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Captured Stock.

<u>Camels</u>	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Sheep & Goats</u>	<u>Ponies</u>
370	533	2,546	3

Note.- The above includes the sum total of all stock captured,
killed or brought in as fines.

Captured & Surrendered Rifles.

Rifles.	Revolvers.	Ammunition. rounds
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Rer Tulha	17	3	6
Rer Hassan	14	-	12
Ben	3	-	-
Rer Garrad	1	1	2
Rer Ahmed Wet	2	-	-
Rer Alidera	-	-	-
Total:-	37	4	19

Ulli,
March 1914.

B. L. Ward, Captain
Staff Officer to the Maratha Force.

Captured Stock.

<u>Camels</u>	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Sheep & Goats</u>	<u>Ponies</u>
370	533	2,546	3

Note.- The above includes the sum total of all stock captured, killed or brought in as fines.

Captured & Surrendered Rifles.

	Rifles.	Revolvers.	Ammunition. Rounds
Rif Talha	17	3	6
Rif Hassan	14	-	12
Ben	8	-	-
Rif Garrad	1	1	-
Rif Ahmed Nat	2	-	-
Rif Alidra	-	-	-
Total:-	37	4	18

11,
March 1914.

J. B. Edwards
Staff Officer to the Marshal Force.

Garrison

Captured Stock.

<u>Camels</u>	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Sheep & Goats</u>	<u>Ponies</u>
370	583	2,546	3

Note.- The above includes the sum total of all stock captured,
killed or brought in as fines.

Captured & Surrendered Rifles.

	Rifles.	Revolvers.	Ammunition. rounds
Rer Tulha	17	3	6
Rer Hassan	14	-	12
Ben	3	-	7
Rer Garrad	1	1	-
Rer Ahmed Wet	2	-	-
Rer Alidera	-	-	-
Total:-	37	4	18

11,
March 1914.

J. H. D.

Re: Office to the Merchant Force.

A

Casualties.

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Approximate enemies casualties.

Place	Dated	Killed	wounded	Remarks.
idelie	Dec. 15th	4	5	
errebahare	Dec. 25th	1	-	
Sogalti	Jan. 21st	15	10	13 killed owned to now by Tulha alone.
angi	Feb. 8th	4	-	
errebahare	Feb. 13th	1	-	
arnwen Hos	Feb 25th	5	3	
akalla	Feb. 27th	7	4	
ebeli	28th.			
arrailli	Mar. 4th	1	-	
ugh (near)	Mar. 6th	3	2	
hasso	Mar. 7th	3	-	
	Mar. 9th	-	1	
Total	--	44	25	

44 killed and 25 wounded.

Our casualties:

elie	Dec. 15th	1	-
galti	Jan. 21st	-	4
errebahare	Feb. 13th	1	1
rnwen Hos	Feb. 28th.	1	1
Total	--	3	6

3 killed and 6 wounded.

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18. Extracts from Staff Diary, Returns
rifles surrendered, captured and confiscated
stock, and casualties are attached.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant.

P R Graham. Lieutenant-Colonel.

COMMANDING MERRIMAN FORCE

I regret I do not know his name. The Italians watched every crossing place on the river and incessantly patrolled the bank and were employing more men between Bardera and Lugh, inclusive of garrison than there were in Serenli and the Ferhan country.

The Italian Resident most kindly allowed me to leave my surplus baggage at Lugh when I moved westwards, and on his suggestion I left some sick in his Hospital.

Captured stock and sick baggage camels proceeded to Serenli via Bardera through Italian territory.

15. The health and behaviour of the troops has been excellent. The conditions have been trying as the shade temperature has varied from 100 to 110.

15. While at Lugh I sold the following stock 16 milk camels, 16 meat and young camels and 16 cattle, which realised Rs.896 after deducting the auctioneers fees. This amount will be credited to Government.

17. The presence of captured stock necessitates the employment of men to guard it and I am allowing men as necessary with every regard to economy, I hope His Excellency will approve my action. I hope I may be able to pay them with stock eventually. I have already by wireless asked you for instructions regarding the disposal of stock.

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15. The health and behaviour of the troops has been excellent. The conditions have been trying as the shade temperature has varied from 100 to 110.

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22

food supplies. In the meantime I am sending out Major Somers with 'B' and 'C' Companies 1st King's African Rifles and some Somalis to relieve the detachment at Garrebahare and to seize the occasion to make an inland patrol North from Garrebahare as nothing still would most certainly be misinterpreted by the Merhan. Unfortunately there are only some 65 really fit camels available.

13. With the arrival of food supplies and improvement in the condition of camels I will move to Garrebahare and propose forming two bases from which flying columns will act.

14. Before closing this report I wish to draw His Excellency's attention to the extraordinary and unfailing kindness and assistance of all the Italian Officers. I understand my predecessor has already had occasion to do this and it is common talk here that had it not been for the Italians the beri-beri outbreak would have had even more disastrous results than it had.

When the force left Serenli with the permission of the Resident at Bardera, the Italian Medical Officer came over to Serenli every other day to attend to Lieut Bentinck. Bardera is three miles from Serenli and I hope I shall not be considered out of order if I suggest that His Excellency's personal thanks would be much appreciated and that the Doctor in question has earned some mark of appreciation perhaps in addition to a professional fee from the British Government.

22

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- 9 -

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no means convinced, the Rer Tulha will eventually comply with the fine C imposed viz 500 camels, 600 cattle and 1000 sheep and goats. The fine is severe but by no means excessive and I am of opinion that the infliction of a minor fine would only be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

It has since transpired that Hassan Deba would not come in earlier as he was afraid of being made a prisoner. I told him on arrival he was at absolute liberty to leave my camp at any time, he was supplied with food and I hope the treatment he received will dispel what I am afraid is the prevalent idea that any man tendering his submission will promptly be imprisoned.

11. The submission of the Tulha will I hope so ease the situation that I may be able to carry on with the arrival of more food supplies without the aid of the 4th Battalion Companies who for the present must remain in Gobwen and Yenti. Their arrival has been noised abroad and has had an excellent effect.

12. The difficulty now is the moving of the Mfudu stores. Owing to the prolonged dry weather the grazing near Serenli has been nil and we have lost a large number of camels of those left behind and the ones that accompanied the patrol naturally require rations. I hope in a month's time there will be enough but I dare not risking them in bringing up stores from Mfudu for fear of fly and I have written to the Director of Supply and Transport to send us the Indian camels via

no means convinced, the Rer Tulha will eventually comply with the fine G imposed viz 500 camels, 600 cattle and 2600 sheep and goats. The fine is severe but by no means excessive and I am of opinion that the infliction of a minor fine would only be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

It has since transpired that Hassan Deba would not come in earlier as he was afraid of being made a prisoner. I told him on arrival he was at absolute liberty to leave my camp at any time, he was supplied with food and I hope the treatment he received will dispel what I am afraid is the prevalent idea that any man tendering his submission will promptly be imprisoned.

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12. The difficulty now is the moving of the Mfudu stores. Owing to the prolonged dry weather the grazing near Serenli has been nil and we have lost a large number of camels of those left behind and the ones that accompanied the patrol naturally require a rest. I hope in a month's time they will again but I dare not utilise them to bring the stores from Mfudu for fear of the men I may have to go the Director of Supply and Transport to send up the Indian camel

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vicinity of Lugh. The Italian Commissario and Resident both proceeded to Dolo presumably to discuss the Abyssinian raid through Italian territory.

I was faced with what to me was a very difficult problem. I was and am still personally of opinion that further immigration of Somalis in to the East Africa Protectorate should be stopped, vide also Captain Balkeld's letter copy of which was forwarded to me under cover of your S.4601 dated 11th February 1914, but here was a large number of Somalis - said to be nearly 1000 including women and children - anxious to come into British Territory, I could not force them all back and I actually had with me some Aulishan illaloes, If I attempted force I might drive them to join hands with the Merahan and the knowledge of the Secretary of State's orders that refugee Beran were to be allowed into British territory made me decide that I should be acting more in accordance with His Excellency's wishes if I allowed them to cross - I stipulated they should surrender all arms and ammunition and supply 50 baggage camels - I hope His Excellency will approve my action in this matter.

10. I arrived at Lollashie on the 10th February and found the Bar Tukha had surrendered - some rifles and were now showing a desire for peace. I sent out messengers and promised their chief "iman", but it was not till the 21st February that the Head Chief Hassan Deba came to my camp. I think, but feel by

deal with the Ahmed Wet who are unquestionably the section most strongly opposed the Government.

8. The only incident on the march to Lugh occurred on the 6th February at Meraille a skirmish with the Somali section in which two Ahmed Wet were killed and two wounded. An Italian Officer Commanding a patrol informed me that on the previous day 500 camels and 1000 cattle had watered here.

9. While nearing Lugh I received information that a large number of Aulihan Rer Ali had crossed Juba to our side. I moved on the Jabrasso and interviewed the elders who informed they had left their own country owing to their being continually being raided by the Mullah and put themselves under Abyssinian control. It appears to have been a case of from the frying pan into the fire as to use their own expression they were "eaten up" by the Abyssinians. They had enormous quantities of stock and I can only wonder what this must have amounted to prior to the "eating up" process. They begged to be allowed to come under the British Government and to attach themselves to their own chief Haile Abdrraham Mursal. The Abyssinians had chased them up through Italian territory and had actually fired on them while crossing the river. I was informed that the Abyssinians would not allow any stay longer in the

I came to the conclusion that there was little stock in the neighbourhood and that it was a waste of time operating from Maralla and decided to return to Garrebahare. En route to Hambali a few shots were fired and two of the enemy's illatees killed.

6. The Far Ogas chiefs came into Garrebahare and assured me their loyalty to Government. I informed them I was perfectly satisfied they had been playing a double game but that the past was past and that they could decide now which side they would join. As a proof of their own doubtful attitude I would mention that Deria Chakool came to Serenli to see me and I told him to supply 20 baggage camels for the Garrebahare force and that I would give him three milik camels for every one supplied. Among Somalis a milik camel is a good deal more valuable than a baggage camel. He only brought in some dozen camels after my own arrival at Garrebahare thereby futile my idea to give some transport to the force in Garrebahare to enable it to co-operate with me in case of need.

V. Information at Garrebahare pointed to the Ahmed Wet watering on the river between Lolleashid and Dukh and I decided to move along the river.

At Lolleashid the Far Ogas supplied 20 milik camels and stated the Far Tulin were numerous. By this I was convinced that the Far Ogas were with me and considered it unnecessary

I consider the bombardment there was little stock in the neighbourhood and that it was a waste of time operating from Maralla and decided to return to Garrebahare. On route to Hushbuli a few shots were fired and two of the enemy's illaloes killed.

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7. Information at Garrebahare pointed to the Ahmed Wet watering on the river between Lolleeshid and Luch and I decided to move along the river.

At Lolleeshid the Far Ogas supplied 20 illaloes and stated the Far Tulha were anxious for peace. I was impressed by the truth of this and concluded it was time to

The stock belonged to Her Tuluhs and we arrived at Garrebaheere on the following day.

5. I immediately sent for the Far Ogas chief who did not come in and I decided to move on Makalla. Accordingly on the 26th I moved out with the force as per margin and arrived at Humbali without seeing anything. On the next morning I left my transport at Humbali with half a company and left camp at 2 a.m. reaching Makalla about 9 a.m. We killed and captured 5 camels and 500 sheep and goats, a very disappointing result.

I utilised the few riding camels for scouting purposes but only a few illaloes were seen and one man was killed.

I decided to occupy for the night both Makalla and Humbali and sent Major Scouthe back to the latter place with half the force. Our move was a surprise as some stock came to water at Humbali after my move to Makalla and was captured by the half company.

That night my camp was fired into at 7 p.m. and again at midnight on the second occasion fairly heavily, but the enemy's shooting was high. My own opinion is that there were only some 50 men outside with perhaps 20 to 30 rifles, though some accounts say there were 300. Next morning 4 beddoes were found, one 35 yards from our kafirs and another 100 yards away. Both were

British Officers
Medical Officer
Asst. Surgeon
'A' Coy 1/K.A.R.
'D' Coy 3/K.A.R.
'E' Coy 4/K.A.R.
'H' Coy 1/K.A.R.
'I' Coy 3/K.A.R.
Details 3/K.A.R.
Total 371 Rank & File
12m. Guns
Armed Syces
Camel Drivers
Baggage camels.

British Officers
Medical Officer
Asst. Surgeon
'A' Coy 1/K.A.R.
'B' Coy 3/K.A.R.
'C' Coy 4/K.A.R.
'D' Coy 1/K.A.R.
'E' Coy 3/K.A.R.
Details 3/K.A.R.
Total 371 Rank & File
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Armed Syces
Camel Drivers
Baggage camels.

The stock belonged to Far Tuluhs and we arrived at Garrebahare on the following day. I immediately sent for the Far Ogas chief who did not come in and I decided to move on Makalla. Accordingly on the 25th I moved out with the force as per margin and arrived at Humbali without seeing anything. On the next morning I left my transport at Humbali with half a company and left camp at 2.a.m. reaching Makalla about 8.a.m. We killed and captured 5 camels and 300 sheep and goats, a very disappointing result. I utilised the few riding camels for scouting purposes but only a few illalows were seen and one man was killed.

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That night my camp was fired into at 7.p.m. and again at midnight on the second occasion fairly heavily, but the enemy's shooting was high. My own opinion is that there were only some 50 men outside with perhaps 20 to 30 rifles, though some accounts say there were 300. Next morning 4 bodies were found, one 40 yards from our veranda and there were several large pools of blood and

(iii) I had to consider the possibility of my not being able to make Garrebahare for the following reasons :-

- (a) The almost extraordinary unanimity of the Merchan information I received that the Merchan had combined to oppose my advance in force.
- (b) Every letter I received from Garrebahare complained of the increasing difficulty of getting any information at all, which tended to show the tribes were combining against the Government.
- (c) In the event of a fight, which I confidently expected, and the probable occurrence of casualties the difficulties of taking wounded men to Garrebahare or as an alternative having to bring them back to Serenli.
- (d) The risk of being held up in the waterless tract between Parnwen Dur and Garrebahare.
- (e) Last but far from least the unsatisfactory behaviour of the men of 'A' Company 1st King's African Rifles at Bogolti. This is a subject on which I prefer not to deal with in this report as I should have to touch on what might appear to be irrelevant matter.

6. The Aulham illaloes commenced arriving in Serenli on the 14th February and I decided to move out on the 17th. As I knew the terrain of the country and as there were no signs of rising trouble with the Bediades