

**FACTORS INFLUENCING RADICALIZATION AMONG
YOUTH IN URBAN SETTLEMENTS IN MATHARE SUB-
COUNTY, NAIROBI KENYA**

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**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

DECEMBER, 2020

DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to my husband Mohammed Noor Kullow for unwavering support in form of understanding, encouragement and support during the entire research period.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I thank the Almighty Allah for good health, provision and wisdom during my studies and in conducting this research study.

Special regards go to my supervisor, Dr Geoffrey Wango for the patience, valuable guidance and mentorship during the entire period of the study. Dr Wango also impressed upon me the need to read intensively on such an interesting topic.

My earnest gratitude goes to all my lecturers at the Department of Psychology, University of Nairobi for their support.

I would like to acknowledge with gratitude my family members including my husband Mohammed Noor Kullow, my children Misky, Imran and Imtaaz for the prayers and all kind of support that they have accorded me throughout my study process.

I also want to acknowledge with all the research participants in my study who provided the data that forms the bulk of this study.

May Our God bless you all.

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ABSTRACT

Radicalization is globally associated with youth mainly Muslim males, who get lured into acts of terrorism and extreme violence. The purpose of this study was to examine factors influencing radicalization among youth in urban settlements, using Mathare Sub-county in Nairobi County as the study location. The study's objectives were to examine the degree to which socio-economic factors influence radicalization, to determine the political factors influencing the radicalization, and to investigate the influence of religious identity in the process. The study adopted a correlational research design, with the researcher targeting 191 youths in Mathare sub-county of Nairobi County. Data collection was done by use of a structured questionnaire and a Key Informant Interview (KII) tool. Demographic characteristics were analyzed using frequencies and percentages. The study's objectives were examined through quantitative analysis using regression, and the results presented using tables and figures, while narrations were used to present findings from qualitative data. Findings showed that most of the youth interviewed had not subscribed to any radicalization agenda, but knew some who had been approached or fully radicalized. Socioeconomic as well as political factors, alongside religious identity, were found to be statistically significant forecasters of radicalization. The study recommends that concerned government agencies should come up with ways of safeguarding urban youth from radicalization by empowering them socio-economically, the youth need to keep themselves productively occupied to overcome peer pressure that and idleness that could lead to radicalization, and that religious leaders who lure youth into radicalization using religion should be monitored closely by the government. It recommended further studies using sample populations from more urban settlements, and for the studies to probe other factors apart from those covered by the current study in order to better understand the causes of youth radicalization.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to the Study

In recent times, radicalization has been identified as the major challenge to international community and in dealing with international terrorism (Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013; Bizina & Gray, 2014; Council of the European Union, 2005; Precht, 2007). Radicalization is a process that impacts on a person to evoke extremist vies towards a particular people, group or viewpoint that leads to violent acts (Hardy, 2018; Koehler, 2017; Neumann, 2010; 2013). In the end, the person becomes what Neumann (2013:874) calls ‘extremist.’ Various scholars comprehend radicalization as a process in which a person or group undergo various steps or stages that progressively inculcate them to the laid out ideas and thus leading to the intended viewpoint and to violence (Giddens & Sutton, 2017; Koehler, 2017). Thus, radicalization has various perspectives including religion (faith ideals), politics, social, economic and psychological perspectives (Anderson. & McKnight, 2015; Bhugra, Ventriglio, & Bhui, 2017; Christmann, 2012; European Commission Expert Group, 2008; Vurmo, Lamallari, Papa, & Dhembo, 2015). A major concern with radicalization are factors leading to radicalization, who is likely to radicalize (Borum, 2011; 2015; Borum & Fein, 2017; Koehler, 2014a) especially among the youth in Kenya and this is the concern of this study.

Increasingly, figures seem to suggest that most of the perpetrators are Muslim youth, mostly male, and that their actions are mainly remote-controlled (Cordesman, 2017; Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013; Hinds, 2013; Precht, 2007; Slooman & Tillie, 2006). In light of this, assumptions among various scholars including western academics have emerged that both radicalization and terrorism are vital physiognomies of Muslim youth (Bizina & Gray, 2014; Geeraerts, 2012; Hegghammer, 2006). Countries in the world and particularly Europe like Germany, England, Sweden and France have suffered terrorism attacks or threats that have been traced to die-hard youths trained and radicalized by the Al-Qaeda whose operational bases are in the Middle Eastern countries

like Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran (Ahmad, 2016; Richardson, Berlouis, & Cameron, 2017; Hegghammer, 2006).

In a study on the operations of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing regime in the UK, Anderson Q.C (2013b) argues that terrorism arose out of brainwashing of less-educated, energetic individuals, especially the youth, into believing they were protecting their identity and religion against western influence propagated through Christianity. This made majority of the young people converting to Islam to be unruly and dangerous to global security. Besides, social factors like stigmatization and a negative perception of the Muslim, poverty levels, inadequate formal education, social media, teachings by religious leaders and biased laws have greatly contributed to youth radicalization in the UK and other countries (Atwood, 2003). A similar situation is witnessed in Western Europe, where second-generation Muslims are still considered immigrants and may not be successfully integrated into society (Bizina & Gray, 2014).

According to Franz (2007), Muslims being suspected of belonging to extremist groups, and reference to Muslim young people as possible extremists, had completed a cycle where United Kingdom Muslim youth were portrayed as different, threatening, dangerous and untrustworthy, a view enthusiastically adopted in strategy, academia and the media for long. Youth radicalization is a huge concern in Africa, due to the fact that about 70% of the population is made up of young people (Botha, 2014; Devine, 2017; Faye, 2017; Hinds, 2013; McCullough & Schomerus, 2017). Also, the various push and pull influences at play in Africa have led many youths to be radicalized (Andrew, 2012; Hellsten, 2016; Hidalgo, 2014). The East African region is no exception and has been predisposed to terrorism for several years now (Hellsten, 2016; Hidalgo, 2014; Nzes, 2014). Tanzania and Kenya were amongst the first victims of terrorist attacks originating from Islamic radicalism, with the 1998 Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam simultaneous, twin attacks. Since then there has been increased threats and attacks, partly attributed to interventions by America and East African states in Somalia's internal conflict (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). For instance, both Kenya and Uganda have experienced several

attacks traceable to their support for the military interventions in Somalia under African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

In general, member states of East Africa have experienced violent extremism resulting from radicalization of their youth and their sucking into internationally-affiliated as well as home-grown terror networks. No constant factors have been identified as solely contributing to radicalization, but there are some that are typically relatable. Some of the circumstances favourable to terrorism, as acknowledged by the UN and OSCE, are dehumanizing victims of terrorism in the different manifestations and forms; violating human rights; lengthy unresolved conflicts; religious, ethnic and national discrimination; marginalizing others socio-economically; political exclusion; lack of good governance and trivializing of the rule of law.

Kenya has continued to experience auxiliary terrorist strikes that have caused multiple deaths and maimed many (Lagat, 2014; Wango, 2015). Terror attack in Kenya has the highest pitch in the twin bombing of the American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998 in which 298 died. Thereafter, there have been several attacks including the 2013 Al-Shabaab strike of the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi which killed 67 people, Mpeketoni attack on the Coast of Kenya near Lamu in which 48 people were killed, the Garissa University attack in 2015 killing 148 people mostly Christian students and the DUSIT hotel in 2019 in which 27 people died.

It has long been argued that the refugee camps in Kenya, namely Dadaab and Kakuma are recruiting grounds for terrorists. However, this has been placed in serious doubts following the patterns of attacks in the country. The more recent terrorist attacks of Garissa and were said to have been planned and executed by young Kenya youths of mixed ethnicity. Nonetheless, radicalization of youths and recruitment into various activities including illegal groupings, religious, social and political groups, criminal and violent activities is common in Kenya (Hellsten, 2016). Criminal gangs, recruitment along political, ethical and religious grounds is common particularly during political campaigns to influence voters or create fear and instability, and thus influence crowds

and voters in various ways and this was evident in the 2007 election violence (Hellsten, 2016).

As a result of the terrorist attacks and to ensure national security, the Kenya government has passed anti-terrorist legislation, approved AU's Convention on Preventing and Combating terrorism, and established a plan of action on combating and preventing terrorism. However, the situation has not changed and the threat of terrorist attacks continues to grow by the day, prompting this study. According to Nthamburi, (2010), on aggregate the terrorist attacks in the country have been carried out by Kenyan citizens, mostly young people recently converted to Islam. In 2012, an estimated 10% of Al-Shabaab's entire forces comprised of Kenyan young men (Nthamburi, 2010). In recruiting Kenyan youth, terror groups are using locals to do the dirty work, while the principals do the planning and stay out of harm's way. The recruits are normally financially constrained, over-zealous and young, predisposing them to recruitment and radicalization. This study sought to assess the factors influencing radicalization among youth in the Mathare sub-county of Nairobi County.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Kenya has suffered brazen terrorist attacks that surpass by far any other threat currently facing the country. Al-Shabaab and Al Qaida-affiliated terror groups have attacked several parts through kidnappings, bombings and cross-border invasions, making the country's security vulnerable and adversely affecting the lucrative tourism sector (Odero, 2009). Acts of terrorism have resulted in loss of lives, injuries, pain, loss of property and heightened insecurity. Additionally, the terrorist threat has negatively impacted on the tourist economic sector leading to closure of hotels and job loss. Arrests and government reports point to the youth being the main perpetrators. Research elsewhere suggests that terrorists gain the allegiance of the young through offering tangible incentives such as money, arms and perks. The young men and women who join terrorism become combatants, bombers, lookouts, mules or errand persons (Lagat, 2014; Odero, 2009). Karanja (2013) avers that Kenya is both a victim and source of terror because many Kenyan youth are struggling with deep-seated issues like re-affirming their identity,

wanting to revenge, and unfulfilled religious inspirations. At the same time, Kenya's efforts to counter terrorism have experienced institutional, legislative and operational difficulties. Still, the youth can and should play productive roles in fighting the rising extremism, radicalization and terrorism; hence the need to identify the factors influencing radicalization among Kenyan youth with a view to finding a remedy.

1.3. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the current research was to assess the factors influencing radicalization among youth in urban settlements.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

1. To establish the social-economic factors influencing radicalization among youth in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County.
2. To examine the political factors influencing radicalization among youth in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County.
3. To establish the religious factors influencing radicalization among youth in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County.

1.5. Research Questions

1. How do social-economic factors influence radicalization among youth in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County?
2. To what extent do political factors influence radicalization among youth in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County?
3. How do religious factors influence radicalization among youth in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County?

1.6. Justification of the Study

Young people, particularly the youth in urban informal settlements are highly prone to radicalization owing to the socio-economic, political and religious dynamics unique to such environments. Additionally, they are also prone to influences from their peers, and

this tends to be much greater than in rural settings. Therefore, this study sought to find out some of the factors that influence radicalization among youth in such settlements.

Terrorism and radicalization are a matter of concern internationally and in Kenya as a result of various incidents of terrorist attacks. In that case, findings from this study will be instrumental in bringing to light the situation the youth are facing vis-à-vis radicalization (leading to acts of crime and specifically terrorism for the purpose of this study), and hopefully help parents and guardians, the government and society in general seek intervention measures to counter the twin threat of radicalization and extremism. It is therefore hoped that the findings arising from this study will be crucial to parents, teachers (schools), policy makers and government officials keen on fighting radicalization especially among the youth. By identifying specific factors, they will hopefully help in reducing costs and time that would be incurred in fighting radicalization blindly and focussing on factors that are more significant in order to socially and psychologically guide the youth into more appropriate and purpose goals of living.

1.7. Significance of the Study

This study is important in a number of ways to various people, including government, schools, parents and guardians as well as young people:

- i. *To local authorities:* Findings from the study will enlighten authorities on certain areas in the social, economic, political and religious sectors to be keen regarding the fight against the radicalization of the youth.
- ii. *To schools and other institutions:* The findings will hopefully assist administrators of schools who are keen on improving performance and school completion rates among youths prone to radicalization.
- iii. *To parents and guardians.* Findings from this study will hopefully be useful to parents and guardians by making them aware of the factors that might push their young to becoming radicalized. This awareness will hopefully equip them with the requisite skills to assist the youth overcome the vice.

- iv. *To the youth.* Findings from the study will hopefully help them be alert and act against certain factors, that might willingly or unwillingly, push them into radicalization.

1.8. Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study was mainly concerned with radicalization rather than terrorism though the two are related subjects. This is because persons seeking to influence people towards violent actions in Kenya, particularly the youth often target the uneducated, unemployed and disillusioned youths in urban informal settlements (Hassan, 2012). Several factors such as religion, politics and social-economic factors have been identified to influence radicalization among youth in urban settlements and this were the focus of this study, rather than the overall national issues in Kenya (Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014). Therefore, the study targeted youths living in Mathare sub-county in Nairobi County. The study also adopts a social and psychological approach rather than a security approach since it did not aim to apprehend any youths that could have been radicalised or participated in acts of terrorism.

1.9. Operational Definition of Terms

- Family** Family is defined as a group of people who share affiliations in matters of marriage, recognized birth and common residence. Wango and Gatere (2019) pinpoint at the relationship of blood, adoption and marriage. Members of an immediate family can thus include parents, spouses, sisters, brothers, daughters and sons (Wango & Gatere, 2019).
- Peers** Peers refer to people who belong to the same age group or social group as someone else characterized by common economic standards, shared values and operational focus.
- Radicalization** This is defined as the method by which groups or individuals progressively get to embrace extreme social, political or religious principles that undermine and/or reject the status quo, and underrate modern expressions and ideas of freedom of choice. Radicalization may come from comprehensive social consensus against reformist

modifications in the society. It may be nonviolent or violent in nature, even though much of the academic literature available emphasizes on radicalization as an aspect of violent extremism (RVE).

Terrorism

This refers to an action or actions intended to cause serious bodily harm or death to civilians or non-combatants, with the nature and purpose being to intimidate or coerce a people, government or organization towards a certain inclination or cause. Giddens and Sutton (2017) notes that terrorist acts are usually designed to instil fear in a population and for political intentions.

Youth

The African Youth Charter definition of a youth is anyone aged between 15 and 35 years. In the current study, youth who were the targeted population referred to participants aged between 18 and 35 years.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0. Introduction

This chapter critically reviews existing literature on youth radicalization as guided by the study objectives.

2.1. The Concepts of Radicalization and Extremism

Scholars tend to disagree of the definitions of radicalization, extremism and terrorism (Crenshaw, 2011). This is because often at times, it is difficult to state clearly if, and when actions of an individual or group can be objectively justified especially when it is violent and adversely affects other people (Crenshaw, 1981; 1998; 2011). Terrorism is defined as any targeted acts or intentional use of violence for political and ideological purposes (Neumann, 2010; Vertigans, 2008; 2011), that is, it is targeted and intentional and thus Vertigans (2008; 2011) argues that terrorism has certain activities that it is conducted via individuals, groups or media and communication messages. Hence terrorism is related to both radicalization and extremism. Radicalization occurs in various contexts and hence various scholars have tended to perceive it in diverse ways (Crenshaw, 2011; Hardy, 2018). For instance, not all persons with radical belief, opinions and ideas are dangerous violent or even harm others and certainly not all such people join terror groups (Crenshaw, 1998; 2011).

The challenges faced in tackling radicalization effectively partly lie in the elusiveness of radicalization as a concept. Ideas and motivations that lead people to radicalization are difficult and diverse and may include religion (spiritualism or faith, politics or social ideals (Wibisono, Louis & Jetten, 2019; Williams, Koch, & Smith, 2013). Also, technological advancement including the Internet are now perceived to be greatly facilitating radicalization (Behr et al., 2013; Geeraerts, 2012; Wright, 2008). Therefore, no solitary factor can be said to be solely responsible for radicalization. Additionally, the profiling of people, some who could have been radicalized, and in several instances

making assumptions based on peoples' past and present circumstances have been enormously inadequate in unravelling the causes of radicalization. This is because wide profiles based on orthodox expectations founded on race, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic statuses and gender have been found to be biased and not as effective (Horgan, 2008; Sageman, 2007).

Radicalization is a threat as it is associated with violence and other illegal behaviours like provocation to hatred (Hardy, 2018; Kruglanski et al., 2014). It is hardly ever a drive towards positive change, notwithstanding the fact that the human and political rights movements that proved influential in eliminating slavery, and the ones championing for common good, were considered radical at some point as they challenged prevailing opinions in the society. Hardy (2018:79) defines radicalization and what leads to extremism, and pinpoints when it becomes a matter of concern:

What constitutes an 'extremist' view? Is it any idea or opinion that is contrary to a society's core values, or does it need to be based in a coherent and recognised ideology? Does it need to justify or encourage the use of violence? Does it need to be religious or political? The answers to these questions are unclear but important: by declaring that someone has radicalised, or is at risk of radicalisation, we are implying that they are progressing on a pathway towards terrorism. This triggers more state responses and comes with many more connotations than saying that a person has progressed towards criminal conduct of another kind. We are also implying that the person has moved beyond a form of legitimate speech or political protest (even violent protest) to something morally unjustifiable.

In that case, radicalization and extremism are a matter of concern to society and to governments all over the world, especially due to the obvious link to terrorism activities. According to various scholars (Newmann, 2013; Hellsten, 2016; Walker, 2016), radicalization is a process through which a person is made to accept violence as a legitimate course of action in redressing perceived injustice. Eventually, this may cause the person to support, advocate for and take part in terrorism. However, there is no straightforward prediction of the direction terrorism can take. Radicalization, as the precursor to terrorism, may happen under various circumstances, at various speeds and take different forms. Recruitment and radicalization to terrorism happens at the unique intersection of personal circumstance, enabling environment and psychological challenge.

Radicalization and the situation in Kenya is best summarized by Hellsten (2016:3 - 4) as follows:

Radicalisation is a complex phenomenon and studies show that the reasons for joining extremist organisations vary between social groups. Some youths living in poor neighbourhoods are attracted by the promise of money and material reward, others believe in the jihadist ideology, some have lost faith in dysfunctional politics, others look for adventure and for a clear set of rules and norms to follow, and yet others join because of peer – even family – pressure. The organisations are very adept at targeting these different youth groups with different promises and messages.

“Self-initiated” or “self-directed” radicalization is used in instances where there is an insignificant degree of collaboration with those who vigorously seek to recruit or radicalize. This partly explains the occurrence of self-starters or sole terrorists who act without any clear support or direction. Radicalization is a vibrant process and can be hastened, slowed down or reversed. So as to avoid radicalization and being taken hostage, it is important to understand the impact and nature of the diverse influences that can predispose someone. Likewise, it is beneficial to differentiate between the pull and push factors that if not addressed can see radicalization triumph. Some factors, like the presence of a fascinating recruiter, may have grip on the unprepared and result in radicalization. Other factors, like the threat of violence against self from agents can lend someone further vulnerable to the plea of terrorism, forcing them in the direction of radicalization (Borum & Fein, 2017; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Sageman, 2007).

Radicalization should be regarded as a cooperation process between a person and external forces such as terrorist and recruiters’ propagandists, and resultant authorities’ actions in retaliation. “Self-directed” or “self-initiated” happens when there is minimal collaboration with those seeking for people to recruit and radicalize. Radicalization can also be enabled by the Internet, which has become a growing concern to many governments globally. There is significant variety in those radicalized. Studies show that people recruited and radicalized are often more exposed, educated and affluent. This means that more learned people are drawn in, and not the less educated as commonly painted by the mass media. Sageman (2007), in an assessment of 400 radicalized youth produced in court, discovered that while Palestinians youth were being enrolled by

terrorist groups when aged just 14 years, Al-Qaeda members were joining *jihad* even at 26 years. Three-quarters of these were professionals or semi-professionals: architects engineers, civil engineers and scientists. According to Precht (2001), in Western Europe the radicalization process commences when teenagers are searching for a life cause or a stronger Muslim distinctiveness. Generally, radicalization goes under the very noses of slack social networks of peers.

A common denominator in radicalization is the presence of a charming person who conveys convincing discourses in schools, mosques or prisons often under guise and with the permission on unwitting officials (Mitchell, 2016; Morris, 2016). Official sources suggest that a number of American homegrown Islamists have been radicalized while incarcerated. A good example is the prison-formed Jamiyat al-Islam al-Sahih cell in California that was convicted in 2007 for attacks on synagogues and the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles. Many young recruits into extremism are not conscious of their nation's past and lack an appropriate awareness level of Islam, and most have not read Quran that the recruiters purport to use in the radicalization. The recruiters prey on young disillusioned persons who have no knowledge of the religion they are hoodwinked to think they are defending by choosing terrorism.

It is imperative to understand the role of social networks in the radicalization process. Social links are key to the dynamics of terror networks. Group singularity is a robust feature of these networks, with the jihadist recruit candidates frequently linked to terrorist networks by acquaintances and relatives. Youth frequently join radical circles after they are discarded or neglected by the society and access terrorist systems online (Koehler, 2014b; Morris, 2016), in youth social activities and areas of worship. The native community, by being impartial to issues affecting the youth, is unable to detect the radicalization, like was the case with the Montreal Millennial Plot bombers in Montreal City, Canada. Dismissed as "a bunch of guys" involved in minor misdemeanor and living in apartments on welfare, the young men involved in the plot escaped the radar of the authorities even though their group rotated about Kamel who had links with international terror groups while posing as a martial arts trainer.

Radicalization has part of its agenda the control of political transformation (Krueger, 2009). Krueger (2009) in a study postulates that terrorism can be compared to voting. On the surface great opportunity, for instance jobs that pay highly, ought to discourage people from engaging in politics. In reality however it is them that actually vote as they seek to manipulate politics and get avenues to articulate their opinions. Extremists also worry about manipulating political outcomes so intensely that they are ready to suffer for it. Understanding the causes of terrorism can lend a hand in dissuading nations from tacking courses of action that are counterproductive.

2.2. Influence of Socio-economic political Factors on Radicalization

Johnston (2009) in a study based in the USA argues that the wave of youth radicalization is tied to identity and belongingness to a particular class in society. For example, up to 32% of Somalia-born immigrants to the States were easily lured to go to Syria and Mogadishu to fight, just because they felt that their agemates were doing the same. For example, Fazul Mohammed and Idriss Kamau who were behind the Mpeketoni attacks and bombings of the U.S embassy in Kenya in 1998 were introduced to the cult of radicalized youths by their friends. Nzes (2014) notes that friends were most of the vigorous role players, presenting 66% of MRC and 38% of Al-Shabaab participants. Hellsten (2016:4) aptly puts it that radicalization is, “easier in places where poverty, inequality, ethnic and religious tension, political marginalisation and insecurity already prevail”. Thus, Kenya is a possible recruiting ground and thus increasing the threat of terrorism through youth radicalization (Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014).

In Azerbaijan, socio-economic problems acted as the primary push factor that drove individuals to radicalize. In an attempt to mitigate the challenge, the government of Azerbaijan launched an important program in 2006, called Targeted Social Assistance (TSA). It is a tested program run by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Population (Georgian Centre for Security and Development [GCSD], 2018) and seeks to assist youths most prone to radicalization integrate more seamlessly with society.

On the other hand, a study by Walker (2016) in Nigeria seeking to find out why youths become radicalized revealed that 72% of those who joined radical groups were motivated by the lives and brave stories they heard from their friends who had joined earlier. They were considered heroes, based on the fact that they were somehow elevated from the poverty of others and that they looted valuables when they struck targets in their terrorist missions. The study also indicated that youth in areas that were greatly hit by the uprising and control of militia groups since the early 1999 - Kano plains, Niger Delta and other northern part of Nigeria - became radicalized by the fact that their brothers, cousins and close age mates had been recruited into such groups.

Deprived economic situations intensify pressure for economic modifications, in turn impacting government responses. Situations with increased economic inequalities, especially when confined to recognizable religious and ethnic groups, disturb political climate and nurturing feelings of marginalization and discrimination. Normally speaking, worsening social circumstances increase the likelihood of such situations becoming political issues. The Kenyan situation appears worsening with sects like Mungiki (Wango, 2015) as Hellsten (2016:5) highlights the complexity of the situation:

In Kenya which is an ethnically divided country, racial discrimination against the Arabs, Muslims, and the Somalis has been based on violation of human rights, religion, access to power and lack of protection as well as social justice. The discrimination has led to tensions and threats to the country security. The discrimination has led to discontent since the leaders have failed to build a united country, there has been impunity and corruption, there has been less participation by the marginalized groups, there has been unequal distribution of power as well as the resource. This has made conflict to escalate as the marginalized groups continues to be resistant. The hostile environment created by the discrimination has made individuals particularly the youths to engage in radicalization activities or joining the terrorist organizations.

Thus, monitoring socioeconomic tendencies could be a surest way to recognize emerging issues that may have political implications (Open Society Justice Initiatives, 2013).

Socioeconomic triggers of radicalization in Kenya comprise perceived and real marginalization and segregation from state resources, relative scarcity and frustrated anticipations. Notwithstanding immediate relations often made between radicalization and poverty, economic conditions encompass more than just scarceness. This is to mean that there are other pointers that provide or facilitate satisfactory settings for radicalization and ultimate recruitment. Thus, economic problems including uneven access to resources and know-how play a role in a country's susceptibility to terrorism. In measuring the influence of economic situations, reference to uneven development, population growth the increased gap between the poor and the rich play a crucial role in radicalization and terrorism. A famous opinion is that poverty causes terrorism. Nevertheless, when learning the contextual information of various terrorists, it has been found that not just poor people are culpable to terrorism. The likelihood of prosperous people being convinced into extremism creates a necessity to establish the roles of deprived economic state of affairs in radicalization and extremism (Independent Policing Oversight Authority, 2014).

Studying the difference between front-runners and supporters, as well as the planners and executors, of terrorism acts can be helpful in evaluating the effects of certain factors, such as social economic political conditions as being favourable to extremism (Devine, 2017; Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013; Hassan, 2012; Hoffman, 2006; Horgan, 2008; Jones, 2017). Frontrunners are habitually educated, charismatic, and are skilful in influencing their supporters and exploiting socioeconomic circumstances. Under usual circumstances, it is expected that the leaders may originate from professional middle class levels that are expensive and difficult to substitute, whereas financial conditions are used as bases of selling ideas to the less privileged. Influenced by their needs to matter and belong, the less fortunate develop to useable foot soldiers (McCullough & Schomerus, 2017). In multinational terror linkages, accomplished people belonging to the middle class are advantaged in that they can easily blend with the public, which perhaps

clarifies the participation of people from improved socioeconomic backgrounds in the commission of terrorist acts (McCullough & Schomerus, 2017).

Notwithstanding these exclusions, meagre socioeconomic environments owing to denied access to public amenities, high population growth with its implications on household incomes, irregular progress, lack of economic prosperity, illiteracy, urbanization and unemployment contribute greatly to a nation's and group's susceptibility to social skirmishes and radicalization. However, it is crucial to retain political situations, mostly the capability to express frustrations as well as other sociological statuses when guiding analysis of radicalisation (Agnew, 1992) in order to effectively assess the risk of aspects such as radicalisation and hence terrorism (Borum, 2015). Thus, discussions about the role of economic settings ought to guard against the postulation that political or socioeconomic situations compel groups or people to engage in terrorism activities. The main argument here is that various factors come into play in bringing about radicalization, among them socio-economic problems. The introduction of an ideology that seemingly offers an escape from this reality becomes a pull factor especially to the youth. It should be noted however that economic problems are in no way the sole factor in fanning acts of terrorism.

Aulakh (2013) studied the reasons why youths join Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. He found out that the family background greatly influenced youths joining these groups. In Nigeria for example, up to 81% of the Muslim orphans were easily lured, joining the Boko Haram within 2 to 30 days of being promised freedom from the economic problems that faced them. They were followed by children born to single parents and then those in large families, with 5-7 children. This scenario is similar to Kenya's MRC and Al-Shabaab hotspots like the Coast region, Eastleigh and North Eastern Kenya. The current study seeks to find out whether indeed there exists a relationship between family and youth radicalization in urban settlements.

According to the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (2014), family size has a significant influence in determining the social life children take. In the coast region for

example, most families are poor and have many children, seven per family being the average. According to the report, based on family size, majority of the participants were from somewhat small families. 68% of Al-Shabaab participants and 56% of the MRC were from families with one to four siblings. 28% of Al-Shabaab participants and 39% of the MRC families had between five and nine siblings, while only 4% of the Al-Shabaab and 5% of MRC participants had families with between ten and fourteen siblings. Originating from small families was seen to have actual influence on the participation of parents, mostly fathers, in debating about politics with the children when they were growing up, with family hardships being blamed on the political class and its followers. 68% of the Al-Shabaab and 78% of the MRC recruits acknowledged having deliberated politics with their fathers. From the study, it was noted that 59% of the MRC participants and 21% of the Al-Shabaab had their parents' support in their resolution to connection with the organizations.

A study carried out by the Government of Kenya (2014) on the causes of and rise of MRC and other extremist groups in the coast region indicated that 18% of Al-Shabaab and 31% of MRC participants were brought up in families headed by mothers whereas 16% of Al-Shabaab and 20% of MRC participants were brought up in families that had no mother figures. 11 out of 54 participants in the case of Al-Shabaab said they were brought up by a caregiver and not their natural parents. What this is predominantly showing is that the age at which the participants lost their parent or parents had a bearing on their joining extremist groups. In one of the newspapers (Daily Nation, 2020) a mother lamented how she had lost four children, including her daughter to al-shabaab and it was notable that the daughter, then aged 17 ran away from home to be an al-shabaab bride in Somalia. Among Al-Shabaab recruits, 19% and 13% had lost their fathers and mothers respectively at the age of five and below; 40% and 81% had lost their mothers and fathers respectively when aged between 16 and 18 years; and 47% had lost their mothers when they were 19 to 20 years old. Among those of the MRC, 17% had lost fathers when they were aged below five years, 75% had lost both their mothers and fathers at the ages of 16 to 18 years, whereas 8% and 25% had lost their fathers and mothers correspondingly at ages 19 and 20 years. Most of the Al-Shabaab and MRC recruits had lost one or both

parents at the beginning of adolescence, the time when people are predominantly vulnerable to loss and grief of this scale.

However, a similar study was carried out by Matt (2014) in March 2014 and according to him, 82% participants of the Al-Shabaab and 69% of the MRC had a surviving father, while 84% of the Al-Shabaab and 80% of the MRC had surviving mothers. To examine the connection they had with the parents when they were growing up, the recruits were asked about the parental roles in making the rules in the respective families, in other words the parent who took lead in instilling discipline. Participants were also requested to specify how severe the punishments were and how the parents were involved as they grew up. In Al-Shabaab families, participants who said that both parents were available and present had their fathers making the rules all the time. In families with absentee fathers, mothers were responsible for making the rules (though this was just in three case scenarios), while male relatives were the ones mostly making the rules. The three instances where mothers were responsible for making rules while the fathers were there were rather the exception. This portrays a real conventional culture. For the MRC, mothers made the households rules in all the instances where there father was absent, excluding the two scenarios where older siblings would be compelled to step in.

From the 65 participants who were interviewed between years 2012 and 2014, 60% of MRC and 54% of Al-Shabaab recruits specified that they had recruited their friends. Friends comprised the largest group in the two organizations, comprising 33% of MRC and 34% Al- Shabaab. Bearing in mind that most of them got into the radical groups as a result of peer pressure, the importance of understanding how relational associations work comes to the fore. Related with this is the sense of belongingness that joining the organizations and being members of the corresponding establishments brought to the young recruits.

2.3. Influence of Political Factors on Radicalization

Muslims in many non-Islamic states point out to poor integration as a major factor leading them to radicalization. Many studies show that Muslim communities within

European countries are not fully integrated into the society. It is thought that global political events play a central role in entrenching Muslim fundamentalism. This in turn brings a perception that the western democracies are anti-Islam. It then appears as though the west is fighting against Islam (European Commission Expert Group, 2008).

When it comes to the influence of politics on radicalization, not much light has been shed. Political groups have also not voiced concerns over the role that politics play. In Georgia for instance, there have been conflicts resulting from political tensions. Different viewpoints between the ruling elite and the radical resistance emerged when Georgia got independence. The first decade of Georgian independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union might be seen as a period of the eruption of “romantic and messianic nationalism.” This reality became the determinant for the most dramatic parts of Georgian history, namely the civil war in the early 90s (Georgian Centre for Security and Development [GCSD], 2018).

Countries that do not conform to the rule of law and display authoritarian tendencies are more likely to predispose their people to radicalization and extremism. It is therefore important to foster democratic values and entrench democratic principles to govern countries. This will aid in reducing the likelihood of people being drawn to “pull” factors that relate to violent extremism including in Africa (Jones, 2017; McCullough & Schomerus, 2017). The International Crisis Group (ICG), as cited by Hinds (2013) and McCullough and Schomerus (2017) depicts a grim picture of the political front in the context of various North African nations. The unstable political environment existing there gives room for the indoctrination of the masses with radical views and ideologies. The recent political upheavals have resulted in a vacuum in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, providing a fertile environment for radicalization. Mark, as cited by Hinds (2013), asserts that disenchantment with political systems has contributed to the growth of radical Islamist movements across the region. Autocracy, coupled with poor governance, has been blamed for predisposing the youth to radicalization and terror networks across the region.

In the Kenyan context, there seems to be ethnic and racial profiling that could have brought about the unfortunate perception that Somali Muslims are taken to be second-class citizens. Additionally they have not been quite visible in the political scene, further entrenching this belief. This has fostered feelings of exclusion and isolation, bringing about an identity crisis (Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Salifu, & Ndung'u, 2017). These observations are consistent with studies by Bhugra, Ventriglio and Bhui (2017) who argue that poor social economic and political engagements have are often fronted as major sources of feelings of isolation and alienation. Poor political involvement and feelings of isolation are major aspects that create fertile grounds for radicalization especially among secluded communities and the youth.

Botha (2014) embarked on a study to establish why individuals join the militant groups. The study was motivated by the fact that violent acts and extremism were on the rise in Kenya. The study sought to identify the pull factors that made members join Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). The observation was that the MRC pursued a secessionist agenda while Al-shabaab was linked to acts of terrorism, and that both attracted youth convinced to pursue either agenda. Most of the youths claim to have joined the groups in an attempt to address deep concerns including perceived injustices perpetrated by government. They decry frustration at being mishandled in “collective punishment” by government agencies with the misguided perception that individuals of Somali origin are potential terrorists. The MRC has attracted attention from Kenyan security agencies due to the fact that they operate in a similar geographical area as the Al-shabaab (Botha, 2014).

For the longest time, tribal politics have been the norm in the Kenyan political arena. These developments have only managed to polarize the country. Most communities especially from the North Eastern and Coastal areas have felt marginalized. Extremist groups have taken advantage, radicalizing the population to claim what it is denied. The MRC has mostly focused on land grievances as the other part of the economy is dominated by the rest of Kenya which mostly relies on tourism.

The role religion played in politics was not put at the forefront up until the end of one party system in Kenya in the 90s. This was in exception of the *Shifita* war during the early years of independence that merged religion and ethnicity (Botha, 2014). However, with the entry of the multi-party era religion started to play a crucial role in politics. It was just after opening the political scenery in 1992 when President Moi declined to have the Democratic Movement (DEMO) and the Islamic Party of Kenya registered as political parties on the basis of their religious associations. DEMO had its origins in traditional philosophies, mostly Kikuyu beliefs that fostered the spirit of collectivism in the rural scope, loyalty to native traditional expressions and respect to ancestors (Deacon & Lynch, 2013). The Islamic Party of Kenya, on the other hand, espoused the political aspirations of the Muslim population mainly from the coastal region (Deacon & Lynch, 2013).

Failure to register both religious groups and political parties was seen as an effort of the then Kenya African National Union (KANU) government to forestall the challenges that the two parties posed to the political status quo that was principally Christian. Regardless that Kenya was on paper a religiously non-discriminatory nation (Constitution of Kenya, 1964), Muslims felt more victimized compared to Christians. In the first instance, Muslims were not as well represented in main government institutions and positions. Secondly, there was open discrimination in the issuance of official documents, especially to Somalis since it was not clear who were Kenyan and who were from Somalia. For instance, upon application for a passport, Muslims were expected to provide additional documented proof of citizenship while Christian applicants just needed their personal and parents' birth certificates. In addition, applicants who had Islamic names were required to produce one of their grandparents' birth certificates (United Nations, 2013). This could have led to discontent among the Muslims and Somalis.

2.4. Influence of Religious Factors on Radicalization

Throughout history, religion has constituted an important part of people's lives. However, religion has also been used as a vehicle for disseminating hate and discrimination, and in recent years through acts of terrorism. Violent radicalization has indeed been grounded

majorly in religion (Bhugra, Ventriglio & Bhui, 2017; Rink & Sharma, 2018). It is possible that religion could have made a lot of individuals, groups and societies more vulnerable to radicalization. Jessica Stern, a professor at Boston University, argues that terrorists have believed they were responding to a higher spiritual calling by carrying out acts of terrorism (Jones, 2017). Wango (2015) states that faith and religious fundamentalism can be extreme since radical views can take a hard stance to the extent that they will yield harm, and thus endanger the life of self and/or others, and liberty of others. Wango gives the example of Islamic terrorism in the world and *Mungiki* sect in Kenya and argues that religion and spiritualism in counselling psychological are more inclined to healing and not terror.

Arena and Arrigo, as cited by Wibisono, Louis and Jetten (2019) had the observation that religious extremism incorporated the negative perception which are associated with particular religious' groups. One of the main definition of extremism was that an action which is associated with the beliefs about an action of bringing back a political system which support particular religious' beliefs through violence. However, Rink and Sharma (2018) was against this argument as they did not see any association between extremism and economic grievances. However, they made a consensus that extremism is mostly associated with infliction of trauma, troubled social relations which are connected to the exposure to social networks which are radical. The findings by these researchers suggest that radicalization is mostly dependent on the individual.

Acts of terrorism are usually carried out on those who actively speak out against these acts, those who are determined to go against these ideologies and curve their own way in the quest for self-determination, freedom and independence (Devine, 2017) Since the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States, the issue of religious radicalization, which has been outstanding for years, has become more widely seen and heard in the international media. A phenomenon that has become a real concern is Jihadist terrorism, embodied by religious fundamentalists from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, MUJWA, Ansar Dine, and others. Nigeria, for example, has suffered from

this phenomenon for a long time, with intensifying attacks by the Boko Haram along the shared borders with Cameroon and Chad (Andrew, 2012; Faye, 2017).

Belaala, as cited by Hinds (2013), puts forth the argument that the important ideological schools in terms of Islamic radicalization are Wahhabi Salafism and Jihadism. Wolf, again as cited by Hinds (2013), argues that Jihadism has a similar approach as that of Islam which proposes the uses of violence when an individual want to achieve certain goals. The researcher further states that Wahhabi Salafism is a foundation which is influences by the Saudi Wahhabism which does not advocate for the use of violence to a achieve a political goal.

Cordesman (2017) asserts that it is quite easy to point out the Islamic faith as being the driver of violent extremism and radicalization and forget that it is one of the world's greatest religions. Cordesman (2017) continues to emphasize that it would be unfair to demonize a religion due to acts of a small fraction of its faithful, adding that it would be wrong not to critically analyze the links that Islam has in relation to radicalization and violent extremism for the sake of being politically correct. In the end, reality will be that terrorism and violent extremism mostly happen in Muslim countries where attacks are carried out by Muslim extremist and it does not comprise of violence which is meted against civilians in that particular country.

The civil society in Kenya have been on high alert as they view that most of the youths have been a huge target by violent extremist in a bid to radicalize them. Most of the youth have no employment and thus they have been more susceptible to the activities of the violent extremist. Regardless of the religion one is in youth especially the male gender from the slum areas have been recruited by the Al-Shabaab as well as the ISIS in order to carry out terrorism activities (Hassan, 2012; Hellsten, 2016). This is because youngsters and people with little hope of education, good jobs and life appear much more vulnerable and are particularly easy prey in the recruitment processes (Hellsten, 2016). Hassan (2012) puts forward the view that ideology and the neglect of the youth in the society has been a key factor in making most of them joins Al-shabaab. Hassan argues that religion has been pivotal in this since the youth identifies with it more than politics.

Politically, the youths have not benefitted much and have instead been engaged in chaos and clan wars. No wonder they are easily pulled by the promise that they will go to paradise if they join Al-shabaab. They are made to believe that they are joining a holy war and that their task is to defend God's religion.

The Al-Qaeda movement has however taken a new turn in what (Burke, 2004; 2015; Giddens & Sutton, 2017) calls new terrorism. This is because it takes on a global network and hence its connection with Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia and its penetration into Kenya. Giddens & Sutton, 2017: 983 - 984) summarises it as follows:

It operates as a global 'network of networks' ...But within this structure, local groups have a high degree of autonomy. For some, this very loose organisational forms suggests that what Western scholars and commentators call 'al-Qaeda' is really more of a shared idea or ideology with similar shared tactics and method.

It is this taking in of a new ideological form that is elaborated by Burke (2004; 2015), Giddens and Sutton (2017) and Kaldor (2006) with new organisational structures that highly links the terrorism and hence radicalization in Kenya to Somalia, the Mombasa Republican Army at the Coast region of Kenya and the war in Somalia.

All schools which have been teaching Orthodox Islam especially in Sunni and Shia have had the belief that those people who die on behalf of other belong to the paradise. They also believe that dying as a martyr is the surest way through which they meet God. There has been disagreement which have come about as they argument on what actually constitute valid jihad. Thus in a bid to convince a Muslim that paradise is real and in waiting, the Al-Shabab must give a justification that a person struggle is the real meaning of Jihad. However, the youth who do not have the right religious information will find the task as one which is challenging.

A study by Hidalgo (2014) entitled 'The Worst Enemy of Kenya' focused on the role of religion in youth radicalization in the Kenyan coast, and gave interesting results following interviews with 127 Al-Shabaab and 300 MRC members. Asked about the role of beliefs in their lives, Al-Shabaab participants positioned their religious convictions in three positions as most important with 59%, very important with 37% and important with

4%. Participants from the MRC viewed their religious affiliation in a small this way, most important at 32%, very important at 59% and important at 9%. In this, it is interesting that the MRC participants were from diverse religious backgrounds: 25% Christian, 59% Muslim and 16% customary beliefs. However, most radicals group particularly from Mombasa and Kwale have more Muslims like the Al-Shabaab. The Muslim community in Kenya is concentrated in the North Eastern and Coast provinces, while in Nairobi Eastleigh, one of the Nairobi suburbs, has a Muslim majority.

The dominant Muslims have greatly contributed to the Al-Shabaab ranks in the coast region and Kwale in particular, where over 2000 youths are said to have been lured into extremism by Jihadist preachings carried out in mosques around Majengo, Likoni and Mwembe Tayari in Mombasa. Based on the 2009 national census, Kenya is a multi-religious country, with Christianity standing at 84% and Islam at 11%.

2.5. Theoretical Framework

Scholarly literature on radicalization has tended to be integrated into national policy strategies in diverse countries such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom. However, there is need for a more comprehensive integration of radicalization as argued by Hardy (2018). This is to enable deal with, and countering violent extremism (CEV). The core nature of radicalization is also captured in various social, psychological and criminology theories that though significant have variations in how they explain the cause of radicalization. Therefore, this study was guided by strain theory and a sociological theory, namely the theory of relative deprivation as outlined below.

2.5.1. Strain Theory

Strain theory was proposed by Emile Durkheim, Robert King Merton (1938, Albert Cohen and Steven Messner among others. Strain theory argues that social structures within the society can, and pressurize persons to certain actions, such as committing crime (Merton, 1938). The theory argues that it is the society that pressurizes the individual in order to achieve or attain certain socially accepted goals. This strain could be either: (a) Structural, as a result of the social processes; or, (b) Individual, that is, what

the individual is experiencing. Subsequently, this pressure leads the individual to act in certain ways such as the famous American dream (Messner & Resenfeed, 1994). In this, study, it is applied to radicalization and why young people may be attracted to certain ideas.

Agnew (1992; 2001) asserted the need to widen the application of strain theory in order to explain social class and cultural variables. According to Agnew the general strain theory is neither structural nor interpersonal, such as the case for radicalization. Instead, the theory should be individual and emotional with careful attention to the individual's immediate environment. In this study, the theory is used to establish the factors leading to radicalization, particularly among the youth (Polk, 1969). In that case, certain factors can trigger emotions like anger and frustrations among the youth, thus leading to undesirable behaviours such as crime and radicalization. These feelings in turn generate tension that calls for remedial action, with delinquency often a possible reaction. The resulting action can be used to lessen or run away from strain, pursue revenge targeting the strain source or connected targets, or relieve adverse emotions. For instance, people facing joblessness may involve themselves in extremist acts like selling drugs and theft of money, search for revenge against someone who dismissed them, or engage themselves in illicit drugs so as to feel better. The strain theory defines specific strains that mostly result in crime, reasons as to why strains enhance crime, and factors that could discourage one from reacting to strains with wrongdoing. This includes the strain type that revolves around incapability to attain financial success or the wider aim of being in a certain group or community, that is, the neglect. This is reflected in

The popularity of the general strain theory declined in the 1970s and 1980, partially as a result of new research that seemed to contest its hypotheses. A number of attempts were made to review it, mostly disputing that crime could originate from failure to attain a variety of goals that may not necessarily be monetary or middle-class in nature. The result was the theory has evolved to be one of the main philosophies of crime. The theory concentrates on wide-ranging forms of strain and includes the lack of ability to achieve diversified goals, losing valued possessions and bad treatment by other people. This

theory has been used in variety of studies that explain age, community, gender, race, ethnicity and communal dissimilarities in the increase in terrorism and rates of crime.

This theory has been used in understanding numerous forms of nonconformity and crime such as police deviance, suicide, commercial crime, bullying and terrorism. Findings appear to suggest that strains recognized by this theory escalate the probability of engaging in crime, even though its forecasts of how different people are likely to react to diverse strains with crime have experienced lesser support. Agnew (1992; 2001) stressed that the General Strain Theory can be essential in understanding crime linked to terrorism, but it requires amendment so as not to be tied to cultural variables and class statuses, but rather re-focused on rules and norms. Agnew maintained that a person's estimated or real failure to accomplish positively-treasured goals, actual or anticipated withdrawal of really valued incentives, and genuine or awaited appearance of damaging provocations all cause strain which leads the person to commit crime.

2.5.2. Theory of Relative Deprivation

The theory of relative deprivation was proposed by Runciman (1966). Relative deprivation argues that social-economic factors, including deprivation have a pivotal role to precipitate a person's perception to justice and injustice. This is because the person becomes aware that others have a higher advantage (or status, that may include social or material conditions) as compared to them (Christmann, 2012). This may be based on social-economic political, or religious inclinations that as a result may lead to radicalization.

Relative deprivation operates on individual, group, community, national and international levels (Christmann, 2012; Olson, Herman, & Zanna, 1986). In this case, various factors such as religion, social-economic and political disparity or diversity can, and are relevant factors in isolation and discrimination. It argues that the person is able to assess their relative deprivation in relation to other people, group (community) and to compare with the rest of the society. In that case, the person may emphasize on their being deprived,

and/or discontent to something or what they are convinced to be entitled (Walker & Smith, 2001).

Measures for countering terrorism can barely ignore the dynamics surrounding radicalization of people. So as to understand what motivates youth to get into radicalization, the study was also guided by the philosophy of relative deprivation. Gurr (2011) explains that as an alternative to an unconditional level of deficiency, a breach between anticipated and attained well-being produces collective displeasure. The theory of relative deprivation touches on people who perceive their own prosperity to be lesser than others' who they draw comparisons with. Gurr (2011) further defines political violence as the result of joint displeasure instigated by a sense of comparative deficiency, and uses the term 'relative withdrawal' for strain that is birthed from the discrepancy between 'ought' and 'is' of communal value gratification, and which oftentimes leads people to violence. The breach between a people's projected and realized welfare leads to collective frustration.

The notion of comparative deficiency ages back to the ancient Greece. Aristotle enunciated the notion that rebellion is compelled by a virtual sense of inequity than entire portions. Gurr (2011) postulates that the root cause of rebellion is hope for political and economic equality on the part of the people lacking it. Perceived discrepancy between value prospects and value abilities leads to displeasure irrespective of monetary standing. The study used this theory to examine the hindrance produced by comparative deficiency, and the resultant antagonism that manifests in radicalism and extremis. Viewed this way, terrorism levels can be described in part as an expression of a nation's circumstances that are conducive to relative insufficiency.

Most vulnerable youth in Kenya need assistance and guidance in their search for personal identity, including definition of their associations, in exploring and trying out matters of faith, legacy and peer group, without exposing them to the risk of being radicalized. Certain youths, though, opt to accept religious identities that are radical and perhaps the consequence of earlier identity crises and confusions in attempts to resolve to do with

what is perceived as the proper identity by other generations, while at the same time sensing they are not acknowledged and do not fit in the broader society. This may be strengthened by involvements of in critical discernment, sense of impassable social agility, and lack of confidence in political arrangements. This can lead to searches for uniqueness in crisis moments, leaving the person susceptible to radicalizing effects or accepting religious essentials as solutions to unsettled internal battles, one that offers highly organized rites and practices.

Socio-economic dissatisfaction can also make youths turn to violent extremism. Although economic pointers alone are not strongly associated with extremism, the combined effects of financial adaptabilities and social variables can lead to better understanding and conceptualization of terrorism. Comparative lack can also be defined in terms of the discrepancies between what one has in fiscal possessions and what they believe they are rightly eligible to own.

The conceptual framework is outlined below using a diagrammatical framework which summarises the interconnections between the study's variables to be measured and the factors contributing to radicalization.




Figure 1.1. Factors influencing radicalization among youth

The study, using the outlined theoretical approach postulated that if the factors that favour or support radicalization are removed and those that deter radicalization like strong religious teachings and beliefs, social economic and political factors, the youth could shun radicalization completely. This study paid attention to this observation in an effort to ascertain how this conceptualization functioned for the sampled participants.

2.6. Conclusion

Literature reviewed concurs that the youth are particularly vulnerable to radicalization, with socio-economic, political and religious factors playing a significant role. The Kenyan youth differs in terms of religious preferences, social settings, diversity of identities and economic backgrounds, and also in their vulnerability to indoctrination into extremism. These factors are important when addressing youth radicalization, as possible drivers of extremism and also as antinodes to violent extremism. With this knowledge,

the government. can utilize multi-dimensional strategies in planning and implementing counter-radicalization measures. Youths in the country have witnessed ethnic conflict, post-election violence and civil wars, all of which could predispose them to radicalization. Additionally, the Kenyan youth have had different experiences with our public institutions, some not so complimentary. The conversation that the country holds with its youth population will inform the ways in which it will view political engagement, and the trust or otherwise they will have in their political leaders. Confidence in the country's political establishments will inhibit youth radicalization, whereas cynicism will cause them to feel frustrated and increase their vulnerability to radicalization.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This section covers the materials and methods employed by the study. The following areas are covered: research design; site selection and description; the target population; the study's sample size; the sampling procedure; the research instruments; instrument validity and reliability; and methods employed in collecting and analyzing data.

3.1. Research Design

The study adopted a correlational research design, which measures interactions between different variables (Creswell, 2014; Creswell & Plano, 2007; Dawson, 2010; Howell, 2013; Vogt, 2008). For this study, the link between independent and dependent variables was evaluated. The dependent variable was radicalization of youths, while the independent variables were the social-economic, political and religious factors. The independent variables were assumed to affect the radicalizations of youths in urban settlements, in this case in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County.

3.2. Location of the Study

The study was carried out in the Mathare sub-county located in Nairobi County. Mathare was selected since it is a settlement in an urban setting. Youths living in the settlement are more likely to be radicalized owing to diversity and other dynamics in the community.

3.3. Target Population

Population refers to people, events and objects having more than one mutual characteristic, to which the scholar needs to simplify on the foundations of illustrative observation sample (Creswell, 2014; Dawson, 2010; Vogt, 2008). Population researches are extra demonstrative since everybody has identical opportunity to be encompassed in the absolute sample (Creswell & Plano, 2007; Dawson, 2010; Howell, 2013; Mugenda &

Mugenda, 1999). This study was done in Mathare Sub County that falls within the Nairobi region. The researcher targeted youths aged between 18-35 years. According to records, the population of Mathare is currently 80,309 people. The sample size was calculated as shown in section 3.4.

3.4. Sampling Procedure

A stratified sampling procedure was used to gather data from participants, who were divided into the villages they came from within Mathare sub-county. Simple random sampling was then used to collect data from individual youths in the villages. Mathare sub-county has 13 villages, a sample of which was picked using the Kothari (2004) sampling formula as given below:

Sample size, $n = N * 20\%$

Where:

n = sample size; N = Target population

Thus,

Sample villages = $13 * 0.2 = 3$ villages.

The concluded sample size was 377 participants, which was arrived at by utilizing Cochran (1977).

Modifying this with Cochran method for small sample sizes was done as follows:

$n = \frac{n_0}{1 + ((n_0 - 1) / N)}$

Whereby:

$n_0 = 385$: Cochran's recommendation for sample size (n_0).

$N = 377$: Thus,

$n = \frac{385}{1 + ((385 - 1) / 377)} = 191$

Therefore, the current research's sample size was 191 youth, who were sampled from the 3 villages located in Mathare slums. Further, the study captured data from 3 local chiefs in each of the selected villages using the KII tool.

3.5. Research Instruments

The researcher used a questionnaire for data collection. According to Patton (1990), questionnaires are easy to oversee. They also minimize prejudice as the opinions of researchers do not guide participants in responding to questions in specific ways as opposed to telephone interviews and personal surveys. To get applicable data from the research, qualitative as well as quantitative data collection approaches were used. Characteristically, quantitative data is collected by use of close-ended questions with 'yes' or 'no' responses or other agreed-upon, predefined replies such as Likert scales which are measurable and quantifiable to offer quantitative outcomes (Patton, 1990). For this research, data was gathered by use of structured questionnaire, as well as a Key Informant Interview (KII) tool. The questionnaire collected data from the youth, while the KII tool was used to collect data from key persons such as government officials. The questionnaire contained Likert scaled questions, and was divided into various segments. The first measured the youths' demographic characteristics, the second collected data on their vulnerability to radicalization, the third captured data on the influence of social-economic factors, the fourth captured data on the political factor, while the fifth captured data on the religious factor.

Qualitative research methods focus on a number of approaches, like participant observation, interviews and focus group discussions. Qualitative methods assist in comprehending life encounters and replicate the shared meanings and understandings of peoples' daily realities and social lives (Creswell, 2014; Howell, 2013; Vogt, 2008). In the current study, the qualitative approach was adopted to collect secondary data through interviews with the participants within Mathare Sub-county, Nairobi County. The aim was to get their opinions on how they perceived the various factors influencing youth radicalization in the sub-county and what should be done by the national and sub-county governments about radicalization. This required talking to the key informants using the in-depth interview technique with the assistance of an interview guide.

Qualitative research is highly relevant especially in the social sciences as it enables an exploration of social interactions, systems and processes (Creswell & Plano, 2007; Dawson, 2010; Howell, 2013; Vogt, 2008). In the present study, focus was centered on the youth and their views on factors contributing to radicalization amongst them, paying special attention to their levels of involvement considering the religious, social, economic and political factors. Hence, use of both qualitative and quantitative methods was justified as the researcher sought to capture the real situation pertaining to the identified variables.

In order to measure the research instruments' reliability and their validity, pilot activity was done using 10% of the study's sample size. Participants who were part of the piloting sample were not included in the main data collection exercise. Pilot testing enabled the researcher to correct errors in the data collection tools and make them reliable and valid in collecting data in adherence to the objectives. Further, the researcher relied on comments from the university supervisor to make any amendments considered necessary in line with the study.

3.6. Data Analysis

Collected data was cleaned, re-organized and coded before analysis. For analysis, the data was fed into Social Package for Social Science (SPSS) software. Demographic characteristics were analyzed using frequencies and percentages. The study's objectives were analyzed using inferential statistics, in particular binary logistic regression to examine the extent to which the three attributes of the independent variable influenced youth radicalization and to check whether the study's independent variables (socio-economic factors, family, peers and religious identity) had an influence on the dependent variable (radicalization of youths). Also, a multinomial regression test was carried out to assess the influence of the confounding variables on the dependent variable. Results were presented by the use of tables as well as figures. Qualitative data was analyzed by identifying the emerging themes which were then presented in the form of statements.

3.7. Ethical Considerations

The researcher strictly adhered to research ethics at all stages in preparing and conducting the study (Elaine, 2020; Iphofen, 2016; The British Psychological Society, 2018; Walliman, 2010). The researcher gained a research clearance from the University of Nairobi and sought ethics clearance from the Mathare sub county administration. The researcher also obtained a research permit from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) prior to commencing the research. During the data collection exercise, the study's purpose was clearly explained to the participants, and they were given the freedom to decide whether to take part in the research or not. All questionnaires were administered privately and in confidence, and participants were guaranteed regarding their anonymity and further informed that no information would be credited to their various responses. This enhanced their willingness to be involved. So as to ensure the originality, the research was run through a plagiarism software to make that the content was original and was not plagiarized from another research/study.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

4.0. Introduction

This chapter presents the results and a discussion of the findings of the study on factors influencing radicalization among youth in urban settlements in Mathare sub-county, Kenya. The results are summarized in frequencies and percentages, and presented in tables and figures. The chapter is presented with the following subsections: response rate; general and demographic information of the research participants, and the social-economic factor, political factor and religious factor and their influences on radicalization of youths in urban settlements.

4.1. Response Rate

The questionnaires rate of response was as shown in table 4.1.

Table 4.1. *Rate of response*

Response	Frequency	Percent
Incomplete questionnaires	155	18.8
Complete questionnaires	36	81.2
Total	191	100

From the results in Table 4.1, an overwhelming majority (81.2%) of the youth participated in the study and filled their questionnaires completely, with only few (18.8%) filling them incompletely.

4.2. Background Information

The study sought to examine the demographic characteristics of the youth who took part in the study. The information examined included gender, age and education level.

4.2.1. Gender

The study was interested in finding out the distribution of the participants by gender. The youth were asked to indicate their gender and their distribution was as summarized in figure 4.2.




Figure 4.2. Gender of participants

Results from figure 4.2 above show that more than half (52.3%) of the participants were male, while 47.7% of them were female. From these results, it may be deduced that majority of the youth in Mathare slum are males.

4.2.2. Age

The study further sought to examine demographic information of the participants by age bracket. Figure 4.3 present the distribution of the participants' age.




Figure 4.3. Age of participants

More than half (55.6%) of the participants ranged in age from 21 to 23 years, 15% of them were in the age bracket of 18 - 20 years, 12.4% between 24 - 26 years, 7.2% between 27 - 29 years, 5.2% between 30 - 32 years and 4.6% between 33 - 35 years.

4.2.3. Education level

To find out how educated the participants who took part in the study were, the youth were asked to indicate their levels of education. Figure 4.4 presents their distribution by education level.




Figure 4.4. level of education of the participants

Less than a half (47.4%) of the youth who took part in the study had attained secondary school education, 24% of them had attended vocational training, 13% had attained primary school education, 6.5% were undergraduate degree holders, 5.8% had attained a diploma, while 3.2% had no education. From these results, majority of the youths in Mathare slums had attained secondary school education.

4.2.4. Radicalization of Youths

Under this section, descriptive analysis was used to present findings on radicalization of youths in Mathare slums. Results are as indicated in the table below.

Table 4.1. Radicalization of youths

Radicalization of youths	Yes		No		Mean	SD
	F	%	f	%		
Have you ever been approached by a person with a radicalization agenda?	42	31	113	69	1.43	.446
Have you ever heard of someone who has been approached for radicalization?	48	25.5	107	73.5	1.79	.464
Do you know of any person who has been fully radicalized?	51	32.9	104	67.1	1.67	.471

From the results in Table 4.1, less than a third (31%) of the participants stated that they had been approached by a person with a radicalization agenda. On the other hand more than two thirds (69%) stated they had not been approached. Generally, a majority stated that they have not been approached by a person with a radicalization agenda (mean = 1.43, SD = 0.446). Secondly, 25.5% of the interviewed youths stated they had heard of someone who had been approached for radicalization, while 73.5% stated that they had not. The youths generally agreed that they had not heard of people who had been approached for radicalization (Mean = 1.79, SD = 0.464). Further, 32.9% of the youths said they knew about people who had been fully radicalized, while 67.1% stated that they didn't. Generally, the youths stated that they didn't know of people who had been fully radicalized (Mean = 1.67, SD = 0.471).

4.3. Influence of Socio-economic Factors on Radicalization

On whether single parented families had more vulnerability to youth's radicalization than families with both parents, the participants were asked to give their opinions. The distribution of their responses is as are summarized in Figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5. Influence of Social Factors on Radicalization

From the results, 26.3% of the participants said yes, 44.1% of the participants said no, while 29.6% of them stated that they were not sure. Generally, the youths felt that single parented families do not have more vulnerability to youth’s radicalization than families with both parents (Mean = 2.03, SD = 0.750). These results were supported by findings from the qualitative analysis, which appeared to suggest that youths from poor families were more likely to be influenced by people with radicalization agendas than youths from rich families. The participants were of the view that youth from poor backgrounds were easily radicalized with the promise of “good money” while the unemployed were promised “good jobs”.

Concurring with the findings, a study conducted by Aulakh (2013) in Nigeria had found that family background greatly influenced the youth who joined Boko Haram, with up to 81% of Muslim joining in under 30 days. A 2014 Government of Kenya report on the MRC and other extremist groups indicated that a good number of the recruits were from single-parent families, with a good proportion having lost either one or both parents at adolescence or earlier. The resultant sense of deprivation and the accompanying desperation makes the youth vulnerable to machinations that also promise a better life.

Radicalization appears to be not only influenced by the family factor, but also by lack of parental guidance and even total lack of attention.

A binary logistic regression was carried out to examine the extent to which family influenced radicalization. Results are as shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2. Model summary for family and radicalization

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Nagelkerke R Square
1	128.596 ^a	.055
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.		

From the results in Table 4.2, family explains 5.5% of the total variation in radicalization among youths ($R^2 = 0.055$).

Table 4.3 presents results on a test to assess whether family significantly predicted radicalization among youths.

Table 4.3. Variables in the equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Family	.061	.293	4.439	1	.053	1.855
	Constant	.594	.533	1.245	1	.265	1.812
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Family.							

From the results in table 4.3, family is a statistically significant predictor of radicalization among youths ($p = 0.05$). Further, the results reveal that unit changes in levels of family factors led to a 6.1% change in radicalization among youths ($\beta = 0.061$).

The results were backed by a qualitative analysis of responses from the KII tool. Most of the participants stated that: “youths from families headed by mothers are not more vulnerable to radicalization than those headed by fathers in urban settlements”.

As to whether family influenced radicalization among youth in urban settlements in Mathare sub county, Nairobi County, the distribution of the participants’ responses are summarized in Figure 4.6




Figure 4.6. Family influences radicalization

From the results, 26% of the participants strongly disagreed that family influences radicalization, 53% disagreed, 9% agreed and 7% strongly agreed that family influences radicalization among youths, while stating that they had not been exposed to radicalization.

4.4. Influence of Political Factors on Radicalization

In this section, a mixed analysis method was used to find out to which extent political factors influenced radicalization of youths in urban settlements. The participants were asked to indicate whether political leaders had been inciting youths for their own gains. The results are as given below:




Figure 4.7. Political leaders inciting youths for their own gains

From the results in Figure 4.7, the majority (72.7 %) of the participant strongly agreed with the statement that political leaders had been inciting youths for their own gain, 11% of them agreed, 9.1% disagreed, while 7.1% strongly disagreed. Generally, the participants agreed that political leaders had been inciting he youths for their own gain (Mean = 3.42, SD = 0.460). These study findings are in synch with reports from the GCSD (2018) that political groups have also voiced concerns on the role politics plays in youth violence.

Further, the participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the statement that their leaders had accumulated wealth from radicalization, and that the youth had also benefited. Their distribution of the responses is as shown in the figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8. Leaders have accumulated wealth from radicalization

Less than a half (46.1%) of the participants disagreed that they had benefitted from what their leaders had collected from radicalization, 20.8% strongly disagreed, 13% strongly agreed, while 12.3% agreed. From the results, the youths generally disagreed with the statement that they had accumulated wealth from radicalization since their leaders had (Mean = 2.33, SD = 0.429). Concurring with the study findings, a study by Salifu and Ndung'u (2016) in Northern Africa observed that autocracy coupled with poor governance has been blamed for predisposing the youth to radicalization and terror networks. These observations are consistent with Bhugra, Ventriglio and Bhui (2017) who assert that poor political engagements have been major players in cultivating feelings of isolation and alienation, both of which create fertile grounds for radicalization.

Binary logistic regression was used to examine the extent to which the political factor influenced radicalization. Results are summarized in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4. Model summary for Political factors and radicalization

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Nagelkerke R Square
1	133.244 ^a	.210
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.		

From the results in Table 4.4 above, political factors explain 21% of the total variation in radicalization among youths ($R^2 = 0.21$). Table 4.5 presents results on a test to assess whether political factors significantly predict radicalization among youths.

Table 4.5. Variables in the equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Step 1 ^a							
	Political factors	.052	.091	5.032	1	.038	1.054
	Constant	1.547	.821	3.547	1	.040	4.698
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: political factors.							

From the results in Table 4.5, political status was seen to be a statistically significant predictor of radicalization among youths ($p = 0.038$). Further, the results suggested that unit changes in levels of political factors led to a 5.2% change in radicalization among youths ($\beta = 0.052$).

4.5. Influence of Religious Identity Factor on Radicalization

Further, the study was interested in finding out the extent to which religious identity had affected radicalization among youth in Mathare sub-county. Figure 4.9 shows the distribution of the participants' responses.




Figure 4.9. *Influence of religious factor on radicalization*

From the results, 11% of the participants strongly disagreed that religious identity influences radicalization, 29% disagreed, 48% agreed and 11% strongly agreed. The study findings are in line with a study by Jones (2017) that singled out religion as a vehicle used to disseminate hate and discrimination through acts of terrorism. Violent radicalization has indeed been grounded on the fundamentals of religion, with terrorists made to believe that by carrying out acts of terrorism they were responding to a higher calling (Jones, 2017). Terror groups paint terrorism as a valid jihad, convincing the

perpetrators, including suicide bombers, that paradise is waiting for them. It becomes much easier to convince the youth, who admit to not being well versed in religion.

4.6. Effects of Confounding Variables on Radicalization

Multinomial regression was conducted to assess the impact of confounding variables (gender, age and level of education) on radicalization among youths in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County. Results are as indicated in table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Confounding variables on religious identity and radicalization

Effect	Model Fitting Criteria		Likelihood Ratio Tests		
	-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model		Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept	70.762 ^a		.000	0	.
Gender	70.973		.211	1	.646
Age	79.339		8.577	5	.127
Level of education	79.379		8.617	5	.125
Religious identity	85.059		14.297	4	.006

From the results, gender ($p = 0.646$), age ($p = 0.127$) and level of education ($p = 0.125$) do not have a statistically significant influence on radicalization.

4.7. Conclusion

Radicalization of youths along various ground including religion, politics, social economic status and other facets is a major contributing factor to terrorism leading to insecurity and other psychosocial problems. Therefore, it is prudent that radicalization and the social psychological environmental factors inherent therein be investigated in order to address the issues therein in social psychological and policy terms.

The next section summarises the study findings and makes several recommendations on radicalization of youth arising from the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0. Introduction

This chapter presents the summary, conclusions and recommendation of the study on the factors influencing radicalization among youth in the urban settlements in Mathare sub-county of Nairobi County, Kenya.

5.1. Summary of Findings

The general purpose of this study was to examine the factors influencing radicalization among youth in urban settlements, with Mathare sub-county of Nairobi County, Kenya as the study location. The study was guided by the following research objectives: to establish the social-economic factors influencing radicalization among youth in Mathare sub-county in Nairobi County; to examine the political factors influencing the radicalization, and to establish the religious factors that predisposed the youth to radicalization. The study adopted a correlational research design, which measures the interactions between different variables. A population of 80,309 people was targeted. Stratified and simple sampling procedures were used to arrive at a study sample of 3 villages and 191 participants. Data collection entailed use of a structured questionnaire, as well as a Key Informant Interview (KII) tool. Demographic characteristics were analyzed using frequencies and percentages. The study's objectives were answered using regression as the tool for quantitative analysis, and the results presented using tables and figures, while narrations were used for qualitative analysis. From the analyses, the following key findings were made:

5.1.1. Demographic Information

A majority of the youth interviewed were male, which was the dominant gender in Mathare sub-county. They were mainly aged between 21 and 23 years, and most of them had attained secondary school education.

5.1.2. Vulnerability to Radicalization

Majority of the interviewed youth stated that they had not been approached by a person with a radicalization agenda. However, they stated that they had heard of people who had been approached for radicalization, and that they knew of people who had been fully radicalized.

5.1.3. Socio-economic Factors influencing Radicalization

Results from a binary regression revealed that social status was a statistically significant predictor of radicalization among youth in urban settlements such as Mathare sub-county. The results further suggested that level of education had a statistically significant influence on the relationship between social factors and radicalization.

Results further showed that peer pressure played a role in youth radicalization, with the participants agreeing that interacting with radicalized persons made one more vulnerable. A binary regression analysis revealed that peer pressure is a statistically significant predictor of radicalization. Additionally, age had a statistically significant influence on the relationship between peer pressure and radicalization.

On whether family affected radicalization, the participants felt that single-parent families were no more vulnerable than families with both parents. Further analysis revealed that family is not a statistically significant predictor of radicalization among youths. Rather, it was age that had a statistically significant influence on the relationship between family and radicalization.

5.1.4. Political Factors influencing Radicalization

The participants felt that political leaders had been inciting youths for their own gain. The youths also stated that politicians were their role models, and that they did not accumulate wealth from radicalization just because their leaders did.

5.1.5. Religious Identity and Radicalization

The findings revealed that the youth has been deceived on religious grounds to support extremist militia. The participants felt that clerics and imams were the major drivers of religious antagonism. However, they disagreed that terrorism was God's war and disagreed that Christians should be eliminated as propagated by some radical groups. Further analysis seemed to suggest that religious identity is a statistically significant predictor of radicalization among the youth. However, gender, age and level of education did not show any statistically significant influence on the relationship between religious identity and radicalization among the youth.

5.2. Conclusions

There are complex factors that lead to radicalization and the complexity of these reasons makes it difficult for various organisations including government to counter violent extremism (Hardy, 2018). Nonetheless, countering violent extremism (CVE) is still a priority area for governments as well as families that are concerned that their children could have adopted extremist ideas (Sinclair, 2017) such as tendency to be inclined towards terrorism, and hence the significance of this study. Additionally, national policies adopted by government must in essence work with the community, private and public agencies and the general public in order to reduce the risk of extremism, and hence radicalization (Beutel & Weinburger, 2016; Borum, 2015; Hardy, 2018).

This study found a statistically significant association between political factors and radicalization ($p = 0.038$). Further, the results revealed that unit changes in levels of political factors led to a 5.2% change in radicalization among youths ($\beta = 0.052$). Socio-economic factors (poverty, family and peers; $p = 0.053$) were also found to be statistically significant in radicalization. The study further revealed that unit changes in levels of family factors led to a 6.1% change in radicalization among youths ($\beta = 0.061$). It was further revealed that religious identity is a statistically significant predictor of radicalization among the youth in urban settlements. From the findings, it appears that radicalization is not only influenced by socio-economic, political and religious factors,

but there are also some compounding variables that predispose youth in Mathare sub-county, Nairobi County to radicalization.

The world is reckoning with various terrorists individuals and groups and as outlined by Burke (2004; 2015), Giddens and Sutton (2017) and Kaldor (2006), the new groupings appear more organised to the extent that Giddens & Sutton (2017), Kaldor (2006) and Sutton and Vertigans (2006) argues that that the new terrorist groups tend to have international and the status of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and hence their ability to convince various people of their commitment and recruit people into their mission. This explains the symbolic ways in which they are able to make recruitment, and hence a major concern for countries such as Kenya. Recommendations made in this study argue that the structural and mission aspects are important considerations for vulnerable groups such as the youth living in urban informal settlements such as Mathare where the study was conducted.

5.3. Recommendations

There is need for governments and families all over the world to decrease radicalisation and this is an urgent and ultimate concern (Wright & Hankins, 2016). The motives and motivations are diverse, and hence different in ideology and intensity (Richardson, Berlouis, & Cameron, 2017).

Drawn from the study's conclusions, the recommendations made were:

1. The government should devise ways of empowering youths in urban settlements socio-economically to shield them from the threat of radicalization.
2. Youths in urban settlements should be encouraged to keep themselves busy in socially productive ways, so as to avoid peer pressure that might lead them to radicalization.
3. The government should closely monitor and arrest religious leaders luring youths in urban settlements into extremism through religion.

4. More guidance and counselling should be availed to the youth so that they understand what can be up building to them, and keep them from idleness and peer pressure.

Future studies must explore various facets including understanding terror networks and the implications of advancement in technology including the Internet (Behr et al., 2013) as outlined in suggestions for further studies below.

5.4. Suggestions for Further Research

It must be admitted that the causes of radicalization and terrorism including among the youth are largely unknown and hence should be fully investigated (Crenshaw, 1981; Peco, 2014; Rzegeer & Aly, 2015; Senzai, 2015; Siegel, Brickman, Goldberg, & Pat-Horenczyk, 2019). For further research, youths in other urban settlements should be included in a similar study so as to ratify the findings of this study. The influence of parents is also important and should be an essential component in future studies (Daily Nation, 2020; Sikkens Sieckelinck, Van San, & De Winter, 2016). Political factors as covered by this study explain only 21% and social factors 5.5% of the total variation in radicalization among the youth. A similar study should be conducted using different factors so as to validate the findings of the current study, and identify other would be significant aspects of radicalization especially among the youth.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Introduction Letter

Farhiya Ali Abdullahi

C50/87230/2016

Dear Sir/Madam,

REF: PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH

I am a student at the University of Nairobi pursuing Master of Counselling Psychology degree. I am undertaking a research on factors that influence radicalization among youth in urban settlements, A case-study of Mathare Sub-County. I am kindly requesting for your participation in this research by responding to the questions in the questionnaires and/or interviews voluntarily and as honestly as possible.

All the information obtained from you for the sake of this study will be taken with the highest confidentiality level and will be solely used for purposes of this academic research.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

Yours faithfully,

Farhiya Ali Abdullahi

Appendix II: Questionnaire for the Youth

I am a student from Nairobi University currently pursuing Master of Counselling Psychology Degree. I am doing a study focusing on the factors influencing youth radicalization among youth in urban settlements. You are humbly invited to take part in the study by filling in the following questionnaire. All information obtained will be treated with utmost confidentiality and used only for the purpose of this study.

Instructions: Please Tick (√) or write down your response.

Section1: Background Information

1. Gender (Tick (√)) Male [] Female []
2. Age (Tick (√))
 - a) 18 - 20 years []
 - b) 21 - 23 years []
 - c) 24 - 26 years []
 - d) 27 - 29 years []
 - e) 30 - 32 years []
 - f) 33 - 35 years []
3. Level of Education (Tick (√))
 - a) Primary
 - b) Secondary
 - c) Vocational training
 - d) Diploma
 - e) Degree
 - f) None

Section 2: Radicalization of Youths

1. Have you ever been approached by a person with a radicalization agenda?
(Tick √) Yes [] No []
2. Have you ever heard of someone who has been approached for radicalization?
(Tick √) Yes [] No []
3. Do you know of any person who has been fully radicalized?
(Tick √) Yes [] No []
4. Do you think that poverty plays a role in the radicalization of youths in your area?

(Tick ✓) Yes [] No [] Not sure []

Give reasons for your answer _____

Section 3: Political Factors on Radicalization

5. The following are statements on socio-economic factors . Please go through each of the statement and (Tick ✓), 5, 4, 3, 2 or 1 . Where: 5 = 'Strongly agree', 4 = 'agree', 3 = 'Uncertain' 2 = 'Disagree', 1 = 'Strongly disagree'.				
Statements	4	3	2	1
Political leaders have been inciting youths for their own gains				
Clerics are our role models				
Our leaders have accumulated wealth from radicalization, so do we				

Section 4: Social Factors on Radicalization

- 6.** Would you say that single parented families have more vulnerability to youth's radicalization than families with both parents?

(Tick ✓) Yes [] No [] Not sure []

Give reasons for your answer _____

- 7.** How much do you agree that youths from families headed by mothers are more vulnerable to radicalization than those headed by dad's urban settlements? (Tick ✓)

Strongly agree [] Agree [] Uncertain [] Disagree []
strongly disagree []

Give reasons for your answer _____

Section 5: Peer Pressure and Radicalization

- 8.** Do you think that peer pressure plays a role in youths' radicalization?

(Tick ✓) Yes [] No [] Not sure []

Give reasons for your answer _____

9. How much do you agree that interacting with radicalized persons makes one more vulnerable to radicalization? (Tick ✓)

Strongly agree [] Agree [] Uncertain [] Disagree []

Strongly disagree []

Give reasons for your answer _____

Section 6: Religious Identity on Radicalization

10. Do you think that youths have been deceived on religious grounds to support the uprising militias?

(Tick ✓) Yes [] No [] Not sure []

Give reasons for your answer _____

11. The following are statements on religious identity. Please go through each statement and mark 4, 3, 2 or 1.				
Where: 5 = 'Strongly agree', 4 = 'agree', 3 = 'Uncertain' 2 = 'Disagree', 1 = 'Strongly disagree'.				
STATEMENTS	4	3	2	1
Clerics and imams are the major drivers of religious divide				
The terrorism war is God's war				
Christians should be eliminated from the world				

Any other comments

Thank you for taking part in this study

Appendix III: Key Informant Interview (KII) Tool


I am a student pursuing a Master of Counselling Psychology at University of Nairobi. I am carrying out a study on the factors influencing radicalization among urban settlements youth. You are hereby requested to take part in the study by answering the following questions. The information you will provide will be confidential and will be used for the sake of this research only.

Key Informant Interview Questions

1. Kindly tell me about someone or people known to you who have been approached for radicalization purposes.
2. Please tell me about a person or people known to you who have been fully radicalized.
3. In your opinion, in what ways do socio-economic factors like poverty influence of leaders) play a role in radicalization of youths?
4. In your opinion, how are youths from families headed by mothers more vulnerable to radicalization than those headed by fathers in urban settlements?
5. In your opinion, how does interacting with radicalized persons makes one more vulnerable to radicalization?
6. In your opinion, how have youths been deceived on religious grounds to support the uprising militias?
7. Any other comments

Thank you for taking part in this study

Appendix IV: Map of Mathare Sub-County



Appendix V: Research Permit

 <p>REPUBLIC OF KENYA National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation</p>	 <p>NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION</p>
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<p>This is to Certify that Miss. FARHIYA ABDULLAH of University of Nairobi, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: FACTORS INFLUENCING RADICALIZATION AMONG YOUTH IN URBAN SETTLEMENTS. A CASE STUDY OF MATHARE SUB-COUNTY. for the period ending : 07/November/2020.</p>	
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Appendix VI: Turnitin

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