

**PERSPECTIVES ON AID POLITICS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE IMPACT OF TURKEY'S INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA**

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DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree or any other academic accreditation at any other university.

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DEDICATION

To my mother Mrs. Habiba Bulle Gessey, who toiled tirelessly and saw to it that not only did I obtain a solid foundation in education but that I also appreciated its worth.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

DAC	Development Assistance Committee
HHI	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
	Key Informant Interviews
KII	
	Federal Government of Somalia
FGS	
LIS	Least Industrialized States
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIS	Most Industrialized States
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
ODA	Ordinary Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SSC	South-South Cooperation
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TİKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TRC	Turkish Red Crescent
UN	United Nations
US	United States

ABSTRACT

This study examined the dynamics of aid politics in Horn of Africa. A specific focus was Turkey's humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia in 2011 when parts of the country were hit by famine that triggered huge populations into the capital Mogadishu. The study had three objectives. It examined the impact of Turkey's humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia. It analyzed the factors that undermined the Turkey's aid delivery in Somalia and finally, the study assessed the dynamics of Turkey's political engagement in Somalia. This research was guided by realism, idealism and dependency theories. The study used descriptive survey design and complemented with an in-depth literature review. The study population comprised of government officials, MPs, and Senators of Federal government of Somalia, INGOs, NGOs, business groups, and academics in Mogadishu. Primary data was gathered through use of survey questionnaire from relevant participants. Quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS while the qualitative data was analyzed thematically and descriptively. The study concludes that Turkey's intervention had multiple positive effects; firstly, the aid intervention averted the unfolding humanitarian crisis by saving lives. Secondly, the Turkey intervention brought the Somalia agenda back on to the international agenda and as well raised the profile of Turkey in the global stage. However, the study also found the Turkey humanitarian aid had significantly reduced over the years due in part to the sustained threats from Al-Shabab because of Turkey's support to the federal government. A decade on the situation has not changed as UN declared in July 2.5 million face food insecurity. The study also found Turkey has succeeded in sponsoring a political dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland-self-declared republic- in 2013 and created momentum for similar dialogues. A key recommendation is coordination with other donors, building the capacity of state institutions and strengthens the social-economic pillars.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1. Introduction

International donors mainly in developed countries, UN agencies or international organizations, have provided different forms of aid assistance to third world countries or their populations for decades. The aid assistance transferred to developing nations, mainly in Africa, consist of economic, military, or emergency humanitarian assistance usually given following natural disasters, wars, pandemics, diseases, or famine. The impact of these aid flows has resulted into debates between scholars arguing for and against aid assistance as a means to assist and spur economic growth in poor nations.

This study explores the perspectives on aid politics in the HoA a region by analyzing the impact of Turkey's intervention in Somalia. The research examined at Turkey's humanitarian aid assistance in Somalia, and also the variables that impeded Turkey's aid delivery and the dynamics of Turkey's political involvement in Somalia. The context of the research, statement of the problem, aims, review of related literature, and justification of the investigation are all included in this section, as well as the hypothesis development, conceptual framework, methodology, and research paradigm.

1.2. Background to the Study

The term "foreign aid" is frequently used to denote any type of help provided by one country's government to another country in order to aid in development or respond to rising concerns that

are creating a challenge to the recipient country. External assistance, according to Radelet, can take several forms, including resource provision, skill transfer, and humanitarian aid, all of which are meant to boost the receiving country's population's economic growth and prosperity. He goes on to say that it include providing grants or loans, as well as human support, military help, humanitarian aid, and infrastructural development.¹ ODA, which is assistance, supported development agendas and also helped in reducing poverty levels through foreign aid. According to Jenny Wells, ODA is sourced by intergovernmental grants from one state to another which is channeled via IO and NGOs.²

Foreign aid is one element of the global development dialogue as well as international economic order in the current world order. For instance, Pankaj argues foreign aid has significantly contributed to the progress and development agenda of the developing nations and established the broad relations between the North-South relations until the 1980s.³ Besides, Jerker, et al; noted aid development is therefore a phenomenon of the post-war period that evolved considerably and led to the development of institutions, bilateral as well as multilateral, that are created to delivering aid to developing nations.⁴ For decades, aid has been seen as something temporary designed or given to complement existing national resources and efforts. However, four decades of existence, foreign assistance has been an enduring feature. For instance, many developing countries are reliant on external assistance to cushion the deficit in their national budget and infrastructure development thus becoming heavily dependent on it.

¹ Ibid

² Jenny Wells, (2015). Foreign Aid and its importance in Relieving Poverty. Oxfam Australia. Accessed from; <https://www.oxfam.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Oxfam-Foreign-Aid-GeoDate-Vol-28-No-3-July-2015.pdf>

³ Ashok K. Pankaj (2005). Revisiting Foreign Aid Theories. International Studies 42, 2 (2005) Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London DOI: 10.1177/002088170404200201. Accessed on https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240967196_Revisiting_Foreign_Aid_Theories

⁴ Jerker C., Gloria S. and Nicolas van de Walle (1997). Foreign Aid in Africa Learning from country experiences Edited by Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1997. Accessed on http://www.diva_portal.org/smash/get/diva2:272899/FULLTEXT01.pdf March 2021

Roughly \$1 trillion in aid money has been channeled to the developing countries by developed countries for the last 50 years. A lot of money has been amassed each year in richer countries to assist charitable operations in Africa during the last decade.⁵ Nevertheless, the real motive for providing foreign aid to other countries tends to vary; some nations use it to improve their own security, while many others use it to realize diplomatic targets, promote exports, alleviate suffering resulting from natural or man-made catastrophic events such as famine, disease, and military conflict, contribute to the economic development, and assist in the establishment or strengthening of democratic structures, making it more difficult to pinpoint the far more important motivation..⁶

Over recent times, the Turkish government has participated in a number of global conferences. This includes a membership on the United Nations Security Council in 2009 and 2010, as well as increased international aid and military support obligations. Even though other donors are cutting back on ODA, Turkey's development assistance grew by 98.7% from 2012 to 2014, and permitted ODA increased from \$1.2 billion to \$3.6 billion.⁷

Ever since early 1990s, Somalia has been experiencing the world's worst humanitarian crisis. This is primarily owing to the state's breakdown and the devastating drought of 1992. Years of insecurity, political upheaval, famine, and food shortages have undermined critical services, wreaked havoc on human capital and physical infrastructure, and exacerbated to widespread poverty and population displacement.⁸ Upwards of 250,000 citizens are believed to have died in the country during the 2011 drought, with half of this being children aged below five years. In

⁵Dambisa Moyo,(2009). Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Penguin, 2009).

⁶<https://www.britannica.com/topic/foreign-aid>

⁷ Ibid

⁸Somalia Drought Impact & Needs Assessment; VOLUME I Synthesis Report. 2018. Accessed from; http://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/GSURR_Somalia-DINA-Report.pdf

addition, the famine has driven 955,000 Somalis to take asylum in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia, wreaking havoc on crops and cattle. Somalia has been labeled a failed state by the international world due to immense obstacles and decades of internal strife.⁹

The crisis in Somalia piqued Turkey's attention, owing to the catastrophic humanitarian disaster that has resulted as a result of the drought. The first visit to Mogadishu by President RecepTayyip Erdogan—then Prime Minister—in August 2011, accompanied by his family and other representatives along with members of the cabinet, legislators, creative types, captains of industry, as well as other distinguished guests, piqued global interest in the unraveling humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Furthermore, Prime Minister Erdogan overcome the odds by visiting the war-torn capital of Mogadishu, defying the UN's warning about the dangers of traveling to Somalia, and becoming the first head of the government from outside Africa to tour the war-torn nation since 1990.

Turkey's response to the 2011 famine in Somalia was therefore effective and complemented with substantial development initiatives to revive the dilapidated infrastructure that suffered decades of destruction and neglect, despite the international community's indecision to much needed humanitarian assistance to Somalia.¹⁰ President Erdogan's tour to Somalia in 2011 seems to have been metaphorical in because he's the first leader from outside Africa to tour the Somali capital in twenty years, and the timing was indeed meaningful since it happened to coincide with the Islamic holy month of Ramadan where Turkey provided \$201 million in humanitarian aid. Most crucially, it reintroduced the Somalia issue to the world agenda. Turkey's intervention in Somalia

⁹AbdirahanAynte, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 4 – 2011, Turkey's Foray Into Africa: New Humanitarian Power?, http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_13_no_4_-2011_ali.pdf

¹⁰Paul A, Oliver V, Drew C and Aweis A. (2014). Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries. Available at https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/33719848/11231936_Published_article.pdf

is often regarded as the most prominent examples of a developing power's foray into a war-torn country in light of Turkey's unprecedented efforts during the height of the 2011 drought. Ever since, Turkey has stepped up its efforts in Somalia, focusing on substantial humanitarian assistance, development assistance, and the capacity of private citizens to help the country recover which has been labeled as a *“failed state”* and sometimes a *“collapsed state.”*¹¹

Since the implosion of the state in 1990, Somalia has not had a functional government, rendering it the longest-running case of complete state collapse in post-colonial history.¹²In 2000, through an internationally backed conference, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established and was relocated to Somalia but did not get the much-needed local support and faced numerous challenges. In 2006, the ICU controlled most of the central and southern Somalia, where they inflicted strict adherence to sharia law especially in the areas where they governed. The TFG was now confined in governing a small segment of the capital Mogadishu. However, the reign of ICU did not last long after the Ethiopian troops intervened and dismantled the structure of Islamist group. This culminated the emergence of Al-Shabab, a more radical group affiliated with Al-Qaeda- that took control of large swathes of south central Somalia.¹³

A prolonged drought in 2011, aggravated by continuous political turmoil, forced thousands of Somalis to escape to neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, putting many on the verge of starvation. Many established western funders as well as new donors lent their help to the humanitarian situation. Erdogan's first journey to Mogadishu, in 2011, coincided with the emergence of a humanitarian catastrophe, at a time when conventional donors mostly engaged Somalia behind

¹¹Venugopalan, Harish. "Somalia: A Failed State." Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief 170 (2017).

¹²Menkhaus, Ken., "Diplomacy in a failed state international mediation in Somalia"2002, (Conciliation Resources 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG) pg 16.

¹³ Ibid

their headquarters in Kenya, while undertaking brief trips to Mogadishu's militarized airport on a regular basis.¹⁴ Somalis became invigorated by the tour, since they felt forgotten by the outside world and that their nation was now an euphemism for failed country.¹⁵ Since 2011, Turkey's highlighted the plight of the Somali people and the unfolding famine and political instability in their country.

Somalia is considered among the highest recipient of Turkey aid assistance in Africa and the largest beneficiary of Turkish aid globally. The Turkey intervention took the traditional donors by surprise and adopted different humanitarian aid approach¹⁶. Turkey's intervention in Somalia was unique, as it adopted a multipronged approach in which Turkish agencies provided much needed aid directly to the people and responded to people's priorities and further supported the Federal Government with a \$2M monthly budgetary support.¹⁷

The Turkish have not only delivered humanitarian and development aid to Somalia but has also been key players in resolving the political impasse. It is under such situations that Turkey has negotiated military cooperation with Somalia, commerce, and capital spending dialogues as well. The Turkish entry into mainland Africa has been analyzed differently by different scholars and has indicated that this entry cannot be analyzed out of the rising Inter-imperialist competitions or oppositions. It has consequently been argued that Somalia is a gate way for refurbished Turkish imperial aspirations in the Horn of Africa where United States' Imperial ambitions are in contest

¹⁴Wasuge. Mahad. Turkey Aid in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little. (Published by Heritage Policy Institute in 2014). Accessed from; <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>

¹⁵AbdirahanAynte Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 4 – 2011, Turkey's Foray Into Africa: New Humanitarian Power?, , http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_13_no_4_-2011_ali.pdf

¹⁶Wasuge. Mahad. Turkey Aid in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little. (Published by Heritage Policy Institute in 2014). Accessed from; <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>

¹⁷Abdurahman. Abdullahi, "Prospects for Somalia-Turkey Strategic Partnership." Published 2014.

by its competitors like China and Russia.¹⁸Therefore, it is important to examine Turkish entry and influence into Somalia as a position squeezed within a venture by the major powers each trying to push its interests but Turkey having an opening because of historical links with Somalia as reflected by the Ottoman period.

1.3. Statement of the Problem

The Greater Horn of Africa has experienced considerable external intervention in the post-Second World War era and post-Cold War era.¹⁹Much of that intervention has had notable impact on the region. Some of these interventions might be altruistic, intended to help the recipients, for instance, in times of natural catastrophe, while others were intended to advance growth or to promote strategic, geo-political and economic agenda of intervening country, although the exact motivations could be misguided.²⁰

Somalia was heavily reliant on foreign aid long before the collapse of the state, in 1991. Due to its strategic location in the Horn of Africa, Somalia received much interest from the Cold War protagonists. Somalia initially received huge military and other forms of assistance from the Soviet Union, but this support ended dramatically and changed sides to aid Ethiopia's fight with Somalia in 1997-78 to stop the latter's' ambition to annex the Somali region in Ethiopia. The US then filled the void left by the Soviet Union; however, their support was not comparable to the massive aid received from Moscow.

¹⁸Paul A, Oliver V, Drew C and Aweis A. (2014). Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries. Available at

https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/33719848/11231936_Published_article.pdf

¹⁹K. Mengisteab.,The Horn of Africa, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014)

²⁰ Ibid

The US withdrawal in the 1990s plunged Somalia into further humanitarian catastrophe and remained in turmoil for the next two decade years. In 2011, the country witnessing famine in many parts of its regions saw the intervention of Turkey in Somalia. Somalia jumped rapidly into the top three states receiving Turkish assistance globally and the greatest beneficiary in Africa.²¹ Thus, Turkey had been gaining enormous influence in Somalia due to its humanitarian intervention coupled with multi-sector cooperation in education, healthcare, business, and political reconciliation. In line with this policy objective, the historical and cultural link between Somalia and Turkey has been revived and Turkish presence in Somalia became highly visible.

The effect of Turkey's development assistance and diplomatic engagement in the war-torn nation are outstanding. A decade on since its intervention in Somalia, Turkey has made several strides and achieved milestones in terms of infrastructure developments and providing different forms of aid to the government and the people that arguably enhanced its presence in Somalia.²² Although the Turkish humanitarian assistance has been hailed as successful in responding to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, there are several factors that undermined their operations and access to areas outside Mogadishu. This study will examine the perspectives on aid in Horn of Africa focusing on the impact of Turkey's aid intervention in Somalia.

²¹Tank. Pinar. "Turkish Humanitarian Approach in Somalia," (Policy Brief, Norwegian Peace-building Resource Center, December, 2013). Also, Jason Straziuso, "Correction: Somalia-Death Story". Associated Press, May. 6, 2013. Available from:<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-report-260000-died-somali-famine> (assessed on September 2, 2017)

²²Cannon, Brendon (2016) "Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia," *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies: Vol. 16, Article 14*. Available at: <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol16/iss1/14>. Accessed September 4, 2017)

1.4. Study objective

The purpose of the study is to examine the perspectives on aid in Horn of Africa focusing on the impact of Turkey's intervention in Somalia

1.4.1. Research questions

- i. What is the impact of Turkey humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia?
- ii. What are the factors undermining the Turkey's aid delivery in Somalia?
- iii. What are the dynamics of Turkey political engagement in Somalia?

1.4.2. General objectives of the study

The objective of this study is to assess the perspectives of aid politics in the Horn of Africa with the focus on the Turkey's intervention in Somalia.

1.4.3. Specific Objectives

- i. Examine the impact of Turkey's humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia
- ii. Assess the factors undermining the Turkey's aid delivery in Somalia
- iii. Assess the dynamics of Turkey's political engagement in Somalia

1.5. Literature Review

This section deals with the analysis of existing literature on the perspectives on aid politics in HoA, an analysis of the bearing of Turkey's intervention in Somalia with the intention of bringing out the contributions, the limitations, differences, and gaps therein. Relevant literature is presented and examined on the research objectives and various theories are discussed that support the approach of the study. This is presented in section of theoretical review and the theories that guide the study presented in various sections.

1.5.1. Theoretical Literature Review

This section describes the theoretical framework as well as various theories that support and guides the study.

1.5.1.1. Realism theory

Realists consider states as the principal actor in the international system and their main interests are to safeguard their own security, and act in pursuit of national interests and strive to build their power.²³ In such an environment, success is defined by preserving and strengthening the state.²⁴ The states are considered to be acting in line with their national interests.²⁵ According to the realist theory, Turkey, like all others, is a power pursuing its own interests. Turkey's engagement in Africa, to this end, can be explained as an attempt to realize its national interests by taking advantage of Africa's economic and political assets.

The realist discussion on foreign aid can be argued with the consideration of realist assumptions that underscore several factors that motivate entities/states to provide aid to poor states on the basis of humanitarian response, economic development, cultural similarity, regional proximity, strategic significance, and ideological position.²⁶ In consideration of those factors the theory suggests that givers of aid can be correctly described by their interests who comprise of colonial

²³Julian W. Korab-Karpowicz. Political Realism in International Relations 2017. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305). P2. Accessed; <file:///C:/Users/Admin/AppData/Local/Temp/WJKKRealism-intl-relations.pdf>

²⁴Waltz. Kenneth N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. University of California, Berkeley. (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.). Accessed <https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=Theory+of+International+Politics+KENNETH+N.+WALTZ+University+of+California%2C+Berkeley>

²⁵Strohmer, C. 2015. "Realism and Idealism in International Relations", Retrieved from <http://www.charlesstrohmer.com/international-relations/international-relations-101/realism-idealism/all/1/>, (Accessed 9/4/2017)

²⁶Watanabe. Y. 2006. What determines bilateral aid distribution? Evidence from Major Donors. <https://economics.uoregon.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/05/Aid.pdf>

links, political likeness, and universal strategic benefits which can be said to be very weak connections with poverty cutback, policy depth, and breadth or actual development approaches.²⁷

The realism theory further argues that aid is just a strategy of foreign aid which is not dissimilar from diplomatic approach or propaganda. They all represent significant weaponries in the political harmony of a given nation. It is therefore important to note that the realist belief system accepts that foreign aid is fundamentally determined by strategic reasons embedded in the foreign policy of states that are giving out aid. It further asserts that relations among states in the international system take place in a Hobbesian condition of landscape in which own security, state security and self-protection or conservation are the fundamental, if not limited, goals. Subsequently foreign aid is seen as being connected to the beneficiaries' economic development and the charitable necessities of the beneficiary states are softened.

While classical realism customarily regards security in relation to alliances and military ability, the neo-realists more lately have emphasized the uniform or not superior significance of awareness of the economic element of national security.²⁸ Classical realism argue that foreign aid primacies are caused fundamentally by readings of states, while neo-realism emphasizes the fact that the beneficiaries' economic ability is essential in transforming the universal balances and thus helpful in explaining one of the many factors possibly determining the donors' aid

²⁷MuhindoMughanda, 2011. Inquiry on self-interested foreign aid: Insights from the ODA-migrations link in SSA countries. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 5(4), pp. 164-173. Available online at <http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir>

²⁸Alesina, A., Dollar, D. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?. Journal of Economic Growth 5, 33–63 (2000). <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009874203400>

priorities²⁹. Realist theory, however, does not totally negate the fact that some states offer foreign aid on the background of humanitarianism which is associated with idealism.

1.5.1.2. Idealism theory

Idealism stipulates that human beings are fundamentally good and suggests that foreign aid is determined by positive and hopeful and non-material inspirations and cravings or appeals for example philanthropy and decent and good or humanitarian responsibilities.³⁰ This theory argues that foreign aid is perceived as a tool or an indication of the shift of states towards cooperation in dealing with concerns of interdependence and globalization which are the current dynamics in the international system of the 21st century.³¹

The theory suggests that countries can be controlled and maintained by the use of international organizations, and this seems to explain why institutions like the WB and the IMF are instrumental in giving aid to states which are in post-conflict situations,³² This is also in line with the idealists' view of the aid given to states which embrace the organizations and regional institutions which promote peace and international treaties as foundations for endorsing shared respect for each other for the strengthening of regional and universal peace.³³

For the idealists, the theory argues that the interests of states or groups of people are expected to be regulated in the broader interest of humanity in entirety, therefore it can be asserted that a system of regulating the interests of states can only arise only by embracing the moral norms in

²⁹MuhindoMughanda, 2011. Inquiry on self-interested foreign aid: Insights from the ODA-migrations link in SSA countries. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 5(4), pp. 164-173.

³⁰AdaneNigatu H, 2015. Foreign Aid in Developing Countries. *J Pol Science Pub Aff* 3: 186. doi:10.4172/2332-0761.1000186

³¹Lancaster C (2007) *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, and Domestic Politics*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

³²JibrilUbaleYahaya, 2018. The Relevance of Theoretical Assumption of Realist and Idealist Perceptions in International Relations Discipline, *Arts and Social Sciences Journal* Volume 9. Issue 5. 1000410 pg 2

³³ Ibid

shared respect in the situation of power where the powerful give foreign aid such that people do not suffer. However, national interest has brought the idealists and realists near each other for the fact that universal development goals can benefit states, the powerful and weak and prosperity can be achieved when the rich help the poor with foreign aid to make the world better. Universal interdependencies and interrelations and foreign aid can therefore be observed from the impact of development encounters that at one time were restricted to states' borders.³⁴

The arguments that are advanced by both the realists and idealists may not satisfy all the questions surrounding foreign aid. On both ends of the continuum of reasons surrounding the giving of foreign aid one may find that donors show mercantile selfish realist reasons and at the other one may see donors exhibiting the decent values and humane norms of a priesthood.³⁵ But in the middle one may not see the above arguments of giving aid as convincing and therefore the need to look at the dependency theory in the explanation of foreign aid to the beneficiaries.

1.6. Empirical literature review

This section examined the various literatures around the objectives of the study. This empirical literature review was intended to bring out the different perspectives and approaches that have been written before about the subject mainly to give some dimensions about the different viewpoints of foreign aid. This section also reviewed how foreign aid can have a bearing on the beneficiary states, the nature of foreign aid and the motivations and international institutions that are responsible for giving foreign aid.

³⁴Kaul, I. (2017) Providing global public goods: what role for multilateral development banks? ODI Report. London: Overseas Development Institute (www.odi.org/ accessed 14th March 2021)

³⁵Van Dam, P. and van Dis, W. (2014) 'Beyond the merchant and the clergyman: assessing moral claims about development cooperation' *Third World Quarterly* 35(9): 1636–1655

1.6.1 Humanitarian aid intervention

Humanitarian aid as “an act of providing material assistance to people in need has existed throughout human history, often in the form of food or material aid provided during famine, drought or natural disaster”.³⁶ Humanitarian aid has existed in human history but the modern concept only emerged in the 20th century.³⁷ Due to changes in the modern events, humanitarian aid is now availed by different organizations and actors.³⁸

Majority of African countries have been the largest beneficiaries of foreign assistance since their independence³⁹. This foreign aid has often been designed to achieve diverse objectives. For instance, donor countries give foreign aid to poor countries in order to help these countries respond to humanitarian situations or undertake long terms development projects that are deemed effective to boost the recipient nation’s capacity to meet its domestic challenges⁴⁰. For example, the USA has been providing aid to countries with aim of improving security and preventing and solving conflict management as well as partnering with other countries in order to lobby for market for its goods. The aid may be from former colonial countries with an intention of strengthening bilateral ties with their former colonies and other nations that have long-standing historical relations.⁴¹

Somalia has been heavily reliant of foreign aid for decades. For instance, the nation received enormous external resources soon after gaining self-rule in 1960s, but there was major tangible

³⁶Turk J Emerg Med. 2015 Oct; 15(Suppl 1): 5–7. Published online 2016 Mar 9. doi: 10.5505/1304.7361.2015.52207. Available at; <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4910138/>

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹Kwemo, A. B. (2017, April 2020). Making Africa Great Again: Reducing aid dependency. Retrieved from Brookings: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/04/20/making-africa-great-again-reducing-aid-dependency/>

⁴⁰Niyonkuru, F. (2016). Failure of Foreign Aid in Developing Countries: A Quest for Alternatives. Business and Economics Journal.

⁴¹ Ibid

outcome.⁴²The geographic location of Somalia in the Horn of Africa was critical during the Cold War era that attracted external assistance first from the Soviet Union and then the United States.⁴³Throughout the 1980s, the Horn region Africa was identified as the greatest receiver of foreign assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁴However, in 1989, thanks to the government's ruthless suppression on an armed revolt in Somaliland, Western funders withheld aid, diluting the rationale of the Cold War.⁴⁵

After the collapse of the military regime in 1991 Somalia has witnessed the largest humanitarian crisis globally.⁴⁶ Sucuoglu & Stearns argued that “the unfolding humanitarian situation in Somalia motivated Turkey’s intervention mainly because of the tragic humanitarian consequences of the famine in 2011”.⁴⁷ Turkey has managed to improve infrastructures in Somalia for instance by building refugees camps and hospitals. Erdogan explains the reasons that influenced Turkey’s intervention in Somalia was to strengthen historical ties, ease humanitarian suffering, reconstruct the country, improve security, draw attention to the world on the devastating drought in Somalia, and to support peace and security in the region.⁴⁸

Bingol attributed the Turkey’s increasing engagement in Somalia to three factors including; the common Islamic faith that Turkey shares with Somalis, explore business opportunities and markets for Turkey business groups, and to strengthen a geo-strategic lead in international

⁴²Ayittey, G. (1994). The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution. Cato Institute-Policy Analysis 205.

⁴³Warsame, H. A. (2011). Role of International Aid and Open Trade Policies in Rebuilding the Somali state. *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*.

⁴⁴Menkhaus, K. (1997). US Foreign Assistance to Somalia: Phoenix from the ashes ? *Middle East Policy* 5.

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶Elsergany, R. (2015, May 18). Erdogan Visits Famine-Hit Somalia. Retrieved from Islamstory.com: <http://islamstory.com/fr/node/31273>

⁴⁷Sucuoglu G. & Stearns. J., (2016) Turkey In Somalia: Shifting Paradigms Of Aid. Research Report 24. Available at: https://media.africaportal.org/documents/RR_24_FP_sucuoglu_stearns_FINAL_WEB.pdf

⁴⁸Erdogan, R.T. (2011). The Tears of Somalia, 18 May 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/10/the-tearsof-Somalia/>

politics.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, Akpınar cites several factors reasons that informed Turkish foreign strategy towards Somalia. Firstly, he notes Turkey was determined to get Somalia out of the international isolation. Secondly, deliver humanitarian response to alleviate the crisis. Thirdly, strengthen the security sector. Fourth, rebuild the dilapidated infrastructure system. Finally, strengthen the unity and solidarity among the federal member states.⁵⁰ Özkan concurs by citing that the tragic humanitarian consequence of the famine in Somalia was the major reason that influenced Turkey's intervention.⁵¹

Turkey's humanitarian relief reaction was multifaceted, which added to its effectiveness. According to zkan, Turkey's intervention included providing hundreds of tons of food and non-food items, as well as aiding "peacekeeping" and "capacity development" operations to aid in the monitoring of the Somali humanitarian disaster.⁵² Moreover, Turkey's strategy also included the deployment of government institutions, such as the TİKA, and Kızılay (TRC), the TA as well as aid agencies such as IHH to deliver aid that boosted the Turkey's foreign policy agenda in Somalia.⁵³

During the drought period, the Turkey's government agency such as Kızılay organized a relief fund from Turkish people for Somalia that was approximately 7 Million Turkish Lira.⁵⁴ Hundreds of temporary houses were constructed for internally displaced people that fled the famine and

⁴⁹Bingol, O. (2013). Turkey's Role in Somali's Peace and Development Process. AkademikBakis, Vol. 7, No 13.

⁵⁰Akpınar, P. (2013). Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy. Turkish Studies, Vol. 14,

⁵¹Sucuoglu G. & Stearns. J., (2016) Turkey In Somalia: Shifting Paradigms Of Aid. Research Report 24. Available at; https://media.africaportal.org/documents/RR_24_FP_sucuoglu_stearns_FINAL_WEB.pdf

⁵²Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. "Turkey's involvement in Somalia." SETA. Available at http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20141021155302_41_somali_eng-web.pdf.

⁵³Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2013. "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects." Nationalities Papers 41 (6): 865–870.

⁵⁴Paul A, Oliver V, Drew C and Aweis A. (2014). Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries. Available at https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/33719848/11231936_Published_article.pdf

provided with food and basic medical assistance.⁵⁵ Governmental organization such as TİKA delivered tons in emergency food rations, medical supplies, and constructed four hospitals⁵⁶

1.6.2. Comparison of the humanitarian aid delivery Approaches

Wolfgang and Homi posit that an estimate of, \$3.2 trillion of aid since 1960 have been channeled to developing countries from the developed countries through bilateral and multilateral institutions.⁵⁷ However, they noted that this traditional strategy of availing development assistance has been transformed and replaced by a more complex reality of aid in response to new settings, that resulted the advent of new international players such as international organizations, charities organizations, and other and private companies which provide aid by private individuals from rich countries to the developing countries.⁵⁸ Majority of these new actors engage differently from and parallel to the traditional aid system.

Sucuoglu G. & Stearns observed that the international assistance landscape is evolving because of the rise of new aid actors- that switched from being door dependent to aid providers- are gaining attention in the world stage.⁵⁹ The emergence of these new donors has also new aid delivery approaches that are different and parallel to the customary aid delivery mechanism. For instance, these emerging actors have transformed the aid architecture by injecting fresh ideas, capital and unique aid delivery approaches. As an emerging donor, Turkey has continually

⁵⁵Neel, A. (2011, October 10). Turkish charities in Somalia for long haul. Retrieved from Hizemet Movement News Archive: <https://hizmetnews.com/313/turkish-charities-in-somalia-for-long-haul/#>

⁵⁶TİKA - TürkiřbirlięiVeKoordinasyonAjansıBařkanlıęı. 2016. "A Press Conference Was Organized Concerning The Aid That Has Been Provided To Somalia." 29 September 2016. Available at: http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/a_press_conference_was_organized_concerning_the_aid_that_has_been_provided_to_somalia-8843

⁵⁷ Wolfgang Fengler and Homi Kharas. (2016) Overview: Delivering Aid Differently. Accessed from; https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/deliveringaid_differently_chapter.pdf

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹Sucuoglu G. & Stearns, J., (2016) Turkey In Somalia: Shifting Paradigms Of Aid. Research Report 24. Available at; https://media.africaportal.org/documents/RR_24_FP_sucuoglu_stearns_FINAL_WEB.pdf

provided ODA since the mid-1980s. Although the volume of its contribution was initially marginal, it has improved significantly between 2011- 2013, due to enormous foreign aid donation to the Syrian refugees and to North African countries after the events of the Arab spring. In 2013 its contribution rose to 3.3 billion US dollars.⁶⁰

In 2013, Turkey availed development aid to 128 nations globally, of this countries, Syria received the highest allocation of 52%, while Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, and Afghanistan cumulatively accounted for 80% of the Turkey's development assistance.⁶¹ Turkey has straddled between the traditional donor countries and the “emerging actors” that underpinned their cooperation activities in accordance with South-South Cooperation (SSC).⁶² For example, Turkey's intervention in Somalia is a good example of an emerging actor engaged in a conflict situation. Its presence in Somalia has influenced and increased humanitarian aid assistance to the catastrophic famine in 2011 but this intervention has morphed from delivering aid and assistance to affected populations into rebuilding and rehabilitation of infrastructure, installing street lights and building hospitals. This growing presence of Turkey in Somalia has generated debates about the unique approach of Turkey's aid delivery in Somalia despite the enormous security and social division in the country.⁶³

Although Turkey has framed its bilateral development similar to the traditional aid providers, that is designed to promote longstanding viable development in partner countries as main reason for providing assistance there are significant distinctions in the executions of cooperation

⁶⁰OECD. (2015). Dataset: Total flows by donor (ODA + OOF + Private) [DAC1]. Retrieved from OECD.stat. : <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?data-setcode>

⁶¹ Jeannine Hausmann and Erik Lundsgaarde. (2015). Turkey's Role in Development Cooperation. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research November 2015. Available; https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3325/unu_cpr_turkey_dev.pdf

⁶² Ibid

⁶³Pinar Tank (2013). Turkey's new humanitarian approach in Somalia. Available at; <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/bbea860140d9140ccbc6c5d427b4f28.pdf>

activities.⁶⁴ A few studies have attempted to explain the difference between the Turkish donor approach and the traditional donor's approach. For instance, Tank pointed out several issues that stand out in the Turkey's model for interaction with Africa in the area of humanitarian aid. For instance, he described Turkish aid model as holistic in nature, which is composed of different activities.⁶⁵ According to Wasuge, the Turkish aid model in Somalia is multifaceted and is comprised of aid and development projects.⁶⁶ Turkey has formulated a humanitarian strategy for Somalia which is different from what other actors focus on and this has forced the traditional actors to change their static and security oriented foreign policies in Somalia.⁶⁷

According to Siradag, Turkey's aid approach is investment in the perceptible projects such as construction and rehabilitation of roads, hospitals, and restoring social amenities; and supplying clean water have strengthened positive views of Somalis towards Turkey.⁶⁸ He indicates that the close working relations between the Turkish state institutions and non-governmental organizations has developed substantial soft power. While agencies like the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and others worked at the grassroots level and implemented myriad humanitarian response initiatives in Somalia seemingly unhindered by the security concerns that restricts Western interactions on the ground.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Jeannine Hausmann and Erik Lundsgaarde. (2015). Turkey's Role in Development Cooperation. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research November 2015. Available; https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3325/unu_cpr_turkey_dev.pdf

⁶⁵ Pinar Tank (2013). Turkey's new humanitarian approach in Somalia. Available at; <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/bbea860140d9140ccbcb6c5d427b4f28.pdf>

⁶⁶ Wasuge, Mahad. 2016. "Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving much with little." Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. Available at <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>

⁶⁷ Ali, Abdirahman. "Turkey's foray into Africa: a new humanitarian power?" Insight Turkey, vol. 13, no. 4, 2011, p. 65+. Accessed 16 Mar. 2021

⁶⁸ Abdurrahim Siradag (2017). Turkish-Somali Relations: Changing State Identity And Foreign Policy. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318121878_TURKISH

⁶⁹ Ibid

Siradaq also highlighted another Turkish aid agency is AFAD “AfetveAcil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı” that provided enormous emergency assistance to Somalis and had implemented numerous humanitarian projects such as construction of water infrastructure such as shallow wells and boreholes and the construction of a modern hospital with 200 bed capacity, the rehabilitation of Mogadishu’s dilapidated roads and streets.⁷⁰

In contrast, the traditional donors despite working in Somalia for decades are often criticized as being bureaucratic and ineffective especially in their response to humanitarian crisis. Particularly the traditional donors ‘intervention shave yielded very limited results and attributed to dismal performance largely to the way they function as they mostly operate in isolation and are highly securitized and operating mostly in remote control from Nairobi, something that is rejected by the Somalis.⁷¹.But Turkey’s aid agencies and institutions used a direct aid delivery model to the intended beneficiaries. Although there are some other international agencies that adopted the same model or have done in the past, majority of Turkish aid staffs consider that this model distinguishes them from traditional donors. Particularly, Turkey’s preference for direct aid approach was justified as a means to ensure aid reaches directly to the target beneficiaries.⁷²

Achilles, et al.,postulatedthe Turkey’s aid intervention to 2011 famine by Turkey’s agencies has created significantcommendation from Somalis and other aid actors. For them, aid was delivered directly to beneficiaries, aligned with peoples’ priorities, fast, and without pre-conditions.⁷³

Nonetheless, the Turkey’s direct delivery model has considerably been praised by other

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ MahadWasuge. (2016). Turkey’s assistance model in Somalia: achieving much with little. The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 20–29. Retrieved from <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>

⁷² Achilles K et al., ‘Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace’, Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

⁷³ Ibid

development actors as a reason for their effectiveness. The commitment of humanitarian workers is strengthened at the state level, for instance Turkish officials communicate using emotive language which is constructed around common values and mutual respect⁷⁴. This argument is consistent with Jeannine and Erik that attributed the Turkey's visibility in Somalia to the strong focus on bilateral support, the abandonment of all forms of conditionalities, and limited cooperation with other traditional donors.⁷⁵ However, some researchers acknowledged that although these emerging donors like Turkey have brought fresh energy, resources, and strategies to the delivery of aid. However, they are faced by myriad of challenges which will impact adversely on the development goals.⁷⁶

1.6.3. Factors undermining humanitarian aid delivery

Humanitarian aid is regarded as a universal good and an important element in availing significant assistance to those suffering violence and insecurity.⁷⁷ Recently, the aid agencies have increased their geographic scope of aid to cover more multiplex and risky areas.⁷⁸ Working in conflict environment is often risky and dangerous affair as the threats from armed non-state actors to

⁷⁴Pinar Tank (2013). Turkey's new humanitarian approach in Somalia. Available at;

<https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/bbea860140d9140ccbcb6c5d427b4f28.pdf>

⁷⁵Hausmann, J., &Lundsgaarde, E. (2015). Turkey's Role in development Cooperation. United Nations University Center for Policy Research. Available at:

https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/1801/UNUCPR_TurkeysRoleinDevelopment_HausmannLundsgaarde_.pdf

⁷⁶ Wolfgang Fenger and Homi Kharas. (2016) Overview: Delivering Aid Differently. Accessed from;

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/deliveringaid_differently_chapter.pdf

⁷⁷Tchie, A., & Hofman, M. (2019, September 17). The challenges of providing humanitarian aid in fragile states and conflict zones. Retrieved from The challenges of providing humanitarian aid in fragile states and conflict zones:

<https://www.iiss.org/events/2019/09/humanitarian-aid-in-conflict>

⁷⁸Ashley Jackson and Abdi Aynte. (2013). Talking to the other side; Humanitarian negotiations with Al-Shabaab in Somalia December 2013. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5346928c4.pdf>

humanitarian personnel are high. The humanitarian action is faced with myriad of challenges which can be categorized in three aspects that is contextual, programmatic and institutional.⁷⁹

Aid organizations (INGOs, NGOs, as well as other organizations) operating in Africa, notably in fragile states, have faced severe logistical problems and risks in delivering desperately needed humanitarian aid to conflict related issues and natural catastrophes. Somalia has a reputation for being unfriendly to humanitarian relief workers. The security situation and humanitarian operations environment has incredibly restricted humanitarian aid, notably in areas controlled by Al Shabaab, a radical Islamist group. Somalia, according to Bradbury, is indeed one of the world's most difficult and complex settings for humanitarian organizations to work in. Aid agencies reacted to al Shabab's warnings by reducing or canceling activities in southern Somalia as a result of the rising threats.⁸⁰ Virtually majority of Somalia's remaining groups have focused their operations mostly around Mogadishu's government-controlled area, as well as territory controlled by government-aligned administrations.⁸¹

Aid organizations in Somalia frequently function within the economics and politics of war rather than being detached from it, and Turkey is no exception. As a result, numerous dangers can be recognized, most of which are inherent to all relief organizations, while others are exclusive to Turkish aid actors.⁸² This has already been exhibited in a variety of different ways in Turkey. Militants opened fire on a crowd in 2012, attempting to prevent desperate displaced persons from

⁷⁹ Metcalfe, V., Martin, E., Pantuliano, S., & HPG. (2011). Risk in Humanitarian action: towards a common approach ? London: HPG Commissioned Paper.

⁸⁰ Katherine L. Zimmerman (2011). Al Shabaab and the Challenges of Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia. American Enterprise Institute. Available at: https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Zimmerman_Shabaab_Human_Assistance_Somalia_Testimony_20110908-1.pdf

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Achilles K et al., 'Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace', Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

receiving relief from Kizilay.⁸³ In similar incident 2012, government forces and clan militiamen fought in Mogadishu over a disagreement of distribution and handling of humanitarian consignment from Turkey.⁸⁴ On the other hand, the al-Shabaab often blame Turkish actors and aid projects, claiming that they support the FGS which makes them a legitimate target-because the militant group denounced the government as apostate. This created a dilemma for Turkish aid agencies as threat from the Al-Shabab and other armed group became a hindrance to their operations.

Having adequate knowledge on the social and conflict dynamics in any environment is critical for accessibility and safety of the staff. Achilles, et al., identified limited knowledge and inexperience about Somalia's conflict dynamics posed a major challenge for aid organizations from Turkey.⁸⁵ The difficulties and risks faced by the Turkish aid staffs was attributed to their limited knowledge about the local context and conflict dynamics in Somalia may have led to a rise in the risks of aid leading to the conflict.⁸⁶

One of the biggest risks is deviation of the international aid into this war economy as evidenced by Turkish aid which have been diverted into the war economy or looted by local entities.⁸⁷ However, insecurity has been a major threat for humanitarian access to areas where vulnerable populations lived despite increase in aid.⁸⁸ Between 2009 and 2010, many humanitarian agencies either reduced their aid delivery or suspended their operations altogether especially in areas

⁸³United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (2012), p 298.

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Achilles K et al., 'Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace', Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸Bradbury M (2010), 'State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia' Briefing Paper – Feinstein International Center, p 4

under the militant group-al-Shabaab-after they announced that aid agencies were regarded as priority targets.⁸⁹The departure of al-Shabab's militia from Mogadishu due to the intense campaign from AMISOM slightly expanded the operating environment for organizations to reach the populations in need.⁹⁰Nonetheless, due to the increased security threats in many parts of south central Somalia and restricted access to al-Shabaab-controlled regions forced many international agencies to adopt remote management or implemented projects in collaboration with local organizations, private sector and administrations.⁹¹The growing threats has prompted the Turkish organizations to change tact and resorted to work through local partners and recruit national staff members to implement programmes.⁹²Moreover, other development agencies have partnered with national organizations to deliver humanitarian assistance to remote locations which are inaccessible to international organizations national agencies were engaged to deliver projects particularly in districts where Turkey's organizations did not have accessibility as well as presence.⁹³Despite the threats from Al-Shabab the Turkish have been defiant and relentless in their quest to delivering aid. However, TMFA has affirmed that they will continue to avail aid to Somalia despite the security threats.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰Bailey R (2013), 'The 2011 Famine in Somalia: lessons learnt from a failed response?' in Conflict and Health Vol. 7, No. 22.

⁹¹Bailey R (2013), 'The 2011 Famine in Somalia: lessons learnt from a failed response?' in Conflict and Health Vol. 7, No. 22.

⁹²Achilles K et al., 'Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace', Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴Pinar Tank (2013). Turkey's new humanitarian approach in Somalia. Available at; <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/bbea860140d9140ccbc6c5d427b4f28.pdf>

1.6.4. The dynamics of political engagement

Diplomacy and recognition play important roles in the conventional conferral of state legitimacy and functioning of the inter-state system.⁹⁵ Somalia established engagements with Turkey by establishing an embassy in Ankara in 1979 and Turkey subsequently opened its embassy in Mogadishu in the same year.⁹⁶ However the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 disrupted the relations for decades but the Turkish interest's remained active as it maintained a non-resident diplomatic mission to Somalia in Addis Ababa.⁹⁷ Ankara-Mogadishu relations were revitalized.

Canon explains that, Turkey's strategy towards Somalia seems to have been started by leaders and diplomats in such ethical terms⁹⁸ Particularly, for President Recep Erdoğan, Turkish agenda in Somalia were framed as an address to the humanitarian situation and as "*one of the key principles of Turkish foreign policy*" towards African continent. Turkey's bold intervention in "*crisis zones*" was seen as a people-centered strategy.⁹⁹ Paul, et al., attribute the Turkey's significant rise in Africa as a result of failure by the Western countries to take a leading role in the region, mainly in Somalia.¹⁰⁰ Although many traditional donors opted to carry their diplomatic operations from Kenya for Somalia because of the insecurity, in contrast, Turkey defied the norm and opened its largest embassy in Africa in Mogadishu. The fledgling political system coupled with social-economic crisis in Somalia arguably motivated Turkey to take a

⁹⁵Brendon J. Cannon (2016). Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia Article · November 2016. Available at; file:///C:/Users/Admin/AppData/Local/Temp/DeconstructingTurkeysEffortsinSomalia_Cannon_Bildhaan_2016-1.pdf

⁹⁶Addow, Salad. 2015. The role Turkish Civilian power in Somali state building process (PhD work). Sakarya: Sakarya University

⁹⁷ Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu. 2016. "A Synopsis of Technical and Humanitarian Cooperation 2011-2015." Available at <http://www.mogadishu.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=252242>.

⁹⁸ Ibid

⁹⁹Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2013. "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects." Nationalities Papers 41 (6).

¹⁰⁰Paul A, Oliver V, Drew C and Aweis A. (2014). Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries. Available at https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/33719848/11231936_Published_article.pdf

leading role in the stabilization process and post-conflict reconstruction of the nation that was once led by the United States and European Union and their allies.

Since 2011, Turkey-Somalia relations have reached new heights as the renewed ties lead to building stronger ties and bilateral cooperation in a wide range of fields sectors including the economy, military, and education and health. Turkey's has continued to provide military assistance to Somalia troops with an aim of state building.¹⁰¹

According to Abdikarim, the economic relations between Somalia and Turkey has sharply risen since 2011 and expected to grow in the coming years. For example, the total trade of Turkey with Somalia was slightly over 500 thousand dollars in 2001. But the nature of trade relations between the two countries changed since 2012 with the AK Party coming to power.¹⁰² In 2010 the Turkish economic relations with Somalia was 6 million dollars but this Turkey trade volume grew seven fold reaching 42 million dollars in 2011 and grew to 63 million dollars in 2014. This indicates its push into Africa.¹⁰³ Turkey is regarded as the only country which has recognized the strategic importance of Somalia in a changing world.¹⁰⁴ Harte postulates "Somalia's security problems and political instability has discouraged potential investments particularly in the exploitation and exploration of minerals. The Turkish business interests regard Somali market important because it is a *"Muslim and open to take risks"*.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹Sputnik News. 2016b. "Why Turkey is Set to Open Military Base in Somalia." 21 January 2016. Available at <https://sputniknews.com/military/201601211033517458-turkey-military-base-somalia/>

¹⁰²Siradag, A. (2017). Turkish-Somalia Relations : Changing State Identity And Foreign Policy . Inquiry.

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴Achilles K et al., 'Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace', Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵Harte, Julia. 2012. "Turkey Shocks Africa." World Policy Journal 29 (4)

Whilst the international community acknowledged Somalia as a sovereign state, some other regions such as the Somaliland, also claims to be an independent state, which acquired its sovereignty from Somalia since 1991.¹⁰⁶ Turkish diplomatic relations was originally with the FGS in order to remain neutral and avoid being seen as encouraging a balkanization of the country. This multi-strategy foreign policy towards Somalia balances Turkey's "*proactive engagement*" with "*crisis management*".¹⁰⁷

The Turkish engagement in Somalia is premised on Ankara's ambitious goal to create influence in the Horn of Africa using Somalia as entry point to pursue its interests. Turkey have portrayed its influence in Africa through its intervention in the Syrian War, Iraq, Qatar, and currently in Somalia.¹⁰⁸ Brendon argues that "the Turkish government chose Somalia as a launching pad for Turkey's desired role as a player on the international stage rather than its traditional role as a regional actor with ambitions that have historically been limited and, more recently, severely frustrated".¹⁰⁹ Cagaptay posit that, international recognition, enhanced diplomatic profile, and profit as major drivers that informed Turkish leadership to prioritize Somalia-unstable country-over more stable countries in Africa and particularly in the HoA.¹¹⁰

Somalia was regarded as a machination for diplomatic, political, and humanitarian gambits.

Intervention of Turkey in Somalia therefore provided a greater return on its investment. Its

¹⁰⁶Daniels, Christopher L. 2012. Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

¹⁰⁷Sazak, Onur and Aueven Woods. 2015. Policies and Role of Turkey in Peace building. Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Centre.

¹⁰⁸Paul A, Oliver V, Drew C and Aweis A. (2014). Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries. Available at https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/33719848/11231936_Published_article.pdf

¹⁰⁹Brendon J. Cannon. (2016)., Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia. Khalifa University of Science and Technology. Available at;

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279911333_Deconstructing_Turkey%27s_Efforts_in_Somalia

¹¹⁰Cagaptay, Soner. "The New Davutoglu." Foreign Affairs. 1 September 2014. Online at: foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-09-01/new-davutoglu.

intervention in Somalia has portrayed a good image especially in Africa where Turkey has been transformed into a humanitarian and diplomatic power in a region traditionally outside its sphere of influence.¹¹¹

1.7. Literature Gap

The above desktop literature review demonstrates that, there is limited research conducted on assessing the outcome of Turkish intervention in Somalia since 2011. The study found existing literature that explores the Turkey's humanitarian intervention in Somalia that has arguably been praised as departing from norm adopted by the traditional donors. However, this study examined the impact of Turkey's humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the light of responding to the humanitarian crisis in the country. The existing literature has not studied the factors that undermined Turkey intervention in Somalia and how have they shaped the Turkey's aid delivery in Somalia. This is a gap that this study will try to address and link how these factors have undermined Turkey's operation in Somalia. Besides, the Turkey political engagement in Somalia has mainly focused on building ties with the federal government of Somalia in Mogadishu and engaged intermittently with the breakaway region of Somaliland. Turkey has brokered a political dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland but with little success to mend the fractured relations. Thus, the study will assess the Turkish political engagement in Somalia and whether this engagement has had any impact on Turkey's image in Somalia.

1.7.2 Hypothesis

The study will test the following hypotheses

H10: The turkey's humanitarian aid intervention had no positive impact in Somalia

¹¹¹Hasimi, C. (2014). Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation." *Insight Turkey* 16, no. 1 (2014).

H20: The factors that undermined humanitarian aid interventions in Somalia have not affected the Turkey's humanitarian aid intervention.

H31: The Turkey's political engagement had positive impact in Somalia

1.8. Justification of the Study

The research findings will help in informing policy makers about the perspectives of Turkey's intervention in Somalia in the areas humanitarian delivery, factors that undermined the humanitarian aid delivery and Turkish political engagement in Somalia and recommend policies that will inform decision making.

1.8.1. Academic Justification

This study will provide new knowledge for the students and researchers examining the impact of external intervention in fragile countries as well as form a reference point for further research on the impact of Turkey involvement in Somalia.

1.8.2. Policy Justification

The study is important to the policy makers as it further influence policy adjustment on efforts to manage bilateral relations. The policy makers may be able to identify policy areas to advance bilateral relations in realm of economic development and address the potential challenges that could undermine between Somalia and Turkey.

1.8.3. To the Public

Finally, the study helps the general public to understand the Turkey-Somalia relations since 2011, and what has been the impact of these relations in the realm of political engagement, economic affairs, and humanitarian intervention.

1.9. Theoretical Framework

The study will be based on dependency theory which will be taken as a basis explaining the behaviors of the actors. Dependency theory argues that development of Least Industrialized States (LIS) is linked to the economic evolution and growth but connected to factors outside of the LIS. This theory suggests that dependence on foreign resources, external finished goods and technology obstructs economic advancement in LIS.¹¹² The theory suggests that the uneven nature of the international system would makes LIS remain in inertia and therefore would not draw level with the Most Industrialized States (MIS) like those states of Europe and America¹¹³

The theory suggests that the connections and interrelations that exist between the states of the North and those of the South are not leveled and the states in the south are over and over again reliant on the states of the North for trade. It is further argued that the poverty which is targeted by the aid that is given to the states in the south and underdevelopment can best be described as a consequence of economic, social, and political systems in states that have been affected by the international economic interactions.¹¹⁴

The supporters and advocates of the dependency theory have reasoned that the allocation of resources has made the LIS poorer and for a long time. It is no longer a falsehood that foreign

¹¹²Carporaso in Jackson, R et al (2010), Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches, 4 thed, New York: Oxford University Press.

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴Viotti, P. R., &Kauppi, M. V. (2013). International relations and world politics (p. 207). Boston, MA: Pearson.

aid has deeply promoted the MIS that give aid more than the recipients. In the bid to guarantee a sustained stream of resources to the MIS, these states, at the “*core*” have utilized trappings like military equipment and power. The use of foreign aid as an effective influence or push to root dependency has been just one of the ways for keeping the LIS in the status quo. It is further argued that there is proof which suggests that foreign aid has a clear cut similarity with dependency theory.¹¹⁵

1.10. Research Methodology

This section discusses the methods, approaches, and instruments used to collect and analyze the data and information on how the independent variable (Turkey’s intervention) and the dependent variable (effects on Somalia) interact. In this section, the research designs, as well as its justification, are presented. The section also describes and discusses “study population, the sampling methods, the data collection methods and techniques, validity and reliability, data processing, the method of data analysis, the expected limitations, and the description of ethical considerations”.

1.10.1. Research Design

The study utilized the descriptive survey design to describe characteristics of the relationships between Turkey and the effect of its intervention on Somalia. The design helped in identifying associations to be studied with different categories of respondents.

¹¹⁵ItaiKabonga 2017. Dependency Theory and Donor Aid: A Critical Analysis, Africanus Journal of Development Studies <https://upjournals.co.za/index.php/Africanus/index> Accessed on 14th March 2012

1.10.2. Geographical Scope of the Study Area

This research study focused on Mogadishu, the capital of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Most of the Turkey aid intervention and bilateral relations are mainly organized and coordinated from Mogadishu where there has been an influx of most of the internally displaced populations as a result of the 2011 famine that hit parts of the country that compounded the insecurity and Al-Shabab persecutions.

1.10.3. Target population

The target population is composed of academicians, aid agencies representatives, members of the federal member states, former and current government ministers, members of parliament, and members of the national chamber of commerce who have worked either directly or indirectly with the Turkish aid agencies and diplomatic officials in Mogadishu. The distribution of the target population is presented in the table 1:1 below.

Table 1:1: Distribution of Target Population

Target group	Population	Proportion
Academicians	10	3%
Aid Agencies representatives	10	3%
Federal Member States representatives	5	1%
Government Ministers	30	9%
Members Of Parliament / Senate	275	80%
National Chamber Of Commerce members	15	4%
Total	345	100%

Source: Researcher, 2021

1.10.4. Sample Size Determination

To determine the appropriate sample for the study Cochran formula was used to calculate the sample size. Assuming “the maximum variability equal to 50% ($p = 0.5$) and taking 95% confidence level with a 5% margin of error, the required sample was determined using the (Cochran, 1977)” formula as follows:

$$n_0 = \frac{z^2 pq}{e^2} = \frac{(1.96)^2 (0.5)(0.5)}{(0.05)^2} = 384.16 \approx 385$$

Where: Z is the critical value at 0.05 = 1.96; p is proportion of the population with required attributes = 0.5; q : proportion of the population without the required attributes = 1- 0.05; e : the acceptable level of precision = 0.05; n_0 : is the sample size

This is adjusted for the finite population of 345 as follows:

$$n = \frac{n_0}{1 + \frac{(n_0-1)}{N}} = \frac{385}{1 + \frac{(385-1)}{345}} = 182.2 \approx 182$$

Where: n_0 = sample size; n = is the adjusted sample; N = Target population. The sample for the study was 182 respondents out of the target respondents. This study utilized stratified random sampling to choose the study participants. The distribution of the sampled respondents is shown in the table below.

Table 1:2 : Table of Sample size of the study

Target group	Population	Sample size
Academicians	10	5
Aid Agencies representatives	10	5
Federal Member States representatives	5	3
Government Ministers	30	16
Members Of Parliament / Senate	275	145
National Chamber Of Commerce	15	8
Total	345	182

Source: Researcher, 2021

1.10.5. Sampling techniques

This study utilized simple random stratified sampling technique and purposive sampling during the data collection process. The use of random sampling ensured that each of the targeted respondents had an equal chance of being selected and chosen for the study. Purposive sampling was adopted to select the officials from the various departments in the ministry of foreign affairs, officials of government agencies, and NGOs who had the relevant information for the study.

1.10.6. Research Instruments

Semi-structured questionnaires were employed to gather data from the identified respondents (see appendix 1).The questionnaires contained a set of open and close ended questions that asked the relevant questions to answer the study objectives. The idea to use questionnaires is because they work well with big target populations and help in collecting big volumes of data. In addition, the study also employed key informant interview guides that to collect qualitative information from selected beneficiaries who are more knowledgeable regarding the research topic.

1.10.7. Data Collection Method

The study collected data using self-administered questionnaires and key informant guide interviews (see appendix 2). The key informant interviews formed part of the qualitative method that collected information that helped provide an in-depth understanding of complex factors that motivated Turkey to give aid, the factors that determine the delivery of aid, and the political dynamics of Turkey's humanitarian intervention in Somalia. The self-administered questionnaires were used to collect quantitative information regarding objectives of the study from the identified respondents while the KIIs were used on selected aid agencies, NGOs, and from the foreign affairs department of foreign aid.

1.10.8. Data Analysis and Presentation

Both quantitative and qualitative data analytical methods utilized in this study employed computer analysis program. Before data analysis, the data collected from interviews was consolidated. Content, regression analysis and SPSS was utilized to analyzed primary data. Descriptive statistics was applied and results presented in form of frequency tables, cross-tabulations and graphs.

1.10.9. Ethical Consideration

The standards of research asked the investigators to keep away from damaging the respondents that were involved in the course of gathering data and considering the needs and the welfare and concerns of those involved in the studies.¹¹⁶ The researcher obtained approval to travel to Mogadishu where an extensive data collection was conducted. The researcher also obtained an introductory letter from the department of post graduate studies was used to introduce the researcher to the relevant administrators in the various offices.

¹¹⁶Flick, U. (2018). An Introduction to Qualitative Research. Sage

During the data collection the researcher adopted ethical practice of notifying the key informants about the research study. This allowed them to voluntarily engage in the research study. Research practices such as integrity, and confidentiality in the data collection and impartiality in the implementation of the data collection approaches to achieve the results were adhered to.

1.11. Chapter Outline

The study was divided into five chapters. Chapter one covered “the background to the study, the statement of the research problem, the objectives, the literature review, the justification of the study, the theoretical framework, and the research methodology”. While the impact of Turkey humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia was outlined in chapter two, chapter three analyzed the factors that undermined the Turkey’s humanitarian aid intervention, besides, the dynamics of Turkey’s political engagement in Somalia is outlined in chapter four. Chapter five focused on summary and recommendations drawn from Turkey’s intervention in the humanitarian affairs, challenges faced and dynamics of Turkey’s political engagement in Somalia.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IMPACT OF TURKEY'S HUMANITARIAN AID INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

2.1. Introduction

This chapter discussed the impact of Turkey's humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia. The chapter also examined aid delivery model used by the Turkey in comparison with the other approaches used by the traditional donors. The demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented in this section.

2.2. Response Rate

A total of 182 self-administered questionnaires were distributed to the study respondents. All the questionnaires were returned representing a 100% response rate. According to Mugenda and Mugenda at least 55% of the response rate is enough to proceed with data analysis¹¹⁷. This high rate of response was attributed to regular follow-up by the researcher hence constantly motivating the respondents to send back the filled questionnaire.

2.3. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The participants indicated their gender, age, the duration of stay or working in Somalia, and the institution or agencies that they have worked with in Somalia.

2.4. Gender of the Respondents

Gender of the respondents was considered to be an important aspect since the aspect being investigated is one that affects different gender groups differently and therefore the researcher

¹¹⁷Mugenda, O.M. and Mugenda, A.G. (1999) Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches. Acts Press, Nairobi.

purposed to capture their views on it. As indicated on figure 2.1 below, 62.6% of the respondents interviewed were male with 37.4% indicating they were female. This is a clear indication that the study is well balanced in terms of gender representation. Men made for the majority in the study because Somali is a largely patriarchal community whereby men are the ones mandated to speak on matters affecting the society.




Figure 2.1: Gender of the Respondents

Source: Field data, 2021

2.5. Ages of Respondents

The majority of the respondents interviewed were aged between 25–31 years accounting for 34.6% of all the respondents. This was followed by those aged 32-38 years who represented 33.0%, those aged 39-45 years accounted for 17.6% , those aged 18-24 years accounted for 8.2%, with the least proportion (6.6%) being among those aged 45 years and above. The distribution of the age groups is indicated on figure 2 below. The majority of the study respondents were aged between 25 and 38 years, this is because they form part of the age group that is adversely affected by matters concerning humanitarianism in the country, and being the

young and able bodied adults who form the larger part of the active labor force in the country that is experiencing acute challenge of unemployment.




Figure 1.2: Age of the Respondents

Source: Field data, 2021

2.6. Duration lived in the region

The duration one has lived or worked in the study region was considered as an important aspect given that the study targeted individuals who had some sort of experience on the aspect under investigation. As indicated on figure 2.4 below, 30.2% of the respondents had been living or working in Somalia for at least 12 years. About a quarter (23.6%) had been living or working in Somalia for a period between 4-7 years, 17.6% had lived between 8-12 years, 19.8% had only lived or worked between 1-3 years with 8.8% indicating they had only worked or lived in Somalia for less than a year. The findings of the study are dependable and reliable given that majority (47.8%) of the respondents had at least lived or worked in Somalia for at least 7 years

indicating they have had the longest experience and interaction with Turkish aid agencies and have also lived longest in the region.




Figure 2.4: The duration the respondents lived and worked in Somalia

Source: Field data, 2021

2.7. Institutions Represented

The participants indicated the agencies and institutions they were working with. Most of the targeted institutions were those that had the relevant information on the study variables, 35.2% were working with INGOs/NGOs, 19.8% were working for government institutions, and equal proportion (19.8%) working for Academic institutions, 15.9% were engaged in business with 9.3% indicating they were working at research institutions as indicated on figure 2.5 below. The place of work is important for the study as it represents the respondents' understanding and perceptions regarding the effects of Turkish Aid assistance in Somalia. More than half (55%) of the respondents were from INGO and NGOs, and government Institutions who have had experience with the experiences of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The responses they

provided for the study are crucial as this set of respondents interviewed have prior experience with humanitarian aid.




Figure 2.5: Respondents occupation

Source: Field data, 2021

2.8. The Impact of Turkey’s humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia

Targeting the first objective of this study, this section focuses on the findings on the impact of Turkey’s humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia. The study sought views of respondents drawn from government institutions, INGO/NGOs, academia, research institutions, and the business groups regarding their levels of agreement or disagreements of the study questions of interest based on “a rating scale of 1 to 5 where 1 meant strong disagreement, while 5 implying strong agreement”.

The survey result showed that 89% of the respondents were of the opinion that the Somali people considered Turkey as a reliable partner being a Muslim and democratic country as indicated on figure 2.6 below. This is supported by an averagemean response of 4.5 that falls between agree

and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 0.81. The mean response and the small standard deviation in the responses for the reliability of Turkey as a partner, suggests that most of the respondents approved of the status of Turkey's reliability as the answers provided are closely clustered around the mean and implying that the respondents held the opinion as truthful and the general view of the people in Somalia.

The survey result was consistent with key informant respondents that observed that Turkey's intervention in Somalia was a godsend because they have demonstrated genuine partnership by effectively catalyzing both peace and development.¹¹⁸ Besides, respondents explained that the humanitarian assistance coincided with the critical time when there was an influx of displaced population from countryside due to the famine and Al-Shabab during the Holy month of Ramadan. Turkey also became the first country that sent over 500 relief workers and volunteers to Mogadishu to help in the humanitarian aid delivery process despite the enormous security challenges.¹¹⁹ The swiftness and risk taking attitude won the support of the people to the Turkey President and its people and set apart from the rest.

Respondents lauded the numerous emergency responses initiated by Turkey in the sprawling camps that ranging from feeding programs, provision of dry food stuff and shelter, renovating the schools, and refurbishing the infrastructures and country's dilapidated airport and Mogadishu port which has long been ignored by traditional donors in the country. Although many people hold positive views about Turkey assistance and appreciate its continued support but equally points to a country that slowly becoming dependent on Turkish aid which creates the risk of the

¹¹⁸Interview with key respondent, 2021

¹¹⁹Campbell, J. (2012, November 7). Turkey's Love Affair With Somalia. Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations 100: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/turkeys-love-affair-somalia>

country of relying on external support instead of investing and developing its own domestic social-economic pillars to expand their livelihood opportunities.




Figure 2.6: Somali People Consider Turkey as a Reliable partner, being a Muslim and Democratic State

Source: Field data, 2021

There was strong sense of brotherhood in Turkish response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. This is reflected in the findings where, 82.4% of the respondents were of the view that Turkish intervention in Somalia in the 2011 humanitarian crisis could be described as an act of faith that was aimed to help a fellow Muslim country in dire need of humanitarian assistance as indicated on figure 2.7 below. The mean response value is 4.3 that lies between agree and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 0.98 indicating a cluster of responses around affirmations of the statement indicative of a clear representation of the general view among the respondents.




Figure 2.7: Turkish intervention in Somalia in the 2011 humanitarian crisis could be an act of faith to a fellow Muslim Country

Source: Field data, 2021

According to Özkan the shared Islamic faith between Turkey and Somalia’s populations plays a critical role in legitimizing Ankara’s intervention and presence in Somalia, as opposed to West and other actors underscoring that faith is the main reason that Somalis trust Turkish.¹²⁰ This view is consistent with that of the key informants who noted that the Turkish people are fellow Muslims, and their intervention was an act of charity that alleviated suffering of thousands of the people something that is consistent with the Islamic teaching. Others felt that the Turkish aid agencies and volunteers embraced the people and identified with the predicaments of the locals with a sense of brotherhood.

Moreover, the survey showed that 83.5% of the respondents believed the visit by the then “Turkish Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdoganto” Somalia during the 2011 famine had generated acceptance of the Turkish government. The mean response of 4.4 which lies between agrees and strongly agrees options with a standard deviation of 0.9. The

¹²⁰Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. "Turkey’s involvement in Somalia." SETA. Available at http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20141021155302_41_somali_eng-web.pdf.

small standard deviation indicates that there are no varied opinions regarding the statement showing a high level of agreement by the respondents that indeed the visit by the Turkish president had reinforced the acceptance of the Turkish government assistance.

The maiden trip of the Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Erdogan accompanied by his wife, children and large delegation of government officials and other members was dubbed historic because he was the first head of state beyond African continent to travel to the war-torn capital of Mogadishu, Somalia in almost two decades.¹²¹ This is consistent with the views of respondents who argued that the visits by the Turkish Prime Minister accompanied by large delegation created a sense of hope for Somali's that have faced bleak reality. Some respondents noted that the visit proved to the people that Turkey was a unique partner who showed genuineness in their engagement with the people and the Federal Government of Somalia. This argument is also supported by the respondents who believed that Erdogan's bold choice to the visit the camp to witness the suffering of the people was remarkable and drew substantial acceptance among Somalis. However, there were fewer respondents who felt that Turkey's intervention was more than just an act of faith but a political move in that Turkey wanted to project its profile and influence in the Horn of Africa.¹²²

Turkish humanitarian aid was also seen as coordinated and effective in its delivery to Mogadishu. The survey results showed that almost three-quarters (74.2%) of the respondents felt that Turkey had effectively responded to the 2011 famine in Somalia as indicated on figure 2.8 below. The mean response value was 4 that falls directly on agree. With a standard deviation of 1.2, it means that there were slightly divergent views on the effectiveness of Turkey's response

¹²¹BBC News. (2011, August 19). Retrieved from Somalia famine: Turkish PM Erdogan visits Mogadishu: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14588960>

¹²² Key informant interview in Mogadishu on May 2021

to the 2011 famine as indicated by 13.7% of the respondents who held neutral views and were not sure if the response was effective or not.

Turkey's foremost emergency response has been its humanitarian intervention during the 2011 drought and famine in Somalia.¹²³ Based on OECD figures Somalia was the fifth- biggest recipient of Turkey's global aid after "Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Pakistan".¹²⁴ Interview with respondents noted that the Turkish humanitarian assistance was effective because there was close coordination among Turkish government institution as well as development agencies, and contractors who were involved in the delivery of aid.¹²⁵ Besides, the aid delivery process was quick and reached its intended beneficiaries quickly. Respondents drew parallels of the effectiveness of Turkish aid delivery with that of the traditional donors who had been criticized as being slow and bureaucratic in delivering emergency response. Some respondents said that Turkey's intervention played a pivotal role in influencing the Gulf countries and particularly the OIC to mobilize humanitarian aid from member countries.

However, 12.1% of the respondents disagreed with the notion of the effectiveness of aid delivery and did not think that Turkish aid was effectively delivered. For instance, some respondents highlighted several incidences when aid was either diverted or stolen by gatekeepers in displacement camps citing limited knowledge of the social dynamics as a major challenge that undermined the effectiveness of Turkish aid delivery.

¹²³Andrea Binder, "The Shape and Sustainability of Turkey's Booming Humanitarian Assistance", *International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement* [Online], 5.2 | 2014, Online since 20 May 2014, connection on 03 July 2021. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/1741>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.1741>

¹²⁴Tank. Pinar. "Turkish Humanitarian Approach in Somalia," (Policy Brief, Norwegian Peace-building Resource Center, December, 2015). Accessed on June 2021 at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/e322a62c1a18b503d37ca6dca4b2188b.pdf>

¹²⁵Key informant interview in Mogadishu on May 2021




Figure 2.8: Respondents' perception of whether Turkey had effectively responded to the 2021 famine in Somalia

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey showed that 77.5% of the participants affirmed that that utilization of the multipronged approach by the Turkish humanitarian aid had largely contributed to its success as indicated on figure 2.9 below. The mean for the responses for this study question is 4.1 that lies between agree and strongly agree, with a standard deviation of 1.0 showing slight variations with regards to the question. This shows that despite some consensus among the respondents regarding how the multipronged approach had contributed to the success of the Turkish humanitarian aid response, some were not sure as 13.7% of the respondents were neutral to the success of the approach as used by the Turkish government.

The survey result is consistent with Özkan who observed that Turkey's humanitarian aid assistance was multipronged in nature arguing that this strategy involved donating tons of food rations and non-food items as well as coordinating 'peacekeeping' and 'institutional building' initiatives to assist in ending the prolonged crisis in Somalia.¹²⁶ Moreover, Turkey's approach

¹²⁶Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. "Turkey's involvement in Somalia." SETA. Available at

also involved the use of state agencies that included the TİKA, the TA and Kızılay (TRC), as well as aid agencies such as IHH to deliver aid. Davutoğlu cites this multipronged approach has contributed to Turkish foreign policy agenda in Somalia.¹²⁷




Figure 2.9: Adoption of the multipronged approach by the Turkish Humanitarian aid had contributed to its success

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey also showed the Turkey's humanitarian assistance was aligned with people's priorities because 78.1% of the respondents were of the opinion that the delivery of aid by Turkey is often directed to beneficiaries and aligned with their people's priorities, fast, and did not have pre-conditions compared to other traditional donors as indicated on figure 2.10 below. The mean response value is 4.2 that lies between agree and strongly agree but closer to agree indicating a high level of agreement among the respondents regarding how aid was delivered. With a standard deviation of 0.97, the results shows that most of the respondents were clustered around

http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20141021155302_41_somali_eng-web.pdf.

¹²⁷Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2013. "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects." *Nationalities Papers* 41 (6): 865–870.

the mean response showing affirmation of the favorable nature of Turkish aid, its distribution to beneficiaries, and preconditions in comparison to other traditional donors.

Although Turkey's humanitarian assistance has evolved, their modus operandi has been having boots on the ground and engaging with affected population to save lives. Interviews with respondents observed that Turkey aid delivery approach focused on working around people's and government priorities. The respondents noted that Turkey's humanitarian assistance cut the perennial bureaucracies and regulations adopted by traditional donors before delivering aid. They added that the assistance was aligned with peoples' priorities, was quick, and without preconditions arguing that approach has saved lives.




Figure 2.10: Turkey aid response mechanism was consistent with people's priorities, fast, and without pre-conditions compared with the traditional donors

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey result is consistent with Achilles, et al., who observed many Turkish aid agencies have adopted 'direct aid' approach which much needed aid was delivery to final beneficiaries.¹²⁸

¹²⁸Achilles K et al., 'Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace', Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

The approach adopted by Turkey makes them unique from other agencies which also offer humanitarian aid to needy countries. The direct aid delivery is justified as ensuring that their aid is delivered to target beneficiaries.¹²⁹

The survey results also found that 75.8% of the respondents felt that Turkey had no direct or indirect conditionalities in its aid delivery to Somalia compared to other traditional donors as indicated on figure 2.11 below. The mean response was 4.1 that fall between agreeing and strongly agree. With a standard deviation of 1 demonstrating that, majority of the participants were agreeable to the perception that there had been no indirect or direct conditionalities in aid delivery.




Figure 2:11 Turkey had no direct or indirect conditionalities in its aid delivery to Somalia compared to other traditional donors

Source: Field data, 2021

When asked to indicate if Turkey had brought out Somalia back on the international agenda, 73.1% held this common ideology as indicated on figure 2.12 below. With a mean of 4.0 that

¹²⁹ Ibid

falls on agree and a standard deviation of 1.2 shows that there was no general consensus among the respondents on this issue. 26.9% of the respondents were either neutral or did not agree that the question of Somalia had been brought back onto the international agenda due to Turkish interventions.

Unlike any other country, Turkey has played an instrumental role in exposing Somalia's predicament in the international arena. According to Özkan, Turkish intervention was instrumental in getting Somalia back to the international agenda.¹³⁰ In its response Turkey took several steps to popularize the plight of Somalia in many international forums. For instance, Turkey held an emergency summit of OIC in Istanbul in response to the famine crisis in Somalia on August 2011. Turkey also convened joint meeting in Istanbul with the United Nations in order to build support within the international community on responding to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

Turkey also took part in the London conference held for Somalia in February 2012, in a bid to galvanize international support for Somalia's problems. At the domestic front, Turkish Airlines flights began flying to Mogadishu for the first time in almost two decades. This was a major breakthrough that connects Somalia to the world and international community catalyzing international trade. Özkan adds that Turkey's development support was critical in the reconstruction of Somalia's rundown infrastructure, such as building a new modern airport terminal alongside the dilapidated in Mogadishu, paving roads that connected Mogadishu's city center to the airport.¹³¹ In addition, the direct weekly international flights by Turkish Airlines connecting Istanbul to Mogadishu have reopened Somalia to the global market and improved

¹³⁰ Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. "Turkey's involvement in Somalia." SETA. Available at http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20141021155302_41_somali_eng-web.pdf.

¹³¹ Ibid

international travels for Somalis especially diaspora members from the United States and Europe.

Interviews with respondents confirmed this view as most felt that Turkey intervention in Somalia was critical is highlighting the war-torn nation’s predicament to the global community. Key informants noted that Turkey’s continued push and passionate appeal for aid from the domestic front, OIC member states and Western countries has raised awareness about the catastrophic humanitarian situation and influenced international response.




Figure 2.12: Turkey brought Somalia situation back on to world stage

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey results showed that there are divergent views held on the question that Turkey had invested in long-term programs aimed to alleviate food insecurity in Somalia. Even though a larger proportion (62.6%) agreed with this, 23.1% of the respondents were not sure while 14.3% insisted that Turkey had not made such investments as indicated on figure 2.13 below. A mean value of 3.8 falls between neutral and agree, and a standard deviation of 1.2 confirms this

divergence of opinion as not many responses clustered around the mean. This is consistent with Özkan's postulation that the objective of Prime Minister, Recep Erdogan's trip to Somalia in 2011 was to deliver emergency aid assistance to the displaced populations fleeing the famine and drought into Mogadishu as opposed to establishing a long-term strategy.¹³²

Interviews with business groups in Mogadishu observed that although Turkey has somewhat excelled in delivering humanitarian assistance to many parts of Somalia, they have not invested in long term projects aimed to improved food insecurity in the country. Some respondents highlighted insecurity and communal land conflicts as hindrance to Turkey undertaking such grand programs. Turkey has shown interest in Somalia's agricultural and livestock sectors through training, implementation of new projects and provision of farmers' support systems. For instance, The TIKA launched an agricultural training programme where some 470 students benefited from these training opportunities.¹³³“*TIKA is also constructing a faculty of agriculture near Afgoye that envisaged to be fully fledged agricultural learning institution to boost agricultural production*”, remarked Galip Yilmac, the TIKA Somalia programme coordinator.

¹³²Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. "Turkey's involvement in Somalia." SETA. Available at http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20141021155302_41_somali_eng-web.pdf.

¹³³Oduor, P. (2015, July 14). The Authoritative Analysis Of Business And Economic Issues of the Region. Retrieved from The Somali Investor: <https://somaliiinvestor.so/long-term-plans-to-boost-agriculture-and-livestock/>




Figure 2.13: Turkey had invested in long-term programs aimed to alleviate food insecurity in Somalia

Source: Field data, 2021

Fidan, H., & Nurdun observed that Turkey has utilized development assistance as a soft power strategy in its foreign policy goals in recent years.¹³⁴ The survey result showed that 72% of the respondents agreed that the close working relationship between the Turkish state and their non-state actors had formulated an important soft power in Somalia as indicated on figure 2.14 below. The mean is 4 that lies on the agree option with a standard deviation of 1.1 indicating that most of the responses were clustered around the mean hence representing the general view among the respondents. This is consistent with the Hasimi's view that observed that Turkey's foreign policy had made important efforts in development assistance in the HoA, partly because of TIKA's restructuring and the expansion of its activities.¹³⁵

¹³⁴Fidan, H., & Nurdun, R. (2008). Turkey's Role in the Global Development Assistance Community: The Case of TIKA. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 93-111.

¹³⁵Hasimi, C. (2014). Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation. *Insight Turkey*.




Figure 2.14: The close working relations between the Turkish State and their non-state actors has developed significant soft power in Somalia

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey found that 83% of the respondents believed that Turkey had made a major contribution to its aid policies in Somalia. The mean is 4.2 that lies between agree and strongly agree and a standard deviation of 0.9 implying a consensus among the respondents in this regard. The findings are consistent with Özkan who explains Turkey's "*Somali experience*" has significantly contributed to its aid policies as follows. Firstly, Ankara's intervention was unique approach because Turkey created an archive for aid politics. Secondly, Turkey's humanitarian agencies did not partner with national Somali organizations to deliver aid as commonly used by traditional donors, instead Turkey opted to go directly to the ground and reach out to the affected population. This enabled Turkish aid organizations to understand the situation better and design bespoke approaches to the prevailing challenges. Thirdly, Turkey's approach was seen as advancing a human development model and Somalia case created a unique model.¹³⁶

Moreover, the survey also showed that 83.5% of the respondents thought that Turkish aid had departed from the traditional donor's practice of engaging local aid groups as the intermediary

¹³⁶ Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. "Turkey's involvement in Somalia." SETA. Available at http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20141021155302_41_somali_eng-web.pdf.

and had instead directly approached the local people as indicated on figure 2.15 below. A mean response value of 4.2 and a standard deviation of 0.96 in this case confirmed that that most of the respondents' answers were clustered between agree and strongly agree to indicate an agreement among the respondents. This is consistent with Tank's argument that Turkish aid model is holistic in nature, which includes various reconstruction and empowerment activities.¹³⁷ Similarly, Wasuge notes that the Turkish aid model in Somalia was multi-faced that combined humanitarian assistance and development projects.¹³⁸ This is similar with Ali contention that while traditional actors prioritized their security and pursued specific political relations, Turkey developed a humanitarian approach.¹³⁹




Figure 2.15 : Turkish Aid organizations departed from the traditional donor's practice of delivering through intermediaries

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey also showed 84.6% of the respondents maintained the view that Turkish humanitarian aid and developmental interventions in Somalia has garnered great publicity

¹³⁷Tank, P. (2013). Turkey's New Humanitarian Approach in Somalia. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center : Policy Brief.

¹³⁸Wasuge, M. (2016). Turkey Aid in Somalia : Achieving Much with Little. Mogadishu: Heritage Policy Institute.

¹³⁹Ali, A. (2011). Turkey's Foray Into Africa : New Humanitarian Power ? Insight Turkey.

because it has worked on the ground with its institutions as indicated on figure 2.16 below. The standard deviation is 0.94 and the mean response is 4.3 that lies between agree and strongly agree. These findings indicate that majority of the responses were clustered around the mean all showing agreement with the sentiments. This is consistent with Siradag who pointed out that “Turkey’s aid approach is the preference for visible projects by Turkish humanitarian agencies. Agencies work at the grassroots level, seemingly unhampered by the security concerns that limit Western engagement on the ground”.¹⁴⁰ For instance, the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) has been vigorously participating in the rebuilding process of Somalia since 2011.




Figure 2.16: Turkish humanitarian aid and developmental intervention in Somalia has garnered great publicity on the ground

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey results revealed that 79.7% of the respondents agreed that Somalia remains an untapped market for Turkey’s expanding business interests in pursuit of new markets. The mean response is 4.2 that lies between agree and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 0.99 which indicates that most of the respondents are clustered around the mean implying a strong sense of belief that Turkey intends to exploit Somalia in its quest to search for new markets.

¹⁴⁰Siradag, A. (2017). Turkish-Somalia Relations: Changing State Identity And Foreign Policy . Inquiry.

This is consistent with Bingol's observation that Turkey's growing involvement in Somalia is premised on the desire to create business opportunities especially new markets for the Turkish goods and investments for its business groups.¹⁴¹ A similar opinion among the diverse business groups in Mogadishu. The key informant respondents argue that the delegation that accompanied Prime Minister Erdogan visit in Mogadishu in 2011 were business groups and contractors which is an indication of their ambition to build trade relations with Somalia from the onset. Moreover, the businessmen felt that Turkey showed strong desire to bolster trade relations by hosting and participating in several business conferences on Somalia in a bid to build trade ties through building partnerships and promoting importation of Turkish goods. In addition, the launch of Turkish flights from Istanbul to Mogadishu has also boosted the cargo businesses.

2.9. Summary of the chapter key finding

This chapter presents a detailed assessment of the impact of the Turkey's humanitarian intervention in Somalia. From the discussion, Turkey's intervention in Somalia has had significant impacts. The maiden trip of the Turkey's Prime Minister highlighted the predicament of the humanitarian situation that unfolded in the country to the international community and enabled Turkish government to mobilize emergency humanitarian response.

The study found there was a consensus between the literature and results from the survey regarding Turkey's intervention in Somalia. For instance, the visit by Prime Minister Erdogan was dubbed as historic because he was the first head of state beyond African continent to come to the war-torn capital Mogadishu for more than two decades. The visit highlighted the need of urgent humanitarian response of vulnerable population fleeing the country side particularly in south central Somalia due to famine and Al-Shabab persecution and as a result, Turkey became

¹⁴¹Bingol, O. (2013). Turkey's Role in Somali's Peace and Development Process. AkademikBakis.

the first country that sent over relief workers and volunteers to Mogadishu to help in the humanitarian aid delivery despite security challenges.

The humanitarian response was seen more coordinated and effective because Turkey's used a multipronged nature and involved donating large quantities of food items and non-food items and other commodities that were observed as initiating groundbreaking emergency responses in sprawling camps ranging from feeding programs, provision of dry food stuff and shelter, repairing and reconstruction of various projects and infrastructure and the country's dilapidated airport and the Mogadishu port. Interviews with majority of the respondents stated that Turkey's humanitarian intervention delivered the much needed aid at critical moment and demonstrated genuine partnership by effectively catalyzing for both peace and development. Despite the positive impact, the respondents noted that even though Turkey has somewhat excelled in delivery humanitarian assistance to many parts of Somalia, they have not invested in long term projects aimed to improved food insecurity in the country and that the food crisis in the country still persists with insecurity and communal land conflicts identified as hindrance to Turkey's undertaking in the country.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FACTORS UNDERMINING TURKEY AID DELIVERY IN SOMALIA

3.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the factors affecting Turkey's aid delivery in Somalia. It assesses the challenges faced by the Turkey aid agencies in delivering aid to Somalia. The section examines how Turkish aid agencies have responded to these challenges including the lessons that could be drawn from Turkey's intervention and aid approaches in Somalia.

3.2. The challenges faced by the Turkey aid agencies in delivering aid in Somalia

The survey result showed that 78% of the respondents agreed that the security situation and the filed level operations have hindered the humanitarian activities of national and international organizations in Somalia. Similarly, these factors also affected the Turkey's aid activities and organizations in Somalia as indicated in table 3.1 below. This is a general view among the respondents confirmed by the mean response of 4.2 that lies between agree and strongly agree and a standard deviation of 0.98 indicating that most of the responses were not varied and clustered around the mean response. The survey result is consistent with the key informant interviews that identified insecurity as the dominant risks facing Turkey and traditional donors in providing aid. They point out that indeed Turkey has suffered security setbacks in its efforts to reach areas outside the government's authority and witnessed targeted attacks even in government controlled areas. This is similar to what Ozkan claims that Al-Shabab has systematically targeted Turkish agencies and staffs with the intent to disrupt and deter Turkey's

continued operations and presence in Somalia.¹⁴² This included attacks on aid workers and agencies, attack on convoys, assassinated Turkish businessman, and attack on Turkey's embassy in Mogadishu.

The targeting of Turkey is largely attributed to its continued support to the FGS. Interviews with key informants stated that Turkey's intervention in the initial stages was smooth and faced little security threats and even accessed Al-Shabab controlled areas. However, they explained Turkey became a target when they started supporting the Federal Government's efforts to rebuild the security infrastructure and restructure the Somali forces.




Figure 3.1 : Security context and the humanitarian operational environment restricted Turkish organizations

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey results indicated that 70.9% of the respondents agreed that the limited knowledge and inexperience of the conflict dynamics has affected Turkey aid delivery in Somalia as indicated in 3.2 below. The mean response for this is 3.9 that lies between neutral and agree. The standard

¹⁴²Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. "Turkey's involvement in Somalia." SETA. Available at http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20141021155302_41_somali_eng-web.pdf.

deviation of 1.2 indicates that most of the responses were not clustered around the mean signifying that there were divergent views concerning this issue. This is shown by the 29.1% who either held a neutral opinion on the matter or had disagreed with this assertion.

The survey result corresponds with findings of Achilles, et al. that observed the initial challenges that hindered Turkish humanitarian organizations was their limited knowledge and in adequate familiarity with the complex conflict situation thus increased their exposure to risks.¹⁴³ Interviews with key informants noted that aid agencies from Turkey did not know anything about the social divisions and residual mistrusts emanating from the civil strife exposed to risks. Turkish goal was to provide quick emergency response but in the process, they were taken advantage of as there were noted instances where aid meant for displaced communities were diverted by gatekeepers.




Figure 3.2: The inadequate knowledge and understanding of Somalia's conflict situation has affected Turkish aid delivery

Source: Field data, 2021

¹⁴³Achilles K et al., 'Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace', Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

The results also found 48.9% who confirmed that there had been cases and instances where Turkish aid meant for vulnerable communities had either been diverted by cartels or looted by gatekeepers or other violent groups in Somalia as indicated in table 3.3 below. The mean response is 3.2 that lies between disagree and neutral with a standard deviation of 1.4 that suggests that there seemed to be no consensus on the issue.

Similarly, there were divergent views among the key informants about the looting or diversion of the humanitarian assistance. Some respondents acknowledged they had heard reports of aid diversion by gatekeepers without the knowledge or suspicion by the Turkish aid workers. Aid diversion has sometimes fueled conflicts between traditional donors and their implementing partners have been fighting to curb with little success. However, some respondents indicated that the Turkey aid have been strictly distributed by Turkish staff directly to the beneficiaries and refuted allegations of aid diversion.




Figure 3.3: Turkish Aid has reportedly been diverted by cartels or looted by gatekeepers/other violent groups

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey results also showed that 80.2% of the respondents believe that the tactical departure of Al-Shabaab from the capital Mogadishu had somewhat created an opportunity for Turkey humanitarian actors to work and reach out to the affected populations in Mogadishu and beyond as indicated in table 3.4 The mean response was 4.1 that lies between agree and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 0.98 which indicates that most of the responses were clustered around the mean. The small standard deviation implies that the general view among the respondents was that withdrawal of Al-Shabaab indeed increased space for operation for Turkish aid agencies.

The tactical withdrawal of Al-Shabab from their strongholds in Mogadishu has increased the areas under the government’s control creating opportunities for NGOs and other development agencies to reach out to the newly liberated areas. Respondents explained that the newly liberated areas in Mogadishu became safe haven for displaced population affected by the famine and fleeing Al-Shabab’s persecution in the countryside, something that created room for aid agencies from Turkey to deliver humanitarian assistance to these areas.




Figure 3.4: Al-Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu partially increased space for Turkish aid agencies to operate in Mogadishu

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey results showed that 65.4% of the respondents agreed with the criticism that the Turkish intervention in Somalia had been Mogadishu-centered. The mean response is 3.8 that lies between neutral and agree with a standard deviation of 1.1 that shows that some of the responses did not share the same feelings regarding the matter. This is confirmed by the 34.6% who were either neutral or did not agree with the criticism of Turkish intervention in Somalia being Mogadishu-centered. This was however contrasted with what the majority of the key informant respondents who did not agree with the criticism of Turkish intervention being Mogadishu focused because they stated that the city was hosting the largest displaced population and the humanitarian crisis was also worsening.

Moreover, the survey found that 69.8% of the respondents concurred that the political instability in Somalia had worsened the severity of the drought and famine in the country and thus has affected the Turkish aid delivery as indicated in table 3.5 below. The mean response was 3.9 that lies between neutral and agree and a standard deviation of 1.2 that implies that there were various views. This is represented by the 15.9% who were neutral and 14.3% who did not agree that political instability had worsened drought and famine and thus affecting Turkish aid delivery.

Interviews with key informants indicated that the absence of a governance system had a knock-on-effect on the infrastructure and eroded the social safety nets. They noted that Somalia has been reeling from the impact of the civil strife that divided the country into tribal enclaves that disrupted food production. The recurrent drought and the 2011 famine in parts of the county exposed the population to starvation as efforts to deliver urgent food aid in the regions was

hampered by Al-Shabab. All the respondents shared a common view that the prolonged political instability has indeed hampered emergency thereby worsening the impact of the drought and famine in the country.




Figure 3.5: The Political instability in Somalia worsened the severity of the drought famine in the country.

Source: Field data, 2021

3.4. Chapter Summary

This chapter examined the factors that undermine Turkey’s humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia. The study found that insecurity mainly from Al-Shabab that constantly targeted Turkish aid workers and their nationals was the major factor that undermines the Turkey humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia. In addition, the limited knowledge of the social dynamics of Turkey aid agencies affected their ability to understand the local dynamics including clan rifts and avoid potential exploitation from gatekeepers and ensure inclusivity in its targeting. Finally, the prolonged political instability in Somalia has exacerbated the cyclical humanitarian crisis and undermined international efforts to support sustainable programs due to weak governance structures. Because of the continued threats Turkey adopted several mitigation measures. Firstly,

Turkey aid agencies significantly reduced the number of staffs or citizens delivering aid to prevent the risk of exposure. Secondly, Turkish aid agencies embraced local NGOs as partners to deliver humanitarian support to people and thirdly, Turkey's agencies limited their operations to government controlled areas and chose to work with government agencies in Mogadishu and other Federal member states.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DYNAMICS OF TURKEY POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

4.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the Turkey's political engagement in Somalia. This also examines the outcome of the political dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland sponsored by Turkey. It also assesses perceptions about the Turkey political engagement in Somalia.

4.2. Turkey's political engagement in Somalia

The survey result showed that 86.8% of the respondents agreed that Turkey's involvement in Somalia had expanded significantly since the 2011 famine as indicated in table 4.1 below. The mean response on the issues was 4.5 that lies between agree and strongly agree and a standard deviation of 0.8 indicating that most of the responses clustered around the mean hence the respondents held similar views on this issue. According to Achilles, et al., since 2011, Ankara has enhanced its political and economic relations, facilitated as well as participated in several international conferences on Somalia, pursued political dialogue and mediation efforts as well as offered military assistance.¹⁴⁴ Achilles, et al., further explained that the bilateral relations have primarily been with Federal Government in Mogadishu, though relation with semi-autonomous region of Puntland and break-away region of Somaliland is developing.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Achilles K et al., 'Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace', Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

Interviews with key informants agreed with the findings of the survey and that the relationship between Somalia and Turkey had deepened over the years. The respondents said that these relations spanned many spheres including governance, economic and social. In the economic sphere respondents explained that the Federal Government of Somalia awarded two Turkish companies contracts to manage the Mogadishu sea port and airport which are regarded as major revenue source for the country. The respondents also added that the people to people relations has immensely improved and eased the movement of Somalis particularly businessmen to import Turkish goods directly. Besides, many Somali students have been offered scholarships and received a chance to study in Turkey. In the political sphere, Turkey has availed monthly budgetary assistance to the government and has boosted its capacity to build security forces.




Figure 4.1 : Turkey's Engagement in Somalia deepened substantially following the 2011 famine.

Source: Field data, 2021

The survey results showed that 80.8% of the respondents held the opinion that Turkey’s robust engagement in Somalia had persuaded the traditional actors to relocated their diplomatic relations from Kenya and begin diplomatic rapprochement with Somalia as indicated in table 4.2

below. The mean is 4.2 and a standard deviation of 1.0 that shows that the responses were gathered around the mean and the respondents held this common view. The results are similar with what Siradag explains when he says that insecurity was a major determinant that influenced the diplomatic engagement of many of the traditional donors to carry out their diplomatic activities from Nairobi, but Turkey defied the norm and opened an embassy in the capital of Mogadishu.¹⁴⁶ Ali also holds a similar view and underscores that President Erdogan's trip made a positive change for Somalia in the international forum.¹⁴⁷ Interview with key informants concurred with the survey results as most respondents felt that Turkey's intervention has ended the isolation and opened opportunities for Somalia.¹⁴⁸ This observation is consistent with the ICG report that highlighted the Turkey's intervention and visibility on the ground brought an end to Somalia's seclusion and shrugged off the label of being the world's most dangerous place to visit.¹⁴⁹

The survey found that 80.8% of the respondents acknowledged that the fledgling governance system and economic meltdown in Somalia inspired Turkey to take state-building role that was previously led by the Western Countries as indicated in table 4.2 below. The mean is 4.2 and lies between agree and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 1.0 indicating similar opinions huddled around the mean indicating a similar opinion. However, 10.4% of the respondents held neutral opinions with 8.9% opposed to the view to the Turkey as leading the post-reconstruction efforts in Somalia.

¹⁴⁶ Abdurrahim Siradag (2017). Turkish-Somali Relations: Changing State Identity And Foreign Policy. Available at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318121878>

¹⁴⁷ Ali, A. (2011). Turkey's Foray into Africa: A New Humanitarian Power? Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 4,

¹⁴⁸ Ibid

¹⁴⁹ International Crisis Group (2012). Assessing Turkey's role in Somalia. Africa Briefing

Interviews with key informants indicated that the traditional donors had failed to revive the economic pillars of the country and repair the much needed infrastructure that lay in ruins for decades and pointed the behavior of the traditional donors of preferring a hands-off style and choosing instead development agencies or contractors to deliver development programs. In contrast, respondents noted that Turkey used multiple approaches of directly supporting the government initiatives and revving some of the economic pillars along with delivering humanitarian assistance.




Figure 4.2: The political and economic crisis in Somalia gave Turkey a post-crisis nation building role

Source: Field data, 2021

The results showed that 84.1% of the respondents confirmed that Turkey’s investment in the security architecture of Somalia in the form of assistance including technical capacity, construction of infrastructure and provision of military hardware had boosted Somalia’s Federal Government capacity to fight Al-Shabaab. The mean of the responses is 4.4 that lies between agree and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 0.99 illustrates the existence of a common view among the respondents as the majority of the responses were clustered and agreeable with this claim. This is similar to the assertion with Achilles, et al., observed that the Turkish

diplomats have underscored their ambition to rebuild the Somali security agencies to prevent the threats of al-Shabaab and to scale down Somalia's reliance on AMISOM was regarded as an ingredient of incitement for al-Shabaab and its sympathizers. Notably, interviews with government officials pointed out that Turkey has built the biggest military training facility for Somali forces in a bid to build the command structure and capability to contain the threat from Al-Shabab and restore peace and stability in the country.

The survey results showed that 78% of the respondents confirmed that Turkey was instrumental in facilitating peace building and mediation efforts on rebuilding the state among the Somali political actors as indicated in table 4.3. The mean response is 4.2 that lies between agree and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 1.0 showing that the responses are clustered around the mean indicative of a common view. Wasuge shared a common view on the matter stating that Turkey have supported Somalia in peace-building efforts by seeking to reconcile the FGS and al-Shabaab, which have however failed due to unclear circumstance.¹⁵⁰

The results are also consistent with respondents view that Turkey through its diplomats has been engaged in enhancing the relationship between the FGS and federal member states with a view to bridge the divide and focus on the rebuilding the country. They added that Turkey is concerned about the tensions among the different political leaders and the potential consequence of undermining the national-building process and the enormous achievement gained since 2011.

¹⁵⁰Wasuge, Mahad. Turkey Aid in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little. (Published by Heritage Policy Institute in 2014). Accessed from; <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>




Figure 4.3: Turkey played instrumental role in the peace building and mediation processes of nation building among Somali regions

Source: Field data, 2021

The study also noted that 77.5% felt that the Turkish government chose Somalia as a platform for its desire as a key player on the international stage. The mean response is 4.1 that lies between agree and strongly agree and a standard deviation of 1.1 showing that most of the respondents had this common view. Turkey has gained attention and visibility as a key world actor. This attributed to President Erdogan’s government for pro-actively seeking to portray Turkey in the international arena as a country committed to enhance stability in its neighborhood and beyond.¹⁵¹ Similarly Ozkan points out that Ankara strive to portray itself as a key global actor in diplomacy and development, and Somalia occupies a central position at the Turkey’s Africa strategy, acting as a link to deepen relations with other countries in Africa.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Achilles K et al., ‘Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace’, Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Centre, March 2015, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkish-aid-agencies-in-somalia.pdf>.

¹⁵² Ozkan M (2014), Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia: Assessment of a State-Building in Progress (Ankara: Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), p 18.

With its increased humanitarian assistance and development programs in Middle East and Africa Turkey has proved to hold on the development platform which has long being dominated by western donors Majority of key informants agreed that there was strong correlation between Turkey's rise as a global actor and its intervention in Somalia. They explained that Turkey's humanitarian intervention in Somalia has emboldened Turkey's position as a key player in the HoA and has since been involved in many international forums in Somalia.

80.8% of the respondents consented that the Turkish was instrumental in initiating the political dialogue between the FGS and self-declared republic of Somaliland as indicated in table 4.4 below. The mean is 4.2 that lies between agree and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 1 indicating that most of the respondents held similar views on the role that Turkey had played in initiating political dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland.

The respondents highlighted that Turkey was instrumental in reviving the talks between Somalia and the self-declared republic of Somaliland in 2013 an initiative that had been started by the United Kingdom in 2012. The initiative yielded some positive outcomes and for the first time the federal government of Somalia and Somaliland agreed, to jointly operate the air space. However, the talks collapsed in 2015 with Somaliland declaring that it preferred another mediator. This was interpreted as Somaliland losing trust because of the growing relations between Turkey and the federal government. Although Turkey has not been successful in brokering a truce between Mogadishu and break-away state of Somaliland it has created a momentum for further engagement. Overall, many respondents noted that Turkey has not succeeded because it did not grasp or comprehended the wide divisions between the two parties.




Figure 3 : Turkish played a key role in initiating the political dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland

Source: Field data, 2021

4.3. Perceptions about the Turkey political engagement in Somalia

The survey result found that 83.5% of the respondents confirmed that Turkey is seen as a neutral actor in Somali affairs compared to the traditional donors as indicated in table 4.5 below. The mean is 4.3 that lies between agree and strongly agree with a standard deviation of 0.99 indicating that most of the responses are clustered around the mean. This represents a common view and opinion among the respondents with the views being more or less the same on the matter. This finding was consistent with Wasuge who explained that Turkey has remained impartial on the domestic politics of the country and approach which he believed has strengthened the Turkey's legitimacy among Somalis.¹⁵³

Interviews with majority of the key informants indicated that Turkey has projected their neutrality regarding the domestic affairs of the country and refrained from supporting any political faction and instead focused providing different forms of aid to the federal government

¹⁵³Wasuge. Mahad. Turkey Aid in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little. (Published by Heritage Policy Institute in 2014). Accessed from; <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>

and federal member states. However, some respondents doubted the neutrality of the Turks citing the imbalance of humanitarian aid distribution from the onset and them being more sympathetic to Mogadishu over the years. They believed that this behavior towards Mogadishu has antagonized Hargeisa and thus Turkey has lost its appeal as neutral mediator in the political dialogue between federal government and Somaliland.




Figure 4.5: Turkey is seen as a neutral actor in Somali affairs compared with the traditional donors

Source: Field data, 2021

4.4. Chapter Summary

This chapter analyzed Turkey's political engagement in Somalia. The analysis showed that Turkey's government relationship with Somalia has deepened significantly over the last decade. The engagement between the two countries has strengthened the relations in many fronts including bilateral engagement, security, education, health, and trade. The outcome of has been found to be mutually beneficial. For instance, Somalia has benefited from the development raising its profile in the global state and arena. On the hand, Turkey has similarly enhanced its diplomatic clout and influence as an emerging global actor and donor. Due to its increased visibility in fragile environment and participation in mediation efforts has somewhat increased

Turkey's prominence as a global actor. Since the onset of its intervention, Turkey has facilitated and participated in several international summits about Somalia in Turkey and Europe, pursued political dialogue, and provided military assistance to Somalia's army and police forces to defeat Al-Shabab. However, despite these achievements Turkey has not been successful in its political mediation between federal government of Somalia and Somalia due to divergent views and differences between the parties leading to failure towards reaching a political settlement.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the summary findings, conclusion and recommendations of the study. Based on the three study objectives, this chapter focuses on three fundamental areas to present the summary, conclusion and recommendations

5.2. Summary of the Findings

The objective of the study was “to examine the perspectives on aid politics in horn of Africa, an analysis of the impact of Turkey’s intervention in Somalia”. The summary below is in tandem with study objectives which were; examining the Turkey’s humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia, assessing the factors undermining Turkey aid delivery in Somalia and assessing the dynamics of Turkey political engagement in Somalia.

5.2.1. The Impact of Turkey’s humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia

The study established that Turkey’s intervention in Somalia has had two significant impacts. Firstly the maiden trip of Turkey's Prime Minister highlighted the predicament of the humanitarian situation that unfolded in the country to the international community and secondly, enabled Turkish government to mobilize emergency humanitarian response. Unlike any other country, Turkey intervention was instrumental in highlighting Somalia’s humanitarian crisis to the world’s attention and its return to the international forum. In its humanitarian aid response Turkey took several steps to popularize the plight of Somalia in many international forums. Turkey’s daring assistance to Somalia has largely influenced international donors to take action

and felt the pressure from Turkey's defiance and groundbreaking interventions in Somalia to deliver aid to the affected communities.

The study found that Somali people regarded Turkey's humanitarian intervention as Godsend because they delivered the much needed aid at the critical moment when thousands of people were facing starvation in the Holy month of Ramadhan. Turkey's action demonstrated genuine partnership by effectively catalyzing for both peace and development. However, over the years Turkey's humanitarian aid intervention has significantly reduced despite the ongoing threats to food security. The study found Turkey has scaled down their operation in Somalia and instead have opted to provide limited emergency response through local partners.

5.2.2. The factors undermining Turkey aid delivery in Somalia

The study found that among the major factors that undermined the Turkey's humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia, insecurity and threats from Al-Shabab was the major one as it disrupted the aid delivery through the constant attacks and targeting of Turkish humanitarian workers, and nationals affecting and disrupting their areas of interest and places where they carry out their activities through suicide missions. Secondly, the limited knowledge of the social context was also found as a hindrance to Turkey aid agencies in delivering humanitarian assistance sufficiently to the target population. Their inability to understand the clan divisions and political biases mainly with most politicians trying to sway aid delivery to their respective clan constituencies was a key obstacle. Thirdly, the prolonged political instability in Somalia has exacerbated the cyclical humanitarian crisis and undermined international efforts to support sustainable programs due to weak governance structures and political divisions among the political actors.

As a result of the continued threats Turkey adopted several mitigation measures. Firstly, Turkish aid agencies significantly reduced the number of staffs or citizens delivering aid to prevent the risk of exposure. Secondly, Turkish aid agencies embraced local NGOs as partners to deliver humanitarian support to people and thirdly, Turkish agencies limited their operations to government controlled areas and chose to work with the government agencies in Mogadishu and federal member states.

5.2.3. The dynamics of Turkey political engagement in Somalia

The study found that Turkey's engagement with Somalia had deepened significantly over the last decade. Particularly, the Turkey-Somalia engagement has strengthened relations in many fronts including bilateral engagements, security, education, health, and trade. The outcome of these relations has been found to be mutually beneficial and Somalia has benefited from the development assistance as it has received and raised profile in the global state.

Similarly, the study found that the humanitarian intervention in Somalia has also enhanced Turkey's diplomatic clout and influence as an emerging global actor and donor mainly due to its increased visibility in fragile environment and participation in mediation efforts that has somewhat increased Turkey's prominence as a global actor. Since its intervention, Turkey has held international conferences in Somalia, engaged in mediation efforts and availed assistance for Somalia's military and police to defeat Al-Shabab. However, despite these achievements Turkey has not been successful in its political mediation between federal government of Somalia and Somalia in 2013 due to extreme views and differences between parties towards reaching a political settlement. Despite frantic efforts concrete results have so far been little and far between.

5.3. Conclusion

Turkey's humanitarian intervention in Somalia since 2011 and the continued political engagement has been mutually beneficial to both parties. Firstly, the intervention has helped awaken the international donors' attention and hope to Predicament of the huge population uprooted from their regions mainly famine, drought and Al-Shabab oppression. Besides, Turkey humanitarian assistance was a life-line for thousands of vulnerable population and funded the critical projects such as digging of boreholes, constructing health centres, and feeding centres. In reciprocation, Turkey's image among Somalis is held in high esteem and they are believed as the genuine partner that Somalia been yearning for many years. The common bond between Turkey and Somalia is the Islamic faith that Somalis believed has distinguished its humanitarian aid and that of the traditional donors that is often full of bureaucracy and riddled with mismanagement.

Moreover, the Turkey's engagement with Somalia was also beneficial in many ways. Firstly, the visibility Turkey on the ground has boosted its diplomatic image and soft power as a result became a key player in the Somali affairs and has since held many international forums on Somalia. Turkey's increased investment in Mogadishu has also become a player in Africa and made inroads in the neighboring counties.

However, the study found the Turkey's humanitarian intervention has not ended the recurrent humanitarian crisis. Despite its enormous response a decade ago, Somalia is again calling for urgent humanitarian assistance to save lives. This predicament shows that whilst Turkey has made significant efforts to address the humanitarian crisis the impact of its assistance has proven unsustainable. The security situation and the complex social dynamics have been shown to have significantly hampered the Turkey's efforts on the ground and prospect of supporting programs

in agriculture and livestock production that are backbone of the Somali economy and livelihood of the people. Consequently, the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation and continued threats from Al-Shabab seems to be reversing the gains being made and the influenced Turkish aid agencies revert to past practices as mitigation measure.

Turkey's political engagement has largely been seen to be leaning to the Federal Government because of its continued support and preference to channel its assistance through the government. This approach has antagonized some of the rival political factions and risked undermining Turkey's position as a neutral player in the Somalia Affairs. Turkey has failed to achieve in its ambition to broker a political truce between the FGS and Somaliland in the 2013 talks held in Istanbul. Consequently, Turkey has fallen out of favor with Somaliland to lead the future mediation process. Although Turkey has succeeded in its humanitarian response efforts external factors seem to be undermining this noble attempt while in the political front Turkey has achieved little in mediating the rival political factors in the country and instead chose to remain as a neutral actor.

5.4. Recommendation

The study recommends Turkey should enhance its coordination with international partners to complement development programs with a view to supporting federal government's priorities to deliver services to the people.

Working in fragile environment is often challenging due to contesting actors and especially Somalia presents a complex social-political dynamics that is influenced by decades of civil strife. Therefore working in such environment requires a better understanding of these actors and how they can undermine well-intentioned development initiatives.

The Turkish engagement in Somalia has often been limited to working with the Federal Government of Somalia, although this is important Turkey can have broad influence in Somalia if it seeks to work with all the regional states and design initiatives that will ease tension between Mogadishu and regional states.

5.5. Areas for further research

Turkey humanitarian assistance has significantly reduced over the years and focused on emergency programs and instead divested to other sectors such as the economy and security. This change is worth studying to understand what has shaped Turkey's venture into these new areas.

Turkish intervention in Somalia is largely driven by AKP lead government but the opposition leaders in Turkey criticized government decision to given additional bilateral aid to Somalia in favor of investing it locally. Such criticism could be an indication that some politicians might not share AKP approach towards Somalia. There is need to study the dynamics within Turkish political actors particularly opposition.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENT

Short message for the respondent

Dear Respondent,

I am conducting an assessment on the perspectives on aid politics in Horn of Africa; an analysis of the impact of Turkey's intervention in Somalia. The output concluded by this research will contribute to knowledge aimed at improving the security in the Horn of Africa Region. On this note, this questionnaire you are about to fill out, will enable me to collect data that will aid in answering the objectives of this study. Kindly answer the questions correctly and sincerely by checking the appropriate response in one of the boxes provided (where applicable). Please note that the information you will provide via this questionnaire will be treated with confidentiality.

Section A: Bio Data of the Respondent

Q1. Indicate your gender

[1]Male

[2]Female

Q2. What age bracket do you fall under?

[1]18-24 years

[2]25-31 years

[3]32-38 years

[4]39-45 years

[5]45 and above

Q3: How long have you have stayed or worked in Somalia?

[1]Less than 1 year

[2]1-3 years

[3]4-7 years

[4]8-12 years

[5]12 years and above

Q4: What is your profession?

.....

Q5: What agency or institution do you work with?

[1]Government institution

[2]INGO/NGO

[3]Academic

[4]Research institute

[5]Businessman/businesswoman

SECTION B: TURKISH INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

Note: Please indicate your level of disagreement/ agreement with the following: using a rating scale of 1 to 5 (1=Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree)

Section 1: Turkey's humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia (Please indicate your level of disagreement/ agreement with the following in a scale of 1 to 5)

Statement	Strongly disagree(1)	Disagree(2)	Neutral(3)	Agree(4)	Strongly agree(5)
1. Somali people consider Turkey as reliable partner, being a Muslim and democratic state.					
2. The visit of the Turkish president to Somalia during the 2011 famine generated acceptance of Turkish government					
3. Turkey effectively responded to the 2011 famine in Somalia despite the international community's inaction to deliver aid to the country					
4. The Turkey humanitarian aid response adopted multipronged approaches that contributed to its success.					
5. The delivery of aid by Turkey is often directly to beneficiaries, aligned with peoples' priorities, fast, and without pre-conditions compared with the traditional donors.					
6. Turkey had no direct or indirect conditionalities in its aid delivery to Somalia compared to the traditional donors					
7. Turkey brought the question of Somalia back on the international agenda					
8. Turkey invested in long					

term programs aimed to alleviate the food insecurity in Somalia					
9. The Turkey's actions in Somalia during the drought and famine period could be seen as an act faith					
10. The close working relations between the Turkish state and their non-state actors has developed significant soft power in Somalia					
11. Turkey has made major contributions to its aid policies in Somalia.					
12. Turkish aid organizations departed from the traditional donor's practice of engaging local aid groups as intermediary and instead directly approached the local people.					
13. Turkish humanitarian aid and developmental intervention in Somalia has garnered great publicity because it has worked on the ground with its own institutions					
14. Somalia is an unexploited market for Turkey's emerging businesses in search of new markets.					

Section 2: Factors undermining Turkey aid delivery in Somalia (Please indicate your level of disagreement/ agreement with the following in a scale of 1 to 5)

Statement	Strongly disagree(1)	Disagree(2)	Neutral(3)	Agree(4)	Strongly agree(5)
1. The security context and the humanitarian operational environment that both local and international aid agencies face have severely restricted humanitarian activities have similarly affected Turkish aid agencies/Organizations					

2. limited knowledge and inexperience of Somalia's conflict dynamics has affected Turkish delivery of aid in Somalia					
3. A rush to provide assistance combined with a weak understanding Somalia's conflict may have increased the risks of Turkish aid agencies inadvertently further fueling the conflict in Somalia					
4. Certain instances Turkish aid has been diverted by cartels or looted by gatekeepers/other violent groups					
5. The withdrawal of al-Shabaab's forces from Mogadishu partially increased the space for Turkish aid agencies to operate in Mogadishu					
6. Turkish intervention in Somalia has been criticized as being Mogadishu-centered,					
7. The political instability in Somalia worsened the severity of the drought and famine in the country					

Section 3: The dynamics of Turkey political engagement in Somalia (Please indicate your level of disagreement/ agreement with the following in a scale of 1 to 5)

Statement	Strongly disagree(1)	Disagree(2)	Neutral(3)	Agree(4)	Strongly agree(5)
1. Turkey's engagement in Somalia is a vantage point of emerging power diplomacy					
2. Turkey's engagement in Somalia deepened substantially following the 2011 famine.					
3. Turkey's active involvement in Somalia influenced the international actors to establish their diplomatic relations with Somalia					

4. Turkey's main aim in engaging Somalia is to create another market for Turkish goods.					
5. The political and economic crisis in Somalia gave Turkey a post-crisis nation building role, once reserved for American and major European imperialist powers					
6. Turkey's military assistance to Somalia in the form of aid has boosted Somalia's Federal Government capacity to fight Al-shabaab					
7. Turkey's military assistance to Somalia has exerted its influence through either soft or hard power.					
8. Turkey played a key role in the peace and mediation process of nation building among Somali regions,					
9. Turkish played a key role in initiating the political dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland					
10. Turkey is seen as neutral actor in Somali affairs compared with the traditional donors					
11. Turkish government chose Somalia as a launching pad for Turkey's desired role as a player on the international stage					
12. Turkey's willingness and ability to take significantly bold risks in Somalia meant a greater return on its investment					

Thank you for your time

Appendix 2: Key informant Guide
Short message for the respondent

Dear Respondent,

I am conducting an assessment on the perspectives on aid politics in Horn of Africa; an analysis of the impact of Turkey's intervention in Somalia. The output concluded by this research will contribute to knowledge aimed at improving the security in the Horn of Africa Region. On this note, this questionnaire you are about to fill out, will enable me to collect data that will aid in answering the objectives of this study. Kindly answer the questions correctly and sincerely by checking the appropriate response in one of the boxes provided (where applicable). Please note that the information you will provide via this questionnaire will be treated with confidentiality.

Section A: Bio data of the respondent

1. Indicate your gender
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
2. What age bracket do you fall under?
3.
 - a. 18-24 years
 - b. 25-31 years
 - c. 32-38 years
 - d. 39-45 years
 - e. 45 and above
4. How long have you have stayed or worked in Somalia?
 - a. Less than 1 year
 - b. 1-3 years
 - c. 4-7 years
 - d. 8-12 years
 - e. 12 years and above

5. What is your profession?

.....
.....

6. What agency or institution do you work with?

1. Government institution
2. INGO/NGO
3. Academic
4. Research institute
5. Businessman/businesswoman

Section B: The Turkey’s humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia

1. How will you describe the Turkey humanitarian aid intervention in Somalia?.....

.....

2. What do you think is the reason behind Turkey’s engagement in Somalia?.....

.....

3. Do you think Turkey’s humanitarian aid delivery approach is different from the traditional donor’s approach?

1. Yes
2. No

4. If yes, how would you describe the Turkish aid delivery approach?

.....

5. In your opinion is Turkey aid delivery approach effective in the delivery aid to vulnerable population?

1. Yes
2. No

6. If yes or No, why?

Section C: The factors undermining Turkey aid delivery in Somalia

7. Has Turkey aid delivery to Somalia increased or reduced over the years?

1. Yes

2. No

8. If yes, why do you think Turkey humanitarian assistance has reduced in Somalia?.....
.....
9. In your opinion what are the major challenges that affected Turkey aid delivery in Somalia?
10. How have these challenges affected the Turkey aid delivery in Somalia?
.....

Section D: The dynamics of Turkey political engagement in Somalia

7. In your opinion how will you describe the Turkey’s political engagement in Somalia?.....
.....
8. How you will you describe the Turkey’s engagement with Federal Government and Federal Member states?
.....
9. How will describe Turkey political engagement with self-declared republic of Somaliland?
.....
10. In your opinion how will you describe the political dialogue organized between Somalia and Somaliland that organized by Turkey in 2013?
.....
11. How will you describe the outcome of the political dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland organized by Turkey?
12. What are the perceptions about the Turkey political engagement in Somalia since its intervention in 2011?
.....
13. Do you think the political engagement has affected Turkey’s image positively or negatively in Somalia?
1. Yes
2. No
14. If yes, how has the political engagement affected the Turkey image in Somalia?
.....

Thank you for your time