

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM BY THE MILITARY IN  
AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCES**

**BY**

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**DECLARATION**

I declare that this research project is my original work and to the best of my knowledge it has not been submitted for any award of Diploma or degree in any other university/learning institution.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this research project to my family. Without their assistance and patience, production of this academic work would have been hard if not impossible. They endured my long absence throughout this long journey of being away while seeking knowledge.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CT	Counterterrorism
EAC	East African Community
GWoT	Global War on Terror
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KA	Kenya Army
KAF	Kenya Air Force
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KN	Kenya Navy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
UN	United Nations
USA AFRICOM	United States Africa Command

## **ABSTRACT**

This study explored the use of military in countering international terrorism in Africa by using the Kenya Defence Forces. The study illustrates the use of the military as a way of eradicating terrorism in the horn of Africa. This study employs securitization theory as a mechanism to illustrate international terrorism and how the military can be used to eradicate acts of terror. The study justifies the hypotheses that nation states uses military to counter terrorism to enhance their responsibility to protect and also the initiative to combat terror has not been fully efficient because of challenges like inadequate personnel and financial constraints. This has made the nation states to embrace the use of non-military tools to assist in combating terrorism. Case study research design was used since it gives deeper explanation of a scenario. Primary and secondary data was used for enhanced validity. The study revealed that Kenya Defence Forces Play major role when intervening in International Terrorism and that Kenya Defence Forces mostly uses patrol and intercept communication methods when intervening in International Terrorism. In addition, the study established that Kenya Defence Forces collaborated with local community, civil societies and NGOs in fight against terrorism and that Kenya military involvements in counterterrorism have resulted to reduced terrorists Incursions in the Country and Manning & Pacification of the Liberated Areas. Further the study established the effects of KDF in Countering International Terrorism to include both positive and negative impacts on human security. This study recommends mutual cooperation between state and non-state actors in enhancing effective and efficient counter terrorism measures for instance effective border control, diplomatic engagements, regional balancing for effective citizen involvement in decision making in Kenya.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction

The chapter entails background, problem statement, study questions and objectives as well as justification. The chapter further gives the literature review, theoretical framework, study hypotheses and research methodology. It also provides the chapter outline.

### 1.2 Background to the Study

International security has transformed both in theory as well as practice as a result of the demise of Cold War. Theoretically, traditional security approach was founded on realism which was state-centric and prioritized military security. In practice, military interventions were the commonly used approach in response to security threats to the state and the international system.<sup>1</sup> However, in contemporary security there exist emerging security challenges such as diseases or global pandemics, adverse climate change, transnational organized illicit acts like cyber-crime, piracy, money laundering, human and drug trafficking. The implication is that new ways of responding to contemporary security challenges need to be developed.<sup>2</sup> Yet, states continue to use military interventions in countering terrorism. A case in point is the Kenya Defence Forces that have intervened both internally and internationally to counter terrorism.

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<sup>1</sup>Boutellis Arthur and Paul Williams, "Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward more Effective Partnerships in Peace Operations," (New York: International Peace Institute, April 2013) p.1

<sup>2</sup> See Kaldor, M., *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (London, Polity Press, 1999).

Historically, military interventions in countering regional and global terrorism gained momentum following a major 9/11 attack in the USA, when US government launched war on all acts of terrorism (global war on terror (GWOt); literally put military approach at the center of counter-terrorism efforts.<sup>3</sup> For instance, the operation enduring freedom that started in 7<sup>th</sup> October 2001 that the USA confirmed its military disrupted operations of 11camp sites where terrorist carried their trainings, leading to the death of many al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists.<sup>4</sup> Rogers observes that numerous military initiatives dominated international security after the 9/11 attack in USA.<sup>5</sup>

However, an emerging debate is whether military approach or negotiations with terrorist would be a better approach given that military operations have yielded mixed results.<sup>6</sup> The argument is that kinetic military operations only focus on short term objectives thus there should be more of diplomatic means or as is said an investment in the campaign to “win hearts and minds”.<sup>7</sup> While it is true that countering international terrorism through military interventions in Africa has raised controversy, states still continue to deploy the military interventions in Africa in counter-terrorism efforts.

All the same, the 9/11 incidence, is an event that has influenced how global authorities combat terrorism. This followed the dawn of massive terror attacks in

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<sup>3</sup> “The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days,” US Department of State Archive, 2001-2019, (available at: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm>, accessed 25/04/2020)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> Rogers P, “Terrorism” in Williams P.D., (ed), *Security Studies: An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2008. p. 172

<sup>6</sup>Khouri, Rami. “Negotiating With ‘Terrorists’? How U.S.-Taliban Talks Expose the Mad Logic of America’s War on Terror.”, August 14, 2019 <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/negotiating-terrorists-how-us-taliban-talks-expose-mad-logic-americas-war-terror>

<sup>7</sup>Berschinski Robert G., “Africom’s Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, And the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, November 2007 p 1-2

Africa mostly targeting USA and other Western installations. The attack on USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 was a clear explanation of severe danger the international community experience in the current 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>8</sup>

Although scholars contend that Africa has no exact number of terror groupings,<sup>9</sup> West Africa's Boko Haram, and the Horn of Africa's al-Shabaab remain the most persistent and formidable terrorist organizations. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project established that Boko Haram has had a hand in over 36,000 fatalities owing to the terror events it has instigated from 2009 to date.<sup>10</sup> In 2014, the West African terror group abducted 276 girls from Borno State in Nigeria and carried out over 3,416 terror events over the past decade.<sup>11</sup>

Likewise, the Horn of Africa states more so Kenya has experienced the Al-Shabaab acts of violence. In Kenya there have been numerous terror attacks perpetrated majorly by Somalia-based Al-Shabaab terror group; namely the Westgate mall attack in 2013 in which at least 67 lives were lost, the Garissa University College attack in 2015 in which at least 148 people lost their lives, and recently January 2019 attack in Nairobi, DusitD2 complex among others. Indeed, it is observed that the Kenyan security officers from all the units operated under one command during the DusitD2 complex attack.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Ewi, Martin, and Kwesi Aning, "Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa," *African Security Studies* 15, no. 3(2006), 33.

<sup>9</sup>LweendoKambela, "Terrorism in Africa: A manifestation of new wars," *The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes*. (2019).<https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/terrorism-in-africa/>. Retrieved on 11/7/2019

<sup>10</sup> See, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), USA, <https://acleddata.com/about-acledd/> accessed 26/04/2020

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup>MuthengiMaluki P., "Kenya's security forces did better this time. But there are still gaps,"*The Conversation* January 20, 2019 (Available at: <https://theconversation.com/kenyas-security-forces-did-better-this-time-but-there-are-still-gaps-110039>, accessed on 26/04/2020)

Notably, Kenya has not only intervened militarily to counter terrorism internally, but also regionally in Somalia, where the country's KDF is operating under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Therefore, while acknowledging that the military have a role in fighting terrorism, this study therefore analyzes military intervention by the KDF in countering international terrorism.

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

International Terrorism is a challenge that affects global, regional, local communities and individual countries like Kenya with a varying degree of consequences. It has had negative effects such as the loss of life, physical and psychological harm, propagation of fear, and damage to the infrastructure of whatever region in question. Admittedly, terrorist activities are a huge problem to governments in Africa. While there is no question as to the threat terrorism poses, there has been debate on the extent to which acts of terrorism causes danger in Africa as compared to issues of poverty, health crisis as well as internal conflicts within the states. That notwithstanding, African continent continues to warrant huge attention in countering acts of terrorism. Terrorism manifests in varied ways and hence causes confusion on effective ways to handle it. As such, effective terrorism intervention measures are required to urgently mitigate the problem. Such measures are of different approaches which entail military and other security forces, economic sanctions, and different types of diplomatic engagements. As it stands, states have been focusing much of their concentration on the use of the military approach to respond to almost all security challenges.

The act of terrorism has been aggravated by the wave of globalization which has made it difficult to monitor the movements of the terrorist as well as militia groupings.

The fact that terrorist's activities in the globalizing world involve a complex of innovative, hard to comprehend channels of operations makes it difficult to eliminate terrorism. In fact over time with the evolvement of these networks in the globalizing world, they easily access global networks as well as infrastructure in which they strengthen their connections and build new networks in areas as well. Such activities has enhanced destructions of human security hence the need for military interventions to curb the threats that are caused by terrorists.

## **1.4 Study Objectives**

### **1.4.1 Main Objective**

The main objective of this study is to analyze the role of the Kenya Defense Forces in countering international terrorism.

### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

1. To examine ways in which states use the military to counter international terrorism in Africa.
2. To assess the effects of Kenya Defense Force in countering international terrorism.
3. To establish the challenges that Kenya Defense Force faces while countering international terrorism.

## **1.5 Research Questions**

1. What are the specific roles which the military have performed in countering international terrorism in Africa?
2. What are the effects of Kenya Defence Force in countering international terrorism?
3. What are the challenges do the Kenya Defence Forces face in countering international terrorism?

## **1.6 Literature Review**

The section illustrates literatures related to the core variables and themes of the study which are military intervention and counter-terrorism. This literature review will be organized thematically beginning with a review of terrorism in general and particularly in Africa. Then the study will review literature on military interventions in countering international terrorism. In so doing, the study will examine the role of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and challenges in countering acts of terror in Africa and specifically Kenya.

### **1.6.1 Terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa**

A review on acts of terror in Africa reveals a growing concern over the effects of terrorism on the continent and how to counter it.<sup>13</sup> The term 'terrorism' gained prominence in 1793-94 reigns of terror at the time of French revolution where the revolutionary leaders Robespierre and Saint-Just conceived use of systematic mass terror as an 'emanation of virtue'.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Collier P., "Security Threats Facing Africa and its Capacity to Respond," *PRISM* 5, no. 2 Available at: [https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism\\_5-2/PRISM5-2\\_Security\\_Threats.pdf](https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Security_Threats.pdf) accessed 02/05/2020)

<sup>14</sup> Wilkinson Paul, "Terrorism" in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, Oxon: Routledge, 2010, pp129-130

Although the concept of terrorism is yet to gain unanimous definition, there exists agreement among scholars on a few features of terrorism namely; use of mass violence targeting public or eminent private institutions and even civilians to create fear, often perpetrated by should be a non-state actor, the acts are normally criminalised by civilised/competent legal systems such as murder, bombing, hijacking, serious bodily harm, terror acts are planned to cause fear in the population so as to force governments, organizations in certain directions or stop doing some actions.<sup>15</sup>

Rourke posits that acts of terror are forms of political violence initiated by individuals, groups of people that try to manipulate politics through the attacks on non-combatants so as to harass and instil fear and animosity in the society.<sup>16</sup> This is in agreement with Wilkinson's definition which sees terror activities as intentional activity of governments, group of people, individuals to instill fear, coerce people as well as institutions so that they can change their attitudes, behavior with a huge focus on both civilian as well as combat officials.<sup>17</sup>

Globally, 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 terrorist attacks, is an event that has influenced how the world responds to terrorism. This followed the dawn of massive terror attacks in Africa mostly targeting USA and other Western installations. The attacks in both Kenya and Tanzanian USA embassies in 1998 was an explanation of the challenges the international community likely to experience in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See Rourke John, *International Politics on World Stage*, New York, NY : McGraw-Hill, 2008; Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, Oxon: Routledge, 2010; Peter Hough, Shahin Malik, Andrew Moran and Bruce Pilbeam, *International Security Studies Theory and practice*, London: Routledge, 2015

<sup>16</sup> Rourke John, *International Politics on World Stage*, New York, NY : McGraw-Hill, 2008

<sup>17</sup> Wilkinson Paul, "Terrorism" in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, Oxon: Routledge, 2010, p.130

<sup>18</sup>Ewi, Martin, and Kwesi Aning, "Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa," *African Security Studies* 15, no. 3(2006), 33.

Although scholars contend that it is not easy to count the number of terror groupings in Africa<sup>19</sup> however, notable terror groups include Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in particular, was formed in Algeria in 2003, as the Salafist Group.<sup>20</sup> Others are West Africa's Boko Haram, and the Horn of Africa's Al-Shabaab remain the most persistent and formidable terrorist organizations. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project affirmed that Boko Haram has had a hand in over 36,000 fatalities owing to the terror events it has instigated from 2009 to date.<sup>21</sup> In 2014, the West African terror group abducted 276 girls from Borno State in Nigeria and carried out over 3,416 terror events over the past decade.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, al-Shabaab has initiated numerous terror attacks in Kenya and the horn of Africa in general leading to destructions of properties and loss of human lives both combatant and non-combatant.<sup>23</sup>

In Africa, terrorism was the pioneer global challenge that the newly formed African Union had to contend with.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps one of AU's direct confrontations with terrorism is through its peace support operation in Somalia (AMISOM) where the organization is fighting Al-Shabaab terror group in the AU's endeavor to stabilize the fragile Somalia state. Kenya has contributed its troops (KDF) to help in combating terrorist in Somalia. Kenyan troops has worked under the operation Linda Nchi and later joined the AMISOM to continue destabilizing the operations of the militia group.

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<sup>19</sup>LweendoKambela, "Terrorism in Africa: A manifestation of new wars," *The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes*. (2019).<https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/terrorism-in-africa/>. Retrieved on 11/7/2019

<sup>20</sup> Didier Rice, "The regionalisation of counter-terrorism strategies in the Sahel: the G5 as a challenge for transatlantic relations," *College of Europe Policy Briefs*, June 2018 [www.coleurope.eu/cepob](http://www.coleurope.eu/cepob).

<sup>21</sup> See, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), USA, <https://acleddata.com/about-acledd/> accessed 26/04/2020

<sup>22</sup> Ibid

<sup>23</sup>MuthengiMaluki P., "Kenya's security forces did better this time. But there are still gaps," *The Conversation* January 20, 2019 (Available at: <https://theconversation.com/kenyas-security-forces-did-better-this-time-but-there-are-still-gaps-110039>, accessed on 26/04/2020)

<sup>24</sup>Ewi and Aning, "Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa," p.33

### **1.6.1 Use of the Military Intervention in Countering International Terrorism in Africa**

Contemporary literature in international security contends that wars in modern societies involve numerous parties like states, non-state actors.<sup>25</sup> The implication is that security is evolving and with it introducing new challenges to security responses. Notably, the military approach to security has had to adjust accordingly in response to emerging global security challenges. Today one of the enduring contemporary challenges to security is terrorism.

By way of definition, counterterrorism includes reducing terrorist capabilities through various instruments such as the use of diplomatic engagements, national intelligence, and control of finances as well as use of military.<sup>26</sup> Thus military security is highlighted in this study because invariably states continue to deploy the military interventions as a response to terrorism.

Since 9/11, scholars in the arenas of humanities and social sciences from universities around the globe have been involved in the monitoring, data collection, and analysis of terrorism related violence.<sup>27</sup> In the United States of America, the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has been playing a vital role in gathering and organizing data on

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<sup>25</sup>Pilbeam, B, "New wars, globalisation and failed states," in Peter Hough, Shahin Malik, Andrew Moran and Bruce Pilbeam, *International Security Studies Theory and practice*, London: Routledge, 2015 pp 104-105

<sup>26</sup> Pillar Paul R, "Counterterrorism" in Williams P.D., (ed), *Security Studies: An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2008. p. 376

<sup>27</sup> Freilich, Joshua D., Steven M. Chermak, and Joseph Simone Jr. "Surveying American state police agencies about terrorism threats, terrorism sources, and terrorism definitions." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 3 (2009): 450-475.

terrorism related occurrences around the world via its Global Terrorism Database.<sup>28</sup> With existing data on the same, scholars and researchers at the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) found that the year 2015 was the second deadliest on record (after 2014) with a total number of 29,376 deaths, and a fiscal loss of US\$89.6 billion. With this kind of impact, states and international players feel compelled to fight fire with fire, and who is to say that this is not an effective course of action?

It follows then that to define counter-terrorism, one has to approach the entire concept within the existing and very specific frames of acts of terror. Should terrorism be defined as crime, then counter-terrorism measures fall under police and law enforcement work.<sup>29</sup> Should it be defined as an act of war, insurgency, or revolution, then defining counter-terrorism shifts to the military responses approach?<sup>30</sup> However, Pillar dismisses this debate arguing that it explains incorrectness of the separation because as he affirms there is no valid reason as to why the choices can be used as option to one another.<sup>31</sup> Either approach notwithstanding, the constant is that counter-terrorism campaigns have one endgame, and that is to successfully eradicate ever-evolving terrorist activities across the globe.

Indeed, counter-terrorism is as old as terrorism itself, as one breeds the other. Just as acts of terror have evolved over time, so have the measures that governments and international bodies have put in place against terrorism. To reach this goal, states

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<sup>28</sup> <https://www.icermediation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Combating-Terrorism-A-Literature-Review-by-Basil-Ugorji.pdf>, Retrieved on 15/7/2019

<sup>29</sup> Ivan Sheehan, *When terrorism and counter-terrorism clash: the War on Terror and the transformation of terrorist activity* (Youngstown, N.Y.: Cambria Press, 2007), 49.

<sup>30</sup> Sheehan, "When terrorism and counter-terrorism clash," 50.

<sup>31</sup> Pillar Paul R, "Counterterrorism" in Williams P.D., (ed), *Security Studies: An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2008. p. 376

employ a combination of both defensive and offensive measures. Strengthening law enforcement, improving border security, cutting off terrorist funding, and countering radicalization are all on the defensive, mentioning just but a few. Internationally, agreements that allow sharing of intelligence among pertinent sovereign states also count as defensive counter-terrorism. On the account of offensive measures, actions such as military raids which could either are preemptive or retaliatory, assassinations, infiltrations, and a host of covert operations take center stage.<sup>32</sup>

As a result of the 9/11 act of terror, global society galvanized its resolve to use all means to counter violent extremism, including via military interventions.<sup>33</sup> One illustration of this is the military alliance under the umbrella of NATO whose counter-terrorism strategy includes intelligence sharing and military interventions to contain transnational terrorism threats.<sup>34</sup> In Africa, there is strong desire for the AU to establish firm and coherent policy response to undergird responses to terrorism, including supporting its member's states to launch anti-terrorism military action.<sup>35</sup> Africa also has other regional bodies for instance IGAD that maintains peace and security division, which partly seeks to prevent and manage conflict.<sup>36</sup> In this vein, the IGAD keeps a standby force, which could effectively be used as needed.

Elsewhere, researcher Falk surveyed the effectiveness of military interventions where

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<sup>32</sup> Pillar Paul R, "Counterterrorism" in Williams P.D., (ed), *Security Studies: An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2008. p. 376

<sup>33</sup> Ugorji, Basil. "Combating terrorism: A literature review." *Journal of Living Together* 2, no. 3 (2015): 1.

<sup>34</sup> Nevers, Renée de. "NATO's international security role in the terrorist era." *International Security* 31, no. 4 (2007): 34-66.

<sup>35</sup> Union, African. "'Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa.'" In *Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government*, vol. 2. 2014.

<sup>36</sup> Kwesi Aning and Andre Le Sage, (Ed) *African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Sub-regional Initiatives*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press and Potomac Books, 2009, p 62.

he specifically looked at the effectiveness of Israeli's military strategy against the Palestine terror groups from use of suicide bombers dating from 2000 to 2010.<sup>37</sup> The Israeli forces' primary focus was the targeted killing of the leaders of terrorist groups, the school of thought here being that militants would lose combat effectiveness owing to the death of their leaders. The research differentiated leadership as either ideological or military and sought to examine whether there was mushrooming of terrorist activities after targeted killing of either type of leader.<sup>38</sup> While admitting that the motivation to carry out attacks against Israel after a targeted attack was always at peak levels, the researcher discovered that most of these attacks failed to materialize.<sup>39</sup> This was especially because leaders who succeeded their fallen counterparts did not want to become targets themselves, and the best way to do this was by avoiding drawing attention to them. On the overall, the targeted killing approach Israel employed proved effective and at the time of Falk's research in 2015, the country had not become victim to a suicide bombing attack since 2009.<sup>40</sup>

Regionally, the effectiveness of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) against the Al-Shabaab has been explored. This is an African Union operation which is authorized by the UNSC. Countries contributed their troops at different times for instance, Uganda (2007), Burundi (2007), Djibouti (2011), Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013) and Ethiopia (2014).<sup>41</sup> Typically, AMISOM is military operations with some elements of police and civilian input.

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<sup>37</sup> Falk Ophir, "Measuring the Effectiveness of Israel's 'Targeted Killing' Campaign." *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol 9, no 1, 2015, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/399/html> Retrieved on 9/7/2019

<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> Ibid

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Paul D. Williams (2018) "Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 12:1, 172-192, DOI: [10.1080/17531055.2018.1418159](https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2018.1418159)

Williams observed that AMISOM was extraordinary in several respects: it is AU's largest peace operation – it involved the use of over 22000 military officers and the longer and running AU- led operation; it is also the AU's most expensive operation, and unfortunately AMISOM had become the most dangerous operation under Africa union, suffering more casualties than the UN's losses over 70 years of peacekeeping operations.<sup>42</sup>

Nonetheless, despite the aforementioned challenges and ubiquitous criticism of inadequate resources limiting AU's military intervention; AMISOM has achieved substantial successes. Since 2007, the mission has displaced and degraded Al-Shabaab terror groups from large areas in South Central Somalia and Mogadishu, enabling the Somali Transitional Federal Government to exercise its authority.<sup>43</sup> However, Al-Shabaab militants continue to exercise considerable authority in rural areas of Somalia.

In Kenya, the counterterrorism strategy, as enunciated in policy and legal instruments, incorporates the military use in destabilizing militia groupings especially the al-Shabaab from initiating acts of terror in Kenya.<sup>44</sup> This policy directive is in line with a belief that using the military is a more effective and suitable tool in eradicating or mitigating activities of terror organizations in their attempts to advance their operations and attacks to human beings. However, a contrary argument has been made that focusing too much on the use of military power is an inadequate response to the security challenges posed by terrorism.

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<sup>42</sup> William P, "Lessons Learned in Somalia: AMISOM and Contemporary Peace Enforcement" *Council on Foreign Affairs*, July 19, 2018 (Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/lessons-learned-somalia-amisom-and-contemporary-peace-enforcement>, accessed 04/05/2020)

<sup>43</sup> Ibid

<sup>44</sup> Aning, Kwesi. "African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives." *African Studies Review* 52, no. 1 (2009): 185-186.

### **1.6.2 The Kenya Defense Forces in countering international terrorism in Kenya**

In the fight against terrorism, the economic and social costs of this security problem need to be put in focus, and existing studies have amply treated this dimension of terrorism. On a moral and legal level, terrorism is an outrage to human civilization, a mortal danger to human security in the international system. It undercuts human development, and it often leads to huge economic losses. Between 2001-2012, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Somali, and the Philippines bore about 40% of all transnational or international terrorist attacks. Due to these attacks, economic costs took the form of destroyed infrastructure, slowdown in investments, and dampened investor confidence. The economic costs of terrorism were quite huge for some states, such as Iraq, which witnessed economic losses of about 25% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>45</sup> According to current trends, terrorism is on the upsurge in most world regions. Between 2012 and 2016, studies estimated the economic costs of terrorism to be USD 296 billion, which was higher than the comparable costs of terrorism between 2000 and 2011.<sup>46</sup> Additionally, terrorists are increasingly targeting civilians<sup>47</sup> with East and Western Africa being the most hard-hit regions on the continent. In Nigeria, for instance, Boko Haram is responsible for the killings of about 20,000 Nigerians and displacing about 3 million others.<sup>48</sup>

Existing studies on the impact of military action against terrorism suggest military action can have unintended consequences. Rather than weaken the military capabilities of terrorist organizations, military action can occasion stronger social

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<sup>45</sup> Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2018 measuring the impact of terrorism, Sydney, November 2018. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> Retrieved on 16/8/2019 p29

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 29

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 4

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 21

cohesion and bolter the motive for revenge.<sup>49</sup> In line with United States fight against terrorist activities, there are evidences showing use of targeted killings using drones has led to more terrorist strikes.<sup>50</sup> Likewise in Nigeria, the elimination of a Boko Haram leader only led to a surge in ferocious terrorist attacks in the northern parts of the country.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, the KDF's perceived occupation of Somalia was used by Al-Shabaab militants as a motive for attacking the Westgate Mall.<sup>52</sup> In this vein, then, it would be fitting for analytical work on the effectiveness of military action to look beyond the destruction of terrorist networks and capabilities, and to whether terrorist networks and capabilities have really been degraded or even neutralized in theatres of conflict.

Another major risk of counter-terrorism measures that include military action is the high possibility that they could inflame passions leading to radicalization and extremism.<sup>53</sup> In fact, the outcome of military strategies to defeat terrorism could at times have the opposite effect of spawning more radicalization and, in turn, more terrorist attacks. The question that then surfaces is, "What kind of military intervention is likely to be associated with an elevated risk of radicalization<sup>54</sup> and terror attacks?"<sup>55</sup> Operations that involve sending of armies to occupy another country, as occurred in relation to America in its fights against the Taliban in

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<sup>49</sup> Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism Past and Present," in *the New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles W. Kegley (Ann Arbor: Prentice Hall, 2003), 102.

<sup>50</sup> Erik W. Goepner, "Measuring the Effectiveness of America's War on Terror." *Parameters* 46, no. 1 (November 3, 2016): 107–20.

<sup>51</sup> Ugorji, Basil. "Combating terrorism: A literature review." *Journal of Living Together* 2, no. 3 (2015): 1.

<sup>52</sup> Downie, Richard. "Al Shabaab: How Great a Threat?." *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* (2013): 581-97.

<sup>53</sup> Johnson, Chalmers. *Blowback: The costs and consequences of American empire*. Macmillan, 2000.

<sup>54</sup> Pettinger, Tom. "What is the impact of foreign military intervention on radicalization?." *Journal for Deradicalization* 5 (2015): 92-119.

<sup>55</sup> Choi, Seung-Whan. "Does US military intervention reduce or increase terrorism?." In *APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper*. 2011.

Afghanistan or Kenya's military incursion into Somalia would be more likely to produce negative outcomes than operations that are more limited in nature.<sup>56</sup>

### **1.6.3 Challenges of Military Interventions in Countering International Terrorism**

Counter-terrorism inevitably raises challenging and contentious situations such as violations of human rights in general.<sup>57</sup> Interestingly, terror cells seem to always find a way of amassing a considerable number of sympathizers. This has been observed in Kenyan case where the terror groups get sympathizers from the population and this allows them to plan and initiate their illicit activities. Just as a refresher, the 1998 US Embassy attack led to the loss of approximately 213 lives, most of which were Kenyan lives. In 2002, terrorists ambushed Israeli-owned hotel leading to the death of 11 Kenyans as well as many casualties. Recently, they carried out the Westgate Shopping Mall attacks, killing innocent Kenyans. The Garissa University attack also comes to mind, a terror incidence leading to the killing of a number of Kenyan students. Such attacks demonstrate that terrorists have a coordinated network, finances, strategies, weapons, and both external and internal support to ensure the success of such activities.<sup>58</sup> The other factors fueling terrorism in Africa is the inadequate practice of good governance principles.<sup>59</sup>

Generally, challenges related to the fight against terrorism are mainly legal, moral,

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<sup>56</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. "Why America? The globalization of civil war." *CURRENT HISTORY-NEW YORK THEN PHILADELPHIA*- 100 (2001): 425-432.

<sup>57</sup> Pillar Paul R, "Counterterrorism" in Williams P.D., (ed), *Security Studies: An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2008. p. 376

<sup>58</sup> Napoleoni, Loretta. *Terrorism and the Economy: How the War on Terror is Bankrupting the World.*(Bolton: Seven Stories Press, 2011.), pp. 45-50

<sup>59</sup> McCabe, Robert. "Policing the Seas: Building Constabulary Maritime Governance in the Horn of Africa–The Case of Djibouti and Kenya." *African Security* 12, no. 3-4 (2019): 330-355.

and organizational. Legal challenges implicate the idea of military use to eradicate terror can be validated by national or international law. In the war against terrorism, questions have been raised on two major areas – whether any move to fight terrorism in external and domestic settings conforms to both international or domestic law, and whether the fight against terrorism even amounts to war in the traditional sense. Critics argue that the enemy in this case cannot be precisely identified and that such a war, which is essentially a political one, cannot possibly be won through military means. Questions have also been asked about the moral impetus and legal motivations of the war, to which some writers opine that the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda by the United States, under President George Bush, meant that the legality or morality of instruments used to counter-terrorism, were expansive, if not without limitation.<sup>60</sup> The United Nations, on the other hand, contemplates that its states should ensure that any maneuver to fight terrorism, either within their jurisdiction or without, needs to conform to global rules and norms.<sup>61</sup>

Unsurprisingly, legal issues have tended to surface whenever military actions have been used in relation to terrorism. The use of targeting killings, for instance, raises profound legal problems. States engaged in major counterterrorism efforts, such as the United States and Israel, make heavy use of targeted killings. In Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia, United States has made heavy use of drone technologies to eliminate suspected terrorist operatives and terrorist leaders.<sup>62</sup> Their use in combat raises profound legal questions; questions that many writers believe cannot be

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<sup>60</sup> Brooks, *Selling the War on Terror*, 91-93

<sup>61</sup> United Nations, *United Nations Counterterrorism Strategy*

<sup>62</sup> Amitai Etzioni, “The Great Drone Debate,” *Military Review* (March/April 2013, p.10 (citing: “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013,” New America Foundation, February 4 2013, [counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones](http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones)).

addressed within the existing frameworks of international law.<sup>63</sup> In Israel, debates have been active on whether it is proper to use drones to target any member of a perceived terrorist group. The issue has been one of whether a narrow or expansive definition should apply in the targeting of terrorist operatives or leaders.<sup>64</sup> In its previous policy position, the Israeli Defense Forces targeted only members of the security establishment it believed belonged to a terrorist group. While this position was in line with the policy of the United States about targeting killings, the issue of what membership to a terrorist group means is contested, with the United States treating it as formal and functional.<sup>65</sup> Increasingly, however, the Israeli Defense Force has revised its policy, and only targets members of terrorists groups who it has reason to believe have been linked to planning terror attacks or who can be associated with hostilities can be deemed as deserving of elimination.<sup>66</sup>

The debate on targeted executions also implicates the idea of when military action might be taken on people who have been associated with terrorist's attacks, with one school of thought arguing that it could be taken at any time, even in places where active hostilities are not taking place. Closer home, the notion of targeted killings has implications on Kenya and on Kenya's military activities in Somalia. The United States has frequently used drones to attack Al-Shabaab leaders, with the terrorist groups lashing out at AMISOM reactions.

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<sup>63</sup> Brooks, *Selling War on Terror*, 83

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>65</sup> Brooks, *Selling War on Terror* *Ibid*, 8

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, 6

## **1.7 Scope and Limitation**

The study focused broadly on countering international terrorism by military in Africa. Particularly, the study analyzed the response of Kenya Defense Forces to acts of terror within Kenya as well as regionally within the Greater Horn of Africa. Geographically therefore, the study's scope is on Kenya and the Horn of Africa whose insecurity epicenter will be Somalia. An actor of interest is the al-Shabaab militia group that has its bases in Somalia and has declared allegiance to international terror organization Al-Qaida. In terms of time, the study covers the period when the KDF intervened in Somalia in pursuit of Al-Shabaab terrorist aggressors in 2011 to the current period which is capped at 2019.

Some of the anticipated limitations will be the limited accessibility to vital information due to the sensitivity of security issues. However, being a military officer I hope to engage some of my networks to reach key informants. The researcher will rely on snowballing method of data collection to reach not easily accessible data. Further, the challenge of bias anticipated due to my association with the KDF may be a limitation. The research plans to use various triangulation approaches such as engaging a variety of data collection methods both secondary and primary as a way of enhancing reliability and validity.

## **1.8 Justification of the Study**

The study highlights both academic and policy justifications.

### **1.8.1 Academic Justification**

Academically, the study contributes more knowledge and literature relating to the military and counterterrorism approaches locally but internationally, as terrorism is a

global issue. The study findings will fill knowledge gaps in the theory and practice of international security studies. For instance the study will enter the current debate on whether the military approach to terrorism is still productive. As such, attempting to answer the question why states continue to use military intervention in countering international terrorism. Moreover, researchers carrying out related studies will use the study findings for more information on counter-terrorism strategies and their subsequent effectiveness or lack thereof.

### **1.8.2 Policy Justification**

The study will inform policy makers such as national governments, regional security organizations and international organizations such as the UN. For instance, through its recommendations, this study will assist the Kenyan government formulate policies that may go a long way in informing counterterrorism measures in as far as military intervention is concerned. The formulation of said policies is key, and their enactment and enforcement is important as well. The failure to prevent frequent terrorist attacks has put pressure on the Kenyan government and its agencies, and focus has lately been on ensuring the safety of Kenyans. As such, this study is relevant because it seeks to help the government deal with terrorism in the country and specifically in Nairobi, and the Coastal and North Eastern regions. Additionally, this study is relevant in that it will serve as a source of reference for future academicians.

## 1.9 Theoretical Framework

This study will adopt securitization theory as depicted by Ole Wæver, which according to Rita Taureck, is “a tool for practical security analysis.”<sup>67</sup> As Wæver puts it, “It is by labeling something a security issue that it becomes one.”<sup>68</sup> In this context, the theory produces the sense of urgency where dealing with the security threat that is terrorism is concerned. By securitizing an issue, Wæver argues that it then becomes prudent to use “extraordinary measures” in tackling it. Just by labeling an object a security threat, the theory insists that it is no longer within the scope of normal politics but rather within that of crisis government. Therefore, needs to be handled quickly as well as with minimal use of standard principles of democracy in decision making.<sup>69</sup> To successfully employ the securitization theory, there are three steps involved: (a) identifying the existential threat, (b) instant emergency action, and (c) identifying the effects of the actions employed, which in this case are counterterrorism measures. While the theory does have its moral and ethical critics, it is relevant to this study in that it defines measures that governments, and specifically the Kenyan government, employ to fight international acts of terror.

## 1.10 Hypotheses

1. States justify use of military interventions through the principle of responsibility to protect.
2. The Kenya Defense Forces intervention in countering international terrorism has not been effective.
3. The challenges that Kenya Defense Forces faces in its attempt to counter international terrorism range from legal and financial to economic challenges.

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<sup>67</sup> Rita Taureck, “Securitization theory and securitization studies,” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, no. 9, 53.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

<sup>69</sup> Ibid

## **1.11 Research Methodology**

The section entails research design, methods of data gathering, as well as ways of analyzing data. Broadly, the study used qualitative approach because the approach focuses on the study of human behavior and social life in a natural context or setting.<sup>70</sup> This will enable the researcher to analyze military interventions and counter-terrorism mechanisms as they happened. A key reason for adopting qualitative research approach is because it is designed to answer output questions of “what is”, “how” and “why”.

### **1.11.1 Research Design**

The study employed case study research design. Case study was important because it enables understanding in which events are studied. Case study is also essential in that it allows deeper comprehension of scenarios therefore allowing the establishment of correlations that were not obvious before. In this case one can discover interplay between main variables namely countering international terrorism and military intervention such as KDF.

### **1.11.2 Target Population and sampling frame**

Target population can be defined as the total group of persons from which the study samples might be drawn.<sup>71</sup> The target population in this study will be drawn from 350 military officers from the three services, Kenya Army, Kenya Navy and Kenya Air force who have served operation Linda Nchi, Amisom and Operation Linda Boni forest. 30% purposive sampling was used to arrive at 106 sample size of the total population.

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<sup>70</sup> Punch K.F, *Introduction to Research Methods in Education*, London: Sage Publications, 2011. p.16; Denzin, N.K and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds) *Handbook of Qualitative research*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994, p. 170

<sup>71</sup> Daniel, Johnnie. 2012. *Sampling essentials: practical guidelines for making sampling choices*. Los Angeles: Sage.

**Table 1.1 Target population, sample size and sampling technique**

Target group	Population	Sample size	Sampling technique
Linda Nchi	95	28	Purposive
Amisom	200	60	Purposive
Linda Boni	55	17	Purposive
Total	350	105	

### **1.11.3 Methods of data Collection**

The study mainly used secondary data and this was triangulated with primary data where need arises. To get relevant primary data the study will adopt key informant interviews based on purposive sampling. This will involve interview certain informants believed to be experts or practitioners such as military officers in the field. Secondary data will come from methods such as literature and documentary analysis of media reports on military interventions such as those of KDF and counterterrorism in Africa. The study will also analyze primary documents such as procedural documents like meeting minutes, formal letters, agreements, communiqués of governments in Kenya, the Horn of Africa and globally. Further, the study will also analyze reports by relevant international organizations such as the UN, AU, AMISOM, and USA AFRICOM.

### **1.11.4 Data Analysis and Presentation**

Data analysis focused on establishing the linkages or interrelationships between the main variables of the study; countering international terrorism and role of military intervention.

The processes of data analysis started with data reduction through activities such as editing, segmenting, summarizing, coding, finding similarities and patterns. Also, the

data was analyzed interpretatively through synthesizing, categorizing, and organizing it into patterns that produce the description of the phenomena in question.<sup>72</sup> Data collected was purely qualitative and was analyzed by means of content analysis which involved the observation and in depth explanation of phenomena that comprised the objectives of the study.<sup>73</sup>

#### **1.11.5 Ethical Considerations**

The researcher obtained an introductory letter that was used at the relevant offices where relevant information for the study was to be gathered. Informed consent is paramount, and as such, the researcher provides enough background concerning the study to willing participants before fully bringing them on board. The researcher also explained the purpose and advantages of the study to the participants and should they agree to provide their input, it will be of their own volition, free from any compulsion or promises given as incentives for participation. Additionally, the actual participant signed a non-disclosure form covering the nature and purpose of the research, the procedures to be utilized, and probable advantages of participating. Lastly, the ethical consideration on confidentiality and anonymity was adhered to, where the researcher ensured confidentiality and anonymity of the participants during the study process and after the research is complete.

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<sup>72</sup> Nolasco, Lazarus Kubasu. "The Management of Conflicts in Kenya." (2017).

<sup>73</sup> Holsti, O.R., "Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities", (MA: Addison-Wesley 1980) pp, 7

## **1.12 Chapter outline**

The study has 5 chapters.

Chapter one provides the background information, problem statement, objectives and research questions, literature review, and theoretical framework. Other sections included in chapter one is the justification, the scope, limitations of the study and research methodology.

Chapter two: Military interventions in countering terrorism in Africa. The chapter analyzes the deployment of military to counter international terrorism in Africa. It gives the history and cases of military intervention in addressing terrorism in Africa.

Chapter three: The Kenya Defense Forces in countering international terrorism. The chapter explores and describes the role of KDF in dealing with terror attacks in Kenya and the Greater Horn of Africa.

Chapter four brings out the analysis and findings of the study. It establishes the mechanisms and challenges that Kenya Defense Forces faces while countering international terrorism.

Chapter five: Summary, Conclusion and recommendations

## CHAPTER TWO

### USE OF THE MILITARY TO COUNTER INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA

#### 2.0 Introduction

This Chapter conceptually looked both military and non-military in countering international terrorism. It shows how non-military instruments that can be used in countering terrorism and ensures that the security of the state is observed. It further elaborates on why the military is preferred in countering international terrorism in reference to how Kenyan Military has been involved in different counter terrorism intervention in different regions to ensure the safety of the state or community.

#### 2.1 Counter terrorism at global and regional level

War and conflicts are considered to emerge from various sources in the society. It has been observed in various circumstances that struggle for power, ideological differences, control of wealth and power, ethnic and social problems, distribution of resources as well as culture and religion in the society.<sup>74</sup> When such variations that exists in any society is not addressed or embraced, then there is a possibility of emergence of frustration amongst the people which in the end leads to various aggressive acts. Based on these, countering acts of terrorism involves the mechanisms, practice and the skills that nation states, governments use to address or mitigate the acts and threats of terrorism in the society.<sup>75</sup> Counter terrorism demands mutual cooperation amongst all stakeholders, both military and the non-military to

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<sup>74</sup> Macionis, John J. "Social Problems, Books a la Carte Edition Plus." (2015).

<sup>75</sup> Adeyemi, Adebayo E., and Mahmoud N. Musa. *Terrorism and Political Violence in West Africa: A Global Perspective*. Xlibris Corporation, 2015.

ensure that there is adequate surveillance and enhanced sharing of information in order to reduce losses.

Nation States in numerous circumstances have been involved in using varied methods in addressing the acts and threats of terror which involves the use of the military as well as other softer ways that enhance human desires.<sup>76</sup> Globally, the nation states under the UN have employed mechanisms to mitigate terrorism based on the structures that was initiated to enhance the promotion of international, regional and national counter terrorism agenda since 2006. These mechanisms were revised in 2014 to entail situations friendly to the spread of terrorism as well as ways of responding to the concerns.<sup>77</sup>

Despite the war on terror being mainly linked to global terrorists, African states still face numerous challenges to security that have huge impacts and this poses questions on the points of focus for Africa as well as the US in countering terror. Africa experiences various rebellion, insurgent groups that in many instances are not classified as terrorist and they cause huge threat to the African people hence a threat to stability within the states. For instance the militia groups in East Congo that for many years have been targeted by the ICC for committing crimes against humanity, the Niger delta of Nigeria as well as the Janjaweed militia in Dafur Sudan.<sup>78</sup>

Regionally, East Africa Community forms part of the Horn of Africa that has been viewed to be affected by acts and threats of terrorism. Almost all countries in this

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid

<sup>77</sup> Karlsrud, John. "Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?." *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 6 (2017): 1215-1231.

<sup>78</sup> Phares, Walid. *Future jihad: Terrorist strategies against America*. St. Martin's Press, 2014.

region in one way or the other have been attacked by the terrorists. This in can be linked to the region's relations and their stands on war against terror and also foreign nationals that has been targets of the terrorist as well, such as the Western states points that are situated in the EAC. Because of the aggressive acts of the militia groupings, most states within the EAC and Horn of Africa at large have been determined to use the non-military and military to counter various acts and threats of the terrorists.

## **2.2 Non-military tools used to counter terrorism**

This approach has been used and is still being used in eradicating vices of terrorism since it is viewed as peaceful. In countering terrorism, non-military tools have been used to help stabilize the security hence safety of the affected population. This is because, terrorism has been known to be a highly subjective and mainly determined by political and economic considerations of various governments around the world,<sup>79</sup> hence the use of non-military tools have been considered to work in such cases. Brill on the other hand is of the opinion that terrorism remains a pertinent topic for most governments around the world due to the nature of the consequences it can unleash.<sup>80</sup> This has given many nations opportunity to think of methods to use to fight terrorism.<sup>81</sup> Following the need for nations to counter terrorism, the tools and methods employed to fight terrorism must be in sync with one another and mutually exclusive methods avoided. This invited many uncalled for political attention, the media, clergy, scholars, opinion shapers as well as the citizens.<sup>82</sup> Solving terrorism problems lies in collaboration between various parts of our societies like media, the civil society,

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<sup>79</sup> Knudsen, Devin. *A new wave of African counterterrorism legislation: contextualizing the Kenyan security laws*, Georgetown journal of international affairs, (2015), pp. 8-11.

<sup>80</sup> Brill, Steven. *Is America any safer?* The Atlantic, (2016), pp2-5.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, (2016), p7.

<sup>82</sup> Ganor, Boaz. *Trends in modern international terrorism*. Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, (2014), pp. 34-36.

diplomatic tools, the business community, educational institutions and multi-agency approaches.<sup>83</sup>

However, according to the United Nations (UN), many measures have already been taken to combat the threats of terrorist activities, where some are effective, but it also emphasizes on the fact that both military and non-military means have been employed differently in countries around the world to counter terrorism.<sup>84</sup>

### **2.2.1 Diplomatic Engagement**

Diplomacy is the tool that builds consensus necessary for international cooperation.<sup>85</sup> It helps states understand each other's' needs in the fight on corruption and then build each other's capacity in fight against terrorism.<sup>86</sup> A lot of diplomacy had to be undertaken behind the scenes to build up the coalition that was going to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.

As Bognoe puts it, diplomacy helps solve other arising or fringe problems that usually accompany fighting terrorist activities such as human rights violations, illegal immigration, environmental protection and even organized crime.<sup>87</sup> Diplomacy is considered a possible response to terrorism. Thus diplomacy is crucial in this fight

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<sup>83</sup> Long, Austin. *Small is beautiful the counterterrorism operation in Afghanistan*. Orbis, Volume 54, No, 2, (2010), pp19-24

<sup>84</sup> The United Nations. *The African regional high-level conference on counter terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism conducive to terrorism*, Nairobi, Kenya (2019).

<sup>85</sup> McAleenan, Kevin. *Department of homeland security strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence*. Homeland Security, United States, (2019), pp 12-19.

<sup>86</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. *Extremism in 2019: new approaches to facing the threat*. The Tony Blair institute or global change, (2019), pp. 11-13.

<sup>87</sup> Bognoe, Camilla. *Understanding the role of gender in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, good practices for law enforcement*. Organization or security and cooperation in Europe, Vienna, Austria, (2019), pp. 16-20.

against international terrorism and its importance cannot be overstated.<sup>88</sup> Naturally such means build constructive engagement between nations which helps in the development of anti-terrorism coalitions. Hence promoting international relation as nations have opportunity to negotiate and counter the terrorist.

### **2.2.2 Information Sharing**

Information sharing has been considered as one of the non-military strategy in countering terrorism. It is important for all scholarly information available about terrorism be shared by all stakeholders involved in fighting to terrorism threats.<sup>89</sup> Sharing information has been a means through which technical analysis of the information shared with the intelligence unit is done hence an application of paradigm shift against terrorist attacks.

Indeed, some government agencies have been protective over the information they possess as they have not been willing to share with other governmental agencies for security reasons. As has been witnessed in the United States (US) government, a body must be created to assess and coalesce all government intelligence.<sup>90</sup> All that is required is for nations to be flexible and resilient in sharing information to confront terroristic attacks.

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<sup>88</sup> Finlay, Brian. *Counterterrorism spending: protecting Americans while promoting most efficiency and accountability*. Stimson study group, United States, (2019), pp. 3-8.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, (2019), p. 19.

<sup>90</sup> The United Nations. *The African regional high-level conference on counter terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism conducive to terrorism*, Nairobi, Kenya (2019).

### 2.2.3 Media Reporting

The media narrative given about terrorism is a powerful force in shaping the public's opinion.<sup>91</sup> Some of the media outlets are great tools on how the general population communicates with each other, for example live shows in radio and television.<sup>92</sup> Responsible media is supposed to be fair and balanced in its reporting.<sup>93</sup> The United Nations notes that due to the media's craving for ratings some media outlets may prefer sensationalized reports as terrorism has also exploited the media to promote its own agendas of recruitment, expansion, publicity, coverage, seize, suppression, and even as a tool to gain sympathy<sup>94</sup>. Thus media need to improve its reporting when on matters of violent extremism and terrorism to help the countering of terrorism.

### 2.2.4 Economic Sanctions

Mueller is of the opinion that sanctions are a means of fighting terrorism. It is either used with the intention of prevention of terrorist acts and ensures the security of the nation benefits its civilian population; and it may also be used after the facts have been established.<sup>95</sup> Sanctions can be directed straight at the terror group.<sup>96</sup> These measures can be formally illustrated as economic forceful mechanisms used in opposition to one or many countries in order to initiate policy changes.<sup>97</sup> This reality is challenged with the emergence of wealthy financiers and states.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Koehler, Daniel. *Violence and terrorism from the far right: policy options to counter an elusive threat*. ICCT policy brief, (2019) pp. 1-3.

<sup>92</sup> Robinson, Pier. *The CNN effect: the myths of news, foreign policy and intervention*, London: Routledge, (2002), pp. 79-81.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, (2002), p. 90.

<sup>94</sup> The United Nations. *The African regional high-level conference on counter terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism conducive to terrorism*, Nairobi, Kenya (2019).

<sup>95</sup> Mueller, John. *Terrorism since 9/11: the case of America*. Columbus, Ohio University, (2018), p. 8.

<sup>96</sup> McAleenan, Kevin. *Department of homeland security strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence*. Homeland security, United States (2019), pp 12-19.

<sup>97</sup> Eva, Guitierrez and Sandeep, Singh. *What regulatory frameworks are more conducive to mobile banking? Empirical evidence from findex data*. The world bank, Washington, DC, (2019), pp. 7-11.

<sup>98</sup> Gareau, Frederick. *State terrorism and the United States: from counter insurgency to the war on terror*. Atlanta: clarity press, (2004) p. 14.

### **2.2.5 State Collaborations and Cooperation**

It seems over the recent years the EU and AU are increasingly playing a more important role in counter terrorism.<sup>99</sup> It is important to appreciate that both organizations that seem to have joined forces by responding to terrorist activities as a borderless problem. They have enhanced their cooperation and harmonized their bureaucracies when it comes to dealing with the threat of terrorism by use of preventive measures and active combat missions.<sup>100</sup> In fact, African nations have been committed in the implementation of the international strategies for countering terrorism as well as action plans to deter violence extremism nationally and internationally.<sup>101</sup> Global powers such as the USA, France and UK have also shown their concern to weed out terrorism from Africa. Hence, strengthening the security of nations, lowering the frequency and the routine of nay planned terror attacks.

### **2.2.6 Intelligence Sharing**

Intelligence sharing is an important non-military strategy in countering terrorism. In accordance to that, Sheppard posit that covert actions may include intelligence gathering through infiltration of these organizations and other clandestine activities.<sup>102</sup> Intelligence is necessary in combating terrorism most effectively by preempting its occurrence and effects it may have on a society. It is important to note that the core activities of intelligence are interception of communication and locating of persons of interest and technology has given intelligence operatives more dynamism in their

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<sup>99</sup> Simons, Greg. *Mass media, and modern warfare: reporting on Russia war on terrorism*, Surrey: Ashgate publishing limited, (2010), P. 99.

<sup>100</sup> The United Nations. *The African regional high-level conference on counter terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism conducive to terrorism*, Nairobi, Kenya (2019).

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, (2019), p. 19.

<sup>102</sup> Sheppard, Ben. *The psychology of terrorism: public government responses to attacks*. (2009), p. 91.

work.<sup>103</sup> Technology enables intelligence operatives to have more ability in their investigative capacity and even surveillance.<sup>104</sup>

### **2.2.7 International Organizations**

Inter- governmental efforts to fight terror around the world have grown significantly and so have the number of counter terrorism laws, policies and enforcement approaches which are being overseen by over seventy international institutions around the world.<sup>105</sup> Indeed, the international organizations have a great consideration to the security of the nations as they ensure their safety. This is done in promulgating international rules, trying to develop global policy standards, drafting criminal laws to information sharing between agencies.

### **2.3 Military in Counter Terrorism**

Silke reveals that there are a myriad of means of dealing with a terrorist threat but many countries prefer to use their military as a first means of deterrence. The United State of America took a more militaristic approach to law enforcement and this was marked by the formation of homeland security department and passing of the patriot act bill into law after the 9/11 attack.<sup>106</sup> Regularly, countries that take this approach to fight, especially, home grown terrorists, become controversial in the eyes of the world. Good cases in point are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Northern Ireland

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<sup>103</sup>Bryden, Matt and Bahra, Premdeep. *East Africa triple helix: the Dusit hotel attach and the historical evolution of the jihadi threat*. Volume 12, issue 6, (2019), pp.12-18.

<sup>104</sup> Sheppard, Ben. *The psychology of terrorism: public government responses to attacks*. (2009), p. 91.

<sup>105</sup>Ganor, Boaz. *Trends in modern international terrorism*. Interdisciplinary center Herzliya. (2014), pp. 34-36.

<sup>106</sup>Silke, Alfred. *Terrorists, victims and societies: psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences*, England, John Wiley and sons, (2013), p.13.

problems with the IRA.<sup>107</sup> The use of military power is especially dangerous because military tactics are “broad-swords” in that they are usually aimed at taking out a large number of enemy combatants in one strike and over a sizable area.

The war on terror has been tightened since 2001 and nation states have been forced to embrace direct military intervention and this has effectively determined the results of countering terrorism. The use of military either directly or indirectly have been preferred by many global actors due to the nature of the terrorist. The aggressive nature of terror groupings of inflicting pain and destabilizing peace has led military use rather than traditional rules and norms enforcement mechanisms. Objective of the military intervention is to kill the terrorists, destroy their institutions as well as eradicate their potential from conducting the acts of terrorism.

## **2.4 Why Military is preferred**

Military is preferred because of the following reasons;

### **2.4.1 Deterrence of acts of terror**

Nation states perceived military use to deter present and subsequent acts of terror. Military personnel have been preferred in countering terrorism because of the technicality they have in dealing with criminal offences. Introspectively, different nations deploy their military for reasons of ensuring that terror attacks are handled and or kept at bay from happening within their territories or neighboring states. The military has been used to discourage the terrorists from taking some course of action that might jeopardize the existence of peace in a state. Smith is of the opinion that the

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<sup>107</sup> Hoyt, Timothy. *Pakistan, an ally by another name*. US Naval institute proceedings, (2011), pp. 44-50.

deterrence strategy is coming back in fashion. It was the go-to strategy during the cold war and in the post-cold war period it began to be employed again.<sup>108</sup> For instance the Afghanistan invasion was a punishment to Taliban for hosting the terrorist as well as a warning to states that sponsors the terrorists. The invasion of Iraq was also a show on the determination to eradicate terrorist despite Iraq was not a sponsor of al Qaeda.

Consequently, the Kenyan Defence Forces in the fighting of terrorist activities in Africa have been used to initiate attacks on the hide outs of the militia groupings currently in Somalia and Kenya. This has jeopardized the operations of the militia groupings by destabilizing their sources of income as well as repossessing areas that had been captured by the terrorists for instance the case of Kismayu that for many years has been used by the terrorist to smuggled goods for their own gains.

#### **2.4.2 Decisive Effect and Degrading Capability**

Stohl found that there is a school of thought of the thinking that so-called precision weapons have made fighting terrorism much easier and more efficient. Reports indicate that there is still a number of collateral damage experienced by military forces, especially in hostage situations.<sup>109</sup> The military has been used and is still being used to aggressively destroy the various sources of revenue of the terrorist in various parts of Africa. For instance the KDF in partnership with the American air forces has enhanced attacks on various bases of the Al-Shabaab in Somalia. This has led to loss of various war heads that the militia is using as well as the capture of various southern parts of Somalia, the ports of Kismayu and Mogadishu which the terror group had been using for many years to enhance piracy in the Indian Ocean.

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<sup>108</sup> Eva, Guitterez and Sandeep, Singh. *What regulatory frameworks are more conducive to mobile banking? Empirical evidence from findex data*. The world bank, Washington, DC, (2019), pp. 7-11.

<sup>109</sup>Stohl, Rachel. *US arms exports and military assistance in the global war on terror, center for defense information at the world security institute*, (2007), pp. 11-14.

### **2.4.3 Equipment and Resources**

Silke opines that the more the government strikes the terrorists at all battlefield by engaging all state machineries, the more the military becomes effective and efficient. The heavy surveillance equipment, air assets, drones, logistics support have made military as the first preference for any counter terrorism mission. Sometimes the military is engaged in a defensive role if an imminent threat is detected.<sup>110</sup> This will necessitate in the deployment of forces in areas with large crowds as these make for the soft underbelly of any government. When it comes to combat, the military have the capability to penetrate difficult places like stadiums, airports or even theatres. Examples from the past that show public crowded places are a high-risk zone for terror attacks are like the Munich Olympic massacre in 1972, Lord airport attack initiated by the Japanese red army in 1972 and the 2007 Islamic militia attack on Glasgow airport that failed, just to mention a few.<sup>111</sup> But all in all the military can be an effective deterrent tool against terror attacks like in the 1974 case when troops were deployed to Heathrow airport to quell fears that Palestinian militants who wanted to bring down planes using portable surface to air missiles.

### **2.4.4 Skills and Training**

This is an indirect military intervention that entails provision of various kinds of support like supporting intelligence and military training to a third party. Military personnel are specially trained to survive harsh and even hostile environments. The specialized forces wing of any military is usually the *crème de la crème* of its personnel. This human resource is a vital asset to governments especially when considering and initiating a first strike against terrorist suspects.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup>Silke, Alfred. *Terrorists, victims and societies: psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences*, England, John Wiley and sons, (2013), p.13.

<sup>111</sup>Stohl, Rachel. *US arms exports and military assistance in the global war on terror*, center for defense information at the world security institute, (2007), pp. 11-14.

<sup>112</sup>McAleenan, Kevin. *Department of homeland security strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence*. Homeland security, United States (2019), pp 12-19.

Just like the efforts initiated to train and equip Syrian rebel groups to fight Islamic State, United States of America has used its intelligence, sale of arms as and logistical assistance to Saudi Arabia intervention in Yemen. Similarly the AU through its AMISOM has supported the training of military personnel in Somalia so as to enhance the capacity of the Somalia in the war against Al-Shabaab.

#### **2.4.5 Retaliation Force**

Freese posits that a massive retaliatory strike is the most forceful show of might a government may exhibit in its fight against terror.<sup>113</sup> A state may feel it should retaliate against another state for aiding or abetting terror elements or it may choose to strike a non-state actor which lies within a failing or a failed state.<sup>114</sup> These operations are coercive and are intended to degrade the capabilities of the enemy or degrade their resolve to stand up against the government as they shall keep facing devastating consequences.<sup>115</sup> The military is super effective to cease and desist terror operations.<sup>116</sup>

Military has been used to retaliate and disrupt the operation of the terror groups in Africa. For instance, the Nigerian Defence forces have been used in various occasions to respond to the threats from the Boko Haram since they started affecting peace and security in the country. Threats from the militia grouping have traversed various countries within West Africa and this has caused various military interventions so as

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<sup>113</sup>Freese, Rebecca. *Evidence based counterterrorism of flying blind? How to understand and achieve what works, perspectives on terrorism*, (2018), pp. 9-11.

<sup>114</sup>McAleenan, Kevin. *Department of homeland security strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence*. Homeland security, United States (2019), pp 12-19.

<sup>115</sup>Bognoe, Camilla. *Understanding the role of gender in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, good practices for law enforcement*. Security and cooperation, (2016).

<sup>116</sup>Silke, Alfred. *Terrorists, victims and societies: psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences*, England, John Wiley and sons, (2013), p.13.

to curb the acts of terrorism. Similarly, in east Africa, military forces have been used to retaliate and destabilize the actions of the Al-Shabaab. This has been established by the moves of the Kenya Defence Forces to launch war against the terror group since 2011 when they started causing insecurity in the Kenyan territory. Kenya launched the Operation Linda Nchi and Operation Linda Boni forest that have the objective of eradicating the terrorists within the Kenyan soil and also to destabilize their operations in Somali. All these efforts have enhanced some aspects of peace in the region since the threats have been reduced and serious monitoring is established.

#### **2.4.6 Military Intelligence**

Military intelligence ensures that information is gathered and analyzed to help in giving ways that can help commanders in decision making.<sup>117</sup> It is the operations for gathering information for military purposes which are usually carried out in a clandestine manner.<sup>118</sup> It is done by personnel that are usually not decked in military regalia and it could be done in any form, both mobile and immobile surveys, individuals on foot, cars that are not marked. Back up military police can also be employed.<sup>119</sup>

Counterintelligence emphasizes more on the identification of terror threats to commanders. They provide the commanders with indicators, hazards in line with time, date place as well as the type of attacks as key parts of intelligence services. Proper information gathering at all strategies that focuses on terrorism threats is

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<sup>117</sup>Austin, N. J. E. and N. B. Rankov, *Exploration: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople*. London: Routledge, 1995

<sup>118</sup>Dettmer, Jaimie. *Al-Shabaab's jihadi recruitment drive in Minnesota*, the daily beast, (2013), p.15

<sup>119</sup>Freese, Rebecca. *Evidence based counterterrorism of flying blind? How to understand and achieve what works, perspectives on terrorism*, (2018), pp. 9-11.

<sup>119</sup>McAleenan, Kevin. *Department of homeland security strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence*. Homeland security, United States (2019), pp 12-19.

essential since it minimizes duplication and this enhance best gathering resources are used.<sup>120</sup>

#### **2.4.7 International Practice**

According to Stohl the use of military force is considered an international practice.<sup>121</sup> Maintaining peace and security requires international involvement of nation states. This is because global challenges like war, terrorism have impacts that spill over from one state to the other as well. The practice of collective security therefore is essential. For instance acts of terrorism have been a huge threat in African security and Somalia has been at the centerpiece for terrorism in the HOA, this has caused the AU to initiate military intervention to curb the menace. African states have jointly worked through the AMISOM to help in initiating stable government in Somalia and enhancing international peace.

International practice has also been advanced by the Chinese role in advancing security in the horn of Africa with its first major role coming in 2008 by launching the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. China has maintained its presence in Africa by dispatched of 32<sup>nd</sup> mission to the Gulf of Aden in April 2019. It has enhanced massive maritime security through the Chinese navy by deploying over 26000 in the horn of Africa during the 2008-18 maritime security operations.<sup>122</sup>

China in the recent years has also deployed peace keepers to Africa through the United Nations mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in which it maintain about 1000

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<sup>120</sup> KDF Counter Terrorism manual, Kenya (2012) pp 80.

<sup>121</sup>Stohl, Rachel. *US arms exports and military assistance in the global war on terror, center for defense information at the world security institute*, (2007), pp. 11-14.

<sup>122</sup>China Global Television Network, '10 years of China's Gulf of Aden journey: a global player with more responsibility', 27 Dec. 2018.

Chinese soldiers. It has also contributed to missions in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mali and Sudan. China established a base in Djibouti in 2017. This base enables china to effectively handle counterterrorism in the operations. In 2015, China passed a law that provides a domestic legal foundation for overseas counterterrorism and intelligence-gathering operations. This is notable given the number of foreign military facilities in Djibouti.<sup>123</sup>

#### **2.4.8 Modus Operandi**

Modus Operandi is a particular way or method of doing things. It is a military language used in deliberating and handling the strategies used by the militia groupings. This is essential as well in describing criminal acts.<sup>124</sup> Based on this, the mandate of the military, culture and modus operandi have enhanced counter terrorism policies into a thin area of operations in the host states. For instance the success in Iraq has been discussed widely hence coming to a consensus that it was neither the extra troops nor a new population-centric modus operandi that led to the decrease in violence.

#### **2.4.9 Reliability and Dependency**

Bognoe is of the opinion that military power is the most efficient method of dealing with terror threats to the state and that governments should use their massive powers bestowed in their militaries to crush terror organizations and completely degrade their capabilities to harm any of their civilians.<sup>125</sup> This has given nations confidence in using military because of its unique characteristic of being reliable and dependent on.

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<sup>123</sup> Downs, E., Becker, J. and de Gategno, P., 'China's military support facility in Djibouti: The economic and security dimensions of China's first overseas base', CNA, July 2017.

<sup>124</sup>Vronsky, R. *Serial Killers* (Berkley Books, 2004), P 412

<sup>125</sup>Bognoe, Camilla. *Understanding the role of gender in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, good practices for law enforcement*. Organization of security and cooperation in Europe, Vienna, Austria, (2019), pp 16-20.

Reliability and dependency has enhanced efficiency and effectiveness from various fronts that are involved in fighting terrorism.

It can be observed that terrorism activities have been responded to in different ways in Africa. Sahelian states in West Africa embraced the American assistance to have control in their spaces that are ungoverned. Despite this, they still face internal problems.<sup>126</sup> This has also been witnessed in the Somalia case where KDF has jointly worked with the AMISOM to destabilize the operations of the Al-Shabaab that traverse borders to cause insecurity in East Africa. The mutual cooperation and interdependence amongst states enhances better results in curbing the acts of terrorism despite being expensive.

#### **2.4.10 Military Operational Reach**

The military operation reach is applied in counterterrorism, owing to the fact that it has greater enemy reach and penetration.<sup>127</sup> The military is said to have the full capability to check, attack, destabilize as well as eliminate terror groupings that seeks to affect in the state, its population as well as its national interest and allies in general. The case of Kenya and Somalia shows that USA can advance the potential of the host government troops through the provision of trainings and machineries to help in destabilizing terror activities, intelligence gathering, and assistance in separating terrorist from the population as well as protection to the friendly bases.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Cooper, Frederick. *Africa since 1940: the past of the present*. Vol. 13. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, (2016), p. 26.

<sup>128</sup>Freese, Rebecca. *Evidence based counterterrorism of flying blind? How to understand and achieve what works, perspectives on terrorism*, (2018), pp. 9-11.

<sup>128</sup>McAleenan, Kevin. *Department of homeland security strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence*. Homeland security, United States (2019), pp 12-19.

#### **2.4.11 Regime change**

In countering the acts of terrorism in the international system, it can involve various actions of overthrowing governments that are involved in the promotion of terrorists agenda or are involved in the provision of safe havens to the militant groupings. This can be closely linked to fighting terrorists following the 9/11 attack. The military has been used and can be used to restore sanity in the actions of states that are viewed to enhance dangers to human security globally. For instance, Ethiopia raided Somalia in December 2006 with the assistance from the United States of America air force power. The American Special Forces units from CJTFHOA actively supported the military forces from Ethiopia. This raid on Somalia was instigated by the increased tolerance by the Islamic Court Union on the activities of the al-Qaeda and this allegation was hugely criticized by the Islamic court union. Consequently in the operation Enduring Freedom made the US and its allies to find themselves in stabilizing mission whom worsened to insurgency against resurgent Taliban, Ethiopia's military intervention pushed it to a weakening conflict in Somalia which continued up when it pulled out its soldiers in 2009 January. The cases indicates that weaknesses of the military force in countering terrorism.<sup>129</sup>

#### **2.4.12 Retaliation**

Countries may use their military power to initiate retaliations or attacks on other states on non-state groupings that enhance acts of terrorism within fragile or weak states. Such actions of states are coercive since they involve the use of force. Retaliatory invasions aims at forcing the militants to stop initiating more attacks as well as to compel the states that are giving them safe havens and also those supporting them to

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<sup>129</sup> Edmund Sanders and Abukar Albadri, "Renewed Fighting Edges Somalia Closer to Civil War," Chicago Tribune, December 21, 2006; Lauren Gelfand, "Ethiopia starts withdrawal of troops from Somalia," JDW, Vol. 46, No. 2, January 14, 2009; "Good-bye, maybe," Africa Confidential, Vol. 50, No. 3, February 6, 2009; "Al-Qaeda on the March," The Economist, May 22, 2009.

stop the attitude of assisting them. For instance, the 1950s Israel attack on Egypt to retaliate on the attack by Cairo backed Palestine Fedayeen as well as Jordan towards the end of 1960s to retaliate on the PLO, PFLP as well as others towards Israel.

In Africa, Military retaliation has been used to curb the missions of the terrorists as in the case of the response to Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam attacks, the USA government initiated attacks of militia training grounds in Afghanistan as well as chemical weapons that were suspected to have been planted in Sudan and this happened on August 20<sup>th</sup> 1998 under the operation dubbed INFINITE REACH.<sup>130</sup> Also, following the several terror attacks in Kenya by the Al-Shabaab in 2011 led to the deployment of the Kenya Defence Forces in the operation Linda Nchi that led to the destructions of various activities of the militants. The actions of the KDF in partnership with the AMISOM led to the repossession of the Kismayu and Mogadishu port that has been used by the Al-Shabaab to acquire resources to fund their activities. It has also been observed that the military has been used eradicate sea piracy. The Kenyan military with support from the American Special Forces had been used to curtail the actions of the militia groupings that for many years jeopardized sea operations in the Indian Ocean. This has enhanced effective international trade within the sea routes on the ocean.

## **2.5 Problems of Military in countering International Terrorism**

The above section has shown that in numerous occasions, the military can be used to provide support to a state's objective of counterterrorism objectives as well as in the provision of capacities that civilian units like the police and the intelligence units

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<sup>130</sup> Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies; Inside America's War on Terror*, London, UK: Free Press, 2004, pp. 184-187; Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars; The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001*, London, UK: Penguin, 2005, pp. 416-431.

might have inadequate capacity to handle. The military has been engaged since they are believed to have physical and psychological stamina that is required to enhance operations in the fragile environment that other service units have not taken seriously; this has made military officers to launch coercive attacks on terrorist and their sanctuaries.<sup>131</sup>

As a result of the belief that military personnel are seen as people who can endure hardship conditions, many governments have used them to achieve their national interest of eradicating terrorist, they have been viewed as magic bullet that can help in solving complex problems pertaining security. Despite all these, there are several challenges that involve the use of military in countering terrorism in the international system.

### **2.5.1 Diplomatic consequences**

Categorically the armed forces mechanisms can be taken by other nation states to be a challenge to both domestic and foreign policy goals hence this in one way or the other has may cause diplomatic complications. For instance the development of the AFRICOM as the USA military regional command enhanced a wavy reception by some states Africa since it is located in Stuttgart in German. Officials from Nigeria had a view that this is a means of reducing their influence in the region, whereas South Africa sees AFRICOM as a way in which the African continent is dragged into war on terror, leading to the destabilization of the continent's economy hence jeopardizing the effectiveness of AU. Critics have a perception that the AFRICOM is a ladder used by the US to advance neocolonialism hence used to protect their socio economic and political struggle with china and their allies that have hidden ambitions to exploit resources in Africa.

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<sup>131</sup> Andrew, Christopher. "The defence of the realm: The authorised history of MI5." (2010).

In the domestic context, the actions of military officers can jeopardize relations with neighboring states more so in situations where military officers advances to neighboring territories to pursue insurgents. In the war against Al-Shabaab, the militants invaded Kenyan territory and this led to the employment of the KDF in the Operation Linda Nchi in which Kenya Defence Forces used force to launched war against the militia grouping. The porous borders between Kenya and Somalia created room for the terror group to cross the boundary and launch attacks. Also Ethiopia and Somalia has had conflicts as a result of the military officers that cross borders to search for the militants in Somalia.

### **2.5.2 Price of military intervention**

Military intervention has been viewed as an expensive exercise that consumes huge resources that some opinion shapers believe can be utilized in enhancing the growth in state GDP. States that have been involved in military intervention such as Israel in their control and possession of South Lebanon during the period of 1982-2000 as well as the Afghanistan predicaments by NATO, military retaliation and regime change can enhance longer military control and possession in a controversial struggle against insurgents.<sup>132</sup> The fighting against terrorism in both Iraq and Afghanistan enhanced increased sense among European states that military itself is a contributor to insecurity in the region due to the rise of various suicide bombers. This has led to various organizations calling for the withdrawal of the military officers from the foreign missions in the Middle East.

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<sup>132</sup> Kim Sengupta, "Afghan War Tied to Security at Home," *The Independent*, August 3, 2009; Bergman, *Secret War*, pp. 251-252.

It was observed that In Africa the military intervention has led to numerous impacts on the African states as the militants tend to retaliate on the states that are operating against their goals. For instance African states operating under the AMISOM had experienced numerous attacks from the Al-Shabaab. This led to loss of various military personnel. This pushed some countries like Uganda to withdraw their soldiers as they could not effectively facilitate their operations in the foreign land. Kenya on the other hand has experienced pressure from various policy makers to withdraw the KDF from operating in Somalia. The KDF presence in Somalia has led to attacks in Kenyan territory as well as increasing number of terrorist sympathizers.

Also in West Africa the actions of the Boko Haram has jeopardized the activities of the states more so Nigeria since peace and stability is paralyzed. Many soldiers have lost their lives and the cost of training soldiers is expensive.

### **2.5.3 Cooperation with local security forces**

In the counterterrorism missions, states usually get involved in the risks of assisting allied forces in the counter terrorist training and this in many instances makes their own soldiers become targets for attacks. For instance, Kenyan soldiers operating in Somalia in many cases has been attacked by the terrorists and is due to inadequate cooperation with the local forces on the ground. Al-Shabaab insurgents attack on the Kenya Defence Force AMISOM base in El Adde, Gedo still remains the dangerous attack against the peace support mission in Somalia and this was so far the biggest attack on the KDF since independence in 1963. The incidence led to loss of lives of military men that is also expensive to train. Due to these, nation states count losses on human capital and machineries.

#### **2.5.4 The Intelligence Aspect**

The biggest challenge for the interdepartmental entails the various ways to get relevant facts concerning the activities of the terror groups, how they relate and network with other agencies. The success of getting effective and adequate information relies on the potential of the military officers in identifying the terror groups, terrorists so as to get on time facts concerning their activities, their goals as well as strategies. Getting these facts poses a huge challenge. Kitson observed that the process of defeating an enemy to a big extent entails getting him/her as well. Key intelligence sources involve informants, undercover officers, non-combatants, changed terrorists who give information to military officers amongst others. It is important to note that insurgents and military officers understands the threats caused by human intelligence and therefore they are always ready to eliminate any suspect so as to silence the population..<sup>133</sup> Inadequate cooperation between and amongst state intelligence and security personnel's makes the information gathered to be of less importance.

#### **2.6 Chapter Summary**

This section has a running theme that depicts the use of military means in fighting terrorism. It emphasizes on both non-military and military use in counter terrorism. More so, the chapter gives a brief discussion on why military has been preferred in fighting terrorism in the world. The study observed that military has been adopted by nation states to deter as well as to counter terrorism since terrorists use excessive force to achieve their objectives. The use of military has been seen I various states

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<sup>133</sup> General Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 2nd Ed., London, UK: Faber & Faber 1991, pp. 95-96.

since armed officers can detect and destabilize the operations of the militia groupings. It was also noted that this may be sometimes useful but should not be the only course of recourse especially for democratic nations. Until recently many nations have employed the military in fighting terrorist forces with mixed results but not many of them seemed to identify the different situations where the military may be needed and where it may not. This section further argues that in some instances the use of military forces provide the much needed service as even the most radical of extremists know when to make a tactical retreat in the face of overwhelming force. This makes the military to remain awake and employ the highest level of intelligence and surveillance in all its tactics to counter terrorism.

## CHAPTER THREE

### EFFECT OF THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCES IN COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter entails discussions on the effect of the Kenya Defence Forces in Countering international terrorism. It brings out how Kenya Defence Forces has been involved in counter terrorism and its impacts in the society. Terrorism infers to all forms of intimidation, threats as well as use of violence so as to push or influence government or general public. These forms of intimidation are used by terror groups to propel their own socio economic, political as well as religion and ideology.

#### 3.2 Military Intervention

Military intervention entails the transfer of troops from a state to another state or military operations that are already deployed in other states to respond to either socio economic or political issues.<sup>134</sup> This may also mean offering security to a country or a nation that is under terrorist threats. For the intervention to be successful, proper preparation by the military has to be taken into consideration as planning of how to execute the process is put in place.<sup>135</sup> Accordingly, Kenya military has been involved in different intervention processes within the country and internationally.

Terrorism is a crime and therefore any operational command of the response to terrorist acts should lie with the police and judiciary who have the responsibility for

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<sup>134</sup>Fredrec S. Pearson & Robert A. Baumann (1988), "International military interventions: Identification and classification" in the Journal of International Interactions Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations Volume 14, 1988- Issue 2

<sup>135</sup> Ibid

dealing with criminal matters. All the other agencies act in support of the police. A country's military is a national instrument of power. Military establishments and deployed forces can easily become a target for terrorists. While armed forces are established for the defence of a country's borders against external aggression, today terrorists are transnational.

Military intervention can cause both national as well as global condemnation and this can make states to be claimed as getting into activities that are unworthy as a result of the challenges that are experienced in the process of identification and pursuing suspects as well as utilizing the intelligence to plan how to retaliate.

Law of Armed Conflict asserts military operations as legal during fights hence should be relative. Challenges in using and practicing such rules and norms are experienced in the disagreements entailed during counter terrorism. They include impeding the grabbed machineries, legality of the suspected terrorists, pre-emptive intercession as well as killing of the targets.<sup>136</sup>

### **3.3 KDF involvement in countering terrorism in Kenya**

Since attaining independence in 1963, Kenya has enjoyed relative tranquility and peace as well as security within the region. However, this was disrupted in August 1998 following the terrorist attack of USA Embassy in Nairobi. Terrorist attack in Kikambala in November 2002 and the failed attempt to down an Israel airliner confirmed Kenya's vulnerability as a target for international terrorism. Since then,

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<sup>136</sup>KDF Counter Terrorism manual, Kenya (2012) pp 105-106,108.

International terrorism became a major security concern to Kenya. The first attack in 1980 of Nairobi Norfolk Hotel was seen as a one-time event and no serious measures were put in place to address the threat. Although the targets for the last two terrorist attacks were clearly not meant to punish Kenya, the consequences were devastating with multiple ramifications. In addition, the attacks had grave economic, political and social implications to the country. Principal economic sectors such as tourism were paralyzed due to imposed travel bans against the country.<sup>137</sup>

Kenya, as an independent country, was considered as an island of peace. Nothing like terrorism was thought of to happen in Kenya as many countries plied business within Kenya. No one was scared of anything as nations established their embassies at the heart of the capital city Nairobi.

It was until 1998 when the US Embassy terrorist attack took place and this was frightening to Kenyans as it was something not thought of to affect the country to that magnitude of losing 213 persons. Since then Kenya has been experiencing terrorist attacks with other major attacks in 2013 Westgate Mall leaving 69 persons as well as 175 injured. The 2015-Garissa University terrorist attack claimed 148 lives with 79 injured. The other major terrorist attack that shocked Kenyans was the Dusit attack that took place between 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> of January 2019 where 21 people lost lives. Such attacks demonstrate that terrorists have a coordinated network, finances, strategies, weapons, and both external and internal support to ensure the success of such activities.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>137</sup>KDF Counter Terrorism manual, Kenya (2012) pp 3.

<sup>138</sup>Napoleoni, Loretta. Terrorism and the Economy: How the War on Terror is Bankrupting the World.(Bolton: Seven Stories Press, 2011.), pp. 45-50

### **3.4 Impact of KDF missions in countering terrorism**

Kenya just like other nation states within African continent has proven their vulnerability to terror activities and this as is a results of the recently attacks both on civilians as well as the military officers. This led to the deployment of various service units to enhance national security and beyond so as to achieve regional peace. In 2011, the government of Kenya rolled out full war against terrorist leading to the deployment of the military to carryout various interventions in Kenya and Somalia with the intention of eliminating Al-Shabaab and initiates a stable government in Somalia. Because of this, various departments of government engaged in developing strategies of preventing and countering the threats and acts of terrorism.

The determination of the government to enhance counter terrorism was advanced by developing national counter terrorism centre. The center has helped in the coordination in countering violent terrorists operations as well as the support of international operations like the presence of the KDF in Somalia and their support to AMISOM. This has been made efficient through military and intelligence frameworks.

#### **3.4.1 Operation Linda Nchi**

It was on 14<sup>th</sup> October 2011 when KDF intervened in Somalia that is, the Kenya's North Eastern neighbor in the Operation Linda Nchi (OLN).<sup>139</sup> This was a brave move for the Kenyan Military as the operation was to take place in a hot pursuit of Al-Shabaab. The Kenya Defence Force had not been involved in such an intervention

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<sup>139</sup> Waldman, Peter. *Revenge without rules: on the renaissance of an archaic motif of violence, studies in conflict and terrorism*, (2019), pp. 435-450.

since independence hence; they required employing their skills and knowledge in ensuring that the Kenya-Somali Borders are safe and free from the terrorist attacks.

The Kenya Defence Forces troop's main objective was to conduct operations in support of the Somalia National Army and Regional Forces in the Areas of Responsibility in order to deter and defeat the Al-Shabab so as to create favorable conditions for peace and stability in Somalia. Improvised Explosive Devices used by the Al-Shabab has been the greatest challenge. The Al-Shabab also operates in small groups, attacking the KDF forces and destroying vehicles and equipment by use of the Improvised Explosive Devices. The KDF has been able to dominate area of operation in Somalia by conducting robust patrols, raids and surveillance in routing out the Al-Shabab from their hideouts and also cleared and secured the main supply routes. The operations in Somalia has been a success especially pacification of the Areas of Responsibility. During this operation, the United States of America air force also shared surveillance information and also assisted to conduct the mission.

Operation Linda Nchi has been essential in countering acts of terror within Kenya as well as in the eastern part of Africa. This has enhanced the development of governance structures in Somalia due to improved human security in the region as well as enhancing border security and containment of sea piracy.

### **3.4.2 Operation Linda Boni Forest**

Despite the peaceful coexistence of the people, main security threats emerge from perceived historical injustices over land distribution, Al-Shabaab terror group and Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). Al-Shabaab cadres attacked Lamu County

between 15<sup>th</sup> and 16 June 2014 and caused a lot of deaths and destruction to property in Mpeketoni and this jeopardized the normal operations in the coastal parts of Kenya. KDF troops were later deployed in June 2014 and the militants ceased their attacks until August 2014 when they attacked Bodhei Police Station in Ijarain a bid to capture arms. The bid failed and the next attack was on a bus in Nyangoro. The next attacks were directed at KDF convoys which were on routine administration duties from Manda. The main objective of Operation Linda Boni was to conduct Internal Security operation to flush out armed militants in Boni forest and its environs with effect from 16 January 2015 in support of National Police Service in order to deter and defeat terrorist attacks as well as revive sanity along main supply routes for Kiunga and Lamu.

Kenya Defence Forces conducted operations in the Boni enclave by providing enduring and picketing patrols during the day and night while relying on intelligence. The KDF provides security to critical installations such as communications masts. It also ensures protection of civilians in IDP Camps and in vulnerable settlements and provision of vehicle escorts.

The operation has been a success where KDF has been able to dismantle Al-Shabab Camps and neutralization of the Al-Shabab troops in the Boni forest. There were also several arrests of suspects some of whom were key facilitators of the terror group in the enclave. The KDF has been able to dominate the Boni enclave with robust patrols. The KDF successfully conducted vehicle escorts which increased the number of people and vehicles coming in and out of Lamu County. Reopening of schools and return of the IDPs to their farms was also realized due to the prevailing security situation.

Operation Linda Boni had the aim of dislodging the Al-Shabaab from the Boni Forest since its launching in 2015. From this perspective, the KDF took another step in ensuring that Kenyans residing in Lamu are free from Al-Shabaab threats coming from the intense Boni Forest.<sup>140</sup> The intelligence and thorough reconnaissance employed by the KDF made the operation successful in infiltrating the Al-Shabaab modus operandi.

### **3.5 Positive effects of KDF operations in countering terrorism**

As from 2003, government of Kenya formulated the Anti-Terror Police Unit and this is advanced by the government initiative to deter the movement of foreign fighters which entailed the Kenyan citizens to get involved in the actions of the Al Shabaaab and also the Kenyan citizen's foreign fighters coming from foreign states. Globally Kenya is a key partner state in the war against terrorism and it participates in the activities of both regional and international bodies such as IGAD's ICPAT, USA's CJTF-HOA as well as many AU and UN's CT action plans, protocols and conventions.

#### **3.5.1 Formation of the national counter terrorism centre**

The various terror attacks against Kenya by the al-Shabaab clearly showed that terrorist activities is a big challenge to peace and security in Kenya and the rest of the world and this led to the institutionalization of a counter terrorism agency to help in the coordination and planning of ways to eliminate the threats and actions of terror.. The KDF intervention in countering the militants led to numerous hide and seek

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<sup>140</sup>KalumeKazungu, in the Daily nation Newspaper "Kitiyo says Linda Boni has reduced Al-Shabaab attacks, September 20 2017

games which the militants used to launch their aggressive actions against Kenya's territory hence the adoption of coordinated action plan to counter terror with other service units.

### **3.5.2 Participation in the AMISOM**

The AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia which originated as the IGASOM has been active since 2007 with the authorization of the UN in Somalia. The AMISOM have the responsibility to assist the government of Somalia to eradicate the militants (Al Shabaab). Kenya contributed around 4000 soldiers to help in the strengthening troops that had been deployed by the AU. The troops launched several offensive operations against the militants leading to the killings of many including their leaders. Consequently, the KDF and the AMISOM enhanced the eviction of Al-Shabaab from their backgrounds in the areas that they captured like the central and south Somalia areas like the port of Kismayu and Mogadishu. This has helped in the reduction of the sources of finances of the militia group after losing the ports that helped to carry various transactions and access to weapons in the hands of KDF.<sup>141</sup>

### **3.5.3 Degrading the Enemy**

The actions of the KDF have led to the degradation of the militia grouping. This has been as a result of stopping the flow of funds especially by the Kenya's government through the KDF by interrupting the Hawala form of money transfers usually conducted by Islamic banks and businesses.<sup>142</sup> Some have justified Kenya's presence in Somalia as having reduced the large-scale attacks carried out by terrorists in Kenyan territory by degrading their capacity to organize and source for weapons. But

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<sup>141</sup> Godfrey Buluma, "Al-Shabaab: The Threat To Kenya And The Horn Of Africa," United States Army War College, 2014

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, pp. 37-39.

on the flip side there has also been concern about human rights violation that some Kenyan soldiers might be engaging in Somalia. This will surely be counterproductive to the long term goals of the Kenyan government to pacify the horn of Africa.<sup>143</sup>

### **3.5.4 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance**

Intelligence gathering is where the information is collected, organized, evaluated, analyzed, integrated and interpreted with the view of avoiding ambiguity of the observation of external activities.<sup>144</sup> Kenya has used intelligence gathering with the aim to provide special information for given interest of a nation or an institution for security purposes. On the other hand surveillance is used for intelligence gathering of information that will help in prevention of crimes. It has been key strategies by the military in countering international terrorism. Kenya through its military forces has fought the terrorism war through their well-established intelligence and surveillance system.

The Security forces progress in responding to terrorist activities hugely lies on the potential to correctly verify terrorists, get essential facts about them at the right time, their actions and plans. The terrorists always understand the risks which come as a result of intelligence services and this has made them ever ready to eliminate suspects that they get into contacts with. This they do to instill fear amongst the people. Hence the need for proper coordination amongst the intelligence service providers to efficiency and effectiveness.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Koehler, Daniel. Violence and terrorism from the far right: policy options to counter an elusive threat. ICCT policy brief, (2019), p. 7.

<sup>144</sup> Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989

<sup>145</sup> KDF Counter Terrorism manual, Kenya (2012) pp 109.

### 3.5.5 Cooperation with Allied States and Defence Forces

Kenya is at an advantageous position being the largest economy in east and central Africa. This has attracted many investors and subsequently allies to whatever cause it may happen to champion. It is also fortunate that the UN headquarters is located in Nairobi, as this serves as a hub for regional coordination. The AMISOM mission which the KDF took part in consisted of countries like Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda. Kenya participates in the programs of AU and it has a seat in the peace and security committee. Kenya is member of IGAD as well as NEPAD.<sup>146</sup> Kenya remains a strong ally to the US in its global war against terror.<sup>147</sup> This has led the US to fund some of the counter terrorist activities like the general service unit dedicated response unit.<sup>148</sup> It was observed that Kenya has been instrumental in helping other countries by facilitating military exercises, trainings as well as drill within and amongst the EAC member states military and other law enforcement professionals and this has promoted security in the region.

Kenya through its Defence Forces has enhanced cooperation with the US as observed through various forms of military supports like trainings, machineries as well as intelligence services to help in promoting peace and security in the international system. Strong coordination can be observed as well by Kenya being one of the six states that are involved in USA security governance initiative.<sup>149</sup>

The cooperation with the developed states has improved the security at the entry

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<sup>146</sup> Eva, Guitterez and Sandeep, Singh. *What regulatory frameworks are more conducive to mobile banking? Empirical evidence from findex data*. The world bank, Washington, DC, (2019), pp. 7-11.

<sup>147</sup> Nzau, Mumo and Guyo, Mohammed. The challenge of securing Kenya: past experience, present challenges and future prospects, the journal of social encounters: vol.2: Iss. 1, (2018), p. 37-39.

<sup>148</sup> Waldman, Peter. *Revenge without rules: on the renaissance of an archaic motif of violence, studies in conflict and terrorism*, (2019), pp. 435-450.

<sup>149</sup> United States Department of State., *Security Governance Initiative: 2015 Review*. (2016). Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/2016/253906.htm>

points in Kenya. This has been proved by the existence of Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System in the ports in Kenya. Such initiatives continuously empower the officers by gaining of experience in handling both regional and international cooperation on territorial security as well as improving the country's counter terrorism responsibilities.

The European Union has also been involved in the training of the Somalia military forces so as to help the government that is in transition. This has helped the work of the KDF that started its intervention in Somalia in 2011 after vital attacks in Kenyan territory and the national interest in general.

### **3.5.6 Deterrence of threats**

The KDF engagement in countering terrorism has promoted the reduction in the rate of threats and attacks by the terrorist in Kenya and her neighbors in general. The purpose is normally to defeat or deter a threat. This creates the circumstances in which the initiative can be regained by offensive action. Defensive operation makes the enemies more vulnerable as they are forced to concentrate their troops, wearing down his offensive capability and also fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations elsewhere.<sup>150</sup> The Kenya Defence Forces has been so tactical in defensive operations by seeking out the enemy forces and striking them thus weakening them before combats begins. They leverage on their mobility by destroying the attacking forces and thus permit the enemy to move to a position that exposes them to counter attacks. Indeed the Kenya Defense Forces was able to defeat the Al-Shabaab attacks as a result of good defensive operation characterized by buying time, utilizing military

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<sup>150</sup>KDF Battlegroup Tactics (2004) pp. 7-8

force, making proper calculation/organized movements and making sure that the condition they were in was favorable for offensive operations hence giving the KDF the energy to regain the initiative.<sup>151</sup> These actions have been essential in promoting security as it has been employed by the Kenyan Defence Forces in operation Linda Nchi and Operation Linda Boni as a tactic in response to disprove the attack of the Al-Shabaab. The Counter attacks launched by the Kenyan military have been aimed at destroying the Al-Shabaab and reclaiming their lost ground.

### **3.5.7 Pacification of Liberated Areas**

It was observed from the war against terrorists in Somalia that the KDF fought gallantly many years towards many insurgents when there was a dangerous attack at the KDF base in Kulbiyow, Somalia.<sup>152</sup> Consequently the KDF took control of Kismayo which was a huge resource center for the al-Shabaab in Somalia.

The KDF has conducted pacification operations in Busar, Fafadun, Dhobley, Afmadhow, BelesQoocani, Tabda, Hoosingo, Kolbio, Sarira, RasKiamboni, Burgavo, Kismayu, AbdaleBirole and Kuday despite IED attacks by the Al-Shabab and non-existent or weak government structures in liberated areas which hinder local support to AMISOM Joint Operations.

### **3.5.8 Cyber Security Operations**

Cyber threats are very challenging since it is hectic to a certain or identify or to know the socio economic and political motivating factors of the perpetrators. Cybercrimes

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<sup>151</sup> Brandon Morgan (July 10, 2018) Make Defensive Operations Great Again, <https://mwi.usma.edu/> accessed on 5/3/2013

<sup>152</sup> Nzau, Mumo and Guyo, Mohammed. The challenge of securing Kenya: past experience, present challenges and future prospects, the journal of social encounters: vol.2: Iss. 1, (2018), p. 37-39.

are wide in their areas of operations and sometimes entail many factors other than hacking of computers. It is linked to the use of dangerous codes. Despite this, cyber terrorism incidences also depend on availability of various factors and not just cyber-attacks.

It is an illicit hacking as well as dangers of attacks on computers, network systems so as to hijack government information, intimidate people in order to advance illicit socio economic or political interests. It can as well be destruction of physical infrastructures like power transmission lines, internet connectivity.

Numerous militia groupings use technology to advance their interests that are linked to promoting acts of terror. Their illegal actions are seen on how they use internet to influence the vulnerable people in the society to join their camps. Other criminal gangs have been found using technology to hack and acquire credit cards so as to access finances that they can use to advance their illegal actions.

Educating the citizens on illicit acts is very important as this will help in containing cyber terrorism. The crime is advanced by the technological advancement in the international system and this makes it to establish itself as trans-national or inter boundary businesses and this has enabled individuals and states that support terrorist to advance their illicit operations.<sup>153</sup>

A Cyber security operation has been used as a strategy to counter terrorism by the military. It helps in tracking any plans set by the terrorist groups. It has contributed in managing terrorist incidents in the country as any noticed incident is quickly

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<sup>153</sup>KDF Counter Terrorism manual, Kenya (2012)pp 110-111.

responded to. On the same note this has contributed to countering use of internet for terrorist purpose. Indeed, the Kenya Defence Forces has used this platform for its information gathering hence empowered intelligence and surveillance of the military.

### **3.5.9 De-radicalization/Anti-radicalization**

De-radicalization is the preventive counterterrorism mechanisms aiming extremists as well as those with illicit religious and political motives to adopt peaceful views.<sup>154</sup>

Anti-radicalization has been implemented by many western countries as a measure to keep off terrorist cases especially after the September 11, 2001.<sup>155</sup> The Kenya Defence Forces has used de-radicalization strategy to counter terrorism. In 2016 Kenya launched its National Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism on counterterrorism efforts with emphasis on de-radicalization over military tactics.<sup>156</sup> It was a shocking for Kenyans to hear that Dusit terror attack was organized and done by home grown Kenyans.

Accordingly, very few countries have policies that illustrate how to deal with radicalized individuals other than engaging them in combat.<sup>157</sup> Therefore, it is crucial to undermine the foundations of the ideology of these terror organizations to stand a better chance at defeating them through soft power.<sup>158</sup> The KDF championed for the development of the anti-radicalization structure that should be used to jeopardize the

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<sup>154</sup> DE radicalization - definition of DE radicalization in English | Oxford Dictionaries". *Oxford Dictionaries / English*. Retrieved 6 March 2020.

<sup>155</sup>Samaan, Jean-Loup; Jacobs, Andreas (7 February 2018). "Countering Jihadist Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of French and German Experiences". *Terrorism and Political Violence*: 1–15.

<sup>156</sup> Kenya: Extremism and Counter Extremism, [https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country\\_pdf/KE-02202020.pdf](https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/KE-02202020.pdf) Accessed on 5/3/2020.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid, (2019), p. 452.

<sup>158</sup> Koehler, Daniel. Violence and terrorism from the far right: policy options to counter an elusive threat. ICCT policy brief, (2019), p. 7.

operations of the terror groups in their attempts to radicalize people in the society more so the youth.

### **3.5.10. Security Operations and Sensitizations**

KDF involvement in countering terrorism has led to the enhancement of security operations in Kenya to enhance human security. This has led to enhancing border control and patrols to reduce the proliferation of illicit arms and persons in the country. The operations have also led to much effort placed to curb persons who are in the country illegally and deport all immigrants who are engaged in illegal activities. This ensured Kenyans and foreign nationals who live in Kenya that they are safe and their security is guaranteed. This has led to economic growth in various sectors of the economy. The military and its intelligence have been very helpful in becoming aware of the terrorist activities in advance and launch effective and efficient ways to respond.<sup>159</sup> Counter terrorism hence has made the government to deploy more security personnel in the volatile areas. It has also led to conducting emergency drills that empowers the citizens on various ways on countering acts of terror. This has been supported locally and internationally by professionals.

### **3.5.11 Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) to Share Information on Terrorism**

The military though serving the interests of the nation must also be strong enough to threaten internal sources that breach national security.<sup>160</sup> Though in democracies the military must have a complementary relationship with the civilians and oversight of

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<sup>159</sup> Anderson, David M., and Jacob McKnight. "Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa." *African Affairs* 114, no. 454 (2015): 1-27.

<sup>160</sup>Nzau, Mumo and Guyo, Mohammed. The challenge of securing Kenya: past experience, present challenges and future prospects, the journal of social encounters: vol.2: Iss. 1, (2018), p. 37-39.

the military must be undertaken through civilian institutions.<sup>161</sup> Using the military internally to carry out counterterrorism operations may be dangerous to the state of democracy within a nation as privileges may be taken by military authorities that will contravene the nature of a true democracy, for instance, arbitrary arrest, martial law being imposed, denial of citizens their right to habeus corpus.<sup>162</sup>

CIMIC is very important in the inter-agency coordination and therefore it should be taken as an initiative for nation building, support for the law enforcement at both national and international level by the military, national and global organizations as well as the private sectors. These institutions should be part of the decision making so as to have consensus on how to respond to matters at earlier stages. The CIMIC is necessary to be pillars of planning and operations, information sharing, socio economic and political infrastructure. This enhances military assessment.<sup>163</sup>


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<sup>161</sup>Wilner, Alex. Targeted killings in Afghanistan: measuring coercion and deterrence in counterterrorism and counter insurgency, 33 stud. Conflict and terrorism 307, (2010), p. 6.

<sup>162</sup> Koehler, Daniel. Violence and terrorism from the far right: policy options to counter an elusive threat. ICCT policy brief, (2019) pp. 1-3.

<sup>163</sup>KDF Counter Terrorism manual, Kenya (2012) pp 107.

**Figure 1: Methods used by the Military to counter terrorism**



**Source: Field Study 2020**

This clearly indicated that the most used method by the military to counter international terrorism in Kenya has been the use of patrols, intercept communication, pre-emption and curfew.

### **3.6 Negative effects of the KDF involvement in counter terrorism**

Fighting terrorist has numerous challenges; poor prioritizing of the donors, competition amongst various military troops from different states like Kenya and Ethiopia, inadequate accountability and border movement issues, mushrooming of displaced persons both internally and externally where some provide sympathy to the militia groups. It is affirmed that Kenyan government had put in place relocation

strategy that could help in resettling a good population of Somalia refugees in Kenya camps back to Somalia. Many Somalia youth has also been associated with enhancing grounds for radicalization.

The involvement of the Kenya Defence Forces in countering acts of terror both nationally and internationally leads to deaths of both civilians as well as military personnel. The terrorists have used various ways to retaliate attacks on the security officer within the country as well as those deployed in Somalia to eradicate the Al-Shabaab.

It should be noted that deterrence as a strategy may fail especially when the terrorist is imbued with a religious zeal coupled with religious extremism<sup>164</sup> and will do whatever it takes to see through their objectives and this is where the military must always be vigilant and maintain situational awareness at all times.<sup>165</sup>

As a result of the transition in the security sector in 2013, Kenya enhanced the division in the roles of counter terrorism amongst the three departments of the national police service units; the Kenya Police consisting of the civil police, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General Services Unit; the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and the Administration Police; and the non-police agencies like the National Intelligence Service and the KDF. Operation efforts were affected as a result of the inadequate intra and inter police institutions cooperation and the coordination with the military institutions,

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<sup>164</sup>Wilner, Alex. Targeted killings in Afghanistan: measuring coercion and deterrence in counterterrorism and counter insurgency, 33 stud. Conflict and terrorism 307, (2010), p. 6.

<sup>165</sup>Nzau, Mumo and Guyo, Mohammed. The challenge of securing Kenya: past experience, present challenges and future prospects, the journal of social encounters: vol.2: Iss. 1, (2018), p. 68.

### **3.7 Chapter Summary**

The main theme of this section was assessing the effect of the Kenya Defence forces in countering international terrorism as discussed under different thematic areas. The chapter has looked at the terrorist attack history in Kenya by giving a background of terrorism attack in Kenya in a chronological order. It also put emphasis on military intervention as a way of offering security to a country or a nation that is under terrorist threats. This chapter has assessed strategies that Kenya Defence Forces has used in Countering International Terrorism, giving the clear understanding of the relevance of the KDF in fighting international acts of terror. This was realized in their intelligence gathering and Surveillance used in the Operation Linda Nchi and Operation Linda Boni Forest in Countering International Terrorism.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter focused on data presentation and analysis. Questionnaires and interviews were administered to gather primary data. Responses to the questionnaires administered were acceptable where 81 out of the total questionnaires sent out were corrected filled or returned to the researcher. The questionnaires and the interviews were tailored to the target samples according to the nature of data to be collected. Data collection was divided into three major subjects, that is, the use of military in countering international terrorism in Africa, effect of using the Kenyan military in counterterrorism and challenges facing counterterrorism efforts

#### **4.2 Demographics Information**

The section illustrates demographic features of the study respondents. It shows the gender, service location, experience. The outcomes are presented in line with study objectives.

##### **4.2.1 Gender of respondents**

The researcher established the gender of the study respondents and the results are as show in figure 4.1

**Figure 4.1: Gender of respondents**



The study established that majority of the respondents (76.5%) were male, while minority 23.5% were female. This indicates that the males highly participates and contributes to the issues of counterterrorism.

#### **4.2.2 Service**

The respondents were asked to state their service at Kenya Defense forces. Findings are as indicated on table 4.1 below.

**Table 4.1: Service**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
KA	42	51.9
KAF	23	28.4
KN	16	19.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100</b>

The study established that majority (51.9%) were Kenya Army (KA), 28.4% were Kenya Air Force (KAF) while 19.8% were Kenya Navy (KN). This is an implication that majority of Kenya Defence forces are comprised of Kenya Army (KA).

#### 4.2.3 Location

The study was interested in establishing the location that the respondents were working from. The study findings are as shown in table 4.2 below.

**Table 4.2: Location for data collection**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Defence Staff College	5	6.2
DOD	6	7.4
Eastleigh	2	2.5
IPTSC	1	1.2
Karen	48	59.3
Mombasa	2	2.5
Nairobi area	16	19.8
Survey	1	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100</b>

The study observed that majority (59.3%) were based at Karen, 19.8% were based at Nairobi area, 7.4% were based at DOD, 6.2% were based at Defence Staff College, and 2.5% were based at Eastleigh and Mombasa respectively, while 1.2% were based at IPTSC and Survey respectively. This implies that most of the Kenya Defence Forces sampled for this study were based at Karen and were readily available to provide the necessary information needed in this study.

#### 4.2.4 Number of years in current position

The study also sought to know the years of work experience of the respondents in a predetermined range of intervals scale. The results were as indicated in table 4.3 below.

**Table 4.3: Number of years in current position**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
6-11 Years	13	13.8
12-17 Years	21	22.3
18-23 Years	43	45.7
24 years and above	17	18.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>

The study established that most of the respondents (45.7%) were of between 18-23 years of experience, 22.3% had between 12-17 years, and 18.1% had 24 years and above of experience whereas the least (13) represented 13.8% had 6-11 years of work experience.


#### 4.3 Use of Military in Countering International Terrorism in Africa

The study was interested in establishing the Use of Military in Countering International Terrorism in Africa. The results are shown in the subsequent subheadings

##### 4.3.1 Use of African militaries to counter international Terrorism

Respondents were asked to indicate whether African militaries are used to counter international Terrorism. Figure 4.2 shows the study results.

**Figure 4.2: Use of African militaries to counter international Terrorism**




The study established that most of the respondents (98.8%) confirmed African militaries are used to counter international Terrorism while the remaining 1.2% disagreed. This clearly shows that African militaries are used to counter international Terrorism

#### **4.3.2 Use of KDF to counter international Terrorism**

The fight against terrorism in Kenya is mainly anchored around the use of military. The study established that the war against the terrorists requires effective as well as efficient structures that are intensified and can be sustained for better outcomes.

Respondents were asked to indicate whether KDF are used to counter international Terrorism. Figure 4.3 shows the study findings.

**Figure 4.3: Use of KDF to counter international Terrorism**




The study results indicated that most of the respondents (98.8%) agreed that KDF are used to counter international Terrorism while the remaining 1.2% was on the contrary opinion. This implies that KDF are used to counter international Terrorism. The study established that the counter terrorism strategies used is the military as well as the intelligence guidelines.

#### **4.3.3 Areas KDF has been used to counter International Terrorism**

The study sought to know areas where KDF has been employed to counter International Terrorism. The results are as indicated in figure 4.4.

**Figure 4.4: Areas KDF has been used to counter International Terrorism**



The study established that majority of the respondents (44.4%) indicated the Areas KDF has been used to counter International Terrorism to be Lamu, 39.5% indicated Somalia, 23.5% indicated Mombasa, 19.8% indicated Mboni Forest, 13.6% indicated Nairobi while 9.9% indicated Garissa. This implies that the major Areas that KDF has been used to counter International Terrorism are Lamu and Somalia.

Fighting fair is almost important and regard for international humanitarian law must be taken into consideration. But this is not an easy thing to do since some states argue that non state actors who are violent cannot be protected by these laws since they were not signatories to them.<sup>166</sup> In 2017 county action plans had been used by the government of Kenya to help in the implementation of the national strategy for countering violent extremism. They were launched in Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi and

<sup>166</sup> Wilner, Alex. *Targeted killings in Afghanistan: measuring coercion and deterrence in counterterrorism and counter insurgency*, 33 studios. Conflict and terrorism, (2010), pp. 6-9.

Lamu counties.<sup>167</sup> In other counties like Nairobi and north eastern counties the police participated in community oversight, discussions on post traumatic challenges, as well as programs on early response.<sup>168</sup> These were programs that led to improvement of handling of detainees and prisoners and other small-scale efforts were undertaken.<sup>169</sup>

#### 4.3.4 Non-Military Approaches

Respondents were asked to indicate the non-military approaches that can work effectively as a tool for Kenya to counter international terrorism instead of relying on the use of Military alone. Table 4.3 shows the results of the study.

**Table 4.4: Non-Military Approaches**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>percent</b>
Diplomacy	78	96.3%
Economic Sanctions	15	18.5%
Multi-agency approach	39	48.1%
Freezing terrorist financing	51	63.0%
Tighter border controls;	61	75.3%
Better inspection of shipping containers	29	35.8%
Improved intelligence sharing	48	59.3%

The study observed that majority of the respondents (96.3%) indicated that the non-military approaches that can work effectively as a tool for Kenya to counter international terrorism instead of relying on the use of Military alone to be diplomacy, 75.3% indicated Tighter border controls, 63.0% indicated Freezing terrorist financing,

<sup>167</sup> Koehler, Daniel. *Violence and terrorism from the far right: policy options to counter an elusive threat*. ICCT policy brief, (2019), pp. 1-3.

<sup>168</sup> Koehler, Daniel. *Violence and terrorism from the far right: policy options to counter an elusive threat*. ICCT policy brief, (2019), pp. 1-3.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid, (2019), p. 7-9.

59.3% indicated Improved intelligence sharing, 48.1% indicated Multi-agency approach, 35.8% indicated Better inspection of shipping containers while 18.5% indicated Economic Sanctions. This implies that the major non-military approaches that can work effectively as a tool for Kenya to counter international terrorism instead of relying on the use of Military alone are diplomacy, tighter border controls and freezing terrorist financing.

The study observed that the non military approach is also important in countering terrorism because they are perceived to be peaceful and does not entail excessive use of force.

#### **4.3.5 Preference of Military as Compared to Non-Military tools**

Respondents were asked to indicate why states prefer use of Military as Compared to Non-Military tools in countering international terrorism. Respondents indicate that they are preferred because of the following: Equipment, Intelligence & Surveillance, Decisiveness, Operational reach, Military effectiveness and Training. In addition, respondents indicated that Military is trained and well prepared for this task. The military is better equipped and has knowledge on multi agency approach to operations.

Also respondents indicated that states prefer use of Military as Compared to Non-Military tools in countering international terrorism because it involves intelligence gathering which is a military function and armed means to achieve its objectives It requires patrols which is done by military in order to pacify liberated areas. Further, they indicated that the fight against terrorism require to be securitized thereby having a common understanding of the threat to the states and therefore need for mitigation strategy for the good of the state and its people. To effectively fight terrorism,

government machineries such as security forces, economy as well as political aspects must coordinate through multi agency approach to have a greater effect. The international terrorism in this regard should involve other states as well since if left to one state then the war can never be won.

The study also observed that Military tools are very effective to combat terrorism and proved to be the best means to degrade terrorists and that terrorists use crude weapons which require military means and tools in order to deal with. The Intelligence gathering and surveillance have been key strategies by the military in countering terrorism in the internationally. Kenya through its military forces, it has fought the terrorism war through their well-established intelligence and surveillance system. In fact with the main cities of Kenya, there has been installation of CCTV cameras to help gather information for intelligence purpose. The intelligence service has been recognized internationally and this is one of the Assistance Programs on Anti-terrorism in the USA.<sup>170</sup>

#### **4.4 The Effect of Using the Kenyan Military in Counterterrorism**

The study also investigated effect of using Kenyan Military to counter acts of terrorism. Results were as shown in the below subheadings.

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<sup>170</sup> NSIS Historical Background “, National Security Intelligence Service, 2006, Archived from the original on October 2017.

#### **4.4.1 Role played by Kenya Defence Force when intervening in International Terrorism**

Respondents were asked to indicate whether Kenya Defence Force Play major role when intervening in International Terrorism. All the respondents agreed that Kenya Defence Force Play major role when intervening in International Terrorism. The study established that the military operations conducted in Kenya like Operation Linda Boni Forest, Operation Linda Nchi as well as KDF participation in the AMISOM has helped in destabilizing the operations of the terrorist groups within horn of Africa hence promoting peace as well as security within Kenya and Africa in general as a whole.

#### **4.4.2 Methods used by Kenya Defence Force when intervening in International Terrorism**

Respondents were asked to indicate Methods used by Kenya Defence Force when intervening in International Terrorism. The findings are presented in table 4.4 below.

**Table 4.3: Methods used by Kenya Defence Force when intervening in International Terrorism**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Patrol	79	97.5%
Curfew	39	48.1%
Pre-emption	61	75.3%
Intercept Communication	73	90.1%

The study established that majority of the respondents (97.5%) affirmed Kenya Defence Force uses patrol method when intervening in International Terrorism. 90.1% indicated intercept communication method, 75.3% indicated pre-emption method while 48% indicated curfew method. Other methods indicated include Counter attacks, De-radicalization, defensive operation, Intelligence gathering, Multi Agency Approach and Use of force e.g. Attacks. This is an indication that Kenya Defence Force mostly uses patrol and intercepts communication methods when intervening in International Terrorism. . Patrols and road blocks were considered very effective in countering terrorism; intelligent resources were employed in intelligence gathering and surveillance well in advance as early warning systems. The patrols have helped much in discouraging terror activities. They are operated by a small well equipped force. It is crucial to appreciate that interrupting the logistical preparations of a terrorist group or cell is the most effective measure that can be taken to thwart potential attacks and dismantle networks. This can be done by jamming system signals, picking up terror chatter by using intelligent spyware and freezing of funds that go into or come out of suspected terrorist accounts.<sup>171</sup>


#### **4.4.3 Collaboration during Counter Terrorism**

The study also sought to investigate actors that Kenya Defence Forces collaborate with during Counter Terrorism. Figure 4.5 shows the study findings.

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<sup>171</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. *Extremism in 2019: New Approaches to Facing the Threat*. The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, (2019), pp. 11-

**Figure 4.5: Collaboration during Counter Terrorism**



The study observed that majority of the respondents (98.8%) asserted that they Collaborated with local community in Counter Terrorism, 92.6% collaborated with civil societies while 81.5% collaborated with NGOs. Other collaborations were indicated to include AMISOM member states collaboration, Police force, Intelligence agencies, and anti-terror units of Partner states in the war against terror and International communities. This implies that Kenya Defence Forces collaborated with local community, civil societies and NGOs in fight against terrorism.

Communities were observed to help in providing information to the government officers and this was found to be essential in curbing terror. It was also observed that local community leaders in many instances have enhanced cooperation with the agencies that counter terrorism through campaigns that reduces extremism and radicalization amongst the people.

#### **4.4.4 Positive impact of Kenyan military in counterterrorism**

The study sought to examine whether counterterrorism by the KDF has led to the following positive impacts. The findings are as shown in table 4.5

**Table 4.5: Positive impacts of Kenya military in counterterrorism**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Dislodged terrorists From their strong holds	61	75.3%
Manning & Pacification of the Liberated Areas	74	91.4%
Stabilized the Juba Corridor	46	56.8%
Reduced terrorists Incursions in the Country	76	93.8%

The study results showed that most of the respondents (93.8%) agreed that as a result of Kenya military in counterterrorism there have been reduced terrorists Incursions in the Country, 91.4% indicated Manning & Pacification of the Liberated Areas, 75.3% indicated dislodged terrorists from their strong holds while 56.8% indicated stabilized the Juba Corridor. This implies that Kenya military involvement in counterterrorism have resulted to reduced terrorists Incursions in the Country and Manning & Pacification of the Liberated Areas hence promoting peace and security that provides stable environment for sustainable societal growth and development.

#### **4.4.5 Negative effects of KDF in Countering International Terrorism**

The study examined negative effects that come as a result of using KDF to counter international terrorism. The results were as indicated in table 4.6 below.

**Table 4.7: Negative effects of KDF in Countering International Terrorism**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Loss of life of soldiers	52	64.2%
Collateral damage	69	85.2%
Destruction of property	61	75.3%
Displacement of people	67	82.7%
Human rights abuse	45	55.6%
Degrading /elimination of the terrorism threat	11	13.6%

The study established that majority of the respondents (85.2%) asserted that the negative effects of KDF in Countering International Terrorism to include collateral damage, 82.7% indicated displacement of people, 75.3% indicated destruction of property, 64.2% indicated loss of life of soldiers, and 55.6% indicated human rights abuse while 13.6% indicated degrading /elimination of the terrorism threat. This implies that Negative effects of KDF in Countering International Terrorism to include collateral damage, displacement of people, and destruction of property and loss of lives of soldiers.

#### **4.4.6 Assessment of KDF involvement in countering International Terrorism**

The study assessed the KDF participation countering International Terrorism. The Table 4.7 shows the response from the respondents

**Table 4.8: Assessment of KDF involvement in countering International Terrorism**

	Frequency	Percent
Averagely successful	1	1.2
Not successful	4	4.9
Successful	7	8.6
Successful to some extent	1	1.2
Very successful	68	84
Total	81	100

As per the results in table 4.7 above, most of the respondents (84%) assessed the KDF involvement in countering International Terrorism to be very successful, 8.6 indicated successful, 4.9% indicated not successful while 1.2% indicated successful to some extent and averagely successful respectively. This implies that KDF involvement in countering International Terrorism is very successful

#### **4.4.7 Suggestions on how best to counter international terrorism affecting Kenya**

Respondents were asked to give their suggestions on how best to counter international terrorism affecting Kenya. Respondents cited Procurement of Modern Equipment to be an essential mechanism among others in combating international terrorist activities affecting Kenya. Modern equipments and training to the security officers is essential since they will enable effective and efficient response to acts of terror. There should be adequate resource allocation to cater for transportation as well as communication. The development of forensic labs will ensure easy verification and prosecution of

cases.<sup>172</sup> Consequently, it is imperative to upgrade the machines and services of the police forces as well as other security agencies, proper remuneration to the officers, good infrastructure for efficiency and effectiveness in handling security concerns. There should be a central electronic data bank for the security agencies to help in keeping, sharing and to access information for adequate efficiency and effectiveness.<sup>173</sup>

Recruitment and training of the security officers was highlighted to be important since it will ensure there is adequate personnel to respond to acts of terrorism. This refers to both deployments of additional security officers as well as giving them the modern equipments, skills to help in detecting and deterring the acts of terror and to perform their general obligations efficiently. The recruitment process should be proper and transparent to ensure that relevant officers are selected so as to enhance proper performance after training. This should be done in line with the proper standards. The trainings should also be done using revised syllabus in line with the issues in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The training should be updated so as to make the officers to advance their skills and not to concentrate on the physical aspects only.<sup>174</sup> This in line with the both Sawyer and Foster who encouraged governments should have effective and efficient police force before the onset of implementing strategies for countering terrorism.<sup>175</sup>

Several individuals were against the invasion of the KDF in Somalia. They argued that the government should withdraw the troops from Somalia so as to restore security

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<sup>172</sup> Katumanga, and Ngunyi, 2014

<sup>173</sup> Otele, Strategic Change Management at Interim Independent Electoral Commission of Kenya, (Unpublished Master's Research Project), University of Nairobi, Kenya (2012).

<sup>174</sup> M. Katumanga, and M. Ngunyi, From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence. Nairobi: The Consulting House, (2014)

<sup>175</sup> Reid Sawyer, and Michael Foster, "The resurgent and persistent threat of al Qaeda," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 197-211.

in the country.<sup>176</sup> They argued that many incidences of terror attacked occurred after the KDF were deployed in Somalia. Hence there was a perception amongst that if the KDF are withdrawn from their operations in Somalia might lead to the reduction in terror attacks and this can help Kenya to advance its counter terrorism measures.

This is in congruent with earlier research that was conducted on ‘The roots of radicalization; Citizens views on the causes and solutions for insecurity in Kenya.’ It established that inclusion of Somalia and semblance of peace proved to be a daunting task, this is because previous initiatives by the USA and UN which have adequate resources and manpower were not effective. It concluded that military on its own is not efficient.<sup>177</sup> Therefore withdrawal of the KDF is essential since it will reduce retaliatory attacks.

#### **4.5 Challenges Facing Counterterrorism Efforts**

The study went further to established challenges that Kenya Defence Forces faces in Countering International Terrorism. Table 4.8 presents the findings of the study

**Table 4.9: Challenges Facing Counterterrorism Efforts**

	Frequency	Percent
Command and control Challenges	40	49.4%
Logistical resources scarcity challenges	61	75.3%
Personnel shortages	23	28.4%
Changing trends of terrorism	73	90.1%
Weather and challenging terrain	37	45.7%
Ill training on asymmetrical warfare	59	72.8%

<sup>176</sup> ibid

<sup>177</sup> D. Green Police Reforms: Helping police fight crime more effectively, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/damian-green-speech-on-police-reform>, (2013).

Based on the findings, most of the respondents (90.1%), changing trends of terrorism are the Challenges Facing Counterterrorism Efforts, 75.3% indicated logistical resources scarcity challenges, 72.8% indicated Ill training on asymmetrical warfare, 49.4% indicated command and control Challenges, 45.7% indicated Weather and challenging terrain while 28.4% indicated Personnel shortages. This implies that Changing trends of terrorism, logistical resources scarcity challenges and Ill training on asymmetrical warfare are the major challenges Facing Counterterrorism Efforts.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

The chapter provides detailed summary on why states use military to counter terrorism in Africa, the effects of Kenya Defense Force in countering international terrorism, the challenges that Kenya Defense Force faces while countering international terrorism. It outlines conclusion and recommendations of the study.

#### **5.1 Summary**

This study revealed that African militaries are used to counter international Terrorism and that KDF are used to counter international Terrorism. The study also revealed that the major Areas that KDF has been used to counter International Terrorism are Lamu and Somalia. The study established that the major non-military approaches they think can work effectively as a tool for Kenya to counter international terrorism instead of relying on the use of Military alone are diplomacy, tighter border controls and freezing terrorist financing.

The study established militaries are preferred because of the following: Equipment, Intelligence & Surveillance, Decisiveness, Operational reach, Military effectiveness and Training. In addition, respondents indicated that Military is trained and well prepared for this task. The military is better equipped and has knowledge on multi agency approach to operations. Also respondents indicated that states prefer use of Military as Compared to Non-Military tools in countering international terrorism because it involves intelligence gathering which is a military function and armed

means to achieve its objectives. It requires patrols which are done by military in order to pacify liberated areas. Further, they indicated that the fight against terrorism require to be securitized thereby having a common understanding of the threat to the states and therefore need for mitigation strategy for the good of the state and its people. To effectively fight terrorism, state machineries combined that is national security agencies, economy as well as political aspects needs coordination and organization through multi agency approach to have a greater effect. The international terrorism in this regard should involve other states as well since if left to one state then the war can never be won. Also Military tools are very effective to combat terrorism and proved to be the best means to degrade terrorists and that terrorists use crude weapons which require military means and tools in order to deal with. The Intelligence gathering and surveillance have been key strategies by the military in countering terrorism in the internationally

The study revealed that Kenya Defence Force Play major role when intervening in International Terrorism and that Kenya Defence Force mostly uses patrol and intercept communication methods when intervening in International Terrorism. In addition, the study established that Kenya Defence Forces collaborated with local community, civil societies and NGOs in fight against terrorism and that Kenya military involvements in counterterrorism have resulted to reduced terrorists Incursions in the Country and Manning & Pacification of the Liberated Areas. Further the study established the Negative effects of KDF in Countering International Terrorism to include collateral damage, displacement of people, destruction of property and loss of life of soldiers.

Procurement of Modern Equipment was cited to be an essential mechanism to combat acts of terrorism affecting Kenya. Modern equipments promote efficiency and effectiveness in responding to attacks and carrying out intelligence services. The study also established that there is need to recruit and train more security officers to as this ensures there are adequate forces to deter and respond to terrorist activities. Changing trends of terrorism, logistical resources scarcity challenges and training on asymmetrical warfare are the major challenges Facing Counterterrorism Efforts.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

The study concludes that African militaries are used to counter international Terrorism and that KDF are used to counter international Terrorism. The study also concludes that the major Areas that KDF has been used to counter International Terrorism are Lamu and Somalia. The study concludes that the major non-military approaches they think can work effectively as a tool for Kenya to counter international terrorism instead of relying on the use of Military alone are diplomacy, tighter border controls and freezing terrorist financing.

The study concludes militaries are preferred because of the following: Equipment, Intelligence & Surveillance, Decisiveness, Operational reach, Military effectiveness and Training. In addition, respondents indicated that Military is trained and well prepared for this task. The military is better equipped and has knowledge on multi agency approach to operations. Also respondents indicated that states prefer use of Military as Compared to Non-Military tools in countering international terrorism because it involves intelligence gathering which is a military function and armed means to achieve its objectives It requires patrols which is done by military in order to

pacify liberated areas. Further, they indicated that the fight against terrorism require to be securitized thereby having a common understanding of the threat to the states and therefore need for mitigation strategy for the good of the state and its people. To effectively fight terrorism requires state machineries such as economy, national security as well as political must be orchestrated through multi agency approach to have a greater effect. The international terrorism in this regard should involve other states as well since if left to one state then the war can never be won. Also Military tools are very effective to combat terrorism and proved to be the best means to degrade terrorists and that terrorists use crude weapons which require military means and tools in order to deal with. The Intelligence gathering and surveillance have been key strategies by the military in countering terrorism in the internationally

The Kenya Defence Force Play major role when intervening in International Terrorism and that Kenya Defence Force mostly uses patrol and intercepts communication methods when intervening in International Terrorism. In addition, the study concludes that Kenya Defence forces collaborated with local community, civil societies and NGOs in fight against terrorism and that Kenya military involvement in counterterrorism has resulted to reduced terrorists Incursions in the Country and Manning & Pacification of the Liberated Areas. Further the study concludes the Negative effects of KDF in Countering International Terrorism to include collateral damage, displacement of people, property destruction and loss of lives.

### **5.3 Recommendation**

The study provides recommendations based on the objectives;

The study recommends that security agents should put measures to ensure increased public participation in countering terrorism. It will enhance ample interaction between the security personnel and the civilians leading to the gaining of a lot of information that is relevant for intelligence services.

The study also recommends that it is essential to embrace modern training of the security officers and use of modern equipment and technology and tactics. This will enable the available personnel to have the knowledge and expertise on how to respond to terrorist situations that keeps on changing in the globalizing world.

The study further recommends that Kenya and other relevant stakeholders should come up with National Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism plans which should reflect a multiagency approach within government, NGOs, religious communities, communities and affected communities. Additionally, the study recommends audit and scrutiny of the security agencies so as to ensure that they are well capable and trained for their respective positions. More so the study also recommends law makers to strengthen laws against terrorism and also formulate others in relation to the changing capacity of terrorism today and its activists

Because of the localization of extremism, there is need to need for the devolved governments to respond to issues of radicalization through investing on the youth. Additionally, this study recommends diversification in counterterrorism strategies put in place. As such, both traditional and nontraditional strategies such as diplomacy and legislations may all be used in combating terrorism.

#### **5.4 Suggested Areas for Further Studies**

Despite the study accomplishing its objectives, the following areas arose and necessitate further studies.

1. The study suggests that a comparative study to be conducted in other countries such as Nigeria and Tanzania. This will enable the determination of any similarities and dissimilarities and also strengthen the fight against terrorism in Africa.
2. To conduct further studies at a different time frame so as to determine whether the situation would have changed.

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## APPENDICES

Appendix I Consent Letter

**TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

**Date**

Dear Sir/Madam

**REQUEST FOR DATA COLLECTION**

**MR. MOSES LERIARE**

I am the above named student currently pursuing Masters of Art degree in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. I am carrying out a research on “**COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM BY THE MILITARY IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCES**”

The basic role of the military is to protect the citizens and keep at bay the enemies that threaten the security of the nation. It is on this basis that the military has been on the forefront in countering terrorism both internationally and locally. You have been identified as a crucial person to assist in this research.

Kindly assist in filling in the attached interview guide to the best of your knowledge.

The information you share will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will purely be used for academic purposes.

Your assistance, support and cooperation will be highly valued.

Thank you in advance.

Yours Sincerely,

Moses Leriari

## Appendix II: Consent Form

Title “Countering International Terrorism by the Military in Africa: A Case Study of the Kenya Defense Forces”

I \_\_\_\_\_ (respondent) give permission to the researcher to utilize the information that I will provide him as part of this research and that the nature of the study has been explained to me by the (Researcher/Research Assistant).....

Signature\_\_\_\_\_Date\_\_\_\_\_

I \_\_\_\_\_(Researcher/Research Assistant) Confirm that I have explained the nature and effect of the study

Signature\_\_\_\_\_Date\_\_\_\_\_



- Improved intelligence sharing.
- Others \_\_\_\_\_

5. Why do states prefer to use the military and not the above Non-military tools / Instruments of national power?

.....

**Section C: The Effect of using the Kenyan Military in Counterterrorism**

5. Does Kenya Defence Force Play major role when intervening in International Terrorism?

Yes

No

6. How do they do it (Methodology?)

Patrol

Curfew

Pre-emption

Intercept Communication

Others (Specify)

.....

.....

7. Who do they collaborate with during Counter Terrorism?

Local Community

Civil Society

NGOs

Other Security Organs (Specify)

.....

Do you agree that the use of the Kenya military in counterterrorism has brought the following positive impacts?

- Dislodged terrorists From their strong holds
- Manning & Pacification of the Liberated Areas
- Stabilized the Juba Corridor
- Reduced terrorists Incursions in the Country

Yes  No

If No, what is your opinion? .....

8. What are the negative effects of KDF in Countering International Terrorism?

- Loss of life of soldiers
- Collateral damage
- Destruction of property
- Displacement of people
- Human rights abuse
- Degrading /elimination of the terrorism threat

.....

9. What is your Assessment of KDF involvement in countering International Terrorism?

- Very successful
- Not successful
- Others (specify)

.....

.....

10. What are your suggestions on how best to counter international terrorism affecting Kenya?

.....  
.....

**Section D: Challenges Facing Counterterrorism Efforts**

11. What are some of the key challenges Kenya Defence Forces faces in Countering International Terrorism? (number in order of priority)

- Command and control Challenges
- Logistical resources scarcity challenges
- Personnel shortages
- Changing trends of terrorism
- Weather and challenging terrain
- Training on asymmetrical warfare

Others (Specify)

.....  
.....

Thanks for your cooperation.