



**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**DEPARTMENT OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**THE ROLE OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND TANZANIA**

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THE AWARD OF MASTERS OF ARTS DEGREE IN DIPLOMACY**

**December 2021**

**DECLARATION**

I declare that this research is my original work and has not been presented to any academic institution or examination body. No part of this research should be reproduced without my consent or that of the University of Nairobi.

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
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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University of Nairobi supervisor

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I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Maria Nzomo for the immense support, patience and the intellectual advice that she has given me to achieve my goal of coming up with this thesis especially during the global pandemic of COVID-19. God bless you abundantly.

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this project to my entire family, especially my parents, siblings, lecturers and classmates at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), Nairobi for their support throughout the program even in this tough time of COVID-19.

## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

APEC:	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AU:	African Union
CFTA:	Continental Free Trade Area
COMESA:	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COVID-19:	Coronavirus disease 2019
EAC:	East African Community
ECA:	Economic Commission of Africa
ECCAS:	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
FDLR:	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FTAs:	Free Trade Areas
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
PTAs:	Preferential Trade Areas
RECS:	Regional Economic Communities
RIAs:	Regional Integration Arrangements
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
UN:	United Nations
UNECA:	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

## **ABSTRACT**

Despite the fact that most of African states have embraced Regional Integration using diplomatic engagements, Kenya and Tanzania's hopes for full Integration, Development and ensuring Peace and Stability in East Africa Community has not been fully realized yet. The general objective of the study was to investigate and assess how the use of Diplomatic engagement can be enhanced in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in Africa. The specific objectives were to investigate and analyze the main challenges of regional integration in Africa, to identify and assess the role and impact of diplomatic engagement in addressing the challenges of regional integration in Kenya and Tanzania and to examine and assess the setbacks of using Diplomatic engagement in addressing the challenges of Integration in Africa. This study used both primary and secondary sources of data. Secondary sources included books, Newspaper articles, various strategic reports, peer reviewed journals, relevant protocols and treaties. The research also used a mixed method approach where both qualitative and quantitative data were collected to substantiate the study. The target population for this study was Regional Integration experts most of whom are senior technical officers in the Kenyan and Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Labor and Social Services. Purposive sampling was used to select the sample population of 10 respondents. A questionnaire was sent to the respondents via e-mail while phone interview guide was used to conduct personal interviews due to COVID-19. The data collected from the field was analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis. Quantitative data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) while qualitative data was analyzed using content analysis. The study found that most common key challenge noted was diplomatic standoffs. Additionally, respondents did not think the strategies were effectively addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC. The study further revealed that the principle of variable geometry in the EAC as manifested through the Coalition of the willing is a commendable political diplomatic strategy to fast track integration. With proper support from the political elite, once the economic structures of Common Market, Customs Union and Monetary Union are fully implemented, the ultimate goal of integration; a Political Federation automatically falls into place. As the ultimate goal of integration, the legitimacy and the sustainability of the EAC Political Federation is largely dependent on the level of development achieved in the region. A successful political federation means a conducive environment with a strong political determination, commitment and the presence of the required regional structures and institutions. The study recommends that the policy makers in EAC should have a Political Diplomatic Strategy to fast track integration therefore, it is imperative that the governments of Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda involve Tanzania and Burundi to be more openly on future joint projects and discuss their entry points when they are ready to team up with them. To the academics, the study recommends that this research to be used to build on knowledge of the role that diplomatic engagement plays in the process of regional integration. It can also be used as reference document for scholars of diplomacy and international relations.

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## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the study

Regional Integration refers to collective governance and material interdependence between or among states.<sup>1</sup> Regional integration is described as a process where nations enter into different agreements to improve cooperation through common rules and institutions. The mandate of the agreement differs from political, socio-cultural, economic, and environmental to security, however, typically, it has been implemented on the terms of political economy initiative where commercial interests are the focus for attaining extensive security and socio-political objectives, as described by national governments. Regional integration is organized either through intergovernmental decision making or supranational institutional structures or a combination of both approaches.

Past regional integration efforts have focused on eliminating the barriers to free trade within a specific region, increasing the free movement of goods, people, capital and labour across international borders, lowering the potential for the occurrence of regional conflict (for instance through security building and confidence measures), and implementing cohesive measures on policy matters including migration, environment and climate change.

It is an illustration of a geographical scope with a number of partner states involved in an arrangement which varies from simple coordination to deep cooperation.<sup>2</sup> The depth of this cooperation is measured in terms of the degree of sovereignty that an individual state is willing to surrender to the regime or institution created by the partner states. Cooperation can also be assessed in sectors such as those of trade, labour mobility, service delivery, harmonization of macro policies and most importantly, whether or not a sense of a security community has been

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<sup>1</sup> Mitrany, D. *The Progress of the International Government*. (New Haven :Yale University Press,1933) p101.

<sup>2</sup> Abegunrin, O. *Africa in Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century : A Pan African Perspective* . New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

realized within that geographical scope.

Integration is a symbol of the unification of a number of hitherto independent Arrangements. In Africa, such arrangements comprise of but are not limited to: the EAC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, COMESA and AMU. In addition to the identified agreements, at the regional context, various initiatives have been implemented to facilitate economic cooperation between the African states.<sup>3</sup> According to Hatzberg, the desire by the heads of state to integrate Africa provided a justification for the implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA).<sup>4</sup> The OAU suggested the LPA which was later adopted by the heads of states of Africa in 1980. The aim of the plan was to increase the self-reliance status of African countries and reduce their level of dependency on Western countries. In 1991, the Abuja treaty was signed and became impetus in the process of integration in the country. The treaty advocated for the solidarity of Africa, its self-reliance, and its pursuit of industrialization. In 1994, the treaty was enforced and it forecasted the development of the African Economic Community by the year 2028. The heads of states during the AU summit held in 2011 endorsed a plan to create the Continental Free Trade Area by the year 2017. The suggested CFTA would propel the integration process in Africa by increasing regional trade by 25-30% by the following decade.<sup>4</sup> Many serious efforts exist in Africa, directed towards the achievement of Regional Integration but in spite of that, RECs in Africa have not shown a high degree of success in fully achieving their intended objectives. Such efforts are mainly

with the intention of generating employment, poverty eradication, and improving per capita incomes and challenges as well as improving the overall living standards of African countries through enhancing intra African trade. Diplomacy on the other hand is the means by which

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<sup>3</sup> Alemayehu and Haile, (2004)

<sup>4</sup> *international Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development*, (2012)

states throughout the world conduct their affairs in ways to ensure peaceful relations. It is concerned with the management of relations between states and other non-state actors. Diplomacy has been used in Africa as an instrument of fostering cooperation among states. There are different forms of diplomacy which include; media diplomacy, environmental diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, sports diplomacy, public diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy to mention but a few. Particular interest to this research project is diplomatic engagement. This style of management largely embraces the calculated art of negotiation conducted by the political class.<sup>5</sup> It is concerned with the allocation of power and resources and high politics decisions such as the decisions around ending wars or managing conflicts. Diplomatic engagement has a cross cutting effect in that it addresses all the aspects of the forms of diplomacy mentioned earlier. It can be very instrumental in realizing the goals of regional Integration.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

Despite the fact that most of African states have embraced Regional Integration using diplomatic engagements, Kenya and Tanzania's hopes for full Integration, Development and ensuring Peace and Stability in East Africa Community has not been fully realized yet. This is attributed to various challenges which vary in nature, scope and levels of complexity.<sup>6</sup> Different forms of diplomacy such as Economic Diplomacy, social cultural Diplomacy and political engagement have been used and continue to be used in an attempt to address these challenges.<sup>7</sup> Diplomatic engagement is not issue specific, it is strategic and cuts across the uniqueness of an issue in the sense that it can be employed to address problems of a political nature as well as those of social and economic nature<sup>8</sup>. Additionally, in the most complex

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<sup>5</sup> Satow E. *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. London: Longmans, 1932.

<sup>6</sup> Elhiraika, Adam B. (et al) *Regional Integration and Policy Challenges in Africa*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

<sup>7</sup> Orji, Kingdom E. *Issues in Diplomacy and Regional Integration*

<sup>8</sup> Dannreuther, R. and Peterson, J.(eds). *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*. London: Routledge, 2006.

cases in Africa, the power of Diplomatic engagement has often played out. This power has manifested itself in form of the potential that Political negotiations have had in managing protracted conflicts , negotiating new trade partnerships , and establishing appropriate policies to enhance cooperation.<sup>9</sup>It is against this background that this study seeks to investigate why the powerful hand of Diplomatic engagement is not being sufficiently utilized to provide a solution to the unending setbacks that Africa has been grappling with in the process of Regional Integration.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

- i. What has been the main challenges of Regional Integration in Africa?
- ii. What has been the role and impact of Diplomatic engagement in addressing the Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa?
- iii. What have been the setbacks of using Diplomatic engagement to address the challenges of Integration in Africa?

### **1.4 Research Objectives**

The general objective of the study was to investigate and assess how the use of Diplomatic engagement can be enhanced in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in Africa.ö

#### **Specific Objectives**

- i. To investigate and analyze the main challenges of Regional Integration in Africa.
- ii. To identify and assess the role and impact of Diplomatic engagement in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in Kenya and Tanzania.
- iii. To examine and assess the setbacks of using Diplomatic engagement in addressing the challenges of Integration in Africa.

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<sup>9</sup> Ziwira E. öExploring the Use of Power in Negotiataion.ö *The Herald* (2016)



## **1.5 Literature Review and Research Gaps**

In addition to elaborating the concepts of Regional Integration and Diplomacy, the reviewed literature covers Regional Integration in Africa and role of diplomatic engagement in the implementation of integrating African states using Kenya and Tanzania as Case studies. This is with an effort to establish other scholars' perspectives on the role of diplomatic engagement in regional integration. The section also covers the diplomatic relations by the member states of the EAC in Regional Integration negotiations as pertains to investments, education, trade, labour, industry and training issues.

### **1.5.1 What is Regional Integration?**

Regional integration is founded on the assumption that when countries come together, they can easily attain their common interests through cooperation has more benefits to be attained. However, scholars are yet to agree on the definition of Regional Integration and neither is there an agreement on its substantive context or form and in the same breath, the ideological perspectives which inform Regional Integration also differ. This lack of clarity on the guiding principles/ideologies on integration and how to articulate it could be contributing factor to the general slow and poor performance of some of the Regional Integration Arrangements which exist on the globe.

Regionalism in general is a policy which is intended for the reduction of trade barriers between or among countries, whether or not these countries are within the same geographical location. An interesting feature of international economic integration however is that most of the RECs involve countries which are geographically close to each other. The main exceptions from this categorization include (APEC), the group of Three (Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela). There are also various plurilateral Free Trade Areas such as Mexico with Chile and South Africa with the European Union. According to Mambara, regional integration is the establishment of close relations between countries in context of economic

relations mostly by forming Preferential Trade Agreements.

### **1.5.2 Neo-Functionalism**

This theory of Regional Integration is associated with scholars such as Ernst B Haas. It is a Break away theory from the theory of Functionalism where Functionalism puts more emphasis on the role of the state as the main actor in the process of Integration. Neo-Functionalism gives special attention to the role of Non óState Actors such as interest groups and the private sector in the Integration process. Following a comparison of the two related theories, neo- Functionalism is more appropriate in relation to the current EAC model where cooperation enjoys the support of the private sector. The existence of various Public Private Partnership Agreements is an attachment to this. Neo-Functional Proponents are concerned about the why and how countries stop being sovereign exclusively and why they make the decision to volunteer to interact and merge with its neighboring countries with an effort to find finding better and mutual ways of conflict resolution and in the long run they end up losing some attributes of sovereignty. The wider assumption of neo-functionalists is that; with economic cooperation i.e., increased economic activity among states, there will be an automatic generation of a spill over which will eventually lead to Political Integration. These two processes are likely to be accelerated by the creation of supranational structures (Regional Institutions).

Ernest Hassø assumption was that once the pressures for further integration begin to be felt after the launch of integration efforts, in a certain region, social and economic groups would definitely demand for additional economic integration. The Neo- Functionalist school has proposed four analytical variables which are crucial to the understanding of Regional Integration; Actors, Motives, Process and Context.

### **1.5.2.1 Actors**

Neo- Functionalists believe that the primary actors of integration are above and below the country. The actors that are below the state include the political parties and interest /groups while actors above the state are the regional institutions. These regional organs are capable of fostering further integration by promoting interest groups development and in establishing close relations with other nations. In the EAC, for instance, the private sector contributes at least 80% to the economy of the region by way of wealth creation, production of goods and services as well as poverty reduction. Therefore, there is a need, within the requirements of the establishment of the community, to have a framework for a continued structured dialogue between Africa, the Private Sector and other members of the civil society

### **1.5.2.2 Motives**

This variable is about the process of forming a community, that is preferable dominated by national based groups with specific objectives with the willingness and the ability to turn to supranational means when in deems fit.

### **1.5.2.3 Process**

This third variable involve functional Spill-Over. The upgrading of common interest according to Burley and Mattli, is the third aspect in the regional integration dynamics. This takes place when partnering states start to experience challenges in establishing a common policy to safeguard other elements on their interdependence. The nation states therefore take up joint efforts, sector by sector to upgrade their mutual interests. For example, the EAC negotiating structures include the National Development and Trade Policy Forum at the national level with representatives of Public and Private sector organizations within the trade sector. The mandate of the body is to prepare negotiating positions on all aspects of EPA negotiations.

### **1.5.6 Intergovernmentalism**

The theory of intergovernmentalism is associated with scholars such as Andrew Moravcsik. It conceptualizes the process of integration as that of a negotiation between governments in a specific region. Ideally, the interests of large states drive the process of integration, smaller states may end up being bought off by the larger ones. Theorists of intergovernmentalism see small states as the believers of regional institutions. They see these institutions as their strategy to deal with the expansive and more complex issues which are an outcome of the process of integration. These two theories are relevant to this study because in the EA the power of decision making rests with the main representatives of the state. These are the Council of Ministers as opposed to the members of the secretariat, regional legislators and members of the judiciary constituted by the judges of the East African Court of Justice. Therefore, this amounts to government-to-government relations as opposed to supranationalism. The current model of the EAC is more of intergovernmental in practice and remains Neo-Functional in theory since the individual partner states have a say at every level of decision making.

### **1.5.7 Regional Integration in Africa**

In Africa, the champion of R.I was the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) which, for the objective of ensuring economic growth and development proposed the division of the African continent into regions.<sup>10</sup> The initial wave of R.I in post-colonial Africa was rooted in the spirit of Pan-Africanism whose vision was the creation of a politically unified Africa. This found its expression in the formation of the OAU. It was created in 1963 during the decolonization in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa.

R.I Was and still is core to many economists, politicians and business people because it made

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<sup>10</sup> Reikojournals.org : *Issues in Diplomacy and Regional Integration for Sustainable Development in Africa*

the promise to increase well-being and wealth of a number of countries at a level higher than the sum of growth and development of participating countries' economies. History indicates such desires in most cases result in a disappointed African continent since the approach by the European continent to integration only succeeded culminated into the existence of the European Union, and has fulfilled its expectations. On the contrary, the continent of Africa, though supports many regions, R.I arrangements is failing.<sup>11</sup> This perceived failure could generally be attributed to: Political Instability; escalation of wars across national borders; Insecurity; Endemic corruption; Lack of harmonization of macro policies; Inter and Intra-ethnic conflicts among others.

Other Arrangements of R.I (often referred to as Regional Economic Communities; RECs or Regional Integration Agreements RIAs) were Africa (EAC) from 1967-1977, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA that started in 1975 and the PTA for Eastern and Southern Africa that was created in 1982 following support from the UN ENECA, SADCC from 1980-1992.<sup>12</sup> Despite being illusive, the Pan-Africanism remained a critical element in identifying the African elites. In 2002, the OAU was changed to the AU.<sup>13</sup>

### **1.5.8 Regional Integration in the EAC**

The first East African Community (EAC1), comprised of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, and traces its roots in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Britain, the colonial power, established a customs union which comprised of the three states which shared the same currency and a management institution of the services and resources shared in sectors of rail, road and air transport.<sup>17</sup>

Due to perceived disparities in the distribution of integration losses and gains, the common

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<sup>11</sup> Ronge, Eric (2000) 'Trade within the COMESA and Between Africa and the European Union' the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), Memo

<sup>12</sup> Alot, M. (2008). Communications and Marketing Strategy for Africa/Federation. Head Information and Public Relations, East African Community.

Asante, S K B 1997. Regionalism and Africa's development. London: Macmillan

<sup>13</sup> Asante, S K B 1997. Regionalism and Africa's development. London: Macmillan

bonds that were earlier established became loose. As Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were heading towards independence in the early 1960s, these suspicions kept growing.

In 1967, there was a major step in an attempt to reconcile these differences; a treaty was signed establishing Africa. Unfortunately, the ideologies of Kenya and Tanzania proved to be constantly clashing and there was high political tension between Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya was perceived as the greatest beneficiary. Beginning from 1971, the speed of the break up gathered. In 1977, the Community Treaty was formally terminated. Owing to this, the shared services and common institutions were also terminated. The progress towards the break up increased in 1971 and in 1977, the community treaty was terminated formally. Majority of the common services and joint organs were also dismantled.

In 1993, however, the 3 nations introduced a process that resulted in the reconstitution of the office of the secretariat. This resulted in signing of a new treaty called the EAC2 that was enforced in 2000.<sup>14</sup> In the new treaty provisions to create a custom union was documented which was to be followed by a common market. The Customs Union became operational in 2005 Burundi and Rwanda were accepted as EAC2 members in 2007. Overall, the EAC seems to have been re-established on much better footing. Currently, the EAC is comprised of 6 Partner States: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. Its headquarters are in Arusha, Tanzania.

### **1.5.9 What is Diplomacy?**

The concept of diplomacy was introduced in the medieval times with simple structures such as sending messengers to share information and negotiate on the behalf of states. This approach then developed to nations establishing embassies for other nations. Diplomacy is described as

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<sup>14</sup> Dinka.T and Walter Kennes. *Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements;History and Challenges.2007.*

the use of representation and peaceful approaches in negotiating and addressing issues as per international law.<sup>15</sup> Diplomacy is a powerful political approach whose mandate is to pave way for states to attain their objectives on foreign policies through acts of negotiations and discussions. Various researchers and scholars have described diplomacy in different ways, but a general consensus is that diplomacy is the means or approach in which dialogue and negotiations are held by states to conduct their relations and interactions within the international system which can be economic, cultural or political in nature. According to Nicolson, diplomacy is a means for peace where different states come together in agreement. Thus, the application of diplomacy is often evident in situations where states have a disagreement. This is articulated in the United Nations Charter, Chapter 6 on peaceful means to address conflict. According to article 33.1, the parties in discourse have to initially seek a solution to the conflict through mediation, negotiation, enquiry, judicial settlement, conciliation, arbitration, seek assistance from regional institutions or the use of any other peaceful mechanism they choose.

#### **1.5.10 Origins of Diplomacy**

Diplomacy originated in the early times in the fifteenth century with the Italian Peninsula, which later spread to France, America, Egypt, Italy and later across the entire world. The first fully functional diplomatic approach was introduced by the French systems which were later modified to the current form of diplomacy. Two developments of significance can be generated from the evolution of diplomatic activities; the first is that diplomacy has changed as the world system has continued to change.<sup>16</sup> Diplomacy has also changed with the population growth around the world. This has resulted in varying needs of differing nations thus elaborating the complex nature of diplomatic activities. The state has been overtaken by

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<sup>15</sup> Barston, R.P. *Modern Diplomacy*. London: Pearson Longman, 2006

<sup>16</sup> Barston, R.P. *Modern Diplomacy*. London: Pearson Longman, 2006

humanitarian and private organizations and has stopped to be a main player in international relations. This is as a result of the weak structures of the states in the world with growing numbers of private organizations. Therefore, diplomacy is shifting from bilateral to multilateral form of diplomatic activities maximize on cooperation with private organizations and facilitate state coordination.

#### **1.5.11 Trends in Diplomacy**

The polyateralism of non-state participation in international relations started after the Cold War diplomacy where transnational forces and actors took part in international operations and the development of better association between actions of the state and the non-state actors. In today's practice of international relations, relationships range from multinational firms, international companies, prominent people and special economic areas. This new approach demands the need for corporation among different actors in their mandate to meet the interests of the globe.

The era of post-cold war was characterized by 4 elements: the emergence of non-state actors, the deregulation of the international environment, transformation from inter-state conflicts to internal discourse and the influence of new ICT. These changes have resulted in the transformation of diplomacy from first to second track diplomacy to multi-layered diplomatic activities which later transformed to poly-lateral layered diplomatic activities hence the emergence of different diplomacy types. With respect to regional integration, Economic diplomacy matters because scholars of regional integration agree that the process begins with economic integration as it advances to other forms of integration.

#### **1.5.12 Economic Diplomacy**

Economic diplomacy originated from Egypt in the early 1400 BC as nations trades different



goods; at the time, Egypt engaged in trading activities with West Asia.<sup>17</sup> Trade was a core reason for the interaction between states at the time and it provided an opportunity for the formulation of economic diplomacy. At the time, there did not exist external exchanges of goods that were documented as signed contracts. In Egypt, the Amarna Archives provide evidence of the trading activities between Egypt and Asia, Additional proof for goods exchange during the period is the Silk Routes of China-Europe and India China that show that individuals engaged in the exchange of manuscripts, products and religion.<sup>18</sup> In the end, trade was perceived as a driving motivator for explores such as Christopher Columbus and Vasco Da Gama.<sup>19</sup>

Economic diplomacy entails engaging in diplomatic activities to attain goals and objectives through commerce and trade. Economic diplomacy relies on relations in terms of trade as opposed to cultural and political associations. States used economic diplomats to ensure the achievement of economic goals are attained through engaging with trade with other states. Therefore, it is argued that states are simply not only actors in economic diplomacy since it also includes non-state actors such as trade organizations, MNCs and NGOs. The diplomats are mandated with the responsibility of promoting investments and trading initiatives in their states. According to Bayne and Woolock, economic diplomacy is a negotiation and decision-making process in engaging internationally. Economic diplomacy is undertaken by different actors, whose aim is ensuring economic growth and development. During the early days of diplomacy, the foreign affairs ministers undertook economic diplomatic activities. However, recently, other institutions/organizations are also included in economic diplomatic activities. As global patterns continue to change, trade and economic related issues have become a

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<sup>17</sup> Cohen & Westbrook. *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations*. (Amarna: JHUPress, 2000)p3

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Rana, K.S.,Charterjee B. *Economic Diplomacy*. Mumbai: CUTS International, 2011

necessity thus evidence of the evolution of economic diplomacy. Today, the multi polar world required the state to stop being the only actor in engaging in relations at an international context. Therefore, there is a need for other parties to engage in the trading activities and negotiations.

Rana posits that economic diplomacy is the approach in which nations address the external world by maximizing on the prosperity of the nation in all sectors including investments, trade and economic exchanges. The basis of economic diplomacy is built in globalization. Through globalization, relationships between states have improved, particularly from an economic aspect. These economic associations are conducted through the implementation of economic diplomacy. Rana, further notes that the key factors that contribute to effective economic diplomatic activities include; it is able to involve other units of the business sector in a state as opposed to only engaging the foreign affairs ministry. This is an implication that non-state actors are actively engaged in economic diplomacy in the modern age.

Secondly, effective implementation of economic diplomacy relies on foreign affairs structure and the management of the external economies. This ensures that the work of external economies is addressed by the foreign affairs ministry. It also enables countries to easily engage in bi and multi-lateral economic activities particularly through the WTO. It is an efficient way for countries to be involved in trading activities and get investments from foreign countries through diplomatic activities.

In addition, effective implementation of economic diplomatic activities results in facilitating foreign investments and export services. Economic diplomacy enables countries to present internal markets to foreign markets, helping traders to engage in international trading activities. Through this, nations gain FDI by attracting international investors in the receiving countries. The success of economic diplomacy also involves the networking of states through

consulates and embassies receiving support from the foreign affairs and trade ministry. According to Rana and Chatterjee, there are different categories of economic diplomacy; economic salesmanship- building economic connection, economic advocacy and networking ó coordinating with entities handling international economic matters, and resource mobilization and management of regulations- entails the process of negotiations and needs high competency to advance economic interests.<sup>20</sup>

### **1.6 Gaps in Literature Review**

- i. From the literature reviewed under this topic, there is lack of a theory that sufficiently explains the role of the political elite in the process of Regional Integration. Many of those that exist agree that state representatives (political elites) but they play a minor role. Much focus is on the institutions created by the states out of the integration process.
- ii. There is insufficient academic research on the role of diplomatic engagement in the implementation of regional integration in Africa. Therefore, this study aims to fill the above gaps

### **1.7 Justification of the Study**

This study hopes to contribute to efforts of various stakeholders including, policy makers and other practitioners in the field of academia. It seeks to enrich their knowledge base from the findings and recommendations of this study, leading to an in-depth understanding of the role of diplomatic engagement in Regional Integration especially EAC

#### **1.7.1 Policy Justification**

This research seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the influence that diplomatic engagement has on policies in the process of regional integration. It also seeks to

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<sup>20</sup> Rana, K.S.,Chatterjee B. *Economic Diplomacy*. Mumbai: CUTS International, 2011.

proffer various strategies to employ with regards to the best way of advancing political diplomacy without other countries appearing as being domineering than others in quest to enhancing regional integration.

Flexibility, a key concept of diplomacy, gives hope that the diplomatic activities will benefit more than the political elites, that it will benefit the entire state and new actors in international trading activities as they pursue the creation of a better global market.

### **1.7.2 Academic Justification**

Academically, scholars can use the findings of this research to build on their knowledge of the role that diplomatic engagement plays in the process of regional integration. It can also be used as reference document for scholars of Diplomacy and International Relations.

## **1.8 Theoretical Framework**

Different theories of International Relations have been formulated by various scholars and they have been used as the basis of explanation of academic studies. This research uses two related theories; Neo- functionalism and Intergovernmentalism will be used as analytical tools.

### **1.8.1 Neo-Functionalism**

This theory is associated with the works of Ernst B. Haas, Leon Lind Berg and Jean Monnet among others. The theory posits that regional integration is a process in which countries eliminate all barriers that may hinder free trade. The Neo-Functionalism theory, develops the principles of functionalism with references to regional organs. Functionalism denotes that regional integration is as a result of growth and development imposing additional functions to state and improving cooperation with international functional organizations. The ultimate outcome of the process is the development of separate institution that perform different functions on behalf of the state.

However, from the view of neo-functionalists, the developed institution drives the process of integration even further. Ultimately, neo-functionalism perceives a shift of everything to the center due to the emerging political society.<sup>21</sup> It is envisioned that nationalism is potent and that nation declines if a central supranational state is created. The proponents of this school of thought, provide 3 techniques that are viewed as driving the process of integration; domestic alliances transfers, positive spillovers and technocratic automaticity.<sup>22</sup>

### **1.8.2 Intergovernmentalism**

This is a critique of the neo-functionalism way to attaining regional integration and is associated with scholars such as Michelle Cini, Wierer Diez and Perez Solorzano Borrogon. It criticizes the theory of neo-functionalism for not addressing the continuous dominance of national and nation state interests and posit that the state plays a critical role in ensuring external policies are implemented. The spill over concept is also criticized since it can be negative from political and economic integration, an implication the integration has focused much more on internal dynamics of the process.<sup>23</sup>

### **1.9 Relevance of theories to this study**

With respect to this study, the relationship between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism is; Neo-Functionalism represents Regional Integration and the positives of the process while intergovernmentalism alludes that there could be negative impacts of the spill over process which can be interpreted as the challenges that of the process of Regional Integration. Intergovernmentalism stresses the fact that the political elites, who are representatives of the state have an overarching role to play in the process of integration.

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<sup>21</sup> Haas, B.E. *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation*. New York:PinterPub, 1964

<sup>22</sup> Wallace, H., Pollack, M. and Young, A. R. (eds.). *Policy-Making in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005

<sup>23</sup> Cini, M. and Perez-Solorzano Borrogon,N. (eds.) *European Union Politics*. Oxford :Oxford University Press, 2004.

Therefore, the negatives of integration can be corrected by more involvement of the political elites through government-to-government negotiations i.e., diplomatic engagement.

### **1.10 Hypotheses**

This study is informed by the following key research hypotheses:

- i. The key challenges of Integration in Africa are undermining the entire Integration process of the region.
- ii. Diplomatic engagement has the potential to effectively address the challenges of Regional Integration in Africa.
- iii. Diplomatic engagement has not effectively addressed the challenges of Regional Integration in Africa.

### **1.11 Research Methodology**

#### **1.11.1 Research Design**

This study seeks to use both primary and secondary sources of data. Secondary sources will include books, Newspaper articles, various strategic reports, peer reviewed journals, relevant protocols and treaties. The primary sources intended for the study will include personal interviews as well as responses from questionnaires. The research also hopes to use a mixed method approach where both qualitative and quantitative data will be collected to substantiate the study.

#### **1.11.2 Target Population**

The target population for this study is Regional Integration experts most of whom are senior technical officers in the Kenyan and Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Labor and Social Services.

#### **1.11.3 Population Sample**

Purposive sampling will be used to select the sample of the population that will be used to assist in collecting first hand data for the purpose of this research. The size of the sample will

be 10 respondents from various departments of the EAC ministry as well as other Integration and Diplomacy experts from the two countries.

#### **1.11.4 Data Collection Tools**

The researcher seeks to incorporate the use of two data collection tools specifically designed to collect relevant data for this study. A questionnaire will be sent to the respondents via e-mail while phone interview guide will be used to conduct personal interviews due to COVID-19

#### **1.11.5 Data Presentation and Analysis**

The data collected from the field will be analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis. Quantitative data will be analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) while qualitative data will be analyzed using content analysis. The analyzed data will be presented by use of pie charts and bar graphs.

### **1.12 Chapter Outline**

#### **Chapter one: Introduction**

This chapter seeks to include; Introduction and background of the study, Literature Review and Gaps, Theoretical Framework, research questions, objectives and hypotheses

#### **Chapter Two: Key challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC**

This chapter seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the main challenges faced by the process of Regional Integration in the EAC

#### **Chapter Three: The role of Diplomatic engagement: The principle of variable geometry in the EAC**

This chapter hopes to assess the impact of diplomatic engagement on its effort to address the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC.

#### **Chapter Four: Setbacks of Diplomatic engagement: The challenges of using variable geometry to alleviate the problems of the EAC**

Chapter four seeks to decipher why Political Diplomatic Strategies have not been successful so far in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration within the EAC.

**Chapter Five: Data presentation and analysis**

**Chapter Six: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations.**



## CHAPTER TWO

### KEY CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

#### 2.1 Introduction

Despite being relatively successful in policy implementation compared to other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Sub Saharan Africa, the integration process in the EAC has accomplished less than what has been anticipated.<sup>24</sup> An observable proof of this is the failure of living up to the timelines set to realize the pillars of the regional body. Although the Customs Union and the Common Market Protocols have already been signed and ratified, the full benefits of these two pillars are yet to be felt across the partner states. The foundation of the Monetary Union and the Political Federation is still struggling to find a solid ground. This underachievement and sluggish implementation of policies is attributed to the challenges of various natures that affect the integration process. However, there are outstanding issues which cut across these challenges and therefore pose as the main factors impeding integration efforts in the region.<sup>25</sup> They include; Lack of Political goodwill and the principle of Sovereignty as well as the overlapping membership of partner states to various Regional Economic Communities.

#### 2.2 The Principle of Sovereignty and Lack of Political goodwill

Good will is the friendliness or helpfulness that a person or group of people can give towards a certain course of action. Political goodwill therefore is the responsiveness of the political elites around particular issues. Within the EAC, Political goodwill has only been witnessed in fragments and not as a continuous baseline from which support for the course of integration may be drawn from. When this happens, the protocols and other regional agreements that are

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<sup>24</sup> AfDB. African Development Report 2014. *Regional Integration for Inclusive Growth: 2014*

<sup>25</sup> Cirera, X. *Regional Integration in EAC Countries: Lessons and the Way Forward. Trademark East Africa*; 2013

signed by the heads of the EAC partner states remain as political declarations and nothing more.<sup>26</sup> For instance, the “Free Education Area” Policy recommendation was signed in 2005 but it has only been approved for implementation during the 17<sup>th</sup> summit in May 2017. Without political goodwill, the implementation phase of policies and agreements is undermined, therefore slowing down the process of integration.<sup>27</sup>

**Table 2. 1: EAC Scorecard 2014: Main Liberalization Restrictions**

Trade in Goods				Trade in Services	Movement of Capital
	Tariff	Reported NTBs	CET Exemptions		
<b>Burundi</b>	10%	3	29	9	16
<b>Kenya</b>	15%	16	41	16	3
<b>Rwanda</b>	9%	5	56	11	5
<b>Tanzania</b>	34%	18	11	17	16
<b>Uganda</b>	28%	9	35	10	5
<b>EAC</b>		51		63	

Source: Adapted from the EAC Secretariat, 2014

The table indicates that the trend towards non-compliance with the tariffs elimination by the member states of the EAC: a higher percentage indicates higher worse score, 2008-2013; 2) Number of reported non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 2008-2013; 3) Numbers of granted requests for

<sup>26</sup> Mattli, W.; *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

<sup>27</sup> Cirera, X.; *Regional Integration in EAC Countries: Lessons and the Way Forward*. Trademark East Africa, 2013

temporary exemptions (stays) of application of the Common External Tariff (CET), 2011-2013; 4) Number of measures inconsistent to commitments to liberalize services trade within EAC, out of over 500 sectoral laws reviewed; 5) Number of capital operations that are restricted, out of the 20 operations covered by the EAC Common Market Protocol (as at January 2014).

In essence, state sovereignty creates institutionalization weaknesses which affect the delivery of most of the promises of Regional Integration. This leaves the EAC with many formal rules which have not been institutionalized, undermining the ability of the EAC to shape its Policy agenda. Examples of weak institutionalization areas within the EAC include:

- i. The Budgeting Processes and rules of EAC financing
- ii. Formal rules of power relations among partner states

### **2.3 Budgeting Processes rules of Financing**

The oversight functions of the budget processes of the EAC are very weak.<sup>28</sup> This alarm has been raised by the General-Purpose Committee and EALA whose recommendations to amend budgets rarely bear fruit. This is attributed to the fact that these two bodies lack the independence that they require to achieve their goals.<sup>29</sup> In comparison to the council, has considerable powers over the terms of service of the assembly and can take disciplinary actions against the members of the assembly. For instance, recommendations for allocations of the social sectors (2013, a) have not been implemented. The only budgetary recommendation that was approved over the past few years was in (2013/14) allowing EALA to hold more sessions.<sup>30</sup> Weak institutions within the budget process is an indication of a larger problem

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<sup>28</sup> Afrobarometer; *Status of the Economy, Constitutional Implementation, and Africa*. www.afrobarometer.org (29 June 2017)

<sup>29</sup> EALA. 2013a. *Report of the Committee on Revenue and Expenditure*. Arusha: East African Legislative Assembly, 2013

<sup>30</sup> EALA. 2013b. *Strategic Plan 2013-2018*. Arusha: East African Legislative Assembly, 2013

within the EAC where partner states strategically decline to show goodwill to certain integration projects.

#### **2.4 Power Relations among member states**

Previously, power among the EAC countries was distributed between the Council, Summit and EALA. Practically, however, the authority is vested in the Summit and the Council that is made up of national politicians rather than the representatives of the member states of the EALA. In particular, the Council applies informal practices and technicalities to maximize on its influence and to hinder efforts by the legislative arm. For instance, the practice of including the plans of implementation in protocols, over-ruling the EALA's mandate in formulating such plans by the council of ministers is an example of the technicalities. The Council is made up by ministers each from a member state and have powers to pass protocols that translate the general Treaty principles into specific policies. These principles are viewed as part of the treaty and thus legally bindings to the member states. The protocols are supplemented through the plans for implementation using Acts which are voted for by the EALA. Contrary, the council bypasses this gradually by including annexes in the protocols which provide a framework for the plans to implement policies by partner states.

Essentially, weak institutions within the process of budgeting indicates a wider trend in formal systems and the set rules to be followed are bypassed to ensure that the partner states avoid relinquishing significant power to the EAC. The states of the EAC have not agreed over the proposed institutional arrangements that can offer more capacity, however, require that each state relinquish its power to the EAC. While it is evident that the organ, the EAC has low levels of institutional capacity, there lacks agreement on the form and structure that increased institutional capacity should be applied. In 2011, the council ministers delegated to the secretariat to commission a review of the organ based on the fact that the secretariat's increased


purpose since the Permanent Tripartite Commission was formed in 1993. However, some years on the review is not sufficient due to the changing positions on policy and the lack of agreement by the member states on the suggested arrangements. The member states of the EALA have opined that there are vacant staffing positions that are waiting for the review to be completed. This delay, hinders that capacity of the secretariat to undertake necessary initiatives. It has also been suggested that the proposal of the institutional structure include a complete-fledged department within the Secretariat for the Common Market Protocol that transfers the existing mandate from the department of planning.

However, the common institutional update that have resulted in contention is the secretariat replacement with a commission that will possess more power, and will be in a position to enforce decisions made over its member states. This will overturn the current decision-making process that is characterized by interstate dominance. The proposals for the suggested commission would involve transferring the ministers in charge of the affairs of the EAC from their respective member states to operate from Arusha and expedite the mandate of decision making. It seems that the member states are yet to commit to a clear position as pertains to the proposal of replacing the secretariat with a commission. Notably, it is unlikely that the member states are willing to cede such power and authority to the EAC or declare their commitment to increasing their financing of the EAC.

## **2.5 Overlapping membership to RECS**

The states in East Africa are at the center of an overlapping web of trade arrangements and regional blocs including membership in SADC, COMESA, ECCAS and IGAD and sets of multilateral and bi-lateral trade agreements with international states. The member states of EAC therefore are faced with competition commitments and disjointed standards and rules to comply with.

**Figure 2. 1: Overlapping membership to RECS**



**Source: AfDB 2010**

There exist some significant variations between the member states political agendas that are related with economic policy. This translates to additional coordination costs and tensions for implementing fragmenting policy environments and regional policies.<sup>31</sup> The impacts of multiple membership of REC are prevalent in trade policy and challenges to the common market implementation.<sup>32</sup> Initiatives to implement common external tariffs have faced challenges ranging from exemptions, among which belong to varying FTAs. Particularly, all the members of the EAC are COMESA members, except Tanzania which has membership in SADC. Therefore, the EACCET makes explicit exemptions to accommodate for such differences among member states. Additionally, Burundi is an ECCAS member, for which there are no formal exemptions recognized by the Custom Union Protocol of the EAC and

<sup>31</sup> Muluvi A. and P. Odhiambo; *East African Partner States Pulling in Different Directions: What Are the Implications for Africa ?* Africa in Focus. Brookings, 2013.

<sup>32</sup> Sandrey, R; *Intra-REC Trade and Overlapping Membership: Review of COMESA, EAC and SADC*. Tralac Working Paper S15WP11/2015

associated regulations but is a de facto derogate to the EAC CET when engaging in trading activities with ECCAS partners. With reference to trade values, the trade flows therefore derogating from EAC CET represents approximately 7%-13.5% of respecting EAC member states external trade (EAC Secretariat, 2014c). This is a systematic challenge that both hinders and complicates integration implementation in the EAC. COMESA is in the process of putting in place its own customs union. Notably, while the COMESA CET is aligned with the EAC CET in principle, there still exists some discrepancies as long as Tanzania does not become a member of COMESA and exemptions and exclusions vary. Since SADC plans to be established as a custom union, the challenge of harmonization and coherence of various trade regimes will still be high.

The process of the tripartite FTA, that involves EAC, SADC and COMESA should in principle create an opportunity the compatibility and alignment of overlapping trade regimes, especially if the Tripartite FTA is transformed into the Tripartite CU as proposed. This transition still has a long way to go. This transition will solve the challenge of the membership of Burundi to ECCAS. Besides, the EAC CU allows for member states to be granted exemptions, when they request (temporary stays of CET application), although they contribute a small percentage of the trade between the EAC member states (1%-3.6%) as indicated by the Secretariat report of 2014. The advantage of exemptions and exclusions is that they accommodate economic and political interests which otherwise could have been used against or even hindered the pursuit of the process of integration by the EAC member states. In doing this, the members reduce the level of integration integrity and coherence and complicate its process of implementation. The overlapping state memberships also hinders the EAC's ability to act as a collective organ within the international context. With reference to the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union, Tanzania at first held negotiations with the member states of SADC before

joining the institution that is made up of all member states of the EAC.<sup>33</sup>

## **2.6 Conclusion**

From an interview with a director at the EAC ministry in Kenya, the EAC has limited authority and capacity to solve and monitor these implementation challenges due to its institutional shortcoming. The institutional capacity of the EAC is low and the EAC arrangements are yet to be updated to consider increasing the scope of EAC goals. It is likely that the member states have not agreed over the suggested institutional arrangements that would increase the capacity of the institution as well as offer the EAC more supranational authority and increase its financial obligations. Currently, the EAC remains to be an intergovernmental organization.

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<sup>33</sup> Bilal, S. ; *Asymmetric Trade Negotiations for Development: What Does the Experience from the ACPEU Economic Partnership Agreements Tell Us?* In Bilal S., P. De Lombaerde and D. Tussie (eds). 2011. *Asymmetric Trade Negotiations, The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series*, Ashgate. pp.45-88.



## CHAPTER THREE

### THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT: THE PRINCIPLE OF VARIABLE GEOMETRY IN THE EAC

#### 3.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the progress of integration has been slow with certain factors hindering integration. The launch of the Coalition of Willing (CoW) in 2013, introduced a much needed, though controversial incentive to the integration efforts in the EA region. With the application of the principle of variable geometry, the heads of state of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have taken bold steps to demonstrate the significant steps that are possible with political support at the top ranks. Moreover, against the odds, the decision to exclude Burundi and Tanzania has brought the member states of the EAC closer.

According to the treaty, the establishment of the EAC, variable of geometry principle is flexibility that allows the progress in cooperation between member states in larger integration schemes in different areas and speeds. Therefore, as posited in article 7(1) b of the treaty, the variable of geometry principle gives Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda the rights to pursue progress and cooperation in areas where they have a common interest if it is grounded on the domain of the overall goal of the integration objective of the regional bloc.

#### 3.2 The Tripartite Initiative

The CoW is formally known as the Tripartite for Fast Tracking the integration of East African member states. The coalition excluded Tanzania and Burundi which were perceived by their partners as laggards of the institution's efforts for integration and held three summits to discuss the issue in 2013. Three heads of state; Uhuru Kenyatta, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda respectively, settled on a number of approaches with the goal of fast tracking the region's efforts of integration. Their first focus was facilitating

joint infrastructural projects and abolishing the non-tariff barriers in the Northern Transport Corridor which covers Rwanda, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. The corridor is a critical trade link for the landlocked states in the region. The achievements of the CoW have included:

### **3.2.1 Infrastructure**

The three partner states signed a tripartite agreement to develop and operate the standard gauge railway (SGR) marking the start of an infrastructural project with potential benefits of transforming and improving the economy of the region. The agreement held that the SGR is to run from the Mombasa port through Nairobi to Malaba to Kampala, Kigali and Juba. The SGR project has the responsibility of supplementing the current narrow-gauge line constructed by Britain which is much slower and only runs from Kenya to Uganda. The first phase of the SGR running from Mombasa to Nairobi was launched on 31<sup>st</sup> May 2017 and is currently operational. Currently, close to 90 percent of cargo from the Mombasa port is transported by road across the region. The SGR is being presented as a necessary alternative to this.

### **3.2.2 Non-Tariff Barriers**

Following the discussions of the three countries, President Kenyatta, ordered for the streamlining of operations at the port of Mombasa which led to the decrease in the time taken for goods to be cleared. Additionally, the Kenyan President ordered that the number of roadblocks on goods in transit headed to Uganda to be reduced. Additionally, the EAT ministers' report pointed out that based on the 5<sup>th</sup> Summit that was held in May 2014, the period for clearance of goods from Mombasa to Kampala dropped from 18 days to 14 days while that of goods from Mombasa to Kigali from 21 days to 15 days. The cost of clearing goods was also significantly reduced with a container destined for Kampala costing 1,731 USD while that destined for Kigali costing 3,387 USD. These figures indicate a fall

from 3,375 USD and 4,990 USD respectively.

### **3.2.3 Freedom of movement**

In as far as the movement of persons and labor is concerned, Rwanda led the way through the abolishment of work permit fees for all the citizens of EAC countries. Kenya followed in Rwanda's footsteps and in 2014, Uganda also abolished the use of work permits for Rwandans and Kenyans. With regards to multinational corporations that are operating multiple offices in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, the abolishment of work permits will ease cross border operations. Additionally, from February 2014, the citizens from the three countries have felt ease travelling within the states using only their national identity cards, where in the past passports were a prerequisite. In June 2014, the East African Visa was launched which is valid for a period of 6 months for residents and non-residents in the three nations. The heads of states from the three countries have also approved the development of a single tourist visa for their nations. These steps mark a substantial progress to traveling for both business and leisure within the region.

### **3.2.4 ICT**

The "Coalition of the willing" announced a plan to form a single mobile network by December 2014. This single area network has led to the elimination of roaming charges among the EAC countries. Since, August 2014, the mobile phone users in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya have enjoyed 20% reduction in tariffs on making cross-border phone calls. This has been followed by the unification of mobile services taxes by the three countries since April 2014 leading to lower charges for voice calls, text messages and data services. There are some indications that Burundi and Tanzania may be invited to become members of the single area network. The successful implementation of the initiative, though virtually, will connect all the East African states.

### **3.2.5 Other areas of cooperation**

Other significant agreements among the three partners have been on; fast-tracking Single Customs Territory (SCT) implementation ahead of their EAC neighbors. They have signed a MoU on security, defense and foreign affairs policy, a clear foundation of a political federation (now confederation)

### **3.3 Conclusion**

Albeit the backlash from certain spheres, the coalition of the three partner states has improved the collaboration levels among the EAC member states and has introduced the motivation needed to achieve the EAC goals. The scorecard in 2016 launched by the secretariat of the EAC in collaboration with the World Bank to oversee the common market implementation of the EAC member states is still an important publication in understanding regional integration. The report does not leave any doubt as to the task that awaits the EAC member states in their progress of attaining a common market status with its first target having been 2015. The publication documents that the challenge of promoting integration trickles down to the common citizen. Evidently, the region is unified; a region where personal interactions and business are becoming easier and more accessible. Companies operating in the EAC will benefit from the efforts implemented to ensure easier movement of capital, people and goods along the borders in the region.

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**SETBACKS OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES OF USING**  
**VARIABLE GEOMETRY TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEMS OF EAC**  
**INTEGRATION**

**4.1 Introduction**

This section covers at setbacks of diplomatic relations. It looks at the challenges faced by the EAC states as they use the variable geometry in engaging in diplomatic relations.

**4.2 Diplomatic tensions among partner states**

The introduction of the CoW and the exclusion of Burundi and Tanzania was motivated by the economic goals of the member states of EAC. The partnership came about when diplomatic relations in the region were perceived as tense. In May 2013, the President of Tanzania Jakaya Kikwete, urged Rwanda to take part in peace negotiations with the FDLR, a rebel group which is held responsible by Kigali for the genocide that occurred in 1994. The head of state, Paul Kagame of Rwanda did not take Kikwete's sentiments positively. During that same period, the participation of Tanzania in an intervention led by the UN in the DRC also increased the tensions along diplomatic lines with Uganda, a nation that has always been involved in the politics of Congo. Moreover, in 2013, July, the head of state of Tanzania, Kikwete, expelled 35,000 immigrants that had entered the country illegally from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. On the other hand, Kenya committed itself to realign its policy on foreign relations to give more focus on regional integration following the ICC charges that faced the head of state and his deputy. Tanzania signaled its closer relations with Burundi and DRC, the probability of another collapse of the EAC was high. Initially, the CoW actions increased tensions; the head of state, Kikwete in 2013, criticized the intervention of the CoW on the issues he argued were already addressed by the protocols of the EAC. He specifically mentioned the use of ID cards as a travel document, the use of a single tourist visa, the political federation and the Single

customs territory. According to Kikwete, the discussions as pertains to the single customs territory and political federation ought to have included the country of Tanzania, explaining that he was okay with the CoW intervention fast tracking other agendas.

#### **4.3 Exclusion of Burundi and Tanzania**

öIn June of 2013, the presidents of Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda met in Entebbe; Uganda in show of the commitment to fast track the integration process. These three countries held a common belief that overtime, the negotiations of the EAC were downgraded by Tanzania's membership in SADC while all of the EAC states belonged in COMESA. Tanzania pulled out of COMESA in 2001. Burundi and Tanzania never attended that summit, although Burundi had been invited.ö As stated earlier, the overriding feeling among the three member countries present was that Burundi and Tanzania have been hesitating to support the issue of integration. While the meeting was held, three countries agreed to fast track their projects on infrastructure development and the key projects underscored during the meeting included the construction of the SGR that moves from Kenya all the way to Kigali, extending the oil pipeline from Kenya to Rwanda, constructing the oil refinery in Uganda and ensuring the interconnection of electricity in the three states. An agenda that was also discussed was the plan for the establishment of political federation that was contentious.

The second meeting held by the presidents of the CoW was in August 2013 in Mombasa County, Kenya. During the meeting, a ministerial delegation was present to represent the Republic of Burundi. Similar to the initial meeting, Tanzania was not invited at all. During the third meeting in Kigali, Rwanda in October, the absence Tanzania and Burundi was felt. During the meeting the heads of states in attendance pointed out that the drive for integration was to propel infrastructural development through the growth of infrastructure, trade, and political integration.

#### **4.4 General Animosity among partner states**

The basis that the issues in the region including the creation of a political federation, the removal of free trade barriers and launching of a single tourist visa together with eradication of work permits were issues of discussion by the 5 states of East Africa. Tanzania and Burundi over the years have raised questions on their being sidelined in the regional projects. The then East African Affairs minister of Tanzania posited that the three member states contradicted the EAC protocol article 7(1) that states that although the article grants the member states the permission to venture into bilateral agreements, the issue must be discussed by all the EAC member states. With the continued animosity between the member states, a number of initiatives with the aim of driving integration may be delayed.

The first issue of concern revolves on the probability of realizing the set targets under the suggested EAMU protocol within the set time for the complete adoption of one currency by the year 2023.

Additionally, the complete implementation of a common market protocol that provides an avenue for free movement of capitals, goods, labour and goods among the member states has taken a long time than its scheduled due date of 2015. Other challenges that are likely to delay the regional integration is the application of a common tourist visa, the eradication of work permits and certificates for yellow fever.

In addition, these new divisions have a potential of slowing down the phases remaining for complete implementation of the custom union. Core among these is adopting a single custom territory and the introduction and application of the EAC sanitary and phytosanitary protocol (SPS) and the EAC industrialization policy and strategy.

#### **4.5 Emerging Mistrust among partner states**

In general, the growing mistrust between the member states has a likely effect to delay trade relations between the member states which will negatively impact the growth of the region.

economy. This is particularly true since Tanzania is an important export destination for goods from Kenya and Uganda. In the same way Tanzania, the East African Community is the second largest trading partner in Africa following South Africa. With reference to the serious implications that the mistrust among the member states pose on the region, the policymakers have the responsibility of seeking sustainable solutions to prevent another major split in the EACö.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

Amidst the diplomatic row among some partner states, president Kikwete came out strongly to state that his country was a member of the EAC.<sup>34</sup> When the CoW summit which was to be held in Kampala was canceled, the tensions that had rose in January 2014 started to deescalate. The summit was held in February 2014 with the attendance of heads of state of the EAC countries including the president of Burundi. During the summit, the heads of states decided to allow South Sudan, Tanzania and Burundi to issue their preferred areas of cooperation before the next summit. During the CoW summit, Tanzania and Burundi were in attendance. Currently both countries have agreed on the implementation of the SCT.

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<sup>34</sup> Muluvi A. and P. Odhiambo, 2013. East African Partner States Pulling in Different Directions: What Are the Implications for Africa? Africa in Focus. Brooking. December



## CHAPTER FIVE

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the data presentation and analysis which was collected from the target audience. The data was acquired through the use of questionnaires and interview guides which were the main tools for data collection in the study and interviews. The interpretation of the data was on the basis of the research questions and objectives.

#### 5.2 Findings

The majority of respondents (73%) said that regional integration in East Africa is struggling to achieve its intended objectives. One-hundred percent of respondents said there are politically initiated strategies put in place to address the challenges of integration in Africa. However, respondents were split on the nature of these strategies with 55% responding they are economic and 45% responding they are political. One-hundred percent of respondent agreed that these strategies are not effectively addressing the challenges of regional integration in the EAC.

The most common key challenge noted was diplomatic standoffs. Additionally, 100% percent of respondents did not think the strategies were effectively addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC. All respondents agree that diplomacy is often used in the integration effort of the EAC and all respondents said economic diplomacy is the most popular form of diplomacy used in integration efforts.


Respondents were split on whether they believed that diplomatic engagement has the potential to effectively address most of the problems of regional integration in the EAC with 64% agreeing and 36% disagreeing. Again, respondents were evenly split (45% yes, 55% no) on whether there has been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC. Sixty-four percent of respondents believe diplomatic engagement is being well utilized

in the EAC and the same respondents agree that diplomatic engagement has been effective in putting up strategies to alleviate the problems of Regional Integration.

All respondents from the Ministry of EAC and the Center for Regional Integration agreed that diplomatic engagement has the potential to effectively address most of the problems of Regional Integration in the EAC while all respondent from CUEA disagreed with the statement. Respondents from the Center for Regional Integration had the same responses for all the questions. Respondents from CUEA were evenly split on whether there has been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC.

### 5.2.1 Regional Integration and its objectives


**Figure 5. 1: Is Regional Integration in East Africa Struggling to achieve its intended objectives?**



A 73% majority of the respondents agreed that regional integration is facing major challenges which hinder the EAC from achieving its intended objectives. One of the directors at the ministry of EAC said that “integration is not at the place where we want it to be. Things are slowly taking shape but we cannot wish a way the fact that there are still major steps which need to be taken.ö

### 5.2.2 Political Strategies of addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC


**Figure 5. 2: Are there politically initiated diplomatic strategies put in place to address the challenges of integration in Africa?**



All the responded agreed that there have been efforts of employing political diplomatic strategies to help alleviate the problem of integration in the EAC. While all were in agreement about the presence of diplomatic engagement in the region, they were not in consensus with the manner in which diplomatic engagements conducted. One of the directors at the Centre for regional integration stated that “economic diplomacy is being used more to further political diplomatic efforts in the region.” This is as indicated in figure 5.3 below


5.3 Nature of strategies

Figure 5. 3: Please give a brief description under the relevant nature of the strategies



5.3.1 Effectiveness of strategies of addressing challenges of Integration


Figure 5. 4: Are these strategies effectively addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC?



All respondents agreed that political strategy put in place have not been effective in addressing the challenges of integration in the region. This means that in as much as there are political diplomatic methods, they do not necessarily touch on solving the major problems of regional integration in the EAC. Those that have been employed are seen as methods of furthering new initiatives in the region rather than addressing the problems at hand.

#### 5.4 Diplomacy in the efforts of EAC integration


Figure 5. 5: Is Diplomacy often used in the integration efforts of the EAC?



All the respondents agreed that diplomacy has often been used in the integration of the efforts of EAC. The region has over time enjoyed fairly peaceful coexistence from the partner states and other countries neighboring the region. Where problems have emerged or conflicts arisen diplomacy has always been the method by which the problems were addressed.

### 5.4.1 Most Popular form of Diplomacy in EAC Integration


Figure 5. 6: Which form of Diplomacy is the most popular in the EAC integration?



All the respondents agreed that economic diplomacy is more popular in Africa as compared to other forms of diplomacy such as diplomatic engagement, cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy. This shows that the economic sector of the region is at the forefront of furthering the efforts of regional integration. On its own however, economic diplomacy lacks the power to address issues which emerge from other sectors such as political, cultural and public sectors.

## 5.4.2 The Potential of Diplomatic engagement in addressing the Problems of Regional Integration in the EAC


**Figure 5. 7: Does Diplomatic engagement have the potential to effectively address most of the problems of Regional Integration in the EAC?**



64% majority of the respondents agreed that diplomatic engagement has the potential to effectively address most of the problems of regional integration in the region. This gives diplomatic engagement cross cutting face meaning that it has the power to effectively cut across different divides i.e., political, cultural, economic and social and successfully address the problems of regional integration. On the other hand, a 36% minority of the respondents think that other forms of diplomacy especially economic diplomacy, with the necessary political backing is solely able to address the problems of regional integration in a crosscutting manner.

### 5.5 Goodwill by Political Elites in the EAC


**Figure 5. 8: Has there been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC?**



A 55% majority of the respondents agreed that there has been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC in the journey of attempting to address the problems of regional integration. Most of these respondents were from the government agencies from the ministry of EAC. 45% of the respondents who were not constituted off of government employees thought that there has been no goodwill by political elites in the region whatsoever and that is why the process of integration in the region has been lagging behind.

### 5.6 Use of Diplomatic engagement in the EAC


**Figure 5. 9: Is Diplomatic engagement being well utilized in the EAC?**





A similar reflection of the previous responses was also seen when the respondents were asked whether diplomatic engagement was being well utilized in the EAC. A 64% majority most of whom were government employees strongly agreed that diplomatic engagement has been and continues to be well utilized in addressing the problem of regional integration in the region. A 36% minority disagreed with varying degrees citing that diplomatic engagement has been and continues to be misused by individual states to further their own selfish national interest.

**Figure 5. 10: Has Diplomatic engagement been effective in putting up strategies to alleviate the problems of Regional Integration?**



When they were asked whether diplomatic engagement has been effective in putting up strategies to alleviate the problems of regional integration, a 64% majority most of whom were government employees strongly agreed that diplomatic engagement has been and continues to be well utilized in addressing the problem of regional integration in the region. A 36% minority disagreed with varying degrees citing that diplomatic engagement has been and continues to be misused by individual states to further their own selfish national interest.

## CHAPTER SIX

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.1 Introduction

This section covers the summary of the findings. It also covers the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

#### 6.2 Summary of Findings

This research project was intended to establish the role of Diplomatic engagement in addressing the challenges of regional integration in the EAC. Upon completion of the research, it was proven that Diplomatic engagement carries the potential to effectively address the challenges of integration in the region. However, key impediments such as the principle of sovereignty, lack of political goodwill, the rules of financing, power relations and overlapping membership to RECs have a detrimental effect on the use of Diplomatic engagement in regional integration.

The principle of variable geometry a product of Diplomatic engagement has been a notable effort of enhancing regional integration in the EAC. However, more needs to be done for it to be more effective.

A 73% majority of respondents said that regional integration in East Africa is struggling to achieve its intended objectives. One-hundred percent of respondents said there are politically initiated strategies put in place to address the challenges of integration in Africa and they agree that the most notable of them has been the Principle of Variable Geometry. However, One-hundred percent of the respondents agreed that these strategies are not effectively addressing the challenges of regional integration in the EAC.

### **6.3 Conclusions**

The research concluded the following:

The principle of Variable Geometry in the EAC as manifested through the Coalition of the willing is a commendable political diplomatic strategy to fast-track integration. However, in as much as it has good intentions, it poses as a challenge by isolating some partner states from getting involved in the mainstream cooperation.

With proper support from the political elite, once the economic structures of Common Market, Customs Union and Monetary Union are fully implemented, the ultimate goal of integration; a Political Federation will automatically fall into place.

As the ultimate goal of integration, the legitimacy and the sustainability of the EAC Political Federation is largely dependent on the level of development achieved in the region. A successful political federation means a conducive environment with a strong political will, commitment and the presence of the required regional structures and institutions.

Even with the efforts of Diplomatic Engagement within the region, the problem of overlapping membership of partner states to various RECs largely undermines the binding commitments to different policy environments whose objectives and mandates are not always similar

### **6.4 Recommendations**

The principle of variable geometry in the EAC being displayed under the Coalition of the willing is a commendable Political Diplomatic Strategy to fast-track integration. However, in as much as it has good intentions, it poses as a challenge by isolating some partner states from integrating into the mainstream cooperation. The approach which the coalition of the willing has used to roll out its plans, has been sending signals indicating that there is no room left for Tanzania and Burundi to be accommodated. The more that these states feel resented

and isolated, the higher the likelihood of another fragmented EAC. Therefore, it is imperative that the governments of Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda involve Tanzania and Burundi more openly on future joint projects and discuss their entry points when they are ready to team up with them. Fast tracking the integration process ought not to be seen as a competitive process but a process where some partners go ahead of the others and encourage and support them to follow in that direction.

Although Regional Integration is mostly seen as a political affair, the Private Sector needs to be more involved in a much deeper sense than how it currently is. As a bloc, Africa is rich in resources which have the potential to spur its course of economic integration. Most importantly, the presence of oil in South Sudan and the discovery of oil wells in Uganda and Kenya poses as an emergence of a new economic order within the region which is expected to reduce over dependence on Western States for oil and oil products. The Private Sector needs to be given more investment opportunities to promote industrial growth in the region.

There is also a need to make integration in the EAC to be more of a citizen-centered process so as to create a sense of a community comprised of the citizens of all the partner states. This can be improved through the elaboration of the East African Civic Education and Sensitization programs in order to promote a true sense of an East African Identity.

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**APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE**

**THE ROLE OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT IN ADDRESSING AFRICA'S  
CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A CASE OF THE  
EAC**

**Part 1: GENERAL INFORMATION**

Name.....

Organization.....

Designation.....

Date.....

**PART 2: OBJECTIVES**

1. a) Is Regional Integration in Africa Struggling to achieve its intended objectives?

No [ ]

Yes [ ]

b) Explain.....

...

.....

.....

2. a) Are there strategies put in place to address the challenges of integration in Africa?

No [ ] Yes [ ]

b) If yes, please give a brief description under the relevant nature of the strategies

Economic [ ]

.....

.....

.....

.....

Social [ ]

.....

.....



.....

Political [ ]

.....

.....

.....

c) Are these strategies effectively addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC?

No [ ]

Yes [ ]

Please explain.....

.....

.....

3. State any 3 key challenges encountered by these strategies in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration

.....

.....

.....

.....

4. Is Diplomacy often used in the integration efforts of the EAC?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

5. Which form of Diplomacy is the most popular in the EAC integration? Explain.

Economic Diplomacy [ ]

.....

.....

Public Diplomacy [ ]

.....

.....

Cultural Diplomacy [ ]

.....

.....

Diplomatic Engagement [ ]

.....

.....

6. Does Diplomatic Engagement have the potential to effectively address most of the problems of Regional Integration in the EAC? Please explain

No [ ]

.....

.....

Yes [ ]

.....

.....

7. Has there been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

8. a) Is Diplomatic Engagement being well utilized in the EAC?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

b) Please explain.....

.....

.....

9. Has Diplomatic Engagement been effective in putting up strategies to alleviate the problems of Regional Integration?

Yes [ ]

No[ ]

b) Please explain.....

.....

10. Give any other relevant comments

.....

.....

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