The Foreign Policy of Tanzania: From Cold War to Post–Cold War

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Even as scholarly perspectives shift to studying the post–Cold War era of globalization, conditionalities, and the emergence of new issues shaping the foreign policies of African states, it should be underscored that this “newest” era is not entirely novel. The role played by the international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, is hardly new. Structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s and the accompanying conditionalities are part of a long trend of policies imposed upon Africa, often with disastrous results.

The struggles for democratization of political economy and society are also not entirely new phenomena. Internal pressures for democratic reforms were evident long before the global popularization of democracy and human rights was triggered by events in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s. What is new, perhaps, is the external pressure for democratization that has become an important aspect of IFI and donor political conditionalities. Because of this, the focus of foreign relations has shifted away from diplomacy and ideological posturing to economic restructuring and globalization.

Against this background, this chapter attempts to reconstruct and reinterpret Tanzania’s foreign policy. Although specific issues have changed over time, it is argued that the basic structural conditions and factors that have shaped foreign policy since independence in 1961 have not fundamentally altered. These resilient factors are primarily (1) the colonial legacy, (2) idiosyncratic variables, and (3) the phenomena of economic underdevelopment and external dependence. The basic socioeconomic and political conditions that have influenced foreign policy are examined
first, followed by a discussion of trends and changes that have evolved over time.

**Colonial Legacy and Foreign Policy**

In Tanzania, as elsewhere on the continent, the social, economic, and political structures inherited from colonialism continue to influence the making and implementation of domestic and foreign policy. Tanzania inherited from the colonizers (Germany and Britain) an export-oriented economy geared primarily to the production of a narrow range of primary commodities (coffee, cotton, sisal, and pyrethrum); little concern was given to subsistence production.

Perhaps because of its mixed colonial history, as well as its poor soils and difficult climate, Tanzania turned out to be one of the worst cases of colonial neglect. Only minimal attention was given to the development of productive social forces, such as a commercial class, skilled personnel, and physical infrastructure (transportation, communication, health, education, and urban facilities). At independence, one of the striking features of Tanzania's new government and bureaucracy was the shortage of indigenous technical, managerial, and administrative cadres, which had important implications for postcolonial governance.

At the political level, the colonial state bequeathed highly undemocratic and authoritarian structures of governance. Indigenous organizations had been outlawed until almost the eve of independence, and elections were only held thirty-three months before independence and then not on the basis of universal franchise. Consequently, the political culture inherited from colonialism had all the ingredients of autocracy. This culture was perfected by the postcolonial state, with significant implications for foreign policy, especially in facilitating the dominant role of the president.

Tanzania emerged at independence with weak social and political institutions and with an equally weak, underdeveloped economy. That economy was highly dependent on foreign exchange earned from a few primary commodities whose prices have been, for the most part, on the decline since independence, whereas the costs of manufactured commodities have consistently been on the rise. Consequently, economic and technological dependence on the outside world has largely shaped foreign economic and political relations.

The lack of well-developed class interests and pressure groups and, to some extent, the absence of ethnic and religious tensions at independence provided a rare opportunity for consolidating power and gave President Julius Nyerere a relatively free hand to shape and direct development and foreign policies without being constrained by competing interests.
The Nyerere Factor in Foreign Policy

Although Nyerere's dominant role has been widely acknowledged, there are some who argue that he was only one of several actors in foreign policy, including government ministries, parliament, and the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). It is my argument, however, that government and party functions centered upon the president, at least until 1984 when the constitution was amended to provide for separate heads of government and ruling party. Indeed, in Tanzania as elsewhere in Africa, the colonially inherited state-centric and authoritarian political culture ensured that the president and/or the head of state shaped the country's foreign policy objectives, approaches, and strategies. Nyerere's personal philosophy, ideology, principles, and changing perceptions of the domestic and global environments were largely manifested in Tanzania's foreign policy posture for nearly twenty-five years.

Nyerere's dominant role in foreign policy also derived from his charismatic personality and from the circumstances in which he found himself at Tanzania's formal independence, for few others at that time had sufficient knowledge or interest in foreign affairs to influence or contribute to foreign policymaking. Nyerere's initial prominence in foreign affairs was soon augmented by authoritarian and repressive tendencies that were clearly manifested in various policy actions taken between 1964 and 1977. These involved the suppression of critics within the government and the co-optation and elimination of potential sources of political opposition, from civil society groups to opposition political parties. These actions effectively removed alternative actors that could have contributed to foreign policy. Instead, the president's monopoly over policymaking and implementation enabled him, if he so wished, to resist or ignore constraints, domestic and international, and to assert autonomous policies and strategies.

The same colonial legacy that propelled Nyerere to prominence in foreign affairs was also marked by underdevelopment and external dependency, which severely limited the country's choices and its capacity to translate desired foreign policy objectives into practice.


The foreign policy guidelines spelled out by Nyerere in December 1961 remain in force today, although the emphasis and focus have shifted and changed. Between 1961 and 1966, Nyerere naively assumed that Tanzania could pursue its domestic and foreign policy objectives without offending vested interests in the international system. It was wrongly assumed that objectives could be advanced through appeals to reason and humanitarian sentiments alone, without recourse to material or military resources.
This attitude was reinforced by an equally misconceived view that Western donors would be willing to finance up to 78 percent of Tanzania’s First Five Year Development Plan and that the procurement of external resources would promote economic growth and/or development within the framework of inherited colonial structures.

Events, both external and internal, in 1964 and 1965 compelled Nyerere to change his perceptions and expectations of the international environment. By 1967, he had come to realize (1) that Tanzania had little influence in international affairs, and (2) that Western “allies,” such as Britain and the United States, felt no moral obligation to assist Tanzanian development and foreign policy objectives but wanted to keep Tanzania within their sphere of influence. The major events that triggered this realization included Tanzania’s army mutiny, conflict with the United States over expelled diplomats, conflict with West Germany over the “Hallstein doctrine,” the Congo crisis, and conflict with Britain over Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). All these events, well documented elsewhere,6 basically demonstrated Tanzania’s naivété and powerlessness globally, as well as Nyerere’s determination to defend nonalignment and contribute to Africa’s liberation.

The government came to realize that repression had to be balanced by some degree of economic growth and that a popular ideology was needed to at least temporarily persuade the disgruntled and impoverished masses that development was taking place, albeit slowly. Some version of “African socialism” that could serve as a unifying ideology had to be devised, and this came in the form of the 1967 Arusha Declaration.7

It was the Arusha Declaration, rather than formal independence, that marked the beginning of change in relations with the global political economy. By 1970, Tanzania had significantly diversified its trade and aid links within the Western bloc but only marginally outside it. By 1974, a clear preference had emerged regarding the countries from whom assistance should be obtained: These included China, the Scandinavian countries, and Canada, all of which were perceived to be sympathetic to Tanzania’s developmental and foreign policy goals and to lack interventionist tendencies. This diversification and other post-Arusha policies may have enhanced the range of choices in development and foreign policy matters and minimized the chance of sabotage by a single donor. But they did not increase effectiveness in implementing chosen goals. Tanzania’s relative powerlessness and peripheral position in the global context persisted and was only exacerbated by other crises in the 1970s and 1980s.

These crises included the 1971 coup in Uganda that brought Idi Amir to power and the intensification of liberation wars in Southern Africa which contributed to Tanzania’s economic woes and brought the question of security to the forefront of national and foreign policies—hence, the in
creased defense expenditure after 1970 and the introduction of a peoples' militia in 1971. The superpowers' military buildup in the Indian Ocean compounded the question of security and pushed Tanzania toward a more activist nonalignment policy.

The 1973-1974 oil crisis also negatively impacted Tanzania, as it did other developing states, by widening the economic gap with industrialized countries. This led to a demand for a fundamental restructuring of the postwar Bretton Woods order. The 1974 UN declaration calling for the establishment of a New International Economic Order marked the beginning of the North-South dialogue for a more equitable order. Tanzania played an active and leading role in lobbying for NIEO, but North-South dialogues did not produce the expected results. Moreover, the alternative proposed by Nyerere and other Third World leaders, namely, the formation of a South-South "Trade Union of the Poor," also did not succeed.

In general, however, Tanzania had, by the 1970s, become less dogmatic and more pragmatic in its pursuit of principles, and it had learned to utilize nonalignment to access development resources from both Cold War blocs. The conception of nonalignment in economic rather than political terms represented an attempt to adapt policy to the changed international system, an adaptation that gradually became accepted by most leaders in the nonaligned movement.  

While nonalignment took center stage, the major issues that preoccupied the leadership in the first two decades after Tanzanian independence essentially revolved around the security of the regime and/or state, domestic political "stability," and the search for economic development and growth. Early diplomacy placed a higher premium on political independence than on economic assistance.


At the regional level, Tanzania pursued a policy of good neighborliness and promoted cooperation, liberation, and decolonization. Nyerere's activism and leading role in the OAU was generally accepted. He served as a chairman of the OAU, and Tanzania was the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee. With the formation of the Front-Line States in 1975, of which Nyerere became the first chair, Tanzania became active in the liberation of Southern Africa.

Tanzania was also instrumental in the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, having hosted the 1979 meeting where SADCC was negotiated. SADCC signified a shift away from a total focus on the liberation struggle toward a preoccupation with economic empowerment. Consequently, SADCC members gradually reduced the tempo and rhetoric about liberation, and they became more pragmatic in
order to cope with rising domestic pressures for liberalization, democratization, and debt reduction. This, combined with Nyerere’s departure, contributed to Tanzania’s waning role in Southern Africa from the mid-1980s. Other critical factors were worsening economic crises, IFI demands for the implementation of SAPs, and the Reagan administration’s rejection of Tanzania’s leadership role in Southern Africa.  

Tanzania’s relations with Kenya and Uganda went through several cycles of conflict and cooperation, despite the declared policy of good neighborliness. Since independence, the three East African countries have recognized the need for regional integration, but ideological and personal differences, the colonial legacy of economic inequalities between them, and external interference in their affairs have bedeviled all efforts toward economic integration and peaceful coexistence.

During the existence of the East African Community between 1967 and 1977, economic, ideological, and personality differences among the leaders made the community unworkable. Both Tanzania and Uganda felt that Kenya was unfairly benefiting from the EAC. The coming to power of Idi Amin in 1971 compounded the problem, as Nyerere swore that he would never meet with the Ugandan leader.

The closure of the border between Tanzania and Kenya following the collapse of EAC in 1977 forced both countries to look elsewhere for economic and political cooperation. Tanzania turned even more southward. However, Nyerere still had to deal with Amin, whose army invaded and occupied part of Tanzania in October 1978 and declared it to be Ugandan. Nyerere promptly declared war and kept Tanzanian troops in Uganda until after Amin was overthrown and an alternative government was established. This military venture lasted for six years at an exorbitant cost to Tanzania, estimated at over $500 million.

Amin’s removal ultimately contributed to improved relations with Uganda and Kenya, as did the death of President Kenyatta in 1978. Tanzania was also in serious economic straits and simply could not afford to keep the border closed. Furthermore, IFIs had made the reopening of the border a condition for further economic assistance to Tanzania. Thus, in November 1983, an agreement was reached between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda on the distribution of assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC. The common border was reopened, and bilateral relations were normalized.

**Political Economy of Foreign Policy: 1985–1998**

Over the years, Nyerere had developed a knack for sensing the right time to change course in national and international affairs. Perceiving himself to be a major obstacle to economic liberalization, he opted to retire in
1985. However, at President Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s request, Nyerere retained his powerful post as chairman of CCM, to which he was reelected for a further five-year term in 1987. Recognizing that his presence as chairman of the country’s sole party could compromise debate and delay the transition to multipartyism, Nyerere relinquished his post in June 1990, halfway through his new term, shortly after initiating the debate on multipartyism in February 1990.

The transition from Nyerere to Mwinyi had its own dynamics not only because of the idiosyncratic differences of the leaders but also because it coincided with other domestic changes, as well as shifts in regional and global political economies. Therefore, there has been debate as to whether Nyerere’s departure brought real change in development and foreign relations. Some have argued that it did, whereas others contend that the changes, if any, have been superficial at best. Mwinyi himself subscribed to this latter view when he stated: “We are just carrying on from where [Nyerere] left off, because after all, I don’t think my government can reverse party policies. . . . There is no change whatsoever. There may be changes in style, but no change in policy matters.”

The CCM party program drawn up in 1987 did, however, shift the emphasis from political to economic development as a priority area of foreign policy. The party noted that although Nyerere’s government had succeeded in laying a strong political foundation, the economic aspect had remained weak and should become the major focus in foreign policy: “A weak national economy is detrimental to a country’s foreign policy, since it leads to failure by the country to make independent decisions and hence failing to achieve its aims in foreign policy. It is for this reason, therefore, that CCM has to see to it that national investments during this period are aimed at strengthening national economy for a stronger foreign policy.”

One indication of this shift has been the cutback in the number and size of foreign missions since 1992. Out of Tanzania’s twenty-eight foreign embassies and high commissions in 1992, at least six had been closed by 1995, and the number of personnel in the remaining offices was reduced.

It was not until 1994 that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally undertook a review of foreign policy in the light of post–Cold War developments. Mwinyi, who participated in the May 1994 foreign policy review workshop, noted in his opening statement that the “new” foreign policy must take into account new issues, new actors, and a radically changed external environment. In regard to new actors, he stated that “as we go forward into the next century, a realistic foreign policy for our country must be one that is broad-based; one that is not the preserve of a few mysterious diplomats but one that truly seeks to take into account the interests of all the sectors of the nation.”
Concerning new issues in a changed environment, he noted:

We are heading for the 21st century in an amoral pursuit of national interests . . . back to the era of "realpolitik" where big powers pursue their security and commercial interests abroad with renewed vigor, characterised by double standards and hypocrisy. . . . We have no option but to take into account this emerging phenomena on the international scene, and to reorient our foreign policy accordingly. . . . Beyond the core interests of survival and sovereignty, we have to put emphasis on the promotion and protection of our commercial interests abroad. . . . We can only enter the 21st century as a respectable state, with some influence on the international scene, if we improve the socio-economic situation in our country.15

The transition from Nyerere to Mwinyi occurred during a challenging period. The implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), adopted in 1986 as part of SAP implementation, resulted in some improvement in food production; industrial output increased by 4.2 percent in 1987 and by 5.4 percent in 1988; and the rate of inflation declined from 43 percent before the ERP to an average of 23 percent in 1989. Furthermore, GDP improved from its negative trend and grew by 4.1 percent in 1989.16

But the Mwinyi regime employed an autocratic style of governance and resisted power sharing and popular participation. Despite the reintroduction of multipartyism in 1992, the incumbent and still undemocratic state continued to control the democratic transition—albeit ineffectively. The transitional government seemed determined to control the pace and direction of political change and ensure CCM's electoral victory: "CCM will not agree to supervise the loss of its 30 year grip on power and has therefore decided to be member of team, captain, referee and linesman all in one."17 The more than a dozen opposition parties initially threatened to boycott the elections, but they ultimately participated in October 1995 despite the government's refusal to respond to their electoral demands.

The political landscape did begin to change in March 1995 when former cabinet member Augustine Mrema, whom Mwinyi had sacked in February 1995 for criticizing government corruption, defected to a major opposition party—NCCR Mageuzi (National Convention for Construction and Reform). He soon became the party chair and a presidential candidate. Mrema, a populist and a crowd puller, significantly tilted the political balance in favor of the opposition parties.18 Meanwhile, Nyerere, who had criticized governmental corruption in his 1994 book Uongozi na Hatima ya Tanzania (Our Leadership and the Future of Tanzania), made another scathing attack on the corruption in Mwinyi's government that echoed the sentiments expressed by Mrema.
Corroborating Nyerere's concern, the March 1995 economic report of the Bank of Tanzania indicated that the economy continued to decline. Inflation was up to 42 percent in March 1995, and the government lacked revenue due to widespread tax exemptions, rampant evasions, and improper monitoring of external trade transactions. Furthermore, at the time, CCM was split on the issue of its presidential candidate, with Nyerere and Mwinyi having different preferences. Nyerere finally prevailed with the nomination of Benjamin Mkapa, who went on to win the presidential election at the end of 1995.


Tanzania has had to adjust to global economic changes since the 1980s, including the rising debt burden and the conditionalities of IFIs. During the 1960s and 1970s, it had acquired a status beyond its meager resources and capability. Tanzania exploited nonalignment to attract economic resources from both Cold War blocs, but the resources procured were increasingly inadequate—hence the search for additional resources from the IMF and World Bank. Nyerere viewed IFI conditionalities as an insult and as another conspiracy by international capitalism to undermine sovereignty and nonalignment. Consequently, between 1980 and 1985, Tanzania played cat-and-mouse games with IFIs, while remaining basically intransigent on SAPs. In the meantime, the country's economy continued to deteriorate. The breakthrough in this economic standoff came shortly after Nyerere's resignation. Mwinyi appeared more pragmatic and less idealistic, and he agreed to the conditionalities implemented through the 1986 ERP.

The point to be underscored here is that Tanzania continued to be structurally dependent on the international capitalist system, having very little power to influence events or resist conditionalities. It continued its nonaligned posture, but it became more preoccupied with economic relations with bilateral and multilateral donors. It also adopted a low-profile and nonconfrontational approach to most issues—a stance that was somewhat similar to Kenya's "quiet diplomacy" of the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter 6). Even in the absence of SAPs and economic crisis, Tanzania's external role was bound to diminish with the attainment of Southern African liberation and the end of the Cold War. Thus, by 1990, there was no international conflict about which it could be nonaligned, and external actors proved more interested in enforcing liberalization than in global diplomatic posturing.

Democratic pluralism was as much a response to domestic pressures as it was a reaction to external pressure from international donor countries.
and institutions. Although the government conceded to multipartyism, the state continued to demonstrate a reluctance to democratize the institutions of governance and to facilitate fair elections. Today, donors and many Tanzanians alike continue to be concerned with the rampant misuse of the state machinery for the personal acquisition of wealth by leading members of the political elite and their families. In 1991, Sweden, one of the major aid donors, reduced its assistance to $10 million to protest the corruption and inadequate accountability in the civil service. Other donors have since taken the cue from Sweden and have, during various periods since 1993, held back economic aid. In November 1994, for example, Norway withheld $35 million in balance-of-payments aid amid reports that over a one-year period, the Tanzanian government had mysteriously lost $125 million. After Mkapa came to office, IMF credits did begin again, and a November 1996 investors' forum produced plans for $786 million of projects.

At the regional level, much of Tanzania's preoccupation with Kenya and Uganda has focused on another attempt at integration, essentially to resuscitate the defunct EAC in a transformed format. In 1987, the Tripartite Commission was established to coordinate cooperation and integration in transport and communications, scientific research, and commerce and industry. After a series of meetings between government officials, the presidents finally signed an agreement expressing the intention to establish a community. This was followed in November 1994 by the establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission on East African Cooperation, whose headquarters were to be in Arusha, Tanzania. The commission took off slowly, each country blaming the others for the delay, but increasingly, Tanzania and Uganda bonded together against Kenya.

Impediments to integration include the presidents' idiosyncratic differences, which worsened in 1995 as Kenyan president Moi and Ugandan president Museveni traded accusations supporting each other's dissidents. Another factor has been Ugandan and Tanzanian participation, since March 1995, in a joint venture with South Africa to form a regional airline. Kenya views this as backtracking on protocols related to civil aviation cooperation and the emergence of a joint East African airline.

It could also be argued that these countries are biting off more than they can chew in their involvement with competing integration initiatives, including SADC, COMESA, the East African Tripartite Commission, and, at the continental level, the AEC. The region, which has lacked the capacity to manage and sustain even one grouping, may benefit more from a single large common market than many smaller groupings. An important precondition for integration is democracy, ensuring that the principal participants are "people" and not politicians. According to M. Nyirabu: "African economic cooperation is a long term matter. The prin-
cipal agents of such a long term project ought not to be politicians, lest it be trivialised and overshadowed by their mundane culture, ceremonial, whiny rhetoric, manipulation, intrigue, etc. . . . When conflict breaks out between two or more African political leaders, one of the areas that suffer is economic cooperation."

This view echoes the sentiments expressed by Mwinyi on the signing of the Tripartite Agreement: "The People of East Africa had always been ahead of the leadership . . . even animals and fish cooperate while political leadership continued to delay cooperation.27 The fact is that all three countries are operating under the dictates of IFIs that stress single-country economic policies, often incongruent with regional integration. Consequently, attempts toward integration under present structural conditions will entail high costs for implementation and enforcement, and they will have a high risk of failure.

Tanzania has a serious problem with refugees from war-torn Rwanda and Burundi. The influx of 700,000 refugees in 1995, for example, caused severe economic and security problems. Some Tanzanian MPs suggested that Tanzania should simply annex Rwanda and Burundi, since the two were historically part of Tanganyika. This idea came in the wake of Ali Mazrui's "recolonization theory" for beleaguered states,28 and it does not appear to have the support of government, which also must resolve the problematic question of union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar.29

Tanzania's diminished role in Southern Africa has been manifested in a number of ways. For instance, it had only a marginal role in the negotiations leading to Namibia's independence in 1990. It also succumbed to IMF pressure and recalled 3,000 troops sent to Mozambique after 1986 to support the government against the South African–supported Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) rebel forces. Furthermore, between 1990 and 1993, South African liberation movements based in Dar es Salaam were relocated to South Africa. Finally, the elections in South Africa in April 1994 marked the end of Tanzania's active involvement in the liberation of Southern Africa. Tanzania remains active in SADC, but it is increasingly redirecting its attention toward its East African neighbors.

New Issues and Actors in Tanzania's Foreign Relations

The state has long ceased to be the only actor in international relations. Many interactions are now carried out by nonstate actors, mainly intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations. These have been joined in the post–Cold War era by additional nonstate actors, and new issues, including democracy, human rights, gender, drug trafficking, and corruption, have come to the fore.
NGOs are now said to have their own foreign policies. Timothy Shaw has argued that the state’s role in foreign relations will continue to shrink and that foreign relations will increasingly include nonstate actors. Shaw further projects that the external relations of African states may be more and more limited to SAP negotiations. But even in regard to SAPs, the state has lost its power to the World Bank and the IMF, which not only control local currencies and macroeconomic policies but also determine foreign policy to a greater extent that in the past. The indebted African state is left with little more than responsibility for judicial functions and the maintenance of public order.

The preceding arguments notwithstanding, in most African countries, as in Tanzania, the resilience of the state and its determination to control and manage change remains phenomenal. Indeed, many setbacks and reversals in countries that have returned to pluralism precisely reflect the resilience of the authoritarian and unyielding state. This persistence suggests (1) that it is not enough for the state to withdraw from the economy and to legalize political parties without democratizing the entire system of governance and (2) that the emergent civil society is not yet strong enough to prevail upon the state to govern democratically.

The hope inherent in democratization has given rise to a resurgence of civil society, best manifested by the mushrooming of NGOs, women’s groups, youth groups, religious groups, and professional organizations involved in promoting human rights and democracy. These groups seek to redefine their role in the emerging order, devise novel strategies of social struggle, augment popular participation, and assert local control over the seemingly remote forces of globalization. The emerging NGOs also seek to improve the lives of those people who otherwise would not benefit from government programs.

Part of this NGO phenomenon in Tanzania has been manifested in the global expansion of the women’s movement and specifically women’s human rights and empowerment NGOs, whose voices can no longer be ignored at international conferences. A case in point is the fourth women’s global conference, held in Beijing in September 1995. The conference brought together over 50,000 female representatives from around the world, displaying women’s increasing presence as actors in global affairs. Today, women are actively lobbying and negotiating with key international actors, including donor agencies, IFIs, UN agencies, the Vatican, heads of state, and governments. The infiltration of women into the previously male-dominated international scene has given credence to gender as an important element of international relations and diplomacy. More broadly, there is need to restructure the new international division of power and labor that to date has contributed to disempowerment and marginalization of the female gender in private and public life.
The return to pluralism has at least created some political space for articulating gender interests and lobbying for gender-sensitive democratic development and foreign relations. Until the mid-1980s, Tanzanian women had only marginally participated in this kind of activism, despite the UN women's decade. The situation has changed significantly since 1992. With the reemergence and redynamization of civil society groups, new forms of women's organizations are emerging. They seek to transcend class, religious, racial, ethnic, and other social divides and focus on issues that unite, such as the impact of SAPs on women, gender violence, and women's marginalization in strategic decisionmaking positions. An example of these new forms of organization is the national women's NGO known as Baraza Ya Wanawake wa Tanzania (BAWATA), launched in May 1995 to coordinate and promote women's rights in the emerging democratic environment. Although it is still too early to predict its performance, it would seem that BAWATA has the potential to galvanize Tanzanian women to become influential actors in future development and foreign relations.

Pluralism has also energized a number of longer-established women's organizations, such as the Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Tanzanian Women's Lawyers Association, and university women research groups. At a global level, Tanzanian women have already made an impact: For example, Gertrude Mongella served as the Tanzanian secretary-general for the 1995 Women's Beijing conference. As international donors become disenchanted with the Tanzanian state, they are increasingly turning to women NGOs as more reliable actors for promoting development and democracy. This new partnership puts women among the most significant "new" actors in Tanzania's foreign relations.

Drug trafficking is another security issue that has acquired prominence. Some argue that drug trafficking, along with the spread of AIDS, has resulted from the increase in poverty globally and more so in the South. Drug trafficking became a concern in Tanzania only in the early 1990s after the arrangement whereby drugs were smuggled into Western Europe and North America via Eastern Europe collapsed with communism. Tanzania, with its coastal capital of Dar es Salaam and an apparent lack of drug-detection equipment, was an attractive new transit route for narcotics traffickers. Consequently, Tanzania became a major transit route, playing a role comparable to other drug centers such as Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa.

Corruption, like drug trafficking, is a global phenomenon that reflects the failure of states to meet social demands and control social action and crime. Unbridled corruption can become a major obstacle to democratic development and international transactions, as it discourages foreign in-
vestment and creates political instability and insecurity. In Tanzania, corruption gained recognition as an issue of concern only in the 1990s, partly due to the anticorruption campaign spearheaded by Nyerere. The government’s immediate response was to take action against key officials accused of corruption in Nyerere’s 1994 book. However, international donors appeared unimpressed with Tanzania’s official action.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined, reconstructed, and reinterpreted the trends in Tanzania’s foreign relations and diplomacy since independence. Foreign policy has been located within a global political economy that has, for the most part, influenced choices and constrained the attainment of desired goals. Until the mid-1980s, there were more continuities than discontinuities in that policy, but with the emergence of the NIDL and NIDP in the post–Cold War era, Tanzania, like most other African states, has been forced to rethink its foreign policy. Earlier, the focus was on defense and nonalignment, but in the post–Cold War era, such posturing has ceased to be relevant, as has nonalignment itself.

Before the end of the Cold War, Tanzania had developed an inflated international status built around its commitment to nonalignment and its leadership of the NAM, the Group of 77, and the North-South lobby. But it found itself without these portfolios in the post–Cold War era. Tanzania’s loss in international status coincided with a similar decline in its status within Africa, especially in regard to its leadership in FLS and the African liberation movement.

By 1998, the focus of Tanzania’s foreign relations had shifted. Under President Mkapa, rhetoric and a preoccupation with diplomacy were supplanted by a more pragmatic emphasis on economic survival under the weight of debt, SAPs, NIDL, and NIDP. The current tendency is toward strengthening national economic structures and resources and building regional economic alliances in Southern and Eastern Africa. Furthermore, although the traditional issues of security and sovereignty remain fundamental pillars of foreign relations (including increasing secessionist pressures within Zanzibar), they have been redefined so that security concerns are less militaristic and more focused on food security, drug trafficking, refugees, migration, and ecology.

Economic and political liberalization have generated new issues and actors, notably NGOs. Corporatism that had prevailed for over thirty years has weakened considerably, but authoritarian structures of governance remain in place. In the meantime, a civil society that had been muzzled is finally reasserting itself by consolidating organizational structures and strengthening capacities. In particular, since 1994, the dynamic and
flourishing independent media have kept up the pressure for change by forcing transparency and accountability in governance, thereby contributing to the empowerment of other sectors of the civil society. And as international donors become disenchanted with the Tanzanian state as a reliable partner, they are increasingly enhancing partnerships with development and human rights NGOs.

As the twenty-first century approaches, sustainable and viable foreign relations for Tanzania and other countries in the South are unlikely to develop without a strong and empowered civil society. In this regard, there is hope yet for Tanzania.

Notes


8. Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Development (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973), and Matthews and Mushi, Foreign Policy of Tanzania, pp. 219–266.


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11. Africa Report, 33, January-February 1988, p. 27. For these discussions, see Hodd, Tanzania After Nyerere.


13. Information obtained from the 1992 Tanzania Diplomatic List and from an interview with a Tanzanian official, Nairobi, June 1995.


15. Ibid., p. 6.


34. Julius Nyang’oro, “Reflections on the State, Democracy and NGOs in Africa,” in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), The South at the End of the Twentieth Century, pp. 130–137.


