

THE DETERMINANTS OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1992-2013

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DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has never been presented for examination in any other university

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DEDICATION

This research thesis is dedicated to my parents Esther and John that both passed in the course of this work. This is for you, Mama and Dad.

I also dedicate this thesis to my wife Kate, and children Brook, Brad and Donna that have been, and still are my biggest source of inspiration.

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ABSTRACT

The formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is a function of several factors, both domestic and systemic. Like all countries, Kenya's foreign policy is formulated in the domestic milieu, an environment that is shaped and defined by various attributes including socio-economic, political, geographical factors. These factors influence the domestic policy environment, the result of which diverse array of policies and priorities emerge that eventually find their way into the foreign policy that the country pursues. At the systemic level, Kenya exists within an international system that like the universe, is characterized by laws, different entities, each with its own set of desires, characteristics, capabilities. These systemic attributes condition, by either providing opportunities or constraints, condition what type of foreign policy Kenya pursues towards the Russian Federation.

Using the neoclassical theory, this study has found that while Kenya pursues national interest as the primary goal of its foreign policy in its asymmetrical dyadic relations with the Russian Federation, it does so under the influence of not only its domestic attributes but also of the systemic determinants. By utilizing the qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources through documentary and survey research methods, this study found that Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is a function of both domestic and systemic determinants, with the domestic decision-making structures acting as the transmission belt that reconciles both sets of determinants. This results in rational foreign policy choice pursued using various instruments to yield maximum gain for the country.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KFPF	Kenya Foreign Policy Framework
MoFAIT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
MITTE	Moscow International Travel and Tourism Exhibition
KTB	Kenya Tourism Board
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
HoA	Horn of Africa
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UN-Habitat	UN Humanitarian Settlements Programme
UNEP	UN Environmental Programme
ICC	International Criminal Court
AfroCom	Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa
EAC	East African Community

IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
WTO	World Trade Organization
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
EU	European Union
PSCU	Presidential Strategic Communications Unit
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
APCs	Armored Personnel Carriers
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
KFC	Kenya Flower Council
HCDA	Horticultural Crops Development Authority
EASBRIG	East African Standby Brigade
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
SALW	Small and Light Weapons
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
IAAF	International Association of Athletics Federations
UCG	Unconstitutional Changes in Governance
FIFA	Federation of International Football Associations

CHAPTER ONE
**THE DETERMINANTS OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, 1992-2013**

1.1 Background to Study

Foreign policies of developing states towards powerful states can be understood through two approaches. First, foreign policies of developing states is understood from the perspective of powerful states whereby developing states are seen as allies and beneficiaries of the foreign policies of powerful states, as typified by the Cold War era developing states' foreign policies. This approach is common in analyses of foreign policies of less powerful states in asymmetrical dyads resulting from imbalances in how capabilities are distributed in the international system. During the Cold War, the two superpowers, the Soviet Union (USSR) and America (USA) sought allies then built alliances with less powerful states which in turn became frontiers for their power projection abroad. Ideology and geostrategic calculations took precedence over other interests as the main motivations for powerful states foreign policies towards less powerful states in the international system. Systemic variables overshadowed domestic determinants of the foreign policy and relations between these states, and little attention was paid to the internal workings of less powerful states' domestic political systems in their asymmetrical relations with great states.

The second and more accurate perspective regarding understanding less powerful states' foreign policy is where foreign policies of less powerful states are explained from their own perspective by examining domestically derived political, economic, security, social factors that inform their foreign policies towards powerful states. In Africa, this perspective gained much relevance when Cold War ended, and African countries started to aggressively compete for attention and resources from powerful states. Inevitably, the foreign policy edifice of the less powerful developing states took shape, resulting in coherent foreign policies directed towards powerful states and informed by domestically generated determinants instead of ideology-based and geostrategic determinants. As soon as the Cold War ended, Kenya, which hitherto had been complacently on the receiving end of the super-powers' foreign policies, felt the need to recalibrate its foreign policy towards these great states, both traditional and nontraditional partners, so as to secure the much needed foreign assistance and realign its post-cold war relations.

The story of Russian Federation's relations with the African continent is a complex tale. Set against a backdrop of USSR-Africa geostrategic relations anchored on the Cold War ideologies, the Russian Federation inherited a complex, if not distorted, relations with the African continent that called for immediate revision. The Russian Federation's independence president, Boris Yeltsin, blaming USSR's economic woes on African states that had received economic assistance from the USSR, started off a series of changes that would not only sever Africa-Russian Federation relations but would also call for immediate repayment of loans owed to the USSR, closure of some embassies and consulates in Africa and revising trade relations. The publication of President Yeltsin's 1991 Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept document and the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation codified Africa's diminished appeal to the Russian Federation interests. The Foreign Policy Concept's top ten most important regions for Russian Federation's national interests, Africa ranked 9th, followed only by Latin America¹. Two issues arose out Africa's asymmetrical relations with Yeltsin's Russian Federation. First, the Russian Federation decided to limit its contact with African continent to relations with the most economically viable African states as Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Libya. Secondly, for the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Russian Federation preferred to deal with African states, in the words of the Russian envoy to the United Nations Yuliy Vorontsov "within the framework of African efforts"².

For Kenya, the 1990s were a defining decade in the practice of Kenya's foreign policy for three main reasons. First, in 1991, Cold War ended, thereby ending half a century of ideologically driven arms race that had split the political world asunder, each side led by the United States and the former USSR, respectively. Secondly, in 1992 Kenya was politically "reborn" from KANU's single-party dictatorship to a multi-party democracy. The traumatic circumstances that surrounded the political transition to multiparty democracy redefined the conduct of foreign policy of Kenya in two ways. First, western countries, which were Kenya's traditional partners, slapped conditionalities on the Kenyan government to exert pressure on President Moi to institutionalize democratic changes. Secondly, the multiparty/democratic transition started off a series of political and constitutional changes that would continue to define Kenya's domestic politics through to the

¹ Melville Andrew and Tatiana Shakleina, eds, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities* (New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 55

² Kanet, Roger and Alexander Kozhemiakin, eds. *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 170

21st century. Lastly, in 1998 Kenya for the first time after the Cold War became a victim of international terrorism when Al Qaeda operatives detonated a bomb in the US embassy in Nairobi. These three factors impacted Kenya's domestic political, economic, and social dynamics, which instigated further ramifications with regard to Kenya's external relations.

Resultantly, Kenya had to recalibrate and escalate its foreign policy towards other partners, more significantly former communist, nontraditional partners as China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. Foreign policy discourse after the Cold war is shaped by, as one of the most prominent players, the Russian Federation, which inherited most of the former superpower's (USSR) international agreements including Kenya-USSR diplomatic relations. The story of the conduct of the country's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is a complex tale of how two countries that once represented opposing sides of the Cold War's ideological divide, came to politically reinvent themselves and their relations starting 1992 when Kenya was politically "reborn" and the Russian Federation emerged as the principle state of the defunct USSR.

This study seeks to examine Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation from a less powerful state's perspective by examining the domestically generated drivers of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russia Federation in the context of post-Cold war international environment up to 2013. The consistence in conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation will be analyzed within the context of Kenya's national interests pursued, determinants of and instruments it has used in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. The time scope of this study covers three presidencies in Kenya: Moi (1992-2002); Kibaki (2003-2013) and Kenyatta (2013-). In these periods, the actors, sources and, primarily, what determine the country's foreign policy under the three presidencies will be examined. Point of departure between this study and other general inquiries on asymmetrical dyads is that this is a study on the drivers of the foreign policy of a less-powerful state in an asymmetrical dyad from the perspective of that state's domestic dynamics.

1.2 Statement of Problem

Limiting its relations with the African continent "within the framework of African efforts"³, Russian Federation pursued a more pragmatic approach towards Africa. This continues to be the

³ Kanet, Roger and Alexander Kozhemiakin, eds. *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 170

Russian Federation standard foreign policy practice in the 21st century. This way, the Russian Federation's departure set the stage for understanding African states' foreign policy from within their domestic contexts. While Russian Federation continues "to employ the African factor for advancing Russian interests in the international arena"⁴, and at the same time engaging African states from within the context of their own efforts, one question stands out: "What drives African states' foreign policy towards the Russian Federation?"

Kenya, which ideologically was not USSR's ally in the Cold War, and had not received much of its economic assistance, started off its diplomatic association with Russian Federation in 1992, as a continuation of diplomatic relations established with the USSR in 1964. Within this context, Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, like all other foreign policies was driven by internally generated socio-economic and political preferences and motives. These include the domestic and systemic factors that motivates Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. However, while studies have focused on understanding the determinants of Russian Federation's foreign policy towards Africa, no particular study has attempted to explain what has driven Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation, particularly from 1992 to 2013. This study will therefore attempt to explain Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation from the context of Kenya's national interests pursued, determinants of and the instruments it has used in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. This time-scope corresponds with Russian Federation's departure from and return to Africa and will cover three presidencies: Moi (1992-2002); Kibaki (2003-2013) and Kenyatta (2013). Domestically generated motivations will be examined, as well as determinants of and instruments that Kenya has used in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation.

1.4 Research Questions

1. What interests influence Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation?
2. What factors determine the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation?

⁴ Arkhangelskay, Alexandra and Vladimir Shubin, "Russia's Africa Policy", Occasional Paper No. 157, South African Institute of International Affairs (September 2013)

3. What instruments does Kenya use, and who are the actors, in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation and how effective are those instruments?

1.3 Objectives of Study

This study seeks to examine what factors determined the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation from 1992 to 2013. Specifically, it seeks to achieve the following objectives:

1. To examine the interests that inform Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation
2. To examine the domestic and systemic determinants of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation and
3. To examine the instruments that Kenya used in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation between 1992 and 2013 and their effectiveness.

1.5 Research Assumptions

2. Systemic factors shape Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation
3. Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation is driven by economic and social factors
4. Kenya's choice of foreign policy instruments and actors is informed by its national interests

1.6 Justification of Study

This study is justified in both policy and academic spheres. In the academic sphere, while scholarly works⁵ abound on Kenya's foreign policy, those that focus on the determinants of Kenya's foreign policy towards powerful countries, more particularly the Russian Federation, after the Cold War are limited in number and scope. This study, therefore, while giving attention to the determinants of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, will examine it within the broad context of the formulation and conduct of a less powerful states' foreign policy towards

⁵ Nying'uro, Philip. "United States Policy and the Transition to Democracy in Kenya, 1990-1992". PhD Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1999; Okello, George. "Economic Dependence as a Basis of Cooperation and Political Compliance in the Inter-State relations. A Case of Kenya's foreign Policy Towards Britain, 1963-1988", M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1994; Maumo, Leonard. "Kenya's foreign Policy towards Israel, 1963-2002: Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Practice", University of Nairobi, 2009; Musambayi, Katumanga. "The Politics of Foreign Policy Execution: Consistency and Inconsistency in Kenya's foreign Policy towards South Africa-1978 to 1992", University of Nairobi, 1995

powerful countries. Moreover, foreign policy is in constant flux and by examining the determinants of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, it will contribute to the dynamic foreign policy discourse. While filling the knowledge gap left by paucity of studies on Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, it will also add to the general knowledge of the formulation and implementation of less powerful states' foreign policy especially towards great powers after the Cold War.

In the policy sphere, the scope of time of the study was defined by both domestic and systemic political changes. This study will factor in how these changes impacted on the formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation in the post-Cold War period. By examining how the determinants of the foreign policy of Kenya towards the Russian Federation, the study will be a useful reference for foreign policy actors and practitioners on how a multiplicity of variables combine to generate a coherent foreign policy. The actors and practitioners in Kenya's foreign policy will use this understanding to formulate a more informed foreign policy and to conduct the same within the opportunities and constraints occasioned by these determinants.

1.2 Literature Review

1.2.1 Introduction and Definition

The literature review is organized around two broad themes within which an examination of the determinants of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation will be situated. By drawing from literature on various countries at different times, the literature review is organized thematically, first, on how various determinants influence the formulation and conduct of countries' foreign policies and what instruments they prefer based on those determinants. Secondly, on how states formulate and conduct their foreign policies in asymmetrical dyads, and how they recalibrate their foreign policies in response to this systemic imbalance in capabilities. Finally, the literature review concludes by examining what other dissertations have been done on Kenya's foreign policy and how these will provide a premise and essence for this inquiry.

Kegley and Raymond define foreign policy as the goals that officials leading nation-states seek abroad, the values that underlie those goals and the means or instruments used to pursue

them⁶. This definition brings out three aspects of foreign policy. First, foreign policy is both a set of goals that a state seeks to achieve abroad and a means of achieving those goals. Secondly, foreign policy is a product of decision making. Lastly, foreign policy is laden with values. From this perspective, foreign policy is what individuals representing a state either do or do not do in their interactions with the world. While the definition is open to any theoretical orientation, this study will examine its relevance against a neoclassical realist theory that, unlike other systemic theories, entrenches the state-level determinants' role in foreign policy making and practice. The definition opens up the foreign policy space for an in-depth examination of how state-level determinants of foreign policy interact with systemic determinants to result in a coherent state foreign policy.

1.2.2 Determinants and Instruments of Foreign Policies

Aras⁷ examines Turkey's foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) against a backdrop of strained relations between the two countries. Aras also examines how Turkey's foreign policy elites have influenced and defined Turkey's foreign policy towards Iran. He argues that politically, Turkey and IRI represent two ideologies: Turkey representing democratic political system while Iran is an authoritarian state with latent Caliphate ambitions. This difference has pitched Turkey's foreign policy decision makers against Iran's own foreign policy elites, the result of which, as Aras argues, is that the foreign policy of Turkey is "taken hostage" to the worldview of its elites driving the foreign policy. Turkey's foreign policy decision makers, using their own foreign policy lens, narrowly defines Iran as "others" resulting in an "exclusionist" Turkey's foreign policy. However, Aras' study does not factor in the post-Cold War realities as interdependence and how it has influenced interstate relations. This study, set against the end of the Cold War, highlights the essence of inclusiveness and tolerance in bilateral state relations while still entrenching the quest for national interests as the main goal of foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, identity was redefined, and increased interdependence necessitated a careful balance between interests and identity in inter-state relations and foreign policy. While identity plays an important role in foreign policy, it remains a social construct that is subject to domestic and

⁶ Kegley, Charles and Gregory Raymond, *The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 82

⁷Aras, Bulent, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran: Ideology and Foreign Policy in Flux", *Journal of Third World Studies* 18, No 1 (Spring 2001), 1-20

systemic changes. This study will fill in the knowledge gap left by Aras by examining Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation in the international system after Cold-War that was characterized by the shift from the exclusive "others" to interest-based identities.

Omeliicheva⁸, in her study of the Russian Federation's foreign policy towards Iran, argues that the Russian Federation has found itself in dilemma owing to the clash between its immediate and strategic interests. In the study, Omeliicheva argues that the Russian Federation was torn between supporting the call for sanctions against Iran due to the latter's nuclear ambitions and not supporting them due to its economic interests in Iran, as well as their mutual bilateral agreements. Under President Vladimir Putin's government, Iran was Russian Federation's third largest arms market while regionally, Iran was pursuing its own nuclear ambitions, an ambition that the Russian Federation was not ready to accept due to regional balance and peace. Omeliicheva argues that to resolve this impasse, the Russian Federation resorted to critical geopolitics, through which it could redefine its interests. Critical geopolitics is a belief that the international system is not a permanent phenomenon but is rather prone to shifts and therefore the need to redefine state power as made up of other interests as economic, financial, technological which offer a wide appeal than just the narrow benefits that one state may offer to another. Iran was eventually referred to the Security Council (UNSC) for sanctions by the Russian Federation from 2006-2008. The study offers a premise for understanding foreign policy agenda setting in an international system that is defined by self-help and proneness to change. The study broadens the concept, geopolitics, to include other instruments as economic, financial, intellectual in determining a country's foreign policy. The setting of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation happened against the backdrop of the just-ended Cold War which was defined by ideological and geopolitical calculations. In appreciating the tenets of the broadened critical geopolitics concept, this study will examine how Kenya, by balancing fear and interests, has sought self-help in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation after the Cold War.

Spyker, in his dissertation⁹, examined external influences on the conduct of a weak state's foreign policy using the case of the United States and Italy. In his study, Spyker argues that theoretically, there are three paradigms that explain weak states' response towards dominant states'

⁸ Omeliicheva, Mariya, "Russia's Foreign Policy Towards Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 14, No.3 (2012), 331-344

⁹ Spyker, Rick. "External Influences on Weak A State Foreign Policy: The United States and Italy During the Cold War", Auburn, Alabama 2010

incentives in asymmetrical dyads: compliance, consensus and counter-dependence. According to Spyker, compliance is tantamount to bargains between the two states while consensus is closeness that exists between foreign policy elites of both states. Counter-dependence on the other hand indicates a willingness of the subordinate state to respond to the challenges of dependence by defying the positions of the dominant state over contested international issues. He posits that using economic instruments, the United States was able to softly buy Italy's compliance and resultantly alter its voting pattern in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in favour of the US. Using two instruments- US exports and loans to Italy, the US influenced Italy's Index of Agreement with the US in UNGA starting 1956. However, with Italy's rising fortunes, it adopted a bellicose foreign policy towards America and started challenging it, especially on matters regarding Middle Eastern oil. Italy's expanded economy resulted in defiant foreign policy. However, theoretically the study approaches foreign policy from an international political economy¹⁰ perspective and therefore ignores domestic sources of a state's foreign policy. It tends to analyze the foreign policy of a less powerful state from the perspective of a greater state in an asymmetrical relationship. It is this void that this study will attempt to fill by examining both domestic and systemic factors determining Kenya's foreign policy and how they have conditioned the same towards, and relations with the Russian Federation.

Nanjira¹¹ examines the role and effectiveness of diplomacy as an instrument of Africa's foreign policy. In his study, he traces African diplomacy from antiquity to the 21st century, concluding that against other instruments, it is the most effective foreign policy instrument for African states in their relations with the world. For relatively weak African states, diplomacy is the most effective instrument as it drives their foreign policy through advising and implementing it abroad. This material inadequacy is compensated for by rigorous diplomatic relations through which they are able to pursue their national interests in an international system characterized by an imbalanced distribution of capabilities. While Nanjira's study entrenches the role of diplomacy as the key instrument of foreign policy, it fails to theoretically explain why other instruments are ineffective in advancing Africa's national interests in foreign policy process, especially in asymmetrical dyads. One question arises out of Nanjira's study: Are there other instruments available for African states to use especially in their relations with the developed world? Unlike

¹⁰ International political economy approaches interstate relations through "what is happening, why, who gains and "who loses" approach (See Tom Conley in Griffiths, Martin, ed. *International Relations Theory for the 21st Century: An Introduction*. (London: Routledge, 2007),146-156)

¹¹ Nanjira, Daniel, *Africa Foreign Policy and Diplomacy from Antiquity to the 21st Century*. (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 147

Nanjira's study that lays emphasis on diplomacy alone as the most effective instrument, this study will examine what other instruments Kenya uses and examine how effective they are in advancing Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation.

Dormandy¹² examines United Kingdom's foreign policy towards the US in the symmetrical relations between the United States and United Kingdom (UK). In the study, Dormandy argues that the effectiveness of foreign policy instruments is best measured by how well they address the long-term objectives of both states and therefore UK's foreign policy towards and relations with the US, being "essential" and "special" are not strategic and therefore don't address the long term objectives of the two states. Strategic objectives address long term goals and therefore are the most effective, especially in a constantly changing international system. Not sure of the outcome of the 2017 referendum to determine UK's stay in the European Union (EU), Dormandy posits that foreign policy instruments and areas of mutual interest should be recalibrated such that the US and UK governments have more strategic relations. However, the study addresses the effectiveness of instruments among equals in a symmetrical dyad. This study, while borrowing from Dormandy's study on how to measure the effectiveness of foreign policy instruments, will examine the effectiveness of Kenya's foreign policy instruments but in the context of the asymmetrical dyad between Kenya and the Russian Federation.

1.2.3 Foreign Policies in Asymmetrical Dyads

Malaquias¹³ examines Angola's foreign policy towards three great powers- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), United States and People's Republic of China- against a backdrop of changes in Angola's both domestic and systemic milieus. In his study, Malaquias argues that before the 1975 independence of Angola, the ruling party, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) solely directed its foreign policy towards USSR and Cuba so as to get the much needed assistance to survive against competition from rival parties National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Immediately after independence, MPLA's leader, Agostinho Neto readjusted Angola's foreign policy to include China as a core partner. The main reason for this was to use Chinese vast

¹² Dormandy, Xenia, "Parliamentary Evidence: UK Government Foreign Policy Towards the United States", Chatham House (August 2013)

¹³ Malaquias, Assis, "Angola's Foreign Policy: Pragmatic Recalibrations", *South African Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper 84* (May 2005), 1-21.

resources to assist Angola to consolidate the gains made by MPLA while equally ensuring economy developed while the civil war raged in Angola. The end of the Cold War in 1991 and the end of Angola's civil war in 2002 resulted in a further recalibration of Angola's foreign policy to include the United States as Angola's major partner to help Angola achieve economic development under expanded democratic space. Theoretically, this study offers a good thrust for understanding the fluidity of foreign policy in response to both internal and systemic changes in pursuit of national interests. While Kenya may differ from Angola in terms of political experience, both are less powerful states as compared to other states including the US, China, and Russian Federation. The study therefore offers a good premise from which to examine Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation after the Cold War as well as after Kenya's political rebirth of 1992.

Gvalia, Siroky, Lebanidze and Iashvili¹⁴ examine the foreign policies of less powerful states towards great states using the case of Georgia and the Russian Federation. Basing their argument on the assumption that individual and state-level attributes are the main determinants of less powerful state's foreign policy, they argue that in an asymmetrical dyad, less powerful states may or may not bandwagon with great powers despite much benefits arising from the relations. Georgia, subordinate to the Russian Federation, benefitted from the relations with the Russian Federation with the latter being Georgia's leading trading partner before 2006. After the tensions that led to the 2008 war with the Russian Federation, Georgia opted for western markets and new sources of gas and oil, a shift they attribute to Georgia's resource demands and leadership decisions. Resultantly, Georgia fortified its resolve to align and identify with the US and other western countries making up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This study entrenches the role that individual and state-level determinants play in directing a country's foreign policy in an asymmetrical dyad. However, the study erroneously presents defiance as an alternative that less powerful states have and can explore to their advantage. Despite its effectiveness in Georgia, less powerful states with limited resource and influence capability more often, instead of outright defiance to great states, usually chose to recalibrate their foreign policies towards other countries, even those that traditionally are not their partners. It is in this light that Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation after the Cold War will be examined. The Russian Federation is traditionally not Kenya's partner and hence the need to examine what interests

¹⁴ Gvalia, Giorgi, David Siroky, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Zurab Iashvili "Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States", *Security Studies* 22, (2013), 98-131

motivates its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation alongside other traditional partners as the US, Britain.

In studying the asymmetrical relations between America (US) and South America, Darnton¹⁵ argues that in asymmetrical dyads, less powerful states' foreign policy agenda setting is one of the most effective sureties of success in their relations with a superior power. Darnton recounts the rise and development of the Alliance for Progress, an economic association that brings together Latin American countries and the United States. Through a series of efforts and calculations by the less powerful Latin American countries, especially Brazil, the United States government under presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy were persuaded into signing treaties that led to the Alliance for Progress which was a development merchant for the Latin American countries as well as a cash channel from the United States to Latin America. Darnton further argues that the access options open to the less powerful Latin American countries were direct access through bilateral relations, indirect access through international organizations and political violence, the latter of which the Latin American countries would not pursue owing to their military inferiority against the United States. This study, despite its homogeneous treatment of Latin America as a single entity, invokes interest in examining what instruments a state may use in its foreign policy and how effective these instruments are. Again, the study highlights the essence of interests in shaping one state's foreign policy agenda towards another state be it in symmetrical or asymmetrical relations.

An antithetical voice to Spyker's argument above is provided by Dolan, Tomlin, Molot and Riekhoff¹⁶ who studied the foreign policies of African states towards great states in asymmetrical dyads. In their study, they used two variables-economy and external linkages to measure how asymmetrical dyads may influence the conduct of less powerful state foreign policy towards a great state. They argue that, in an asymmetrical dyad, the state of the nation's economy and the extent of its external linkages results in expanded relations for more developed African states and restricted relations for the less developed African states. Theoretically, the study offers a basis for understanding the domestic sources of less powerful states' foreign policies towards great states while in asymmetrical relations. While for Spyker, expanded economy results in bellicose foreign

¹⁵ Darnton, Christopher, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress", American Political Science Association Annual Meeting Paper (2010)

¹⁶Dolan, Michael, Brian Tomlin, Maureen Molot and Harald von Riekhoff, "Foreign Policies of African States in Asymmetrical Dyads", *International Studies Quarterly* 24, No. 3 (Sep. 1980), 415-449

policy leading to strained relations, for Dolan, Tomlin, Molot and Riekhoff, expanded economy leads to closer relations expressed through cordial foreign policy. However, in keeping with one of the central assumptions of this study that Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is informed by Kenya's economic factors, this study will attempt to examine whether it was the expansion or constriction of Kenya's economy between 1992 and 2013 that motivated its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation.

1.2.4 Academic Literature on Kenya's Foreign Policy

Kenya's foreign policy has also been a subject of university dissertations. Nying'uro examined Kenya's foreign policy from the United States' perspective by examining the role that the latter played in the democratization process in Kenya¹⁷. Katumanga¹⁸ examined the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards South Africa against the backdrop of apartheid and observed that there were inconsistencies in public declarations and foreign policy practice. Okello¹⁹ examined the role of dependence and how it shapes the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards Britain from Kenya's independence in 1963 to the late 80s/early 90s. In his study, he argues that because Kenya was economically dependent on Britain, Kenya tended to pursue a compliant foreign policy towards Britain in the study period. Maumo²⁰, in examining Kenya's foreign policy towards Israel, identifies ambivalence and inconsistencies between foreign policy rhetoric and actual practice. Nying'uro's study offers good insights on the conduct of great states' foreign policies towards less powerful states in the immediate period after the Cold War and at the same time also gives a detailed study of the traumatic circumstances under which Kenya's transition to multiparty democracy happened. However, the study presents an understanding of Kenya's foreign policy from the context of American foreign policy towards Kenya. On the other hand, both Katumanga's and Maumo's studies identify one string, ambivalence, between rhetoric and practice

¹⁷Nying'uro, Philip. "United States Policy and the Transition to Democracy in Kenya, 1990-1992". PhD Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1999.

¹⁸Musambayi, Katumanga. "The Politics of Foreign Policy Execution: Consistency and Inconsistency in Kenya's foreign Policy towards South Africa-1978 to 1992", University of Nairobi, 1995.

¹⁹Okello, George. "Economic Dependence as a Basis of Cooperation and Political Compliance in the Inter-State relations. A Case of Kenya's foreign Policy Towards Britain, 1963-1988", M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1994.

²⁰Maumo, Leonard. "Kenya's foreign Policy towards Israel, 1963-2002: Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Practice", University of Nairobi, 2009.

of foreign policy of Kenya towards South Africa and Israel, respectively. Ambivalence in Kenya's foreign policy resulted from within South Africa and Israel's domestic political context. Theoretically, this great power perspective on understanding Kenya's foreign policy fails to incisively answer the questions "why" and "how" Kenya actually conducts its foreign policy towards South Africa and Israel but instead explains the foreign policy as a consequence of other states' politics. While ambivalence in Kenya's foreign policy lies at the core of their inquiries, the two studies offer a good premise for understanding how Kenya's interests have conditioned Kenya's foreign policy towards other states despite the changes in the other states' domestic political arena.

Literature has demonstrated that the making and implementation of foreign policy is a complex process, especially for less powerful countries in asymmetrical relationships with great states. In asymmetrical dyads, less powerful states foreign policies are more often understood from the context of great states. This position was conditioned by the systemic conditions that arose out of the Cold War. However, this perspective does not theoretically answer to the "why" and "how" questions of foreign policy. Literature has equally demonstrated that a better perspective for understanding foreign policies of less powerful states is from within the domestic context of less powerful states themselves. An inquiry into the domestic sources of less powerful states motivations towards great states, especially after the Cold War, will help explain why less powerful states conduct their foreign policies towards great states and how effective are the means that they have accordingly employed. Nevertheless, the literature has also shed light on externally generated foreign policy motivations and how they have impacted the conduct of one state's foreign policy towards another country both during and after the Cold War. These include systemic changes as polarity, international law and organizations, international economy. There appears to be minimal literature though, on the formulation and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy towards other states after the Cold War, especially the Russian Federation, as understood from Kenya's domestic perspective. The study will therefore examine the process of formulation and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation by answering the questions "why" and "how" to fill this gap in foreign policy literature.

1.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Meehan posits that a theory may be a single statement but more often, it comprises a number of general statements that are linked together in complex ways to describe and explain to answer the questions “why” and “how”²¹. In foreign policy analysis, theory should be able to address the two aspects of foreign policy: formulation and implementation thus answering the “why” and “how” questions, respectively. While liberalist, realist and Marxist theories are the dominant theories of foreign policy, this study will employ one strand of realism, neoclassical realism over the other theories. This is because while classical realism stretches parsimony too far by reducing all state motivations to power, structural realism completely “black boxes” the state to the point of ignoring the state’s domestic influences on its foreign policy. Liberalism on the other hand, while it holds an optimistic view of interstate relations through economic interdependence, downplays the role of strategic security as the guiding principle of the conduct of states’ foreign policies, because states must first seek survival in an international system defined by anarchy and stark inequality in power distribution. Economic interdependence, while it remains relevant in interstate relations, it is anchored on state survival in the broadened context of strategic security. Like classical realism, Marxist theories also suffer reductionism; erroneously reducing all state foreign policy motivations to one variable: economic interests. Neoclassical realism on the other hand combines international opportunities and constraints, domestic political influence and national interest in explaining foreign policy. By balancing parsimony against explanatory power, neoclassical realism thus overcomes classical realism’s and Marxism’s main weakness-reductionism.

Foreign policy, as literature has shown, is formulated in the domestic political environment and implemented in the international milieu. Neoclassical realism attempts an explanation of both the formulation and implementation in the domestic and international milieus, respectively. As a theory, neoclassical realism is propagated by Gideon Rose²², Randall Schweller, while it has its roots in the classical and structural realist theory as propagated by Hans Jacob Morgenthau, Edward Hallett Carr, Kenneth Waltz, the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr among others. While

²¹Meehan, Eugene. *The Theory and Method of Political Analysis* (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1965), 132,89

²² Rose, Gideon “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, *World Politics* 51, No. 1 (Oct. 1998), 144-172

premising on the core assumptions of the broader realist thought, neoclassical realism holds the following distinctive assumptions²³:

1. Foreign policy depends on domestically derived factors that include domestic political structure, institutions, ambitions, ideology, economy.
2. The core motivation of foreign policy is a combination of both power and interests.
3. Domestic decision-making structures and resource endowment intervene between structural constraints and the behavior of a state's foreign policy.

These assumptions by no means downplay the role of systemic variables in influencing foreign policy. Rather, as Schweller argues, domestic political structure and resource endowment act as the “transmission belt”²⁴ that links systemic power shifts and domestic environment in the process of formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Neoclassical realism captures all the three foreign policy “images” and their roles as Waltz²⁵ envisaged. Accordingly, the role of systemic variables in foreign policy is linked to domestic determinants through foreign policy decision making structure. Neoclassical realism broadens the concept “national interest”, drawing a distinction between “national interest” and “power”, thus overcoming classical realism’s oversimplification of the same concept. By breaking it down, a state can pursue national interests in its constituent parts as military, economy, political, social interests. Neoclassical realism posits that government institutions with extractive and mobilization capacities mediate between systemic variables and domestic preferences so as to develop a coherent foreign policy.

All sovereign states have national interests. Neoclassical realism suggests that domestic factors are far more likely to influence national interests and foreign policy more than systemic determinants would. In an anarchic international system, these interests are defined by the state to achieve self-help. Foreign policy objectives are therefore defined in the context of national interests and power. For Kenya, national interests in the study period were laid out in the independence Kenya African National Union (KANU) manifestos of 1961 and 1963 while in the

²³Rasler, Karen and William Thompson, “Malign Autocracies and Major Power Warfare: Evil, Tragedy and International Relations Theory”, *Security Studies* 10, No.47 quoted in Griffiths, op. cit., p.27; Lobell, Steven, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro, eds. *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),19-22

²⁴Schweller, Randall. *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 6 quoted in Griffiths, op. cit., p. 27-28

²⁵The three images of foreign policy are discussed in Waltz, Kenneth. (*Man, The State and War*. New York: Columbia University Press,1959) are the individual, the state and the international system

post-Cold War period, they were formally codified in the 2009 Kenya Foreign Policy Framework (KFPPF) which became “the standard reference and principle guide in the conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy”²⁶.

Conceptually, the interaction between policy and milieu is best understood through levels of analysis. A preferred entrance point to foreign policy therefore is through levels of analysis framework. Rourke argues that the linkage between environment and policy making happens at three levels of analysis: individual, state and systemic²⁷. Foreign policy cannot be viewed outside of a state’s political context, a context defined by individual and state actors as well as by several determinant factors. Foreign policy at the individual level is influenced by an individual’s idiosyncrasies, psychological and organizational behaviour. At the state level, foreign policy is influenced by the state’s societal attributes, operation and governmental politics while at the systemic level, polarity and polarization, geostrategic position, international law and organizations influence the conduct of foreign policy. Rourke’s levels of analysis offer a simplified basis for explaining the interaction between various factors and the formulation of foreign policy at the individual, state and international levels. It also blends the role of both domestic and systemic determinants in influencing foreign policy, in keeping with the tenets of neoclassical realist theory. This study will therefore adopt Rourke’s three-tier framework of analysis in an attempt to explain the role of individuals, state and systemic determinants in influencing Kenya’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation from 1992 to 2013.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 Research Design

This is majorly a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources through documentary and survey research methods. Documentary method will entail an analysis of existing primary and secondary documents as government publications like the foreign policy document, foreign policy framework, treaties, trade agreements, magazines and newspapers, as well as speeches and secondary sources as books, journals. The survey method will entail conducting interviews among purposively selected respondents from Kenya MoFAIT, Russian Federation

²⁶Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Foreign Policy Framework*. (Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nairobi: 2009), 2

²⁷Rourke, John, *International Politics on the World Stage* (12thed.) (University of Connecticut: Storrs, 2008): 65

Embassy, Office of the President, Kenya Association of Manufacturers, commodity exporters (Kenya Flower Council, Kenya Tea Development Authority, Coffee Board of Kenya) and Kenya Tourism Board and other Russian Federation firms and organizations. Moreover, it will also entail analysis of non-complex quantitative secondary data especially concerning trade and other statistics typical of inter-state relations like imports and exports.

1.4.2 Sampling

Because of the specific nature of the study, the survey will use purposive sampling method to select key interviewees. The key informants will be picked from among a sampling population composed of individuals in the foreign policy and diplomatic fields, commodity producers and exporters and the tourism sector. The sampling frame will be the individuals in Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (MoFAIT), the Russian Federation Embassy in Kenya, manufacturers and exporters and tourism actors. Because of the specific nature of this study, a purposively selected sample of 15 respondents: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2), the Russian Federation Embassy in Kenya (2), Kenya Association of Manufacturers (2), Kenya Flower Council (2), Kenya Tea Development Authority (2), Coffee Board of Kenya (2) and Kenya Tourism Board (2). These will be selected based on their experiences, opinions as well as their knowledge of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation in the study period.

Purposive sampling, according to Neuman can be used in two cases. First, when selecting especially informative cases and secondly, when the population is specific and not easy to reach²⁸. The latter justification offers a premise for this study to select 15 respondents for the interview. The interviews will be guided by specifically designed interview schedules.

1.4.3 Data Analysis

Being a majorly qualitative study, the primary and secondary qualitative data will be analyzed in comparison with the quantitative data to establish consistencies and patterns. The interview responses, together with the available primary and secondary literature will be analyzed together to establish consistencies and enhance data reliability. The analysis will be used to measure the

²⁸Neuman, Lawrence. *Understanding Research*. (Boston: Pearson Education, 2009), 90-91

given assumptions to conclude on determinants of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation.

1.5 Definition of Terms

Foreign policy: Conceptually, foreign policy refers to the objectives that inform what kind of activities and the relationships that a country has with other countries²⁹. It refers to procedures, rules, and principles that guide how a state interacts with others and what activities it does in the process. However, operationally and in this study, it refers to the goals that states seek outside their boundaries as well as the means of achieving those goals.

Asymmetrical dyad: the imbalanced relations between a less powerful state and great state based on their capabilities

Diplomacy: Diplomacy is conceptually defined by Sir Earnest Satow as the “conduct of relations between states by peaceful means”³⁰. In this study, however, diplomacy is operationally referred to as the negotiations between and among states at bilateral or multilateral forums.

National interest: Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley conceptually define national interest as the “driving motivations of state conduct”³¹. In this study however, national interest is operationalized as the common interests shared by the members of a state society.

Sovereignty: Conceptually, sovereignty is defined as the “supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestricted by laws”³². In this study, it is operationally defined as the ultimate political power held by a state.

Globalization: Conceptually, globalization refers to the increased and “growing interdependence among states”³³; increased global human interaction in all spheres of life.

Rogue state: Conceptually, rogue states are states that “are prepared to threaten the regional peace and security but is not in a position to threaten the global balance of power”³⁴. However, the

²⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edvard-Benes> (Accessed August 29, 2020).

³⁰ Nanjira, Daniel, *Africa Foreign Policy and Diplomacy from Antiquity to the 21st Century*. (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 134

³¹ Brown, Chris and Kirsten Ainley. *Understanding International Relations* (3rd ed) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 67

³² Nanjira, *ibid.*, 131

³³ Sorensen, Georg and Robert Jackson. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (5thed.). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10

³⁴ Sorensen and Jackson, *ibid.*, 95

concept of a rogue state is operationalized in this study to mean a state that does not abide by any international rules or norms.

Anarchy: Conceptually, anarchy refers to the lack of an international authority or government. This study adopts this definition.

Critical geopolitics- Conceptually, Omelicheva³⁵ defines critical geopolitics as the belief that the international system is not a permanent phenomenon and state power can be broken up into other interests as economic, financial, technological interests. In this study, critical geopolitics is operationally defined as the belief that foreign policy, happening in an international system that is in perpetual flux, can be pursued as a sum of various constituent elements but not a wholesome entity, hence various instruments can be deployed to pursue these various elements of foreign policy.

1.6 Study Outline

This study will have five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. This chapter will include the problem statement, study objectives, questions, study assumptions, literature review, theoretical framework and finally the research methodology. Chapter two will examine the Kenya's domestically derived determinants of its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Chapter three will examine systemic determinants of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Chapter four will examine the conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation from 1992 to 2013. This will entail examining the actors, instruments used and how the determinants influenced the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Lastly, chapter five will present the summary, recommendations and conclusions of the study.

³⁵ Omelicheva, Mariya, "Russia's Foreign Policy Towards Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 14, No.3 (2012), 331-344

CHAPTER TWO

DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

2.1 Introduction

Due to limited influence capability, less-powerful states like Kenya can rarely conduct an independent foreign policy. Whereas the foreign policies of powerful states are driven by the size of their domestic capabilities, a less powerful state's foreign policy is motivated by domestically generated socio-economic conditions that guide the formulation and pursuit of its foreign policy. Domestic determinants of less powerful states' foreign policy are therefore geared towards the preservation of their sovereignties, pursuit of their national interests and ensure their survival in an anarchic international system. Domestic drivers of foreign policy include topography, economic and social system, a state's conception of national interests, decision-making structures as well as the role that non-state actors play in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy³⁶. These factors broadly constitute the socio-economic factors upon which the formulation of a state's foreign policy is premised. Kenya's national interests can be broadly defined around socio-economic interests.

2.2 Domestic Determinants of Kenya's Foreign Policy

2.2.1 National Interests

The primary motivation for Kenya's foreign policy is its national interests. Kenya's national interests, as the central theme of its foreign policy, are defined in the KANU manifestoes of 1961 and 1963 as well as in the 2009 Foreign Policy Framework. Not differing much from the KANU Manifestos, the 2009 Foreign Policy Framework outlines Kenya's foreign policy objectives to include: Protect Kenya's sovereignty and territorial integrity; Promote sub-regional and regional integration and cooperation; Enhance regional peace and security; Advance the economic prosperity of Kenya and her people; Project Kenya's image and prestige; Promote international cooperation and multilateralism; Promote and protect the interests of Kenyans abroad; and Enhance partnership with the Kenyan Diaspora³⁷. Primarily, Kenya's engagement and relations

³⁶ Knudsen, Olav, "Norway: Domestically Driven Foreign Policy" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 512 (Nov. 1990), 101-115

³⁷ Interview with "Mrs. J", the Russian Federation Desk Officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Policy Framework. Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nairobi: 2009

with other states is defined around the pursuit and achievement of these interests. Accordingly, Kenya's foreign policy is formulated in ways as to advance the pursuit of these national interests. Through a series of strategies, Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation, like towards all countries, is driven by these national interests.

Kenya's 2009 foreign policy framework³⁸ outlines the strategies to include the use of bilateral agreements with foreign governments through treaties and diplomatic relations. Through bilateral agreements, Kenya not only seeks to achieve its national interests at the domestic milieu, but also seeks to safeguard its interests abroad including the wellbeing of its diaspora population. Moreover, Kenya also, by regional integration with other African countries and through such integration, can further its foreign policy towards other countries outside of the regional association. These regional associations include the East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and continental-wide association like New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the African Union (AU) among others. Additionally, Kenya pursues its national interests through global integration in international organizations like the ICC, UN, as well as its specialized agencies like the World Trade Organizations.

Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation is defined around Kenya's national interests, as recently laid out in its foreign policy document framework. Using the various foreign policy strategies, Kenya formulates and conducts its foreign policy towards Russian Federation, as elucidated previously. The primary motivation and determinant of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation remains, however, the pursuit of its national interest³⁹.

2.2.2 Kenyan Economy

Kenya's economy, in this regard, drives its foreign policy towards Russian Federation in two ways. First, in areas that Kenya has comparative advantage over Russian Federation, Kenya formulates an outward-looking foreign policy in a manner as to explore the opportunities that Russian Federation has to offer. For instance, in areas like tea production, in which Kenya has a dominant comparative advantage over Russian Federation, Kenya reaches out to Russian Federation through its foreign policy to find market for its tea. Secondly, in economic areas in

³⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Policy Framework. Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Nairobi: 2009), 25-28

³⁹ Interview with "Mr. E", a Europe and Commonwealth Division officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019.

which Kenya does not have comparative advantage over Russian Federation like the production of fertilizer and manufacturing, Kenya formulates and conducts an inward-looking foreign policy through which it seeks to tap into Russian Federation advantages to enhance its economic capabilities. Hence, Kenya's economy determines Kenya's foreign policy with the intention of pursuing Kenya's economic interests, as a national interest.

2.2.2.1 Economic Outlook

Kenya's economic situation in the post-1992 period was a major catalyst for the recalibration of Kenya's foreign policy, especially towards non-traditional partners like Russian Federation. Kenya's economic woes were a direct result of its extended linkages with western economies. The economic consequences that attended the clamor for multiparty democracy in the early 1990s had economic consequences, the most pronounced being the aid cut and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that resulted from the Paris Club meeting that happened in November 1992. The result was a \$350 million cut in aid to Kenya⁴⁰. Moreover, in 1994, the United States economically threatened Kenya by placing quotas on the latter's apparel bound to the United States⁴¹. At the time, garment was one of the leading commodities that Kenya exported to the U.S., and with the quotas to be imposed in 1995, Kenya had to refocus its economic policy, especially to non-traditional partners.

Kenya's economically detrimental linkages with western countries equally manifested in the 2000s. In 2006, Kenya was "wrongly" slapped with a travel advisory by the United States despite the stable security situation in the county. Diplomatically, this was seen in bad light because at the time, countries like Egypt were going through political and security turmoil that warranted travel advisories and yet the U.S. was reluctant to issue travel advisories to the same countries⁴². According to Kenyan manufacturers and exporters, Kenya's economic problems in the 1990s was a "direct result" of its "undiversified" association with western countries. This undermined the "need" and "urgency" to associate economically with other countries like the Russian Federation, a situation that would have boosted Kenyan economy when it fell out with western donor

⁴⁰ Interview with "Ms. Teddy", the assistant to Political Diplomatic Secretary at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

⁴¹ Mshomba, Richard, *Africa and the World Trade Organization*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 65

⁴² *Ibid.*, 66

countries⁴³. The previous year, the European Union (EU) had equally placed unnecessarily stringent conditions concerning the quality and safety of Kenyan agricultural exports to the EU market. The estimated losses from these conditions affecting Kenya's fruit and vegetable exports to the EU was estimated at 400 million US dollars⁴⁴. For fear of further conditionalities, while also feeling the hurt of the present ones, primarily initiated by Kenya's traditional allies and donors, prompted a formulation of foreign policy towards non-traditional partners like Russian Federation.

Despite the occasional economic malpractices from Kenya's traditional partners, Kenya stabilized economically in the post-2000 period, while its economic interests also increased with the desire to join the league of developing countries. The optimism that characterized the post-KANU era was coupled with an increased desire to attain economic stabilization, in keeping with national economic interests. However, the drive towards economic development was undermined by poll-related violence that followed the contested 2007/2008 general elections. This both undermined the economic milestones hitherto achieved as well as left the economy vulnerable. This further necessitated the need for reaching out to other countries like Russian Federation for economic assistance.

Kenya's economic situation informed the reformulation of Kenya's economic policy resulting in expanding on areas that Kenya has advantage over like agriculture while also benefitting from occasional loans and grants from Russian Federation. While the latter was always given within the Sub-Saharan framework, Kenya's leveraged agricultural production and export as its "strongest point", in its relations with Russian Federation⁴⁵. While Kenya's economy prompted a frantic search for aid, grants and loans from other countries, it equally prompted the effort towards internal economic growth-driven foreign policy.

2.2.2.2 Agriculture

The conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy is a direct function of, among other factors, its agricultural capabilities, and needs. As a majorly agricultural country, Kenya has comparative advantages over Russian Federation in several areas that necessitate the search for

⁴³ Interview with "Mr. P", (Regional Chapters Project Manager), and 'Mr. Jerry' (Chapters and County Affairs Manager) at Kenya Association of Manufacturers on November 7, 2019

⁴⁴ Mshomba, *ibid.*, 179

⁴⁵ Interview with "Mrs. J", the Russian Federation Desk Officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019.

markets from Russian Federation, despite the latter not being Kenya's traditional export destination. Hence, since 1992, Kenya's agricultural exports to Russian Federation have increased in directly proportionality with the intensification of Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Primarily, these can be seen in the export of both food and other agricultural products including timber, cotton and leather. As indicated in the chart below, Kenya's exports to the Russian Federation have significantly increased with each successive regime, beginning with Moi in 1992 until Uhuru's presidency in 2013. This have increased in direct proportionality with Kenya's general increase in agricultural exports that, by the end of Mwai Kibaki's presidency in 2010, accounted for a total of 55.3% of Kenya's exports⁴⁶. Naturally, the domestic increase in agricultural production and exports necessitated the need for newer markets, besides the traditional destinations. It is at this point that Kenya's foreign policy became a necessary instrument for the exploitation of new markets. Kenya's 2009 Foreign Policy document identifies Russian Federation as a "a more assertive power in global affairs" and, besides India and China as one of the "emerging economies"⁴⁷, implying that not only is Russian Federation a dominant player in world politics, but also has the economic wherewithal to influence affairs globally.

A similar sentiment is expressed in Kenya's foreign policy 2013/2014-2017-2018 Strategic Plan that identifies Russian Federation as one of the "non-traditional partners" with which Kenya seeks to shift its "strengths of cooperation" so as to achieve its much-desired economic development⁴⁸. In comparison with many countries, including Russian Federation, Kenya has comparative advantages in the production of certain agricultural products, and therefore uses its foreign policy towards Russian Federation to make inroads into the Russian markets. These include tea, coffee, and floricultural products. Even more interestingly in agricultural exports is the introduction of new crops like passion fruits, avocados as well as other products like leather, timber. Hence, as Kenya's agricultural production and exports increased, so was the need for new markets.

⁴⁶ World Trade Organization, "International Trade Statistics 2015: SPECIAL FOCUS: WORLD TRADE AND THE WTO: 1995–2014" WTO, (2015), 78.

⁴⁷ Interview with "Ms. Teddy", the assistant to Political Diplomatic Secretary at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Foreign Policy Framework*. (Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nairobi: 2009), 11, 13.

⁴⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Strategic Plan: 2013/14-2017/18*". (Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nairobi, 2013),78




Table 1 (Source: WTO 2015)

Kenya’s production and export of tea to the Russian Federation best depicts its economic drivers of its foreign policy towards Russian Federation. As one of the leading producers of tea in the world, Kenya has not only exploited the Russian market, but is also increasingly expanding its export of tea to the Russian Federation towards being the largest tea exporter to the Russian Federation⁴⁹. Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA), as one of the leading sellers to the Russian market, notes that whereas the market was relatively insignificant to Kenya’s tea exports, it currently one of the “upcoming” and most important markets for Kenya⁵⁰. As reflected in the chart below, Kenya’s tea export to the Russian Federation has tremendously increased since 2000, in keeping with Kenya’s intensification of foreign policy implementation towards Russian Federation at the turn of the millennium. Whereas Kenya’s tea imports of 90 tons by Russian Federation in 2000 accounted for only 0.1% of Russian total tea imports, it rose to 14,755 tons that accounted for 8.8% of Russian Federation’s global tea imports in 2010⁵¹. This significant increase can be attributed to the reformulation of Kenya’s foreign policy to include Russian Federation as

⁴⁹ A phone interview with “Mr. Waweru”, the Trade Development Manager at East African Tea Trade Association on Dec. 4, 2019

⁵⁰ Interview with “Mr. B”, Marketing Officer (Exports), KTDA on 13th January 2020.

⁵¹ Kiselev Sergey and Romashkin Roman “Possible Effects of Russia’s WTO Accession on Agricultural Trade and Production” ICTSD Issue Paper 4 (2012) <http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/downloads/2012/04/possible-effects-of-russias-wto-accession-on-agricultural-trade-and-production.pdf> (Accessed May. 4 2015), 73

an economically viable partner for Kenya’s tea exports. The quantity of Kenyan tea import by Russian Federation increased even further with Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidency in 2013, rising to 30,300 tons in 2013⁵².




Table 2 (Source: Kiselev and Romashkin)

Like tea, Kenya’s foreign policy towards Russian Federation has also been a driven by Kenya’s position as one of top global coffee producers. The increase in Kenya’s coffee production and the need for new markets have informed an “improvement in Kenya’s relations” with the Russian Federation⁵³. Beginning from a humble 91 tons of coffee exports to Russian Federation in 2005, which accounted for 0.4% of Russian federation’s global coffee imports, Kenya’s export of coffee to Russian Federation rose to 188 tons and 327 tons in 2009 and 2010, respectively. These accounted for 0.3% and 0.6% of Russian Federation global coffee imports in 2009 and 2010, respectively⁵⁴. Whereas this accounts for a marginal share of Russian Federation’s global coffee imports, it denotes an increase in Kenyan share of Russian Federation’s coffee market, thanks to

⁵² Interview with “Mr. B”, Marketing Officer (Exports), KTDA on 13th January 2020; Klomegah, K. Kester, “Kenya Seeks Closer Cooperation With Russia”, Modern Ghana, Jan, 11, 2015. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/591393/kenya-seeks-closer-cooperation-with-russia.html> (Accessed July. 11 2015).

⁵³ Phone discussion with “Mrs. Y” (Marketing Assistant) and “Mr. Oyoo” (Export Officer) at Coffee Directorate under the Agriculture and Food Authority on January 14th 2020.

⁵⁴ Kiselev and Romashkin, op.cit.. 61

the reformulation of Kenya’s foreign policy to include Russia Federation as an emerging economy in world international trade.




Table 3: (Source: Kiselev and Romashkin)

Kenya’s horticultural exports is one of the most vibrant in the world, especially the cut flower production. More importantly, Kenya is one of the leading producers and exporters of fresh flowers in the world, and resultantly controls a significant share of the flower market⁵⁵. Between 2009 and 2013, Kenya’s cut flower export was the fastest growing in the world, at a rate of 30% per annum, followed at a distance by Israel at 19%. In keeping with this aggressive production and export of cut flowers, Kenya accounts for about 8% of total cut flower production in the world⁵⁶. Consequently, and in keeping with Kenya’s desire for economic development, Kenya’s significant share of global cut flower market necessitates the need for exploration of new markets besides the traditional western European markets. This economic need has been met by Russian Federation’s emergence as the 5th leading importer of cut flowers in the world, accounting for a total of 580

⁵⁵ Interview with “Ms. Sauda”, (Communications Officer) at Kenya Flower Council on Dec. 5th 2019

⁵⁶ Mamias Sylvie “Dynamics of The International Flower Market: Key Trends & Prospects for Kenya,” (Nairobi: Kenya Horticulture Competitiveness Conference–22 January 2015), 9.

million euros of flower imports in 2012, a figure that rose from under 30 million euros in 2000⁵⁷. Hence, while Russian Federation is rising as a market for cut flowers, Kenya's increasing production of cut flowers has spurred the need to "take advantage of this market" with the intention to tap into the Russia's expanding flower needs⁵⁸. Resultantly, Kenya is one of the leading exporters of cut flowers to the Russian Federation.

Besides Kenya's comparative advantage in the production and export of tea, coffee, flowers and fruits over the Russian Federation, it however must rely on the importation of those agricultural products that it does not produce in sufficient quantities. Russian Federation, on the other hand has comparative advantage over Kenya on these products. Wheat is one example where Kenya has to rely on imports and assistance of the Russian Federation, which is the fifth leading producer of wheat in the world⁵⁹. However, with an annual need of 900,000 tons of wheat and an annual production of about 300,000 tons that accounts for a third of Kenya's annual need, Kenya has turned, primarily, Russian Federation to bridge its surplus wheat need⁶⁰. To meet its wheat needs, Kenya turned to Russian Federation that both exports its wheat to Kenya as well as gives Kenya aid in terms of wheat. Between 2006 and 2011, more than half of Kenya's wheat imports came from Russian Federation⁶¹. In 2012 when Kenya was faced with drought that affected its wheat production, while also facing famine and high refugee influx from Somalia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Burundi, Russian Federation provided assistance of wheat worth a total of 2 million dollars to Kenya⁶². While this bridged Kenya's wheat needs, it reflected Kenya's outward-looking foreign policy to ensure that it meets its economic needs in areas in which it lacks comparative advantage over Russian Federation.

⁵⁷ Mamias Sylvie "Dynamics of The International Flower Market: Key Trends & Prospects for Kenya," (Nairobi: Kenya Horticulture Competitiveness Conference–22 January 2015), 9

⁵⁸ Interview with "Mr. Rob", (Marketing Assistant) at Kenya Flower Council on Dec. 5th 2019

⁵⁹ Global Monitoring Report "Food Prices, Nutrition, and the Millennium Development Goals: Using Trade Policy to Overcome Food Insecurity" (2012), 119.

⁶⁰ Odhiambo, Allan, "Russia's wheat export ban signals rise in prices" Business Daily, Aug. 9, 2010
<https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/Russias-wheat-export-ban-signals-rise-in-prices/539550-973150-1341g3s/index.html> (Accessed March 9, 2015).

⁶¹ Food and Agricultural Organization "Analysis of Incentives and Disincentives for Wheat in Kenya" FAO, 2013.
<http://www.fao.org/3/a-at561e.pdf> (Accessed March 10, 2016).

⁶² World Food Programme, "Russian contribution of wheat flour worth US\$2 million to help WFP fight hunger in Kenya" Relief Web, July 30, 2012,
<https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/russian-contribution-wheat-flour-worth-us2-million-help-wfp-fight-hunger-kenya> (Accessed Jan. 6, 2016)

Equally, Kenya's needs for fertilizer and its related lack of capacity to produce it has also necessitated the need to reach out to Russian Federation for fertilizer through its foreign policy. Kenya, being a majorly agricultural country, relies on fertilizer for its annual crop production. On the other hand, Russian Federation is the largest producer of fertilizer in the world and is Kenya's primary source of fertilizer. In a meeting with Russian representatives of Akron and Uralchim, the two leading Russian fertilizer manufacturers, President Uhuru Kenyatta argued that while Kenya does not produce fertilizer, it needs about "500 thousand metric tonnes per year"⁶³. This necessitates the need for an aggressive foreign policy towards Russian Federation, to not only ensure that Kenya meets its annual fertilizer needs but is able to enter into agreements with Russian producers to establish plants in Kenya. Moreover, in advancing Kenya's foreign policy in Russia, the then Prime Minister Raila Odinga argued that "Russia is the biggest producer of fertilizer in the world. But we are getting it through middlemen in Amsterdam and other brokers in Nairobi. This results in delayed deliveries, higher prices and poor harvests"⁶⁴. This implied that among the areas that Kenya's fertilizer needs would impact is the need for direct flights between Kenya and Russian Federation to enable direct importation of Russian Federation's fertilizer by Kenyan farmers. Therefore, as indicated, Kenya's need and high reliance on fertilizer, drives its foreign policy towards Russian Federation, the latter being a leading producer of fertilizer. This aligns with Kenya's economic interests that without the fertilizer, would be difficult to secure.

2.2.2.3 Tourism

Kenya's tourism product line is one of the most attractive and diversified in Africa, attracting millions of tourists annually. As such, Kenya's relation with any country in terms of tourism is majorly driven by the abundance of tourist attractions in Kenya. These "tourism product lines" comprises safari and nature trail products, coastal tourism services and business traveler services⁶⁵. A combination of the three product lines has created a competitive global ranking for Kenya resulting in a high influx of tourists from all over the world. Kenya's safari product line

⁶³ State House-Kenya, "Russian Government pledges to help Kenya secure fertilizers at affordable cost" Aug. 18, 2013 <https://www.facebook.com/StateHouseKenya/posts/russian-government-pledges-to-help-kenya-secure-fertilizers-at-affordable-costmo/691038387578355/> (Accessed June. 6, 2015).

⁶⁴ Mulunda, Luke "Kenya woos Russian investors, begins talk on air traffic deal" Business Today, June 25, 2012 <https://businesstoday.co.ke/kenya-woos-russian-investors-begins-talk-on-air-traffic-deal-2/> (Accessed June. 6, 2015).

⁶⁵ Interview with "Janice", (Marketing Manager) at Kenya Tourism Board on Feb. 12th 2020

comprises over “47,674 square kilometers in 29 national parks, 27 game reserves, 4 wildlife sanctuaries, and 13 wildlife conservancies”⁶⁶. These include Maasai Mara, Nairobi, Hell’s Gate, Tsavo, Amboseli, Meru national parks among others as well as many conservancies like Ol Pejeta. These are populated by hundreds of animal and bird species, some of which are unique to the Kenyan habitat, are endemic and endangered species like the northern white rhino of which only 2 infertile females survive. Notably, the annual wildebeest migration in Kenya’s Maasai Mara has been ranked one of the wonders of the modern world, attracting thousands of tourists annually.

Similarly, Kenya’s coastal tourist product line comprises about “536 kilometers” of attractive tourist friendly coastline that is characterized by natural mangrove forests complete with their own unique ecosystems, fauna and flora⁶⁷. The coastal tourist products also include pristine marine reserves as well as unique coastal artisan products that include apparel, music, cuisines, cultures and annual cultural activities. Notably, Kenya’s rich coastal history is a leading coastal tourist product. This includes the historical Vasco Da Gama pillar, Fort Jesus, Gede Ruins among other ancient historical monuments including the slave-trade era bell at Kengeleni in Mombasa⁶⁸. Primarily, Europeans are the majority of coastal tourists in Kenya, with thriving European settlements comprising Germans, Italians, French among others.

Kenya’s traveler product line comprises hotel-based tourist services that include holiday, business, conference, retreat visits. Towards this, Kenya has a well-developed hotel network that includes five-star hotels, resorts, cottages, villas, as well as conference facilities. The most important conference facility in Kenya is the Kenyatta International Convention Centre that has hosted many international meetings, summits, conferences and continues to play a critical role in sustaining Kenya’s traveler tourism product line.

A combination of these tourist product lines, coupled with Kenya’s attractive geographic and topographic features motivates the need for a tourism-driven foreign policy. Consequently, Kenya formulates its foreign policy as a function of its possession of sufficient and marketable tourist attractions and services. Through marketing, diplomatic relations, economic outreaches, Kenya deploys its foreign policy as an instrument of attracting foreign tourists that are part of its pursuit of economic interests.

⁶⁶ World Bank, “Kenya’s Tourism: Polishing the Jewel” Finance and Private Sector Development Africa Region Final Report, (2010), 79

⁶⁷ World Bank, “Kenya’s Tourism: Polishing the Jewel” Finance and Private Sector Development Africa Region Final Report, (2010), 83

⁶⁸ Interview with “Janice”, (Marketing Manager) at Kenya Tourism Board on Feb. 12th 2020

Because of Kenya's attractions as a tourism destination, Kenya has had an active tourism policy towards Russian Federation. According to Victor Akunov, the Kenya Tourism Board representative in Moscow, since Kenya launched a series of tourism promotions in Russian Federation in 2003, the result of which the number of Russian tourists coming to Kenya has increased by 15% since then, reaching to about 7800 tourists in 2011⁶⁹. This denoted a 39% increase from the number of Russian Federation tourists that visited Kenya the previous year⁷⁰.

2.2.2.4 Manufacturing and Industrial Capacity

Unlike the Russian Federation, Kenya is a comparatively low manufacturing base, a situation that is however fast changing as Kenya enters middle income country status. The rebasing of Kenya's GDP from the year 2001 to 2009 resulting in a 25% increase in Kenya's GDP ushered the country into the lower middle-income country status⁷¹. However, while this is the case, Kenya's industrial and manufacturing capacity remains low, more so because the bulk of the country's economy is still agriculture-based. This has resulted in a manufacturing lacuna that can only be bridged through importation of industrial and manufactured goods. These include motor vehicles, industrial and agricultural chemicals and equipment, pharmaceuticals, petroleum and petroleum products, airplanes among others⁷². The trade imbalance resulting from Kenya's industrial lack of competitiveness has resulted in significant trade balance of payments for the country.

To offset its incapacity to meet its industrial needs, Kenya deploys its foreign policy and its economic and diplomatic instruments towards other more industrialized countries like Russian Federation. As a driver of Kenya's foreign policy formulation and conduct, Kenya's industrial capacity informs the need for maintenance of good relations with countries like the Russian Federation. This is aligned with the foreign policy objective of securing economic interests as part of the national interest.

⁶⁹ AfroCom, "Russia and Kenya will create a joint working group on agricultural issues" Dec. 15, 2012, <http://www.afrocom.ru/news/news/540> (Accessed June. 6, 2015).

⁷⁰ AfroCom, "Russia and Kenya will create a joint working group on agricultural issues" Feb. 21, 2012, <http://www.afrocom.ru/news/news/100> (Accessed June. 6, 2015)

⁷¹ Copley, Amy, "Kenya Rebases GDP and Becomes Ninth-Largest African Economy" Brookings, Oct. 3, 2014 Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/03/africa-in-the-news-kenya-becomes-a-middle-income-country-mo-ibrahim-index-released-south-sudan-peace-talks-yield-promise/> (Accessed Jan. 6, 2016)

⁷² Interview with "Mr. Dok", (Operations Manager), at Kenya Association of Manufacturers on November 7, 2019

2.3 Military and Security Needs

Kenya, unlike Russian Federation is not a world military power, and neither does it have a vibrant military-industrial complex like Russian Federation does. Yet, Kenya is part of the anarchic international system defined by statist individualism and the resultant need for survival. In this regard, Kenya's foreign policy is to a large extent driven by the desire for enhanced military capability to enhance its survivability in keeping with its sovereign needs. Moreover, since late 1990s, Kenya has been a victim of international terrorism that has not only worsened its local security situation but has also increased its need for more arms necessary for national security⁷³. It is this lacuna that Kenya recalibrates its foreign policy towards Russian Federation to fill. The lack of a military-industrial complex implies that Kenya relies on imports of its military equipment from, among its key markets, Russian Federation. To address its military need, Kenya often buys its military equipment including reconnaissance vehicles, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), attack helicopters from Russia arms producers including Rosoboronexport⁷⁴. To secure its military hardware, Kenya reaches out to Russian Federation through its foreign policy as well as use of necessary foreign policy instruments that enables it to secure the military equipment.

Besides the military equipment needs, Kenya is geographically "situated in a troubled neighbourhood" that is rife with constant threats, most of which it has neither the full know-how nor the capacity to fight⁷⁵. These include international terrorism and piracy, both that are asymmetrical warfare of which Kenya has limited resource and training capacity to successfully fight. This incapacity has necessitated the reformulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation from where it not only gets material support, but also technical support to fight both international terrorism and maritime piracy. Against the threats of international terrorism and piracy, Kenya reached out to Russian Federation that provided its naval forces to help fight the piracy off the Gulf of Aden and into Kenyan maritime space. Besides the naval support, Russian also provided financial support to Kenyan government, totaling to 9.3 million dollars, given towards the refurbishment of Shimo La Tewa maximum prison where the pirates

⁷³ Interview with "Ms. Teddy", the assistant to Political Diplomatic Secretary at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

⁷⁴ Goldman, David, "Kenya Acquires 88 BRDM-3 Reconnaissance Vehicles Russia for \$105.6 Million" Strategic Intelligence, Feb. 1, 2012

<https://intelligencebriefs.com/kenya-acquires-brdm-3-reconnaissance-vehicles-russia-for-105-6-million/>; RWR Advisory Group, "Strategic Analysis: Russian Business Activity in Kenya (Abstract)" <https://www.rwradvisory.com/russian-activity-in-kenya-abstract/> (Accessed March 27, 2019)

⁷⁵ Interview with "Ms. Teddy", the assistant to Political Diplomatic Secretary department at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

would not only be held during trials but will also be incarcerated upon conviction. This was coupled by Russian promise of legal support towards the establishment of legal framework that would enable Kenya to successfully prosecute the pirates. This was necessitated by the weak international legal provisions that have undermined the process of prosecuting pirates^{76 77}.

Technically, Kenya has sought Russian Federation's help in fighting off the pirates operating off the Somalia coast. Through joint operations with the Russian naval forces, Kenya has increasingly regained the control of the piracy-prone waters off the Somali coast. Operating alongside Kenyan naval forces, Russian forces have helped restore order in the Indian ocean coast off the Somali coastline. Itself a victim of the Somali piracy, Russian naval and air forces have played a significant role in routing out the piracy menace off the coast of Somalia. With itself a victim, having its sea-going vessels captured and held for ransom severally by pirates, Russia has conducted successful naval operations off the coast of Somalia to free the captured vessels. Russian naval expertise has manifested severally in the war against Somali pirates. In 2010, Russian naval forces successfully liberated a Russian oil tanker that had been hijacked by Somali pirates and arrested the pirates⁷⁸, who were to be tried in Kenya. This was among the many successful rescues by Russian Federation naval forces off the coast of Somalia, thereby establishing themselves as a naval powerhouse capable of liberating the waters off Somalia from the pirate stranglehold.

2.4 Geopolitical Factors

Geographically, Kenya borders Ethiopia to the north, Somalia to the east, Tanzania to the south, Uganda to the west, with a long coastline along the Indian ocean. However, Kenya's geographical location has been both a blessing and a curse to the country, with significant influence on its foreign policy decision making. As part of the "troubled neighbourhood"⁷⁹, Kenya shares a border with Somalia, a country that failed in the early 1990s and is home to several international terror organizations including *Al Shabaab* as well as *Al Qaeda* that operate within the country. Equally significant is the fact that Somalia is also home to the notorious pirates that operate around

⁷⁶ Charbonneau, Louis "Legal limbo makes Somalia piracy worse: Russia" Reuters, April 7, 2010 <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJJOE63602Q20100407> (Accessed March 20, 2015).

⁷⁷ Daily Nation, "Russia urges more support for states trying piracy suspects" July 30, 2010, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Russia-urges-more-support-for-states-trying-piracy-suspects-/1066-967890-7gvqikz/index.html>

⁷⁸ Helmer, John "Kenya: Russia Sells Weapons to Kenyan Government Body" All Africa, Sep. 2, 2002 <https://allafrica.com/stories/200209060602.html> (Accessed June.6, 2018).

⁷⁹ Interview with "Ms. Teddy", the assistant to Political Diplomatic Secretary at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

the Gulf of Aden region and have posed immense losses to international trade along the Gulf-East African coast sea-lane. For instance, in 2009 alone, of the 406 acts of piracy that happened globally, 217 of those happened in the Indian Ocean off the Somali coast⁸⁰. This implied that Kenya, as the regional political, military, economic and security hegemon, was faced with existential threat at its border. However, Kenya had jurisdictional, financial and technical challenges in fighting piracy, and consequently it formulated its foreign policy towards other countries including Russian Federation. As a result, the latter offered not only naval support to the Kenya Navy, but also provided legal technical assistance that enabled Kenya to try both Kenyan and non-Kenyan pirates and jail them in Kenyan prisons. Russian Federation equally provided financial assistance towards the renovation of the Shimo La Tewa prison where the convicted pirates were to be jailed⁸¹. Hence, to protect the all-important sea lanes off the Somali waters through which Kenyan trade vessels pass, Kenya has formulated its foreign policy to countries with more powerful naval capabilities like the Russian Federation⁸². These countries not only help secure the East Coast of Africa sea lanes but are themselves motivated by their economic interests that are jeopardized by the Somali piracy that undermine trade through Kenya's Mombasa port.

Territorially, Kenya has had and is in territorial disputes with all its neighbors apart from Tanzania. In the Indian ocean, Kenya and Somalia are embroiled in a territorial dispute over the exclusive economic zones that each country can safely exploit as part of their aquatic territory. Besides the aquatic territorial contestations, Somalia has traditionally laid claim on Kenya's northern territories, the former Northern Frontier District. This has resulted in diplomatic, legal and security tensions between two countries. In the north, Kenya also has territorial tensions with Ethiopia, which got worse after Ethiopia built a dam on the Omo river that drains its water into lake Turkana, thereby undermining the livelihoods of Kenyans depending on Lake Turkana. The same tensions are witnessed between Kenya and Sudan and now South Sudan over the Ilemi Triangle that is claimed by both countries. In the western side, Kenya is embroiled in a territorial dispute with Uganda over the tiny Lake Victoria island of Migingo⁸³. Both sides claim the island,

⁸⁰ Wambua, P. Musili "The jurisdictional challenges to the prosecution of piracy cases in Kenya: mixed fortunes for a perfect model in the global war against piracy" World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 11 (2011), 97 <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs13437-012-0021-6.pdf>

⁸¹ Daily Nation, "Russia urges more support for states trying piracy suspects" July 30, 2010, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Russia-urges-more-support-for-states-trying-piracy-suspects-/1066-967890-7gvqikz/index.html>

⁸² Interview with "Mr. E", a Europe and Commonwealth Division officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

⁸³ Interview with "Mr. E", a Europe and Commonwealth Division officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

that ironically has Kenyans living in it while Ugandan flag fly in it with Ugandan police maintaining security there⁸⁴. In keeping with its national security and foreign policy objective of maintaining and protecting its territorial integrity at all costs, Kenya formulates its foreign policy with the full knowledge and intent of protecting its territory as part of its national security.

Kenya's geographical location has also positively influenced its foreign policy towards other states. Economically, Kenya is not only the regional hegemon but for long has been a haven of peace. Lying astride the troubled Somalia and war-torn South Sudan as well as Burundi and Rwanda, Kenya provides asylum to thousands of refugees from these countries. However, due to drought and uncontrolled refugee numbers, Kenya often lacks the capacity to provide for the needs of the refugees in its various refugee camps including Kakuma, Dadaab as well as the refugees in urban centres. Dadaab refugee camp, for instance, is the largest refugee holding in Africa, with a population of between 350,000 and 500,000 refugees⁸⁵. Consequently, through its foreign policy, Kenya reaches out to other countries like Russian Federation that provide assistance, with the latter providing wheat worth 2 million dollars in 2012 to cater for the refugees needs, exacerbated by the 2012 drought that affected Kenya's grain production⁸⁶.

Kenya's geographical location as a determinant of its foreign policy is also manifested in the diplomatic and security role that it plays in the Horn of African region that has since become synonymous with armed conflicts. Primarily, Kenya has played a leading role in the stabilization of the Horn countries, especially those that have suffered civil war like Sudan and Somalia.

At the multilateral level, Kenya is equally a member of important regional bodies that are involved in the maintenance and resolution of peace in the region. Chief Among these is Inter-Governmental Authority on Development that has not only played a leading role in peace process in the region but is also the only sub-regional body to which Somalia belongs⁸⁷. Together with IGAD as a member and in collaboration, Kenya has been at the forefront in establishing a functional government in Somalia, at some point hosting the Transitional Federal Government of

⁸⁴ Cannon J. Brendon "Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya's Proposed Border Wall with Somalia" *Journal of Terrorism Research* 7, issue 2 (2016), 9

⁸⁵ Cannon, *ibid.*, 4

⁸⁶ World Food Programme, "Russian contribution of wheat flour worth US\$2 million to help WFP fight hunger in Kenya" Relief Web, July 30, 2012, <https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/russian-contribution-wheat-flour-worth-us2-million-help-wfp-fight-hunger-kenya> (Accessed Jan. 6, 2016)

⁸⁷ Mumma-Martinson, C.A. "Efforts Towards Conflict Prevention In The Eastern African Region: The Role of Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms" *International Peace Support Training Centre, Occasional Paper 1*, no. 1 (2010) https://www.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Implementing%20Partner%20Reports/Collaborative_efforts_revised_version.pdf

Somalia immediately after its creation in 2004⁸⁸. Kenya's involvement with these organizations have a bearing with the way it formulates its foreign policy towards other countries that are members of the organizations and with other countries that are supporting the processes.

More importantly, Kenya has for centuries been the economic gateway to the landlocked East and Central African regions. The port of Mombasa, with its deep harbours and developed maritime infrastructure, is both an enabler of international between the East/Central Africa region and the world as well as is an important port of call for military assistance if need be. Kenya's geostrategic location has thus, to a large extent, been an important determinant of what foreign policy Kenya pursues as well as what relations Kenya has with other countries. Kenya's exports to and imports from other countries like Russian Federation pass through the port of Mombasa, and so are the imports from the other countries to the landlocked East and Central African countries like Uganda. In his foreign visit to Russian Federation soon after his election, President Uhuru Kenyatta leveraged Kenya's geostrategic location to Russian Federation, arguing that Kenya is not only geostrategically located but is also a member of numerous regional economic associations thereby a gateway to the 400 million strong Horn of Africa market. Moreover, Kenya's geostrategic location has ensured that it is a "trans-African transport hub" from where a network of railways, ports and road networks originate and converge to other Horn and Central African countries. Due to its geostrategic advantages, many Russian companies expressed interest to invest in Kenya, including RNII, Agropribor OJSC that expressed interest in cooperation with Kenya in agricultural science and technology⁸⁹.

Kenya's foreign policy is also influenced by its topography, being overly an agricultural country. Geographically, Kenya's land mass is about 80% arid and semi-arid⁹⁰, a fact that implies that Kenya's ability to become food-secure is grossly undermined. This is occasionally worsened by drought that often leads to famine and the need for food aid from other countries and humanitarian agencies. Consequently, Kenya formulates its foreign policy towards other countries that can help Kenya offset its food security imbalances as occasioned by aridity and annual droughts with this fact as a determinant. With only about 20% of Kenya's land mass receiving sufficient rainfall, the result has been famine that affects millions of Kenyans. In the 1997 drought,

⁸⁸ Relief Web, "Somalia: Interim government to relocate from Nairobi" JAN. 10, 2005

<https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-interim-government-relocate-nairobi> (Accessed July. 6, 2015)

⁸⁹ Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry "Meeting of President of Kenya Uhura Kenyatta with representatives of Russian business circles" Aug. 19, 2013 <http://www.afrocom.ru/news/news/900> (Accessed July. 6, 2015)

⁹⁰ Government of Kenya Ministry of Devolution and ASALS <http://www.devolutionasals.go.ke/dasal/> (Accessed May. 6, 2019)

about 2 million Kenyans faced starvation; the drought in 2000 affected over 4 million Kenyans that needed food aid; in 2004 drought, 2.3 million Kenyans faced starvation and the latest is the 2010-2011 drought that was the worst since Kenya's independence and left millions of Kenyans in dire need of food aid⁹¹. Using the drought and its consequences as a policy driver, Kenya reached out to other countries seeking humanitarian assistance, among which was Russian Federation. In response to the Kenyan situation, Russian Federation, through its Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, extended a plane loaded with 35.3 tons of emergency cargo. These included mobile power equipment, prefabricated kitchens, blankets to assist the victims of the famine resulting from Kenya's food insecurity⁹². As evidenced, Kenya's geography has direct result on its food sufficiency which informs its foreign policy priorities and linkages.

Kenya formulates and conducts its foreign policy towards Russian Federation with the full knowledge that Russian Federation is not only 30 times the size of Kenya's land mass but is also one of the largest food producers in the world besides being an economic powerhouse. For instance, Kenya relies on Russian Federation farming equipment, fertilizers to enhance the fertility of its arable land while also exploiting its markets for products that Kenya produces like tea and coffee. The need to feed its people despite the geographical location and majorly arid topography, Kenya conducts its foreign policy to address these deficiencies while also able to explore ways through which it can capitalize on areas in which it has competitive advantage in keeping with its national interests.

2.5 Political Determinants

Kenya's foreign policy is equally a function of human decision as expressed individually or collectively in different offices involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Influential individuals in the foreign policy edifice like the presidents often differ in their decision making, resulting in different foreign policy outcomes. The decisions themselves spring from different contexts as influenced by a multiplicity of factors including the individuals' idiosyncrasies and preferences. Hence, in like manner, the formulation and conduct of Kenya's

⁹¹ Mbogo, Earnest, Inganga F. and Maina J.M. "Drought Conditions and Management Strategies in Kenya", Integrated Drought Management Programme, http://www.droughtmanagement.info/literature/UNW-DPC_NDMP_Country_Report_Kenya_2014.pdf (Accessed May. 6, 2019)

⁹² EMERCOM "EMERCOM of Russia to deliver humanitarian aid to Kenya" Feb. 28, 2012, http://en.mchs.ru/mass_media/news/item/270694 (Accessed July. 15, 2015)

foreign policy towards Russian Federation exhibits variations as reflections of the various regimes that fall under the study period.

2.6 Individuals and Foreign Policy

In keeping with the argument by Rosenau⁹³, Sprout and Sprout⁹⁴ and others that that individuals determine foreign policy, Kenya's foreign policy has in equal measure been subject to the individuals occupying the presidency. social milieu of decision making which is the feelings and psychological make-up of an individual. Foreign policy is contingent upon the leadership as much as it depends on the state's attributes as well as the position that it occupies in the international system. Hence, Kenya's foreign policy from 1992-2013 was a subject to influence, primarily by the respective presidents being the chief diplomat.

2.6.1 Daniel Moi

President Moi ascended the presidency on the principle of "Nyayo", literally referring to footsteps. Accordingly, he followed in the footsteps of his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta and like him, was more concerned with domestic politics and regime survival. Hence, according to Barkan⁹⁵, President Moi was a dictator who 'micromanaged' all aspects of government including the foreign policy edifice. This implied that Moi, used foreign policy insofar as it served his obsession with the maintenance of his stranglehold of domestic politics, hence was his regime linked to the 1990 gruesome murder of the influential Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Robert Ouko⁹⁶. Through police brutality and repression, Moi stifled the voices of sub-state actors like civil societies and other political parties as well as maintained a close watch over ministries in a manner that undermined the full participation of these institutions in the foreign policy formulation and implementation.

Like Jomo Kenyatta, Moi did not recognize the role that non-traditional partners like Russian Federation could have on Kenya in terms of foreign policy. Rather, Moi maintained economic,

⁹³ In his levels of analysis thesis, James Rosenau analyzed individual's idiosyncrasies as determinant of their decision-making actions.

⁹⁴ Sprout and Sprout argue that foreign policy, like all decision-making dependent undertakings, takes place in what they call "psycho-social milieu" that is defined by the individual's psychological make up and how the same influences their causes of action.

⁹⁵ Barkan, Joel, "Kenya After Moi" in *Foreign Affairs* 83, No.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2004), 87-100

⁹⁶ Oyugi, O. Walter, Wanyande Peter and Mbai Odhiambo, *The Politics of Transition in Kenya: From NARC to KANU*, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2003), 53

political, and diplomatic alliance with western powers, much to the detriment of Kenya's ability to reformulate its foreign policy to other countries like Russian Federation. In his time, particularly between 1992 and 2002, Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation did not have any significant influence on the relations between the two countries. Rather, it was sustained nearly solely by the diplomatic missions that either side maintained in each other's capital.

2.6.2 Mwai Kibaki

Unlike President Moi who ascended the presidency on the principle of continuity of Jomo Kenyatta's principles and leadership approach, President Mwai Kibaki ascended the presidency on the principle of economic reforms including putting an end to endemic corruption, provision of free education for all as well as economically empowering Kenyans to come out of poverty. Himself an economist, Mwai Kibaki's presidency was characterized by robust economic policies that redefined Kenya's foreign policy making context and aroused new motivations and determinants. These economic documents include the *Investment Programme for The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2007* that sought to undo the economic mismanagement that resulted from Moi's two-decade mismanagement. These economic blueprints spurred the need for economic development and growth that in effect recreated the policy environment resulting in new motivations for Kenya's foreign policy. Resultantly, Kenya not only deployed new robust economic tools in its relations with other foreign countries but also reached out to non-traditional partners like the Russian Federation. Kibaki's economic background was reflected in the manner in which economy took centre stage as the main instrument of implementing Kenya's foreign policy in Russian Federation. For instance, during Kibaki's tenure, Kenya's export to Russian Federation grew the highest⁹⁷.

At a personal level, Mwai Kibaki was a "laid back" president that preferred delegation to micro-management of the foreign policy making and implementation processes⁹⁸. This implies that whereas Moi was more concerned with the survival of his regime, Kibaki let the foreign policy machinery to run towards the attainment of Kenya's national interests. As a result, he let the appointed individuals to manage Kenya's foreign policy docket with minimal interference unlike

⁹⁷ World Integrated Trade Solutions, "Kenya Product Export Product Share to Russian Federation in % 1992-2013", World Bank, <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KEN/StartYear/1992/EndYear/2013/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/XPRT-PRDCT-SHR/Partner/RUS/Product/all-groups#> (Accessed Jan. 4, 2019)

⁹⁸ Barkan, Joel, "Kenya After Moi," *Foreign Affairs* 83, No.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2004).

his predecessor. These include Kalonzo Musyoka (2003-2004), Chirau Ali Mwakwere (2004-2005), Raphael Tuju (2005-2007), Moses Wetangula (2008-2012) under whose tenure Kenya's relations with non-traditional partners like Russian Federation significantly improved⁹⁹. The same was extended to Kenya's missions abroad including Russian Federation where he appointed individuals like Sospeter Machage under whose tenure Kenya registered remarkable improvement especially in its economic relations with Russian Federation.

However, Kibaki's inability to abide by the October 22, 2002 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between himself and other National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party members like Raila Odinga revealed his other personal attributes that influenced Kenya's foreign policy environment. The MoU was signed to, among other things, end corruption, initiate a political and economic transformation of the country. The political transformation entailed changing the constitution within 100 days, equal sharing of Cabinet appointments, creation of a parliamentary political system¹⁰⁰. The subsequent institutional and legal changes would have direct influence in the formulation and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy. However, thanks to Kibaki's craftiness, he trashed the MoU and continued with the centralized presidential system that concentrated all power in the presidency.

2.6.3 Uhuru Kenyatta and Beyond

Unlike his predecessors, President Uhuru Kenyatta redefined Kenya's the foreign policy towards Russian Federation, creating an impetus for closer and more robust engagement between Kenya and the Russian Federation. Soon after his election, President Uhuru's first foreign visit was to Moscow, a move that not only marked a new era in Kenya's foreign relations, but also signaled the recalibration of Kenya's foreign policy towards non-traditional partners like Russian Federation. Being indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the time, Uhuru Kenyatta's presidency aroused speculations into what direction Kenya's foreign policy would assume. The peak of Kenya's diplomatic relations was in 2013 when Kenya's newly elected President Uhuru Kenyatta visited Russian Federation as his first foreign trip. Hailed by the Office of the President

⁹⁹ Interview "Mr. Q", a Sector Delivery official in the Office of the President Nairobi on Sep. 23, 2016.

¹⁰⁰ Kadima Dennis and Owuor Felix, "The National Rainbow Coalition: Achievements and Challenges of Building and Sustaining a Broad-Based Political Party Coalition in Kenya" in *The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa*, 204.

as “a turning point in Kenya’s diplomatic relations”¹⁰¹, the visit was the beginning of an escalation of Kenya’s foreign policy towards Russian Federation.

One of the most determining factors in Uhuru’s foreign policy shift towards Russian Federation and China, in what became known as ‘Look-East Policy’ was the fact that Uhuru was at the time facing criminal charges at the ICC. As an ICC indictee, Uhuru Kenyatta’s psycho-social decision-making environment was a function of his need to clear this name from the Hague-based court. This called for political and diplomatic rethinking, hence his look-east approach. Hence, in continuity with President Kibaki’s diplomatic charm offensive to United Nation Security Council’s members to support the deferral of the case against Uhuru and his co-accused, Uhuru opted to lean towards Russian Federation that had supported the deferment of the case at the Security Council meeting. In a Security Council vote on 15th November 2013, Russian Federation, alongside China, Azerbaijan and other countries voted in favour of the deferral of Kenyan cases¹⁰². The vote by Russian Federation was both a direct culmination of Uhuru Kenyatta’s east-leaning foreign policy towards Russian Federation. The outreach to Russian Federation was done both at bilateral and multilateral forums, the latter including the use of bodies like the African Union.

However, while individuals may influence the kind of policies that states pursue, the ultimate policies are determined at the institutional level through bureaucratic politics, legal provisions for policy and competing institutional preferences. Consequently, these result in various policy outcomes depending on what institutions are most influential in directing the formulation or conduct of foreign policies.

2.6.4 Institutions, bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy

Foreign policy decision making in Kenya primarily happens in the policy triad that involves the Presidency-Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Legislature. Kenya’s independence constitution conferred more foreign affairs powers on the president making him the chief diplomat in Kenya¹⁰³. These powers implied that other foreign affairs personnel were subordinate to the president in relation to the formulation and conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy. The powers, as Ojwang and

¹⁰¹ Interview “Mr. Q”, a Sector Delivery official in the Office of the President Nairobi on Sep. 23, 2016.

¹⁰² United Nations Security Council “Security Council Resolution Seeking Deferral of Kenyan Leaders’ Trial Fails to Win Adoption, with 7 Voting in Favour, 8 Abstaining” Nov. 15, 2013, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11176.doc.htm> (Accessed Dec. 17, 2015).

¹⁰³ Ojwang, John and Luis Franceschi, “Constitutional Regulation of the Foreign Affairs Power in Kenya: A Comparative Assessment” in *Journal of African Law* 46, No. 1 (2002), 43-58

Franceschi argue include treaty making power, the making of war and peace, diplomatic relations and the recognition of other states and governments. President Moi, operating under the legal provisions of the independence constitution, played a critical role regarding the formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation. He appointed ambassadors, aligned and escalated Kenya's foreign policy with the local needs as would bolster his regime that was incessantly under criticism especially from western nations. This implied that through his unilateral appointment of ambassadors and stranglehold of the foreign policy edifice, Kenya's foreign policy was often aligned with President Moi's regime needs.

The role of Kenya's parliament in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy is equally significant, especially after the Moi era. This reflected the continent-wide role of legislatures that Zaffiro¹⁰⁴ argues was a result of the wave of democratization and political liberalization that swept across Africa in the last decade of the 20th century that strengthened the role of the parliament in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. As other African legislatures increasingly took up the role of budgetary and policy debates on issues of foreign policy, Kenya's parliament equally took its place in the formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Unlike in the Moi era where the formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy was directly linked to the presidency, Kenya's 2010 Constitution elevates the role of the legislature to check the powers of the president in the appointment of diplomats and other foreign policy personnel including Cabinet Secretary and Principal Secretary. Thus, the role of the legislature under the new Constitution is felt more in the appointment of diplomats to other countries as well as in the formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards specific countries and the instruments to be used. Moreover, Kenyan parliament also ratifies the various treaties and agreements that Kenya enters into with other countries or international agencies. These include Even declaration of war and commitment of Kenyan troops beyond state borders is done jointly between the presidency and the legislature. The formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy will reflect the objectivity that results from the involvement of more than one institution as was the case in the Moi regime.

Besides its general roles in the foreign policy formulation and conduct, the role of Kenya's legislature in foreign policy was boosted in 2003 during the Kibaki era that ushered in the

¹⁰⁴ Zaffiro, James "African Legislatures and Foreign Policy Making: A Case of Botswana" in *Botswana Notes and Records* 23 (1993), 39-58.

parliamentary committee system in the Kenya national assembly. The general responsibilities of the committees include playing the oversight role over appointments by the executive, reviewing legislations and budgets as allocated to various departments. These committees included the Committee on Defence and Foreign relations that oversees all foreign relations with other countries and aligns the same to the national security needs of the country, Committee on Finance, Commerce and Budget that coordinates all matters related to budget and trade, Sports, Culture and Tourism committee that deals with cultural matters¹⁰⁵. Broadly, all the relevant committees are involved in the foreign policy formulation and implementation and accordingly, are likely to influence Kenya's foreign policy.

Besides the state agencies in foreign policy, Kenya's foreign policy is also influenced by sub-state actors. These are entities that, whereas they operate outside of the established government structures, make inputs that are instrumental at either the formulation or implementation stages of Kenya's foreign policy. These include the private sector, non-governmental organizations, sports bodies, special interest groups. For instance, the Kenya Flower Council (KFC), a lobby group of cut flowers growers and exporters, often engages the government in the exploitation of foreign markets for Kenya's cut flowers. As a result, they engage in marketing activities of Kenya's flower markets abroad, working closely with Kenyan government bodies like Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) in finding new markets for Kenyan products, including non-traditional markets like Russian Federation. Resultantly, KFC is responsible for all cut flower exports outside Kenya to these markets. This typifies the role that non-state actors play in the formulation and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy.

Another notable player in influencing the domestic policy making environment is Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA). Notably, KEPSA's mandate includes initiating conversations between the private sector and the government, influences the business environment to enhance business the ease of doing business in the country, while also pushing for legal, political and economic changes that influence the policy environment in favour of doing business¹⁰⁶. In this manner, KEPSA, like as an umbrella body of private sector organizations, can influence policy both domestic and foreign that impact the business environment. By extension, these policy

¹⁰⁵ The Parliament, <http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/committees> (Accessed April. 9, 2019).

¹⁰⁶ Interview/discussion with "Diana" (Legislative Officer) and "Naomi" (Public Private Dialogue Officer-Devolution) of KEPSA on May 7th 2019

dialogues influence Kenya's foreign policy with countries with which Kenya and its sub-state actors do business.

The interaction between the individuals in leadership and various institutions involved in foreign policy creates both a context for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy that differs from one regime to another. In authoritarian regimes where the input of other institutions diminishes in comparison to that of the executive, foreign policy tends to be more focused on regime survival as opposed to the attainment of the national interests. In more open, democratic regimes that seeks and upholds the input of various foreign policy players like the Kibaki and Uhuru regimes, foreign policy tends to serve national interests as they involve the input of not only state actors but also non-state actors.

2.7 Conclusion

Kenya's foreign policy originates from its domestic environment. The needs, interests, capabilities, deficiencies in the domestic context combine to create a policy environment that not only informs the policy makers of what Kenya's interests are but also what policy instruments Kenya has at its disposal and what resources are available for the pursuit of its foreign policy. The societal attributes indicate what Kenya needs, and as revealed, its possession and relative deprivation of some resources inform the type of foreign policy it formulates and conducts towards Russian Federation. Where Kenya has advantage, it formulates outward-looking policies that seek to find new frontiers for the implementation of such foreign policy. For areas that Kenya is disadvantaged in its domestic milieu, it formulates inward-looking policies that seek to attract the resources and capabilities that it lacks as compared to Russian Federation. Through the process, Kenya's decision-making structures intervene during the formulation and implementation of its foreign policy.

CHAPTER THREE

SYSTEMIC DETERMINANTS OF KENYA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

3.1 Introduction

Foreign policies of all countries are formulated in the domestic milieu and implemented in the international milieu. Consequently, foreign policy is both a function of systemic determinants as much as it is of domestic determinants. The international system is rife with many variables that influence foreign policy including polarity and polarization, international organizations, international trade, international terrorism among others¹⁰⁷. The very nature of systemic factors implies they influence foreign policy either because they “force a specific choice” or “circumscribe a set of possibilities”¹⁰⁸. Hence, states are either presented with opportunities enabling their foreign policies’ practice or limitations restricting the foreign policy choices they have at their disposal. Accordingly, Kenya’s foreign policy towards Russian Federation can be defined within an international system framework characterized by both opportunities and limitations.

3.2 Systemic Determinants of Kenya’s Foreign Policy

3.2.1 Polarity and Distribution of Capabilities

The possession of various capabilities, and the distribution in the international system either restrict or promotes states foreign policy actions. The post-World War 2 bipolar system presented an overly dichotomous ideological environment that meant that states foreign policies were formulated to align with either the United States-led capitalist west or with the USSR-led socialist-east. Kenya’s foreign policy choices were arguably uninfluenced by the Cold War

¹⁰⁷ Kegley, Charles and Shannon Blanton. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 2010-2011 Edition. (Boston: CENGAGE Brain, 2011), 282

¹⁰⁸ Stein, A. Arthur “Constraints and Determinants: Structure, Purpose, and Process in the Analysis of Foreign Policy” in Starr Harvey, ed. *Approaches, Levels, and Methods of Analysis in International Politics: Crossing Boundaries*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 190.

dynamics as Kenya was ideologically non-aligned. In its foreign policy formulation with Russian Federation, other capabilities like “economic and military power” influence its foreign policy choices¹⁰⁹. Russian Federation emergence from the Cold War as a weak economic power and its subsequent rise as an economic influencer of global event has influenced Kenya’s foreign policy towards it. This new trend in Kenya’s foreign policy is manifested in the high esteem with which Kenyans and Kenyan government currently holds the Russian government as a positive influence on world politics.

In a 2010 survey by the Russian Analytical Survey to understand Kenyans’ perception of the influence of Russian Federation in the world, about 38% of Kenyans felt that Russian Federation is negatively influencing the international system and global peace. On the contrary, about 37% felt that indeed Russian Federation was a positive influence on world affairs and was therefore a necessary force in ensuring international stability. The same study also revealed that whereas 37% of Kenyans expressed minimal confidence in the then Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, to be a good influence in global affairs, 49% of Kenyans expressed optimism and high confidence in PM Putin to be a good influence on world affairs¹¹⁰. These sentiments are shared by Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that argue that Russian Federation is indeed one of the most important actors in the 20th century.

This was however not the case in the 1990s in the immediate period after the rise of the Russian Federation from the defunct USSR. Russian Federation emerged a militarily powerful country but with insignificant economic prerequisites sufficient for superpower status. Itself a recipient of the G7 economic bailout plan of 24 billion dollars in 1992, and later raised to 44 billion dollars in 1993¹¹¹, Russian Federation lacked the prerequisite capacity to influence world affairs, a result of which Kenya did not pursue an aggressive foreign policy towards it as it would later do at the turn of the 21st century. However, the turn of the 21st century saw Russian Federation become one of the “second tier great powers” besides other large economies like China, Kenya started an aggressive formulation of its foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Kenya’s 2009 Foreign Policy Document identifies Russian Federation as an emerging and increasingly influential pole

¹⁰⁹ Interview with “Mr. E”, a Europe and Commonwealth Division officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

¹¹⁰ Katz N. Mark “Russia’s Policy toward the Middle East” *Russian Analytical Digest* No. 83 (24 September 2010), 8.

¹¹¹ Diamond, Larry “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,” A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Carnegie Corporation of New York, (1995), 40.

of power in the international political and economic system. Among the factors that are “changing the contours of diplomacy” in Kenya are the “resurgence of Russia in global politics” with the “the potential of changing the world’s strategic stability in ways that will affect Kenya’s external relations”^{112, 113}. This implies that the actions of Russian Federation, as one of the dominant poles of power, have direct effect on Kenya’s formulation and conduct of its foreign policy towards other states.

The implication of this is that Kenya’s foreign policy towards Russian Federation, is a function of among other factors, the latter’s resurgence as a military, political and economic powerhouse after the end of the Cold War. In keeping with Stein’s argument that states respond to polarity through mobilization or alliance¹¹⁴, Kenya’s foreign policy towards Russian Federation has been one defined by both mobilization and alliance, at both bilateral and multilateral levels. At the bilateral level, Kenya currently has an active foreign policy towards Russian Federation undergirded using economic, diplomatic, cultural tools that anchor the relations between the two countries. At the multilateral level, Kenya has often called on Russian Federation as an influential ally in world affairs, especially based on its role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

3.2.2 Anarchy

The glaring lack of a superordinate world government capable of regulating state behaviors is a definitive attribute of the international system. Naturally, this the lack of an international government is defined by “self-help” competition and selfishness with each state seeking to maximize on the opportunities available in the international system to enhance its power and survival chances. Consequently, this anarchic situation foments the need for states to solely be responsible for their own defense and survival. Kenya, like all other states in the international system seeks to enhance its survival chances by increasing its power. This becomes particularly important because of Kenya’s geographical location in the volatile Horn of Africa (HOA) region characterized by international terrorism, civil wars, failed states, as well as inter-state wars that

¹¹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Kenya’s Foreign Policy Framework*. (MFAIT, Nairobi, 2009), 11, 13.

¹¹³ Interview with “Mr. E”, a Europe and Commonwealth Division officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

¹¹⁴ Stein, A. Arthur “Constraints and Determinants: Structure, Purpose, and Process in the Analysis of Foreign Policy” in Starr Harvey, ed. *Approaches, Levels, and Methods of Analysis in International Politics: Crossing Boundaries*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 190.

pose existential threat to Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Consequently, Kenya formulates an aggressive foreign policy in keeping with the devastating consequences of anarchy. This includes formulating an aggressive military and security policy aimed at not only modernizing its defense forces but also aligning them with other countries that have better defensive capabilities like the Russian Federation. Without its own military-industrial complex, Kenya buys its military hardware from other countries like Russian Federation, enters into joint military operations with them to enhance its own defense capabilities in an anarchic international system. At the height of constant attacks from Al Shabaab terrorists from Somalia and the subsequent incursion in Somalia, Kenya reached out to Russian Federation and purchased armoured personnel carriers (APCs), attack helicopters from Russian Federation¹¹⁵.

Whereas the influence of anarchy has informed Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation at bilateral level, it equally informs Kenya's interaction with Russian Federation at multilateral levels. This particularly comes into play where Kenya formulates its foreign policy towards Russian Federation affiliated collective security regimes. At the global sphere, Kenya is a member of, most importantly, the United Nations that together with its security agencies and provisions supports Kenya's national efforts for survival. For instance, following multiple terrorist attacks from Somalia-based Al Shabaab, Kenya unilaterally invaded Somalia in 2011. However, the United Nations Security Council passed the Resolution 2036¹¹⁶ that formally integrated Kenya into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that formally receives logistical, technical, and financial support of the United Nations. Through the collective efforts of the AMISOM forces, Kenya has created a buffer zone in Somalia that has not only helped secure its borders but is also enhanced its security despite the thriving terrorism in Somalia. At the regional level, Kenya's foreign policy document identifies such defense bodies of which Kenya is a member to include Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) at the regional and continental levels¹¹⁷. Besides membership to the UN, Kenya is also a member of other organizations like the International Court of Justice that arbitrates territorial

¹¹⁵ Goldman, David, "Kenya Acquires 88 BRDM-3 Reconnaissance Vehicles Russia for \$105.6 Million" Strategic Intelligence, Feb. 1, 2012 <https://intelligencebriefs.com/kenya-acquires-brdm-3-reconnaissance-vehicles-russia-for-105-6-million/>; RWR Advisory Group, "Strategic Analysis: Russian Business Activity in Kenya (Abstract)" <https://www.rwradvisory.com/russian-activity-in-kenya-abstract/> (Accessed March 27, 2019)

¹¹⁶ Africa Union Mission in Somalia, "Kenya – KDF" <http://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/> (Accessed April. 9, 2019).

¹¹⁷ Interview with "Mrs. J", the Russian Federation Desk Officer at MFAIT on June 14, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Kenya's Foreign Policy Framework*. (MFAIT, Nairobi, 2009), 19

disputes between states, like the current territorial tensions between Kenya and Somalia off the Kenyan coastline.

The anarchic international system has also necessitated the need for Kenya to amass other capabilities including economic and diplomatic clout necessary to enhance its domestic security. Kenya formulates economic and diplomatic policies towards other countries to enhance its ability to survive in the anarchic international system. Through the pursuit of “preventive diplomacy”¹¹⁸, Kenya enters diplomatic alliances with the intention of securing both its domestic and international peace environment. Accordingly, Kenya maintains strong diplomatic relations with Russian Federation as a continuation of the diplomatic relations established at independence with the USSR in 1964. Likewise, survival in the anarchic international system rests on sound economic capabilities as much as it needs powerful military. Hence, Kenya’s foreign policy documents presents that the pursuit of Kenya’s national interests is “predicated on the quest for national security and economic prosperity”¹¹⁹. This underpins the vibrant economic relations that exists between Kenya and the Russian Federation. Hence, to survive the anarchic international system, Kenya not only formulates an aggressive foreign policy towards Russian Federation but is also a member of trade regimes at bilateral and multilateral levels aimed at the increment of Kenya’s economic capabilities.

3.2.3 Global Economic Interdependence

The era of globalization ushered in an international system defined by international trade and economic interdependence. As an inescapable feature of the current globalized world, economic interdependence conditions states’ foreign behavior towards one another. The resulting economic linkages brought about by international trade create opportunities that either entrench existing foreign policies or necessitate the formulation of new ones. Interestingly for Kenya, international trade plays a pivotal role in influencing its foreign policy behavior, especially as a precondition to the attainment of “economic prosperity, which is one of the objectives of Kenya’s foreign policy. Hence, Kenya’s foreign policy is driven by, among other strategies, the need to “promote economic development and prosperity by increasing market access”¹²⁰. The need for

¹¹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *ibid.*, 9

¹¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *ibid.*, 2

¹²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *op. cit.*, 8

accessing international markets informs the formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards other countries, including nontraditional trading partners like Russian Federation.

The role of economic interdependence on Kenya's foreign policy is accentuated by both comparative advantage and disadvantage that Kenya has in its production capabilities. In areas that Kenya has comparative advantages over other countries, like in the production and export of tea, cut flowers and coffee, it seeks market access for its goods. The same applies to areas that Kenya is comparatively disadvantaged like in the manufacturing sector. Kenya, in such instances, relies on other countries for its needs in keeping with the tenets of economic interdependence.

Hence, economic interdependence is one of the strongest influences of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation¹²¹. While Kenya is one of the leading cut flower exporters in the world and to Russian Federation specifically, Russian Federation the other hand is one of the leading importers of the commodity in the world, rising to be the 5th largest importer of cut flowers globally in 2012. This accounted for about 580 million euros in value of cut flowers¹²². On the other hand, Russian Federation is the leading producer and exporters of fertilizer in the world and Kenya, while it cannot produce its own fertilizer, relies on agriculture as the bane of its export economy. Resultantly, Kenya imports its fertilizer from Russian Federation. While this case is anchored on the cordial trade relations between the two countries, it affirms the role that international trade interdependence plays in influencing the Kenya's foreign policy formulation and implementation.

Remarkably, the argument that amiable trade relations correlates with peaceful coexistence between trading partners¹²³ further establishes the role that economic interdependence plays in influencing states' foreign policy. Kenya's economic policy towards Russian Federation is a function of the amiable relations that exists between the two countries. While the Russian Federation severed links with the rest of Africa following the collapse of the USSR, it maintained cordial relations with Kenya, out of which interdependent economic relations would later grow.

¹²¹ Interview with "Ms. Teddy", the assistant to Political Diplomatic Secretary at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

¹²² Mamias Sylvie "Dynamics of The International Flower Market: Key Trends & Prospects for Kenya," (Nairobi: Kenya Horticulture Competitiveness Conference-22 January 2015 -Nairobi), 9.

¹²³ Kegley, Charles and Gregory Raymond, *The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 188.

3.2.4 International Terrorism and Crime

The metamorphosis of terrorism into a global phenomenon, feeding on the opportunities created by globalization, is one of the primary systemic drivers of states' foreign policies. Like all other phenomena that are driven by globalization, international terrorism is more pervasive than perhaps all other globalized aspects of the international system. However, because of its geographic location, political history, relatively weak economy and security infrastructure, Kenya has been unfortunately one of the world's soft underbellies for global terrorism¹²⁴. This implies that the formulation of Kenya's foreign policy must be attended by strategic thinking on the issue of international terrorism. Hence, Kenya is as much entangled and influenced by international terrorism as much as the developed world.

Kenya's August 1998 Nairobi bombing of the American Embassy was the defining moment for both Kenya and the world, especially regarding international terrorism. As a result, as Davis argues¹²⁵, Kenya's experience with terrorism "has raised Kenya's profile" in the international system for two reasons. First, due to Kenya's geographical location in the terror-prone Horn of Africa, Kenya is considered a source of terrorism. Terrorists operating from as far as Afghanistan including Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have found a local partner in Somalia-based Al Shabaab that operates cells in Kenya, a situation that makes Kenya a source of terrorism. This situation has necessitated the need by Kenya, as a source of terrorism, to cooperate with other nations in the global war on terror that is primarily led by a consortium of powerful nations including Russian Federation. Hence, through its foreign policy, Kenya has reached out to Russian Federation, itself a victim of Islamic extremism and terrorism, at both bilateral and multilateral fronts in the fight against international terrorism.

Secondly, Kenya's international profile has also been redefined by the fact that Kenya has itself been a victim of international terrorism. Due to Kenya's geopolitical involvement in the Horn of Africa region as well as its relations with other Western countries, Kenya has become a target for terrorists operating from Middle East and Somalia. Like most countries, Kenya has had its own share of international terrorism. In 1998, Kenya suffered what was hitherto the single, most serious act of international act of international terrorism. In 1998, Al Qaeda terrorists attacked US

¹²⁴ Davis, John, ed., *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 65

¹²⁵ Davis, John, ed., *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 63

Embassy in Nairobi killing 291 and injuring over 5,000 Kenyans and Americans¹²⁶. While the American Embassy in Nairobi was the target, Kenya bore the burden of Al Qaeda's attack in Kenya. This single event has been followed by numerous other cases of terrorism meted against Kenya by international terror organizations like Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab and their ilk.

The 1998 attack was later followed by a series of other attacks. These include the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala bombing of 2002 when as well as the attempted shootdown of an Israeli airline in the same area¹²⁷. These were followed by a series of grenade attacks that while they were lesser in scale, they still led to fatalities. However, the narrative changed when Kenya sent its troops into Somalia in 2011, after which retaliatory terror attacks from Al Shabaab intensified in both fatalities and frequency. In 2012 July, terrorists attacked churches in Garissa near Kenya-Somali border and killed some worshippers while also injuring many others. From 2008 to 2013, the worst terrorist attack came on 21st September 2013 when suspected Al Shabaab terrorists laid a siege that lasted over 3 days at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. Westgate, a high-end mall was taken hostage by terrorists who killed 67 people, majority of whom were Kenyans¹²⁸. These are besides the cases of piracy that have happened severally off the Kenyan Indian ocean seacoast. The cases of international terrorism and piracy cast a bearing on Kenya's foreign policy landscape, arousing new needs that Kenya must respond to either as a country or in a plurality of states.

Like international terrorism, the global socio-political and security arrangements against terrorism have also shaped Kenya's foreign policy. Like most victims of international terrorism, Kenya has been absorbed into and influenced by the organized global counterterrorism initiatives, led by United States, and supported by major security actors like Russian Federation. Accordingly, Consequently, Kenya has formulated its foreign policy towards powerful states like Russian Federation in addressing international terrorism. At bilateral level, Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation is aimed at increasing Kenya's potentials in addressing international terrorism. Itself a victim of international and organized terrorism, Russian Federation has developed the technical and tactical capability to effectively respond not only to domestic terrorism, but also to join the global war on terror. This is exemplified by its naval capabilities that helped mitigate

¹²⁶ Davis, John, op.cit.,72

¹²⁷ United States Institute of Peace, "Terrorism in the Horn of Africa" Special Report 113 (2004), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr113.pdf> (Accessed May 5, 2019).

¹²⁸ Howden, Daniel "Terror in Nairobi: the full story behind al-Shabaab's mall attack" The Guardian, Oct. 4, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya> (Accessed Nov 3, 2015).

against the Gulf of Aden/Somali piracy menace of which Kenya was worst hit in the region. Consequently, while Kenya was faced with the legal dilemma over the trial of captured Somali pirates, in 2010 Russian Federation initiated the process of drafting a resolution that would culminate into the Security Council resolution 1976 of 2011¹²⁹ that would enable Kenya to try and incarcerate the captured pirates in Kenyan court at Shimo La Tewa. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russian Federation has power to make resolutions on piracy and terrorism. Prior to the resolution, there was a legal dilemma concerning the arrest and trial of piracy, a situation that implied that Kenya, as one of the worst affected countries by the Somali piracy, suffer on. However, with the resolution, there was hope that Kenya would play its part in the war against piracy and maritime terrorism. It is against the shared history and experience with international terrorism as well as Russian Federation's technical capability to deal with terrorism that Kenya formulated its foreign policy towards Russian Federation.

At the multilateral level, by 2009 Kenya had ratified about 12 international treaties and agreements as a key player in the global war against terrorism. The Russian Federation, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is instrumental in the making and maintenance of these treaties. These include the 1997 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1999 Africa Union's Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism¹³⁰, as well as other multilateral agreements to fight international terrorism and its manifestations like piracy.

Besides terrorism and piracy, Kenya's foreign policy has also been influenced by Kenya's adverse experience with transnational organized crime (TOC). Principally due to its strategic geographic location, busy port of Mombasa and high prevalence of corruption, Kenya is identified as one of the leading hubs for transnational organized crimes¹³¹. TOC syndicates that have found a safe haven in Kenya include international trafficking of narcotics like heroin and cocaine, and of which over 10 organized international groups operate; trade in contraband and counterfeit goods, of which Kenya is the leading market in the East Africa region, causing Kenya to loses hundreds

¹²⁹ United Nations, "Security Council to 'Urgently Consider' Plans for Specialized Courts, Prisons for Somali Pirates, Cites Rise in Violence off Somalia's Coast" April 11, 2011 <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10221.doc.htm> (Accessed Nov 3, 2015); Charbonneau, Louis "Legal limbo makes Somalia piracy worse: Russia" Reuters, April 7, 2010 <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJQE63602Q20100407> (Accessed March 20, 2015).

¹³⁰ Odero O. Hillary "Multilateral Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism: Kenya and the UN" (University of Nairobi, 2009), 5.

¹³¹ Interview "Mr. Q", a Sector Delivery official in the Office of the President Nairobi on Sep. 23, 2016.

of millions of dollars in taxes. Other TOCs include poaching and trade in animal trophies, human trafficking, trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and money laundering¹³². Because of the transboundary nature of these crimes, Kenya formulates its foreign policy to respond with the necessary countermeasures capable of dealing with international crime.

Consequently, Kenya's foreign policy identifies the efforts to combat TOC as a "core priority" that is necessary for enhancing peace and security. At the bilateral level, Kenya identifies "new anchors" with whom to cooperate in the war against transnational organized crime¹³³. Based on its capacity to deal with TOC, this includes the Russian Federation with the capability and experiential know-how to deal with these emerging threats.

At multilateral level, Kenya's foreign policy is directed to like-minded organizations whose members are willing to join in coalitions against TOCs. These include regional efforts like the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of The Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2000) in which Kenya entered into agreement with other regional countries to address the issue of SALW that have pervaded the Horn region¹³⁴. Kenya was mandated with the responsibility of overseeing the implementation of the declaration in conjunction with other governments. At the global level, Kenya has also ratified United Nations conventions on TOCs including the signing in 2005 the November 2003 *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children*, that supplemented the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*¹³⁵. Kenya's foreign policy, as indicated, is formulated based on the nature and extent of transnational organized crime, hence does Kenya conduct its foreign policy at both bilateral, regional, and international levels.

3.2.5 International Organizations

The United Nations is the most powerful and influential international organization in contemporary world politics. Whereas the international system is anarchic, the UN is the closest

¹³² Miraglia Paula, Ochoa Rolando and Briscoe Ivan "Transnational organised crime and fragile states" *International Center for the Prevention of Crime and the Clingendael Institute, Working Paper 3* (2012) <https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-institutions/WP3%20Transnational%20organised%20crime.pdf> (Accessed May 10, 2019).

¹³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, op. cit., 23; Interview with "Mr. E", a Europe and Commonwealth Division officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

¹³⁴ Project Ploughshares "Nairobi Declaration" March 15, 2000, <https://ploughshares.ca/conventional-weapons/un-poa/regional-agreements/nairobi-declaration/> (Accessed May 10, 2019).

¹³⁵ United Nations Treaty Collections https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&lang=en (Accessed July 6, 2019).

entity to a world government, a position particularly bolstered by the powerful UN organs like the Security Council, General Assembly, semi-autonomous agencies like International Court of Justice, World Trade Organization and other specialized agencies like UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNEP, UNDP among others. Premising on their roles, influence and power, these agencies not only condition what foreign policy choices states pursue but also prescribe the opportunities and limitations within which such foreign policies are made.

Article 24 sec. 1 of the UN Charter establishes the UN Security Council as the primary body mandated with maintaining world peace and security. Hence, the UNSC is the most powerful collective security arrangement in the world today, and as such conditions countries' foreign policies regarding security and peace¹³⁶. Through its resolutions, the Security Council has severally defined Kenya's foreign policy choices especially with regards to its security initiatives in the Horn region. For instance, when Kenya was faced with increasing acts of piracy in the Kenyan coast off the Somalia waters, it sought the intervention of the Security Council that passed Resolution 5902 that empowered Kenya, among other countries to use any means possible to bring to a stop the Somali piracy problem¹³⁷. The same case happened when Kenya's military policy in Somalia was altered through the Security Council Resolution 2036 that officially integrated Kenya into the African Union Mission in Somalia¹³⁸. Kenya had in 2011 unilaterally intervened into Somalia following a series of terrorist attacks from Somalia based Al Shabaab terror group. Equally, Kenya reached out to the Security Council on 8/2/2011 seeking its support for the deferment of the Kenyan cases at the International Criminal Court. While this failed, the permanent Security Council member, Russian Federation, supported Kenya's plea¹³⁹. The move heralded a more robust foreign policy towards the Russian Federation in the subsequent Uhuru Kenyatta presidency, whose first international visit would be to Moscow.

The UN specialized agencies like International Court of Justice also handle international territorial disputes among countries. Currently, Kenya and Somalia have a pending case before the

¹³⁶ Interview with "Mr. Ochieng" (Political Liaison Officer) at UN Support Office in Somalia on Sep. 21st 2019

¹³⁷ United Nations "Security Council Condemns Acts of Piracy, Armed Robbery Off Somalia's Coast, Authorizes For Six Months 'All Necessary Means' To Repress Such Acts" June 3, 2008, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9344.doc.htm> (Accessed Aug. 10, 2019).

¹³⁸ Africa Union Mission in Somalia, "Kenya – KDF" <http://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/> (Accessed April. 9, 2019).

¹³⁹ Mwangi, Dann "Deferral and Enforcement Powers of the United Nations Security Council under the Rome Statute: A Case Study of Kenya" International Journal of Education and Research 4, no. 7 (2016) <https://www.ijern.com/journal/2016/July-2016/02.pdf> (Accessed April 10, 2019).

Court regarding disputed territory in the Indian Ocean. Through established legal framework and arbitration, the Court has limited a range of foreign policy options through which either Kenya or Somalia can defend or claim the disputed territories. This is despite the states' claim to sovereignty and territorial integrity and their avowed policies to defend their territorial integrity from external aggression. The same applies to other agencies like World Trade Organization that regulates trade practice among its members. The Treaty establishing WTO stipulates that it has a "legal personality" all member states are bound to act according to its directions on international trade matters¹⁴⁰. The other UN agencies like the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) that are headquartered in Kenya play specialized roles that on human settlements, refugees, environmental that condition what options states like Kenya take on those issues¹⁴¹. For instance, Kenya is a signatory to several environmental treaties that define Kenya's environmental practice while also binding it to international commitments and expectations. This implies that Kenya's foreign policy is guided, limited and enabled by these treaties as led by the UN specialized agencies.

Like the UN, the African Union is the continental behemoth whose treaty and charter condition what range of foreign options Kenya is able to undertake. When need arises, African Union like the UN can intervene inside an African state like Kenya's environmental to avert a crisis or provide assistance as needed. This often alters the foreign policy choices and the context within which it happens. For instance, the AU intervened in Kenya following the 2007 contested elections that nearly plunged the country into a civil war. This led to the creation of coalition government that redefined the foreign policy making environment and averting the creation of unconstitutional changes in government (UCG) that could redefine policy environment¹⁴². Moreover, AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) became and still is the umbrella military that runs the peace keeping process in Somalia. Whereas Kenya had unilaterally intervened, it could not maintain war chest necessary to run the Somalia campaign and therefore resorted to be rehatted into AMISOM, thereby increasing the troop numbers to 17,731. This included Kenya's contribution of 4,000 troops¹⁴³. In essence, because of AU's role and influence, Kenya's earlier

¹⁴⁰ WTO "AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION"

https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (Accessed April 12, 2019).

¹⁴¹ Interview with "Mr. Ochieng" (Political Liaison Officer) at UN Support Office in Somalia on Sep. 21st 2016

¹⁴² Laibuta, Mugambi, "The African Union and Kenya's Constitution-Building Process" *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance* (2014) <https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/379211270.pdf> (Accessed July, 10, 2018).

¹⁴³ Miyandazi, Luckystar "Kenya's military intervention in Somalia" Accord, Nov. 11, 2012

unilateral foreign policy towards Somalia had to be recalibrated to entail acting alongside other forces in the Somalia campaign.

Besides political organizations, other international organizations that influence Kenya's foreign policy include sports organizations like the Olympic Committee, Federation of International Football Association (FIFA), and the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). Kenya, being a leading sports country, especially in athletics, is bound by the treaties and agreements as well as the regulations that regulate the sporting activities, and in formulating its foreign policy towards Russian Federation on cultural and sporting issues, it does so within the opportunities and limitations set by these sporting international organizations.

3.3 Conclusion

Kenya's foreign policy, like Kenya itself, does not exist or happen in an international vacuum. Rather, the attributes of the international system like the lack of a super-ordinate government responsible for international government, international law, international organizations, distribution of capabilities influence the conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Consequently, Kenya's foreign policy is formulated as a response to the systemic attributes that individually or collectively present opportunities or constraints within which Kenya can formulate and conduct its foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Hence, while Kenya's foreign policy is primarily motivated by its national interests, systemic forces condition how such foreign policy will be implemented. Just as resource endowment will condition the nature of a foreign policy that Kenya formulates, its standing in the rungs of distribution of capabilities will condition how it implements its foreign policy. Similarly, the anarchy in the international system presents the opportunity for Kenya to formulate its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation that includes military purchases, joint military activities and economic cooperation.

<https://www.accord.org.za/publication/kenya-s-military-intervention-in-somalia/> (Accessed Jan. 4, 2016).

CHAPTER FOUR

CONDUCT OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FROM 1992 TO 2013

4.1 Introduction

Between 1992 and 2013, the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation was informed by a combination of domestic and systemic variables. Resultantly, the choice of foreign policy instrument, actors, robustness of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation reflected the opportunities and limitations that these variables presented to Kenya. As a constant, Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation was driven by the pursuit of Kenya's national interests as laid out in both the independence as well as the 2010 constitution and enshrined in the 2009 Kenya's foreign policy document as objectives. These interests include the need for economic prosperity, protection of Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty, regional peace and security, promotion of regional integration, protection of Kenya's international interests as well as enhance Kenya's partnership with its diaspora population in the anarchic international system¹⁴⁴.

4.2 Kenya's Foreign Policy Making Process

The conduct of foreign policy is not an automated, self-executing process but is rather a rational process that requires a supporting legal framework, formulators, resources, implementers, vision, and the deployment of appropriate instruments. Kenya's constitutional provision undergirds the legal framework that guide its formulation and execution and all the related actors and instruments. According to Kenya's 2009 Foreign Policy document, the primary institutions formulating Kenya's foreign policy is the Presidency, the Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliament, each with its respective roles. The President is the chief diplomat and represents the country as its primary ambassador. Kenya's independence constitution codified this provision by conferring on the president overriding powers over foreign policy, and hence in President Moi's last decade between 1992 and 2002, the foreign policy edifice was synonymous with the Presidency¹⁴⁵. The Cabinet, as a body of technocrats, is involved in the actual policy making that

¹⁴⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Kenya's Foreign Policy Framework*. (MFAIT, Nairobi, 2009), 8.

¹⁴⁵ Ojwang, John and Luis Franceschi, "Constitutional Regulation of the Foreign Affairs Power in Kenya: A Comparative Assessment" in *Journal of African Law* 46, No. 1 (2002), 43-58

is translated into various foreign policy options that the country pursues. More specifically, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, made up of “Office of the Minister, Bilateral Missions, Multilateral Missions and Foreign service Institute”¹⁴⁶ oversees the implementation of Kenya’s foreign policy in keeping with its national interests.

The Parliament provides the legislative framework within which the formulation and conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy happens. Besides legislation, Kenya’s legislature undertakes endorsements or limitation of foreign policy options, vetting of diplomatic appointees, oversight of policy options and implementation, as well as the allocation of budgetary needs for the implementation of the foreign policy options. Whereas these are the primary offices involved in the making of Kenya’s foreign policy, there are various other offices including the National Security Advisory Committee, Office of Retired Heads of State, the Kenya Fund for Technical Cooperation. These offices support, advise and influence the conduct and formulation of Kenya’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation among other countries.

4.3 Instruments of Kenya’s Foreign Policy

4.3.1 Economic Instruments

Resource endowment and deprivation are some of the key determinants informing the formulation and conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy. Economic growth, by leveraging its economic strengths while seeking to improve its inadequacies inform the conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation.

4.3.2 Trade

The use of economic instrument in the conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation manifests mainly through exports and imports, as informed by the comparative advantage that either country has over the other.

4.3.2.1 Kenya’s Exports to Russian Federation

Kenya’s economic relations with Russian Federation is nascent, when compared to other economies, accounting for about 0.7% of all Kenya’s bilateral economic exchanges, ranking 20th,

¹⁴⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Kenya’s Foreign Policy Framework* (MFAIT, Nairobi, 2009) 32.

by 2012¹⁴⁷. While this is economically less significant when compared to other bilateral exchanges, Russian Federation is among the countries that Kenya's 2010 constitution identifies as one of the "emerging economies" with the potential of influencing the international system. Kenya's economic exchanges with Russian Federation has in like manner has grown both as Russian influence in global affairs increased as well as the relations between the two countries improved.

Kenya's exports to, and imports from the Russian Federation provide a visual expression of the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy through time. Between 1992 and 2013, Kenya's exports towards the Russian Federation increased in value from 22,730 dollars in 1992 to 77, 313, 660 dollars in 2013 as shown in the chart below ¹⁴⁸. The sustained increase in the value of Kenya's exports to the Russian Federation coincided with the economic resurgence of the Russian Federation as a world power, while also reflecting Kenya's desire to attain economic growth towards middle-income country status. This created a need to make inroads into unfamiliar, nontraditional markets like the Russian Federation.

¹⁴⁷ IBT, "Kenya's President Goes East: Why China Could Become Uhuru Kenyatta's Closest Friend" International Business Times Aug 20, 2013, <https://www.ibtimes.com/kenyas-president-goes-east-why-china-could-become-uhuru-kenyattas-closest-friend-1391675> (Accessed Jan. 11 2016)

¹⁴⁸ World Integrated Trade Solutions, "Kenya Product Export Product Share to Russian Federation", World Bank, "<https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KEN/StartYear/1992/EndYear/2013/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/XPRT-PRDCT-SHR/Partner/RUS/Product/all-groups#> (Accessed Jan. 11 2016)




Table 4: (Source: World Bank).

The diversity of Kenya’s export product portfolio reflects the vibrancy with which the economic instrument is used in Kenya’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. The products that Kenya exported to the Russian Federation include consumer good like vegetables and other food products that account for 93% of the total Kenyan exports to the Russian Federation. These include tobacco, coffee, tea and cut flowers. Notably, Kenya’s tea export to Russian Federation plays a significant role as an economic instrument for Kenya’s foreign policy to Russian Federation, accounting for 95% of total beverage export to Russian Federation by 2013¹⁴⁹. Beginning as a humble market for Kenyan tea, by 1999, the Russian Federation had risen to be the 6th largest importer of Kenyan tea, a position that improved even further by 2013 when the Russian Federation became the 4th largest importer of Kenyan tea¹⁵⁰. Consequently, the Russian market recorded the one of highest increase in Kenya’s tea exports, as seen in the 2010-2013 period when Kenya’s tea exports to the Russian Federation rose from 15.7 million kgs in 2010 to 30.3 million kgs in 2013. This resulted in an increase in the value of tea exports from US\$ 40.2 million to US\$

¹⁴⁹ Trading Economics, “Kenya Exports to Russia of Coffee, tea, mate and spices” <https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/exports/russia/coffee-tea-mate-spices> (Accessed May. 11 2018)

¹⁵⁰Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, *Kenya Economic Report 2013* (Nairobi: KIPPRA, 2013), 119

69.4 million during the same period¹⁵¹. In the Russian Federation, Kenyan tea is majorly imported by KENY-Tea, a Russian company that has been at the forefront of importing Kenyan tea since 2006. With conducive trading environment assured by the Kenyan government through agencies like KENINVEST that promotes local investment¹⁵², KENY-Tea has been at the forefront of ensuring that tea exports to Russian Federation is ever increasing in quantity since 1992¹⁵³.

Like tea, avocado has equally become an increasingly important crop in Kenya's economic relations with Russian Federation. Currently, according to Horticultural Crops Directorate, Kenya exports two avocado varieties to the Russian Federation: HASS and Fuertes, the quantity of which has significantly rose¹⁵⁴. While it was insignificant at first, the economic significance of avocado started to show in late 20th century, when Kenyan tropical fruits including other fruits as passion and star fruits accounted for 0.19% of the total tropical fruits imported by Russian Federation. This equated to 5,969 kilograms of avocados and 4,788 kilograms of passion and star fruits exported to Russia in the same year¹⁵⁵. By 2012, Kenya was the 5th leading avocado exporter to Russian Federation, accounting for 3% of all avocado imports by Russian Federation^{156, 157}. This significant growth in exports can be attributed to the intensification in Kenya's economic policy towards the Russian Federation, by introducing new products into the market and finding new market in Russian Federation for them.

The trends in Kenya's exports to the Russian Federation indicate the transformations that Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. As the exports increased and grew in value, Kenya's foreign policy actors ensured that the tempo of Kenya's foreign policy rose to meet the increasing need for the Russian market. Moreover, the transformation of Russian Federation

¹⁵¹ Klomegah, K. Kester, "Kenya Seeks Closer Cooperation With Russia", Modern Ghana, Jan, 11, 2015. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/591393/kenya-seeks-closer-cooperation-with-russia.html> (Accessed July. 11 2015)

¹⁵² A phone interview with "Mr. Tirop", (Assistant to General Manager-Investment Promotion) at KenInvest on Jan. 14th 2020).

¹⁵³ A phone interview with "Mr. Kirwa" (Business Development Assistant) at CTCL, a KTDA subsidiary on Jan. 13th 2020.

¹⁵⁴ Phone discussion with "Mr. Hamisi" (Export Officer) at Horticultural Crops Directorate under the Agriculture and Food Authority on January 14th 2020

¹⁵⁵ Food and Agricultural Organization, *Committee on Commodity Problems*, <http://www.fao.org/3/y2127e/y2127e.htm> (Accessed April 4, 2015)

¹⁵⁶ United States Agency for International Aid, *Global Competitiveness Study: Benchmarking Kenya's Horticulture Sector For Enhanced Export Competitiveness*, <https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/6933/usaid-khpc-global-competitiveness-study.pdf> (Accessed Feb. 4, 2016)

¹⁵⁷ Phone interview with "Tembo" (Communications and Marketing Officer) and "Ronald" (Assistant to Technical Manager) at Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya on Dec. 2nd 2019

as a “resurgent power” provided the impetus for the intensification of the use of economic instrument in Kenya’s foreign policy.

4.3.2.2 Kenya’s Imports from Russian Federation

Like Kenya’s exports to the Russian Federation, imports from the latter have significantly increased since 1992. This is best indicated by the remarkable period between 1996 and 2008 when Kenyan commodity imports from the Russia Federation increased by 1,281%, second only to imports from China which increased by 2,084%¹⁵⁸. This tremendous increase in Russian imports could be attributed to, among other factors, the resurgence of Russian Federation as an economic power as well as Kenya’s economic restricting and drive towards economic development that necessitated excursions into the Russian Federation markets.

Between 1992 and 2013, Kenya’s imports from Russia Federation also increased significantly. While there were fluctuations in the annual value of imports from the Russian Federation, there was a significant increase in import value from 1992 to 2013: rising from a value of a mere 1,045,420 dollars in 1992 to 269,176,120 dollars in 2013¹⁵⁹. Based on Russian Federation’s comparative advantage over Kenya in the manufacturing sector, the major products imported by Kenya from Russian Federation include chemicals, vegetables, plastics, rubber, footwear, machines, and electrical goods. As Kenya’s economic needs increased, and as economic policies increasingly enabled Russian Federation to export more to Kenya, the value of Kenya’s imports from Russian Federation increased accordingly.

¹⁵⁸ Daniel Fiott, “The EU and China in Africa: The Case of Kenya,” *Madariaga Paper*3, No. 5 (Jul., 2010), 2

¹⁵⁹ World Integrated Trade Solutions, “Kenya Product Import Product Share from Russian Federation in % 1992-2013”, World Bank <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KEN/StartYear/1992/EndYear/2013/TradeFlow/Import/Indicator/MPRT-PRDCT-SHR/Partner/RUS/Product/all-groups#> (Accessed Jan. 11 2016)




Table 5: (Source: World Bank).

However, as indicated by the import/export variations, there still exists a significant balance of payment between Kenya and Russian Federation. This balance of payment can be attributed to the economic asymmetry between the two countries, with Russian Federation being an economically more advanced power, and is therefore able to export more to Kenya than Kenya is able to export to it. This economic variation necessitates an increased need for the utilization of economic instruments in Kenya’s foreign policy towards Russian Federation, with the intent of increasing the value of exports to the Russian market to narrow down the balance of payment. This balance of payment notwithstanding, Kenya’s imports and exports to Russian Federation have increased significantly since 1992. Whereas several factors are responsible for this increase, one of the primary reasons for this increase is the good relations that has been fostered by Kenya’s foreign policies towards Russian Federation.

4.3.3 Agriculture

Agriculture, as an element of the economic instrument, lies at the centre of comparative and absolute advantage that Kenya has over the Russian Federation. Hence, Kenya is not only able to produce more selected agricultural products than the Russian Federation, it can also produce superior quality that trades well at the Russian Federation market when compared to other

producers. The production and export of tea is a paradigm case of Kenya's use of economic instrument in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Kenya is one of the leading tea producers in the world, and consequently, tea accounts for the largest share of Kenya's exports to the Russian Federation. In an interview with the Russian Federation Desk Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, it emerged that agriculture is "Kenya's strongest point in its relations with Russia"¹⁶⁰. This is because Kenya has absolute advantage over the Russian Federation on production and export of certain agricultural commodities and this has enhanced their interdependent economic relations.

At the turn of the century in 2000, Kenya's tea exports to the Russian Federation was only 96 tons, a figure that significantly increased to 13,337 in 2005, 15,033 in 2009, 14,755 in 2010, and 30,300 tons in 2013¹⁶¹. The steady increase established Russian Federation as the fourth largest importer of Kenyan tea by 2013¹⁶². A similar trend is also seen in Kenya's coffee export to the Russian Federation. While significantly less than tea exports, coffee exports to the Russian Federation has also increased over time, from 91 tons in 2005, to 188 tons in 2009 and 327 tons in 2010¹⁶³. These indications point to the increasing use of agriculture, as a tool of the economic instrument, besides the political and diplomatic instruments that have traditionally defined Kenya-Russian Federation relations.

Whereas tea and coffee are the dominant exports to the Russian Federation, Kenya also exports other agricultural products like avocado, timber, cotton, wood, skins and hides among other products. With a net export value lesser than that of tea and coffee, they have equally increased Kenya's export volume to the Russian Federation, nonetheless. Augmented with the export of other horticultural products, especially cut flowers. Kenya's agricultural products have performed well in the Russian Federation market.

Besides Kenya's exports to Russian Federation, Kenya's use of its economic instruments also entails importation of agricultural products of which the Russian Federation has comparative

¹⁶⁰ Interview with "Mrs. J", the Russian Federation Desk Officer at MFAIT on June 14, 2016.

¹⁶¹ Kiselev Sergey and Romashkin Roman "Possible Effects of Russia's WTO Accession on Agricultural Trade and Production" ICTSD Issue Paper 4 (2012) <http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/downloads/2012/04/possible-effects-of-russias-wto-accession-on-agricultural-trade-and-production.pdf> (Accessed May. 4 2015), 73; Klomegah, K. Kester, "Kenya Seeks Closer Cooperation With Russia", Modern Ghana, Jan, 11, 2015. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/591393/kenya-seeks-closer-cooperation-with-russia.html> (Accessed July. 11 2015).

¹⁶² Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis. *Kenya Economic Report 2013* (Nairobi: KIPPRA, 2013), 119

¹⁶³ Kiselev, *ibid.* 61

advantage. Wheat is one such area where Kenya, imports from the Russian Federation, which is the 5th leading producer and trader in the world, accounting for about 10% of global wheat trade¹⁶⁴. Resultantly, Kenya gets wheat from the Russian Federation both as direct importation and as aid whenever there is need occasioned by natural disasters and the high refugee influx. Under the *Protecting and Rebuilding Livelihoods in the Arid and Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya* program, (PRRO), Kenya received wheat from Russian Federation worth about 1 million dollars¹⁶⁵ towards assisting the communities most at risk due to drought in northern Kenya. This was also coupled with another wheat aid from Russian Federation worth about 2 million dollars from Russian Federation to fight hunger in Kenya¹⁶⁶. The high refugee numbers especially from the troubled Somalia exacerbates the situation.

To meet its fertilizer needs occasioned by low industrial capacity to produce fertilizer locally, Kenya imports fertilizer from Russian Federation for its agricultural sector. With an annual need of “500 thousand metric tonnes per year”¹⁶⁷ that Kenya does not have the capacity to manufacture locally, Kenya reaches out to Russian Federation, which is the leading manufacturer of fertilizer in the world. Through diplomatic charm offensive to address Kenya’s fertilizer needs, President Uhuru Kenyatta reached out to leading Russian fertilizer manufacturers, Akron and Uralchim, with the intention of wooing them to establish fertilizer manufacturing plants in Kenya. Resultantly, the two firms expressed interest in putting up fertilizer manufacturing plants in the country. This move had been preceded by a visit by the then minister for agriculture Mr. Henry Koskei to the Russian Federation specifically on the issue of fertilizer in which he met his Russian counterpart and fertilizer producers and deliberated on cooperation on agriculture and its related products as fertilizer¹⁶⁸. The ensuing relations was built on the symbiotic trade relations built around agricultural products.

¹⁶⁴ Global Monitoring Report “Food Prices, Nutrition, and the Millennium Development Goals: Using Trade Policy to Overcome Food Insecurity” (2012), 119

¹⁶⁵ Brezhneva Anna and Ukhova Daria “Russia as a Humanitarian Donor” OXFAM Discussion Paper (2013), 11

¹⁶⁶ Interview with “Mr. Ochieng” (Political Liaison Officer) at UN Support Office in Somalia on Sep. 21st 2019; World Food Programme, “Russian contribution of wheat flour worth US\$2 million to help WFP fight hunger in Kenya” (Accessed Jan. 6, 2016)

<https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/russian-contribution-wheat-flour-worth-us2-million-help-wfp-fight-hunger-kenya>

¹⁶⁷ Presidential Strategic Communications Unit, “Uhuru woos Russian investors to Kenya’s agricultural sector”

<https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Uhuru-woos-Russian-investors-to-Kenya-agricultural-sector/539546-1956392-14co013/index.html> (Accessed Jan. 6, 2016).

¹⁶⁸ State House-Kenya, “Russian Government pledges to help Kenya secure fertilizers at affordable cost”

<https://www.facebook.com/StateHouseKenya/posts/russian-government-pledges-to-help-kenya-secure-fertilizers-at-affordable-costmo/691038387578355/> (Accessed June. 6, 2015).

The culmination of these diplomatic discourses was the agreement by the two countries in 2012 to create a working group for joint cooperation in the agricultural sector. The Kenyan parliamentary group visit to the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture and the meeting with the Minister in charge, Elena Skrynnik¹⁶⁹ finalized the plan to create the working group. One of the main action points from the meeting for the working group was the agreement that Kenyan students would be trained on agricultural courses in Russian universities. This will enable technology and knowledge transfer from the Russian Federation to improve Kenya's agricultural productivity.

Interestingly, because of the balance of payment in Russian Federation's favour, the bilateral trade between Kenya and Russian Federation benefitted the latter more. Hence, while the value of trade between the two countries increased from 161.4 million dollars in 2010 to 341.1 million dollars in 2013, the balance of payment greatly favored Russian Federation. This manifested in Kenya's exports to Russian Federation that paled in comparison to the value of goods imported from Russian Federation at 263.4 million dollars¹⁷⁰ within the same period. Nonetheless, while trade imbalance is synonymous with asymmetrical dyads, the use of economic instrument in Kenya's foreign policy resulted in significant increase in the trade between Kenya and the Russian Federation.

4.3.4 Tourism

Tourist flows between Kenya and the Russian Federation is consistent with the trends and transformations in Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation from 1992 to 2013. While statistically not as significant as tourism flows from countries like Britain, Russian Federation tourism flows to Kenya indicate an upward growth consistent with the recalibration of Kenya's foreign policy towards the country. In turn, the Russian Federation has been one of the important countries that Kenya tourism sector has been targeting since 2000, principally due to its promises for Kenyan tourism sector. This is equally consistent with the Russian Federation's attribute as one of the top origin of tourists in the world, a position that reached its fever-pitch in

¹⁶⁹ AfroCom, "Russia and Kenya will create a joint working group on agricultural issues" May 17, 2012, <http://www.afrocom.ru/news/news/221> (Accessed June. 6, 2015).

¹⁷⁰ Klomegah, K. Kester, "Kenya Seeks Closer Cooperation With Russia", Modern Ghana, Jan, 11, 2015. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/591393/kenya-seeks-closer-cooperation-with-russia.html> (Accessed July. 11 2015)

the 2012-2013 period when the Russian Federation became the fifth highest spending country on tourism in the world, spending a total of 43 billion U.S dollars¹⁷¹. This economic and cultural capability attracted Kenya whose top tourism executives embarked on a robust tourism promotion in the Russian Federation. The culmination was an aggressive tourism policy towards the Russian Federation with the intent of capturing the high Russian tourism expenditures. This move was built on an earlier policy prediction by the 2001 Kenya Economic Survey that identified the Russian Federation, alongside China, India Europe, and USA, as one of the most potential and significant tourism source markets in for Kenya¹⁷²¹⁷³.

Consequently, Kenya has in place a robust tourism policy towards the Russian Federation. According to Victor Akunov, the Kenya Tourism Board representative in Moscow, following Kenya's launch of a series of tourism promotions in the Russian Federation in 2003, the number of Russian tourists coming to Kenya has increased by 15% since then, reaching to about 7,800 tourists in 2011¹⁷⁴. This denoted a 39% increase from the number of Russian Federation tourists that visited Kenya the previous year in 2010¹⁷⁵. As deduced from this number, the Russian Federation tourists that visited Kenya was so low it paled to other countries from where Kenya gets close to 2 million tourists annually. Nonetheless, based on the Russian Federation's growing potentials as a tourism source market, Kenya Tourism Board embarked on several trade fairs in Russian Federation among other target source countries to boost tourist arrivals.

One of the most significant events was the 2008, week-long tourism promotion event, the Moscow International Travel and Tourism Exhibition (MITTE) in which Kenya participated. Kenya's intention was to build on the previous promotional activities to boost Russian Federation tourists to Kenya. Furthermore, Kenya Tourism Board announced that it will spend a total of 13 million dollars on marketing Kenya's tourism sector to the Russian Federation, among other leading tourist source markets like the US, Middle East and China¹⁷⁶. The promotion was followed

¹⁷¹ Tourism Review, "Russian Outbound Tourism Market Review," Feb. 11, 2019

<https://www.tourism-review.com/russian-outbound-tourism-industry-news10935> (Accessed May. 11 2019)

¹⁷² Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, *Economic Survey 2001*, (Nairobi: Ministry of Finance and Planning), 182

¹⁷³ Interview with "Janice", (Marketing Manager) at Kenya Tourism Board on Feb. 12th 2020

¹⁷⁴ AfroCom, "Russia and Kenya will create a joint working group on agricultural issues" Dec. 15, 2012, <http://www.afrocom.ru/news/news/540> (Accessed June. 6, 2015).

¹⁷⁵ AfroCom, "Russia and Kenya will create a joint working group on agricultural issues" Feb. 21, 2012, <http://www.afrocom.ru/news/news/100> (Accessed June. 6, 2015)

¹⁷⁶ World Bank, "Kenya's Tourism: Polishing the Jewel" Finance and Private Sector Development Africa Region Final Report, (2010), 56; Interview with "Janice", (Marketing Manager) at Kenya Tourism Board on Feb. 12th 2020

in 2009 by another promotional trip by then Kenya's tourism minister, Najib Balala, who visited Moscow as part of the Source Market Diversification Programme in which Kenya sought to gain significant access to new tourist source markets¹⁷⁷. In the meeting with his Russian Federation counterpart, Anatoly Yarochkin on 28th June, 2009, Balala noted that between June and August 2009, Kenya intended to market its tourist products in the Russian Federation, to the tune of about 16 million shillings. A number of incentives supplemented the promotion, aiming at increasing the Russian Federation tourist arrivals. These incentives included the reduction of visa costs by 50%, and most importantly the launch of a Russian-language tourism website alongside the official tourism websites like Kenya Tourism Board website. This prompted Russian tourism agencies like Capital Tour, Aviareps and VKO Travel to initiate marketing Kenya in Russian Federation jointly with Kenya tourism agencies.

The highest-ranking visit to the Russian Federation after Balala's visitation the 2010 to Moscow by the then Kenya's Prime Minister Raila Odinga. Raila not only engaged with the Russian authorities on how to increase Russian tourists in Kenya, but also identified the biggest impediment to the Russian tourist numbers in Kenya. According to Raila, to boost Russian Federation tourism in Kenya, there was an urgent need for direct flights between Moscow and Nairobi. In his presentation, Raila argued that the "absence of direct flights was the main reason Kenya, with more to offer in tourism than Egypt, attracts far less Russian tourists than the North African country"¹⁷⁸. As a consequent of the lack of direct flights between Kenya and Moscow, Kenya receives a meager 7,000 Russian tourists as compared to the majorly dry Egypt, without much to offer as tourists' attraction when compared to Kenya, which receives upwards of 1 million Russian tourists per year¹⁷⁹.

4.3.5 Manufacturing and Investment

One of the most important pillars of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, albeit in the future is the manufacturing sector. This position derives from the fact that Kenya's industrial and capacity is in its nascent stage and hence provides one of the strongest

¹⁷⁷ Barasa, Lucas "Russian-language website for Kenya tourism" Daily Nation, June 29, 2009

<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-616680-jocs13z/index.html> (Accessed June. 6, 2015)

¹⁷⁸ Mulunda, Luke "Kenya woos Russian investors, begins talk on air traffic deal" Business Today, June 25, 2012

<https://businesstoday.co.ke/kenya-woos-russian-investors-begins-talk-on-air-traffic-deal-2/> (Accessed June. 6, 2015).

¹⁷⁹ Mulunda, Ibid.

linkage points with the Russian Federation. Accordingly, Kenya has measures to ensure that Russian Federation investment and manufacturing companies enter and operate in Kenya. Unlike Russian Federation, Kenya is not an industrialized country, and its foreign policy towards Russian Federation aims at attracting Russian Federation investment companies by creating an enabling environment for Russian firms. Whereas Russian Federation manufacturing and investment footprint is not as pronounced in Kenya as other countries', one of the most established Russian companies in Kenya is Kenruss Medics, a joint Kenyan-Russian Federation medical equipment supply company in Kenya. Kenruss was registered in Kenya in 1994 and has been supplying medical equipment ever since, becoming one of the most active and established investors in that sector¹⁸⁰.

Another Russian Federation investment company active in Kenya is Renaissance Capital, an investment bank and financial management firm with an authoritative presence in the financial sector. With its foundation in Moscow, Renaissance Capital was established in Nairobi in 2006. It has however rose to be the largest financial investment firms in Kenya, second in turnover only to Kestrel Capital. With a turnover of about 20.6 billion shillings, Renaissance Capital is a paradigm case of the cordial political relations that exists between Kenya and Russian Federation¹⁸¹.

4.3.6 Kenya-Russian Federation Economic Relations

Like most African countries conducting their foreign policies towards the Russian Federation, Kenya's foreign policy was conducted against a background where the Russian Federation preferred to relate with Africa from "within the framework of African efforts"¹⁸². This implied that Russian Federation, while having little financial obligation in the continent, maintained no regular, significant financial policy towards Kenya, like in most Sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya, in this regard, received marginal financial assistance from the Russian Federation in terms of aid, grant or loans. Nonetheless, while Kenya's financial assistance from Russian Federation is marginal and is enmeshed within the broader financial assistance that the latter

¹⁸⁰ A phone conversation with "Rick" (Sales Representative) and "Moon" (Projects Officer) on Sep. 27th 2017 from Kenruss Medics.

¹⁸¹ Renaissance Capital, 'History' <https://www.rencap.com/InvestmentBanking/History/> (Accessed June.4, 2018); Phone interview with "Patrick", Financial Executive at Renaissance Capital on Aug. 14, 2019

¹⁸² Kanet, Roger and Alexander Kozhemiakin, eds. *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 170

extends to Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya has “special economic relations with Russia”¹⁸³. The special relations notwithstanding, Kenya’s economic relations with Russia is currently happening within a framework of Kenya’s own efforts, an effort primarily driven by commodity exports to the Russian Federation.

4.4 Military Instrument and National Security

Kenya’s national security needs and vulnerabilities, derived from its geopolitical location and linkages necessitate the need for a well-equipped, trained, and capable military and homeland security. However, Kenya has no neither a thriving military-industrial complex nor the capability to meet its ever-increasing security needs including international terrorism, regional instabilities and other security challenges in the Horn of Africa security complex. To meet its security needs, Kenya has an active security and military policy towards Russian Federation that includes military hardware purchases, technical assistance, joint operations and training for Kenya’s security forces to combat the mostly asymmetrical warfare of which Kenya has little capacity. The escalation of Kenya’s security threats at the turn of the century and the end of the Moi regime necessitated a rethinking of Kenya’s military policy towards the Russian Federation, a move that was marked by the first deal defined by a “substantial number” of military hardware purchases. This included the purchase of assault rifles AK-101 and AK-102 Kalashnikovs from the state-run Rosoboronexport¹⁸⁴. This deal was to boost the Kenyan securities forces’ capabilities in the face of fast-morphing regional and international security situation.

Through financial arrangement with the Russian Federation, Kenya bought military equipment that included 88 BRDM-3 armored reconnaissance vehicles from the leading Russian military company, Rosoboronexport, at a cost of about 101 million dollars in 2011¹⁸⁵. The financial agreement entailed a deal in which the Russian military company bought back used Kenyan defense forces’ vehicles that were being replaced, thereby enabling Kenya to get the military equipment without much financial pressure. While the deal enabled Kenya to increase its military

¹⁸³ Interview “Mr. Ray”, a Communications Officer with Russian Embassy Nairobi on June 16, 2016.

¹⁸⁴ Helmer, John “Kenya: Russia Sells Weapons to Kenyan Government Body” All Africa, Sep. 2, 2002 <https://allafrica.com/stories/200209060602.html> (Accessed June.6, 2018).

¹⁸⁵ Goldman, David, “Kenya Acquires 88 BRDM-3 Reconnaissance Vehicles Russia for \$105.6 Million” Strategic Intelligence, Feb. 1, 2012 <https://intelligencebriefs.com/kenya-acquires-brdm-3-reconnaissance-vehicles-russia-for-105-6-million/> (Accessed June.6, 2018).

capabilities, it also doubled as a military financial assistance as the Russian Federation-owned Rosoboronexport extended Kenya favourable financial terms enabling the military purchase.

Similarly, in 2013 just after the election of President Uhuru, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) bought five Mi-28 attack helicopters while placing an order for another 11 helicopters at a total cost of 20 million dollars. This was followed by the purchase of another batch of military equipment like artillery and armored personnel carriers from a Serbian military supplier in Velika Plana, Serbia. The Serbian military manufacturer produces the military hardware jointly with the renown Russian arms manufacturer Rosoboronexport¹⁸⁶. Hence, despite its low military-industrial capability, Kenya is able to acquire equipment and modernize its military through active military policy towards the Russian Federation.

International terrorism and the resulting global war on terror has further necessitated the need for the formulation and implementation of a military policy towards the Russian Federation. Kenya, because of its strategic and operational incapacity to fight international terrorism and piracy alone, cooperates with the Russian naval forces, besides other powers including Japan and European countries, in dealing with the Somali piracy menace off the Gulf of Aden¹⁸⁷. This was anchored in the bilateral talks held in Nairobi on 29th July 2010, where the Russian Federation deputy ambassador to Kenya presented President Dmitry Medvedev's commitment to dealing with maritime terrorism by proposing that "special mechanisms be established to prosecute these pirates"¹⁸⁸. This commitment was a result of ongoing bilateral security talks between Kenya and Russian Federation on finding a working solution on the trial of arrested pirates. As a result of Russian Federation's efforts on legal reforms on international piracy, Kenya received the go ahead to try the pirates locally, while also receiving 9.3 million U.S. dollars from Russian Federation to refurbish the Shimo La Tewa prison where pirates are held for trials before they are eventually imprisoned in the same facility¹⁸⁹. However, as indicated, Kenya's use of military instruments in

¹⁸⁶ RWR Advisory Group, "Strategic Analysis: Russian Business Activity in Kenya (Abstract)" <https://www.rwradvisory.com/russian-activity-in-kenya-abstract/> (Accessed March 27, 2019)

¹⁸⁷ Charbonneau, Louis "Legal limbo makes Somalia piracy worse: Russia" Reuters, April 7, 2010 <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJJOE63602Q20100407> (Accessed March 20, 2015).

¹⁸⁸ Daily Nation, "Russia urges more support for states trying piracy suspects" July 30, 2010, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Russia-urges-more-support-for-states-trying-piracy-suspects-/1066-967890-7gvqikz/index.html>

¹⁸⁹ Daily Nation, op. cit.

its foreign policy is limited to making purchases of equipment and call for assistance towards the modernization of Kenya Defense Forces.

4.5 Diplomatic Instruments

The use of diplomatic instrument in Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is the longest, and most effective deployment of instruments of foreign policy. As a ring-beam around the foreign policy edifice, diplomacy holds together all the other instruments together in a coherent, seamless flow that collectively constitute the country's foreign policy. **4.5.1 Bilateral Diplomacy**

Kenya has had consistent diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation since 1992, domiciled in the Kenyan embassy in Moscow that is also accredited to Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine¹⁹⁰. The Kenyan embassy in Moscow is responsible for representing Kenya abroad, providing consular, visa, trade advisory and various promotions abroad. Through the embassy, several diplomatic exchanges have taken place between Kenya and Russian Federation since 1992, the most significant being the 2013 Moscow visit by the newly elected President Uhuru Kenyatta's visit to Moscow "for diplomatic and economic support"¹⁹¹ that constitute part of Kenya's national interest agenda. Currently, Kenya and Russian Federation have one of the "most stable diplomatic relations in Africa"¹⁹², as evidenced by the strong diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Between 1992 and 2013, Kenya's diplomatic representation in Moscow has been headed by an ambassador. These include Dickson Kathambana (1991-1998), Meshack Nyambati (1999-2002), Mathew M'Irithi (2003-2005), Sospeter Machage (2005-2010), and Paul Kurgat (2010-2015)¹⁹³. Whereas these ambassadors were political appointees, their primary mission was to advance Kenya's national and international interest abroad. This includes championing the country's foreign policy in various fronts in Moscow and the other countries to which they are accredited.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with "Mrs. J", the Russian Federation Desk Officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

¹⁹¹ Blanchard, L. Ploch, "U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues" *CRS Report for Congress* (Sep. 23, 2013), page 14. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42967.pdf> (Accessed Aug. 6, 2016).

¹⁹² Interview "Mr. R", a communications officer with Russian Embassy Nairobi on June 16, 2016.

¹⁹³ Interview with "Ms. Teddy", the assistant to Political Diplomatic Secretary at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019

The end of Moi presidency marked a new and more vibrant diplomatic era in Kenya's relations with the Russian Federation. This was characterized by increased bilateral visits from either side, as initiated by Kenya's diplomatic corp. In 2004, May 11th, Russian diplomat and head of the Department of International Organizations at Russian Federation MFA, Mr. Andrei Granovsky, visited Kenya at the invitation of Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. In a meeting with Kenya's then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kalonzo Musyoka and Lazarus Amayo, who headed the International Organizations and Conferences Section, mutual interests in economic and bilateral areas were discussed. Besides bilateral interests, the two sides also discussed international matters beneficial to both countries including the necessity of reforms at the United Nations and how to respond to cross-border terrorism and international peace¹⁹⁴. Notably, the meeting reawakened the need for intensification of bilateral cooperation in other areas as economic, diplomatic, and political fields. Through this visitation, matters of importance to Kenya's national interest were discussed.

In a return visit in 2005, July 15th, then Kenya's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amb. Chirau Ali Mwakwere, visited Moscow on an official trip. Matters of national interests to either country dominated the talks between Mwakwere and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov. These include increased bilateral relations, international peace, and stability not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world. Moreover, they also discussed the need for increased development in Africa through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)¹⁹⁵. For Kenya's the trip necessitated the use of foreign policy to achieve national interests in areas where Kenya had little capacity to meet its needs like in the areas of international terrorism and on bolstering the activities of NEPAD that aimed at economic development for Africa.

This visitation was reciprocated 5 years later in 2010 when the hitherto most important person from the Russian Federation to ever visit Kenya, Sergey Lavrov, officially visited Kenya¹⁹⁶. Among the key areas that the visit focused on are on how Kenya and Russian Federation can build

¹⁹⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation "RUSSIAN-KENYAN POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS" May 12, 2004 http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/ke/-/asset_publisher/Ekuq3mezVhOy/content/id/473908 (Accessed June 10, 2016).

¹⁹⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation "RUSSIAN-KENYAN POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS" May 12, 2004 http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/ke/-/asset_publisher/Ekuq3mezVhOy/content/id/473908 (Accessed June 10, 2016).

¹⁹⁶ Daily Nation, "Russian minister set for Kenya, Nigeria visit" Nov. 14, 2010 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Russian-minister-set-for-Kenya--Nigeria-visit-/1066-1053532-iy0qqt/index.html> (Accessed March 20, 2015).

their relationship around Kenya's geostrategic location and how that geographic location can be exploited and deployed in the resolution of conflicts in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region. Other developments that the Mr. Lavrov's talks focused on include the improvement of trade relations and infrastructural development between Kenya and the Russian Federation. Through Kenya's diplomatic instrument, it was able to tap into the Russian Federation's capabilities in the areas of security, trade, African integration, and the collective response to the increased insecurities in the Horn region.

The peak of Kenya's diplomatic relations was in 2013 when Kenya's newly elected President Uhuru Kenyatta visited Russian Federation as his first foreign trip. Hailed by some as "a turning point in Kenya's diplomatic relations"¹⁹⁷, the visit was the beginning of an escalation of Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation. While it denoted the betterment of Kenya's diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation since the end of the Moi era in 2002, it also heralded the potentials and directions that Kenya-Russian Federation would assume.

4.5.2 Multilateral Engagements

The United Nations remains one of the most important multilateral diplomatic forum in the world today. Through its various agencies, some of which are headquartered in Kenya, as well as its other organs like the International Court of Justice, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Security Council of which Russian Federation is a permanent member and Kenya has been a non-permanent member, the UN provides a platform for multilateral diplomatic engagements, resolution of disputes among others. UNGA provides a platform for debates on matters of international interest including international peace and security, human rights as well as on areas that the Security Council action is impeded by veto powers held by permanent members¹⁹⁸. Capitalizing on the opportunities created by UNGA, Kenya has found a multilateral platform through which it can deploy its diplomatic machinery in the pursuit of its national interest. Another notable organ is the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), created by ECOSOC as a regional commission to drive Africa's economic growth.

¹⁹⁷ Interview "Mr. Q", an official in the Office of the President Nairobi on Sep. 23, 2016.

¹⁹⁸ United Nations "Role of the General Assembly" <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/role-of-general-assembly> (Accessed March 12, 2015).

Internationally, the bulk of Kenya's multilateral diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation happens primarily under the aegis of the UN and its specialized agencies and organs. Notable case in point is the diplomatic need created by the 2007/08 post-election violence in Kenya, and the resulting International Criminal Court trials. To deal with the cases, and amass international support for the trial of the indicted Kenyans at a local tribunal apart from the International Criminal Court, Kenya launched a diplomatic outreach to the United Nations Security Council, with particular focus on its permanent members in a bid to secure its support for the deferment of its case at the ICC. The Russian Federation, in response to Kenya's diplomatic plea, gave its support for the deferment of the cases, the result of which the Russian Federation together with other Council members like Pakistan voted in favour of the deferral.

In another case occasioned by increased terror activities at the Kenyan coast by the Somalia-originated terrorists, Kenya reached out to the United Nations to secure its support in the war against the Somalia-originated acts of terror against it. The need for UN support was further necessitated by the emergence and escalation of piracy along the Kenyan coast. Consequently, in its 5902nd meeting, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1816 that stipulated that the states that worked with Somalia's Transitional government use "all necessary means" to address the piracy menace¹⁹⁹. As a result, all the five permanent members sent their naval forces to support Kenya Navy that was already running a campaign against the pirates. While Kenya had inadequate tactical capacity to deal with the pirates, the UN resolution and the resultant multi-country response support from the more powerful UNSC members greatly improved Kenya's efforts to address the Indian ocean piracy around the Gulf region.

Besides the UN organs, specialized UN agencies including United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) are headquartered in Kenya, thereby providing multilateral diplomatic platforms for Kenya to engage with other countries as well on thematic areas. For instance, UN-Habitat and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) enabled Kenya and Russian Federation's cooperation on the

¹⁹⁹ United Nations "Security Council Condemns Acts of Piracy, Armed Robbery Off Somalia's Coast, Authorizes For Six Months 'All Necessary Means' To Repress Such Acts" <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9344.doc.htm> (Accessed March 12, 2015).

issues of high refugee influx into Kenya from the neighboring countries including Somalia, Burundi, Sudan due to conflicts.

Regionally, the African Union and its associated entities like New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) are equally important multilateral forums for diplomatic engagement with the Russian Federation. African Union, as the highest continental diplomatic organ represents individual countries' desired diplomatic outcomes at other international forums like the UNSC. This is exemplified when the AU presented a case for the deferment of Kenya's ICC cases at the UNSC.

Uniquely, Russian Federation has, on its own, also created a multilateral forum through which it engages with African countries on matters of common continental interest. Through the Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa (AfriCom)²⁰⁰, established in 2009 as a platform for promoting Russian Federation interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, AfriCom is "designed to create a space for Russian and African businessmen and politicians to network"²⁰¹. It provides a mutually beneficial platform from which both sides can engage in economically and politically gainful dialogues and agreements. Kenya engages Russian Federation in the platform while also utilizing the other multilateral platforms at global and regional milieus.

4.6 Conclusion

The conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is a function of a multiplicity of factors driving it from both within and without the country. Whereas these factors provide the impetus for the formulation and eventual conduct of the foreign policy, the actual conduct of the foreign policy depicts how a combination of domestic and systemic determinants, actors, instruments all work in synergy to deliver a national interest-based foreign policy. The Kenyan Presidency is both at the heart of the formulation process and the top of its implementation abroad, being the chief diplomat in the country. The roles that the president plays include representing Kenya at the diplomatic summits like happened in President Uhuru's first

²⁰⁰ AfriCom "About the Committee: goals and objectives" <http://www.afrocom.ru/committee/about> (Accessed March 12, 2015).

²⁰¹ Giles, Keir "Russian Interests In Sub-Saharan Africa" Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013 <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1169.pdf> (Accessed March 12, 2016).

foreign trip upon election as president in 2013; appointment of the diplomatic representatives to Kenya's missions abroad, as well as providing the general direction of the country's foreign policy relations with the Russian Federation. The President's position as the topmost actors in Kenya's foreign policy explains the variations in intensity and tempo of Kenya's foreign towards the Russian Federation through the three presidencies spanning the 1992-2013 period in Kenya. The President works closely with the relevant Cabinet ministries to collectively formulate and implement Kenya's foreign policy in keeping with Kenya's national interests. The underlying legislation that hold together the conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy, including the actors, instruments, agreements and on what outcomes are desired from any foreign relations, is the Kenyan legislature. The legislature equally provides the requisite budgetary allocation that drives the implementation of Kenya's foreign policy abroad. As seen, the various actors, both state and substate, employ the various instruments in the achievement of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation.

The primary instruments that Kenya uses in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation are the economic, diplomatic, cultural and military instruments. As the data has shown, while diplomatic instrument holds together all the other instruments and their deployment in the foreign policy process, economic instrument remains one of the most important foreign policy instruments through which Kenya implements its foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Kenya has successfully utilized diplomacy at both bilateral and multilateral fronts. Through commodity exports in areas where Kenya has both comparative and absolute advantage like in the production and export of coffee, tea and cut flowers, and the importation of commodities that it is comparatively disadvantaged, Kenya pursues an increasingly robust foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Importantly, Kenya uses its military instrument not as an active spearhead for power projection of Kenya's foreign policy abroad, but as an empty chalice presented to militarily more powerful Russian Federation to be filled either through equipment acquisition, joint military activities. This relatively passive deployment of the military instrument is premised on Kenya's comparative military inferiority to the Russian Federation, and its linkages with the latter bolsters its military superiority and capability in the face of increasing dangers.

Through the deployment of various instruments, Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation has significantly morphed from 1992 to 2013 both in importance and extent.

This keeps with the regime changes that have happened in Kenya in the study period, and the prioritization with which each successive regime has held and continues to uphold the relations with the Russian Federation. Interestingly, the common thread through the successive regimes, and the extent of the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy, national interest is the primary determinant of Kenya's foreign policy. In its unaltered form, pursued with a multiplicity of actors and instruments, national interests underlie Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Findings

The period 1992-2013 provides interesting insights in the conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. These include the changes through time, determinant factors, prioritization of the relations with the country, deployment of various instruments, multiplicity of actors, and the desired outcomes that each regime needs.

5.1.1 Conduct of Kenya's Foreign Policy

The asymmetrical dyad framework where Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation happens is defined by variations in histories, attributes, capabilities, and interests between Kenya as a small state and Russian Federation as a more powerful country. Like all asymmetrical dyadic relations, there are variations in what priorities each country pursues, in their unchanging pursuit of national interest. However, as the study has revealed, Kenya's primary motivation in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation has revealed, is its national interest. Using various instruments, each working to achieve diverse objectives, the conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is but an earnest quest for the achievement of the desire of all nations: national interest.

The objectives of Kenya's national interest are codified in the 2009 Kenya Foreign Policy Framework (KFPPF) which is "the standard reference and principle guide"²⁰² for the formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy and the pursuit of its national interest. The objectives include commitment to achieving economic prosperity, protection of Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty, commitment to regional peace and security, promotion of regional integration, protection of Kenya's international interests as well as enhance Kenya's partnership with its diaspora population abroad. A combined pursuit of these constitutes yield the national interests. Each objective is pursued using specific relevant instruments.

²⁰² Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Kenya Foreign Policy Framework*. (Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nairobi: 2009), 2; Interview with "Mrs. J", the Russian Federation Desk Officer at MoFAIT on Nov. 13, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kenya meets the systemic anarchy with a self-help approach to its national security and survival policies embedded in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Through a rational pursuit of its national security objectives, Kenya deploys its economic and military instruments in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Through intricately planned economic policies, interwoven with military policies, Kenya is able to build its war chest and military capability to meet both regular and asymmetrical security challenges including terrorism and piracy in the Indian ocean.

Kenya's resource endowment equips Kenya with economic instrument as the most potent instrument in its foreign policy arsenal towards the Russian Federation. By drawing comparisons on areas of the Kenyan economy where it has both comparative and absolute advantage over the Russian Federation, patterns can be deciphered on how exactly Kenya has been able to employ the use of its economic instrument in its foreign policy. The study has revealed that Kenya massively exports products to the Russian Federation that it has comparative capability in producing and exporting. These include coffee, tea, horticultural crops like fruits and flowers. In turn, Kenya's trade relation with the Russian Federation has expanded from insignificant quantities to reckonable values towards the middle of the first decade in the 21st century.

However, whereas absolute and comparative advantages have been in Kenya's favour concerning agricultural commodity exports, the converse is also true. The Russian Federation is equally an agriculturally endowed country, both in agricultural technology and know-how and in the production of certain commodities. This necessitates the retuning Kenya's foreign policy to capture these advantages of which it has little capability to produce on its own. These areas where the Russian Federation has absolute advantage over Kenya include the production of wheat, agrochemicals, fertilizers, vegetables, plastics, rubber, footwear, motorized machines, and electrical goods. While the net result has revealed that the balance of payment favours the Russian Federation, Kenya has nonetheless formulated its foreign policy to meet these economic deficiencies.

As the study has revealed, diplomacy is the ring beam that holds Kenya's foreign policy edifice together, more so towards the Russian Federation. When Kenya marginally used the other instruments in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, diplomacy, both at bilateral and multilateral forums, drove the agenda of Kenya's foreign policy. At the bilateral level, In the

strictest sense, Kenya's diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation, as an independent country out of the USSR, is traceable to 1991 when the latter emerged from the USSR. However, since the Russian Federation was the principle state of the USSR, it inherited its diplomatic relations with most country, implying that Kenya's bilateral relations with the Russian Federation date back to Kenya's independence in 1964. Between 1992 and 2013, Kenya's diplomatic mission in Moscow has been headed by 5 ambassadors charged with bearing the burden of representing the country abroad while also spearheading the pursuit of Kenya's national interest.

At multilateral level, Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation has been subject of engagements in various multilateral platforms. The most important of these is the United Nations and its agencies and organs that have provided Kenya with a platform for diplomatic engagement of matters in Kenya's national interest. Kenya has advanced its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation at the UN Security Council where the latter is a permanent member and has often proved to be Kenya's ally. As the most important and highest organ charged of the United Nations charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, and because the Russian Federation is a permanent member of the UNSC, Kenya has occasionally resorted to the vote and guidance of the Council. At such critical moment, like when Kenya canvassed for the UN vote for the deferment of its cases at the ICC, the Russian Federation is the only permanent UNSC member that voted in Kenya's favour, thanks to the former's relations with the it. Moreover, when Kenya was faced with the issue of terrorism and piracy originating from Al Shabaab in Somalia, it once more turned to the UNSC where, through a unanimous vote, passed a resolution that enabled Kenya to get naval reinforcement from all the permanent members of the UNSC that dispatched their naval forces to the Gulf region to counter the piracy. The UNSC, as a multilateral diplomatic forum, provided Kenya with a forum to engage, among the most powerful countries globally, the Russian Federation.

While the economic and diplomatic instruments have spearheaded Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, Kenya's comparatively military inferiority to the Russian Federation has equally been used in the country's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Unlike the economic and diplomatic instruments that are projected forwards towards the Russian Federation, Kenya's foreign policy is used to ensure that Kenya's military capability benefits from the more powerful Russian Federation military- industrial complex. Hence, whereas Kenya cannot

deploy an aggressive foreign policy for lack of the requisite military capability to support a robust power projection abroad, it formulates its foreign policy to build its military capability in keeping with its national interest and survival needs in the anarchic international system. Consequently, Kenya maintains a military policy with Russian Federation through which it can purchase military equipment, enter into military agreements and receiving military support from Russian Federation.

5.2. Determinants of Kenya's Foreign Policy

The study has revealed that most importantly, Kenya's foreign policy is a direct function of its national interest. It is the single most influential determinant of what goal Kenya pursues in its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. The pursuit of national interest abroad, through foreign policy, is itself contingent upon several state attributes including resource endowment, topography, political structures and leadership. Kenya's foreign policy, as a function of national attributes, is influenced by both Kenya's possession and lack of certain attributes necessary for driving its foreign policy. The study has found that Kenya's geographical location impacts its political decision-making environment and structures that in turn influence the foreign policy making space. As the study has indicated that Kenya's geography is both a curse and a blessing, resulting in diverse foreign policy goals. As a blessing, Kenya maintains an economic and socio-political dominance in the region, making it a regional hegemon. Among the notable hegemonic attributes, it possesses include a large economy, fairly stable political landscape, powerful military, a combination of which makes Kenya the steppingstone from which the external world trades and engages with the other regional states. As the political hegemon, Kenya seeks to stabilize the regions politically turbulent states through dialogue, diplomacy, and occasional military action. Equally, foreign powers like the Russian Federation that seek to stabilize the region find their entry point through Kenya, as was the case with the Somalia-based pirates and terrorists operating off the Gulf of Aden disrupting shipping lines.

Kenya's geography is also a blight that has had tremendous influence on its foreign policy making process. Situated in the volatile Horn of Africa region defined by civil wars, violent secessionist politics, and state failure, Kenya formulates and conducts its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation with the intent of building up its military and economic capability to survives the threats that attend the regional anarchy. Its military and diplomatic policy towards the Russian Federation has been influenced to a large extent by the regional insecurities occasioned

by terrorist groups like Al Shabaab and Somali-based pirates off the Kenyan coast. Russian Federation, in response to Kenya's foreign policy, has provided Kenya with diplomatic, military and material support to empower Kenya's efforts in national and regional security.

Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation is also a function of its topographical features and how the same influence the country's productivity. As a majorly agricultural country, Kenya has comparative advantage over the Russian Federation in the production of some products like tea and coffee. This necessitates new markets including from non-traditional partners like the Russian Federation. Kenya's economic policy, deriving from Kenya's agricultural advantages occasioned by its topography, is one of the anchors of Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation. On the converse, Kenya's inability to produce fertilizer on which its agricultural sector relies equally drives its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, which is the leading producer of fertilizer in the world.

As a newly transitioned lower middle economy, Kenya's domestic economic situation and the attendant needs has significantly influenced Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Between 1992 and 2013, Kenya's economy has expanded and contracted in response to the prevailing domestic and international economic and political situation. The domestic economic situations occasioned by the 1992 IMF-instituted aid conditionalities resulted in a rapid economic downturn for Kenya, a condition that necessitated reformulation of an economic policy towards, among others, the Russian Federation. While this did not bring any serious economic advantages in the immediate future, it sparked off a series of foreign policy recalibrations that would build up to strong foreign relations with non-traditional allies like the Russian Federation. This was bolstered by the priorities of the successive regimes that followed Moi's era from 2003.

Typical of President Moi's regime, Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation in the decade from 1992 was not as aggressive and the deployment of foreign policy instruments like economic and diplomatic instruments was not as pronounced as in the subsequent decade. This reflected President Moi's overinvolvement with the maintenance of his regime at the expense of broadening the foreign policy agenda. However, in the decade astride Moi and Kibaki's regimes between 1996 and 2008, foreign policy realignments happened that saw Kenya's commodity imports from Russian Federation registering the second highest increase between at 1,281%,

preceded only by imports from China which increased by 2,084%²⁰³. Hence, while the regime changes from KANU to NARC in 2002 marked a transitional point in Kenya's politics, it awakened new priorities in Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. Borrowing from President Kibaki's prioritization of the economy, there was an intensified use of the economic instrument that saw to a significant increase in exports to and imports from Russian Federation., increase in Russian tourist numbers among other changes.

To keep the momentum, President Kenyatta's presidency infused new energy into Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Not only was he the first sitting Kenyan head of state to visit Moscow, but he birthed a new era in Kenya's foreign relations with Russian Federation. Kenyatta's 'look-east' policy escalated Nairobi-Moscow relations leading to a further use of instruments like diplomatic, military, economic instruments. While the intensification was partly attributed to Kenyatta's ongoing case at the ICC and the resultant need for international support for the deferment of the same, it followed that Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation took an upturn.

Systemic occurrences and variables in the period 1992-2013 equally impacted Kenya's foreign towards the Russian Federation. The opportunities created by the systemic variables like the transition from the ideology-based bipolar world to a unipolar and finally to multipolarity created a more relaxed foreign policy environment devoid of ideological straitjackets. The same was occasioned by the anarchic international system necessitates the need for self-help, a situation that compelled Kenya to enhance its military, economic and diplomatic capabilities using its foreign policy. On the flipside, the systemic determinants also restricted the range of options that a country like Kenya had in its foreign policy conduct with the Russian Federation. The distribution of capabilities in the international system placed Kenya below the Russian Federation in terms of economic and military power, thereby implying that whereas the latter had at its disposal certain policy options, Kenya could not project its power abroad with the same vigour.

Other systemic variables that influence Kenya's foreign policy also include international economic interdependence that promotes cooperation between Kenya and the Russian Federation by either country leveraging its areas of economic advantage. The cooperation space created by

²⁰³ Fiott, Daniel. The EU and China in Africa: The Case of Kenya. *Madariaga Paper*, Vol. 3, No. 5 (Jul. 2010), 2

economic interdependence has enabled Kenya to leverage its capabilities in the production of crops like tea, coffee, and cut flowers in its foreign policy towards Russian Federation, the latter that dangles its industrial and military superiority in its reciprocal relations with Kenya. These complement the role of yet another systemic variable, international organizations, that condition the interaction between states while also influences their foreign policy environment as engagement platform and umpires. The United Nations, for instance, creates multiple platforms where Kenya conducts its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. This is exemplified by the vital role by the powerful UN Security Council that oversees the maintenance of world peace and as such, holds the ultimate say on when it is necessary for another country to deploy its military against another. By reaching out to the Russian Federation, Kenya exploits its permanent membership in the Security Council, the result that has been manifested by the study on various fronts.

One of the most significant systemic influences of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation are international terrorism and transnational organized. With both countries having been victims of international terrorism, Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation happens against a backdrop of Kenya as a victim of international terrorism while also a source of transnational organized crime. This new profile has had tremendous impact on Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, particularly with the intent of complementing Kenya's capability to deal with the asymmetrical warfare of which it has little capacity. Consequently, several agreements have been signed between Kenya and the Russian Federation both at bilateral and multilateral forum to boost Kenya's security preparedness and capability.

As the study has indicated, a combination of domestic and systemic determinants influence the formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy. The domestic determinants condition the environment in which the formulation happens, by providing the policy options within which Kenya acts. Domestic attributes, capabilities, idiosyncrasies and needs drive the country's foreign policy making process. Systemic variables on the other hand create the context within which Kenya can implement its foreign policy. The context created by the systemic environment either promotes or limits a range of options that Kenya has. Nonetheless, a combination of domestic interests and systemic variables interact to result in foreign policy options that Kenya pursued towards Russian Federation between 1992 and 2013.

5.3. Theory and Kenya's Foreign Policy

Neoclassical theory, through its assumptions, offers both a framework and an analytical platform for understanding Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. As a theory, neoclassical theory provides both a systemic and domestic explanation of the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. The formulation of foreign policy takes place in the domestic milieu while its conduct is done at the systemic environment, towards which end the neoclassical theory provides an explanation of the interplay of a combination of factors at the domestic and systemic to result in a coherent foreign policy. Hence, the study examined Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation through the neoclassical realism lens. Basing the analysis on the assumptions of the theory, the study examines the extent to which neoclassical realism could explain how domestic and systemic variables determine the conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. The primary motivation of Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation is its national interest. State survival in a world without an international government informs every policy that collectively constitute Kenya's foreign policy. The inherently selfish nature of states compels complements Kenya's self-help approach to its foreign policy to be the guiding principle of its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation.

The interaction between domestic and systemic variables in influencing foreign policy decision making meets with exactitude in the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Kenya's policy makers, acting as what Schweller refers to as "transmission belt" between the systemic milieu and the domestic policy environment, reconcile the factors, attributes, and determinants at the international system with the domestic drivers in Kenya's policy environment. The result is a coherent foreign policy that reflects systemic realities and domestic motivations. The opportunities and limitations at the systemic levels condition to what extent the policy that results from Kenya's military, economic, diplomatic variables can be deployed. Decision making institutions, bureaucracies and individuals merge the two sets, much as neoclassical theory posits.

5.4 Conclusion

Kenya's national interest undergirds the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. The formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy is thereby

conditioned by a multitude of domestic factors that shape the policy environment, as well as other external factors at the systemic level. Particularly, several socio-economic and political factors combine with a diverse array of state attributes condition the making of Kenya's foreign policy. The resulting foreign policy happen either within the opportunities that the systemic variables avail or the constraints that they impose in the way of implementing a domestically formulated foreign policy.

The resulting foreign policy is implemented using a diverse array of instruments. Kenya pursues its foreign policy from a critical geopolitical approach, whereby instead of a unitary approach to foreign policy, it pursues each aspect of its foreign policy individually. These individual parts, acting as the constituent elements of state power, include military, economic, cultural, diplomatic goals that Kenya seeks using various relevant instruments of foreign policy. In response to the domestic and systemic variables conditioning its foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, Kenya uses these instruments to meet its national interest based on its strength through possession of deprivation in each element. In areas where Kenya's domestic determinants confer on it a comparative advantage over the Russian Federation, it capitalizes on such an area and conducts an aggressive foreign policy in pursuit of its national interest. Through the critical geopolitical approach, Kenya is able to extensively utilize some instruments like the horticulture export while marginally deploying others like the military and industrial export.

The period between 1992 and 2013 has been defined by tremendous changes, occasioned by changes in Kenya's domestic environment and the systemic changes. The foreign policy variations visible through presidents Moi, Kibaki and Uhuru's presidencies, correspond partly to the policy environments created by each successive president. These include their individual idiosyncrasies, the legal framework at the time, the institutional framework holding up the foreign policy framework. President Moi's concern with domestic regime survival resulted in a less-aggressive foreign policy towards the Russian Federation. President Kibaki's concern with Kenya's economic resurgence set in motion a foreign policy that exalted economic growth above regime survival. The zenith of success of Kenya's foreign formulation, in comparison to the preceding regimes, was during President Uhuru's first presidency. Albeit examined in the first year, the pace set by Uhuru, coupled by diplomatic forays in Russian Federation and continuity and expansion of President Kibaki's economic policies, indicate a growing foreign policy towards the Russian

Federation. This study has provided an incisive understanding of what factors influenced the conduct and formulation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, while also providing a critical view into how Kenya conducts its foreign policy against the stage set by these determinants.

5.4 Recommendations

The study makes the following recommendations at policy and academic levels.

5.4.1 Policy Recommendations

1. There is need for complete institutionalization of the foreign policy edifice in a manner that the formulation and conduct of Kenya's foreign policy is minimally influenced by regime changes to maintain the current momentum especially in Kenya's foreign policy towards powerful countries like the Russian Federation.
2. Based on the consistent growth of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation since 1992, Kenya's foreign policy practitioners should identify and deploy more instruments to broaden the pursuit of national interest abroad while enriching the relations between the countries.
3. Kenya's foreign policy practitioners should formulate Kenya's foreign policy as a function of not just Kenya's domestic determinants and national interest, but also as contingent upon the influences at the systemic level.
4. There is need for increased investment in export crops like coffee, tea and cut flowers, which are the primary commodities that Kenya exports to the Russian Federation and are areas of Kenya's comparative and absolute advantage over the Russian Federation.

5.4.2 Academic Recommendations

1. Not many studies have examined Kenya's foreign policy in asymmetrical dyads and therefore, as this study has revealed, there is need for more similar studies to examine Kenya's foreign policy formulation and implementation towards other powerful states to establish consistencies and patterns for guiding Kenya's foreign policy decision making.

2. Scholars should examine how Kenya's national interest continue to shape its foreign policy towards other powerful countries like the Russian Federation.
3. As the she study has found that there are new systemic variables like transnational organized crime that determine foreign policies of states, new studies should be conducted on how these emerging determinants may influence the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy especially in asymmetrical dyads.

APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

A. QUESTIONS FOR THE KENYA MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. What are the core objectives driving Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation?
2. What do you think are the major factors influencing Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation?
3. Have the regime changes in Kenya influenced Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation?
4. What instruments does Kenya use in its foreign policy towards Russian Federation?
5. Does Russian Federation position in global politics influence its relations with Kenya and the formulation of Kenya's foreign policy to the former?
6. In Kenya's 2009 Foreign Policy framework, mention is made of Russia's resurgence in world politics. How has this impacted Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation?
7. Are there any trade agreements between Kenya and Russian Federation?
8. Does Russian Federation's position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council position influenced Kenya's foreign policy formulation towards it in any way?
9. Terrorism and piracy pose major security challenges for Kenya, how have these influenced Kenya's foreign policy towards the Russian Federation?

B. QUESTIONS FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION EMBASSY

- 1.0 How would you describe Kenya-Russian Federation relations since 1992?
- 2.0 How has international terrorism impacted Russian Federation, and does it intend to influence global affairs more like the US did through the global war on terror?
- 3.0 In 1992, Russian Federation severed links with some African countries, why wasn't Kenya affected?
- 4.0 Russian Federation has regained its economic and military power and position in the world, how will this influence world politics?
- 5.0 Studies show that Russian Federation is increasingly becoming interested in Africa, how will this impact on Kenya-Russian Federation relations?
- 6.0 Is there any long term project or area of cooperation that Russia has initiated in Kenya in any sector?
- 7.0 What is your view on the future of Kenya-Russian Federation relations?

C. KENYA ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, KEPSA

1. In your view, what factors drive Kenya's foreign policy towards Russian Federation?

2. How is Kenya Association of Manufacturers involved in Kenya's foreign relations with other countries, particularly Russian Federation?
3. Do you consider Russian Federation a viable trading partner for Kenya, and if so, why or why not?
4. What commodities does Kenya export to the Russian Federation?
5. What are some of the challenges encountered during export to the Russian Federation?

D. KENYA TOURISM BOARD

1. Noting how important tourism is in Kenya's foreign exchange and relations, does Kenya Tourism Board consider Russian Federation a viable tourism source market?
2. How competent in Russian Federation tourism in Kenya in terms of arrivals between 1992 and 2013?
3. Does Kenya Tourism Board do promotions and marketing in Russian Federation, especially in the 1992-2013 period?
4. What would you consider as the key determinants of tourists, including (Russian Federation's), coming to Kenya?
5. What is the future of tourism in Kenya-Russian Federation relations?

E. KENYA TEA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

1. Do you consider Russian Federation as a viable market for Kenya's tea?
2. Besides tea export to Russian Federation, are there any tea-related imports that Kenya receives from Russian Federation?
3. What would you consider as the key determinants of Kenya tea exports to Russian Federation?
4. How much tea does Kenya export to Russian Federation?
5. Do tea exports to the Russian Federation impact the relations between the two countries? If so, how?
6. How does KTDA deal with competition in the international market, especially in the Russian Federation market?
7. What drives Kenya's tea exports to the Russian Federation?

F. COFFEE BOARD OF KENYA (COFFEE DIRECTORATE).

1. Do you consider Russian Federation as a viable market for Kenya's coffee?
2. What would you consider as the key determinants of Kenya coffee exports to Russian Federation?
3. How much coffee does Kenya export to Russian Federation?
4. Do coffee exports to the Russian Federation impact the relations between the two countries?

5. How does CBK deal with competition in the international market, including in Russian Federation?
6. What drives Kenya's coffee exports to the Russian Federation?

G. KENYA FLOWER COUNCIL

1. What factors inform Kenya's flower export to other countries, particularly to the Russian Federation?
2. How much flowers does Kenya export to Russian Federation?
3. Based on the quantities of flower exported to the Russian Federation, do you consider Russian Federation to be a viable market for Kenyan products?
4. Do flower exports to the Russian Federation impact the relations between the two countries?
5. What are the main drivers of Kenya's flower exports to the Russian Federation?
6. What is the future of Kenya's flower market in the Russian Federation?

H. UNITED NATIONS (UNSO)

1. Does the UN and its agencies influence Kenya's foreign policy in any way?
2. Based on your experience in Somalia, what role has the UN played regarding Kenya's war against Al Shabaab and piracy in Somalia?
3. What role do the UN play in mitigating against international terrorism?

I. HCD, FPEAK

1. Does Kenya consider the Russian Federation a viable trading partner?
2. What factors, both within Kenya and outside, do you think determine Kenya's trading with the Russian Federation?
3. What commodities does Kenya, through HCD and FPEAK, export to the Russian Federation?
4. Are there any observable trends in Kenya's horticultural and fresh produce to the Russian Federation since 1992?

J. GENERAL KIIs

1. I understand KENRUSS Medics/ Renaissance Capital have Russian origins, kindly share how they came to establish their operations in Kenya?
2. What factors, both in Kenya and the Russian Federation led to the success of this organization in Kenya?
3. Has the relations between Kenya and the Russian Federation had any influence in your operations in Kenya?

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