UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

RESEARCH PAPER TITLE:

CHALLENGES OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATION: CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDAN 2011-2016

JOHN SIKAMPE SHANKATA

REG NO R47/9256/2017

SUPERVISOR:

MR R N OMWEGA

A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE POST-GRADUATE DIPLOMA IN STRATEGIC STUDIES

NOVEMBER 2018

DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been presented for the award of Diploma/Degree in any other university. All other scholarly sources from relevant studies have been duly acknowledged.

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Signature   Date

SHANKATA JOHN SIKAMPE

REG NO R47/9256/2017

Approval

I confirm that the work reported on this project was carried by the candidate under my supervision.

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Signature   Date

MR. R. N. OMWEGA

University of Nairobi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study may not have been possible without the efforts, contribution and commitment of various individuals and the institution thus the need to acknowledge these efforts. I owe special gratitude to my supervisor MR. R. N. Omwega who mostly dedicated his time and offer his moral, cordial and academic support in the research project. I appreciate your effort and support. I also own great gratitude to the Defence Staff College in collaboration with Nairobi University for their commitment to ensure my success in completion of this work.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to my wife Catherine, my daughters Joy and Grace as well as my son Jordell for their encouragement to undertake this study. I was so committed giving them very little attention. Hongera to you all.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS I, II	African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	Somalia Africa Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
GPOC	Greater Pioneer Operating Company
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JOC	Joint Operations Center
POC	Protection of Civilian
RPF	Regional Protection Force
TSA	Transitional Security Arrangement
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOS	United Nations Office in Somalia
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defense Force

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the challenges of Peacekeeping Operations in South Sudan between 2011 and 2016. The first objective was to analyze the conflict dynamics in South Sudan. The second objective was to examine the peace support operations in South Sudan. The third objective was to determine the challenges of peace support operations in South Sudan. This study employed the theory of Liberalism by focusing on tenet of democracy that promotes rule of law, human rights and economic development. On conflict dynamics in South Sudan, findings revealed the emergence of December 2013 politically triggered conflict resulted from incomplete adherence to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). There are several reasons for this, including mistrust among political and military leaders as well as political domination across the country by some political leaders or political parties. On peacekeeping activities in South Sudan, the study found that UNMISS has enabled the mission to protect civilians, monitor and investigate human rights, support implementation of ceasefire agreement and enable conditions for humanitarian assistance. On challenges of peacekeeping in South Sudan, this study established that UNMISS is facing both internal and external challenges that include inadequate resources and poor leadership, increasing risks of attack, government restrictions, weak political commitment and lack of peace to keep. The study concluded that challenges of peacekeeping operations in South Sudan between 2011 and 2016 can be resolved if the political, economic and social issues in the country are resolved and sustainable peace agreement made so that UNMISS becomes effective. The study recommended for Government of South Sudan to support UNMISS while UNMISS should increase its capacity UN Security Council should prevent escalation of the conflict through imposing arms embargo.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

In many years, Africa has been facing serious challenges especially to its security and peace. The continent has been characterized by civil wars that are more intrastate than interstate, leading to the deaths of more civilians.[1] In this regard, the United Nations (UN) expanded the scope of peacekeeping due to emerging issues in intra-state conflicts especially gross violation of human rights.[2] Intra-state conflicts in North Africa (Libya), Central Africa Republic, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia prompted the UN and African Union (AU) participate in peace operations through deployment of special missions.

For example, the AU deployed the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) while in Central Africa Republic MISCA was deployed, African Mission in Sudan (AMIS I, II) and for Somalia Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed.[3] In South Sudan United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was deployed to restore peace in the young nation. The pattern of deploying peace operations in conflict zones is first informed by the need for not deterring aggression but for protecting civilians.[4] This indicates that peacekeeping operations are intended to protect civilians in armed conflicts. This was a build up from the Agenda for Peace by Boutros Boutros that provides for peace and stability resulting from preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping.[5] In this regard, the mandate of the peacekeeping operations incorporates elements of international relations such as collective responsibility in security.

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[1] Kaldor, M., *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity, 1999, p. 6

[2] Woodhouse Tom, Bruce Robert & Dando Malcom, ″Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts,′ London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p. 11

[3] Cedric de Coning, ″Peace Enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations,″ Contemporary Security Policy, 38(1): 145-160, 2017, p. 26

[4] Mayall James, ″The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia,″ Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 18

[5] Boutros Boutros, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General," Geneva: UN, 1992, p. 13

In these missions, the Horn of Africa has received much attention due to its vulnerability to international terror networks such as the al-Qaeda and the transboundary effects of the conflict. It is documented that the in the Horn of Africa there is instability in terms of peace and security. The Middle East, Horn of Africa has received global attention in terms of seeking lasting solutions to peace and stability.[6] This region is characterized intractable conflicts such as the Somalia conflict and South Sudan conflict. These conflicts have regional, continental (Africa) and global implications in security. For example, the ever-growing insurgency of al-Shabaab has increased involvement of UN and AU in peace support operations through the United Nations Office in Somalia (UNOS) and AMISOM.[7] The peace support operations include funding the troops involved in Somalia, facilitating dialogue and proving technical support in the deployment of military force for disarmament, demobilization.

In the Horn of Africa, peace support operations are focused more on interventions during conflicts, which include protecting the governments with their citizens against aggressors. For example, AMISOM's mandate is to help Somalia government in regaining control of the country from al-Shabaab.[8] The mandate of AMISOM is therefore exercised through the application of military force alongside security officers of Republic of Somalia. Despite the peace support operations in Somalia, peace and stability is yet to be realized.

In South Sudan, the model of peace support operations is different as the AU's intervention is focused on eliminating the aggression between Government of South Sudan forces and rebels. Deployment of UNMISS was considered as an opportunity for restoring elusive peace in South Sudan. UNMISS was established in 2011 to consolidate peace and security in preparation for the

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[6] Shinn, David, "Horn of Africa: Priorities and Recommendations.' Testimony to the Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations," Washington DC, 2009, p. 4

[7] Cedric de Coning, "Peace Enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations," Contemporary Security Policy, 38(1): 145-160, 2017, p 2

[8] Ibid, p. 2

formation of the new Government of South Sudan.[9] The focus was on strengthening security capacity for the new government. Upon formation of the new government, the mandate of UNMISS ended on 9th July 2011.

However, on 15th December 2013, violence erupted in Juba between Riek Machars allied forces and Salvar Kiers allied forces.[10] This unprecedented situation was a complete contradiction of the vision of John Garang about Sudan. Garang had envisaged a free people of South Sudan from oppression where ethnicity, race and ideological differences will not be used to define South Sudanese.[11] This indicates that despite the independence of South Sudan, the South Sudanese people were enemies of their own. Francis Deng warned that failure of South Sudanese people to be their brother's keeper will likely have consequences in the aftermath of Sudan-South Sudan separation.[12] This implies that peace and security of South Sudan depends on peaceful co-existence between different ethnic groups and political formations.

Considering the political and ideological differences as well as unfulfilled vision, the conflict spread quickly in South Sudan and this prompted the UN to give UNMISS fresh mandate and increased its capacity. UNMISS was expected to protect civilians fleeing from conflict zones by offering them temporal shelter in the UN compound.[13] UNMISS was also expected to transform its operations from traditional peace and state building to impartial operations which are civilian protection, monitoring of human rights and humanitarian assistance.[14]

Despite the new mandate of UNMISS, many civilians are not fully protected, and humanitarian assistance remains a challenge. Protection of civilians in the UN security framework is

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[9] UNMISS, "Background of UNMISS," UN, Accessed 30th May 2018 at: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background
[10] UNMISS, "Background of UNMISS," UN, Accessed 30th May 2018 at: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background
[11] Irit Back, "John Garang's Vision for a 'New Sudan', Contemporary Perspective," Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2018, p. 22
[12] Deng Francis, "War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan," Brookings Institution Press, 2011, p. 9
[13] Ibid, p.10
[14] UNMISS, "Background of UNMISS," UN, Accessed 30th May 2018 at:https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background

imperative as armed conflicts have adverse effects on women and children and the gross violations of human rights should be prevented.[15] Reports indicate that since the conflict broke in South Sudan, gross human rights violations have occurred including rape, torture, murder, detention and forceful resettlement of the civilians.[16] This situation has put into question the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. It is against this background the study seeks to investigate challenges of peacekeeping operations in South Sudan between 2011 and 2016.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

In 2011, South Sudan obtained its independence from the larger Sudan after many years of civil conflict. This was considered an opportunity for people of South Sudan to embrace peace and security by promoting peaceful coexistence exercised through compatibility of political, economic and social differences. However, the anticipated stability in the region was short-lived as new internal conflict in South Sudan emerged in 2013. It was highly unexpected for South Sudan to plunge into civil conflict following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that resulted into the new nation from Sudan. The existence of this conflict prompted for the UN to intervene by invoking its mandate in peacekeeping. While there has been progress on restoring peace in South Sudan, the UN's peacekeepers are not effectively carrying out their mandate. Humanitarian crisis continues and the situation is seemingly not going to change anytime soon. This against the expectation about UNMISS addressing humanitarian crisis through implementing peace support operations. Unless the reasons for inefficiencies are identified to inform decision making on improving the situation in South Sudan, humanitarian crisis will persist and this will reduce the confidence in the UN's peacekeeping system. This paper

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[15] UNITAR, ″Protection of Civilians in Peace Operations,″ UNITAR, 2016, p. 15
[16] UNMISS, ″Facts and Figures,″ UN, Accessed 30th May 2018 at: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/facts-and-figures

addresses emerging issues on the factors that led to re-emergence of the conflict in South Sudan and why are the peace operations not effective!

1.2 Objectives of the Study

This study sought to achieve the following objectives:

    i.   To analyze the factors of conflict dynamics in South Sudan.

    ii. To examine the peace support Operations in South Sudan.

    iii. To determine challenges of peace support Operations in South Sudan.

1.3 Hypothesis

This study tested the following hypotheses:

    i.   Peace support operations are significantly limited by structural challenges in South Sudan.

    ii. Inadequate capacity of UNMISS has significantly contributed to humanitarian crisis in South Sudan.

1.4 Justification of the Study

This study will greatly contribute the understanding of security dynamics that influence UN's security system. Attempts aimed at understanding the dynamics of conflict in South Sudan have not comprehensively addressed all aspects. The connection of clan dynamics to conflict as well as implementation of peace treaties, political domination and international actors has not been adequately explored.

With little academically documented evidence, there is need for further exploration on the challenges of peacekeeping in South Sudan. It will therefore add academic value to existing literature on changing conflict dynamics in South Sudan. It will also offer academic information

on UN's peacekeeping operations which are unique to the conflict in South Sudan. In addition, the study will provide invaluable academic information on the challenges in the UN system encountered in South Sudan and how it is useful to the peacekeeping frameworks and models.

The main challenge in South Sudan peace process is attributed to uncertainties of implementing the CPA. CPA is one of the outcomes of a negotiation process aimed at resolving a conflict. This makes it a policy supporting document on activities intended to restore peace. However, with uncertainties in such documents, the policy making process is affected hence the need to review the policies. It will therefore provide information to support in the review of policies and regulations that are dependent on by the outcomes of the peacekeeping process.

1.5 Literature Review

Peacekeeping in the UN system is found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter that requires disputes to be resolved peacefully through use of diplomatic instruments.[17] Chapter VII of the UN Charter also provides for the use of force. However, due to the need for paradigm shift in the approach of dispute resolution occasioned by challenges in humanitarian assistance and international security, the UN re-evaluated the approach. In this regard, Agenda for peace was conceived by former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1992.[18] The Agenda for peace provided dispute or conflict resolution process which includes prevention, management, and resolution. The Agenda for Peace therefore places emphasis on peace support operations.

Peace support operations involve deployment of military in resolving conflicts through peacekeeping activities. The military were involved in restoration and maintenance of peace in

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[17] United Nations, "The Blue Helmets," Geneva: UN, 2015, p. 8
[18] Ibid, p. 9

post-conflict areas.[19] In this case, the military were not used during conflict but when truce had been declared. This approached limited the use of force in the restoration of peace as provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Use of force under international law was considered unsuitable. The criticisms of approach in which use force was applied in the gulf war led to the paradigm shift in peace support operations.[20] The new paradigm therefore was widely accepted and it involves preventive diplomacy and peacemaking followed by peacekeeping, post conflict peace building, disarmament, sanctions and enforcement actions.[21] It therefore means peace keeping activities are sequential.

The UN peacekeeping framework is relevant in South Sudan, but questions emerged on effectiveness of the mission. This indicated that addressing effects of conflicts has never been easily successful. There were many attempts including use of force and sanctions but some of the conflicts have never been resolved. According to several studies, the traditional model applied by United Nations (UN) in peacekeeping has not been effective as conflicts have never been resolved successfully.[22] This indicated that some methods of resolving conflicts cannot guarantee good results. It is documented that with the increase in occurrence of intra-state conflicts after fall of the Berlin Wall, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are increasingly applied to ensure adherence of parties in conflicts to peace agreements.[23] This gave an example of

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[19] Dale, Stephens, "Military Involvement in Law Enforcement," *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 92 Number 878 June 2010; p 6

[20] Dale, Stephens, "Military Involvement in Law Enforcement," *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 92 Number 878 June 2010, p 2

[21] ONU (1995). "Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper Of The Secretary-General On The Occasion Of The Fiftieth Anniversary Of The United Nations." A/50/60 - S/1995/1. January 3, 1995. Accessed on December 28, 2017 at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html

[22] Murdoch James & Sandler Todd, "Economic Growth, Civil Wars and Spillover." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.Vol. 46. No. 3, 2001

[23] Dale, Stephens, "Military Involvement in Law Enforcement," *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 92 Number 878 June 2010; p 6

justification for peacekeeping as the drawback necessitated for change in approach in resolving conflicts.

Peacekeeping is therefore considered as one of the methods used to resolve a conflict. Peacekeeping refers to a collective effort by the UN involving military operations, established by the United Nations to maintain and restore peace and security in areas affected by conflicts.[24] This definition indicates that UN is mandated to maintain peace in areas affected by conflict across the world. The mandate given to UN has been expanded to include civilian components that ensure adherence to civil rights, child protection and rule of law among others.[25] This implied that effective execution of this mandate requires an integrated approach.

For example, by focusing on the role of civilians and communities, peacekeeping operations require their participation. However, the *Blue Helmets* report by UN indicates that many peacekeeping operations are not yielding intended results of maintaining peace in the conflict zones. This has been attributed to various reasons. For example, one of the reasons is inadequate resources as UN peacekeeping missions require a lot of financial resources occasioned by lack of logistical and political support from UN's member states.[26] This indicated that inability to meet budgetary requirements limited the deployment of peacekeeping officers.

Another reason is that the current approach in peacekeeping allows peacekeeping forces to engage in reconciliation and dialogue activities in situations where peace agreements are absent.[27] This implied that relevant context in which peacekeeping activities should function is not adhered to hence rendering the process ineffective. Another challenge is the increasing threat

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[24] United Nations, "The Blue Helmets," Geneva: UN, 2015, p. 3.
[25] Murdoch James & Sandler Todd, "Economic Growth, Civil Wars and Spillover." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.Vol. 46. No. 3, 2001, p. 221
[26] United Nations, "The Blue Helmets," Geneva: UN, 2015, p. 8
[27] Shinn, David, "Horn of Africa: Priorities and Recommendations.' Testimony to the Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations," Washington DC, 2009; p. 46

on UN's installations and personnel as in the case of Baghdad in 2003 where UN's peacekeeping facility was attacked by terrorists.[28] This implied that there is need to reduce such threats which require legislation as well as increase in number of security personnel.

In the book on peacekeeping and peacemaking, Woodhouse, Tom and Dando opine that peace support operations are focused on preventing gross violations of human rights yet cases of civilians suffering are reported.[29] By referring to Bosnia, Rwanda and Somali, Woodhouse et. al., conclude that peace support missions seemed powerless despite the cases of genocide and other gross violation of human rights. This observation put into question the reliability of peace support mission in South Sudan as many people continue to be displaced, killed or tortured in presence of UNMISS. This study therefore sought to investigate challenges that limit UNMISS from exercising its mandate effectively.

In the book on the *New Interventionism* between 1991 and 1994, it is stated that each peace support mission has unique challenges. By referring to Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Somalia, James Mayall explains that despite standard model on peace support as depicted in Peace Agenda of Boutros Boutros, each mission presented international community a unique challenge.[30] For example, Mayall opines that peace support operations in Cambodia were infective because previous negotiated agreement was not implemented as expected. In Yugoslavia, peace support operations were ineffectively achieved due to lack of clear understanding on division of labour between UN and European Union. In Somalia, lack of clear government hindered coordination of humanitarian activities.

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[28] Paul Williams, 'Thinking about Security in Africa', International Affairs, 83:6, 2007, p. 58
[29] Woodhouse Tom, Bruce Robert & Dando Malcom, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts,' London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p. 2
[30] Mayall James, "The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia," Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 8

Placing the observations of Mayall in the context of South Sudan indicates that the different situations in Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia could be in play. For instance, the emergence of December 2013 politically triggered conflict is believed to be a by-product of incomplete adherence to the CPA.[31] Abel Alier gives an account of the conflict in South Sudan in which he emphasizes that conflict is stemming from many agreements that have been dishonoured.[32] This situation mirrors the case of Cambodia.

Also, the misunderstanding between government of South Sudan and UN could be a challenge in the implementation of peace operations. It is stated that immediately after the war broke in Juba in mid-December 2013, there was hostility between UNMISS and Government of South Sudan just as it was with rebels led by Machar.[33] In view of this hostility, UN resolved to re-define the mandate of UNMISS. The resolution made UNMISS to focus on humanitarian support and prevention of further suffering of the civilians by opening its gates to civilians. This situation also mirrors the case in Yugoslavia as explained by Mayall. This study therefore sought to clearly establish whether peace support in South Sudan are resulting from failure to implement CPA or misunderstanding between UN and Government of South Sudan.

Supporting the literature by Mayall, Wakengela argues convincingly that success of AMISOM is significantly dependent on a comprehensive peace framework accepted by all parties.[34] In Somalia, the mandate of AMISOM has propositions of peace enforcement activities that include: first making Somalia stable which should be followed by dialogue and reconciliation; create enabling environment where humanitarian assistance can delivered; and create long-term

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[31] Ylönen Aleksi, "The failure of 'making unity attractive: The uncertain future of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation in Sudan," *Monograph 178*, p 147

[32] Alier Abel, "Southern Sudan: Too many agreements dishonoured (Sudan Studies series)," Ithaca Press, 1999

[33] UNMISS, "Background of UNMISS," UN, Accessed 30th May 2018 at: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background

[34] Mupenda Wakengela, "Keeping an elusive peace: AMISOM and the quest for peace in Somalia," Monograph 178: 377-406, 2010, p. 384

conditions for long lasting peace and stability.[35] These peace support operations partly depend on the commitment of the agreement among Somali political groups. This study therefore explored the extent to which UNMISS is effectively operating in South Sudan in the wake of political disagreements between government forces and rebels.

Analysis of South Sudan Peace by Alex de Waal reveals that suffering in South Sudan is attributed to convergent situation in economic, security and political crisis. According to de Waal, South Sudan is a collapsed market place that requires fixing political differences through fair distribution of economic benefits from oil and other state resources.[36] According to de Waal, security will be relatively being guaranteed upon tackling the issues on political differences that require economic solutions. Regarding the peace support operations, the emerging question is whether UNMISS has the capacity to support mediation between rebels and Government of South Sudan in view of resolving political issues. This study therefore established the extent to which UNMISS has the capacity of including mediation as part of peace support operations in South Sudan.

In view of the analyzed literature, while UN's peacekeeping troops or missions are required to restore peace, they are faced by many challenges that require urgent attention. Reviewed literature revealed that while challenges documented occurred in other areas provided critical lesson on how to handle such challenges, the conflict remains intractable. Documented evidence revealed that presence of peacekeepers in South Sudan is yielding less significance as civilians are continuously attacked and killed.[37] This begged the question on the extent to which

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[35] Ibid, p. 386

[36] de Waal Alex, "A Political Marketplace Analysis of South Sudan's Peace," *JSRP Policy Brief 2*, March 2016, p. 12

[37] Coleman Peter, "Intractable Conflicts," Intractable Conflicts, July/August 2012, Vol 43, No. 7. American Psychological Association, http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/07-08/conflicts.aspx. Accessed January 15, 2018, p. 19

peacekeepers in South Sudan are effective. This study therefore investigated the challenges of peacekeeping operations in South Sudan between 2013 and 2016.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study employed the theory of Liberalism first propounded by Immanuel Kant in 18th Century. In this theory, Kant elucidates that liberal peace is significantly dependent on stability of democracies that is not understood from a military perspective.[38] Kant further explains that liberal peace theory provides a basis of understanding and defining sustainable peace and security that are supported by values of democracy and justice. The driving force of liberalism theory is interdependence of economy, politics and democracy. In this case, the interdependence supports mutual political interactions that provide suitable conditions for economic development resulting from cooperation between people, communities and governments.

According to the theory, democracy is a function of global peace. In this case, states that are democratic promote rule of law, adherence to human rights and therefore achieve economic development. This situation promotes global peace as interaction of democratic states limit deception, unfavorable policies and conflicts. This gives the impression that states should pursue democracy to achieve economic development. This indicates that while countries can have economic potential, this potential is only realized when democracy and rule of law are achieved.

Finally, the interrelationship between democracy and economic development is affirmed by the existence of regional and international frameworks in form of international laws, treaties and conventions. In this regard, political and economic power takes centre stage and this brings to play prosperity. This implies that countries seeking prosperity should first promote internal

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[38] Immanuel Kant, "*Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, 1975, Accessed May 30th 2018 at: http://www.constitution.org/kant/perpeace.htm.

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democracy that is supported by rule of law and governance. This creates a situation where conflicts are minimized hence global peace and security is achieved.

In view of these tenets of Liberalism theory, the relationship of these aspects guarantees peace. In perspective of South Sudan, the adherence to political and economic principle of equity, transparency and accountability will guarantee peace. As a new democracy, the support obtained from international partners under the international relations and law through UNMISS will therefore cement the pursuit for peace in South Sudan. This implies that humanitarian crisis in South Sudan will be resolved if Liberalism theory us put into practice.

This theory will support the determination on whether the unprecedented security challenges in South Sudan are indicators of the path towards stabilizing the country. It should be noted that the country is in the early stages of building a nation and the emergence of such conflict was inevitable following the rushed implementation of the CPA. According to the Liberalism theory, there exists significant interdependence between economic development and political ideologies. In this context, responsive political ideologies support economic development while economic resources define the political ideologies. It is from such interdependence that peace is constructed and maintained hence the need to determine extent to which politics and democracy are strongly associated with conflict that limits economic development in South Sudan.

1.7 Methodology

Desktop review was employed in this study. This involved review of literature on conflict in South Sudan. Qualitative data were collected from secondary sources about peacekeeping in South Sudan. Collected data was analyzed qualitatively. Qualitative data, content analysis of challenges encountered by UN's peacekeepers in South Sudan was done. The analyzed data was

presented qualitatively. Qualitative data was presented based on thematic areas: conflict dynamics, UN's peacekeeping activities and challenges encountered.

1.8 Chapter Outline

    i.   Chapter one:

         a)   Introduction.

         b)   Statement of the research problem.

         c)   Objectives of the study.

         d)   Hypothesis.

         e)   Literature review.

         f)   Justification.

         g)   Theoretical framework.

         h)   Methodology.

    ii.   Chapter Two: The factors of conflict dynamics in South Sudan.

         a)   History of peacekeeping in South Sudan.

         b)   Humanitarian crisis.

         c)   Peace support intervention.

    iii.   Chapter Three: Peacekeeping operations in South Sudan.

         a)   Civilian protection.

         b)   Protection of civilian centers.

         c)   Coordination of Humanitarian supplies.

         d)   Monitoring and investigating Human Rights.

    iv.   Chapter Four: Challenges of Peace Operations in South Sudan.

         a)   Internal Challenges.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN SOUTH SUDAN

2.1 History of Peacekeeping in South Sudan

South Sudan has encountered civil strife, political conflict and humanitarian crisis for many years after its independence. The reports indicate at least 50,000 civilians have lost their lives while another more than 1.5 million are internally displaced persons following political conflict that started in December 2013.[39] This situation threatened global peace hence the need to put pressure on South Sudan leaders by enforcing international sanctions. After the crisis many negotiations were initiated by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to ensure that President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar on August 26, 2015, signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).[40] 26 April 2016, the peace efforts led to Riek Machar returning to be sworn in as Vice President.[41] Machar's return happened after two years of his absence from the country. Just over two months after Machar returned, there was war between government forces and factions loyal to the opposition, displacing more than 10,000 people. The start and escalation of this conflict have been associated with some dynamics. This paper chapter extensively describes the dynamics in South Sudan Conflict between 2011 and 2016. The chapter outlines causes and effects of the conflict.

Conflict in South Sudan is traced to events before South Sudan became independent in 2011. There has been disagreement on the actual events, but it is stated that SAF launched an attack against SPLA-Abyei, SPLA-North in South Kordofan, and Blue Nile in May, June and

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[39] De Waal, Alex. "When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan." *African Affairs* 113, no. 452 (2014): 347-369, p. 356
[40] Ibid, p. 359
[41] Ibid, p. 362

September 2011 respectively.[42] There was also bombing of South Sudanese territory, which was allegedly used by SPLA North since September. Additionally, the armies of Sudan and South Sudan clashed in March 2012, at Heglig.[43] This raised the questions on the future relations, if any, between the governments, dissent armed groups and armed forces on either side of the South Sudan-Sudan border. The disputes also revived the unresolved legacies of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was not entirely implemented before independence of South Sudan, the failure which was attributed to ethnicity as underlying factor.

2.1.1 Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The protocol was meant to govern South Sudanese exported oil through Sudan using the major oil pipeline. The protocol ended without any consensus on the action plans so that the intended results can be realized. Therefore, there were months of political dialogues conducted in Addis Ababa, but neither South Sudan nor Sudan came up with a workable proposal to end the recurrent stalemate surrounding wealth sharing. The disagreements led to the closure of oil production and export via the Port of Sudan in January 2012.[44] The government of South Sudan was forced to adopt austerity measures meant to counter any adverse economic impact because of the oil export closer. This made the citizens to dissent the government thus increasing the possibility of ethnic divisions.

These units offered protection in distinct areas within South Sudan during the implementation of CPA. In most cases, ex-SAF units mostly composed of the southerners declined to join SPLA but instated became renegade militia. This phenomenon indicated the constant readjustment of

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[42] Cormack, Zoe. "Borders are galaxies: interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan." *Africa* 86, no. 3 (2016): 504-527, p. 514
[43] Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. "Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead." *Congressional Research Service* (2016), p. 28
[44] Cormack, Zoe. "Borders are galaxies: interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan." *Africa* 86, no. 3 (2016): 504-527, p. 516

affiliation of the armed groups near the inter-Sudanese Border since 2011.[45] It also revealed the

how it is easy for either Sudan or South Sudan could provide assistance to the militants as

proxies within the other country. Additionally, differences showed the increased difficulties of

working towards the achievement of national cohesion and diversity through correction of

significant historical grievances.

These South Sudanese were returned home through bilateral relations with the Sudan

government. There were an estimated 250,000 civilians to be returned to South Sudan during

2012.[46] The collapse of the mutual relationship had placed a disproportionate burden on the

Northern states. The northern states hosts majority of these initially displaced South Sudan and

currently suffer from the imposed trade blockade and urban centers. The dynamic revealed an

increase in linguistic and economic differences in regards to identity, social and regional identity

groups within South Sudan. Returnees whose were Arabic-speaking from the Sudan were

disadvantaged relative to English speakers who were returning from Uganda and Kenya.[47] This

brought about a mismatch between the economic skills and economic reality of the young nation.

It thus created more chances of conflict among citizens who felt marginalized by the

independence of the country.

The realities of access to the foreign development aid were reversed in 2012 when oil production

was suspended followed by the introduction of radical austerity measures.[48] The oil suspension

undermined South Sudanese confidence as an investment partner. Also, the reduced government

funding capabilities and the ever-changing needs of the ordinary citizens in the country forced

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[45] Craze, Joshua, Jérôme Tubiana, and Claudio Gramizzi. "A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013-15." (2016), p. 18
[46] Williams, Paul D. *War and conflict in Africa*. John Wiley & Sons, 2016, p. 9
[47] De Waal, Alex. "When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan." *African Affairs* 113, no. 452 (2014): 347-369, p. 355
[48] Idris, Amir, ed. *South Sudan: Post-independence Dilemmas*. Routledge, 2018, p. 38

donors to switch to humanitarian spending instead of development. This revelation indicates that South Sudan is highly dependent on technical, food and financial assistance, and a low capacity to manage the already existing resources.[49] The non-security social contract that links the society through policy was also lacking thus inability for the state to ensure harmony and tranquility prevail after independence.

The suspension of the oil production led to the radical change of the public's expectation of the independence dividends and peace. The austerity spending plans in 2012 coupled with the confrontation with Sudan, immensely drifted the government spending from social development to military spending.[50] The uncertainties that faced South Sudanese citizens were concerns about management of resources by the government and if feasible plan existed in the management of its recurrent expenditure after the depletion of accrued foreign reserves and whether the populace will agree with such a action in the medium term. This created a lot of division among government officials as to how the country's economic system was being handled.[51]

As indicated by the developments, complexities of attaining independence created a context that was less conducive for harmony as compared to the time of CPA enforcement. The main reason for the conflict immediately after independence was because South Sudan's economic and border relationship with Sudan was not addressed by the CPA or was left unresolved at the liberation. The expectation of increase in revenue by South Sudan was supposed to gain after its attainment of self rule, such as increased access to financial and development aid and more control over oil

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[49] Jok, Jok Madut. "Negotiating an end to the current civil war in South Sudan." *Inter-Press Service/Berghof Foundation. http://ips-project. Org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/IPS-paper-16-Negotiating-an-End-to-the-Current-Civil-War-in-South-Sudan. pdf. Accessed* 18 (2016), p. 42
[50] Pendle, Naomi. "Interrupting the balance: reconsidering the complexities of conflict in South Sudan." *Disasters* 38, no. 2 (2014): 227-248, p. 232
[51] Justin, Peter Hakim, and Mathijs Van Leeuwen. "The politics of displacement-related land conflict in Yei River County, South Sudan." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 54, no. 3 (2016): 419-442, p. 424

reserves were hugely undermined by the negative relationship which developed between Sudan and South Sudan.[52] This situation put into disarray the economic development of South Sudan.

2.1.2 Ethnic Identities

The concept of ethnicity in South Sudan and Africa in general is a common phenomenon now. This concept can be invoked at any given time to defend cultural, political and social positions since it carries authority, choice or preference beyond rationality.[53] The disorder of South Sudan's political structure that directly relates to ethnic ground is a major reason for the constant conflict among South Sudanese citizens. Although most of the conflict is politically fueled, there are ethnic drivers escalating the Civil War.

When the Dinka and Nuer fought during the second Civil War, they were deliberately politicized with formation of militarized structures of communities such as White Army Bunam, Titweng, and Gelweng. The arming and polarization of communities along ethnic lines in the South Sudan conflict is considered a critical factor in the escalation of the conflict.[54] Also, manipulation of populations by powerful elites is a critical factor that promotes a rapidly more in-depth and extensive war with severe political and humanitarian consequences.

Inclusive governance is critical to the achievement of peace dividends and democracy in states emerging from any conflict. However, in South Sudan, inclusivity has been marred by the confusions between existing practices and constitutional provisions. Political parties in Sudan currently reward warlords, dubbing them as freedom fighters at the expense of the civilian

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[52] Knopf, Kate A. *Fragility and state-society relations in South Sudan*. National Defense Univ Fort Mcnair Dc Africa Center For Strategic Studies, 2013, p. 17
[53] Brosché, Johan, and Kristine Höglund. *"Crisis of governance in South Sudan: electoral politics and violence in the world's newest nation."* The Journal of Modern African Studies 54, (2016): 67-90, p. 69
[54] Pendle, Naomi. "Interrupting the balance: reconsidering the complexities of conflict in South Sudan." *Disasters* 38, no. 2 (2014): 227-248, p. 237

structures.[55] The country also exercises centralized nomination system and use of ethnic functionalism at the expense of nationalism. These activities have created disaffection and tensions among South Sudanese. Additionally, the perception of ethnic favoritism in public appointments and employment, the unequal share of the national resources, marginalization of regions that exist outside the urban centers and militarization of public service violates all the standards of a comprehensive governing system.[56] This thus pushed the country to the peak of the conflict.

2.2 Increased Humanitarian Crisis

On 15 December 2013, after a meeting of the SPLM National Liberation Council, intense fighting broke out among the presidential guard in Juba.[57] This led to the split of SPLA with some forces backing President Salva Kiir while others supported the former vice president and leader of the rebel group, Riek Machar. The fighting was so intense such that by the following morning, after the defeat of the forces allied to Machar, government-allied forces launched an attack on Nuer neighborhoods in Juba. The government forces went from door to door, abducting and killing any Nuer civilian in the city. News of the killings rapidly spread across the nation and an immediate opposition was formed in protest at the events that occurred in Juba.[58]

As a result of the government targeted killings, SPLA commanders and many other soldiers allied to Nuer community joined the opposition in a bid not to betray their community. The opposition started their rebellion against the government, using their military skills to conquer various states in the country. At the time the shootings in Juba occurred, the 4th Division had

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[55] Mamdani, Mahmood. "South Sudan and its unending bloody conflict: No power-sharing without political reform." *The East African* 15 (2014): 2014, p. 52
[56] Idris, Amir, ed. *South Sudan: Post-independence Dilemmas*. Routledge, 2018, p. 7
[57] Mamdani, Mahmood. "South Sudan and its unending bloody conflict: No power-sharing without political reform." *The East African* 15 (2014): 2014, p. 21
[58] Mamdani, Mahmood. "South Sudan and its unending bloody conflict: No power-sharing without political reform." *The East African* 15 (2014): 2014, p. 10

11,000 men, 4000, all Nuer, were reported to have joined the rebel forces.[59] At the same time, the governments targeted killings of the Nuer civilians placed many Dinka communities within the Unity state to become targets of retaliatory attacks. By 17th December, the Dinka UNMISS employees requested for evacuation help from their Nuer colleagues. The Nuer 4th Division officers helped to evacuate some of the Dinka and Equatorians out of Unity states on 20th December.[60] Similarly, Dinka officers in Abiemnom helped evacuate some of the Nuer soldiers back to the state's capital.

Due to the massive defection at the start of the conflict, the 4th Division no longer represented an efficient fighting force for GRSS. This left Sudanese rebel in charge of the Unity state, the area where most of the conflict took place at the time. As the situation deteriorated, the fight became inter-ethnic rather than political. The Nuers opened retaliatory attacks on the Dinka community. As the anger about the killings in Juba boiled, fighting broke out in most parts of the country. On 18th December, the SPLA forces in Panakuach, who guard the Sudanese border near the Hejlij field defected to the SPLM-IO and briefly took control of the oil field. The Nuer oil workers thus killed many Dinka and Equatorian colleagues at the base of operation of Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC).[61]

2.3 Peace Support Interventions

On 20 December 2013, the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) entered the country to help manage the situation. UPDF managed to secure the capital and push far north including Bor thus forcing the rebel group out of the south of the country. However, conflicts continued in the

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[59] Pendle, Naomi R. "'The dead are just to drink from': recycling ideas of revenge among the western Dinka, South Sudan." *Africa* 88, no. 1 (2018): 99-121, p. 111

[60] Justin, Peter Hakim, and Mathijs Van Leeuwen. "The politics of displacement-related land conflict in Yei River County, South Sudan." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 54, no. 3 (2016): 419-442, p. 436

[61] Idris, Amir, ed. *South Sudan: Post-independence Dilemmas*. Routledge, 2018, p. 15

northern areas rendering the oil field in unity state useless. In early 2014, opposition leaders coalesced around the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/in Opposition (SPLA/iO) led by Riek Machar.[62]

By July 2014, the conflict was mainly isolated to the Greater Upper Nile states. The states fell within the unofficial boundaries that traditionally marked Nuer dominant territories. The competing political elites reached out to the communities which offered then trustworthy and robust support. Both the Dinka and Nuer communities characterized themselves as rival groups with the backing of their historical conflicts. The Dinka mobilized around Salva Kiir as their rightful leader while the Nuer offered their support to Machar as their elite leader.[63]

At the end of 2014, it was clear that the dynamics of south Sudanese war was comparatively simple. It was entrenched in the competition of reasonably clear agendas from the dominant communities. Nuer and Dinka communities wanted to solidify their economic and political position within the newly formed structure of governance.[64] There was hope that the warring factions were edging towards an agreement. Such expectations were raised by the signing of a peace agreement between the two conflicting communities led by their leaders in 2015. However, even before the details of a comprehensive agreement could be finalized, the cooperation had fallen apart.

The government of South Sudan conducted an offensive operation against SPLA/iO within the Upper Nile region in early 2015.[65] There were situations between the Shilluk and the Dinka Padang in Upper Nile which showed that the government inclined towards a single community.

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[62] Knopf, Kate A. *Fragility and state-society relations in South Sudan*. National Defense Univ Fort Mcnair Dc Africa Center For Strategic Studies, 2013, p. 12
[63] Idris, Amir, ed. *South Sudan: Post-independence Dilemmas*. Routledge, 2018, p.45
[64] Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. "Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead." *Congressional Research Service* (2016), p. 24
[65] Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. "Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead." *Congressional Research Service* (2016), p. 78

This turned the localized dispute into a national conflict. Similar dynamics were observed in summer 2015, within Wau in Western Bahr e Ghazal where some incidents rose between Dinka dominated security and local Banda community. In Yambio, for instance, war broke out between Azande militia group and the Dinka Dominated SPLA.[66] The militia group later joined the SPLA/iO.

The cumulative incidences where the Dinka national security members involved themselves with fights against non-Dinka communities increased the scope of the domestic conflict. The government raised the situation by launching a ruthless offensive against SPLA/iO in Unity state. The SPLA members raped and murdered civilians in the Unity State. By August 2015, the scope of the war had significantly changed. It was no longer restricted to the three states in Nile region, but it had already spread to the other parts of the nation.[67] At the time of the signing of ARCSS, its relevance had disappeared. The government resented the constraints the agreement placed on its military exercise, while the rebel group saw the deal as a sign of their military weakness.[68] The components of the agreement were gravely broken within weeks of its implementation.

As the ceasefire violations were ongoing, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which was created as a component within the ARCSS structure, investigated and reported the issues. However, as the violations were being carried out, neither the international community nor the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) to which CTSAMM reported, moved to intervene in the situation.[69] Therefore, there was

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[66] Cormack, Zoe. "Borders are galaxies: interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan." *Africa* 86, no. 3 (2016): 504-527, p. 516
[67] Pendle, Naomi. "Contesting the militarization of the places where they met: the landscapes of the western Nuer and Dinka (South Sudan)." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 11, no. 1 (2017): 64-85, p. 77
[68] Craze, Joshua, Jérôme Tubiana, and Claudio Gramizzi. "A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013-15." (2016), p. 23
[69] De Waal, Alex. "When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan." *African Affairs* 113, no. 452 (2014): 347-369, p. 358

lack of discipline that in turn made the ARCSS to be manipulated by the parties and by far affected their ability to work together.

As 2015 ended, with background conflict continuing in the country, the return of the vice president to the capital was unlikely due to the security situation. The workshop on Transitional Security Arrangement (TSA) was given priority to come up with security structure in the capital. The workshop agreed that 4,920 SPLA and 2,910 SPLA/iO soldiers would carry weapons in Juba to ensure the protection of each party leaders.[70] These security changes did not inspire confidence since, under TSA, Juba was highly likely to be militarized to a higher level than that observed in 2013.

By the time Machar decided to come to Juba, the environment for the progress of the ARCSS had looked profoundly problematic. The critical collective security bodies such as the Joint Operations Center (JOC) were never implemented. This created new areas of conflict which were further worsened by the continued disagreement between Kiir and Machar on the newly created states. As both parties, Riek Machar and Salva Kiir brought their forces together in an organized meeting at Presidential Palace on July 9, 2016; there were increased tensions within Juba and its surrounding regions.[71] Politically speaking, the peacemaking process had become partly irrelevant due to the violations of ARCSS provisions. Meanwhile, civilians from other parts of the country were subjected to security operations. This deteriorated any likelihood of a successful conclusion of the peace agreement.

Up to date, there is no decisive evidence of what happened near the Presidential Palace in Juba on 8 July. The only apparent assumption is that the repeated confrontations between armed

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[70] Jok, Jok Madut. "Negotiating an end to the current civil war in South Sudan." *Inter-Press Service/Berghof Foundation. http://ips-project. Org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/IPS-paper-16-Negotiating-an-End-to-the-Current-Civil-War-in-South-Sudan. pdf. Accessed* 18 (2016), p. 3
[71] Idris, Amir, ed. *South Sudan: Post-independence Dilemmas*. Routledge, 2018, p. 12

forces from the two rival factions created high tensions.[72] The other evident fact is that both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar had no idea violence would erupt as the meeting was ongoing. The calm that followed on 9 July acted as evidence that the eruption of conflict between the two factions was not planned.[73] What later brought large-scale conflict on 10 July was the coordinated massive assault that was carried out by the government on SPLA/iO base within the capital.

Over the next twenty-four hours, the SPLA/iO soldiers fought robustly despite the unfair advantage that the government soldiers had over them regarding weaponry. The SPLA/iO was also outnumbered and, therefore, by 11 July, they were defeated.[74] However, they were still able to fight an excellent defense to allow their leader, Machar, to escape the city. With the SPLA/iO forces gone, the SPLA had no one to fight in the city, and thus they resorted to rape, violence, and looting.

The chaotic month of July had significant implications in reference to the future of the South Sudan Conflict. The SPLA/iO lost most of its best soldiers, and they separated from senior politicians who commanded them. Also, even though Machar managed to escape, his security appeared far much compromised. Over the next forty days, Machar was chased by the government using considerable forces through the Equatorian forest.[75] It is possible that the government planned to kill Machar to disrupt the leadership of SPLA/iO. The separation of SPLA/iO soldiers forms their elite leaders in Juba resulted in defections among the elite politicians belonging to SPLA/iO who remained in Juba. They joined Salva Kiir as de facto

[72] De Waal, Alex. "When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan." *African Affairs* 113, no. 452 (2014): 347-369, p. 348
[73] Ibid, p. 28
[74] Idris, Amir, ed. *South Sudan: Post-independence Dilemmas*. Routledge, 2018, p. 26
[75] Jok, Jok Madut. "Negotiating an end to the current civil war in South Sudan." *Inter-Press Service/Berghof Foundation. http://ips-project. Org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/IPS-paper-16-Negotiating-an-End-to-the-Current-Civil-War-in-South-Sudan. pdf. Accessed* 18 (2016), p. 11

representatives of the opposition to implement the ARCSS. On 23 July, Taban Deng was appointed the new vice president of South Sudan.[76]

These moves by the government, at first failed to neutralize Machar. Instead, the incidences increased the conflict that had been building up in many parts of Equatorial. Known SPLA/iO aligned Equatorian commanders were critical in the successful escape of Machar from Juba. The Equatorians conducted large-scale military operations that forced the government to abandon its operation of capturing Machar. It was, thus, clear that the rebel groups in Equatorian state had grown to maturity stage. At the same time, the faction of SPLA/iO who defected to join Taban as opposition representatives failed to cripple the operation of SPLA/iO in many parts of the country.[77]

The violence that followed the flight of Machar from Juba progressed on a massive scale. The SPLA/iO in the Equatorial regions targeted and killed both Dinka civilians and soldiers. For instance, in October, about twenty-one, Dinka civilians were killed in Yei as they tried to flee the violent region.[78] This type of warfare led to increased communal tensions and ruthless government response which included violent targeting of specific communities.

The level of violence during this period was considered the worst incident because of the number of deaths and casualties. Close to 600,000 people left the country as refugees, doubling the number of South Sudan's refugees in regional countries.[79] Majority of the displaced people during this time came from Equatorian region since the region experienced the most intense

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[76] Pendle, Naomi R. "'The dead are just to drink from': recycling ideas of revenge among the western Dinka, South Sudan." *Africa* 88, no. 1 (2018): 99-121, p. 114

[77] Craze, Joshua, Jérôme Tubiana, and Claudio Gramizzi. "A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013-15." (2016), p. 23

[78] Jok, Jok Madut. "Negotiating an end to the current civil war in South Sudan." *Inter-Press Service/Berghof Foundation. http://ips-project. Org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/IPS-paper-16-Negotiating-an-End-to-the-Current-Civil-War-in-South-Sudan. pdf. Accessed* 18 (2016), p. 18

[79] Craze, Joshua, Jérôme Tubiana, and Claudio Gramizzi. "A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013-15." (2016), p. 47

conflict. This sustained fight created food insecurity in areas south of the country. For instance, the Kajo Keji and Morobo areas attained the "emergence phase" food insecurity classification by late 2016.[80]

There was a corrosive element of the conflict about increased intercommunal relationship deterioration. This was evident from the brutal ambushes on the Dinka civilians by the Equatorians aligned with SPLA/iO as they traveled along the roads in South Juba. This increased anti-Equatorian sentiments by the government. Tensions also increased, particularly, in October, with rumors of the death of President Kiir. The civilians in Juba feared that Paul Malong would seize the opportunity to carry out retaliatory attacks on other communities in South Sudan. Calm was, however, restored after Kiir showed up at the back of his pickup as he traveled through the city.[81]

When Machar finally emerged from the Bush, he appeared weak and ill, and he lost direction in the leadership of SPLA/iO. Salva Kiir and Taban were, however, healthier and had a comprehensive political plan. The policy changes after the period mostly favored the government thus placing the peacekeeping operations to become increasingly irrelevant in the country. There was also the lack of international interest in supporting a continued peacekeeping force in the country.[82] After an extended stay in DRC followed by Sudan, Riek Machar returned home only to find that political atmosphere had immensely changed around him. He became an isolated figure. Most regional countries declined to offer him a chance as their visitor. Nonetheless, he managed to get a medical visit to South Africa in October 2016, but the South African

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[80] Justin, Peter Hakim, and Mathijs Van Leeuwen. "The politics of displacement-related land conflict in Yei River County, South Sudan." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 54, no. 3 (2016): 419-442, p. 22

[81] Cormack, Zoe. "Borders are galaxies: interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan." *Africa* 86, no. 3 (2016): 504-527, p. 508

[82] Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. "Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead." *Congressional Research Service* (2016), p. 24

government placed some travel restrictions on him.[83] With the leadership of SPLA/iO divided and its leader trapped outside South Sudan, the prospects on SPLA/iO as a political force diminished. The body majorly remained as a political umbrella for the opposition politicians.

The decision by the international community to support the government of South Sudan seems to have come down to perception rather than evidence. Questions about the decision of President Kiir to replace Machar as the country's First Vice President was remarkably avoided by the international community. For instance, when John Kerry, the then U.S secretary of state, was asked in Nairobi whether the U.S. supported the decision to replace Machar, he declined reiterated that U.S. had no stand in who should lead the country.[84] This limited the peace support operation on mediation.

By the end of 2016, a lot had changed for Africa's youngest nation. The government had struggled to install itself as an image of power and legitimacy. The continued conflict of interest within the government has remained the most prominent problem since it is pulling the government operations in opposing directions thus resulting in weak economic bonds that united the nation. The question that remained in the public's mind as of 2016 is whether the government would be able to negotiate a comprehensive peacemaking process to rehabilitate the country.

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[83] Cormack, Zoe. "Borders are galaxies: interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan." *Africa* 86, no. 3 (2016): 504-527, p. 509
[84] Craze, Joshua, Jérôme Tubiana, and Claudio Gramizzi. "A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013-15." (2016), p. 15

CHAPTER THREE

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN SOUTH SUDAN

3.1 Civilian Protection

Peacekeeping activities in South Sudan have been top agenda of the international community especially the UN since hostilities broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. Peacekeeping involves protection of civilians and infrastructure and coordination of humanitarian supplies.[85] The events of December 15, 2013 necessitated the review of the UN mandate in South Sudan as several drastic measures were undertaken to balance expectations of the Government of South Sudan and forces allied to Machar. In view of the deteriorating situation, the UN resolved to task UNMISS to institute measures that ensures safety of civilians and monitor and investigate human rights violations, support cease fire agreement implementation and enable conducive environment for humanitarian assistance.[86] This chapter therefore examined the extent to which the stated peacekeeping activities are implemented.

The protection of civilians is considered the core function of contemporary peacekeeping operations. Protection of civilians promotes legitimacy and credibility of peacekeepers.[87] In view of this role, peacekeepers are expected to build support and confidence among civilians and external observers. The success of any peacekeeping mission is therefore gauged based on support received from civilians and other observers. The fulfillment of this expectation therefore justifies the intervention of any peacekeeping mission hence increasing credibility and relevance

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[85] Aguirre Mariano & Joana Abrisketa, "Pressing issues for UN peacekeeping operations," Transnational Institute, 29 September 2009, Accessed 12 June 2018 at:
file:///G:/JOHN%20SHANKATA/Pressing%20issues%20for%20UN%20peacekeeping%20operations%20_%20Transnational%20Institute.htm

[86] Sharland Lisa & Gorur Aditi, "Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on Protection of Civilians," Sydney: The Stimson Center and Australian Strategy Policy Institute, December 2015

[87] Holt Victoria & Taylor Glyn, "Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges," New York: UN, 2009, p. 48

of the UN system. Also, peacekeepers support sustainable political peace.[88] Peacekeepers are therefore expected to engage in activities that will reduce hostility and escalation of the conflict. These roles and expectations provide basis on which peacekeeping forces and missions are necessary in conflicts that result into many impacts on civilians.

In South Sudan, the situation warranted for the protection of civilians. For example, since the eruption of the war on 15th December 2013, reports indicate that more than 2.6million people have been displaced and tens of thousands others killed.[89] In 2015, while the conflict was ended through the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), the rebels and SPLA continued to violate the agreement. Spink explains that the violation of the agreement led to the spread of the conflict to other areas outside Juba and include Western Bahr al Ghazal and the Equatorias. This situation further plunged the country in one of the worst civil violations in the world. It is against this unprecedented occurrence that UNMISS was expected to ensure the safety of civilians.

In South Sudan, protection of civilians is done through hosting of civilians in UN compounds or designated fields surrounded by UN peacekeepers. For example, in 2014, Harve reported that UN peacekeepers continuously providing guarding services to UN compound and infrastructure as well as civilians. In his report, Harve explains that more than 90,000 civilians are protected in UN compound that sometimes is overstretched and new sites usually empty fields are offered to the ever-growing number of civilians.[90] Similarly, Sharland and Gorur report that by November 2015, more than 200,000 civilians were protected in or near UN bases in Juba, Bor, Malakal,

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[88] Holt Victoria & Taylor Glyn, "Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges," New York: UN, 2009, p. 12

[89] Spink Lauren, "Challenges and Conditions for Deploying and Effective Regional Protection Force to South Sudan," Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017, p. 56

[90] Ladsous Harve, "New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping," New York: The Brookings Institution, 17 June 2014, p. 13

Bentiu, Melut, and Wau.[91] Since 2015, the political and ethnic uncertainty in the country has led to more civilians to seek for protection in POCs.

On July 8, 2016 there was violation of ARCSS that required attention of UNMISS in protecting civilians. It is reported that the emergence of fierce fighting which was concentrated near Protection of Civilian (POC) sites that housed more than 37,000 civilians was between forces loyal to Machar and Kiir.[92] The indiscriminate use of firearms led to deaths of 30 civilians who attempted to flee the POCs. In addition, civilians (women) who were in search of food and other basic needs were raped and murdered. The need for protection of human rights through providing security to the vulnerable in armed conflict therefore formed the basis at which UNMISS was forced to house the civilians.

In August 2016, the UN Security Council passed a resolution 2304 extending the mandate of UNMISS as part of the strategies aimed at protecting civilians in South Sudan following the fierce fighting in July.[93] The extension of the mandate was strategically taken to increase the capacity of UNMISS. According to Spink, the Resolution it gave consent for the creation of Regional Protection Force (RPF) comprising an additional 4,000 peacekeepers. The additional peacekeepers supplemented the more than 12,000 peacekeepers in Juba whose mandate was to protect civilians.[94] Spink explains that RPF was required to carry out security patrols in Juba. Security patrols were intended to enhance assessment of the security situation and therefore allow the peacekeepers to identify security hotspots. In addition, security patrols were aimed at enabling the peacekeepers to map out concentration of civilians that require urgent support.

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[91] Sharland Lisa & Gorur Aditi, "Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on Protection of Civilians," Sydney: The Stimson Center and Australian Strategy Policy Institute, December 2015, p. 16
[92] Spink Lauren, "Challenges and Conditions for Deploying and Effective Regional Protection Force to South Sudan," Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017, p. 6
[93] Ibid, p. 9
[94] Ibid, p. 14

Patrols also enabled the peacekeepers to map out movements of civilians hence provide the necessary protection.

Protection of civilians also involved the application of neutral approach in the conflict. It is reported that UNMISS neither leaned towards either Government of Sudan nor rebel forces allied to Machar.[95] This implied that all resources of UNMISS were focused on protecting civilians through provision of humanitarian support.

3.2 Protection of Civilian Centers

Another major function of the UN peacekeepers is protection of key installations in conflict zones. Installations are strategic resources that form part of military infrastructure in operations. These installations include communication systems such as towers, masts, cables and exchange centers. Others include military camps and bases as well as utilities such as electricity, water and medical facilities. Apart from military installations, other important installations that indirectly support military operations include public systems such as airports. As strategic resources, these installations support communication, transport and other life activities that fulfill human needs.

In the context of security, installations such as communications systems provide active linkages between forces on ground and air or command centre. If this connection is cut, the objectives of operations are likely not to be achieved. This indicates that such installations should be protected just as the forces protect themselves from enemies. However, on July 8, 2016 fighting erupted again despite the existence of the ARCSS of August 2015. In this fierce fighting, it was reported that forces loyal to Kiir and Machar engaged their fighting near UN strategic installations such as the UN House base and the strategic location of the UN Tongping base. In this attack, UNMISS was expected to prevent further damage to the installations by enforcing the ARCSS.

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[95] Sharland Lisa & Gorur Aditi, "Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on Protection of Civilians," Sydney: The Stimson Center and Australian Strategy Policy Institute, December 2015, p. 9

In 2016, UN's resolution 2304 of increasing capacity of UNMISS was aimed at supporting the protection of key installations especially telecommunication and transport infrastructure such as airport.[96] This paved way for UNMISS to control Juba Airport which critics consider it as overambitious in the context of core mandate and available resources.[97] The presence of UNMISS at Juba airport was therefore intended to assure and allow entry of international delegation and humanitarian actors into South Sudan.

3.3 Coordination of Humanitarian Supplies

In any conflict, humanitarian crisis poses great challenge to peacekeepers. Peacekeepers are therefore expected to coordinate humanitarian activities including liaising with humanitarian aid agencies. There are several activities and expectations of peacekeeping mission in any conflict zone. The peacekeepers are also expected to support the supply of food, shelter materials and provide basic medical services. In South Sudan, UNMISS is tasked with maintaining equal monitoring of needs and risks inside and outside POC sites.[98] Also, UNMISS is expected to rationalize the number of humanitarian partners inside POC sites.[99] UNMISS is also required to decide between targeted and blanket humanitarian assistance. With these expected tasks, UNMISS has the responsibility of providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance.

The sudden fighting which occurred in mid-December of 2013 in South Sudan resulted to humanitarian crisis which was viewed in the world as the worst. The conflict rendered access of the civilians to basic needs impossible.[100] In addition, the concentration of civilians in UN camps

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[96] Spink Lauren, "Challenges and Conditions for Deploying and Effective Regional Protection Force to South Sudan," Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017, p. 16

[97] Humanitarian Practice Network, "The Crisis in South Sudan," Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, January 2017, p. 3

[98] Norwegian Refugee Council, "Protection of Civilian Sites: Lessons from South Sudan for Future Operations," Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017, p. 7

[99] Humanitarian Practice Network, "The Crisis in South Sudan," Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, January 2017, p. 2

[100] Humanitarian Practice Network, "The Crisis in South Sudan," Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, January 2017, p. 2

created another problem of providing the civilians with adequate food supplies, cloth and shelter. Moreover, the many number of injured people as well as the sick especially children and women required medical attention. It is also reported that immediately the conflict erupted, humanitarian aid workers were unable to reach out to the many civilians.

In response to this situation, UNMISS coordinated the humanitarian activities. For example, the RPF was expected to ensure that humanitarian aid workers were protected and transported around Juba to provide the humanitarian services to the burgeoning number of civilians in need of food, shelter, clothe and medical assistance.[101] The coordination of humanitarian activities involved the facilitation by the government troops in the supply of basic needs and allowing passed of manned checkpoints.

It is also reported that increased insecurity in South Sudan especially Juba, Akobo, Bor, Malakal, Bentiu and Melut led to acute shortage of humanitarian responses. By 2014, more than 85,000 people had sought refuge in UN compounds and the number grew to 166,000 in a span of three months.[102] By this time, only a few humanitarian actors were serving the increasing number of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The presence of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported the provision of humanitarian response but the growing number of IDPs in different regions required urgent attention that will ensure optimal resource utilization.[103] In this situation, the UN compounds were used as refuge centers (security) while MSF and ICRC were expected to support alleviate the human suffering by providing the basic needs such as food, shelter and medical care.

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[101] Spink Lauren, "Challenges and Conditions for Deploying and Effective Regional Protection Force to South Sudan," Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017, p. 6
[102] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 12
[103] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 22

In this arrangement, UNMISS was tasked with heaviest responsibility of ensuring security in the wake of increased resistance from the government and rebels. This challenge was therefore resolved by clustering the services offered in respective regions. In this regard, UNMISS was tasked with coordinating the humanitarian support apart from ensuring security for both humanitarian actors and IDPs.

3.4 Monitoring and Investigating Human Rights

Monitoring and investigating human rights cases in any conflict zone is a fundamental function of peacekeepers. This function is both an early warning system as well as a progress indicator and evaluation framework.[104] This framework supports decision making process at different levels about the progress, outcomes and challenges in any conflict out of which key lessons are drawn for improvements.

The presence of UNMISS in South Sudan is strategic outfit of the UN in terms of collecting information on behalf of the UN Security Council for decision making on security in the country. In this regard, the mission is expected to collect and analyze information on security vulnerabilities and cases of human rights violations. The process of monitoring and investigation involves use of intelligence gatherers such as the UNMISS troops, police, Humanitarian Agency personnel and civilians.[105] During monitoring, the persons involved record cases, persons involved, causes, effects and general situations surrounding such cases. For example, in Unity State UNMISS monitors were used to report atrocities in which decision on increasing presence in the region increased. This led to the construction of the UNMISS POC site that housed more

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[104] Humanitarian Practice Network, "The Crisis in South Sudan," Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, January 2017, p. 14

[105] Sharland Lisa & Gorur Aditi, "Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on Protection of Civilians," Sydney: The Stimson Center and Australian Strategy Policy Institute, December 2015, p.3

than 50,000 civilians.[106] In this situation, the role of monitors and investigators facilitated the protection of many civilians in Unity State.

Monitoring and investigation of human rights data gathered has elicited debate on whether the situation amounts to crimes against humanity. The collaboration between UNMISS and United Nations Development Progamme (UNDP) created a framework of reporting cases of human rights violation. The information obtained revealed that the situation in South Sudan is worse as civilians seeking protection in UN camps are ten times more than those already on the camps.[107] The report further states that civilians escaping to UN POC sites are stopped at checkpoints and not allowed to get to the camps. In some instance, it is reported that civilians in Greater Upper Nile region who were escaping to UN POC sites were barred and resorted to shelter in swamps.[108] It is with this report that Adama Dieng, the United Nations Special Advisor on the prevention of Genocide termed the situation 'brutality and cruelty' that defied the imagination and therefore constituted war crimes against humanity.

Monitoring reports indicate that humanitarian workers are also attacked, and this has the implication of rendering the supply of food and medicine ineffective. This implication puts more risk to the mission in South Sudan. In the period between 2011 and 2016, the number of aid workers attacked increased as shown in Table 1 annexed. This report supported the need for increased capacity of UNMISS as failure to address the situation ruined the credibility of the Mission.

Monitoring also provided information on the nature of violated human rights. The UNMISS is therefore expected to develop a database of tactics and types of violence employed to civilians

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[106] Sharland Lisa & Gorur Aditi, "Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on Protection of Civilians," Sydney: The Stimson Center and Australian Strategy Policy Institute, December 2015, p. 4
[107] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 14
[108] Ibid, p. 10

and other personnel for appropriate action to be taken. In South Sudan, both government and rebel forces have continued to perpetrate heinous against humanity. This is illustrated in Figure 4 annexed. In addition, investigation reports revealed that 38% of violence cases are committed against UN personnel while 57% are committed against International Governmental Organizations (INGO).

Owing to dire situation characterized by unprecedented human suffering in South Sudan, UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan is relevant in the war-torn nation. The presence of UNMISS in South Sudan since 2013 has been significant in giving civilians assurances of their security. The revised mandate of UNMISS has enabled the mission to deliver on its mandate of protecting civilians, monitoring and investigating human rights violations as well as support ceasefire agreement implementation and create conditions for humanitarian assistance. The role and presence of UNMISS is an opportunity for restoring elusive peace in South Sudan.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS IN SOUTH SUDAN

4.1 Internal Challenges

The violence has not abated and many civilians are still encountering effects of civil and political conflict. The country remains highly insecure as many civilians are displaced, killed, tortured and generally disfranchised. This is despite the UN interventions aimed at protecting the civilians from such humanitarian crisis. The question in this case is why the UN's presence in South Sudan is not effectively managing the humanitarian crisis. According to the Ban Ki Moon, success of peacekeeping operations depends significantly on several factors. These factors include: clear mandate; political, financial and material support; institutions that enforce and uphold rule of law; active civil society; effective relationships with other local, regional and international bodies.[109] This chapter investigates the challenges of peace operations in South Sudan. The chapter focused on institutional challenges that are internal to UN systems. The chapter also focused on external factors that limit UN's peace keeping operations.

UNMISS has continued to face several internal challenges. The challenges are not unique from other Missions across the world. For example, in 2004, the UN reported that its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was facing the challenge of capacity constraint. With many peacekeeping field operations (17) and less number of peacekeepers (60,000), the UN's DPKO was considered overstretched.[110] This indicates that effectiveness of peace operations was limited. Under such situations, humanitarian crisis in conflict zones is difficult to manage and

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[109] Aguirre Mariano & Joana Abrisketa, "Pressing issues for UN peacekeeping operations," Transnational Institute, 29 September 2009, Accessed 12 June 2018 at:
file:///G:/JOHN%20SHANKATA/Pressing%20issues%20for%20UN%20peacekeeping%20operations%20_%20Transnational%20Institute.htm

[110] United Nations, "2004 Parliament Hearing at the United Nations: From Disarmament to lasting peace: Defining the parliamentary role," UN: New York, 19-20 October 2004, p. 27

this exposes civilians to more danger. This situation has led the UN to increase capacity of peacekeeping operations. For example, by 2014 more than 120,000 troops were serving in 17 missions across the world.[111] Harve predicted that the number of troops will increase due to the conflict dynamics in South Sudan and Central Africa Republic.

In support of the finding by UN, the UN's Under-Secretary-General, Herve Lasous in 2014 opines that while conflicts around the world has reduced significantly in the last decade, the present conflicts are few but highly intractable. According to Herve Lasous, conflicts in DRC and South Sudan are escalating into second or third wave of conflict.[112] Herve further explains that 87% of UN's peacekeepers are in Africa. The argument in this case is that while majority of UN's peacekeepers are in Africa, the conflicts should therefore not result into adverse effects on civilians. However, many people in African including South Sudan continue to be affected by the conflicts.

4.1.1 Lack of Secure Centers

Lack of secure centers or fields for hosting civilians has been observed. According to Harvey, more than 90,000 civilians were protected in UN compounds in 2014. This situation becomes worse as more civilians join the UN protection sites resulting into crowding hence identification of open fields to support the civilians.[113] It is also reported that UNMISS continues to experience many challenges due to upsurge of civilians near UN bases.

The presence of the civilians extends the boundaries of the UN' POC sites as allocated by the government.[114] In this situation, logistical challenges pose many risks to effective protection of

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[111] Ladsous Harve, "New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping," New York: The Brookings Institution, 17 June 2014, p. 45
[112] Ibid, p. 46
[113] Ibid, p. 48
[114] Sharland Lisa & Gorur Aditi, "Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on Protection of Civilians," Sydney: The Stimson Center and Australian Strategy Policy Institute, December 2015, p. 2

civilians. For example, perimeter protection is required by increasing number of police and troops while humanitarian requirements such as shelter should also be built. Sharland and Gorur explains that the perimeter barriers around the POC sites are sometimes porous with lack of adequate lighting and this contributes to increased insecurity characterized by easy movement of contraband goods and weapons. It is also reported that the Mission lacks strategic equipment such as bullet proof guard towers.[115] Lack of a functional judicial system has worsen the situation and therefore there is no competent system that can be used to prosecute persons involved in such acts of criminalities.

4.1.2 Inadequate Humanitarian Facilities

It is reported that camp management by UNMISS is a serious challenge as the camps are overcrowded and there are few sanitary, shelter and other amenities.[116] In this unprecedented situation, meeting humanitarian standards is a challenge as UNMISS is overwhelmed due to government restrictions that limit entry of other humanitarian actors to ease out the burden. While resources available do not meet the needs of the users, this situation is made worse by poor camp management.

Camp management for POC sites is a major problem for UNMISS. The growing population of the IDPs has led to several societal challenges in the camps. These challenges include increased ethnic tension, sexual harassment and other criminal activities. It is reported that the UNMISS police are not able to maintain law and order in the POC sites as cases of clashes within the POCs increase.[117] This situation indicates that internal capacity is required to support the

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[115] Humanitarian Practice Network, "The Crisis in South Sudan," Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, January 2017, p. 8
[116] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 16
[117] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 18

maintenance of humanitarian standards where the IDPs are expected to be more secure and free from any danger.

Command structure of UNMISS is considered as one the greatest challenge the mission is facing. Investigations on the inefficiencies of UNMISS revealed that lack of leadership contributes to many of the Mission's operational challenges. Coordination of civilian component is ineffective despite strong joint operations. For effective coordination, the UN policy requires a fragmented response comprising of Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and the Security Information Operations Centre (SIOC). It is stated that the operation centres are not co-located yet the UN policy requires fragmented response.[118] In the case of South Sudan, fragmented response was not effective due to lack of unified command. Peacekeeping forces from Ethiopia, China, Nepal and India were expected to be under unified command.[119] This resulted into conflicting orders and underutilization of the forces.

In addition, the appointment of commanders was questionable. For example, Chinese Battalion commander was appointed by the Force commander to command the incident troops and this limited decision making. Stammes further explains that the Incident Commander Force Commander was ordered by Force Commander to retain his role in addition to being Battalion commander. This situation affected the command link and UN House was cut off from the activities in South Sudan. The confusion coupled with lack of leadership led to poor performance of the UN House. The poor performance was largely attributed to decision by the Chinese battalion on 10 and 11 July of abandoning defensive positions at POC 1.[120] This further created

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[118] Humanitarian Practice Network, "The Crisis in South Sudan," Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, January 2017, p. 14

[119] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 22

[120] Humanitarian Practice Network, "The Crisis in South Sudan," Humanitarian Exchange, No. 68, January 2017, p. 29

loopholes in security where civilians began looting the UN compound. The Nepalese Formed Police Unit's was therefore assigned to improve security of the UN compound. This challenge indicates that inadequate resources coupled with poor leadership renders the mission ineffective.

4.2 External Challenges

There are several external challenges mainly from government of South Sudan and rebels that have continued to affect the mandate of UNMISS.

4.2.1 Weak Political will and Commitment

The South Sudan political elites are obliged to promote cohesion and steer political, social and economic agenda of the nation. However, it is not the case as the commitment of the elites has been put into question. According to Spink, the increased mandate of UNMISS in South Sudan was met with resistance from may parties involved in the conflict. For example, the UN Resolution 2304 provided for the increase in capacity of UNMISS through additional of 4000 peacekeepers and importation of security enforcement equipment.[121]

Spink further explains that the relationship between UNMISS and Government of South Sudan deteriorated due to increased violations of human rights alleged to be committed by SPLA. In some instances, government officials accused UNMISS of taking sides by publicly discrediting the Mission.[122] It is worth noting that credibility of any peacekeeping mission is dependent on the relationship between the mission and conflict actors. In this case, the soar relationship between UNMISS and the Government of South Sudan reduces credibility of the mission.

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[121] Spink Lauren, "Challenges and Conditions for Deploying and Effective Regional Protection Force to South Sudan," Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017, p. 34

[122] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 23

Reports shows that the Government of South Sudan has increasingly prevented UNMISS peacekeepers from executing their mandate of providing patrols in armored vehicles or using air-support for operations.[123] Also, the anti-UN demonstrations in the country coupled with obstruction of UNMISS personnel and forceful entry of SPLA soldiers in UN compound in Bor threatened the operations of UNMISS.[124] This is a clear indication of resistance to the presence of UNMISS in South Sudan. Under such situations, the rationale of having peacekeepers in South Sudan is not considered necessary hence exposing civilians to more humanitarian crisis.

4.2.2 Absence of Peace

Effective peacekeeping is significantly dependent on existing peace. In their article about pressing issues in UN's peacekeeping operations, Mariano Aguirre and Joana Abrisketa explain that lack of peace to keep is one of the major challenges faced by UN peacekeepers. According to the Aguirre and Abrisketa, peace operations are more effective when conflict has ended.[125] In this regard, truce, peace deals and peace treaties should be in place to warrant peacekeeping operations. This explains the essence of keeping the peace. However, in South Sudan peace remains elusive yet peacekeepers are actively involved in protecting civilians against humanitarian problems resulting from the unending conflict.

In 2011, the CPA provided a framework in which peace should have been restored. The deployment of UNMISS in 2011 was intended consolidate peace and security in South Sudan in preparation for the formation of the new Government of South Sudan.[126] The focus was on

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[123] Spink Lauren, "Challenges and Conditions for Deploying and Effective Regional Protection Force to South Sudan," Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017, p. 20
[124] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 11
[125] Aguirre Mariano & Joana Abrisketa, "Pressing issues for UN peacekeeping operations," Transnational Institute, 29 September 2009, p. 19
[126] UNMISS, "Background of UNMISS," UN, Accessed 30th May 2018 at: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background

strengthening security capacity for the new government. Upon formation of the new government, the mandate of UNMISS ended on 9th July 2011.

However, on 15th December 2013, violence broke out in capital Juba between Riek Machar's allied forces and Salvar Kier's allied forces.[127] This unprecedented situation was a complete contradiction of the vision of John Garang about Sudan. Garang had envisaged a free people of South Sudan from oppression where ethnicity, race and ideological differences will not be used to define South Sudanese.[128] This indicates that despite the independence of South Sudan, the South Sudanese people were enemies of their own hence absence of peace to keep. Francis Deng warned that failure of South Sudanese people to be their 'brother's keeper' will likely have consequences in the aftermath of Sudan-South Sudan separation.[129] This implies that peace and security of South Sudan depends on peaceful co-existence between different ethnic groups and political formations. In this situation, UNMISS will continue to be ineffective as peace is not guaranteed unless the peace is made available for UNMISS to support keeping of such peace.

4.2.3 Targeting of UN Infrastructure

Since the conflict broke in December 2013, UN installations have been part of the target sites. UNMISS bases and installations have been frequently attacked by both government and rebels. In the fierce battle that occurred on July 8, 2016 UN bases in South Sudan were targeted by forces loyal to Machar and Kiir. It is reported that during the fight, fighting occurred near the UN compound and this increased security risk to civilians in POC sites.[130] During the fighting, the UNMISS was operating in extremely dangerous environment.

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[127] Ibid
[128] Irit Back, "John Garang's Vision for a 'New Sudan', Contemporary Perspective," Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2018, p. 17
[129] Deng Francis, "War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan," Brookings Institution Press, 2011, p. 13
[130] Spink Lauren, "Challenges and Conditions for Deploying and Effective Regional Protection Force to South Sudan," Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2017, p. 41

The attacks have been occasioned by new threats arising from emergence of militia and rebel forces. This outcome is increasingly affecting the operations of UN peacekeepers in South Sudan. This seems to be a common challenge in many peacekeeping missions across the world. For example, in a report detailing on how UN peacekeeping operations can become effective, it is stated that new threats such as terrorism and other organized crimes are adversely affecting peacekeeping operations.[131] This indicates that capacity for peacekeeping should be increased whenever new threats emerge.

However, matching the demand for peacekeeping operations becomes a challenge whenever contingency plans do not envisage such events. It therefore remains a challenge as attempts made to control the situation are ineffective. In this case, civilians are exposed to more dangers of the respective conflict. In South Sudan, UNMISS faced the challenge of direct attack by both Government and rebel groups. It is reported that during the crisis, the UN compound and personnel were caught on the war frontlines as heavy fighting machinery were used near the UN facilities. In the initial days of fighting, two peacekeepers were killed while several were injured, and 182 UN buildings were struck by bullets and mortars.[132] It is further reported that this situation occurred since government forces were fighting the rebel forces who had taken the war frontier near UN compound as a means of discrediting government response.

4.2.4 Contested Consent

Effective peacekeeping operations in sovereign countries is largely dependent on the collaboration between the government and the peacekeepers. The governments are expected to provide a suitable environment for mission operations. However, lack of consent and access

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[131] Nyheter Dagens, "How UN peacekeeping operations can become more effective," Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden, 2015, p. 34

[132] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 25

restrictions have continued to affect the operations of UNMISS. According to Sharland and Gorur, the violation of Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) by the Government of South Sudan has restricted UNMISS from accessing many areas in South Sudan.

It is reported that the continuation of the Government of South Sudan to limit UNMISS troops and personnel from moving by air, water and road in South Sudan has limited effective implementation of UNMISS mandate. In the SOFA agreement, government of South Sudan was expected to give UNMISS necessary support including allowing the peacekeeping troops to travel freely across the country as well as process visas and import UN logistical materials freely.[133] The SOFA agreement was expected to support UNMISS reach out to civilians in remote areas as well build its capacity during protecting civilians.

However, the Government of South Sudan reneged on the agreement by restricting UNMISS from accessing most areas of the country. In addition, the opposition members and rebels have also continued to frustrate the efforts of UNMISS by restricting movement in rebel held regions. These restrictions have several impacts on mandate of UNMISS. For example, it is stated that UNMISS helicopters are not allowed in some parts of South Sudan and yet the helicopters support the delivery of humanitarian supplies as well as personnel and troops to civilians in need of protection.[134] Concerns about obtaining air safety assurances from the government and even rebels have been reported as this daunting task takes more time yet emergency cases involving responding to civilian distress require urgent attention devoid of many consultations.

Moreover, the use of checkpoints for UNMISS convoys in areas controlled by either government or rebels has continued to limit performance of peacekeepers. It is reported that checkpoints

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[133] Sharland Lisa & Gorur Aditi, "Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on Protection of Civilians," Sydney: The Stimson Center and Australian Strategy Policy Institute, December 2015, p. 34

[134] Stamnes Eli, "The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South (UNMISS): Protecting Civilians in a Volatile Environment," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Policy Brief* 24, 2015, p. 17

mounted by either government or rebels are used to solicit for bribes from UNMISS personnel and peacekeepers.[135] This is a restriction has implications on urgent UNMISS activities such as evacuation and access to medical support or other urgent services. Also, the restrictions are considered as situations that deter UNMISS from monitoring cases of human rights abuse. This implies that the restrictions are intentional with a view of limiting efforts of UNMISS in protecting civilians.

UNMISS is facing critical challenges in South Sudan. The challenges are internal as UNMISS internal capacity is not responsive to the dynamics of the conflict. This characterized by inadequate resources and poor leadership. The external challenges include increasing risks of attack, government restrictions, weak political commitment and lack of peace to keep. The combination of internal and external challenges threatens the achievement of the mandate of UNMISS.

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[135] Sharland Lisa & Gorur Aditi, "Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on Protection of Civilians," Sydney: The Stimson Center and Australian Strategy Policy Institute, December 2015, p. 36

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

This study investigated the challenges of peacekeeping operations in South Sudan between 2011 and 2016. The study sought to answer three questions: What are the conflict dynamics in South Sudan; what are the peace support operations in South Sudan; and what are the challenges of peace support operations in South Sudan? In the study, the following hypotheses were tested: Structural challenges in South Sudan are significantly limiting peace support operations; and Humanitarian crisis in South Sudan is significantly resulting from inadequate capacity of UNMISS.

On the first objective about conflict dynamics in South Sudan, the study established that by the end of 2016, the government of South Sudan had struggled to install itself as an image of power and legitimacy. The continued conflict of interest within the government remained the most prominent problem since it is pulling the government operations in opposing directions thus resulting in weak economic bonds that united the nation. The overriding concern is about the restoration of peace in the country that was formed based on independence, adherence to human rights and good governance.

The findings have revealed that the emergence of December 2013 politically triggered conflict resulted from incomplete adherence to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). There are several reasons for this, including mistrust among political and military leaders as well as political domination across the country by some political leaders or political parties. In view of these findings, this study deduces that occurrence of conflict on 15 December 2013 could have been avoided on condition that CPA could have been implemented completely.

It was expected that the CPA was meant to govern South Sudanese exported oil through Sudan using the major oil pipeline. The protocol ended without any consensus on the modalities for its implementation. Therefore, economic development of South Sudan was affected yet it formed a basis at which political and ethnic stability remained mutually binding. However, the government of South Sudan was forced to adopt austerity measures meant to counter any adverse economic impact because of the oil export closer. This made the citizens to dissent the government thus increasing the possibility of ethnic divisions. In this situation, political differences were created which majorly contributed to the conflict.

Placed in the context of the theory of Liberalism, the unprecedented security challenges in South Sudan are indicators of the path towards stabilizing the country. It should be noted that the country is in the early stages of building a nation and the emergence of such conflict was inevitable following the rushed implementation of the CPA. According to the Liberalism theory, there exists significant interdependence between economic development and political ideologies. In this context, responsive political ideologies support economic development while economic resources define the political ideologies. It is from such interdependence that peace is constructed and maintained.

However, in South Sudan persistence of conflict is linked to management of economic resources. The adherence to political and economic principle of equity, transparency and accountability is weak hence the elusive peace. This situation has made worse by ethnic hatred and tension that has degenerated into armed conflict perpetrated by the political elites. The differences in interests between Machar and Kiir epitomizes the situation among different ethnic groups with varied social and economic interests. Unless this situation is reversed, the country will further plunge into one of the worst civil and armed conflicts in the world.

On the second objective about peace support operations in South Sudan, the study established that UNMISS was deployed to the country to improve humanitarian condition. In respect to the dire situation characterized by unprecedented human suffering in South Sudan, UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan is relevant in the war-torn nation. The presence of UNMISS in South Sudan since 2013 has been significant in giving civilians assurances of their security. The revised mandate of UNMISS has enabled the mission to offer protection to civilians, monitor and investigate human rights, support ceasefire agreement implementation and enable conditions for humanitarian assistance. The role and presence of UNMISS is an opportunity for restoring the elusive peace in South Sudan.

In South Sudan, the model of peace support operations is different as the AU's intervention is focused on eliminating the aggression between Government of South Sudan Forces and rebels. The establishment and deployment of UNMISS in 2011 was considered as an opportunity for restoring elusive peace in South Sudan. UNMISS was therefore expected to consolidate peace and security in preparation for the formation of the new Government of South Sudan. The focus was on strengthening security capacity for the new government. Also, it was expected that by 9th July 2011 mandate of UNMISS was supposed to have ended. This situation indicated that presence of UNMISS was not expected beyond a confirmed peaceful and stable South Sudan. It is the unfortunate event of 15 December 2013 that led extension of UNMISS mandate.

Regarding the extension of the mandate, it is important to indicate that UNMISS was causing fatigue among the parties engaged in the conflict. The perception was that UNMISS was considered as an enemy by either party hence the need to frustrate its efforts. This was against the expectations of UNMISS in terms of protecting civilians, monitoring of human rights and humanitarian assistance. Findings of the study have indicated that civilians were not protected,

and humanitarian assistance remained a challenge. The challenges encountered by UNMISS therefore emanate from its presence before independence and the extension of the mandate. This situation made the government as well as rebel leaders consider UNMISS as a party in the conflict that prevented their agenda. It can therefore be concluded that UNMISS remained ineffective due to perceptions of conflict actors.

Placed in the context of Liberalism theory, the problem of democracy arising from different political interests coupled with ethnic tension in South Sudan has resulted into profound implications on national, regional and international security. The increased human suffering with impacts going beyond South Sudan provided a justification for the intervention from the international community. According to the Liberalism theory, the implementations of democracy functions as the basis for global peace and this necessitated the deployment of UNMISS. The deployment was done within the framework of international law as political, social and economic aspects in South Sudan are linked to international systems. The presence of UNMISS in South Sudan is therefore justified and the roles are relevant to the international systems.

Despite the justified presence of UNMISS, findings of third objective about challenges of the mission in South Sudan revealed that the mission is facing critical challenges. Findings of this study have revealed that UN compounds sites are not secure. This situation becomes worse as more civilians join the UN protection sites resulting into crowding and logistical challenges. In view of this finding, there are indications that UN facilities overstretched and this increases risk of ineffective protection of civilians.

This study has also found that lack of adequate humanitarian facilities due to influx of internally displaced persons has resulted into challenges related to overcrowding such as outbreak of diseases and stress among the people seeking humanitarian support. This situation has been

worsened by government restrictions that limit entry of other humanitarian actors to ease out the burden. Regarding the overstretched facilities, this study concludes that unless the conflict is resolved, the UN sites will always be considered a safer place despite the risks associated with overcrowding. Also, it can be concluded that unless the government lifts restrictions on entry of other humanitarian actors, the situation will not improve hence more humanitarian crisis.

Poor management was also cited as a major challenge encountered by UNMISS. This study established that there is lack of leadership coupled with lack of fragmented response. Outstanding is the implementation of the UN house expectations about command of UNMISS in respect to the realities in South Sudan and formations of each of the battalions. These unprecedented outcomes have resulted into conflicting orders and underutilization of the forces. This study concludes that inadequate resources coupled with poor leadership has rendered the mission ineffective.

This study has also established that there is weak political will and commitment. Since the extension of the mandate of UNMISS, political parties and leadership have expressed dissatisfaction. The resistance of the parties to operations of UNMISS is evident as the relationship between UNMISS and Government of South Sudan has deteriorated. This situation has also been made worse by the government's decision to prevent UNMISS peacekeepers from patrolling in armored vehicles or using air-support for operations. In view of this finding, the study concludes that the rationale of having peacekeepers in South Sudan is not considered necessary hence exposing civilians to more humanitarian crisis.

The challenge on lack of peace to keep seems to be the most outstanding factor that has continued to put mandate of UNMISS into question. Effective peacekeeping is significantly dependent on existing peace, yet peace agreement or framework has never been in place. This

has been attributed to several factors including lack of adherence to CPA. Attempts of brokering peace deals has not been successful as the parties continue renegading. In this situation, UNMISS will continue to be ineffective as peace is not guaranteed unless the peace is made available for UNMISS to support keeping of such peace.

This study also established that increased attacks on UN infrastructure has continued to render UNMISS ineffective. With a sole purpose of protecting civilians, attacks on UN infrastructure intended to protect civilians is a threat to the lives of civilians. This study concludes that unless attacks on UN infrastructure is stopped, key facilities meant to protect the civilians will be destroyed thus exposing civilians to more dangers.

Regarding the challenges encountered by UNMISS, this study concludes that the challenges are internal as UNMISS internal capacity is not responsive to the dynamics of the conflict. This characterized by inadequate resources and poor leadership. The external challenges include increasing risks of attack, government restrictions, weak political commitment and lack of peace to keep. The combination of internal and external challenges threatens the achievement of the mandate of UNMISS.

In view of the findings of this study, it is clear that the warring parties are likely not to end the conflict and the atrocities are likely to continue. The civilians are likely to continue suffering due to scourge of conflict. The only hope is from protection from UNMISS in the protection of civilian sites (POC). Several challenges have emerged in the protection of civilians by UNMISS but increasing capacity of UNMISS could improve their safety and security.

This study considers that structural challenges in South Sudan are significantly limiting peace support operations. Thus, hypothesis stating that inadequate capacity of UNMISS has significantly contributed to humanitarian crisis in South Sudan is rejected since the structural

causes of the conflict are resulting into humanitarian crisis. The study therefore concludes that the challenges of peacekeeping operations in South Sudan between 2011 and 2016 can be resolved if the political, economic and social issues in the country are resolved and sustainable peace agreement made so that UNMISS becomes effective.

5.2 Recommendations

The government of South Sudan should allow UNMISS to execute its mandate without limiting their activities and freedom of movement. This can be done by upholding the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which was signed even before the UN deployed. It should also permit full deployment of RPF including importation and movement of UNMISS logistical materials and equipment. In this regards the UNMISS will be able to respond to any crisis on violation of the mandate. There should be honest and structured engagement of the opposition to realize a lasting solution in the restoration of peace.

The opposition parties should cease attacks on UNMISS to reduce civilian suffering and destruction of UN infrastructure. UNMISS is mandated to protect the civilians and the opposition parties should uphold the international humanitarian law and law of armed conflict. They should also cease from preventing civilians from reaching UN sites. The civilians try to access the UN sites for protection. The opposition parties should also engage the government of South Sudan in dialogue for restoration of peace. The conflict can only be found through structured dialogue which the government and opposition parties they commit to.

UNMISS should endeavor to document and report all cases of violence as provided for in the Security Council Resolution 2304. It should also use its mechanism in its engagement with relevant authorities to acquire adequate land that will be used by RPF troops. UNMISS should make more effort based on the expansion of mandate to ensure that the civilians are protected.

Response time in case of violation of human rights should be reduced. It should also conduct aggressive civil-military campaign in efforts to assure the local population and also manage their expectation.

The United Nations Security Council should create an opportunity for Salvar Kiir and Machar to have dialogue and end the conflict by committing to a peace agreement. This activity can be delegated to IGAD which supported the brokering of peace between South Sudan and Sudan. It should also make efforts of forcing the government to allow unlimited restrictions to RDF including armament. This will enable quick response.

The UN Security Council should limit use of weapons by imposing arms embargo and more emphasis should be restriction on the use of heavy weapons against non-combatants and also act on the actions by the government in restricting the deployment and employment of RDF. The protection of civilians can only be assured when there is peace and the UNMISS forces are allowed unobstructed access.

UN Security Council should engage all its mechanisms towards achievement of a lasting peace by have structural solutions that involve engagement of all parties. This can be done through structured dialogue between the actors in the conflict.

UN Security Council should increase capacity of UNMISS by improving financial, human and capital resources to allow for more civilians protected in many UN sites. More funding and additional troops can help in protection of civilians.UN Security Council should ensure leadership and command of UNMISS is in tandem with UN House command links. This ensures good command and control of all troops deployed in the pursuit of UN mandate.

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APPENDIXES

Figure 1: UN Protection Site in Malakal

Source: IOM, 2015

Figure 2 Arrival of Nepalese Peacekeepers to increase capacity of UNMISS in Juba

Source: HPN, 2017

Figure 3 Civilians receiving food rations in Jonglei State


Source: ICRC, 2015

Table 1: Major attacks on Humanitarian Actors, 2011-2016

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Total killed	2	9	15	11	15	22	74
Total injured	2	10	31	10	25	30	108
Total kidnapped	0	6	0	2	2	0	10
Total affected	4	25	46	23	42	52	192

Source: HPN, 2017

Figure 4: Tactics and Types of Violence

Source: HPN, 2017

Figure 5 Fire Damage on POC Site in Malakal

Source: IOM, 2016