UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS)

POWER, BAD GOVERNANCE AND PERSISTENT CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDAN

KAKENYA ZONA

REG NO: R52/12389/2018

SUPERVISOR:

DR. KIZITO SABALA

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FROM THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS), OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

2020

DECLARATION

I, KAKENYA ZONA, hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signed …………………………   Date …………………………………

KAKENYA ZONA

REG NO: R52/12389/2018

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

Signed …………………………   Date …………………………………

Dr. KIZITO SABALA

Lecturer,

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies,

University of Nairobi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I thank God for the gift of life, His favor, grace and provision throughout this study. This study reflects a support system made up of several individuals who have supported me throughout this journey. I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Kizito Sabala, for his consistent guidance, commitment and support. He was patient with me and pushed me to do better.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family; my friends Sharon Taiy and Vincent Osukuli. I am thankful for their support and encouragement. I am forever grateful, to them for being my biggest cheerleaders; the source of my inspiration and my motivators.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to explain how power, bad governance and greed by the political elites in government cause the violent conflicts witnessed in South Sudan. The overarching aim of this research is to establish a connection between authority, poor governance and recurrent conflicts in the Horn of Africa, using the Republic of South Sudan as a case to study. The thesis is driven by the following objectives: to explore the link between power, governance and conflict to scrutinize the relationship of power, governance and conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and, ultimately, to assess objectively the effects of struggle for power and weak governance on stabilization in South Sudan. This thesis will be driven by two hypotheses that: there is an inverse association between influence, poor governance and stability; and instability in South Sudan is primarily the product of power struggles and poor governance.

The hypothesis used in this analysis is that the theory of greed vs. sadness developed by Hoeffler and Paul Collier. This research would have been inspired by the theory of greed vs. sorrow. This hypothesis focuses on the micro-level of conflict, which seeks the roots of conflict in terms of human motives to participate in aggression, and the large-scale escalation needed to turn a small problem into a full-scale war. This theory seeks to understand why rebel forces are emerging and why they are engaging in civil wars in order to demonstrate their frustration with the government. This research will integrate qualitative and quantitative approaches into the data collection process. . Primary data will be gathered by organized interviews and questionnaires with government agencies and officials of the South Sudanese Embassy in Nairobi. Major decision makers in intergovernmental organizations such as UN and UNMISS officials, as well as other non - profit organizations and refugees.

There are five chapters in this review. Chapter one offers a sneak peek in to the analysis and provides a context to the causal association between thirst for power, poor governance and dispute. It will provide a brief context to the rise of governance as an important debate on state stability. The section will also include a statement of the research problem; the goals of the study; research questions and hypotheses; Justification and importance of the thesis with an emphasis on both theoretical and policy justifications. The section would also set out the theoretical context on which the analysis is based. Chapter two aims to explore the connection between influence, bad governance and recurring violence across the world through case studies of the Arab Spring and other revolutions across Africa. Chapter three explores the relationship between influence, bad governance and violence in the Republic of South Sudan. It assesses how decades of elite lust for influence in Sudan and the subjugation of South Sudan have driven the people to participate in civil wars that lasted more than three decades and only ended with the signing of the CPA. Chapter 4 tries to objectively examine the impact of power struggle and poor governance on South Sudan's peace. Chapter 5 will conclude the report and identify relevant policy responses based on the results of the analysis. The segment will indicate whether or not the theories have been proved.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CPA   -   Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDR   -   Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reconciliation

GDP   -   Gross Dynamic Product GNI Gross National Income

GoS   -   Government of Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan

HDI   -   Human Development Index

HIIK   -   Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research

ICC   -   International Criminal Court

IGAD -   Intergovernmental Authority on Development

LDC   -   Least Developed Countries

NGO   -   Non-governmental Organizations

NPPR -   National Platform on Peace building and Reconciliation

SPLA -   Sudan's People Liberation Army

SPLM -   Sudan's People Liberation Movement

SPLM -   IO -Sudan's People Liberation Movement in Opposition

SSDF -   South Sudan Defense Forces SSLM South Sudan Liberation
Movement

UCPD -   Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UN   -   United Nations

UNDP -   United Nations Development Program

UNMISS -   United Nations Mission in South Sudan UNSC United Nations
Security

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Introduction

Most of the current wars are intra-state disputes, which also have far-reaching geographical and international repercussions. Such disputes not only weaken the economic growth of a country; they are also a pointer to the failure of a country's governing style. The relation between influence, bad governance and conflict is significant, but is only beginning to grab the attention of the global community.[1] Africa has undergone a relatively high number of armed conflicts ever since the Cold War ended. As per the Uppsala Conflict Data Program UCDP), there were over 600 state-based and non-state wars and conflicts in Africa between 1990 and 2015.[2] These issues, triggered by political, social and economic turmoil and the persistence of cultural, communal and religious tensions that have degraded the globe, speak to the problems of hunger for power and poor governance, which have dire effects in that they cause numerous outbreaks of violence and occupy much of the figures listed above.

The extent of violence over time in the Horn of Africa is greater than in any other African region. While there is no lack of literature on disputes in the sub-region, many of the publications do not systematically describe their root causes. Although some studies underscore ideology, others underscore wealth, race, or politics, the tendency to exaggerate it has the risk of distorting the primacy of politics, i.e. the function of the state in terms of poor governance and the fight to retain power, which

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[1] Dixon, J. (2009). What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings. *International Studies Review,* 11(4), pp.707-735.
[2] Paul D. Williams, (2016) *War and Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge: Polity, 2nd edition).

is at the core of conflicts in the sub-region.[3]. The governments of most states in this region are epitomized by poor performance records when considering key provision of services such as health, education, employment, water and sanitation among others. Runaway corruption that has eroded public trust in the government and stunted development in these countries is also major issue afflicting such countries. [4] These countries have also witnessed power struggles between top political leaders and these have always led to armed deadly conflicts.

Since the end of 2013 South Sudan has been moving from civil wars civil war. Most if not all of this conflict involves major political and military figure heads of the infant state. Amongst the main governance issues is a lack of political orientation, that is, a lack of ambition to pull people together and without it, it is difficult for the country to forge a national identity. Second, the lack of political goodwill to drive the nation ahead amid rampant impunity and willful disrespect for the law has only made matters worse. Furthermore, power struggles have been experienced since pre-independence, leading to deep divides and fragmentation among the people of South Sudan. This thesis attempts to offer insight into the chaos, but reflects on the important and frequently neglected cause of a profoundly embedded crisis of authority and poor governance.[5] Promoting permanent stability in South Sudan needs a drastic change away from the existing mode of government. The goal of this analysis is to outline the connections between the lust for control of bad governance and the conflicts experienced in South Sudan.

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[3] Adewoye, Omonyi. (2000). "Leadership and the Dynamics of reform in Africa," in, Haroub Othman (ed.), *Reflections on Leadership in Africa: Forty Years after Independence.* Dar Es Salam and Brussels, np.

[4] Jinadu, L. Adele (ed.) (2000). *The Political Economy of Peace and Security in Africa: Ethno cultural and Economic Perspectives*. Harare: AAPS Books

[5] Brosché, Johan, and Kristine Höglund. (2016). *"Crisis of Governance in South Sudan: Electoral Politics and Violence in the World's Newest Nation."* The Journal of Modern African Studies 54 (1): 67–90.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

By the late 1990s, there was a growing agreement that the systemic roots of Africa's conflict had to do with fragile states and poor governance in other words, the turbulent surge of violence, instability, the rising crime wave, economic stagnation, the split of law and order are attributable to the issue of hunger for power in poor leadership. The fledgling Republic of South Sudan is suffering from a multifaceted crisis that has had a disastrous impact on the development of the nation and the formation of a new country. Although several causes led to the crisis, poor governance explains much of the crisis. It is unlikely that South Sudan will exit the uncertainty trap until government is set. Many critics and policy experts in South Sudan refer to poor governance and control as a malefactor of political conflicts and a lack of change in the country's socio-economic growth. The executive and presidency are based on control, the legislature and the judiciary subordinates; vertically, the Juba forces concentrate at the expense of the periphery, causing more discontent in the people. Power is centralized. These negatives have combined to establish a very precarious political and security condition in the region, culminating in a much-vaunted insurgency, widespread migration, constraining fundamental liberties, starvation and appalling human rights and humanitarian conditions in the country, even as the revitalized Peace Deal aims to resolve several of these problems. The purpose of this analysis is therefore to establish the causal relationship between control, poor governance and dispute in South Sudan.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The overarching aim of this analysis is to create a connection between authority, bad governance and recurrent disputes in the Horn of Africa, South Sudan as a case study. The research shall be directed by the following objectives:

i. To examine the nexus between power, governance and conflicts.

ii. To examine the relationship between power, governance and conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan.

iii. To critically analyze the effect of power struggle, bad governance on stability in South Sudan.

1.3 Research Questions

This analysis will be motivated by the following questions to achieve the above-mentioned objectives:

i. What is the nexus between power, bad governance and conflicts?

ii. What is the relationship between power, bad governance and conflict in the Republic of South Sudan?

iii. What are the effects of power struggle, bad governance on stability in South Sudan?

iv. What are the required policy answers from the results of the study?

1.4 Study Hypotheses

The theory will lead the analysis:

1. There is an inverse relationship between power, bad governance and stability.

2. Instability in South in South Sudan is largely a consequence of struggle for power and bad governance.

1.5 Study Justification and Significance

1.5.1 Academic Justification

The violence and instabilities in the Horn of Africa have not attracted serious scholarship with regard to their root causes. Although there is no shortage of academic literature on the conflicts in the sub-region, many of the works do not explain their root causes systematically. While some studies emphasize religion, others underline resources, ethnicity, or politics. Needless to say, since the end of cold

War debates on issues of conflict in general and the Horn of Africa in particular tend to emphasize ethnicity. While ethnicity as a factor of conflict cannot be denied, the trend to overstate it, however, has the implication of obscuring the primacy of politics, i.e. the role of state in terms of bad governance and power struggles which is at the center of the contemporary conflicts that rock the young nation of South Sudan.

There is need for research in this area since the conflicts continues to shift in dynamics while hundreds of lives are lost while millions are displaced. This study aims to shed light on shortcomings and strengths of governance institutions and various steps taken to address the conflict. By doing so this will contribute to academic discourse aimed at addressing issues of instability and state fragility in the horn of Africa and emerging issues in international security.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

This study aims to clearly outline the issue of greed for power, and bad governance as the causes of the disputes and insecurity in the Horn of Africa and especially in South Sudan, seeking out to suggest intra and inter-state conflict resolution strategies with a view of provoking concrete policy recommendations on the subject matter. This study is therefore timely for policy makers who are seeking to find an all-encompassing approach to good governance and ensure a comprehensive policy framework that will help prevent future conflicts that might arise because of the stated issues.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1 Empirical Literature Review

Academic and applied research literature provides many concepts of government that revolve around three dimensions: power, decision-making and responsibility. Raadschelders states that government decides who holds power and influence, who takes decisions, how other actors make their voice heard and how they

are accountable. At the most basic level, the terms "state" and "government" are used interchangeably to describe the exercising of authority and decision-making in any country, entity or agency.[6] However, the new scholarship distinguishes the two noticeably. Government is an agency that exercises power when regulating how society or individuals within it organize decisions and how to come to the laws, mechanisms and processes that connect and limit the exercise of that authority and establish the rights and responsibilities of actors. The Authority is clearly described as a lawful authority. Power, meanwhile, is the capacity to control the actions of others, and the authority has the right to do so.[7]

Most social scientists and power theorists (for instance Max Weber, Plato, Machiavelli) view power as one's ability to dominate the other.[8] They concur with the simple equation of power of power-over, which is where A exerts power over B and influences B in a way that is contradictory to B's interests. This entails the ability to force others to comply, coercion may be used if necessary.[9] Dahl in his paper 'The concept of power' employs a couple of alternative terms to power such as oppression, subjection, control and influence. He defined power that is accepted in political science in his famous paper 'The concept of power' where he defined it as a relationship where "A has power over B exceeds to the point that B does what he/she will otherwise not do".[10]

Dahl presented in his paper three assumptions of power as a relationship. The first assumption is, in a power relation, is a time lag for compliance, and that is, an action exerts power when there is immediate compliance (time lag). The second

[6] Raadschelders, B. R. (2008*). Mastering Public Administration: From Max Weber to Dwight Waldo 2nd Edition*. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
[7] Ibid
[8] Dahl R (1957). "The Concept of Power" *Journal of Behavioral Science, volume* 2, issue 3. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/bs.3830020303. (accessed 1512-2019)
[9] Chabal, Patrick (2009). *Africa: the politics of suffering and smiling*. London: Zed.
[10] Ibid Pg 202

assumption is 'a connection', that is not until there is a connection between A and B, a power relation cannot exist. The third assumption is that the 'ability of A to successfully get B to do something' [11]Lukes later added a third dimension to power in his work 'Power: a radical view' in 1974 which deals with the ability to manipulate what people view as right. It explains power in an ideological sense. His view of power is close to the Marxist approach to power as linked to the class struggle in his conflict theory. Marx is concerned with why the lower classes seem to be okay with or fail to recognize they are being oppressed.[12] The third dimension of power focuses on the most failproof and treacherous use of a position of power; for instance, to prevent the opposition from attaining power by changing government officials and firing his vice president after accusing him of an attempted coup Salva Kiir changed some laws in order to achieve this.

Another approach to power worth mentioning is the elitist theory of democracy which is a power theory that says power lies in the few (elites) who seek to control the economy. [13]Pareto believed elites to be the most superior in any social structure and thus true power resides with them. The pluralist theory of power is a critique of the elitist theory of power. The pluralist theory is concerned with how power is distributed in a political process. Pluralists maintain that power and governance are not only the responsibility of politicians and a select few but it is also that of individuals and social groups.[14]This concept is also most relevant in the case of South Sudan where power only rests on the few political elites who are closest to the president hence they get to enjoy wielding this power through control of state resources with no limits hence further worsening the already questionable bad

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[11] Ibid Pg 204

[12] Amenta et al (2012). Marxist Approaches to Power. *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, Oxford: Blackwell*, 3-14, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/linne-ebooks/detail.action?docID=865177 (accessed 18-19-2019).

[13] Lukes, Steven (1974). *Power: a radical view*. London: Macmillan.

[14] Ibid.

governance proceeded in the country. This concept of power informs this study of power, bad governance and conflicts in South Sudan.

The issues of bad governance and how they cause conflict have been debated in recent years. As United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF) notes, "corruption and bad governance were among the causes of war. The majority of the people had no voice in the government and no opportunities in life and so they were easily provoked to violence". This perception was illustrated by episodes of armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following the tradition of weak governance and an absence of democracy in the region. The Rwandan genocide laid the framework for a war in the DRC in 1994.[15]. Shyala argues that the collapse and dissolution of the DRC states in the 1990s, Uganda between 1981 and 1986, Burundi between 1983 and 1996 and Rwanda in 1994 are the consequences of the fight to gain and retain political control and poor governance. Discrimination, nepotism, exclusion, inequality and unfair allocation of national wealth have been the key markers of the type of government seen in these nations. Indeed, many African countries that lack a strong governance structure and witness power disputes display a correlation between violence and weak law enforcement in the defense of the resource base and respect for human rights[16].

Similarly, weak government and the aspirations of authority and money are triggering civil wars in Liberia. Liberia witnessed its first brutal civil war in 1989 following the invasion of Liberia by the National Patriotic Front led by Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor became President of Liberia in 1997. Liberia was thrown into a new civil war in 1999 as a result of racial tensions, repression, subjugation and

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[15] Shekhawat, S. (2009). Governance crisis and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Working Paper No. 6.
[16] Adano, W.R. and Daudi, F. (2012). Links between climate change, conflict and governance in Africa. ISS Paper No.234.Institutte for Security Studies, Federal Foreign Office and Humanity United.

suffering among the population. [17]. At the close of the Second Civil War, horrible acts of brutality and massacres targeting civilians were committed in Liberia, such as kidnapping, torture, indiscriminate beatings, shootings and abductions. [18]. Mali is another African country that endured civil war and relentless political turmoil, and bad governance has led to not only to the politicization of the military and security forces, but also to the fragility of the state. Francis points out that "poor governance, marginalization, the alienation of significant parts of the Malian population from political and economic structures and the inability to resolve the basic concerns of the ruling and ruling elite in Mali have provided a fertile place for Islamist extremists to establish a foothold' in Mali.[19].

On the other side, Usman et al. argues that bad governance and graft are related to the Nigerian crisis. Indeed, politicians themselves play a part in provoking violence by capitalizing on the hostile ethnic nature of the Nigerian state, in order to divert attention from the shortcomings of their leadership.[20]. Earlier, Salawu insists that the inability of Nigerian politicians to build proper governance and their hunger for power has contributed to communal, racial, religious and class disputes. This can easily be seen in the case of South Sudan, where problems of power struggle and poor governance have persisted for years, long before it achieved independence, and as a result of the eruption of war in 2013.[21]

There is also a need to improve government in order to reduce the incidence of conflict. In another article, Walter concurs that weak leadership is contributing to civil

[17] Anna, N. (2014). Violent conflicts and civil strife in West Africa: Causes, challenges and prospects. Stability: *International Journal of Security and Development*, 3 (1), 3, 1-16.

[18] Vinck, P., Pham, P.N. and Kreutzer, T. (2011). Talking Peace*: A population-based survey on attitudes about security, dispute resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia.* Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley.

[19] Francis, D.J. (2013). *The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali*. NOREF Report, The Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre.

[20] Usman, I., Kyari, G.A., Hajja, A.M.S. and Goni, U.A. (2013). Is bad governance/corruption the major source of conflict in Nigeria? *Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy,* 5 (1), 30-43.

[21] Salawu, B. (2010). Ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria: Causal analysis and proposals for new management strategies. *European Journal of Social Sciences,* 13 (3), 345-353.

war. Walter suggests that in a world governed by a poor government that is not accountable to the people, civic participation in economic and political processes is restricted and information and responsibility limited; civil wars are more likely to replicate themselves .[22]. Similarly, Choi and Raleigh conclude that, with greater degrees of civic involvement, there is a lower likelihood of violent and civil conflict.[23] This study will thus aim to create a connection between control, poor governance and prolonged conflicts; by studying the complexities of this trend in South Sudan, demonstrating how the country's gross governance structures keep exposing it to fragility, making it vulnerable to violent conflict; therefore, this study seeks to include alternative suggestions on how best to resolve the lacking.

1.6.2 Theoretical Literature Review

The principle of Frustration and Aggression was introduced in Frustration and Aggression by Dollard et al, where a number of renowned psychologists attempted to understand human conflict behavior, with the basic premise that human frustration could contribute to violent behavior. It says that if expectations are not met or hindered, it contributes to anger. Aggression, on the other hand, is an act whose objective reaction is damage to an organism. Dissatisfaction, however, does not immediately result in aggression, but creates preparation for aggression if activated.[24] Dollard et al concluded that if the cause of anger could not be physically handled, then violence would take place. It was referred to as the 'kicking the dog' effect, and when the root of anger cannot be specifically answered, then the violence is turned to the 'kicking the dog' effect.[25]

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[22] Walter, B.F. (2014). Why bad governance leads to repeat civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 1-31. DOI: 10.1177/0022002714528006
[23] Choi, H.J. and Raleigh, C. (2015). Dominant forms of conflict in changing political systems. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59, 158-171.
[24] Dollard, John., Miller, Neal E., Doob, Leonard W., Mowrer, O. H. & Sears, Robert R. (1939). *Frustration and aggression.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
[25] Ibid

Frustration and aggression theory have received a lot of critics from various scholars. For instance, Bandura as cited in Tadayon, criticized Dollard et al view on aggression in his Social Learning Theory (SLT) which was later revised as the Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) in 1986. Bandura as cited in Tadayon believed that frustration produced a general form of arousal and it is the SLT that determines how the arousal influences human behavior (reaction). The SLT maintains that a person will respond aggressively if that behavior had been effective in the past by oneself or others. [26]Bandura as cited in Tadayon argues that individuals use aggression in situations only when they have learned previously that they can be successful in it. Another critique of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is that aggression is not always prompted by frustration. Someone that faces a life-threatening situation will fight or flight. In this scenario, any aggression will be in self-defense and not necessarily frustration. [27]

This frustration and aggression theory put forward by Dollard et al will help explain the aggression of the South Sudanese people towards the ruling government and against each other especially the two dominant ethnic groups that Salva Kirr and Riek Machar come from as a way of them taking out their frustration against someone or something else as they did not have the power to direct their aggression towards those who led them to be frustrated, meaning the government of Sudan pre-independence.

Another theory that informs this study is the conflict theory. There are many conflicts theories, however, the research will be based on the Marxist theory. The

[26] Tadayon N, (2012). Bandura's Social Learning Theory & Social Cognitive Learning Theory
[27] Berkowitz Leonard, (1969). "Perspectives: Simple Views of Aggression: An Essay Review." 57*American scientist, volume*, issue 3, page 372-383. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27828639 (accessed 13-12-2019)

theory focuses on the uneven allocation of power, income and status in society.[28] Conflict theorists maintain that one remains in the class they are born into due to a reoccurring state of inequality in the society.[29] Those with wealth and power strive to maintain the status quo using any means under the sun which are usually by exploiting the weak and the less fortunate. It is this divide in society that is referred to as conflict theory. Social order is maintained by domination; therefore, power lies in the hands of those with the greatest resources be it political, economic or otherwise and those with fewer resources are in a constant struggle for power. This process of class struggle in society is in a continuous and never-ending loop. Marx argues that the only way out of this continuous loop is a revolution that will involve breaking the political and economic dominance and also establishing a state of collective ownership (socialism) and eventually a classless state (communism).[30]

Marx stresses that society has been full of conflict since the dawn of civilization. This conflict in society presents itself in intangible structures such as race, gender, class, religion and several other structures of society. Another assumption of conflict theory is inequality. According to conflict theorists, class, power and other societal structures abound with inequalities. Some people will always dominate others and will strive to keep it that way hence the never-ending circle of inequality exists unless in the case of a revolution.[31] Marx's theory of oppressors becoming oppressed ideology will be used in this research as this can be seen in the "reverse" case between Christians and Muslims in South Sudan. Although each theory presented in this section have both pros and cons, regardless, it's important to note

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[28] Intriligator, Michael D. (1982) "Research on Conflict Theory: Analytic Approaches and Areas of Application*." The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 307–327. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/173904 (accessed 16-12-2019).
[29] Collins, Randall & Sanderson, Stephen K. (2009). *Conflict sociology: a sociological classic updated.* Abridged and updated Boulder: Paradigm Publishers
[30] Marx K, Engel F (1848). *Manifesto of the Communist party. Marx*/Engels Selected Works, volume 1, progress publisher, Moscow, 1966. pp 98-13.
[31] Ibid

that these theories are shown to be best suitable Marx's conflict theory has been criticized by authors such as Bottomore, although his theory applies to certain societies by upholding its status quo, the same cannot be said in some societies. This is due to the loss of radical thrust in some societies as it's no longer applies to major conflicts or problems faced in those societies. Therefore, ignoring this fact has resulted in the theory losing its liberating character.[32]In conclusion, using the lenses of these theories to examine the South Sudanese case will be of great importance as there are seen to be best suitable for this case study for it can explain why the conflict continued to prolong even after several peace agreements Salva Kirr wanted to remain in power by all means while the opposition led by Riek Machar also wanted to acquire the same power hence this resulted in the conflict outbreak.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study would be motivated by the philosophy of greed vs. grief. This philosophy focuses on the micro-level of conflict and seeks the origins of conflict in terms of human motives for engaging in violence and the large-scale effort needed to turn a small conflict into a full-scale war. One of the first works to coin the term 'Greed and Resentment Theory' was published by Paul Collier in his essay 'Making well out of war' in the 1999 book 'Greed & Grievance – Neoliberal Agendas in Civil Wars.' Since then, the model has been thoroughly analyzed and reformulated in various articles and reports.

The essay expanded Hoeffler and Collier 's 1998 paper, "On the Economic Roots of Civil War," which provided a detailed comparative study of the war economy , the economic motive of the rebel groups, and proposed the theory that civil wars was largely attributed to the greed of rebel groups to earn some money. Their

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[32] Bottomore, T. B. (2012). *Sociology as Social Criticism* (Routledge Revivals) [Elektronisk resurs]. Taylor and Francis.

later work, in particular the 2004 article, gave two lines of reasoning, the economic reasons; the greed-based argument, and the socio-political motives, the grievance argues. As Collier points out, these two lines follow the two lines of thought of political science and economists. He concluded that the uprising was based on two variables: drive and incentive.[33] While political science appears to focus on the motives behind rebel behavior, economists discuss the possibility of revolution. Coller points out that "the problems are so serious that people want to engage in armed revolution." In the opinion of the economist, there are rebellions – those with attractive opportunities for violent insurrection – which are seen as "an enterprise that provides further insights into inspiration and possibilities for War." [34]

The economic claim implies that as reasonable actors, rebels perform a cost-benefit study before engaging in acts of provocation in pursuing their uprising with the return of their actions. Collier and Hoeffler introduced in their 1999 Article statistical models that explain the occurrence of rebellions of greed. According to their arguments, only if corruption or extortion of financial assets, usually primary commodities, offers ample gain in threatening the effect of weapons on the country will a politically motivated rebellion arise. The rebels must also ensure that government forces are dispelled in the near term, while they attempt to kill the rebellion and contain the revolution. In the following articles Collier and Hoeffler then explained and introduced different proxies for both greed and grievance, as well as their arguments and methical analysis methodology, and tested these variables in cross-country regression studies. Some academics can regard reports from 2004 and 2009 as the most significant. In 161 nations, the former developed its 5-year study model, which culminated in a more accurate theory of economic greed. The second

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[33] Collier, P. (1998). *On economic causes of civil war*. Oxford Economic Papers, 50(4), pp.563-573.
[34] Ibid Pg 564

essay contains the theory of viability, based on more precise proof according to the authors. This research attempts to specifically merge the political science and economics principle, since they can be used in the Horn of Africa and in South Sudan to explain the conflicts and what drives them.

1.8 Research Design & Research Methodology

Data for the examination of research questions and theories will be investigated in a mixed-method case study. According to Bryan, [35] A mixed research approach combines both qualitative and quantitative study into a single project. Inherently analytical is thus both qualitative and quantitative results. By using South Sudan as a case study, the analysis model used tests the causal relationship between power, weak governance and violence. A case analysis seeks to explain the cause and outcome of the syndrome by means of complete assessment, interpretation and examination of the cases studied by integrating both quantitative and qualitative data.[36]

The alternative for a case study, in contrast, is to provide an in-depth, multi-dimensional study of the problem statement instead of a general study of the research problem. A case study in social science analysis "allows the creation of findings and principles on social behavior and social processes in natural settings examined in close proximity"[37]. Case research also offers "knowledge from a variety of sources and over time, enabling a holistic study of diverse social networks and structures of social actors and social meanings"[38]. According to Kothari, the case approach is popular for its width rather than its scope. Furthermore, the case study relies on the

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[35] Allan Bryman ;(2008) *Social Research Methods 3rd edition* (Oxford. Oxford University Press 603-626)

[36] Hamel, J., Dufour, S. and Fortin, D., (1993). *Case Study Methods.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications

[37] Orum, A. M. et al., (1991) *A case for the Case Study*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press) p 8.

[38] Ibid

full analysis of a limited number of events or situations, so the case study deals with the procedures taking place and their interdependence. The implementation of a case study design for this study would therefore provide a comprehensive overview of the problem of power and bad governance and its relation to civil war by studying the social complexes of actors, behavior and intentions that inform this issue.

1.8.1 Data Collection

The data used in this analysis would be integrated from both secondary and primary sources. Primary data would be extracted from formal interviews across different avenues (telephones, emails, zoom calls) and structured questionnaires. This study will use a sample size of 100 respondents. Twenty of these respondents will be drawn from government institutions and civil servants, twenty officials at the South Sudanese embassy in Nairobi, another twenty will be policy makers; the other twenty will be from intergovernmental organizations such as the UN or UNMISS and the last twenty will be respondents from South Sudanese refugees living in Kenya who were directly affected by this conflict.

According to Kombo and Tromp, structured interview method is a systematic interviewing technique which subjects every informant in a sample to the same stimuli.[39] Kvale guide on the nine questions asked in qualitative interviews was highly useful in this study.[40] The systematic technique was favorable and most preferred because of its systematic, comprehensive, reliable, and time saving advantage. However, its weakness is its rigidity and formal status which sometimes makes the respondents limited to the questions asked rather than open up without constrains. This will overcome through the questionnaire method which contains as many choices

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[39] Kombo DK, Tromp DLA ;(2009) *Proposal and Thesis Writing: An Introduction*. (Nairobi Kenya, Paulines Publications Africa, Don Bosco Printing Press).
[40] Kvale S,(1996) *Interviews and Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing* (Thousand Oaks, Calif Sage)

as possible, having open ended questions, following up in case an issue is not clear giving respondents adequate time and guidance to answer the questions freely. Sources of secondary data are newspapers, government publications, website sources and other scholarly work on issues of power bad governance and conflicts.

Further this study depended on primary data acquired through secondary data analysis. Secondary data analysis is a method that involves analysis of data that has been collected by other researchers and also through official statistics. According to Byrman the advantages of the secondary data analysis is the cost and time involved is less than what could have been incurred if student was to collect the data. The disadvantage lies with the lack of credibility and lack of familiarity with data. Official statistics nonetheless was highly considered.

1.8.2 Data Analysis

The qualitative interpretation of the data would form the basis for this report's evaluation of the data. Responses and views of voters and facts from official stats will be analyzed and viewed conceptually. As recommended by Bogdan and Biklen, the data analysis approach would involve 'working with the data, sorting it into comprehensible units, synthesizing it, checking for similarities, discovering what is relevant and what needs to be clarified, and deciding what you are going to say others."[41]

1.8.3 Data Presentation

The research findings are presented through charts and diagrams to demonstrate relationships and figures emanated from quantitative data. For qualitative data a narrative description which connects findings to hypothesis and research questions is employed. Quotes from interviewees are used to explain, study and

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[41] Bogdan, R.C. and Biklen, S. (1982) "Qualitative Research for Education" in Educational Research: *Contemporary Issues and Practical Research,* ed., J. Wellington, (London: Continuum,) p 145.

endorse conclusions. However, caution is used to ensure the authenticity and relevance of each quotation.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The study will comprise of five chapters as outlined below:

Chapter One: This chapter will give an introduction to the study and cover a background to the causal relationship between greed for power, bad governance and conflict. It will give a brief background to the emergence of governance as an important discourse to stability of states. The section will also include a statement of the research problem; the goals of the analysis; research questions and assumptions; and the rationale and importance of the project, with an emphasis on both academic and policy justifications. The section will also include the theoretical history on which the thesis is based.

Chapter Two: This chapter examines the nexus between power, bad governance and persistent conflicts generally and across the globe using the case studies of Arab springs revolution and across Africa. It seeks to critically analyze how years of bad governance and greed for power by various actors set the situations ripe for conflict outbreaks and civil wars. Issues such as acute corruption, repression by the governments that led to marginalization and grievances by the masses finally caused the people to rebel and demand for change.

Chapter Three: This chapter evaluates the relationship between power, bad governance and conflicts in the republic of South Sudan. It analyzes how years of greed for power by elites in Sudan and marginalization of South Sudan led the people to engage in civil wars that lasted for over 30years only ending when the CPA was signed. This chapter discusses how these issues of bad governance didn't end even after South Sudan gained independence. Thus, showing how the conflict wasn't inevitable since these grievances were used as an excuse to start conflict.

Chapter Four: This chapter seeks to critically analyze the effects of power struggle and bad governance on stability of South Sudan. For a long time, South Sudan top elites have engaged in a power struggle that is primarily fueled by greed. This greed for power and power struggles have been witnessed for many years and this has caused long term effects where by lines were drawn in terms of political support and favors. This led to deep rooted division that were witnessed along ethnic lines a clear picture that was seen when the conflict broke out in 2013.This chapter hence analyzes the political and socio-economic effects that leave South Sudan vulnerable to more conflict outbreaks and issues that further prolong the said conflicts.

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations: Based on the findings of the study, this section will conclude the report and identify appropriate policy responses. Whether or not the hypotheses had been proven, the section would suggest.

CHAPTER TWO

AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEXUS BETWEEN POWER, GOVERNANCE

AND CONFLICTS

Introduction

This chapter examines the nexus between power governance and conflicts. This chapter uses case studies of the Arab spring Revolution and conflicts across the African region to draw the interlink ages between the above-mentioned variables of power, bad governance and conflicts. Although some of these regions were already experiencing unrest and conflict for a while, greed for power and bad governance have inflamed conflicts hence prolonging and further exacerbating them. The indexes of good governance, namely voice and transparency, democratic peace, a lack or extremism, the effectiveness of the administration, legislative coherence, the rule of law and graft are major influences and a short-term and long-term detrimental impact on a society in which one lead the people to rebel, dissent and civil war. The lack of violence or ideology is important. Therefore, this chapter is structured to explore this causal relationship.

2.1. Case Studies: Power, Governance and Conflicts

2.1.2. The Arab Springs

The revolt in Tunisia in 2011 – the first civil unrest in what became the Arab Spring – signaled the culmination of decades of a dictatorial regime, first by postcolonial figure Habib Bourguiba then by Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. When a demonstration erupted in Benghazi in February 2011, few predicted Libya to see a phenomenon close to that which had shaken Tunisia and Egypt in the prior months.[42] At the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011, Western media quickly labeled events

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[42] Merone, F & Cavatorta, F. (2012). *Salafist Mouvance and sheikh-ism in the Tunisian democratic transition*. Dublin City University.

in Tunisia and Egypt an 'Arab Spring,' assuming that they were a kind of revolution against totalitarianism and dictatorship.[43] Very little recognized that the origins of these movements were often motivated by insecurity and dignity, as a response to the decaying socioeconomic climate triggered by years of weak governance lust for power by the political elites in these regimes.[44]

Along with the oppression between Habib Burguiba and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, the suppression and restriction of the freedoms of the citizens were marked by, e.g., secularist policies which impose limits on religious expression and the wear of hijabs, along with the persecution of the Islamist movements and the detention of many followers and their families.[45] The repressive historical context can be described as a factor leading to violence and protests in the North African region.[46] Ben Ali used state-sponsored coercion, in particular to suppress any means of dissent to political inequalities and widening inequality. In this region, Ben Ali's archive in the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes has contributed to an "invasive cycle of persecution and radicalization." All this has been done to keep him in control and to ensure that his nearest allies and family members maintain their power as Islamists, and those accused of being Islamists have been persecuted primarily and subjected to systematic persecution, imprisonment and sometimes torture. About 35,000 men and 1,500 women were arrested under the Ben Ali dictatorship in the name of 'internal security.' This history of political warfare and grave repression is important to recognize the present patterns of confrontation and abuse as political violence is perceived as "intrinsic to the post-colonial policy of Tunisian state-building." 'One outcome of the

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[43] Marks, M. (2013). Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: *Understanding the Jihadi Current.* Mediterranean Politics, 18(1), 104-111.
[44] Ibid
[45] Cavatorta, F., & Merone, F. (2013a). Moderation through exclusion? *The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party*. Democratization, 20(5), 857-875.
[46] Storm, L. (2009). *The persistence of authoritarianism as a source of radicalization in North Africa*. International Affairs, 85(5), 997-1013.

years of weak governance of Ben Ali was the development of local geographical antagonism as leading to conflict and stress. The traditional and current conflict in Tunisia is robustly regional, focused on deep economic inequalities between developed coastal regions and poor internal regions.[47] In the civil discontent of the revolution this injustice played an important part. Official figures show substantial change over the past two decades, but vast areas of the globe have been ignored and racial disparities have been intensified. [48]

Research cited by Boughzala indicates that ethnic differences occur in areas such as unemployment, wage levels and poverty.[49] In Kasserine (30-40%), Sidi Bouzid (35%-45%), and Gabes (27-31%) relative and absolute poverty rates are higher than in the rest of the country.[50] [51] In basic infrastructure, schooling and health care, inequalities continue to be the norm rather than the exception. Geographic disparities not only are the product of unequal 'natural donations' but are also compounded by federal policies benefiting the regions of the northwest and central east. All these issues led to marginalization saw these regions quickly taking up protests against the government when the first wave broke out .most of the people in the streets were young professionals and disenfranchised youths who had faced years of neglect and lack of employment leading to building up of grievances against the government hence they had to demand for regime change by all means possible.

The above case can be listed in Egypt where this study indicates that accumulating poor governance and a need for Egypt to cling to power over the past 30 years is a major factor in people's revolt. The bad governance has led to three basic

[47] ICG. (2012b). Tunisia: *Combatting Impunity, Restoring Security*. International Crisis Group.
[48] Achy, L. (2011). *Tunisia's Economic Challenges.* Carnegie Middle East Centre.
[49] Boughzala, M. (2013). *Youth Employment and Economic Transition in Tunisia.* Brookings.
[50] ICG. (2012c). Tunisia: *Confronting Social and Economic Challenges.* International Crisis Group.
[51] ADB. (2011). *Social Inclusion and Transition Support Program: Tunisia.* African Development Bank.

aspects of the collapse of the Mubarak regime: first, it generated the circumstances, which helped to encourage popular action against the government (e.g. rampant corruption, violations of human rights and absence of a constitutional state); second, it brought down key elements which were crucial to the survival of the regime in the bureaucracy and the judiciary; and third. The above case can be said for Egypt, where this study argues that the accumulation of bad governance and the innate need to cling to power in Egypt over three decades and its inability to understand the intended growth of the population is one of the key reasons why people have revolted. The bad governance has led to three basic aspects of the collapse of the Mubarak regime: first, it generated the circumstances, which helped to encourage popular action against the government (e.g. rampant corruption, violations of human rights and absence of a constitutional state); second, it brought down key elements which were crucial to the survival of the regime in the bureaucracy and the judiciary; and third,[52] in June 2014, former army chief Abdul Fatah al-Sisi was chosen. A return to the military establishment was witnessed by the Sisi presidency. After its emergence in 2014, Egypt has also undergone an uptick in the number of terrorist attacks. [53]

The aspect of the authoritarian political structure is already being observed even with the current administration, which has continued to spark tensions in Egypt. Mansour said Egypt had experienced a transformation from the utter rebellion of the regime of Mubarak to its near-full restructuring: civil, military and oligarchical Networks are on the rise, and political parties from the Mubarak period have battled their way back.[54] Parliamentary elections took place in 2015. Voter attendance was

[52] Tobin, J., Haves, E., Waitzman, E. & White, S. (2015). *Recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa* (House of Lords Library Note). London: House of Lords Library.
[53] Ibid Pg 31
[54] Mansour, D. (2016). *The socio-economics of exclusion:* Re-questioning citizenship in relation to social justice in post-Arab Spring Egypt (Policy Brief No. 54). Beirut: Orient Institute Beirut

poor, standing at a paltry 28 per cent. Parliament is supposedly governed by 'Sisi Loyalists'. [55]

The government of Sisi was accused of severe violations of human rights of liberal and Islamist critics.[56] Forced disappearances have been on the rise since he assumed office. In comparison, security forces have allegedly carried out abductions in public and in the open. There are also allegations of extrajudicial executions.[57] Amnesty International reports on systemic torture, which encourages political opposition and protesters including students and children to confess 'terrorist' acts. Torture is also used for the inclusion of some. The techniques used are electrical hanging of limbs when handcuffed and nude, including rape and kicks, on vulnerable corporeal areas; and violent attacks; assaults and beatings[58] . The government has already taken rigorous steps to restrict religious freedom. About 27,000 mosques have been closed in 2015 and mosque activities have been subject to tight restrictions, including who is to preach and what can be discussed in sermons. Every old Islamic literature was also banned[59] According to an article published by the European Union Institute for Safety Studies (EUISS) the possibility of social interference from financial difficulties will reinforce the repression of the government and the security forces' abysses.[60]

Military authority is rising in Egypt, with increasing civil military courts. According to an article published by the Carnegie Middle East Centre, Sisi was able to issue arbitrarily hundreds of presidential decrees due to widespread support for the

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[55] Sharp, J. M. (2016). Egypt: *Background and U.S. relations. Washington D.C.:* Congressional Research Service.
[56] Ibis Pg 3
[57] Cachalia, R. C. (2015). *Extremism in Egypt: when countering terrorism becomes counterproductive* (Peace and Security Council Report). Addis Ababa: Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
[58] Amnesty International. (2016). Egypt*: "Officially you do not exist" – Disappeared and tortured in the name of counter-terrorism*. London: Amnesty International.
[59] Ibid
[60] Luengo – Cabrera, J. (2016). Egypt: *A giant with (financial) feet of clay (Issue Alert No. 8).* Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).

government as well as the absence of parliament before the 2015 elections. Some undermined the rule of law. Sisi released Law 136 in 2014, which provides two years of military force in support of public and state institutions. Military courts were granted authority over all alleged offenses against public property. In August 2016 the new Parliament approved an expansion of Law 136 of 2014 to 2021 for another five years.[61]

The military courts' authority has been expanded by the modifications to the Military Judicial Statute, which counts national property and entities as military property. Government-owned offices, warehouses, businesses or highways have become military spaces where civil courts are no longer professional. Aziz claims an allegation by a military court is a promise of guilt nearly always.[62] All these problems in combination with the wavering economy in Egypt have led to increasing inflation, a poor Egyptian pound and increased unemployment, which have been the cause of widespread instability and demonstrations across the world over the years.

A major and rich region for researching power persuasion governance and civil disputes was initiated by the Civil War in Syria in 2011. Despite different methods of fighting the civil war in Syria, observations from analytical models of good or bad governance can be used to analyze the cause of the civil war. The results support the theoretical claim that a weak government contributed to Syrian civil war. The Governance metrics indicate that elections are not free and equal, that the rule of law is poor, that corruption is very high, that the various interest groups are not being taken care of, that inequity and inefficiency of the government in Syria have contributed to lasting civil war[63]

[61] Aziz, S. (2016). *The expanding jurisdiction of Egypt's military courts*. Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center.
[62] Ibid
[63] Mahdi Karimi-Sayed; Masoud Mousavi Shafaee: Poor *governance and Civil War in Syria*: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.

A family which makes itself rich at the expense of the overwhelming majority of its citizens has long governed Syria. The rule became more of an Alawite and family affair when Bashar came to power. The presidential guard is headed by one brother, Maher; the Republican guard is headed by a cousin on his mum's side, Adnan Makhlouf; the combat companies are commanded by two other cousins, Adnan and Mohammed el-Assad. Manaf Tlas, the son of a permanent minister of defense, and one of Hafiz 's closest colleagues, Mustafa Tlas, were almost the only non-Alawites.[64]

What would presence in such a State be meant? This is not inherently a democratic country, which illustrates parliamentary government and a pure emphasis on voter engagement can be deceptive. Voter participation in Syrian legislative and presidential elections has always been higher than 65% and 70 %, respectively.[65] However, when the public is obligated to nominate the candidate from the pack that Bashar has, when there isn't civil society that respects and Defends and regulates democracy where there is no independent supervisory authority for election supervision and where free speech, the press, etc. is absent. A family is dominated in Syria and real democracy and determination threaten the ruling family.

Civil harmony / tension is synonymous with the rule of law. Although a State with a rule of law appears to recognize non-violent dispute resolution processes, the situation in Syria is shows a downward regression between 1996 and 2014 in favor of pacifistic answers to civil tensions. A mechanism of this type lacks Syria. What originated in 2011 as a nonviolent popular rebellion became a complicated and prolonged civil war. Assad's regime does not provide just legal structure and absolute defense of human rights, nor does it provide a rule of law-enhancing society. Disputes aren't supposed to transform into complex civil wars within such a structure and the

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[64] Barry Rubin. (2007)*The Truth about Syria*, Macmillan.
[65] IDEA. (2015) "*Voter Turnout Data for Syrian Arab Republic,*" International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA),

ruling family is not intended to address the dispute in the peaceful way. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad regularly named militant opposition forces. Assad's tension reaction system was a counter-insurgency tactic forcing people in the sight of some scientists to assist the insurgents.[66]

In addition, such techniques have also raised the number of assaults by militants. Based on the IEP results, there is a link between a low corruption level and peace. This transformation was a lasting civilian war in Syria. [67] In other words, the corruption is high and the stability of the body is smaller. The 2014 IEP Global Terrorism Index58 report has shown that the 10 most extremist countries are on average more authoritarian. Transparency International (TI) reported that the Corruption Perception Index ranked in Syria 159 out of 175 TI-survived nations. With regard to the control of corruption, Syria ranks among the most corrupt countries about 10539.[68]

2.2 Power, Governance and Conflicts Across Africa

In Africa, as in any other region, the standard and characteristics of governance from the degree of security and prosperity and the opportunities for economic growth. There is no more important variable than governance, for it is governance that decides whether there are permanent relations between the state and the community that it purports to rule.[69] Bad government performance is the most prominent source of protest, with people across the continent protesting against poor service delivery, worsening socio-economic conditions and rising physical insecurity. In recent years, in many nations, demonstrations have been related to the voting period, to challenge or affect the result of the vote – as in Gabon or Uganda – or to

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[66] Kocher Matthew Adam, Thomas B Pepinsky, and Stathis N Kalyvas. (2011) "*Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,*" American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 201-18.
[67] Ibid
[68] Transparency International. (2014) "*Corruption Perceptions Index.*"
[69] Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela (2011) (eds.) *Rewiring Regional Security.* USIP press.

press for fresh elections – as in the case of delayed elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The third popular cause for protest was the lack of political freedoms and government repression, which triggered much of the demonstrations in Ethiopia and Chad. These patterns indicate that popular demonstrations pose a significant challenge to the unity of African governments.[70]'

Empirical data from western African conflict zones clearly shows the connection between bad governance and political instability. In much of West Africa, the regime was an elite civilian and military diarchy until the end of the Cold War.[71] These regimes were maintained by clan allegiance, patronage, and oppressive intelligence rackets sponsored by criminal networks and illicit enterprises. Governance has become synonymous with the imposition of "violent stability" in Liberia , Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, marked by corporate corruption and greed, the growth of zero infrastructure, hostility and bigotry along ethnic lines, and alienness and consequent disappointments among young people.[72] These factors combined to compromise state legitimacy and generate violent conflicts that have reverberated throughout the country. The breakdown of institutional institutions and resources, in turn, has led to the decline of the conventional economy and a surge in the shadows of warlords', impunity and violence. Difficulties with the poor government of the MRU basin, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire, first caused instability in Benin and Mali, and then civil wars.[73]

The fragile underbelly of the authoritarian regimes' defense apparatuses was uncovered in these wars as civil warlords, dissidents and mercenaries were for the very first time a serious element affecting the very existence of the state-based

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[70]Abdel-F atau Musah (2009) *West Africa:* Governance and Security in a Changing Region.
[71] West Africa: (2004) *Analysis of Social and Economic Data*, 1960-2001," OECD-Club du Sahel.
[72] MusahA. F and J. K. Fayemi, (2000) *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*. London: Pluto.
[73] Barger M, McCarty N. (2017) *Causes and Consequences of Polarization*. The American Political Science Association. Pg.:19-46.

security apparatuses in the field to date. The resulting violent wars brought in a lot of latent security. There was a collision of cultures based on warped idea of Côte d'Ivoire, as well as racial and clan animosities (Liberia and Sierra Leone). Furthermore, they demonstrated the scale of the youth crisis and the tendency for the mismanagement of natural capital. Warlords, crooked officials of government and shady trade and mercenary networks exploit these vulnerabilities in the chaotic post-Cold War era.[74]

In 2013, the CAR, a nation rich in minerals, plunged into a brutal inter-ethnic dispute with thousands of people between the majority of Christians and the Muslim minority. Everyone's overall quality of living has plummeted drastically after terrorist outbreaks, as does a still poor Human Growth Index and a drop in per capita earnings (USD2011). [75] The lack of a completely legitimized and representative national central administration, the violation of the rights of religious minorities, the inadequate mitigation of sectary aggression of government agencies, pervasive corruption and people's lack of access to necessities, including sanitary and food can all be attributed in substance to this pattern.[76]

The current situation in the Central African Republic is focused on decades of poor governance and persistent sub-development – with reduced state capability, a lack of stabilization by the state institutions, and ultimately the state's failure to give basic services to its residents, leading to insecurity and injustice which is important to the country's political instability.[77] The government is largely absent from Bangui city, and in many areas of the country there is a shortage of essential facilities such as food, water, highways, education and defense. In particular, public utilities have been

[74] Conciliation Resources. (2013); Briefing: *Crisis in the Central African Republic*. Pg.: 1-6.
[75] Koura B, Eckel M. *In Central African Republic, Diamonds Fuel A Cycle of Violence and Poverty.* VOA.
[76] Flanagin J. (2015). *The blood diamond trade is tearing the Central African Republic apart.* Quatz.
[77] Affa'a Mindzie, George Mukundi Wachira; Lucy Dunderdale (2014): *Effective Governance in Challenging Environments;* Africa's Governance Challenges. International Peace Institute

lacking in the northeast region for a long time, and the ethnic marginalization in Central African Republic has further intensified ethno-geographical insecurity.[78]

The authority of the State was seriously challenged in these circumstances. Central Africans have had to fight primarily against attacks from bandits, robbers, militias and rebel groups in a situation where instability is near forever lasting.[79] Importantly, the grievances driving the population – the unsatisfied demands and lack of social security and economic opportunity – led to the country's militarization. The socio-economic inequalities between Christians and Muslims also fueled communal tensions, with Muslim merchants seeing as injustices over the majority of the population to be advantaged. The lack of stability in the State has made it possible for militant groups in the north and other non-state armed actors to emerge from a security vacuum.[80]

The State's low availability of defense and social resources provided a breeding ground for militia recruiting because rural and northern local residents are looking for safety and economic opportunities that the state cannot offer.[81] Through the absence of state institutions and resources, chaos, uncertainty and internal tensions were established. In a devastating spiral, the state was also undermined and regulating ability was hindered, which means that the population of Central Africa are continuously vulnerable to violence, infectious diseases and hunger.[82]

The Greater Horn region is one of the most conflict-ridden countries in Africa. In the post-independence period, starting in 1956, Sudan became the first African sub-Saharan nation to gain its independence, and the region's populations have seen many

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[78] Ibis Pg 5
[79] Ibid
[80] Katz A. (2014).*The Muslims of the Central African Republic Face a Deadly* Purge. Time.
[81] Wetterberg, and Stephen Dunn, (2012)*"Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States,"* Public Management Review14, No. 2.
[82] Claire Mcloughlin, (2014) *"When Does Service Delivery Improve the Legitimacy of a Fragile or Conflict-Affected State?"* Governance, March.

inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts.[83] Many civil wars are caused by domestic factors, such as problems of diversity management and government construction, like real or alleged injustice in state growth and technocratic characteristics, while external interventions might be involved in some way. Others are responses to authoritarian rule and weak governments, while others are motivated by power struggles among the elites.[84]

As Deng states, rivalries among the elites also lead to rivalries between ethnic groups. The ideological conflicts have sparked a couple. Sudan may have faced the worst civil wars as far as deaths are concerned. The most important wars in Sudan included the 1955–72 North / South war, the 1983–2005 North / South war, the 2003–present fighting in Darfur, and the Beja Congress and the Free Rashaida Lions in the East and the Nuba Mountain Revolt. The history of bad governance is central to the country's disputes over the past 50 years. Sudan's history of poor governance is central. The metrics of the governor of the nation are tricky. Sudan's governance efficiency is recorded in most governance areas at the lowest ten percent of nations, according to the World -Wide Governors Indices (1996-2005). With many of Africa's vulnerable states, the nation policy and structural evaluation data of the World Bank position Sudan in the lowest quintile. Likewise, it ranks among the lowest in poor governance (69th out of 76 brokers) in the IDA index.[85]

The Sudanese governance is defined by the rule of authority by certain people and by the concentration of economic activity in certain areas of Sudan. Evidence has demonstrated that peace talks between the Government and the Opposition Groups have not provided the world with a permanent peace, they have also threatened the

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[83] Cramer, C (2006), *Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing:* Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries. London: Hurst
[84] Ibid
[85] D-JAM, (2007), *"Governance Report"*, Interim Findings of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, track 2, Draft Cluster Report, 21 April, pp. 5

peace attempts that have resulted. Political dictatorships and the tendency of the middle to dishonor peace negotiations have been at the forefront of the government's problems. After eleven years of relative stability, the Addis Ababa Agreement was unilaterally violated by the country.[86]

The long-standing Sudanese dispute represents continuing economic imbalance in the allocation between the center and the periphery of political and economic power, political separation or social and cultural inequality. The nation has a strongly centralized patriarchal government and standardized provincial growth pattern inherited from colonialism. This structural aspect influenced the later growth of the modern Sudanese state and led to the periphery becoming marginalized, especially in the South.[87] Both variables strengthen each other, as economic and social growth in the repressive regimes also relies on political leverage and access to political resources. Marginalized communities and territories have restricted access, without government patronage, to social and economic programs and institutions. The intense Southern marginalization led to civil struggle lasting more than 30 years, leading to the founding of Southern Sudan in 2005, which culminated in secession calls from the mainly Christian South.[88] All of the above problems lead to Sudan's exhausted and disappointed president Al-Bashir. What began as peaceful demonstrations by Sudanese citizens against Al Bashir's rule led to a military coup in which more than 25 years of totalitarian control and rule in Sudan came to an end in 2019.[89]

In the Somali people, their fellow Somalis suffered a lasting persecution and brutality. The continuing struggle in Somalia has deep historical origins and has

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[86] Salih Mohamed (2005), "*Understanding the Conflict in Darfur*", Occasional Paper, Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, May
[87] Flint, J. and de Waal A, (2006), Darfur: *A Short History of a Long War*. London: Zed Books.
[88] Hillharot, D. and M. van Leewen, (2005), "*Grounding Local Peace Organizations: A Case of Southern Sudan*", Journal of Modern African Studies 43(4):537–64.
[89] Kasfir, N., (2005), "*Sudan's Darfur: Is it Genocide*?" Current History 104(682):195–202.

continuously fought for power between the TFG and the opposition. The relentless attacks and involvement of the Alshabaab extremist groups, who continue to take power over different parts of the world, worsen this further. When Somalia first achieved independence, it was corrupt yet still democratic. It had checks and balances and people were willing to learn about wrongdoing and discuss it. At that time, Somali leaders were ill-trained novices with little government administration experience. However, during his rule Abdirizak Haji Hussein, former Prime Minister, succeeded more in grappling with stability and corruption issues. [90] But things changed in October 1969 when General Mohamed Siad Barre took power. The Revolutionary Council developed and written the Somali language for the first few years. The Fixation of the General to control and to consolidate his influence in the interests of his clan was nonetheless apparent to all Somalis. Opposition parties were banned and none of the military officials could criticize.[91]

The leadership of the opposition capitalized on this incentive, because representatives from exact clans dominated all the levers of state power and economics. A number of military officers wanted to take over the government during the 1977/1978 war between Somalia and Ethiopia.[92] Following the coup against Majerteen (the clan of which most of the officials were members), Siad Barre's regime proceeded using overwhelming powers. This is the beginning of the Somali civil war. Other clans have begun with influence from Opposition groups, including Isaac, Ogaden, Hawiye, Digil, Mirifle.

Current realities are confirming that the main cause of violence among clans and militia groups is the struggle for influence and/or money. A power-motivated

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[90] John Markakis, (1998) *Resource conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Sage, London.
[91] Lewis I M, (2002) Modern history of the Somali: *Revised, updated & expanded,* Ohio University Press, pp 1–18.
[92] Ibid

conflict was the civil war among Hawiye, the Darod, the Digil and Mirifl and the clans of the Isaacs. For instance, in the course of their history the clans Abgal and Habargidir had never clashed, actually belonging to the same clan (Hawiye) and subclan (Hiraab).[93] But the power struggle between General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed came to the United Somali Congress (USC) when Mogadishu collapsed. In the course of the civil war in Kismayo (when the USC dominated the city) between Habargideur and the Hawadle clans, interviewees have reported that. Then in Qoryooley district there were other disputes regarding state farms. In the end, the conflict extended into the regions of Mogadishu and Hiiraan. The second largest source of civil war was state repression.[94] 21 years of military dictatorship (1969–1991) have elapsed for the Somali people. An order to suppress dissent, the military government used extreme brutality and collective punishment. There were no registration systems for the inhabitants. The framework did not permit the presence of opposing movements, let alone speech in key issues. In 1978, when some military officers threatened to disintegrate the military dictatorship, the Siad Barre Government was in charge of suppressing people in the Majerteen Clan by the national army and police. The military then took part in the killing and massive violations of people and the devastation of the clan's territories.

The attempted coup in 1978 set a precedent for efforts to challenge the government by other Somali parties. The Somali National Movement (SNM), a party of politicians of the Isaak clan founded in London, England, in 1981. Still, people were disciplined by the military authorities. The Siad Barre regime demolished

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[93] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (1999) Learning from Somalia: T*he lessons of armed humanitarian intervention,* Westview Press, pp 67–77.
[94] Abdi Ismail Samatar, (1997) Leadership and ethnicity in the making of African state models: *Botswana versus Somalia,* Third World Quarterly 18(4), pp 687– 707.

Hargeysa and Bur'o and murdered several innocent citizens by the SNM in 1988.[95] Human rights groups have estimated that in these wars more than fifty thousand civilians have been murdered. [96] The larger the number of innocent citizens that the leaders of government have killed or jailed, the increased people are defiant and join the resistance forces; the more the collateral casualties that are being inflicted the more guerrilla leaders attract new participants. Fearon and Laitin wrote:

As the Somali Security Democratic Front (SSDF) (Opposition Clan Group Majerteen) and the SNM (Opposition Party Isaq Clan) launched their armed fight against the military government, Ethiopia and Somalia maintained a hostile relationship. Other opposition coordinated military operations in Ethiopia, including the USC (the competing Hawiya class party) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). The military government of Somalia refused citizens the chance to join. Opposition parties returned to aggression denied any other avenue impacting the regime's transition. [97] The state's persecution, brutality and disproportionate force justified the starving opposition leaders crossing the border and invading Somalia from Ethiopia. After 1992, the focus was shifted to the sub-clan identities of the Harti, Mareehaan, Habargidir or Mudular, from inclusive clanic identities (such as Darod or Hawiye). In 1991, for example, the clan identities that were involved were those of Muddullod and Habargidir in the power struggle between General Mohamed Farah Aideed (both of whom are members of the Hiraab subclan).[98] The violence in Somalia was fueled by these clan Identities, but the war was not triggered by them. In other

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[95] Africa Watch, (1990) A government at war with its own people: *Somalia,* The Africa Watch Committee, p 10.
[96] Ibid
[97] Mohammed Abu-Nimer, (2003) Non-violence and peace building in Islam: *Theory and practice,* University Press of Florida, Gainesville, pp 42–84.
[98] Taiseer Ali & Robert Mathews, (2004) The long and difficult road to peace, *Durable peace*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, pp 409–410.

words, clan affiliation was a vehicle for mobilizing leading political elites who fought against influence.

In brief, this study has tried to explain the relation between authority, weak governance and conflicts around the world. As discussed above, it is clear that the key causes of the violence are poor government and avidness for power in general. The characteristics of government regimes in the case studies listed above indicate that misrules are: the monopolies of power, the systematic repression, the lack of accountability, the dishonors of peace negotiations and the military dictatorships that have broken the political parties. Bad governance, as one of the key triggers of these disputes, is defines the countries of the above regions and states. This is notwithstanding the fact that the tensions are articulated in character and type as ethnic, tribe, racial, regional and religious. From this chapter one may suggest the need to strengthen the governance in the region as these disputes are more likely to arise in the most sparsely institutionalized circumstances to minimize the occurrence of conflicts. Conflict in countries with more open political environments and limits on their leaders are unlikely to allow violence recur. This enables in understanding the predominance of civil conflicts in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, the two least areas of the world with a system. This is not democracy or poverty per se, but very clear follow up structures that make it highly or less possible for nations to witness civil and military war. Governance insists on the following governance requirements essentially.

CHAPTER THREE

AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER,

GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

Introduction

This chapter discusses the relationship between power, governance and conflicts in post independent South Sudan. A brief history of these issues will first be analyzed before its independence when these regions was still under the rule of Al Bashir in Sudan. In this context Southern Sudan will be discussed through a long history of neglect, marginalization, violent and brutal oppression and exploitation within Sudan[99].These issues occurred because of bad governance and power struggles that saw Sudan experience over 30 years of violent civil war that stopped after the agreement of the CPA in 2005. Although South Sudan achieved its independence, these issues of greed for power and bad governance continued to prevail in this young nation. All these shaping and influencing the political elites governing ways and power dynamics in South Sudan leading conflicts witnessed from 2013 to present.

3.1. A Brief History of Power Struggles; and Problems of Governance in the South of Sudan

Without recognizing the historical composition, diversity and creation of South Sudan, it is difficult to comprehend the existence, strength and period of war in South Sudan. A diverse and evolving collection of problems is being fought in the fight. This included the nationality, culture and competing interests of various African and Arab peoples, environmental assets such as soil, cattle, water and oil regulation,

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[99] De Waal Alex, (2001), 'Exploiting slavery: *human rights and political agendas in Sudan'*, New Left Review (first series) pp. 62–73.

and, above all, the imbalance of influence between a strong river minority and a small, weakened majority scattered throughout the rest of the vast world.[100]

With regard to power politics, the SPLM and the South as a whole dominated a militaristic mindset, considering the attempts being made to build up civilian administration and the need to be seen as a southern, pending government in the South. It emerged from a military uprising in 1983, and was exclusively governed by the military until 1994, when the first SPLM Convention set up civil administration systems and authorized the establishment of Sudanese NGOs.[101] The SPLM lacked the people's well-structured political mandate, but was claimed to be sponsored by the people. There was no option in many areas to the SPLM, and it thus remained the de facto authority rather than the de jure one.[102] Political and military convenience often override the efforts of a functioning, efficient public administration and institutions. Much of the separate commissions are led by military officers. More representative bodies have also been formed by national decision-making bodies. For example, the SPLM Council, made up mostly of top military commanders, substituted in all crucial decisions the National Liberation Council, a civilian body elected in 1994.[103]

Furthermore, legislative and administration systems were heavily limited, which, as a result of the lack of consistent legal and political frameworks, has distorted the division of powers between military, government and civil society. What few SPLM policies remained are sometimes circumvented in favor of more opportunistic or necessitated activities. Despite this, the government of Al Bashir lacked investment in management systems, attempts were made to create civil authorities in the SPLM-held regions, but they were under-resourced and did not

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[100] Salam Abdel A.H &De Waal Alex (ed.): (2001). The Phoenix State. *Civil Society and the Future of Sudan*, Justice Africa p. 179.
[101] Abel Alier (1991). *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonored.* 2nd Edition Ithaca Press, London.
[102] Al-Asam, M. (1983), *Local Government in Sudan, Khartoum*, Sudan Bookshop.
[103] Teraifi, al-Agab Ahmed. (1987). *Decentralization in Sudan*, Oxford University Press.

obtain real internal investments and were hence unsuccessful in serving the people.[104] Even for the most essential items, SPLM still relies heavily on outside aid to work as an administration. Most citizens worked 'voluntarily' deterring professionals who had moved regularly to NGOs or into exile. In SPLM areas the creation of more representative institutions, such as 'Liberation Committees,' had no merit because they had no specific positions and duties and did not actively lead to higher decision-making standards. In non-SPLM (other than the Southern States Coordinating Council in government guards), governance systems remained virtually absent. [105] The unification of the SPLM and SPDF governments was sluggish and faced a loss of confidence and incessant political infighting. The South has restricted judicial freedom, and the legal and judicial systems are fragile. While it had been established in principle in 1999 as an independent judiciary, it still has many resource limits, political limitations, and capability restrictions.[106] As certain customary schemes prevailed, there were no true federal statute. A shortage of qualified judges was becoming a major issue, because corruption charges and slow justice impeded the efficiency and credibility of the few available.

No successful law enforcement departments were exaggerated of jails and police. This hampered the profession of justice management and a broader public knowledge of the justice system, which led to more casual and aggressive means of resolving disputes.[107] In order to be successful, all legal and law enforcement organizations need training and funding. In areas of the south, in which military justice and human rights violations were common due to the absence of any civil

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[104] Harir, Sharif and TerjeTvedt, eds. (1994). *Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika institute.

[105] Peter Adwok Nyaba, (1997), *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An insider's view* (Fountain Press, Kampala, p.55

[106] Lual Deng, (2013). *The Power of Creative Reasoning: The ideas and vision of John Garang* (I Universe, Bloomington, IN,

[107] Weber, Max. (1946). "Politics as a Vocation." *In from Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* translated and edited by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press

institutions, things went much worse. In certain countries the military mindset and overall institutional deterioration associated with war have undermined and destroyed the normal structures for conflict settlement.[108]

Because of the lack of the southern police agencies the South Sudanese region remained dependent on the SPLA and Khartoum for protection. Often there were brutal clashes between the various customary structures.[109] The GoS-sponsored militia worked with impunity in the south and undermined the efforts by the South. Semi-autonomous police forces, local militia and common defense forces, fighting bands and the large conscripted army were included in Northern Sudan Security Arrangements. The restoration of the state of emergency and the changes to the National Security Services Act include legal impunity for abuses of the Southerners by security officials.

This culminated in the bombing of civilians from the south, Nuba, south Blue Nile and Abyei who continued to strike, helicopter gunships and humanitarian aid restrictions to terrorize and starvation citizens and clear them from their territories, amid the peace process. With regard to transportation and connectivity, there was almost absolute absence of working networks, which meant that many places were unavailable, and thus posed an enormity challenge in developing good governance. [110]

3.2. Power, Governance and Conflict in South Sudan 2005-2020

This section reviews South Sudan's experience with governance from 2005 to this present time. For the purposes of this analysis, South Sudan's short history can be divided into three phases. Phase I was the six years of interim period from 9th July 2005 to 8th July 2011. Phase II is the short period after independence from 9th July

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[108] O'Brien, Jay. (1986). "*Understanding the Crisis in Sudan*." Canadian Journal of African Studies 22(2): 275–279.
[109] Jaregandi, Ali. (2015). *Fiscal Federalism Institutional Reform, Unicorns*: Sudan.
[110] Ahmed, Abdel Ghaffar M. (2013). Changing Dynamics in Borderlands*: Emergence of a Third Sudan*?, in Sorbo, Gunnar.

2011 to 14th December 2013. The last period is the crises period from 15th December 2013 to the present. In reviewing South Sudan's performance on governance, this study will look at broad attributes of good governance as discussed: strategic vision, legitimacy and voice, performance, accountability, and fairness all these issues will be discussed alongside power struggles and how these interactions led to conflicts breaking out in South Sudan.

3.3. Strategic Vision

3.3.1. Performance of Government

When presented with the question: ''*in the context of South Sudan how is the relationship between power, bad governance and conflicts and how does it manifest itself?*'' most of the respondents (90%) said that bad governance contributed to the conflict outbreak in by encouraging corruption, theft of public resources, poor planning, sustaining unequal distribution of oil resources contributing to lack of transparency, creating weak institutions mismanagement resources, slowing democracy ,inhibiting reforms and interfering with mediation processes to end conflict. This will be discussed further in this chapter.

During the interim period (phase I), the SPLM had an overarching goal of restoring peace through development and to "leap-frog into the 21st Century global economy" [111] A revolutionary and democratic transformation of Sudan was the final goal of the SPLM through a restructuring of its control on a new basis which would enable effective governance to be developed. Nevertheless, the South Sudan Government (GOSS) had to ensure that the people of South Sudan had a right to self-determination by a prompt referendum, after Dr. Garang's death.[112] The government intended to lay the foundations for a united, prosperous and democratic society, based

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[111] SPLM Economic Commission. (August 2004). SPLM *Strategic Framework: From War to Peace.* New Site: SPLM.
[112] SPLM. (2008). SPLM *Constitution.* Juba: Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

on democracy, equality, respect for human rights, and the rule of law as articulated in the South Sudan provisional constitution.[113]

When South Sudan moved to phase II of its transition into statehood, things changed. During the period between 9th July 2011 and 14th December 2013, many South Sudan started to be disillusioned about the direction of the country. The country was experiencing widespread communal violence, there were active rebellions following the 2010 elections and tensions with the erstwhile enemy in the Sudan were rising yet again. [114]These tensions forced South Sudan to shut down its only source of revenue, oil, in January 2012, just five months after independence. The oil shut down has had devastating effect for South Sudan and many experts have claimed it is responsible for the current conflict. These events heightened state fragility in the country and there was some feeling of uncertainty.

Phase III in South Sudan's short history is characterized by complete breakdown of national unity, upsurge in violence and great insecurity, massive displacement and increasing claims of illegitimacy of the government. In this phase of history, South Sudan completely lost strategic direction. For example, a report produced by Tetra Tech ARD in 2013 When South Sudan was striving to create a national identity, it advised that the fact that sub-national identities remained strong enough to challenge the national identity, and eventually that of the national government, they would jeopardize not only State viability, but also democratic governance viability.[115]This alert was clearly given in 2012; the developments from December 2013 to the present say the truth about this. As one of the interviewees stated "*Our country, as it stood in 2012, was a four-legged animal but the legs were*

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[113] Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development. (2005). *the Interim Constitution of South Sudan.* Juba: Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development.
[114] Douglas Johnson, 'Briefing: The crisis in South Sudan', *African Affairs* 113, 451 (2014), pp.309.
[115]Abraham A. Awolich, (2014) '*The unwarranted carnage in South* Sudan' (The Sudd Institute, Policy Brief, Juba, 13 February p.16.

broken. The first leg for any government is a disciplined military. We have problems with the way our military functions in the past and today. That's a broken leg. We had civil society; but this was very weak. The third leg is delivery of services. It was very hard to deliver security. The fourth leg is political unity. We had political unity in the days leading up to the referendum [which led to independence]. Since the referendum, there had been difficulties uniting our ranks. So now the animal was standing on four crooked legs. Our government did not fix these legs, and this led to the conflicts that we are witnessing today".[116]

For South Sudan, as described above, weak governance is the greatest problem and the most serious post-independence deficiency. Gastil refers to these as effective national governance processes and structures and policies which provide the public goods and services which people expect in an equal way.[117] Government effectiveness is calculated not only for bureaucratic purposes by individuals, but also by whether it actually performs. Effective governments offer essential public goods, such as security; law and order; justice; vital infrastructure; social services, such as schooling, water and healthcare services; and instruments and strategies on economic growth and some measure of stability.[118].

The African Union Commission (AUCISS) discovered in 2014 that the South Sudan crises are embedded in and indeed are rooted in a crisis of bad governance, incompetent leadership and weak institutions, a mixture of professional, tribal and state interests, and the problematic nature of the CPA transition.[119] The government did not initiate any major developmental projects either before or after independence.

[116] Respondents remarks from telephone Interview 20th October 2020
[117] Gastil, K. L. (March 2006). The Origins and Consequences of Consensus Decision Making: A Test of the Social Consensus Model. *Southern Communication Journal*, 1– 24.
[118] Hyman, G. E. (2013). *Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of the Republic of South Sudan. Burlington,* VT: United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
[119]AUCISS. (2014). *Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.* Addis Ababa: African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS).

There is only one tarmac road between Juba and Nimule, built with funding from the United States. Juba, the seat of government is still powered by privately own individual diesel generators, there is no running water in all cities and towns. The only existing major investment in the country is the oil infrastructure, which was built by Sudan government prior to the CPA time. Even this critical infrastructure is dilapidating slowly without proper maintenance or renovation.[120]

Although the government got a lot of support from the international community and it received a lot of money from oil proceeds, it has little to show for this. Schooling conditions remain appalling in the country and the health systems and infrastructure is grossly inadequate. The reach of government is unjustifiably limited, insignificant or non-existent in many places. Failing to invest in critical services is a recipe for failure. [121] For the management and preservation of sovereignty in every society, good governance is critical, while its corollary, poor governance, has the capacity to weaken and retard scientific and common sovereignty. Recent political developments in South Sudan have shown that bad governance is the rule rather than an anomaly in this region.[122] Sadly, in South Sudan, Machar and Kiir are among the prime perpetrators of poor governance. They have maintained a patron-client system and have consistently proven that they are unable to offer transformative leadership.

Good governance is also the product of a political strategy, transformative leadership, efficient structures, and consistent processes for ensuring consistency with the set laws and fundamental human rights. Kiir and his ministers frequently challenge platitudes of cooperation, prosperity and stability, but what they claim does

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[120] Ibid
[121] Centre for Civilians in Conflict. (2016). Under Fire: *the July 2016 violence in Juba and UN Response.*
[122] Natsios, A.S. (2012). Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur*: What Everyone Needs to Know?* Oxford University Press, USA

not have any substance.[123] In essence, this absence of a common political strategy has led to weak and mistaken policies. After Garang 's death in 2005, Kiir was promoted to leadership on the basis of his martial skill, not his political acumen. It's one thing to fight a war, but creating a state and governing it for the good of the citizens is another. Kiir, who spent more than two decades waging a guerrilla war, did not establish a western democracy out of nowhere. It is Kiir, Machar and other senior members of the political elite of South Sudan who have presided over their misuse of influence and the young South Sudanese administration. [124]Three of the group of civil servants' interviews ascribed the escalation of conflict to bad governance over greed for power. As one of the respondent said; "*To me it was caused by selfish motives because all our leaders have an army and want power and they want power in order to control resources. As far as Garang was concerned, he had a vision that would have taken us to greater heights. But after his death I really do not know whether Salva Kiir is focused on that vision or if his vision is only for the promotion of himself. Independence has shown us how selfish our own people can be".[125]*

Democracy, which underpins good government, can only be accomplished if the mechanisms, procedures and organizations by which citizens express themselves have been internalized[126]. No evidence exists that the SPLM has tried to include South Sudan's people in governance. The opaqueness in the political system was demonstrated by Kiir 's nomination of Taban Deng Gai in July 2016 to succeed Machar as senior vice president. Like the SPLM, since April 2014, the SPLA, headed

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[123] Grindle, M.S. (2004). 'Good Enough Governance*: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries'.* Governance, 17(4): 525-48. Holland

[124] Government of the Republic of South Sudan. *South Sudan Development Plan*, 2011-2013.

[125] Inteview with loul akul on 23rd October 2020 in Nairobi.

[126]Roque, P. and Miamingi, R. (2017). Beyond ARCISS: *New fault lines in South Sudan.* East Africa Report.

by Paul Malong Awan, has not turned itself into a modern military force[127]. It continues to be an umbrella of warlords and armed groups operated loosely from the center. For many decades, several of these warlords have been contracting their forces in exchange for rent. Now that they are part of the SPLA, they have to prove their full commitment to a united South Sudan.

It may have been unforeseeable to predict the eruption of war, but what was truly important was the nature of the current crisis. Simplistic "tribal" interpretations have been inaccurate: what is really going on in South Sudan, then? In brief, since 2005 there have been two parallel conflicts, one in the ruling party, the SPLM and another in the army, the SPLA. The SPLA split in the 90s and its incomplete reintegration in the SPLA of anti-SPLA campaigns since 2005 all have their origins in unresolved disputes.[128] In the light of high tensions between the SPLA and the newly independent South Sudan leaders, national elites were unwilling to restore relations between the citizens of South Sudan. If they are to mobilize a constituency that is built on historical and ethnic differences, they'll have to find a way. Many groups were fearful of rebuilding interethnic relationships and reinstalling peaceful local justice systems because they did not feel the elites had approval to do so.[129] Local societies have often also lacked the ability to support bottom-up dispute resolution and reconciliation processes on their own following decades of victimization and enduring instability.[130]

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[127] Young, J. (2017). Isolation and endurance: *Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17*. Small Arms Survey.

[128] Douglas H. Johnson, 'Briefing: The crisis in South Sudan,' *African Affairs* 113, 451 (2014), pp. 300– 309, p. 302

[129] Pendle, N. (2018). *Elite bargains and political deals project: South Sudan case study*. London: Stabilization Unit, UK Government

[130] Ibid Pg :29

Moreover, local militias were not only dominated by national leaders, but followed their interests and even rebelled against them. [131]. Ancient Jonglei after the Civil War. The state is one of the most heavily-hit areas for large-scale counter-insurgency operations. The mixture of the insurgents and the local civilian militias has brought the war additional tinder.[132]. The civil war escalated in Juba, leading to widespread slaughter of Nuer civilians and the setting up of PoC camps adjacent to United Nations bases for those who succeeded in escape. The murders of Nuer in Juba also raised friction in Jonglei as many had relations in the remote regions who came from their homes. The Nuer was equated by war speeches with rebel supporters loyal to the former vice president, Rieck Machar. Juba and SPLA were seen as Dinka forces. The inclusion of a Dinka militia, composed of former militaristic nomadic herders devoted to President Salvar Kiir and his homeland, which was in close proximity to Juba, furthered the ethnic war. [133] In the civil war, the legacy of large-scale ethnic wars has a serious impact on civilians, further weakening civilians' neutrality negotiations and the populations of similar factions cannot remain credibly impartial to prevent conflict trapping.

3.4. Oversight and Accountability

3.4.1. The Separation of Powers in South Sudan

South Sudan's political game is at best fragile or at worst missing altogether. A peaceful democratic transition in South Sudan is much more complicated due to the weakness, almost lack of unity on the rules of a democratic political game. The rules of the political game are mostly a branch of the legal system, which is also rather

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[131] Stringham, N., & Forney, J. (2017). It takes a village to raise a militia: Local politics, the Nuer White Army, and South Sudan's civil wars. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 55(2), 177–199.
[132] International Crisis Group. (2014). *South Sudan: Jonglei—'we have always been at war'* (Africa Report No. 221).
[133]Liz Caere, Sophia Dawkins, and Gordon Lam Gatluak, "*Pathways to Peace: South Sudan's Constitution"* (Briefing Paper, Conflict Dynamics International, Cambridge, MA

frail.[134] This paper points to the lack of consensus on the rules and deliberate misunderstanding of the political process whereby members of the hierarchy of power are clearly aware of how government functions in other countries but choose not to be bound by these laws;.[135] The SPLM 2015 implosion and the subsequent fight for control and degeneration of the civil war speak to the lack of consistency of the laws and the utter disrespect for these rules. [136].

During phase II of South Sudan transition, a number of issues surfaced pointing to a shrinking competitive democratic space in South Sudan. These is the apparently rising forces and wealth accumulation in the hands of the country's power elite. "Power accumulation" is the advent of more powerful, military and political figures who can handle themselves without real control.[137] This strengthening of power is reflected in four areas: the dominance of the central government over the provinces, indeed, over the whole of Southern Sudan (center against periphery). The executive branch of government-against the legislature and judiciary; the SPLM over the other political parties.

The South Sudanese national government is comprised of the administrative, legislative and judicial bodies of three common state authorities. Ideally all three entities should function separately and be regulated and balanced by a framework for the separation of powers. Separation of powers by splitting government roles and associated jurisdiction between independent branches of government, meaning that no branch operates outside its mandate or executes the key functions of another branch,

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[134] Ibid

[135] Pantuliano, S. (2009). 'International Engagement in Fragile States: *Lessons from Southern Sudan'*. ODI Opinion, 135.

[136] Management Systems International (MSI) (2010). '*Government of Southern Sudan:* Strategic Capacity Building Study'. USAID, 15 June

[137] Ibid

protects against authoritarianism.[138] In this way, the excesses of each government arm are limited by controls and balances. In South Sudan, although the 2011 Transitional Constitution enshrines a degree of division of powers, the concept is yet to completely take hold or be applied successfully in practice.

South Sudan has a bicameral administration, the upper chamber, of which is the Council of States, and the National Legislative Assembly.[139] It is up to the Council of States to introduce and implement regulations of concern to the ten South Sudanese countries.[140] The Lower Parliamentary House, the National Legislative Council, has primarily legislative duties at national level.[141] Via a hybrid electoral system, Both the National Parliament and the Council of States shall be selected where 60% of their members are elected by electoral and majority vote. The remaining 40% shall be chosen on a proportionate basis from the lists of national and regional parties.

Southern Sudan's general elections had still not taken place; the first elections were planned for 2015, but the ongoing conflict had recently caused their postponement. It is doubtful that minority parts will win many of the easiest majority seats at elections or will gain a lot of control over the proportional seats due to the unrivaled supremacy of the SPLM. In practice, it is necessary for one party to be able to apply for a proportional representation to meet a 4% level of national voting. So, although the executive must be adequately controlled, the legislature would be governed by the SPLM and could not thus act against the executive in the presidential system of government of the country.[142] In general, the South Sudan parliament lacks

[138] Mwangi S. Kimenyi, "Making Federalism Work in South Sudan," *in "South Sudan One Year after Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country"* (Africa Growth Initiative Report, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC: June 2012
[139] Liz Caere, Sophia Dawkins, and Gordon Lam Gatluak, "*Pathways to Peace: South Sudan's Constitution*" (Briefing Paper, Conflict Dynamics International, Cambridge, MA.
[140]The 2011 Transitional Constitution, Article 59
[141] Ibid. Article 57.
[142] Kimenyi, M. and J. Mbaku (2011). '*South Sudan: Avoiding State Failure'*. The Brooking Institution, 8 July.

the capacity and self-government to intervene with, hinder, or keep executive officials accountable for their actions.

Overall, the parliament in South Sudan lacks the power and the political freedom to engage in, obstruct executive or policy laws or to keep executive officials responsible for their conduct. In fact, during his term in office the 2011 Transitional Constitution grants the President immunity from any disciplinary proceedings, leaving the President out of the rules.[143] The executive and military representatives of South Sudan have been stated on many occasions to have unduly intervened in and affected the exercise of judicial functions. In South Sudan, the level of administrative and military meddling in judicial affairs negates the fundamental independence of the judiciary in effect.

South Sudan's consolidation of power and capital has been generated by two systemic realities. Secondly, South Sudan emerged from its protracted war of liberation as a one-party state governed by an independence movement and not an actual political party.[144] It does not have nearly complete party structure but is "lumpy," with numerous party bases of influence all rounded around people and in some situation's collective faithfulness not so much for contradictory visions or philosophies. The SPLM does not have the absolute discipline of community.

Oil is the second and most important element facilitating South Sudan's consolidation of influence, reminding us of a properly established, close link between renegade states and political totalitarianism.[145] The genesis lies in the resource equilibrium between the state and society; that is, oil revenues provide the state with considerable wealth vis-à - vis its own society, enabling the state to reshape main

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[143] The 2011 Transitional Constitution, Article 103 (1).
[144] Dagne, T. (2011). 'The Republic of South Sudan: *Opportunities and Challenges for Africa's Newest Country'*. U.S. Congressional Research Service.
[145] Ross, M. L. (2012). *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

social structures. [146] With access to the huge revenues obtained from selling oil, countries need not see their own societies as a source of income to operate power and government structures, and so societies lose their primary ability to compel the state to be politically available. In this case, every political actor, in the expectation of maintaining loyalist handouts from the state, would appear to tamp down criticism of the state, thus the breakdown of transparency processes.

Another factor of consolidation of influence is the SPLM's relations with the SPLA and its coalition with the nation. It has been difficult to dispel power elites with military struggles (SPLA), democracy (SPLM) and government identity. The interlinked political, military, administrative and economic structures are truly the distinguishing features of South Sudan's political economy.[147] Developing an accountable government often needs the participation of non-state entities who demand transparency from elected authorities. These protagonists encompass a range of independent media, committed, powerful civil society and academia, trade unions and a thriving private and middle class. These industries can represent a substitute for democratic competition or a material danger to political space closure and the growing accumulation of power, where fully operational.[148] *The respondents clarified that "Southern Sudan, long before Sudan's independence, had been at war for many years." So, you've had your first world war, and there is another civil war right now. So, it is a nation that for a long period of time has gone through poor governance, it is also a land-locked nation.* [149]

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[146] Davies, F., G. Smith, and T. Williamson. (2010*) Coordinating Post-Conflict Aid in Southern Sudan´* ODI Background Note.

[147]Holland, H. (2012). '*South Sudan Officials Have Stolen $4 Billion*: President'. Reuters

[148] Kameir, El Wathig (2011). 'The Political Economy of South Sudan: *A Scoping Analytical Study'*. African Development Bank.

[149] Interview with Ajok Deng on 22 October 2020 in Nairobi.

Another respondent stated: "Weak institutions are another issue we have in South Sudan." This is perhaps the biggest obstacle, because in these kinds of crises we have always seen vulnerable systems open up. First of all, the current crisis started within the SPLM. Even in the absence of any tradition of political mechanism in the group, a minor crisis was not managed. The entire country remains dependent on the SPLM as it led the fight for independence and when an internal crisis happens within the SPLM it often becomes a national problem which makes South Sudan very vulnerable. And, naturally, this is due to the weak institutions of Southern Sudan.[150]

3.4.2. South Sudan's Oil Dependency

The oil dependency of South Sudan is closely related to its weak governance. No true social compact between the government and its citizens has formed in the short life of the nation. This lack of a social compact is also due to the poor degree of political consciousness of the South Sudanese citizenry.[151] However, the significant reliance of the nation on oil prices has undoubtedly also led to a lack of relations, as the government recognizes that, regardless of how it acts against the citizens, it will continue to collect profits from oil exports.[152] All this goes to show that South Sudan is lacking in all aspects of an open, transparent and accountable government showing in levels of corruption. [153]

According to one of our respondents, "Our nation has lacked any and all laws to tackle fraud and corruption among senior government officials, especially among government procurement officials in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning".[154] Nyol Gaar Nguen wrote in an essay in 2013: "In South Sudan, the enforcer or man in charge is still in power despite outright theft and robbery of public

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[150] Interview with Demabior Maluk on 21st October 2020 in Nairobi.
[151] Ibid
[152] The World Bank. (2016). *The World Bank* in South Sudan.
[153] Daron Acemoglu et al, (2004)"*Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: a Model of Personal Rule*," Journal of the European Economic Association 2, no.2-3.
[154]Respondents remarks from zoom Interview 23 October

funds.[155] The degree of corruption and mismanagement allegedly "brought to tears several MPs in the National Legislative Assembly of South Sudan in the Auditor General's report for 2005 and 2006." A 2012 study reported that government assets in excess of $4 billion have been plundered since self-government was implemented in 2005.

The so-called "Dura Saga," though hundreds of other big instances have been equally incorrect, has been the greatest case of corruption since self-rule. "There are hundreds of other substantial cases of similar misconduct," One respondent claimed.

"These episodes have often been shrouded in confusion and have almost never resulted in prosecution or punishment. The problem is compounded by the serious lack of transparency in South Sudanese government records and business information. Requests for official data can be arbitrarily turned down with impunity."[156]

There have also been so many instances of constitutional violations, but no one either in the states or local governments or private sector has dared to take the government to court for apparent violations. State governors can be removed without a cause and no complain would be raised though this is an apparent violation of the constitution. One respondent stated, "So *I could say that there are two main reasons that cause instability in South Sudan at the moment. One is the problem of oil and weak institutions and the second one is, what I call, the chaos of liberation. When we moved from the liberation movement to the governing phase it's been difficult and chaotic. This chaos again is a result of weak institutions in South Sudan."[157]*

[155] Nguen, Nyol Gaar *(Jul 19, 2013). "The 488 million pounds evidence of corruption in the presidency". Sudan Tribune.*

[156] Zoom Interview with Rebecca Mangiek on 23rd October in Nairobi.

[157] Telephone Interview with Angeline kwoth on 22nd October In Nairobi

The country has slowly drifted towards authoritarianism with no evidence of resistance. Accountability is therefore pronounced dead in South Sudan and with it goes good and democratic governance revenues needed to work in South Sudan, and has therefore shown little, if any, responsibility to its citizens on how revenues are spent.[158] South Sudanese people, on the other hand, have never seen a government that represented or was responsible to them, and they have grown used to the government's use of state resources for personal gain. In addition, it takes time to cultivate and grow the relationship between a government and its citizens, as it takes a while to establish both successful institutions and trust. The ethno-military patronage practice of South Sudan has proved to be an unaffordable means of retaining influence.

This has been especially apparent since the oil production shutdown in 2012, when Juba abruptly shut down oil production during a dispute with Khartoum over oil revenues. By the end of 2012, government revenues in South Sudan had spiraled down to almost zero without oil production. Over the last two years, it has taken a great deal to get the best out of the production of oil back to planned standards, a time which South Sudan walked a financial tight rope. [159]

"Three of the civil servants were interviewed and testified that" *government spending has been monitoring oil sales, which is reflective of a government that has used every penny possible to stay afloat. The government could clearly not afford the loyalty fees [needed] by 2013 to keep the programme going.*[160]The consequences is the civil strife we are currently witnessing.

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[158] Fok Madut Jok, (2011), "*Diversity, Unity, and Nation Building in South Sudan*" (Special Report 287, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC: "Sudan:

[159] Larson, G. (2013.) *The Road from the Paris Declaration to the Reality of Juba* 2005-11. ´ UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research.

[160] Telephone Interview Apiek Nyapal on 20th October 2020 in Nairobi.

In conclusion this study shows how bad governance and issues of power in South Sudan have been in the heart of the causes of the conflicts being witnessed today. Power monopolization, pervasive repression, moral opaqueness, dishonoring of peace negotiations and military dictatorships that dissolved political parties, obscured the right to assembly and freedom of speech are among the characteristics of bad governance of the region. Marginalization, depletion of government capability and weekly oversight systems are main obstacles that have restricted the capabilities of local governance frameworks. One result of the above-mentioned problems is that the economic mismanagement that contributed to the tensions was triggered. Clearly, South Sudan remains uncertain as a result of democracy about the political system that determines economic policy and the allocation of costs. Defense spending absorbs an overwhelming 44 percent of the economy, while infrastructure expansion and spending on social support is marginally lower. Oil sales for the purpose of funding consumption of manufactured products shall be maintained or deceptive by government authorities.

This study therefore concludes that poverty, anger, frustration and depression may not be specifically responsible for violent conflicts, but played an important part in the sustainment of conflicts in South Sudan. Furthermore, oil fields have proved to be crucial strategic priorities for the rebels given the importance of oil for the domestic economy. The fight to manage them has destroyed populations and eroded existing infrastructure, worsening the serious socio-economic problems of the world even further. The development of these consolidated components resulted in the savagery and the resulting Nuer massacre in Juba in December 2013. The crisis was the product of an engagement with the post-CPA SPLM / elites, especially with Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in particular, as president.

One factor that has obviously arisen is that race has been used as a justification for the eruption of war, and this analysis has demonstrated how this came about because of poor governance and, most importantly, the government's political elites' power struggle. For instance, the elites, Kiir and Machar, have dominated political drama and comparisons and brought them under the wing of ethnic patriotism. They have educated their family members to become active in the violent conflicts between many people and left a large amount of South Sudanese poor and homeless. The mass murder of the Nuer by the Dinka militia in Juba in the wake of the confrontation between President Kiir and his former vice president, Machar, in late 2013 was certainly the guise for the starting point of the struggle, which was in the first place just a political conflict.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF POWER STRUGGLE AND BAD GOVERNANCE ON STABILITY IN SOUTH SUDAN.

Introduction

This chapter critically analyzes the effect of power struggles and bad governance on stability in South Sudan. In the previous chapter, the ongoing political turmoil in South Sudan was clarified almost entirely in terms of the complexities of internal control and poor governance. These disadvantages have merged to build the country's extremely volatile political and security situation. In light of this, this chapter explores the consequences for both the population and the government. Civilians, mostly along racial lines, were regularly killed in the conflict, and the warring sides were found guilty of having committed crimes against humanity. The consequences of this terrible conflict have led to significant migration, limited civil liberties, hunger and appalling human rights and humanitarian conditions, and the devastation of the nation's economic stagnation of infrastructure.

4.1. Historic Tensions and Power Struggles within South Sudan's Ruling Party

"This study referred to some respondents and their opinion(s) concerning the effects of greed for power and bad governance on stability of South Sudan. From the findings established it was evident that these effects have far much dire political and socio-economic consequences that severely affect the stability of South Sudan. Majority of the respondents representing 90.0 per cent of the total responses indicated that history of constant power struggles and years of bad governance have negative impacts on stability of South Sudan.

Riek Machar ,a Nuer, was a prominent SPLA commander in the 1990s during Sudan's north-south conflict, who, along with others, broke from the SPLM / A, alleging grievances under John Garang, a Dinka, with the authoritarian leadership of

the SPLM; suspected violations of human rights; and disagreement on the goals of the revolt against Sudan.[161] The predominantly ethnic Nuer or Shilluk, Machar and his allies later collaborated with and held positions briefly in Sudanese government in the Khartoum government. Amnesty International estimated that 2,000 civilians, mostly Dinka, were killed by the Machar-controlled Nuer forces in a series of attacks, known as Bor Massacre, and their fight against Garang 's forces took thousands of lives of people living in southern Sudan.[162] Abuse of civilians by ethnic hatred and struggles on both sides, particularly in Upper Nile during the 1990s. In the beginning of the 2000s Machar reconciled with the SPLM, after Garang and his deputy Salva Kiir, he took the third highest position in leadership.[163]

Kiir joined the SPLM as its deputy in 2005 shortly after the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2005, after John Garang 's death in a helicopter crash. In 2010 Sudan held national elections before the 2011 Southern Separatist Referendum. As part of the CPA agreement the SPLM had formed a temporary government of national unity with the ruling party of Sudan. Kiir was SPLM President and first vice-president, Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir and concurrently Southern Sudan Semi-Self-Government (SSG) President.

In addition to Kiir's run against Bashir in 2010 the SPLM decided to send a Northern candidate for their National Ticket. The GoSS president, Kiir who, in many respects and with almost 93% of votes cast, saw the secession as impending.[164] As President of the GoSS, Kiir has maintained his post as President for the four-year period starting 9th July 2011, after Machar 's independence from the transitional

[161]Douglas H. Johnson, (2003). *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, Pg- 85.
[162]Human Rights Watch, (1994.)*, Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan,* June 1.
[163] Amnesty International, (1992) *"Sudan: A Continuing Human Rights Crisis,"* AI Index: AFR 54/03/92, April 15.
[164] The Carter Center, (2010) *Observing Sudan's 2010 National Elections, April 11-18, Final Report.*

organization. The activities of the SPLM, primarily led by Kiir, aim to pursue peace with various army groups and societies around the world.[165]

As part of these efforts, Kiir has issued amnesty to many citizens who have once waged rebellions against the SPLM out of obvious respect for political peace. Other leaders of the groups who reconciled with the SPLM and pledged themselves to amnesty were included, in addition to the government and military. Many have taken over their armies (some of them have their divisions still relatively intact) since the 2005 obstacle to consolidation, to 'right size' and to professionalize the heavily floated defense market. Any of the commanders including Peter Gadet, another Nuer Leader who fought Garang in the struggle, the SPLA (now the South Sudan Army). Gadet was one of the first SPLA commanders in the mutiny following the outbreak of conflict in December 2015. The government's post war efforts to disarm societies were problematic and always accompanied by SPLA commanders' claims of ethnic favouritism and abuses of rivals.

The struggle between President Salva Kiir and his ex-vice chairman Riek Machar for political power is the source of the violent war that began in December 2013. As Kiir became president of the world's newest republic, a few of its officials and senior members, including Machar and Pagan Amum, SPLM Secretary General, considered his government cautious and autocratic.[166]

Political tension came to life when VP Riek Machar, SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amun and Rebecca Garang, the late leader of the SPLM, John Garang's widow, publicly announced their intention to run as President of the SPLM and, by their

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[165]Natsios, A.S. (2012). *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What everyone needs to know*? OUP USA.
[166] Koos, C., & Gutschke, T. (2014). South Sudan's newest war: When two old men divide a nation, *German Institute of Global and Area Studies* (GIGA), Focus No.2.

involvement, as President of the country. President Kiir answered that in April 2013 with the revocation of the executive powers of the Vice President.[167]

President Kiir then demanded that dissident leaders, including Pagan Amum, be arrested. In Jonglei Province, Machar avoided the arrest and escaped Juba to his house. During this time, the aim ethnic murders of civilians were carried out in Juba, giving the war between Kiir and Machar an ethnic dimension to the political force. Weeks after the battles in Juba, heavy fighting extended to the state of Jonglei, Unification, Central and Upper Nile between army units loyal to Kiir and rebel forces devoted to Machar. The crisis then deteriorated to a total civil war from the political division between President Kiir and Machar.[168]

The oil-rich towns of Bentiu and Malakal were captured by rebels aligned with Machar in December 2013. While in the current conflict the ethnic group played a significant part, the political controversy that the crisis seems to have caused was not an ethnic or community dispute. Multiple ethnic groups were seen as politically allied with Machar before the war. During the civil war, some became the chief supporters of Garang. They alleged that Kiir had become extremely dictatorial – concentrated in the president's office within a small group of aides (many of the Dinka-dominated state of Northern Bahr El Ghazal and the home of Warrap), allowing "regional and ethnic lobbies" to overrule the ruling party's decision-making mechanism through utilizing corruption charges to sideline the party's viewed rivalry. Machar's accusations are seen to be politically driven and are part of a long personal mission to control Kiir and others who are close to him. Although the elections were postponed

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[167] Dessalegn, G.A. (2017). The cause and consequence of conflict in South Sudan, *International Journal of Political Science and Development,* 5(1), 15-21. doi. 10.14662/IJPSD2016.063.
[168] Ibid

later, Machar was expected to challenge Kiir to be nominated as president of the party in 2015.[169]

Many of the core SPLM members who expressed Machar's views on Kiir's leadership did not support his presidential ambitions; some suggested in 2013 seeking the party's presidential appointment. The political and economic value of both cities gained the interest and participation in the confrontation of foreign governments. The government of Uganda participated in war and used ariel bombing to remove the rebels and aid government troops recover Bentiu and Malakal. The Uganda administration believed it was defending its borders. Thus, the war escalated from a political differing between Kiir and Machar, a violent dis and a likely ethnic conflict in which Uganda participated. Foreign analysts, like the American intelligence community, have evaluated the highly authoritarian approach to government by Kiir.[170] *One of the respondents acknowledges "This disagreement is about dirty politics (read poor governance). It's about covetousness for power. Machar wanted to be President of the SPLM in the 2015 presidency as a step forward, but did not succeed when Kiir sacked him.[171]*

4.2. Consequences and Effects of Power Struggles and Bad Governance on South Sudan's Stability

4.2.1. Political Impacts

The outbreak of this unconscious military conflict, which obviously has caused innocent civilians innocent misery and devastation, as regards lost lives, way of life, personal and social relations, and indeed property harm, is a powerful indicator of a collective leadership breakdown, owing to bad governance, by the people

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[169] Lunn, J. (2016). *War and peace in South Sudan:* March 2016 update briefing paper, House of Commons Library, No.7552

[170] Clapper James R. (2014) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment,* January 29.

[171] Telephone interview with Gerang Garang24th October 2020 in Nairobi.

assigned, to Instead of handling their differences in a productive way, the political leaders of the world unwisely allowed carnage to walk the streets openly, and this has much greater political and socio-economic implications.[172]

One of the unfortunate truths of traditional wisdom is that it separates cultures, and that's precisely what happened in South Sudan after the start of the current conflict. Today, more than ever, the extent of mistrust and hate is unparalleled in the past of the Southern Sudanese people and this in part is the explanation for the unjustified, unjustified and indiscriminate killings of innocent, unarmed civilians by those accused of aiding the other side in the war. If this happens without pause, it will definitely serve to consolidate an increasingly unbearable mutual mistrust and hate which will render it incredibly challenging to accomplish conciliatory work.[173] Judging from the recorded ethnic-driven targeted killings that have occurred in South Sudan since the outbreak of conflict, the harm to the structure of community and communal ties so far, while it is not currently easy to thoroughly measure, appears to be significantly greater.

After nearly two days of violence in Juba at the height of the crisis last December, ethnic Nuer members were allegedly unjustifiably killed by government-allied troops. It was not long until the counter-slaughter of the ethnic Dinka by insurgent forces and their armed civilian allies in areas such as Bor, Akobo, Bentiu, and Malakal, among others, ensued. Forces loyal to the rebel leader, Riek Machar, reportedly killed more than two hundred civilians in the Unity State capital of Bentiu last Easter after recovering it from government troops. As the news says, people who died were of a broad variety of ethnic groups, including various groups in South

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[172] Rumelili, Bahar. (2013) "Identity and desecuritisation: *the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security."* Journal of International Relations and Development.

[173] Richard Garfield (2007): *Violence and victimization in South Sudan:* Lakes State in the post-CPA period, Small Arms Survey.

Sudan and the Sudan.[174] After 16 December, Dinka security forces started to concentrate on the residential areas of Lologo, Khor William and Jebel. A respondent claims that about seven Dinka soldiers assaulted his house in Khor on 17 December. *"They greeted us in Dinka language when we failed to answer they said that means you are Nuer and we are looking for Nuer,"* he said. He fled from the house, then returned home, he discovered three Nuer bodies of people who had been with him the compound and the fourth in the house. *"*After people had left the city, the authorities may have stayed in some houses, plundered their possessions and threatened residents who came back for their possessions. One interviewee together with his family escaped from the Jebel market on 16th December to seek protection at the UN house said his son and friend, when Dinka police officers returned to the area on December 18, were identified as Nuer to raise money to return to the camp.[175]

Another government finance respondent said on December 19 that he went back to his house in Khor William to pick up clothing. Upon arrival, young Dinka men in the uniform of the police attempted to kill him while taking his belongings. *"I came back to check my house, they were carrying away all our stuff,"* A respondent said that on 16 December, one who had left her Khor William House but returned later. She's been attacked, too. *"When they saw me, they shot me in the arm just because they suspected I was Nuer."[176]*

The crime of the unarmed, threatened civilians who were mercilessly killed appeared clearly to be seen as members of the other side of the war. Two days later following Bentiu 's collapse in April 15, 2014, armed young men organized in Jonglei 's capital Bor in a recorded way like a retaliatory movement, assaulted the United

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[174] Kon M (2015) Institutional Development, *Governance, and Ethnic Politics in South Sudan*. J Glob Econ 3: 147. doi:10.4172/2375-4389.1000147
[175] Telephone Interview with David Gai on 25th October 2020 in Nairobi.
[176] Telephone Interview with Riek Malakal on25th October 2020 in Nairobi.

Nations foundation, where Nuer's ethnic group's internally displaced people took shelter, killing fifty innocent civilians.[177] The assault, which apparently started in protest at UNMISS and called for its evacuation within 72 hours, led by the Bor Community Youth Association (BCyA) against the involvement of the "Nür White Army" was scheduled. The protestors assembled in Bor City, submitted copies of their petition to the office of the Governor, and then moved on to UNMISS. At around 11 a.m. UNMISS is hit. The party shifted to the east side and broke the perimeter within minutes of the UN compound, in the area of the IDP camp. "*One of the attackers climbed a tree at the camp's perimeter and fired an automatic machine gun into the crowded camp, while others entered the camp shooting guns and attacking IDPs*" said one respondent One woman, a former civil servant, who ran away from the attackers, recalled: "*I was sitting here in this house when the attack started and saw [the attackers] coming. They shot six of my family members, and I found their bodies when I came back later the same day; most of the dead were women and children*"[178], These massacres have obviously shaken the world, as the fearful likelihood of genocide appears to be closer to them. In this connection, the then US Secretary of State, John Kerry, United Nations General Secretary, Ban Ki Moon, and the Head of United Nations Human Rights, Navi Pillay, paid highly unprecedented high-level visits to the South Sudan to advise the parties to pursue the crisis peacefully.[179]

In this escalated, divided war, the South Sudanese community will have to contend with a range of possible political impacts. Any South Sudanese may most likely define themselves politically along ethnographic lines and the implications of

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[177] Nyathon, J; Hoth M; Tiitmamer, N; Augustino, T M. (2016). Sporadic Fuel Crisis in South Sudan: *Causes, Impacts, and Solutions.* Journal on African Studies.
[178] Zoom Interview Eunice Kwoth on 25th October 2020 in Nairobi.
[179] King, K. (2015). *Deteriorating Economic Situation*. Juba, South Sudan: Oxfam.

this are important in terms of uncertainty – politics and otherwise. If it is not adequately managed, the implementation of an ethnic strategy similar to Kenya means that the Kikuyu, a dominant tribe, would not rise to power with a Luo from the third ethnic group.[180] It would be exceedingly difficult to maintain peace and harmony if this situation were to arise in South Sudan. What's more, it would have a corrosive impact on a sense of nationalism if major ethnic groups like the Dinka or Nuer are in a position, say, to win elections or take office militarily. Such people are expected to associate with their ethnic groups rather than they are. Politics are primarily motivated by racial unity rather than merit-based thought, experience and knowledge.[181]

The polarity of the conflict further theoretically emerges in the situation of the citizens of the three Equatorial Nations, who stay away from the conflict today, with the exception of a few individuals who insist on the Equatorials to vote for one side. Equatoria's stance is definitely important for the country's future stability; they will either continue to do little, set a middle path for it, or take side in the fight. There is no question that a monolithic role in Equatoria cannot be considered, as the political goals of all Ecuadorians cannot be compatible.[182] However, their part in the debate on South Sudan's future could arise from the crisis, after a political resolution, as the debate turns to federalism as a form of government in South Sudan. Equatorians are already making more and more demands for federalism. However, all three regimes in Equatoria are apparently endorsing and opposing the rebel group openly. The Ecuadorians are, however, afraid that the talks between the Dinkas and the Nuers are mainly on the table and thus want to be on the table as another group.[183] Kiir later

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[180] Breidlid, I. and Arensen, M. (2014). Everyone who can carry a gun can go - *The role of the White Army in the current conflict in South Sudan.* Oslo: Peace Research Institute (PRIO).
[181] Ibid
[182] Sorbo, G.M. (2014). *Return to war in South Sudan.* Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre, Policy Brief.
[183] Aziza, Geleta.(2017). *The Cause and Consequence of Conflict in South Sudan.* Inter. J. Polit. Sci. Develop. 5(1): 15-21

agreed to practically choose a war with the Equatorians. Kiir released an order to redraw the internal borders of the country in October 2015, just a little over a month after the peace agreement with Machar's powers was inked, raising the number of states from 10 to 28. That set off border wars over who owned what territory. The Equatorians, who live mostly in the southern part of the country, saw Kiir's move as nothing more than the Dinka's bare land grab, which had even more repercussions, as one respondent said, *"there were attacks by the government on the Equatorians, and the Equatorians took up arms and promising vengeance on the Dinka, leading to more than 1,900 houses had being destroyed in the Central Equatoria region since September.* " [184]Another respondent commented **"***So you now have a new element of ethnic hatred and conflict, adding to what had been going on before, It was like dropping a match into a pile of twigs," he added, "everywhere we went across this country we heard villagers saying they are ready to shed blood to get their land back many told us it's already reached a point of no return."*[185]

The political arena has indeed lost and will not be quick to rebound, as the manner in which politics has been done has never been even. As previously stated, the instant rebellions which emerged following elections in 2010, especially in the Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, are explained by mismanage or regulated political process. The consequence of these insurgencies is the emergence of numerous paramilitary movements which have publicly devastated the target populations and which has inevitably deeply hardened or contained social and political connections.

The politics of South Sudan seemed to be changing wrongly early in 2013. This came after the government was successfully able to endorse the latter's brutality

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[184] Telephone Interview+ with Riek Nyadeng on 23rd October 2020 in Nairobi.
[185] Telephone Interview with Achil Okwoth on 23rd October 2020 Nairobi.

and recognize incorporation by the SPLA, an Armed Rebel Group focused in the Unity Regime, the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA).[186] In addition to this SSLA government agreement, a presidential amnesty issued to politicians and some military officers who had been arrested, suspected, at least in the court of public opinion, of carrying out clandestine operations against the establishment, was another significant step taken to apparently ensure conciliatory work by widening the political room.[187]

While the effect of the aforementioned insurgencies was undoubtedly debilitating for ordinary South Sudanese who had to bear this in their everyday lives, relative to the current condition of the nation with regard to the harm caused in social, political and economic terms, this pales in a way. It is fair to assume that the political influence of the current war is immense and takes concentrated, determined attempts to turn it, with the rift between the top political SPLM leadership at its height, along with the resulting ethnic division.[188] It is not reasonable to expect the conduct of elections any time soon, considering the divisive war climate that currently exists in the world, and this fact just serves to entrench the status quo, in which most people are not especially pleased. Elections tend to boost emotions for every country, regardless of how mature it is politically speaking, so it would be clearly too impractical to think of getting them in South Sudan in a very short order after some form of settlement to the dispute is sought.

A 'one mission' strategy has been an unpleasant, not so clever way of handling public relations that the governing classes have adopted since the signing of the CPA, whereby several urgent problems were simply brushed under the carpet in order to be dealt with later. This mindset is best illustrated by how the whole transitional phase was handled, downplaying the value of mechanisms of healing to facilitate a stable

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[186] Ibid Pg 20.
[187] WFP. (2015). *South Sudan market price monitoring bulletin*. Juba, South Sudan: WFP
[188] Mahmood Mamdani, (2016) "*Who's to blame in South Sudan?*" Boston Review, June 28.

change. [189] Instead of the SPLM working to convert some of its wartime slogans into practice in order to consolidate the progress achieved, the political leadership's common interest during the period was to ensure that a vote was held to address the problems of unification or independence once and for all.[190] The view displayed by those charged with leading the state into the gathering mountains of problems was generally that these concerns would be resolved later, intimating an obvious lack of ability to multitask in a very high-paced setting. Unfortunately, the anticipated gains never appeared to have materialized, but now the truths that have been perennially ignored are overflowing with damning repercussions. Corruption was the other worry of the SPLM establishment, who almost bankrupted the infant government.

4.2.2. Socio -Economic Impacts

Since the war in Juba started in December 2013, seven of the 10 States in South Sudan have been ravaged by violence, leaving an estimated ten thousand dead and more than one million displaced. Huge portions of the population of South Sudan have endured atrocities, migration and food deficits. As from early May, challenges and food shortages caused over 400,000 people to migrate to neighboring countries. Nearly 100,000 South Sudanese refugees have fled to Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. One respondent a refugee who fled to Kenya with her family states *that "I had to flee from my home with my children when our village erupted in violence. Having left everything behind, we had to survive by eating water lilies until we were reached by food assistance, we had to wait for days since it wasn't safe because of the militias who were targeting people whenever they went."[191]*

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[189] Ibrahim, A. O. (2013). South Sudan Secession: *Modeling the Fiscal Shock and Its Spillover Effects.* University of Khartoum .UNISCI Discussion Papers, No 33.
[190] Ibid
[191] Respondents remarks from zoom Interview 24th October in Nairobi.

However, most residents have lived within the borders of South Sudan, abandoning their homes. About 80,000 of the 800,000 internally displaced people have taken shelter in the local UN mission bases in South Sudan.[192] However, these supposedly secured camps were also attacked, and asylum seekers were shot and killed. The 3.7 million people with high risk of acute food shortages-a third of the total population in the South Sudan- are finding aid from UN agencies and foreign non-governmental organizations. The World Food Programme declared plans at the beginning of April to provide about 30,000 tons of food to the people of rural areas of South Sudan. By 14 April 2014, nearly 600,000 displaced South Sudanese people had obtained food assistance.[193] The nation, however, has partially stalled or blocked shipments of humanitarian assistance. The UNMISS patrols and exercises by helicopters have also been limited. There is therefore a dire humanitarian problem, and the conflict is hurting the worst. A UNMISS respondent notes "*South Sudan also has very little formal infrastructure — roads, buses, buildings — which makes it difficult to transport food and supplies. Many towns and villages become inaccessible during the annual rainy season due to closed airstrips, washed out roads or lack of roads altogether, sometimes limiting any delivery of humanitarian aid to the isolated areas that need it most. These logistical constraints, combined with the violent context, make reaching people with the humanitarian support they desperately need incredibly challenging and risky. Over the course of the crisis, South Sudan has become one of the most dangerous places in the world to be an aid worker.*"[194]

While the downturn in South Sudan 's production arising from the conflict is difficult to measure, significant economic consequences have become increasingly

[192] UNMISS (2015), *The State of Human Rights in the Protracted Conflict in South Sudan*, December 4.

[193] World Food Programme (2014), *Special Focus South Sudan, online*: <http://www.wfp.org/content/ south-sudan-special-focus>.

[194] Interview with Ajok Deng on 25th October 2020 in Nairobi.

evident, and the fiscal condition of the nation has weakened as government revenues have declined. This has contributed to fiscal restrictions and government proposals to raise spending have been scrapped. 98% of government profits comes from the petroleum industry but violence has contributed to a decline of petroleum output due to crime. The already reduced oil production dropped by another 40% as conflict spread to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, the oil field technicians being evacuated or fleeing troubled regions.[195]

The output in the Upper Nile and Unit states has decreased particularly dramatically, with production losses of about 50,000 barrels per day (b / d) as petroleum fields were shut down in January 2014. [196] While this reduction accounted for about half of the usual Unity State capacity, the production of the Upper Nile was not significantly impacted. However, the production of Upper Nile Blocs 3 & 7 was reduced from some 200,000 b / d to some 160,000 b / d as a result of the two most productive blocks in South Sudan. The costs of the war declined the limited reserves of financing acquired in summer 2013 after the return of oil exports, when the country's oil income was falling. For example, an extra budget of 749 million pounds (USD 254 million) was approved in February 2014 by the Legislative Assembly of the country to cover the costs of this dispute.[197] South Sudan has not borne the impact of decreased petroleum production alone: petroleum transit charges and financial arrangement money are a major source of revenue for Sudan. The consequences of the crisis were also felt by China, the main oil producer in Dan's oil fields in South Sudan and the largest user of its crude oil. Oil companies such as China's national oil company and Sinopec were pushed out of the Unification State Fields and had to

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[195] U.N. Security Council, (2016) *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan,* S/2016/341, April 13.
[196] Ibid
[197] Basedau, Matthias, and Thomas Richter (2013), Why Do Some Oil Exporters Experience Civil War but Others Do Not? *Investigating the Conditional Effects of Oil, in: European Political Science Review*, November, 1–26.

evacuate their workers. The war has also made subsistence farming harder, leading to starvation, and an impossible or substantially harder life for major sections of the population. In addition, day-to-day economic operations in South Sudan has been interrupted and thousands of foreign employees have moved home from neighboring countries. Towards the end of 2013, after the reopening of oil wells, the economic outlook for South Sudan was somewhat seen as positive after the two Sudan's agreed to reset their rocky relations by agreeing to resolve their disagreements peacefully. The Government of South Sudan arranged an investment conference next year that brought together a variety of prospective investors involved in pursuing investment prospects in the new republic.[198] There was a feeling in some quarters at its end that the conference was indeed going to dramatically boost the overall economic situation in the world. But in what seems to be a pure slap in the face of this obvious hope, the eruption of violence in Juba, less than three weeks after the conference was ended, severely questioned this positive economic outlook, although temporarily before a settlement is found.

Furthermore, the economic harm caused to the livelihoods of private residents and public finances, which specifically impacts service delivery and growth problems, is another unwelcome consequence of the war. Not only did the outbreak of war lead to deaths, plunder and land destruction, but it also led to the people's living standards being undermined. Conflict, for example, created a highly volatile environment which has uprooted people from their homes so as not to provide an acceptable climate for economic activities for those who rely on cultivation, fishing and livestock farming, for both their livelihoods and profits.[199] This, in essence, means that the population's

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[198] Ansorg, Nadine, Felix Haaß, and Julia Strasheim (2013), Institutions for Sustainable Peace: From Research Gaps to New Frontiers, in: *Global Governance*, 19, 19–26.
[199] Edward Thomas, (2015) *South Sudan: A slow liberation* London, Zed Books.

welfare level declines dramatically, as people or families often have to rely on handouts from their family and neighbors.[200]

This instability has terrified investors around the country, and will continue to hamper economic growth. In addition to the war, food prices have also skyrocketed and 70 percent of South Sudan's families are starving. Company production and job prospects have been adversely affected by the prevailing war conditions in the country. Production is vulnerable to insecurity, like everything else in culture, and this is just what is happening in South Sudan right now. Most enterprises are closed because of the conflict, but not solely in the most war-affected states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, and those that may still be opened do not work entirely as before.[201] Which means that productivity has declined due to the closing and lack of new enterprises. The same refers to jobs, as both self-employed employees and public sector workers are displaced and are, thus, not actually engaged in economically beneficial activities. Insecurity and financial hardships have also contributed to a decline in skilled labor that usually comes from the area.[202] One bitter fact of war is that it leaves us weaker and that is what the people of South Sudan are going with at the moment. Given the very uncertain, volatile military climate, it is very hard for many civilians to support themselves and their extended families for whom war has changed economic behavior. [203]

Without a reliable source of income to fulfill personal and family needs on a regular basis, poverty becomes a reality for others. In other words, with the new war climate, the extent of poverty just gets worse. One UNMISS camp respondent reports

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[200] Nyadera, I.N. (2018). South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018: Rethinking the causes, situation and solutions. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 18(2),* pp.59-86.

[201] Ibid Pg 84.

[202] Roque, Paula. (2014) "*Reforming the SPLM: A requisite for peace and nation building.*" Institute for Security Studies. Policy brief 63.

[203] Clemence Pinaud, (2014) 'South Sudan: *Civil war, predation and the making of a military aristocracy',* African Affairs 113, 451 pp. 192–211

that *"at this point in the war, many people have had to flee for safety more than once. Repeated displacement makes it impossible for people to regain any sort of stability — if they do manage to make progress by planting crops, purchasing animals or rebuilding livelihoods in their places of refuge, they must quickly abandon them if the fighting forces another escape."*[204]

It is no exaggeration to claim in the war's hardest-hit areas that livelihoods like farmland, fishing, livestock farming and commerce are seriously affected and maybe washed out by others. In other words, mass migration due to struggle forced people to give up their kind of economic life. *"I am afraid we have lost our future and everything we worked so hard for to win our independence,"* says one respondent from Kakuma refugee camp. *"We worked hard to build a life here [in South Sudan] and have beds to sleep on, blankets and plates to eat off. Now it is all gone."*[205] Although another respondent (a three-mom) says in the camp "*I just want peace and to be able to take my family home, so they can have a normal life,"* she continues. *"I spent most of my life as a refugee, I don't want my children to grow up like I did. "* [206] Because when war started, the economy was still weak, individuals like this respondent have very little finances that might help them survive the vagaries of being displaced.

This means basically because people cannot save or spend sufficiently in new business opportunities, and that means that total savings and assets in the world are being deteriorated.[207]

Because when war started, the economy was still weak, individuals like this respondent have very little means to help them survive the long-term struggle and

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[204] Interview with Igga Taban on 25th October 2020 in Nairobi.
[205] Interview with Hussein Maluk on 24th October 2020 in Nairobi.
[206] Interview with James Kiir on October 24th 2020 in Nairobi.
[207] Ibid Pg 210

displacement they are now facing. In fact, this means that individuals will not be able to save or have enough to invest in new business prospects, and this leads to a decline in the country's total savings and expenditure.[208]

In addition to crude, which appears to be the only South Sudanese asset to reach the foreign market, the youngest nation primarily runs an economy focused on imports. It is not very hard to see what is happening with imports, with the war in full swing. Companies importing goods and services to South Sudan are now taking special caution to properly determine how and when these imports will be supplied. For the most part, because of instability, the Upper Nile states appear out of control for these businesses, be they from Kenya, Uganda or Sudan, right now. The recorded shutdowns of the Unity-based wells indicate a decrease in volume for crude, the presumptive export commodity of South Sudan.[209] As a consequence, reducing the production of oil weakens the financial infrastructure of the world. In a nutshell, imports and exports are reduced by battle. This, in fact, decreases economic growth dramatically, leading to increased unemployment and poverty. This is because the dispute is obliterating the buying power of many individuals.

Finally, the conflict has affected a predominantly illiterate society's educational system and opportunities. Schools have been demolished, services stopped and the population relocated in the Upper Nile region. This lead to the closure of some academic centers, such as elementary, secondary and university schools, which discouraged students from completing their studies. As a consequence, it has both short and long-term effects for education in both the region and the world. Most

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[208] United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2015). *South Sudan Humanitarian Bulletin.* —Bi-weekly update: Juba, South Sudan.
[209] UNMISS, (2015) *Human Rights Report on the Escalation of Fighting in Greater Upper Nile* April/May 2015, June 29 Pg 77

of these is the induction of children into the warring parties' armies when they are reluctant to go to school.

[210] For the workforce, the short-term effects are disrupted educational cycles. In essence, this raises the prevalent adult illiteracy, which in the future makes it difficult to build new academic and educated community of managers to get closer to most developed African countries and the Western world. The long-term implications involve an economically impoverished generation that inevitably presents security threats to the region. When peace arrives, heavy investment in this sector would be required, with significant economic consequences for the region.

In conclusion, the present crisis has led to a variety of latent problems. This include the weak democratic structure and insufficient political leadership of South Sudan, the historical mistrust between the Dinka and the Nuer, and the unsustainable dependency of the nation on oil rentals. The civilian community pays the cost of the dispute.

More than 10,000 civilians have been killed and over a million displaced since the beginning of the present war. Sustainable supplies are lost, and over a third of the population (estimated at more than 3.7 million people) are at risk of food shortages. The economic implications for South Sudan in the short and long term are harsh. Production of oil has fallen by 40 percent, seriously impacting the budget of the state. Trade has been struggling. Political uncertainty would threaten foreign direct investment in South Sudan in the long term. The implications of South Sudan's war are by far unimaginable. Among major factors have been identified, namely political, economic and humanitarian implications. While the lack of political participation and government transparency, along with ingrained corruption, is seen by many long-time

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[210]Douglas H. Johnson, (2014) '*Briefing: The crisis in South Sudan,*' African Affairs 113, 451, pp. 300– 309.

South Sudan watchers as the root causes of the ongoing conflict; there is still a long way to go considering the vulnerability of the Kiir government to potential challenges to its sovereignty, the road to some significant political restructuring and structural transition in Juba and South Sudan is a long way to go.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION, SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This study set out to interrogate the interface between power, bad governance and conflicts. Using South Sudan as a case study, it interrogated the theoretical and practical linkages between greed for power by the top political elites in South Sudan. In addition to this, this study discusses the years of bad governance that led to the outbreak of conflicts in 2013 and the further prolonging and exacerbating of the conflicts as its happening now. This chapter summarizes and concludes the key issues emerging from the study and ends with recommendations of areas for further research. Specifically, it provides an overview of the current state of knowledge on power, bad governance and conflicts. This chapter therefore presents discussion of the study findings, the summary of the key findings and generalization as well policy recommendations suitable to end the protracted violent conflict in South Sudan.

5.1 Summary

In summary this study has attempted to shed light into the nexus between power, bad governance and conflicts that have been endemic across the globe. As discussed above it is clear that bad governance and greed for power in general has been in the heart of the causes of the conflict. Among the characteristics of the government systems in the case studies mentioned above indicating bad governance are; monopoly of power, rampant corruption, lack of transparency, dishonoring of peace agreements and military dictatorships that disbanded political parties. There is also confiscated rights to assembly and freedom of expression and the inherent need to cling to power by a certain group or political elites; and the nature of the state. Poor governance which has characterized the countries of the above mentioned

regions and states is singled out as the major cause of these conflicts. This is despite the fact that these conflicts manifest themselves as ethnic, clan, racial religious, regional in character and form. Conflicts that occur in countries with more open political environments and more constraints on their executives are much less susceptible to repeat bouts of violence. This helps to explain why civil wars are predominantly located in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa the two most weakly institutionalized regions of the world.

This study attempts to shed light on the political crisis that affects South Sudan since December 2013 and its regional consequences. The ongoing civil war in South Sudan has interrelated causal factors that includes power struggle, corruption, patronage and impunity, militarization and arm proliferation, weak institutional capacity, instrumentalization of ethnic identities, lack of inclusiveness and participatory state apparatus, lack of commitment towards nation building, oil and past rift. Lack of political will and willful disregard for the rule of law have been cited, and there is a lot of evidence to support this, as the main reason for the failure of governance in South Sudan. One consequence of the above mentioned issues is that it caused mismanagement of the economy that led to the conflicts. It is clear that since independence, the political framework that delimits economic management and budget allocation in South Sudan remains unclear. Security spending devours an enormous portion of the budget (44%) while expenditure on infrastructure development and provision of social services is significantly lower. Oil revenues are diverted to finance consumption of imported products or embezzled by government officials.

The crisis was the result of a tension relationship and a competing desire for presidency among SPLM / elites in the post-CPA period, especially between Salva Kiir, and Riek Machar. This study has established that the consequences of this

conflicts are far much worse and cannot be measured. Unfortunately the civilian population is carrying the cost of the conflict. More than 10,000 people have been killed and more than one million displaced since the outbreak of the latest violence. Livelihoods have been destroyed and more than 3.7 million people, approximately a third of the population, are estimated to be at risk of food insecurity. The short- and long-term economic consequences for South Sudan are harsh. Oil production has dropped by 40 percent, severely affecting the state's budget. Trade has suffered.

In the long run, political instability will jeopardize foreign direct investment in South Sudan. Already the ramifications of conflict in South Sudan are by far unimaginable. Furthermore, the implication of conflict in South Sudan is not limited to the country rather have regional diminution and consequences like insecurity in the neighboring states. The regional consequences of the South Sudan conflict are by far unimaginable. Among the many factors, three major ones like the political, economic and humanitarian consequences are the very important ones. It will not be very hard to guess the extent to which the country is affected from these major factors

5.2 Conclusion

From the analysis and particularly on the on the objectives of establishing the role of power and bad governance in facilitating eruption of violent conflicts in horn of Africa using South Sudan as a case study, while including the research questions; this study concludes that indeed greed for power and bad governance has caused the outbreak of conflicts in this region and specifically in South Sudan. Practically, this study shows that greed and struggle for power and bad governance deficit has bread conditions for conflicts witnessed conquering with the hypothesis that here is an inverse relationship between power, bad governance and stability. Basically this means that instability in South in South Sudan is largely a consequence of struggle for power and bad governance.The propagation of conflict was effected by bad

governance through graft of public resources, poor planning, sustaining unequal distribution of natural resources, creating weak institutions, mismanagement of natural resources, slowing democracy, inhibiting reforms and interfering with mediation processes. Bad governance is entrenched in the culture of impunity which characterizes the south Sudanese of regime. In south Sudan bad governance has played an integral role in perpetuating violent conflict which has lasted for over 8 years. The point of contention which attracts intensive debate centers on the proposition which calls for exit of President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar who have been labelled as the war protagonist and whom South Sudanese term their armies/ generals as war mongers responsible for the protracted conflict which has lasted for decades.

This study refutes the claim that ethnicity was a critical factor in causing the conflict rather this study states that instrumentalization of ethnicity and ethnic identity was used by political elites to further their agenda. The political conflict that triggered the crisis was not based on ethnic identity, but overlapped with pre-existing ethnic and political complaints, sparking armed conflicts and targeted genocide in the capital, Juba and other places.[211] From the objectives of this study, this study found out that the major factors entrenched in bad governance and which have been sustaining the conflict in South Sudan were tribalism/ ethnic intolerance driven by political incitements. Others were; lack of will from the two warring parties, external interference, greed for political power struggle, dependency on a diminishing oil resource base, historical injustices for instance; marginalization, colonialism, dependency syndrome, social cultural erosion .

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[211] Kulang, T.T. and Ogbonna, C.C. (2018). South Sudan: *The dilemma of a protracted social conflict*. Journal of Economic and Social Thought, 5(3), pp.265-272.

Corruption and theft of public resources featured prominently among the factors which have contributed to the recurrence of violent armed conflict in South Sudan.[212] According to findings established by this study, plunder of national resources leads to lack of proper national infrastructures while greed by political leaders leads to unequal distribution of public resources.

Graft of national resources has led to manipulation of national budgets by corrupt government bureaucrats which has resulted to marginalization of some communities while excluding qualified experts from government employment opportunities and other areas of resource management.[213]

This research study has established a close nexus between availability of oil resources and sustainability of violent conflict in South Sudan. That is generalized helped in the perpetuation of the South Sudan conflict. This is majorly through oil resources being used to spread incitement and also procure weapons. The other ways oil resources were found to have helped in the perpetuation of the South Sudan conflict were; oil has led to struggle over political power and who has the control over it, political-elite control over oil revenue and violation of human rights.[214]

Lastly, the study established that political manipulation was responsible in fueling cattle rustling, propagating nepotism, protecting corrupt officials, violating constitutional laws influencing decision making in favor of their ethnic groups, arming their respective ethnic groups through incitement and political patronage directed towards funding armed groups as well legitimizing militia and rebel groupings. Using the greed and grievance theory, this study concludes that the economic situation of South Sudan(caused by bad governance and greed for power)

[212] Blanchard, P.L. (2016). *Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead.* Congressional Research Service.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Justice Achol Mading Mayien Jok (2012), *The Secession of South Sudan:* printed and published by improved Visual Art Ltd Kampala Uganda.

allowed for rebellion to be easily to finance and sustain. [215]There were severe differences between South Sudan's states and amongst citizens. Some states were found to be significantly better off in economic indicators, others were found to be marginalized. The same result was shown for the livelihood in certain states, hence the feasibility conditions for rebellion were fulfilled long before the December outbreak of violence. This study therefore concludes that poverty, anger, frustration and despair may not be direct drivers of violent conflict in South Sudan, but they have played a role in maintaining conflict. Given the importance of oil to the national economy, oil fields have additionally turned out to be vital strategic goals for insurgents. The struggle to control them has displaced communities and undermined existing infrastructure, further exacerbating the country's severe socio-economic conditions. The heightening of these consolidated components resulted in the December 2013 savagery and the consequent Nuer Massacre in Juba

5.3 Recommendations

South Sudan currently stands at a crossroads: a continued legacy of divisiveness and conflict or the difficult task of inclusive state-building. In order to ensure sustainable peace, political leaders need to facilitate an all-inclusive national discussion on what it means to be South Sudanese and determine clear and actionable priorities for development and equitable service provision. Building an inclusive, representative, and accountable framework of governance is vital to the stability of the country and to strengthening resilience against future outbreaks in the country. The aforementioned options are futile without the government's willingness and commitment to implement these matters. Internally, the government should open up the national dialogue to make it more inclusive to the SPLM-IO and other armed

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[215] Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D. (2009). *Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war.* Oxford Economic Papers, 61(1), pp.1-27.

groups. The government should complete a constitutional amendment which loosens executive power and provides ample checks and balances, whereas a timeline for elections should be set, respected and implemented.

Secondly, this study recommends a post conflict reconstruction mechanism: the many years of conflict has left the socio-economic sector of South Sudan shuttered. Majority of the people are poor, illiterate and cannot access the basic social services. The higher levels of unemployment coupled with deep rooted grievances has led to the increase of armed violence as a means of bargaining for social gains. It is therefore necessary to heavily invest in the socio-economic sectors of the country such as health, education and infrastructure.

5.3.1 Policy Recommendation

There is a need for a national mechanism to coerce political leaders to provide the much-needed political will to unite and move the country forward. Concentration of power in the executive branch remains intact, a situation that weakens accountability and in fact weakens the desire of the leadership to provide the political will needed, because they face no consequences. Prior efforts to address the conflict for reasons known to all, failed to aggressively address this matter. Perhaps, the remedy may be to introduce policy framework that will have accountability measures externally through pressure groups from civil society and the media and through international mechanisms. In this case both international and all national think tanks should develop compact and relevant policies through adoption of various tools for measuring governance in South Sudan. This will enable close monitoring of government functions and give citizens a sense of where progress is being made and where the government is failing

Further, these policy frameworks should insist on participatory and inclusive approaches to institutional reforms. Ultimately, all citizens, regardless of their social

status, should be allowed to participate in the construction of their country's laws and institutions. The GoSS could develop a process that effectively engages all relevant stakeholders regardless of their educational background, employment status, religious or ethnic affiliation, social or political status, and income or wealth status. Through such a process, South Sudan can secure for itself a constitution that reflects its values, traditions and cultures, and provides its population with an appropriate foundation to build institutions for organizing their private lives, resolving conflict, and regulating their socio-political interaction. Thus, a priority for the Government of South Sudan and its development partners would be to invest heavily in capacity building. Several capacity training modalities should be investigated, with a view to identifying models that are cost effective and appropriate for the country.

5.4 Academic: Areas for further Research

Concerning future research, one has to point out the importance of more reliable and, first of all, more data. It was especially hard to get recent data of South Sudan's economic and social situation on a micro level. Furthermore, it was next to impossible to link the horizontal inequalities to certain areas and their cultural composition Furthermore, it was next to impossible to link the horizontal inequalities to certain areas and their cultural composition. If it was possible, to gather data on the ethnic background, the economic situation and the access to social services in wide areas of South Sudan, and complement this quantitative data with qualitative data on potential grievances, the analysis would be far more reliable. Therefore, stratified random cluster samples could be a useful completion to the data used in this paper. All in all, the greed and grievance model proved to be a possible way, to investigate the underlying causes of South Sudan's current politically induced civil war. Nonetheless, there is a further need to find more reliable explanatory variables and proxies thereof.

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APPENDIX

Appendix I: Questionnaire

ANNEX 1: Questionnaire: Broad Research Questions

SECTION: A

Personal Details

Name of the Respondent: -------------------------------------

Age and Gender of the Respondent--------------------------

Education Level (Highest) -------------------------------------

Profession: ---

Location of Interview: --

Date of Interview: ---

SECTION B.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER, BAD GOVERNANCE. AND CONFLICTS IN REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN.

Q 1. In the context of South Sudan how is the relationship between power, bad governance and conflicts and how does it manifest itself?

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Q2. Explain how greed and struggle for power provokes instability in South Sudan.

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Q3. Explain how bad governance exacerbate and prolong the conflicts in South Sudan.

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Q4. Explain the relationship between military, power, bad governance and conflict in South Sudan.

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SECTION C.

EFFECTS OF POWER, BAD GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICTS ON THE STABILITY OF SOUTH SUDAN.

Q5. Explain the various ways in which greed for power has affected the stability of the government of South Sudan.

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Q6. What are the political repercussions of the conflicts in South Sudan.?

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Q8. How do the socio-economic impacts of the conflicts affect the stability of South Sudan?

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Q9. Do you think ethnicity was used as a weapon to polarize the masses and further

exacerbate conflict in South Sudan?

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Q10.If so, what are the consequences of the use of ethnicity as a weapon of pitting the

people against each other?

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....

Q11. Describe what other matters arose as a consequence of the conflicts in South

Sudan.

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Thank You

Appendix II: Turnitin Report