

THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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DECLARATION

I CHAO J. MAKEKE declare that this project is my original work and it has not been submitted in any other institution.

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I am grateful to God for enabling me to tackle this research project on time. I would also like to acknowledge my supervisor Prof. Patrick Maluki for his tireless support, guidance and encouragement.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my siblings and parents

TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iii
DEDICATION	iv
TABLE OF CONTENT	v
ABSTRACT	viii
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY	1
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background to the study	1
1.2 Statement of the problem	3
1.3 Research Questions	4
3. What is the nexus between media and conflict in the Horn of Africa?	4
1.4 Broad objective	4
1.4.1 Specific Objectives	4
1.5 Literature review	4
1.5.1 Theoretical literature review	4
1.5.2 Empirical Literature Review	5
1.5.2.1 Eritrea	6
1.5.2.2 Ethiopia	7
1.5.2.3 Somalia and Somaliland	9
1.5.2.4 Hybrid Media	10
1.6 Gaps in literature	12
1.7 Hypotheses	12

1.8 Justification of the study	13
1.9 Methodology of the study	13
1.9.1 Research Design	13
1.9.2 Target Population	13
1.9.3 Research Sample Size	14
1.9.4 Data Collection	14
1.9.5 Data Analysis	14
1.9.6 Ethical Consideration	14
1.10 Chapter outline	15
CHAPTER TWO	16
CAUSES OF CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA	16
2.1 Introduction	16
2.2 High levels of unemployment among young men	16
2.3 Scarcity of resources	16
2.4 Internal conflicts	17
2.5 Availability of small arms and light weapons	18
2.6 Absence of strong, well informed and independent civil society	20
2.7 Colonial inheritances	20
2.8 Weak governing institutions	22
CHAPTER THREE	24
THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA	24
3.0 Introduction	24
3.1 The Role of Journalists in Conflict	24
3.2 Negative ethnicity and conflicts	26
3.3 Power of influence and shaping opinion	28

3.4 Media and de-escalation of conflicts	29
CHAPTER FOUR	30
THE NEXUS BETWEEN MEDIA AND CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA	30
4.0 Introduction	30
4.1 Private mass media	30
4.2 New mass media	31
4.3 The mass media as conflict facilitator in the horn of Africa	32
4.4 Media as tool for conflict management and state-building	33
CHAPTER FIVE	35
SUMMARY CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS	36
5.0 Introduction	36
5.1 Summary of Findings	36
5.2 Study Conclusions	37
5.3 Recommendations	38
5.4 Areas of further research	39
REFERENCES	40

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the role of media in horn of Africa, looking at how the press – mainly radio – is used in conflict management while at the same time assessing the positive and negative impacts the media has on the prolonged Somalia conflict. The thesis also looks at the challenges faced by the journalists and their media houses in respect to the conflict in the war torn horn of Africa nation. Special attention is given to the de-escalation approach used by media operating in the horn of Africa to mitigate the impact and spread of conflict. The study focuses on the years when the region conflict was at its peak, especially during the era of warlords, moderate Islamist, extremists such as Al-Shabab and the Federal government. Unemployment among young men, and where male educational levels are low, faces high degree of conflicts. For instances throughout Horn of Africa, factional conflicts have been drawn on a pool of marginalized or socially excluded young men. Conflicts of scarcity are linked to the control of land and water rights. In both cases, the crucial element is how competing interests for those resources are controlled. The Horn has been called one of the most armed regions in the world. The study pursued to evaluate possible expressions of peace journalism against war journalism by using tools unique to conflict analysis. The study used secondary sources of data, this includes; several media houses websites and reporters operating in the horn of Africa. The study used the frameworks of peace and war journalism to analyze the impact of media reports has had on the conflict in Somalia, and the result shows that even though both local and international media houses tend to use more of war journalism than peace journalism, some local stations in the country have championed peace journalism and actually helped calm tensions in different parts of Somalia. The research also found that radio station is the most preferable source of media in Somalia; since most people are not literate they do not depend on newspaper.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Horn of Africa traditionally includes Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. However, due to the spillover of conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia, the Horn of Africa has extended to include Kenya and Uganda. Even though these countries vary in terms of strengths, capabilities and size, the pattern of conflicts and problems affecting them are similar¹. Generally Africa for many years, since in early 1950s has been characterized by conflict namely; Anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, independence and post-independence wars in Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Eritrea and DRC (Zaire), civil wars in Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Liberia, Somalia, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), DRC, Guinea Bissau, Ivory coast, Uganda and Sierra Leone. Ethnic strife and genocide in Rwanda and Burundi and border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

1.1 Background to the study

Approaching media through a regional or state-centric prism can be deceptive, suggesting similarities among countries and peoples that are profoundly diverse. The sedentary and hierarchical societies that characterize the Abyssinian Highlands, extending from northern Ethiopia into Eritrea, are significantly different from the nomadic and largely egalitarian Somali social formations that stretch well into the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia¹. Similarly, the culture and communicative norms of the Oromos in southern Ethiopia or the Nuer in western Ethiopia often have more in common with their kin in Kenya or Sudan.

Differing external influences have had a significant role in reshaping societies. Eritrea and Somalia came under Italian and British rule during colonial times, but Ethiopia was only very briefly occupied by an external force. And while for most of the Cold War period all three countries gravitated towards the Eastern bloc, today they have very different positions on the international stage². Ethiopia was for years considered a “darling” of the West for its economic

¹Myths of Digital Technology in Africa. Leapfrogging Development?” Global Media and Communication 1(3) (2005), pp. 339–356. Bernal, V. “Eritrea on-line: Diaspora, Cyberspace

policies and the ruling party's apparent commitment to stability and development, making it the largest recipient of aid in Africa. Somalia, on the contrary, has been labelled as the world's worst case of a failed state, unable to establish a viable government outside breakaway Somaliland. And the head of Eritrea's government, President Isaias Afewerki, is generally regarded as an unstable autocrat³.

Addressing the evolution of digital media in the Horn of Africa as a whole, however, highlights some of the factors that the three neighbors share. The persistence of violent conflicts within and across borders and the role of the Diaspora in influencing politics back home have uniquely shaped new interactive spaces. Historic patterns of political marginalization have turned Ethiopian diaspora blogs and forums into one of the most vocal and unfettered spaces to oppose the incumbent government⁴. In contrast, Eritrean Diaspora communities have mostly been supportive of the Eritrean national project, and have used the web to engage and contribute to government-led initiatives. Only very recently has President Afewerki's increasingly despotic and erratic leadership started to alienate some of his staunchest supporters.

In the early 1990s, when the first internet browsers were laying the foundations of the digital revolution, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia were struggling to reconstitute themselves after years of civil war. Rebel groups that were backed by significant popular support had ended the dictatorships of Siad Barre of Somalia and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, encouraging international optimism about the future of the region. Rebel leaders in Ethiopia and Eritrea were considered to belong to a new generation of African leaders who might usher in an African renaissance. Unfortunately, this vision failed to materialize and varying levels of violent conflicts have continued across the region.

Somalia disintegrated into several fragments including: South-Central Somalia, which is nominally governed by the weak internationally-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), but whose territory is in reality largely controlled by al-Shabaab, affiliated to al-Qaeda; Puntland, which has achieved some stability and aspires to have a central role in a unified Somalia; and Somaliland, the northern region that has achieved significant success in building peace and a

² *ibid*

³ Lyons, T. "Conflict-generated Diasporas and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia," *Conflict, Security & Development* 7(4) (2007), pp. 529–549. Ottaway, M. *Africa's New Leaders*. Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment, 1999. Prendergast, J. and C. Thomas-Jensen

⁴ *ibid*

democratic and participatory government, albeit with some authoritarian tendencies, particularly in relation to media. Ethiopia and Eritrea, after having been at war between 1998 and 2000, continued along a path towards becoming relatively stable one-party states, using different means, but sharing similar objectives, to coerce consensus among their citizens and to repress the emergence of opposition voices.

The continued conflicts have had significant repercussions on how the governments and leaders in power have formulated media policies⁵. In Ethiopia, the development of the media has been shaped by the ideology of revolutionary democracy, a Leninist approach that emphasizes the role of a politically astute and dominant party directing policies from the center but with some limited consultation with the masses. While a very limited degree of freedom⁶.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The Horn of Africa is one of the least connected regions in the world. Nevertheless, digital media play an important social and political role in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (including South-Central Somalia and the northern self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland). This study shows how the development of the internet, mobile phones and other new communication technologies have been shaped by conflict and power struggles in these countries.

It addresses some of the puzzles that characterize the media in the region: for example, how similar rates of penetration of media such as the internet and mobile phones have emerged in Somalia, a state which has not had a functioning government for two decades, and in Ethiopia, one of the countries with the most pervasive and centralized political apparatus in Africa. There is a particular attention to the role played by diasporas, which have been highly influential in starting the first websites, blogs and forums covering the politics of the Horn and facilitating debates among Eritreans, Ethiopians and Somalis living at home or abroad.

⁵Ethiopian Experience in a Comparative Perspective. Oxford: James Currey, 2006. Vaughan, S. and K. Tronvoll. "The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life," 2003.

⁶ ibid

1.3 Research Questions

1. What are the causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa?
2. What is the role of media in conflict in the Horn of Africa?
3. What is the nexus between media and conflict in the Horn of Africa?

1.4 Broad objective

The overall objective of this study is to critically investigate the role of media in conflict in the Horn of Africa.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives

This study has the following specific objectives;

1. To critically examine the causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa
2. To investigate the role of media in conflict in the Horn of Africa
3. To explore the nexus between media and conflict in the Horn of Africa

1.5 Literature review

This section will deal with the review of both theoretical and empirical literature that is relevant to achieving the objectives of this study. It will consider relevant works done in this field before.

1.5.1 Theoretical literature review

Realism is a theory in international relations that came up as an academic study during and after the Second World War in response to the theories that had been popular in between the two world wars. The rise of realism was partly a response to theories that had become popular after the First World War. In its aftermath, leaders of that war's victorious nations were driven by the passionate desire to prevent war. These leaders saw war as a disease of the international body politic. Realism is an approach to international relations that has emerged gradually through the work of a series of analysts who have situated themselves within, and thus delimited, a distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis. Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest. Human nature has not changed since the days of classical antiquity. According to realists, is at its core egoistic, and

thus inalterably inclined towards immorality. As Machiavelli puts it, in politics it needs be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers.

Most realists recognize that men are motivated by other desires than the urge for power and that power is not the only aspect of international relations. Thus Niebuhr couples his harsh doctrine of original sin with an insistence that individuals are not consistently egoistic. He even argues for an adequate view of human nature, which does justice to both the heights and depths of human life. Likewise, Morgenthau argues that to do justice and to receive it is an elemental aspiration of man. Nonetheless, realists characteristically give primary emphasis to egoistic passions and the tragic presence of evil in all political activities

1.5.2 Empirical Literature Review

The numerous conflicts afflicting the Horn have produced several waves of migration. In each country, the relationship between members of the Diaspora and their homeland is characterized by a set of unique traits and by various degrees of support for, or opposition to, governments back home. In all cases, however, transnational media, from shortwave radio to satellite television and the internet, have been employed as means for Diaspora members to recreate or reinvigorate links with their countries of origin, and more recently for national governments to extend their ability to interact with relevant constituencies abroad.

The first websites for Somalis, Ethiopians, and Eritreans were started by members of these communities living in the United States or Europe, and most of the popular platforms for discussing Somali, Ethiopian, and Eritrean culture and politics still run on servers abroad⁷. When narrowing the focus to politics, the Diaspora's mediated voices have played an important role in their homelands, either backing governments' actions, such as in the case of Eritrean bloggers supporting the war against Ethiopia, or presenting alternatives to the narrative articulated by those in power, for example advancing the idea of Ethiopian unity against the government's project of building Ethiopia as an ethnic federation⁸. In some cases, particularly among the

⁷Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment, 1999. Prendergast, J. and C. Thomas-Jensen. Cross-Boundary Collabo“Blowing the Horn,” *Foreign Affairs* 86 (2007), pp. 59–74. Sanchez, M. and S. Ganapati. “The Use of Internet by Diasporic Communities for Political Mobilization.” In Y. Chen and P. Chu, *Electronic Governance and ration: Innovations and Advancing Tools*. Hershey, PA, IGI Global, 2011, pp. 281–293.

⁸ *ibid*

Diaspora from South-Central Somalia, the digital media appear not only to reflect the ongoing violence but also to have played a role in facilitating or enabling it.

1.5.2.1 Eritrea

The evolution of digital media in Eritrea looks paradoxical. This was the last country in Africa to be connected to the internet (in 2000), but in 2010 it registered the highest percentage of internet users in the Horn (5.4 percent), except for Djibouti. It is the only country on the continent with no private media outlets, and the state-owned media are vehicles for aggressive propaganda celebrating the country's fighters and the government's political project, which is based on self-sufficiency and resistance to external influences in the. This study does not consider Djibouti, where the percentage of internet users in 2010 was 6.5 percent (ITU). Form of development aid or foreign inward investment⁹. It is also now the only country in Africa with no plans for fibre optic communications to neighboring countries, Europe, and North America). As a result, prices will likely remain high and obstruct the growth of mobile internet.

President Afewerki has shown little tolerance of criticism, and many journalists and political opponents have been imprisoned without a trial. Despite this climate of intolerance, however, the internet in Eritrea is relatively uncensored. Websites that are critical of the regime are blocked by only two of the four internet service providers (ISPs), and are thus accessible to Eritreans who are willing to risk to read their posts. Due to the high cost of private internet connections, most internet users go online through cybercafés, exposing themselves to the risk of observation by government agents disguised as customers.

These contradictions become less obscure, however, when the content of the websites targeting Eritrean audiences is analyzed in the context of the Eritrean Diaspora and its history¹⁰. In contrast to other authoritarian countries, such as Tunisia under President Ben Ali and Egypt under President Mubarak, where the internet represented a space for citizens to voice their anger against the government, and organize and build political alternatives, the "Eritrean internet" has generally been supportive of the government. Popular discussion forums such as Dehai.org, which started even before Eritrea was connected to the internet, and hence functioned as a meeting space for the diaspora, have been largely sympathetic towards the regime. They may host criticism of specific policies or decisions, but they do not question the legitimacy and

⁹Lyons, T. "Conflict-generated Diasporas and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia," *Conflict, Security & Development* 7(4) (2007), pp. 529–549. Ottaway, M. *Africa's New Leaders*

¹⁰ *ibid*

authority of the government or its national project. Similarly, websites that later turned into spaces for voicing more fundamental or challenging critiques, such as Asmarino.com, initially started as sympathetic to the government.

To explain this unusual level of support for an autocracy, it is worth considering both online and offline forms of relationship between the Diaspora and the homeland. President Afewerki's party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), known as the Eritrean¹¹.

People's Liberation Front (EPLF) at the time of the guerrilla struggle that led to Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia, has developed a unique set of strategies to engage the Eritrean diaspora. In the 1970s and 1980s, civil society organizations were created in Europe and in the United States to support the EPLF's struggle both financially and ideologically. After independence, most of these activities were taken over by Eritrean embassies¹².

The government charges a percent tax per year on the income of every Eritrean living abroad, but it also recognizes the Eritrean citizenship of every person born to one Eritrean parent and makes it easy for Eritreans abroad to maintain dual citizenship. Over the years, the EPLF/PFDJ has supported a myriad organizations and activities to popularize the national cause (as defined by it) among diaspora members. But "unlike cases where transnational policies and practices have expanded socio-political and economic participation, Eritrean transnational's has forged a heavily circumscribed field in which one participates on the state's terms or risks retribution.

In the long term, this strategy has produced vocal supporters of the Eritrean cause and a silent crowd of Eritreans who are increasingly skeptical of the PFDJ's national project, but are afraid to dissent because of the risk of retaliation against family members at home or of marginalization within their Diasporas community.

1.5.2.2 Ethiopia

The development of digital media in Ethiopia, while similar to the path taken by other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, has certain distinctive characteristics. Ethiopia is the only country in Africa with a state monopoly over telecoms, despite strong pressure from international organizations, foreign countries and corporations to liberalize the market. As argued by a high-ranking Ethiopian technocrat: "Monopoly is a crucial factor. It is exactly because ICTs are so important and they have the capacity to penetrate every aspect of our lives

¹¹Beyond Regional Circularity: the Emergence of an Ethiopian Diaspora." Available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=604>

¹² ibid

that we have to make sure that it is the state that is in charge of using and implementing them. In this phase we cannot leave it to the market¹³. ICTs are too key for our development. They are a priority. Behind the decision of leaving the monopoly in the ICTs and telecommunication market there is big philosophical thinking. It is not just because we want to make money from the use of telecoms.

The mix of commitment to using new technology and fear that the same technology could unsettle existing power structures is reflected in the government's massive efforts to use digital media in schools and government offices, and the neglect of providing reliable and affordable internet connections in the major towns, including the capital. In 2010, Ethiopia had one of the lowest internet penetration rates in the world (a meagre 0.75 percent)¹⁴. Despite the very limited diffusion of the internet among Ethiopian citizens, in 2006 the government began to actively filter the websites of opposition groups and human rights organizations, specifically targeting those that gathered the voices of Ethiopians living abroad.

One reason for blocking these online spaces can be attributed to the composition of the Ethiopian diaspora and to the ability of the discourses it articulates to reach beyond the digital media. Similar to other national groups that migrated from the Horn, Ethiopians living abroad represent a large and powerful force that have historically been involved in wars and politics back home.

But, in sharp contrast to the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland, the great majority of politically minded Ethiopians in the Diaspora have opposed the political agenda of the incumbent government led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Many attacks on the government in online spaces such as Nazret.com or Ethiopianreview.com, two popular websites blocked in Ethiopia, attack the very core of the EPRDF national project, refusing to recognize the current government as either legitimate or as the expression of the people's will. It is not uncommon to find a blog post labelling the prime minister as "crime minister" or describing the government as a dictatorship led by an ethnic minority group. On the other hand, pro-government websites—and on some occasions Prime Minister Zenawi himself—have responded by accusing opponents of

¹³Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy, 1960–2000. Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing House,; Freedom of Speech in Post-conflict Somaliland," *Afrika Spectrum* 43 (2008), pp. 91–113. Kalathil, S. and T.C. Boas. Open Networks, Closed Regimes. The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule

¹⁴ *ibid*

chauvinism and of encouraging tensions within multi-ethnic Ethiopia similar to those that led to the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

This vehemence and polarization are not exclusive to online spaces and are evident in the long history of engagement or lack of engagement—between the EPRDF on one hand, and other political forces in Ethiopia and the Diaspora on the other. Since coming to power, the EPRDF has chosen not to negotiate with its adversaries, preferring to expand its influence and presence on the ground by delivering progress rather than enlarging its base by incorporating new forces and perspectives. This strategy has been applied to both old and new media. After coming to power, in response to internal and external pressures, the EPRDF allowed for unprecedented levels of freedom of expression, but they did not develop a strategy for reconciling or negotiating with the forces that were defeated or marginalized. As in Eritrea, the ruling elite is not well disposed to compromise.

As a result, journalists who were fired from the Ministry of Information and sympathized with those opposed to the EPRDF were given the opportunity to set up independent newspapers and use them as platforms for criticizing the government. The decision of the EPRDF to ignore these voices, or attack them without engaging with their arguments, exacerbated the polarization over time. A few years later, when the first websites were created for an Ethiopian audience, the EPRDF took a similar approach and largely ignored them.

The divide between pro- and anti-government forces has widened over time, having consequences in the aftermath of the elections in 2005 when the EPRDF reacted to its substantial electoral losses by imprisoning opponents and firing on demonstrators. Prominent journalists were arrested, their papers closed, and, the following year, blogs were also blocked to silence all alternative voices. As a result, both old and new media in Ethiopia now carry pro-government information or criticism that can be easily managed by the ruling elite and does not challenge its fundamental political goals of retaining power and reinforcing its vision of ethnic federalism¹⁵.

1.5.2.3 Somalia and Somaliland

The role of the Diaspora in developing and shaping the digital media in Somalia and Somaliland shares many characteristics with Ethiopia and Eritrea, but has been even more significant in national politics. Somali language websites have proliferated rapidly in recent years and most clans or political factions have developed their own platforms (two of the most popular are

¹⁵ *ibid*

Hiiraan.com and Haatuf.net). This growth in the media sector has been important because domestic politics are dominated by the Diaspora. In 2011, for example, Diaspora members comprised 16 of the 18 ministers of the TFG.

Diaspora politicians are also among the few with the funding and technical expertise to set up radio stations in South-Central Somalia, often making the media active participants in the conflict. Though most of the websites are registered and hosted in Europe or North America, the news sites are able to get stories from inside Somalia through a network of informants or relatives acting as “journalists.” Although these spaces are largely populated by members of the diaspora, they do influence opinions back home. The information carried on websites is often repeated by newspapers and other media outlets in Somalia and Somaliland.

One of the most striking developments of the last 10 years has been the remarkable proliferation of telecoms companies in Somalia offering inexpensive and high-quality services. This development is closely connected to the involvement of the Diaspora and the remittance business. Diaspora remittances are the primary source of income for both Somaliland and South-Central Somalia, and the major communications companies have been driven to innovate to provide the best service possible for their customers, which include having the widest reach and network. These are companies such as Somaliland’s Dahabshiil, a multi-million-dollar enterprise with offices in more than 40 countries around the world. These businesses, reliant on trust and deeply intertwined with national and Diaspora social relations, have thrived.

The proliferation of telecoms has been facilitated by the lack of a central government able to regulate the industry, thus allowing telecom companies the opportunity to operate throughout Somalia at will. Within the limits set by the general insecurity prevailing in Somalia, telecoms are often seen as paving the way for the development of a business sector in Somalia. While most of these companies are owned and operated by members of the diaspora, the telecoms revolution has, at the same time, transformed the ability of Somalis to connect with those living abroad and to build bridges between Diaspora communities and Somalis at home.

1.5.2.4 Hybrid Media

The limited penetration of digital media in the Horn of Africa should not obscure their broader impact on existing media and channels of communication. Messages originating online show a remarkable ability to reach well beyond the population that has access to the internet. For example, a message on a forum or a blog can be picked up on newspapers, broadcast on radio

and later discussed in coffee shops. This is particularly the case at critical moments, such as during elections or conflicts, when there is greater thirst for a plurality of voices and particular attention to what influential figures in the Diaspora have to say. Similarly, some of the newest technologies have been reshaped by local agents to fit indigenous realities and political agenda.

The implications of digital innovation cannot be fully understood without considering these forms of hybrid media, emerging either as combinations of old and new media through which information is collected, interpreted, and disseminated, or as entirely new artifacts incorporating the unique needs, habits, and practices of a specific community.

Cases of the first type of hybrid media can be found in the close interconnection between Diaspora online spaces and the printed press in Ethiopia and Somaliland. Especially before the Ethiopian elections of 2005, it was common for opposition newspapers to republish entire blog posts which had appeared on platforms such as Nazret.com, Ethiomedia.com or Ethiopianreview.com. Similarly in Somalia and Somaliland, hybrid media have had a central role in information flows. Just as in Ethiopia, blog posts are often taken from websites and printed in newspapers published in Hargeisa¹⁶, Somaliland's capital. Some of these articles, especially those that are considered less controversial, are then read out during the evening state-run radio news bulletin, which encourages discussion and debate in teashops and buses.

Newer media also intersect with older modes of communication that may be perceived as more trusted, as is the case with poetry, which is considered by Somalis to be one of the most important means for expression and political mobilization. During the Somali National Movement (SNM) struggle in the 1980s and early 1990s, poetry was seen as having a crucial role in mobilizing the population; nowadays it is used in online spaces as a means to frame the grievances and hopes of Somalis inside and outside Somalia. As noted by a veteran of the SNM from Somaliland, poetry was often read over the radio during the struggle, when it was more effective than anything else.

It mobilized people. Poetry plays a big role as a means of communication with the public. Many listen to it only once and keep it by heart. I can't do that but a lot of people do this is an oral society. They just pick it up. Instead of a very long lecture or an article, a poem would be more effective than an ordinary talk or a speech by a politician.¹⁴

¹⁶Beyond Regional Circularity: the Emergence of an Ethiopian Diaspora." Available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=604> (accessed 6 May 2020). Turton, D., ed. Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in a Comparative Perspective

Poets themselves are also highly influential. They have held, and to some degree continue to hold, prominent positions in the political space. Regarded as intellectuals, they are considered to have the ability to interpret and convey the urgency and importance of current events. Cases of the second type of hybrid media are evident in the unique systems that have been developed by the Ethiopian government to communicate with the lower and outer reaches of the state administration and with Ethiopian citizens. Known as WorldNet and Schoolnet, these systems became partly operational in 2004, on the basis of strong support from the government, while frustrating the donors that were trying to promote the agenda of “ICT for development.”¹⁵ Woredanet and Schoolnet are examples of how digital media can become a vehicle for power to be exercised from the state center to the periphery, reiterating key messages to progressively lower tiers of government and reaching wide sections of the society—even if technical hitches and bandwidth limits often prevent these platforms from reaching their potential.

Woredanet, which stands for “Network of district administrations,” employs the same protocol the internet is based on, as well as satellite communications, to allow ministers, civil servants, and trainers in the capital to videoconference with the 11 regional and 550 district administrations and instruct local officials on what they should be doing and how. As an indication of the sensitivity of the project, the servers necessary to manage videoconferencing are installed in the office of the prime minister.

1.6 Gaps in literature

Many studies have always been focusing on other causes of conflicts and their impacts but less attention have been shifted to the role of media in conflict, especially the CNN effect which have spillover effect. There is need for more attention on the nexus between conflict and media in the Horn of Africa since it’s the most dynamic region in the world when it comes to conflicts.

1.7 Hypotheses

This study will seek to test the following hypothesis;

1. There media causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa
2. The media plays a major role in conflict in the Horn of Africa
3. There is a nexus between media and conflict in the Horn of Africa

1.8 Justification of the study

This study aimed to analyze the role of media in conflict in the Horn of Africa. The results of this research maybe are useful for policy makers, scholars, academicians, lecturers, students, diplomats, NGOs, IGOs and the general public to evaluate the role of media in conflict management.

The general public needs to knowledge of a the country's effort in maintaining another country's efforts in maintaining another country's state of peace is not a conceivable factor of importance yet it is therefore imperative that efforts to restore peace where non or where its threatened have far reaching effects than as seen on the surface.

1.9 Methodology of the study

Research methodology is the strategy a researcher employs in investigating a specific phenomenon to obtain reliable and dependent answers to research questions or problem. It simply an outline of the research that highlights what the researcher will carry out procedurally to the eventuality of data analysis. Research methodology seeks to find objective, dependable, valid, accurate and economic answers to research questions. Since research entails a systematic process, research methodology arranges the crucial conditions needed for adequate collecting and analyzing data.

1.9.1 Research Design

Research design is a plan that the researcher adopts so as to answer questions accurately, according to the objectives, reliability and economically.¹⁷ It's simply the blue print for carrying out research, since it's the procedure the researcher employs to achieve objectives of research. The study will employ a mixed method approach that combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches for data collection and analysis. Quantitative research on the other hand, which relied on printed materials, internet, published data makes it possible to media and conflicts in the lager horn of Africa.

1.9.2 Target Population

The participants in this research are residents of the areas around and along the Kenyan borders and decision makers and stakeholders who can formulate future strategies and policies that guard the country from the transnational crimes.

¹⁷Cooper , W. (2009). *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. London : Sage

1.9.3 Research Sample Size

A complete list of units or items with the same interest from where the sample is obtained is what is termed as sampling frame.¹⁸ Kothari asserts that 10% - 20% sample size of targeted population is effective enough. Thus the sample size can be chosen using size calculation to statically represent the areas threats are most eminent to which will help come up with representative fraction which ensures inclusion of gender and age.

1.9.4 Data Collection

In this study there was the use of primary and secondary data through an in-depth analysis of literature review of relevant secondary sources such as policy papers, reports, journals, periodicals and other published works. The aim is to collect relevant written information to address the security issues brought about by the media. The questionnaires and interviews form the primary data; the researcher will also administer questionnaires to various respondents.

1.9.5 Data Analysis

This Data will be analyzed using content analysis by grouping the responses given in similar themes.

1.9.6 Ethical Consideration

Since the study relied heavily on questionnaires and interviews the researcher was obliged to seek respondent consent and ensure confidentiality when conducting interviews e.g. interviewees were not to disclose their names or official rank.

The research study also adheres to the existing conduct of research according to academic guidelines of non-plagiarism and by acknowledging the authors and sources of information materials by referencing which is cited throughout the research study.

This study will utilize library and internet research. In this case, published and unpublished data will be used to put issues into context and to justify the research study. Additionally, data from books, journals, protocols, reports and other relevant published materials were incorporated in the study to build the literature review and put issues in the conflict into perspective. All these materials were explored to help understand the prevailing situation in other parts of the world.

¹⁸Kothari,C.(2004. Pretesting in questionnaire design: *The impact of respondent characteristics on error detection* .Journal of the Market Research Society. 36 (October), pp 295-300

1.10 Chapter outline

This chapter is organized as follows; introduction and background to the study, statement of the research problem, research questions, research objective, literature review, gaps in the literature, theoretical literature review, hypothesis, justification of the study, research methodology and finally chapter outline,

CHAPTER TWO

CAUSES OF CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

To understand the causes of conflict in Horn of Africa, it is important to look at the political history of Horn of Africa and the genesis of the long civil war. This chapter therefore traces and discusses the origin and the background of the Horn of Africa conflict. It provides an analysis of the events leading to the outbreak of the conflict. It looked into the structures that have led to the Horn of Africa conflict, and how these structures such as social, economic, legal, institutional and governance, have been used to perpetuate Africa's longest civil conflict.

2.2 High levels of unemployment among young men

Countries in Horn of Africa, with high levels of unemployment among young men, and where male educational levels are low, face high degree of conflicts. For instances throughout Horn of Africa, factional conflicts have been drawn on a pool of marginalized or socially excluded young men. In Rwanda, the high levels of rural unemployment, and increasing insecurity of land, provided already group of participants in the genocide. The conflict in Kenya during post-election on December 29th, 2007 following disputed presidential elections result was fought by socially marginalized young men¹⁹. Also Economic shock may cause conflict in Horn of Africa. It involves various forms ranging from natural catastrophic to sudden large shifts in terms of trade and commodity prices. Natural catastrophic for instance, droughts are cyclical and omnipresent and worsened by over cultivating. Large areas of one's fertile soils are decertified, available land is reduced, and competition over remaining land intensifies. The Ethiopian famine of 1974 was the main factor in the overthrowing of Haile Salasse's government²⁰.

2.3 Scarcity of resources

The most frequent conflicts of scarcity is linked to the control of land and water rights. In both cases, the crucial element is how competing interests for those resources are controlled. Countries whose market depends on natural resources such as oil, minerals, and unfair access to land suffer a high risk of conflict. In these wars of abundance, groups fight for control of these resources which become the prize for controlling the state, and could lead to coups as in Burundi, Rwanda, and Somalia. Changes in land use and access have been significant factors in several high-intensity conflicts in Horn of Africa. In Somalia, a land base and its resources play a central

¹⁹ Peace and Development Network Trust. Waki Commission: Process Monitoring Report, 2008. PI.

²⁰ A. Boghen African Prospective on Colonialism. (Baltimore: The Johns I lopkins University Press. 1985); p96

role to conflict. The Somalia conflict involves many clans and sub clans. Shifting alliances are formed between different clans and sub clans to gain leverage in the conflict and to stake stronger claims to particular deegan²¹. The natural resources of Sudan, particularly in the South where there are significant oil fields. Oil revenues make up about 70% of Sudan's export earnings. Due to numerous tributaries of the Nile River and heavier precipitation in Southern Sudan, the south also has greater access to water and therefore much more fertile, while the North of the country is on the edge of the Sahara desert. The Northern desire to control these resources, while the Southern also desire to maintain control of them, hence contributing to conflicts²².

2.4 Internal conflicts

Internal conflicts are mostly settled when the parties involved have come at a stalemate, often a political and military balance. When each party to a conflict feels that it has a perceived advantage or disadvantage it proceeds to fight spurred on by the hope of winning a desire to negotiate from a more advantageous point. A hurting stalemate" where all belligerents have lost provides the opportunity for resolution of the conflict in many cases the chances for resolution are wasted because of the absence of reliable external patrons to the peaceful means. This is particularly important when dealing with demobilization and disarmament where the stakes are high for the belligerent groups in terms of the potential loss of power and personal security²³.

External mediation is frequently offered in times of conflict, yet the past decade has seen few obvious successes. While the option for peaceful resolution of conflict must always be available, poor mediation processes can make the situation worse and prolong conflict by giving combatants time to rearm and recognize as has happened in the DRC and Angola. Peace processes that are based on inadequate analysis and rushed timescales can push the parties to conflict into untenable position and threaten their power base or chances of survival. Greater emphasis on securing and maintaining a cessation of hostilities as the first priority is critical. Peace processes need to be able to draw on a wider spectrum of arrangements for transitional

²¹ A I-'arah I lussein and Lind J.. Deegan. Politics and War in Somali: in Lind. J and Kathryn Sturman (eds), P321-356.

²² L. I. Goldsmith Abura and Switzer J., Oil and Water in Sudan. in Lind, J and Kathryn Sturman, (eds), PI 87-241.

²³ Ibid Pp 219-220

government to provide the conditions in which a stable peace, that addresses the fundamental causes of conflict can be established²⁴. Also there are increasing dangers that much needed humanitarian assistance can cause wars to be intensified or prolonged²⁵.

Where wars are fought through factional or proxy forces, there is little recognition or respect for international humanitarian standard. Such forces seek to control humanitarian assistance as a means of conferring greater political legitimacy on themselves and asserting controller the population. Relief supplies may also provide the focus for increasing tensions and fighting between groups that receive supplies and their neighbors, as was the case in South Sudan, and Somalia, demonstrated the problems that occur when humanitarian assistance becomes the key elements in a resource starved environment and therefore subject to predatory behavior. Humanitarian agencies increasingly recognize that they face a major dilemma in meeting the needs of victims without providing the means to resume fighting; misplaced development assistance can also heighten tension between groups and increase the risks of conflict²⁶.

2.5 Availability of small arms and light weapons

The Horn has been called one of the most armed regions in the world. In Somalia alone, some estimates place the number of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the millions. Research in north-eastern Kenya has found that every second household had a gun and that 60% of the patients in field hospitals were being treated for gunshot wounds²⁷. The 2003 Small Arms Survey identified Kenya and Uganda as two countries in the region that had a domestic SALW manufacturing capacity, and that the two countries have utilized this production to each amass a national stockpile of up to a million weapons²⁸.

The availability of small arms in Horn of Africa is a major factor in sustaining and fueling conflict. Considerable supplies of small arms have been in circulation from pervious wars. For

²⁴ Ibid P. 16

²⁵ http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/3513/Mutio%20Manuel%20M_The%20Causes%20and%20Responses%20to%20Conflict%20in%20Horn%20of%20Africa-%20Case%20of%20Mai%20Maiuu%20in%20Kenya%2c%202005-2009..pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

²⁶ Ibid P. 16

²⁷ Quaker United Nations Office, “Lessons from the Field: Human Dimensions of Small Arms Control”, panel briefing, First United Nations Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms Demand, New York, 7– 11 July 2003

²⁸ Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2003: Development Denied, Small Arms Survey, 2003.

example between 1972 and 1990 Ethiopia and Somalia imported \$8 billion worth of small arms and light weapons²⁹. Imports of arms primarily, from former Soviet bloc countries continue to grow and to sustain conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The availability and relatively low cost of small arms has been coupled with the emergency of a network of both local and international dealers who trade arms for minerals or other resources³⁰. This has been a major factors in prolonging Horn of African conflicts which have become self-sustaining conflict and consequently-less an able to external mediation or intervention³¹.

International criminal and terrorist organizations operating both within Somalia and in the region as a whole are a further example of SALW proliferation pressures in the HoA. The widespread underdevelopment in the region has made it attractive to the international drug trade and other criminal organizations. Poverty has led many to participate in either the cultivation or transport of drugs for their livelihood. Furthermore, according to the EU country overview, Somali logistical support was given to the terrorist bombing of a Mombasa hotel and a missile attack on an Israeli plane. This same report cites the “increasing Talibanization of Somali public opinion” as a “progressive threat”³².

Terrorist cells in the Horn have also been attributed with the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen³³. The presence of these groups gives two-fold SALW proliferation pressure. Firstly, these groups further aid the spread and sale of illicit SALW in the region. Secondly, the presence of terrorist and criminal groups has led to incidences of security sector abuses as they seek information from civil populations³⁴. Further, Djibouti has seen a noted militarization of society as thousands of American, French, and German troops have established an ‘anti-terrorist’ command post in that country³⁵. The international criminal and terrorist organizations have added to the SALW proliferation pressures by aiding the illicit trade and by adding to the human security threats in the region

²⁹ Laurance J.m Siemont Wezeman T.',*& I lerberl Wall'. Arms Hatch SIP III Report on the hirst Year o f the Un Register o f Conventional Arms, (New York: Oxford University. 1993). P29.

³⁰ Deegan. Third Worlds, the Politics of the Middle Last and Africa, (London: Roulledge. 1996). Pp186- 187.

³¹ Ibid. P.15

³² Ibid.P 16

³³ Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 113, January 2004, p. 4.

³⁴ Pauline Jelinek, “More Troops Sent to the Horn of Africa”, The Somaliland Times/Associated Press, 9 November 2002,

³⁵ Ibid.

2.6 Absence of strong, well informed and independent civil society

Censorship of the media, harassment of journalists and abuse of media for propaganda purposes can have a devastating impact. This was amply shown by the role of media controlled by the genocidal forces in Rwanda in 1994 civil society organizations, including independent media; provide important channels for expressing discontent in society. They also provide basic services in many situations where state provides services are inadequate or non-existence, civil society organizations can also help to build bridges between divided and disaffected communities and are essential for the promotion of accountability and inclusive government³⁶. Parts of Horn of Africa have settled into a conflict cycle in which states or factions move from low level crisis or open war into long term and protracted conflict and then back to low level crisis. Often the greatest risks occur when a fragile peace is not properly consolidated. This was demonstrated in Sudan, Uganda and Somalia. In some cases, states or factions have entered into a framework that provides for “consensual” conflict where belligerents have more to gain from sustaining low level conflict than from its resolution³⁷.

2.7 Colonial inheritances

Another underlying source of conflict is the demarcation of the African borders colonialist. Mwangi states that the realities of the African ethnic context were enshrined at 1845-5 Berlin conference, where Africa was carved up by the imperial powers He further states that the imperial power³⁸ paid little attention to the ethnic diversity in the Horn, when carving out the borders. Therefore, the boundaries were drawn without heed to different religious and ethnic groups that already inhabited the territory. In Horn of Africa conflicts occur where there is a tradition of resolving problem by violent means.

Political violence is entrenched and the instrument of the state such as the army, police and judiciary sustain the process. Colonialism in places such as the Rwanda and Burundi; created a state model based on the artificial creation and abuse of ethnicity to maintain power³⁹. For instance, before the arrival of European colonialists, Burundi had a strong well organized kingdom for centuries. The country comprised of three primary groups, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid P. 16

³⁸ M.. Mwangi Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. (Nairobi: Watermark Printers Ltd 1999) P.65

³⁹ Ibid. P.70 proofread your work before submission

The European colonists brought a culture of racial differentiation and considered the Tutsi group as the racially superior dominant group and the Hutu as racially bound to be servants of the Tutsi, the European culture influenced the traditional relationships between each group negatively. After independence in 1961, the division between the Tutsi and Hutu group became more clearly and intensely. The Tutsi group wanted to take the control of the state while the Hutu would not give up their rights on pursuing military and political power⁴⁰.

Political leaders and belligerents in Horn of Africa have made increasing use of ethnic hatred. Such abuse prolongs conflicts and creates long term divisions that reduce the effectiveness of peace building efforts⁴¹. The war in Somalia provides a ready example of the abuse of ethnicity. The clan system has played a major role in the catastrophic civil wars. To this effect since Somalia attained statehood, private pursuit and fierce competition over the resources of the country have been a marked feature among Somalia elite behavior. Every elite person within the government believes to be representing the interests of his or her particular kinship and lineage members. Each member of the governing elite thinks that he or she is in the government, not as a national figure but as a clan representative.

Conflicts in Burundi have often been characterized as clashes between two inherently antagonistic ethnic groups. Going beyond of horn, the war in the DRC also provides an example of the abuse of ethnicity. Elements of the DRC governments have openly provoked ethnic tensions in the Kivus with the intention of destabilizing areas under Rwanda influence. Equally elements of the Ugandan armed forces have exploited ethnic differences in order to benefit commercially from the conflicts, in both instance community divisions have been deepened and there have been a greater number of fatalities and injuries than are experienced in more conventional fighting⁴². Scholars allude that the Horn of Africa conflict is a value conflict. For example Somalia and Sudan. South Sudan feels their religion and culture should have been accepted by the North and the North should not have forced the people of the south into Islamic religion and their culture⁴³.

⁴⁰ R. Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa; pressures and incentives for cooperation.* (Washington, L). C. Irookimis Institutions Press, 1997), Pp6-15

⁴¹ Ibid P 10

⁴² Ibid P 11

⁴³ [http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/3513/Mutio%20Manuel%20M The%20Causes%20and%20Responses%20to%20Conflict%20in%20Horn%20of%20Africa-%20Case%20of%20Mai%20Mau%20in%20Kenya%2c%202005-2009..pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/3513/Mutio%20Manuel%20M%20The%20Causes%20and%20Responses%20to%20Conflict%20in%20Horn%20of%20Africa-%20Case%20of%20Mai%20Mau%20in%20Kenya%2c%202005-2009..pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

2.8 Weak governing institutions

The weak governing institutions with minimal capacity such as executive body, legislative and judiciary has caused internal and regional conflicts for example a large area of Africa from Sudan to Angola, passing through the great lakes and the DRC, is caught up in a series of multiple and interlocking conflicts. The duration of conflicts therefore increases with the complexity of regional intervention and the inter-relationship of one conflict with another⁴⁵. In horn of Africa conflict has long been regionalized. For instance, as Ethiopia supported insurgents in Sudan and Somalia while each of these two states⁴⁴

Responded in kind with support for Eritrea and other opposition on groups in the 1970s and 1980s In the 1990s, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda formed a set of “frontline states” with encouragement from the United States to contain the national Islamic front regime in Sudan and in support of the insurgent SPLA. Sudan responded by supporting Eritrea and Ugandan opposition groups⁴⁵. The weakening and collapse of state institutions has caused internal and regional conflicts. However, collapse is rarely sudden. It arises out of a long and degenerative process. In Horn of Africa, state institutions never grew very strong roots in the first place. Unable or unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain popular support, governments began to operate through coercion, corruption and the use of autocratic styles of ruling in order to secure political power and control of economic resources. In Somalia, competition for control of power and resources has significantly destroyed state institutions, leading to conflicts. The deterioration of the Security structures in countries like, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi, in the past security sector had become unaccountable and abusive. Judicial and penal systems had collapsed⁴⁶. The state found itself unable to provide the basic social services and security to her people. The erosion of the infrastructure completely led to the breakup of state. This has been usually accompanied by violent, competition for power between different groups and factions who sometimes identified themselves in ethnic terms. Overtime one of these factions may dominate but this does not necessarily result in the resolution of the conflict. Rather it leads to the perpetuation of state collapse⁴⁷.

⁴⁴As 41 Above

⁴⁵L. Goodrich M. Edvard I Iambro, & Arne Patracia Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. Third Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press. 1969), P37

⁴⁶I. Abdullah: Between democracy and terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War, (South Africa: UNISA Press, 2005), p90

⁴⁷N. Chazan. Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill & Donald Roth child. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, second edition. (Colorado: Lyninne Rienner Publisher. 1992). Pp189-208.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

3.0 Introduction

The Horn of Africa is one of the least connected regions in the world. Nevertheless, digital media play an important social and political role in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (including South-Central Somalia and the northern self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland). The

development of the internet, mobile phones and other new communication technologies have been shaped by conflict and power struggles in these countries.

3.1 The Role of Journalists in Conflict

Violent conflict in Africa has shaped and defined media and journalists in many ways. The conflicts of the post-colonial period left a legacy of guerrilla fighters adept at using media and communications as part of their struggle that affected the media in the post-Cold War period. Over the past two decades, from Rwanda's genocide to the ongoing violence in Somalia to post-election violence in places such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Guinea, the media has been a defining feature of many conflicts. Distilling what this has meant for the role of media in democratization requires a bottom-up approach, in order to understand the media systems according to their own logic, rather than an assumed normative and democratic role.

Radio stations are also complemented with newsletters, newspapers, and other communications initiatives, such as mobile theatre groups, to convince war-weary populations to join a struggle. In Eastern Africa, the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) that was actively fighting the Soviet-backed government of Mengistu Haile Mariam from the 1970s until 1991 had a portable radio station, Voice of the Rebellion, but also printing presses that were hidden in caves in northern Ethiopia. In Uganda, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) published Resistance News from neighbouring Kenya and practiced a unique mobilization approach of establishing Resistance Councils in every village as part of their comprehensive communications strategy. In the nearby breakaway region Somaliland, poetry was regularly recited over the Somali National Movement (SNM) radio during the war against the Southern based government of Siad Barre.

The years spent in conflict had a clear impact on how journalists and policymakers perceived themselves and their roles in society. Concepts such as 'watchdog' media or 'independence' took on different meanings and interpretations. For many journalists involved with guerrilla insurgencies, their new appointments represented a continuation of their struggle through other means, an opportunity to implement the ideology and political vision for which they had fought for decades.

Movement' system could be communicated both in words and through practice. Designed to be relatively independent and critical (within bounds) of the government itself, The New Vision newspaper became the platform to test new ideas and policies, in conversation with a private

press, which for a long time represented the only oppositional voice, as political parties were initially banned when President Museveni came to power. At the core of the Movement system was an effort to find an alternative way to have democratic dissent without multi-party politics. For Museveni and his new government, competitive elections were seen as having been at the core of dividing communities and leading to conflict. It was only after they believed that the country had stabilized sufficiently, or, as critics argued, that the ruling party had consolidated its hold over government institutions and could no longer sustain the continued domestic and international pressure for reform, that multi-party politics were reintroduced in 2005.

In Ethiopia, the culture of communication of the new government was rooted in a Marxist–Leninist approach privileging channels and methods of communication that could reach the masses directly, rather than negotiating and debating visions of the new nation with elites and intellectuals. This led the new leaders, when they came to power in 1991, to invest resources in forms of communications that would allow them to speak directly with peasants in the rural areas, from village councils to remote video conferencing facilities. The emphasis was on connecting the centre of the state with its peripheral nodes. In contrast, the arguments that were being advanced in what was a relatively open press during the transition period were largely dismissed by the ruling party as the perspectives of a limited group of intellectuals⁴⁸.

The reforms instituted in Ethiopia and Uganda were implemented at a time when the end of the Cold War was making it particularly challenging for countries that wanted to be recognized as legitimate members of the international community, and to receive assistance, to escape liberal orthodoxy, and to experiment with a combination of socialist values and liberal concepts. To be accepted, governments had to at least nominally subscribe to the canons of a liberal press, often implementing laws allowing a freer circulation of ideas. However, in environments still characterized by instability and the absence of reconciliation with those that had previously controlled the country, measures such as the liberalization of the press and of the airwaves, however, led to unintended consequences.

⁴⁸ Gagliardone, I. ‘New media and the developmental state in Ethiopia,’ *African Affairs*, 113: 451 (2014), pp. 279–99

New media outlets, rather than acting as impartial watchdogs of the government, became part of the competition for power. For those that had been actively excluded from power, such as journalists and politicians previously working for a defeated regime, media became platforms from which to attack the new leaders, escalating tensions within societies in transition⁴⁹.

In one of the most extreme cases, the government has been too weak to effectively regulate the media market. Few countries exemplify the role of media in ongoing violence as clearly as Somalia. With over two dozen radio stations broadcasting in Mogadishu, satellite television channels from London beamed into tea houses across the country, and a vibrant online community mostly driven by the Diaspora but closely connected with informants on the ground, it is an information-rich environment, and one that is also turning a profit for some businessmen. Many of these media outlets have been established by warlords or aspiring politicians seeking to consolidate power and radios have often been used to promote violence rather than to pursue peace.

The political economy of the media system defies normative analysis. Those ‘employed’ by media outlets often receive most of their ‘salaries’ through external means—whether per diem from training run by international organizations or the common practice of *shuurur*, which includes a range of activities from blackmailing politicians or businessmen to paid news. In such a context, while there may be a popular discourse about journalism standards or a free media, the reality is that the system functions by an alternative rationale, and one that serves both certain political interests as well as the financial interests of important businessmen and investors.

3.2 Negative ethnicity and conflicts

The connection between ethnicity and the media has received attention almost exclusively when it has led to violence, as in the aftermath of contested elections, such as those in Kenya in 2007 and 2008, when journalists and politicians reverted to ethnic claims and grievances to rally audiences and supporters. One of the most well-known examples in recent history is the case of radio journalist Joshua Arap Sang, indicted by the International Criminal Court for having incited hatred and encouraged violence against Kikuyu communities during the contested elections of 2007. Ethnicity, however, has rarely been explored for its ability to not simply be a

⁴⁹ . Chabal, P. and Daloz, J-P. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 1999), p. 196

destructive force, but also an element that reinforces accountability mechanisms available to the community⁵⁰.

Elected representatives are more likely to respond to claims advanced by citizens when these are raised within a communitarian framework, rather than invoking the rights of the individual or the application of the rule of law⁵¹. In societies where oral communication still plays an important role, claim-making may take the form of poetry, music, or songs, or use metaphors or allusions, which can be understood best within a localized ‘universe of meaning’. They may appear less effective when analyzed through the lens of liberal democratic standards and media, but they have actually been among the most trusted and effective means to articulate dissent and propose alternatives⁵².

Even in countries that have been recognized as among the most democratic and open in terms of their politics and their media, such as Ghana, these elements have been central to the ways in which journalists operate. As Jennifer Hasty, a scholar of Ghana, argues, ‘meaning is not objectively embedded in an event and uncovered by the autonomous individual, as in the western logic, but rather meaning is collectively generated by the participants in an event—including the journalist. And the social meanings of events are not rooted in conflict, impact, and novelty, but rather emphasize cooperation, legitimate authority, and redemptive development.’⁵³ In many African countries, there may be agreement across society’s social strata about the desirability of democracy as the only legitimate system of governance, but institutions have not been allowed to grow from the bottom up to reach this goal, and to build on the language and mechanisms which are routinely used by those who participate in them and contribute both to their perpetuation and change. Most good governance projects, including those making use of the media, have tended to work against the grain, rather than with the grain of African societies.

They have preferred to look elsewhere, framing the media and the state as autonomous and opposite, stressing the significance of citizen groups and media organizations acting to check on a corrupt and unaccountable central authority, rather than harnessing the notions of moral and social obligation and interpersonal accountability that already permeate these institutions. This

⁵⁰ Gagliardone, I. ‘“Can you hear me?” Mobile–radio interactions and governance in Africa,’ *New Media & Society* (2015)

⁵¹Hyden, G. ‘Political accountability in Africa: Is the glass half-full or half-empty?,’ Report No. 6. (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010). Available at: /

⁵²Willems, W. ‘Interrogating Public Sphere and Popular Culture as Theoretical Concepts on their Value in African Studies,’ *African Development*, 37: 1 (2013), pp. 11–26.

⁵³ Hasty, J. ‘Performing power, composing culture The state press in Ghana,’ *Ethnography*, 7: 1 (2006), p. 85.

paradigm has been actively encouraged by bilateral and multilateral organizations eager to find additional ways to increase forms of accountability and transparency that are complementary to their own activities, putting pressure on state institutions to which they channel the majority of their funds. New media such as the internet and the mobile phone, with their potential of mobilizing crowds and revamping journalism, have further emboldened this perspective, which over time has led to the creation of important initiatives to keep elected representatives accountable in a more formal sense adopted in liberal democracies.

3.3 Power of influence and shaping opinion

History has shown that media can incite people towards violence. Hitler used the media to create hatred for Jews⁵⁴. Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's Minister of Propaganda, masterminded the most effective effort of mass persuasion, heavily relying on propaganda messages in motion pictures and radio broadcasting⁵⁵. In the 1992-5 Balkan conflict, electronic and print media helped promote ethnic conflict and hatred leading to violence. While the explicit broadcast of hate messages was rare, the cumulative impact of biased coverage fuelled the hatred over a long period polarizing local communities to the point where violence became an acceptable tool for addressing grievances⁵⁶.

In the past four years, the African continent experienced several political uprisings in Arab countries. Some of these uprisings were claimed to be engineered and subsequently escalated by media. Using the Libyan civil war as a case study explored the media's role in modern conflicts. Emphasizing on the media's shortcomings in its reporting and analysis of the conflict, he highlighted the double standards that the media gave by drawing parallels between the wars in Iraq and Libya in an effort to illustrate the errors repeatedly carried out by mass media⁵⁷.

Eventually, Viggo concluded with reference to Muammar Qaddafi's capture and subsequent killing on October 20, 2011, "The power of media in conflict cannot be assumed speed and technology with which images of the event recorded on cell phones were transmitted around the

⁵⁴ Vladimir, B., & Schirch, L. (2007). Why and when to use media for conflict prevention and peace building. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Issue No. 6).

⁵⁵ Jowett, G. S., & O'Donnell, V. (1999). Propaganda and persuasion (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE

⁵⁶ Buric, A. (2000). Media, War and peace in Bosnia. In E. David (Ed.), Regional Media in Conflict (p 64). London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting.

⁵⁷ Viggo, M. (2011). Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space. (P. M. Taylor, Ed.) Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

world via social media platforms and widely disseminated even before Qaddafi's death was confirmed. During the 2010 general elections in Côte d'Ivoire, the media landscape was rife with partisan polemic and misinformation from opposing sides and incitements to violence, while members of the media themselves were frequent targets of violence and intimidation⁵⁸. During the post-election crisis that followed after the announcement of the presidential results, the print media and public television were used by both presidential candidates Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara as a tool for propaganda and a means for mobilizing their electorate against their opponents⁵⁹. The media occupied a central role in the post-election crisis and the descent into civil war that saw the displacement of more than 1 million people, the effective termination of many government services in parts of the country and further economic decline⁶⁰.

3.4 Media and de-escalation of conflicts

Apart from the negative roles of media, several cases have also linked media to the promotion of peace and reconciliation. For example, in Northern Uganda where the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) has camped for decades, media has been used to create the common good for the people to promote peace. Struges found that Mega FM has promoted peace in Northern Uganda with positive effects since 2002⁶¹. The station has encouraged LRA members to come out of the bush, joined radio phone-in talk shows and hold discussions with government and civil society representatives, a good step in peace building. Likewise, Open Broadcast Network (OBN), a media network established in Bosnia two decades ago, is one of the most ambitious and earliest intentional media attempts to reduce violent conflict. To this day, it remains the only television.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NEXUS BETWEEN MEDIA AND CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

4.0 Introduction

The media serve to escalate or reduce the overall conflict situation. The argument goes that the media either escalate the conflict by accentuating disagreements, foregrounding confrontations,

⁵⁸ Media Foundation for West Africa. (2011, April 18). Ban on international media lifted by Ouattara government. Retrieved May 30, 2020, from International Freedom of Expression Exchange: <http://www.ifex.org/>

⁵⁹ Electoral Reform International Services. (2011). Broadcasting a peaceful future. London.: 6 Chancel Street Press.

⁶⁰ *ibid*

⁶¹ Struges, D. (2007). Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement. International Organization, No. 4: , 653-681.

and lending air time to forceful voices, or, conversely, reduce the conflict by shunning extremism, giving room for alternative voices and visualizing peaceful solutions. For several reasons, the media situation in and around Somalia provides an interesting ground for discussing these issues. For one, the long lasting Somali conflict has been a recurrent issue for both the local and the international media.

4.1 Private mass media

In Uganda, a study investigated the role of peace journalism versus more traditional mass media in the reporting of the Northern Ugandan conflict, a sharp dispute that erupted in 1986. Two national newspapers were studied during three different years. Both newspapers mainly dealt with the conflict by means of shorter articles; only occasionally were longer articles published. The state-run newspaper, *The New Vision*, turned out to be more confrontational in the reporting than the private *The Monitor*, a finding which is surprising in the African context given that official media channels usually try to minimize conflicts while the private media tend to amplify them. In the Ugandan case, however, the coverage of the conflict in the state-run newspaper should be read in light of the government's interests in the conflict. Nevertheless, the study concludes that both the private and the government publication fell short in journalistic professionalism, such as the lack of balance⁶².

Today, there are about fifteen newspapers in Somaliland and fifty in the rest of Somalia. Though it may sound like a decent number, many of the newspapers only come out once a week and the circulation figures are usually less than 1,000 copies. Most newspapers contain only eight pages and are printed in A4 size, with the exception of some papers in Somaliland, which are full broadsheets. Newspaper distribution is poor outside of the big cities. These facts notwithstanding, one should not underestimate the impact of the publications that do come out. A glimpse at the newspapers shows that they have an overwhelming focus on politics, even to the extent that they have been criticized for not containing enough sports and entertainment⁶³.

They are widely read by the small elite—the highly educated and well-positioned segment of the population—which explains why most Somali newspapers are published in the English language.

⁶² Goretti, Linda Nassanga. "Peace Journalism Applied: An Assessment of Media Coverage of the Conflict in Northern Uganda." *Conflict and Communication Online* 6, no. 2 (2007). Available online at cco.regeneration-online.de/2007_2/pdf/nassanga.pdf.

⁶³ Ismail, Jamal Abdi. "Somalia. Research Findings and Conclusions." Report. London: BBC World Service Trust, 2006.

Also, Somali culture has an oral tradition, which encourages people to pass on news verbally in a systematic manner⁶⁴. Thus, the newspaper material becomes redistributed in a second circle. Of current Somali newspapers, three are state owned while the rest are private. Regardless of ownership, the newspapers are closely tied to the interests of the owner. Most private newspapers are critical of the government. The newspapers are commonly viewed as mouthpieces of different political interests rather than objective news channels⁶⁵.

Television came to Somalia in the year 1983, which is late compared to other African nations. Of today's four television stations, only one is state owned (Somaliland National Television in the north of the country). In addition, there are stations abroad that broadcast Somali programs via satellite. International television networks, particularly Arab channels, constitute a large part of television consumption in Somalia⁶⁶. Somali television stations have very limited resources, proving that low-cost television production is indeed possible. To this end, it is convenient for the stations that there are no functional copyright laws in Somalia.

4.2 New mass media

Mass media plays sensitive role in perception and actual accounts of conflicts and wars. On one hand, the expectation is nothing short of a watchdog, to help the public filter facts from fiction, preserve the conscience of the people, and provide the information that people need in order to make rational decision among choices.

On the other hand, the media is also sensitive and help galvanize public opinion and convey same to other sections of the society⁶⁷. The role of mass media in disseminating information as a matter of knowledge in human awareness can actually be both constructive for peace as well as deconstructive. The constructive aspect of mass media is grounded on the formation of reality during peace process in conflict resolution. On the other hand, the deconstructive phenomenon of mass media can be sieved by the news content causing an inevitability or probability of violence

⁶⁴ Johnson, John William. "The Politics of Poetry in the Horn of Africa. A Case Study in Macro-Level and Micro-Level Tradition." In *Milk and Peace, Drought and War. Somali Culture, Society and Politics*, edited by Markus Höhne and Virginia Luling, 221–43. London: Hurst, 2010.

⁶⁵ Ismail, Jamal Abdi. "Somalia. Research Findings and Conclusions." Report. London: BBC World Service Trust, 2006.

⁶⁶ Ducaale, Boobe Yuusuf. "The Role of the Media in Political Reconstruction." In *Rebuilding Somaliland. Issues and Possibilities*, edited by Matt Bryden, 123–88. Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 2005.

⁶⁷ Dimitrova, D. V. & Strömbäck, J. 2008. *Foreign Policy and the Framing of the 2003 Iraq War in Elite Swedish and US Newspapers*. SAGE Publication: *Media, War and Conflict*: 1 (2); 203-220.

reaction among the conflicting actors⁶⁸. Mass media plays key role in violence conflict situation; which may take two different and opposing forms. Either the media stay out of the conflict and are independent, hence become a critical tool for the resolution of conflict and management of violence: or it takes an active part and has responsibility for increased violence. The role of media in a given conflict, and in the stages before and after, largely depends on a complex set of variables: including relationship between the media and actors in the conflict and independence the media has to the power holders in society. Fundamentally, a strong and independent media contributes to, not just the management of violent conflicts, but retention or creation of peace and stability in conflict affected areas⁶⁹.

4.3 The mass media as conflict facilitator in the horn of Africa

Although establishing a causal relationship between radio listening, television viewing and other media on one hand and the framing of opinion, attitudes, emotion and beliefs that result most times to violent conflicts in SSA on another hand is neither linear nor clear. The predominant assumption is that mass media exerts compelling influence not only in the realm of politics, culture and economics, but also on how population develop image about phenomenon; especially in armed conflict environments. The media “provides not only information, but also conceptual frameworks within which information and opinions are ordered⁷⁰. In other words, mass media (especially radio and TV in SSA) had been used as weapon in the hands of warring actors or partisan states in violent conflicts, to spread favorable views, hate campaigns or mobilize society for or against others, a political agenda, their values and/or ideologies. Similarly, just like how the Western mass media (BBC, CNN, DW, etc.) influences global consciousness, so that the World Economic Order that favors the West seems natural⁷¹. The mass media in conflict environment becomes effective propaganda machine not only for promoting defense of an actor’s argument, building resistant movement or army of people to challenge opposing arguments/views, but transform the actor’s interest into people’s interest. State actors in SSA are

⁶⁸ Imtihani, N. 2014. The Mass-Media Role in Conflict Resolution: A Case Study of Kompas Daily Coverage on Aceh Conflict 2003-2005. The 4th International Conference on Sustainable Future for Human Security, SustainN 2013. Kyoto: Elsevier B.V: pp 451- 458.

⁶⁹ Puddephatt, A. 2006. *Voices of War: Conflict and the Role of the Media*. Copenhagen: International Media Support.

⁷⁰ Lichtenberg, J. 1990. *Democracy and the Mass Media*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.

⁷¹ MUSAU, P. M. 1999. The Liberalization of the Mass Media in Africa and its Impact on Indigenous Languages: The Case of Kiswahili in Kenya. *AAP*, 60: 137-146.

famous for this practice: from South Africa (apartheid), Zimbabwe (Land/white farmers), Nigeria (Biafra agitation/civil war), Rwanda (genocide), Cameroun (French/English regions dichotomy). According to Joseph Goebbels: “Propaganda works best when those who are being manipulated are confident, they are acting on their own free will the most impactful of mass media in this respect in SSA has been the radio⁷².

Mobile phones were used to create disinformation and hate speech following the 2007 general elections in Kenya. False information circulated outside the mainstream media, created a cycle of ethnic violence that engulfed almost half of the country. Before official announcement of results, messages claiming that incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was using the Electoral body to rig the elections started circulating. Considering the intensity of ethnic-based politics in Kenya, coupled with an online disinformation about falsification of results to favor an ethnic group over another, the eventual results announcement further triggered widespread and systematic violence, resulting in more than 1,000 deaths and displacement of over 500,000 civilians: according to ICRtoP. The media was used to circulate false voting process and results, in which Kenyans believed, but changed upon release of official results. This created doubt over the political system and in turns suspicion by ethnic groups. The outcome was the 2007 post-election violence⁷³.

4.4 Media as tool for conflict management and state-building

The growing acknowledgement of immense role the media play in helping to fuel conflict has turned scholars towards examining how it can equally play a constructive role in conflict resolution, peace-building and state-building in Sub – Saharan Africa. The need for unfettered access to unbiased information is critical for Africa’s development. Disinformation can at any stage of a conflict, make people desperate, restless and easy to manipulate. According to President Harry Truman “You can never get all the facts from just one newspaper, and unless you have all the facts, you cannot make proper judgments about what is going on”.

For the media, it is difficult to find a balance between preventing harm caused by information and protecting individual expression. However, finding the balance is important, especially in conflict situations. Mass media and journalism must help to distribute information that counter

⁷² McIntyre, Lee (2018). Post-Truth. Cambridge, MIT Press

⁷³[https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/61761/ssoar-jlibertyintaff-2018-3-adeyanju-The mass media and violent.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/61761/ssoar-jlibertyintaff-2018-3-adeyanju-The%20mass%20media%20and%20violent.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

hate-speech and foster environments of balanced opinions⁷⁴. Responsible journalism must be truthful, balanced and carry fair account of events; without judgmental representations and embellishment of reality. The media possess ability to defuse tensions before reaching breaking points and keep a critical observation on government, opposition and society. Supply of credible information enhances reach and conflict management, and also advance democratic principles. In most armed conflicts, parties often make overtures to draw majority of the people on “their” side, which in many occasions induces misrepresentation of facts and an attempt to seize control over the distribution of information. Therefore, the intervention of unbiased and free media is important not only for societies, but people directly affected by violent conflicts: prompting peace-promoting citizen media, media regulation to prevent incitement of violence and conflict-sensitive and peace journalism. There is no consensus on the best approach to reporting conflict in the media industry. Recent plights have sought to explore the distinction between peace journalism and conflict sensitive journalism through analyzing specific interventions on conflict reporting⁷⁵.

The political structure of a given society determines the media and conflict relationship. There is a high chance that media coverage may incite violence through the manipulative and negative presentation of facts if political structure is undemocratic⁷⁶. This kind of media coverage provides justification to a group to start violent acts. Many conflict situations have suffered from such kind of unbalanced and negative coverage of the media. For example, in the case of famous Darfur conflict, local media without highlighting the atrocities committed in Sudan framed it rather as an “Arab war”. The role of local media is very crucial in the context of a conflict situation because they are in an advantageous position to influence the situation. Fishman introduced the term ‘news waves’ where frames of local media have been picked by national or international media⁷⁷.

⁷⁴ Koven, R. 2004. “An Antidote to Hate Speech: Journalism, Pure and Simple”. In *Media Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, edited by Barry James, Paris, UNESCO.

⁷⁵ [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/61761/ssoar-jlibertyintaff-2018-3-adeyanju-The mass media and violent.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/61761/ssoar-jlibertyintaff-2018-3-adeyanju-The%20mass%20media%20and%20violent.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

⁷⁶ Radoli, L. O. (2011). *Press Freedom and Media’s Role in Conflict and Peacebuilding Case of the Post-2007 Election Crisis in Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg.). Retrieved from <http://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/3506/thesis.pdf>

⁷⁷ Scheufele, D. A. (1999). *Framing as a theory of media effects*. Retrieved from www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/Scheufele_Framing_theory_media.

This signifies that local media can become the source for national or international media while covering conflicts of hard to reach regions. Despite greater significance, very few studies have been conducted on the role of local media in a conflict situation. This research gap motivated the researcher to focus on local print media of Assam and its role in the conflict situation⁷⁸. The information need of the people increases during conflicts and they depend on media to fulfill their needs. Livingstone observes that political leaders of modern age prefer to communicate through media programmes to accelerate political decisions rather than depending on traditional diplomatic channels⁷⁹. They build relationships with journalists to use them for their interests. The journalists who fall in the trap of political or other powerful leaders may tend to fit the news in their favors. This tendency of media refers as ‘ethnocentric’, which means to see the world from the perspective of one group while ignoring the others and their perspectives. The ethnocentric media coverage may increase hatred and tension among groups in the conflict. In case of the high ethnocentrism media coverage, news may tend to portray one group as winner and another group as a loser. From Rwanda into Gulf war much media coverage of conflicts has suffered from high ethnocentrism⁸⁰.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This study investigated: causes, role and the nexus between media and conflicts in the horn of Africa. This chapter covers: summary of findings, study conclusions, recommendations and areas for further studies.

⁷⁸Ishak, M. A., & Yang, L. F. (2012). Framing interethnic conflict in Malaysia: a comparative analysis of newspaper coverage on the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf). University of Southern California, AnnInternational journal of communication

⁷⁹Radoli, L. O. (2011). Press Freedom and Media’s Role in Conflict and Peacebuilding Case of the Post-2007 Election Crisis in Kenya (Doctoral dissertation, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg.). Retrieved from <http://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/3506/thesis.pdf?>

⁸⁰https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/150216/6/06_chapter%203.pdf

5.1 Summary of Findings

Based on objective one of this study which was, to establish the causes of conflicts in the horn of Africa this study has established that high levels of unemployment among young men, and where male educational levels are low, face high degree of conflicts. For instances throughout Horn of Africa, factional conflicts have been drawn on a pool of marginalized or socially excluded young men. Conflicts of scarcity are linked to the control of land and water rights. In both cases, the crucial element is how competing interests for those resources are controlled. The Horn has been called one of the most armed regions in the world. In Somalia alone, some estimates place the number of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the millions. Research in north-eastern Kenya has found that every second household had a gun and that of the patients in field hospitals were being treated for gunshot wounds. Censorship of the media, harassment of journalists and abuse of media for propaganda purposes can have a devastating impact. This was amply shown by the role of media controlled by the genocidal forces in Rwanda in 1994 civil society organizations, including independent media; provide important channels for expressing discontent in society. They also provide basic services in many situations where state provides services are inadequate or non-existence, civil society organizations can also help to build bridges between divided and disaffected communities and are essential for the promotion of accountability and inclusive government. Political violence is entrenched and the instrument of the state such as the army, police and judiciary sustain the process. Colonialism in places such as the Rwanda and Burundi; created a state model based on the artificial creation and abuse of ethnicity to maintain power⁸¹. For instance, before the arrival of European colonialists, Burundi had a strong well organized kingdom for centuries.

Based on objective two of this study which was, to examine the role of media in conflicts in the horn of Africa, this study has established that violent conflict in Africa has shaped and defined media and journalists in many ways. The conflicts of the post-colonial period left a legacy of guerrilla fighters adept at using media and communications as part of their struggle that affected the media in the post-Cold War period. Over the past two decades, from Rwanda's genocide to the ongoing violence in Somalia to post-election violence in places such as Ethiopia, Kenya. Ethnicity and the media has received attention almost exclusively when it has led to violence, as in the aftermath of contested elections, such as those in Kenya in 2007 and 2008, when

⁸¹ Ibid. Pg.70 proofread your work before submission

journalists and politicians reverted to ethnic claims and grievances to rally audiences and supporters. One of the most well-known examples in recent history is the case of radio journalist Joshua Arap Sang, indicted by the International Criminal Court for having incited hatred and encouraged violence against Kikuyu communities during the contested elections of 2007.

Based on objective three of this study which was, to determine the nexus between media and conflicts in the horn of Africa, this study has established that Mass media plays sensitive role in perception and actual accounts of conflicts and wars. On one hand, the expectation is nothing short of a watchdog, to help the public filter facts from fiction, preserve the conscience of the people, and provide the information that people need in order to make rational decision among choices.

Although establishing a causal relationship between radio listening, television viewing and other media on one hand and the framing of opinion, attitudes, emotion and beliefs that result most times to violent conflicts on another hand is neither linear nor clear. The predominant assumption is that mass media exerts compelling influence not only in the realm of politics, culture and economics, but also on how population develop image about phenomenon; especially in armed conflict environments.

5.2 Study Conclusions

The terrorist network such as Al-Shabab, have driven instability and religious extremism in the region. These groups have also encouraged coiled with other equipped groups, such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia's Ogaden region. Ethnicity makes these countries susceptible to disputes mainly as a result of the "we-versus them" situation that it brings into the already tense reservations among the different ethnic groups. Besides to improper management of resources, the horn's considerable strategic importance to control of the resources such as the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, oil, agriculture and grazing lands and water resources like River Nile is one of the due reasons for the continuous dispute among the states of the confined territory. History also contributes to the prevailing conflicts in a way that colonial sentiments and colonial border demarcation impose countries to clash over. Moreover, the region's states had a long history of supporting insurgents in neighboring states to weaken what they consider to be oppositional regimes.

5.3 Recommendations

The actors of conflicts of the HOA should give priority and work on conflict prevention actions and stretching a system of anticipating possible conflicts to early warn them. An early warning response system is needed to identify dispute risks at an early stage and take action to prevent the escalation of conflicts into violent forms. The International, Regional and Sub-regional organizations like IGAD, AU and UN should scrutinize the root causes of conflicts of the region and they have to strategically intervene and take action if necessary. This could be done by: strengthening the Secretariat of the IGAD to address regional issues such as nomadic- pastoral conflicts. o Building regional conflict management capacity by AU and this could alleviate the destructive effects of international influences i.e. states which has a particular self-interest around the region. Putting holistic effort (UN, AU and IGAD) to the facilitation of negotiation for peaceful resolution of existing conflicts and the effective implementation of peace agreements. The states themselves should work on common political policies specifically on their foreign policies of each other to bring at least normative peace among the society. Promoting the cultural conflict resolution mechanisms in which inculcating religious and ethnic leaders as they know their problems therein they can easily convince to bring up peoples under their clan or religion for discussion and it is also a way that blocks conflicts not to be escalated. Clear demarcation of borders in between countries of the horn, the Ethiopian-Kenyan border harmonization committee has started addressing the cross-border dimensions of the conflicts. Likewise, there should be clear cut boarder lines among countries of the HOA so as to settle repeated disputes among themselves.

5.4 Areas of further research

The researchers should try to examine the laws that should guide the media on the reporting while preventing the interest groups and the government from censoring the media.

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