the phenomenon here; motivate universities, professors, journalists and researchers to work on such topics”.<sup>103</sup> The government saw these as important first steps, but acknowledged that more issues can and should be included – the issue of justice for example. However the Strategy was seen as a start. They are in the process of setting up coordination/monitoring mechanism to oversee implementation. They plan to organize events to further introduce their concept, and to ensure continued support. (Albania has support from the US and EU, and is in the process of reaching out to others in south Eastern Europe.) Independent respondents describe the extent of consultation with civic groups as modest, noting that this reflects the reality of Albanian governance more broadly, as civil society dialogue and communication/coordination was not institutionalized.

However, some CSOs were invited to provide input and were consulted on certain aspects. While the Islamic Community was a participant in the strategy development, rural community representatives were not. Future refinement and iterations are urged to be more consultative. Governmental and non-governmental actors alike noted that without action and dedicated follow up the strategy and action plans will remain just words on paper. However, having the documents provides a first step. “The Albanian government has also opened up a new NATO training centre to focus on anti-radicalism, aimed at understanding drivers and designing prevention strategies”.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>102</sup>Ibid

<sup>103</sup>Ibid

<sup>104</sup>“NATO Anti-Radicalism Center to Open in Albania.” Transitions Online. 16 May 2016



## 2.7 Kosovo

The main acknowledged extremism/ violent extremism threat in Kosovo is the impact of ISIL/Daesh-inspired groups, and in particular returning FTFs. However, the tense situation in the north created space for other manifestations of nationalist extremism, potentially leading to escalatory spirals. “After 1999, Salafists began coming to Kosovo, bringing money, NGOs/charitable organizations, new religious interpretations and new influence”,<sup>105</sup> often preaching that the way Islam had been practiced until 1999 was in fact incorrect.

Imams from Kosovo went to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen and Egypt and then returned and started teaching from schools of Islam different than the Hanafi tradition of Kosovo. These returning imams weren’t necessarily radical in their behaviour/ actions, but in their thought and teaching; this was new. Poor, rural, marginalized communities were often the target of such outreach; however, signs of radicalization were also evident in the capital Prishtina.<sup>106</sup>

Until 2014, the government mostly focused on CT, not CVE. In 2014, there were more than 130 arrests, including FTFs, recruiters and collaborating imams. Illegally operating mosques were closed, as were several NGOs with ties to extremist activity. However there are differing opinions regarding the depth and breadth of these operations. Some respondents described it more as an exercise in public relations to show that something was happening and the government was acting. “Others were concerned about the lack of proper investigation. In 2015 PVE/CVE began to get more attention”.<sup>107</sup>

In September 2015, the government approved the National Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization which led to Terrorism. The strategy goes to 2020 - a five-year plan. The Action Plan is finished and is envisioned to be a flexible document, responsive to ongoing implementation experiences. The Kosovo Security Council is the body responsible for monitoring implementation of the strategy, with a five-person working group (technical)

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<sup>105</sup>Xharra, Arbana. “Few but Fanatical- the Kosovo Women who go over to ISIS.” Balkan Insight. 26 January 2016

<sup>106</sup>Ibid

<sup>107</sup>Kursani, Shpend. “Report Inquiring into the Causes and Consequences of Kosovo Citizens’ Involvement as Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.” Kosovo Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper 04/2015. April 2015.

and a larger government working group involved in implementation. The larger working group includes Ministries' representatives (Labour, Foreign Affairs, Education, and Security), NGOs, religious communities and others who led the actions indicated in the Action Plan. The larger group is supposed to meet twice per year.<sup>108</sup>

A National Coordination Mechanism contact leads the joint working group. A donor conference was organized to support the strategy implementation; there were mixed comments on the success of the conference. An acknowledged weakness of the CVE Strategy development is that it did not include local levels of government, or local level input. However, the government decided that time was critical, so the process moved forward. As a part of implementation, the government reached out to municipalities to improve central and local government communication.

Overall, Kosovo is still in the early phases of implementation. Respondents are fairly confident the police and security services have the capacity to fulfil their role. However, there is across the board less confidence in the bodies responsible for prevention – social welfare, education and judicial processes. Regional cooperation on this matter is complicated by the Kosovo status issue.<sup>109</sup> For example, Kosovo authorities have limited cooperation with Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, but often through other partners due to the politics involved. Kosovo is not a member of Interpol. There is regular cooperation with police and intelligence/ security services in Albania, including regular focal points and contacts.

Contacts with Montenegro are characterized as limited, as the scope of the potential problems is viewed as limited. Officials note that it is useful to meet colleagues and counterparts informally at conferences, if they cannot meet formally at bilateral meetings.

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<sup>108</sup>Xharra, Arbana. "Few but Fanatical- the Kosovo Women who go over to ISIS." Balkan Insight. 26 January 2016

<sup>109</sup>Kursani, Shpend. "Report Inquiring into the Causes and Consequences of Kosovo Citizens' Involvement as Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq." Kosovo Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper 04/2015. April 2015.

## 2.8 Turkey

Turkey is unique in this study in that it is facing three different Violent Extremism threats: ISIL/Daesh inspired extremism; the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan; Kurdistan Workers' Party); and the DHKP/C (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front) and smaller leftist/Marxist-Leninist groups. Different respondents differently rank the threat of ISIL/ Daesh vs. the PKK,<sup>110</sup> but most agree that at this stage they are feeding off of one another.

While the Turkish government is accustomed to the threat from the PKK, the ISIL/Daesh threat is new, and has grown and taken root quickly. The ISIL/ Daesh threat is also viewed as more unpredictable. Nearly all independent respondents noted that the threat of radicalization and VE has not been taken seriously enough beyond military and CT response, and that more pro-active and preventive approaches are needed as well.

Turkey is involved in many efforts to counter terror at the global level, including the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh, the Global Forum for CT, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (where it was chair of the Horn of Africa Working Group) and other international fora. Turkey also supports global CT efforts by providing access to air bases in support of regional military actions.<sup>111</sup> It was also noted that Turkey's efforts to secure its borders contributes to CVE regionally, particularly related to the issue of FTFs.

Domestically, the Turkish National Police are engaged in countering radicalization, including awareness-raising, social projects, preventive engagement with families, and professional training of officers. The TNP has also established a research centre within the Police Academy to better support in the field.<sup>112</sup> Such efforts, in 81 provinces throughout the country, have great potential, and could be strengthened through more outreach and coordination with independent.

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<sup>110</sup>Kursani, Shpend. "Report Inquiring into the Causes and Consequences of Kosovo\* Citizens' Involvement as Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq." Kosovo\* Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper 04/2015. April 2015.

<sup>111</sup>Kursani, Shpend. "Report Inquiring into the Causes and Consequences of Kosovo\* Citizens' Involvement as Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq." Kosovo Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper 04/2015. April 2015.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid

## **2.9 Conclusion**

From this chapter, it is clear that impacts of violent extremism vary by country and community; so do capacities to respond. Global CVE initiatives are increasing where states and non-state actors are applying liberal approaches to countering terrorism in general. The CVE initiatives serve as a practical reference on how different states are preventing and managing violent extremism, where Kenya can borrow from these practices from both developing and developed states within Kenya's capacity and demography. The challenge observed in these initiatives is that they lack coordination between the NGOs, community and government institutions which is needed in order to provide the support effective for CVE measures.

This chapter sought to address the study's second objective which was meant to examine the existing initiatives, strategies and challenges for CVE globally. It was quite evident from the data reviewed that, even though quite a number of initiatives exist in an effort to counter violent extremism, which encounter numerous challenges in their formulation and particularly implementation, a lot still needs to be done. This discovery confirmed the researcher's assumption that there indeed exist inadequate CVE initiatives globally.

The interface between security, good governance, inclusivity and development is indispensable in mitigating drivers to radicalization. The existing global CVE initiatives and strategies differ in contexts, models and philosophical grounding but converge in their prevention of radicalization underpinnings. The main challenge is lack of coherent global approaches to countering violent extremism that according to this study explains the inadequacies of existing initiatives.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CVE IN AFRICA**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter seeks to explore factors surrounding the concept of public participation in counterterrorism as an evolving and much needed strategy in the African continent that is more prone to violent extremism.

### **3.2 The Concept of Public Participation**

Public participation is either direct or indirect. Indirect involvement “acknowledges that electoral officials and professional administrators should act on behalf of the citizens in a representative democracy”.<sup>113</sup> Direct involvement suggests that “citizens are the owners of the government and should be involved in the decisions of the State”. “This simply means that it focuses on the role of the public in the process of administrative decision-making or their involvement in decision-making related to service delivery”.<sup>114</sup> “It thus implies governmental efforts to involve citizens in administrative decision making and management processes”. “Since it occurs primarily at the administrative-citizen interface direct participation therefore differs from political participation”. “The latter includes but is not limited to voting in elections, contacting elected officials and campaigning for political candidates”.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup>[www.tisa.or.ke](http://www.tisa.or.ke)

<sup>114</sup>ibid

<sup>115</sup>Yang, K and Callahan, K. (2005) Assessing Citizen Involvement Efforts by Local Governments. Public Performance and Management Review Vol 29 (2).

“The imperative for citizen participation is also drawn from their statutory duty to pay taxes for service delivery thus this means that they are not only consumers of services but essential financiers of government”.<sup>116</sup> “Citizen Participation in administrative decision making is thus inclusive of goal setting, determination of strategies, policies, and monitoring and evaluating government services”.<sup>117</sup> “Public participation activities would then relate to the techniques and mechanisms to arrive at these through but are not limited to public hearings and sittings, citizen advisory councils and citizen panels, neighbourhood or resident association meetings and citizen surveys among others”.<sup>118</sup> “The functional or practical areas for citizen involvement are economic development, education, security, environmental protection, public health and policing and public safety amongst others”.<sup>119</sup>

### **3.3 Public Participation in Counterterrorism**

“For a long time counterterrorism measures have focused on external strategies before transitioning to focus on domestic terrorist ideological groups”. “Many governments focused on integrating state and local law enforcement, sealing the borders and securing the infrastructure”. “Eventually, there has been a shift to raise awareness and cooperation in critical stakeholders”.<sup>120</sup> “Yet there was never really a prolonged undertaking to keep the public in participation; especially when security services turned their sights internally”.<sup>121</sup>

“The Boston Marathon Bombing is a perfect example of government security and public cooperation”.<sup>122</sup> “All the surveillance programs in the US did not prevent, deter, or capture the jihadists involved in the attack and did not prevent the apprehension of Tamerlan Tsarnaev beforehand, in spite of being warned by Russia, and they did not prevent his re-entry into the US, even as a person of risk”.<sup>123</sup> “Citizens help identify suspects and bring

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<sup>116</sup>Ibid

<sup>117</sup>Ibid

<sup>118</sup>Ibid

<sup>119</sup>Yang, K and Callahan, K. (2005) Assessing Citizen Involvement Efforts by Local Governments. *Public Performance and Management Review* Vol 29 (2).

<sup>120</sup> Bartlett, J. and Birdwell, J., *From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society*, London: Demos, 2010

<sup>121</sup>Mackenzie, S. and Henry, A., “Community Policing: a Review of the Evidence”, Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2009

<sup>122</sup>Ibid

<sup>123</sup>Ibid

problems to the attention of law enforcement and Officers also get out of their cars and begin to walk the beat again, getting to know the people in the community that they are charged with protecting”.<sup>124</sup>

“It is through these daily interactions that law enforcement officers and community members build trust and work together to solve some of the crime and disorder problems of the neighbourhood”.<sup>125</sup> “Whether or not public participation has become an institutional feature of government and public policy decision making, the degree of attention being given to expanding ordinary citizens’ roles in the policy process underscores the need to consider what effects these processes might and will have on public policy decisions and on those who participate in them”.<sup>126</sup> “Democratic theory tells us that public participation is undertaken for different purposes and with different underlying goals”.<sup>127</sup> “Lying somewhere between is the desire for public participation to contribute to a more educated and engaged citizenry”.<sup>128</sup>

### **3.4 Public-Oriented Approach to Counter-Terrorism**

That the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities has been a growing recognition. “Some OSCE participating States are developing community-oriented approaches to countering terrorism that emphasize public support and participation in order to increase accountability and effectiveness”.<sup>129</sup> “These approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations, businesses and/or the media”.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>124</sup>Ibid

<sup>125</sup>Innes, M., “Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing”, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 605, May 2000

<sup>126</sup>[www.ipea.gov.br](http://www.ipea.gov.br)

<sup>127</sup>Ibid

<sup>128</sup>Abelson J, Forest P-G, Eyles J, Smith P, Martin E, and Gauvin F-P. “Obtaining public input for health-systems decision making: Past Experiences and Future Prospects”. *Canadian Public Administration* 2002, 45(1) Spring: 70-97

<sup>129</sup>Ibid

<sup>130</sup>Huckerby, J. C., “Women and Preventing Violent Extremism: the USA and UK experience”, briefing paper, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York: New York University School of Law, 2012

“What the terrorists target is to inspire fear in all of the public in order to draw attention to themselves, their goals and grievances as well as to impose their demands on society and the nation”. “They seek to communicate through their attacks and the propaganda surrounding them, their particular interpretation of reality and what should be done”. “Such attacks and the narratives they convey can have a very divisive impact on society”. Rumours can easily spread, when the identity of the perpetrators is not known, laying blame on the basis of stereotypes and prejudices. In shock, which is sometimes precisely what terrorists are trying to achieve, society and state authorities may be induced to overreact.

“When the identity of the perpetrators is not known, rumours can easily spread, laying blame on the basis of stereotypes and prejudices”.<sup>131</sup> “In shock, society and state authorities may be induced to overreact, which is sometimes precisely what terrorists are trying to achieve”.<sup>132</sup>

The security of the public is closely related to the degree of cohesion and resilience of their community which explain the notion in which public oriented approaches rely on. “Therefore policies on National Counterterrorism aim to build resilient communities that reject violent extremism, terrorist propagandists and ideologies, as well as to mobilize the public and including individuals and groups in society in support of counter terrorism goals”.

“While counterterrorism policies have traditionally focused on developing technical resilience such as by protecting critical infrastructure and strengthening emergency response, there is growing recognition that insufficient emphasis has been placed on fostering resilience at the level of ideas to counteract the appeal of violent extremism and terrorism”.<sup>133</sup>

“They have focused on tactics such as the use of police stop-and-search powers, covert operations and intelligence-gathering methods to detect suspected terrorists and thwart their activities, especially active plans for attacks”.<sup>134</sup> “Such methods are a necessary part of any effective strategy for countering terrorism, but should be carried out at all times within a

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<sup>131</sup>Bartlett, J. and Birdwell, J., *From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society*, London: Demos, 2010

<sup>132</sup>Ibid

<sup>133</sup>Mackenzie, S. and Henry, A., “Community Policing: a Review of the Evidence”, Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2009

<sup>134</sup>Huckerby, J. C., “Women and Preventing Violent Extremism: the USA and UK experience”, briefing paper, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York: New York University School of Law, 2012



framework based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights”.<sup>135</sup> “These methods, however, involve little or no consultation or partnership with members and groups from the public”. “They are not aimed at gaining trust and support from women and men in local communities and rarely take into consideration their diverse needs or how they are differently affected by terrorism and measures against it”. “As such, they may run the risk of marginalizing or even stigmatizing some communities and individuals”.

“The actual scope and nature of multi-stakeholder collaboration will vary depending on the specific issue at stake”.<sup>136</sup> “On the side of public authorities, counterterrorism has been increasingly carried out through inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination, involving traditional actors from the security and criminal-justice sectors, in particular the police”.<sup>137</sup> “However, with the growing emphasis on preventing terrorism, which requires a multidisciplinary approach, a varying number of additional public authorities, such as social and health services, are integrated”.<sup>138</sup>

“Community-oriented policies and measures for countering terrorism recognize and emphasize the role of the public at large, individual people, particular communities and their members, community based organizations and other civil society and private sector organizations in general, making them active stakeholders in counterterrorism”. “These stakeholders need to be encouraged and empowered to contribute to countering terrorism, in particular with regard to prevention, preparedness, first response and recovery”.

“The need to empower communities against terrorism has been stressed in particular with regard to preventing terrorism and countering terrorism”. “Capacities and initiatives at the community level need to be identified and supported or otherwise developed”. “Public authorities should be cautious, however, not to stigmatize particular communities by attempting to empower only them, exclusively against terrorism as this becomes

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<sup>135</sup>Ibid

<sup>136</sup>Friedmann, R.R., and Cannon, W.J., “Homeland Security and Community Policing: Competing or Complementing Public Safety Policies”, *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2007

<sup>137</sup>Ibid

<sup>138</sup>Ibid

counterproductive”. “Public authorities can both diminish this risk and be more effective if they engage a broader number of people on a diverse range of issues, especially those of concern to the communities themselves”.

### **3.5 Kenya**

“Kenyan strategies on countering violent extremism (CVE) also exist, most prominent among them the one developed by the Kenyan National Counter-Terrorism Centre and one drafted by the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims”.<sup>139</sup> “They are now focusing on developing a collaborative national approach and a task force has been formed to spearhead that process, and it seems as though the strategy will be endorsed soon which will oversee the implementation of the strategy”.<sup>140</sup> “Despite progress in this regard, there have been delays in the implementation of a national CVE strategy and some civil society groups have expressed concerns over the extent of national commitments to address governance deficits”.<sup>141</sup>

“A number of civil society organizations are working actively with the youth populations, including through radio and cultural programming, community centers, and vocational training programs”.<sup>142</sup> “Yet, youth participation in some of the more influential Islamic institutions and civil society groups is seen by some as lagging behind because the leadership traditionally has consisted of older men”.<sup>143</sup> “Furthermore, the government has cooperated with civil society organizations;” “but tensions remain, particularly around reintegration and community policing issues”.<sup>144</sup>

#### **3.5.1 Kenya Transition Initiative**

“The Kenya Transition Initiative was implemented by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) between 2011-2014, what was essentially a pilot program of the Countering

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<sup>139</sup>Kenya National Anti-Counter Terrorism Unit.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid

<sup>141</sup>Jonathan Horowitz, “Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Uganda: The World Cup Bombing and Beyond,” Open Society Foundations, 2013

<sup>142</sup>Ibid

<sup>143</sup>Ibid

<sup>144</sup>Civil society representative, interview with CVE expert, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2017.

Violent Extremism (CVE) concept”.<sup>145</sup> “Within this tense context USAID’s Office of Transition Initiative (OTI) implemented what was essentially a pilot program of the new Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept, forming one component of the wider Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI)”.<sup>146</sup> “Between 2011 and 2013 the program was operational in Eastleigh and its environs, and in 2012 it was expanded to the coastal regions of Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa”.<sup>147</sup> “It was delivered through a flexible funding mechanism that supported individuals, networks and organisations, often with small grants implemented over a short duration”.<sup>148</sup> “These grants funded a broad range of activities aiming to counter the drivers of VE, including livelihood training, community debates on sensitive topics, cultural events, counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder, and so on”.<sup>149</sup>

### **3.5.2 Kenya Tuna Uwezo**

Another community oriented approach initiative is Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU). “KTU is different from standard peace-building practices as it integrates conflict mitigation and civic education approaches”. “Civic education is key to addressing the rights of groups that have been disenfranchised and ignored, empowering them with constitutional knowledge, human rights knowledge, and information on how to engage with their government to address the grievances that are driving them into conflict and radicalization”.

“Many are aggrieved because they are ignored by their government and feel excluded, marginalized and frustrated”. For example, “the vetting process for ID issuance seems to take longer people of certain communities and/or regions of the country compared to others which makes them feel noncitizens”. “However helping them understand their rights and responsibilities and facilitating dialogues/platforms in which 21 aggrieved communities

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<sup>145</sup> Khalil, J and Zeuthen, M 2014. A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTI’s Kenya Transition Initiative. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 31, pp. 1-12

<sup>146</sup>ibid

<sup>147</sup>USAID 2013 Mid-Term Evaluation of Three Countering Violent Extremism Projects. Available at [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACX479.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX479.pdf)

<sup>148</sup>ibid

<sup>149</sup>Khalil, J and Zeuthen, M 2014. A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTI’s Kenya Transition Initiative. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 31, pp. 1-12

(especially youth) meet in a safe space with government enables communities to work together effectively, and to appreciate their diversity and address Issues that have divided them”.<sup>150</sup>

“KTU takes a community-based conflict management approach that affirms that there is a security problem but that those who are part of the problem are also part of the solution and are able to come up with their own approaches to achieve the same goal”.<sup>151</sup> “The approach used by KTU is based on the realization that grievances, real or perceived, cause conflicts. These grievances can be economic, social, tribal, ideological, personal, political, and historical”.<sup>152</sup> “Home to a significant immigrant and Muslim population of which most are of Somali background, Eastleigh also has had a long history of marginalization and police harassment particularly after terrorist attacks”.<sup>153</sup>

“This negative profiling and often heavy-handed tactics by security officers, coupled with marginalization particularly among youth and the military actions in Somalia and elsewhere, are seen to have contributed to growing radicalization and extremism in Eastleigh”. “Whilst the reasons why specific individuals join extremist groups and engage on actions related to violent extremism differ, experts agree that no single intervention can be effective in addressing violent extremism, and that interventions need to be contextualized and designed to apply to local specificities and need to have a real impact”.<sup>154</sup> “KTU staff understand that while lack of viable livelihoods is an important driver, it is not enough to simply give someone a job”.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>150</sup>Dualeh, Rahma. 2015. ‘Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa’ in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. <http://journal.georgetown.edu/countering-violent-extremism-in-the-horn-of-africa/>

<sup>151</sup>Ibid

<sup>152</sup>Ibid

<sup>153</sup>Khalil, J and Zeuthen, M 2014. A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTI’s Kenya Transition Initiative. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 3(1): 31, pp. 1-12

<sup>154</sup>Dualeh, Rahma. 2015. ‘Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa’ in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. <http://journal.georgetown.edu/countering-violent-extremism-in-the-horn-of-africa/>

<sup>155</sup> Selline Korir. A community-based approach to increasing the peace in Nairobi’s informal settlements. *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, 2016, 28(1)

“The program gives the youth the chance to realize and display their talents, and to engage in meaningful communication engagement that will lead to training and/or employment”.<sup>156</sup>

“These youth then have legitimacy when they speak to those engaged in crime and help convert them into Change Agents, thereby increasing the program’s sustainability and reach”.<sup>157</sup> “It has also made great strides in improving relations between youth and law enforcement officials, mainly by getting the two groups together and having them know and collaborate with each other to fight crime in the slums.”<sup>158</sup>

“But excluding women from these conversations has been a missed opportunity: women often head their families and generally spend more time with their children since they are their primary caregivers, and they spend much of their time in the settlement”.<sup>159</sup> “KTU has worked closely with families in the community to persuade them of the helpful role of women in reducing conflict and making the communities safer, as well as spurring economic opportunities for youth in Eastleigh and other settlements in Nairobi”.<sup>160</sup> “By providing a safe platform, dozens of women, are now free to speak openly and honestly about the problems in their community, and offer their ideas to solve them”.<sup>161</sup> “The vast networks of support including women and many others has helped advance efforts to engage young people and help them lead productive lives, regardless of their past, and the networks have given women who previously have been silent or ignored a voice to help make peace in the settlements”.<sup>162</sup>

“The strengthened social networks are able to intervene in crises and help prevent tragedies before they occur”.<sup>163</sup> “In one case, Change Agents were able to intercede in the wake of attacks on houses of worship, stopping the cycle of violence before it could begin”. “KTU’s success shows the power of CVE programs to have a positive impact”.<sup>164</sup> “However, these

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<sup>156</sup>Ibid

<sup>157</sup>Selline Korir. A community-based approach to increasing the peace in Nairobi’s informal settlements. *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, 2016, 28(1)

<sup>158</sup>Ibid:23

<sup>159</sup>Ibid

<sup>160</sup>Selline Korir. A community-based approach to increasing the peace in Nairobi’s informal settlements. *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, 2016, 28(1):23

<sup>161</sup>Ibid

<sup>162</sup>Ibid

<sup>163</sup>Ibid

<sup>164</sup>Ibid: 24

transformations would not be possible if Global Communities attempted its work without the benefit of key relationships in the community”.<sup>165</sup> “KTU is an effective way to address violent extremism through a community-based, peace-building framework that focuses on human rights, economic needs, and religious and political factors”.<sup>166</sup>

### **3.6 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Initiatives in West Africa**

“The ECOWAS strategy has three pillars:” “prevent, pursue, and reconstruct”. “The prevent pillar requires member states to ratify and implement existing regimes, work to alleviate conditions conducive to terrorism, and improve early-warning and operational intelligence, as well as take other preventive steps, including to protect human rights and democratic principles with the pursue pillar which aims to help states investigate and disrupt terrorist activities in accordance with the rule of law”. “The reconstruct pillar aims to support responses to terrorism that address the aftermath of an attack and help to rebuild societies that suffer from terrorism”.<sup>167</sup>

“The ‘prevent’ pillar of the ECOWAS counterterrorism strategy envisages enhancing CVE-specific initiatives across the region”.<sup>168</sup> “ECOWAS could work with its member states to assist them in their implementation of this part of the strategy”.<sup>169</sup> “Such networks help to feed information about needs, threats, and challenges back to ECOWAS for further analysis and incorporation into community level national responses to violent extremism”.<sup>170</sup>

“The 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security led to the establishment of an innovative early warning mechanism for the ECOWAS region to monitor and report to the ECOWAS Commission on signs of potential conflict”.<sup>171</sup> “The ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) evolved into a partnership between governments and

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<sup>165</sup>Ibid

<sup>166</sup> Selline Korir. A community-based approach to increasing the peace in Nairobi’s informal settlements. *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, 2016, 28(1):23

<sup>167</sup>Martin A. Ewi, “West Africa: The New ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Its Implications,” 13 March 2013

<sup>168</sup>Ibid

<sup>169</sup>Ibid

<sup>170</sup>Ibid

<sup>171</sup>Ibid

communities, across the ECOWAS region”.<sup>172</sup> “The system involves two monitors from each ECOWAS member state, one from government and another from civil society, allowing information from grassroots, community-level sources to provide a more localized and complete picture of the potential for violent conflict”.<sup>173</sup>

“Building on the model of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, which includes a CVE dimension, ECOWAS has the capacity to enhance further the capacity of local communities to identify relevant information about potential threats from violent extremism”.<sup>174</sup>

### **3.7 Somalia**

“Despite considerable support from bilateral and multilateral donors, the nascent Somali government is unable to effectively govern or provide security and basic services to the Somali people”.<sup>175</sup> “Pervasive violence, instability, corruption, and political infighting; poor resource management; and a lack of public trust severely hamper the capabilities of state institutions”.<sup>176</sup>

“A number of bilateral and multilateral development assistance projects are helping Somalia in an effort to mitigate the drivers of violence and violent extremism in the country”.<sup>177</sup> “For instance, with support from the European Union and Japan, the UN Development Programme is assisting the development of people-facing justice and safety services”.<sup>178</sup> “Previous efforts to devise and implement strategic development and security policy that might address some of the underlying drivers of violent extremism suffered from an overreliance on top-down implementation by weak and ineffectual federal institutions based on the agendas of external partners”.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>172</sup>Ibid

<sup>173</sup>Martin A. Ewi, “West Africa: The New ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Its Implications,” 13 March 2013

<sup>174</sup>Ibid

<sup>175</sup>Ken Menkhaus, “Governance Without Government in Somalia,” *International Security* 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006/2007)

<sup>176</sup>Ibid

<sup>177</sup>Ibid

<sup>178</sup>Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, eds., “Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking,” *Accord*, no. 21 (2010)

<sup>179</sup>Ibid

“In 2014 the U.S. Department of State observed that Somalia had limited investigative and enforcement capacity to prevent terrorism, limited judicial capacity to prosecute suspected terrorists, and limited capacity to draft counterterrorism laws”.<sup>180</sup> “The only specific countering violent extremism (CVE) interventions being undertaken by the government were public messaging campaigns via Radio Mogadishu and state-owned television stations”. “Although the government adopted a national counterterrorism strategy in April 2015,<sup>181</sup> it is difficult to foresee the impact of any strategy that relies heavily on a proactive and capable governance, which is not the case for Somalia”.

### **3.8 CVE Initiatives in the Horn of Africa**

“Following the statements of the White House CVE Summit held in February 2015, experts of the Horn sub-region agreed to establish a regional CVE and Counter Messaging Hub under the auspices of IGAD”.<sup>182</sup> “This initiative was reaffirmed in the 30 September 2015 Experts meeting held in New York following the agreement of leaders reached in the 29th September White House Summit on ‘Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism’”.<sup>183</sup> “It can be considered as an indication of progress, if the regional CVE hub is established taking into account the specificities of the of the region best practices”.<sup>184</sup>

“The GCTF, Horn of Africa Desk, engaged in capacity building measures is another initiative supported by the EU and donor countries”.<sup>185</sup> “The EU through its program Strengthening Resilience to violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (STRIVE), focuses on capacity building and civil society engagement in Somalia and Kenya”. “International organizations including USAID, DFID are also actively engaged in CVE related projects”.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>180</sup>Ibid

<sup>181</sup>Hanad, “President of Somalia Hassan Welcomes Adoption of Counter Terrorism Strategy,” Jowhar.com, 7 April 2015

<sup>182</sup>Institute of Community Cohesion: Understanding and monitoring tension and conflict in local communities: A practical guide for local authorities, police service and partner agencies. 2n ed. Coventry: Coventry University, 2010

<sup>183</sup>Meeting outcome document of the Horn and Eastern Africa Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Experts Workshop –“Building Regional CVE Capacity/Cooperation.” held 28th-29th August 2015, Djibouti

<sup>184</sup>Ibid

<sup>185</sup>Ibid

<sup>186</sup>Brett, J; Eriksen, K.B; Sorensen, A.K.R and Aps, T.C Lessons Learnt from Danish and Other International Efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Development Contexts, DANIDA, 2015 . Romaniuk, P Does CVE Work: Lessons Learnt from the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism, GCCS, 2015.



“The challenge of these initiatives is that they lack coordination and they provide the support based on their own specific policies on CVE rather than developing an agreed regional policy and strategy that is contextualized to fit the specific situations and threats of VE in the sub-region and its member states”.<sup>187</sup> The efforts are also being implemented in an ad-hoc and piecemeal manner. However, this does not necessarily mean that the efforts are not contributing at all to CVE. Brett<sup>188</sup> shows, the initiatives implemented in Somaliland, Puntland and Kenya have contributed to building community resilience and brought state and non-state actors together in addressing CVE”.<sup>189</sup>

### **3.8.1 STRIVE in the Horn of Africa**

“Funded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and implemented by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI)”.<sup>190</sup> “The programme aims to understand the drivers of violent extremism through evidence-based analysis, to develop best practices around CVE programming in the Horn of Africa based on short pilot activities, and to provide recommendations allowing for increased impact and more focused interventions”.<sup>191</sup> The programme comprises three thematic priorities - Youth Engagement, Investing in Women and Capacity-Building – and four main work stream.

“STRIVE is helping to develop CVE best practice in the Horn of Africa through education, training and capacity-building with both law-enforcement agencies and civil society actors”.

<sup>192</sup> “STRIVE engages with women’s organisations to contribute to building greater resilience in communities vulnerable to radicalization”.<sup>193</sup> “This includes conducting training workshops, which provide guidance to women’s organisations on how to increase

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<sup>187</sup>Ibid

<sup>188</sup>Ibid

<sup>189</sup>Ibid

<sup>190</sup> STRIVE for Development: Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism Wednesday, 17 June, 2015 Available at [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strive-development-strengthening-resilience-violence-and-extremism\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strive-development-strengthening-resilience-violence-and-extremism_en)

<sup>191</sup>Ibid

<sup>192</sup> STRIVE for Development: Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism Wednesday, 17 June, 2015 Available at [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strive-development-strengthening-resilience-violence-and-extremism\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strive-development-strengthening-resilience-violence-and-extremism_en)

<sup>193</sup>Ibid

engagement with security providers at both the state and clan level, in order to establish or improve de-radicalization initiatives”.<sup>194</sup>

The program incorporates aspects of “identifying and tackling the drivers for violent extremism among youth in Kenya and addressing macro-factors such as limited education, political participation and the absence of rule of law as drivers of youth radicalisation and violent extremism in the HoA. Local and regional factors are equally important; including narratives of historic injustices, local identity issues and pressures from families and communities. STRIVE aims to develop a greater understanding of these drivers in areas afflicted by violent conflict”.

Ethiopia’s capital is the seat of many international and regional bodies, including the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, to mention but a few that makes it a fore player in Regional politics. “Following the 2005 elections, the government implemented new regulations for media and civil society and passed the country’s first counterterrorism legislation in 2009”. “Additionally, Ethiopian government officials participated in a workshop organized by the IGAD Security Sector Programme to promote rule of law–based approaches to countering terrorism in the country”.

“In 2015, Ethiopian Grand Mufti Abdullahi Sharif Ali served as a co–keynote speaker for a meeting of more than 300 delegates representing Sufi orders from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo”. “The 2009 charities and civil society law prohibited non-profit organizations that received 10 percent or more of their funding from international sources from working in the areas of democracy, human rights, or other domestic issues”.

### **3.9 Nigeria’s Tolerance Model**

Over the years, Boko Haram has leveraged on the existence of young people on the streets by luring and sometimes kidnapping them while offering them economic and social security

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<sup>194</sup> Ibid:21

opportunities. “This is done in order for Boko Haram to advance its extreme cause through, for examples: international collaborations to travel and join other fighters in another part of the world, guarantee of social security, elevation of social status among peers and as well as the ultimate end of entering Al-Jannah”.<sup>195</sup> “Tolerance Academy is the flagship project of Youth Tolerance for Peace Development Initiative which is a boot-camp dedicated to grooming young people through a comprehensive curriculum spanning: religious integration, intercultural dialogue, forgiveness, and psychosocial engagement”.<sup>196</sup>

“The key objectives of Tolerance Academy are: To enhance the resilience against violent extremism and boost the integrative complexity of teenage students with low school attendance rate in North-eastern Nigeria; To provide social association and civic engagement alternatives for at risk youth with wide area of influence and are exposed to radical narratives; and to increase the inclination of government owned secondary schools in North eastern Nigeria towards countering violent extremism”.<sup>197</sup>

“There are advocacy visits to the Ministry of Education to secure partnership with the government and facilitate collaboration with government owned secondary schools to drive CVE programming”.<sup>198</sup> “There are series of advocacy visits to selected secondary schools in North-eastern Nigeria meant to secure partnership and collaboration with the schools to facilitate the implementation of CVE programs in the schools”.<sup>199</sup> “Young and highly inspired community leaders less than 25 years old are also selected. These people are called Tolerance Ambassadors”.<sup>200</sup>

“The Tolerance Ambassadors are camped together and taken through a psycho-social training curriculum using music, dance, sports, video modelling, storytelling and instructional

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<sup>195</sup> European Commission. (June 2016). Advancing CVE Research: The Roles of Global and Regional Coordinating Bodies. CT Morse.

<sup>196</sup> Azman, N. A., & Othman Alkaff, S. H. (2015). ISIS in Horn of Africa: An Imminent Alliance with Al-Shabaab? 282. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Retrieved from <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CO15282.pdf>

<sup>197</sup> Ayodele Obajeun Radicalization Drivers and De-radicalization Process: The Case of Tolerance Academy in Nigeria Jona, in Expanding Research on Countering Violent Extremism, Hedayah and Edith Cowan University, 2016.

<sup>198</sup>Ibid

<sup>199</sup>Ibid

<sup>200</sup>Ibid

classes”.<sup>201</sup> “They are equipped with countering violent extremism knowledge through another curriculum that spans: resilience building, intercultural integration, narratives and counter narratives development, relational leadership, conflict resolution as well as critical thinking aimed at increasing their integrative complexity”.<sup>202</sup> “During the internship program, interns and the teachers, based on the knowledge they acquired at the residency training above, develop a framework curriculum for countering violent extremism in the schools, aimed at building the resilience of students against violent extremism and boost their integrative complexities”.<sup>203</sup>

“The countering violent extremism framework is adapted from a template where the interns and the teachers groom peer educators among the students and drive the setting up Tolerance Clubs in school and the construction of Peace Parks within the premises of the schools”.<sup>204</sup>

“The Peace Parks are run by peer educators among the students and facilitated by the interns and the trained teachers’ educational models for CVE programming”.<sup>205</sup>

### **3.10 Conclusion**

From the chapter, there is a growing appreciation that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities. More notably in this chapter is the lack of initiatives funded and managed to a larger extent by African states. Most of the initiatives are sponsored and managed by donor states either directly or through intergovernmental institutions such as EU.

After extensive research it was confirmed that, public participation in CVE is indeed a new phenomenon in Africa and thus the researcher’s assumption was correct. The objective of this chapter was to examine and assess the role of public participation in CVE in Africa. The

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<sup>201</sup>Ibid

<sup>202</sup>Ibid

<sup>203</sup>Ayodele Obajeun Radicalization Drivers and De-radicalization Process: The Case of Tolerance Academy in Nigeria Jona, in Expanding Research on Countering Violent Extremism, Hedayah and Edith Cowan University, 2016.

<sup>204</sup>Ibid

<sup>205</sup>Ibid

objective was achieved but the findings showed a need for more awareness and inclusivity of the public in the participation of matters related to CVE.

Whereas engagement of the public in CVE is an emerging phenomenon in Africa, governments need to commit more resources into locally tailored and driven programs in order to reduce donor dependency; to address governance deficits, security and development. Integration of the public in development and decision making processes alleviates feelings of exclusion in the economic social and political life and addresses structural drivers to radicalization and builds community resilience as CVE strategy.

The study confirmed that whereas there have been conscious attempts at public engagement, Africa lacks clear frameworks that focus on broader prevention such as poverty reduction, youth empowerment ,good governance and fighting marginalization. Existing initiatives are adhoc, piecemeal and seldom bring together state and non-state actors to build community resilience to radicalization.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE, STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CVE IN KENYA**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter addresses the state actors and machinery and non-state actors in Kenya and their place in increasing public participation in CVE measures in an overall attempt to counter terrorism.

### **4.2 Counter Radicalization Measures among the Kenyan Youths**

The potential for Kenya's and the entire East Africa's youth to serve as drivers of economic growth are apparent when comparing its demographic trends to other world regions. "In other regions such as South Korea, the country's youth bulge was converted into a national asset through a blend of educational programs and youth-oriented services that prepared young people for jobs in a modern and globally connected economy".<sup>206</sup> "However, in Kenya the government has not conducted sufficient government planning, attracted adequate amounts of private sector investment, or fostered the public awareness necessary to convert these demographic trends into national advantages or even to properly accommodate their current and future young citizens".<sup>207</sup>

"Kenya's up-and-coming youth generation is marked by a number of unique characteristics increasingly connected to each other and the global marketplace of ideas via information and communication technology".<sup>208</sup> "In addition, improvements in Internet penetration have increased the number of Kenyan youth accessing information online, albeit at relatively low levels when compared to other parts of the world".<sup>209</sup> "The modern Kenyan youth is using social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, SnapChat and others to share ideas about a range of topics with each other and their peers in the diaspora".<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>206</sup>Sabahi, Muslim Youth Centre vows violent response to killing of its leader Rogo, 27 August 2012, [http://sabahionline.com/en\\_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/27/feature-01](http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/27/feature-01) (accessed 26 March 2017).

<sup>207</sup>Ibid

<sup>208</sup>Ibid

<sup>209</sup>Interview with a Youth from a counter-radicalization campaign organization

<sup>210</sup>Ibid

“Youths in Kenya are migrating to cities in search of educational opportunities, employment, and the modern amenities that accompany urban life. Although East Africa’s rapidly growing cities provide opportunities, they are also places where youth experience hardships connected to job shortages, high costs of living, and a lack of traditional family and social structures”.<sup>211</sup>. “Counter-radicalization programs therefore make special efforts to reach young people struggling to survive in large cities”.<sup>212</sup> “Some Kenyan youth choose to live in rural areas, adhere to more traditional lifestyles, and are far removed from the activities of the state”.<sup>213</sup>

The Kenyan youth also vary according to different identities, economic backgrounds, social settings, religious preferences, among others. “Thus the government should apply multi-dimensional approaches in her counter-radicalization planning and program implementation”.<sup>214</sup> “Many youths in Kenya have experienced war, civil war, ethnic conflict, or post-election violence, while others have enjoyed relative peace”. “In addition, the Kenyan youth have divergent experiences with their country’s public institutions”. “The diverse interactions that Kenya maintains with its youthful population shape how young people view political involvement and their trust in or disillusionment with political leaders”.

#### **4.2.1 Intelligence**

“Increased army operations against Al-shabaab, besides border operations by special army units, and the Rapid Deployment Unit to confound proliferation at the border with Somalia by the terror groups are paying off”.<sup>215</sup> “This has led to the arrests of recruiters and killings of dozens of key Al Shabaab terrorists, and many facing cases in court, nearly a hundred are on the terror watch-list, while key terror cells in East Africa are being closely monitored by

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<sup>211</sup>Ibid

<sup>212</sup> Anzalone, Christopher. “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabaab’s East African Recruitment.” CTC Sentinel 5, no. 10 (October 2012).

<sup>213</sup>Ibid

<sup>214</sup> Combating Terrorism Center, “Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa,” 2 July 2007, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidasmisadventures-in-the-horn-of-africa>.

<sup>215</sup>Ibid

intelligence services”.<sup>216</sup> “The role of the Kenyan intelligence service is to identify and provide effective counter intelligence on threats on national security, as such the intelligence service is limited in its counter-intelligence operations”.. “Both the Intelligence and Police cannot solely be able to do so without the involvement of the public, thus the engagement of the government security agencies with the public has been on the increase”.<sup>217</sup>

“The National Intelligence Services in Kenya however needs robust homeland security policy, public awareness, effective law enforcement, and most important, inter-agency coordination to achieve effective counter-terrorism”.<sup>218</sup> “Kenya’s security strategy focuses on both pre-empting the threat posed by radicalization and the threat of terrorism”.<sup>219</sup> “In-fact the core objective of the strategy is to secure civilians and the property of the country from destruction by terrorists”.<sup>220</sup> “However, this diverse strategy does not exclude the use of force to enforce law and safe guard human life and protect property of the Kenya’s public”.<sup>221</sup>

#### **4.2.2 Counter Terrorism Laws in Kenya**

“Domestic legislation is not the sole determinant of whether states have the capacity to arrest and prosecute terrorists, nor is it necessarily reflective of a state’s ability to deter terrorist activities”. Other factors, including “the effective implementation of these laws, the state and strength of the judicial system, and whether or not states approach CVE in a manner that addresses its root causes, are equally important”. “Even with some of the most controversial provisions struck out, the law expands the power of the president, the cabinet secretary, and the director general of the National Intelligence Service, which human rights activists and political commentators claim takes Kenya back to the Moi era”.<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Interview with Security Analyst (Crisis Group), May, 2017

<sup>217</sup> Interview with CVE Expert from a security Think Tank in Kenya, April 2017

<sup>218</sup> Ibid

<sup>219</sup> Ibid

<sup>220</sup> Ibid

<sup>221</sup> Aronson, S.L. United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 2012 5(1), 119-126

<sup>222</sup> Ibid



“The National Intelligence Service (NIS) is now allowed to authorize covert operations to “carry out any of its functions,” “which can include entering any place, obtaining anything or any information, and search, take, return, and install anything”.<sup>223</sup> The court allowed up to 14 years in prison for saying anything “that is likely to be understood as directly or indirectly encouraging or inducing another person to commit or prepare to commit an act of terrorism,” “whether or not that person actually does so”.

Another section allows any NIS officer to “detain any person whom the officer... suspects of engaging in any act or thing or being in possession of anything which poses a threat to national security,” “thus allowing a wide berth for interpretation”.<sup>224</sup> “Other provisions left in the bill reduce legislative oversight over the NIS, allow the organization to demand any information from any government entity, allow suspects to be detained for up to 90 days, and allow individuals to be arrested more than once for the same crime without any new evidence and without a warrant”.<sup>225</sup>

“Before this second wave of counterterrorism legislation gains momentum, a third wave of legislation focused on civil liberties and human rights protections from counterterrorism responses would achieve more progress towards peace and stability in the region, at least in countries that do not already have these liberties enshrined in their constitutions”.<sup>226</sup> “In Kenya’s case, as in many others with expansive constitutional protections in this area, the independence and strength of the judiciary, combined with a determination by government leadership to balance citizen security with civil freedoms, is the real determinant of progress in this realm”.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Ibid

<sup>224</sup> Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

<sup>225</sup> Ibid

<sup>226</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

<sup>227</sup> Ibid

### 4.2.3 Religious Groups Involvement

“Religious leaders at all levels representing different faiths have an essential role to play in promoting inter- or intra-religious dialogue, tolerance, and understanding among religions, all of which are identified in the Strategy as important”.<sup>228</sup> For example, “compared with other segments of civil society, the clergy is often in the unique position of both having access to those in high-level government positions and engaging with the masses on the ground”.<sup>229</sup>

The role of Kenyan religious groups and leaders cannot be underestimated in CVE because terrorism in Kenya has religious aspects to it and that terror groups have had a degree of intentions to divide the country into religious line and form a conflict of that sort. The latest major attack at Garissa University saw the religious leaders coming together to condemn the attack, while demystifying the conflict between Muslims and Christians. “Indeed, the Muslim leaders condemned the attack and disowned terrorists, terming them as criminals using religion to commit crimes”.<sup>230</sup> “In Garissa following the university attack, the Muslim community in Garissa County strongly condemned barbaric acts committed against innocent university students as stated by Abdullahi Salat, chairman of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims”.<sup>231</sup>

Additionally, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, stated that “the Pope who is the head of Catholic Churches worldwide condemned the terror act of senseless brutality and prays for a change of heart among its perpetrators”. “He called upon all those in authority to redouble their efforts to work with all men and women in Kenya to bring an end to such violence and to hasten the dawn of a new era of brotherhood, justice and peace”.

The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) has been on the fore front in CVE measures within the Muslim community. SUPKEM conducted a survey in the coastal region

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<sup>228</sup> Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTI) Press 20-06-2014. ‘Press Statement on the Mpeketoni and the Deteriorating state of Security in Kenya.’

<sup>229</sup>Ibid

<sup>230</sup>Fredrick Nzwili, Kenya religious leaders urge unity after Garissa attack. Religion News Service 6:12 p.m. EDT April 6, 2015. Available <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/03/religion-news-service-kenya-garissa-attack-religious-leaders/25254935/>

<sup>231</sup>Ibid

to first get a better understanding of the motivational factors behind the radicalization, and together with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission are also advocating an amnesty regulation to deal with the return of the youth who joined the Al-Shabaab organization. “The Council of Imams, SUPKEM and council of elders from both the Borana and Somali communities that largely profess the Islamic faith have also been noted to swear to combine forces with the Kenyan government to root out any false ideologies by Muslim radicals that have led to loss of many innocent lives”.<sup>232</sup>

#### **4.2.4 Civil Society Organizations Engagement in CVE**

A strong civil society is vital to democracy, security, and prosperity in general. The UN Strategy specifically encourages “non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy.”<sup>233</sup> “A September 2008 General Assembly resolution on the occasion of the first formal review of strategy implementation efforts is expected to go slightly further and specifically encourage them to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy, including through interaction with member states and the UN System.”<sup>234</sup> “The inclusion of the clause” “as appropriate,” “however, leaves it to states to determine the role (if any) to be given to civil society organizations, thus reflecting the range of views on CSOs among the UN membership”.<sup>235</sup>

“For any comprehensive counterterrorism strategy to be effective, civil society needs to be part of its development and implementation, as broad-based engagement between the state and CSOs can help serve as a medium for addressing concerns between the state and the public in the context of specific counterterrorism actions”.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>232</sup>Interview with an Imam from Islamic Organization, April 2017

<sup>233</sup>Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs, New York, 12 July 2007].

<sup>234</sup>U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2013). Country reports on human rights practices for 2013: Kenya. Available at: [http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dliid=22012\\_4#wrapper](http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dliid=22012_4#wrapper)

<sup>235</sup>Ibid

<sup>236</sup>Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs, New York, 12 July 2007 [On file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation].

“NGOs and other CSOs have been actively engaged in long-term efforts to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism well before the Strategy labeled those efforts as such”.<sup>237</sup> For example, “CSOs have been working to support sustainable development, realize the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), provide humanitarian relief, empower marginalized communities, promote dialogue, protect human rights, improve governance, expand political participation, empower women, and prevent and resolve violent conflict”.<sup>238</sup>

“More broadly, CSOs can serve as a stabilizing force in communities when governments are temporary, changing every few years, or even completely absent”.<sup>239</sup>

In Kenya, the mistrust of mainstream Civil Society clouds its judgment towards the need to focus at common citizen-focused goals. Information as to how Civil Society could participate in the meeting was not readily available, and some NGOs discovered that they were required to apply for accreditation and “vetting” to the NGO Council if they wished to participate. A Summit addressing such grave issues affecting the region, while it seems intent on not being a cosmetic talk shop of profound speeches also seems fearful of dissenting opinion and criticism. This could also mean it is a missed opportunity that will certainly not have the buy-in of a vital sector in society that could offer a vital bridge between the state and sometimes marginalized communities.

“The exclusion of Civil Society from this regional conference on CVE is a disturbing indication that Kenya continues to employ an approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism that has proved to be divisive”. “This, as has been evidenced in the past, is not useful for the longer-term tackling of CVE,” stated Njonjo Mue, Senior Advisor of Kenyans for Peace with Truth & Justice<sup>240</sup>.

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<sup>237</sup>Ibid

<sup>238</sup>Ibid

<sup>239</sup> Ibid

<sup>240</sup> Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

### 4.3 Challenges Facing Kenyan Law Enforcement

“Since Kenya intervened in Somalia, there have been a total of over 30 attacks involving grenades or improvised explosive devices”.<sup>241</sup> “This succession of relatively minor incidents precluded the attack on the upscale Westgate shopping mall on September 21, 2013”.<sup>242</sup>

“For instance, on 30th April 2003, the government introduced the suppression of terrorism bill (through Supplement No. 38 of Kenya Gazette)”.<sup>243</sup> “The anti-terrorism bill was abandoned midway as anti-lobbyists of the bill perceived that if enacted, it could be perceived as calculated to stereotype and victimize the Muslim population”.<sup>244</sup> “One of the claims made against the bill was that it allowed problematic police searches and extra-judicial actions against suspected terrorists who would have no recourse within the law”.<sup>245</sup>

“The secrecy concerning the training and equipping of the special units of the police for counter-terrorism operations have in the past heightened the chances of repression and unaccountability by a police largely perceived to be incompetent, corrupt, repressive and alienating the public that it serves.”<sup>246</sup> As one interviewed police officer put it, “the fight against terrorism is viewed as being discriminatory to the Muslim community in Kenya.”<sup>247</sup>

“Curbing terrorism is, however, challenging because the Muslim population claim the efforts put in place are discriminatory to them”.<sup>248</sup> “The police officers perceive terrorism threats as emanating from the lawless state of Somalia that has lacked a central governing authority since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991”.

“With regard to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) championed by the US government, there appears to be a convergence of interest between the Kenyan state security apparatus and the

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<sup>241</sup> Nelson Odhiambo, “Experts Split on Calls to Withdraw Kenyan Troops from Somalia After Terror Attack,” Daily Nation, April 12, 2015.

<sup>242</sup>Ibid

<sup>243</sup> Counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies. 5(1), 119-126

<sup>244</sup>Ibid

<sup>245</sup>Al Jazeera America (2013). Kenyan authorities hold eight suspects in Nairobi mall attack. (2013, September 28). Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28/>

<sup>246</sup> Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, “Transnational Crime,” in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Collins, A. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 346-367.

<sup>247</sup>Ibid

<sup>248</sup>Ibid

US foreign policy goals on security”.<sup>249</sup> “From a purely Kenyan state-centric position, this relationship is arguably beneficial because international cooperation and support may assist the Kenyan state to overcome capacity deficits in terms of policing terrorism”.<sup>250</sup> “Police officers interviewed, cognizant of the fact that they cannot effectively prosecute the anti-terrorism campaign alone, advocated the need for partnership with international bodies, such as Interpol”.<sup>251</sup>

Some of the police interviewed “noted that the Kenya Communications Amendment Act of 2008 in which cybercrimes are defined is not sufficiently comprehensive as there are a number of new crimes that are not covered by the Act”. For instance, respondents observed that “over the past two years there has been an increase in fraud involving mobile phone money transfer services that is not adequately addressed in the 2008 legislation”. Interviewed police officers stress “the need to constantly review legislations to make them more responsive to changing crime trends, especially cyber-crimes”.<sup>252</sup>

“There is strong evidence that Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) has carried out a series of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances”.<sup>253</sup> “The Human Rights Watch also found evidence of arbitrary arrests and mistreatment of terrorism suspects in detention”.<sup>254</sup>

#### **4.5 The Challenges of Home Grown Terrorism in Kenya**

“Despite Al-Shabaab being weakened, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximize its asymmetric advantage”.<sup>255</sup>

“One tactical change has already become clear. Rather than fight in the open, it has melted into the background, allowing Kenyan mechanized infantry to move deeper into its

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<sup>250</sup>Ibid

<sup>251</sup>Ibid

<sup>252</sup>Ibid

<sup>253</sup>Ibid

<sup>254</sup> Kazungu Chai. UN to help Kenya Fight Terrorism, says Ban Ki-Moon. Daily Nation Saturday, June 28, 2014

<sup>255</sup> Rudner, M. “Al-Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36(12): 2013 953-980.

heartland”.<sup>256</sup> “Its fighters blend into the civilian population and distribute weapons”.<sup>257</sup> “This is a result of lessons learned during the December 2006 Ethiopian intervention, when the Union of Islamic Courts deployed many of its combatants, including Al-Shabaab, conventionally in the vast arid plains of south-western Somalia, and they were annihilated by ground and air fire power”.<sup>258</sup>

In expounding on the ‘reinvention of Al-shabaab’, Bryden states that “Kenya remains susceptible to Al-Shabaab, given the existence of domestic jihadist affiliates such as the Al-Hijra (Formerly, The Muslim Youth Centre-MYC). Others include Kenyan fighters in Al Shabaab’s ranks”.<sup>259</sup> “Security officials and analysts state that the MYC ‘is out to create sectarian violence in Kenya”<sup>260</sup> “The MYC, which is also known as Pumwani Muslim Youth, in a post on its website on 14 January 2012 the group vowed to carry out” “attacks against Kenya’s ‘kuffars’ (infidels) for our al-Shabaab brothers until the country withdraws its troops from Somalia”.<sup>261</sup>

“In 2011, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia cited MYC for recruiting, fundraising, training and supporting a jihadist movement on behalf of al-Shabaab in Kenya. Since its inception, the MYC has developed a strong network of members and sympathizers in Kenya”.<sup>262</sup> “The MYC has been very active trying to garner support for al-Shabaab using a two-pronged strategy of publishing threatening messages to spread fear among the public, and igniting religious strife in Kenya”.<sup>263</sup> According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, “most of the operatives who conspired in the attack were Kenyan and close to MYC leaders”.

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<sup>256</sup>Ibid

<sup>257</sup>“Somalia”, *The New York Times*, Topics (online), 25 January 2012

<sup>258</sup>I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 183-201.

<sup>259</sup>Matt Bryden, *The Reinvention of Al Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? A Report of the CSIS Africa Program*, CSIS, February 2014. Available at: [http://csis.org/files/publication/140221\\_Bryden\\_ReinventionOfAlShabaab\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf)

<sup>260</sup>Ibid

<sup>261</sup>Watts, Clint, “Was Kenya Westgate Attack More AQAP/AQ Central than Shabaab?” *Selected Wisdom*, October 7, 2013, <http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=164>

<sup>262</sup> Bryden, M, et al, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853* (2008), UNSC Document S/2010/91, March 10, 2010, 51

<sup>263</sup>Ibid

“MYC attacks have been restricted to low-level grenade and rifle attacks against Kenyan security forces, as well as softer targets like transports hubs, bars, and nightclubs frequented by locals in Nairobi and coastal tourist hub of Mombasa”.<sup>264</sup>“Examples can be seen in March 2012 when suspected MYC followers staged grenade attacks against a church and restaurant; this was followed by the multiple grenade attack in June targeting Euro 2012 spectators at the Jericho bar, in Nairobi”.<sup>265</sup>

“However, Bryden observes that a core of committed Kenyan fighters has emerged and they have been learning”.<sup>266</sup> The Kenyan authorities have also claimed that “they have been monitoring al-Hijra’s activities in Kenya, including online postings, and working with security officials in Tanzania to neutralize any possible terrorist threat”. “Al-Hijra members were plagued by unexplained killings, disappearances, continuous catch and release’ arrest raids and operational disruptions.”<sup>267</sup>

#### **4.6 Prevalent Socio-Economic Challenges**

Kenyans continue to decry the escalating insecurity that affects their socio-economic fabric. They fault the government for not having forensic laboratories that can record data with profiles of suspected terrorists, their sponsors and sympathizers. Retired Captain Simiyu Werunga, who is a security expert and the director of African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, maintains that “it would be difficult for Kenya to win the war against terrorism in the absence of a proper mechanism to profile suspects, which creates a reserve of information that security organs can easily refer to.”<sup>268</sup> “Nonetheless, the Anglo-Leasing scandal which rocked Kibaki’s government during his first term is blamed for having hindered the creation of such labs”.<sup>269</sup> “The National Intelligence Service is also in question

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<sup>264</sup> Bryden, M, et al, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), UNSC Document S/2010/91, March 10, 2010, 51

<sup>265</sup> Peter Taylor, “On the trail of al-Shabab’s Kenyan recruitment ‘pipeline’,” (2 Oct 2013) <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-02-on-the-trail-of-al-shababs-kenyan-recruitmentpipeline>

<sup>266</sup> Matt Bryden, the Reinvention of Al Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? A Report of the CSIS Africa Program, CSIS, February 2014. Available at: [http://csis.org/files/publication/140221\\_Bryden\\_ReinventionOfAlShabaab\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf)

<sup>267</sup>Ibid

<sup>268</sup>Ibid

<sup>269</sup>Ibid



for not justifying its huge annual allocations of over Ksh10 billion, in relation to curbing insecurity. During the 2013/14 fiscal year, a total of Ksh1.2 billion has been set aside to erect a National Forensic Laboratory to facilitate criminal investigations in order to get justice for victims of crime”.<sup>270</sup> Time will tell whether the plan to build a National Forensic Laboratory will be actualized.

It is therefore clear that the Kenyan government must have a new approach in counter-terrorism by advancing its weaponry, applying new technologies, gathering intelligence by infiltrating terrorist cells and by being ahead every time. Kenya is a key ally of the West in their fight against terrorism and should seek more assistance in terms of cash and equipment. In October 2012, former president Kibaki assented to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 which is expected to lawfully disrupt the networks of financiers and sympathizers used by terrorists, to conduct their crimes.<sup>271</sup>

According to Werunga, “some factors affecting the security sector in Kenya include: lack of modernization of the security system and serious lapses of coordination between intelligence, the police and the Executive”. Generally, “there is no centralized coordination in the security sector”. Within the top security apparatus, there is the element of shifting blame and giving excuses such as “I was not aware; I was not informed; we were not given the intelligence; this caught us unawares”<sup>272</sup> “The state security organs are reactionary and not proactive and to a good extent, do not apply early warning systems”. “Poor governance and the use of security forces by politicians to divide the electorate are also part of the problems ailing the sector”.<sup>273</sup>

In 2015, during his state visit to Kenya; the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in his statement on the current state of Kenya, said “the UN is determined to work with the Kenya government in combating terrorism”. He said “the UN will support Kenya’s efforts to fight

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<sup>270</sup> Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

<sup>271</sup> Westgate Terrorist Attack: A Compilation of Statements September 23, 2013. <http://kenyastockholm.com/2013/09/23/>

<sup>272</sup> State Report : Kenya. Available at <http://www.state.gov.html>

<sup>273</sup> Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

the global threat by boosting the capacity of the country's security agencies". This was after he had a meeting with the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, which he "stated as very fruitful discussion on major political and security issues concerning counter-terrorism, in Somalia, South Sudan and the Great Lakes region".

## **4.7 Counter Productive Terrorism Measures by the Kenyan Government**

### **4.7.1 Further Marginalization**

"The fight against Al-Shabaab has led to an increase in ethnic profiling and discrimination against Somalis in particular and Muslims in general".<sup>274</sup> "Police harassment and discrimination in the name of" "Global War on Terror" "continue deep-rooted trends dating back to the Shifta War".<sup>275</sup> "Government counter-terrorist operations, such as Operation Usalama Watch, have unfairly targeted Somali Kenyans, serving as a pretext for blanket punishment and mass human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest, extortion, ill-treatment, forced relocations, and unlawful expulsion".<sup>276</sup> Afrobarometer survey findings going back to 2005 indicate that "a considerable proportion of Somali Kenyans have consistently felt marginalized by the government". "In 2005, almost seven in 10 Somali Kenyans (68%) said that their community was "often" or "always" treated unfairly by the government". "This proportion steadily dropped to 45% by 2011 before rising again to 51% in 2014".<sup>277</sup>

"Somali Kenyans are mostly concentrated in Kenya's North eastern counties, and there have been fluctuating levels of tension between the community and wider Kenyan society since the 1960s". "This social fault line poses challenges to national cohesion and has the potential to incite civil unrest if left unaddressed".<sup>278</sup> "While radical and intolerant views may generally

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<sup>274</sup> Crisis Group observations; "Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border", Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2012.

<sup>275</sup> Guled Mohammed, "Hounding Somalis hurts terror fight", *The Star*, 2 November 2011.

<sup>276</sup> Transparency International. (2014). Corruption by country: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN>.

<sup>277</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

<sup>278</sup> National Cohesion and Integration Commission. Preach hate: Face charges: The National Cohesion and Integration Commission's concerns of rising religious, ethnic, and political intolerance. Press statement (Nairobi, 5 November 2011). Available at: <http://www.cohesion.or.ke/press-statements/press-statement-on-rising-religious-ethnicand-political-intolerance.html>

be held only by a minority of a given community, extremist organizations recruit from these peripheries, and it is the size and distribution of this minority that is most important to security risk analysis frameworks”. “Among the 131 Somali Kenyan respondents in Afrobarometer’s 2014 survey, 75% are aged 18-35 years, compared to 57% of Kenyans of other ethnicities, and 99% are Muslim, compared to 4% of Kenyans of other ethnicities”. “A majority of Somali Kenyans express tolerance regarding people of other religions, ethnicities, and nationalities”.<sup>279</sup> “The National Cohesion in its reports noted that the coastal residents have also been marginalized in allocation of resources”.<sup>280</sup> “Some Mombasa elders and traditional leaders mentioned unemployment and a lack of education as the primary reasons for youth frustration”.<sup>281</sup>

#### **4.7.2 Human Rights Violations**

“In Kenya’s attempts to address the threat of violent extremism, the Somali Kenyan community is often stigmatized, and serious human rights violations during counter-terrorist operations by the police and other security forces have been reported”.<sup>282</sup>” “The report cites a case scenario of the November 13–14, 2012 operation in Mombasa, during which ATPU human rights abuses included capturing several suspects and beating them prior to bringing them to various police stations, without evidence, upon which all cases were later dropped”.<sup>283</sup> Recent Afro-barometer survey data show “that Kenyans disapprove of their government’s handling of terrorism and that the Somali Kenyan community is even more critical than citizens from other ethnic communities”. “Like most Kenyans, a majority of Somali Kenyans see the police as corrupt and untrustworthy”.<sup>284</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

<sup>280</sup>NCIC, Report Of The Youth Integration Forum , December, Kwale County. January, 2015.Reconciliation And Integration Department National Cohesion and Integration Commission

<sup>281</sup>Shetret, L. and M. Schwartz, And Danielle Cotter, Mapping Perceptions of Violent Extremism Center on Global Counterterrorism Co-operation: Pilot Study of Community Attitudes in Kenya and Somaliland, January 2013

<sup>282</sup>Amnesty International. (2014). Kenya: Somalis scapegoated in counter-terror crackdown. 27 May 2014. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/05/kenya-somalisscapegoated-counter-terror-crackdown/>.

<sup>283</sup>MUHURI, “We’re Tired of Taking You to the Court” Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit Accessed on 8/18/2015 at <http://www.muhuri.org/index.php/media-center/publications#>

<sup>284</sup>Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

In the last six years, organizations such as Amnesty International have continued to report and warn reports of police abuse. Most of these violations have occurred in the context of Kenya's counter-terrorism operations, led by the AntiTerrorism Police Unit (ATPU). "In July 2010, following a bomb explosion in Kampala, Uganda, the ATPU arbitrarily detained at least six people who were later the subject of rendition to Uganda".<sup>285</sup> "The renditions were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Kenyan High Court".<sup>286</sup>

"Members of the Somali community in Kenya, particularly refugees, have been disproportionately impacted by counter-terrorism operations in Kenya".<sup>287</sup> "Since early April 2014, thousands of Somalis have been subjected to arbitrary arrest, harassment, extortion and ill-treatment in the context of the counter-terror operation known as" "Usalama Watch".<sup>288</sup> "Over five thousand individuals have been relocated to refugee camps in the north of Kenya and hundreds of others have been deported back to Somalia".<sup>289</sup> Prior to the April 2014 crackdown on Somali refugees, a tripartite agreement was signed in November 2013 between the governments of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR, establishing a framework for the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees over a three year timeframe.

Research conducted by Amnesty International indicates that "most Somali refugees were deciding to return as a result of negative push factors in Kenya rather than positive pull factors in Somalia. Such returns do not qualify as voluntary and may violate the principle of non-refoulement".<sup>290</sup> From the Muhuri report, "the Coast region has been marginalization: its predominantly Muslim population is still largely landless and has other long-standing grievances against the central government". The dissatisfaction was in some cases, articulated through support for "the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), with its slogans of "Pwani si

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<sup>285</sup>Ibid

<sup>286</sup>Ibid

<sup>287</sup>Amnesty International, "Somalis are scapegoats in Kenya's counter-terror crackdown", 27 May 2014

<sup>288</sup>Ibid

<sup>289</sup>Ibid

<sup>290</sup>Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

Kenya” (the Coast is not part of Kenya), and “Tumechoka na Ahadi” (we are tired of promises)”.<sup>291</sup>

#### **4.8 Lack of Public Confidence in Government**

“According to Transparency International, Kenya is plagued by high levels of corruption, ranking 145<sup>th</sup> of 175 on the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, which cites the police as the state’s most corrupt institution”.<sup>292</sup> “Furthermore, allegations of arbitrary and unlawful killings of suspected criminals are common; human rights groups estimate the police to be responsible for at least 1,000 extrajudicial killings between 2008 and 2012”.<sup>293</sup> In 2013, the Kenyan government established the Independent Policing Oversight Authority to “conduct impartial and independent investigations, inspections, audits and monitoring of the National Police Service to prevent impunity and enhance professionalism in the interest of the public.”<sup>294</sup> “Similarly, Amnesty International describes the extortion of bribes as a common part of abuses of Somali Kenyans by the police and other security forces”.<sup>295</sup>

“The primary goal of the Operation Linda Nchi, was to create a 100km buffer zone along the border and eliminate Al-Shabaab militants, who had been mounting increasing numbers of terrorist attacks on some of Kenya’s northern and coastal towns”. “A month after deployment, most Kenyans (82%) held a favourable opinion of their government’s handling of the threat posed by Al-Shabaab”. “Whilst two-thirds of Kenyans say that KDF involvement in Somalia has been necessary despite Al-Shabaab reprisals, 48% of citizens support KDF withdrawal”.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>291</sup>International Crisis Group, Kenya’s 2013 Elections, Report N°197, 17 January 2013, p. 43, at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdf), accessed September 3, 2013.

<sup>292</sup>Transparency International. (2014). Corruption by country: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN>.

<sup>293</sup>U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2013). Country reports on human rights practices for 2013: Kenya. Available at: [http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dliid=22012\\_4#wrapper](http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dliid=22012_4#wrapper)

<sup>294</sup>Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) “Introducing IPOA” Accessed 8/18/2015 <http://www.ipoa.go.ke/>

<sup>295</sup>Amnesty International. (2014) Op Cit

<sup>296</sup>Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

## **4.9 Conclusion**

Kenya's state centric approach to counter terrorism has been bedevilled by institutional weaknesses. The exclusion of the civil society and other non-state actors from CVE initiatives alienates a vital sector that could partner with the state to address drivers to radicalization. Al-shabaab's efforts to ferment ethnic, religious and/ or sectarian strife require building of trust in the effectiveness, professionalism and transparency of Kenya's security sector by the community.

The winning of minds and hearts of the population augment community cohesion and resilience and eliminate feelings of marginalization and exclusion. The study confirmed that feelings of marginalization especially by the Kenyan muslims through ethnic and religious profiling, arbitrary arrests, human rights violations, unemployment, lack of education, landlessness and other ills cause stigmatization and frustrations that drive the youth in these communities to seek for livelihoods that end up luring them to radicalization. Establishing and analysing the challenges and opportunities for effective public participation in CVE in Kenya was the objective that this chapter sought to achieve. The study discovered that, there is exclusion of individuals in public participation in Kenya, politically, economically and socially resulting to increased susceptibility of individuals to radicalization. The exclusion is attributed to the many challenges that face the both the institutionalization of CVE frameworks and their implementation. The objective was achieved and the assumption confirmed to be true.


## CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

### 5.1 Introduction

This section is about data analysis and presentation of the responses collected during the study.

### 5.2 Response Rate

From data collected, 100 respondents filled and returned the questioner out of the sampled 113. This represented an 88% response rate, which is regarded acceptable. “A 50% response rate is adequate, 60% good and above 70% rated very well”. Bailey<sup>297</sup> assertion that “a response rate of 50% is adequate, while a response rate greater than 70% is very good”<sup>298</sup>.



**Figure 4.1: Response Rate**

<sup>297</sup> Bailey, K.D. (1994). *Methods of social research*. (4th ed.). New York: The Free Press.


<sup>298</sup> Mugenda O.M. & Mugenda A.G. (2003). *Research Methods Quantitative and Qualitative approaches*. Nairobi: Acts Press.

### 5.3 Demographic Information

The demographic data seeks to establish the general information of the respondents. From the questionnaire, the following demographic statistics were established, gender, age and time worked in the organization and the highest level of education. They are explained in the subsections below.

#### 5.3.1 Gender of the Respondents


From the findings, the male respondents were the majority (56%) compared to females (44%).



**Figure 4.2: Gender of the Respondents**




### 5.3.2 Age brackets of the Respondents



**Figure 4.3: Age bracket of the Respondents**

Findings showed, most (38%), 31% were aged between 36 to 45 years of age. 16% were aged below 25 years while (13%) were aged between 26 to 35 years of age. The least response was of respondents (2%) indicated that they were aged above 51 years.

### 5.3.3 Level of Education of the respondents




**Figure 4.4: Level of Education**

Findings revealed (45%) of those interviewed had a degree. (21%) were diploma holders. And 13% had a PHD. Also noted 11% of the respondents noted that indicated that they had

reached form four as their highest level of education. 9% of the respondents indicated that primary school was their highest level of education. The least response was of respondents (1%) who indicated that they had no school.

### 5.3.4 Time worked in the organization




**Figure 4.5 Years worked in the organization**

Study findings indicated (39%) had worked 4 to 6 years. 26% had worked above 6 years. 23% of those interviewed had worked 1-3 years. (12%) formed the least group having worked for less a year.

### 5.4: The Awareness of the Concept of Countering Violent Extremism

The study sought from the respondents their knowledge and skills in countering violent extremism.



**Figure 4.6: Awareness of counter terrorism**

From the analysis of findings majority of the respondents 45% of the respondents indicated that their knowledge and skills in countering violent extremism was excellent while 21% of the respondents indicated that their knowledge in countering violent extremism was excellent. 13% of the respondents indicated that their knowledge and skills in countering violent extremism was excellent. Generally, the study noted that the respondents had adequate knowledge and skills in countering violent extremism.

### 5.4.1: Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya

The study sought to determine responses on various interventions in countering violent extremism in Kenya.

**Table 4.1: Countering Violent Extremism**


All CVE programs are funded and run by international actors (eg. EU,USAID)	4.622	0.045
There are no effective CVE policies in Kenya	4.482	0.706
The Kenyan government has not adequately involve the public in CVE	4.335	0.358
There is good relations between the public and public security sector in CVE	4.054	0.584
CVE programs in Kenya should involve reducing Radicalization of youths	4.493	0.421
CVE programs in Kenya should involve addressing structural issues that lead to radicalization of individuals	4.268	0.761

From the findings in the SPSS analysis, the statement, All CVE programs are funded and run by international actors (eg. EU,USAID) had the highest level of mean (4.622) meaning that majority of the respondents concurred that all CVE programs are funded and run by international actors. The standard deviation calculated from the analysis of 0.045 indicated uniformity in the responses from the respondents. Also noted was that a great number of the respondents agreed that there are no effective CVE policies in Kenya. This was supported by the mean value calculated at 4.482. A significant number of the respondents also agreed to the statement; The Kenyan government has not adequately involved the public in CVE, this was inferred from the mean value calculated in the analysis of 4.335. The standard deviation of 0.358 calculated in the SPSS indicated little variation in the responses of the respondents. The study also established that there relations between the public and public security sector in

CVE is poor. This was noted from the mean calculated of 4.054, which indicated that most respondents disagreed to the statement and the standard deviation calculated of less than 1.5 indicates that there was high variance from the mean value.

### 5.5: Counter Radicalization Measures and Strategies, as part of CVE

The study sought to establish the counter radicalization measures and strategies, as part of CVE. From the respondents the study sought if there are any aspects of home grown terrorism and radicalizations in Kenya.



**Figure 4.7: Aspects of homegrown terrorism and counter terrorism**

According to the results (72%) observed there were aspects of homegrown terrorism and counter terrorism measures while only a mere 28% of the respondents indicated that there were no aspects of homegrown terrorism and counter terrorism measures.

### 5.5.1: Measures of Counter-Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism Measures

The study sought to establish measures of counter radicalization and counter terrorism.

**Table 4.2: Responsiveness on performance**


	Mean	Standard deviation
Counter-terrorism and radicalization measures have been effective in Kenya in the past few years	4.146	0.2132
Communities have been involved in countering radicalization in partnership with the government	4.221	0.4814
Some of the counter-terrorism measures by the government have led to counter-productive outcomes that have worsened the fight against terrorism in Kenya	3.587	0.3859
There is need to adopt multi-sector approach in CVE in Kenya	4.596	1.096

Based on the responses from the respondents, it was clear that most respondents saw that there is need to adopt multi-sector approach in CVE in Kenya. This was noted true from the high mean calculated from the analysis of findings of 4.596. The standard deviation calculated in this case of 1.096 indicated uniformity in the responses from the respondents. It was established from the analysis that counter-terrorism and radicalization measures have not been effective in Kenya in the past few years. This was established by the high mean value calculated of 4.146. The standard deviation calculated of .2132 indicates uniformity in the responses from the respondents. It was also established that communities have been involved in countering radicalization in partnership with the government. This was seen true by the high mean value calculated in the spss analysis of 4.221. The standard deviation calculated in

the analysis of 0.4814 indicated little variance from the mean mark in the responses. Also noted from the analysis of the findings was that some of the counter-terrorism measures by the government have led to counter-productive outcomes that have worsened the fight against terrorism in Kenya. This was noted true by the mean calculated of 3.587, showing a little variance.

## 5.6: Policy Adjustment

The study sought to establish from the respondents if there is need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter violent extremism.



**Figure 4.8: Need for policy reforms**

According to the study results, (85%) observed there was need for policy reforms adjustments to successfully avert and counter terrorism. Only a mere 15% of the respondents indicated that there was no need to effectively prevent and counter violent extremism.

### 5.6.1: Policy Adjustment on CVE in Kenya

The respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the following statement relating policy adjustment on CVE in Kenya.

**Table 4.3: Policy adjustment on CVE in Kenya**

The government should make an effort to increase CVE programs and public participation in vulnerable communities	4.135	0.594
The government should provide alternatives strengthen public/community resilience in violent extremism	4.255	0.508
The Judicial system in Kenya does not compliment the works of intelligence and police officers leading to human rights violations by these officers	4.506	0.287

Study findings observed that the judicial system in Kenya does not compliment the works of intelligence and police officers leading to human rights violations by these officers. This was seen by the high mean value calculated of 4.506. The standard deviation calculated of 0.287 showed common view by the majority and that the government should provide alternatives strengthen public/community resilience to violent extremism. This interpretation was recognized by the mean of 4.255. Again most concurred that the government should make an effort to increase CVE programs and public participation in vulnerable communities. This was noted true by the mean calculated on the statement of 4.135. The standard deviation calculated in the study of 0.594 indicated uniformity in the responses from the respondents.

### **5.7 CVE in Kenya**

Due to persisting security concerns within a thriving economy, Kenya been rolling out a new CVE policy and initiatives with the intention of enhancing long-term national security. These initiatives are playing an increasingly important role in national counterterrorism (CT) agenda, with the aim of minimizing the reach and effectiveness of groups employing terrorism by bolstering resilience among at-risk populations.



A look into CVE in Kenya in this research shows a vital arm of holistic CT, as it works from the ground up to prevent radicalization, rather than attempt to simply destroy operational extremists. One obvious shortcoming of lethal force-heavy CT operations is that they can fuel the very radicalism they aim to eradicate as one respondent indicated.<sup>299</sup>

Most respondents in the field of CVE particular on the counter-radicalization initiatives at the local level, indicated that one of the reasons why youth join extremist movements in Kenya, is the government's counterterrorism strategy that targets Muslims as a main driver, showing the shadow side of a conservative counterterrorism policy that doesn't simultaneously support integration and a counter narratives. Unemployment in Kenya has been steadily increasing for the past several years, albeit at a slow pace. Unemployed youth are especially susceptible to recruitment tactics that exploit grievances and engender allegiance to extremist agenda among other factors such as marginalization and lack of education.<sup>300</sup>

Over the years the Kenyan government officials have been moving towards an understanding that the violation of rights and generalizations of ethnic populations only fuels radicalization, a shift from a previous strategy based on force. Kenyan officials have been focusing on more innovative CT initiatives, hoping to foster cooperation between government and civil society for open dialogue.<sup>301</sup> Security forces targeting ethnic Somali citizens have contributed to a tense climate where perceived and actual injustices facilitate successful recruitment leading to a Kenyan CVE policy that aims to harness civil society infrastructure and minimize restrictions to civil liberties that have often accompanied security crackdowns.

According to Munk, CVE is not only concerned with targeting the roots of extremism; it also aims to confront the ideological reach and strength of extremism through strategic communications, awareness raising, and initiatives that promote dialogue and integration with communities being involved. A well-administrated CVE strategy that works to maintain human rights while addressing factors that lead to violent extremism, can only add value to

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<sup>299</sup>Interview with Research Consultant at the Institute for Security Studies, May 17, 2017

<sup>300</sup>Interview with CVE consultant at Royal United Services Institute for Security and Defense. May 6, 2017

<sup>301</sup>Interview with CVE consultant at Royal United Services Institute for Security and Defense. May 6, 2017


the security climate.<sup>302</sup> As Kenya's 2016 CVE applies an economic outlook remains promising, a focus on a well-rounded CT strategy can only contribute to mid to long-term security and growth.

The general challenges of income inequality, youth unemployment, and the impact of climate change can easily combine with perceived tribalism, corruption, impunity, and a number of unresolved historical grievances to fuel unrest. More so the upcoming elections in August 2017, as the political highlight of the year, is an event that creates opportunities for exploitation by violent groups. The figure below shows respondents' views of the national problems contributing to grievances therefore playing a direct and indirect role in radicalization of youths.

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<sup>302</sup>Kira Munk, CVE: A Necessary Tool in Kenya's Security Drive, *Global Risk Insights*, February 24, 2016

**Figure 4.9: National grievance**



### 5.8 CVE strategies in Kenya and Challenges in their implementation

As highlighted by H.E. President Uhuru Kenyatta during a Nation address<sup>303</sup> on 15 March 2017, “the counter terrorism effort of the Government of Kenya has delivered a sharp reduction in the number of fatalities, attacks and attempts by terrorist entities”. This has placed Kenya among the first countries in Africa to pursue national level coordination of all

<sup>303</sup> <http://www.president.go.ke/2017/03/19/speech-by-his-excellency-hon-uhuru-kenyatta-c-g-h-president-of-the-republic-of-kenya-and-commander-in-chief-of-the-defence-forces-during-the-2017-state-of-the-nation-address-parliament-buildings/>

CVE efforts. The CVE response covers almost all angles including psychosocial, political, faith based, capacity building, arts and culture, legal, and policy and media aspects. While the CVE strategy reflects a comprehensive and inclusive response to violent extremism in Kenya, dedicated support is needed in key target areas for the strategy to be effectively implemented and with sustainable impact. These areas include collection and sharing of context-specific evidence, the collaboration of key partners such as civil society and county level state actors, the management of the disengagement and rehabilitation processes of foreign terrorist fighters, and the advice and referral support to communities who are exposed to radicalisation and violent extremism.

So as to successfully coordinate the implementation process of the various components of the strategy, there is need for engaging different stakeholders both at national, regional and international level. The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of the National Government has been tasked as the government's lead implementing agency for the CVE Strategy (with the County Security and Intelligence Committees playing a key role at the county level), the strategy is owned by the Centre, which is the lead agency coordinating all actors (state, non-state and bilateral and multilateral partners) involved in the implementation process of the strategy.<sup>304</sup>

The EU also supports community-led CVE relevant activities through the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), for which Kenya is a pilot country, as well as via an upcoming call for non-state actors focusing on support to conflict prevention, peace building, and crisis preparedness in Kenya. A directly CVE-specific project under the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability has also recently started in the Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps, supporting formal and community policing set-ups and preventing radicalisation through youth inclusion.<sup>305</sup> The above actions mainly support the capacities of

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<sup>304</sup>Interview with Law enforcement Officer, June 9th, 2017

<sup>305</sup>Interview with CVE consultant at Royal United Services Institute for Security and Defence. May 6, 2017

communities and civil society actors (including their interactions with law enforcement agencies) by building their resilience and empowerment.

On public perspectives about violent extremism, the study found them quite concerned about the dangers posed by Islamic extremism. Respondents stated that “majority of Kenyan youth would do anything to generate money and wealth regardless of its legality as long as they are not caught”. This is particularly worrying as unemployment is one of the main factors luring Kenyan youth to join Al-Shabaab, together with ‘feelings’ of marginalization to recruit.<sup>306</sup>

Despite the different counter terrorism efforts by the Kenyan government, there has been increased public frustration with Al-Shabaab’s continued ability to mount deadly attacks in Kenya.<sup>307</sup> A local member of parliament, Barre Shill, called on the national government to arm “the community” to defend itself against Al-Shabaab because “we are not being protected.” “Teachers and health workers who failed to report to work due to security fears added to the officials’ concerns”.<sup>308</sup> This serves as a clear indication of vulnerable communities’ sense of helplessness in the government’s efforts which had earlier focused on traditional counter terrorism efforts, without involving the communities themselves.

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<sup>306</sup>Interviews with CVE consultant: RUSI and ISS, May 6, 2017

<sup>307</sup>Interview with Law enforcement Officer, June 9th, 2017

<sup>308</sup>VOA News, June 2017

## CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 Conclusion

As seen in chapters two, three and four for long term achievement in terms of addressing the existing drivers of extremism an all-encompassing course outlining measures for addressing prevailing political, commercial and public grievances and mechanism to successfully respond to future grievances are vital. Positively restraining radical violence will need, majorly, an unprejudiced understanding of the fundamental drivers of insecurity and approval of actions custom-made to react to these contests in arrangement with native, countrywide, and regional settings, grounded on corporations between global and domestic actors.

Investing in CVE can be contentious, as results are not as tangible at the beginning. Thus CVE strategies and initiatives should clearly define the target of the projects. As it stands, most respondents, who are researchers and practitioners in the field of CVE, agreed that there are no finite 'causes' or 'roots' that indicate whether or not someone is likely to undertake a violent act of terror; they are fluid and contextual. Kenya has struggled for the last three years to develop a CVE policy. So as to counter violent extremism, Kenya needs to capitalize on hard-power tactical successes by implementing a comprehensive CVE approach that addresses the underlying reasons behind the problems that act as pull and push factors for radicalization. These CVE strategies should employ socially-focused tactics that include the rehabilitation of returned fighters, constructing effective counter-narratives, developing community resilience and, especially, harnessing the power and influence of women, men and families in communities in combatting extremist ideologies.

Countering violent extremism programming requires to be tailored to the local setting, intended and steered with practicality concerning the political and security context, and focused on envisioned recipients. When urgency over-rides these considerations, ill-designed programming could result in anything from inefficient use of resources to diplomatic backlash for the donor and death for practitioners and intended beneficiaries.

Kenya's effort to counter radicalization to violent extremism needs to be inclusive and productive relationships must be built with all stakeholders. The state as the guarantor of security should provide the leadership that harnesses national power and capacities of non-state actors such as the civil society among other stakeholders to collaboratively tackle and counter violent extremism through a coordinated and holistic approach that addresses the push and pull aspects to radicalization. The current path of alienating communities where radicalization occurs as well as estranging organizations and individuals that are critical of counterproductive approaches employed only serve to provide a conducive atmosphere for radicalization

Growing sense of socio-economic and political marginalization in Kenya especially in Muslim dominated coastal areas and north-eastern coupled with stigmatization of the Somali Kenyan community occasioning serious human rights violations by security agencies during counter terrorism operations serve to ferment resentment, mistrust and contempt between the community and the state. The chequered relations between the government and civil society further serves to poison trust and breed suspicion that lead to mutual mistrust and resentment hence stifling cooperation. This poses challenges to effective public participation and inclusivity in counter violent extremism and there is need for a strategic shift if this war is to be won.

## **6.2 Recommendations**

The research outlines the following recommendations to guide future policy direction and areas for further academic research;

### **1. Key Drivers and Perceptions.**

Government of Kenya and other African states should embark on a sequence of nationwide evaluation and observation studies to well comprehend indigenous drivers of insecurity in their populations, including citizens' perceptions of state and world-wide responses to counter violent extremism. Through this, well formulated and articulated CVE policies that will help address this concerns will be properly anchored and implemented.

### **2. Awareness Creation**

Government should collaborate with other players both state and non-state actors, to increase responsiveness among high-ranking officers and policymakers of the key drivers of violent extremism and acquaint them with the chief objectives, approaches, and consequences of CVE guidelines and agendas. Such exercises offer officers working in diverse departments and on numerous questions an extensive overview to the interdependence of security, growth, and governance.

### **3. Governments' Support of robust Nyumba Kumi Initiative.**

Security agencies are frequently the only interaction citizens have with their government, which are usually not viewed positively. Precisely in relation to countering extremism, community based law implementation has confirmed crucial in diverse areas of the globe in the initial identification of radicalization and discovery of intimidations, strong partnerships between societies and security services, and amplified trust in administrative procedures and actions. Civic policing in Kenya need a range of investments, together with refining procedures and training on human rights confines and responsibilities, on rule of law-based exploration and questionings methods and religious sensitivity.

### **4. CVE and Community Engagement Strategy**



Countries in the Larger Horn of Africa could formulate their own all-inclusive CVE and community involvement strategies and action procedures, based on nation-wide assessment and awareness studies of local drivers of insecurity and violent extremism and prior responses to it. These do not need to be stand-alone plans with their specific exclusive line of policy procedures, but should in its place take the form of extremely integrated strategies and values across all institutions and service providers at all stages of government as well as civil society players, co-ordinating and increasing prevailing determinations and promotion interagency synchronisation. Gender questions also need to be deliberated when developing and modifying such strategies. The participation of women in countering violent extremism should go past traditional roles and duties, ensuring that they aggressively take part in the development and application of CVE processes.

**5. There is need for technical and supplementary education programs.**

Government institutions mandated with handling the education docket may possibly contemplate developing curricula that inspire a deeper understanding of national histories or uniqueness, enrich innovative and critical thinking, motivate civic accountability and social responsibility, and highlight the efficacy of public service outside the military. With these determinations, young individuals can be better armed to resist the pull aspects that may force them toward radicalization to or recruitment for violent extremism.

**6.3. Suggested Areas for Further Research**

The researcher suggest the following areas for further research: Examining and assessing the key drivers of radicalization and violent extremism and countering violent extremism through a comprehensive framework of both state and non-state actors.

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# RESEARCH PERMIT



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Solomon Akadake Abwaku  
National Defence College  
P.O. Box 24381-00502  
**NAIROBI.**

### RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“Countering violent extremism through public participation: a case study of Kenya,”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **all Counties** for the period ending **18<sup>th</sup> July, 2018.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, all Counties** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit a **copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

**GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM**  
**FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The County Commissioners  
All Counties.

The County Directors of Education  
All Counties.



**COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: A  
CASE STUDY OF KENYA**

**Questionnaire**

Kindly tick in the space provided (✓) the correct answers or supply the required information where, required, please specify and elaborate.

**Section A: Respondents Information**

1. Name..... (Optional)
2. Age of the respondent  
Below 25 years ( )      26 to 35 years ( )      36 to 45 years ( )  
45 to 50 years      above 51 years ( )
3. Gender of the respondent?  
Male ( )      Female ( )
4. What is your highest level of education?  
Postgraduate ( )      Degree ( )      Diploma ( )      Form four ( )  
Primary School ( )      No school ( )
5. Occupation?
6. How long have you worked in the organization?  
Less than 1 year ( )      1-3 years ( )      4-6 years ( )      above 6 years ( )

**Section B: The Awareness of the Concept of Countering Violent Extremism**

1. How do you measure your knowledge and skill regarding Countering violent extremism?  
a. Excellent b. Good c. average d. poor e. very poor
2. Does your work experience give you adequate exposure in the concept of countering violent extremism?  
a. Yes b. No
3. If your answer for question number above is yes, how did you get acquainted to it?  
a. on job training b. short term trainings c. seminars d. conferences e. workshops

4. How would you rate your Kenyan public attitude towards countering violent extremism?

a. very high b. high c. average d. low e. very low

**Section C: Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya**

7. Are there any existing CVE policies in Kenya

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If yes please give examples?

.....  
.....

1. Are there any existing CVE programmes in Kenya

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If yes please give examples.

.....  
.....

If yes, are the CVE programs involve public participation?

2. How has counter terrorism measures such as CVE involved the public and communities in general?

3. Are the current CVE programs efficient and adequate in countering violent extremism

Please explain your answer.

4. In your opinion what are the challenges of implementing CVE policies and programs in Kenya?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

5. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to CVE in Kenya  
(Scale 1=strongly agree 2= agree 3= moderate 4= disagree 5=strongly disagree)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
All CVE programs are funded and run by international actors (eg. EU)					
The are no effective CVE policies in Kenya					
The Kenyan government has not adequately involve the public in CVE					
The public security sector adequately involves the public in countering terrorism					
There is good relations between the public and public security sector in CVE					
CVE programs in Kenya should involve reducing Radicalization of youths					
CVE programs in Kenya should involve addressing structural issues that lead to radicalization of individuals					

**Section C: Counter Radicalization Measures and Strategies, as part of CVE**

6. What makes Kenyan individuals more susceptible to recruitment into terror groups in the region?

.....  
.....

7. Are there any aspects of homegrown terrorism and radicalizations in Kenya?

11b. If Yes, please explain your answer.

.....  
.....

8. What measures is the Kenyan government taking to prevent youths from being radicalized? (this question applies to government stakeholders)

.....  
.....

9. To what extent have counter-radicalization measures been effective in Kenya?

- Very great extent [ ]
- Great extent [ ]
- Moderate extent [ ]
- Little extent [ ]
- No extent [ ]

10. Is there any evolving nature of partnership between the states and non-state actors in CVE efforts?

- Yes [ ]
- No [ ]

If yes please explain how?

.....  
 .....

11. What is the role of non-state actors in partnering with the Kenyan government in countering violent extremism?

.....  
 .....

12. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to measures of Counter-radicalization and Counter-terrorism measures. Scale (1=strongly agree 2= agree 3= moderate 4= disagree 5=strongly disagree.)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
Counter-terrorism and radicalization measures have been effective in Kenya in the past few years					
Communities have been involved in countering radicalization in partnership with the government					
Some of the counter-terrorism measures by the government have led to counter-productive outcomes that have worsened the fight against terrorism in Kenya					
There is need to adopt multi-sector approach in CVE in Kenya					

13. In your opinion, how best can the religious leaders and groups in Kenya be involved in CVE measure in Kenya?

.....  
.....

14. Do you think that community involvement and public participation is important in CVE in Kenya?

If yes, explain your answer

.....  
.....

**Section D: Policy Adjustment**

15. Is there need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and count violent extremism?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If yes please explain how?

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.....

16. To what extent should policy adjustment involve the public in countering violent extremism?

Very great extent [ ]

Great extent [ ]

Moderate extent [ ]

Little extent [ ]

No extent [ ]

Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating policy adjustment on CVE in Kenya (Scale 1=strongly agree 2= agree 3= moderate 4= disagree 5=strongly disagree.)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
The government should make an effort to increase CVE programs and public participation in vulnerable communities					
The government should provide alternatives strengthen public/community resilience in violent extremism					
The Judicial system in Kenya does not compliment the works of intelligence and police officers leading to human rights violations by these officers					

17. In your opinion, what the challenges facing current countering violent extremism measures in Kenya?

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18. In your opinion, what other measures can be adopted for effectiveness in preventing and countering violent in Kenya?

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19. Any other comments?

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Thank you for your time