

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER-STATES IN SUB-REGIONAL
ORGANISATIONS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A CASE OF KENYA IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT**

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2020

DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for any award in any other University

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DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this work to my dear family; my mum for always encouraging me all through. My aunt Roselyne – thank you for seeing I get this far, my cousins, friends and colleagues for their support, patience and sacrifice during my study.

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the role of individual member-states in sub-regional conflict management; a case for Kenya in IGAD. It examines the role played by individual member states towards the efforts carried out by the sub-regional organizations in managing conflicts; highlighting the reasons for states' engagement, how states have been involved and the implications of their involvement in sub-regional conflict management. The study is concluded with recommendations on more surgical, impactful and operational strategies to ensure that regional organizations address the challenges they are facing and be able to execute their mandates more effectively specifically through stabilizing themselves financially without over-reliance on the contributions given by member states. The study further recommends the distinguishing of national and regional interests as well as constant review of regional organizations guiding principles. The study sets out two hypotheses. The first one is that, national interest is the instrument for the formulation of foreign policy. The second one is, collective states' interests in a regional set up are not always individual states' interests in conflict management. The study depended largely on primary and secondary data with the intermediate use of maps and narratives including thematic approach to present the information situated within the national interest concepts.

This study adds emphasis on the national interest concept pointing out that, national interests are always at the core of all foreign affairs of states. Having established that security interests matter first, states will craft their foreign policies to pursue their own national interests. States' main objective is to pursue their economic, political and territorial security which they will seek to guard at all costs including intervention in conflicts in strengthening regional organizations. This pursuit determines their conduct in international system including formation of regional organizations to address the common interests and issues affecting them. Specifically, this study establishes that the main motivation for Kenya to support IGAD in conflict management is to safeguard its national interests.

This study demonstrates analytically the implications of states' interests over those of the region in their involvement in conflict management. The implications of Kenya's robust involvement in supporting IGAD's conflict management roles are broadly categorized into economic, security and political implications. The study also establishes that the interests of the regional organizations are more or less the same as those of the member states. This, as much as it helps in attaining the common goal, brings contention as the interests may be conflicting. This lowers the credibility and capacity of regional organizations in conflict management since states may opt out or choose to stand aside when they perceive that their interests are at stake thus undermining the process of peace pursuit.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AU	African Union
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel–Saharan States
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
LAPSSET	Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
LON	League of Nations
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Union
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

Chapter One

Introduction to the Study

1.1 Introduction and Background to the Study

The absence of “world government” in the international system has renewed the argument on the pattern of international politics with critics of the realism theory arguing that developed states have ceased to pursue survival as their primary objective.¹ State’s behavior and nature of interaction can be understood in the framework of international institutions and multilateral norms that have contributed towards enhancing stability of the peaceful revolution of the international systems and managing change at the regional and global levels.²

Intergovernmental organizations have become key actors in facilitating conflict resolutions between and among states. The League of Nations (LON), the first international organization aimed at systemizing third party intervention/mediation in international conflicts and prevent an outbreak of future wars.³ It was established on the legal notion of “*collective security*” implying that; if a state acted in an aggressive manner, other states had the legal right of intervening to enforce international law against the aggression committed by taking a collective action aiming to stop it.⁴ However, the LON proved to be weak in its functional ability after it failed to prevent the Italian, German and Japanese aggression resulting to World War 2.

The United Nations (UN), was created in an attempt to institutionalize the world’s collective security as the primary mandate. It played a big role in the Korea conflict in 1950, Congo conflict in 1960 and the peace keeping missions in the Mediterranean island of Cyprus and Sinai

¹ Robert O. Keohane, “*Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research*,” *International Journal*, 65, no. 4 (Autumn 1990) pp. 733-736.

² John Gerard Ruggie, “*Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution*,” *International Organization*, 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992) p 561.

³ Paul R. Viotti & Mark V. Kauppi, “*International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity*”, 2009, 4th Ed, Pearson Education International, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, p 70.

⁴ *Ibid* p 71.

desert. The start of the Cold War and the politics around it hindered its work thus it took over new roles including the place of regional organizations in managing conflicts. It also permitted the establishment of alliances as states sought both individual and collective defense.⁵

Regional security institutions have risen since World War 2 with the numbers growing steadily and members committing themselves to the security provision mandate. Most of these institutions were primarily established for economic integration but later, this mandate has grown to include dispute settlements, peacekeeping, foreign policy coordination, arms control etc. The roles of these institutions have also been recognized as quoted by Kofi Annan that, “multilateral institutions and regional security organizations have never been more important than today”.⁶

These organizations have grown in their unilateral capacity as well as engaging in collaborative security activities both with the UN and also similar institutions both regionally and cross-regionally especially in the area of peacekeeping. The security dimension of regional institutions is seen in three ways; one is promotion of peaceful relations among member states to establish security and community through cooperation, two is bearing charters that have reference to security provision through harmonization of security, defence and foreign policy and three, security is aimed at defusing arising threats from both intra and inter-state conflicts.⁷

Regionalism discusses issues on politics, international relations, interests and policies of regional states, conflict and cooperation among states and other entities. Alagappa defines regionalism as “*cooperation among governments or non-government organizations in three or more geographically proximate and interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in one*

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Annan Kofi, “UN/SG/SM/8543: 9/12/2002”, 2002.

⁷ Williams, Paul D (Ed). “*Security Studies: An Introduction*”. Routledge, 2012.

or more issue-areas.”⁸ Regional organizations addresses economic, political, security and social issues among the states of a specific region. Key elements for regionalism are a minimum of three countries cooperation for common gain, interdependence, geographical immediacy and non-limitation regarding issue-area.⁹

The end of the Cold War re-energized the UN Security Council's role of maintaining international peace and security to include reinforcing the security capacity of regional organizations. The former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in a report that, in the new era of regional arrangements and agencies, although the security council is primarily mandated to enhance international peace and security, there is need to delegate this mandate to regional actors in the international system.¹⁰

In view of this, the persistent emergence of longstanding regional conflicts and the eruption of new ones has prompted regional powers and organizations to be vigorously engaged in conflict management more than before. The emergence of slogans such as “Try Africa first” and “African solutions to African problems” are an indication of African states’ desire to govern their strategic environment believing that there’s a possibility of a collective action to mitigate their deprived position in the international system.¹¹

The IGAD region has an area of 5.2 million km² and has membership of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda.¹²

⁸ Alagappa, Muthiah "Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis." *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (1995): 359-87. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097422>, Accessed: 13-06-2019 06:03.


⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping” (New York: United Nations, 1992) p3.

¹¹ Paul Taylor, 'Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed', in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Framework for International Relations* (New York, 1990), pp. 151-171

¹²IGAD, “The IGAD Region,” Retrieved from: <https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region#:~:text=The%20Geography%20of%20the%20Region.Toudjoura%20and%20the%20Red%20Sea>. On 13th April, 2019.

Figure 1: Map of IGAD Member States



Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-IGAD-countries_fig1_315818798, Accessed 6th July 2019.

Countries in this region have experienced political upheavals and violent conflicts better known as complex political emergencies (CPEs).¹³ Societies are distinguished along ethnic and religious lines and are characterized by political affiliations and loyalties which tend to spill over to other surrounding states. These spillover effect means that the conflict will include at least one state as a major or secondary actor in the conflict thus clearly manifesting the regional dimension

¹³ Cliffe, Lionel, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1999): 89-111. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993184>.

of intra-state conflicts. Conflict management in such cases has been relatively unsuccessful since most of the conflicts are not solved to address the root causes.

Violence and repression have been the major apparatus for conducting politics within the region with the use of force to attain political goals hence undermining democracy making and accountability. As a result, political grievances have been marked by eruption of outright violent rebellion resulting from unfairness in distributing state resources, lack of political representation and marginalization of the smaller communities.¹⁴ The nature and the composition of conflicts in this region have made the development of peace and security strategies more crucial and difficult compared to other Africa regions.¹⁵

The various conflicts in the region consists of the deep hostilities amid Ethiopia and Eritrea, the weak peace pact between the North and South Sudan, the civil war in South Sudan, instability in Darfur, the collapsed/failed state in Somalia, the peacekeeping efforts in Mogadishu and Darfur and series of periodic outbursts of fighting in Ogaden region and Northern Uganda. Therefore, the state of instability calls for IGAD to intervene in these conflicts and bring the parties to mutually agree to settle their grievances to stabilize the region.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

States are the main actors in international politics and have the mandate of ensuring their own security. The pursuit of this goal is seen in their capacity as unitary actors in the international system or as individual states within a regional organization. States will therefore tend to pursue individual interests first to ensure peace within their territories and which may eventually lead into achieving collective security within their regions through regional organizations.

¹⁴ S. Healy, *Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel*, Chatham House report (London: Chatham House, 2008).

¹⁵ G. L. Khadiagala, *Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility*, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2008).

The contribution of each state to peace making in a regional grouping varies from one state to the other. This can be due to different factors at play such as variation in resource capability, states' stability, political or economic interests (both personal and collective) or even the status of the state among other states. Therefore, the level of individual interests and goals provokes their involvement in regional peacemaking thus projecting the notion that states do not contribute equally to peacemaking efforts in their sub-regions through regional organizations.

It is against this backdrop that this study uses Kenya as a case study to understand the role of individual member states in regional peace making in an effort to cushion or strengthen peace and security efforts of IGAD.

1.3 Research Objectives

Broadly, this study discusses the role of individual member states towards the management of conflicts within sub-regional organizations.

Specifically, this study:

1.3.1 Investigates the contributions of member-states to sub-regional organizations and peacemaking in Africa.

1.3.2 Determines Kenya's contribution to IGAD's peacemaking efforts in the Horn of Africa.

1.3.3 Assesses the implications of individual states' interests versus the collective responsibility for conflict management in Africa.

1.4 Research Questions

This study is guided by and will seek to answer the following research questions:

1.4.1 What are the contributions of member states to sub-regional organization's peacemaking in Africa?

1.4.2 What is Kenya's contribution to IGAD's peacemaking efforts in the Horn of Africa?

1.4.3 What are the implications of individual states' interests versus collective responsibility for conflict management in Africa?

1.5 Literature Review

Introduction

This section covers scholarly work around the contribution of states towards peace making and conflict management within regional groupings. States' roles in peace making are diverse since each state conceptualize differently how to engage in peace pursuit. This section covers ideas and concepts such as the collective security, the correlation between national interest and foreign

policy and individual states and regional peacemaking. This gives a clear understanding of why and how states engage in the international system especially in the area of peace keeping.

1.5.1 Collective Security

The roots of collective security concept date back to the centuries of advocacy for maintaining peace in the international system, but the core notion of collective security maintains that: governments will endeavor to prevent another actor from using coercion to achieve a goal over the rest. Collective security depicts the long-term recognized commitment by governments between other groups of countries within their joint spheres of interests, aiming at protecting their security interests within these groupings.¹⁶ Countries in Africa have reacted to the post-Cold War challenges by promoting sub-regional and continental initiatives to collectively ensure conflict resolution and peace building.

Collective security system ensures the security of each state against any war or act of aggression since nations are mandated to neutralize such an act to protect the victim state and promote global peace and security. Collective security assumes that a member state within the regional grouping is deterred from threatening the peace and security of other members. Unity, especially in terms of regional cooperation and shared rule of the law, is important for collective security and no nation in the wider international system is kept out of ensuring the responsibility to maintain peace and security irrespective of their ascription to a collective security system.¹⁷

Any nation is liable to an enforcement should it breach peace and commit aggression against the norms of their respective collective security system. Furthermore, any nation perceiving a threat from another actor may call for help from other actors within the system as part

¹⁶ Aleksovski, S., Bakreski, O., & Avramovska, B. (2014). “*Collective Security – The Role of International Organizations – Implications in International Security Order.*” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(27 P1), 274. Retrieved from <https://www.mcseser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/5080> 24th Sep 2019

¹⁷ Ibid.

of exercising its right of collective defense.¹⁸ Collective defence results from an agreement formalized by a treaty and an association, between member states supporting a member state when attacked by a state outside the regional grouping.¹⁹

The UN Charter acknowledges regional institutions' role in maintaining international peace and security as long as their activities observe the purpose and principles of the UN.²⁰ In the post-Cold War era, Africa has witnessed an increase in the participation of its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the peace building process of conflicts witnessed in the continent.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) demonstrates the best form of collective defence organisation through its Article 5 which requires member states to intervene when one of their own is attacked.²¹ NATO invoked this article to assist the US in the war against terror in Afghanistan article after Al-Qaeda attack on the United States twin tower in September 11 2001.²² The basis of collective defense is in multiparty alliances and is composed of gains and losses. Collective defence can reduce a single state's cost to provide security in their territories and beyond by combining and merging resources.

1.5.2 States' National Interests and Foreign Policy

The national interest concept arguably stands out to be the rationale which countries get involved in international relations and engage with each other. National interest is termed to be a key component for the development of strategy and policy of a country, and every country is

¹⁸ U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright speech – Transcript, “*Building a Collective Security System.*” (US Department of State Dispatch, May 10, 1993), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n19_v4/ai_13180855/

¹⁹ Claude Jr. Inis L, “*Collective Security as an Approach to Peace*”, in *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, ed. Donald M, Donald M. Goldstein, Phil Williams, & Jay M. Shafritz, (Belmont, 2006), pp. 289-302.

²⁰ United Nations Charter, 1945.

²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “*The North Atlantic Treaty*,” Washington D.C. 4th April 1949. Retrieved on 22nd Sep 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

²² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “*Collective defence - Article 5*”, Last updated June, 2018, Retrieved on 22nd Sep 2019 from, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.

expected to outline and show their understanding of them in their pursuit. “*Interests are the foundation and starting point for policy prescriptions.*”²³ Thus, they display the importance of a policy that should or is employed by a country in its engagement in the international system.

National interest is thought as a valuable goal and when a state achieves these interests, it is believed that it has attained a positive gain that would enhance its political, security, economic and even environmental well-being. Lerche and Said define national interests as “*the general long term and continuing purpose which the state, the nation and the government all see themselves as serving.*” Morgenthau alludes that the survival of the state, protection of physical, cultural and political identity against intrusion by other countries remains core.²⁴

Sovereign states as the core actors in international relations will seek survival and dominating each other. Power, whether military, economic or cultural is important for states and the international system is all about competition to achieve this. To the realists therefore, national interests is mainly about power and its accumulation and the pursuit of national security (survival) and its competition will possibly lead to an anarchical situation.²⁵

Policy of states can be domestic or foreign. Domestic policy is applies to the internal political system, policies such as taxes, education standards and civil rights, while foreign policy applies to the policy towards the world states territorial borders.²⁶ This may include a country going into war with another, signing of an international agreement or aiding/fighting a rebel insurgency in another country. Governments and/or their officials are the main actors when executing both domestic and foreign policies.

²³ The Commission on America’s National Interests, “*America’s National Interests*,” Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2000, p. 15.

²⁴ Morgenthau, H.J, “*Power and Ideology in International Politics*,” 1948, New York NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶Kissinger, Henry A. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy." *Daedalus* 95, no. 2 (1966): 503-29. www.jstor.org/stable/20026982.

Holsti views foreign policy as actions by states in their relations with actors, state and non-state, in the international system to guard or achieve their purpose, welfare, autonomy, security etc.²⁷. Modelski and Seabury conceptualize foreign policy in terms of inputs and where it refers to the totality of purpose and commitment which states seek to deal with foreign states and problems in the international environment and adjust their own prevailing environment.²⁸ National interests and foreign policy are viewed in terms of the struggle for power and state survival. If a state achieves its national security as the primary objective, then other interests such as economic, environmental and humanitarian will eventually be achieved.

Foreign policy exists to serve national interests in the realm of international politics. States will intervene in conflicts in their region when their interest of security and survival is threatened. Globally, states will craft and execute foreign policies that inform their external relations, promote and defending their core national interests. These include but not limited to promoting military, strategic, economic, political and diplomatic interests and defending their territorial integrity.

1.5.3 Individual States and Regional Conflict Management

The national security of states determines how state engages with other actors. In light of this, the international security of states in a regional context will tend to take two dimensions. First, it involves the external side of national security related to establishing and maintaining at least two or multilateral relationships with other actors in the region either countries, international organizations, military alliances or regional institutions.²⁹ Secondly, the state will be connected to the international system. In this case, the security of a state in a regional context will have

²⁷ K. J. Holsti, *“International Politics; a Framework for Analysis”*, (New Jersey, 1967), p.21.

²⁸ Modelski, George, *“A Theory of Foreign Policy.”* No. 2. Praeger for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1962. London: Pall Mall Press, pp.6-7.

²⁹ Kuształ, Aleksandra. *“Theoretical Foundations of Regional Security in International Relations-The Overview.”* *Zeszyty Naukowe/Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. Gen. T. Kościuszki* (2017). Journal of Science of the Gen. Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Academy of Land Forces, 49 (1), p. 17-30, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/17318157.1234845>

significant elements such as, “*the structure and the framework of the system; increasing or decreasing of the importance of regional ties and activities within the structure; and the position of a country and the region it belongs to, in the global system.*”³⁰

Regional security is determined by the state of the international relations and the dominant criteria of national security policies of the states in the respective regions. States feel secure when free from any military threats and attacks, economic coercion and political pressure.³¹ State security has shifted since the 1990s from focusing primarily on issues such as territorial integrity, national security and state-centered welfare focusing on the individuals too.³² This focus has been incorporated to understand the changes in the security discourse through the concepts of human security, development, emergency and humanitarian intervention through the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P).

Intra-state conflicts could be challenging due to lack of clarity in distinguishing civilians from combatants. Therefore, it’s difficult to distinguish the enemy from an ally due to the changing loyalties. The porous nature of the borders often lead to spillover of the conflicts to neighboring states thus, conflicts that would be considered as “domestic” end up acquiring international status. States in the region will end up intervening, therefore calling for a collective action from each other and support the regional institutions mandated to ensure peace and security. The immediate aim of doing this is protecting their own interests first and eventually the well-being of the region.³³

³⁰ Czaputowicz J. “*Criteria for the International Security of the State*”, [Ed.]. S. Dębski, B. Górka-Winter, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2003, p. 13-31.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Söderbaum, Fredrik, and Rodrigo Tavares. "Problematizing Regional Organizations in African Security." *African Security* 2, no. 2-3 (2009): 69-81.: DOI: 10.1080/19362200903359121, retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19362200903359121>, 16th July 2019.

³³ Poku, Nana, (Ed). “*Security and Development in Southern Africa*”. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001.

1.6 Justification of the Study

This study uses both academic and policy justifications.

1.6.1 Academic Justification

States' role in pursuing peace and managing conflicts in the international system is significant as the main actors in the international system. As such, this study notes a gap in distinguishing how states act as unitary actors or collectively through regional entities. This study seeks to bring out this interplay in their effectiveness in conflict management. The subject of foreign policy, national interests and third-party mediation is important when discussing the relations between states. This study has established that there is a substantive amount of academic work that links foreign policy and national interest concepts but does not address the three altogether. This study aims to bring up the link between the three concepts and add new body of knowledge to the theoretical and conceptual development of the same. Further, the findings of this study will provide a model of interconnection between the three concepts mentioned above demonstrating how states can both work as unitary actors and/or complement each other in peacekeeping.

1.6.2 Policy Justification

The study notes the role of member states in supporting regional organizations in conflict management and precisely Kenya's contribution to IGAD. It is inspired by the need to highlight the role of individual member states and the efforts made by states in a regional context. Therefore, this study will help policy makers in designing policies aimed at understanding the role and operation of states in regional peace process to ensure peaceful regions. It also aims to add to the policies available, guidance and action plans set by IGAD, the Government of Kenya and other actors and stakeholders regarding the role individual member states are playing to back up sub-regional efforts to manage conflicts in the Horn.

1.7 Hypotheses

1.7.1 Significant involvement in regional grouping's quest for peace and security is driven mainly by national interests.

1.7.2 Multiple state membership in RECs limits their full support to RECs conflict management roles.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

There is no overarching theory that speaks on the role of member states in their involvement in regional peace process. This study notes an increasingly number of theories and concepts that would speak to and try to justify why states would act in the manner they do when it comes to pursuing peace. This study finds the concept of National Interests as the most appropriate to speak on the core reason for states' involvement in regional peacekeeping activities and as such, this study is anchored on this concept.

National Interests Concept

States pursue national interests through relations with each other with the clear overall objective of attaining national development. The international relations discipline gives centrality to the state as an actor in the international arena. The realist school of thought contends that the state has a common interest in ensuring its survival & security is addressed in an anarchical world. Further, states will seek to amass military power & form alliances which are in line with the national interests that often are permanent & cannot be affected by ideology or regime change.³⁴

³⁴ Burchill Scott, *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*. Springer, 2005. New York: Pal-grave Macmillan. P 125.

Realists project national interests to be the power a state has³⁵ while the neorealist believe it to be the survival ability of a state when it either has minimum or maximum power.³⁶ The survival of the state is the main goal leading to pursuance of all other political or economic goals. Since the drive for power is innate in humans, it shapes the nature of the state in the global system thus key for attaining the political goals in the scene.³⁷

States are security maximizers and their competition results from lack of a supreme authority that is beyond them.³⁸ Therefore, conflict or war by states is allowed if it is geared towards attaining national interests. Foreign policy according to realism exists to serve state interests in the realm of international politics. National interests and foreign policy can be viewed through the struggle for power and state survival. If a state achieves its national security as the primary objective, then other interests such as economic, environmental and humanitarian will eventually be achieved.

In the anarchical world for the liberalists, it's important for states to cooperate with each other to enhance peaceful relations.³⁹ Unlike the realists who believe war is inevitable in international politics, liberals believe that war is unnatural and irrational which is not a product of human nature, rather, it is used as an avenue by the governments to increase taxes, enlarge their bureaucratic apparatus hence increasing their exercise of control over the citizens.⁴⁰ International politics should be viewed from an angle of cooperation and harmony between peoples of countries. Therefore, national interests to the liberals should focus on pursuing of peace and harmony

³⁵ Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton. *“Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace.”* Vol. 1725. New York: Knopf, 1985.

³⁶ Waltz, Kenneth N, *“Theory of International Politics”*, 1979 Boston: McGraw-Hill.

³⁷ Mearsheimer, John J. *“The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.”* WW Norton & Company, 2001 New York: p 31-32

³⁸ Op Cit 36, Waltz, Kenneth N, *“Theory of International Politics”*. 1979, Boston: McGraw-Hill.

³⁹ Op Cit 34, Burchill Scott, *“The National Interest in International Relations Theory”*. Springer, 2005.

⁴⁰ Ibid

between nations. Foreign policy according to liberals should focus on the pursuit of peace and cooperation and not conflict as the realists would allude to.

This study seeks to use the national interest concept to inform the actions of states and their contribution towards peace and security mechanisms in their regions through RECs.

1.9 Research Design and Methodology

Research methodology involves a methodical and theoretic examination of approaches used in a field of study including the research design, population sample, data collection and data analysis procedures and measurement of variables. This study adopted the exploratory form of research design. This form of research design is carried out about a research problem when there are minimal or no previous studies to refer to. It assumes that the researcher has observed something or has an idea and seeks to understand more about it by attempting to lay the groundwork that would further lead to more studies regarding that subject matter. Further, the goals of this exploratory design are to produce, create familiarity of the basic details and concerns, creating new assumptions, ideas and hypotheses and determining whether the subject is feasible in the future, aligning the issues by refining them to obtain a systematic investigation.

1.9.1 Data Collection

The study focused on Kenya's support to IGAD from 1993-2005 in the Sudan/South Sudan and Somalia conflicts, to understand its role towards IGAD-led mediations in search of peace in the Horn of Africa.

The study adopted purposive sampling to produce the maximum outcome as well as variation within the sample. The participants were targeted and chosen based on their expertise and experience in the field of security and peace making. The study sought to attain the best

outcome by purposive sampling of the key stakeholders involved or are familiar with the engagement of Kenya in the pursuit of peace and security in the Horn.

Primary data collection was conducted using interviews, telephone (video conferencing) and through observation. The interviews were carried out using questionnaires (see Appendix 1) which contained questions relevant to the study and answer the research problem. The main respondents to the study were representatives from Diplomacy Scholars Association of Kenya and policy makers that have been involved in different mediations Kenya has engaged in. The study embraced the use of an open-ended questionnaires to collect primary data from the identified respondents. The study chose to use this as the best form of data collection to give room to the respondents to add their thoughts to the issues surrounding the study and respond freely. Further, the interview questions were structured to inform the subject of the study from a broader view to a more specific issues of the case study. However, in the course of the interviews, the structure was not followed as the interviewees would merge the questions at one point or another.

A pretest of the data collection questionnaires was done to see if the possible outcomes are relevant to the objectives of the study. This was be done to ensure that the study followed the guidelines and required standards by the university. Respondents used to pretest the questionnaires were classmates and colleagues to omit what was irrelevant for the study.

Secondary data relied on books, articles, journals and reliable academic internet sources relevant to the area of study. This helped noting and understanding what has been done regarding the role played by individual member states in supporting their respective regional bodies in management of conflict and is relevant in informing the subject of the study.

1.9.2 Data Analysis and Presentation

The data collected was sorted and categorized thematically and later processed based on the emerging issues of the study. This was done with the aim of capturing important data directly relating to the research questions focusing on Kenya. Data collected was analyzed through set study objectives and was presented in the form of narratives to inform the research questions of the study and quoting of the respondents words that are relevant to the study. The presentation of the data was also through quoting the respondents as sources and referencing the first-hand information given. This also formed the basis for the conclusion of the study.

1.9.3 Ethical Consideration

This study adhered to the stipulated research procedures by the university, followed the guidance of the supervisor and ensured acknowledgement of all the sources of information. This study maintained the full confidentiality of the participants and only revealed and quoted those who gave consent that their identity can be revealed. Further, personal information of the participants was not used for the study.

1.10 Chapter Outline

This study is structured around five chapters.

Chapter one “**Introduction to the Study**” introduces the study, giving a broad background to the study especially on the concept of regionalism and how states’ involvement in regional affairs came about. This chapter also states the statement of the research problem, the objectives, literature review on the subject matter, the academic and policy justification of the study. It also speaks into the conceptual framework, the national interest concept, which gives the framework of the study, provides the hypotheses the study will test and concludes with the research methodology the study employs and the chapter outline.

Chapter two entitled “**The Role of States in Sub-regional Conflict Management in Africa**” reviews the contribution of states to international organizations engaged in peace and security activities. It then discusses the various contributions of individual member-states to other sub-regional organizations in Africa towards conflict management. This chapter focuses on the contribution of individual member states specifically Nigeria and South Africa to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) respectively.

Chapter three entitled “**Kenya’s Contribution to IGAD’s Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa**” examines country’s role in enhancing peace in the Horn of Africa through supporting IGAD. It discusses the motivations for its involvement, categorizing this into national security interests, refugee issues, regional security, political status, economic interests and its foreign policy. It hypothesizes that Kenya has played a significant role in promoting peace and security in the Horn of Africa. It also specifically depicts Kenya’s support in the Sudan and Somalia peace processes.

Chapter four, “**Implications of Individual State’s Interests in a Regional Grouping for Conflict Management in Africa**” gives an introduction of the collective interests in a regional grouping. It then shows the implications of individual member-states’ interests in their involvement in the regional setup by addressing the economic, security and territorial interests implications and how they also affect the collective interests. The chapter also brings out the conceptual clarity of states’ individual interests and collective interests bring out the point where they converge and diverge in conflict management. This chapter hypothesizes that collective interests of states in regional conflict management are not always individual interests.

Chapter five, “**Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations**” gives an overview of the finding of the study and gives the conclusion based on the emerging issues of the study. It then gives three recommendations for further areas of research. After this, the annex of the sample questionnaire used in the study for collecting primary data and the bibliography are given.

Chapter Two

The Role of States in Sub-Regional Organizations Conflict Management in Africa

Introduction

The foreign policy of a state actor towards RECs is a common feature in the modern world order. The framework of any country's foreign policy establishes the basic conception of how it views the world from a vantage point politically, economically, socially and ideologically. This will govern how the country determines its foreign policy towards regional and international affairs. The focus is more on the foreign policy of a nation and how the actions and principles associated with it are employed by the decision makers with the aim of attaining short- and long-term objectives.⁴¹ As such the contribution of states to regional and international organizations is determined by their foreign policy objectives. This chapter will therefore demonstrate how individual member states contribute to regional economic communities majorly in conflict management.

2.1 Nigeria's role in ECOWAS' Peace Making in West Africa

The Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed on 28 May 1975 comprises of Nigeria, Liberia, Togo, Ghana, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Ivory Coast, Guinea, Gambia, Benin, Niger, Sierra Leone, Guinea - Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Mali.⁴² The signing of this treaty was an attempt at bringing economic integration and enhance economic stability and relations between member states in the West African region. Therefore, it

⁴¹ Frankel, J. (1978) *International Relations*, (2nd Ed.) London: Oxford University Press.

⁴² *Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States*, done May 28, 1975, reprinted in 14 Int'l Legal Materials 1200 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ECOWAS Treaty]. The signatories of the Treaty are the Republics of: Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta.

was expected to offer mechanisms and solutions to the problems of the developing economies to eradicate poverty in the sub-region.

States will always seek to protect the welfare of their citizens which always determine or influence the decisions they make with other states or intergovernmental actors. For instance, Nigeria has membership in the Organization of The Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to manage its crude oil for the benefit of its citizens.⁴³ It also belongs to the African Union to align its country in the African economic and political scene. As a member of the UN, it aims to draw the economic and political benefits from the UN to its citizens and as a member of the World Bank, it purposes to move forward its development agenda.⁴⁴

The West African region has battled with issues ranging from internal wars, border conflicts, and terror attacks among others. Nigeria seeks to protect its security, both internal and external, and border conflicts that have existed such as the Yoruba in the Republic of Benin and the Hausa-Fulani found in Niger and Chad. Nigeria comes in the international scene as an ex-British colony country whose energy producing role in the global market is significant and has caused it to incline towards many economic organizations. Its foreign policy framework forms its basic perception of the region and world from ideological, political, economic, and religious positions. Nigeria plays a significant role in West Africa sub-region, Africa, and global stage, especially in and through ECOWAS.⁴⁵

⁴³ Osondu, Monica Oluchi. "Membership in the Multilateral Economic Organizations: An Evaluation of Nigeria's Participation in ECOWAS (1985–2014)". "International Journal of Development and Management Review" 10, no. 1 (2015): 95-109.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ojo, Olatunde J. B, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS", International Organization 34, no. 4 (1980): 571–604. Doi: 10.1017/S0020818300018853.

Gambari argues that Nigeria's foreign policy is informed by "concentric circles" principle of national interests.⁴⁶ One is its dependence on its neighbours; Chad, Benin, Cameroon and Niger for its security, independence and prosperity. It will therefore ensure the collective security of the region especially its immediate neighbours. The second circle is its relations with other West African neighboring countries which determine its takes on policy matters. Third is its involvement in the issues of the African continent on peace, development and democratization. The last circle consist of a state's relation towards international institutions/organizations and non-African states.⁴⁷

Since its independence, successive regimes in Nigeria have prioritized the country's diplomacy. Immediately after independence, Nigeria joined the UN and Commonwealth of Nations and was later involved in the refurbishing of existing and formation of other international organizations; the Organization of African Union (OAU) which later changed to the African Union (AU), World Bank, OPEC, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the establishment of ECOWAS. The attention given to different organizations it belongs to varies and her participation changes frequently.⁴⁸

States seek objectives feeding their national interests which involve the welfare and well-being of the nation actor. As such, national interest policies may lead to the protection of existing structures hence, influencing how other actors behave. In understanding the contribution made by Nigeria towards ECOWAS, it will be key to answer the question of what policy goal does Nigeria hope to achieve through ECOWAS.

⁴⁶ Gambari, Ibrahim A, 1989. *Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making Nigeria after the Second Republic*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Op Cit 45, Ojo, Olatunde J. B, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS", International Organization 34, no. 4 (1980)

Internal security is crucial for Nigeria having come from a British colonial rule. After independence, the country was marred by internal crises ranging from high levels of corruption, poor leadership, tribalism and conflicts which it has since sought to see eradicated and bring internal cohesion. Internal actors such as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Boko Haram, and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) have caused internal instability in the country.⁴⁹ External actors have caused insecurity too i.e. after a failed coup attempt against the government of Sir Balewa, Ghana offered asylum to the plotters of the coup, an indication of an unfriendly neighboring state. Additionally, the police officers of Cameroon have overtime insisted on attacking of the Nigerian citizens in Iking, Cross River State.⁵⁰

Nigeria's foreign policy focuses on Africa as a regional power by aligning itself on the principles of African unity, non-interference to internal matters of states, peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts and regional cooperation and development economically.⁵¹ Its commitment and involvement in ECOWAS' security structure through peace keeping operations is based and guided by its foreign policy framework. Its Afrocentric guidelines on foreign policy has changed over time to include cooperation with the neighbours and other member states to uphold peace and address the present-day challenges in the region.

Nigeria's involvement in peace keeping operations by ECOWAS began in the 1990s when President Ibrahim Babagida, advocated for establishing the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a military arm of the ECOWAS, due to the insecurity in

⁴⁹ Adamu, M. (1992), "*An Analysis of Nigeria's Commitment to Integration in the Economic Community of West African States*", Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, Bayero University Kano, in: Osondu, Monica Oluchi. "*Membership in The Multilateral Economic Organizations: An Evaluation of Nigeria's Participation in ECOWAS (1985–2014)*." International Journal of Development and Management Review 10, no. 1 (2015): 95-109.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Wachukwu, Aja. "*Establishing Nigeria Foreign Policy Identity*." Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria (1961): 4015-4022.

the region emerging from the civil war in Liberia. This group was established on the humanitarian grounds acknowledging the view that an injury to one affects all. Since its internal stability is linked to the regional security, Nigeria was prompted to be involved in ECOWAS peace keeping operations.⁵²

Nigeria has the largest and well-equipped army in the West African region⁵³ which established dependent rapid deployment forces meant for operating in conflict areas. It was ranked by the UN as the fifth major military contributor in 2012 towards UN peacekeeping missions.⁵⁴ The highlight of its contribution towards ECOWAS peacekeeping activities was when it led ECOMOGs peace keeping operations by intervening in Liberia in 1990 -1998 under the command of the ECOMOG Cease-Fire Peace Monitoring Forces.⁵⁵

Nigeria hosted the ECOWAS summits consecutively in 1986 and 1987 amidst other countries unwillingness to host the same. Nigeria's contribution to ECOWAS has been observed through grants of financial aid and concessional rates for oil to other states.⁵⁶ Further, Nigeria has been the largest contributor of ECOWAS financially by supporting its budget up to 33.3% as well as refurbishing and maintenance of the ECOWAS offices and other facility.⁵⁷

The role and impact of Nigeria in the West Africa region is evident especially towards peace and security contribution in the region. ECOMOG resulted from the Liberian crisis and Nigeria spearheaded its formation especially in terms of power arrangement in proportional terms

⁵² Omo-Ogbebor, Dennis O., and Ahmed H. Sanusi. "Asymmetry of ECOWAS Integration Process: Contribution of Regional Hegemon and Small Country." *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 17, no. 1 (2017): 59-73.: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/asymmetry-of-ecowas-integration-process-contribution-of-regional-hegemon-and-small-country>

⁵³ Global Fire Power, "African Military Strength (2020)", <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-africa.asp>, retrieved on March 2020.

⁵⁴ Economic Commission for Africa. "UN. *Fragile States and Development in West Africa*", February 2012.

⁵⁵ Op Cit 52, Omo-Ogbebor, Dennis O., and Ahmed H. Sanusi. "Asymmetry of ECOWAS Integration Process: Contribution of Regional Hegemon and Small Country." 2017.

⁵⁶ Osuntokun, Jide. 2011, "Some Thoughts on Our Foreign Policy-1". The Nation, 17 November. Retrieved from <http://thenationonlineng.net/category/news>, 28th Aug 2019.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

to the other regional countries. ECOMOG aimed to help restore the legitimate government of President Ahmad Tejan.⁵⁸ This was done to gain the status recognition by the international community through its intervention and leading the region in conflict management.⁵⁹

Nigeria has played the role of a leader in the sub-regional intervention of conflict through troop contribution in ECOMOG led interventions.⁶⁰ Nigeria's troop contribution to the peace keeping operations has been higher compared to other countries. Data from 1990 shows it contributed about 5000 out of 6000 troops which was an equivalent of 84% of the total troops. Between 1991 and 1993, it contributed 10000 out of 12000 troops which was about 80% contribution. In 1995, 1996 and 1997, it contributed about 75%, 85% and 82% respectively of the total troop contribution.⁶¹

In Sierra Leone also known as ECOMOG II in 1997, Nigeria's influenced militarily, financially and diplomatically over the forces involved in the peace mission in terms of the process and outcomes.⁶² For example, after the commander of Ghana failed to avoid the killing of Samuel Kanyan, Nigeria took over command of the operation on September 1999. Nigeria took an extra step by having the commanders be directly accountable to the Ministry of Defence for Nigeria.⁶³

Nigeria's involvement in Sierra Leone's military operation was justified to as its foreign policy mandate. Nigeria bore about 70% of the cost financially to sustain ECOMOG in Sierra

⁵⁸ Adibe Clement, "Muddling Through an Analysis of the ECOWAS Experience in Conflict Management in West Africa," 2002. In *Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and Peace building in Africa: Europe, SADC and ECOWAS*, ed. L. Laakso, 103–09. Helsinki: Department of Political Science.

⁵⁹ Adeniji, Olu. "Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization." *Accord Occasional Paper 2* (1997): 97. Retrieved from <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/118>, 27th Aug 2019

⁶⁰ Abegunrin, Olayiwola, "Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1999." Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003. Westport, CT: Praeger.

⁶¹ Ajayi, Kunle, and Kolawole Dipo, "Power Politics: Nigeria and Peace Keeping in the West African Sub-region.", in *Nigeria's Foreign Policy since Independence: Trends, Phases and Changes*, Lagos, Julius and Julius & Associates, pp198-213 (2004).

⁶² Osakwe, Chukwuma CC, and Bulus Nom Audu, "The Nigeria led ECOMOG Military Intervention and Interest in the Sierra Leone Crisis: An Overview." *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 8, no. 4 S1 (2017): 107.

⁶³ Ojajorotu, Victor, and Adewole Ayodeji Adeleke. "Nigeria and Conflict Resolution in the Sub-regional West Africa: The Quest for a Regional Hegemon?" *Insight on Africa* 10, no. 1 (2018): 37-53.

Leone and largely spent the welfare, medical facilitation, food, equipment and weapons, to even paying the allowances of the other soldiers from the contributing countries such as Niger and Sierra Leone itself.⁶⁴

2.2 South Africa's role in Southern Africa Development Community's (SADC) Peace Making

South Africa is strong economically and politically in the Southern Africa region and it considers the region a key priority of its foreign relations in the international system.⁶⁵ South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy pillars include focusing on self and consolidating the entire continent's unity to end conflict and strengthen political stability for regional and continental integration. Therefore, South Africa has emerged to be a key actor of transformation in Africa and in the international arena.

South Africa has committed itself to engage in ending conflicts and political crises including rebuilding post-conflict societies. Mandela's government resolved that stabilizing the region was a good and necessary initiative for its interests and the region. This commitment aimed to remedy the transgressions of apartheid that sought to bring division and instability in Africa in order to win over the liberation movement's solidarity taking place within independent Africa.⁶⁶

South Africa's commitment towards regional and continental stability can be attributed to three reasons. First, after the Cold War and the aftermath world transformations, there was a change of power from a bipolar to a multipolar system that was dominated by a single super power,

⁶⁴ Oluyemi-Kusa, Dayo. "Sacrifices of the Nigerian Nation and Armed Forces in Peace Missions since 1960." *Peace Support Operations, Command and Professionalism: Challenges for the Nigerian Armed Forces in the 21st Century and Beyond*. Ibadan: Gold Press Limited (2007) Gold Press Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria, pp. 137-163.

⁶⁵ Amos, Sauombe. "The Role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: The Making or Braking of the Organization." *J. Int'l Com. L. & Tech.* 5 (2010) pp. 124.

⁶⁶ Zondi, Siphamandla. "South Africa in Southern Africa: a Perspective" (2012). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Series. <http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/mosambik/09403-no-8.pdf>

the United States.⁶⁷ This created room for regional and middle powers to influence international affairs and draw away the attention from the single power.

Mandela's regime filled this void through a rise in diplomatic representation across the globe and involvement in global conferences and forums that saw its international stature rise. This increased its expectation to demonstrate its power for the advantage of entire Africa. For example, South Africa's push under Mandela for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.⁶⁸

Secondly, the fall of dictators and transformations in Africa's politics influenced South Africa's leadership role. These transformations saw many countries subjecting to a pluralist form of electoral democracy and South Africa leveraged this time to spearhead political and economic reforms in Africa.⁶⁹ It pushed for peace diplomacy and a build-up of efficient and strong organizations regionally and continentally. This helped it build partnerships with other countries in other regions such as Nigeria, Algeria, Tanzania and Mozambique to strengthen its regional power thus promoting the progress towards New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as an economic vision in Africa.

Thirdly, the establishment of South Africa signified a merging of the above two attributes. South Africa's democratic shift served into the season of Africa's democratization. This illuminated its hands-on reaction to international affairs and gave it political integrity to lead the wave of democratization in Africa and bear Africa's self-confidence image in global affairs. South Africa's foreign policy shifted to strengthening regional integration in Africa and enhancing economic relations in a mixed economy perspective.⁷⁰ This helped in its involvement in the

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Curtis, Devon. "The Peace Process in Burundi: Successful African Intervention" *Global Insight* 24, no. 1 (2003). Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue. http://www.igd.org.za/jdownloads/Global%20Insight/gi_24.pdf

⁶⁹ Op Cit 66, Zondi, Siphamandla. "South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective" (2012).

⁷⁰ Hirsch, Alan, and Sally Hines, "Season of Hope: Economic Reform under Mandela and Mbeki". IDRC, 2005.

transformation of SADC and the OAU by facilitating the adoption of intra-regional trade, common security and economic cooperation practices among states.⁷¹

South Africa's involvement in peace and security activities in Central and Southern Africa is connected to its national security and economic interests.⁷² President Jacob Zuma re-emphasized that "South Africa's survival is not based on isolation, rather, its security and economic development is linked to the stability of the continent. South Africa therefore fosters peace in the continent, creating a conducive environment that results in faster economic development."⁷³ South Africa has facilitated and supported political dialogues between conflicting parties causing them to sign up comprehensive political settlements such as power sharing and dialogue between conflicting parties. Further, South Africa led successive conflict mediation processes such as Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros and Zimbabwe.⁷⁴

South Africa avoids military involvement in conflicts and opts for negotiation in political destabilized areas to promote peace and security by SADC. The one instance of active military intervention was the SADC- mandated Operation Boleas in Lesotho in September 1998 where 600 South African troops were sent to stop an imminent coup attempt.⁷⁵ This invasion was successful as it helped evade a breakdown of law and order that would have hurt the region's stability and the economic interests of South Africa especially the water resources. South Africa has since

⁷¹ Op Cit 65, Amos, Saurombe. "*The Role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: The Making or Braking of the Organization.*" 2010 pp. 124.

⁷² Cilliers, Jakkie, and Mark Malan, "A Regional Peacekeeping Role for South Africa: Pressures, Problems and Prognosis" *African Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996) pp. 1-11.

⁷³ Nibishaka, Emmanuel, "*South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Africa: Motives and Challenges of Peacekeeping.*" *International Politics* 2 (2011).

⁷⁴ Presidency, South African. "*Towards a Fifteen-year Review Synthesis Report.*" Pretoria: Government Printers (2008).

⁷⁵ Johnson Likoti, Fako. "*The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or Resource War?*" *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 2 (2007): 251-263., DOI: [10.1080/13533310601150875](https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310601150875)

restrained itself and only participated in the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the conflicts that have erupted in Africa.⁷⁶

2.2.1 South Africa's role in SADC-led Mediation of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Conflict

The removal of Mobutu Sese Seko from power by the Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire in 1997 led by Laurent Kabila saw a new series of violence by insurgents in the eastern parts of country that were supported by neighboring countries who supported Kabila into power.⁷⁷ The attack of DRC by Rwanda and Uganda in support of Banyamulenge in 1998 worsened the already existing inter-ethnic conflict thus prompting Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Sudan to send in troops in support of Kabila as a counter-invasion.⁷⁸ This heightened conflict necessitated a quick ceasefire and conflict settlement process to start under SADC in Lusaka with the actors being the parties and the Congolese belligerents that led to an agreement of having an Inter-Congolese Dialogue to resolve the conflict.⁷⁹

South Africa assumed the role of facilitating this Inter-Congolese Dialogue that took place from February to April 2002 in South Africa.⁸⁰ The Dialogue brought success after 70% of the attending envoys signed the agreement. South Africa continued to convene and chair the succeeding dialogues in Pretoria to include the 30% remainder of the dissatisfied parties.⁸¹ These negotiations took about 52 days at the cost of South African taxpayers to about 37 million rand

⁷⁶ Alden, Chris, and Garth Le Pere. "South Africa in Africa: Bound to Lead?" *Politikon* 36, no. 1 (2009): 145-169.

⁷⁷ Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges, "From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo". No. 28. Nordic Africa Institute, 2004.

⁷⁸ Op Cit 66, Zondi, Siphamandla. "South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective" (2012). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Series, pp. 19. <http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueeros/mosambik/09403-no-8.pdf>

⁷⁹ Claude Kabemba and Roger Kibasomba, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: A Diagnosis of the Prospect for Peace." Issue No 27, October 2003.

⁸⁰ Khadiagala, Gilbert M., ed. "Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region" Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.

⁸¹ See M, Baregu's input into IGD, *The DRC: Challenges and Prospects*, 2006: In Zondi, Siphamandla. "South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective" (2012).

and the delay in the process was because South Africa wanted the negotiating parties to extensively agree on all political issues of contention.⁸²

South Africa used its political weight to have international donors and get financial incentives to hasten the negotiation process and bring the parties to table.⁸³ Additionally, it had mediators at hand to assist the parties in case of a stalemate. This successive Dialogue led to the signing of the Inclusive Political Agreement in December 2002 in Pretoria. South Africa's role in the peace process continued through supporting the implementation process and ensure the transitional government was stable for 24 months until the democratic elections in 2006.⁸⁴

2.2.2 South Africa's role in the SADC-led Mediation of Zimbabwe Conflict

The Zimbabwean conflict in late 1990's saw an opposition between Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two groups of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).⁸⁵ The MDC sought to bring to effect a democratic transition through winning of elections while the ZANU-PF, the government, opposed these campaigns by alluding that they were being pushed by the whites to stop the decolonization process in Zimbabwe.⁸⁶ ZANU-PF used and controlled the state apparatus to conquer and weaken the MDC. These oppositions were followed by series of conflicts which escalated in 2001 after ZANU-PF lost a constitutional reform it had sponsored and ZANU-PF used brute force to maintain its control of the state.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ajulu Che. "South Africa and the Great Lakes: A Complex Diplomacy." State of the Nation: South Africa (2008): 253-274.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. "Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21st Century." African Journal on Conflict Resolution 3, no. 1 (2003): 99-134. Paper presented at the 7th Congress of the Organisation of Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, 14-19 December, in Sudan.

⁸⁶ Cawthra Gavin. "The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict." The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Peace and Security Series), Maputo (2010).

As a result, Africa intervened using former president Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Joachim Chissano of Mozambique and several chairs of AU.⁸⁷ However, these efforts failed to contain the situation and in 2007, ZANU-PF police attacked the MDC during their prayer meeting and SADC intervened by first convening a summit to address the situation. South Africa was mandated to facilitate urgent political talks to find a lasting solution.⁸⁸

South Africa assumed the lead role by taking a diplomatic approach and pushed SADC and the AU to adopt the same in addressing the crisis.⁸⁹ The aim of this approach was to suppress the tensions and hardening of the main protagonists of the conflict.⁹⁰ This decision demonstrated South Africa's capability of influencing a diplomatic decision in the region and allow political talks to address the issues around the conflict.⁹¹ President Thabo Mbeki oversaw the negotiations in discrete locations in South Africa and within three months of in-person bilateral talks, the parties agreed on some disputable issues and eventually led to a constitutional amendment passed by a vote in the parliament by both parties.⁹²

South Africa continued to facilitate the negotiations that saw the adoption of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on September 17, 2008 that provided the roadmap for establishing a constitutional and electoral structure to ensure free, fair and credible elections.⁹³ The GPA had aspects of constitutional security, economic, social justice and reconciliation, power-sharing and

⁸⁷ Mhandara Lawrence. "Mediating a Convolutated Conflict: South Africa's Approach to the Inter-party Negotiations in Zimbabwe." ACCORD Occasional Paper 2013, no. 1 (2013): 1-42, retrieved from <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175516/ACCORD-occasionalpaper-2013-1.pdf>, 28th Aug 2019.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Hendricks Cheryl. "Zimbabwe: Beyond the Democratic Impasse." African Security Studies 14, no. 3 (2005) pp. 119-121.

⁹¹ IRIN News, "Zimbabwe: South African 'Quiet Diplomacy' Tested by Recent Events," 20 January 2005.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Adriana Lins de Albuquerque and Cecilia Hull Wiklund, 2015, "Challenges to Peace and Security in Southern Africa: The Role of SADC", *Studies in African Security*, Retrieved; <https://www.foi.se/download/18.7fd35d7f166c56ebe0bb390/1542369060270/Challenges-to-Peace-and-Security-in-S-Africa-The-Role-of-SADC-FOI-Memo-5594.pdf> on 28th August, 2019.

legal reforms. This resulted to the formation of an all-inclusive government between Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai as President and Prime Minister respectively, thus ending the conflict.⁹⁴

South Africa continued to see the terms of the agreement are implemented.⁹⁵ President Zuma's term ensured the parties are addressing the key issues and the chair of SADC updated on the progress of the conflict calling out the spoilers of the full implementation of the GPA. This at one point caused Mugabe to prompt his supporters into condemning South Africa for "meddling" into its internal affairs rather than playing the role of a mediator.⁹⁶

Conclusion

This chapter establishes that a states' security policy outlines its principles and decisions which is often derived from its geo-strategic environment. This informs states relations, developing frameworks, unilaterally or through the collective security arrangements by RECs, in addressing security threats by actors outside their jurisdiction. This chapter comes up with two conclusions: one, states' contribution is prompted by the perception of them having attributes of regional leaders in their regions thus the need for them to maintain that status and have a voice in the region and to the world. Two, since states seek to secure their security, Nigeria and South Africa's active involvement in regional peace and security is inspired by this first then maintaining their interests in a collective grouping comes second.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Habib, A. 2010. 'South African Foreign Policy: Context and Contours,' in Zondi, S. and Masters, L. (Eds). *The Future of South Africa's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change?* Pretoria: Institute for Global Dialogue.

⁹⁶ Ndlovu-Gatsheni Sabelo J. "Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe." SAIIA Occasional Paper No 92, September 2011.

Chapter Three

Kenya's Contribution to IGAD's Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa

Introduction

RECs maintain peace and security in Africa through resolving of conflicts in a democratic and non-coercive manner, since the 2000 Lomé Summit of the AU. The OAU metamorphosed into AU in 2002 that saw the formation of the peace and Security Council protocol that mandated the AU to form a comprehensive peace and security architecture and intervene in conflict matters in Africa. This saw the coining of the phrase “African Solutions to African Problems” meaning Africa was ready to manage its issues. The RECs were part of this protocol and in the Horn of Africa, IGAD is the institution mandated to handle peace and security issues.

This chapter discusses Kenya's contribution towards peace and security in the Horn of Africa under the auspices of IGAD. It also seeks to hypothesize that the pursuit of its national interests based on the national interests' framework informs its involvement in the search for regional peace as a means of enhancing its foreign policy. This study consists part of Kenya's foreign policy, national interests and how mediation has been employed to further its interests.

3.1 Factors motivating Kenya's involvement in IGAD's Mediation

State-led mediation in conflicts between or within states as a conflict resolution tool is not new in the international scene. Mediation is the process of conflict resolution where conflicting parties seek or agree to the assistance of a state, an individual, a group or an organization to change their conduct, settle conflict or address their grievances without using physical force or imploring

the authority of the law.⁹⁷ Voluntary presentation by states as mediators is often guided by factors subjective to the state in question since not all states will be willing to mediate.

States judiciously choose when and where to intervene in a conflict considering the strategic benefits in their role as mediators. Mediation role is considered when they foresee a possibility of growth of their influence, power and resources meaning they will display discrimination in how they engage in mediation. This section gives an outline of different factors that have guided Kenya in providing mediation assistance to countries experiencing conflicts within the region.

3.1.1 National Security Interests

States are likely to employ defensive policies to protect themselves and their constituents from external threats and secure their space in the international arena. National security is important for states and their survival thus, states will seek to protect their values and interests accordingly. Previously, national security has been linked to issues of peace, security and survival especially in the event of an armed conflict. Foreign Policy on the other hand was meant to cover all external aspects to ensure a states' survives during a conflict. This has changed such that national security converges with foreign policy at times.⁹⁸

Kenya shares borderlines with South Sudan and Somalia of about 306-350km and 700-1000km respectively. In the 1990s when Somalia and former Sudan sank into conflict, the influx of the refugees posed a security threat for Kenya through a conflict spillover. This would be through increase of small arms and light weapons, cross-border raids, banditry, cattle rustling and

⁹⁷ Bercovitch Jacob and Su-Mi Lee, "*Mediating International Conflicts: Examining the Effectiveness of Directive Strategies*" *International Journal of Peace Studies* 8, no. 1 (2003): 1-17. Accessed Sep 16, 2019. www.jstor.org/stable/41852891.

⁹⁸ Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes & Politics*, Fourth Edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), Pg. 4.

conflicts with the host communities thus escalating the conflict in both Sudan and giving rise to one in Kenya.⁹⁹ Further, hosting refugees means competition over resources such as health, jobs, infrastructure, and education etc. with local communities. This could therefore cause tensions between the two and may lead to a rise of conflict thus the need to avert it.

In view of South Sudan, Kenya's concern was that the civil war could create an environment for both international and transnational terrorists to carry their acts of aggression and serve as a base for coordinating and launching terror attacks against neighboring countries. An example is the attacks Kenya has faced in the hands of Al-Shabaab terrorist group from Somalia who are believed to have links with refugees in the Dadaab camp.¹⁰⁰ As such, Kenya's involvement in ensuring stability of Sudan was a measure to ensure its own national security.

In respect to economic security, hosting refugees has a big economic impact on Kenya.¹⁰¹ It is costly to provide support to refugees since all of them usually leave their livelihoods and property and all they regard as their economic and financial security. As a result, Kenya has overtime opted to mediate in order to avert this by repatriating the refugees back to their country in the hopeful event that the peace would be achieved in their home countries.

3.1.2 Refugee Issue

At the core of the conflicts witnessed in the Horn, the refugee issue is key. Kenya has often provided safe havens for individuals from neighboring countries affected by conflicts. Since the 1970s, Kenya has been hosting refugees due to the changing economic and political crises in the

⁹⁹ Mwaruvie John, and Peter Kirui. "The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North-Eastern Kenya." (2012), International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol.3 No.8.

¹⁰⁰ Burns Avery, "Feeling the Pinch: Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa's Refugee Crisis", *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 27, no. 1 (2010): 5-15. Retrieved from: <https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/34356> on 22 Oct 2019.

¹⁰¹ Jeff Crisp, "A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya's Refugee Camps, *African Affairs*," Volume 99, Issue 397, October 2000, Pages 601–632, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/99.397.601>

horn and central Africa regions.¹⁰² In the 1970s-80s, Kenya hosted Ugandan refugees resulting from political unrest and coups in the country. In 1990s, there was an increase in the number of refugees making Kenya host refugees from Ethiopia after the end of Derg's regime in 1991 as most of them were facing persecution.¹⁰³

Refugees from Somalia came to Kenya as a result of the end of Siad Barre's regime in 1992 when conflict erupted and have since been in Kenya largely in the Dadaab refugee camp. Kenya also hosted refugees from Rwanda after the 1994 genocide in the conflict between the regime of Kinshasa and the rebels from Congo. In the former Sudan, the political and religious unrest that led to the war between the North and the rebels, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), after the entering of the "Lost Boys" group.¹⁰⁴

Kenya has overwhelmingly been hosting refugees especially in the two camps, the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps and this has placed economic weight on it in handling of the refugees. The cost of hosting refugees is high on a country especially if not receiving enough support from other actors. This study has established that Kenya's move to start shutting down the Dadaab refugee camp results from limited resources and lack of funding from donors and other institution to help in settling the refugees permanently.¹⁰⁵ Kenya has further adopted a policy that allowed some of the South Sudanese refugees to live in urban areas in Kenya allowing them to make a living and support themselves.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Op Cit 99, Mwaruvie John, and Peter Kirui. "The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North-Eastern Kenya." (2012).

¹⁰³ UNHCR, Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme, 2014. Retrieved from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/29314#:~:text=The%202014%20Kenya%20Comprehensive%20Refugee,Nations%20Agencies%20and%20government%20entities,> 16th October, 2019.

¹⁰⁴ Ali, Jecinta Anomat, David Kamar Imana, and Witchayane Ocha. "The Refugee Crisis in Kenya: Exploring Refugee-host Community Causes of Tensions and Conflicts in Kakuma Refugee Camp." J Int'l Relations Foreign Policy 5, no. 2 (2017): 39-51. Retrieved from, http://jirfp.com/journals/jirfp/Vol_5_No_2_December_2017/4.pdf on 15th October, 2019

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ V Angelo and K McGuinness, "Security and Stability: Reflections on the Impact of South Sudan on Regional Political Dynamics", Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Report, 2012, 54-55.

Kenya has supported displaced people from South Sudan since the 1980s and 90 when the visibility of Kenya's involvement in the Operation Lifeline Sudan was clear. Kenya offered a significant logistical and operational area for the mission after a serious famine and the civil war resulting from the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army (SPLM/A). Kenya demonstrated its support through a humanitarian programme to help internally displaced people and the civilian populations affected by the conflict.¹⁰⁷

The Sudan conflict caused havoc and trauma through destruction of property, atrocities such as rape, maiming and killings by armed groups that brought terror on the affected communities causing them to flee from their homes. The looming humanitarian crisis as a result of the civil war raised the eyebrow of the international community to intervene. The rising influx of the refugees in this camp could be partially considered as what influenced Kenya to enter the Sudan peace process.¹⁰⁸

Kenya's motivation to address the Sudan/SPLM crisis was a humanitarian consideration on the plight of the refugees. As a neighbor and a relatively stable country, Kenya had previously offered refuge to refugees from Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, DRC and Uganda during the seasons of famine and diseases. The civil war in South Sudan increased the number of refugees and Kenya continued to open its borders for the refugees.¹⁰⁹

3.1.3 Regional Security

Since the post-Cold War there has been a significant change in the patterns of security whereby, threats are no longer emanating from the states only but also from other actors such as ethnic groups within countries, epidemics, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, terrorism, food security,

¹⁰⁷ Amb Amina Mohammed, "This is No Way to Honour Kenya's Contribution to Peace in South Sudan", <http://www.mfa.go.ke/?p=1128>

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Amb. Dr. Hukka Wario, Chairman, Egerton University Council, on 5th Nov 2019.

¹⁰⁹ Idris Amir, "Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan". Springer, 2005.

poverty, influx of refugees, overpopulation etc.¹¹⁰ To this extent, victims of security can now be categorized as individual security, societal security and global security.

As states continue engaging, the world becomes more united than before through different forms such as globalization, internationalization, transnationalism, interdependence and integration especially after the cold war slogan of “one world or none.” This engagement results in better structural and political conditions to actualize their engagement through common acceptance of global norms, democracy, human rights, economic collaboration, freedom etc. Most states agree with these norms and the opposing states are often considered as “rogue states”.

In an anarchical world, states cluster themselves in regions informing their common goal and bring coherence through interactions. This may not necessarily be based on the geographical proximity, but what matters is the coherence of states involved and the stability of the region. Barry Buzan refers to this coherence as regional security complex which refers to a group of states whose main security concerns merge together such that their national security cannot realistically be separated from one another.¹¹¹

Conflicts in Africa tend to leak to neighboring states or pull regional actors into regional war zones than “domestic conflicts”. These conflict patterns calls for mediation and intervention by the affected neighboring states through regional organizations. The Horn of Africa has witnessed a series of conflicts and instabilities from Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan. These conflicts have impacted Kenya in various ways for instance, after the toppling of Siad Barre, Somalia went into a crisis and became a state of lawlessness thus the instability in

¹¹⁰ Bertel Heurlin and Kristensen, “*International Security*”, 2009, in “*International Relations*,” Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, Volume 2, edited by Jarrod Wiener, Robert A . Schrire pp. 1-46.

¹¹¹ Buzan Barry, “*Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World*.” In *Theories of New Regionalism*, pp. 140-159. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2003.

Somalia had insecurity implications on Kenya especially on the issue of international terrorism from groups from Somalia.

Hukka Wario says that, “When a dog barks, it does so to protect both itself and its master from the perceived threat”.¹¹² Therefore, frontline states are involved in regional peacemaking first for their protection and stability then the region second. As a frontline state to several countries in the Horn, Kenya acts in line with this argument. Since it shares borders with Somalia and the then Sudan (current South Sudan) its involvement in the two peace processes was inspired by this.¹¹³ This study argues that Kenya’s support for the IGAD mediations in Sudan and Somalia was to secure its stability and eliminate any threats that would result from the conflict.

3.1.4 Regional Leader/ Political Status

The realism school of thought bases its argument that power is the key subject in the sphere of international relations and states will accumulate it to show their dominance. Morgenthau says power will remain the immediate goal of states in international politics regardless of any other ultimate goal.¹¹⁴ Power politics is at the heart and competition for power is inevitable. Further, states’ calculations concerning power depend on how states view the world.¹¹⁵

The components of national power approach emphasize that as the sole property of states, power is manifested through possessing precise resources as well as the combination of all resources amounting to the aggregate power of that state.¹¹⁶ In this case, indicators of power will be seen in form of military spending, the armed forces size, Gross National Product (GNP), territory, population size etc. Contrary to this, relational power approach argues that power is the

¹¹² Interview with Amb. Dr. Hukka Wario, Chairman, Egerton University Council, on 5th Nov 2019.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Op Cit 24, Morgenthau, H.J, “*Power and Ideology in International Politics*,” 1948.

¹¹⁵ Op Cit 37, Mearsheimer, John J. (2001), “*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*”. New York: W.W. Norton, p 12.

¹¹⁶ Raimzhanova Aigerim, “*Power in IR: Hard, Soft, and Smart*”. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy and the University of Bucharest 20 (2015).

ability to demonstrate change in the outcome and it is located in the human relationship.¹¹⁷ Power can be seen as having resources or the ability to exercise influence over others.

Power could take the form of diplomacy, military, economic or symbolic powers. The structure of the international system drives states to pursue power and capitalize on their power position. This study also considers that states' execution of power takes the form of either hard or soft power.¹¹⁸ Hard power implies the anarchical system where power politics focus on the use of coercion and threats commonly known as "carrots and sticks." Soft power connotes the capability to restructure the desires of others' without using force, violence or coercion but through immaterial possessions such as attractive personalities, institutions, policies, political beliefs and cultures viewed as legitimate. As such, for effective soft power execution, legitimacy is key.¹¹⁹

Kenya's desire as a regional leader in the region is seen in its involvement in the IGAD and EAC affairs to gain personal credibility. Kenya has supported regional diplomatic initiatives and offered leadership towards addressing conflicts through its significant diplomatic standing as well as hosting of missions and international institutions and agencies in the region.¹²⁰ Its leaders have also established personal relationships with African leaders and keeping up a significant profile in international affairs and politics to keep the country's legitimacy.

Kenya has pursued negotiated solutions to different conflicts in Africa since its independence. This was facilitated first by president Jomo Kenyatta who was a great icon both in the region and Africa at large thus Kenya winning trust over other states. Jomo Kenyatta as the chair of the African Union Conciliation Commission on the Civil war in Congo in 1964 set up the

¹¹⁷ Lasswell Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham (1950), *"Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry."* New Haven: Yale University Press.

¹¹⁸ Nye Joseph S. *"Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power New York"* (1990), p 167

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Wanyama L, *"The Economic Diplomacy of Kenya's Regional Interests"*, South African Institute of International Affairs African Perspectives, Global Insights, South African Foreign policy and African Drivers Programme-Occasional Paper No. 137, P. 10

commission in Nairobi that sought to put pressure on the OAU and prompt it to act accordingly. Although this wasn't achieved, it gave the impression that Kenya had a long-term impact to the crisis.¹²¹

The Uganda civil war in 1980s also demonstrated Kenya's intervention and proof of political status. The conflict saw the death of over 100000 people which prompted Kenya's intervention through the late president Daniel Moi. Khadiagala submits that Moi's intervention was invoked by the necessity of Uganda's for the stability of the region as well as for Kenya to attain its strategic interests in a peaceful way.¹²² Moi was personally imprinted in the mediation process through round table bilateral talks that saw the signing of the Nairobi Peace Agreement on December 17, 1985, that was inclusive of power sharing and cease-fire provisions. This agreement however didn't last long since Museveni broke the terms and ended up forming his own government in 1986.

Moi's stature in facilitating the Sudan peace process was to project himself as a peace broker in the African continent and boost his personal prestige. His pursuit of giving a Pan-Africanism impression of a statesman who understands African ideals was backed up by his use of conflict management as a way of furthering his prestige among other African leaders. His foreign relations were centered on the diplomacy of conflict management which guided Kenya's foreign policy at the time.¹²³

Further, he selected special envoys to do special work aiming to publicize Kenya's image regionally and internationally and in turn he gets credibility. Moi's relationship with SPLM and

¹²¹ Howell John. "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (1968): 29-48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/158675>.

¹²² Khadiagala Gilbert M. "Mediation Efforts in Africa's Great Lakes Region," (2007) pp. 47-63, *Africa Mediators Retreat*. Available at: <http://dSPACE.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30865/1/Mediation%20Efforts%20in%20Africas%20Great%20Lakes%20Region.pdf?1> , last accessed 20 Sep 2019.

¹²³ Ibid

the GOS had been okay at a personal level which saw him bring the parties together to agree on peace. Moi had a good working relationship with both John Garang, leader of the SPLM and Omar Bashir the then president of Sudan.¹²⁴ Moi's era was leaning towards portraying Kenya to be a peacemaker and to uphold its statesmanship.

3.1.5 Economic Security

Two respondents to this study also established that states will seek to engage economically first with their immediate neighbours who are at peace.¹²⁵ The economy of a state is directly related with peace and security, both within and outside its borders. Therefore, countries need to be in a state of peace to trade with their neighbours and improve their economies. Peace and economic prosperity have a symbiotic relation such that, for an economy to be strong there has to be peace within and with its neighbours.

Countries are often concerned about regional economic development in their region and they devise mechanisms to stabilize their economies especially through trade and other economic partnerships. In conflict situations, trade is often negatively impacted, and a rise of booming black markets characterized by tax evasion and other economic malpractices is seen which hinders regional governments from getting revenues that would have otherwise been obtained legitimately through trade.¹²⁶

Kenya has been a fast-growing country with a great industrial capacity in the region¹²⁷ and has sought to build up regional partners to strengthen itself economically. Its involvement in the

¹²⁴ El-Affendi Abdelwahab, "The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits of Regional Peacemaking?" *African Affairs* 100, no. 401 (2001): 581-99. www.jstor.org/stable/3518702.

¹²⁵ *Interview with Ambassador Hukka Wario*, 5 November 2019 and *Interview with Respondent from the Diplomatic Scholars Associations of Kenya* on 13 April 2020.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Ochieng Kamudhayi, "The Somali Peace Process" p 119, in "African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization." 2004 Edited by Makumi Mwangi, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa, Nairobi.

Sudan peace process till date is to guard its economic and financial interests in South Sudan. There existed a big market for Kenya's industrial products/unemployed skilled labor force in the Southern region of Sudan and Kenya sought to pursue economic relations and the civil war inhibited this. South Sudan being a landlocked country would mean that the port of Mombasa in Kenya is the main entry point that would boost the economic relations thus the reason for Kenya's intervention.¹²⁸

Economically, the Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project conceived initially in 1975 and re-initiated in 2008 in Kenya's vision 2030 includes the building of a port in Lamu and an oil pipeline from South Sudan to give it better access to the sea. The development aims to enhance larger regional trade; economic development of Kenya and the region hence transforming its role in the Horn of Africa to being a regional integration facilitator.¹²⁹ Therefore, peace in Sudan meant Kenya would strengthen its trade relations with South Sudan and tap into the vast resources in the country.

3.1.6 Kenya's Foreign Policy

One respondent to this study, contends that Kenya has the interests of IGAD and the member states in its relations with different actors in the region.¹³⁰ Member states in a region cannot exclude themselves from the interests of the REC since they are the ones who develop the objectives and overall mandate of the REC. As such, in their pursuit of individual interests, states will by default pursue the interests of the REC. Kenya's foreign policy therefore inclines towards

¹²⁸ Wakhungu Juma, "Kenya's Mediation in the Sudan Peace Process", 2013. Masters Research Thesis: retrieved from, http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/60179/Wakhungu_Kenya%e2%80%99s%20mediation%20in%20the%20Sudan%20Peace%20Process.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y on 22, Oct 2019.

¹²⁹ Luke Obala, "South Sudan and Kenya: The Relationships," Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2012, 4, retrieved from <http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2012/3/29/201232915413854734South%20Sudan%20and%20Kenya.pdf>, 19th Sep, 2019.

¹³⁰ Interview with Amb. Dr. Hukka Wario, Chairman, Egerton University Council, on 5th Nov 2019.

safeguarding the state's sovereignty, promote global peace and enhance better relations with other counties. Its foreign policy objective is informed by a mutual desire for a peaceful, united and prosperous country leading it to pursue, promote and defend national, regional and global peace and security to guard its sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹³¹

Despite Kenya launching its first written foreign policy in November 2014¹³², its policy has focused on maintenance of regional and African peace and stability since its independence. Its geographical location places it at the heart of the protracted conflicts experienced in the region invoking its frequent involvement in conflict resolution. Kenya has experienced a relatively “peaceful” time compared to other countries in the Horn region apart from the 2007/08 violence. Peace diplomacy being its key foreign policy pillar, Kenya's prosperity depends on peace and stability of the region.

Kenya therefore engages in enhancing regional peace and security to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This has been seen in its role in Somalia by facilitating the establishment of the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2005 and in the peace-process that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between South Sudan and Sudan in 2005 ending the longest civil war in Africa as discussed below.

3.2 Kenya's Contribution to IGAD-led mediation

3.2.1 Kenya's role in the Somalia Peace Process

The Somalia conflict resulted from failed state institutions after the ousting of Siad Barre in 1991 over the control of capital and later worsened into clan-based groups. The neighboring countries to Somalia were participants in the conflict because the rise of Islamism as a political force in Somalia brought a regional dimension of the conflict to involve Kenya and Ethiopia which

¹³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “*Kenya Foreign Policy*,” 2014.

¹³² Ibid.

have Somalia communities within their borders.¹³³ As the conflict had built up, the IGAD Summit appointed President Moi to begin a shared initiative with Ethiopia and Djibouti to bring to the table the warlords of the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and the Transitional National Government (TNG).¹³⁴

Kenya assumed the mediator's role of the forefront states technical committee with Djibouti favoring the TNG while Ethiopia supported the SSRC. Kenya started the mediation in October 2002 in Eldoret town and saw the parties agree to cease hostilities through the known Eldoret Peace Process. Despite the slow progress of implementation and the expiry of TNG's mandate time, Kenya was relentless despite other countries like Djibouti giving up. It oversaw the parliament formation based on clan representation which later saw Abdullahi Yusuf elected as the president of the Transitional Federal Government and eventually a government formation led by Prime Minister Gedi.¹³⁵

This study notes that as the mediator, IGAD's contribution was clear after the mediation process when Yusuf's government failed to command enough support for it to function and the TFG failed to establish its authority in Somalia. This called for IGAD to mitigate the conflicting issues between its member states, converging them to decide how they could support the government created.¹³⁶ IGAD didn't anticipate this since the end of the negotiations and creation of the government under the new interim charter seemed to be a successful mediation. Kenya takes the credit for this due to its secretariat function and mediation.

¹³³ Nyuot Yoh, John G. 2003. 'Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa', African Security Review 12(3): 83-93.

¹³⁴ Healy Sally. "Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security in the Horn of Africa." (2009) p 7, retrieved from <http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp59.2-peacemaking-in-the-midst-of-war.pdf>, on 22 Oct 2019.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Sally Healy "Seeking Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: The Contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development" International Affairs 87, no. 1 (2011): 105-120.

3.2.2 Kenya's role in the Sudan Peace Process

This study notes that mediation can either be as a result of voluntary presentation of states as mediators to a conflict or through the invitation by a state/states for intervention by other actor(s). In the Sudan and South Sudan Peace process, Sudan invited IGAD to intervene in the north-south conflict that was being witnessed.¹³⁷ This prolonged war existed way before the establishment of any regional security organization in the Horn of Africa.

In 1993, Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), before renaming, launched the peace process on Sudan upon its invitation by the then President Omar El-Bashir at the Addis Ababa summit which President Moi chaired. This summit was also backed up by other international countries i.e. United States, Norway, Britain and Italy as “friends of IGAD” that wanted to see peace restored in Sudan.¹³⁸ The common interest for the regional countries was to contain the civil war for two reasons, one was to prevent the spillover of the conflict into the neighboring countries and two there were concerns regarding the rise to power of an Islamic regime in Sudan, a potential security threat in the region.

Kenya's backing of the peace process began in 1994 when president Moi was appointed the mediator as the chairperson of the IGAD sub-committee on Sudan peace representing the heads of states.¹³⁹ The mediation dynamics were Ethiopia and Eritrea favoring Khartoum, while Kenya and Uganda influenced SPLA giving the process an impression of a coordinated mediation. However, the rivalry within the Horn resumed and the balance was firmly tilted towards the SPLA. As a result, Eritrea discontinued relations with Sudan in January 1994 having accused Khartoum

¹³⁷ Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Khadiagala, *Sudan: “The Elusive Quest for Peace”* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2006), pp. 101–132.

¹³⁸ Young, John "Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation," Sudan Tribune 30 (2007). Retrieved from https://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Igad_in_Sudan_Peace_Process.pdf, on Oct 13, 2019.

¹³⁹ Mulu Francis K "The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict Management: IGAD and the Sudanese Civil War" (2008). The CUEA Publications Department, Nairobi.

for supporting an Islamist insurgent group in Eritrea's territory. Similarly, Uganda formed a hostile attitude towards Sudan and Ethiopia followed the same trajectory in 1995 after Sudan was blamed for attempted assassination of President Mubarak during the Addis Ababa OAU summit. Kenya remained neutral and continued organizing close talks between the contending parties.¹⁴⁰

Kenya had an upper hand in the mediation as it was perceived to be a neutral party. For instance, the GOS accused Uganda and Ethiopia of supporting the SPLA/M. Ethiopia was accused for supporting National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and Djibouti as a member of the Arab League of Islamic States, was assumed to be biased and would favor Khartoum.¹⁴¹ The negotiations continued until 1999 when the process safeguarded funding and acquired its official home in the Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs an indication of personalizing the peace process.

Kenya led the negotiations by first offering the lead mediator of the peace process, Gen Lazaro Sumbeiywo who President Moi personally requested to undertake the task.¹⁴² The first step Kenya did was contributing through the government treasury an amount of Ksh 10 million to cater for bills and allowances accrued by the IGAD secretariat in order to facilitate the peace negotiations.¹⁴³ Kenya provided delegations of envoys, advisors and ministers to help in the consultations and assist in addressing contentious issues the conflict. Further, Kenya provided accommodation and conferencing venues for the delegations involved during the months of the negotiation meetings.

General Sumbeiywo successfully facilitated the negotiation of the Machakos protocol leading to the formation of the vital "one country, two systems" concession and the two parties

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Op Cit 138, Young, John "Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation," Sudan Tribune 30 (2007).

¹⁴² Sumbeiywo Lazaro. "The Mediator's Perspective: An interview with General Lazaro Sumbeiywo." *Accord Sudan: Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan's Conflicts* 18 (2006): 22-27. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/mediators-perspective.php>, retrieved on 24 Oct 2019.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

agreeing that the source of the law for the North part of Sudan would be Sharia and the South remain a secular administration.¹⁴⁴ This protocol facilitated the signing of the CPA on the 9th of January 2005 and ended the conflict. The protocol established the timelines of the referendum to be 6 years after signing the CPA to give room to the South for self-determination which was successfully implemented and in 2011, South Sudan held elections and became independent.

As the lead mediator, Kenya was commended by the parties due to its accumulation of extensive experience in managing conflicts both at regional and continental levels.¹⁴⁵ Key to this is that, Kenya has always been supporting peace keeping operations in Africa and beyond through provision of armed military personnel or any other support to the UN when asked to do so.¹⁴⁶ It was believed by the actors that Kenya had the necessary experience in mediation thus the approval by the parties amidst several instances of reluctance in acceptance especially by the GOS after Kenya had hosted the SPLM's leadership in Nairobi. Further, Kenya's role was not only seen in its organizational capacity only but also in its provision of diplomatic capacity which the process heavily relied on.¹⁴⁷

This study acknowledges that the success of both IGAD-led Somalia and Sudan Peace processes can be attributed largely to the contribution by Kenya through several ways. One in both cases, Kenya provided the chief mediators: Amb Bethuel Kiplagat and Gen Lazaro Sumbeiywo for Somalia and Sudan respectively. Two, Kenya maintained its neutrality in mediation of both processes which enabled it gain credibility and trust among the warring parties. For instance,

¹⁴⁴ Op Cit 138, Young, John "Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation," Sudan Tribune 30 (2007).

¹⁴⁵ Carey Timothy, "The Negotiation of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and its Implementation From 2002-2005", (2007) United States Institute of Peace Special Report 194P. 4, Retrieved from; <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr194.pdf> on 22 Oct 2019.

¹⁴⁶ United Nations, "Kenya: A Key Supporter of UN Peace Operations", retrieved from, <https://news.un.org/en/gallery/540062> : Accessed 20th Sep, 2019.

¹⁴⁷ Op Cit 134, Healy Sally. "Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security in the Horn of Africa." (2009).

political neutrality was vital for the success of the peace process securing the government agreement on the Declaration of Principles at a time of Khartoum's pressure. Three, Kenya gave material and human resources in the form of organizational and diplomatic capacity towards the peace processes and in as much as these cannot be quantified, they were necessary to see the mediations are a success.

Conclusion

Although Kenya had its written foreign policy in 2014 for the first time, its actions and style of operation in the management of IGAD-led mediations and conflict management is evident. This study establishes the motivation for Kenya's involvement is to secure its national interests first before considering what the region's interests are. As such, this study can conclude that when crafting their foreign policy, the aim of countries is to defend their crucial national interests. Therefore, this study can comfortably state that when looking at mediation, foreign policy and national interests as concepts and where the three meet, national interests of states are like conduits for the formulation of foreign policies and mediation is a tool to achieve the same.

Chapter Four

Implications of Individual States' Interests in a Regional Grouping for Conflict

Management in Africa

Introduction

The realism school of thought scholars submit that states have the political legitimacy to act in the international system due to the lack of a “world government” to govern them.¹⁴⁸ The dominating interest of states is national security which this study largely considers to be the military capability of the state in its relations with other states. Scholars of this theory emphasize that states ought to secure themselves militarily to defend themselves against threats; whether real or perceived, from their neighboring states.¹⁴⁹ Sovereign states' relations are viewed within the confines of a “Balance of Power” system where states pursue their interests in an anarchical international system.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, such individual interests would conflict with those of another as well as those of the region resulting in conflicts and even possibilities of war. This chapter seeks to assess the implications of individual member states interests in a regional grouping in Africa.

4.1 Collective Interests in a Regional Grouping

Regional security is key for member states to attain their goals and every region in Africa is characterized by different patterns and nature of conflicts. The Horn of Africa region is characterized by conflicts between current regimes and opponents from within or outside their countries. Conflicts in West Africa are characterized by complexity of post-colonial truths, drivers of globalization and world governance, external actors and notions of the environmental system.

¹⁴⁸ Op Cit 24, Morgenthau, H.J, “*Power and Ideology in International Politics*,” 1948, New York NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, “*Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa*” in Mwagiru, Makumi, “*African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*.” (2004), Makumi Mwagiru, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa, Nairobi, pp. 8.

Conflicts in the Southern African region revolve around issues of politics and regime change, ethnic identities, conflict over resources, civil unrests among other issues. Each state therefore has its own issues that may affect the region's stability.¹⁵¹

Buzan notes that security in the context of individuals, states and regional organizations is interdependent and is affected by five major sectors; military, political, economic, societal and environmental.¹⁵² Militarily, security is viewed within two confines; one, the armed offensive nature where states employ the use of military weapons against an aggressor in order to eliminate the threat. Two is the defensive capability of the state whereby it displays its defense mechanisms to guard itself from any perceived threat. Politically, security is seen when states establish structures and systems that give them ideologies of how they should function, relate with each other and the ability to have legitimacy of decision making in the international system.¹⁵³

Economically, states seek to obtain resources, finances and key markets to ensure their sustainability and standard levels of well-being and state power in their relation to one another. Societal security involves the language, culture, religion, national identity and customs that a state believes in. These are what states and individuals within that territory ascribe to as their origin or what they can be identified by. Environmental security involves maintaining local, regional and planetary biosphere which is a necessary support system through which human beings depend on.¹⁵⁴ These security sectors cannot be undertaken solely by an individual state, institution or a cooperative body. Therefore, individual states in regional organizations appreciate political and economic collaboration to maximize the benefits of interdependence.

¹⁵¹ Bozeman Adda Bruemmer, *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976. Accessed Oct 22, 2019. Doi:10.2307/j.ctt13x14fp.

¹⁵² Buzan Barry, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century." *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 67, no. 3 (1991): 431-51. Doi: 10.2307/2621945.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

Collective regional activities provide member states with a competitive upper hand and bargaining power than when acting unilaterally. Regional states mediate in conflicts having an upper hand of greater proximity to the conflict, knowledge and understanding of and occasionally leverage over parties to the conflict. Individual states, will intervene in a conflict from a place of relative power and influence over the conflicting parties such as Nigeria, South Africa, Libya, Egypt and other states in their respective regions.¹⁵⁵ States of the same locality geographically collaborate to pursue integration and attain mutual economic, social and political goals.

The objectives of IGAD under the Peace, Security, Stability and Governance division commit to promote and maintain peace, security and stability in the region through the formation of mechanisms that will prevent, manage and resolve inter and intra-state conflicts.¹⁵⁶ This is coordinated with the member states to fulfil their objectives through promotion of policy harmony and cooperation among them through three things: one, is to undertake collective measures that are effective to get rid of threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability. Two is to set up an effective consultation mechanisms and cooperation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and three is to address differences between member states before referring them to other regional or international organizations for intervention.¹⁵⁷

ECOWAS' broad interest is promoting economic cooperation in the West African region. Member states commit to integrate its ambitions in planning and directing their national policies towards each other and the region.¹⁵⁸ At its inception, ECOWAS was an economic union and it delved into the security realm to address wars and conflicts to avoid the regionalization of internal

¹⁵⁵ Whitfield Teresa, and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, "*External actors in Mediation: Dilemmas & Options for Mediators*," HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010.

¹⁵⁶ Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, "*About the Peace and Security Division*", <https://igad.int/about-igad/49-about-us/97-about-the-peace-and-security-division>, last accessed 23rd Oct 2019.

¹⁵⁷ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 1996. "*Agreement Establishing IGAD*". Djibouti: IGAD

¹⁵⁸ Adeniran Adebunsi. "*Regional integration in the ECOWAS Region: Challenges and Opportunities*" (2012). Retrieved from: https://www.africaportal.org/documents/7028/Backgrounder_No._19.pdf on 5th November 2019.

conflicts and wars.¹⁵⁹ ECOWAS started engaging in regional peacekeeping through peace operations and interventions through ECOMOG by conducting military and peacekeeping operations in Liberia and in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Ivory Coast.

The Southern Development Africa Coordination Conference (SADCC) was created to promote the national course of political and economic freedom in the Southern Africa region. The main objectives were to lessen the over-reliance of states on the then apartheid South Africa, assemble resources to advance national and regional policies and enhance cooperation and understanding among the member states.¹⁶⁰ In 1992, the Heads of State and governments narrowed down the policies and strategies of the institution to enhance integration and cooperation processes. This saw the SADC Treaty signed thus transforming SADCC into SADC. The new mandate clearly involved promoting sustainable and equitable economic growth, fostering mutual political values and systems through various institutions and promoting and maintaining democracy, peace and security among member states.¹⁶¹

4.2 Implications of individual member states' interests on regional groupings

Regional organizations have the common interests of the region according to the agreement of member states. These interests are often developed by individual member states of the grouping depending on goal for their entities within their territories. As such, the regional actor's interest is more or equal to what the individual states' goals and the goal is common for all. Since the drive for states to achieve their national interests comes first, the next part of this study will focus on the

¹⁵⁹ Elowson Camilla, and Justin MacDermott. "ECOWAS Capabilities in Peace and Security: A Scoping Study of Progress and Challenges" (2010). Retrieved from: <http://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=370137663> on 4th November 2019.

¹⁶⁰ Southern African Development Community, "Towards a Common Future," Retrieved from: <https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-objectiv/>, 22 Oct 2019

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

implications of individual interests over collective interests in a regional grouping in peace, security and conflict management in Africa.

4.2.1 Economic Interests Implications

The economic implication for Nigeria towards regional peacekeeping comes in two facets, one; this study argues that from a national financial standpoint view, Nigeria is entitled to financial reimbursement for troop and equipment that it “leases” for peacekeeping operations.¹⁶² This study argues that these reimbursements could generate revenues and return amounts in monetary form beyond Nigeria’s cost of deploying troops and equipment. If managed judiciously, these revenues could be used to upgrade its military infrastructure, equipment and improve the life of military personnel. The second facet is that supporting peace operations is costly and it’s argued that Nigeria could not be receiving the commensurate economic, political and military compensation for its active involvement in regional peace and security and the economic support injected into peacekeeping.¹⁶³

Kenya belongs to more than one REC: IGAD, East African Community (EAC), Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa (COMESA). According to the Africa Regional Integration Index, Kenya ranks top three in RECs through its involvement in their activities.¹⁶⁴ Kenya seeks to establish itself economically through trade, partnerships, economic enhancing activities etc. with neighboring countries. As such, the involvement of Kenya in the region’s peace and security management under IGAD has demonstrated its desire to secure itself economically.

¹⁶² Ahmed Sule, “*Nigeria’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations*”, 2013. Peace Operations Training Institute, retrieved from <https://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/sule.pdf>, on 20th November 2019.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Africa Regional Integration Index, “*Country Ranking Profiles: Kenya*” retrieved from: <https://www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/country-profiles/kenya/> on 23rd Oct 2019.

Kenya aims to see an economic integrated region as part of its economic interests as well as foreign policy which is reflected through multiple signing of trade agreements and other economic pacts with the regional countries. Kenya sees the LAPPSET project as the best tool of integration of the regional countries through the oil pipeline from South Sudan across to Mombasa. For instance, when Uganda discovered oil in 2006, it was impelled to engage with Kenya to discover new routes for exporting the oil due to its landlocked nature and the two reached an agreement to have the oil transported through the port of Mombasa.¹⁶⁵

The signing of the 2005 CPA and later the independence of South Sudan saw the economic sector in South Sudan attracting Kenya's government, banking institutions, corporate and individual actors. Peace in South Sudan is not only important to South Sudan but also to Kenya. EAC is a more stable REC regarding economic integration compared to IGAD and Kenya is the strongest country in EAC. In the search for its economic interests, Kenya pushed for the joining of South Sudan in EAC to increase trade relations and economic integration with it.

The implication of this comes in two ways, one: Kenya strengthening its trade relations with other states in pursuit of economic interests makes it advance for peace to trade and engage with its neighbors hence pursuing the peace of the region. On the contrary state actors don't give their all in securing the objectives of the regional actor due to multiple membership. For instance, Kenya has paid more attention on EAC through economic integration than it has to IGAD. This divided attention limits the state in engaging fully the regional agenda. The implication of this minimal economic support towards IGAD's mandate of development hence inhibiting the realization of its mandate.

¹⁶⁵ Watkins Eric. "*Al-Shabaab Militancy Undermines Kenya's LAPSSET.*" Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, no. 6 (2016): 9-13. www.jstor.org/stable/26351425.

4.2.2 Security Interests Implications

In pursuing regional peace, states deal with internal conflicts and security causing them to shift and address the internal issues as opposed to the regional interests. Nigeria has supported ECOWAS and its neighbours in securing peace and stability as well as establishing friendly relations. Security issues arising from Boko Haram insurgent group threaten regional security and is the main security threat to Nigeria.¹⁶⁶ The friendly relations Nigeria has with its neighbors have arguably halted its internal security especially after establishing that members of the Boko Haram have habitation in parts of Cameroon and other villages which offer grounds for attack preparation.

Additionally, in restoring peace in Liberia and other West African states, Nigeria brought the burden to its citizens, for instance, maintenance of troops is an expensive cost with severe financial constraints on Nigeria. Although its strategy of maintaining friendly relations could be flawless, there is clear uncertainty as to whether other ECOWAS member states can form a strong force in support of Nigeria should it be a victim of foreign aggression. Its own interests are threatened thus impeding its full support towards the regional agenda of peace and security.

Nigeria's headship in regional peace and security through ECOWAS and ECOMOG's peacekeeping and conflict interventions been in form of military, political or financial aspects thus demonstrating its ability to contain civil wars from the neighboring countries.¹⁶⁷ Despite the West African countries acknowledging its regional leadership in this manner, some are skeptical of its unilateral military intervention as well as the "gun boat" diplomacy approach which projects its sub-regional hegemon role.¹⁶⁸ This, arguably, sends the impression that it could be a threat to the

¹⁶⁶ Ismail Olawale. "The Boko Haram Insurgency and the Changing Patterns of Regional Security Arrangements in Africa." *Contemporary regional development in Africa* (2015): 201-224.

¹⁶⁷ WO Alli, "The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy", Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012. Retrieved from, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10253.pdf>, 22nd Nov 2019.

¹⁶⁸ Francis, David J. "Peacekeeping in a bad neighborhood: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Peace and Security in West Africa." *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 9, no. 3 (2009).

sovereignty of member states for instance, Nigeria's superiority and 'pax Nigeriana' by smaller states has raised concerns causing other regional actors with strategic interests in West Africa discouraging ECOWAS member states from participating in Nigeria-led peacekeeping thus pulling down the efficacy of ECOWAS in peace and security.¹⁶⁹

Nigeria's contribution towards peacekeeping has been evident largely through contribution militarily and by giving personnel as peacekeepers troop contributors to ECOWAS and the UN missions in the region. This has seen its army receive international recognition thus giving it legitimacy and status.¹⁷⁰ Further, this study establishes that Nigeria's contribution towards peacekeeping could be a strategy to give it legitimacy in claiming a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), hence seeking international status.¹⁷¹ Additionally, Nigeria's army has been exposed to both modern military hardware as well as modern military operations as opposed to war only thus improving the efficiency of the troops. To its advantage, Nigeria's army has been kept a brace with the evolving nature of peacekeeping operations hence stabilizing its security.¹⁷²

South Africa's economic strength comes second after Nigeria in Africa with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$358.8 billion as of 2019.¹⁷³ South Africa has battled to be a sophisticated country in the region and also reluctant to influence power or project acts that would portray it as a hegemon or a bully boy in the region. Therefore, South Africa focuses on establishing multilateral agreements with member states rather than acting unilaterally.¹⁷⁴ South

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Op Cit 53, Global Fire Power, "African Military Strength (2020)".

¹⁷¹ Interview with DIPSAC respondent, April 13, 2020.

¹⁷² Op Cit 162, Ahmed Sule, "Nigeria's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations", 2013.

¹⁷³ Statistics Times, "List of African Countries by GDP," Feb 2020; retrieved from <http://statisticstimes.com/economy/african-countries-by-gdp.php> on 15th April 2020.

¹⁷⁴ Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, "South Africa's Regional Engagement for Peace and Security," October 2007. Retrieved from <https://www.saija.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/south.africa.comment1.pdf>, 20th Nov 2019.

Africa's hegemon perception by other states is derived from its strong economic and military capability which threatens stronger neighboring states such as Nigeria and Angola that consider themselves as equal rival partners of South Africa in the region thus creating a conflict of interests in the area of regional peace.¹⁷⁵

South Africa has also faced challenges of internal insecurity arising from the xenophobic attacks (discrimination and violence) against other foreign nationals within the country.¹⁷⁶ The attacks are believed to be as a result of perception by South Africa nationals that foreigners are the reason behind economic fall, hunger, lack of jobs infrastructure and other amenities due to their increased populations. This has caused the nationals to attack foreigners from neighboring states in the name of seeking what belongs to them.

These attacks have implications on the region since some of the nationals such as Zimbabwe nationals affected equally belong to the SADC as South Africa is, thus conflicting interests in the region.¹⁷⁷ Further, the attacks in September 2019 on Nigeria's nationals is a potential avenue for diplomatic row between the two countries which would have an impact within the two countries and therefore the implications will not only be between states of one region but different regions which could extend to the larger Africa.

The pursuit of security interests is key for states when there is a perceived threat even if the perpetrator is another actor or a state, within the same region. Kenya has supported peace keeping operations in neighboring countries like Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Democratic Republic of Congo through contribution of peacekeepers and observers. Further, Kenya has been

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ogunnowo Oluwaseyi, and Segun Joshua. "Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa and Nigeria's Foreign Policy: Rethinking Nigeria's Afro-Centric Foreign Policy Posture." *Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs* 7, no. 1 (2019).

¹⁷⁷ Hagensen Live. "Understanding the Causes and the Nature of Xenophobia in South Africa: A Case Study of De Doorns." PhD diss., Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University, 2014.

hosting refugees in both Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps whose populations consists largely of persons from the Horn of Africa region (Somalia¹⁷⁸ and South Sudan¹⁷⁹ respectively).

Besides the economic implications of hosting the refugees, the high influx of refugees has to some extent posed as a security threat for Kenya and the region.¹⁸⁰ This has been in the form of human and drug trafficking, increase of small arms, conflicts between refugees and host communities and most recently the rise of terrorism attacks from Al Shabaab, a terrorist group operating from Somalia whose allegiance is from Al-Qaeda. Since individual interests towards peace and security are prioritized, Kenya has been assessing the impact of its involvement in multiple peace and security advancement activities regionally and the implications of the same on it and on the region.

Kenya is largely involved in the AU-led peace operation in Somalia against the Al Shabaab (AMISOM) through Operation Linda Nchi, where Kenya deployed its troops, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to secure Somalia from the hands of the terror group. Several attacks on Kenyan troops and citizens are believed to be as a result of the presence of Kenya in Somalia. This has caused Kenya to start withdrawing its troops from bases in Somalia and retreat towards its borders and eventually, withdraw from the mission in 2020. Further, this study observes that the move to close the Dadaab refugee camp results from the terror attacks by the Al-Shabaab who have linkages with refugees in the camp.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ UNHCR Operational Update, “*Sub Office Dadaab, Kenya*,” April 2020. Retrieved from, <https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/05/Dadaab-Operational-Update-1-30-April-2020-1.pdf>, 13th May 2020.

¹⁷⁹ UNHCR Monthly Operational Update, “*Kakuma Camp & Kalobeyi Settlement, Kenya*,” April 2020. Retrieved from, <https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/05/Kakuma-camp-and-Kalobeyi-settlement-Operational-Update-1-30-April-2020-1.pdf>, 13th May 2020.

¹⁸⁰ Loescher Gil, and James Milner, “*Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implications*,” Routledge, 2013. Pg. 34.

¹⁸¹ Cannon Brendon J., and Hirotaka Fujibayashi. “*Security, Structural Factors and Sovereignty: Analyzing Reactions to Kenya’s Decision to Close the Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex*.” *African Security Review* 27, no. 1 (2018): 20-41.

Hosting refugees at the Dadaab refugee camp and also the presence of the KDF in Somalia has placed Kenya at a tight place security wise especially after the terror attacks by the Al-Shabaab, most notably, attacks on the West Gate Mall in 2013, Garissa University in 2015 and most recently Dusit Complex in January 2019. The security threat and implication of this is the stability of Kenya hence the consideration moves to withdraw from Somalia and closing of the refugee camp. This study argues that Kenya has resorted to protect itself from threats to security due to the overwhelming implication of its engagement in Somalia.

Amb. Hukka Wario argues that the regional implication of this is that, the presence of Kenya's troops in Somalia has stabilized the region and the move to withdraw will give the Al-Shabaab foothold to execute their attacks and give rise to active attacks from the group.¹⁸² Closing of the refugee camp means sending back most of the Somali's in their war-torn country and since Somalia doesn't have enough capacity to reconstitute them into their homes and other areas at the moment, it will have to send them in conflict torn areas thus risking their lives and further destabilize the region.¹⁸³

4.2.3 Territorial Interests

States seek to safeguard their territorial interests in their relations with each other especially with those whom they share borderlines or natural resources with. Dr. Hukka argues that protecting borderlines is always the goal of states and the regional actor can only be involved in the event there is a conflict but not determining what portion belongs to which country.¹⁸⁴ As such, territorial interests will often override those of the region at large.

¹⁸² *Interview with Amb. Dr. Hukka Wario*, Chairman, Egerton University Council, on 5th Nov 2019.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

The Horn of Africa has witnessed significant conflicts and disputes over territories and borders for instance, maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia, Ogaden dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Ilemi Triangle between Kenya and South Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea post secession conflict and Kenya-Uganda conflict in 1976.¹⁸⁵ The dispute between Kenya and Uganda over the Migingo Island where the two countries were competing for that resource almost saw the two countries fall into a conflict.¹⁸⁶

Kenya and Somalia are currently having a maritime border dispute with and a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This raging Indian Ocean maritime dispute has been existing since 2014. The conflict has been underneath since the 1960s over common border widely known as the Shifta war, 1963-67. The two countries decided to settle the dispute through legal instruments in 1979, 1989 and 2005 which saw Kenya establish its maritime boundary in its Exclusive Economic Zone and Somali didn't dispute.

In 2009, Kenya negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Somalia on their common maritime border.¹⁸⁷ However, Somalia changed after realizing the presence of huge amounts of hydrocarbon deposits and the potentiality of oil in this region. In 2012-2014 period, it rejected the bilateral negotiations and the terms of the 2009 MOU and went to file the case at the ICJ in August 2014 accusing Kenya of encroaching the maritime space.

The implication of the pursuit of territorial interest is that states often stand their ground which may lead to interstate disputes. In the case of Kenya and Somalia, this pursuit has resulted

¹⁸⁵ Clapham Christopher. "*Boundary and Territory in the Horn of Africa.*" (1996): 237-250.

¹⁸⁶ Okumu Wafula. "*Resources and Border Disputes in Eastern Africa.*" *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4, no. 2 (2010): 279-297.

¹⁸⁷ Kenya and Somalia Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to grant to each other no-objection in respect of submissions on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Nairobi, 7 April 2009, retrieved from <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202599/v2599.pdf>, on 10th November, 2019.

in a diplomatic row between the two countries and this not only affects the bilateral relations between the two but also extends to the region relationships since countries may not only split to support either parties but would also how countries decide on matters affecting the region.

In an interview with a respondent from the Diplomacy Scholars Association of Kenya (DIPSAK), he argues that this territorial dispute stands as a threat to Kenya's interest to clinch the United Nations Security Council non-permanent seat for the year 2020/21 against the Djibouti.¹⁸⁸ He points on Djibouti for using this as the main tactic to win support from other countries over Kenya, especially the Arab states like the Organization of Islamic Conference and *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)* who are leaning towards Somalia due to the common religious belief.¹⁸⁹ As such, if Djibouti mobilizes enough support based on this argument, Kenya would lose this seat which may halt its personal interests.

While national self-interest is the core of power politics in international relations, cooperation and collaboration is vital for peace, security and development both regionally and internationally. A respondent to this study argues that another implication is, the pursuit of personal interests would appear to override those of the region.¹⁹⁰ For instance, this territorial row is a possible threat to the regional stability because, Kenya's threat to withdraw troops from Somalia and closure of the refugee camp could be ascribed to this maritime dispute. If it does this, the same implications highlighted under the security interests section would still apply. Further, the use of this dispute by Djibouti to campaign is an indication that the personal interests of the two states would affect their relations at a bilateral level as well as within the region.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ *Interview with DIPSAK respondent*, April 13, 2020.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

In the West African region, Nigeria and Cameroon were in a situation of mistrust and friction with each claiming the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsular until 2006 when the Greentree Agreement was secured and the region given to Cameroon.¹⁹² These interstate territorial conflicts destabilizes the regions thus affecting member states' relations and the continent at large halting peace, security and integration due to the tensions and mistrust among states.

Conclusion

This study notes that from the interviews conducted, respondents argued that regional economic institutions don't have collective interests per se as institutions. Rather, member states develop these interests and therefore there is a narrow line in distinguishing the two. This study notes that national (individual) interests of states come before that which the regional actor would prioritize. The implication of this is that states playing a key role in supporting their respective RECs in the management of conflict may find themselves as parties to conflicts/disputes in their pursuit of national interests and this may undermine the work of the regional organizations. On the positive side, some of the individual interests are at times for the greater good of the region which is something that can be commended.

¹⁹² Babatola Jadesola ET. "*Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary Dispute: The Quest for Bakassi Peninsular.*" *International Affairs and Global Strategy* 4 (2012): 81-95.

Chapter Five

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

Introduction

This section summarizes the study on the role played by individual member states in supporting sub-regional organizations in managing conflicts in Africa. It also sums up the roles played by countries identified in managing conflicts under the auspices of their respective regional organizations, specifically; Nigeria in ECOWAS, South Africa in SADC and Kenya in IGAD. Further, it will examine the implications of individual interests of states over those of the regional body. Conclusions and recommendations for the case studies will be presented in the different sections of the study.

5.1 Summary

The study sought to determine the role played by individual member states in a regional grouping in the management of conflicts in Africa and ascertain whether individual interests of states come before those of the regional actor in conflict management. This study has shown that the interests of member states precedes those of the regional institution at large hence, the main motivation for the states' involvement is to safeguard their national interests first in a regional grouping. Further, member states of RECs are the main actors who establish the guiding principles and objectives of the RECs thus, the interests of the RECs are almost similar for its member states.

RECs were initially established to advance the economic integration of their regions and improve the economic status of their member states by alleviating poverty and other economic challenges.¹⁹³ Although some RECs in Africa have maintained this agenda, with the outburst of protracted conflicts both interstate and intrastate, others took over the responsibility and

¹⁹³ African Union, "Regional Economic Communities", African Union Handbook 2020, Pg. 150. Retrieved from https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/31829-doc-au_handbook_2020_english_web.pdf on 20th June 2020.

incorporated management of conflicts in their regions to enhance peace and security for adequate regional integration for instance IGAD.

Individual member states support RECs as guided by their foreign policy which is informed by their national interests. This study showed that states have multiple membership in regional organizations to get specific benefits the organizations can offer. Further, states depend on each other for security and prosperity thus, when a neighbor is at peace, then the region will be at peace and will develop. Additionally, the objectives of states in a region are sought based on their national interests through relating with each other.

States perceived to be stronger either politically or economically have more influence in their regions and the continent at large. This influence effects the behavior of other states in the international scene and therefore, strategy is necessary for states' conduct in the international system. This study noted Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya's influence in their respective regions cannot be ignored. Further, despite the desire of to influence other actors, the state's foreign policies are aligned with the principles of the AU and their respective RECs.

This study also notes the lack of a written foreign policy document for reference and guiding states relations with each other in the political scene at the inception of the various RECs. Despite this and the fact that each president has their own style of leadership in the form of foreign policy tool that they use (economic, political, environmental or peace), their conduct in the international scene has always endeavored to seek their peace and security first.

Kenya's incentive for supporting IGAD in conflict management has been driven by the desire to attain national interests, specifically security.¹⁹⁴ This is depicted in the form of addressing the issues of refugees both as a potential security threat as well as economic burden to the country

¹⁹⁴ *Interview with Amb. Dr. Hukka Wario, Chairman, Egerton University Council, on 5th Nov 2019.*

through the refugees' camps.¹⁹⁵ The longing for a peaceful and economically integrated stable region is a reason for active involvement towards IGAD. Additionally, the desire to be a regional power in the Horn of Africa and grow its status as a significant actor has been the craving of its leaders.

The involvement by Kenya towards conflict management by IGAD was and still is a measure of safeguarding its territorial integrity and secure its economic strength in the region. This aligns with its foreign policy and the extra effort to engage in both the Sudan/South Sudan and Somalia peace processes was motivated by several factors as mentioned in the study. Kenya regards EAC as a stronger regional actor than IGAD when addressing economic issues over and vice versa when addressing security and development matters. Therefore, the motivation by states in sub-regional conflict management is comprised of multiple issues that states seek to attain.

Member states have an important role in supporting regional conflict management mechanisms. The study establishes that Kenya has been supporting IGAD's peace and security efforts largely. Despite the weight it bears, costs and the consequences that comes with its role in enhancing peace in the region, Kenya cannot and should not stop supporting this regional body since the investment made is already huge and opting out will be a loss for it. Emphasis is made that as long as there is peace, Kenya will continue growing economically and its status will increase. Therefore, it is worthwhile for it to continue supporting regional peace and security.

¹⁹⁵ Op Cit 178 UNHCR Operational Update, "*Sub Office Dadaab, Kenya*," April 2020.

5.2 Conclusion

This study deduces several conclusions as follows:

States will prioritize their interests in their conduct in the international system. States seek to achieve their national interests through regional groupings and their support of regional conflict mechanisms is primarily to avert any threat to their national interests.

A state's foreign policy must advance its interests, peace and security relations with other countries. States are part of the global village and countries are linked through sharing of borders and other external relations such as trade, cultural exchange, multiple ethnic communities in different countries therefore, a peaceful world is in the interest of each state for attaining these interests. This study also established that the core policy tool in the conduct of foreign policy is promoting and pursuing national interests. Therefore, national interest is not an end to itself but a means to an end. As such this study tested the first hypothesis that *significant involvement in regional grouping's quest for peace and security is driven mainly by national interests*.

Further, in establishing the link between foreign policy, third party mediation and national interest, this study demonstrated the link between foreign policy and national interests. Therefore, third party mediation is part of the tools that states use to advance their policies in the pursuit of interests. As such, this study conclusively argues that Kenya's involvement in active conflict management practices as a third-party intervener either through mediation or peacekeeping operations is a way of advancing its policies.

In testing the second hypothesis; "*Multiple state membership in RECs limits their full support to RECs conflict management roles*", this study established that states have multiple membership to the various RECs thus there is conflict of interests causing them not to give their all into RECs works. Moreover, identified states playing an extra role in sub-regional conflict

management do have internal interests as well as challenges that at times causes a shift of their priorities and the actions. Priority is given to individual interests over the collective interests should the states feel that their security is threatened. This study noted that some of the individual member states priorities incorporates what would be the desirable state of the region thus, the implications do not have a negative facet only but a positive one too.

The study also established that before and during the Cold War era, state relations were more political in nature and that political diplomacy was being pushed more. However, after the cold war, the global arena started witnessing a state of relative peace and states began embracing economic diplomacy; using economic relations to further their foreign policy. Economic diplomacy especially for Kenya has been emerging as the strongest arm of diplomacy in its foreign policy.

In IGAD region, Kenya is a strong actor because it has been relatively stable politically with no successful coup and omitting the 2007 post-election violence, Kenya hasn't had a major conflict. Additionally, it has been involved in several peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and diplomatic works as well as having the headquarters of several international organizations which makes it an ideal place to make peace and facilitating efforts towards the same.

5.3 Recommendations

This study recommends to the individual member states that the governments need to have a clear guideline of their national interests that would help streamline their involvement in the peace and conflict management mechanisms in their respective regions. Kenya specifically needs to be clear on its national interests and what specifically guides its involvement in the promotion of peace in the Horn of Africa.

5.3.1 RECs to strengthen self-reliance financially and avoid reliance on external sources

This study has established that a major setback for RECs in the management of conflicts in their regions is major dependence on the member states and/or external actors for financial contribution for their activities. Khadiagala submits that, most of RECs in Africa are lack sufficient according to the international standards.¹⁹⁶ RECs lack their own support system and most of the member states do not submit their contributions as expected. This slows down and affects the necessary arrangements required to enhance peace in the region. As such, this is what puts the weight on individual member states in the region causing them to safeguard their own interests.

Additionally, RECs reliance on external funders for its activities limits their performance in their regions. In IGAD's case, "Friends of IGADD" were the initial funders of the institution and its efforts of peacemaking and integration.¹⁹⁷ After restructuring to IGAD, the donor group metamorphosed into IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) to become more formal in its function. With heavy reliance of funding from external actors, IGAD's authority is questioned in that, instead of shielding the region from external actors' meddling, it has become a channel to enhance their influence.¹⁹⁸ As such, IGAD is seen as a facilitator of the foreign policy desires of the funders thus questioning its domestic legitimacy and influence. RECs must find ways to stop depending largely on the contributions of their member states in order to achieve their mandate.

5.3.2 States to strike a balance between national and regional interests

States should be cautious in prioritizing the desires of prestige over the well-being of their citizens by risking their peace and security for instance, giving the "big brother" role to other

¹⁹⁶ Khadiagala Gilbert, "Regional Cooperation and Democratization Conflict Management in Africa". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018. Pg. 2. Retrieved 21st May 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_327_Khadiagala_Africa_Interior_Final.pdf

¹⁹⁷ El-Affendi, Abdelwahab, "The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan; the Limits of Regional Peacemaking?" 2001. African Affairs, Vol. 100, no. 401, Pg. 583

¹⁹⁸ Mengisteab Kidane, "The Horn of Africa". John Wiley & Sons, 2013. Pg. 14.

member states at the expense of their citizens. In support of this, Inno argues in the case of Nigeria that, it should focus on promoting African Unity and not policing African Unity.¹⁹⁹ States must not bear the weight of policing African Unity rather, they should leave that greater mandate to the AU.²⁰⁰ Over involvement of individual states in regional security creates further avenues for attacks from other actors and insecurity issues that would jeopardize state security as in the case of Kenya and Nigeria. This study therefore recommends that states should prioritize internal security rather than prestige and fame in the regions.

Additionally, the credibility of individual states playing a leading role in conflict management is in question due to internal governance issues and democratic weakness resulting from conflicts. These states are also tainted due to massive corruption and exploitation of state institutions which undermines their positions as models of well-governance in their regions and in Africa thus inhibiting their influence in RECs.

Further, states should avoid imposing military solutions to other regional member states' internal affairs to minimize threats of being perceived as hegemons. Rather, they should use more of diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy in addressing internal affairs of other states and encourage the use of dialogue instead of violence. States are encouraged to continue supporting RECS and the conflict management mechanisms set in place to help create competitive sub-regions. Member states should continue collaborating to improve relations and prioritize the implementation of the REC policies such as trade, transport and security among themselves.

¹⁹⁹ Inno Ukoeja, "*Nigeria's Security and the Great Power Politics*," 1998. Nigerian Journal of International Studies, Volume 12, pp. 70-77.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

5.3.3 RECs to review their guiding principles

RECs have comprehensive frameworks for addressing multifaceted threats in their regions but implementation of the same remains futile.²⁰¹ RECs should occasionally assess their guiding principles, clearly defining their interests in the region so as to incorporate and seek the political will of member states to commit to the agreement on paper and see implementation through military cooperation with the aim of promoting economic integration, peace and security.

Regional norms thrive well in the presence of good interstate relations as well as states respecting regional institutions. RECs are marred by intra and inter-state conflicts among member states and leadership contests within the institutions.²⁰² There is also need for conflict resolution and democratic governance institutions to enhance stability and recovery from the conflict cycle. RECs should work on establishing institutions informed by shared values and identities that will enhance regional preparedness on mediation and early warning mechanisms to minimize recurring conflicts in their regions. RECs should focus on their institution building since most are weak in their capacity²⁰³ and have a small and overwhelmed number of secretariat which limits their functional capacity.

²⁰¹ Op Cit 134, Healy Sally. "*Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security in the Horn of Africa.*" (2009) Pg. 15.

²⁰² Op Cit 196, Khadiagala Gilbert, "*Regional Cooperation and Democratization Conflict Management in Africa*". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018. Pg. 2.

²⁰³ International Peace Academy, "*Building Peace in Eastern Africa*", December 2002, Pg. 23. Retrieved from https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/building_peace.pdf on 21st June 2020.

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS

1. In your opinion, what are the policy/priorities for Kenya’s involvement in conflict management in the Horn of Africa?

Explain.....
.....

2. What has been Kenya’s contribution to IGAD in respect to peace, security and conflict management?

.....
.....

3. What do you think are the collective interests of IGAD as a region in relation to peace and security?

.....
.....

4. In supporting IGAD in conflict management, is Kenya prioritizing its national interests or IGAD’s interests?

.....
.....

5. Do you think Kenya is using third party mediation in the Horn of Africa to attain its own interest? How successful/unsuccessful has this been?

.....
.....

6. What role has Kenya played in the Sudan/Somali Peace process both under the auspices of IGAD?

.....
.....

7. What are the implications of Kenya's national interests in IGAD's Peace and Security agenda?

.....
.....

8. Has IGAD been effective in the management of conflicts in the Horn of Africa?

.....
.....

9. Do you think Kenya has been successful in ensuring stability of the Horn of Africa through IGAD?

.....

Is it worthwhile for it to continue supporting IGAD?

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