

EAST AFR. PROT  
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REC

Date  
Booring  
1917  
10 Aug

SOMALI UNREST IN NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICTS

Gives resume of occurrences so that a decision may be come to in the event of his having to recommend punitive measure against Aulihan.

1917  
10 Aug

Last previous Paper.  
Sur  
48910

sent with [unclear]

~~Mr. F. [unclear]~~  
Mr. G. Fielder + 49981 in lower [unclear]

I am glad to think that the situation in Jubaland is no longer what it was when the despatch was written. The despatch is contemporaneous with 36447 and 39931; since then two Oag has recommended, and two S. of S. has approved, such punitive measures against the Aulihan (beyond the occupation of Beeni) as local resources permit. (45902)

Copy to [unclear]

Next subsequent Paper.  
40  
51400

It does not seem necessary to  
comment on the historical portion  
of the despatch; it is merely  
a careful summary of events  
with which we are familiar in  
detail. The most striking  
point in the despatch is the  
account of the ~~disputed~~ situation  
which followed on Col. Barre's  
patrol from Kisanagu through  
Afuadu, Et Waki, Wajheir,  
and the Marhan country to  
Kughi. On the one hand, this  
march aroused <sup>among the various tribes</sup> an expectation  
of vigorous action against the  
Aulhian which it would  
have been dangerous not to  
justify; on the other, it drove  
the Aulhian to take action;  
they almost won over the  
Mohammed Zubair to their cause.

and were within an ace of 315  
attacking the Park <sup>Station</sup> ~~at~~ at  
Washington. Hence arose a situation  
which caused some anxiety, and  
the need for ~~action~~ comprehensive  
action against the Anlihan became  
acute.

The Oag's telegram of 9<sup>th</sup>  
September refers to this aspect  
of the situation, but it has not  
before been so clearly emphasized  
as in this despatch.

The situation will now have  
changed, as already explained. But  
having regard to the somewhat  
serious tone of the last paragraphs,  
I think it would be well worth  
while to tel. to Oag, as in  
draft submitted herewith. ~~Some~~

~~Some~~  
~~Some~~

AFRICA PROTECTORATE.

No. 132

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,  
NAIROBI,  
BRITISH EAST AFRICA.CONFIDENTIAL

August 10th, 1917.

Sir,

With reference to the correspondence ending with your cypher telegram of the 23rd of July and particularly to the final paragraph of my cypher telegram of the 15th idem I have the honour to address you on the general question of the attitude of the Somali tribes in Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District as it appears to me at the present time. This attitude is the natural corollary of a sequence of events which have periodically been communicated to you in the précis which have been prepared in the Secretariat but I think it desirable to furnish you with as brief a resume as possible of these occurrences and to show how far they are mutually interdependent in order that all the information necessary to enable you to come to a decision may be before you if it should happen that I have to recommend early punitive measures against the Aulihan.

*no 2644*  
From Mr. Butler  
23. 6. 17

From Mr. Kitter-  
master  
30. 6. 17 *354*

From Mr. Butler  
4. 7. 17

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WALTER LONG, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,

DOWNING STREET,

LONDON, S.W.

Aulinan. The places to which I shall have occasion to refer are to be found on the sheets 'Marsabit' and 'Mombasa' 1: 1,000,000, copies of which have already been sent to you.

2. The sack of Serenli took place in February 1916 and was the work of a band of 500 Aulinan under the leadership of Abdurrahman Mursaal who claims to be the chieftain of all the Ogaden Somali in East Africa. His claims to this position are, however, not recognized by the Government nor are they, I believe, acceptable to the various sections of the tribe, but at the time of the attack he had probably seen more service under the Government and possessed as much, if not more, influence than any other Somali. He is a man of undoubted attainments and his years gave added weight to his advice.

3. Realizing that the result of his adventure would be to render him to all intents and purposes an outlaw, he immediately set himself to win the sympathies of the other sections of Somali tribes by threats and intrigues and he no doubt hoped that the flame of insurrection would quickly spread through the country in which case his power would be enormously enhanced and his punishment for his crime possibly indefinitely deferred. To enable the position in which

he

he found himself to be clearly understood it will be desirable for me to state shortly the districts in which the various Somali tribes reside and their probable attitude towards him.

In the extreme north, from the Daua river to Serenli, were the Marehan, sufficiently strong in numbers to render him valuable assistance, but not of Ogaden descent. Moreover, they bore a grudge against the Aulihan by reason of the help afforded to us by that tribe in the Marehan expedition of 1913, and it must therefore have been clear to Abdurrahman Mursaal that they would not jeopardize their position in the eyes of the Government by allying themselves with him unless the rebellion threatened to become general.

Marching with the southern boundary of the Marehan was the district of the northern Aulihan themselves, stretching south along the Juba river at least as far as Salagli. Next come the Bartiri, a small tribe who were implicated in the Serenli affair and then, passing through the Gosha country, we enter the Herti lands in the neighbourhood of Kismayu and extending inland as far as the Deshek Wema. These people are not Ogaden by descent and have in past years developed into peaceful traders. They might be regarded as unwilling and unlikely to afford him any assistance.

Some 90 miles to the west from Kismayu in the well area of Afmadu were the Mohamed Zubeir,

Zubeir, an Ogaden tribe and the most powerful in Jubaland. An alliance between this tribe and the Aulihan would probably have resulted in a general insurrection.

In the vicinity of the Lorian Swamp and the Tana river were the Abd Wak and Abdullah, both Ogaden tribes of no great strength, and long cherishing a hatred of the Mohamed Zubeir, while in the area known as Chare were the Maghabul, another Ogaden tribe of little military importance.

At Wajheir were the Habr Suliman the tribe of the Prophet, with a considerable number of Dagodia, a powerful section from Abyssinia who had emigrated from that country across the Dawa river, and the camel-owning people of the Mohamed Zubeir, while to the south were the Aulihan Rer Jibrail, generally known as the Southern Aulihan.

3. From the above it will be clear that the cooperation of the Mohamed Zubeir was essential to Abdurrahman Mursaal if he was to maintain himself in Jubaland, and there can be no doubt that he made the most strenuous efforts to gain their allegiance. Immediately after the attack on Serenli, the Tur Adi Aulihan raided some Gosha villages, which step was almost certainly prompted by the desire to cause widespread alarm throughout a non-combatant community and to impress the Mohamed

Mohamed Zubeir with a sense of the Aulihan power. For a long time the position was serious, as the young men of the Mohamed Zubeir were very restless, but luckily the old men remained firm and the danger was for the time being averted, the arrival in Kismayu of the Arab Rifles and the presence of a man-of-war in the offing being important contributory factors. Simultaneously Abdurrahman Mursaal approached the Marehan, giving them to understand that Abyssinian levies would at his wish descend upon Jubaland from the north, but the tribe preferred to adopt an indecisive attitude and to await the trend of events.

4. About this time also, Abdurrahman Mursaal was reported to have solicited assistance from the Mullah of Somaliland and to be in close communication with one Sheikh Ali Nairobi, a very influential man residing at Bardera in Italian Somaliland, on the Juba river opposite Serenli. It was believed that this man was contemplating the crossing of the river into British territory where his presence would certainly have been inimical to our interests, but the Italian authorities, with their customary willingness to help, readily acceded to our request for his surveillance and removed him to Mogadiscio.

5. As regards the southern tribes, the Aulihan sections south of Wajheir had in  
December

We had with  
heard of  
this before  
[87]



December 1915 carried out a very extensive raid on the Samburu, no doubt at the instigation of Abdurrahman Mursaal, but the prompt and vigorous measures taken against them by the administrative officers in the neighbourhood had left them disinclined to test the power of the Government more severely. It is fortunate that this was so, as they would have found sympathisers in the Habr Suliman, the Dagodia, and the Maghabul in the vicinity of Wajheir.

6. In the meantime, the Government Station at Wajheir was evacuated in view of the probability of an attack by Abdurrahman Mursaal and the apprehension that the Mohamed Zubeir in that district would in such an event assist him. - Later, when both these contingencies appeared reasonably remote, a reoccupation was ordered and the defences of the station have subsequently been so improved that all danger of a successful attack may be said to have disappeared provided that reasonable precautionary measures are taken.

7. In March 1916 the situation improved. Raids by the Marehan on the Aulihan had been reported, the Mohamed Zubeir still held aloof, a Police Service Battalion had arrived at Merti, a Government station on the Sirra plateau by the Uaso Nyiro river, and an attack by the Fai Section of the Dagodia on the Boran near

Wajheir

Wajheir had failed owing to the action of Haji Hassan, the Mohamed Zubeir headman who had been left in charge of the station. The position was however less satisfactory in the country occupied by the Garreh, natives of the Northern Frontier District, to the west of the Marehan. On the evacuation of Wajheir it had become necessary to order the withdrawal of the administrative officer from this district which was in consequence threatened by the Dagodia on the north and the Marehan to the east, while in their midst were numerous Murulleh, cousins of the Dagodia, who had settled among them and though ostensibly friendly had secretly cooperated with raiding parties. This region has possibly suffered more than any other in recent years from the westward flow of Somali immigration and the Garreh are entitled to all the assistance we can give them.

8. At the end of April of the same year the first proposal for the reoccupation of Serenli was received from Captain H. Rayne but after referring the question to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief it was decided that any such action must be deferred.

9. For the next few months Abdurrahman Mursali and his band of followers appear to have wandered from waterhole to waterhole in the interior, chiefly in the area lying between Eil Wak and Serenli. He is thought

to have made more than one effort to break through the Marehan country into Abyssinia and it is substantiated that dissensions occurred among the different sections of which his adherents were composed. The greater portion of the southern Aulihan had by this time expressed their disapproval of his action and he was, during the summer months of 1916, to all intents and purposes completely isolated. Indeed, after the onset of the rainy season when any hostile manifestation on the part of the other tribes might have been expected to appear, our chief anxiety was with regard to the animosity shown by the Dagodia towards the Garreh. The administrative officer in charge, with his police, was at Buna while the greater portion of the tribe was in the vicinity of Eil Wak. No fight on a large scale had yet taken place but several murders had been committed on both sides.

10. In July news came of the expected battle at Dadatch Korm Addou. The Garreh, assisted by Abyssinian Tigre, appear to have been the aggressors in the hope that by taking the initiative they would forestall an attack upon themselves. This action was the natural result of the constant raids conducted by the two tribes on each other since the departure of the administrative officer in March. In the first attack the Garreh lost

62 killed and the Dagodia 52 while in the second attack the Garren lost 4 killed, the number of the Dagodia casualties being unknown. After the second attack the Dagodia fled east along the river Daua and were said to have crossed into Abyssinia beyond Malka Dakka. As the Garren in addition captured probably between 3000 and 4000 camels and 5000 sheep and goats they may be considered to have inflicted a severe defeat upon their foes and to have freed themselves of their encroachment for some time to come.

11. In September the reoccupation of Serenli was seriously discussed but, as you are aware, no action was taken in view of the wishes expressed by the Army Council. In the same month reports were received of repeated successful attacks on the Aulihan by the Marehan. There appears to be little doubt that at this juncture Abdurrahman Mursaal would willingly have left British territory if possible.

12. In January Abdurrahman Mursaal was reported to be moving against Mfudu but, if this was the case, he evidently thought himself insufficiently strong to attack and returned to the neighbourhood of Serenli. In all other respects the situation appeared unchanged but in that month an event took place which, though it appeared at the time to

to be of little general importance, was destined to have far-reaching consequences. As the result of a representation by the officer in charge of the Northern Frontier District that the southern Aulihan were not paying off the fine imposed on them for their raid on the Samburu in December 1915 the Governor ordered Lieut. Colonel Barrett to proceed from Kismayu and to patrol the district. After carrying out this order Lieut. Colonel Barrett, at Mr. Kittermaster's request, proceeded to Wajheir where he learnt that the Dagodia were making preparations to avenge themselves on the Garreh for their defeat in June. The administrative officer, with his small body of police, had returned to the Daua river after the fight and his position there had again become precarious as our prestige with the tribe could hardly be expected to survive a second evacuation on the part of the Government while his force was totally inadequate to afford them any material assistance if they were again attacked. After consultation with Mr. Kittermaster, therefore, Lieut. Colonel Barrett proceeded to Eil Wak and thence through the Marehan country by which means he hoped to thwart any inclination which that tribe might have to join the Dagodia. He ultimately arrived at Lugh.

13. As the result of his inspection, he was convinced that the Marehan would not offer any

any opposition; - indeed, they hastened to approach him with protestations of friendship and willingness to assist - and as he knew that all the other tribes would at least remain neutral for some time after they had witnessed the march of a British force, however small it may have been, right through the interior of the country, he felt justified in considering the Aulihan as isolated and in stating that in his opinion Serenli could be occupied immediately without difficulty. His telegram to this effect arrived here at the end of April and in it he mentioned that the situation as regards the Dagodia was for the time being safe as the river Dausa was in flood and impossible to cross. An additional argument put forward by him was the presence near the border of one Sheikh Mohamed Yusuf, an influential Somali resident of Abyssinia, who was seeking to incite all the Moslem tribes to revolt.

14. I immediately referred Lieut. Colonel Barrett's telegram to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief who replied requesting further information on certain points. By the time this information was ready, the news had arrived that Lieut. General Hoskins was shortly proceeding to England and I therefore asked him if he could arrange to visit Nairobi en route in order that I might have the advantage.

advantage of discussing the question personally  
 with him before communicating with you, and it  
 was not therefore till the 7th of June that my  
 first telegram was despatched. Owing however  
 to various reasons your final approval did not  
 reach me till the 24th of July and in the  
 meantime a very serious situation has arisen.

15. There is not the slightest doubt  
 but that on learning of Lieut. Colonel Barrett's  
 movement from Kismayu to Wajheir and the north  
 the entire native population expected to see  
 vigorous action taken at once against the  
 Aulihan. It is moreover not surprising that  
 they should have been unable to appreciate the  
 causes of the delay and as time went on and  
 no move was made their conviction became less  
 certain and latterly has gradually yielded to  
 positive mistrust. It is also not difficult  
 to imagine the feelings of Abdurrahman Mursaal,  
 who, after every hope had been taken from him  
 except that of one last fight for existence,  
 found that possibly there was still left to him  
 one loophole of escape. If he could  
 successfully attack Wajheir, who could say  
 what might not happen? He collected his  
 followers and without delay marched to Ribba  
 on the Eil-Wak road. Here he found, among  
 others, the camel-owning people of the Mohamed  
 Zubeir and, by playing on their feelings by  
 depicting the cowardice and treachery of the  
 Government and by promising immediate settlement

of the numerous claims for blood-money which they had against his tribe, he had within a short time the satisfaction of seeing their enmity towards him to a great extent disappear. Numerous meetings of a friendly nature were held between the two tribes and they resided in close proximity to one another for a period of some weeks.

16. When the position appeared to him sufficiently secure, Abdurrahman Mursaal left Ribba and marched to Arbagramso, only a few hours distant from Wajheir, with the avowed intention of attacking the station. On the way, a Herti Somali living in a Mohamed Zubeir village was killed by one of the Aulihan, and it will probably never be ascertained whether it was the fear that the Mohamed Zubeir, after this untoward incident, would not refrain from attacking him in his rear, or whether it was the fact that the defences of Wajheir were too strong for him, that caused Abdurrahman Mursaal to refrain from pushing on. At any rate he retraced his steps and returned to Ribba.

17. The situation is however extremely disquieting. It must be remembered that to reach Arbagramso Abdurrahman Mursaal had to pass through forty miles of country occupied by the Mohamed Zubeir, a feat which would last year have been impossible, and it must also be borne



in mind that the Mohamed Zubeir camel people have for the past few months combined in a passive resistance to the orders of the Government and have failed to bring in as directed any meat or baggage animals. It is true that their relatives, the cattle owners at Amadu, deprecate this attitude, but, if the sections at Wajheir were to join Abdurrahman Mursaal, I hesitate to predict that the remainder of the tribe would not do likewise.

18. It is for this reason that I state that it may be necessary for us to undertake active operations against the Aulihan, apart from the reoccupation of Serenli. The tribes all expect it and they will interpret any delay in doing so as fear or bluff. It seems to me that we have gone too far to draw back, our prestige is at stake, and by swift and decisive action now we may save ourselves an infinity of trouble in the future. My ultimate recommendation on the matter will depend on the attitude of the Mohamed Zubeir but in order that you may know that the opinion which I hold is shared by all officers best qualified to judge I will quote the following excerpts from recent communications I have received.

Mr. T. D. Butler, Acting District Commissioner, Wajheir, June 23rd 1917. "It is undoubtedly a fact that the immediate reoccupation

reoccupation of Serenli and the vigorous prosecution of the punitive measures against Abdurrahman Mursaal are matters of first importance to the peaceful administration of this district."

Mr. J. L. B. L. Llewellyn, recently Acting District Commissioner, Wajheir, July 16th 1917. "I quite agree with Mr. Butler that it is high time to reoccupy Serenli. I consider that the reoccupation, with the prospect of operations against the Aulihan in the near future, would have a distinctly calming effect on the attitude of the young men".

Mr. Butler July 3rd 1917 "Wish to call special attention to danger of deferring action against all the Aulihan and especially the reoccupation of Serenli".

Mr. H. B. Kittermaster, Officer-in-Charge of the Northern Frontier District, June 30th 1917. "Unless immediate action is taken at Serenli and the campaign against the Aulihan pushed on vigorously, I have the gravest fear that within a few weeks you will find the Mohamed Zubeir out against us at Wajheir, and that will bring in the rest of the tribe... I wish you clearly to understand that the matter is serious"

Mr. Kittermaster July 24th 1917. "Barrett reports Marehan suspicious owing to his long continued inactivity. Impossible to lay too much

much stress on danger of delay in reoccupying Serenli. Situation worse than last year and more critical."

Mr. E. Power, Acting Provincial Commissioner Kismayu, July 18th 1917. "I strongly suggest that an immediate move be made on Serenli and against the Serenli Aulihan. If this is not done at once I am certain we shall have further trouble in the interior."

19. I trust that very shortly we shall hear that the reoccupation has been effected. The necessity of moving troops up the Juba river from Gobwen in cooperation with Lieut. Colonel Barrett's march south is no doubt responsible for the present delay, but I cannot disguise from you the fact that the present situation is causing me great anxiety. Once the reoccupation is accomplished, the tribes will wait to see what further action we intend to take unless in the meantime the Mohamed Zubeir have been drawn in, in which case they will in all probability be joined by the Marehan, the Habr Suliman, the Dagodia, the Bartiri, and the Maghabul. The northern Aulihan by themselves are a comparatively small force, estimated at between 600 and 1000 men of no conspicuous warlike attainments, and the troops at Lieut. Colonel Barrett's disposal are amply sufficient to deal with them, but a joint rising such as I have suggested above would mean the despatch of a large and costly expedition.


20. My excuse for the length of this despatch is that I wish by every means in my power to give you a clear understanding of the position and I trust that I have succeeded in doing so. I am taking advantage of Mr. Kittermaster's presence at Archer's Post to summon him to Nairobi in order that I may be able thoroughly to discuss matters with him.

21. Since this despatch was prepared, I have received a telegram from Lieut. Colonel Barrett, which I have already transmitted to you, reporting that he believes Abdurrahman Mursaal to be dead and that in such an event the Aulihan will sue for peace. I earnestly trust that the report may prove to be correct.

22. I enclose copies of the more recent correspondence for your information.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,



ACTING GOVERNOR.

INCLOSURES

Wajheir.

In Letter No. 132 of 1917

28.6.17.

Sir,

I have the honour to report fully with reference to my telegram of today's date.

1. My previous reports have been made in the ordinary course to the Officer in Charge but as he is at present on the Marsabit side of the district it is now advisable to report directly to you.

2. During the last seven or eight weeks the Northern Oulehan have had their villages in the Gerrileh area (ref p 291 Jubaland and N. F. D. handbook) while the Wajheir camel owning tribes have been located in the country near Wajheir Bor and Ribba (ref 10 e Marsabit map), thus the Oulehan have been in close touch with the tribes of this district.

The position of the tribes has caused me to watch the situation closely but it has not appeared to me desirable to attempt to remove the Wajheir tribes from the area in which they were since it contained the camel grazing grounds to which they have been accustomed of late years to go at this season and any attempt to move them would have been likely to involve friction and would probably have proved useless.

3. The position however has puzzled in the case of the Mohamed Zubeir and Haber Suleman, both tribes are professedly at enmity with the Oulehan and it was difficult to understand how they could remain at such quarters with their enemies without the occurrence of some of the incidents usual to tribal enmity.

No

No such incidents occurred however, and, since all reports went to show that there was regular intercourse between the two tribes and the Oulehan it had therefore to be assumed that relations were becoming less strained and more friendly.

With regard to the ~~Bartir~~ Waghbul and Shiek Al tribes there appeared no reason to doubt that their relations with the Oulehan were friendly though tempered perhaps by fear.

It should be here stated with regard to the Mohamed Zubeir that certain orders which were issued to the tribe by the Officer in Charge at a meeting of all Somali headmen held here on the 24th of April, have not been favourably received by the tribe nor, indeed, have they been obeyed.

These orders dealt (inter alia) with the supply by the tribe of meat and baggage animals to the Government.

In order to endeavour to obtain a regular supply the Officer in Charge directed that a certain number of animals should be brought in monthly at the full moon by the tribe on sale and hire.

This order was objectionable to nearly all sections of the tribe since it should directly affect each individual at some time, it is possible, moreover that to the suspicious Somali mind the order savoured of taxation on account of its inevitable monthly recurrence.

A concerted arrangement was thereupon made under which not only has the tribe refrained from carrying out the orders with regard to the supply of animals but some of the more inoffensive tribes have been persuaded to do likewise with the result that, since the 24th April no meat or baggage <sup>animals</sup> have been produced by the Mohamed Zubeir in spite of the fact that considerable pressure has been brought to bear on the headmen.

As a result of this position the question as to the manner in which future supplies of rice and meal are to be obtained from Aro Dima is becoming one of the considerable anxiety while a shortage of meat is very shortly to be felt.

This state of affairs should of course be met by immediate and drastic measures against the Muhamed Zubeir primarily concerned in this disobedience of orders, but I refrain from taking them since any measures suitable to the occasion would be calculated to drive the tribe into open opposition when it would be difficult to prevent them from making common cause with the Oulehan.

5. The situation stood thus on the 7th instant when a body of Oulehan, estimated at 350 strong, moved from their villages at Dundum Adka in the Gerrileh area and came down to Arbagramso, some six hours from Wajheir, (ref Marsabit map 10e), passing through some forty miles of country occupied by Muhamed Zubeir and other Wajheir tribes on their way.

This party was led by Abdurrahman Mursal in person and included Sheik Ahamedeh of the Sheik Al Her Akutub, the present holy man of the tribe.

On the way from Ribba to Arba gramso an untoward incident occurred, an Oulehan, Her Ali when calling in at a Muhamed Zubeir village of the Sumuntah Khalaf section for milk which was duly provided, shot himself by accident when emphasising a remark with his rifle, whereupon, his brother, who was accompanying him presumably in order to relieve his feelings shot and killed, a Muhamed Zubeir, Sumuntah Khalaf who was present in the village where the visit was being made.

At Arbagramso the Oulehan were visited in their camp by a party

by a party of Muhamed Zubeir headed by Ali Shiek Abdi of the same who held a long and apparently friendly conversation with Abdurrahman Mursal. A rifle was handed over by Abdurrahman Mursal as "sabien" or a peace offering for the murder of the Sumuntah/<sup>Khalaf</sup> and the Qulhan later departed from Arabagrusso and returned to Ribba.

An offer has been made by the Qulhan to pay blood money of a hundred camels for the murdered Muhamed Zubeir at Ribba to the Muhamed Zubeir headmen within three days of reaching that place.

The alleged intention of the Qulhan in coming to Arabagrusso was to come to the station and attack the station. If this was so, then it is to be presumed that they abandoned the idea and returned to Ribba because they feared that a Muhamed Zubeir having been killed, the Muhamed Zubeir might rise against them and attack them on their return journey.

6. The position now stands as follows, the Muhamed Zubeir profess the intention of protecting the station with their lives and wish it to be understood that it is thanks to their intervention that the station was not attacked on the occasion just referred to.

A meeting of the Muhamed Zubeir is to be held at Arabagrusso tomorrow to consider future action with regard to the Qulhan, it is however to be remembered that, actually, with the exception of the murder of the Sumuntah Khalaf for which full reparation has been offered and with the exception of a long standing mistrust, there are no very recent causes for difference between the two tribes and it would seem doubtful if the Muhamed Zubeir are likely to start



start the hostilities against the Oulehan of which there has been slight mention since the appearance of the Oulehan at Arabagrussa and this is more especially so since during the last few weeks their relations had much improved.

5. Meanwhile the position here can only be called most unsatisfactory and no effective measures can well be taken to improve matters until the Northern Oulehan have been dealt with in as severe a manner as their conduct has merited.

I understand that an Oulehan patrol recently visited Serrenleh and found the place unoccupied by us.

I would point out that the attitude so far adopted by us towards the Oulehan is misunderstood by the majority of the ignorant Somalis of the bush while even the more enlightened natives can find no precedent in our past administration of Somali tribes to convince them that Abdurrahman Mursal and his ~~tribe~~ tribe will receive the severe punishment which they have deserved.

These ideas, which are in reality pleasant to all Somalis in the bush, are daily fostered by the close proximity of the Oulehan to an important station like Wajheir where they are free to intrigue with the surrounding tribes and to adopt present boastful and bragging attitude.

It is difficult to see clearly the course which events are likely to take during the next two months during which time the larger water pools will continue to contain water but it is undoubtedly a fact that the immediate reoccupation of Serrenleh and the vigorous prosecution of the punitive operations against ~~the~~ Abdurrahman Mursal are matters of first importance to the peaceful administration of this district. ad/- T. D. Butler,

CONFIDENTIAL.

MARSABIT,

85/1/17.

30th June, 1917.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I have today received a mail from Mr. Butler at Wajir. His report is disquieting. He is convinced that the Mohamed Zubeir especially the camel people are intriguing with the Aulihan. The passage of troops recently through Wajir has of course thrown a good deal of extra strain on the natives for the supplying of meat and transport animals. This is causing a certain amount of dissatisfaction. Recently when I was in Wajir I informed the Mohamed Zubeir they must do their fair share of supplying the needs of the station. This is just what they object to doing. Mr. Butler informs that lately when he was out on safari he was the object of what he could only describe as a hostile demonstration. He is of opinion that probably unrest will come to nothing but he does not feel confident about it and for my own part I cannot conceal that I am anxious. I know on how slender a thread our authority in that district hangs. As always I imagine that it is chiefly the young men who are anxious to make trouble.

The unrest is probably from two causes.

- (1) Our failure to occupy Serenleh. In the past we have always said that we were not quite ready. Now the natives have seen the troops passing through Wajir and they say our hesitation with the men on the spot can only be put down to fear.
- (2) The religious propaganda of the man Sheik Mohamed Yusuf, of whom you have probably heard from Col. Barrett, is

probably -

The Honourable,  
The Chief Secretary,  
NAIROBI.

( 2 )

probably adding to this feeling of unrest.

The delay in occupying Serenleh is undoubtedly a prime cause. Unless immediate action is taken here and the campaign against the Aulihan pushed on vigorously I have the gravest fears that within a few months you will find the Mohamed Zubeir out against us at Wajir and that will bring in the rest of the tribe. I do not believe that the tribe as a whole is anxious for trouble but if any one section gets out of hand the whole tribe will be drawn in.

I have never concealed from you my opinion that sooner or later we are going to have trouble with these people. I can only urge that representations be made to the Colonial Office, warning them of the danger in delaying action at Serenleh and as a later permanent measure the need of the additional officers in Wajir. Up to the present we have carried on administration there only to this point at which the Somalis found themselves not accommodated. But this certainly does not satisfy me and it will be a lamentable thing if very much more through measures are not taken after this Somali unrest has been settled. I have hesitated to ask for more men knowing how short handed you are, but I wish you clearly to understand that the matter is serious.

I have etc.,

Sd. H. B. Kittermaster.

OFFICER - IN - CHARGE.

to The Hon. The Chief Secretary  
Colonel Barrett 5th. K.A.R.  
4.7.17.

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To The Officer in Charge E.F.O.  
Somali Uprist.

1. The position of affairs here has not appreciably altered since my last report to the Hon. The Chief Secretary on the 2<sup>nd</sup> ult.
2. Northern Oulehan. On the return to Ribba of the party which made an incursion to Arabagrasso on the 19th ult the attention of the tribe was distracted by a false rumour of the approach of the troops of Colonel Barrett and all natives hurried to their villages.

About the 20th ult. a party of some forty Oulehan encountered the Herti on their way from Kismayu at Aragne between El Fuli and Arabagrasso, the Herti were robbed of their two camels and all their trade goods.

On the 19th ult. the tracks of a large number of baggage camels and some goats accompanied by men women and children were seen at Dieff, the tracks came from the Gerrilish area and went towards the lower Guaso Nyero and were presumably those of Northern Oulehan moving to join the Southern Oulehan.

A raiding party is said to have made an excursion to the Wajkier-Kismayu road in search of trading safaris and to have returned without success.

The villages of the tribe are still in the Gerrilish area but a note of some of the villages to the southern end of the Wida Gutchi (see Handbook) seems to be in progress.

It is suggested that the tribe will send their goats and cattle down to their relations in the north in the lower Guaso Nyero area, and so having obviated the need for a large water supply, will send this dry season in, the bush and out of touch with a good, or perhaps any,

water supply. This would be possible but there is still much water in the rain pools.

2. Southern Oulshan. It is said that eight of the Abaker section have returned to their villages having been released from prison in Nairobi, they report that two of their number died in prison and a third is still in prison.

These people appear to be on their usual grazing grounds. No attempt has been made to pay the fine outstanding against them and the date fixed on which payment had to be completed is now past.

3. Wajihar Tribes, Muhammed Zubier. The meeting of the tribe at Arabakrusso referred to in par. 6 of my letter of the 23rd to The Hon. The Chief Secretary, does not seem to have come to any momentous decisions, the idea of attacking the Oulshan does not seem to have been mooted.

It appears that the Sumuntah Khalaf killed by the Oulshan and referred to in par. 5 of the above letter was not a Sumuntah Khalaf by birth but a Warti, Warangelleh, Aurlalini, his death would naturally not excite such keen resentment among the Muhammed Zubier.

No meat or baggage animals have yet been brought in by the tribe and the difficulties of provisioning the station here and at Arro Sima are great.

Ali Burreh, headman of the Wana Guled section, whom I have recently seen, and whose statement, at least on a point such as this, may be taken to be correct, informs me that the trouble which is at present being experienced here with the camel owner Muhammed Zubier is the result of a prearranged plan to resist Government orders, and further that the Oulshan have been in close communication with the Muhammed Zubier for some time and made their recent visit to Arabakrusso in the belief that they would be met by the support of the Muhammed Zubier camel owners. He assures me that the cattle owners from the Wana are opposed to the attitude of the camel owners except in the case of Hussein Kaitin whom I have constantly heard of as

dent on trouble at the present time.

the fines reimposed by you in punishment of the Gutehi  
 1915 the Mahad Rob and Bar Amaden sections have made and  
 making no attempt to pay the fines, of 60 head imposed on  
 sections respectively, the date on which payment should  
 been made is, of course, long past.

Habar Suleman. This tribe continues to make common cause  
 and are at one with them in resisting  
 orders. They have recently induced the Gulehan to  
 a large number of the camels raided from them in 1916  
 ibba. A Habar Suleman has been killed by a Barritirri  
 Barritirri below).

Waghahul. The Habar Eli section of this tribe in this area  
 particularly sympathetically disposed towards the Gulehan  
 constantly entertain them in their villages. Twenty eight  
 are said to have accompanied the Gulehan to Ara-  
 so on the 19th ult.

Barritirri. These people have murdered an Habar Suleman on  
 a pool in the usual quarrel, there has been ill feeling  
 the two tribes for some months. Muhamed Zubier, Fai and  
 Suleman youths have made the murder the excuse for looting  
 Barritirri village but I have not yet got full particulars.

Barritirri have been constantly moving into closer touch  
 and deserve scant consideration.

The extent of the casualties incurred by the  
 on the attack on Mr. Glenday's camp on the Dawa  
 the names of the killed, seems to be common  
 Godi here, the possession of such informa-  
 at Godi are passing between this area  
 a River, if, indeed, proof were needed

by that Hubia living with Muhamed Zubier,  
 two Gurreh and wounded a third, where-  
 sing upon the tracks of their murderers  
 it, this is not yet confirmed but it sounds

generally I have obtained no information as to the arrival  
of emissaries the Habar Awal, Sheik Mohamed Yussuf who is  
now carrying on a vicious Moslem propaganda in Abyssinian  
territory but without doubt his emissaries are here since  
frequent communication takes place between the Mahomedans in  
his area and those in Abyssinian and Italian territory. 343

I know Sheik Ali Nairobi to be in communication with na-  
tives here as a letter of his to the Muhamed Zubier, Hadji  
Hassanah I opened recently to come into my hands, this letter,  
which directed Hadji Hassan to make peace among the tribes on  
his side, appeared harmless on the face of it but the bearer of  
the letter to Hadji Hassan had verbal messages from Sheik Ali  
Nairobi of which of course I know nothing.

The fact that communication between this area and the areas  
on the other side of the Frontier is constant and quick is proved  
beyond doubt, it is however, difficult to know if the  
present unsatisfactory state of affairs has to any extent been  
aggravated by the activity of the Derzishas in Abyssinian territo-  
ry and elsewhere, and if so, to what extent. No doubt the know-  
ledge of such activity in north and north-east lends itself to  
strengthen opposition to Government control; the Ogaden, of all  
the Somali tribes here in the South, might fairly be considered  
the best and most fruitful soil for the spread of any dangerous  
religious crusade.

It cannot be said that the situation has in any way improved  
here since my report to The Hon. The Chief Secretary ten days ago  
nor can my opinion expressed therein be modified.

T. D. Fuller.

A. D. C.

Q B  
1917

49936-2 ad.  
17

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DRAFT.

19 October 1917

The Sec.  
W.S.

Sir,

With ref. to the letter from

MINUTE.

- Mr. Brander, 16 Oct (49910)
- Mr. Balthamley, 16 Oct 17 p
- Mr. Grindall
- Mr. Lambert
- Mr. Bond
- Sir G. Fiddes
- Sir A. Steel-Matland
- Mr. Long

this Dept. of the 5<sup>th</sup> of Oct  
 are re to his to you for the  
 info of the A.C. copies of  
 two desps for the adv. of  
 the deal dealing with the  
 formal united in the  
~~territories in Jerusalem~~  
 northern territories of the  
 High Palestine & the northern  
 frontier district.

10 Oct  
 132  
 20 Oct  
 (49981)

1917



October

I have received your  
confidential despatch of  
August 10<sup>th</sup> regarding  
situation in Subarand

DRAFT. Telegram after

Government Nairobi

Since it was sent,  
my telegram of Sept 19<sup>th</sup>

MINUTE.

Gov.  
45902

- Mr. Egan 12/18/17
- Mr. Robinson 13/10/17
- Mr. Butler 13
- Mr. Grindle.
- Mr. Lambert.
- Mr. Read. 13/27/17
- Sir G. Fiddes.  
in Hewson  
St. 4. Street. Maitland.
- Mr. Long.

has authorized the  
further measures against  
the Am'iban which you  
had recommended, and  
the re-occupation of  
Sereniti and the arrival  
there of a force from  
the South will do  
some to have modified the  
whole situation.

for conven  
purpose action

should however be glad  
to receive latest info.  
as to the general position,  
and particularly as to  
present attitude of the  
tribes referred to in  
paragraph 19 of your  
despatch of 15<sup>th</sup> June  
any confirmation of the  
report that Abdul  
Rahman Narwal is  
dead?

Yours