

**VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA: ROLE OF NON-  
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN KENYA AND NIGERIA**

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## DECLARATION

This is my original work and has not been presented for examination in any of the programs in any university. Referenced works duly acknowledged have complemented the Proposal. Where text, data, have been borrowed from other works including the internet, the sources are specifically accredited through referencing in accordance with anti-plagiarism regulations

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Glory and Honor be to God.

## **DEDICATION**

I would like to dedicate this work to my mother Alice, sister Melody and Brother Isaac. Thank you for everything.

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## ABSTRACT

Governments globally have been faced with threat on their peace and security, which has been attributed by increase in radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist groups. The rationale of this study was based on increased attacks that have led to a dark corner in various nations resulting to panics and dilemma on the best criteria to counter these violent activities. In Africa, Violent extremism has been on the rise affecting different capitals, resulting in mistrust among different nations, leading to a reduction of trade due to fear of attacks. In Kenya and Nigeria, terrorism is a rampart problem and this situation has been fuelled by increased radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist groups. The two countries largely rely on tourism which thrives in peaceful environment. Due to the panic from insecurity cases, the socio-economic activities in Kenya and Nigeria have been disrupted leading to more social malice. The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are actively participating in countering violent extremisms and radicalization at both national and global levels. There is need to establish the role of the various NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism. It is in this light that this study sought to examine the role of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria. The study is aiming at analysing the role of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria, evaluate the interventions by NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism and explore challenges faced by NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria. The literature review focuses on global overview of violent extremism and terrorism, rationale of countering violent extremism and terrorism and challenges of countering violent extremism in Kenya and Nigeria. A cross-sectional survey design was used to study a sample size of 60 NGOs from Kenya and Nigeria. Data was collected using interview guide, documentary analysis and questionnaires. Data was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Descriptive statistics were used to analyse interventions on countering violent extremism and inferential statistics to explore challenges faced by NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism. The findings of the study revealed that respondents were aware of Violent extremism, recruitment into Violent Extremist and terrorist groups (VE&TGs) within the area they were operating. Further, that violent extremism is driven by increased level of unemployment among the youths as well as drug addictions, interethnic and interreligious tensions and external factors such as joint war against terror, foreign military deployment and the influence of terrorist organizations abroad led to violent extremism and terrorism. Moreover, the study revealed that NGOs employ formal and informal conversations and meeting with community leaders and communities; and also used sports activities and discussions in schools, advocacy campaigns, as well as training sessions and mentorship programs in countering violent extremism and terrorism. The study therefore recommends that governments in collaboration with NGOs need to develop policies, laws, special offices and special programmes or action plans that will specifically deal with matters of violent extremism and terrorism in order to counter VE&TGs activities for peaceful coexistence and security in Kenya and Nigeria.

## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

ACT	Act, Change, Transform
CICC	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
KMYA	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MUHURI	Muslim for Human Rights
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
RADAR	Risk Assessment, Decision Making and Response Tool
SFT	Structural Functionalism Theory
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VE	Violent Extremism
VEOs	Violent Extremism Organizations
WHO	World Health Organization
WILPF	Women International League for Peace and Freedom

## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.1 Background of the Study

According to the United Nations Development Programme (2017), violent extremism and terrorism are seen as sophisticated and multiphase global threats that are not confined to one territory. Terrorists and violent groups have been seen as more united and complex to understand. Their goal and motivation to terrorism vary and creates more panic in countering their activities<sup>1</sup>. This reality requires a comprehensive and multidimensional approach, which is well understood by Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs)<sup>2</sup>. Varied nations globally are grappling with approaches to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism and terrorism. Contextually, it is seen as ‘political geared tactic involving the threat or use of force and violence in the pursuit of publicity’ while counter-terrorism composes the actions taken by the government and non-governmental institutions in response to those act committed<sup>3</sup>. In an effort to manage violent extremism and terrorism as conflict, there is need to address the root causes of violence and terrorism, which will in long-term significantly reduces the growth and spread of terror acts. Notably, such considerations cannot work alone cannot manage conflict but the involvement of collaborative efforts of non-state and state policy makers provides means to counter such activities as opposed to the military and traditional approaches aimed at short term solutions.

Peace is a key ingredient needed for stability of the world economies. With conflicts and terrorism all over socio-economic development is compromised. Terrorism poses a great threat to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals<sup>4</sup>. Recruitment to violent

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<sup>1</sup> Liz Ford, “Sustainable Development Goals: All You Need to Know | Global Development | The Guardian,” *The Guardian*, 2015.

<sup>2</sup> M Mustapha, K Shehu - New Architecture of Regional Security in, and undefined 2019, “Humanitarian Agencies, Counter-Terrorism, and Counter-Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin,” *Books.Google.Com*, accessed May 29, 2020, [https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=S1i8DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA437&dq=role+of+NGOs+in+fighting+violent+extremism+in+nigeria+&ots=riPdrpETVX&sig=V1kMF0FzxfKdd\\_pNxJbnHWjIxys](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=S1i8DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA437&dq=role+of+NGOs+in+fighting+violent+extremism+in+nigeria+&ots=riPdrpETVX&sig=V1kMF0FzxfKdd_pNxJbnHWjIxys).

<sup>3</sup> Anne Aly, Anne-Marie Balbi, and Carmen Jacques, “Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society,” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 3–13, <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1028772>.

<sup>4</sup> Harriet Allan et al., “Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature W,” no. October (2015): 65.

extremist groups and terrorism of the youths hinder economic development and which disproportionately affect areas that are already poor and marginalized (Sheikh, 2016). Violent extremism and terrorism is a serious global problem with effect on socio-economic aspects<sup>5</sup>. There is an alarming rate of youths being recruited to violent extremist and terrorist groups around the world<sup>6</sup>. Terrorism is a solemn problem in the African nations<sup>7</sup>. Largely, it has affected the socio-economic activities of the various African nations<sup>8</sup>. This problem is acute in fragile African areas, with fatal conditions that increase violent terrorism. According to UNDP (2017) report, youths (18-35 years) accounts for more than 30% of the African population. Consequently, majority of these youths are unemployed. Statistics shows that 40% of youths are jobless thus making them prey for recruitment into terrorist groups and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)<sup>9</sup>. Ideally, 44% males and 56% females of youth's populations are economically inactive and based on the pull and push; youths can venture in the terrorist activities thus deterring peace and stability in Africa.

For more than two decades, Africa has experienced disturbance in public security. Various insecurity disturbances have been reported in different African nations<sup>10</sup>. These disturbances have resulted in the loss of human life, destruction of infrastructure, and more profoundly resulting to negative economic impact all over the country. The alarming attacks have threatened the peace in Africa, which has been articulated to minimal political will to adhere

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<sup>5</sup> Halimu Shauri, "PERCEPTION OF THE POLICE AND THE YOUTH IN ENHANCING COMMUNITY-COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATION IN KILIFI COUNTY , COASTAL," no. August (2018).

<sup>6</sup> John McCoy and W Andy Knight, "Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, Global Trends," *Taylor & Francis* 40, no. 4 (April 3, 2016): 267-99, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1206734>.

<sup>7</sup> HS Shauri - The African Review and undefined 2018, "Impact of Violent Extremism and Recruitment of Spouses on Widows in the Coastal Region of Kenya," *Journals.Udsm.Ac.Tz*, accessed April 14, 2020, <http://www.journals.udsm.ac.tz/index.php/ar/article/view/1666>.

<sup>8</sup> F Foley, "Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past," 2013, <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jhevek8VvVkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=the+role+of+NGOs+in+countering+terrorism&ots=IXYRVoz4-N&sig=uj41Cy1OnDfIyz95Lvei8G6y-TA>.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism Report of the United Nations Development Programme Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism, 'Oslo II,'" no. May (2018).

<sup>10</sup> J Luengo-Cabrera and A Pauwels, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Horn of Africa," 2016, <https://doi.org/10.2815/98226>.

to the stipulated peace agreements. Increases attacks have been multiplying due to unwholesome merger of multi-ethnic groups in different nations<sup>11</sup>. More terror incidents have been witnessed ranging from the military attacks, creating more tension in the various African parts<sup>12</sup>.

Referring to Lemon & Pinet (2018), there is a compelling context for addressing the role of NGOs countering violent extremism and terrorism of not only the youths but also the general population including children worldwide and in Africa<sup>13</sup>. This paves the way for NGOs in Africa; seeking to remedy the Violent extremists, thus promoting their full involvement in each aspect of growth and development. In this light, this study seeks to evaluate the role NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria, and interventions employed by NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

The war on terror has remained a pivotal topic for the past years; with Kenya and Nigeria being at the forefront in coming up with strategies that can be applied to counter violent extremism and terrorism. However, to date there are still a number of terrors that are felt<sup>14</sup>. Research shows that war on terror is not only a Kenya and Nigeria issue but also a global problem<sup>15</sup><sup>16</sup>. Several debates and reviews have been made over years on how this terror

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<sup>11</sup> Daniel P Aldrich, "First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds? USAID's Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 3 (2014): 523–46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.738263>.

<sup>12</sup> AA JULIUS, "RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED," 2016, [http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/99474/Adinoyi\\_Impact of Terrorism on Human Rights in Africa The Case Study of Counterterrorism in Kenya,1998 -2014.pdf?sequence=1](http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/99474/Adinoyi_Impact%20of%20Terrorism%20on%20Human%20Rights%20in%20Africa%20The%20Case%20Study%20of%20Counterterrorism%20in%20Kenya%2C1998-2014.pdf?sequence=1).

<sup>13</sup> David Law, "Intergovernmental Organisations and Their Role in Security Sector Reform," *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, 2007, 3–24.

<sup>14</sup> Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, "Building Peace from the Margins in Somalia: The Case for Political Settlement with Al-Shabaab," *Contemporary Security Policy* 39, no. 4 (October 2, 2018): 512–36, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2018.1429751>.

<sup>15</sup> Martin Ewi and Kwesi Aning, "Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa," *African Security Review* 15, no. 3 (January 2006): 32–46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2006.9627603>.

<sup>16</sup> OECD, "Interim Report of the Green Growth Strategy: Implementing Our Commitment for a Sustainable Future," *Strategy*, 2010.

extremism can be countered. These were in different contextual frameworks and not the role of Non-governmental Organizations. Historically, violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria was rampant and this led to the welcoming Non-governmental Organizations by the governments who were willing to go an extra mile of ensuring that there is peace and security. This is because terrorists are always one-step ahead of the technology applied, hence, making government missions vulnerable on several occasions<sup>1718</sup>.

Consequently, governments employ lethal methods to deal with violent extremism and terrorism, hence increasing mistrust between government authorities and communities. Various efforts to customize responses aimed at countering violent extremism and terrorism have been instituted to help curb this vice that threatens global and regional peace and coexistence<sup>19</sup> but not the role of Non-Governmental Organizations. Therefore, this understanding points out that there is a gap on the role of Non-governmental Organizations in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria. Thus, justifies the study in examining and analysing the role of Non-governmental Organizations in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The study is guided by the following research question:

- i. What is the role of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria?
- ii. What interventions do NGOs put in place in countering violent extremism and terrorism?

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<sup>17</sup> Simon Gray and Ibikunle Adeakin, “The Evolution of Boko Haram: From Missionary Activism to Transnational Jihad and the Failure of the Nigerian Security Intelligence Agencies,” *African Security* 8, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 185–211, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2015.1069120>.

<sup>18</sup> Eric Mutisya Kioko, “Conflict Resolution and Crime Surveillance in Kenya: Local Peace Committees and Nyumba Kumi,” *Africa Spectrum* 52, no. 1 (April 2017): 3–32, <https://doi.org/10.1177/000203971705200101>.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Development Programme, “Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity,” 2016, 1–44, <http://www.undp.org/>.

- iii. What are the challenges faced by the NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria.

#### **1.4 Objectives of the study**

The objectives of this study are:

- i. To analyse the role of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria
- ii. To evaluate the interventions put in place by the NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism.
- iii. To explore challenges faced by the NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria.

#### **1.5 Literature Review**

##### **1.5.1 Overview of Non-Governmental Organizations in countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have been in existence for a long time, although they became popular in the 1980s. In the most artistic sense, NGOs constitute the space outside the family, state, and the economy<sup>20</sup>. Similarly, the World Health Organization conceptualizes NGOs as the arena for action against similar or shared interests and values, which exists independent of government and commercial interests<sup>21</sup>. In this sense, NGOs encompass players such as women groups, community-based organizations, trade unions, and

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<sup>20</sup> I. Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, and D. B. Subedi, "Countering Violent Extremism through State-Society Partnerships: A Case Study of de-Radicalisation Programmes in Indonesia," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 15, no. 1 (2020): 23–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2020.1722317>.

<sup>21</sup> Aldrich, "First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds? USAID's Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa."



advocacy groups, among others<sup>22</sup>. Necessarily, NGOs are a precipitator of democracy and progress in society.

However, as the 'third sector,' which it is often referred to, NGOs play the role of service providers, guardians, watchdogs, and general change agents<sup>23</sup>. They identify and provide essential services that are not offered to the general citizenry or particular groups in society while monitoring government agencies and activities to ensure that their activities are adequately run<sup>24</sup>. This implies that NGOs tries to ensure positive change in society. Thus, this study sought to analyse their role in Kenya and Nigeria.

## 15.2 Global Trends of NGOs in Violent Extremism and Terrorism

The prevalence of violent extremism in the global scenario has been noteworthy in the recent past, with endless waves of the phenomenon claiming the lives of many people based on religious, ethnic and even political sentiments<sup>25</sup>. This has called for timely mechanisms to end or at least reduce such occurrences. Sadly, Kenya and Nigeria have not been spared by the multi-consequential spread of violent extremism. Its rise and spread have cemented the role of civil society, which has amongst its mandates countering violent extremism under the more comprehensive framework of promoting peace and security thereof.

Violent extremism and terrorism have gained motion globally, and they are the main concerns in many nations. This concern has raised the alarm to researchers, policymakers as well as the international community in understanding the origin, motive, and mitigation

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<sup>22</sup> M Legrenzi, *Beyond Regionalism?: Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East*, 2016, <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tBMGDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=nzomo+on+violent+extrmism+and+terrorism&ots=oFpUBws65E&sig=4Plvudcwy8GR353edmS2q5000EQ>.

<sup>23</sup> A Lemon, M Pinet - Evaluation and program planning, and undefined 2018, "Measuring Unintended Effects in Peacebuilding: What the Field of International Cooperation Can Learn from Innovative Approaches Shaped by Complex Contexts," *Elsevier*, accessed April 14, 2020, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149718917302938>.

<sup>24</sup> Lemon, planning, and 2018.

<sup>25</sup> United Nations Development Programme, "Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity."

factors<sup>26</sup>. The twenty-first Century has been marked by various global changes, and this has led to the loss of identity, in both political and religious crises, thus contributing to multiple cases of violent extremism and terrorism. The understanding of the tension as had born the focus of public insecurity, violation of the human right, and more profoundly social stability. The social need has called for a systematic and organized approach to deal with terrorism and violent issues<sup>27</sup>. Numerous organizations such as NGOs, faith-based organizations, and community groups have been at the frontline in the international attempts to counter violent extremism and terrorism.

Given the complexity of violent extremism and terrorism, various international laws governing counter violence and terrorism have been developed eased by international treaties<sup>28</sup>. Efforts to fight violent extremism and terrorism are mostly undertaken in places where armed conflict has been identified and primarily where humanitarian actors are conducting their activities; and such reported cases in African countries such as Mali, Nigeria, Somali, and Kenya, where these terrorist groups are active<sup>29</sup>. Despite various international counter terrorism approaches, minimal success has been attained. The existing international counterterrorism frameworks have achieved minimal success in eliminating the threat is different. NGOs, on the other hand, have played a vital role in mitigating the situation; the working of NGOs has been a success due to the level of trust by local and international communities and non-lethal approaches. NGOs play a significant role in bridging the gap between the community and the international government in the whole world. The heart of NGOs has been to protect human rights and enhance peaceful coexistence among the community members and the government and more so the international

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<sup>26</sup> Jude Howell et al., “The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror,” *Development in Practice* 18, no. 1 (February 2008): 82–93, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520701778884>.

<sup>27</sup> AC Okoli, P Iortyer - Global Journal of Human Social Science, and undefined 2014, “Terrorism and Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram Insurgency,” *Academia.Edu*, accessed June 15, 2020, <https://www.academia.edu/download/35073999/6-Terrorism-and-Humanitarian-Crisis-in-Nigeria.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism Report of the United Nations Development Programme Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism, ‘Oslo II.’”

<sup>29</sup> B Blakemore, *Extremism, Counter-Terrorism and Policing*, 2016, <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=uvvFDAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=global+trends+in+violetnet+extrims+and+terrorism&ots=xn1-WegPzh&sig=eLJz5xiAdQzH2991HDHSjKofm0>.

government. NGOs have evolved over time and have attained better results for a short time compared to the international government<sup>30</sup>. These were done in different contextual framework not in Kenya and Nigeria and not specified. Hence, this study sought to analyse the role of these NGOs in countering violent extremism and evaluate their interventions in Kenya and Nigeria.

### **1.5.3 Regional Trends of NGOs in Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

The development of violent extremism and terrorist attacks in Africa has created more political and security phenomena in<sup>31</sup>. Terrorism has curtailed operations in countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Somalia and Kenya Terrorist attacked have affected the social, economic and religious fabrics. In the recent past Africa has witnessed countless terrorist activities in different nations. Researchers have stated that lasting peace is vital for sustainable development and this includes peaceful as well as inclusive coexistence among different nations and groups in Africa Division among various nations fuels more conflict and terrorism. Institutions such as political parties, different faiths, media, NGOs, educational institutions and others in Africa; Kenya and Nigeria inclusive have played a role in defending human right not limited to countering terrorism and violent extremism. The current and future society need to understand the roles of NGOs in promoting peace and governance of the heterogeneous African communities especially in Kenya and Nigeria<sup>32</sup>.

In more than decade, different NGOs have interlinked their efforts and broadened their approach in countering terrorism and violent extremism<sup>33</sup>. Their input has been recognised in dealing with rise in violent extremism and peace building among different nations. In most

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<sup>30</sup> V. R. Raghavan, "Challenges to Global Security," *Pakistan Horizon* (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, n.d.), <https://doi.org/10.2307/41500077>.

<sup>31</sup> Harriet Allan et al., "Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review," 2015, [www.rusi.org](http://www.rusi.org).

<sup>32</sup> "Role of Ngos in Fighting Violent Extremism and Terrorism... - Google Scholar," accessed June 16, 2020, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as\\_sdt=0%2C5&q=role+of+ngos+in+fighting+violent+extremism+a+nd+terrorism+in+africa&btnG=](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=role+of+ngos+in+fighting+violent+extremism+a+nd+terrorism+in+africa&btnG=).

<sup>33</sup> Wanderi Simon Mwangi, Susan Waiyego Mwangi, and Joseph Wasonga, "Assessing The Effectiveness Of Intelligence Gathering And Sharing (IGS) In Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) In Kenya," *Ijiras.Com* 7, no. 1 (2020), [www.ijiras.com](http://www.ijiras.com).

African countries, NGOs have employed variety peace building approaches to counter violent extremism and terrorism<sup>34</sup>. Their activities have been focused on protecting security and human right in those nations. They integrate their approaches to obtain the best results beyond the government efforts. Their tireless works in different remote areas has enhanced the identification of root causes of terrorism in different parts of Africa. NGOs identify the commonly accepted driver of terrorism and violent extremism and provide the ultimate solution to the problem. The integration of inclusive actions aimed at mitigating terrorism and violent extremism by NGOs has widened their tolerance and success in their activities, however, this is in different contextual framework not in Kenya and Nigeria<sup>35</sup>.

Many African states fail to provide basic rights security and services multiplying the inequalities in the countries<sup>36</sup>. The desire to meet basic needs draws people to joining various terrorist groups<sup>37</sup>. In response to the terrorist attacks various African government employ lethal tactics, which adversely increase the activities of violent extremist and terrorist actions. There is risk of failed political and government transition in the fight against terrorism<sup>38</sup>. NGOs provide check mechanism to counter the terrorist actions by working closely with the groups. The main approach employed by NGOs is aimed at peaceful livelihood. They play

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<sup>34</sup> Gretchen Alther, “Development in Practice Colombian Peace Communities: The Role of NGOs in Supporting Resistance to Violence and Oppression,” *Taylor & Francis* 16, no. 3–4 (June 2007): 278–91, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520600694828>.

<sup>35</sup> United Nations Development Programme, “Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity.”

<sup>36</sup> . “Nyumba Kumi Is a Govt Intervention Programme to... - Google Scholar,” accessed April 14, 2020, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as\\_sdt=0%2C5&q=.+Nyumba+kumi+is+a+govt+intervention+programme+to+increase+security+within+communities&btnG=](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=.+Nyumba+kumi+is+a+govt+intervention+programme+to+increase+security+within+communities&btnG=).

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism Report of the United Nations Development Programme Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism, ‘Oslo II.’”

<sup>38</sup> M Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, 2009, [https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=\\_88w9S28ZkUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=\(Jung+2009\).From+theoretical+perspective+the+military+focused+and+state+centred+reading+of+security+studies+has+been+put+on+the+defence+&ots=svYcWOFYJZ&sig=SvvuMcKEMH1WpHPYfoYUTXSqD](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_88w9S28ZkUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=(Jung+2009).From+theoretical+perspective+the+military+focused+and+state+centred+reading+of+security+studies+has+been+put+on+the+defence+&ots=svYcWOFYJZ&sig=SvvuMcKEMH1WpHPYfoYUTXSqD).

part in supplementing the weak governmental institutions in law enforcement and peace building<sup>39</sup>.

The birth of NGOs in Africa can be traced to the realization of ability of terrorist group to expand and projecting beyond national outreach. An overview of Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Kenya; many lives have been claimed by their activities resulting to more conflict within and outside the countries<sup>40</sup>. The gradual and phased process and employing the ideological conditioning among the groups to socialise them into violent extremism, and recruitment into terrorist groups has being more problematic in Kenya and Nigeria<sup>41</sup>. Boko Haram and al-Shabaab dependency on a fanatical ideology that rejects dialogue and compromise in favour of a ends-justifies-ends approach, particularly in the willingness to utilize mass violence to advance political aims as created more panic in Kenya and Nigeria. Different NGOs have worked tersely to mitigate the problem by providing mitigating ground between the terrorist groups and the government<sup>42</sup>. The roles of NGOs in Kenya and Nigeria can be well understood by focusing individual countries.

#### **1.5.4 NGOs and Violent Extremism in Kenya**

The Kenyan idea of NGOs can be traced to the 1920s when welfare associations mandated with advocacy for human rights and overlooking colonial administration were formed. These included the East African Association and Kavirondo Taxpayers association, among others<sup>43</sup>. In the current times, NGOs are held in high regard for they have been deemed quite essential

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<sup>39</sup> OECD, “Interim Report of the Green Growth Strategy: Implementing Our Commitment for a Sustainable Future.”

<sup>40</sup> United Nations, United Nations, and United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 5 (2008): 742–99, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802396475>.

<sup>41</sup> Osman Antwi-Boateng, “The Rise of Pan-Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge,” *Politics and Policy* 45, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 253–84, <https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12195>.

<sup>42</sup> Agastia, Perwita, and Subedi, “Countering Violent Extremism through State-Society Partnerships: A Case Study of de-Radicalisation Programmes in Indonesia,” 2020.

<sup>43</sup> J McCulloch, S Pickering - British Journal of Criminology, and undefined 2005, “Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: Proliferating State Crime, Eroding Censure and Extending Neo-Colonialism,” *Academic.Oup.Com*, accessed June 15, 2020, <https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article-abstract/45/4/470/305415>.

in finding common ground between the government and the interests of the citizens<sup>44</sup>. Amongst the most fundamental roles of NGOs in different nations is the promotion of peace and security. The pertinent question is; what is the NGOs roles in countering violent extremisms and terrorism in Kenya?

For more than a decade, the Kenyan story has been one marked by considerable violent extremism, with Kenyan people facing significant terrorist attacks and countless incidences of violent extremism<sup>45</sup>. Interestingly, violent extremism is often mistaken for terrorism. However, whereas there is no globally accepted definition of terrorism, violent extremism can be conceptualized as incidences which involve individuals or groups of people using, or in the least threatening to use violence in order to advance fanatic or radical ideologies<sup>46</sup>. This is usually directed towards emphasizing the supremacy of a defined group, over tolerance and inclusivity.

Violent extremism and terrorisms poses a great threat to different regions in Kenya. Attacks and terrorist activities have been witnesses in areas such as coastal region, north part, Eastern area as well at the capital city<sup>47</sup>. The terrorist attacks have resulted to insecurity and lack of peace in the whole nation. North part has been in the front line with many cases been reported notwithstanding the various socio-economic activities such oil extraction and tourism attraction. Attacks in Nairobi have resulted to low performance of business affecting the gross domestic production within the country. For the last years cases have emerge leading to loss of life both for Kenyans and for foreigners<sup>48</sup>. Regarding the terror attacks in Westgate

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<sup>44</sup> Mustapha, in, and 2019, "Humanitarian Agencies, Counter-Terrorism, and Counter-Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin."

<sup>45</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism Report of the United Nations Development Programme Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism, 'Oslo II.'"

<sup>46</sup> Matiku Paul, "Does Participatory Forest Management Change Household Attitudes towards Forest Conservation and Management?," *African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology*, 2012, <https://doi.org/10.5897/ajest12.012>.

<sup>47</sup> Paul.

<sup>48</sup> "Shauri, 2018 Violent Extremism - Google Scholar," accessed April 14, 2020, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as\\_sdt=0%2C5&q=shauri%2C+2018+violent+extremism&oq=shauri%2C+2018+violent+extr.](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=shauri%2C+2018+violent+extremism&oq=shauri%2C+2018+violent+extr.)

mall and Kikambala hotel there has drastic fall in tourist visit in areas such as Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu. For the two years after the cases, there has been poor economic performance due to low uptake of tourist in Masaai mara, Tsavo and Saburu. In nutshell, terrorism has affected other parts of Kenyan economy resulting to panic among investors<sup>49</sup>. Attempts to intervene in violent extremism require great tact and sacrifice due to the divisive nature of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, it would be an injustice to fail to acknowledge the attempts of NGOs to counter violent extremism all over the world thus the study sought to analyse the role of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya.

### **1.5.5 NGOs and Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Nigeria**

For more than five years, Nigeria has experienced economic disruption due to increased terrorist booming in different parts. Terrorism and violent extremism in Nigeria cannot be reduced to Boko Haram, but other movements such as Christian south and Muslim north division<sup>50</sup>. The division of the areas has been associated deep-rooted ethnic, linguistic as well as class conflicts. In the recent past, Boko Haran has gained motion in different parts of Nigeria and has been associated with many terror attacks posing a great threat to the national development and peace. Boko Haram is a self-declared Islamic movement that has been responsible for increased damages and social menace<sup>51</sup>.

Boko Haram has being involved in various campaign bombing, assassination and abduction of citizen. Their activities have created panic and chaos leading to political stability<sup>52</sup>. Their

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<sup>49</sup> Halimu Suleiman Shauri, Hassan Mohamed Mutubwa, and Timothy Mwaka Musa, "Perception of Peace Actors on the Nexus between Criminal Gangs and Violent Extremism in the Coast of Kenya," *The African Review* 47, no. June 2019 (2020): 1–26, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1821889x-12340017>.

<sup>50</sup> Steven E Hendrix, "THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Combating Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Nigeria: Defining a New Approach to Winning Modern Jihadist Conflict," *HeinOnline*, accessed May 29, 2020, [www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-renames-itself-islamic-states-west-](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-renames-itself-islamic-states-west-).

<sup>51</sup> Ufo Okeke Uzodike and Benjamin Maiangwa, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Causal Factors and Central Problematic," *African*, vol. 9, 2012, <https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/sabinet/aaafren/2012/00000009/00000001/art00006>.

<sup>52</sup> Anthony Abayomi Adebayo, "Implications of 'Boko Haram' Terrorism on National Development in Nigeria: A Critical Review," *Print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing* 5 (2014): 2039–2117, <https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n16p480>.

actioned has been based on Jihad ideology, and their security disruption has being rampant. Boko Haram started from environmental disruption because of economic, social and political marginalization of some areas by the government<sup>53</sup>. In Nigeria, the higher percentage is low income earners associated with poverty and corruption. Due to the social fabrics the government has not succeeded in fighting terrorism and violent. The Nigeria national security has employed lethal means to deal with terrorism and Boko Haram take opportunity in attacking public places resulting to more chaos and insecurity<sup>54</sup>.

Addressing security as well as humanitarian problem required sophisticated and comprehensive approach provided by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Variety efforts through national dialogues and debate to mitigate terrorism and violent extremism have yielded less fruits<sup>55</sup>. NGOs have invested in community development and governance tactics in promoting peace. Their approach has been aimed at understanding the root causes of terrorism and violent extremism. NGOs main goal in countering violent extremism has been targeted at empowering the community on self-reliance and resilience terrorism and extremism through various platforms<sup>56</sup>. The understanding of emotional and psychological aspects in terrorism has enable NGOs in Nigeria to develop and implement grassroots strategies in fighting against terrorism. Their approach has been based on reintegrating Boko Haram defectors and victims back to the local community through social support and economic grants. NGOs working as been integrated in the national plans to maintain peace and unity between the Christian south and Muslim north. NGOs contribution has not been limited to terrorist activities but also focused on peace building witching educational

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<sup>53</sup> Nick Sitter and Tom Parker, "Fighting Fire with Water: NGOs and Counterterrorism Policy Tools," *Global Policy* 5, no. 2 (2014): 159–68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12058>.

<sup>54</sup> Olabanji Olukayode EWETAN and Ese Urhie, "Journal of Sustainable Development Studies Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria," *Infinitypress.Info* 5, no. 1 (2014): 40–63, <https://www.infinitypress.info/index.php/jsds/article/view/531>.

<sup>55</sup> V Comolli, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency*, 2015, <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=vYmMCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=the+role+of+NGO+s+in+fighting+boko+haram+in+nigeria&ots=5B2aCLa7nN&sig=IvXvNTN-OM-MclUaxDny2dlsqhl>.

<sup>56</sup> Rajah Rasiah, Peter Gammeltoft, and Yang Jiang, "Home Government Policies for Outward FDI from Emerging Economies: Lessons from Asia," *International Journal of Emerging Markets* 5, no. 3–4 (July 6, 2010): 333–57, <https://doi.org/10.1108/17468801011058415>.



institutions through peace clubs<sup>57</sup>. Example of NGOs that have taken part in peace building and countering terrorism in Nigeria include: Peace initiative network, Nigerian Stability and reconciliation, centre for Humanitarian dialogue and many others<sup>58</sup>. However, their specific role on countering violent extremism and terrorism has not been addressed, thus justified the study.

### **1.5.6 Interventions Put in Place by NGOs to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

The endeavour to intervene into and end violent extremism and terrorism on a global scale has proved to be quite demanding owing to the multifaceted nature of the aspects of the phenomenon. This has necessitated objective intervention aimed at not only providing security to the people but also identifying even the subtlest of its drivers and addressing them conclusively<sup>59</sup>. Conventional thought has it that violent extremism and terrorism is a product of religious indifferences. However, instances of violent extremism and terrorism are more often than not, products of political, historical, social and economic situations. As such, curbing violent extremism and terrorism requires that all these circumstances be analysed in order to come up with relevant counter-action<sup>60</sup>.

NGOs approach in countering violent extremism and terrorism (context-based intervention) has proven to be useful in nations such as Iraq, which have been subject to extremist activity for decades. A good example is the effort of women international league for peace and freedom (WILPF). The organization, in partnership with MENA (Middle East and North Africa), affirm that violent extremism and terrorism in the region is often directed towards

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<sup>57</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism Report of the United Nations Development Programme Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism, ‘Oslo II.’”

<sup>58</sup> Gorm Rye Olsen, “Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy: The USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali,” *European Security* 23, no. 3 (July 3, 2014): 290–306, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2014.884074>.

<sup>59</sup> World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2016, The Global Gender Gap Report 2016*, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192513X04267098>.

<sup>60</sup> Sitter and Parker, “Fighting Fire with Water: NGOs and Counterterrorism Policy Tools.”

women due to patriarchal arrangements and that it is sustained by widespread militarization and access to firearms in the country and its environs<sup>61</sup>. In this respect, the two organizations thereof, recommend that countering violent extremism in Iraq should be carried out in consideration of the arms trade in the region as well as the political and economic incentives granted to its military. Additionally, they recommend that firm action be taken against perpetrators of violent extremism in order to reduce its prevalence<sup>62</sup>.

In the same vein, think peace, Non-Governmental Organizations in Mali, recognizes the tendency of youth in the country to succumb to extremist ideology and radicalization under the pretext that they will be able to improve their socio-economic welfare. The organization as such has emphasized and utilized the help of community leaders, religious leaders, local leadership and influential persons to help the youth identify and access alternative ways of improving their social and economic welfare<sup>63</sup>. In Uganda, the immigration of Somalis from Somalia has raised unrest breeding extremist sentiments among the locals, who perceive the newcomers negatively. Nevertheless, the Somali community, through their business community, has fostered the creation of the Uganda- Somali community as a response to the misconception and the resulting unrest. The organization has fostered a positive relationship with the local authorities, undertaken community outreach and strengthened relationship with media outlets. This has resulted in recognition of the importance of the Somali business community, and the consequent reduction of violent extremism<sup>64</sup>.

The Kenyan and Nigerian story is no exception, with NGOs in various capacities making unique contributions in the war against violent extremism and its consequences. Among the notable NGOs in doing well in this war is Search for Common Ground (SFCG). In the year

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<sup>61</sup> N Nthamburi - Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya, "Edited by Mutuma Ruteere and Patrick Mutahi Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya Debates, Ideas and Challenges," *Chrips.or.Ke*, accessed April 14, 2020, <https://chrips.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Confronting-Violent-Extremism-in-Kenya.pdf#page=79>.

<sup>62</sup> "Agency for Peace Building. (2018). Security Approaches... - Google Scholar," accessed April 14, 2020, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as\\_sdt=0%2C5&q=Agency+for+Peace+Building.+%282018%29.+Security+Approaches+to+Violent+Extremism+in+Coastal+Kenya.+October.&btnG=](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Agency+for+Peace+Building.+%282018%29.+Security+Approaches+to+Violent+Extremism+in+Coastal+Kenya.+October.&btnG=).

<sup>63</sup> United Nations Development Programme, "Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity."

<sup>64</sup> Allan et al., "Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature W."

2018, the organization, in collaboration with organizations such as KMYA, KYBI and MUHURI, conjured a project named INUKA! The initiative was designed to foster trust and co-operation between all segments of the society in order to bring an end to terrorism and violent extremism<sup>65</sup>. The initiative focused on building the capacity of community leaders and NGOs to, in collaboration with the government, deal with local security challenges; strengthen collaboration between security forces and communities and fostering collaboration in responding to shared security challenges at all levels in society.

In similar measure, the Council of Imams and Preachers of Nigeria (CIPN) and the Northern Nigeria Interfaith Council of Clerics (NNICC), vouched for empowering local and religious leaders to increase the ability of youth to identify terrorism and violent extremism in its initial stages and to assess activity at the mosque. The spirit of this initiative was to reduce violent extremism and radicalization while maintaining the legitimacy of mosques. This was coupled with the Know your neighbour initiative, with the elders acting as observers in combating the menace. Know your neighbour initiative is a government intervention programme to increase security within communities<sup>66</sup>. Additionally in Kenya there has been implementation of Nyumba kumi initiative to monitor area activities and counter any terrorist activities at early stages. The term is derived from Kiswahili and translates as 'ten houses'. Ten households are seen as a unit and members should identify and create rapport with each other, ('know your neighbour') as a safety measure<sup>67</sup>. The strategy was created as a reaction to radicalization and extremism. Such studies and interventions are in different contextual framework and not analysing the role of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism.

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<sup>65</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism Report of the United Nations Development Programme Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism, 'Oslo II.'"

<sup>66</sup> Festus M Munyao and Robert Ng'ang', "EFFECTS OF NYUMBA KUMI INITIATIVE ON SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN KENYA, A CASE STUDY OF LUNGALUNGA SUB-COUNTY," *Iprjb.Org*, accessed April 14, 2020, [www.iprjb.org](http://www.iprjb.org).

<sup>67</sup> By Rinnah Ngoiri Ngigi Nairobi, "ROLE, PRACTICE AND CHALLENGES OF NYUMBA KUMI INITIATIVE IN CRIME REDUCTION: A CASE STUDY OF MAKONGENI ESTATE, DELTA ZONE, THIKA," 2018, <http://156.0.232.45/handle/11071/6070>.

## 1.6 Summary of Literature and Research Gaps

Countering violent extremism and terrorism have been subject to scrutiny, in so far as its qualifiers and indicators are concerned<sup>68</sup>. Laws in many countries take violent extremism to include non-violent opposition to their laws, values and policies<sup>69</sup>. These include vagary, which may be anarchist, totalitarian or even racist. As such, some of the acts that are deemed extremist are mere beliefs and opinions<sup>70</sup>. The result is that human rights are often infringed on when dealing with individuals who are deemed extremist based on their ideological sentiments.

The rehabilitation and re-integration of violent extremists is a structurally essential aspect of the collective intervention against violent extremism. However, the method has proven to be quite controversial and complicated. There have been challenges in ascertaining the culpability of the individuals being rehabilitated, as well as the motives behind the initial participation in violent extremism<sup>71</sup>. These have made it difficult to contrive effective rehabilitation and re-integration mechanisms. Moreover, it has proven difficult to address some of the drivers of violent extremism; such as economic deprivation and individual motivation<sup>72</sup>. This results in high likelihoods of individuals returning to violent extremism. The pertinent question is, what is the effectiveness of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria?

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<sup>68</sup> Shauri, "PERCEPTION OF THE POLICE AND THE YOUTH IN ENHANCING COMMUNITY-COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATION IN KILIFI COUNTY , COASTAL."

<sup>69</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism Report of the United Nations Development Programme Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism, 'Oslo II.'"

<sup>70</sup> UN Women - New York: UN Women and undefined 2015, "Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325," n.d.

<sup>71</sup> "Agency for Peace Building. (2018). Security Approaches... - Google Scholar."

<sup>72</sup> Legrenzi, *Beyond Regionalism?: Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East*.

## **1.7 Justification of the study**

The findings are useful to the Ministry of Internal Security and Department of Defence in Kenya and Nigeria in understanding the current situation on recruitment and radicalization of youths into violent extremist groups in Kenya and Nigeria and the role of NGOs in countering violent extremism as well as terrorism. The findings help the local administration on the various interventions employed by NGOs in countering violent extremism; generating knowledge on the drivers of terrorism and thus the effectiveness of the interventions. The findings are important to academicians and researchers as a basis for further research by providing research lacuna in preventing and countering violent extremism.

## **1.8 Theoretical framework**

The theoretical framework is a unifying section in the research process. In fact, the integrity of any theoretical framework lies in its capacity to unite the study and its variables to larger fields of inquiry or even academic disciplines. Specifically, it attempts to clarify the cause-effect relationship proposed by a study by means of an existent paradigm. Therefore, operationalization of causal relationship based on an existent paradigm is the fundamental pretension of any theoretical framework. This section attempts to establish the nexus between violent extremism and existing theory, by proposing the use of Structural Functionalism Theory (SFT) in the efforts to address the phenomenon in a manner that is sustainable and conclusive.

The SFT is a theoretical framework developed by Emile Durkheim (1895), who built upon Herbert Spencer's organic analogy; that society can be equated to a living organism with parts that operate in functional unity for the survival of the whole body. It is a product of his attempts to understand the workings of society; more so how order is established and maintained. The theory conceptualizes society as a sum of individual parts, each of which has an integral part to play in order to ensure survival of the whole<sup>73</sup>. As asserted by the theory, society is held together by common values, languages, and symbols. As such, studying society requires that we look beyond individuals to social facts such as laws, values, beliefs,

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<sup>73</sup> George W Bush et al., "A New Understanding About the InStitute MeMbers Ex OfficiO," 2013, [https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Transnational\\_CVEUSIP.pdf](https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Transnational_CVEUSIP.pdf).

customs and rituals, as components of social life<sup>74</sup>. The individual is just but a fragment of the society and should therefore be examined in the context of the totality. Society is characterized by social, economic, and political components, each of which has its part to play in maintaining dynamic equilibrium.

Understanding violent extremism from a structural functionalist perspective requires that all its components, which include its underlying causes, its survival and its eradication be viewed as products of collaboration between the various social components thereof. In this respect, violent extremist tendencies are not products of individual decisions but are products of society. People involved in violent extremism have in most cases been characterized by past criminal records or networks, adherence to extreme Islamic ideology, affiliation to radical social networks, negative profiling by friends and family and unemployment or job instability<sup>75</sup>.

Intervention against violent extremism therefore, should be structural rather than individual oriented, focusing on customizing social, economic and political environment such that individuals in society have no inclination to participate in violent extremism. The traditional focus, involving suppression using the military, assisted rehabilitation and re-integration have seldom alleviated the situation<sup>76</sup>. Notably, these commonplace methods are limited in their ability to tackle all the underlying causes of violent extremism. It is therefore crucial that more holistic intervention mechanisms be idealized and implemented in order to completely and sustainably tackle the problem.

## **1.9 Hypotheses**

Efforts by NGOS in countering violent extremism and terrorism will lead to effective counterterrorism in Africa.

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<sup>74</sup> Paul L Darket et al., “Vol. 156, No. 1, 1988” 156, no. 1 (1988): 297–303.

<sup>75</sup> Allan et al., “Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review.”

<sup>76</sup> United Nations Development Programme, “Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity.”

The implementation of interventions by NGOs to counter violent extremism will lead to peace and security in Africa.

Addressing the challenges NGOs in Africa will increase the capability to counter violent extremist and terrorist activities in Africa.

## **1.10 Research Methodology**

### **1.10.1 Introduction**

This section comprises Research design, Locale of the study, Target population, Sampling procedures and Sample size, Research Instruments, Data collection procedures, Data analysis techniques and Logistics and ethical considerations.

### **1.10.2 Locale of the Study**

According to Cohen, Marion & Morrison (2011), a study may cover any geographical area. This study therefore is carried out in Kenya and Nigeria. The increase in human population and consequent social issues that prevail in Nigeria and Kenya have created pressure on the available natural resources, and this has been made worse by political conditions prevalent in the area<sup>77</sup>. The study is conducted in various parts of Kenya and Nigeria. The countries are conveniently selected because of the characteristics of the study and because of many returnees and many cases of violent extremism and terrorism having been reported. Moreover, Boko Haram are in Northern Nigeria and Alshabaab terrorist in Kenya attacks are aimed at Nairobi WestGate, Dusit Hotel, Coastal region Mombasa, Lamu, Kilifi, Garissa, Tana River, Kwale, Wajir, Mandera and Isiolo.

### **1.10.3 Research Design**

Terrorism and Violent Extremism (VE) are sensitive topics and in most cases talked as special research projects. Owing to the unique nature of the research, the approach to study

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<sup>77</sup> Hugh Matthews, "Citizenship, Youth Councils and Young People's Participation," *Journal of Youth Studies* 4, no. 3 (September 2001): 299–318, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676260120075464>.

requires skill, tact and experience. Therefore, the study employed a cross-sectional survey design. This design entails observing a representative subset over a short period. The design was used because it is versatile and can be used in a range of situations. More so, it is very flexible, cost-effective and provides an extensive application, which allows the generalization of study findings<sup>78</sup>.

The study used quantitative and qualitative procedures in collecting and analysing data. Qualitative technique involved the collection of extensive narrative data in order to gain insights into phenomena of interests: data analysis included the coding of data and production. It is studying the phenomena as they are in natural setting<sup>79</sup>.

#### **1.10.4 Target Population**

The target population is the that part which the researcher intends to generalize the findings<sup>80</sup>. The target population for the study was drawn from the county registry of all NGOs registered in the selected Countries. The target population of the study was the leaders in each NGOs. The target population was selected because they were conversant with roles and interventions employed by their organization in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism. Based on the aims of the study, and conclusions were drawn on the basis on the data collected to reflect the roles and interventions employed by NGOs in Kenya and Nigeria in countering violent extremism and terrorism.

#### **1.10.5 Sampling procedures and Sample Size Determination**

This study used a mixed sampling design. Probability and Non-probability sampling designs was used in the selection of the sample. Probability sampling design is preferred because, as

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<sup>78</sup> Paul, “Does Participatory Forest Management Change Household Attitudes towards Forest Conservation and Management?”

<sup>79</sup> J Cilliers - African Security Studies and undefined 2003, “African Security Studies TERRORISM AND AFRICA,” *Taylor & Francis* 12, no. 4 (January 2010): 91–103, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2003.9627255>.

<sup>80</sup> AO Adewole - International Journal of Physical and Social and undefined 2012, “Effect of Population on Economic Development in Nigeria: A Quantitative Assessment,” *Indianjournals.Com*, accessed May 29, 2020, <http://www.indianjournals.com/ijor.aspx?target=ijor:ijpss&volume=2&issue=5&article=001>.



noted by Straits and Singleton (2011), it is more scientifically acceptable. They add that biases are minimized as each member is given an equal chance of being selected into the sample, which is used as a representative of the broader population.

According to Johanson & Brooks (2010), 30 elements are considered as the minimum size of a sample. Other researchers opt for a minimum sample of 100 units, while others opt for 200 (Chadwick, 1984). In this study, 30 respondents were picked from each of the two selected countries totalling to 60 respondents.

#### **1.10.6 Data Collection**

The study utilized questionnaires and interview guides as the primary source of data collection and documentary analysis for secondary data. This helped in triangulation during analysis<sup>81</sup>. In addition, due to prevailing condition of COVID-19 accessibility to Nigerian NGOs is curtailed by restricted movements. Therefore, desktop review were done and interviews conducted through mails and online platforms. Due to the risky nature of the study during the data collection process, research assistants with adequate knowledge of the violent extremism and terrorism issues were involved. These assistants were trained to ground them on the objectives of the study, methods, especially of data collection and ethical considerations to enhance competency.

#### **1.10.7 Data Processing and Analysis**

The collected data was coded, themes established and analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23.0. The analysed data was presented in form of graphs, figures and tables.

#### **1.10.8 Ethical Considerations**

The researcher sought permission from relevant government authorities and the selected institutions and business centres before involving the respondents. The researcher explained

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<sup>81</sup> Kent Buse and Sarah Hawkes, "Health in the Sustainable Development Goals: Ready for a Paradigm Shift?," *Globalization and Health* (BioMed Central Ltd., March 21, 2015), <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-015-0098-8>.

to the officers that the research was voluntary and assured them of confidentiality and no elements of individual identification was recorded. No embarrassing questions or statements were made that would interfere with the self- esteem of the respondents.

## CHAPTER TWO

### ROLE OF NGOs IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the global dimension in relation to countering violent extremism and terrorism then narrows it down to regional and local. Moreover, it gives specific examples of where terrorism has occurred. It has established that terrorism is not just a problem related to one nation rather a global menace. Terrorist organizations attacks do not only target specific countries. Their consequences affected multiple nations throughout the world. Various dimensions on the impact of violent extremism and terrorism is presented next.

#### 2.2 Overview of Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Following multitude attacks and the unprecedented impact thereof, the notion of a “violence and terror” has essentially become a universal term employed in both popular and official discourse. The global response to violence and terror has virtually come to dominate the international peace, influencing government policy around the world<sup>82</sup>. In this sense, the understanding of counter violence and terrorist has been associated with an offensive military hard line, largely focused on securitisation and primarily targeting Islamist forms of violence and terrorism. From the first declaration of “war”, it was clear that the terrorist attacks in different nations would frame the conditions for hard power to shape the counterterrorism response and define the roles of significant actors in international security. As the world watched the capture and demise of Osama Bin Laden on 2 May 2011, almost a decade after the attacks, scholars reasonably argued that the prolonged war on terror failed to eradicate the threat of international terrorism<sup>83</sup>. While the international approach of the war on terror succeeded in decimating the operational and tactical capacity, the belief that the destruction of training camps would lead to the demise of the ideology of varied terror attacks.

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<sup>82</sup> Mustapha, in, and 2019, “Humanitarian Agencies, Counter-Terrorism, and Counter-Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin.”

<sup>83</sup> Legrenzi, *Beyond Regionalism?: Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East*.

The tactic of employing a conventional “hard” military response against an unconventional enemy whose regenerative capacity relies on its ability to employ “soft” strategies of influence and mobilisation has, rightly, been questioned<sup>84</sup>. In the media and public arena, the “war on terror” became the dominant frame in reference to a range of diverse responses to violence and terror from military action in Afghanistan and Iraq to local Muslim community initiatives in the suburbs of Sydney. Attempts by political leaders in the USA, Australia and the UK to clarify that the war on terror was not a war on Islam failed. Instead the “war on terror” was constructed in the public imagination as a cultural/ ideological clash between the culturally progressive West and the culturally resistant Islam. Importantly, rather than improve the US (and Western) soft power capacity in the Muslim world, this construction of the “war on terror” did irreparable damage not only to the US capacity to influence but also to that of the Western world<sup>85</sup>.

More evidently, American and British intelligence agencies report that the use of military in Iraq without a balanced and effective soft power strategy has increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the past decade or so<sup>86</sup>. Consequently, the need to get smart about counterterrorism, more than ever before, has become important and necessary. The failure of the war on terror to effectively eradicate the threat of international terrorism is more complex than a simple military and negotiations balance. It is not simply a matter of too much military response and not enough negotiations. In 2010, the Obama administration made a strategic decision to change the way that the US Government talked about the conflict announcing that they were not at war with “jihadists”, “Islamists” or “terror”. In place of the “war on terror”, President Obama began referring to the “war on al-Qaeda” referring to terrorist as the enemy and most Muslim victims as allies<sup>87</sup>. The new terminology reflected a much needed and long-neglected understanding of the importance of language in counterterrorism. The attempt to shift the language of the war on terror, however,

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<sup>84</sup> Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*.

<sup>85</sup> Aly, Balbi, and Jacques, “Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society,” January 2, 2015.

<sup>86</sup> Foley, “Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past.”

<sup>87</sup> Antwi-Boateng, “The Rise of Pan-Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge.”

came too late. By 2010 jihadist ideology was already well entrenched and polls revealed an increasing wave of anti-American sentiment throughout the Middle East and other Muslim majority countries<sup>88</sup>.

### **2.3 Role of NGOs in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism globally**

United Nations public diplomacy efforts to change negative perceptions among people in the Arab world largely met with failure. The task of undoing a decade of damage done by a prolonged military campaign required more than a shift in the language of war. Subsequently governments have had to contend with the reality that now presents itself in the form of what has been variously dubbed a “war for hearts and minds” and a “battle of ideas<sup>89</sup>”. Western governments in particular are playing a game of catch up in attempting to construct viable and effective counter narratives that challenge the ideological foundations of the Salafi Jihadi narratives<sup>90</sup>. It is within this context that the notion of countering violence and terrorism has developed within government policy as a way of capturing and coordinating soft efforts and mechanisms in the counterterrorism space<sup>91</sup>.

Defining the notion of countering violence and terrorism has proved to be a difficult undertaking as the term initially developed out of government policy rather than scholarship<sup>92</sup>. Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011 posits that, throughout CVE literature it appears to be a phenomenon that often stands as if it was something self-evident and taken for granted. The term is typically cited in the context of strategies that either aim to respond to or prevent violence, often within the policy sphere. CVE is also often understood in relation to VE,

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<sup>88</sup> Jakkie Cilliers, “Violent Islamist Extremism and Terror in Africa,” *Ingentaconnect.Com*, accessed June 16, 2020, [www.start.umd.edu/gtd/](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/).

<sup>89</sup> Alther, “Development in Practice Colombian Peace Communities: The Role of NGOs in Supporting Resistance to Violence and Oppression.”

<sup>90</sup> Rinnah Ngoiri Ngigi Nairobi, “ROLE, PRACTICE AND CHALLENGES OF NYUMBA KUMI INITIATIVE IN CRIME REDUCTION: A CASE STUDY OF MAKONGENI ESTATE, DELTA ZONE, THIKA.”

<sup>91</sup> AB YARROW, “College of Humanities and Social Sciences,” 2014, [http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/98336/Yarrow\\_Countering Radicalization And Its Impact On National Security In East Africa The Case For The Diplomatic Approach In Kenya.pdf?sequence=1](http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/98336/Yarrow_Countering%20Radicalization%20And%20Its%20Impact%20On%20National%20Security%20In%20East%20Africa%20The%20Case%20For%20The%20Diplomatic%20Approach%20In%20Kenya.pdf?sequence=1).

<sup>92</sup> JULIUS, “RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED.”

which implies that the ways in which VE is conceptualised informs how counter strategies are developed and applied<sup>93</sup>. Moreover, the mode in which CVE is understood often reinforces and reproduces interpretations of VE. Recognising this relationship is crucial as the ways in which VE is conceptualised enables and favours particular responses while reducing or excluding others<sup>94</sup>.

Non-state actors are critical in providing a framework for distinguishing between different types of approaches to terrorism and violent extremism. While much of the counterterrorism practice post-violence favoured the hard approach, the non-state actors countering violent extremism reflects recognition among governments of the need to incorporate a multifaceted approach that combines negotiation and military strategies into a single framework and that reflects “smart power”<sup>95</sup>. The conceptual shift from military counterterrorism to non-state actors countering violence and terrorism is based in the fact that CVE strategies are increasingly focusing on preventing rather than responding to violent extremism<sup>96</sup>. In a prevention-oriented approach, the “traditional” hard strategies involving military, policing, intelligence and legislation, become insufficient for establishing an effective long-term strategy, but they are not entirely discounted. Rather, hard power measures are used in combination with soft power in ways that effectively respond to the root causes of violent extremism. Non-governmental approach considers the social, economic, political and historical contexts in which violent extremism and terrorism arises<sup>97</sup>.

NGOs achieve counterterrorism through an integrated strategy, resource base and tool kit that draws from both authority and community<sup>98</sup>. However, NGOs countering violence and

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<sup>93</sup> Ewi and Aning, “Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa.”

<sup>94</sup> Bush et al., “A New Understanding About the Institute Members Ex Officio,” 2013.

<sup>95</sup> OECD, “Interim Report of the Green Growth Strategy: Implementing Our Commitment for a Sustainable Future.”

<sup>96</sup> Mwangi, Mwangi, and Wasonga, “Assessing The Effectiveness Of Intelligence Gathering And Sharing (IGS) In Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) In Kenya.”

<sup>97</sup> Pierre Emmanuel Ly, “The Charitable Activities of Terrorist Organizations,” *Public Choice* 131, no. 1–2 (April 2007): 177–95, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9112-2>.

<sup>98</sup> Adebayo, “Implications of ‘Boko Haram’ Terrorism on National Development in Nigeria: A Critical Review.”

terrorism is not just a matter of balancing government and community measures. Armitage & Nye (2007) points out that US foreign policy has tended to over-rely on hard power because it is the most direct and visible source of American strength<sup>99</sup>. The same can be said about Australia's approach to counterterrorism, invested largely in participation in military exercises as part of the US led coalition. Since 2003, however, Australia has attempted to develop its soft power measures in the prevention of "home-grown" terrorism. For the most part this has been through programmes and activities that focus largely on social harmony, the promotion of Australian (Western) democratic values and the integration of "suspect" communities into the broader Australian society<sup>100</sup>. NGOs approaches are important, their effectiveness in countering violence and terrorism in Australia and elsewhere has been questioned. In particular, such approaches have drawn criticism for their narrow focus on Muslim minority communities and for being based on flawed assumptions about the role of religion in violent extremism and terrorism<sup>101</sup>.

Ideally, NGO-oriented CVE approach should reduce the necessity for intervention and response. CVE focuses on counter radicalisation and aims to prevent societies from becoming more vulnerable to growing radicalisation. Intervention focuses on radicalisation and is best targeted at individuals and groups that are in the early (engagement) to late (highly radicalised) phases of radicalisation<sup>102</sup>. Their approach uses experts, community, government and law enforcement in the development of targeted counter narratives. Reaction focuses on punitive measures by law enforcement targeting highly radicalised to operational individuals. This approach requires carefully managed counterterrorism narratives that construct positive attitudes to law enforcement and garner public support<sup>103</sup>. Thus, the study focuses on the role of these NGOs specifically in Kenya and Nigeria.

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<sup>99</sup> Munyao and Ng'ang', "EFFECTS OF NYUMBA KUMI INITIATIVE ON SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN KENYA, A CASE STUDY OF LUNGALUNGA SUB-COUNTY."

<sup>100</sup> Stevan Weine, "Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism," *American Psychologist* 72, no. 3 (2013): 289–300.

<sup>101</sup> Antwi-Boateng, "The Rise of Pan-Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge."

<sup>102</sup> YARROW, "College of Humanities and Social Sciences."

<sup>103</sup> Allan et al., "Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature W."

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE INTERVENTIONS BY NGOS IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN KENYA AND NIGERIA

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter is based on our objective number two that evaluates the interventions put in place by the NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria. The chapter focuses on the role played by NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism. The logic of global counter terrorism partnerships is to a great extent informed by the structural factionalism and interdependence especially in its argument that multiple channels connect society<sup>104</sup>. These channels include informal ties between governmental elites making it possible for them to initiate cooperative counter terrorism strategies.

#### 3.2 Overview of Violent Extremism

The rise of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa region is associated with the emergent regional security threat posed by Somalia's al-Shabaab. Kenya, Somalia's neighbour to the southeast, has been particularly vulnerable to the group's activities and has been the target of most of its attacks outside Somalia. Within Kenya, al-Shabaab has had the most success in the northeast in recruiting new members, launching attacks, and spreading an extremist ideology<sup>105</sup>. Al-Shabaab's increased activity in Kenya comes in the wake of Kenya's intervention in Somalia in 2011 and of a purge within al-Shabaab leadership ranks by the late Ahmed Abdi Godane in June 2013. After the purge, Godane ordered a reorganization of the group's military wing, Jaysh al-Usra, as part of a strategy to expand its jihad beyond Somalia's borders. The commander in the Lower and Middle Juba regions, the late Mohamed

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<sup>104</sup> Foley, "Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past."

<sup>105</sup> Kioko, "Conflict Resolution and Crime Surveillance in Kenya: Local Peace Committees and Nyumba Kumi."



Kunow Dulyadeyn known as Gamadhere began to expand his operations into Garissa and Wajir counties at the same time that Adan Garar, his counterpart in the Gedo region of Somalia, had begun to expand his into Mandera County<sup>106</sup>.

The membership of Kenya's al-Shabaab franchise, al-Hijra, whose leadership ranks had been depleted, was largely swallowed into a new military unit, Jaysh Ayman, which is made up of Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian nationals tasked with waging attacks in those countries<sup>107</sup>. This strategy is part of al-Shabaab's latest reinvention from an Islamist rebel group controlling territory in southern Somalia to a leaner and much more coherent organization focused on waging an insurgency in Ethiopia, southern Somalia, and Kenya's northeast. Consequently, al-Shabaab activities within Kenya (2013–16) have become much more sophisticated and lethal, as is clear from the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi in 2013, the Lamu County attacks in June and July 2014, the Mandera bus and quarry attacks in November 2014, and the Garissa University attack in April 2015. In the northeast region, as elsewhere in Kenya, al-Shabaab has been able to exploit a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and individual characteristics that render many people and youth in particular vulnerable for recruitment<sup>108</sup>.

A simultaneous trend of politically instigated violence is on the rise in the northeast especially in the period between the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010 and during and after the 2013 general elections<sup>109</sup>. The constitution introduced a devolved system of government and created new political constituencies (parliamentary districts), change that translated into an introduction of three new political seats at the local county level: county governor, county senator, and county female representative and member of county assembly

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<sup>106</sup> Bush et al., "A New Understanding About the InStitute MeMbers Ex OfficiO," 2013.

<sup>107</sup> RF Sambaiga - The African Review and undefined 2018, "Changing Images of Nyumba Kumi in Tanzania: Implications for Youth Engagement in Countering Violence at Community Level," *Journals.Udsm.Ac.Tz*, accessed April 14, 2020, <http://journals.udsm.ac.tz/index.php/ar/article/view/2231>.

<sup>108</sup> Blakemore, *Extremism, Counter-Terrorism and Policing*.

<sup>109</sup> Brendon J Cannon, "Explaining Trans-Border Terrorist Attacks: The Case of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab View Project," *Papers.Ssm.Com* 10, no. 5 (2016): 56–65, <https://doi.org/10.5897/AJPSIR2015.0861>.

(formerly ward councillor)<sup>110</sup>. In a country where political and ethnic identities align, voting and political patronage networks compete along ethnic lines

### 3.3 Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Kenya

Since Kenya gained its independence in 1963, the northeast of the country has experienced civil strife and state-instigated violence, at times seeing casualty and displacement levels typically associated with civil wars<sup>111</sup>. The politics of the region have been predominantly shaped by three historical trends restriction of movement, denial of political voice, and militarization<sup>112</sup>. These trends are key to understanding how Nairobi-based central governments (both colonial and postcolonial) have dealt with the northeast region. The historically contentious border with Somalia was settled in 1925, when the British offered Italy (which had colonized part of the country) a huge chunk of southern Somalia (the Trans-Juba area) that had been part of British East Africa in the World War I Treaty of London<sup>113</sup>. During the colonial period, what was referred to as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) was made up of six districts: Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Moyale, Marsabit, and Isiolo. Restriction on movement by both the colonial and postcolonial governments ensured that Somalis' westward movement was halted from Somali-dominated Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera to Moyale, Marsabit, and Isiolo, districts dominated by other pastoral and a few agricultural groups. Much of the colonial history of northern Kenya is marked by restrictions on movement, as noted, and rangeland demarcation by land, a strategy that was meant to reduce communal conflict over grazing areas. In actual terms, the policy of rangeland demarcation established a link in the political imagination of northern Kenyans between political-administrative boundaries and the lines demarcating exclusive clan rights to land. As

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<sup>110</sup> "Agency for Peace Building. (2018). Security Approaches... - Google Scholar."

<sup>111</sup> C. Gabler et al., "Die Allman-I-Fraktur Des Schlüsselbeines," *Aktuelle Traumatologie* 25, no. 2 (1995): 50–55, <https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2212067788>.

<sup>112</sup> L Hamasi - Journal of African Interdisciplinary Studies (JAIS) and undefined 2017, "Armed Women, Religion and Quest for Unknown: Interrogating Females in Terrorism and Implications for Security in Kenya," *Cedred.Org*, accessed June 16, 2020, [http://cedred.org/jais/images/issues/Journal\\_of\\_African\\_Interdisciplinary\\_Studies\\_JAIS\\_Vol1\\_No\\_1\\_2017.pdf#page=69](http://cedred.org/jais/images/issues/Journal_of_African_Interdisciplinary_Studies_JAIS_Vol1_No_1_2017.pdf#page=69).

<sup>113</sup> George W Bush et al., "A New Understanding About the InStitute MeMbers Ex OfficiO," 2013, [https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Transnational\\_CVEUSIP.pdf](https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Transnational_CVEUSIP.pdf).

independence neared, the British appointed a commission to gather public views on the question of the secession of the NFD<sup>114</sup>.

In the northeast of Kenya, a combination of local and national government initiatives to end conflicts and build peace appeared to reduce armed conflict for a time after 2005, though with highly variable results by location. However, the upsurge of communal conflict and violent extremism since 2011 is clear, and in districts (now counties) where remarkable levels of peace had been achieved (such as Wajir), conflict reappeared in 2014<sup>115</sup>. These trends suggest that communities in the northeast have been able to exploit a number of resilience factors against violence for at least a time<sup>116</sup>. In particular, the establishment of clan civic associations that worked with formal government officials in conflict mitigation, national pressure to resolve conflict, and accommodation of rivals' interests among different clans after periods of conflict all worked to reduce levels of violence in the region. However, local capacities have been weakened by recent developments both political devolution and the emergence of al-Shabaab as a security threat<sup>117</sup>.

Although no evidence of a neat overlap between extremist recruitment and clan membership exists, counties in northeast Kenya inhabited by clans with close cross-border ties with clans in Somalia, especially Garissa and Madera are also more at risk for extremist recruitment and clan-based conflict. Although this report does not establish a clear correlation between successful conflict mitigation and successful curtailing of violent extremist activities, it does suggest that the interplay of risk and resilience factors for clan-based violence affects violent extremist activity in the three counties of the northeast<sup>118</sup>.

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<sup>114</sup> Mikewa Ogada, "Emerging Developments in Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism in Kenya," no. 8 (2017): 8–11.

<sup>115</sup> "DEFINITION AND MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES Ömer Göksel Öü YAR \*," 2008, 1–48.

<sup>116</sup> H Solomon, "Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram," 2015.

<sup>117</sup> World Bank, "Minding the Stock: Bringing Public Policy to Bear on Livestock Sector Development," *Report No. 44010-GIB*, 2009.

<sup>118</sup> WILPF, "Open Briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on 'The Role of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism' Civil Society Intervention/Statement," 2020.

### **3.4 Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Nigeria**

For more than five years, Nigeria has experienced economic disruption due to increased terrorist booming in different parts<sup>119</sup>. Terrorism and violent extremism in Nigeria cannot be reduced to Boko Haram, but other movements such as Christian south and Muslim north division. The division of the areas has been associated deep-rooted ethnic, linguistic as well as class conflicts. In the recent past Boko Haran has gained motion in different parts of Nigeria and has been associated with many terror attacks posing a great threat to the national development and peace. Boko Haram is a self-declared Islamic movement that as been responsible for increased damages and social menace<sup>120</sup>.

Boko Haram has being involved in various campaign bombing, assassination and abduction of citizen. Their activities have created panic and chaos leading to political stability. Their actioned has been based on Jihad ideology, and their security disruption has being rampant. Boko Haram started from environmental disruption because of economic, social and political marginalization of some areas by the government<sup>121</sup>. In Nigeria the higher percentage is low income earners associated with poverty and corruption. Due to the social fabrics the government has not succeeded in fighting terrorism and violent. The Nigeria national security has employed lethal means to deal with terrorism and Boko Haram take opportunity in attacking public places resulting to more chaos and insecurity<sup>122</sup>.

### **3.5 Global NGOs interventions to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

CVE offers a mechanism for encouraging exchange between government, academia and civil society by shifting the focus of CT on to prevention and interruption and conceptualizing VE as a social issue with security implications (as opposed to a security issue with social

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<sup>119</sup> *Journal of Horticulture and Forestry* (No. 37B New Ogorode Road, Sapele P.O. Box 1005, Sapele, n.d.), [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273945390\\_Journal\\_of\\_Horticulture\\_and\\_Forestry\\_Agroforestry\\_practices\\_and\\_concepts\\_in\\_sustainable\\_land\\_use\\_systems\\_in\\_Nigeria](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273945390_Journal_of_Horticulture_and_Forestry_Agroforestry_practices_and_concepts_in_sustainable_land_use_systems_in_Nigeria).

<sup>120</sup> Hussein Solomon, "Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria Responding to Boko Haram," *RUSI Journal* 157, no. 4 (August 2012): 6–11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.714183>.

<sup>121</sup> *Journal of Horticulture and Forestry*.

<sup>122</sup> Cilliers, "Violent Islamist Extremism and Terror in Africa."

implications)<sup>123</sup>. The potential for CVE to deliver effective outcomes requires that the prevailing CVE discourse be unconstrained from the currently hegemonic CT connotations. A broader more open discourse emancipates CVE from the constraints of hard-focused CT and its derivative assumptions about drivers of VE. When VE is understood as a social phenomenon, as opposed to a security issue, its response CVE, is open to strategies, practices and actors that have previously been excluded or marginalised from CT<sup>124</sup>. Strategies that have been successfully implemented in response to other social phenomenon such as gang crime can offer useful insights for the development of CVE-focused strategies. Though some attempts have been made to analyse the connection between gang crime and terrorism in the literature, the potential for traditional crime prevention strategies to inform CVE has not yet been fully realised. Similarly social-marketing strategies particularly in the public health arena can enhance the development of CVE prevention initiatives that also target attitudinal and behavioural change<sup>125</sup>.

Concepts commonly applied in marketing and social marketing such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) offer a framework for understanding attitudes, behaviours and intentions in relation to VE and the construction of counter narratives. Education approaches to youth issues also comprise an untapped resource for enhancing CVE<sup>126</sup>. A rapid evidence assessment of teaching methods that help to build resilience to extremism conducted a review of the literature in relation to preventative programmes targeting gangs and gun activity and VE among young people. As expected, the review found no empirical studies or case studies on educational approaches to preventing VE. It did, however, identify seven types of preventative initiatives that could be transferrable to the CVE context and provide some good practice guidelines for CVE education<sup>127</sup>.

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<sup>123</sup> Blakemore, *Extremism, Counter-Terrorism and Policing*.

<sup>124</sup> Ingiriis, “Building Peace from the Margins in Somalia: The Case for Political Settlement with Al-Shabaab.”

<sup>125</sup> Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Horn of Africa.”

<sup>126</sup> Mwangi, Mwangi, and Wasonga, “Assessing The Effectiveness Of Intelligence Gathering And Sharing (IGS) In Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) In Kenya.”

<sup>127</sup> (RUSHI) Royal United Service Institute, “CVE Workshop : Opportunities and Challenges for Bilateral and Multilateral Donors,” 2016, 1–15.

These include taking an evidence-based approach, working collaboratively and involving cooperation from school personnel<sup>128</sup>. Importantly, reconstructing VE as a social phenomenon creates a platform for recognising the role of civil society in CVE. Among the civil society actors whose voices can be harnessed in CVE are survivors and formers, not only for informing the construction of counter narratives, but also as powerful and authentic sources of counter narratives. In a recent report by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in Hague, the vital role that civil society can play in helping governments produce effective CVE policies was highlighted in the following: due to their work and their formal and informal relationships in the north of Nigeria<sup>129</sup>. Some of these organisations have a profound understanding of the historic background of Boko Haram and other extremist groups, their functioning, convictions and mobilising force<sup>130</sup>. Therefore, it is crucial to engage with these CSOs when looking for an effective strategy to counter these threats and to identify ways in which they could cooperate with government forces in a broad counter violence strategy<sup>131</sup>.

As previously mentioned, hard and soft power are rarely equitable in their level of resourcing, power and influence. The challenges for developing a smart CVE approach that effectively combines soft and hard power elements are located both within the traditional structural divides of hard and soft power and within the contemporary context in which CVE has evolved from a hard CT focus<sup>132</sup>. Smart-powered CVE requires government to enact policy that supports, coordinates and structures soft power in order to balance its influence with hard power. In this sense, governments need to think simultaneously about hard and soft strategies and how one might affect the other as well as recognize that their limitations in incorporating

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<sup>128</sup> Abass Kassim Sheikh, "Conflict Assessment Report," 2016.

<sup>129</sup> Comolli, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency*.

<sup>130</sup> Uzodike and Maiangwa, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Causal Factors and Central Problematic."

<sup>131</sup> Aaron Flaaen, Syed Ghani, and Saurabh Mishra, "How to Avoid Middle Income Traps? Evidence from Malaysia," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 6427 (2013): 1–7, <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6427>.

<sup>132</sup> Matthews, "Citizenship, Youth Councils and Young People's Participation."

soft elements of power are outside their sphere of influence and expertise<sup>133</sup>. Since soft power resources generally exist outside the government realm, governments must learn to conduct business in a more fluid, dynamic and flexible way with smaller less formal/bureaucratic groups. The tools of soft CVE reside in small, adaptable, transnational networks, which work towards prevention, intervention and rehabilitation<sup>134</sup>. In this sense, smart CVE is dependent on harnessing the power of grassroots civil society movements in ways that address the shortcomings of institutionalized power. Nye suggests that government support for soft power should go beyond funding civil society-based programmes. Rather governments need to change the political culture that preferences hard power tools (police, intelligence and defence agencies) in order to ensure that soft programmes flourish and succeed. Nye (2011) also suggests that by engaging with non-traditional or unorthodox actors, government will be better placed to understand and respond to local issues and situations<sup>135</sup>.

One way to achieve this shift in political culture is by applying the concept of “transversal politics”. Transversal politics “recognises the differential power positions among participants in the dialogue, but it nevertheless encompasses these differences with equal respect and recognition of each participant”<sup>136</sup>. Transversal politics therefore offers a mechanism for inclusivity in the policy development process by requiring governments to ensure that: (1) Soft power advocates are heard equally within the world of policy decision-making; and (2) A diverse set of voices and actors are actively and equally encouraged to take part in, listened to and utilised as soft power tools<sup>137</sup>. A second challenge to smart CVE is the historically inherited framing of VE as a security issue. As discussed earlier, the securitisation of VE

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<sup>133</sup> Richard Chinomona et al., “Soft Power and Desirable Relationship Outcomes: The Case of Zimbabwean Distribution Channels,” *Journal of African Business* 11, no. 2 (2010): 182–200, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15228916.2010.508997>.

<sup>134</sup> Mariam Nzomo et al., “Project Report on Strengthening Community Resilience against Radicalization & Violent Extremism Sub Theme: A Comparative Assessment of Disengagement and Rehabilitation Programs for Returnees in Kenya Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies,” 2017.

<sup>135</sup> “. Nyumba Kumi Is a Govt Intervention Programme to... - Google Scholar.”

<sup>136</sup> Cannon, “Explaining Trans-Border Terrorist Attacks: The Case of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab View Project.”

<sup>137</sup> Anne Aly, Anne-Marie Balbi, and Carmen Jacques, “Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society,” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (January 2015): 3–13, <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1028772>.

effectively limits the range of responses to those that are coordinated and implemented through hard power mechanisms. Importantly it also limits the popular construction of VE and defines VE as an issue that can most effectively be addressed through punitive and defensive measures. In such an environment, civil society groups with a CVE focus are faced with the challenge of changing public perception of their cause in order to garner popular support for their programmes<sup>138</sup>. To do this, they must contest the dominant politicised construction of VE, effectively creating a counter narrative to the official discourse. As a result, these groups are seen to be working at odds with the government rather than in cohesion with them. An example is the social media campaign developed by the Western Australian-based People against Violent Extremism. The campaign, entitled “Violent extremism has many faces” is aimed at raising public awareness of VE by utilising visuals that depict a variety of violent extremist forms (right wing nationalist and Islamist). While the campaign received funding support from the Australian Government, the campaigns central message competes with the dominant official message which constructs VE as primarily an Islamic issue<sup>139</sup>.

Shifting the political culture to accommodate and include the civil society sector as actors in CVE can also address the challenge of securitisation framing by aligning official messages around CVE with those of CSOs in order to support and facilitate the success of civil society-driven programmes. The overly simplified dominant discourse focusing on hard CT evident throughout the war on terror period has largely proved counterproductive, forcing governments to rethink how they approach the transnational issue of terrorism and VE<sup>140</sup>. Therefore, it is vital to highlight the fact that how we talk, frame and conceptualise VE will ultimately determine how we approach CVE. Smart CVE involves the effective amalgamation of hard and soft power tools into a single framework. This does not presuppose

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<sup>138</sup> Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrelle, and Andrew Zammit, “What Is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8, no. 1 (January 2016): 6–24, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2015.1104710>.

<sup>139</sup> Hussein Solomon, “Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria Responding to Boko Haram,” *RUSI Journal* 157, no. 4 (August 2012): 6–11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.714183>.

<sup>140</sup> Nicolas Papanastopoulos, “Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs, Gearing Crisis Situations in Greek Foreign and Defence Policy,” *International Journal of Political Science* 4, no. 2 (2018): 1–14, <https://doi.org/10.20431/2454-9452.0402001>.



that CVE should be entirely detached from hard power and singularly vested in a soft power base. Rather, in its Rethinking countering violent extremism suggests that a prevention-oriented approach to CVE utilises complementary hard and soft measures and eliminates opposition between these two forms of power cite. It also calls for CVE practiced through a soft power lens, which is, at times and only when necessary, augmented by hard power measures<sup>141</sup>.

### **3.6 Interventions Employed by NGOs in Kenya and Nigeria to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

There has been an apparent increase in radicalization and violent extremism across the East African region. These have been engineered by the ongoing insurgency of the Somalia-based militant group, Al Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iran and Syria (ISIS)<sup>142</sup>. Accordingly, this has necessitated integrated regional responses to prevent and Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). These Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) have been very dynamic in their mobilization, recruitment and operations, to also include gender as a consideration<sup>143</sup>. In East Africa, unlike in Nigeria, where Boko haram has recruited many young women<sup>144</sup>. Al-shabaab are targeting vulnerable young men with the allure of employment and good life (Bombshell et.al 2006). It has become easier to recruit the youth into radical and VEOs<sup>145</sup>. Kenya's CVE initiatives emerged in response to the home-grown violent extremism supported by Al-Shabaab, although it was rooted in the historical landscapes of violent

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<sup>141</sup> Aly, Balbi, and Jacques, "Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society," January 2, 2015.

<sup>142</sup> United Nations, "Civil Society Is Key to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism," accessed April 9, 2020, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ngos/civil-society-is-key-to-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism.html>.

<sup>143</sup> I Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, and D B Subedi, "Countering Violent Extremism through State-Society Partnerships: A Case Study of de-Radicalisation Programmes in Indonesia," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 15, no. 1 (2020): 23–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2020.1722317>.

<sup>144</sup> CK Thurair, "Role of African Union in Promoting Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa: A Case Study of Igad in South Sudan," 2019, <http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/108952>.

<sup>145</sup> Anneli Botha, "Challenges in Understanding Terrorism in Africa: A Human Security Perspective," *African Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (June 2008): 28–41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2008.9627469>.

extremism across the Middle East, North Africa, the western Sahel, and the Horn of Africa (Davis 2010; Ridley 2014). The County has experienced various forms of violence ranging from violence perpetuated by electoral processes, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and terrorism, among others<sup>146</sup>. Terrorism in Kenya has resulted in not only the loss of lives, personal suffering, and pain, but also in growing instability of the economy especially the tourism sector and a heightened sense of insecurity. Some of the largest and most significant terrorist attacks of the last several decades are the Garissa University attack, the Westgate attack, the 1998 bomb attack on US embassy and the Mandera attack on civil servants. More specifically, the high unemployment rate of the youth in Kenya and unresolved historical injustices<sup>147</sup>.

Peace is a key ingredient needed for stability in the world. With conflicts and terrorism all over socio-economic development is compromised. Terrorism poses a great threat to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals<sup>148</sup>. Recruitment to violent extremist groups and terrorism of the youths hinder economic development and which disproportionately affect areas that are already poor and marginalized<sup>149</sup>. Shauri (2018) asserts that violent extremism is a serious problem in the Kenya that has an adverse effect on socio-economic aspects<sup>150</sup>. He further suggested that the Kenyan coastal region relies on tourism as the backbone of the Coastal region economy and the Kenyan economy in general. Apparently, with increased insecurities, tourism sector is much affected as it thrives well in serene and secure environment<sup>151</sup>.

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<sup>146</sup> Becky Carter, "Helpdesk Research Report Women and Violent Extremism," 2013, [www.gsdr.org](http://www.gsdr.org).

<sup>147</sup> Mwangi, Mwangi, and Wasonga, "Assessing The Effectiveness Of Intelligence Gathering And Sharing (IGS) In Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) In Kenya."

<sup>148</sup> Sector Mainstreaming, "Highlights of UNICEF's Results in Advancing Gender Equality, Empowering Adolescent Girls and Achieving Equitable Outcomes for Women and Children," 2016, [https://www.unicef.org/gender/files/Gender\\_Equality\\_ARR\\_Brochure\\_2017.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/gender/files/Gender_Equality_ARR_Brochure_2017.pdf).

<sup>149</sup> Sheikh, "Conflict Assessment Report."

<sup>150</sup> Shauri, "PERCEPTION OF THE POLICE AND THE YOUTH IN ENHANCING COMMUNITY-COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATION IN KILIFI COUNTY , COASTAL."

<sup>151</sup> Review and 2018, "Impact of Violent Extremism and Recruitment of Spouses on Widows in the Coastal Region of Kenya."

There is an alarming rate of youths joining Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in Nigeria and especially in northern region<sup>152</sup>. Over the past four years, Boko Haram is believed to be mobilized around political power and Jihad<sup>153</sup>. This group has been fighting against the European education, referring it as forbidden and against Allah's teachings<sup>154</sup>. In other cases Boko Haram has been involved in sexual violence, robbery, murder and theft and their targets are social events such as school, weddings, funerals, homes and businesses<sup>155</sup>. Due to increased attacks in various there has been an increase in the panic and this has resulted to more social problem in Nigeria.

According to Shauri et, al. (2020), youths (18-35 years) accounts for more than 30% of the African population. Consequently, majority of these youths are unemployed. Statistics shows that 40% of youths are jobless thus making them prey for recruitment into terrorist groups and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)<sup>156</sup>. Ideally, 44% males and 56% females of youth's populations are economically inactive and based on the pull and push; youths can venture in the terrorist activities thus deterring peace and stability in Africa.

### **3.7 NGOs Interventions in Kenya to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

Violent extremist and terrorism in Kenyan has disrupted the status quo and economic activities<sup>157</sup>. Kenya in general has relied on tourism as its leading economic activity, and for its success, there is a need for a secure environment<sup>158</sup>. Due to the different insecurity cases, the tourism sector has been affected to a great extent which has led to social malaise such as

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<sup>152</sup> Antwi-Boateng, "The Rise of Pan-Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge."

<sup>153</sup> Sheikh, "Conflict Assessment Report."

<sup>154</sup> Shauri, Mutubwa, and Mwaka Musa, "Perception of Peace Actors on the Nexus between Criminal Gangs and Violent Extremism in the Coast of Kenya."

<sup>155</sup> Shauri, Mutubwa, and Mwaka Musa.

<sup>156</sup> United Nations Development Programme, "Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity."

<sup>157</sup> Allan et al., "Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review."

<sup>158</sup> Weine, "Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism."

unemployment, drug abuse, prostitution and many other<sup>159</sup>. Non- Governmental Organizations (NGO's) have been unequivocal in countering terrorism and violent extremism for the last decade. Their efforts and commitments to prevent and counter Violent Extremism (VE) portrays the growing awareness and understanding of the effects associated with violence and terrorism <sup>160</sup>. The evaluation of why and how individuals live their lives to Violent Extremism groups and working toward countering these actions advances the NGO's attention. According to the UNHCR, (2017) the NGOs entails a various body of civil actors, communities and formal or informal organizations with an extensive role who engage in public life to advance shared values and objectives. NGOs may include; community leaders and groups, grassroots associations, religious leaders and faith-based organizations<sup>161</sup>. NGOs have operated in the physical spaces and communications technology (ICT) innovations in the last decade and have created a new era of citizen engagement and have fundamentally changed the way people relate to each other and have facilitated the achievement of countering violent extremism and terrorism<sup>162</sup>.

In Kenya, the proportion of NGOs who participate in countering Violent Extremism and terrorism has increased over the years<sup>163</sup>. It is an implication that NGOs have grossly gained motion in understanding the cause and effects of violent extremism and terrorism in society<sup>164</sup>. A significant amount of research has been conducted on the general phenomenon

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<sup>159</sup> Adebayo, "Implications of 'Boko Haram' Terrorism on National Development in Nigeria: A Critical Review."

<sup>160</sup> David Cortright et al., "Friend, Not Foe: The Role of Civil Society in Preventing Violent Extremism," *Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law*, vol. 2, 2012, <https://www.civicus.org/content/CIVICUS->.

<sup>161</sup> Tara Murphy, "Security Challenges in the 21 St Century Global Commons," *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, no. Spring/Summer (2010): 28–43.

<sup>162</sup> United Nations Development Program, "PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH PROMOTING INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT, TOLERANCE AND RESPECT FOR DIVERSITY A Development Response to Addressing Radicalization and Violent Extremism," 2016, <http://www.undp.org/>.

<sup>163</sup> FA Badurdeen, P Goldsmith - Journal for Deradicalization, and undefined 2018, "Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya," *Journals.Sfu.Ca*, accessed April 14, 2020, <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/162>.

<sup>164</sup> "Role of NGOs in Fighting Violent Extremism in Nigeria - Google Search," accessed May 23, 2020, [https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&sxsrf=ALeKk01zztIM4BHRZwM\\_Uno0APPxmI65yw%3A1590236832434&ei=oBbJXsKTGpHJgQaXppb4Bw&q=role+of+NGOs+in+fighting+violent+extremism+in+nigeria&oq=role+of+NGOs+in+fighting+violent+e](https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&sxsrf=ALeKk01zztIM4BHRZwM_Uno0APPxmI65yw%3A1590236832434&ei=oBbJXsKTGpHJgQaXppb4Bw&q=role+of+NGOs+in+fighting+violent+extremism+in+nigeria&oq=role+of+NGOs+in+fighting+violent+e)

of Violent Extremism, especially on the push and pulls factors. Hargis (2012) researched how the Christian-Muslim conflict resolution has been a necessary component to the social, economic, and political developments in Kenya<sup>165</sup>. Hargis (ibid) emphasizes the need to foster NGOs' relations because of the apparent benefits it contributes to and the ability to guarantee peaceful coexistence. According to Chome (2016), Kenya is in a unique position in regard to the role of NGOs, particularly in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism<sup>166</sup>.

### 3.8 NGOs Interventions in Nigeria to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism

The main goal of signing treaties and peace agreement is to maintain peaceful coexistence among various nations and different parts within a nation<sup>167</sup>. Peace and security in the most valuable public good but the most elusive in many countries, especially in Nigeria (Revi, 2017). For many decades Nigeria has experience peace, but for the nine years, there has been a disturbance of the public security. Various insecurity disturbances have been experienced in various parts of Nigeria<sup>168</sup>. These disturbances have resulted in the loss of human life, destruction of infrastructure, and more profoundly resulting to negative economic impact all over the country. The alarming attacks have threatened the internal peace of Nigeria, which have been articulated to minimal political will to adhere to the stipulated peace agreements<sup>169</sup>.

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xtrmism+in+nigeria&gs\_lcp=CgZwc3ktYWIQDDoECAAQDTtoICAAQDRAFEB46BAghEApQ6DIY\_HdgjrgBaABwAHgAgAGXA4gBui-SAQowLjE0LjYuNS4xmAEAoAEBqgEHZ3dzLXdpeg&sclient=psy-ab&ved=0ahUKEwjC44Xs\_cnpAhWRZMAKHReTBX8Q4dUDCA.

<sup>165</sup> Antwi-Boateng, "The Rise of Pan-Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge."

<sup>166</sup> Ngala Chome, *PEACEW RKS VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND CLAN DYNAMICS IN KENYA*, 2016, <http://www.academia.edu/download/50038468/PW123-Violent-Extremism-And-Clan-Dynamics-In-Kenya.pdf>.

<sup>167</sup> SS Lim et al., "Measuring the Health-Related Sustainable Development Goals in 188 Countries: A Baseline Analysis from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015," *Elsevier*, accessed April 18, 2020, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673616314672>.

<sup>168</sup> Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Horn of Africa."

<sup>169</sup> M Shamsul Haque, "Revisiting the New Public Management," *Public Administration Review* 67, no. 1 (January 2007): 179–82, [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00705\\_5.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00705_5.x).

Increases attacks have been multiplying due to unwholesome merger of multi-ethnic groups in the country <sup>170</sup>. For the last few years, Nigeria has been faced with terrorism cases which have arisen from Boko Haram attacks in various parts of the world<sup>171</sup>. Their terror attacks have been targeting areas of public gathering and more especially churches. Their activities have threatened the operations of other institutions such as media as well as universities. Boko Haram has brought social anarchy and intercepted peace and security, in turn, impacting the development of various sectors of Nigeria. Investment is vital for any country's growth and thrives in a peaceful and favourable economic condition, which has been overturned by Boko Haram activities<sup>172</sup>.

According to Olukayode, EWETAN & Urhie (2014), terrorism in Nigeria has increased over time, which sets a serious threat to lives and properties, interferes with business activities and discourages local as well as foreign investors, all which sets back Nigeria's socio-economic development<sup>173</sup>. More incidents have been witnessed as there has been an attack on the military, creating more tension in the various parts<sup>174</sup>. Due to increased insecurity, there has been a minimal investment for most capital has been diverted by investors to other parts of the world due to fear of losses and being victims of the terror attacks<sup>175</sup>. This rising trend of insecurity and terrorism has not gone down but has assumed a risky aspect which is hostile for the corporate existence of the country. The diversion of investment has resulted in low Gross Domestic Product (GDP), resulting from increasing rates of unemployment and poverty<sup>176</sup>. The government has employed various proactive measures in dealing with

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<sup>170</sup> Aly, Balbi, and Jacques, "Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society," January 2, 2015.

<sup>171</sup> B López, BRA Nagda, and A Yoder-Maina, "GROWING CONNECTION, AGENCY, AND RESILIENCE," *Globalinnovationexchange.Org*, accessed April 14, 2020, [https://www.globalinnovationexchange.org/s3\\_objs/new/uploads/1574968860-22dbd7d0f44201373b520e6489633e00/GSN-Impact-Report-2019-FINAL-for-website-orientation-null.pdf](https://www.globalinnovationexchange.org/s3_objs/new/uploads/1574968860-22dbd7d0f44201373b520e6489633e00/GSN-Impact-Report-2019-FINAL-for-website-orientation-null.pdf).

<sup>172</sup> Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Horn of Africa."

<sup>173</sup> Olukayode EWETAN and Urhie, "Journal of Sustainable Development Studies Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria."

<sup>174</sup> Olukayode EWETAN and Urhie.

<sup>175</sup> United Nations, "Civil Society Is Key to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism."

<sup>176</sup> Sheikh, "Conflict Assessment Report."

security issues and threats, but minimal success has been achieved<sup>177</sup>. The real solution lies in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with a mandate of accelerating the pace of economic development through creating an economy with relevant social, economic, then physical infrastructure to support business and industrial growth<sup>178</sup>.

Referring to Lemon & Pinet (2018), there is a compelling context for addressing the role of NGOs countering violent extremism and terrorism of not only the youths but the general population including children in Africa<sup>179</sup>. This paves the way for NGOs in Kenya and Nigeria; seeking to remedy the Violent extremists, thus promoting their full involvement in each aspect of growth and development. When Kenya and Nigeria attains preferable conditions and peace the tourism sector will gain its motion, and the socio-economic activities of the African countries will be restored thus their potential, all African families and communities will grow stronger<sup>180</sup>.

### **3.9 Implementation of Interventions by NGOs to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

Prevention has been argued to be a more effective way of dealing with issues that emerge in society in their day-to-day lives. Ideally, it curtails the occurrence of underutilized events and eliminates the need to counter the effects of such events. However, whenever prevention fails to be effective, it becomes necessary to intervene to ensure the welfare of societies is maintained<sup>181</sup>. In the context of violent extremism, NGOs in Kenya and Nigeria have put in place numerous interventions in response to the ever-increasing cases of violent extremism and terrorism within the countries. However, intervention mechanisms only make sense once

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<sup>177</sup> Comolli, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency*.

<sup>178</sup> Okoli, Science, and 2014, "Terrorism and Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram Insurgency."

<sup>179</sup> Lemon, planning, and 2018, "Measuring Unintended Effects in Peacebuilding: What the Field of International Cooperation Can Learn from Innovative Approaches Shaped by Complex Contexts."

<sup>180</sup> Roger A Shiner, "Law and Its Normativity," in *A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory: Second Edition* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 415–45, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444320114.ch28>.

<sup>181</sup> Ewi and Aning, "Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa."

they are correctly implemented<sup>182</sup>. Amongst intervention efforts to curb violent extremism is action by ACT (Act, Change, Transform). The organization implemented its program against violent extremism between 2014 and 2019, to examine the causes of radicalization and violent extremism and minimize the effectiveness of radicalization. The intervention mechanism involved increasing the capacity of select NGOs organizations to mitigate violent extremism through expanding economic opportunity, counter-messages against radicalization, terrorism and inter-faith dialogues<sup>183</sup>.

In the year 2016, UNDP also put in place a program to strengthen the society and government, to reject and act against violent extremism<sup>184</sup>. The program was implemented through the creation of awareness on violent extremism, terrorism and building community capacity to counter the same, sustainable support and reintegration of individuals that were initially perpetrators of violent extremism and the expansion of knowledge on violent extremism and terrorism<sup>185</sup>. Similarly, Search for Common Ground took part in the implementation of the INUKA! project, in collaboration with KMYA, KYBI and MUHURI, located in the coastal belt of Kenya<sup>186</sup>. The program, which was driven by the need to enhance the trust and capability of coastal communities to counter violent extremism, involved conflict scans aimed at improving the understanding of the existence and evolution of conflict and peace<sup>187</sup>.

In Nigeria various NGOs came up with an approach to Deal with increase terrorism in the north part. The main goal was to trace back the origin of terrorist group like Boko Haram.

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<sup>182</sup> Clever Madimutsa, “The Policy Formulation Process” (LUSAKA, 2008), [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336927323\\_The\\_Policy\\_Formulation\\_Process](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336927323_The_Policy_Formulation_Process).

<sup>183</sup> Port Harcourt and P M B Port Harcourt, “No Title” 5, no. 1 (2017): 1–8.

<sup>184</sup> Irene Tulel, “Strengthening Community’s Resilience Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism FINAL REPORT Implementing Partners: National Counter Terrorism Center Responsible Parties: National Cohesion and Integration Commission, University of Nairobi, Supreme Council,” 2016.

<sup>185</sup> Ingiriis, “Building Peace from the Margins in Somalia: The Case for Political Settlement with Al-Shabaab.”

<sup>186</sup> Susan Juma, Judy Kimamo, and Carlotta Fassioti, “Inuka!’: Community-Led Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Coastal Kenya Contact,” 2018, <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/KEN002-Conflict-Scan-Report-20180321.pdf>.

<sup>187</sup> Juma, Kimamo, and Fassioti.



This was geared toward recovering school children who had been abducted and various business people. The working of NGOs in Nigeria was facilitated by different approaches which were accompanied by a variety of interventions fighting against violent extremism and terrorism. In the northern Nigeria, local and NGOs have collaborated to counter conflict and ensure peaceful coexistence between various groups<sup>188</sup>.

### **3.10 Effectiveness of NGOs in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

NGOs in Kenya and Nigeria have been at the forefront in the war against violent extremism and terrorism. Numerous NGOs have repeatedly rolled out remarkable projects which have taken different approaches and orientations in order to ensure context-based intervention. Most of these programs have been marked by success, characterized by reduced instances of violent extremism and radicalization. The 2016-2017 UNDP violent extremism intervention program is an example of success in the Kenyan war against violent extremism<sup>189</sup>. Its effectiveness can be attributed to the project's multifaceted approach as well as its vast coverage. These have yielded extensive creation of awareness and improved capacity in communities in Wajir, Mandera, Kilifi, Garissa, Tana River, Kwale, Nairobi and Mombasa, to take up roles in combatting violent extremism. Specifically, community outreaches and media campaigns have made it possible to engage close to two million community members in the nine counties involved<sup>190</sup>. Moreover, the engagement of the media in the war against violent extremism was enhanced through training of media personnel to sustainably engage communities on countering violent extremism. The program also resulted in increased instances and potential for re-integration and rehabilitation of previous violent extremists, through the building of operational frameworks namely; RADAR (Risk Assessment, Decision Making and Response Tool), and SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures). The frameworks have enhanced better reintegration of returnees into society through

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<sup>188</sup> Cilliers, "Violent Islamist Extremism and Terror in Africa."

<sup>189</sup> United Nations Development Program, "PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH PROMOTING INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT, TOLERANCE AND RESPECT FOR DIVERSITY A Development Response to Addressing Radicalization and Violent Extremism."

<sup>190</sup> Tulel, "Strengthening Community's Resilience Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism FINAL REPORT Implementing Partners: National Counter Terrorism Center Responsible Parties: National Cohesion and Integration Commission, University of Nairobi, Supreme Council."

strengthening rehabilitation and integration counselling, introducing a rehabilitation curriculum, as well as supporting governmental and non-governmental players to support rehabilitated youth<sup>191</sup>.

The INUKA! Project, implemented by Search for Common Ground and its partners, also yielded phenomenal success as far as its capacity to enhance resilience against violent extremism is concerned<sup>192</sup>. The project was motivated by the confirmed divide between security agencies and communities, which resulted in the incapacity of community stakeholders to communicate their feelings and grievances. Similarly, security agencies and authorities were limited by this divide, as both parties were brought together to assess their differences and provide solutions to them. Activities between the police and the public were also organized, which built collaboration between the public and the agency<sup>193</sup>.

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<sup>191</sup> Tulel.

<sup>192</sup> Juma, Kimamo, and Fassiotti, “‘Inuka!’: Community-Led Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Coastal Kenya Contact.”

<sup>193</sup> S A Voronin, “Specific Features of Criminal Law Characteristics of Organized Crime,” *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues* 20, no. Special issue 1 (2017): 1–8, <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85041596664&partnerID=40&md5=3c48bd771c365c39264739ce626eeeb8>.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CHALLENGES FACED BY THE NGOS IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN KENYA AND NIGERIA

#### 4.1 Introduction

Traditionally, the war against violent extremism was considered military and was therefore left to security forces<sup>194</sup>. However, in time and space, the phenomenon has proved to be multi-faceted, rendering purely militaristic action null and void. This has necessitated the integration of other stakeholders to hasten CVE efforts. These include, but are not limited to Local communities, Governmental and Non-Governmental organizations and civil societies<sup>195</sup>. Essentially, NGOs, as part of civil society, have been deemed essential in countering violent extremism in Africa.

#### 4.2 Challenges Faced By the NGOS in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism

The impact of NGOs has been particularly felt in the Western and Eastern domains, which feature record levels of violent extremism<sup>196</sup>. In fact, these organizations have not only spearheaded the arrest of situations conducive for the thriving of CVE, but have also participated in the rehabilitation of perpetrators of violent extremism<sup>197</sup>. Nevertheless, for

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<sup>194</sup> (Sharland et al., 2017)

<sup>195</sup> USAID, “Stakeholder Engagement | CVE Reference Guide For,” 2020, <https://www.cverefereceguide.org/stakeholder-engagement>.

<sup>196</sup> Abah Danladi and Kofi Solomon Amoah, “The Role and Challenges of Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism in West Africa,” *Legon Journal of International Affairs and Diplomacy* 10, no. 1 (May 2019), [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341940831\\_The\\_Role\\_and\\_Challenges\\_of\\_Civil\\_Society\\_in\\_Counter\\_ing\\_Violent\\_Extremism\\_in\\_West\\_Africa](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341940831_The_Role_and_Challenges_of_Civil_Society_in_Counter_ing_Violent_Extremism_in_West_Africa).

<sup>197</sup> Bibi van Ginkel, “Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism : Experiences with the UN Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy,” *The International Centre for Counter- Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague*, 2012, 1–12.

Africa NGOs, Countering violent extremism has in sum, yielded little success resulting in the undermining of CVE efforts. Specifically, efforts to counter Violent Extremism have more often than not resulted in the discrimination and profiling of people for whom they were intended. In extreme situations, CVE efforts have even resulted in increased violent behavior<sup>198</sup>. Moreover, the experience of African NGOs in CVE, is one characterized by structural barriers, significant side-lining as well as shortfalls in communication<sup>199</sup>. These, alongside other drawbacks, have significantly deterred continued attempts to end violent extremism in the African continent.

In Nigeria, the effectiveness of civil societies in combating violent extremism has been compromised by government interference into the practice. Specifically, the activities of NGOs have been subjected to hostile restrictions under the presumption that the organizations are involved in money laundering and in the financing of terrorism<sup>200</sup>. Notably, the Nigerian government has been defamed for the formulation and enactment of anti-NGO policy directives that have reduced the capacity of the organizations to address violent extremism conclusively. These policies, which nationalize CVE efforts while regulating the acquisition and allocation of funds for VE initiatives are argued to, in the near future, result in closure of many organizations involved in CVE<sup>201</sup>.

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<sup>198</sup> National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine; Health, and Medicine Division; Board on Health Sciences Policy, *Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice, Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice* (National Academies Press, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.17226/24638>.

<sup>199</sup> (Institute For Security Studies, 2019)

<sup>200</sup> Danladi and Amoah, “The Role and Challenges of Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism in West Africa.”

<sup>201</sup> Danladi and Amoah.

Essentially, the war against violent extremism is an expensive venture, requiring constant financial remission and the establishment of cautionary financial and general resource pools<sup>202</sup>. However, in Nigeria, financial cutbacks have significantly limited the effectiveness of CVE efforts by NGOs therein. NGOs and other civil societies largely depend on external donors for financial and other resources. These donors are usually specific about the use of their money, limiting the creative capacity of NGOs to come up with innovative and contextual CVE approaches<sup>203</sup>. This has called for the possible, yet time consuming of the reconciliation of civil societies and the private sector, as the latter features a rich resource base which, if tapped, would ease CVE efforts.

Kenyan NGOs, like their Nigerian counterparts, have not been spared from drawbacks concomitant with the complexity and sensitivity of CVE. Following the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi in the year 2013, the Kenyan government embarked on a national strategy on countering violent extremism which was rolled out in the year 2016<sup>204</sup>. In spirit, the policy resultant policy directives appeared promising as it emphasized partnership between government and non-government agencies alongside strict monitoring and evaluation. However, in the formulation of the strategy, important stakeholders including NGOs and local communities were side-lined. The exclusion of the public, though subtle, has been argued to foster non-acceptance of its provisions among communities affected by violent extremism. Additionally, the formulation of the policy considered neither gendered intervention nor existing mistrust between the general public and law enforcement agencies.

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<sup>202</sup> (RUSHI, 2016)

<sup>203</sup> Danladi and Amoah, “The Role and Challenges of Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism in West Africa.”

<sup>204</sup> Ogada, “Emerging Developments in Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism in Kenya.”

As a result, NGOs have experienced difficulties in implementing CVE programs which are sensitive and therefore require co-operation of communities alongside sustainable relationship between law enforcement agencies and the citizenry<sup>205</sup>.

Violent extremism is a complex phenomenon which has over time, proved elusive to define. Therefore, the formulation of policy directives and monitoring and evaluation guidelines has presented problems to NGOs in the Kenyan domain<sup>206</sup>. This has been the case despite the integral role of monitoring and evaluation in the determination of the success, or lack thereof, of programs directed towards eradication or management of CVE<sup>207</sup>. The complex nature of violent extremism and CVE practice has therefore necessitated development of comprehensive monitoring and evaluation frameworks, which owing to financial and administrative constraints, is not manageable by Kenyan NGOs.

Moreover, attempts by Kenyan NGOs to end violent extremism have also been deterred by limited funding which have resulted in the non-effectiveness of CVE programs. Many NGOs in Kenya rely on donors for financial support<sup>208</sup>. The success of CVE programs lay in their intensity and sustainability, which ensure that results are not short-term, but that they yield order for long periods. This however, depends upon resource availability. The lack of

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<sup>205</sup> Ogada.

<sup>206</sup> Ogada.

<sup>207</sup> (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016)

<sup>208</sup> Princeton University, "Preventing Violent Extremism: Lessons from Kenya by Princeton School of Public and International Affairs - Issue," June 2020, [https://issuu.com/woodrowwilsonschool/docs/preventing\\_violent\\_extremism](https://issuu.com/woodrowwilsonschool/docs/preventing_violent_extremism).

resources therefore, has confined Kenyan NGOs to short CVE eradication programs that have only yielded short term results<sup>209</sup>.

The reduction in violent extremism its eradication all the same, is dependent upon consideration of its innermost characteristics and the involvement of all stakeholders, including the government, local communities, security forces, youth, civil societies and even donors. CVE approaches which integrate the interests of all these stakeholders, while providing a suitable environment for the de-radicalization and re-integration of recruits into society, would undoubtedly catapult CVE efforts in a timely and sustainable manner. Many challenges have been identified in the attempts to develop and integrate such approaches to CVE. These challenges, which range from shortfalls in policy development to limitations in structural organization and resource constraints, have significantly undermined the capability of NGOs to conclusively address violent extremism. Nevertheless, it would be perilous to disregard and fail to take advantage of distinct opportunities which, if properly utilized would strengthen anti-violent extremism initiatives.

Arguably, the success of CVE depends upon the integration of the youth into its ranks. Notably, the youthful population has proved to be highly susceptible to radicalization and violent extremism<sup>210</sup>. Moreover, the youth are relatively marginalized in terms of decision making, policy formulation and involvement in CVE programs. However, in society, the youth are the most grounded in the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism<sup>211</sup>.

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<sup>209</sup> Princeton University.

<sup>210</sup> (Sommers, 2019)

<sup>211</sup> SfCG, “Working Together to Address Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Youth-Government Partnerships,” *Search for Common Ground*, 2016, 5–30, [https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/YouthGovtCVE\\_StrategyDocument\\_122116.pdf](https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/YouthGovtCVE_StrategyDocument_122116.pdf).

Moreover, the youth are aware of the channels through which recruitment into violent extremism is perpetrated. The integration of youth by NGOs into all phases of CVE programs is therefore fundamental to the success of these programs. In Kenya for example, the Garissa Youth Program by USAID registered successful engagement of Somali youth in aspects of skill development and civic engagement. The success of this program however, is attributed to the inclusion of youth in implementation. Similarly, in Nigeria, the inclusion of youth into strategizing against violent extremism has yielded notable benefit, qualified by reduced violent sentiments. Programs such as the Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Program and the Peace Initiative Network have fostered community resilience while informing anti-CVE policy directives.

The development and sustenance of trust among the government, civil societies and local communities has also presented opportunity for the success of CVE for Kenyan and Nigerian NGOs. The reconciling of these stakeholders has traditionally been ignored, resulting in the non-effectiveness of CVE programs and policy directives<sup>212</sup>. Nevertheless, in Nigeria, the strengthening of multi-sectoral relationships and the introduction of civil security relations for trust and confidence is hypothesized to in the long-run, yield sustainable results<sup>213</sup>. In the Kenyan domain, the engagement of all stakeholders in CVE has presented a promising opportunity for the success of CVE, specifically, the engagement of the government and local communities has been considered integral to the success of CVE programs. The INUKA! Project in the Kenyan coast, funded and coordinated by SFCG in collaboration with established and grass root NGOs has presented significant success in the Kenyan war against

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<sup>212</sup> Ogada, “Emerging Developments in Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism in Kenya.”

<sup>213</sup> (World Leadership Alliance, 2017)



CVE. Notably, the program's success has been attributed to its tendency to incorporate the ideas and preferences of local communities, while adhering to government directives<sup>214</sup>.

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<sup>214</sup> (SFCG), 2021)

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION**

#### **5.1 Introduction**


This chapter presents and analyses data collected during the research period. The data is collected from 30 respondents Kenya and 30 respondents from Nigeria totalling to 60 respondents. The research employed mixed method approach, using both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. Quantitative data was obtained through semi-structured questionnaire and qualitative data was obtained by interviewing key informants. The data collected in the research was obtained from urban part of the northern Nigeria where more incidents of terrorist attacks have been experience such as Borno, jos, Kano city, Mubi, Yobe and Bauchi States ; whereas in Kenya, respondents were obtained from different counties with high number of violent extremism and terrorist attacks such as Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Kilifi, Garisa, Isiolo, Marsabit, Kwale and Tana river most focusing on leaders of varied NGOs working in those areas. Kenyan and Nigerian embassy staffs were also interviewed who formed the key informants of the study. Data collected is analysed using IMB's SPSS version 23.0

#### **5.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents**

This sub-section provides a summary of the demographic characteristics of the respondents that formed part of the study in the two countries. The demographic characterises in this study-included: gender, marital status, age, level of education and religious education.

##### **5.2.1 Gender of the respondents**

Apart from differentiation of the sample by country of residence, the criterion of gender is also used. The idea behind the categorization is to ensure the views of males and females were included in the study. Accordingly, Figure 5.1 captures the number of respondents by gender.




**Figure 5.1: Distribution of respondents by gender**

Findings in Figure 5.1 shows that (57%) of the respondents were female while the rest 43% were male. The gender representation was adequate in research and met the Kenyan Constitution (2010) threshold where not more than two thirds should be of one gender.

### **5.2.2 Marital status**

Families often form the primary unit of socialization, which largely forms the bedrock of behaviour adoption. Violent extremism and terrorism is understood as a behaviour that is pursued greatly depending on the family ties and responsibility that such members shoulder. In this light, it is significant to acknowledge that terrorism affects both men and women; and is often experienced across different marital standings. The study findings is presented in Figure 5.2.




**Figure 5.2: Marital status of the respondents**

Figure 5.2 with regard to marital status reveals that, more than two-fifths (44%) of the peace respondents were married, another over two-fifths (44%) were single, while the other 8% and 4% were either divorced or widowed respectively. The over half (56%) being in marital union is a positive finding bearing in mind that these non-state actors who need some experience in conflict resolution and management and also some trust in their work borne out of the integrity and respect they enjoy being in marital unions. More importantly, being in a union represents the responsibility borne to the non-state actors in countering violent extremism and terrorism for peaceful coexistence in the community.

### **5.2.3 Age distribution of respondents**

The study is designed to oscillate between Kenya and Nigeria in order to understand the dynamics of violent extremism and terrorism in the selected areas. In this regard, age becomes an important variable, as views of the population with regard to social life vary with age; more so, in African communities where individuals' age has implication for participation in social activities, especially with regard to leadership and decision-making. Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the respondents' by age.




**Figure 5.3: Distribution of Age among the respondents**

Results in Figure 5.3 reveal interesting findings with regard to the age of non-state actors in the study site with over half (53.3%) being below 30 years, which qualify as youth in the Kenyan context. While this was a surprise finding, youthful non-state actors may be relevant in mitigating youth involvement in terrorist and VE groups bearing in mind that it’s the youth who are more at risk of recruitment. In fact, the youthfulness of non-state actors may be an asset in facilitating peer-peer interventions aimed at countering and preventing multiplications of terrorist and VE groups in the regions.

#### **5.2.4 Level of education of respondents**

Education is an important aspect of human development, especially with regard to understanding socio-economic development of societies. Accordingly, the level of education of an individual may have significant implication in the understanding of interfaith, intercultural and intergenerational relations among diverse groupings in society, hence mitigating terrorism and violent extremism<sup>222</sup>, as presented in Figure 5.4.




**Figure 5.4: Level of education of Non-state actors**

In Figure 5.4 statistics shows that over one third (33.2%) of the non-state actors had attained either secondary, 14.2% had religious educations, 17.2% had attained diploma or certificate education, 21.2% had bachelor’s degree while 14.2% had master’s degree. The majority (52.5%) with certificate/diploma and above level of education presents an opportunity for peer-peer interventions by ensuring capacity building on the non-state actors to engage with their peers in VE groups and prevent them from transiting into terrorist.

### **5.2.5 Religious affiliation of respondents**

Religion is a critical variable that influence the way perceives social life as members of the community. This is because; each religion harbours different values and believes with points of convergence and divergence. This diversity is key in understanding the dynamics of radicalization, terrorism and recruitment into VE groups<sup>225</sup> as presented in Figure 5.5.



**Figure 5.5: Religious affiliation of respondents**

Figure 5.5 shows that four-fifths (80%) of the non-state actors were Muslims, with Christians making up the rest (20%). The high (80%) number of Muslim non-state actors is not a surprise to this study as the coast region residents are predominantly Muslims. However, since most of the young people involved in Violent extremist and terrorist groups are Muslims, the high (80%) number of Muslim non-state actors is critical in intra-faith dialogues.

### **5.3 Factors influencing Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

The topic of terrorism and recruitment into VE has dominated the security sector in Africa for more than a decade now. Understanding the level of knowledge with regard to this topic may hold the key to successful interventions. The following sub-sections provide some information from the respondents' with regard to this theme.

#### **5.3.1 Awareness and Knowledge of Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

Kenya and Nigeria are affected by terrorism through recruitment and radicalization into Violent Extremist Groups (VEGs); hence, the study seeks to determine respondents' knowledge on the subject that is critical in countering violent extremism and terrorism; as below tabulated in Table 5.1.

**Table 5.1: Awareness of Violent extremism and Terrorism**

<b>Description</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Violent Extremism (VE)?	90.3%	9.7%
Terrorism	85.4%	14.6%
Recruitment into Violent Extremism and terrorist groups (VE&TGs)?	63.8%	36.2%

In Table 5.1: 85.4% of respondents, know something about terrorism, whereas 14.6% did not. 85.4% knowledge on terrorism among respondents is an opportunity for NGOs and other non-state actors to push forward interventions to mitigate recruitment into terrorist groups and Violent Extremists’ groups.

Table 5.1 also carries the picture of over four fifths (90.3%) of the respondents reporting that they knew something about VE. This was not a surprise because cases of VE, either by criminal gangs or VEGs, have become so rampant that VE has become a household topic in the study area as evidenced further by less than one tenth (9.7%) of the respondents who answered to the contrary. The high (90.3%) knowledge on VE among respondents is argue for NGOs to initiate activities to P/CVE.

Finally, Table 5.1 also reveals that over three fifths (63.8%) of the respondents know about recruitment into Violent Extremism and Terrorist Groups (VE&TGs), whereas 36.2% were not, showing that terrorism and violent extremism is prevails in Kenya and Nigeria. The study findings mirror violence in the region as epitomized by the mushrooming of criminal gangs, in addition to the traditional conflicts, radicalization and recruitment into VE&TGs. This concurs with Shauri 2018<sup>215</sup> study on Perception of the police and the youth in enhancing the community-police relations in Kilifi County, Coastal and Shauri *et, al.* (2020)<sup>216</sup> who alluded that VE and terrorist groups have been growing overtime which has been attributed by the socio-economic factors prevailing in the coastal region of Kenyan.

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<sup>215</sup> Shauri, “PERCEPTION OF THE POLICE AND THE YOUTH IN ENHANCING COMMUNITY-COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATION IN KILIFI COUNTY , COASTAL.”

<sup>216</sup> Shauri, Mutubwa, and Mwaka Musa, “Perception of Peace Actors on the Nexus between Criminal Gangs and Violent Extremism in the Coast of Kenya.”



### 5.3.2 Awareness of Violent extremist and terrorist groups

Knowledge about VE does not speak much of what is known about the problem, but understanding its manifestations and specific VE and terrorist groups, shades more light into shaping successful interventions. In this regard, the study sought to establish respondents' knowledge of VE and terrorist in their area as presented in Figure 5.6 below




Figure 5.6: Awareness of Violent extremism and terrorism groups in the region

The survey findings in Figure 5.6 shows that 68% are aware of varied terrorist and violent extremism groups within their area; whereas 23% are not aware of them and 9% are not sure whether they could refer them as terrorist groups or just movements. The study reveals that communities are aware of varied terrorists and violent extremism existence within them; such as *Wakali Kwanza, Wakali Wao, Wanjukuu wa Bibi, Watalia* and *Al-Shabaab*. These groups have emerged from different criminal gangs and violent extremist groups such *Wakali Kwanza, Wakali Wao, Wanjukuu wa Bibi, Watalia, Wajukuu wa Mtume, Kapenguria Six, Wajukuu wa Babu, and Funga File* observing that they are: *VE groups are actually training on how to fight other groups and execute their terrorist activities....they have gone further to fix machete matches between rival groups, which are fought on chosen open community grounds.*

A key informant reported that there: *....are cases of robbery with violence and innocent people being killed using machetes and others stabbed with knives and bicycle spokes in*

*different areas of the town. Other VE groups are emerging to revenge when a member of their group has being killed by others or security officer.*

In Nigeria, Boko Haram and Nigeria Movements are the main extremist terror groups. This finding concurs with <sup>217</sup><sup>218</sup>studies that reveal, violent extremism, terrorism has evolved over years, and the operation of these groups is a threat to global security. They add that the terrorist groups have grown over time and this has resulted to more panic in the society. The emergency of criminal gangs that transition to VE groups, later to terrorist group is not linear and the fight among different terrorist groups has influenced different economies<sup>218</sup>.

#### 5.4 Causes of joining violent extremist and terrorist groups

**Table 5.2: Causes of Violent extremism and Terrorism**

Causes of Violent Extremism and terrorism	Yes	No
High levels of unemployment	96.7	3.3
Inter-ethnic tension	63.3	36.7
Inter-religious tension	80	20
Land disputes	56.7	43.3
Political incitements	90	10
Youth's use of drugs	63.3	36.7
Radicalization at religious centres	83.1	16.7
Bad governance	83.3	16.7
External factors such as joint war against terror, foreign military deployment and the influence of terrorist organizations abroad	73.3	26.7

Table 5.2 shows that's 96.7% of the respondents agree that the high level of unemployment is the main cause of violent extremism and terrorism, as is recruitment to the VE&TGs in different Kenya and Nigeria whereas 3.3% do not. This finding aligns to the study by Bush *et*

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<sup>217</sup> Mustapha, in, and 2019, "Humanitarian Agencies, Counter-Terrorism, and Counter-Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin."

<sup>218</sup> Antwi-Boateng, "The Rise of Pan-Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge."

*al.* (2013) <sup>219</sup> who eluded that lack of socio-economic and livelihood activities resulted to increased recruitment of community members to VE and terrorist groups for the provision of family basic needs.

Further, Table 5.2 shows 63.3% of the respondents allude that ethnic differentials and tension among different ethnic groups cause violent extremism and terrorism whereas 36.7% do not agree to ethnic tension among various groups in Kenya and Nigeria resulting in violent extremism and terrorism.

Additionally, 80% agree that inter-religious tensions among different communities contribute to violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria; more so, recruitment to VE&TGs to revenge against other religions and this has widened the gap between different religions while , 20% incline to it not contributing to violent extremism and terrorism in both countries as shown in table 5.2. This finding concurs with that of Antwi-Boateng (2017)<sup>220</sup> who argued that the differential religious affiliation has resulted to interreligious tension, which result to conflict thereof fights among different religions.

Moreover, 56.7% of the respondents in table 5.2 reported that land disputes causes violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria whereas 43.3% do not concur with it.

Furthermore, 90% of the respondents said that political incitements to the community members and paying youths to cause riots was cause of violent extremism and terrorism while 10% said that political incitements was not a cause of violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria.

In Addition, Table 5.2 reveals 63.3% of the respondents viewed youth's use of drugs as a cause of violent extremism and terrorism while 36.7% deny its contribution to violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria. This finding concurs with sheiks (2016)

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<sup>219</sup> Bush et al., "A New Understanding About the InStitute MeMbers Ex OfficiO," 2013.

<sup>220</sup> Antwi-Boateng, "The Rise of Pan-Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge."

<sup>221</sup>who observed that peer pressure, drug addiction among the youths has become one of the greatest challenges, and it becomes easy to radicalize the youth’s drug addicts to VE&TGs.

The study further revealed that over four fifths (83.1%) of the respondents reported that radicalization at religious centres by religious leaders and other influential members of religion was major cause of violent extremism and terrorism while 16.7% said radicalization in religious centres was not a contributor to increased cases of terrorism. The finding concurs with sheik (2016)<sup>222</sup> study that revealed radicalization at religious centres and mosques by Imam in Garissa resulted to more terrorism in the area.

83.3% of the respondents viewed bad governance as a cause of violence and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria, whereas 16.7% do not agree so. This finding concurs with Uzodike and Maiangw (2018) <sup>223</sup> study that established that bad governance contributed to violent extremism and terrorism in Nigeria.

Finally, 73.3% of the respondents reported that external factors such as joint war against terror, foreign military deployment and the influence of terrorist organizations abroad result to more violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria, whereas 26.7% do not agree to it.

## 5.5 Interventions used by NGOs to counter VE and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria

**Table 5.3: Interventions used by NGOs to counter VE and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Informal conversations in the community	16.7	40	6.7	20	16.7
Formal meetings with community leaders	20	33.3	10	13.3	23.3

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<sup>221</sup> Sheikh, “Conflict Assessment Report.”

<sup>222</sup> Sheikh.

<sup>223</sup> Uzodike and Maiangwa, “Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Causal Factors and Central Problematic.”

or members					
Training sessions for community members	16.7	36.7	10	20	16.7
Advocacy campaigns	26.7	26.7	10	13.3	23.3
Discussions in schools	30	16.7	13.3	23.3	16.7
Sports activities	23.3	26.7	13.3	20	16.7
Mentorship programs in schools	16.7	13.3	23.3	20	20
Role playing/community theatres	16.7	20	13.3	30	20
There are no activities on this topic taking place	3.3	6.7	6.7	30	53.3

Findings in Table 3 show 56.7% of the respondents agreed that NGOs use informal conversations in the communities in addressing violent extremism and terrorism in the community, with 16.7% having strongly agreed whereas 36.7% disagreed to NGOs using informal conversion with communities to address terrorism; 16.7% strongly disagree.

Further, 53.3% of the respondents agree that NGOs use formal meetings with community leaders or members to address violent extremism and terrorism; 20% strongly agree while 36.6% disagree: 23.3% strongly disagree and 13.3% disagree that NGOs use formal meetings with community leaders or members to address violent extremism and terrorism. This concurs with UNDP (2018) <sup>224</sup> study that established that informing authorities on various activities formalized the meeting held with community leaders and members, which facilitated the dialogues as well acceptance of the activities conducted in countering violent extremism and terrorism.

Moreover, 53.4% agree that NGOs use training sessions for community members to create awareness about terrorism and countering violent extremism, while 36.7% disagree that NGOs use training sessions to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The findings concurs

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<sup>224</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism Report of the United Nations Development Programme Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism, ‘Oslo II’,” no. May (2018).

with Aldrich (2019)<sup>225</sup> findings which revealed that through training there awareness creation on signs of violent extremism and terrorism in the community which in return helps in identifying youths and community members at risk of being recruited to VE&TGs.

Further, in table 3, the study shows 53.4% of the respondents agree that NGOs employed advocacy campaigns to sensitize the community as well as address violent extremism and terrorism with 26.7% strongly agreeing, while 36.6% disagree: 23.3% strongly disagree that NGOs use advocacy campaigns to sensitize the community as well as address violent extremism and terrorism.

In addition, 46.7% agree that NGOs visit various schools within their locality and have discussions in schools with students on peace building in order to prevent and counter terrorism. 30%, who strongly agree, 30% disagree: 16.7% strongly disagreed that NGOs visit various schools within their locality and have discussions in schools with students on peace building in order to prevent and counter terrorism.

Findings in Table 3 shows 50% of the respondents agree that NGOs use Sports activities to involve community members in preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism in the community. 23.3%, who strongly agree; while 36.7% disagree: 16.7% strongly disagreed that NGOs use Sports activities to involve community members in preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism in the community.

Findings in Table 3 shows that 30%) of the respondents agreed that NGOs use mentorship programs in schools as an intervention in countering terrorism and violent extremism. 16.7% strongly agreed that NGOs use mentorship programs in schools as an intervention in countering terrorism and violent extremism. 40% of the respondents disagree. 20% strongly disagreed that NGOs use mentorship programs in schools as an intervention in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

36.7% agree that NGO use role-playing/community theatres as an intervention to counter violent extremism and terrorism. 16.7% strongly agree, 50% disagree: 20% strongly

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<sup>225</sup> Aldrich, "First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds? USAID's Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa."

disagreed agreed that NGO use role-playing/community theatres as an intervention to counter violent extremism and terrorism.


83.3% of the respondents reveal that NGOs employ a combination of intervention in addressing violent extremism and terrorism whereas, 10% reveal that there were no activities on terrorism and violent extremism taking place in the community. The finding concurs with Aly *et, al.* (2015)<sup>226</sup> which revealed that the drivers of violent extremism and terrorism could not be dealt by one intervention rather a combination of varied mechanism to ensure inclusivity of all stakeholders for the effective prevention and countering of violent extremism and terrorism.

## **5.6 Constructiveness of interventions used by NGOs in countering Violent and terrorism**

To understand the role of NGOs to counter violent extremism and terrorism, it is vital to explore the impact of different interventions by NGOS to counter terrorism. In this regard, using a scale of: 4-very valuable, 3-valuable, 2- fairly valuable and 1- not valuable; as captured in Table 4; whereby, respondents are asked to rate different activities that contribute in vulnerability to Violent Extremism and terrorism.

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<sup>226</sup> Aly, Balbi, and Jacques, "Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society," January 2, 2015.



**Figure 5.7: effectiveness of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism**

Findings in Figure 5.7 show that, 10% of the respondents reported that NGOs were very valuable in countering violent extremism and terrorism, 30% reported that they were effective, 43.3% reported that they were fairly valuable while 16.7% reported that GOs were not valuable in countering violent extremism and terrorism in the areas. Consequently, 40% of the respondents reported that the effectiveness of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism enhancing by their understanding and awareness of various groups operating in the society. Moreover, the employment of varied interventions is possible by government support and collaborations in various initiatives. This finding concurs with UN (2018) findings<sup>227</sup>, which established that the counterterrorism intervention in Africa had attained milestone in the effort to prevent and counter violent extremism and insecurity.


### **5.6.2 Awareness of other NGOs Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

Given the fact that 40% of the respondents’ reported that NGOs were effective in countering violent extremism and terrorism, it was prudent to find out more if study participants knew other counterterrorism organization in their area. Nevertheless, knowledge of other NGOS countering VE and terrorism as bellow in Figure 5.8.

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<sup>227</sup> United Nations, “Civil Society Is Key to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.”





**Figure 5.8: Knowledge of other Counterterrorist organizations**

From the study findings in Figure 5.8 it was evident that 97% of the counter terrorist organization knew of other NGOs countering violent extremism and terrorism within their areas while 3% didn't know other counterterrorist organization within their working areas. In Kenya they include: Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA), Likoni Community Development Programmes (LICODEP), Muslim for Human Rights MUHURI), HAKI Africa, HURIA, Mombasa Human Rights , Amnesty International Kenya, Kenya National Commission On Human Rights, Muslim for human rights, Safer worlds, USAID, Oxfam, Ant-terror, GNRC, Red cross, ICPJ , International Crisis Group, United Nations (UN), Centre for the Promotion of Democratic Governance, Isiolo peace link, Lamu peace organization, NOSWUD, Search for Common Ground (SFCG). In Nigeria, they include: Peace initiative network, Nigerian Stability and reconciliation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Council of Imams and Preachers of Nigeria (CIPN) and the Northern Nigeria Interfaith Council of Clerics (NNICC). The counterterrorist groups work together to countering violent extremism and terrorism

## **5.7 Challenges facing NGOs in countering violent extremism**

NGOs face varied challenges in their effort to counter violent extremism and terrorism in varied areas<sup>228</sup> owing to diversity in languages of communication. In this regard, there arises language barrier, which hinders proper communication between them and their targeted audience. They also do not have local support or community members are reluctant to identify perpetrators of violent extremism and terrorism, which complicates NGOs efforts in countering and preventing violent extremism and in most cases not welcomed and supported by the society.

Operating NGOs requires labour or work force, which ascertains to financial input from different stakeholders. When NGOs face a financial constraint, it limits their capabilities to function in different areas<sup>229</sup>. The understanding of violent extremist groups requires engaging the communities and going deeper into grass root areas; which require different equipment. Insufficient funding derails this purpose and so are personnel involved, who also require basic needs, whether, in voluntary or involuntary case studies to reach out to wider coverage and lack of enough resources in terms of personnel, information and so on.

Violent extremism and terrorism are critical topics to deal within communities. During different undertakings by NGOs, there is exposure to risk of attacks, including a risk to their lives. In other cases, when the leaders discover they are exposed, they resort to bribes to avoid exposure and it compromises on professionalism.

In order to engage community leaders or community members, there is need for authorization from the government officials of the state. At times, lack of authorization, which hinders their working. Sometimes they authority is given with many limitations and sanctions, which interferes with sensitization, and it may result to unpreparedness and inadequate recognition and participation in state- led initiatives and policymaking.

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<sup>228</sup> Ewi and Aning, “Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa.”

<sup>229</sup> Antwi-Boateng, “The Rise of Pan-Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge.”

Sometimes lack of harmonious relationship with the state their limits their activities. From a government perspective, NGOs gain more trust from the community, which threaten the survival of the politicians. Sometimes their activities can alter political ambitions and this contributes to mistrust especially, when sensitization occurs, that may result to violence in the community, as leaders feel threatened.

Different donors fund NGOs operating in different communities<sup>230</sup> and corruption or mismanagement of funds may lead to withholding or withdrawal of funding. Lack of funding slows down work and may expose them to further complications.

For various interventions, there is need for synergy between the government and non-state actors<sup>231</sup> to counter violent extremism and terrorism. In addition, there is need for specific laws and rules, plans, special offices and special programmes to deal with matters pertaining terrorisms and insecurity. When there is no good corporation between the state and non-state actors in the development and implementation process of intervention, countering terrorism and violence become theoretical rather than practical.

In cases where retaliation from other organizations that believe in taking the law into their own hands through violence due to bad governance and lack of a just system occurs, the issue of safety prevails while in the process of working towards eradicating violent extremism and terrorism.

## **5.8 Opportunities present for Non-Governmental Organizations in countering violent extremism**

NGOs have a wide network that provides alternative activities to the community and provide socially sustainable models for countering violent extremism. Therefore, they are important in resolving underlying grievances and push factors that make the young vulnerable to

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<sup>230</sup> Aly, Balbi, and Jacques, “Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society,” January 2015.

<sup>231</sup> Kristina Coop Gordon, Donald H. Baucom, and Douglas K. Snyder, “An Integrative Intervention for Promoting Recovery from Extramarital Affairs,” *Journal of Marital and Family Therapy* 30, no. 2 (2004): 213–31, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-0606.2004.tb01235.x>.

extremist influence. Furthermore, they act as important agents in interreligious conversations and integrating reformed people back to the community<sup>232</sup>.

NGOS need to build trust between community and state. This is by ensuring collaborative working and creating platforms that involve all stakeholders in society. The fight against terrorism and insecurity in our society will not be resolved by a single entity hence, need for non-state actors to work with other organizations.

Better engagement with state actors in order to maximize on various advantages enjoyed across the divide. Working with the government and other NGOs will reduce the chances of duplications and reaching grassroots. More so, there is need for brand visibility when doing adverts, going into schools and teaching them Morals to spread the word through awareness creation and understanding areas to focus and activities to involve the youths, therefore, empowering youth with skills to create self-employment.

There is need for NGOs to conduct community mobilization in joint efforts to curb terrorism through civic education and joint strategies with other forces. In other cases, there is need for public participation and community dialogues to discuss matters arising in the community. More importantly collaborating with local administration to reach out to youth at location and sub-location levels for they understand the society better.

There is need to provide innovative and efficient ways to help provide a sense of self-independence and belonging by providing various activities and income generating opportunities to the community members, for example creation of job opportunities or support in starting small and medium sized enterprises.

NGOs can serve to integrate reformed members of society back into the community through rehabilitation while working at minimizing their victimization. Moreover, the families

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<sup>232</sup> AI Ajayi - religion and undefined 1990, “‘Boko Haram’and Terrorism in Nigeria: Exploratory and Explanatory Notes,” *Augustusconsulting.Co.Za*, accessed June 15, 2020, <http://augustusconsulting.co.za/bhubhuzz/uploads/2015/01/Boko-Haram-and-Terrorism-in-Nigeria-by-Ajayi.pdf>.

affected by terrorist attack to be emotionally and morally supported through counselling and financial supports do deal with their loss. Most victims undergo trauma, which affects their capability to work in the community and provision of livelihood for themselves.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed summary of the study in an outlined brief of findings from this study in relation to the research objectives of the study. Furthermore, the chapter provide conclusion concerning the findings and provides recommendation on areas for improvement.

#### 6.2 Summary of the research findings

The main aim of the study was to assess the role of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa using Kenya and Nigeria as case study. The demographic findings showed that 57% of the non-state actors interviewed were male and 43% female. 56% were married and 44% not married. The findings also show that 53.3% of the non-state actors were below 30 years of age, also known as youth who serve in the fight against violent extremism in Kenya and Nigeria.

52.5% of the respondents had attained certificate/diploma and above level of education. This presents an opportunity for peer-to-peer interventions by ensuring capacity building on the non-state actors to engage themselves in Violent Extremist groups. 80% of the non-state actors were of Islamic religion and 20% from other interfaith religions. 90.3% of the non-state actors know something about Violent Extremism, whereas 63.8% had information on different areas where recruitment into Violent Extremism and Terrorist Groups occurs; which is a mirror of the growing tendency towards violence as epitomized by the mushrooming of criminal gangs in addition to the traditional conflicts, radicalization and recruitment into VE&TGs.

The study findings in Figure 5.6 showed that 68% of the non-state actors had knowledge on different terrorist and violent extremism groups within their area. They added that high level of unemployment among youths contributed the increased number of violent and terrorist acts. Further, 63.3% reported that ethnic differentials and tension among different ethnic groups caused violent extremism and terrorism, 80% reported that tensions among different

contributed to violent extremism and terrorism and 56.7% of the indicated that land disputes was a cause of violent extremism and terrorism in a Kenya and Nigeria.

90% of respondents agree that political incitements, bribes (*Toa Kitu Kidogo*) to the community members, especially the youth to riot further fuels violent extremism and terrorism. 63.3% viewed youth's use of drugs as a source of joining violent extremist and terrorist groups and 83.1% added that radicalization at religious centres by religious leaders and other influential members of religion is major cause of increased violent extremism and terrorism activities. 83.3% argued that bad governance led to violence and terrorism and to recruitment to violent VE&TGs in Kenya and Nigeria.

Findings in Table 5.3 reveal that varied interventions by NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism such as; use of informal conversations in the community, use formal meetings with community leaders and members, training sessions for community members to create awareness and advocacy campaigns to sensitize the community. apart from that, by visiting various schools within their locality and teaching students on peace building in order to counter terrorism and also sports activities, mentorship programs and role-playing/community theatres. These interventions are not used separately but in combination in order to incorporate all stakeholder and for effective countering of violent extremism and terrorism.

The study further reveals that NGOs face different challenges ranging from financial constraints, lack of support from state officers, threat of attacks by VE groups, corruption, and misconception as well as lack of corporations from community. These challenges can be resolved through collaborative relation with all stakeholders in their activities. More importantly, there was need for transparency in their goals and activities in the society to avoid misunderstanding and mistrust from the government and communities.

## **6.2 Conclusion**

In summary of the study finding, we deduce that involvement of both genders could make positive impacts in countering violent extremism and terrorist in Kenya and Nigeria. More importantly, socialization of youths and community within the family and other agents of learning are of importance towards peace and security in the society, which is critical in countering violent extremism and terrorism. Actually, non-state actors are an asset in facilitating peer-to-peer interventions aimed at countering and preventing multiplications of terrorist and VE groups in different regions.

Additionally, the increased cases of recruitment to violent extremist groups and incidents of terrorism was contributed by high levels of unemployment, inter-ethnic tension, inter-religious tension, land disputes, political incitements, youth's use of drugs, radicalization at religious centres, bad governance and other external factors such as joint war against terror, foreign military deployment and the influence of terrorist organizations abroad.

For the success of NGOs in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria, it's critical to employ a combination of informal conversations in the community, have formal meetings with community leaders or members. Provide training sessions for community members through advocacy campaigns, discussions in schools, sports and tournaments between communities, mentorship programs in schools and role playing/community theatres to demonstrates the effects of terrorism and importance of peace and security in the community.

Finally, the varied challenges faced by NGOs in the effort to counter violent extremism and terrorism could be resolved by ensuring transparency and accountability in their activities. It was crucial to create good rapport with the state and communities they work to ensure trust and minimize misunderstanding.

## **6.4 Recommendations**

Based on the research findings the study, the following recommendations are made:

- i. The NGOs countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria need to work closely with other organization as well as the government authorities in



exploring alternative restorative justice in preventing terrorism and violent extremism in different nations.

- ii. There is a need to expand the existing collaborations between the state and non-state actors to ensure inclusive formulation and implementations of strategies to deal with violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Nigeria.
- iii. Government in collaborations with NGOs need to develop policies, laws, special offices and special programmes or action plans that will specifically deal with matters of violent extremism and terrorism in order to counter VE&TGs activities for peaceful coexistence and security in Kenya and Nigeria.
- iv. The NGOs in partnership with government should find ways to endow understanding of the dynamics and socialization in radicalization and terrorism and pay attention to the studies' findings.

### **6.5 Recommendation for further research**

There is need for further research to comprehend the link between criminal gangs and terrorism. This would form a basis for understanding the transition from criminal gangs to terrorist groups.

There are limited studies that have empirically explored the role of women led NGOs as counterterrorist actors. Such research will enhance the understanding of the gender dimensions in counter terrorism as well as how women as non-State actors are of importance in countering violent extremism in Kenya and Nigeria.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix i: Budget

S/NO	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QTY COST	TOTAL AMOUNT
1	HP Laptop	1	45,000
2	Printing papers	10Rms @500	5,000
3	Typing and photocopy services		10,000
4	Transport and lunch for research	4 for 4 days @2,500	40,000
5	SPSS Program for data analysis	10,000	10,000
6	Airtime and biro pens		4,000
7	Miscellaneous	8,000	8,000
	<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>122,000</b>

**Appendix ii: Questionnaire**

1. Gender Male [ ] Female [ ]
2. What is your age? \_\_\_\_\_ Years
3. Name of your organization? \_\_\_\_\_
4. What is your area of specialization? \_\_\_\_\_
5. What is your period of experience in the organization? \_\_\_\_\_ Years
6. In which county do you operate?

**SECTION B: CAUSES/DRIVERS OF TERRORISM IN KENYA**

7. What are the biggest challenges of violence and insecurity in your county?  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....

8. (a) In which activities do non-state actors engage in to prevent/transform violent extremism in your county?

.....  
 .....  
 .....

What do you think are the drivers of terrorism?

.....  
 .....  
 .....

9.  
 10. Tick your opinion on the following:

Statement	yes	No
Poor socio-economic conditions such as low income, unemployment, illiteracy and marginalization influence Terrorism.		
Bad governance influences Terrorism.		
Religious fundamentalism influences Terrorism.		
External factors such as joint war against terror, foreign military deployment and the influence of terrorist organizations abroad influence Terrorism.		

(b) How effective do you think the various non-state actors are in addressing the causes of violence and insecurity within your County?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

11. In your opinion, **what should non-state actors be doing to solve challenges relating to insecurity and violence** within this community, including those relating to violent extremism? (record the respondent's answer)

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

Do you think that addressing the aforementioned drivers of terrorism will help in ameliorating it?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

12.

Do you think that the inclusion of NGOs, religious communities, affected communities, families of victims, private sector, media and rehabilitated victims, in the GoK's CT strategies will help to combat terrorism?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

13.

14. What systems does your office have in place to support (other) non-state actors' in P/CVE efforts?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

(a) How does government respond to P/CVE initiatives implemented in the community?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

(b) In your opinion, how would you rate the response?

.....  
.....  
.....

15. What are your views on state and non-state collaboration in P/CVE in  
(a) Design of strategies and initiatives?

.....  
.....  
.....

(b) Implementation of strategies and initiatives?

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16. What can be done to make P/CVE interventions more impactful in your County?

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What are the challenges NGOS face in countering violent extremism and terrorism

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17. What are your suggestions on how Terrorism could be countered in the best of ways, in Kenya, while considering the drivers mentioned in Question No 2 of Section B?

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**Thank you very much for your time**

**Appendix iii: Interview Guide**

18. What are the biggest challenges of violence and insecurity in your county?

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19. (a) In what activities do non-state actors engage in to prevent/transform violent extremism in your county?

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What do you think are the drivers of terrorism?

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(c) How effective do you think the various non-state actors are in addressing the causes of violence and insecurity within your County?

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20. In your opinion, **what should non-state actors be doing to solve challenges relating to insecurity and violence** within this community, including those relating to violent extremism? (record the respondent's answer)

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Do you think that addressing the aforementioned drivers of terrorism will help in ameliorating it?

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21. Do you think that the inclusion of NGOs, religious communities, affected communities, families of victims, private sector, media and rehabilitated victims, in the GoK's CT strategies will help to combat terrorism?

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22.

23. What systems does your office have in place to support (other) non-state actors' in P/CVE efforts?

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(a) How does government respond to P/CVE initiatives implemented in the community?

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(b) In your opinion, how would you rate the response?

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24. What are your views on state and non-state collaboration in P/CVE in

(c) Design of strategies and initiatives?

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(d) Implementation of strategies and initiatives?

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25. What can be done to make P/CVE interventions more impactful in your County?

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What are the challenges NGOS face in countering violent extremism and terrorism

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26.

What are your suggestions on how Terrorism could be countered in the best of ways, in Kenya, while considering the drivers mentioned in Question No 2 of Section B?

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.....

## Appendix iv: University Ethical Approval



**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**  
College of Humanities and Social Sciences  
**Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies**

Tel : (02) 318262  
Telefax : 254-2-245566  
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P.O. Box 30197  
Nairobi  
Kenya

October 5, 2020

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: FAITH MOREMA MORAA – R50/11056/2018

This is to confirm that the above-mentioned person is a bona fide student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi pursuing a **Master of Arts Degree in International Studies**. She is working on a research project titled, **“VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA: ROLE OF NGOs IN KENYA AND NIGERIA”**.

The research project is a requirement for students undertaking Masters programme at the University of Nairobi, whose results will inform policy and learning.

Any assistance given to her to facilitate data collection for her research project will be highly appreciated.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.



Professor Martha Nzomo,  
Director, IDIS  
&  
Professor of International Relations and Governance



## Appendix v: NACOSTI Ethical Approval

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA	 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
Ref No: <b>615358</b>	Date of Issue: <b>11/November/2020</b>
<b>RESEARCH LICENSE</b>	
	
<p>This is to Certify that Miss. Faith Morema of University of Nairobi, has been licensed to conduct research in Garissa, Kilifi, Kiisi, Lamu, Nairobi, Nakuru, Tana River, Wajir on the topic: <b>VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA: ROLE OF NGOS IN KENYA AND NIGERIA</b> for the period ending : 11/November/2021.</p>	
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## Appendix vi: Plagiarism Report

### VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA: ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN KENYA AND NIGERIA

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