

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI



INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN MULTI-AGENCY SECURITY
OPERATIONS IN EASTERN AFRICA: A CASE OF KENYA DEFENCE
FORCES**

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DECLARATION

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I, Thomas Kiplangat Bor, hereby announce that this thesis is my creative work and has not been submitted for graduation or diploma in any institution.

Signed.....Date.....

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This proposal, with my consent and advice as university supervisor, was submitted for review.

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DEDICATION

This project is devoted to my dear wife Caro and children Brian, Corazone, Roy and Blessings for their continuous inspiration, encouragement and patience during my one year of intensive study and research at the Kenya Defence Staff College (DSC).

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ABSTRACT

This study was intended mainly at identifying elements affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations in Eastern Africa and to ascertain the nature and rationale of the mechanisms and strategies used in Kenya. This study therefore aims to make an impact to the national security organs on policy formulation process by explaining the determinants of military participation in internal security actions in the face of new security threats. The study adopted a case study approach that is best suited to the study of individual cases and included research design, techniques and tools for collecting data, sampling frames and analyzing and presenting data. The results of this study reaffirm that an acceptable and efficient multi-agency security operations strategy in Kenya and East Africa must be multidimensional, involving both non-state and state players in the combat against insecurity and terrorism through a combined effort. The study recommended development of a national multi-agency security operations and a new strategy to combat terrorism in Kenya and Eastern Africa.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA: Africa Contingency Operations Assistance and Training

AMISOM: African Union „Peacekeepers“ sent to Somalia

AU: African Union

CT: Counter – Terrorism

DoS: United States Department of State

EAC: East African Community

GoK: Government of Kenya

GWoT: Global War on Terror

HOA: Horn of Africa

ICISS: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

ICPAT: Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism

ICU: Islamic Courts Union

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

JIATFs: Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces

KDF: Kenyan Defence Forces

KECOSCE: Kenya Community Support Center

MHR: Muslim for Human Rights

NCTC: National Counter-Terrorism Center

NSAC: National Security Advisory Committee

NSA: Non-state Actors

SUPKEM: Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims

TFG: Transitional Federal Government

UN: United Nations

US: United States

USAID: United States AID

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a qualitative overview of the factors that require military forces to be involved in multi-agency security operations in Eastern Africa, particularly as a case study in Kenya. The chapter also outlines the problem statement and goals, a literature review, defines the scope under which the study is conducted, the study's justification, meaning, and limitations.

1.1 Background of the Study

Several intelligence agencies operating on different levels of organization have emerged to counter armed groups following 9/11 attacks on US soil by Al Qaeda. The U.S. government made a concerted effort in the Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI), to consolidate its intelligence and security agencies into one organization. The DNI office's principal objective was to promote the exchange of information between U.S. and Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and to an even smaller degree with other countries in one entity. On the tactical level of the Long War, US Military personnel, in collaboration with other coalition partner intelligence agencies, security agencies, and some of these host-nation security agencies, formed organized and ad-hoc Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces (JIATFs) organizations with more constrained, yet yet more focused arms fighting operations.¹

JIATF creation is based on the notion that no sort of intelligence alone can provide the most accurate picture of armed group activity. It is an all-source intelligence bundle that provides the most accurate information, except for certain specially scheduled or well-placed single-source intelligence reports. Whilst various agencies have experience in different intelligence styles, no agency has an intelligence all-source advantage, making coordination and de-confliction critical for generating reliable and actionable intelligence.

¹ *World defense reconsideration: an African outlook?* , Heinrich Boll Foundation, East and Horn of Africa District Office, Nairobi.

Further, Africa's persistent instability has incorporated the continent into the security architecture of the international system. On the other hand, however, there is very little understanding of what Africa is, for most people in Europe or the West (as it is popularly known) let alone the United States of America (USA) and these two areas happen to be the ones that shaped most of the past of Africa. Faced with many traditional and non-traditional security threats, Africa is now experiencing an emerging sub-regional, regional and international awareness of how it can ensure security and harmony on the continent and add to the realization of international security and peace. To this end, the African Union (AU) appears to have embraced, among other theoretical approaches, a constructivist approach to realizing the peace, security, and stability of the continent, effectively initiating a new paradigm in its thinking on security and development.

For some time now, the African landscape has been characterized by various types of conflict, including armed and violent ones. Some of the conflicts have spanned from the beginning of independence, and even earlier. With the establishment of the African Union in 2002, it was hoped that the organization would move the continent towards a new level of coordination and cooperation in addressing the problems of Africa, including conflicts.²

Eastern Africa applies to the Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Uganda geographical area of the seven IGAD member states. As it has had long-standing political and historical relations with Uganda and Kenya, Tanzania is also included in East African Cooperation (EAC). Economic and political fragility, environmental degradation and lack of resources are the key challenges to human security in this area.³

In East Africa and the Horn of Africa (HOA), chronic unrest plagues the country as one of the most conflict-prone areas world-wide. This is due to chronic political instability, a huge inflow of refugees, humanitarian crisis, illegal migration, and

² Owuor, P.O. *Securing Peace in Africa; The Role of Institutional Frameworks and Coordination Mechanisms*, unpublished M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2015.

³ Khadiagala (2008)

insecurity at sea. All of these factors threaten the region's security, peace, and stability, resulting in multi-agency efforts to curb the threat. There is a lot of pressure on both the countries involved and their neighbors to test their national ability and resilience vulnerabilities. States also are not able to address the needs of local communities and political uncertainty aggravates secondary needs.

As a result of national and local grievances, inter-state regional rivalries, and identity politics, each of the East African countries has experienced protracted political conflict. The emergence of Somalia's Islamic Courts Union, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, the US targeting of alleged Al Qaeda leaders, the ten-decade war in Somalia, and the post-election unrest in Al-Shabaab, Kenya, and a recent skirmish in the Sudan-South Sudan have contributed to several instances of significant unrest and turmoil in the region that has contributed to multi-agency security operations.

Somalia's tragedy is at the heart of multi-agency security operations development. Beginning in 1991, the relentless brutal civil war paved the way for contemporary violence and instability. Terror in Somalia has been featuring in international headlines continuously over the past two decades. During the civil war, this entails state terrorism with the battle between clans and the humanitarian disaster. Domestic terror is due to the State's failure to prevent the state's geographical boundaries from becoming a terror breeding ground and ultimately global terror from which coordinated attacks can be carried out, as is evident from the 1998 terror campaign on the US embassy in Kenya.⁴

Another example is the assault on Westgate shopping mall in Kenya in 2013, where the government of Kenya was caught on their own.⁵ Al-Shabaab took accountability and said that it was also a response to military actions in Somalia by Kenya. This instance involves numerous attacks in Kenya as domestic and external factors determine the national security of Kenya, hence the need to join hands in

⁴ Thomson, Alex, "Somalia's Taliban?" Channel 4, 6 June 2006. Retrieved on 10 May 2019, from <http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/taliban+somalias/16555>;

⁵ New York Times, "Gunmen Kill Dozens in Terror Attack at Kenyan Mall", 21 September 2013. Retrieved on 10 May 2019, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/world/africa/nairobi-mall-shooting.html?pagewanted=all>

multi-agency security operations. The government is responsible for ensuring the preservation and sustainability of national interest by removing a risk that threatens the security and wellbeing of its people. Incidents such as the latest effort to bomb the convoy to the Mandera Governor in 2015 have made multi-agency security operations more vigilant in curbing insecurity and terror,⁶ And the attack that killed 148 students at Garissa University. Such brutal and relentless attacks are a clear indication of the need for multi-agency security operations to hire, train and carry out attacks in Kenya and the government's ability to fight them.⁷

Despite the evident merits of the data exchange at all conflict levels, cooperation between international agencies and inter-agencies is obstructed. Such problems are caused by want or by a lack of determination. Some of the impediments related to capability include regulations preventing the exchange of information, or at least the disclosure of information sources and resources; technical challenges such as fireworks between various agency databases; communication difficulties; and a shortage of adequately qualified staff. Besides, some multi-agency coordination missing organizational leaders who can provide the requisite skills to accomplish the numerous above-mentioned missions. While it will take some time, better infrastructure and regulations will solve those problems. Nevertheless, the issues related to the lack of desire to collaborate appear more intractable. Hypothetically there is a shortage of agencies and members can make a deliberate decision not to shape, participate or contribute significantly to a collective intelligence sharing organisation.

The approaches used by governments and multi-agency operations to counter instability and violence are most often militaristic. The research study seeks to explore the factors affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations and proposes complex, multidimensional, systematic and all-inclusive approaches, which is the case study of Kenya.

⁶ Citizen TV, "Mandera Governor Convoy Attacked By Militia," 13 March 2015. Retrieved on 10 May 2019, from <https://citizentv.co.ke/news/mandera-governor-convoy-attacked-by-militia-70028/>

⁷ Kfir, Isaac, "Islamic radicalism in East Africa: Is there a cause for concern?" Conflict and Terrorist Research 31(9), 2008: 829–55

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The primary duty of any state is, first and foremost, to protect its people, and Kenya is no exception. In this way, security agencies play a vital role throughout ensuring protection against threats to the state, whether internal or external. Multi-agency security operations are therefore of key importance in achieving this goal in today's ever-changing security environment, along with the associated challenges.

Multi-agency cooperation is essential to respond to threats against the civilian population however despite the obvious merits some obstacles remain that arise from lack of capability, a lack of will or a combination of both. In some countries and some situations, a combination of economic disparities and democratic deficits has contributed to sustained conflict, state failure, or collapse. Any form of insecurity somewhere on the globe becomes a security threat everywhere with increasing globalization hence sensitizing the need for multi-agency cooperation.

There is a continued search of an effective grand strategy towards curbing insecurity such as terrorism in the region hence the need to broaden analysis and investigate all the relevant stakeholders. Therefore, it is wise to tackle the danger of insecurity, the causes of insecurity more thoroughly and to take preventive steps that are geared towards human protection. Hence, the research seeks to analyze the factors affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations as a case study of Kenya in East Africa.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The study goals were broken down into general goals and specific goals.

1.3.1 General Objective

To investigate dynamics affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations in Eastern Africa.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives:

- i. To determine the nature and rationale for multi-agency security mechanisms used in Kenya.

- ii. To analyze factors affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations.
- iii. To evaluate the effectiveness of multi-agency security strategies used in Kenya and East Africa.

1.4 Research Questions:

The research looks into the actors in military action, multiagency security, causes of insecurity and measures adopted towards insecurity by Kenya and cooperating agencies by trying to retort the following enquiries:

- i. What is the nature and rationale for multi-agency security mechanisms used in Kenya?
- ii. What are the factors affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations?
- iii. How effective are the multi-agency security strategies used in Kenya and East Africa?

1.5 Literature Review

This chapter reviews literature on the security cooperation between multiagencies in East Africa and Kenya.

This aims to recognize and review the information and results of the different studies carried out in this area. A lot will be listed from literature review in relation to terrorism at different rates. The chapter then points out the gaps in examined literature to be found.

1.5.1 The model of security and multi-Agency security

The Chambers 21st Century English Dictionary defines the word "security" as a "state of safety ... protection from physical harm ..." and the word "free from danger ... trouble ... fear ... uncertainty or mistrust ... risk."⁸ In this way, protection can be taken to mean that it is "secure and free from risk" and means that there is no threat to the

⁸ Chambers 21st Century Dictionary of English.

international system, its countries, and individuals.⁹ The idea of security has been disputed by security experts for quite some time now.

For example, from what it used to be, an extended concept of security arose ... As a bipolar process directed against changing climate, challenges, and requirements, interaction is restructuring among states.¹⁰ This is all the more so because, in today's world, the main threats to international security stem from situations within states themselves as opposed to between states, particularly when one looks at the African experiences.

The practice of multi-agency security has a long history behind it. It ' may be interpreted as a political, regional or world security agreement, where states in the process recognize the security of one member as concerned by all of them, and therefore agree to a collective response to a threat to peace.¹¹ Multi-agency security "is not only about military intervention."¹² The main idea behind it was to have a system that ensures international peace and security since wars had wreaked havoc on humanity, as we saw in the First and Second World Wars and others before them. Accordingly, the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 and the Treaty forming the League of Nations were intended to address this question. The attempt to prevent wars proposed recognition of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent states.

These treaties, signed after the war, were aimed at safeguarding international security and peace. The most vocal individuals who contributed to the concept included Cardinal Richelieu of France, who was the King's chief adviser during the reign of King Louis III. In 1629, Cardinal Richelieu proposed a scheme for multi-agency security that, to some degree, mirrored the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. The

⁹ Nebiyou, D. T. *The United Nations Security Mechanism, and Africa: challenges and The Way forward*, Scientiae Juridicae Doctor thesis, Golden Gate University of Law, San Francisco, <http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/theses>, p1.

¹⁰ *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective?*, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa, Nairobi.

¹¹ Wikipedia accessed on 11.07.2019 at 1050hrs

¹² Damien, H. *Africa, the EU, and RTP: Towards pragmatic international Subsidiarity?* [https://library.fes.de>ipg>05_a_helly_us](https://library.fes.de/ipg>05_a_helly_us) accessed on 11.07.2019 at 1100hrs

other proponent of multi-agency security was the founder of the Bahai Faith, whose writings represented the concept of multi-agency security in the 19th century.¹³

The interpretation of the idea of "multi-agency security" tends to vary depending on the perspective from which the interlocutor looks at it and how he or she would like to implement it. The definition derives from the theory of liberal institutionalism and describes a situation in which actors within the international system ally "to counter some actor's aggression."¹⁴ The idea of multi-agency security also refers to a situation that defines a defense community where, if a non-member country attacks one within the community, the community is seen as an attack on all the others and the aggressor must oppose it.

Multi-agency security is a kind of social contract that obliges a Member State to increase its power to upset the balance of the unit, thus enabling the status quo to be maintained with the ultimate goal of stability and peace. League of Nations was established with the conclusion of the 1st World War, but it did not include all nations, and most of its members were unable to bear the cost of joint action to address the issue of violence whenever and wherever the same took place.

Nevertheless, with the formation of the UN in 1945, the body began to foster multi-agency security as set out in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. As a result, several intergovernmental organizations are engaged in multi-agency action worldwide. Amongst these are the African Union, the Arab League, the United States Party, the Asian Southeast Nations Group and the European Union.¹⁵

Some of these bodies are designed to protect the Member States from attacks by other states, and a good example is the Cold War arrangement of the Warsaw Pact. NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a North American-Western Europe coalition, while the Warsaw Pact was a Soviet Union-Eastern Europe

¹³ <http://www.bahai.org/documents/the-universal-house-of-justice/promise-world-peace> accessed on 13.10.2019 at 1030hrs.

¹⁴ Joshua, G. & Pevehouse, J. *International Relations*, Noida-India, Dorling Kindersley, 2011, p90.

¹⁵ *ibid*

alliance. The reason behind this agreement is that either alliance is intended to protect its member states from attacks by the other alliance.

Multi-agency security is seen as one mechanism for the UN to intervene to tackle the danger of aggression from a state threatening international stability and peace. The UN main goal is to ensure world peace and stability Security. Agency security is one mechanism. Nevertheless, there is no consensus on what can be considered a danger to international security and stability, thereby having no level at which the UN must act.¹⁶ This leads to a lacuna that is sometimes abused by states to discourage the notion of multi-agency security under the UN framework.

With all these issues in mind, what should a comprehensive multi-agency security system be? It's a question that one would have asked. An effective multi-agency security system should be one that can deter dangers to international security and peace and be able to mediate in the undertakings of the Member State concerned.

ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) has defined intervention as an unauthorized action against the leaders of the State or the State itself, without their consent or for humanitarian or protective reasons.¹⁷ A good multi-agency security system is seen as comprising the following:

- i. A group wishing to rely on multi-agency security should have considerable military power relative to the group or groups that are responsible for the threat. The overwhelming force and strength should be apparent to the supposed aggressor or aggressor, and if it is not known to the supposed aggressor, it should be made known to the aggressor. The information so transpired should be at a point where the aggressor knows that if the force or skill is applied, the aggressor would lose. Members of the multi-agency security agreement must have a clear stance or stand against the aggressor or suspected aggressor.

¹⁶ Nebiyou, D. T. *The Defense System of the UN and Africa: problems and development*, Scientiae Juridicae Doctor thesis, Golden Gate University of Law, San Francisco

¹⁷ Ibid.

ii. Representatives of a multi-agency security agreement must refrain from taking unilateral action against the aggressor. Without the permission or authorization of other members, a member can take unilateral action on the grounds of self-defense. No manipulation of the principle should be made to give rise to the defense of self-interest

iii. The concept of true international solidarity, therefore, provides the basis for multi-agency security. This is when the international community works together to fully resolve the challenge to its security. In this case, countries are coming together for the common good of the international community and are sacrificing their national interest or interests to realize the common good in question which is under danger and thus eventually to implement the initiative aimed at restoring international justice.

For similar reasons, the United Nations has intervened in many crises to restore peace based on its responsibility to protect those whose security situation is under serious threat. This involves crimes like genocide, ethnic purging and other crimes against humanity, where it is clear that there is no willingness or incapacity for the local government to act.¹⁸ The United Nations should intervene in such situations.

In accord with Article 4 of the AU Constitutional Act, the AU has adopted a multi-agency security principle which is the UN model of 'responsibility to protect' which authorize it to hamper in in-house affairs of a Member State under circumstances that lead to unadorned human rights abuses, such as annihilation and human civil rights crimes.¹⁹

For multi-agency security to succeed, members must adopt an inward-looking policy, keep their obligations to their group and avoid them depending on the efforts of other members. The group must also agree on what constitutes and how to confront

¹⁸ <http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/theses>

¹⁹ *African Perspective Rethinking Global Security?*, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa, Nairobi.

aggression. In the case of regional organizations, multi-agency security means joining forces to address threats from non-member countries to the Member States.²⁰

In some cases, multi-agency security has been heralded for having been able to prevent wars, thereby leading to both stability and justice at the international level. However, its positive contribution has been marred by the application of unilateral actions by powerful nations that more often defy the advice of the UN or simply never consult the world body when it comes to taking certain actions that can be construed as hostile to world peace.²¹

There is a question of double standards promoted by multinational political and judicial bodies and the absence of a global police force. The UN is in charge of spearheading the new multi-agency security set up in the world. For example, in defending the countries of Kuwait and South Korea against attacks by Iraq and North Korea, the UN has invoked the principle of multi-agency security.²²

The main challenges to multi-agency security are the growing resort to unilateral action by the world's major powers, the continuing double standards of the UN and other international organizations like the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the lack of cohesion between members of the international community.

1.5.2 The Kenyan Governance System

The decentralized governance system enshrined in the new constitution of Kenya in 2010 is not a new phenomenon for the state. When the country gained independence in 1963, the then Independence Constitution adopted a governance system based on a kind of regionalism popularly known as "majimbo," a Swahili-language term for regionalism. The Constitution conferred sovereign powers on Parliament with a federal structure of seven provincial assemblies structured to provide for power-

²⁰ <http://www.bahai.org/documents/the-universal-house-of-justice/promise-world-peace> accessed on 13.10.2019 at 1030hrs.

²¹ Nebiyou D. T., *The UN Defense System and Africa: Problems and The Way*, Scientiae Juridicae Doctor thesis, Golden Gate University of Law, San Francisco

²² Ibid.

sharing.²³ The political structure was largely based on districts that were fairly reflective of the country's ethnic composition.

As Ghai and McAuslan state in their book, *Political Change and Public Law in Kenya*, the distribution of power between the center and the regions was given more in-depth than in any other commonwealth constitution.²⁴ Yet shortly after, when the governing party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), joined with President Jomo Kenyatta as leader in the antagonistic Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which initially endorsed the policy of "majimboism." From then on, the country was ruled by the one-party rule until 1992, when pluralism was restored by parliamentary legislation.

With the re-establishment of multi-party policy, calls for constitutional review, a new constitution and good governance have been made with civil society groups and donors playing a leading role. Kenya's review committee, formed by Kenya's 1997 Constitution, began the drafting process of a new constitution, but after a referendum, the 2005 draft constitution was rejected. Post-election violence in 2007 intensified the demands for a new constitution and a new constitution was eventually adopted in 2010.

The new constitution provided for the decentralization and decentralization of power.²⁵ With these provisions, it was hoped that the constitution would resolve the ills that afflicted the state. Some of these ills have been described as ethnic discrimination, numerous disparities, corruption, insecurity, poverty, among others, and allow for better, if not greater, public participation in governance and other policy-making.

In the run-up to the 2010 Constitution, a two-tiered police system provided the internal state security services; the Kenya Police Force and the Police Force for Administration. Both of these police forces were separately controlled and given

²³ *ibid*

²⁴ Yash P.Ghai and J.P.McAuslan, *Public Law and Political Change In Kenya*, Nairobi, Oxford University Press,(1970),pp196-197

²⁵ *Centre for Human Rights Studies (CHRIPS) and Policy*, November 2014, p19

separate security services. The Kenya Police Force dealt with security-related issues daily, such as the identification of crime and prosecution of criminals with the Administration Police Force, as well as the safety of government buildings and facilities.

With the new constitution of 2010, police units and intelligence services, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) underwent a reform process that culminated in the award of new titles. The National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) was renamed the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the two police units were put under one command. The overall unit set up was called the National Police Service (NPS) under the supervision of the Inspector General as the overall commander. The Administration Police Force has been renamed the Administration Police Service (APS) and the Kenya Police Force has been renamed the Kenya Police Service (KPS). With these reforms, it was expected that these two main internal security entities would be focused on human protection while providing security services to the public.²⁶

1.5.3 Nature and Rationale of Military Involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations in Kenya and East Africa

Multi-agency security programs implemented through a U.S-Africa partnership against insecurity and terror were largely influenced by empirical radicalization studies using methodologies that are suitable for multi-agency cooperation.²⁷ The aim focuses on security, sustainability, governance, and sustainable democracy issues with a specific focus on counter-extremism addressing radicalization and combating the ideology of the terrorist. Such projects specifically target populations that are deemed not to be a beneficiary of development programs and reduce their chances of engaging in poverty or violence and promoting them.²⁸

²⁶ *ibid*

²⁷ Bureau of African Affairs, "U.S. Policy in Somalia, Special Briefing by Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, and Ertharin Cousin, Ambassador to the UN Mission in Rome," Washington DC, March 12, 2010. Retrieved on 16 April 2019, from <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm>

²⁸ USAID, "Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism, 2009. Retrieved on 16 April 2019, from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadt998.pdf

Following the Kenya and Tanzania bombings, anti-terrorism campaigns and actions centered primarily on dissuading Al Qaeda and its Eastern African partners. The Department of State has been helpful of establishing the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSII) and Eastern African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), both of which are aimed at countering terrorism of East Africa.²⁹ In 2000, Somalia was targeted by special multi-agency operations because of increased exposure to insecurity and terrorist attacks. The Department of State concentrated on improving coordination between national and sub-regional bodies such as IGAD, Warlords, and the AU against instability and terror in Somalia. Further initiatives include the State Department in backing of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

The state secretary for Africa has assigned priority to counter-terrorism in Somalia in 2005 with more comprehensive policy formulation and execution processes. Somali warlords against ICU were supported by the United States and permitted the TFG to slowly gain political and military control. The United States supported the ICU. Nevertheless, supporting the US warlords did not have a secure victory because the Somalis had the ICU's power and mass support. That also encouraged the growth of ICU sharia law courts and trials.

Following the defeat of the warlords, the Secretary of State for Africa's office conducted meetings with Ethiopian leaders before Ethiopia's incursion of Somalia in 2006. The U.S. military eventually supported this.³⁰ The State Secretary and the DoS office endorsed the African Union's peacekeeping assignment in Somalia that saw the advent of AMISOM, which skilled and armed Ugandan, Burundi, and TFG troops. The program lasted until 2011, despite its ineffectiveness.

In the sense of the Bush policy on "Global War on Terror," this top-down multi-agency defense strategy could be best understood. The United States was pressured by the government to pursue peace in the region after its former state devastation ensuing

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ The briefing, US Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 14, 2012.

the US incursion of 2001 and 2003 in Afghanistan and Iraq correspondingly.³¹ After neglecting the bottom-up initiatives, the US instituted the top-down reconstruction in both countries until 2007. The US then tried this strategy in vain in Somalia before making a reproach.³²

The peace process recognizes the importance, within the continental multi-agency strategy, an inclusive Somali government that contributes to regional security in order to nurture harmony and stability in Africa an inclusive Somali government that contributes to regional security in the mandate to foster peace and stability in Africa an inclusive Somali government that contributes to regional security to foster peace and harmony in Africa, the peace process in Djibouti sustained by the Nations, the AU, the Arab League, IGAD, and countries of this region.³³ It cost the US around \$650 million from 2007 to 2012 to fund, train and assist the AMISOM forces, half of what was spent on Ugandan and Burundi forces through the ACOTA State Department initiative amid 2008 and 2011. The program aimed to weaken the Al-Shabaab that emerged in the region as a militant group. The Somali rebel groups then clashed with the Ethiopians and captured major fragments of the Somali national capital, Mogadishu, and the central port of Kismayo. Two years later, Ethiopia withdrawn support and left AMISOM and TFG troops with pint-sized hope of success. The TFG was then unable, due among other factors, to retain its government reconstruction mandate.³⁴

Also, AMISOM and TFG secured Mogadishu from the Al-Shabaab in 2011. Further gains in South Central Somalia such as Juba Land and Kismayo were made by support from Kenyan and Ethiopian forces.³⁵ The construction of an institutional

³¹ James Dobbins et al, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq," Rand, 2003

³² James Dobbins et al, "The UN's Role in Nation-building: From the Congo to Iraq", Rand, 2005.

³³ Bureau of African Affairs, "U.S. Policy in Somalia, Special Briefing by Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, and Ertharin Cousin, Ambassador to the UN Mission in Rome," Washington DC, March 12, 2010. Retrieved on 16 April 2019, from <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm>

³⁴ Le Sage, "Somalia's Endless Transition," 2010, p.1. Hawiye, Darod and Rahanwein are the leading clans in south-central Somalia. The Issak in Somaliland and the Ogaden in Ethiopia, which also cross the Kenya-Somalia border at Jubaland, are both the largest Somali clans.

³⁵ Ken Menkhaus, "After the Kenyan Intervention," Enough Project, January 2012, pp.1- 15. Retrieved on 14 April 2019, from <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/MenkhausKenyaninterventionSomalia.pdf>

structure and the election in 2012 of Somalia's president then had a good peace. While the new government was making efforts, it was not only in Somalia, but also in bordering countries, including Kenya, that Al Shabaab's work was being fought weakly, as did national security and other multi-agency combat efforts.

1.6 Justification of the Study

To the academy, this report will contribute to researchers on factors affecting military involvement in East Africa's multi-agency security operations, bridging the gaps in studies where NSAs were not included in the fight against instability and terror.

Military involvement in internal security operations (ISOPs) is unavoidable as it increasingly demonstrates the need for a higher level of aggression. The recent incidence of terrorism-related incidents in the country has further reinforced the need for military involvement in ISOPs in a multi-agency set-up by collaboration between agencies to put an end to many forms of crime, including terrorism. In contrast to the traditional silo approach, a focus on a multi-agency approach pays dividends in detecting, preventing and disrupting terrorist groups and networks ' operational objectives. It is necessary to replicate this type of approach across other regions of the country where there are security concerns, especially in making border areas secure.

This research will discuss the factors that require military involvement in internal security operations by looking at existing security agencies ' capabilities, integration with these agencies, and instances of military ISOPs in other countries, ISOP challenges, and recommendations.

This study thus seeks to contribute to the policy-making process for national security authorities, by identifying the determinants of military engagement in internal security operations in response to new security threats. Politicians can thus use the data to ensure that national security agencies will thrive by working together to counter terrorism and any other threat to the nation.

This study's conclusion and recommendations will also help formulate improved government policies and other relevant stakeholders towards military involvement in multi-agency operations.

1.7 Methodology

1.7.1 Introduction

This segment addresses the investigation methods used in the research. The study adopted an approach to case study that is best suited to the study of individual cases. It included research design, techniques and tools for collecting data, sampling frames and analyzing and presenting data.

1.7.2 Research Design

It is a clear methodical strategy to direct a project and stipulates the aims of the research, the process and the methods used to achieve the goals.³⁶ The study was conducted through case study research design to question the interplay between security agency coordination, mechanisms, and information management in providing a safe environment for Africa with special emphasis on Kenya. The study design has been selected because it is best suited for performing, among other situations, in-depth and detailed analyses of individual situations such as series, social groups or independent units.

1.7.3 Research Method

The Case Study approach was the overall framework used for the study. A questionnaire survey was used for the collection of data as well as interviews and the use of secondary and primary sources.

1.7.4 Sampling Procedure

The study used the methodology of census survey because when a researcher has arrived at a decision on the use of sampling in the process of designing a field study, he or she has to determine whether to cover all or a small part of the units involved. If all the units have to be tested, the sample form used here which amounts to a full survey is the census survey, and where only one sample of the units is chosen, then the study involved is the sample survey which includes the gathering of first-hand information on field study units.

³⁶ Krishnaswami O.R. and Ranganatham, M. *Methodology of Research in the Social Sciences*, Mumbai, Himalaya Publishing House, 2011, p108.

Study units may include the aspects covered by the study that involve or are available for data. The population or universe as the category to be analyzed is the exhaustive sum of the units that contribute to the analysis. A member is referred to as an entity and is calculated as the subject. The aspect is the unit being studied. The survey is what makes up part of the population.³⁷

A sample is a representative part of a community.³⁸ Without studying the whole population from whose study it is possible to know about a population. Other writers define a sample as "the whole group's miniature representation."³⁹

1.7.5 Sample Population

A mockup is part of the overall populace and is a smaller subgroup of the population as a whole. The study targeted some African Union headquarters representatives that the researcher had the opportunity to visit and have a discussion with their officials on the activities of the AU, especially in dealing with conflicts and other crisis situations on the African continent.

The study mostly targeted members of the republic's major security agencies; the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), and the National Police Service (NPS), as stated in Chapter Fourteen on National Security in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 from Article 247 to Article 238. The study also targeted a select sample of government department officers who were taken as part of the country's police agencies, as stated elsewhere in this study.

Certain state agencies included the Ministry of Interior and National Government Coordination, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Department of Immigration, the Kenya Wildlife Service, the Kenya Maritime Agency, the Kenya Airport Authority, the National Youth Service, Kenya's Department of Fisheries, Judiciary, Kenya Forest Service, Kenya Revenue Authority, National Environment and Management Authority, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, Kenya

³⁷ Op.cit. Krishnaswami, O.R.and Ranganatham, M.

³⁸ Peters, C.B. *A Guide to Academic Writing*, Eldoret, Zapf Chancery, 2011.

³⁹ Singh, T., Shah, D., Gupta, P., *Principles of Thesis Writing*, Mumbai, Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers, 2008.

Private Security Guards, Kenya Citizenship Overall and the Private Security Regulatory Authority.

1.7.6 Accessible Population

The target population was limited to a select few members of the security agencies as well as technocrats within the relevant ministries due to the sensitive nature of the target population. These representatives included those responsible for overseeing the numerous planning and management systems set up to achieve the desired goals.

1.7.7 Sampling Technique

A survey method was chosen due to the small number of players expected within the population size. This strategy was chosen because it is easy to administer because all those appointed at both administrative and lower levels have equal opportunities to participate.

1.7.8 Sample Frame

The study comprised of members of key security agencies including those in coordination and information management roles in the central management committees. Thanks to their experiential experience and exposure to safety issues, the sample was chosen.

1.7.9 Case Study Method

There are different definitions and interpretation of what is or what is implied by a case study process. It was described by some writers as "a comprehensive study of an individual, group, episode, situation, procedure, system, culture, institution or any other special unit."⁴⁰ It is characterized by other scholars as an exhaustive, concise, and all-inclusive review of an individual whose object is a comprehensive study aimed at

⁴⁰ Op.cit. Krisnaswami O.R. and Ranganatham, M.

gaining insight into larger cases.⁴¹ A case study is characterized as an all-inclusive analysis by a social unit, be it a individual, a community, a group or a community.⁴²

1.7.10 Data Collection Techniques

Data from a number of primary and secondary sources was collected and included official documents from the areas that constitute the study at global, international, regional, sub-regional and national level for Kenya's case study as a country where appropriate. Questionnaires were prepared for specific target populations for primary data collection purposes and will be administered personally. This meant that the target demographic will be presented.

1.8 Limitation and Scope of the Study

The investigation sought information from several security sector stakeholders in Kenya, particularly those directly involved in internal security operations. The report also explored the capacities of all security agencies to counter emerging security threats and the reasons that contributed to military integration to assist other security agencies in setting up multi-agency. Work was limited to just 2 months.

The researcher anticipated that it would be difficult to obtain honest information from the respondents due to fear of the unknown, but the researcher ensured that the study would be used exclusively for educational purposes. Furthermore, the information needed for the analysis was confidential and collected from the government, which were willing to share the same information because of national security concerns. In this case, it was appropriate to use open-source data to address this situation. Time and money were also be anticipated as limitations.

A case study was taken as a common research method that helps provide insight into a unit being studied along with the interactions between factors informing its current status or growth. The method helps to provide insight into normal or extreme cases whose particular characteristics cannot be given by the regular statistical

⁴¹ Yuko, W. O. and David Onen(eds.), *A Guide to Writing Research; An initial researchers' handbook*, Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2009.

⁴² Young, P.V., Scientific Social Surveys and Research in Peters, C.B., *A Guide to Academic Writing*, Eldoret, Zapf Chancery, 1994.

method. Therefore, a case study offers in-depth information about the unit being investigated, which can also provide an avenue or avenues, suggestions or hints for further analysis or research.

While other approaches can only provide limited data, a case study allows the phenomenon under analysis to be "intensively studied," which other research or study methods can ignore. Smaller samples are used for in-depth research, are multi-modified, practical, concise and 'want to know something rather than know more about it.' A case study approach may be used to establish new hypotheses or test current theories.

CHAPTER TWO

MULTI-AGENCY SECURITY COOPERATION MECHANISMS IN KENYA

2.0 Introduction

Though Kenya appears ready to rid itself of terror threats for security and economic reasons, it is very imperative to change the approach to multi-agency cooperation for a holistic grand strategy. This is because in Section 3.1 of Chapter three in Kenya there are still many factors listed as causes and facilitators for instability and terrorism. Chief among them are Islamic radicalization, violent extremism, weak socio-economic conditions in the world that make young people vulnerable to cause insecurity and terrorist recruitment, dysfunctional neighbors (Somalia and Sudan) and porous borders between Somalia and Kenya, which should be tackled systematically.

In the last chapter we discovered that most approaches to multi-agency cooperation in East Africa and Kenya on a national, local and global scale are a short-term approach, militaristic, state-centric and often fail to tackle the root causes of insecurity and terrorism. It is crucial that we develop a holistic strategy with less reactive and militaristic strategies to effectively tackle the threat on a long-term basis. The strategy encompasses all relevant stakeholders, including NSAs, and facilitates policy harmonization among non-state and government players and addressing the basis of insecurity and terrorism.

This chapter explores active, multi-agency cooperation in Kenya and offers the basis for a great strategy which will include initiatives to cooperate multiple agencies of the Kenya Government, NGOs, religious groups, the affected communities, the victims' families. It will discuss the factors that influence military participation in multi-agency security activities in this study. We also describe a major strategy for East Africa involving processes that are the product of a thorough study of the bases of instability and extremism in the area.

2.1 Roles and Collaborations in Multi-Agency Operations

The key for an important approach to discourse the root grounds of violence and terrorism successfully, like violent extremism, Islamic radicalization and deprived socio-economic conditions, are Kenya-Nazi partnerships and government harmonization, including NGOs, the Administration, private and religious groups.

2.1.1 Private Sector Role in Multi-Agency Operations

As well as having the ability to be resourceful in fighting terror, the private sector may serve as a catalyst or resource for insecurity and terror.⁴³ It has been reported that the financial institutions of the private sector⁴⁴ and innovations in technology⁴⁵ It also helps to run extremists. However, it has also been recognized that terrorism has many impacts on the private sector, including property loss and increased corporate cost. Via the partnership of digital technology companies with government agencies, the private sector would make the commitment to counter-terrorism a basis for technical innovation to boost the capabilities of the security forces. It will also create collaboration with local government firms to minimize financial flows for extremists.⁴⁶

In 2011, private security undertakings joined government agencies to ensure that the property of the Kenyans is secure, with growing insecurity and terror attacks. Such private multi-agency security cooperation have assisted in sharing information, surveillance, defense, and property protection, all of which work to support national security. It can be seen in the complete and strongly detailed security inspection

⁴³ Neal, S., As Usual Business? Enhance the private sector in the war against terrorism. *Terrorist Outlook*, 2(3). (2019). Checked from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/31/html>

⁴⁴ Kenya is shutting down financial companies with extremist ties. *Industry practice*. (2016). Retrieved 20 September 2019, from http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-cracks-down-on-financial-firms-over-terror-links115040800973_1.html

⁴⁵ The director of intelligence, claims new encryption technology protects terrorists. *The analysis of Christian science*. (2016). Retrieved 20 September 2019, from http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitor_breakfast/2016/0425/Newencryption-technology-is-aiding-terrorists-intelligence-director-says

⁴⁶ Nairobi, Kenya, 25–28 June 2015 Regional Conference on Violent Extremism Kenyatta International Conference Centre, "Outcome Paper / Improved Collaboration in Violent Extremism Monitoring"

carried out by the private police at the entrance of most cooperative and business buildings. However, the prevalence of private police in Kenya's towns and metropolitan centers greatly outstrips public police.

In April 2015, following the attack on Garissa University, Kenya's government published a list of private organizations that were deemed financially capable to have supported terrorists.⁴⁷ However, several of these entities have contravened and subsequently delisted the financial regulations of Kenya. In advanced security and terrorism-related work, academic institutions including private universities and private institutes in Kenya are actively involved.

2.1.2 Role of NGOs in Multi-Agency Operations

In close partnership among NGOs and the Government of Kenya, there is enormous interest. This is based on the fact that these non-governmental organizations have extensive expertise in promoting neighborhood and family services, which can lead the basic social organizing units to a multi-agency partnership.⁴⁸ NGOs to have the ability to campaign against the methods used by extremists for mass indoctrination and mobilization.⁴⁹ Kenya's government has the opportunity to give priority to assisting NGOs in ensuring and improving successful local multi-agency security operations. Collaboration between government and NGO on "points-of-contact" facilitates healthy de-radicalization for friends, family members and neighbors of the persons concerned.⁵⁰

Kenya's NGOs are instrumental in providing programs that are funded by funds supported by Kenya's donors and the government, they contribute to resolving social

⁴⁷ Kenya's business standard has a terrorist attack on financial firms. (2016). Retrieved 20 September 2019, from http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-cracks-down-on-financial-firms-over-terror-links115040800973_1.html

⁴⁸ OSCE ODIHR., The role of civil society in the prevention of terrorism and informal work, 14-16 March 2007, Barcelona, Spain, Report, ODIHR.GAL/34/07, 16 May 2007, Retrieved 20 September 2019, from http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/05/24495_en.pdf

⁴⁹ *ibid*

⁵⁰ Panel on Violent Extremism International Conference, "Outcome Document - Deepening Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism," Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 to 28 June 2015

and economic issues that are deliberated a critical component of root causes of poverty and terrorism.⁵¹ Such NGOs were also crucial in monitoring the government's multi-agency security operations to ensure people's rights and security. In the outcome of incidences of terror and counter-terrorism, additional health-oriented agencies play a significant role in the rehabilitation and response phases of health emergencies.

Examples of effective multi-agency security operational projects include, but are not limited to, East African NGOs: the Africa Peace Advocate who work in Somalia, Africa and Djibouti with extremism and radicalization communities; the Peace League Africa which coordinates with Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea communities; Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum (UMYDF) working on comprehensive agendas aimed at de-radicalizing, counter-violent extremist messages, improving religious literateness that promotes unity, fights and counteracts vicious fanaticism; Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE) in Kenya's coastal region; and Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya (SUPKEM).⁵²

An NGO, Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE), founded in 2006, has been actively active in activities to improve community resilience to insecurity and terror. In particular, the Center helped to recognize radicalized youth and others at risk of radicalisation or recruitment; Engaged in effective group and psychological mentoring and support; engaged in monitoring and tracking online media content deemed abortive; workshops on de-radicalization; and forums on radicalization awareness; and systemic interaction with serious dependence.⁵³ KECOSCE is part of

⁵¹ Lind, J. and Howell, J., Civil society responses in Kenya: counter-terrorism and aid policies. *Change and Development*, 41: 335–353. (Hague, 2010) doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01637.x

⁵² Ahmed, Hadji., Ndugwa, Hassan., CSO Position Against Violent Extremism (CVE)-Case of the Eastern African Region Actors. (Umydf, 2016) Retrieved Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://umydf.org/downloads/Role%20of%20CSOs.pdf>

⁵³ The role of civil society in combating terrorism, study PTSS 16-12 Marshall Center... (2016). Retrieved 17 September 2019, from <http://www.marshallcenter.org/MCPUBLICWEB/de/nav-main-more-employmentde/62-cat-english-en/cat-gcmc-pao-en/cat-gcmc-pao-news-en/2028-ar-news-2-25-jul-16-en.html>

the Kenya Peace Network, partners with other civil society organizations. KECOSCE is active in radio and television harmony and public recognition of peace initiatives.⁵⁴

Besides, KECOSCE provides support for the future of unemployed and underemployed young people through schooling, employment and internship/learning. KECOSCE is dedicated to community-based policing initiatives aimed at ensuring public safety at local level and promoting effective urban government. Advocacy ensures basic programs are offered including tracking and reporting on unethical practices.

In 1973, the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) was formed to resolve the issues facing Muslims and to provide a productive platform for social and economic support. In partnership with the state, donors and community authorities, SUPKEM has dedicated itself to advocacy and awareness-raising initiatives and economic empowerment. Over the years, SUPKEM has sturdily urged the Muslim community not to question the awareness through formal institutions but to make sure that they are trained. SUPKEM has continuously worked to build networks with relevant organizations, institutions, and agencies at various levels of society governance, as well as exchanging insightful data strategically with other credible stakeholders.⁵⁵ SUPKEM plays the leading role of the National Charter of Advocacy and Transparency in countering violent extremism in an initiative by multi-agency security.⁵⁶

SUPKEM's goal is to educate religious leaders to combat aggressive and radicalized hate messages. It shares tactical expertise with higher education institutions and promotes peaceful coexistence between nationals. The country continues to face the task of harmonizing relationships with many NGOs engaged in multi-agency security work in Kenya, as well as tracking and updating programs

⁵⁴ Center for Community Support in Kenya- 2013 - (KECOSCE, 2013). Retrieved 17 September 2019, from http://www.kecosce.org/downloads/kecosce_organizational_annual_report_2013.pdf

⁵⁵ Arcworld., MDGS Strategic Strategy & Move from the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims to SDGS. (2015) Retrieved 17 September 2019, from <http://www.arcworld.org/downloads/SUPKEM.pdf>

⁵⁶ Kenya International Center to Fight Incitation and Violent Extremism. Kenya 's National Workshop | ICCT. (2014). Icct.nl. Retrieved 17 September 2019, from <https://icct.nl/update/icct-works-with-uncted-on-counterterrorism-in-nairobi/>

produced by those NGOs, given the efforts made by the government-NGO partnership in Kenya.

2.1.3 Role of Internet and Media in Multi-Agency Security Operation

Social media and the internet are available to mass culture and extremists, as study and reality show.⁵⁷ Terrorism and security trends have evolved in modern times, in part as a consequence of the emerging technology and the growing global power that they dominate in the media market.⁵⁸

Extremists typically use social media for recruitment. This includes analysis of common practice in internet usage, related technologies and multi-agency security media to improve the part of the Internet and media in successful multi-agency security operations. Today, it was important for the government, media outlets and other significant players to monitor the exploitation and usage of social media and the Internet to organize and employ, and to collaborate with terroristic groups to reduce the supply of the media resources.⁵⁹

More often than not, the press is criticized for serving as a terror trigger. This is due to the psychological effect of the news of traumatic incidents of violence and tactical avoidance of reporting terrorist's political order.⁶⁰ And the media is regarded as the strongest friend of the attacker.⁶¹ Coverage from the Westgate bout on social media and news outlets, evidently helped terrorists build intellectual momentum, generating panic and disinformation globally and internationally.

⁵⁷ Cha, V. D., "Globalization and the Study of International Security," *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3), (2000)

⁵⁸ Cronin, A. K., "Behind the Curve, Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security*, 27(3), (2003)

⁵⁹ Regional Conference on Violent Extremism Prevention, "Outcome Document - Deepening Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism," Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 to 28 June 2015

⁶⁰ Peter Orendo, "Tears as blast victims commemorate 1998 bombing," *East African Standard*, August 7th 2011.

⁶¹ Walter, Laqueur., *Terrorist age: fanaticism and mass destruction weapons*. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987)

Never before and after the 9/11 attack has media power in multi-agency operation been dramatically demonstrated as the position of media.⁶² The Kenyan government has also used social media creatively to deflate pervert nationalist ideologies and solidify the message of universality, tolerance, equity, inclusion and democracy as the framework for the common humanity.

2.2 Multi-Agency Security in Kenya

Tactical measures to help Kenya and other Eastern African countries fight terror were taken after 9-11 by western countries, and particularly by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. In terms of strategic preparations, arms and other logistics assistance, they have supported numerous successive eastern African governments. Since AMISON was formed and security forces have been deploying in Kenya, Burundi, Uganda and Ethiopia, helping to preserve the peace against Al-Shabab and other militant groups in Somalia.

The EU has prepared and equipped the Somali National Army to support the transitional government of Somalia. In 2011, following a militant assault on vital facilities, aid workers and tourists were kidnapped in Kenya previously involved in Somalia. Kenya has tried to safeguard its vital political, national and security interests. This has resulted in a backlash from heightened militant attacks on Kenya's soil over the year.⁶³

Kenya's government has set up several military counter-terrorism organizations, including but not restricted to the National Security Intelligence Service, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the National Counter-Terrorism Center, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the National Security Advisory Committee.⁶⁴

⁶² Nacos, Brigitte L. and Oscar Torres-Reyna. 2002. "Muslim Americans in the News before and after 9-11." Prepared for presentation at the Symposium "Restless Searchlight: Terrorism, the Media & Public Life," co-sponsored by the APSA Communication Section and the Shorenstein Center at the John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University.

⁶³ Mohochi, S. 'Counter-terrorism preventive measures': Kenya Case Study. Electronic Journal. Retrieved 16 September 2016, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228214415_'Preventive_Counter_Terrorism_Action'_Case_Study_of_Kenya

⁶⁴ *ibid*

Such existing agencies have incorporated full harmonization among themselves in a comprehensive military approach to prevent and counter-terrorist attacks in advance. Improved deployment of security forces in areas that are at risk of terror; constructing defensive walls and fortified border patrols on the Kenya-Somali boundary to bar terrorists; creating the 'Nyumba Kumi Program' to allow Kenyans to identify their neighbours, monitor suspicious fellows and actions and enhanced military budgets. Improved defense budgets.⁶⁵

2.3 Multi-Agency Security Operation Grand Strategy for East Africa and Kenya

Following the 9/11 incident, Kenya's government affirms support for enhanced and inclusive global support in the fight counter to insecurity and terror by UN Resolution 1373.⁶⁶ State has ratified and signed international and regional agreements and resolutions involving counter-terrorism. The State has also actively engaged in the implementation and use of legislative initiatives to ensure that the multi-agency security activity approaches comply with UN instruments.⁶⁷

Kenya has greatly benefited in the fight against terrorism through international multi-agency security cooperation. Kenya is one of Sub Sahara Africa's largest beneficiaries of U.S. aid. Since 2010, over \$141 million has been received, most of which focused on military training and arms procurement. Somalia's stabilization efforts have been made to allow her to join the East African Community.

Several difficulties in the war against terrorism have arisen: lack of priority for donors; conflicting regional army interests, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia; immigration and bribery issues; cumulative influxes of refugees from Kenya,

⁶⁵ Kenya's government's anti-terrorist measures against Al-Shabaab Islamists Strategic intelligence service. (2016). Retrieved 17 September 2019, from <http://intelligencebriefs.com/kenya-government-counter-terrorism-measures-against-alshabaab-islamists/>

⁶⁶ United Nations Security Council Letter of 2002/09/29 established in line with Resolution 1373(2001) of the Security Council by the Chair of the Security Council, 31st July 2002, S/2002/856, Retrieved 17 September 2019, from <http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/517/02/IMG/N0251702.pdf?OpenElement>

⁶⁷ Mohochi, S. 'Counter-terrorism preventive measures': Kenya Case Study. Electronic Journal. Retrieved 16 September 2016, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228214415_'Preventive_Counter_Terrorism_Action'_Case_Study_of_Kenya

including loyalist and terrorist backers. Kenya has reaffirmed attempts to facilitate the evacuation by the Somali resettlement program of a substantial number of Somali refugees to Kenya. Many Somali young people in Kenya have also created an upbringing ground for radicalisation.

2.4 Conclusion

This report argues that insecurity and extremism cannot be tackled by a exclusively militaristic approach, but by a multidimensional tactic interconnecting with policy institutions such as the military, civil society (NGOs and CBOs, religious organizations, media, the private sector, pretentious populations, victims' families and related research). For multi-agency defense activities, regional and multilateral agencies also play an significant role.

The results of this chapter affirm the goal, i.e. to determine the nature and rationale for multiagency security mechanisms used in Kenya must be multidimensional, involving all relevant actors in the fight against insecurity and terrorism.

CHAPTER THREE

MILITARY AND MULTI-AGENCY SECURITY OPERATIONS

3.1 Security Situation in Kenya

Kenya was a main focus and faced multiple Al-Shabaab terrorist attack, a significant terrorist threat for a variety of reasons in the HOA. This is due to geographical, financial, legal, economic and national and socio-cultural influences, including Islamic radicalization in the area, Kenya's thriving coastal beach leisure trade, and the weak socio-economic position of the country as the 45% of people living under the poverty line;⁶⁸ Kenya is strategically close to Somalia, with the headquarters of Al-Shabaab and the Middle East, weak neighbors (Somalia and Sudan), open boundaries between Somalia and Kenya and a good historical link between Kenya and West Israel. The most important marginality of the world is the Muslim minority;⁶⁹ According to the above, many of Kenya's acts of terror were aimed towards the country's western targets.

In 2011 the KDF was involved in its counter-military operations in Somalia in response to multiple terrorist attacks. Such successes are, however, short-lived as terrorist attacks continue despite a sporadic, short-lived pause of hostile attacks. This is due to the ever-increasing risk of serious domestic violence, terror and radicalisation. The previous chapter discusses only a few terrorist attacks against Kenya and before the Paradise hotel bombings of 2002. Kenya has suffered many terrorist attacks since that time and since late 2011.⁷⁰

The assault on a blue-collar bar identified as Kwa Mwaura on Mfangano Street in Nairobi occurred on Monday 24 October 2011.⁷¹ The grenade threw a man dead

⁶⁸ World Bank 2010

⁶⁹ Cannon, B.J., (2016). The Border Wall suggested to Somalia by militants, geopolitics and Kenya. *Terrorism research journal*. *Terrorism research journal*. 7(2), pp.23–37. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1235>

⁷⁰ Daily Nation., How KDF's Somalia incursion changed Kenya. (2016). Retrieved 19 September 2019, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/newsplex/newsplex-Linda-Nchi-Terrorism/2718262-2917062-9fm054/index.html>

⁷¹ Jason Strazius, Tom Odula, Associated Press, "2 blasts in Nairobi amid fears of terrorist reprisal," Hearst Communications Inc, 25 October 2011

and injured more than 20. The police in Kenya have confirmed that the weapons used are a Russian-made F1 grenade.⁷² Later that evening, after the bomb was hurled from a moving vehicle to the bus station, a second blast occurred.⁷³ About 69 people were admitted to hospital, five of whom were found dead.⁷⁴ This happened despite a perceived possibility of attack by the USA, alleging that in the months before and in October in particular Al-Shabaab faced a reprisal after KDF operations in Somalia.⁷⁵ In November the same year, a military truck and several other strikes were carried out on the Holiday Hotel, the eastern African Pentecostal Church. Around nine other assaults happened in Kenya in December.⁷⁶ The Westgate Shopping Center suffered a terror attack on 21 September 2013 in which unidentified gunmen targeted a state-of-the-art shopping mall in Nairobi.⁷⁷ The violence caused about 67 deaths in a mass shooting and hundreds of people seriously injured. Another big attack was that of 2014, known as the attacks at Mpeketoni.⁷⁸ They happened between 15 and 17 June, and in attacks in and around Mpeketoni, County Lamu, more than 60 people were murdered.⁷⁹ The assaults revealed that approximately 50 concealed gunmen seized a truck⁸⁰ and invaded a police station in a mostly Christian city⁸¹ and the destruction of

⁷² Associated Press, "Two grenade blasts rattle Nairobi; 1 dead", 24 October 2011. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-10-24/kenya-grenade-attack/50898570/1>

⁷³ David, Clarke, "A grenade attack at a bus station in central Nairobi killed five people and wounded 69, the Kenya Red Cross said on Sunday," Reuters, 11 March 2012. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/11/uskenya-blast-idUSBRE82A03W20120311>

⁷⁴ *ibid*

⁷⁵ CBC News, "Deadly grenade blasts rattle Nairobi", 24 October 2011. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/10/24/kenya-blast.html>

⁷⁶ Macharia, James., "Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, open new strains with wary West," Reuters, 1 June 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019 from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/01/uk-kenya-security-tourismidUKKBN0EC1D720140601>

⁷⁷ Associated Press; Daniel, Douglass K., "39 people killed in Kenya mall attack claimed by Somali militants; hostages still held", The Washington Post, 21 September 2013, p. 2

⁷⁸ Daily Nation, "Mpeketoni attack: Death toll rises to 48", AFP, 16 June 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/1056/2349860/-/yf5qvgz/-/index.html>

⁷⁹ *ibid*

⁸⁰ Gander, Kashmira, "Kenya hotel attack: Suspected Al-Shabaab militants kill 48 people in Mpeketoni," The Independent, 16 June 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from

hotels, cafes, and government offices. Approximately 53 people were purportedly killed during the violence and as of 18 June 2014 eight others were missing.⁸²

Gunmen raided Garissa University College in April 2015, killing nearly 150 people and injuring a few more. This was despite the warning of intelligence that it was planning an attack.⁸³ The perpetrators claimed to belong to the Al-Shabaab rebellious group and stated that they were carrying out reprisals against non-Muslims entering Muslim territory.⁸⁴ Some students were taken hostage, Muslims were free but Christians were rejected. More than 500 students remained unaccounted for.⁸⁵ Many fewer attacks occurred around 2012 and 2015, including the attack at St. Polycarp Church Sunday School in Nairobi on 30 September 2012;⁸⁶ Nairobi Bus Attack 14 December 2013; Eastleigh Bout 1 April 2014; Bombing of the Nairobi Police Station 23 April 2014;⁸⁷ 4 May 2014 Bombings involving Nairobi bus at Thika Highway in Nairobi;⁸⁸ 6 May 2014 Gikomba Bombings;⁸⁹ Ambush to Garissa 26 May 2015 and more.

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenya-hotel-attack-suspectedalshabaab-militants-kill-48-people-in-mpeketoni-9539402.html>

⁸¹ Daily Nation, "Mpeketoni attack: Death toll rises to 48", AFP, 16 June 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/1056/2349860/-/yf5qvz/-/index.html>

⁸² Daily Mail., "Al Shabaab gunmen kill 15 in an overnight raid on Kenyan coastal villages just 24 hours after killing 50 in nearby Mpeketoni", 17 June 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2659903/BREAKING-NEWS-Al-Shabaab-gunmen-kill-eight-night-raid-Kenyan-coastal-town-Poromoko-24-hours-killing-50nearby-Mpeketoni.html>

⁸³ TSG Intel Brief., "Terrorism in the Horn of Africa", July 28, 2015.

⁸⁴ Fox News, "Nearly 150 dead in Al-Shabaab school attack, Kenyan officials say". Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/04/02/garissa-attack-kenya/>

⁸⁵ BBC News., "Kenya attack: Garissa University assault 'killed 147'", 2 April 2015. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080>

⁸⁶ BBC News., "Kenya children hurt in church grenade attack", 30 September 2012 Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19776747>

⁸⁷ BBC News., "Kenya car bomb kills four in Nairobi's Pangani quarter", 23 April 2014 Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27134695>

⁸⁸ BBC News, "Kenya buses hit by deadly twin blasts in Nairobi", 4 May 2014 Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27277811>

⁸⁹ BBC News, "Kenya's Nairobi hit by twin blasts in Gikomba Market", 16 May 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27443474>

Al-Shabaab was considered responsible for most of these bombings, carried out on its own or by radicalised Kenyans who may be considered sympathizers of Al-Shabaab. Compared to the aforementioned figures, approximately 25% of the total donors to Al-Shabaab in 2014 are Kenyans⁹⁰ better identified as ' Kenyan Mujahideen.'⁹¹ Many of these radicalised Kenyans are usually over-enthusiasts and young people searching for Al-Shabaab cell recruitment. So the benefit for the Kenyan Mujahideen is that they completely integrate with little to no detection and trace into the broader Kenyan culture. Muslims, who are vulnerable to radicalization, terrorist recruiting and security shelters, are predominantly populated by the coastal areas of HOA including the Mombasa coasts and Zanzibar. Al-Shabaab also identified these assaults as members of the Kenyan army's deployment in Somalia by Operation Linda Nchi.

The campaign was a joint Somali-Kenyan militant military mission that began in October 2011, with Kenyan forces traversing the border into war areas in the South of Somalia. The action prompted some of these never-ending assaults. By May 2014, the US, the United Kingdom and other Western countries sent their residents who either stay or travel to Kenya a high security alert⁹² that eventually affected the holiday business segment in Kenya. The leisure industry division is the leading foreign exchange producer in the world, departure of foreign tourists leading to a decline, which in turn decreases labor and productivity of employees.⁹³ Not only tourism but foreign affairs are affected in Kenya, because certain countries have been pressured to restrict their lives in Kenya to one city altogether, Nairobi. As shown by the British

⁹⁰ BBC News, "Funding jihad: Al-Shabab cash lures in young Kenyans", 11 December 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30419987?print=true>

⁹¹ Reuters, "Special Report: In Africa, a militant group's growing appeal", 30 May 2012. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530>

⁹² NPR Parallel (2016). Npr.org. Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/06/10/320335669/western-countries-issue-warnings-kenyan-tourism-gets-pummeled>

⁹³ Macharia, James., "Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, open new strains with wary West," Reuters, 1 June 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/01/uk-kenya-security-tourismidUKKBN0EC1D720140601>

vote to shut down the Mombasa Consulate.⁹⁴ The US has condensed its work force to ensure sufficient health of all its workers following the deaths of many of its workers during the 1998 bombing.⁹⁵

3.2 Military Involvement and Multi-Agency Strategies in Kenya

In order to avoid the influx of foreign militants, including Kenyans, into neighboring Somalia, Al Shabaab, and foreign Kenyans, the Government has focused more efforts on stopping the establishment of the Country's Anti-Terrorism Strategy Unit in 2003. Kenya has worked on ICPAT, US-based CJTF HOA and other UN and UAU multi-agency protection action plans, Operational conventions and protocols as a key component of systems and programs on regional and international multi-agency defense operations.

3.2.1 National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)

The Government of Kenya recognized that extremism is a danger to national security and a transnational criminal crime, following repeated threats by al-Shabaab radicals against and within Kenya. This included the establishment of a multi-agency structure, active co-operation of key stakeholders and a framework for collaboration as a national priority of the multi-agency security activity.⁹⁶ In April 2003 a strategy paper on multi-agency security, submitted to the cabinet of Kenya in September 2003, was drafted. This contributed to the formation and opening of the NCTC on 27 January 2004. The NCTC describes itself as a coordination body formed primarily as a coordinating mechanism for all multi-agency security activities (GoK) of the Government of Kenya. It gives recommendations and guidance to public and private institutions on the danger to the country from terrorism to the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC).⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Capital News., "UK closes Mombasa Consulate over security fears", 13 June 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/06/uk-closes-mombasa-consulate-over-security-fears/>

⁹⁵ The Guardian., "The US to cut Kenya embassy staff as the threat of 'sophisticated' attacks grows", AFP, 17 May 2014. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/17/kenya-nairobi-bomb-us-embassy-security>

⁹⁶ National Counter-Terrorism Center's website, at <http://counterterrorism.go.ke/aboutus.html>

⁹⁷ *ibid*

It is responsible for organizing regional efforts to detect, prevent and stop terrorist activities. It has the responsibility of creating a database to support law enforcement officers, etc. As part of Kenya's ambitious multi-agency security operation program, the center created a prevention center to counter violent extremism and radicalization, focused on the Principle of Prevention and intended at taking a softer tactic to terrorism prevention.⁹⁸

3.2.2 Operation Linda Nchi

Operation Linda Nchi is the soubriquet for a multi-agency joint military camp in Somalia concerning the Somali and Kenyan Somali armies. The action persisted from 16 October 2011 to 31 May 2012 for eight months. The troops have targeted al-Shabaab militants who are charged with abducting many foreign visitors in Kenya.⁹⁹ Al-Shabaab was destabilized by the campaign, and Kenyan forces were later incorporated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Several Al-Shabaab members have been slayed during the battle. More than 6,000 Kenyan security forces, comprising the military, were involved and over 700 Al-Shabaab supporters were arrested, with little casualties on the Kenyan side.¹⁰⁰ The operation was being carried out in collaboration with the AU, IGAD and the Ethiopian military.¹⁰¹ Throughout the maneuver the United States the Air Force also exchanged and assisted in the project surveillance data with the Kenyan army.¹⁰²

3.2.3 African Union Mission in Somalia

The African Union Mission in Somalia, originated as IGASOM, is a vigorous (since 2007), regional diplomacy mission run by the AU with UN sanction in Somalia. AMISOM helps the forces of Somalia in their fight counter to Al-Shabaab radicals as

⁹⁸ *ibid*

⁹⁹ Al Jazeera, "Kenyan troops pursue al-Shabab into Somalia in Operation Linda Nchi", 16 October 2011. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/20111016115410991692.html>

¹⁰⁰ BBC News., "Kenyan troops 'kill 60 al-Shabab fighters' in Somalia", 7 January 2012 Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16455039>

¹⁰¹ Maasho, Aaron., "Ethiopia plans a military mission to Somalia", *Uk.reuters.com*, 25 November 2011

¹⁰² Musau, Nzau, "Kenya: Somali Prime Minister Arrives to Explain Position", *Allafrica.com*, 31 October 2011

part of their mandate. At 22,126 troops,¹⁰³ with Kenyan backing about 4,000, the troop strength was as of 2015. Numerous offensives against Al-Shabaab were carried out by the soldiers, slaying many of them, comprising their leaders. However, AMISOM and the KDF were capable to expel Al-Shabaab from their fortress in the southern and central parts of Somalia, in particular, the port city of Kismayo and Mogadishu.¹⁰⁴ It abetted to drastically diminish the financial resources of Al-Shabaab, as the group lost export and import income owing to the seizure of the key source of income ports.¹⁰⁵

3.2.4 Law Enforcement, Legislation, and Border Security

In 2003, Kenya formed an anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism bankrolling inter-ministerial multi-agency task force. The task force has been able to review the current laws and propose measures to create a regional plan to shut down terrorism funding channels.¹⁰⁶ In the same year, the GoK used the 1990 Coordination Act of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to de-register several Muslim NGOs suspected of communicating with extremist groups. This includes the Islamic al Muntada al-Haramain, the Muslim Youth World Congress, the I-Ibrahim Base, Wakalatul-Rahmah and I-Najah in northern Kenya.¹⁰⁷ In January 2004, the Kenyan High Court tossed out appeals to overturn the ruling, whereas the GoK expelled al-Haramain's Sudanese president, Sheik Muawiya Hussein.¹⁰⁸

Kenya also introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act for 2012 in order to support the Corruption & Money Laundering Act 2011 and the Organized Crime

¹⁰³ See: UN Resolution 2182 (2014) Adopted at its 7286th Session by the UN Security Council., on 24 October 2014; Paragraph 23 - at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2182\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2182(2014))

¹⁰⁴ Godfrey Buluma, "Al-Shabaab: The Threat To Kenya And The Horn Of Africa," United States Army War College, 2014

¹⁰⁵ *ibid*

¹⁰⁶ Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies", Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review 15.3, 2006

¹⁰⁷ P Mayoyo, "Kenya Muslims say no to US school funds," East African, 23 February 2004.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies", Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review 15.3, 2006

Prevention Act 2012.¹⁰⁹ The President of Kenya signed the 2014 Security Laws (Amendment) Act in December 2014. In an attempt to strengthen the multi-agency security operation policy framework, the 2014 Security Laws modified 20 existing ones. Positive steps included creating a centralized border control agency, assisting with criminalization and supporting terrorist training, improving the NCTC's capability. Other provisions, on the other hand, included human rights violations such as autonomy of speech and refugee rights. This ignited debate and attracted disapproval of violating constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and international obligations in Kenya.

In line with the restructuring of the security sector, the GoK divided the functions of multi-agency security operations in 2013 amongst the three divisions of the National Police Service: the Paramilitary General Services Unit, the Civil Police, and the Anti-Terrorism Police Force, the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Administrative Police and non-government entities for instance the National Intelligence Service and Nat State Police Department. Owing to an absence of intra-police and inter-police harmonization as well as the cohesion of the militaries, the success of this system has been undermined. Failure to plan adequately, resources; order concept, politics, and exploitation of the multi-agency security operations are other causes.¹¹⁰ While the government has made successful attempts to resolve these problems, in the areas of corruption, border protection and defense it has proven inadequate.

The inadequacy of the national surveillance plan and the lack of border defense equipment reduced the effective rate of law enforcement agencies to identify and apprehend terrorists suspected. Nonetheless, the most important entry ports in the world provide biographical and biometric identification and jihadist check lists among other initiatives.

¹⁰⁹ US State Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, Chapter 2. Nation reports: BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM Summary of the African Union. Retrieved on 25 July 2019 from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2019/239404.htm>

¹¹⁰ *ibid*

There are multiple and countless terrorist threats that the security operatives in Kenya responded to or thwarted in 2014. Between April and May 2014, the multi-scaled operations carried out by Usalama Watch detained thousands of potential criminals, mainly in Kenya's two major cities.¹¹¹ But the operation was criticized for being a component of violence, bribery, and human rights violations.

3.2.5 Opposing the Financing of Terrorism

Kenya is an affiliate of the regional body of the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Network-style Financial Action Task Force. Kenya has taken steps to enforce its anti-money filtering and anti-terrorism backing program and was excluded from the FATF's ongoing surveillance system in 2014.¹¹² In December, the Coordinating Board of Kenyan NGOs announced that 510 NGOs had been revoked for not providing the financial recording required; The Board also discussed the potential annexation of 15 more NGOs in the accusation of terror funding. Conversely, many of these NGOs were excluded after reviewing the Board's criteria.¹¹³

Kenya's anti-money laundering maneuvers have increasingly turn out to be efficient, with expanded capacity for assessment, monitoring and reporting. Conversely, due to shortcomings in critical infrastructure, including but not restricted to the electronic-financial recording system, systems have not been tremendously successful. In order to pledge effective and open financial regulations in Kenya, the Central Bank of Kenya has increased responsiveness of a necessity to make use of the permissible monetary system in its dealings and investments.

3.2.6 International and Regional Cooperation

The twelve international conventions and agreements on simultaneous defense activities were ratified by Kenya in 2003, and the terrorism reduction bill was issued on 30 April. As an AU, IGAD, COMESA and EAC republic, Kenya has played a momentous role in the respective regional blocs to which it belongs through

¹¹¹ *ibid*

¹¹² *ibid*

¹¹³ *ibid*

multilateral and bilateral agreements in conflict-affected nations, with significant presence there. In 2014, the AU Peace and Security Council assembly of leaders for Nairobi was primarily based on multi-agency security issues and national Summits for EAC intelligence and police chiefs. The nation has assisted other Member States to host and promote military maneuvers, recruitment and preparation for law enforcement personnel within and within the EAC states.¹¹⁴

3.2.7 Countering Violent and Radicalization Extremism

The Kenya program for multi-agency defense activities was established in 2014, with the cooperation of non-governmental organisations and the civil society of CSOs. The National Conference on Security and CVE 2014, which saw both state and non-state players participating in creating and implementing a Code on Violent Extremism, provided significant and official support.¹¹⁵ It has also created a robust Regional Anti Radicalization Policy to offer religious leaders the mission of decreasing the threats in societies to terrorism and extremism, since they are able in particular following terrorist acts to manipulate confrontation and stability through their schismic discourse.

3.2.8 Partnership with the US

Kenya has been a major US and African companion in the universal war against extremism since the stir of September 11, 2001. This relationship includes planning, equipment sales, logistical support, and the sharing of tactical knowledge, but not limited to. In Kenya's role as one of the six U.S. - engaged nations Lead Security Governance Initiative (SGI) is seen as deeper cooperation between the two nations.¹¹⁶

Like in other United States programs, Kenyan security authorities engaged like disaster management, study and enforcement initiatives, which are supported and funded. The joint operations antiterrorism assistance programme, including training

¹¹⁴ Foreign Policy, Kenya, November 2014, Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://www.mfa.go.ke/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Kenya%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf>

¹¹⁵ *ibid*

¹¹⁶ Security Governance Initiative: 2015 Review of the United States Department of State. (2016). Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/2016/253906.htm>

series on crisis management and other areas, lasted about four weeks in the US Departments of State for East Africa.¹¹⁷

Kenya's partnership efforts with developed states have enhanced Kenya's entry ports security systems. This is clear from the implementation of the Evaluation System and Personal Identification Secure Comparison in Kenya's ports. Law enforcers have persisted to advance expertise in territorial security through regional and international collaboration and improve the multi-agency security operation capabilities of the government.¹¹⁸

3.2.9 Diplomatic Solutions

Dysfunctional nationals have been one of the guiding forces behind extremist attacks in Kenya. Nairobi is leveraging its multi-agency defense activity program to explore the search for stability between Somalia and Sudan in its diplomatic sphere. This is seen in Sudan and Somalia, Kenya has tried for a long time to develop direct mediation as a crisis resolution mechanism. Somali talks 'inaugurated and concluded in Eldoret' led to the acknowledgement and establishment of the TFG that allowed Somalia to return to substantive peace.¹¹⁹ The peace talks in Sudan led to the Sudan's Inclusive Peace and Freedom Pact. Although South Sudan later ended its conflict, Kenya also played an significant part in settling it through IGAD. The policy of Kenya was to bring diplomatic peace to Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia and make them safe neighbors, with security significantly improving that of Kenya.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Department of States of the United States. Enhancing the ability of East African States to fight terrorism. DipNote. Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2016/08/17/bolstering-east-african-nations-capacity-counterterrorism>

¹¹⁸ Department of State of the United States. Country Terrorism Report 2015. Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2016-State-Department-Country-Report-on-Terrorism.pdf>

¹¹⁹ AMISOM. Somali Peace ProcessLe processus de paix somalienGeedi socodka Nabadda Soomaaliya - AMISOM. (2016). Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/somali-peace-process/>

¹²⁰ Sudan Tribune. Sudan's multicultural news and opinions. (2016). Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot3042>

3.2.10 Multi-Agency Tactics Driven by Non-state Actors

Several Civil Society groups, which are primarily funded by the US-Kenya cooperation and Kenya alliance, are actively operating through multi-agency security operations to combat terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya.¹²¹ Some are Muslim for Human Rights, the Supreme Council of Muslims in Kenya, and the Kenya Mutual Support Center (KECOSCE), etc. A main concern is that they discuss some of the root foundations of extremism that are frequently linked to Kenyan social vulnerability, radicalisation, and militant extremism.¹²² Many of them do have programs to counter propaganda by militant and terrorist actors. Additionally, they have been key players in engaging the public to recognise, learn, and participate to prevent and minimize crime.

In addition, organizations have helped raise visibility and concern on the national and neighborhood level about violence and possible terror threats. We also organize conferences on multi-agency security operations in partnership with government agencies and benefactor partners. Any of these aids are planned to educate more about CVE to the media, lawyers, and other CSO members.¹²³ The CSOs also works with police and judicial authorities and support others directly to report suspicious activity.¹²⁴

For example, Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE)¹²⁵ has programs to enable coastal communities to pledge the aggregate radicalization in Kenya's coastal regions; this is helped by augmenting the terror-resilience capacity of the youth. They further promote the organisation, from law enforcement and the broader population, the coordination of voluntary organisations and the formation of a incessant space for

¹²¹ Lauren, Ploch., *Eastern Africa: the US response Counter Terrorism*: (DIANE Publishing, 2011)

¹²² Muslim leaders are trying to change the way Kenya combat terrorism. Public Radio International. (2016). Retrieved 20 September 2019, from <http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-23/muslim-leaders-are-trying-change-way-kenya-fights-terrorism>

¹²³ Ahmed Hadji & Ndugwa Hassan, "Working Paper Series", Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum, 1/2014.

¹²⁴ *ibid*

¹²⁵ A coastal Kenya-based non-governmental body.

dialogue.¹²⁶ The core goal of KECOSCE has been to increasing the awareness that all members of the community are complicit in mistreatment of radicalization. It has been as important as ever to boost the capacity to counter aggressive extremist activity in communities, classrooms and public places and to encourage coordination with security forces, create strategies and reinforce cooperation to deter jihadists from using the coast as a viable base for their operations.

Finally, KECOSCE trains and empowers young people on business skills; and establishes an early response and warning system to protect information sources and track suspicious groups and individuals' activities.

3.3 Conclusion

The result of this chapter seems to suggest that, in spite of many small and large-scale threats, Kenya's multi agency defense and prevention measures between 2002 and 2011 were generally inadequate and counterproductive. However it has not been a positive idea to ease continuing four-year attacks by forming NCTC in 2004 to create and enforce strategies for multi-agency protection practices. We also pointed to the inability to plan for, and politicize such terrorist activities and a number of other factors influencing the capacity of Nairobi to counter terrorism effectively, especially according to its law enforcement authority, corruption, bureaucratic imbalance, resource scarcity and technological capabilities.

In contrast, from the analysis of Nairobi's multi-agency security operation approaches in this section, there is a cascade of parallels in the previous chapter to that of East Africa. In light of this, the findings show that Nairobi has multi-agency security operations concentrated more on state-centered and militarist approaches in the combat against terrorism, according to the second hypothesis of this report. However, in the battle against Al-Shabaab, the Kenya Defense Forces were at the forefront and have achieved many victories. Although, on condition that the reasons that originate and encourage extremism in Kenya, the republic is likely to remain dealing with terrorism.

¹²⁶ Ahmed Hadji & Ndugwa Hassan, "Working Paper Series", Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum, 1/2014.

The results of this section suggested that second objective of the report, i.e. to analyze factors affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations, indicates that multi-agency security operations single militaristic strategy has demonstrated to be more ineffective in the combat against terrorism and has precipitated increased insecurity. This system was inadequate due to a lack of information of the causes of terrorism and a lack of multi-agency security operation framework involving non-state actors.

CHAPTER FOUR
EFFECTIVENESS OF MULTI-AGENCY SECURITY STRATEGIES IN
KENYA AND EAST AFRICA.

4.0 Introduction

Development, prosperity, or peace don't make East Africa rhyme. Ethiopia is making substantial strides at the moment due to its authoritarian regime. Somalia has been an ineffective case study for any possible failing state around the region, and the international community has been betrayed more than ever. Thousands of refugees escape from a barbaric regime in Eritrea while Kenya has done its utmost to fight terrorism, as a small success story. If these nations aggressively seek to battle radicalism and impose human civil liberties by whatever means conceivable or whether the new threats and political conflicts are taken advantage of by their regimes now is becoming a question for experts.

The region has experienced ongoing and destructive conflicts within and between states, political segregation, instability, and scarcity. This makes it susceptible to terrorist manipulation. Security is a complicated issue in East Africa that needs a comprehensive and ongoing approach to a solution. Effective awareness of the motives and aims of terrorists is important as it provides the basis of multi-agency operations. The Al-Shabaab aims take over Somalia's government and administration and replace the existing civil law with strict Islamic rules besides.

This chapter initiates by providing an investigation of the effectiveness of multiagency cooperation in East Africa, in route with the third of this study's objectives. It is watching the patterns, causes, and drivers carefully. It explores the multi-agency cooperation processes in East Africa objectively. It explores foreign and regional players' attempts to fight terror within East Africa.

4.1 Multi-Agency security cooperation in East Africa

4.1.1 Overview of the Security Situation

For nearly three decades East Africa, as an important conduit and/or victim of violence in the world, has led to global terrorism. Such terrorist attacks are aimed towards citizens in the country for the reasons of their terrorist actions, whether local, and/or non-nationals of the country allegedly opposed.¹²⁷ This began with the 1975 Nairobi bombing, in which a travel agency office and a nightclub contained two bomb blasts. The Norfolk Hotel attack in Kenya in 1980¹²⁸ accompanied by the National Islamic Front seizure of power in Sudan in 1989 to build an Islamist State.¹²⁹ Sudan has, as is evident from Al Qaeda leadership Osama bin Laden and his supporters inside the Sudanese borders, opened its doors to the unrestricted entry of refugee extremists in the 90s. This paved the way for safe travel, shelters and terrorist activities inside the HOA without threats to Al Qaeda's other terrorist affiliates.¹³⁰

In a terrorist attack in 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed. In five years, American embassies in Tanzania, and Kenya, the notorious and important HOA warfare bombed American operation. More than 200 people have been killed and over 4,000 wounded during this strike.¹³¹ In a terrorist attack in 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed. In five years, American embassies in Tanzania, and Kenya, the notorious and important HOA warfare bombed American operation. More than 200 people have been killed and over 4,000 wounded during this strike.¹³²

¹²⁷ Rosand, E, Millar, A., and Ipe, J., "Enhancing Counter-terrorism in Eastern Africa," African Security Review, 18:2, 2007

¹²⁸ Patrick, Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011.

¹²⁹ The United States Institute of Peace, "Special Report - Terrorism in the Horn of Africa," Washington DC, January 2004.

¹³⁰ *ibid*

¹³¹ *ibid*

¹³² *ibid*

Admittedly, due to persistent war and conflicting states in the region, the HOA has been weak, and thus a favorable area for flourishing terror activities. Nevertheless, substantial efforts have been made, particularly after the September Attack in the USA and its supporters, as the decrease in terror and militant links in the region is significant in the global war against terrorism, multi-agency security efforts in East Africa have slowly increased and are growing.¹³³

4.1.2 Vulnerability of the Security Situation in East Africa

There are several causes or drivers of insecurity in East Africa, though this study briefly mentioned some of them. First, there are serious conflicts exacerbated by poor government and statelessness. For starters, with many rebel groups and Eritrea, Ethiopia was at war simultaneously.¹³⁴ Territorial disputes were one of the main drivers of the conflict. Furthermore, Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of al-Shabaab funding terror in Ethiopian territory. This has culminated in ongoing conflict, devastation, death and human rights abuse within the two countries,¹³⁵ and expulsion from IGAD of Eritrea.

In a similar note, insurgent groups in northern Uganda, in particular the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Democratic Forces Alliance (ADF), which were considered to have employed terror tactics in the war against Kampala.¹³⁶ Recently, South Sudan emerged from its battle, which witnessed a large scale of humanitarian crises, violations of rights and death. Somalia was in turmoil, for God knows how long.

¹³³ Patrick Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011

¹³⁴ McGregor (2007), A., "Ethiopia Faces Ethnic Fallout from Somalia Intervention," Terrorism Focus, Volume 4, No. 17, June

¹³⁵ Amnesty International, "Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia," Report, at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/ethiopia/report-2010#>

¹³⁶ International Crisis Group, "Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State," ICG Africa Report 45, Nairobi/Brussels, 23 May 2002

Furthermore, the porous borders that have contributed to the free flow of arms and individuals considered a security threat. It poses a challenging task in East Africa for the national security of different governments.¹³⁷

Lastly, there are many explanations why East Africa has become a frontline for jihadists and their enemies. One is the propagation of radical Islam linked to pervasive poverty and low socio-economic conditions and a deep logic of marginalization among many assemblages in the countries in the region. This has helped Islamists to capitalize on the spread of their ideas and winning alliances among the weak Muslim minorities and needy refugees.¹³⁸

4.2 Multi-Agency Security Strategies in East Africa: Examining the Roles of International Bodies

Global players, including the United Nations, the EU, the United States, and international stakeholders, including the AU and IGAD, played an immense part in multi-agency collaboration approaches on the field. This is attributed to other advantages: First, they have the experience of local concerns, allowing them to establish solutions that take into justification cultural and other circumstantial problems. This encourages them to pursue global or sub-regional programs that complement and build on international security priorities for multi-agencies.

They can also strengthen a nous of local pride and exposure of global efforts and retain the commitment needed to battle terror. Secondly, to encourage expert and knowledge sharing in East Africa among multi-governmental organizations and non-governmental organisations. East Africa, however, shares good regional practices and lessons learned between the countries from the regional implementation.

4.2.1 The African Union and Multi-Agency Security in East Africa

AMISOM thanked the AU for their contribution to the war against al-Shabaab and for their performance. As regards the security of multi-institutions, the Al-Qaeda Attack in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, the Anti-Terrorism Convention (1999), has carried out

¹³⁷ Rabasa, A., "Radical Islam in East Africa," RAND Project Airforce, RAND Cooperation, 2009a

¹³⁸ Rosand, E, Millar, A., and Ipe, J., "Enhancing Counter-terrorism in Eastern Africa," African Security Review, 18:2, 2007, p. 11

a number of operations and arrangements in order to ensure a nation is free from terrorist threats; The Agreement on Capital Development, Extradition, Information-Sharing and other Elements to enhance Security Coordination between multi-agency agencies on the continent also included in the AU Anti-Terrestrial Action Plan (2002).¹³⁹

The AU does, however, face many difficulties in enforcing these treaties. One is the dissimilarity between AU member states in the extent of perception of territorial threat levels. Two is the AU's failure to produce adequate money to combat terror by formulating and implementing policies. The AU set up Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the African Center for Study in 2004 to specifically address terror concerns to educate member states and improve the capacity of the state to deal with terrorism.

4.2.2 The European Union and Multi-Agency Security in East Africa

The EU has implemented a very extensive tactic to cooperation on multi-agency security cooperation with Africa. The majority of EU policy and political operations in Africa was carried out under the agenda of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement between Africa and the European Union.¹⁴⁰ In many fields, both call for cooperation, including defense, development, and politics. As set out in its Action Plan on multi-agency security cooperation,¹⁴¹ The EU pursues to discourse the root causes and radicalization factors of extremism. Poverty eradication, the creation of stable civil order and the defense of human rights are the basic factors. Violent radicalisation would both promote extremism and pose a danger

¹³⁹ *ibid*

¹⁴⁰ According to Article 11a of the 2005 Cotonou Cooperation Agreement, the participants are participants (European Union and ACP countries) to terrorist activities "condemn all acts of terrorism and undertake to combat terrorism through international cooperation, following the Charter of the United Nations and international law, relevant conventions and instruments and in particular full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1456 (2003) and other relevant UN resolutions". They therefore agree to discuss ways and methods to prevent terrorism, including in technical areas, training, and experience in terrorists prevention and exchanges of information, and support networks for terrorists groups.

¹⁴¹ "Cotonou Partnership Agreement Revised," EC Article 11a 2005. European Commission. And the "EU General Security Strategy," EUTM Somalia, Retrieved on 25 July 2019 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1870=en>

to policy security. There is a possibility that "two birds are killed with one stone."¹⁴² by building a conducive environment for democracy.

A mutual goal of resolving the issues of violence and defense, the European Commission for Political and Security Relations, the Peace and Security Committee of the African Union, has been worked for. This includes the application of the APSA, especially the African Stand-by Force and Early Alert Program. This includes the introduction of the Africa Peace and Security Mechanism in the African Union.¹⁴³ With a separate IGAD system the EU has supported the APSC with EUR 1 billion. The EU is now promoting the peace and stability process in Somalia, while the Somali Forces have already been militarily trained by the EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia).¹⁴⁴

4.2.3 Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa on Multi-Agency Security

Introducing capabilities across member states in the sense of improved cooperation between multi-agency security transactions through individual member states of the IGAD; providing training and information sharing, as well as enhancing border protection, IGAD's Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT), which was implemented in 2006.¹⁴⁵

The ICPAT opened ministerial-level meetings on counter-terrorism at IGAD in late 2007. The first meeting of the same year that took place in Kampala in September affirms the call for Member States to pursue an organizational, legislative and legal methodology to combating terrorism. This concerted effort paved the way for the formation in the Member States of inter-ministerial counter-terrorism mechanisms meant to perpetuate the legislations on human rights during counter-terrorism; integrated intelligence, info and knowledge sharing; The Kampala Conference also

¹⁴² Makinda, S., "The European Union and the Fight Against Terrorism and its Impact on Democracy Building in Africa," Contra and Electoral Assistance International Institute, 2009, p.8.

¹⁴³ Patrick Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in East Africa", Monash European and EU Monash University Global Terrorists Research Center and Monash, 2011

¹⁴⁴ *ibid*

¹⁴⁵ *ibid*

urged Member States to adopt the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Policy, as well as other international anti-terrorist instruments.¹⁴⁶ The retirement from IGAD and a partial collaboration between Member States to adopt IGAD multi-agency defense cooperation policies were however questioned by Eritrea's plan.¹⁴⁷

4.2.4 The United Nations and Multi-Agency Security in East Africa

In 2006 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which called for an all-inclusive anti-terrorist policy, unanimously adopted a Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGC-T strategy). In this context, the national and sub-regional players and organizations need to enhance their role and obligations in countering terrorism.¹⁴⁸ Those efforts resulted in the creation of the United Nations Task Force on Counter-Terrorism Execution (UNCT). The UNCT Strategy proposed a detailed structure by member states and provided substantial unique opportunities for strengthening regional East Africa and UN multi-agency security cooperation.

The UN Multi agency Security Cooperation Action Plan focuses comprehensively on four key pillars: by addressing the driving factors that spread violence, creating capacity to deter and thwart terrorist activities; and, ultimately, designing and enforcing terrorist counter-terrorism frameworks that uphold rule of law and human rights. The plan represents what have been long believed by other East Africa terror observers, namely to incorporate preventive steps that address concrete and perceptible protests and the underlying socio-economic and political problems in a successful multi-agency coordination approach.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, "The Kampala Statement - Meeting of Ministers of Justice of IGAD member states on legal cooperation against terrorism," Kampala, Uganda, 20–21 September 2007. Retrieved on 25 July 2019, from http://www.igad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=65

¹⁴⁷ Patrick Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in East Africa", Monash European and EU Monash University Global Terrorists Research Center and Monash, 2011

¹⁴⁸ Rosand, E, Millar, A., and Ipe, J., "Enhancing Counter-terrorism in Eastern Africa," African Security Review, 18:2., 2007, p. 103

¹⁴⁹ *ibid*

4.2.5 The United States and Multi-Agency Security in East Africa

A conference for US Forestry Policy Experts and multi-agency professionals on defense coordination in East Africa was arranged by the United States Peace Institute in 2003; to assess the level of terrorist threats and evaluate the correct multi-agency security cooperation response within East Africa. Multi-agency security cooperation specialists from the region presented a specific but clear and comprehensive framework for combating horror in East Africa.¹⁵⁰

In East Africa, the U.S. Military Command operates from Djibouti and is recognized as the African Joint Task Force-Horn (CJTF-HOA). Since the fall of the ICU, the CJTF-HOA supports the Ugandan and Burundian armies in Somalia, supports the participating troops of the AU Member States in Somalia, and also facilitates the establishment and advancement of the countries of eastern Africa.¹⁵¹ While the U.S. activity from its Djibouti military base has helped to maintain stability within the Gulf of Aden between Djibouti and East African member states; Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that, due to the State's right to sovereignty, the operation concentrated less on governance and thus undermined long-term success in combating terror within East Africa.¹⁵² Currently, due to inadequate national multi-agency security cooperation specialists and language barriers for foreign multi-agency security cooperation specialists, the CJTF-HOA faces challenges of successful and continuing operations.

The foundation standing of CJTF-HOA necessities to concentrate on sustainable and long-term strategies for multi-agency security cooperation on governance issues to improve the efficiency and efficacy of co-operation with regional military forces;

¹⁵⁰ The United States Institute of Peace, "Special Report - Terrorism in the Horn of Africa," Washington DC, January 2004

¹⁵¹ Patrick Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in East Africa", Monash European and EU Monash University Global Terrorists Research Center and Monash, 2011

¹⁵² Robert Jones and David H Gray, "Bolstering Governance: The Need for a Multifaceted Approach to United States Counterterrorism Policy in the Horn of Africa Region," *Global Security Studies*, Fall 2013, Volume 4, Issue 4

and more on the issue of East African training nationals to become experts than to implement fewer regional linguistic and cultural knowledge.¹⁵³

Furthermore, if pressure can be put on regional governments which are heavily funded by US donor funds, the US will affect stability within the East African region. This is especially important in the event of a growing dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. All governments operating on an authoritarian model can be diplomatically pressured to minimize aggression and animosity through the threat of reducing or removing U.S. donor funds.¹⁵⁴ This tactic can also be applied to non-U.S. donors to warring or aggressive states in East Africa.¹⁵⁵ This will help to reduce the likelihood of confrontation with its ability to direct favorable terror conditions.

Furthermore, such a systemic strategy of persuasion is critical in reducing state-sponsored terror: as it relates to both Eritrea-backed Ogaden National Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front; the Eritrean National Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front are both funded by Ethiopia to weaken Eritrea. There is also a need for the US to foster proper stability in Somalia, Sudan and, to a large extent, in South Sudan, which has been in an endless conflict.

In 2009, the United States formed a PRACT (Partnership for Eastern Africa Anti Terrorism). It comprises multi-annual, multi-agency protection collaboration, a multi-dimensional program to develop capability and co-operation between law enforcement, military and civilian stakeholders in East Africa for multi-agency defense counter-terrorism collaboration. This uses regulatory, military and technology tools, including the tactical capabilities of terrorist networks, to accomplish their strategic objectives; combating terrorist financing; improving border security, and the attraction of radicalization and recruitment to violence. Partners for Successful PRACT include Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, Somalia, Djibouti, Tanzania, and

¹⁵³ Rabasa, A, "Radical Islam in East Africa", Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009, p. 76

¹⁵⁴ Robert Jones and David H Gray, "Bolstering Governance: The Need for a Multifaceted Approach to United States Counterterrorism Policy in the Horn of Africa Region," *Global Security Studies*, Fall 2013, Volume 4, Issue 4

¹⁵⁵ Lyons, T., "Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea", *Council on Foreign Relations Special Report*, (21), 2006, p. 28

Uganda, PRACT, also includes the Comoros, Seychelles, Sudan, Rwanda, and South Sudan.¹⁵⁶

In 2014, the US government has started to construct the capability and ability of East African governments to combat the pervasive threat faced by Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and other radical groups through PRACT. PRACT is committed to promoting the work of Washington in Somalia and Eastern Africa to foster stability and governance through AMISOM sponsorship. It co-ordinates joint training activities for first responders and law enforcement officers from Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in order to promote efforts to strengthen national collaboration and support, secure common borders and react to terrorist instances. The training of prosecutors has also been sponsored in Kenya and Uganda to improve the ability of prosecutors to manage terrorist cases.¹⁵⁷

4.3 Conclusion

The results of this chapter indicate that East African Member States' vulnerabilities to insecurity and its origins must be recognized in imperative to maintain a deeper and long enduring relationship between multilateral security institutions. Therefore, it became clear that international actors play a considerable role in helping countries and organizations to boost the ability of the region. According to the initial hypothesis of this paper, the dependence in Somalia's 2006 U.S. Ethiopia-led involvement on state-centered multi-agencies coordination structures that are often militaristic may be counterproductive. The reliance on orthodox extremist military methods has led to repeated defeats and significant casualties in the war against terror. Terrorist sympathizers are taught to create a favorable climate for indirect assistance, such as safe havens for terror or overt support for terror.

Finally, to ensure an effective multi-agency security cooperation strategy, it is necessary to enhance global, international, non-governmental and governmental efforts through synchronized harmonization and equally separation of effort.

¹⁵⁶ US State Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, Chapter 2. Nation reports: BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM Summary of the African Union. Retrieved on 25 July 2019 from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2019/239404.htm>

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*

Furthermore, ensuring the maximization of all multi-agency security cooperation actors regarding their corresponding comparative advantages and capabilities is essential.

The results of this chapter, however, suggested that the third aim of the analysis, i.e. When assessing success when Kenya and East Africa of multi-agency defense approaches, the militaristic solution has been shown to be the dominant policy in East Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This section offers a detailed overview of multi-agency security cooperation mechanisms used in East Africa, multi-agency security collaboration approaches in Kenya and the efficacy of multi-agency security cooperation mechanisms in Kenya and East Africa. The chapter further explains the study's thesis and recommendation.

5.1 Summary

East Africa is vulnerable to insecurity and terror and has been defeated militarily in the multi-agency security cooperation system used in East Africa, and therefore the root causes of terror need to be tackled to increase the effectiveness of the security cooperation efforts of multi-agency organizations. The study accomplishes the main objective to investigate factors affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations in East Africa which are often militaristic. Grief from militaristic multi-agency security operations leads to massive terrorist sympathizers, deaths, and further contributing to the threatened goal of multi-agency security operations. Local involvement and collaboration within East Africa are crucial to winning the war against terror.

Due to the ongoing frequency of terror attacks, particularly between 2011 and 2015, the efficacy of the frameworks for multi-agency security operations has proved ineffective. While systemic reforms of the security activities of multi-agency organisations, lack of funding, bureaucracy and red tape and technological capability, inadequate coordination between law enforcement agencies, politicisation of some terrorist incidents, insufficient preparation and a wide range of other factors, GOK has been weaker, especially in line with the capability to effectively tackle the terrorism Nairobi relied mainly on militarist and state-centered strategies in the fight on terror. To a greater extent, the single militaristic approach to the multi-agency security operations has proven ineffective in the fight against terror and has driven an increase in violence.

The holistic agenda of Kenya needs a multidimensional approach including state and NGOs, such as CBOs, government, private sectors, religious groups, the groups impacted, victims' families and related academic institutions. Kenya is a country without a common strategy. The findings of this study reaffirm that all targets were accomplished and that a multi-agency security operations policy that would be effective and productive in Kenya and East Africa must be multilateral and include all related players in the fight against insecurity. The report advocates an ongoing joint effort by non-state and government players to fight terrorism.

5.2 Conclusions

This study described Kenya's current multi-agency security operations policy and East Africa. Although East Africa's closeness to the Arab Peninsula affords the Horn of Africa with an ability to be a continuous corridor and sanctuary for Al Qaeda operations, the application of this new approach principally leads to the reduction of al-Shabaab.

Kenya's multi-agency defense operations policy to fight terrorism also needs to be addressed by proactive terrorist measures, such as strengthened coordination between the national and state NSAs of Kenya to poker chip radicalization and extremism and other bases of terror.

This grand scheme is by no means comprehensive yet, if successfully implemented jointly, would mark substantial progress in multi-agency security operations in Kenya and East Africa. Failure to adopt such a manifold strategy, however, is still a major downside to Kenya's stability both regionally and globally.

5.3 Recommendations

The study suggests a national multi-agency security operations and CVE plans; another successful multiagency security operations strategy that includes border control components, addressing Muslims' marginalization, diplomatic arrangements, and equipping security forces; and lastly, a new tactic to combat extremism in Kenya

5.3.1 Elements of Effective Multiagency Security Strategies for Kenya

One is that while the political settlement in Kenya has yielded positive results in the mediation and development of peace in Sudan and Somalia, Kenya must ensure that its position in the region does not bring South Sudan back into war. Nairobi will also continue to collaborate with key actors in multi-agency defense operations to make Somalia a secure country with a powerful government. This is one big explanation for the prevalence of terrorist attacks in Kenya. The issue of dysfunctional neighbors.

Second, to tackle refugees, the host of cross-border problems, and immigration, Nairobi must improve its border control police and surveillance. It would help ensure that other forms of instability and extremism will not illegally penetrate Kenya, which will be crucial to a successful strategy for multi-agency security operations. Accordingly, the security forces have to treat graft ruthlessly.

Third, Nairobi will make committed and concrete efforts to address the security forces' inefficiency within its organization. Nairobi will start capital courting, improve the technical capabilities of these interventions and powers and enhance the security forces' cohesion. More efforts should be made to develop capability and train the police and military on new technology and multi-agency security operations techniques. Nairobi should ensure reliable and timely information about the Al-Shabaab activities through bilateral and multilateral cooperation in order to allow fruitful responses. It is also imperious that the nation maintain a high degree of insecurity and terror preparedness.

Finally, Nairobi must give priority to the presence of Muslims in the economy, politics and daily life. It entails "winning the hearts and minds of target populations," which was a crucial Global War on Terror strategy. In this situation, Islamic scholars, the coastal Swahili Muslims, are the target group. And, rather than being branded supporters of extremism, organisations should play a role of civic life. Kenya will be able to live as a society that is more open and tolerant where religion does not bear wrath and dispute.

5.3.2 Multi-Agency Grand Strategy for Kenya and East Africa

Firstly, regional and international players should give priority to efforts to make Somalia secure. In the same way, it is necessary for the UN, the AU and the global community to appeal to all parties concerned, plus the Gulf States, to help the Somali Government.

Second, the different welfares of the regional armies need to be discussed so as not to negatively affect the unity of the alliance and the capability to conduct operations.

Thirdly, Washington also should take its role as a donor in Kenya to encourage institutional reform of the culture of corruption in the Kenyan bureaucracy. Despite of inadequate pay and poor training requirements, most police officers and immigration officers are vulnerable to bribery both in criminal and extremist cultures. Likewise, Washington will advise Nairobi to commit ample money to improve the salaries and training received by its police and migration staff to reduce the chances for terrorists to rub off the police in order to escape capture and detention or to bribe immigration employees to procure fake transit documentation.

Fourthly, the battle against Al-Shabaab will continue to give priority to information sharing and intelligence cooperation between regional partners and coalition powers. National governments in the regions and Somalia will continue to combat the propaganda of the group. The UN and U.S. will maintain AMISOM Forces' logistical support and resourcing. The UN should consider taking over the AU mission to strengthen it and lend it proper international validity. In addition, this would improve capacity building possibilities for the establishment of successful security agencies. AMISOM Forces ought to conduct training and capacity-building for the Somali forces to begin performing successful, timeline-based security duties.

Fifthly, region-wide economic blocs must agree that Somalia supports international exchange and markets its resources in order to reestablish its economy. It is crucial for Somali youth to increase their employment opportunities, which would reduce Al Shabaab's oppression. The region's multi-agency policies for defense operations will be proactive, as they would aim to address wider social and political

dynamics promoting terrorist dissemination. Such reform interventions concentrate on the topics of lack of rule of law, social marginalization, economic marginalization, government isolation, and lack of accountability, and the development of human rights security and peace-building, and the promotion of discussion.

Sixth by protecting national borders, monitoring and preparing border control personnel, the irregular dimension should be recognized by the legitimate refugees before they can be detected and entered Kenyan refugee camps. To facilitate multi-agency security operations, increased alliances should be established between States, foreign and regional actors, and national NSAs. This also addresses violence, radicalisation and many other underlying factors of terrorism. Military operation, law enforcement and intelligence can not resolve terrorism alone. In the end, because Al-Shabaab wants a sanctuary to operate, under-governed areas need to be vigorously policed and the group's finances and support network undermined.

5.4 Recommended Areas for Further Studies

On the root of the discoveries of this research: the effect of Somalia's National Coalition Forces on attempts to support defense multi-agency operations in East Africa are the following areas relevant for further study; Corruption, Socio-economic Growth, and Security Operation Multi-agency Effectiveness in Kenya; and Feasibility of Security Operation Police Joint Government, Public and Private in Kenya.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I - Letter of Introduction

Appendix II - Consent Form

Title of Project: Factors Affecting Military Involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations in East Africa: A Case of Kenya

Institution: Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Nairobi, P.O.BOX 30197-00400, Nairobi.

Investigator:

Supervisor:

Ethical Approval: University of Nairobi Ethical and Research Committee; and National

Council for Science and Technology.

- a. Your permission to contribute in this research study is sought.
- b. With principles that volunteer your consent to contribute in this report.
- c. Might seek clarification about the existence and significance of this study.
- d. May I wish at any point that you feel is appropriate to stop the investigation.

Purpose of the Study: To investigate factors affecting military involvement in multi-agency security operations in East Africa.

Procedure to be followed: With your assistance, you'll answer questions relevant to this study's goals. All material collected is handled confidentially.

Risks: This research does not pose any threats to you.

Benefits: There is no direct benefit to you, but the results of this study will be useful to investigate the performance and to propose a more holistic Horn of Africa and Kenya strategy involving all stakeholders.

Confidentiality Assurance: All of the information you provide is kept confidential and is used only for this report.

Contacts: With regard to questions relating to this report, you may wish to contact me via any of the numerous addresses given above.

I'll now ask you to sign the attached consent form.

CONSENT FORM

Factors Affecting Military Involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations in East Africa: A Case of Kenya

I _____ (respondent) Offer the investigator 's consent to use the information that I will give him in his research and to explain the purpose of the analysis to me by the.....

Signature_____

Date_____

I (field agent / researcher) ratify I clarified the essence of the study and its impact.

Signature_____

Date_____

Appendix III - Questionnaire

Date_____/2020

PART I

1. *Gender Male [] Female []*
2. *How old are you? _____Years*
3. *What are your specialty areas? _____*
4. *What is your years of practice? _____Years*
5. *Training at the highest level? _____*

PART II

- 1) What do you think is a factor affecting military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations?

- 2) Tick your view on this:
 - a. Do poor government policies influences military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations? [Yes] or [No]
 - b. Do religious fundamentalism influences military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations? [Yes] or [No]
 - c. Do weak social-economic factors like unemployment, low wages, and marginalization have an effect on military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations? [Yes] or [No]
- 3) Do external considerations such as the global war on terror, overseas military deployment and the involvement of international terrorist organisations have an effect on military engagement in MSO operations? [Yes] Or [No]

- 4) Do you think that the Government of Kenya's (GoK) security policies do not resolve any of the factors affecting military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations in issue no II?

PART III

- 1) What are the Government of Kenya (GoK) policies supporting military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations?

- 2) Kindly state Yes or No and explain the frameworks in the ongoing support of military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations by the GoK that include:

- a. Communities? [YES] or [NO]

- b. Social-Economic? [Yes] or [No]

c. Religious fundamentalism? [Yes] or [No]

d. NGOs? [YES] or [NO]

e. External factors? [Yes] or [No]

3) Security operations in Kenya:

a. Are they more of military? [Yes] or [No]

b. Have they elements of democratic governance? [Yes] Or [No]

c. Will they have any less regard for human rights? [Yes] or [No]

PART IV

1) How successful were those military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations?

2) Which are the limitations of military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations frameworks of GoK?

3) Do you think considering the aforementioned factors affecting military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations would help to strengthen it?

4) Do you think the inclusion of religious groups, NGOs, impacted societies, the corporate sector, victims' families, media and rehabilitated victims would help in military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations by the GoK?

5) What are your suggestions on how to best address military involvement in Multi-Agency Security Operations in Kenya, while taking into account the drivers listed in PART II Question No 2?
