



**University of Nairobi.**  
**Department of Diplomacy and International Studies.**

**The Impact of Violent Extremism and Radicalization on the Political Economy of the  
Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Somalia and Eritrea.**

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
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
**DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that this is my original work and has not been presented to any other university.


Signed..........Date ..... 25<sup>th</sup> NOVEMBER 2021

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This research has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

Signed..........Date ..... 25/11/2021

**Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo.**



## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to all people who have lost loved ones and their livelihoods due to barbaric acts of violent extremism. I also dedicate this thesis to ever enduring nations of Somalia and Eritrea and other member states in the horn of Africa who bore the brunt of political and economic instability due to radicalization and violent extremism resulting to unpredictable negative impact of political economy within the horn of Africa.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I want to acknowledge the Almighty God, Professor Amb. Maria Nzomo for her guidance and support, my esteemed family; wife Dr. Maymuna Abdi Ali for her continuous support throughout my study, my daughters and my son for their endurance in my absence, colleagues and friends to whom I will always be grateful for their continuous support and patience which has enabled me realize the fruitful accomplishment of this training program and thesis research at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi.

## ABSTRACT

Extremism and radicalization in the Horn of Africa have put human development at risk, and socioeconomic activities have been impeded. There has been no positive change in people's lives as a result. Additionally, people are unable to live the lives they value because they lack the opportunity and freedom to pursue education and training as well as access to the resources, they need to sustain a decent standard of living. This study seeks to establish the impact of violent extremism and radicalization on the political economy of the horn of Africa: a case study of Somalia and Eritrea. The study concludes terrorist activities have huge adverse consequences on the political economy of a nation just as its neighbours, the exercises additionally contrarily affect the existences of the blameless residents also. In Somalia for example, the test related with rebellion have come about because of the horrifying exercises of Al-Shabaab fear monger bunch which have at last come about to the breakdown of the general public. Moreover, their risky exercises, like seizing, torment, incendiarism, murder, mutilation and shakedown have likewise come about to a climate of uncertainty and worry in the Somali society. Efforts for Countering Violent Extremism efforts should be aligned to match threat levels that are found within each state in the region. Although there is a possibility of a risk-reduction strategy for the region, particularly on areas like anti-money laundering (AML) strategies and criminal justice cooperation as well countering the financing of terrorism and t CVE approaches that are tailor made will help in realizing most noteworthy pace of progress and such help would be more viable whenever coordinated through privately drove drives rand not endeavours that are driven universally. The horn of Africa region's key partners must fairly review public and neighborhood issues that encourage ruthless fanatics and radicalization, for example, by leading overviews inside local networks and creating the impression of gatherings that address the country's diversity. Many means may be used to do this, such as public events that allow citizens to express their views openly, surveys conducted by government agencies and regular interactions between government officials, delegates/heads of networks, and common culture performers. Throughout the world, religion inspires and encourages individuals to do good deeds and acts of compassion. Understanding the importance of religious identity and ideology as well as the influence of religion on communities, people, and institutions is critical to countering violent extremism. It's also critical to challenge the growing idea that religion itself is a source of violence.

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## CHAPTER ONE:

### 1.1 Background of the study.

Opportunities for development exist in the Horn of Africa despite the region's instability and high poverty levels, which are exacerbated by drought and violence. Drought and other global causes, such as proxy wars and international conflicts, are causing regional growth to lag. For a while in the 1990s, religious radicals, namely Jihadi and al-Qaeda, made the Horn of Africa their principal operations base. According to other jihadis including Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida is trying to use Eritrea and Somalia as clandestine bases for the jihadis in Europe. To what degree al-Qa'ida has a foothold in the area, and why this has become such a hot topic for policymakers and experts. Al-Qaeda and other Islamist organizations operating in the Horn of Africa face a number of challenges, but they aren't given the attention they deserve in the discussion. It has been relatively successful in Kenya and Eritrea, but has failed miserably in Somalia and Eritrea. A deeper understanding of Al-accomplishments Qaida's and failures in Africa may help other nations and failed states in the area with comparable governance circumstances devise more effective strategies for reducing the danger of international terrorism.

All terrorist groups are constrained by the need to keep their operations at an understood level of security, and this means that the danger posed by terrorism varies greatly from state to state in this area. Governing is poor in locations like Siuthern Somalia, making them less safe. As a result, it's an ideal location for military training camps, yet the terrain is so bad that it effectively eliminates its military potential. It's also possible that regional adversaries have absolute control over Somalia and Eritrea's political economy because of the absence of a strong central authority. Terrorists operating in this area pose a significant danger, and understanding this threat needs an understanding of how their key leadership issues play out in the region's historical context. Conflict and instability have plagued the Horn of Africa area for more than four decades. Interstate hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia (the 1977-1978 Ogaden War) and Eritrea have culminated in political battles in Somalia Ethiopia and Eritrea (the 1998-2000 border war)

As a further complicating factor, there are a number of rebel groups that have been created to fight alongside military forces or for the benefit of different factions' vested interests. According to the Eritrean People's Liberation Forces (EPLF), and other local groups, importing more from other

countries would improve military performance while also helping these groups accomplish their political objectives.

Somalia's current political situation, which seems to be beneficial to al-Qa'ida, has made it difficult for both al-Qa'ida and Western groups seeking to alleviate the country's problems. For al-Qa'ida, the Horn of Africa has become an inhospitable environment, as shown by the group's experiences in Eritrea and Somalia. Counterterrorism efforts and government capacity in the Horn of Africa's two nations are quite different. Al-Qa'ida and Somalia's Islamic extremists have a long-standing relationship. Because of this, they prefer to exploit Somalia as an operational area for additional terrorist attacks.

As a result, other militant groups operating in Somalia are frequently targeted by Western forces engaged in counterterrorism operations. In spite of the fact that al-Qa'ida terrorists found a haven in Somalia, the country's isolation and lawlessness, which many identify as perfect for the organization's activities, have made it almost hard for the group to set up a secure camp for operations there. When compared to Somalia, Kenya seems to have a lower degree of danger than it really does. However, despite Western counterterrorism help, Kenya's counterterrorism operations have been unsuccessful and unproductive. In other words, Kenya's actions have exacerbated the segregation of the country's Muslim minority. As a result of the political and economic situations in some of their states, Western assistance has done nothing to boost Kenyan military confidence. Authorities in Kenya say they will get more Western military support if there are credible claims of terrorist activity in the country, and this aid might be costly in terms of lost tourist revenue

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem.**

There has been continues conflict in the horn of Africa since independence and violent extremism as well as radicalized groups have extended themselves past their starting places in the Middle East causing wanton destruction of lives and livelihoods beyond their sphere of influence across boarders globally. Violent extremists and radicalized groups subjects huge difficulties and stresses many nations throughout the world by exposing global and local citizens not only to brutal violence and violent materials but many other inappropriate information's which harms peace and security as well as basic survival of human beings.

Although radicalization and violent extremism is a global phenomenon, many countries in the horn of Africa experienced deteriorating human security, improper health services , poor functional educational institutions and rampant violation of human rights that has led to impoverishment and economic under development indicating that the region is more susceptible to this phenomenon and in particular, radicalization and violent extremism is more vibrant to some countries in the region more than others. There has been existent of perennial, multifaceted, multi-dynamic and never ending conflict since independence and the problems of conflicts that has not been arrested has created a vacuum of non-state actors including international terrorism groups like Al-shabaab, Al-Qaida and ISIS.

Efforts to build strong functioning governments by the international community has never been fruitful while the cycle of violence perpetrated by terror groups like Al-shaabab, Al-Qaida and Isis continues an abated causing massive loss of human lives and destruction of properties on daily basis whilst the security situations in the region seems to be going from bad to worse owing to lack of strong governance, cohesive leadership and peace keeping interventions from international community are constantly failing to yield any progress towards ending violent extremism menace.

With increased levels of violent extremism and radicalization, basic human development has been at stake in many states within the horn of Africa and there has been very little or no improvement of human lives as their engagement of socio-economic activities has been hindered by radicalized terror groups. Additionally people from the region do not have opportunities as well as the freedoms to live the lives that they value and there is general limitations to develop themselves due to fear limiting their abilities through education and training as well as access to resources that they require for decent livelihoods.

Savage fanaticism and radicalization keep on frustrating the interaction of human improvement in the Horn of Africa since the delicate states have neglected or are incapacitated to establish a climate for individuals to separately and altogether foster their maximum capacity hence the need to carry out this research in two most affected countries from the region.

### **1.3 Research Question.**

1. What are the nexus between radicalization and violent extremism with regards to human development in the horn of African economy?
2. What are the causes and consequences of radicalization and violent extremism in Nigeria?
3. What is the impact of violent extremism on political economy of Somalia and Eritrea?

### **1.4 Research Objectives.**

1. To investigate whether there is any direct link between radicalization and violent extremism with human development in the horn of Africa.
2. To examine and analyze the causes and consequences of radicalization and violent extremism on Nigerian political economy.
3. To critically analyze the impact of violent extremism on political economy of Somalia and Eritrea.

### **1.5 Literature Review.**

#### **1.5.1 Radicalisation and Violent Extremism**

There is no tolerance for any type of variety in the minds of extremist organizations and people, according to Schmid. 'extremism groups or individuals may display behaviours that are violent or nonviolent, be democratic or not,' he writes. While Bötticher and Mares identify 'receptive' revolutionaries and views fanatics as motivated by a desire to force congruence on the general public by coercion, extremists, on the other hand, may tolerate a range of viewpoints According to Nasser-Eddine et al., it is also common for fanaticism to be used interchangeably with psychological oppression in the literature based on the assumption that violent extremism results from the process of radicalization and to those individuals who have been radicalized and carry

out acts of terror. Mroz argues that violent extremism and terrorism are not fundamentally comparable, and a comparison between the two is exceedingly difficult to resist since 'lone wolf attacks' are the most common kind of violent extremism. Viciousness without reason," he says, or rather, "the idea that submitting a manifestation of violence delivers advantages beyond the price of human lives," is how he describes fiery radicalism. Its devastation, criminality, fratricide, and even unlawful intimidation' if you're a radical.

Radicalisation is considered as harmful to both the person and the larger society, despite the fact that the term's meaning and use are contested and varied to the point of being almost impossible to understand. Consequently, it is widely understood that the radicalization-to-radicalization connection has a detrimental influence on individual ideas that deviate from the norm. This premise, however, is challenged by a more nuanced approach to radicalization, one that examines the ways in which radicalization has been seen in the past.<sup>1</sup>

Radicalization, according to Schmid, has been considered as a positive force in the long run, and not a source of negative connotations. As a result of the assumption that all people who have been radicalized are prone to viciousness, it restricts our understanding of the various types of radicalization that don't result in acts that are considered rough, as well as limits our investigation into the reasons why not all people who have been radicalized continue to draw in acts that are brutal..

Presumption that persons who attend extremist groups seek out beliefs that are different from the norm further restricts our understanding of radicalization drivers. There are certain cases when this may be true in the West, but it doesn't hold true for present events in Somalia. Some young Somalis in Al Shabab-involved districts join the terrorist group since it is typical for all young and physically fit individuals to do so, and the local area may see the inability to join Al Shabaab as an extreme step.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Meinema, E., 2021. Countering 'Islamic 'violent extremism? The implementation of programs to prevent radicalization by Muslim-led civil society organizations in Malindi, Kenya. *Religion*, 51(2), pp.259-279.

<sup>2</sup> Rye Olsen, G., 2018. Transatlantic cooperation on terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Africa: The Franco-American axis. *European Security*, 27(1), pp.41-57.



Non-state entertainers are sometimes referred to as 'aggressors' in writing on fanaticism and radicalization, implying that they are the best candidates for radicalization or radicalization. Writing does not obscure the role of the state in the radicalization cycle or the possibility for the state itself to be radicalized. An important role in radicalization is performed by the state, according to studies on how state entertainers throughout the world react to threats of violent fanaticism and radicalization. Governments' counter vicious fanaticism and radicalization estimations reflect the highly political character of these efforts, which the states may particularly influence in order to achieve certain purposes or goals.<sup>3</sup>

### **1.6 The Concept of Terrorism**

Terrorism is defined in a variety of ways by academics from different academic backgrounds as well as observers and governments. These theories and concepts, however, are difficult to understand. There are numerous definitions in academic writing that require two components: "undermined or genuine brutality against people or regular citizens who are not included directly in threats" and "the express or certain reason for the demonstration, including terrorizing or persuading a government, populace, or association into some strategy." 'Comprehensively defined as the unexpected utilization of savagery against ordinary persons with a goal to achieve political purposes or objectives,' according to Laqueur, is an usual supposition concerning psychological oppression. Winkates and Loza argue that different definitions of psychological warfare consider it to be a threat to property or individuals intended for terrorizing guiltless regular citizens, non-soldiers, with the long-term goal of changing public strategy or giving around something of significant value convention support for the plan of the fear-based oppressor gatherings, while others focus on the way in which the gatherings are organized..<sup>4</sup> Maogoto, argues that because there is no universal definition of terrorism, the international community has taken a piecemeal approach by addressing the challenges related to international terrorism with specific criminal acts

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<sup>3</sup> Luengo-Cabrera, José, and Annelies Pauwels. "Countering Violent Extremism: The Horn of Africa." Brief. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2016.

<sup>4</sup> Ganor, B. (2002). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter? *Police Practice and Research*, 3(4), 287-304.

that are inherently terrorist in nature, either by focusing on their prevention or using domestic legal frameworks and legislations to punish them..<sup>5</sup>

### **1.6.1 Gender and Violent Extremism**

There are many different ways to conduct an audit on a piece of writing. Women's enrolment in VE bunches in the Horn of Africa has been studied before, but a more nuanced perspective of how and when women organize themselves is needed. In addition to this consensus, it is also critical to assess the situation of women in VE groups. Even when women are active and eager to participate in rough radical gathering, there is a strong relationship between sex and fanaticism in Horn of Africa. Aside from VE's effect on the political economy of the nation, harmony-building, and goal-oriented initiatives, women's role as perpetrators of cruelty and allies has received minimal attention. Additional instances of VE sympathizers and couriers have been uncovered in the course of this investigation. Despite this, there have been cases of female self-destruction planes and competitors in the East Africa region, similar to trends seen elsewhere..

One of the main reasons for ignoring women's roles and responsibilities in fanatic groups is because they're seen as a probable de-radicalizer, embedded security companions, and archives of public or family strength. (D'Estaing 2017) As "inner middle people's in families and networks," women are seen as either "resources" or "partners" when it comes to combating the threat of harsh radicalism. Strategy makers and software developers regard women as able to "influence the social mechanisms that steer individuals to destructive extremism," according to the Quilliam Foundation, 2015".

A gendered perspective that accepts women's office as a starting point and rejects efforts to use their work in CVE programming is advocated by Sjoberg (2017). Sexist-based differences in the way individuals are treated and exercised of force would enable an enhanced understanding of how sexual orientation norms shape and influence women's work and collaboration in furious fanatic groups. As a result, it would help us understand the impact of VE on women's life in a new way. A gendered point of view, then, implies a dedication to the ways in which sexuality influences women's positions and status within the context of VE meetings.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid

While a gendered perspective has been mostly absent from the literature, a few examinations conducted in various situations have provided some critical experiences on the role and impact of women in harsh radical action. Thus, the literature re-energizes the need to recognize the explicit intricacies of sexual orientation in forces of push and pull. As such, it highlights the importance of overcoming suppositions and accepting that sex standards build and force women's participation in brutal radicalism exercises and that female members, like male members, are specialists who practice their decision, even within exceptionally obliging social designs.. In the East African context, such a focus point is particularly relevant since it would offer light on the many facets of women's enrolment in VE groups, which, despite significant investigation, continues to be a very young area of research.

While women have traditionally been seen as peacemakers or victims of violence, a growing number of women are actively participating in terrorism and violent extremism across all political and religious spectrums. Studies of female fighters in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka have shown that there is no connection between women and peace and concord. According to this argument, women's involvement in self-destruction aircraft in groups like the PKK (Turkey), LTTE ( Sri Lanka), and Black Widows (Chechnya) demonstrates that this is the case. The LTTE and PIRRA often referred to women as 'political dissidents' for their role in the development of Sri Lanka. According to O'Rourke, female ardent fanatics attend fanatic meetings for similar, complicated reasons as their male counterparts. Soldiers' wives often consider themselves as "cultural security" or as "guardians of the country's social, economic, political and military security." Stories about psychological warfare and counter-illegal intimidation have developed just as activated sex generalizations have developed, such as the concept of the weary gullible non-political woman who resorts to shows of fanaticism or psychological warfare<sup>6</sup>.

Alison's analysis of following paramilitary groups reveals that a larger percentage of women were introduced to these groups via their male relatives than the opposite. Consequently, the women's relatives and networks are assured that their registration is legitimate. Additionally, a lax security atmosphere and a societal acceptance of guerrilla behaviors such as male suicide bombings and

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<sup>6</sup> Wanjiru, Carolyne, "Kenya and the War on Terrorism," in Review of African Political Economy, No. 107, (Mar 2006), pp. 133-162.

funding radical action are beneficial for female cooperation' since the assets are already in place. FARC and Maoist guerrilla groups in Nepal have both had a large number of women in their ranks, with over 30 percent of its members being women, much as in the FARC..

When males are in short supply or engaged in high-energy, low-military-value jobs like self-destruction missions, women may have a high value. Operations also suggest that the associations they are involved with have a high level of viability, which incites "entertainer advancement" to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. Al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi advised Iraqi women to carry out self-destruction attacks in order to weaken American security inspections in Iraq in the 2000s.<sup>7</sup>

### **1.6.2 Education and Violent Extremism**

A wide scope of contentions against and for the presence of a causative connection among instruction and radicalism exist in the writing. Moreover, there is no huge connection between people's degrees of instruction and association in savage fanaticism. Subsequently, a large part of the writing will in general be speculative where it is observational, it will in general be subjective and case explicit. Restricted admittance to formal schooling just as low degrees of proficiency may suggest that an individual don't can address and basically examine the philosophical stories just as conventions upheld by the strict pioneers or the individuals who are going fanatic gatherings<sup>8</sup>. Besides, youngsters having almost no training are less inclined to have perused the sections of the Quran which sabotage the philosophies of revolutionary gatherings. In any case, endeavors to arrange radicalism dependent on degrees of training can't disregard the way that people who are associated with savage fanatic will in general show practices that change with financial status, age, occupation, levels of education and past criminal records.

Examination recommend that even people who are profoundly instructed can be radicalized, in Nigeria for example about 60% of youngsters enlisted from working class families and having secondary school training have been discovered to be associated with rough fanaticism. In an investigation by Sageman on transnational fear mongers set up that more that 60% of people

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<sup>7</sup> Bloom, M, (2011). *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists*. Hurst.

<sup>8</sup> Galtung Johan, "Cultural Violence," in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3(1990) pp 291-305 Hoffman, B., *Inside Terrorism*. rev.ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

occupied with transnational rough fanaticism had some more elevated level training. Sageman likewise tracked down that the initiative of dread associations just as radical gatherings are generally accomplished with 88% having completed advanced degree and 20% having postgraduate certificates<sup>9</sup>.

Further, the examination by Sageman likewise settled that, 'at the hour of joining, most of Islamists were experts with some being educators, specialists, or semiskilled callings. Routinely, it is accepted that instruction ingrains a feeling of social obligation just as empowering people to direct their looks. Political information that people acquire by going through an instruction framework can impact to the level of contribution in issues as a grown-up. Be that as it may, in light of the contention by Krueger and Malečková, people who are profoundly instructed may discover more degree to become assessment pioneers inside fanatic gatherings or fear based oppressor associations contrasted with their less-taught or ignorant partners and they may distinguish all the more intimately with the political belief systems or objectives of such gatherings or associations.

Radical gatherings may like to work with people with the capacity to 'find a way into an unfamiliar climate to be effective' and such people might be offered more noteworthy advantages Other investigations features a fascinating recurrence of science and innovation graduates for example designs in Islamist fear based oppressor associations, which may propose that specialized orders can add to reductive styles of reasoning<sup>10</sup>. Davydov builds up articulations of rough radicalism in youthful people through an outward dismissal for qualities and standards in the general public prompting them looking for those that are not worthy for the most part. This outcome to unfriendly gatherings turning out to be 'fanatic packs. Further, an investigation in Europe looking at the activities of assailant Islamism set up that the draw of vicious fanaticism is established in the absence of conviction that the young can address complaints and bring change through legitimate and sacred channels as opposed to financial factors or levels of training.

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<sup>9</sup> Abrahms, M. (2012). The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited. *Comparative Political Studies* 45(3): 366-393

<sup>10</sup> Abrahms, M. (2012). The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited. *Comparative Political Studies* 45(3): 366-393

Children's vulnerability to ferocious fanaticism may be a consequence of inadequate preparation in 'struggle-free communication' rather than poor levels of education. Whatever the case may be, the path taken by these people could be to participate in a common distress, such as in Tunisia in 2011, or it could be more reminiscent of the 1980s in Palestine, where the development of colleges and worker's guilds in the preceding decade had separated class barriers and replaced them with a public awareness among the adolescent, who then received the strategy of self-destruction besieging. Influential personalities and peers are more likely to spread extreme beliefs than educational institutions. Thus, most people who are highly educated and radicalized may have been radicalized outside of the educational system itself.<sup>11</sup>

### **1.6.3 Research Gaps**

There has been an increase in violent extremist assaults throughout the globe, resulting in the deaths of many innocent individuals. Extremist ideas, regardless of whether they are founded on ethnicity or religious conviction, celebrate the superiority of one group over another and reject a more inclusive and accepting cohabitation. Some research suggests that political, social, economic and historical factors such as global and regional power politics can lead to violent extremism; poverty and unemployment may not be the only push factors that lead to extremism and violence, but also social and political exclusion, human rights violations, a sense of injustice, the treatment of certain groups for an extended period of time, or widespread corruption, which all contribute to the spread of violence.

While countries need a solution to safeguard citizens' lives and national assets, stopping violent extremism requires analysis of previous security issues to develop new strategies and causes that are geared towards the development of remedies for violent extremism. However, this cannot be done without an understanding on the activities of violent extremist on the economy therefore necessitating a study on how violent extremism impact the political economy of the Horn of Africa Region.

### **1.7 Justification of the study**

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<sup>11</sup> Davies, L. (2008). Gender, education, extremism and security. *Compare*, 38(5), 611-625.

### **1.7.1 Policy Justification.**

According to the study's conclusions, policymakers may develop more effective security and economic strategies to combat violent extremism in the world today. As a result of this research, security forces in Eritrea and Somalia may be better equipped to combat violent extremism and the political economy it brings. Changes or updates to current counterterrorism plans may be prompted as a result of this report's suggestions.

### **1.7.2 Academic Justification**

The influence of extremism and radicalization on a region's politics and economics. The outcomes of this study will be useful to students in the future who want to do similar studies. The purpose of this research is to contribute value to the academic literature on violent extremism and to expand the available data on the diverse impacts of counter-terrorism measures established and operational in Africa in combatting violent extremism. Policymakers might use the study's results to help them develop.

## **1.8 Theoretical Framework**

There is no one idea that has a better foundation than the others. Any social science theory, like any other, reflects current discussions and thinking in a particular academic subject.<sup>12</sup>

### **1.8.1 Relative Deprivation Theory**

According to the Relative Deprivation Theory, persons who do not meet their socioeconomic goals have an increased risk for violent radicalization, since they believe they are being deprived of something in relation to others in terms of politics, society, or the economy. Because of their low socioeconomic status (i.e., poverty, unemployment, and underemployment), they are more susceptible to extremism. This is the basis of the problem. For many academics, a person's "susceptibility" to reformism, or their degree of readiness to be used and exploited, is an important assumption. For example, Pargeter focuses on persons like those who commit criminal activities that aren't visible among young males in Western cultures, save for the justifications that have been used to justify their actions.

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<sup>12</sup> Schmid, A. P., & Jongman, A. J. (1988). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories, and Literature*. Amsterdam: SWIDOC.

## **1.9 Hypothesis.**

Based on the hypothesis the research was conducted.

H1: Radicalization and Violent extremism undermine human development in the horn of Africa.

H2: Radicalization and Violent extremism has a Negative impact on Nigerian political economy.

H3: Political economies of Somalia and Eritrea are negatively affected by violent extremism.

## **1.10 Research Methodology.**

The study was majorly conducted in Asmara, Djibouti City and Mogadishu.

Desktop research has also been used where library materials are the main source of information. Some of the sources which have been used include legislation, government policy documents and reports. Relevant secondary literature has also been reviewed and where necessary, online sources are used.

### **1.10.1 Research Design**

Research design is defined by Cooper and Schilnder as a framework for the connection between variables under investigation as well as detailing every step of the research process. On the other hand, Maxwell defines research design as an arrangement of circumstances for collecting and analyzing data based on their link to the study's objective. There will be a descriptive research strategy used in this study, which allows for a lot of data to be gathered at once, as well as being cost-effective and suited for a researcher who has to collect data quickly. It was determined that a descriptive research approach would be most suited for this study since the researcher hopes to demonstrate the current link between terrorism and Kenya's political economy..

### **1.10.2. Research Site**

The research site was Mogadishu and Asmara



### **1.10.3. Target Population**

Violence extremists, defence ministry officials from both Somalia and Eritrea, as well as non-governmental organizations focused on terrorism, radicalization, and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa region are among the subjects of this research.

### **1.10.4. The Sample Size**

It's important to remember that Zikmund defines a sample as being a representative of the population that shares many of its traits. As a result of sampling, a researcher is able to ensure that the population being examined is really representative. Purposive sampling was used in the study's selection of the key informants who were interviewed in order to get the most relevant information. For this study, the researcher relied on a sample size of thirty two (32) people.

### **1.10.5 Data Collection**

Interviews were used to gather data in this study. The researchers conducted virtual interviews with the responders because of the Coronavirus Pandemic and the accompanying global health procedures.

### **1.10.6 Data Presentation**

The research will be presented as a project to the University of Nairobi

### **1.10.7. Ethical Issues**

Given that most of the activities within the security sector are classified and security personnel restricted from sharing information, using code names and ensuring respondent's anonymity was observed during conduction of the research.

### **1.10.8. Scope and Limitation**

Given the nature of security issues and activities, some respondents who are security personnel may have concealed some classified information. However, the strategy used by the researcher with promise of anonymity, the researcher believes the information obtained combined with public security information from secondary sources makes the finding and recommendation of this research will be relevant to both the academia and policy

## **1.11 Chapter Outline**

### **1.11.1 Chapter One: Introduction**

This is the introduction to the study, which explains the context of the topic and the statement of the problem. The study's goals, research questions, methods, and relevance are all laid forth in this section, as well as the importance of the study. Finally, the chapter will evaluate and analyze the relevant literature and theoretical frameworks on the topic matter.

### **1.11.2 Chapter Two: Radicalization and human development in the horn of Africa.**

This chapter examines the relationship between radicalization and violent extremism, the role of the international system in combatting violent extremism, and the Horn of Africa as an area that provides a safe haven for violent extremism.

### **1.11.3 Chapter Three: Impact of violent extremism on the political economy of Africa with particular attention to Nigeria.**

Global and regional politics play an important role in this chapter, as well as the convergence of horizontal inequalities, which is discussed. Economic exclusion, unemployment, and limited opportunities for upward mobility, political exclusion, and shrinking civic space are among the factors that contribute to violent extremism, as are injustice and corruption and mistreatment of certain groups, rejection of the socio-economic and political system, weak State capacity and failing security, changing global culture, and the normalization of violence in the media and entertainment industry. Lastly, the UNDP Conceptual Framework for Countering Violent Extremism is examined.

### **1.11.4 Chapter Four: The impact of violent extremism on the political economy of Somalia and Eritrea.**

Global and regional politics, as well as the convergence of horizontal disparities, are examined in this chapter. There are many factors that contribute to violent extremism, including economic inclusion, unemployment and limited opportunities for upward mobility, political exclusion and shrinking civic space; injustice; corruption and mistreatment of certain groups; rejection; growing diversity in society; weak State capacity; failing security; the changing global culture; and the banalization of violence in media and entertainment. The last section of the chapter examines the UNDP's Conceptual Framework for Countering Violent Extremism.

### **1.11.5 Chapter Five: Data Analysis and Presentation**

The findings of the study's qualitative data analysis are presented in this chapter.

### **1.11.6 Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations**

A worldwide, integrated, and multi-dimensional strategy is needed to solve the issues raised in this study, which are also relevant to countries and regions across the world. Several changes to the CVE measures are suggested to address the broader research issue in this chapter.

## CHAPTER TWO

### **RADICALIZATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

As a whole, the Greater Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world. For fear-mongering purposes, all nations in East Africa have been cheated, regardless of whether the perpetrators were domestic or foreigners, such as the consulates of Western countries. International combat has been fought by a large majority of the world's countries during the last 30 years, while those that haven't still face intermittent scenes of inter- and intra-communal violence, guerrilla groups, or state-executed atrocities.

In recent years, observers around the world have grown increasingly concerned about the district's vulnerability to illegal intimidation and ferocious fanaticism, particularly from al-Shabaab, which has suffered setbacks in Somalia but demonstrated its capacity to direct attacks in neighbouring countries.. Combined with a growing number of fanatic meetings across the globe, there are increasing concerns regarding the long-term viability of the area's infrastructure. Focuses on the radicalization of human progress in the Horn of Africa..

#### **2.2. From Radicalization to Violent Extremism**

An individual or a group can be radicalized by receiving increasingly outrageous political, social, or strict standards and yearnings that are oddball or sabotage business as usual or dismiss and subvert contemporary thoughts and articulations of opportunity of decision, according to the United States National Counter Terrorism Center (US-NCTC). There are several theories regarding radicalization. Political tensions and social cleavages have been cited in certain instances by some as the underlying causes of radicalization, while others have focused on more immediate elements, such as the shock of a landmark event or the effect of an influential teacher..

According to Wiktorowicz and Quintan, following the 2005 London bombings, the word "radicalization" became increasingly often used to describe the rise in extremist activity in the city's transport system and metro system. The perpetrators of the attacks were two young men who had grown up in the United Kingdom and did not match the stereotype of previous fear-based oppressor criminals. One of the four aircraft that attacked a train on July 7, 2005, was a model. He

had never been in trouble with the law, was raised by a stable family, and was assimilated into society without issue (in the same place). Beginning with McCauley and Moskalenko's work in the 1990s, a large number of studies have been conducted to better understand why certain groups are unable to resist radicalization and the cycles through which radicalization develops. As an example, the European Commission's Directorate of General Justice in 2008 concluded an investigation of convictions, belief systems, and tales of radicalization throughout Europe. Concerns were raised as to whether current forms of radicalization are just aimed at particular groups of people

The US-NCTC distinguished four general classifications of depicting the manner by which youthful people are enlisted or become revolutionaries. These are; naturally introduced to an extreme climate (brought into the world of revolutionary guardians) constrained into radicalism (selected powerfully), convinced (allured through some inspiration) and self-radicalization (driven by singular interest). These are not comprehensive of the relative multitude of manners by which youthful people are enlisted, and are probably going to happen in different mixes. The reasons for radicalization are however different as they may be bountiful. Youth enlistment depends on a mix of reasons. These can be sorted as an abstract of "push" and "pull" components, Community and individual elements. Push factors incorporate estrangement from winning standards and openings; pull factors are favored philosophies and openings; local area parts of radicalization incorporate social and social milieu while the individual components are essentially character and aura<sup>13</sup>.

This process of psychological militant radicalization does not proceed in a linear fashion, according to Alexander and Githigaro; rather, the circumstances that make it possible fluctuate from one person to the next: In most cases, it is the result of a complex interplay of relevant and personal factors that might include feelings of separation, avoidance, poverty, instability, or exploitation. Savage fanatics employ ideas and complaints that resonate with various needs of the young to choose and abuse them by presenting a distorted sense of direction and character. Alexander et al. said that this is the test. There are two sorts of benefits to youth enrollment: those that benefit the oppressors and those that benefit the select. Selecting young is a key benefit for

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<sup>13</sup> Salifu, U., Cachalia, R.C. and Ndung'u, I., 2016. The dynamics of youth radicalisation in Africa-reviewing the current evidence. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, 2016(296), pp.1-32.

groups investigated because it allows aggressor cells to maintain their locations, which is crucial for their continued existence. The use of young individuals is likely to help certain groups avoid detection by security forces, allowing them to carry out psychological terrorist attacks more effectively. Individual, societal, and government support needs that may not currently be provided by their social or family groups are addressed by the group.

### **2.3. Youth Radicalization in the Greater Horn of Africa (HoA)**

All of the above countries make up the Greater Horn of Africa (HoA), which is a region of Africa that stretches from Somalia to Ethiopia. Radicalization is becoming more and more prevalent in this area. Al-Shabaab, a Somali-based al-Qaeda affiliate, and the ongoing international fight against psychological oppression have fueled the relationship. Al-shabaab has developed in Somalia for a variety of reasons, including the lack of a functioning government since President Mohamed Siyad Barre's defeat in 1991. Somalia's savage extremism fills in the gaps created by regional pressures, slows the flow of financial resources, and feeds regional and global instability.<sup>14</sup>.

Global maritime vehicle traffic passes via the Greater HoA area, which has global significance. This is a place where many cultures, religions, and ethnicities come together to form a distinct neighborhood. Harmony, strength, and development might be threatened by the rise of teenage radicalization and ruthless fanaticism in the HoA. Transnational fear mongers and other violent meetings are a problem in the area, which contributes to the radicalization of young people. There are a number of continuing difficulties that worsen these security challenges. These include issues such as underdevelopment and a weak government, as well as significant unemployment. The teenager may be more vulnerable to the bogus promises of a better life and the financial incentives presented by fear-mongering organisations because of these issues..

According to Silber and Bhatt, this region has been heavily impacted by deadly cross-line collective conflicts that are often triggered by asset shortages due of rapid population growth and porous borders. Military and other abusive reactions to security threats, such as unlawful

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<sup>14</sup> Weine, S., Horgan, J., Robertson, C., Loue, S., Mohamed, A. and Noor, S., 2009. Community and family approaches to combating the radicalization and recruitment of Somali-American youth and young adults: A psychosocial perspective. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 2(3), pp.181-200

intimidation, can delegitimize neighborhood experts and sabotage efforts to prevent and resist harsh fanaticism via local area commitment. In addition, the area's underdevelopment and delicacy have led to a variety of young grievances that foster an atmosphere of empowerment for psychological oppressor meetings to propagate their message and recruit support.

Attributing this to a lack of effective government administrations in the area, Ali sees psychological oppressor groups profiting from financial problems, administration deficiencies, terrible battles, and the absence of successful government administrations. These key "push" elements, along with "pull" ones such as appealing enrollment experts, engaging doctrines, and monetary and social motivators, have fueled young radicalization into harsh fanaticism across the Greater HoA and adjacent countries.

Greater HoA governments and its provincial and worldwide allies have been more focused on measures aimed at limiting the growth of juvenile fanaticism in the region. These measures include military harmony-keeping exercises, a crackdown on alleged psychological oppressors and their followers, and ethnic and strict profiling. These techniques are likely to increase the risk of unlawful intimidation in the Greater HoA because of the power and segregation they represent.

Enlisting young people in bloody conflict is by no means a new phenomenon in the Eastern African region in general. During the mid-1990s, the National Islamic Front (NIF) Sudanese legislature was condemned for encouraging young people to join the NIF for the purpose of spreading nasty extremism, as Pirio documents. In addition, the NIF was accused of collaborating with al-Qaeda to overthrow the legislatures of its neighbors in order to establish an Islamist state as a goal in itself. Radical Islam's main focus in Eritrea is the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ). The EIJ is pushing for the establishment of an Islamic state in Eritrea and has focused on recruiting new recruits among the country's young people. This organization is now part of the umbrella group known as the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA), which opposes the Eritrean government.

Because of its strategic location, its close proximity to Somalia, its role in the fight against illegal activities, and its proximity to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel, Kenya is always on the move. Fear-based oppression of the country has been referred to in a variety of ways. It is widely agreed that a weak security and criminal justice framework deters local networks from participating in efforts to address the root causes of juvenile radicalization in the country.



Considerations show that, despite the fact that most of the scare exercises take place in Somalia, some of the perpetrators are from Kenya. In Eastleigh in Nairobi and the Kenya-Somali border, ethnic Somalis predominate, which is where the spotters focus.<sup>15</sup>.

## **2.4. Causes of Violent Extremism**

### **2.4.1. Political Leadership and Ideology and Violent Extremism**

Hannah Arendt takes a different approach to the question of actual power and cruelty in her debate about what political administration implies for violent fanaticism. she wants the state to have a position, power and force that is based on its authenticity because it cultivates collective activity among its inhabitants. In order to achieve resident consistency by non-coercive force, a state's viciousness, however justified, suggests that the state's authenticity be enough. Disinterested sections of the public may rise up in opposition to this.

Ted Gurr's, 1970 thesis asserts that fanaticism and power are inseparable, and this argument resonates with it. He defines psychological warfare as a tactic used by the weak to intimidate the strong and the strong to frighten the weak. As a technique against the state, psychological oppression reveals a lack of capacity to resist the state at a higher degree of viciousness, such as guerilla or direct combat. When a particular state resorts to methods of terror against its own citizens, it sabotages the power and authenticity of its common and criminal cycles or its melting away capacity to grant a request without resorting to violence. The state's propagation of brutal radicalism indicates the lack of a true political perspective. When sub-state entertainers embrace political fear for the express, that is to uncover political resistance against the state, they too express the insufficiency of the state's force and disappointment with the unwieldy idea of real power, force, and pressure. "

However, Gurr believes that psychological oppression is a tactic. Psychological warfare, which is nasty dissent, may be another level of dissent than a call for provided savagery below guerrilla and open conflict, to highlight the state's and its citizens' frailty and expose a group's or

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<sup>15</sup> Kfir, I., 2017. Al-Shabaab, Social Identity Group, Human (In) Security, and Counterterrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(9), pp.772-789.

person's new or continued opposition to the state. Rough radicalism without power acquires the personality of a process in excess of a strategy, is more elusive, and needs a lower level of affiliation and authority than more refined radicalism. Furthermore, it is claimed that philosophical beliefs might lead to criminal intimidation. Another topic that has come up recently in modern discussions on unlawful intimidation is the role of the majority rule system in psychological warfare. An elected government should engage citizens and provide them the opportunity to express their concerns via political means, thereby creating a circle where criminal intimidation does not have a foothold. Unless the harmed group is adequately handled, the infringement on the principles of popular governance and constitutionalism has occurred.

Honestly, this may not be the case. It would be possible for Wilkinson's assertion that political savagery is ethically reasonable in a vote-based system to be substantiated in two ways: first, when the minority is denied or made an away by the discretionary move of the public authority or its organizations; and second, when one minority is assaulted by another minority and does not receive satisfactory security from the state. He argues that they are not constrained by politics since the state has not granted them any rights.<sup>16</sup>

In the context of these examples, one may argue that the problem is not the lack of a proper implementation of popularity-based objectives, but rather the lack of a vote-based system. Despite this, a characteristic of popular regimes is their openness. However, other scholars believe that the framework's receptiveness is a key flaw and hence a source of psychological tyranny. But Keet argues that receptivity alone cannot be a reason for using psychological warfare as a tool; it may facilitate fear-based oppressors and work with exposure in the general lack of control, but it is not the 'alter of outlook' to use psychological warfare. The purported terror of the majority, disguised as the tyranny of numbers, may be the reason why the minority is addressed and allowed to express their problems, but this cannot be safely transformed into desired ways because there are not enough votes to approve the desired legislation

A manipulator's objective choice relies heavily on philosophy, which provides them with a fundamental way of thinking in action and a prism through which they may see events and the

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<sup>16</sup> Lowen, M. (2014, January 29). Kenya Al-Shabab Terror Recruits 'In It for The Money'. Retrieved April 7, 2014, from BBC News Africa: <http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-25934109>

actions of others. The dread-based oppressors insightfully based acceptable framework sees such persons and foundations as certified targets that the mental attackers feel supported in assaulting. Similarly, theory permits dread-based oppressors to excuse their violence by dislodging the commitment onto either their setbacks or other performers, whom they think accountable for the scenario that the mental attackers assure prompted them to get cruel. Even though it's not the only aspect that determines whether a possible aim is attacked, theory provides a fundamental scope of certifiable targets and a tactic through which mental oppressors attempt to legitimate assaults, both to others and themselves.

Attacks by savage fanatics are often referred to be 'aimless.' Fear mongers seem to be benefiting from the arbitrary punishment of harm as well as the organized exposing of cruelty, which has nothing to do with who or what is being injured. But in the long run, attacks by non-state psychological oppressor gangs are almost never pre-planned. The psychological militants' ideology is crucial to this interaction because it not only provides the underlying dynamic for the fear-based oppressors' operations, but also it establishes the Moral system within which they operate. This interaction dictates the target. Since it has been linked to psychological subjugation for so long, its Purpose has been obscured by a desire to doom certain people. Even if the workouts themselves aren't cruel, they are labeled as such by political opponents. A more accurate description of what we mean when we say "illegal intimidation" is that it describes a particular way violence is used to compel a person or group of people to comply in a way the aggressor desires.

Despite the fact that the physical attacks are intended to achieve a certain aim, they are not truly focused on the psychological objective or targets, despite this. It's also important to keep in mind that certain attacks may not be intended to evoke a negative emotion like fear in the target's mind, but rather to elicit a good one. Fear-based oppressors' supporters could, for example, be the primary mental purpose of a few attacks, such as the death of an unpopular person, such as a savage beating or a beating that leaves a person unconscious. Legal intimidation is defined here in terms of a group's attempt to persuade at least one mental focus to behave in a way that the psychological oppressors want by use of politically-motivated and secretly organized cruelty.

There are several aspects that impact the decision of vicious radicals. For fear-based oppressors, political goals are achieved through arranging the gathering's resources, examples of attacks, and

other activities - potentially including political activities - into a successful method. Psychological oppressors, if they are operating rationally, will choose to attack those targets that provide the most benefits to their motivations if they have a choice of targets. An unlawful intimidation group's technique will, in a perfect world, comprise attacks that are more likely to result in the desired reaction by the mental aim, as shown in the model of intimidation shown above. Target selection is also determined by factors such as the group's resources, public reaction, and security environment in which the fear mongers operate. Although philosophical considerations are crucial, there is no one rationale that can adequately explain the target determination of fear-based oppressors.

#### **2.4.2. Poverty and Violent Extremism**

The financial inspiration driving wrongdoing is basically the apportionment of another person's property. Another inspiration is the quest for criminal behavior even at the danger of being gotten and rebuffed. In this manner, criminal wrongdoers are probably going to be found among the individuals who have moderately more to acquire from these exercises and generally little to lose in the event that they are gotten.<sup>17</sup> People, for example, these apparently have a place with the neediest gatherings in the public eye, their number being more noteworthy and their inspiration being more grounded the more inconsistent the dispersion of assets in the public eye. Experimental proof throughout the long term upholds this contention. In a 1980 investigation of detained Islamic aggressors in Egypt, social researcher Saad Eddin Ibrahim tracked down that the regular part is from the center or lower working class, with high accomplishment and inspiration, upwardly versatile, with science or designing instruction.<sup>18</sup> During the 1980s a few nations that accomplished extraordinary financial development encountered a flood in aggressor Islam simultaneously. In Kenya, John Nene, a BBC journalist, met with an Al Shabaab combatant and documented the encounter. Many young Kenyans are flocking to the terror group not because they believe in jihad or Islam but because they want money and a promise that their next meal will be provided.

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<sup>17</sup> Agubuzu, L. (2004). Regional Economic integration a development paradigm for Africa, in Adebayo Adedeji (ed) African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st C. London, Zed books.

<sup>17</sup> Axel, D., Martin, G., & Cars, S. H. (2007). Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Zurich: Swiss Economic Institute.

<sup>18</sup> Hoffman, B (2006). Inside terrorism (2nd Edition) by Columbia University Press New York.USA pp 40-46.

### 2.4.3. Religion and Violent Extremism

If one's ideas and inspirations have a transcending stringent nature or influence, then religion has contributed to psychological tyranny. Psychological warfare, according to Mark Juergensmeyer, is based on actions that terrify the audience, rather than on the group that presents the show; this is because the importance of the act is given to the audience, not to the group that presents the performance (Religious Terrorism). Researchers have long argued that religion does not have a role in the creation of mental oppressors. Is religious belief a component in the unstable mix of administrative concerns, culture and mental science that pushes fans to target irreparable persons and take their own lives? Ariel Glucklich, a specialist on religion and violence, believes that the finest fantasy about religion and violence is that religion displays contempt. Savagery stems from a want for love and a willingness to take the necessary means to get it, which he refers to as the Prozac effect. According to him, a few faiths do really provoke derision, but the roots of severe viciousness are often concealed somewhere in the good aspects of religion, as he points out. People are vulnerable to religious pioneers who preach a degraded form of religion when societal orders break down, making them vulnerable to psychological warfare.

There exist a large number that structure the 'strict' part of the radical belief system. This paper means that western human progress and the thought of innovation and majority rules system are viewed as ethically side-lined; consequently, just Islamism has the qualities needed for simply an and the great universe<sup>19</sup>. Despite what might be expected, Islam people group have turned sour, helpless against Western interruption, and become ethically bad since Muslims have coordinated away from their convictions. It is expressed that an equitable universe must be sure by returning to 'genuine Islamism.' The associations and gatherings that utilization these 'strict' points of view without treating them appropriately are seeking to get their political destinations and points in an alternate conviction technique.

The absence of accomplishment from the past political stance container Arabism, communism, Marxism, and what is named as the bad idea of radicalism have come about to a clearly shift in religion and explicitly strict imagery of imparting past verifiable accomplishments of the Islamic

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<sup>19</sup> Isam, E. (2006). *Karitat Iktrak El-Ikwan Wa-El-Irhabieen Lil El-Taleem El-Masry [How the Terrorist's Brothers Invaded the Egyptian Educational System]*. Cairo, Egypt: Rose-El- Yossef.

world which take a critical float from the primary data of Muslim and its principle fundamentals<sup>20</sup>. The gatherings and political associations have used recollections and 'religion,' basing on networks' ethical wanderer by taking advantage of socially isolated individuals' difficulties as a merging point to make fascination, inspiration, and get responsibilities from plausible gatherings.

Khan and Azam<sup>21</sup> have expressed those strict practices have been utilized as an instrument by radicals to draw adherents into an assailant comprehension of the religion in the investigation. Generally, strictly vicious occasions and practices can be found to 'legitimize' future activity. The analysts further affirm that religion can be used to give the personal matters of political pioneers and individuals who are unsteady intellectually or potentially crazy. Controlled 'strict' convictions play a significant capacity in radicalizing adolescents among Islam social orders, enrollment, teaching to fear monger belief systems, and in this manner inquisitive to request that they perform vicious fanaticism activities. The rough fanatics' convictions are not another issue or are it fundamentally to Muslims that grew consistently around the second 50% of the 19thC, explicitly among the Muslims who have dominated in the current world.

## **2.5. Regional Trends and Radicalization in the Horn of Africa**

Investigations on a public premise uncovered various territorial shared traits and patterns. Financial minimization of huge portions of public populaces can be seen in practically the entirety of the Greater Horn nations studied.<sup>22</sup> A mix of rising pay imbalance, high joblessness, and restricted market variety and framework, just as uncommon segment shifts, long haul evacuee emergencies, and natural corruption, is in any event mostly to fault. Notwithstanding the moderating variables, neglected assumptions and sensations of relative hardship at last add to expanded pressures between various networks and among networks and their administrations. The combination of monetary increases inside political elites and their voting demographics and the

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<sup>20</sup> Ismail, O., 2013. Radicalisation and violent extremism in West Africa: implications for African and international security. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 13(2), pp.209-230.

<sup>21</sup> Barry Buzan, *Security, A new framework for Analysis*, Lynne, Rienner Publishers, London, 1998

<sup>22</sup> Carson, J. (2005). "Kenya." *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.

intrinsic limits in financial portability for those external the support network further propagate these conditions.<sup>23</sup>

Fundamental defilement, patrimonial and nepotism administration lie at the core of a large number of the financial as well as political drivers of fanatic savagery in the area. Debasement not just subverts public monetary advancement through the generous robbery or redirection of public incomes, however it likewise addresses, from one viewpoint, the brutality, separation, and shamefulness experienced by a huge number of individuals across the locale consistently and, on the other, the exemption and uneven force of the political and state first class. In certain specific circumstances, endemic defilement goes connected at the hip with both by law and true shortenings of common and political rights<sup>24</sup>. Where source for city and political activism are restricted or unavailable, social orders' strains discover articulation in different structures, bringing about peaceful and rough results. As confirmed by the moderately humble degrees of fear-based oppressor brutality experienced in the locale when contrasted with different types of (political) viciousness, conditions, for example, sociopolitical underestimation and disappointment, restricted monetary portability and relative hardship, foundational institutional debasement, and limited roads of political or institutional change are lacking to create fierce fanaticism at the level of individuals.

Commitment in vicious conduct is molded by a blend of individual conditions, relational connections, perspectives, and tendencies, just as additional general political social, and monetary variables and the significant presence of, openness to, and fondness with brutal fanaticism and rough radical gatherings<sup>25</sup>. Some might be attracted to the allure of radical accounts that uphold brutality as a feasible strategy to accomplish social and political objectives. For the less philosophically slanted, the social, monetary, as well as material actuations offered by vicious fanatic associations are so a lot if not more a factor in enrolling devotees. Albeit beginning investigations have started to arise on singular cycles of radicalization and enlistment into

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<sup>23</sup> Rye Olsen, G., 2018. Transatlantic cooperation on terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Africa: The Franco-American axis. *European Security*, 27(1), pp.41-57.

<sup>24</sup> Meinema, E., 2021. Countering 'Islamic 'violent extremism? The implementation of programs to prevent radicalization by Muslim-led civil society organizations in Malindi, Kenya. *Religion*, 51(2), pp.259-279.

<sup>25</sup> Carson, J. (2005). "Kenya." *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.

territorial aggressor gatherings, most quiet in Kenya, further exploration is expected to comprehend the intricate interaction of elements to all the more likely distinguish possible wellsprings of strength.<sup>26</sup>

### **2.5.1. Radicalization in Ethiopia**

In spite of the fact that Ethiopia has been subjected to political brutality and attacks by domestic tough radical groups, it has yet to experience a successful attack from an internationally recognized fear monger group. To administrate the country, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has implemented an ethnic federalism system since 1991, with the Tigray region in the north taking the lead. Ethiopia has had a period of rapid economic growth, which has resulted in significant reductions in poverty. However, since gains provide the perception of being more unified within the decision-making global class, tensions have grown. There are many who believe that ethno federalism has created a systematized arrangement of asset support that has allowed for a distinct but remarkable intermixing of state and group institutions.<sup>27</sup> Restrictions on political office and a particularly restrictive common-society space have created a dearth of elected voices and led to feelings of dissatisfaction. As the government has been more involved in increasingly stringent tasks, the nation has seen a rise in tensions. A key role in the West's counterterrorism strategy ensures that Ethiopia will continue to play a vital role, but security responses must be complemented by efforts to strengthen local area flexibility that promote the norms of reasonable and fair governance and respect for fundamental freedoms.

### **2.5.2. Radicalization in Kenya**

The Kenyan city, Nairobi, is home to a flourishing neighborhood regular society, UN associations, and international undertakings, making it one of the most important economic hubs in Africa. The nation has become weak against violence and relentless enthusiasm, as well as mental maltreatment, due to a facade of cosmopolitanism that conceals underlying political, social, and financial concerns. There has been an increase in al-Shabaab and its partners' violent terror attacks

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<sup>26</sup> Avis, W., 2016. The role of online/social media in countering violent extremism in East Africa. *Helpdesk Report*.

<sup>27</sup> Chome, J.N., 2020. *Violent Non-State Actors and National Security in The Horn of Africa: The Kenyan Experience, 2012-2018* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).



in Kenya since Kenya joined Somalia in October 2012, up to and after that time. When it comes to administrative concerns in Kenya, interethnic tensions have often flared up around the time of the country's annual elections.

The tradition of ethnic and territorial separation keeps on being reflected in inconsistencies in admittance to training, occupations, medical care, water that is clean, power, and workable streets and therapy by nearby police and equity authorities. Debasement and institutional corruption, exceptional underlying imbalance, and a developing youth populace with restricted monetary freedom, joined with the impacts of weakness, are among the fixings in Kenya that make conditions helpful for vicious radicalism. An expanding number of common society entertainers center around addressing the components helpful for savage radicalism just as CVE-explicit intercessions, and the public authority is going to understand a public CVE technique that has been created in collaboration with nongovernmental entertainers<sup>28</sup>. In the interim, Kenya's counterterrorism endeavors have been dependent upon inescapable analysis for their disproportionality and asserted denials of basic freedoms. The country's execution of the new constitution has guaranteed much that is required for change; however, Kenyan government has a lengthy, turbulent experience ahead in tending to the socio-political, financial, and economic differences as well as intercommunal clashes that drive savagery and brutal fanaticism.

1998 were an early indicator of the threat of extremism in post-autonomy East Africa. In spite of the assertions of Kenyan and Tanzanian political leaders that their countries had merely been used as a point of reference for the United States and its tendencies, it was later discovered that both strangers and locals were involved in the attacks. As public and territorial fanaticism grows, harsh radicalism loses its entirely foreign aspect. On November 28, 2002, two self-destruction planes targeted the Israeli-claimed Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, highlighting the success of al-Kenyan Qaeda's branch. On the contrary, unlike the 1998 attack on the US embassy in Nairobi, in which Kenyan citizens were all involved save for Abu Talha al-Sudani, a Sudanese citizen.

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<sup>28</sup> Meinema, E., 2021. Countering 'Islamic 'violent extremism? The implementation of programs to prevent radicalization by Muslim-led civil society organizations in Malindi, Kenya. *Religion*, 51(2), pp.259-279.

The use of social and financial grievances by Al-Shabaab to entice Kenya's young to join their ranks is clear evidence that the terrorist group has deliberately defined Kenya's strict and ethnic demarcation points (Rakodi, 2000). In 2006, the majority of Kenyan young radicalization, enrollment, and dealing for the local army and al-Shabaab fighting in Somalia was reported by the general population (Rabasa, 2009). In Nairobi and Mombasa, two specific locations were identified as the focus of these activities. These radicalization exercises grew in popularity over time throughout the nation.<sup>29</sup>

For a long time, Kenya's official authority saw the reports as nothing more than propagandistic and scare-mongering, and they were dismissed as such. Claims of such enrolment sparked outrage throughout the country. Nonetheless, as indicated by Rabasa, four years after the fact, the public authority recognized the way that adolescent were really being enrolled for psychological militant exercises. As a matter of fact, Kenyan citizens have been directly linked to al-Shabaab recruitment efforts. Initially, after being radicalized, these individuals would flee the United States and fight in Somalia. As time went on, the trend of using individuals who had been personally marginalized, radicalized, and conscripted to attack their own dirt altered.

On September 21, 2013, 67 innocent bystanders were gunned down in Nairobi's Westgate Mall. Shooters stormed the Garissa University College, Kenya, on April 2, 2015, killing 149 people and injuring 79 others. Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, was responsible for both attacks. As a result of the Westgate massacre, a Norwegian citizen of Somali descent was one of the perpetrators. One of the four gunmen in the Garissa attack was a Kenyan national who was characterized as a high-flying, grade-An understudy with a bright legal career ahead. The two males were both in their early twenties at the time<sup>30</sup>.

### **2.5.3. Radicalization in Somalia**

Governmental issues, command over state foundations, and admittance to public products keep on being challenged based on tribe lines, and inter-clan contest and doubt have solidified throughout over twenty years of contention. Bad and restricted in limit, the early Federal Government of

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<sup>29</sup> Mesfin, B., 2011. The Horn of Africa security complex. *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*, p.1.

<sup>30</sup> Stephen J., "The Terrorist Threat in Africa," in, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.83, No. (2005), pp. 75-86

Somalia presently can't seem to show its capacity to successfully oversee or give security and fundamental administrations to the citizens of Somali under its ward. To economically subvert the drivers of fierce radicalism, Somalis themselves should accomplish a comprehensive settlement of political issues as well as building up the reason for an interaction that is troublesome and long leading to social compromise, monetary turn of events, and participatory administration<sup>31</sup>.

#### **2.5.4. Radicalization in South Sudan**

Since 2011 after the accomplishments of freedom, South Sudan has fallen into an extended common conflict with critical philanthropic and improvement outcomes. The continuous clash addresses profound established ethnic strains and force battles that were not enough settled in the hurry to build up a bound together state after autonomy. The government that is exclusively driven by the Dinka has been blamed for rampant nepotism, tribalism, defilement, as well as the minimization of other ethnicities from public political and monetary stages and assets. With a thriving economy primarily dependent on the oil business, private area development is restricted while very high rates of joblessness among young people specifically<sup>32</sup>.

South Sudan is additionally tested by a wealth of inside uprooted people and helpless proficiency and numeracy rates, just as the expansion of little arms, which confounds endeavors to move from restricted local armies to a bound together public armed force. In spite of the fact that there is no proof in South Sudan of savage fanaticism fundamentally, states of delicacy may give freedoms to brutal radical gatherings to work or accumulate backing and enlists<sup>33</sup>. Political dealings and internecine savagery at present rule the scene, however state-building endeavors should be sought after at the same time with harmony building drives while guarding against standardized frameworks of underestimation that can expand weakness to brutality and radical philosophies.

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<sup>31</sup> Peter Tase, "Illegal intimidation, War and Conflict, an examination into the Horn of Africa," *Academicus - International Scientific Journal*, 2012.

<sup>32</sup> Peter Tase, "Illegal intimidation, War and Conflict, an investigation into the Horn of Africa," *Academicus - International Scientific Journal*, 2012.

<sup>33</sup> Sandler, T. (1992). *Aggregate Action: Theory and Applications*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Michigan. pp 105-11

### **2.5.5. Radicalization in Tanzania**

Low levels of violence and generally peaceful vote-based power shifts have been the norm in Tanzania since it gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1963. Public pressure has grown as a result of concealed irregularities and wage discrepancies in the provincial areas, where poverty rates are far greater than in the metropolis, Dar es Salaam. Zanzibar's Muslim-populated archipelago of Zanzibar has also been a source of tension because of its prolonged self-administration. Complaints over financial and political underestimate, including the recent nullification of Zanzibar judgements, have been mixed together with stringent indications on occasion despite verifiably sure interfaith ties

Interfaith relations may likewise be progressively stressed notwithstanding more bigoted mentalities many partner with traditionalist Islam strands presented from the Gulf of Persia. Furthermore, The Republic Tanzania and explicitly Zanzibar battle with the commonness of medication pirating rings that may give a section highlight brutal fanatic associations trying to select among irritated youth populaces<sup>34</sup>. Tanzania has profited with an intense local area policing drive that reinforced connections between the public authority and networks. The public authority has demonstrated it is inspecting its public counterterrorism technique and is hoping to make a CVE activity plan. Races give an indispensable political outlet to bring down pressures, yet the administration of that interaction will probably assume a vital part in the development of vicious radicalism in Tanzania.

### **2.6. Identification of Radicalization Factors**

Assembling a counterweight to extremism at the community level is the most effective way to combat radicalization and fanaticism. In most cases, radicalization occurs in free informal networks of family, friends, and companions. Potential enlistees who are seeking for a career and a personality at the same time as looking for endorsement and approval are the most vulnerable to enlistment. Radicalization and unlawful intimidation in the country has been exacerbated by the

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<sup>34</sup> Mogire, E., Agade, K.M. (2011). Counterterrorism in Kenya. *Diary of contemporary African investigations* 29(4).473-49.

following factors: underlying and institutional components, grievances, an unfamiliar and military-like attitude, as well as the jihadist mindset.

It is also understood that radicalization is an individual process, and that fighting it requires methods that are tailored to the specific needs of each person. Adolescents' neighbors, teachers, mentors, guides, and strict pioneers all play important roles in identifying unique activities or habits in the community. When it comes to identifying and preventing radicalization, groups who operate at the grassroots level are the most equipped to do so

Youth in the East Africa Region are unable to access business, education, housing, health care, and other requirements. Some feel frustrated with their lack of socially accepted grownup status and strive for approbation via joining brutal radical groups, which offer them an adult-like status through responsibility, reason, and usually monetary compensation. This is a common trend among young people. Mogire and Agade believe that in Kenya, political leaders who are immune from the law have a negative effect on the confidence of young people in their authorized organizations. The criminal equity framework may be to blame for this improvement, since it seems to use a seemingly discriminatory technique. There is a strong likelihood that young people will be punished severely for seemingly minor transgressions, such as not having National recognized proof cards or dallying about.

Legislators often play on the frustrations of young people in order to create positive changes in their life. Although they are abandoned after races, they leave people to assume that remedies to their difficulties must be handled outside of regular government issues, maybe via cruel fanaticism. Young Kenyans, particularly those in the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi, experience uneven or contradictory use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). Disappointment and disdain seem to be irritated by police actions for the sake of fighting radicalization.

To find meaning and purpose in their life, young people often search for experiences that will provide them the ability to separate themselves from the limelight and seek out venues that allow them to do so. Young people in Eastleigh face the same garish demand of extreme Islamic religious systems that exploit their social isolation, sudden concentration on genuine wellbeing, and limited contact with family. As a result, the young people are compelled to look for significance and build viewpoints that satisfy their longings for self-realization and fulfillment.

## 2.7. Countering Radicalization

Countering radicalization has been a vital viewpoint in the battle against radicalization and savage fanaticism. Different accounts and counter-stories have been progressed on the issues encompassing savage radicalism which may mean fear related exercises. The resulting dread assaults on western and non-western states perceived the need to apply option in contrast to abusive procedures of countering radicalization just as fear exercises. Counter stories that influence the manner in which the weak networks see radicalization and psychological oppression is an angle that can be examined taking into account minding the disappointment and effective methodologies in countering vicious fanaticism.

A portion of the perspectives proposed incorporate the messages, courier, the crowd, the source and the channel which may decide the accomplishment of the mission. They are the getting sorted out structure that illuminate strategy plans and the reference for how occasions are to be contended and portrayed.<sup>35</sup> Also, as in any essential correspondence made arrangements for an intended interest group, fanatics tailor their accounts to suit the objective populace just as utilize correspondence channels that suit and reverberate with the intended interest group. This is educated by crowd research did to empower appropriate division and greatest effect of the stories to their crowd.<sup>36</sup>

Worldwide reaction to countering the psychological militant philosophies accounts has been feeble. This is clear as the endeavors put in countering savage radicalism have borne little effect if any on the battle against illegal intimidation and fierce fanaticism. He calls attention to four recognizable columns in countering illegal intimidation which incorporate; counter psychological oppression knowledge, counter illegal intimidation activities, counter illegal intimidation examinations and fear based oppressor restoration and local area commitment psychological

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<sup>35</sup> Woodhams, K. M. (2016). Associations among networks: forestalling radicalization and vicious fanaticism through interpersonal organization examination in the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) system. Maritime Postgraduate School Monterey United States.

<sup>36</sup> Mirahmadi, H. (2016). Building versatility against savage radicalism: A people group based methodology. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 668(1), 129-14.

oppression techniques<sup>37</sup>. The profiles based on cliché suppositions dependent on religion, race, nationality, sex or financial status are biased as well as inadequate. As such accordingly, cliché approaches and methodologies should be changed to guarantee that the attention is on countering brutal radicalism and the stories in that for viability to be accomplished.

Battling psychological warfare through tending to radicalization and fierce fanaticism has become an omnipresent element of public systems, bringing about the development of numerous strategies and practices coordinated toward countering and forestalling vicious fanaticism<sup>38</sup>. These delicate force approaches focus on intercession before viciousness happens, and have brought about another jargon: forestalling brutal fanaticism, countering savage radicalism, and forestalling radicalization to rough fanaticism. Nonetheless, despite the fact that these words are commonly used in opposition, there is a considerable subgroup of work on fanaticism that focuses on upstream cautious actions toward that place themselves firmly outside a security-driven system

In the previous decade, the focal point of global and public methodologies for countering psychological warfare has moved from utilizing hard safety efforts to battle fierce fanaticism and illegal intimidation to a more multi-sectoral and improvement approach. At first, the advancement talk credited the underlying drivers of VE basically to neediness and absence of training, and numerous giver nations called for expanded guide and instructive help as a method for finishing illegal intimidation<sup>39</sup>. However, a few specialists discovered the connection questionable. Kruger and Malečková for instance, noticed that any association between destitution, instruction and psychological warfare is circuitous, confounded and likely feeble. They additionally noticed that drawing an association among destitution and illegal intimidation, on the off chance that it's anything but supported, could be possibly risky.

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<sup>37</sup> Nozell, M., and Hayward, S. (2014). Strict pioneers countering radical viciousness: How strategy changes can help. US Institute for Peace, 31.

<sup>38</sup> Gielen, A. J. (2019). Countering rough radicalism: a pragmatist survey for evaluating what works, for whom, in what conditions, and how? *Psychological warfare and political savagery*, 31(6), 1149-1167.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid*

Radicalization and mental mistreatment are, for the most part, repudiations of the ubiquity based potential gains of strength, respect, joining and assortment that help made by the relationship for security and co-action.<sup>40</sup> There is sweeping worldwide arrangement that the dynamic counter-mental fighting undertakings embraced in the past numerous years have been inadequate in undercutting the appeal of extremist ways of thinking and thwarting the spread of savage zeal. Governments have the obligation to ensure security and respect for normal freedoms, similarly as keep up rule of peace and law and execute approaches that counter isolation, underestimation and dismissal. These are seen as huge fragments of any procedure to counter the harsh extremist peril.

Coincidentally, a couple of grumblings mishandled by horrible fan get-togethers lie past managerial reach. Basic culture performers are consistently better situated, more acceptable, and more capable and experienced in working with express social occasions to help perceive and address the protests that make individuals all the more unprotected against merciless devotion. Youth, women, and neighborhood, including severe pioneers, are key normal society performers who can give huge and suffering responsibilities to preventing and countering unpleasant radicalism.<sup>41</sup> Key constructions and procedure reports logically call for more focus on, and support for, these specific performers. Youth and women, explicitly, are seen as experts of social change and as inestimable associates in tries in countering horrendous devotion attempts.

Coincidentally, a couple of objections abused by savage devotee get-togethers lie past regulatory reach. Regular society performers are as often as possible better situated, more reasonable, and more capable and experienced in working with express get-togethers to help recognize and address the objections that make individuals all the more exposed against awful radicalism. Youth, women, and neighborhood, including exacting pioneers, are key basic culture performers who can give successful and suffering responsibilities to thwarting and countering furious zeal. Key constructions and technique reports dynamically call for more focus on, and support for, these

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<sup>40</sup> Allan, H., Glazzard, A., Jespersen, S. T., and Sneha Reddy Winterbotham, E. (2015). Drivers of savage fanaticism: Hypotheses and writing audit

<sup>41</sup> Joined Nations (2008), United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Activities of the United Nations System in Implementing the Strategy, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/62/998, Annex. 7 Jul.



specific performers.<sup>42</sup> Youth and women, explicitly, are seen as experts of social change and as critical accessories in attempts in countering furious radicalism tries.

The International Movement Association plays a critical role in the Horn of Africa's effort to fight psychological warfare. A collaborative effort by the organization and the governments in the region is preparing the communities for the migration focused on security problems. Expanding the local boundaries on biometric screening at line check points, as well as assisting pastoral organizations in co-organizing on fitting the lawful and varied elements of counter-illegal intimidation efforts in the region, are the main goals of this initiative. The screening has been a great help in determining what is coming in via the line focus. However, the sparsely populated, deserted, and unmonitored areas are excellent for fear-mongers and runners alike.

Additionally, a few nations have been accused of obstructing efforts to restrict weapons selling, which aids the advancement of fear-based oppressive strategies. For example, the Islamic Courts Union and the Somalia transitional government have both been accused of receiving military assistance from countries and organizations including as Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. In addition, arms-exchanging networks based in Yemen have also delivered large quantities of weapons to numerous factions in Somalia, as well as to the organization in Puntland.

Africa's African Union plays a key role especially in the areas of peacekeeping and conflict prevention as well as emergency response. As a result of the Horn of Africa's ongoing territorial tensions and confrontations, the three pillars of the African Union commitment to counterterrorism are important. In order to combat psychological warfare, this is not a broad methodology based on a system of agreements. ACSRT was established in 2004 as an African Center for the Study and Analysis of Terrorisms (ACSRT). It is the responsibility of the African Center for the research and investigation of Terrorisms to ensure that counterterrorism capabilities and engagement among African Union member states are improved..

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<sup>42</sup> U S Department of State (1996). Examples of Global Terrorism 1996. By the US branch of state. Washington D.C. U.S.A, pp 24.

Individual states are instructed about the dangers of psychological warfare in Africa, given limit-building assistance to improve public and local abilities, made a component for all part states to get to master direction, gathered a data set to work with the sharing of insight and other illegal intimidation related data, fit and normalize homegrown legitimate structures with the African Union individuals states and worldwide counterterrorism systems, and disseminated council information. Terrorism Center of Africa envisions a well-coordinated governmental and local finance network.. However, the recognition of its complete multi-dimensional order has been limited by monetary imperatives, among other things, such as the lack of full involvement by individual states..

For non-administrative organizations and the general public, United Nations Strategy gives them the ability to collaborate with as appropriate on the best method to implement the Strategy. In the end, nations are left with the task of determining the role of common social organizations. Common society has a particularly important role to play. An important role is played by NGOs and other common-society organizations in activism and campaigning; training; research; supervision; assistance and specialty co-ops; and perhaps most importantly, driving neighborhood activities on the ground. The UN Strategy requires well-known assistance, which is worked with the support and involvement of the common community in East Africa. It is being implemented by the United Nations. It has long been the case that well-functioning, responsive, and popular governments were built on the foundation of energetic shared social systems. Society's common connections allow undervalued and weak groups a voice and provide a good channel for shifting grievances.

Accomplished non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a critical role in making sure that counterterrorism estimates take into account basic liberties and law and order; monitoring activities of the military and other security agencies; setting rules, leading investigations into alleged manhandles; investigating counterterrorism enactment and creating awareness of unlawful practices and other common freedoms and Strategy-related issues. Many common-sense organizations in East Africa deal with Strategy-related concerns such peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, fundamental freedoms observance, and other challenges whose work is primarily tied to Strategy implementation.

The sub district's governments may use reprisals against neighborhood common society gatherings if they draw attention to issues of psychological oppression and counterterrorism, even though the general public plays an important role in implementing this strategy. For this reason, there are increasing difficulties in getting the general public to take a more active role in these issues in the sub district. As a result, focusing on counter-psychological warfare risks undermining the support and legitimacy of neighborhood gatherings, and it may be more productive to support common society's commitment to issues like wrongdoing anticipation, great administration, or harmony and security, rather than counter-terrorism. Governments also vary widely in the working space they grant to common society organizations, with the ability for these groups to operate in many countries in the sub-district being explained in detail.

In most cases, a person's ability to participate in society is limited by their access to information and the ability to form relationships. The United Nations plays a role in achieving and raising best practices associated with these essential criteria in order to develop further respectful society commitment. The fear that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may serve as a conduit for the funding of violent Islamist extremists has prompted a closer look of the activities of Islamic organizations in the sub-district. As a result of these obstacles, common society commitment has been stifled by the negative relationship between common society and the less equitable institutions in the sub region. As far as contributors are concerned, they should focus on funding for such gatherings and activities, as the UN Task Force on Counterterrorism needs to contact and energize their commitment to these issues

## **2.8. Citizens' Participation in the Prevention of Violent Extremism**

Residents' cooperation in the avoidance of rough fanaticism should fundamentally zero in on reinforcing nearby and endogenous capacities with respect to PVE and local area flexibility to fierce radicalism. In certain unique situations, there might be a particular job for advancement accomplices in getting sorted out and working with organizations between formal government foundations and formal and casual common society structures. Specifically, it is imperative to set up organized spaces of exchange among improvement and security entertainers at the public and

nearby levels.<sup>43</sup> Where the state is unfriendly towards common society associations or when common society associations work as intermediaries for political as well as monetary interests, improvement entertainers should be especially careful and vital by the way they build up and deal with their organizations.

To distinguish, oversee and influence the neighborhood associations expected to forestall fierce fanaticism, improvement entertainers should put resources into examination to comprehend the nearby setting, trust-building measures with accomplices, and limit advancement of endogenous constructions. This action incorporates fostering the assets and limit of confided in people inside networks, like ladies' pioneers, strict researchers, youth bunch pioneers, and conventional pioneers<sup>44</sup>. Furnished with the right specialized and monetary assets, such people and gatherings can instruct their networks on PVE and foster local area explicit procedures for effectively forestalling rough fanaticism at the nearby level. The basic factor here is the idea of nearby formal and casual specialists, for example their capacity to give shared help (and pressing factor), positive good examples, and mentorship through existing commonality, authority and trust. In the accompanying segments, chosen partners with a basic job in PVE are portrayed in more detail.

Resident support centers around reinforcing level and vertical union for example attachment among people and gatherings yet additionally among networks and people and the express, the points of interest of which will again rely upon territorial, public and neighborhood settings. Level union programming centers around discourse, participation, trust-building, and compromise instruments while vertical union programming may zero in on improving the responsiveness of specialists, fortifying straightforwardness and responsibility, guaranteeing impartial admittance to cultural assets, ensuring that maltreatment and unfortunate behavior by open specialists are punished, and so forth Other than these social angles, there are different manners by which advancement entertainers can help develop the office, flexibility and abilities of people to forestall

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<sup>43</sup> Sharland, L., Grice, T., and Zeiger, S. (2017). Forestalling and countering brutal radicalism in Africa: The part of the mining area. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Pg. 56.

<sup>44</sup> Ranstorp, M., and Hyllengren, P. (2013). Counteraction of savage fanaticism in third nations: measures to forestall people joining furnished radical gatherings in struggle zones: chief rundown. Försvarshögskolan (FHS). Pg. 506.

vicious radicalism<sup>45</sup>. These may incorporate injury mending, formal and casual training, abilities improvement, exercises focused on strengthening, and work pointed toward fostering a 'culture of harmony'. In planning programming, advancement entertainers ought to ask themselves how they could uphold positive social change at various levels with the passage focuses and apparatuses accessible.

Youngsters are the primary objective of enrollment and preparation endeavors by rough fanatic associations. Independent of nation, religion, social foundation or level of schooling, youth comprises the gathering of people generally helpless against brutal fanaticism<sup>46</sup>. Analysts trait this weakness to various variables, including however not restricted to, youngsters' quest for personality, a feeling of importance, cooperation, reason, acknowledgment and having a place. Their regular impulsivity and readiness to face more noteworthy challenges may likewise be contributing components to their penchant to join gatherings or developments that may uphold savagery.

## **2.9. Conclusion**

Finally, it may be concluded that political, economic, and individual variables play a significant role in driving young people into violent extremism. Youth radicalization is a danger cannot be fully addressed by any one counter-radicalization strategy because of the variety and dynamic nature of these elements. Even while law enforcement officers are the most visible enforcers, they may be unable to address the many circumstances that lead young people to engage in violent extremism. That's what the research found out, and it might be a major point of departure for the fight against terrorism in the horn of Africa. This was motivated by the idea that preventing the radicalization of young people may need extensive local knowledge of the recruiting process and context-specific comprehension of radicalization processes.

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<sup>45</sup>Allan, H., Glazzard, A., Jespersen, S. T., and Sneha Reddy Winterbotham, E. (2015). Drivers of vicious radicalism: Hypotheses and writing audit.

<sup>46</sup>Allan, H., Glazzard, A., Jespersen, S. T., and Sneha Reddy Winterbotham, E. (2015). Drivers of vicious fanaticism: Hypotheses and writing survey.

## CHAPTER THREE

### IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO NIGERIA.

#### 3.1. Introduction

In 21<sup>st</sup> century, many people have accepted that amazing financial development rates that have been are sufficient to permit our social orders to accomplish their formative objectives. Around the African mainland, different markers have given a hopeful person approach that it will do well later on: this is because of the idea of extended struggles which are suggested be arriving at reaching a conclusion; a working class, which some assessed at more than 400 million, was arising; the immediate speculations from the outsiders of more than \$50bn each year which have been seen straightforwardly moving from towards a landmass seen as yielding the best profit from venture; another factor of outside accomplices, continuing in the drive of china in Africa's economy, begun running back; and the normal assets which have present in Africa<sup>47</sup>.

The unfavorable impact of savage fanaticism in Africa has prompted financial slack. This can be seen from various points of economy from the travel industry area to unfamiliar direct Investment of specific nations. The results of psychological militants striking nations, for example, Algeria, Mali, or even Chad, the casualties are not restricted to Africa yet in addition the entire world on the loose. With a similar focal point, when the bad habit of psychological oppressor exercises upsets the security of a country which has a urgent influence in Africa, for example Kenya<sup>48</sup>. This section will introduce writing on effect of vicious fanaticism on the African political economy.

#### 3.2. Violent Extremism.

Violence alludes to the punishment of torment, shedding of blood, utilization of actual power, savage language, fierceness and coercive obstruction with individual flexibility. Vicious radicalism, is the convictions and activities of individuals who backing or use brutality to accomplish philosophical, strict or political objectives. All types of brutal fanaticism incorporate illegal intimidation, common savagery and different types of politically persuaded viciousness.

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<sup>47</sup> Abrahms, M. (2012). The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited. *Similar Political Studies* 45(3): 366-393

<sup>48</sup> Grossman, M., and Tahiri, H. (2015). Local area view of radicalization and rough fanaticism: An Australian viewpoint. *Diary of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 10(1), 14-24.

Numerous scientists and strategy producers have thought little of the force of belief systems and profoundly felt feelings as the principle inspirations driving various types of vicious fanaticism. Radicalism, then again, is the philosophical convictions and conduct past the limits of the normal in a political, social, strict, or moral setting. One of the variables that drive rough fanatics is culture and culture explicit impression of what is reasonable and unreasonable, just and out of line. Their inspirations are normally gotten from essential common agreements between the state and residents<sup>49</sup>.

The media and the general populace commonly portray religious fanaticism as a fundamental part of a person's identity. Although this is a generalization, it is in light of the reality that many nasty extremists justify their viciousness and alienation from others by citing their belief systems and rigorous readings of holy texts. ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaida, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram are all examples of Salafi jihadi developments, despite the fact that fanaticism has been around for a very long time. Radicals may more easily trash their opponents by portraying them as malevolent because of religion. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to see Salafi jihadists, for example, join forces with public and international plans to rid the world of insidiousness. Esposito has also agreed that fear mongers' primary concerns and goals are political, and they exploit religion to achieve this. As a result of dissatisfaction with both the local and global political landscape, as well as philosophically-inspiring events, there has been a rise in violent protests.

Most investigations by Western researchers propose that financial difference and ignorance are the main impetuses behind savage radicalism in the Muslim world, which might be valid sometimes. In any case, numerous demonstrations of brutality after 9/11 in different areas repudiate the supposition of financial and instructive setting as the elements adding to savage radicalism. Piketty, nonetheless, contends that the high convergence of abundance in couple of hands (nations with not so much populace but rather more riches), and the conflicts pursued by the West in the Middle East have prompted dissatisfaction and defense for jihad. Monetary hardship and wars have profited just the couple of in the district; accordingly, financial disparity is the significant driver of illegal intimidation.

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<sup>49</sup> Subedi, D. B. (2017). Early admonition and reaction for forestalling radicalization and fierce fanaticism. *Harmony Review*, 29(2), 135-143.

### **3.3. Rise in Violent Extremism**

During the last decade, the ability of violent radical groups to expand and extend themselves beyond their public beginning points has grown considerably as people, goods, and ideas have spread across borders. With its roots in Syria and Saudi Arabia, ISIS and al-Qaeda have wreaked havoc in their region as well as in Asia, Africa, Europe and the United States. Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are now exerting considerable local influence. Extreme extremism has claimed the lives of 32,000 people in 2014 and 29,376 in 2015. Similarly, outraged conservative scorn groups have been as adept at bringing together new members online beyond public boundaries.

As with the 2011 Norway massacre and the 2015 South Carolina church shooting, both incidents sprang from a disdain-filled mindset. One mystery of fierce fanaticism is that it isn't a one-to-one correlation with radical, stringent beliefs. Khmer Rouge Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge's strong revolutionary attitude to decontamination and socialism in Cambodia resulted in the execution of 1.5 million people. Nazism was the spark that ignited World War II, a crude radical doctrine that transcended public bounds and put millions of ordinary people's lives in jeopardy all across the world. Many lives have been lost as a result of ethnically motivated violence, even amongst networks of the same faith (for example, most recently in Rwanda and Burundi).

Savage radicalism presents fundamental challenges on the public, territorial, and global levels, delivering an absence of a significant number of the customary devices for violence counteraction, building peace, and popularity-based administration. Many strategy makers and specialists are aiming for a cheap destruction of metro demand rather than a modification or even a rebuilding of it, which is why these belief systems are so important. Extreme religious extremism has blocked the evacuation of millions of people. Boko Haram's operations have displaced 1.2 million Nigerians and forced more than 200,000 Nigerians to flee to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. There is also a massive influx into Europe due to the conflicts and linked nasty extremist groups operating in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen and other weak governments.. 49 percent of the 970,000 migrants and refugees who crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 were from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. There were 58% males, 17% women, and 25% children among the migrants and exiles. The vast



majority of violent fanatics are males. The dislodging that comes with rough radicalism is not a reliable indicator of a person's sexual orientation.

Savage radicalism presents fundamental challenges that often make traditional systems of viciousness counteraction at the global, provincial, and public levels ineffective. Savage radicalism. Approaching strategy makers and experts with the concept that belief systems that seek or support the obliteration of municipal demand rather than its modification or, at the very least, its reconstruction is a fascinating one. Radicalism has sparked mass exodus from the country, leading to the displacement of millions. More than 200,000 Nigerians have fled to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger as a result of Boko Haram's atrocities, which have forced 1.2 million people from their homes in Nigeria. Significant emigration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe has also been traced down to the conflicts and fanatical movements that have erupted there (such in Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria). Syria was the country of origin for over half of the 970,000 migrants and refugees who crossed the Mediterranean to Europe in 2015. There were 58 percent males, 17 percent women, and 25 percent minors among the transients and exiles, according to the study. The vast majority of hard-edged radicals are guys. A sex assessment based on extreme radicalism and its accompanying exclusion is a flawed one.

### **3.4. Violent Extremism in Africa**

The recent spate of murderous extremism has claimed the lives of a number of innocent people of many faiths, races, and nationalities throughout the world. More than a 9-fold increase has taken place between 2000 and 2014 in the number of people transiting from harsh fanaticism and psychological warfare. In 2015, there was a decline in deaths, but it was still the second worst year on record with 29,376 deaths. However, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries reported an increase in psychological militant related deaths from 77 per year to 577 per year. In addition, it was the bloodiest year in Afghanistan (both fear-based oppressor passing and war zone passing for the Taliban). Seventy-two percent of the deaths in 2015 occurred in countries other than Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria. The rapid growth of rugged radicalism is of the utmost concern. The number of countries seeing more than 500 passes has increased from five to eleven in 2014, a 120% increase from 2013. More than 500

people passed via Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Cameroon in addition to the above-mentioned countries. There has been a rise in the number of attacks by extremists on the global scale.

As a result of environmental change and catastrophic catastrophes, as well as clashes in a few African states, the Arab and Western Asian states and the realignment of the global world monetary demand, a massive population deluge is occurring in the neighboring countries, Europe or the United States. More than 500 people died from ferocious radicalism in 2014 in ten of the eleven countries where there were more than 500 exiles and inside displaced people (IDPs) in 2014. More than 16 million evacuees and IDPs were generated in 2014 by the five countries with the highest levels of fear-based oppressor/brutal extremist attacks. Displaced people face a variety of obstacles, such as: The enormous influx of foreigners stokes concerns that are leveraged by outlandish conservative ideological parties that need the protection of public borders. Radicalization among refugees and travelers is also a possibility, especially if their aspirations for a better life end in poverty or belittlement. Both host networks and exiled and temporary populations should strive a blend in this way.

Africa faces an extraordinary weakness to savage radicalism that is formed by industrious underdevelopment and fragmented peace building and state-working in key locales. There are tremendous difficulties looked by governments: in conveying harmony and soundness, and in guaranteeing that the speed and advantages of development stay aware of the extension of the most energetic populace on the planet. Stories of revolutionary disturbance and change, which appeal to the multi-layered feeling of complaint that may wrap a person whose skylines guarantee no way for headway, will keep on being alluring as long as fundamental conditions stay unaddressed<sup>50</sup>. Where there is foul play, hardship and franticness, savage fanatic philosophies introduce themselves as a test to the state of affairs and a type of departure. The message is customized by spotters to suit various settings just as various sorts of people. In any case, low degrees of schooling and a dependence on go-betweens to decipher religion permits to a great extent imported

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<sup>50</sup> Ismail, O. (2013). Radicalization and brutal fanaticism in West Africa: ramifications for African and global security. *Struggle, Security and Development*, 13(2), 209-230.

philosophies to fill in as a lightning conductor for the disappointment and outrage that is the unavoidable result of ages of financial and political underestimation<sup>51</sup>.

Complaints against government and state security entertainers are especially articulated among those generally powerless against enrollment, who likewise express profound situated wariness about the chance of positive change<sup>52</sup>. The speed with which enlistment needs to date been displayed to occur by this examination shows the 'readiness' for enrollment of the individuals who do make the excursion, and henceforth the profundity of Africa's weakness. In spite of the fact that enrollment is generally profoundly limited, consistently expanding availability across Africa will empower enlistment to grow over the long haul, maybe prompting bigger quantities of African unfamiliar warriors joining theaters of contention outside of their nearby surroundings<sup>53</sup>. Without a doubt, there is an undeniable possibility of a much more prominent spread of rough fanaticism in Africa than has been seen as of late, with additional related demolition and breaking faith being developed terms. This warrants deliberate endeavors both to prepare for and change it. The window for supported activity to forestall and react to vicious fanaticism is currently.

There is agreement among examiners that long-term tranquility and economic growth can only be achieved via peaceful and thorough cooperation across groups. Continued conflict will only be sparked by the discussion of divisive political themes (us vs them). Various rigorous beliefs, political arrangements, fundamental liberties protections, media, educational groups, and others should promote resistance and respect for variation (in political assessment, in confidence, in way of life, in friendly behaviours). It is imperative that future and present political settlements alter their setups and cycles so they can manage more diverse social orders quietly. The rise of violent radicalism and its expansion over public borders, as well as the administration of more diverse, multi-social orders, are two of the most pressing challenges facing governments throughout the globe, as well as governments in the immediate vicinity.

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<sup>51</sup> Orsi, D. (2015). Michael Oakeshott's political way of thinking of common affiliation and constructivism in International Relations. *Diary of International Political Theory*, 11(3), 331-350.

<sup>52</sup> Subedi, D. B. (2017). Early admonition and reaction for forestalling radicalization and brutal fanaticism. *Harmony Review*, 29(2), 135-143

<sup>53</sup> Vallacher, R. R., Coleman, P. T., Nowak, A., and Bui-Wrzosinska, L. (2011). Reevaluating recalcitrant struggle: The point of view of dynamical frameworks. In *Conflict, Interdependence, and Justice* (pp. 65-94). Springer, New York, NY

Revolutionary innovations and barbarism are certain to erupt when this weight of level mismatches comes together for a given meeting. State failure to provide essential rights, administrations and security is not a vacuum that allows non-state actors to take responsibility for state sway and domain. Rather, it contributes to the development of inequality. Brutal fanaticism may thrive in a fertile field provided by political advancements that have been bombed, with weak institutions, law enforcement, and governing standards. Following the collapse of the United States, fanatic meetings were able to enter the real world.

### **3.5. Violent Extremism on the African Political Economy**

A few researchers recommend that rough radicalism is a political apparatus utilized by a gathering to accomplish political objectives. As seen before, illegal intimidation has mental, monetary and social effects on a country. Because of this effect savage fanaticism has on individuals, the public authority is compelled to discover approaches to recapture public certainty and recuperate from the assaults. Pollack and Wood note that in situations where a circumstance after an assault is by all accounts misused, the residents may lose trust in the public authority and public organizations. To acquire public trust and certainty, the public authority may take estimates that may disregard the common freedoms. An administration may for instance effectively pass hostile to dread laws that are in opposition to common liberties essentially on the grounds that they are upheld by people in general. Friedland and Merari contend that there are times when fierce radicalism turns into a compelling device to accomplish political objectives<sup>54</sup>. They say that when a basic limit is surpassed, individuals are probably going to surrender to the requests of the fear mongers. For Kenya for instance, general society may request that the powers be removed from Somalia, or a conclusion of evacuee camps in Kenya. The different effects of savage fanaticism on the political economy in Africa are talked about in the accompanying subsections.

#### **3.5.1. Loss of Human Capital and the Political Economy in Africa**

As a crucial aspect in the production of new products and services, human resources is concerned with the well-being of employees, their knowledge, their skills and their motivation. For both production and dispersion, this is critical job. Displacement, relocation, and the loss of employees

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<sup>54</sup> Berrebi, C. also, E. F. Klor (2008). Are elector's delicate to psychological warfare? Direct proof from the Israeli electorate. *American Political Science Review* 102(3): 279-301

due to wounds and death are common occurrences in topographies predisposed to psychological oppressor attacks. Political economy suffers the most when there is a shortage of skilled personnel, which reduces the efficiency of the space and has an impact on government and new ventures. In one study, Lama used the "US's 9/11 psychological oppressor assault" as a backdrop and found that after the terror attack, people delayed filling in because they feared another assault, much as there was some widespread uprooting as workers moved away. As a result of the rerouting of work assets and the subsequent transfer of gifted and non-gifted personnel, work expenses increased.

Human and non-human resources were estimated to have been squandered by the "September 11 attack" by Becker and Murphy. The loss of lives as a result of psychological oppressor exercises results in a loss of human resources, which burdens the economy as it raises the cost of work with an ensuing impact on debilitating private enterprise and furthermore confounding utilization designs in Bali and Kenya, according to the findings of these studies. It was found that the process of creating, transporting, and using work is all harmed by moving and removing it. Fear-based oppression activities in Kenya's Northern region have resulted in the exodus of skilled professionals, including as doctors, nurses, and teachers, among others. Local learning establishments were also impacted as children and understudies were frightened of attending there.

Market harmony is affected by people's behavior as a result of psychological oppression, which may lead to increased or decreased consumption. Businesses in Kenya's largest cities, Nairobi and Mombasa, have been severely impacted by rising costs of doing business and the consequences that follow. Even human activities were disrupted by the terror that resulted in the bending of auxiliary business sectors such as those that support the tourism activities, such as friendliness and farming. Psychological oppression has been shown to influence human development even at the earliest stages of incubation, according to Almond and Currie This is due to the fact that stress during the first trimester of pregnancy might cause a baby to be born with a low birth weight. In this way, psychological warfare has a negative impact on human resources and a positive impact on human resources.

### **3.5.2. Destruction of Infrastructure and the Political Economy in Africa**

The foundation is the primary structure and office that supports a nation or a region in the flow of labor and goods. It's not a need for the economy of a certain region or area to function. Consumption and production of essentials for cultural life are carried out via this component. An oppressive attack on the framework disrupts the cycles of production and distribution of labor and goods. For the United Nations 15 Member Council, the enticing nature of frameworks and offices like banking and transportation as well as broadcast communications, schools, energy supply, and water supply as targets of psychological militants has prompted a renewed call to improve efforts toward obtaining and ensuring moderately clear targets like public fields and foundations.

According to Caruso and Schneider's study, unlawful intimidation had a direct and immediate impact on urban infrastructure including schools, exchange centers, libraries and energy and water facilities. This damage has a negative impact on social and economic activities in the affected areas. Another analysis by Chukwurah, Ogbeje and Eme revealed that unlawful intimidation has a direct impact on the framework, affecting sectors such as medical clinics, the hotel and restaurant industries and even sports facilities, such as parks. Northern Nigeria's unavoidable criminal intimidation linked damages compelled understudy, expert, and foreigners to go to calmer states in the south. Each and every low tourist count in the friendliness sector (such hotels and parks) is bad news for the Northern Nigerian economy.

Terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, and security in the African energy sector are all covered in a new report from the University of South Africa (UNISA), which shows that a complex network of facilities is required to efficiently produce and supply energy sources, including treatment facilities, pipeline systems, fuel storage reservoirs, terminals and rigs, stream stations and siphon stations as well as electrical energy arches and prefabrication plants. If the foundation is destroyed, it has a crippling effect on a broad range of essential economic operations. According to a 2017 study by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), psychological oppression serves as the basis of real injury. '

Energy, transportation, water supply, and web-related framework are some of the most essential types of basic foundations cited by CTED. Using Algeria as an example, CTED used the Tiguentourine gas office in Amenas, Algeria, which is located someplace down in the Sahara

Desert, on January 16th, 2013 as a point of reference. As a result, CTED argued that it would be more difficult for psychological oppressors to target their intended victims if the foundations of the system were adequately protected. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has significantly reduced water supplies for the water system frameworks and treatment plants in the mainly Shiite downstream regions of Babil, Karbala, Najaf, and Qadisiya, which are among Iraq's most important agrarian centers, putting the country's food security at risk.

An examination of "The Impact of Al-Shabab Terrorist Attacks in Kenya Eastleigh district in Nairobi" found that the market framework has been adversely affected by ongoing unlawful intimidation in this area. People from all over the country come to Eastleigh to buy products at a discount and then resell them at retail prices in their own businesses. Psychological warfare has a profound effect on society as a whole. Residents of New York City, and Americans in general, were more aware of their surroundings after the 9/11 attacks, which led to a dramatic shift in attitudes about security and Muslims. There has been an increase in the rigor of security inspections at airports since then, and Muslims/Arabs have been survivors of racial/strict profiling, with their ethnicity or ethnicity alone being used to link them to terrorists or criminals

Anti-Islamic sentiment soared in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. During the ensuing intifada in Israel, Waxman writes, the Israeli people saw the Palestinians as dishonest, aggressive, and without regard for human life. Since the rise of generalizations, public opinion has been skewed against the group that the psychological oppressors promise to treat. For example, separating Christians from Muslims and then executing Christians would portray Muslims as psychological militants if done out of fear. The psychological militant group's target audience's aggression and skepticism is also on the rise in the public eye. Muslims were considered as a threat to Israeli security because of an inquiry led by Asher Arian, for example. Anxiety and fear for one's own safety are expected as a result of criminal intimidation. As a result, people will have a negative outlook on the psychological militants and their motives, rather than a positive outlook on them and their demands.

Waxman clarifies that a feeling of victimhood is regular to a general public encountering psychological oppression. The outcome might be a solidifying of mentalities and crystallization of resistance to the reason sought after by the fear-based oppressors. At last, individuals dread

associating in regions which are inclined to fear monger assaults<sup>55</sup>. In Kenya, for example, the previously well-known Westgate Mall is currently yet a shell of its previous self. Following the psychological militant assaults in 2013, endeavors to remake the shopping center back to its previous greatness have generally been fruitless and meticulously sluggish on the grounds that individuals dread visiting a spot that helps them to remember the horrendous demonstration of illegal intimidation that happened in that. This limitation regarding mingling uninhibitedly brings down the personal satisfaction as it keeps individuals from genuinely making the most of their life and cutoff points where they can belittle, at what time, etc<sup>56</sup>.

### **3.5.3. Damage of Private Property and the Political Economy in Africa**

It's possible to quantify the immediate costs of psychologically motivated protests by looking at the monetary value of the property that was destroyed. In a company or simply a local site, the destroyed property might be one item or several things. In most cases, the current market value of the destroyed property is used to estimate its monetary value. During the 2001 psychological oppressor attack on the US World Trade Center, extensive property damage was found, which had a significant impact on the individuals, organizations, and financial supporters who were located nearby. Because of the attacks, experts estimated that \$22.7 billion in property damage will be incurred in and around the World Trade Center<sup>57</sup>.

An analysis by Waxman points us that self-destruction aircraft may quickly annihilate property by psychological militant attacks. Additionally, Enders and Gary observed that the most immediate effects of psychological militant attacks were the destruction of buildings, a decline in commerce, incinerated products, and other related losses of property. Experts found that property obliteration has a direct impact on the economy by lowering the energy levels of potential financial supporters. Wong argued that psychological oppression has a negative impact on properties. Gatimu found that most businesses in Eastleigh, Nairobi County, Kenya, shut down or relocated to Nairobi's Central Business District, indicating a decrease in Eastleigh's economic and social activity.

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<sup>55</sup> Lama, J. (2013). The Cultural Set-up of Comedy: Affective Politics in the United States Post 9/11. *Acumen*.

<sup>56</sup> Agubuzu, L. (2004). Local Economic combination an improvement worldview for Africa, in Adebayo Adedeji (ed) *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st C*. London, Zed books.

<sup>57</sup> Cortright, D., Millar, A., Gerber-Stellingwerf, L., and Lopez, G. A. (2011). Companion, not adversary: The job of common society in forestalling fierce radicalism. *Notre Dame J. Int'l and Comp. L.*, 2, 238.



Relaxed employees were laid off as expenditures and activity expenses soared, especially in light of the fact that people realized the need to implement security measures for their property.

Psychological warfare and raw fanaticism have a negative impact on the Kenyan economy, according to UNDP's articulation of the effects of psychological warfare and rough fanaticism on the country's economy. Protecting against psychological warfare, implementing security measures, and hiring cheaply available workers all increased the costs of the organizations. Psychiatric attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa had a significant impact on economic activity in 2013 and 2014, according to the research. After Westgate Mall's psychological militant attack, a prominent protection office's CEO was quoted in a neighboring newspaper as noting that property security premiums had risen and financial backers in the land had acknowledged the necessity for protection against unlawful intimidation.

### **3.6 Causes of Violent Extremism in Nigeria**

Preceding the formation of Boko Haram and the ensuing rise of violence in Nigeria's northern area, Maitatsine uprisings had occurred in the country's northern region. It had previously been unthinkable for Nigerians to witness an insurgency pattern like to that of Boko Haram, aside from the fact that the group is the most extremist of all of these crusades.<sup>58</sup> Local, national, and regional stakeholders may have overestimated Boko Haram's risks because of this, some say.

Magari Hill assert that Islam first came in West Africa somewhere around the 8th century. Initially, Islamic ideals were incorporated into traditional kings' policies, and Muslim recruits were kept apart from the rest of the population. Later, the rulers enabled Muslim assimilation, and Islam was incorporated into local customs. Sokoto Caliphate founder Uthman Dan Fodio launched a revolution against the tampering with their faith in the 19th century. Muslim leaders and landowners arose as a result of the uprising against the old monarchy, which was led by the people. In northern Nigeria, Dan Fodio's interpretation of Islamic ideals and sharia law became the standard.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2002) 'Manual of the General Conference', Available at: <<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001255/125590e.pdf>> [Accessed 10 July 2015]

<sup>59</sup> Hill, Magari (2009) 'The Spread of Islam in West Africa: Containment, Mixing, and Reform from the Eighth to the Twentieth Century', Available at: <<http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Islam.pdf>> [Accessed 12 July 2015].

Dan Fodio's revolt in sub-Saharan Africa was the first effective jihad. During the British colonial era, sharia practices were tolerated in the north. However, in the 1990s, military administrations formally ceased these practices. Sharia was still practiced in several northern villages despite this. A democratically elected government in 2002 reinstated Sharia law in the north despite the fact that the constitution of Nigeria forbids the practice.

Boko Haram's "jihadi war" began in 2002, as previously stated. They used this opportunity to spread their ideas and engage in horrific extrajudicial acts since sharia law had been legalized by the federal government. Boko Haram, for instance, publicly flogged and stoned those they suspected of violating moral, religious, and legal norms without first going through a court of law or consulting with sharia officials. They were applauded and hailed by many locals in northern Nigeria for bringing social justice and order to the region. Boko Haram's rise in Nigeria's north-eastern area is the focus of this historical account.

Although Boko Haram's severe brutality in Nigeria may surprise many Nigerians, research shows that extremism is the result of both purposeful and inadvertent violence in the society. A brutal jihadist and advocate of holy war, Dan Fodio, is revered in Nigerian history. Popular folklore and proverbs extol Dan Fodio, and many young people in northern Nigeria are taught about how he built a 'ideal-type' community.

Schools of thought based on Dan Fodio's writings and teachings have been established in academia. Leading northern clergymen and political figures openly preach and promote his radical viewpoints as well. To put it simply, for millennia, the rationalization of such brutality and fanaticism has been the work of folklore, literature, philosophy, religion, and history. The ideology of the Dan Fodio movement, the Maitatsine movement, and the Boko Haram struggle are all based on the same principles.

### **3.7 The Contemporary Blame Game in Nigeria**

Since 2009, Boko Haram has become the most researched war in West Africa. Since experts in the disciplines of peace, security, and conflict have demonstrated an interest in this topic, several hypotheses have been produced. Some researchers attribute Boko Haram's insurgency to a new phase of international terrorism, while others attribute it to a power struggle inside Nigeria. Some

argue that the conflict is to blame for social ills including unemployment and underemployment as well as a lack of access to quality education.

According to the academics that link Boko Haram to power struggle dynamics, the Islamic invasion of northern Nigeria in the early 19th century dethroned traditional authority institutions. The Colonialist Empire subsequently abolished the Islamic system in the early twentieth century. Nigeria became a Muslim-majority country when it attained independence in 1960. In the years that have followed, northern Nigerians have consistently avoided adopting 'Western' practices. A generational principles of "political anxiety" "the dread of the repercussions of not being in charge of the government, coupled with a suspicion of political opponents" was established as a result of this need for power and control.<sup>60</sup>

Contemporary sociologists have re-examined the power tensions in Nigeria. Following the death of President Umar Musa Yar' Adua, a Muslim from the north of Nigeria, this organization made its controversial foray into the geopolitical arena, according to these detractors. Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the south, ascended the presidency in accordance with the Constitution. The Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria was sparked by the sudden political shift from the Muslim north to the Christian south, which sparked tensions.

It is claimed that Boko Haram had a little impact on local Muslim populations. After Jonathan was re-election as head of state in 2011, the rioting become more violent in the community. Since then, the gang has targeted non-Muslims and those from southern Nigeria who have relocated north.<sup>61</sup> Boko Haram has been increasingly employing lethal weapons and bombs in its operations, which is the form of violence characterized as terrorism in today's world. Following the election of a non-Northerner and non-Muslim as president, widespread hate erupted in public places such as marketplaces, public transit hubs, and educational institutions. Boko Haram's commander has

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<sup>60</sup> Ake, Claude (1973) Explaining Political Instability in New States. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11 (3), pp. 347–359

<sup>61</sup> Ogoloma, F. (2012) Secularism in Nigeria: An Assessment. *International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 1 (3), pp. 63–74.

stated openly that they will not allow themselves to be governed by non-believers.<sup>62</sup> Boko Haram's political motivations may now be proven to be a religious one, thanks to this development.

According to Abubakar Shekau, the head of Boko Haram, these charges have been publicly accepted on several times (via posts on social media and videos online). The claim that Boko Haram's enmity increased because Nigeria elected a non-Muslim president is founded on circumstantial evidence. Despite this, the Christian-Muslim split and the north-south geographical division have remained at the heart of disputes and political influence struggles since Nigeria's independence. If a northerner and Muslim president had remained in power, would the fanaticism in northern Part of Nigeria have turned into an all-out civil war? Despite the fact that Nigeria's president is a Muslim from the north, many have wondered why Boko Haram actually carries out terror attacks. This might indicate that the Boko Haram crisis has to be seen from a broader perspective, one that goes beyond the theological and political divisions inside Nigeria.

The power struggle idea is not only supported by a number of academics, but it is also widely accepted by Nigerians. Research shows that Boko Haram is a serious threat, yet there are many alternative viewpoints out there. The most contentious and exaggerated idea is that the war is linked to economic distress. Boko Haram's battle was sparked by a lack of formal education, a deficient healthcare system, and a high unemployment rate, according to a number of researchers. According to the authors, individuals became radicalized by emotions of alienation, frustration, and abandonment that were exacerbated by a lack of basic necessities provided by the government.<sup>63</sup>

According to Simeon Alozieuwa, "the Boko Haram dilemma in Nigeria from a socioeconomic standpoint" is the foundation for this thesis. The human wants theories of social conflict are at the heart of the approach that places the responsibility for violence on societal conditions. Conflict can

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<sup>62</sup>Ogoloma, Fineface (2013) op. cit.; Onuoha, Freedom (2013) Understanding Boko Haram's Attacks on Telecommunication Infrastructure. In Boko Haram: Anatomy of a Crisis. E-International Relations Edited Collections, Bristol, pp. 16–28.

<sup>63</sup> Maiangwa, Okeke and Whetho, Onapajo (2012) Baptism by Fire: Boko Haram and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria. Africa Today, 59 (2), pp. 41–57; and Alozieuwa, Simeon (2012)

arise when someone's fundamental needs are not met by others, and this can be caused by the failure of other people or organizations in meeting these requirements.<sup>64</sup>

Nigeria's failure to improve education quality and accessibility prompted the Boko Haram conflict, according to socioeconomic theory. How can Boko Haram claim to be fighting against human development and education if education is a problem? A socioeconomic perspective of the conflict is called into question by the kidnapping of over 300 schoolgirls in Nigeria's Chibok and the continuing and devastating assaults on educational facilities in northern Nigeria.

They argue that poverty, educational inadequacy, and unemployment are a national problem and not just a local issue. Boko Haram is a violent extremist group because of socioeconomic distress, but why haven't similar groups appeared in other Nigerian geographical regions?<sup>65</sup> Scholars and stakeholders need to be aware of the difficulty of appeasing such a group in principle and in reality, says Fineface Ogoloma. If a group has publicly stated that its only goal is to promote an Islamic monarchy, then it should be considered a terrorist organization. Why do people keep blaming it on issues like poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy? Is there a way to release the unsuspecting from the terror that they are subject to?

When it comes to Nigeria's north-eastern region, Boko Haram's commanders and followers have not shown any concern for the high levels of unemployment, illiteracy, and misery there. The purpose of their violent activities is to enhance human progress and social status, not to benefit themselves. The most vulnerable must be protected in this battle between 'Boko-Haram' and democratic reform.

Ideological battles between Boko Haram and democracy have yet to be given the attention they deserve. Dissatisfaction with the intergenerational social order, which has resulted in structural and cultural violence, drives Boko Haram's aggression against the Nigerian state. These behaviors have been perpetuating a cycle of violence against women and children (especially girls) in Northern Nigeria from the beginnings of time, including forced marriages, restricting girls' access

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<sup>64</sup> Alozieuwa, Simeon (2012) *op. cit.*; and Ogoloma, Fineface (2013)

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*

to vaccines and formal education, as well as other unequal gender practices. As recent history shows, violence against minorities has occurred in northern areas as well.

sharia law is in place across northern Nigeria, but federal authorities have previously taken steps to stop these attacks on minorities and vulnerable people. Therefore, the Boko Haram problem and these democratic changes are intertwined, since individuals in north-eastern Nigeria who have profited from cultural and structural terrorism may not want their hierarchical advantages to be removed. Like those claiming guardianship of tradition, these people also feel a feeling of obligation to maintain their way of life. Boko Haram's insurgency is also a kind of protest against modern institutions that seek to abolish normative structural and cultural violence from society, as well.

### **3.8 Impact of Violent Extremism in Nigeria**

Boko Haram's continuing attacks of rebels undoubtedly cause casualties and damage to property. Although there is an absence of independent evaluations of the atrocities, accessible numbers suggest that Human Rights Watch (2012) claimed total deaths of 935 individuals in 164 incidents. Additionally, it is stated that approximately 550 people have been murdered in bombings and other assaults; 550 people were assassinated in 135 incidents in 2011. According to Amnesty International,<sup>66</sup> at least 500 people were killed in the 2011 Boko Haram attacks. Besides the loss of human life, explosives also cause purposeful destruction of property worth several trillions of naira.

Tollota claims that people are no longer able to go about their daily lives without fear of being assassinated. As many as half a million residents in Nigeria's southern area have been relocated in a short period of time. Economic activity is waning as a result of the negative effects on long-term viability. A hostile business environment for both domestic and international investors is created through violent crime campaigns and physical assaults on individuals and organizations. Foreign investment is critical for attaining long-term growth. Along with significant economic benefits to the host country, foreign investors provide livelihood prospects via employment creation and the

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<sup>66</sup> , Amnesty International, (2016). [www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/boko-haram-summit-humanrights-must-be-foundation-of-regional](http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/boko-haram-summit-humanrights-must-be-foundation-of-regional)

supply of large-scale products and services. Nigeria is, therefore, no longer able to seize this opportunity due to the unfavorable economic climate caused by Boko Haram's violent operations.

Boko Haram's instability challenges have resulted in a greater proportion of internal attention and resources exclusively allocated to the defense industry. With such vast resources at its disposal, Nigeria's government must prioritize defense at the expense of sustainable human capital development and other areas that promote productivity and growth. It unavoidably provides an important task to a sophisticated system for producing jobs and reducing poverty, which is, of course, a prerequisite for sustained progress. It worsens when leadership becomes preoccupied with fighting and winning the war on terrorism by allocating big budgets to the security business.

Ekanem et al. argue that Nigeria's government is hindering long-term development by putting too much emphasis on security. It also has to do with a lack of infrastructure and hyperinflation as well as microeconomic inefficiencies in Nigeria's economic progress. The cost of private sector investment and governmental service provision rises as a result of increased insecurity. As a result, money that would have been spent on the economy and other social services is being used to fight crime. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Nigeria's ex-finance minister, claims that the 2013 budget prioritizes essential infrastructure (such as power supply and utilities; transportation; aerospace; the Federal Capital Territory; and gas pipelines; and food production/water management) at N497 billion; human resource growth (ie, health and education) at N705 billion; and food production/water management at N175 billion. In order to maintain national security, around N950 billion was set aside, with N364 billion going to the Army, N320 billion to the Military, N154 billion to the Ministry of Interior, and N115 billion to the National Security Agency. Economic damage is caused by a scenario in which national defense expenditure is almost as high as the amount spent on integrating education and health each fiscal year, as in Nigeria.

### **3.9. Conclusion**

Fanatic political viciousness, regardless of the character or label given to those responsible, is a sign of deeply complicated long-standing concerns in Africa's Greater Horn of Africa region. Fanatic savagery is fueled by a different set of factors and situations than the violence that fuels other forms of conflict. In order to achieve economic harmony and compromise and lessen the vulnerability to rough fanatic philosophies and associations, there must be genuine activities of force and responsible administration; monetary, political, and social consideration; access to equity and viable paths of change; and impartial appropriation of public products. Key to long-term success in dealing with the push components of vicious radicalism is a thorough engagement that establishes the foundation for responding to current and future concerns..

As a first step, we need to understand the root causes of viciousness, and then we need to implement measures that are tailored to respond to these difficulties in accordance with neighborhood, public, and community settings in light of connections between worldwide and public entertainers, as well as between governments, common society gatherings, and networks. Partners from the Greater Horn region stress the need of coordinating all performers to ensure that protocols are complete, efforts are coordinated, and appropriate practices and exercises learnt are shared.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOMALIA AND ERITREA:

#### 4.1. Introduction

Somalia's stability, harmony and advancement possibilities have been subverted by radicalization. Rough radicalism in Somalia has progressively become a security worry in Somalia. Youngsters in Somalia who are not taught in a joint effort with profoundly instructed peers in the diaspora who have experienced childhood in the West have become self-destruction planes and infantrymen for the Somalia's fanatic rebellion known as Al-Shabaab. A variety of interlaced outer and inward factors has made the adolescent in Somali powerless to the tempting philosophies of Al-Shabaab adding to an expansion on the planet's driving just as deadly uprisings<sup>67</sup>.

Somaliland has a higher level of security than other parts of Somalia, although there are still challenges. In the East and West of Somalia, where the Isaq faction is not as dominant, there is ongoing instability. Al Shabaab has been kept out of Somaliland so far, at least in terms of dynamic threats, mostly due to the efforts of Somaliland's public safety authorities. Another hazardous aspect has entered the picture during the preceding decade, adding to the unexpected factors of disagreement and removal, radicalization threats as well as harsh fanaticism.

In the post-opportunity era, Eritrea's main security worry was its neighbor, Ethiopia, with which it had a 30-year conflict of self-governance and a limit battle from 1998 to 2000. An agreement to end hostilities was signed in 2000, but since then, the two countries' forces have had a series of unpredictable clashes. The political economy of Somalia and Eritrea is examined in this context-oriented part, which takes a look at the influence of terrible extremism.4.2. The Impact of Violent Extremism on the Political Economy of Somalia

#### 4.2.1. Al Shabaab's Rise and Somalia's Structural Challenges

In terms of Africa's raw radicalism, Somalia is often mentioned. More people were killed than any other militant group in 2016 by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), according to ACLED's

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<sup>67</sup> Grossman, M., and Tahiri, H. (2015). Local area impression of radicalization and vicious fanaticism: An Australian point of view. *Diary of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 10(1), 14-24

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). AMISOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the Somali government have all been targeted by Al-Shabaab as it tries to topple the Somali government from power. Despite initial attacks, the group has been very successful in attracting and training young people into its ranks.

While al-Shabaab is based in Somalia, it lacks the ability to sell viciousness and has carried out attacks in Kenya and Uganda, despite the fact that it is located there. In and out of Somalia, the process of relocating is very complex and often involves many factors. Additionally, government security forces, AU soldiers and united local armies have been held responsible for random attacks, sexual assaults, self-assertive captures, and detention. Violent conflicts between groups for political and financial power have also contributed to dislodging.

#### **4.2.2. Geopolitical Uncertainty in Somalia**

Throughout the Horn of Africa, terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab have increased their attacks. As a result of the terrorist actions, Somalia has been plagued by geopolitical wars for many years, resulting in constant political instability. Due to a government that is neither stable nor genuine, Somalia's many communities and armed groups have been embroiled in deadly war for almost two decades. The brutal battles in Somalia have led to the formation of a few extreme groups that have taken control of large swaths of the country and even threaten the authority of neighboring countries like Kenya. In any case, the current political situation makes it impossible for the public authority to provide citizens with basic forms of aid like medical treatment, education, and shelter for a true administration that has been enthroned.

Despite this, the Al-Shabaab organization has been able to attract more young people due to the country's political unrest and the country's unstable leadership. The government of Kenya was forced to localize Somali misfits residing in the Dadaab displaced person camp as a result of the terrorist group's continuing instillation of fear across Somalia and its neighbors. This decision had an impact on the Somali government's political, diplomatic, and ties with Kenya's public authority. Other neighboring countries, including as Uganda and Ethiopia, have also taken steps to strengthen

their border security, which has had a negative impact on the free flow of goods and services in the area.

#### **4.2.3. Socio- Political Economic Impact in Somalia**

Violence in Somalia has had a negative impact on the country's and its neighbors' economies. Since the creation of the Federal Government in 2012, the terrorist actions of Al-Shabaab have thrown Somalia's economy into turmoil. About 40 percent of Somalia's population lives in abject poverty, according to a study from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the United Nations specialized agency for Somalia. Al-Shabaab terror threats, as well as the Somali government's incapacity to properly care for its inhabitants, are other factors.

There has been an increase in terrorist actions by Al-Shabaab in neighboring countries such as Kenya, which has had a negative impact on Somalia's socioeconomic development and progress. As a consequence of the terrorist actions, innocent individuals in Somalia and nearby countries such as Kenya have been subjected to harsh economic hardships as a result. There has been a decrease in Somalia's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a consequence of terrorist activity, which has hampered economic growth.

Nonetheless, not exclusively do fear based oppressor exercises have huge adverse consequences on the political economy of a nation just as its neighbors, the exercises additionally contrarily affect the existences of the guiltless residents too. In Somalia for example, the test related with disorder have come about because of the offensive exercises of Al-Shabaab psychological oppressor bunch which have eventually come about to the breakdown of the general public. Moreover, their risky exercises, like seizing, torment, torching, murder, mutilation and extortion have likewise come about to a climate of uncertainty and worry in the Somali society.<sup>68</sup>

Besides that, there is a reduction in the inevitability of life especially when civilians, women and children are killed by terrorists resulting to societal discord. Al-Shabaab exclusively control over certain regions in Somalia, as a result, the terrorist group engage in smuggling

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<sup>68</sup> Richardson, H. and Gordon, P. (2008). Monetary expenses and outcomes of Terrorism.

of goods, tax evasion, sneaking of merchandise, and assortment of charges from merchants and laborers who work in the regions that the gathering control. This provincial control by the Al-Shabaab in Somalia has subsequently influenced the Somalia's monetary advancement when all is said in done. The fear based oppressor assaults by Al-Shabaab in Somalia has been related with death toll and property, interruption of financial exercises just as the annihilation of society's social texture by denying offspring of their friends and family, harming and damaging individuals just as denying a portion of the dread overcomers of their wellspring of vocations. Thus, the result has portrayed incredible financial ramifications for the heretics who may have needed the help of individuals who get murdered or truly harmed during dread assaults.<sup>69</sup>

In the Horn of Africa, environmental deterioration has resulted in violent conflicts as people compete over a limited supply of a rare natural resource, which has led to environmental degradation. Al-operations Shabaab's have resulted to serious environmental deterioration, which has slowed economic growth and sparked violent confrontations amongst communities in the battle for scarce resources. A further factor affecting Somali citizens' ability to participate in economic activities like as agriculture is the use by the Al-shabaab terrorist organization of hazardous weapons, radioactive pollution, chemicals, and other pollutants.

#### **4.2.4. Gender Dynamics in Somalia**

Along with a reduced emphasis on the role and logic for women's participation in violent fanatic action, sexism has also received less attention. Regardless of the method in which radicalization of youth, the cruelty given by fanatic advances, and the state's response substantially damage relational characteristics, particularly relationships based on sexual orientation. As a result of the male shortage in Somalia, women have been encouraged to take up more financially dynamic professions. Somalia's civil war and state disintegration have led to the development of women as crucial leaders who have taken on responsibilities for their families without a male head of state,

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<sup>69</sup> Jackson, P. (2011). Terrorism: A critical introduction.

according to Gardner and Bushra. There has been a decline in the number of work opportunities for males, leaving them with limited options for achieving their "masculinity."

According to gendered norms, Somali women's jobs and status are still considered as supplementary sources of income, even if their level of devotion may be considerably different. Males have the majority of authority in the economic sector, public administrations, paid political positions and police and security forces in all regions. In other circumstances, owing to philosophical problems caused by VE meetings, stronger adherence to sexual orientation criteria has been achieved via struggle and violent fanaticism. Radical groups with conservative or archaic values may seek to restrict the employment opportunities and civil liberties of women.

For Sigsworth in Carter nonetheless, while whole networks endure the impacts of outfitted struggle, ladies specifically bear an unbalanced weight inferable from their enfeebled societal position. All the more explicitly Sigsworth takes note of that in the consequence of contention, ladies are designated with types of sexual savagery (counting: mass assault, constrained pregnancy, constrained prostitution, constrained marriage, and sexual subjugation) and furthermore face abusive behavior at home, outrageous monetary weakness, and optional exploitation through state foundations like the criminal equity framework. Tough in Carter likewise tracks down that some radical gatherings may target female casualties for their vicious demonstrations, due to the enthusiastic effect of female losses<sup>70</sup>.

To counter these views, it is necessary to examine how harsh radical workouts, either by the fanatic or as a consequence of governmental or societal constraint because of extreme fanaticism, affect women differently. An understanding of this impact is especially important if new family and dynamic courses of action are initiated, since such systems might assist illuminate the ways in which efforts to fight VE can be enabled and conducted without instrumentalizing or building up current sex preconceptions.

#### **4.2.5. The Conflict in Somalia**

Since the collapse of the Barre government in 1991, the long-running conflict in southern and center Somalia has presented a danger to international concerns in the Greater Horn of Africa and

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<sup>70</sup> Van der Merwe, T. (2017). Resource Extraction and Violent Extremism in Africa.

the past. Somaliland's stable and free commonwealth was bolstered by grassroots harmony and compromise measures in the north, while the absence of similar cycles in the south has thwarted the establishment of locally genuine and suitably complete public institutions. Philosophy-tinged enmity was present during the events that toppled the Barre regime, but it did not play a significant role in the major decade of Somali common strife. Fundamental drivers of common barbarism in Somalia revolve from legal concerns of underestimate and avoidance based on community and familial bonds and the results of international intercessions, which are undeniably more strong than intellectual liking for savage radical causes.

Savagery that pervaded southern Somalia and the focus region between 1990 and 2000 was fueled by group-based warlordism, widespread availability of small guns throughout the country, and intermittent periods of annihilating hunger and dry spell. Even while colonialism, the Cold War, and the Barre framework can all be traced back to the 2000s, a larger international driver of Somali radicalism can be traced back to this time period. The rise of al-Shabaab and similar gatherings in Somalia may be partially attributed to the new interventionism that has taken place. Even in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some US officials were understandably concerned that al-Qaeda may establish itself in the Horn of Africa. United States began assisting a group of warlords in 2006 in an effort to capture or kill al-Qaeda associates in the nation believed to be operating in the country.

Consideration of individuals from al-Ittihad, a Somali group that engaged in various demonstrations of psychological warfare in Ethiopia, and a few suspected al-Qaida agents by the United Nations Intercontinental Committee (UIC) has led to a deterioration of relations between Washington and Ethiopia. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia's tenuous hold on power was quickly overtaken by the UIC's rapid rise (TFG). UIC hard-liners' influence grew as a consequence of the standoff with the TFG and the inevitable prospect of Ethiopian attack. Al-rise Shabaab's to power has been attributed to Ethiopia's December 2006 attack and subsequent two-year rule of the nation.

### **4.3. The Impact of Violent Extremism on the Political Economy of Eritrea**

#### **4.3.1. The Emergence of Extremist Groups in Eritrea**

The Islamist bunches in Eritrea are developments addressing the advancement and progress of Islamic fanaticism in the country. These gatherings developed mostly because of the rising Islamist radical components in the Middle East somewhere in the range of 1960 and 1970 and incompletely because of inward rough struggles that existed among Eritrean outfitted groups, which battled for the freedom of Eritrea between 1961 and 1991. The circumstance in the Middle East emphatically impacts the occasions in Eritrea since it is arranged in the Red Sea beach front region. Islamic revivalism just as development of fanaticism has fundamentally affected on Eritrea's political economy<sup>71</sup>.

The creation and development of the Islamist bunches was because of the inward clash inside the Eritrean outfitted groups. In 1961, the equipped battle in Eritrea was dispatched after the mission for freedom contrary to British pioneer decide that had existed since the mid-1940s fizzled. From its origin, the outfitted battle was pointed toward accomplishing public freedom<sup>72</sup>. There was no undeniable sectarianism among the individuals who were battling for Eritrea to be an autonomous and Free State. Be that as it may, philosophical competitions existed inside the authority of the equipped groups.

When it came to legislation, there was a big divide. Many Eritrean government officials believe that the ELF, which was headed by the Labor Party and pushed for communism, was based on Marxist ideology. This communist ideology failed to meet the needs of partisans or traditionalists. In addition, there was a steady progression within the ELF authority that was at odds with a political bent. In 1977, the ELF divided into two groups, the ELF and the Peoples Liberation Front (PLF), which became the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1978. Islamic fundamentalism overtook the ELF and shifted the balance of power in Eritrea from left to right between the EPLF and ELF. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement and the Islamic Brotherhood

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

were the next groups to meet. Between 1980 and 1981, the EPLF ejected the ELF from Eritrea's territory to the Sudanese border because of a similar dispute.

The expulsion was caused by the ELF's authority being disrupted to the point that a percentage of its leaders started embracing Islamist extreme groups' beliefs. They relied on religion to ensure that political assistance would be forthcoming. The EPLF government's partisan and harsh propensities towards Muslims during the outfitted fight and in the post-autonomy period spurred the establishment of the Eritrean jihad developments. It was claimed that the EPLF ignored Eritrean societal norms in its fight for independence by enlisting Muslim women who used their positions of authority to do acts prohibited by Islam. Islamic groups in post-freedom Eritrea accused the government for restricting and even forbidding Islamic rituals and torturing and kidnapping Muslims because they were certified Muslims. Because of this, they accused the state of exerting too much control over the country's laws.

For the EPLF, the Eritrean Islamist groups were two things: bankrupt organizations in the legislative concerns of the equipped war for independence in Eritrea, whose disappointments came due to fear mongering activities that rely on a strong belief system; and also, as vehicles of foreign powers. It is the Islamic Front in Sudan, which is the preferred political party in Sudan for the EPLF, that provides support for these social gatherings in Eritrea in order to achieve an Islamic government in Eritrea. It is a measure of Islamic globalization to unite Islamist groups from across the globe under the banner of the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC). Putting Sudan in the center makes sense. While Eritrea's public authority was providing assistance to the resistance movements in neighboring countries to counter the assistance that neighboring countries were providing to Eritrea's Islamic developments, the 'the adversary of my foe is my companion' rationale was advanced by the public authority.

#### **4.3.2. The Legal Political Entity in Eritrea**

After al Qaeda's connection to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM), Eritrea has been included on a list of countries with mental oppressors after 9/11. Despite the rarity of what is generally viewed as evidence of mental persecution in Eritrea, the word has actually acquired currency as an imprint for political opponents of the framework, spearheaded by Issaias Afwerki. Eritrean Independence Justice Movement (EIJM) was founded in 1980, despite the



fact that its origins can be traced back to 1975, when many Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) members were disciplined for being too demanding.

It had been more than a decade since the EIJM had successfully maintained its presence in Eritrea when the EPLF declared the nation to be sovereign. EPLF changed its name to People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in 1994, which marked the beginning of President Afwerki's reformist era in office. In 2001, several of his former colleagues fought against what they saw as a new kind of persecution, leading to the formation of the EPLF-Democratic Party obstruction bundle (EPLFDP). Eritrea's political landscape features a wide range of social events, including the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA), the EPLF-DP, and the EIJM, all of which oppose the PFDJ.

#### **4.3.3. Islam as Social Protest**

From Afro-Marxism to Maoism and Baa'thism, the PFDJ, the EPLF-DP, and the ENA all adhere to key belief frameworks. The EIJM is the only organization that promises to address the complaints of Muslim Eritreans. One of the few organizations that resembles the typical manipulator connection, as shown by its involvement in exploding deadly traps, abduction, and the destruction of state-guaranteed financial ventures. It's true that many of EIJM's allies don't accept the PFDJ's crammed version of Muslim rights to recite their faith as the denial of Eritrea's Afro-Arab heritage. As a result of this, persons who were hesitant to accept the Marxist interpretation of religion as the "opium of the individual" reacted with a backlash against the ELF and EPLF leaderships. Most Eritrean Muslims living in 1981 were taken by political portrayal when the ELF (kept by the Tigray People's Liberation Front) was abolished by the EPLF (the Tigray People's Liberation Front). When the modernizers couldn't come up with an adequate solution, Islam was always there to fill the gap. Similarly, the enormous migration of Muslim foreigners from Eritrea to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan created the circumstances for the radicalization of Eritrean Muslims.

Freedom-loving members of the EPLF and ELF, social conservatives, and Islamophobic youngsters are all represented by the EIJM's investment. Its origins may be traced back to the mid-1970s, when party ideologues regularly caged and isolated heroes who dared to question strict proclamation. ELF demonstrators formed the Eritrean Pioneer Muslim Organization

(Munezemet Arrewad al Muslim in al Eritrea) in 1981. The Eritrean National Islamic Liberation Front (Jebhat Tahrir al Eritrea al Islamiya Wataniya) was founded in Sudan in 1983. It wasn't until 1988 that the two groups came together to form the EIJM, together with the Islamic Defense Committee, the Movement of Oppressed Eritreans, and an Islamic uprising known as Al Intifada. However, the EIJM is far from becoming a stable and powerful affiliation, despite its long-term social and political relevance. Ever since it was founded, there has been a raging outbreak of factionalism.

An outlandish gathering attempted to expel the moderate setting up pioneers after the merger of the five social affairs in 1988. When Mohammed Ahmed (Abu Suhail), who had claimed ties to the Afghan mujahedin, withdrew from the group in 1993, a new group formed. The new allies, led by Arefa Ahmed, focused their attention on the immediate area and the problems of the people. Third offshoot, al Majlis al Islamiya Leddewa wa Islah fi Eritrea (Islamic Council for Reformation), led by Ibrahim Malek, arose in 1996 in opposition to Abu Suhail's extremism and sought to trade with the broader political neighborhood. Radical and moderate Muslims, disgruntled pariahs, and ordinary residents stunned by the PFDJ's worth are all part of EIJM's diverse membership in 2004. The PFDJ framework's reluctance to consider the legitimacy of Eritrea's heterogeneous inhabitants' political conjecture is a threat to the EIJM's long-term viability as an organization.

#### **4.3.4. U.S. Policy toward Eritrea**

The rise of a social event "connected" to al Qaeda has accumulated the earlier U.S. Eritrean cooperation (1991–2001), which was based on common grievances about democracy and development. According to the "alliance of the willing," moderate and revolutionary Muslims in Eritrea may open out to each other based on the system's use of "war against unlawful threats" to eliminate any differences. U.S. unwillingness to reprimand the structure despite the two-year detention of Muslim more experienced persons is being slammed. Their goal was to intercede between the reformist legislators and President Afwerki, who had referred to more significant commitment and openness from the head of state.

Current U.S. policy seems to be "generous partners' course of action," but this puts the State Department's political work specialists a long shot off in terms of dealing with serious violations of basic freedoms. Such a strategy has resulted in a desire for the PFDJ structure to use "the debate on fear" as an aid to eliminate political enemies. In the period from 1991 to 2001, the United States and Eritrea's blessed principle held democratization in high regard. However, while Eritrean democratization was mentioned by association in 2001, the United States' decision to abandon taking an unequivocal stand against completing the deliberate completion of larger part drives system advocates sent the message that only appearances of viciousness and dread will lead to real change. U.S. policy in Eritrea has two distinct outcomes: real support for a regime that is fighting the "war on dread" and evidence of skepticism about the regime's onslaught on opposition. The existing organization of the U.S. military should be restructured in order to avoid the growing radicalism of its non-military employees and non-typical persons. The EIJM and the ENA might become more aggressive if they are unable to achieve so.

Ethiopia and Eritrea have an undeniably bizarre relationship of presence, one that has become more problematic in recent years. One of the longest and most respected hostilities in Africa's history was sparked by Eritrea and Ethiopia (1961-1991). Both resentment and animosity remained even after Eritrea was freed in 1993. Despite the accord, the two countries remained at odds over the border. The question sparked a prank war sometime between 1998 and 2000. The United Nations was able to make this deal possible thanks to their cooperation. The two agreed to adhere to the terms and conditions set out by the United Nations. A UN-backed limit committee established preparations to transfer the questioned areas, including Badme, to Eritrea, regardless of Ethiopia's understanding. After Ethiopia refused to accept responsibility for the town, it is clear that its tactical presence in the area is still being built.

In any case, since 2000, when the agreement was struck, there has been some overall harmony. Following Ethiopia's invasion on Somalia in 2006, the tension started to mount. According to the United Nations Security Council, Eritrea was particularly accused of providing financial assistance to Somalia in order to destabilize Ethiopia. Eritrea, according to most news reports, views its presence in Somalia as a chance to make life as difficult as possible for Ethiopia, which it regards as a long-term deadly enemy. Asmara, Eritrea put it truthfully, saying that they were

opposed to any new Somali groups. During Ethiopia's assault on Somalia, this was taken place. After the agreement was signed in 2000, peace was widely supported since the United Nations had stepped up its presence with peacekeepers, notably in the disputed town of Badme. When Eritrea forbade the UN helicopter from flying over vital parts of its airspace, the pressure was amplified, and Ban Ki Moon signaled that the troops should be withdrawn. Researchers have argued that the United Nations' peacekeepers were the key to maintaining stability and trust, and if they were to depart, such stability and trust would not be maintained.

In part, Asmara's decision to exclude the United Nations from its airspace was a consequence of Eritrea's role in Somalia being widely criticized. However, others argue that Ethiopia's invasion on Somalia was an attempt to demonstrate its might and convince Asmara that it is still a regional power. Accordingly, if this was Ethiopia's level headed stance on the matter, and then why did they not do this is because they were ashamed and finally backed out of Somalia, leaving behind an even more divided and nasty country than when they were there. Despite the fact that the United States provided significant assistance, Ethiopia was left with a severely degraded financial and military infrastructure. Eritrea may be tempted to escalate the border argument or possibly attack Ethiopia, considering that Ethiopia's position is becoming more vulnerable.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

In order to achieve practical agreement and bargain and reduce shortcoming to fierce dedication, it is essential to use authentic force and reliable control; political, financial, and social consolidation; section to conventionality and convincing streets of pay; and fair-minded distribution of public product. All things considered, a long-term strategy for managing and resolving money related, social, as well as political protests and parts is essential. Over the course of more than twenty years of investigation, administrative issues, government control over national institutions, and access to public resources have been tested on social lines and between group challenge and uncertainty.

Despite its shaky foundations and seeming insufficiency, the Somali government has shown its ability to exert effective authority and provide basic institutions to the Somali people living under its jurisdiction. The people of Somalia need to reach a comprehensive political solution in order to

set the stage for a lengthy and unusual path of social trade-offs, monetary occurrences, and participation positions. Political, financial, and military dominance; authentic use of force; Because of the conflict in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea's disagreement is particularly worrisome. The Horn of Africa is sluggishly sitting on a live bomb that the rest of the world hasn't given much consideration to. This dispute is startling and may need more critical consideration by the global neighborhood and social community.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### 5.1. Introduction

Data gathered from interviews in Eritrea and Somalia is examined in this chapter. For the study's main goal, it was to examine the influence of terrorism and radicalization on Somalia and Eritrea's political economies. We wanted to look at how radicalization, and violent extremism, affects human development in the Horn of Africa, as well as how it affects African political economies. We also wanted to look at the influence of violent extremism on Somalia and Eritrea's political economies. In this study, the researchers used a descriptive research strategy, which allows for a large amount of data to be gathered at one time, as well as being cost-effective and useful when a researcher has to obtain data quickly. Researchers are looking for professionals in the field of violent extremism, military officials from Somalia and Eritrea, and non-governmental groups working on terrorism and radicalization. To meet each purpose, the results were organized, summarized, and assessed.

#### 5.2. Factors That Drive Individuals to Recruitment into Terror Groups

Respondents were asked to identify the reasons that make people more likely to join terrorist organizations in the area. Violent extremism and radicalization have their roots in the socioeconomic realities in Somalia and Eritrea, according to the survey respondents from those countries. Most of the respondents were of the view that the country's socio-economic conditions caused terrorism to a very great extent. As per Defense Ministry authorities from both Somalia and Eritrea, the financial conditions are a significant reason for psychological oppression in Somalia and Eritrea. An absence of a fundamental way of life has uncovered people and their families to look for or source elective earnings which have gotten progressively accessible through psychological militant associations. Accordingly, this was the perspective on the insightful writer. As one key source contended that psychological oppression gives impetuses both philosophical and financial. A disappointment by the chosen forces to accommodate the penniless permits dread associations to exploit the void and fill it while at the same time philosophically lecturing an answer that subverts the current forces. This was additionally reflected by a Defense Ministry official, who said that weakening in the financial exercises made psychological oppression an

enormous degree since needy individuals are effortlessly allured to join fear-based oppressor exercises than more extravagant individuals. Financial progression isn't the issue, the deficiency lies in that this advancement just sensibly benefits a bit of the populace.

While stricter controls on cash would fairly diminish fear subsidizing, it would not do as such in the domains of neediness where the economy is generally underground. Neediness makes a philosophical void that fear associations use to philosophically change over and enlist; the disappointments in a single framework are absent in other, hence the other should be better. A respondent from the service of protection from both Somalia and Eritrea expressed that the country's financial states of the nation are incompletely to fault in all things considered. This is on the grounds that, they contend, an absence of an essential way of life has uncovered people and their families to look for elective wellsprings of livelihoods of which have gotten effectively accessible through psychological oppressor associations. The majority of the families are going by male in Somali people group in this manner making them more inclined to joining these dread gatherings to get cash to have the option to raise and keep up their families.

Because of their proximity to fanatic meetings, both restrained and willing members of psychological militant groups are at risk. Massive abductions carried out by Boko Haram finest illustrate this point. For the most part, it is this amazement that motivates adolescent participation in political atrocities to a greater extent. Boko Haram's repeated kidnappings and attacks have prompted young people in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad to form vigilante groups. To protect their networks from local criminals, radical groups, and neighborhood military units, Mali's youth have stated their intention to join armed associations.

Respondents also said that the radicalism of talented young people may be fueled by unmet assumptions. ISIS recruits in Tunisia were likely to come from areas with high levels of internal transience and unemployment among college graduates. Travelers and those who are well-educated may have higher expectations of up mobility, which may lead to disappointment when opportunities don't show up. Jobless and underemployed persons with optional and tertiary degrees of training are more likely to have extremist views than those with less education. According to the respondents, fear-based oppressor enrolment is influenced by people's perceptions of

avoidance from their local region or culture, regardless of whether such perceptions are real or perceived. Fear-based oppressive gatherings may position themselves as an elective local region that provides young people with a voice, a sense of belonging, and the freedom to participate in a choice that might be more prominent than themselves.

As a result of terrorist activities in Kenya and Somalia, deaths, injuries, and labor mobility as well as health complications have had a negative impact on the political economies of both countries. Terrorist attacks on commercial buildings, critical infrastructure, such as communication networks, transportation systems, electric power grids, water supply systems, and educational institutions, as well as the political economy of the two nations, have been enormous in the past.

### **5.3. Factors that make Somali and Eritrean youngsters prone to the Violent Extremist movement.**

As a result of these factors, young people in Somalia and Ethiopia are unable to resist Violent Extremist/Terrorist groups' ideological systems, according to the respondents. Several factors are cited as contributing to the vulnerability of youngsters to psychological militant recruitment, including their proximity to a fear monger group, financial insecurity, a perception of social or political marginalization and a susceptibility to fanatic deliberate propaganda. These factors' relative importance vary on their own, according to the survey's participants, as well as in relation to the immediate surroundings. In psychological militant groupings, both male and female kids are routinely used in aid, recruitment, and war occupations, although a significantly bigger proportion of youth soldiers are male. In Salafi-jihadist groups, women's roles are often limited.

Female psychological militants, on the other hand, play a crucial role in advancing the group's main objective. Young women and young women are impotent in the face of ruthless fanatics since they are primarily responsible for supporting duties, such as preparing meals, collecting kindling, providing therapeutic care, and maintaining camps. Individuals who join voluntarily or are persuaded to do so are included in this definition. Young women and young women in a number of psychological militant groups also assume roles that are specific to their sex, such as the husbands and mothers of their opponents' children. Regardless, these vocations that are explicitly



sexual are deeply intertwined with other types of support work. The presence of young women in oppressor groups allows them to play an important role in recruiting other young women.

#### **5.4 Violent Extremism and Human Development**

The respondents reported that violent extremism influences both the market forces for education via several networks. Disputes may well have a direct effect on primary and secondary education demand. Instead of attending school, pupils often fight, flee, or hide in violent conflicts. Armies and rebel organizations find it particularly simple to recruit young boys since they are easier to abuse than adults and seldom demand remuneration for their services. Large-scale conflicts often lead to humanitarian disasters, causing extensive relocation and emigration, generally disruptive to education. Violence often destroys physical property, such as classrooms and road systems, eroding the state's ability to provide fair education access. According to the respondents, the exhaustion of human resources due to teacher absenteeism exacerbates the dysfunction of educational systems and may lead to long lost productivity. The foundations and mutual power of armed clashes and state competency are the same. Although conflicts destroy the state's capacity, and inadequate state capacity may also foster the growth of violence. Further, they noted that violent extremism influences subsequent state resource allocation choices, limiting the creation of stable and effective institutions. It leads to a dynamical short-term goal-setting process instead of a long-term goal-setting system, increasing susceptibility to external forces.

#### **5.5. Impact of Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Somalia and Eritrea**

Somalia and Eritrea's political economy has been severely damaged by terrorist attacks, particularly in the tourism and horticultural sectors, according to the respondents. The terrorist actions of Al-Shabaab have spread to neighboring countries such as Kenya, resulting in strained economic and diplomatic connections between Somalia and its critical neighbors, which has a negative impact on the country's socioeconomic development and progress. As a consequence of the terrorist actions, innocent individuals in Somalia and nearby countries such as Kenya have been subjected to harsh economic hardships as a result. There has been a decrease in Somalia's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a consequence of terrorist activity, which has hampered economic growth.

Respondents also said that terrorist acts have a substantial detrimental influence on the lives of innocent persons, not just on the political economy of a nation but also on its neighbors. For example, anarchy in Somalia has been exacerbated by the terrible operations of Al-Shabaab terrorists, which has led to societal breakdown. They have also created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the Somali community because of their heinous crimes including kidnapping, torturing, arsoning, murdering, mutilating, and blackmailing.

In addition, when terrorists murder innocent individuals, women, and children, the subsequent social turmoil reduces the inevitability of life. There are specific sections in Somalia that are under the exclusive authority of Al-Shabaab and hence, the terrorist organization engages in illegal activities such as smuggling and money laundering as well as collecting fees from merchants and employees that operate in these areas. The Al-dominance Shabaab's of Somalia's regional economy has so impacted Somalia's overall economic growth. Al-shabaab terrorist attacks in Somalia have resulted in the loss of life and property, the disruption of socio-economic activities, and the destruction of society's social fabric by depriving children of their loved ones, injuring and mutilating people, and depriving some of the terror survivors of their source of income.

To put it another way: Terrorist acts not only harm countries and their neighbors' economies, but they also harm the lives of those who are not involved in terrorist operations. For example, anarchy in Somalia has been exacerbated by the terrible operations of Al-Shabaab terrorists, which has led to societal breakdown. They have also created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the Somali community because of their heinous crimes including kidnapping, torturing, arsoning, murdering, mutilating, and blackmailing.

Environmental deterioration has led to violent conflicts as communities compete for dwindling natural resources in the Horn of Africa, according to those polled. Environmental degradation has led to violent conflicts. Al-operations Shabaab's have resulted to serious environmental deterioration, which has slowed economic growth and sparked violent confrontations amongst communities in the battle for scarce resources. Furthermore, the Al-Shabaab group's terrorist activities involve the use of weapons (bombs), radioactive contamination, chemicals, and toxins that are particularly harmful to the environment and agricultural lands, limiting Somali citizens' ability to participate in important economic activities like agriculture.

## **5.6. Counter Violent Extremism Program and Involvement in Somalia and Eritrea**

People were asked to report how the anti-violent extremism program had a positive impact on their communities. Respondents agreed that one approach to combat violent extremism is to educate and occupy young people via the establishment of seminars and vocational centers. Another respondent supported the notion of educating people about alternative conflict resolution mechanisms, such as dialogues, mediation, and arbitration, in order to help them better understand them. Because Africans are a religious people, religious leaders should serve as a bridge between the public and the institutions they expect to handle their concerns so that they don't resort to violent extremism. According to the respondents, it was acceptable to arrange public forums where participants could submit solutions to terrorism-related issues based on their own principles.

That administration is unable of effectively managing or keeping security and basic services in place for the Somali people; it also fails to engage the public in efforts to combat violent extremism. The national institutions' abilities are severely impeded by widespread instability, fierceness, corruption, poor resource management and political infighting, and a lack of civic confidence. Somaliland is receiving assistance from a variety of bilateral and multilateral growth aid missions in an effort to reduce violent fanaticism in the country. As a result of an overreliance on top-down execution by shaky and ineffective central institutions grounded on the programs from outside partners, some of the primary charioteers of furious radicalism have been tackled by previous attempts to plan and instrument calculated growth and safekeeping rule.

According to the survey results, Eritrea's culture of exemption has become stronger since 2001, causing a rift within the ruling PFDJ and igniting a reform movement known as the G-15. Prominent political prisoners, particularly those affiliated with "jihad sympathizers," should no longer be detained by the PFDJ, according to reformers. Another basis for the realignment of all PFDJ foes was given by this open affirmation of Muslim residents' self-assertive captures and "vanishing," which had only been raised by EIJM and ENA at the time. 11 reformers were captured and taken into custody on September 18, 2001. As a follow-up, the top of the state chose the Guantanamo policy, which involves holding political prisoners whom the government considers a threat to the country's security.

### **5.7. Religious Leaders and Groups in Somalia and Eritrea involvement in Countering Violent Extremism**

Those surveyed were asked to explain how religious leaders and organisations in Eritrea and Somalia may best assist in the fight against violent extremism. Religious leaders were seen by respondents as fostering harmony within their particular groups. According to one respondent, the ability of local communities to fight extremism can be strengthened by collaborating with all religious and political groups in order to address the needs of the community. Religious leaders hold a special place in the society by educating and propagating the importance of our social norms and values which is the basis of the understanding and practicing what is required of us in Islam. This therefore enables them to interact with communities they operate in and advice accordingly. Another respondent said that religious leaders were best placed to counter violent extremism with enough support from the relevant authorities. He however added that proper monitoring and evaluation of the work of the religious leaders was also important.

There is need for the religious leaders to encourage the government to have employment programmes for the youths. Religious leaders know how to persuade their way into the community hence their effectiveness authority. Religious leaders can reach the maximum number of people in mosques, madrassa and other religious gatherings. They are effective because they are considered to be opinion leaders in religious setup. Their presence within the society makes them more of genuine moderators than other leaders and the communities they operate in trust them better. This enables them to engage better with the people they are tasked to help. The religious leaders have knowledge on the changing dynamics of terrorism and there is the will from these leaders to fight radicalization and promote coexistences amongst their communities and bordering neighbors.

### **5.8. Counter Violent Extremism Programs in Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia and Eritrea**

The respondents were requested to explain whether the current counter violent extremism programs are efficient and adequate in countering violent extremism Somalia and Eritrea. As per the respondent's mediations to counter savage fanaticism ought to be centered around killing the vicious radical's stories as well as on recognizing the provisos being used by the rough radicals. Albeit the countering rough fanaticism techniques are as yet coming to fruition on the planet over,

procedures have followed three significant philosophies. These philosophies range from distinguishing the push and pull factors that lead to V.E to planning a designated mediation program to address and defeat the above factors just as carrying out the intercessions on the weak gatherings or those generally radicalized.

As indicated by the respondents not all fierce radicals are youngsters, they may likewise be old individuals who want to have their voices heard. As per the respondents most mediations need to have countering brutal radicalism accounts and methodologies remembered for the instructive organizations (essential, auxiliary and tertiary levels). Be that as it may, the particular importance of training for countering rough fanaticism should be investigated on the nearby setting since certain networks may not be exceptionally enthusiastic about instruction rather on strict examinations otherwise called Madrasas. It is essential to take note of that, while considering countering rough fanaticism procedure inserted in proper instruction, low education levels or saw underestimation might be the push and pull factors that lead to weakness to savage radicalism. Other social-political factors possibly affecting everything.

It was found that program implementers were unable to provide convincing proof of attitudinal or social change despite long periods of subsidizing for countering brutal fanaticism programs because most projects do not gather information on direct markers of radicalization, such as the use or support for political viciousness. According to an extensive examination of current research, experts found that just 5% of studies reported any findings (rather than generally noted yields like the quantity of members). As a general rule, projects report on local area indicators of social attachment, such as confidence in the local police, involvement in local community events, or beliefs regarding interethnic marriage.

### **5.9. Policy Reforms with Regard to Public Participation and Prevention of Violent Extremism**

In order to determine whether or not any strategy modifications or changes in public interest may effectively prevent or stop severe radicalism, the responses were cited. For now, according to those polled, the adjustments in strategy for countering overseas fanaticism aren't able to use young

people's vulnerability to psychological oppressor group enrollment to their advantage. This is especially true for young women and young women, whose support for psychological warfare avoidance efforts has lagged behind those of their male spouses' efforts. As a result of these findings, it is clear that approaches and practices must take into account the roles of both male and female young people in fear-based oppressor groups, as well as the roles of families and daily routines. If Somalia and Eritrea are to successfully oppose teenage radicalization and recruitment, it is critical that the public authority-supported psychological warfare anticipatory programs embody the subtle variables that contribute to juvenile vulnerability. As a result, they include factors such as proximity to a war zone, poverty, socioeconomic or political underestimate, tolerant family and informal networks, and receptivity to violent fanatic deliberate advertising via instructional organizations and media.

#### **5.10. Role of Government in Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia and Eritrea**

Respondents were asked to identify the role of the government in combating violent extremism in Eritrea and Somalia. In spite of substantial assistance from multilateral and bilateral sectors, Somalia's government, according to the respondents, was unable to effectively administer or maintain security and basic services for the Somali people. The national institutions' powers are severely impeded by widespread instability, fierceness, corruption, bad resource management and political infighting, and a lack of citizen trust. Somaliland is receiving assistance from a variety of bilateral and multinational development aid missions in an effort to reduce violent extremism in the country. The UN Development Program, for example, works with the European Union and Japan to help create people-centered justice and security. As a result of an overreliance on top-down execution by fragile and incompetent central institutions anchored on foreign partners' plans, some of the key charioteers of furious radicalism have been tackled by previous efforts to plan and instrument measured growth and safekeeping rule.

The respondents indicated that the government's only unique combating violent activities actions were state-owned television stations and public messaging campaigns via Radio Mogadishu. Even though the government opted for a state response to terrorism strategy in early 2015, Hence, it is not easy to predict any generalship effects that rely so much to the anticipatory and able leadership of the capital city of Somalia. With the support of several small and large governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public messaging campaigns via Radio Mogadishu support

humanitarian and economic empowerment programming, such as alternative energy solutions, micro-financing for agricultural innovation, young entrepreneurs, as well as production in small scale. Growth in a complex of Somali civil society operators, other association with universal Non-Governmental Organizations, is functioning to bring about community safety, domestic peace and reconciliation, and civil activism actions.

The respondents indicated that most Somalis citizens were getting back from other countries to assist with development activities, peace-building, civic engagement and grassroots humanitarian and other civil communities and agencies. Most of them joined leadership and had important, however not effective enough, functions of the TFG and present-day administration. Groups of the Somali people have had exceptionally functional functions in Somali financial activities. A gift of money from the outside sources concocts a substantive part of Somalia's country total local product, enhancing local family groups with a living and setting up funds source to back up their enterprises. Even now, towards the atmosphere of enhanced though shakily supported universal issues over the funding of extremism, most administrations as well as financial institutions have stopped operation or have threatened to stop operation and giving of funds to companies which allows fund transfers to Somalia.

The respondents indicated that outside support for direct counter violent extremism involvement, like those concentrated on fighting violent extremism ideologies in Somali land, are not likely to be the most suitable step to solving driving forces of violence fanaticism in the state, specifically provided the multi-level structure of individual safety faced by most Somali states. Alternatively, help is more efficiently tuned to supporting varied, local inventiveness that better the livelihoods and lives of Somali societies. Eventually, the communities have to bring about an all-round political development since externally made interventions have worsened inter-communal mistrust, disputes, and insecurity, that propel situations collaborative to violence fanaticism. Using a good approach, the inventiveness's should collaborate together and authorize domestic valuable as well as civil community operators who work in concert as well as being responsible to the societies in that the operate.

The extent of this varied from state-building speculation, which is an obvious choice for a united states, according to the respondents. However, this conclusion is incorrect since the deciding connection in a solid state-arrangement is not between psychological oppression, state growth, and advancement, but rather among political and power-class members (financial). If you want to get a sense of what a stable Somali state may look like, you need to go beyond the state-building hypothesis and clannish aspects to understand how vested parties are motivated by money. A vague formula is used to choose MPs in the present administration, permitting each tribe to determine how best to treat its sub-families. Because of its stated goal, which is to increase faction hostility, the consequence is to politicize the group explicitly as a component of state authority. This structure also causes accusations that MPs from Puntland and Somaliland are tampering with the national government question by settling matters in the south. It seems sense that this tribal center obscures the parties that really matter. There is a real disagreement over the control of productive assets.. The emergence of the extreme semiautonomous republics of Somaliland and Puntland is a technique for bringing into the center the understanding that family governmental difficulties can't supply the rationale for nationhood.

It was clear from the responses that despite Somaliland's incredible, self-determined success, the country's financial stability is much more precarious. This divide between Somaliland's political economy and southern Somalia's provides a useful framework for examining how and why individual performers in southern Somalia have come to see their nation. There is a driving force structure that shifts control of state-coordinated wealth in the South, which dates back to the Barre system of the 1970s and 1980s. Consolidated associations of productive interests pursuing state access use Faction ID as an astonishing yet useful tool. In the 1980s, financial backers' turn of events and communal land promotion both directed in large part via the state enabled one backed layer of the emergence vendor class to acquire amazing abundance and responsibility for massive stretches of land for farming and quiet land. Deficient pressure was exerted on competitors, such as the Isaak domesticated animal traders. 'Financial lunacy that pounced on the economy's valuable regions' was the result of this orderly seizure of the politically.

Respondents revealed that the 1980s' economic reshaping triggered a few gifts that continue to exacerbate Somali society's problems. There is still a lot of work to be done in the area of land



grabbing and resource theft. Current renters and a 'landowner' class that had property in the capital prior to being forced to flee in 1991 have the potential for argument. There will be pressure on any new entity to resolve the long-standing disagreements over the beautiful property in Mogadishu and the riverine land in southern Somalia. Some animal traders in Berbera and Bosso may be battling each other for the right to command the exchange of domesticated animals, which might lead to violence.

As a result of Somalia's proven role in dictating the winners and sprinters up of the political economy and business class over the past two decades, the current political rivalry has grown as elites believe that those who gain control of the country will find it as their forefathers twenty years ago. There is little doubt that 'disagreements over the imaginary assets of a restored nation' have been sufficient to hinder the beginning of a functioning country because of Barre's absurd lease-hunting, consolidation of foreign funding, and corporate control. Even the TFG and the 15 international agreements since 1991 have all essentially attempted to reinitiate state-driven patrimonial schemes. This is a problem. As a result, at every event, social gatherings that fear being overshadowed by the new group worry that they will be financially ruined as a result. Because of the single access each corporation will have to the external guide and the demand for state-coordinated worldwide business cooperation, this problem is compounded. In light of China's interest in Somali legislative concerns, the latter may be more important. As recently as July 2007, the Chinese state oil giant, CNOOC, asserted its right to conduct oil exploration in Somalia.

Organizational commitment in Eritrea has expanded the culture of exception that became apparent in 2001, resulting in a split in the People's Front for Democracy and Justice and the G-15, a secretive reformist movement. Many political prisoners, including those tied to jihad, have stopped being emotionally targeted by the People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Another cause for the stunning realignment of the Front for Democracy and Justice's enemies was the explicit acknowledgment by the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement of the many voluntary captures and disappearances of Muslim inhabitants. On September 18, 2001, eleven reformists who had joined the ranks of those who had vanished were apprehended by the government. Vote-based framework segments and the highest level of-gathering state's of the Guantanamo procedure, which is the control of political prisoners deemed a threat to the country, were subjected to a systematic crackdown.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.0 Introduction

It is in this chapter that the study's results and suggestions are presented. Finally, the chapter provides a list of recommended research topics

#### 6.1. Conclusion

As a result of deaths, injuries, mobility, and health complications caused by terrorist activities in Kenya and Somalia, political economies in both countries have been negatively impacted as a result of the rise in violent extremism and terrorist activities in the region. Political economies in both nations have been adversely impacted by terrorist attacks that have damaged commercial premises and infrastructure such as electricity grids and water delivery systems in both countries.

The study concludes terrorist activities have huge adverse consequences on the political economy of a nation just as its neighbors, the exercises additionally contrarily affect the existences of the blameless residents also. In Somalia for example, the test related with rebellion have come about because of the horrifying exercises of Al-Shabaab fear monger bunch which have at last come about to the breakdown of the general public. Moreover, their risky exercises, like seizing, torment, incendiarism, murder, mutilation and shakedown have likewise come about to a climate of uncertainty and worry in the Somali society.

It was found that environmental deterioration has led to violent conflicts as communities compete for dwindling natural resources in the Horn of Africa, concluding that environmental variables impact politics and socio-economic activity. Al-operations Shabaab's have resulted to serious environmental deterioration, which has slowed economic growth and sparked violent confrontations amongst communities in the battle for scarce resources. Furthermore, the Al-Shabaab group's terrorist activities involve the use of weapons (bombs), radioactive contamination, chemicals, and toxins that are particularly harmful to the environment and agricultural lands, limiting Somali citizens' ability to participate in important economic

activities like agriculture.

In spite of massive assistance from two-sided and multilateral sectors, the confident Somali government is unable to effectively manage or maintain security and essential services for the Somali population. Inevitable instability, cruelty, defilement, helpless asset the board and political infighting, and the lack of municipal certainty mercilessly degrade public organizations' abilities. The charioteers of barbarism and ruthless obsession in Somalia are being dislodged by a few multinational and bilateral development assistance missions. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) builds a human confronting justice and security framework with the help of Japan, The European Union and others. It's possible that some of the charioteers of angry radicalism may have been rescued from an overreliance on hierarchical execution by shaky and unsuccessful incorporated organizations based on the projects of outside accomplice in past efforts to arrange and instrument.

According to the report, the socio-economic realities in Somalia and Eritrea were the driving force for fanaticism and radicalization. Psychological warfare, according to a significant number of respondents, was made more difficult by the country's financial situation.

As indicated by Defense Ministry authorities from both Somalia and Eritrea, the financial conditions are a significant reason for illegal intimidation in Somalia and Eritrea. An absence of an essential way of life has uncovered people and their families to look for or source elective livelihoods which have gotten progressively accessible through fear-based oppressor associations. Consequently, this was the perspective on the analytical columnist. As one key source contended that psychological warfare gives impetuses both philosophical and monetary. A disappointment by the chosen forces to accommodate the penniless permits dread associations to exploit the void and fill it while at the same time philosophically lecturing an answer that subverts the current forces. This was additionally reflected by a Defense Ministry official, who said that disintegration in the financial exercises made illegal intimidation an enormous degree since needy individuals are effortlessly allured to join psychological oppressor exercises than more extravagant individuals. Monetary advancement isn't the issue; the issue lies in that this progression just reasonably benefits a bit of the populace.

Researchers found that the radicalization of talented young people may be fueled by their failure to recognize their own biases. For example, Tunisian ISIS recruits were likely to come from areas with somewhat high levels of inside travel and high unemployment among college graduates. Travelers and those who are especially well-informed may have higher expectations for upgradability, which might lead to disappointment if opportunities do not materialize. Jobless and underemployed persons with auxiliary and tertiary education are more likely to have radical views than those with less educational background. People's perceptions of social exclusion (regardless of whether they are real or perceived) have a role in psychological militant enrollment, according to the respondents. An oppressed gathering might position itself as an elective local area that gives young people a voice, the sense of belonging and the freedom to participate in an alternative that could be more prominent than themselves.

The inquiry was completed. Fear mongering enrollment is influenced by many factors, including the proximity of a psychological militant gathering to a young person's geographic location, their financial situation, their perspective on social or political minimization, and their openness to lenient interpersonal organizations and fanatical propagation. According to the survey results, the relative importance of these characteristics varies depending on the neighborhood in which you live. Young people, whether male and female, are often used in psychological militant groupings for aid, enrollment, and fighting parts, although the majority of young warriors are male. The idea of Salafi-jihadist meetings usually forces young women's occupations to be those of wives and mothers.

Atrocities committed in Somalia and Eritrea's political economies, notably in those related to tourism and horticulture, were shown to have had disastrous impacts, according to the findings of this research. The terrorist actions of Al-Shabaab have spread to neighboring countries such as Kenya, resulting in strained economic and diplomatic connections between Somalia and its critical neighbors, which has a negative impact on the country's socioeconomic development and progress. As a consequence of the terrorist actions, innocent individuals in Somalia and nearby countries such as Kenya have been subjected to harsh economic hardships as a result. There has been a decrease in Somalia's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a consequence of terrorist activity, which has hampered economic growth.

The study concluded training of youths and young children through creating seminars and vocational centers to make them busy was one way of countering violent extremism. Another respondent was for the idea of training so as to improve their orientation towards alternative dispute resolution mechanism like having dialogues, mediation and arbitration. Since Africa is religious continent, religious leaders should be on the front line bridging the gap between the public and the relevant institutions expected to address the issues the public is demanding, to avoid them from expressing themselves through violent extremism. The respondents demonstrated that holding public gatherings were fitting that permitted members to propose intercessions to tackle psychological warfare related subjects as indicated by their very own expansive exhibit esteems.

The study concluded there is need for the religious leaders to encourage the government to have employment programmes for the youths. Religious leaders know how to persuade their way into the community hence their effectiveness authority. Religious leaders can reach the maximum number of people in mosques, madrassa and other religious gatherings. They are effective because they are considered to be opinion leaders in religious setup. Their presence within the society makes them more of genuine moderators than other leaders and the communities they operate in trust them better. This enables them to engage better with the people they are tasked to help. The religious leaders have knowledge on the changing dynamics of terrorism and there is the will from these leaders to fight radicalization and promote coexistences amongst their communities and bordering neighbors.

The study concluded not all savage fanatics are youngsters, they may likewise be older individuals who want to have their voices heard. As per the respondents most mediations need to have countering fierce fanaticism accounts and systems remembered for the instructive foundations (essential, optional and tertiary levels). Notwithstanding, the particular significance of instruction for countering rough radicalism should be examined on the neighborhood setting since certain networks may not be excited about training rather on strict investigations otherwise called Madrasas. It is critical to take note of that, while considering countering vicious radicalism technique installed in conventional schooling, low proficiency levels or saw underestimation might be the push and pull factors that lead to weakness to brutal fanaticism. Other social-political factors possibly affecting everything.

## **6.2 Recommendations**

The problems and challenges that this study has addressed call for a multi-dimensional, global as well as integrated approach that I combined with country and regional specific analysis as well as initiatives. Further, while there is urgent need for country and level responses, there is only a dire need to secure funding to countering violent extremism, provision of a strategic framework that is global as well as corporate direction on approach and writing computer programs are similarly imperative to help a long haul, composed reaction. The suggestions for activity introduced in this examination gives a demonstrative game plan that would guarantee that the drives and imaginative projects that are on-going or potentially got ready for the future both at country and provincial levels profit with an all around the world educated exploration, strategy just as programming viewpoint created with the commitment of a more extensive scope of accomplices.

The way wherein security organizations in the horn of Africa react to potential fear based oppressor dangers could prompt slander of specific gatherings or people and could along these lines drive savage fanaticism and radicalization measures in the district. Worldwide offices working in the horn of Africa to counter vicious radicalism for example UNDP ought to in this manner incorporate as one of its columns for forestalling brutal fanaticism internationally, measures pointed toward expanding the limit of the equity frameworks and security area, not just for the location and anticipation of rough exercises, yet in addition to guarantee that there is legitimate legal interaction and the lawful and common liberties of individuals being indicted are regarded and followed.

The rehabilitation and reintegration of convicts, particularly those accused of terror-related offenses and violent extremism, may be greatly improved if correctional institutions such as prisons are maintained and supervised by highly competent professionals. A de-radicalization program in correctional facilities would guarantee that they are not used to attract violent extremists. In addition, correctional institutions must engage closely with civil society groups and national human rights advocacy bodies to ensure that justice delivery, surveillance, and security are carried out in accordance with the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

It is possible to enhance the legitimacy of governmental institutions and foundations by ensuring openness and combating debasement, which also reduces the perception of inequality as a kind of foul play. States in the Horn of Africa should be assisted by international organizations in the region in enhancing their capacity to resist debasement establishments, cultivating the common public's ability to screen accountability and openness in the public authority, and assessing defilement hazards in specific areas and in the immediate vicinity.

The horn of Africa region's key partners must fairly review public and neighborhood issues that encourage ruthless fanatics and radicalization, for example, by leading overviews inside local networks and creating the impression of gatherings that address the country's diversity. Many means may be used to do this, such as public events that allow citizens to express their views openly, surveys conducted by government agencies and regular interactions between government officials, delegates/heads of networks, and common culture performers.

For women and men, especially those who have been disenfranchised, participation in civic activities and participation in essential decision-making is critical. There should be a wide range of approaches to support inclusive political processes that include men and women of all ages, as well as groups that have been marginalized and discriminated against, to improve civil society's capacity as well as protect public participation spaces, with a special focus on groups that have been marginalized and discriminated against.

Regular meetings between political leaders and important decision-makers, especially at the local level, are essential if peace and social cohesion are to be achieved. Legislators may encourage the passage of measures promoting equality for women and minorities, as well as enhancing safeguards for human rights and basic freedoms. Passing anti-terrorism legislation that might lead to the infringement of human rights and freedoms must also be done with caution.

Both budget allocation and enactment may assist in addressing the avoidance test. Legislators may also foster a public consensus that is based on the natural features of society. Furthermore, parliamentary oversight may help build popular confidence in the legitimacy of the leader's use of force and reveal a generally more open attitude toward acknowledging the validity of options for dealing with harsh fanaticism.

Efforts for Countering Violent Extremism efforts should be aligned to match threat levels that are found within each state in the region. Although there is a possibility of a risk-reduction strategy for the region, particularly on areas like anti-money laundering (AML) strategies and criminal justice cooperation as well as countering the financing of terrorism and CVE approaches that are tailor made will help in realizing most noteworthy pace of progress and such help would be more viable whenever coordinated through private drives and not endeavors that are driven universally. The ID of cooperative energies inside arranged and existing improvement help at global and public levels to address the elements that drive psychological oppression and brutal fanaticism is an essential need used to plan an all-encompassing methodology for countering savage radicalism. A drivers' approach to countering violent extremism should focus on addressing the socioeconomic and political grievance grievances that exist in communities. Additionally, diverse streams of development assistance should be given priority in order to achieve the goals of CVE.

Restricted limit of governments especially shows itself at the levels that are considered subnational whereby residents hold the most immediate contact with state organizations, as well as where the absence of safety and administrations turns out to be exceptionally evident. There is along these lines a need to improve administration quality and of commitment among residents and specialists upgrades public trust and state authenticity that are critical to quiet and just societies. States in the Horn of Africa must take the lead in reversing the long-held notions of socioeconomic injustice by concentrating on socioeconomic development for the disadvantaged, underprivileged, and historically excluded groups and creating responsibility, transparency, ownership, and cooperation.

Addressing grievances that are longstanding in society is dependent on an open and safe environment for inclusive and constructive dialogue. For instance, using counter-terrorism policies and enactments for the mistreatment of minority gatherings and political resistance can seriously harm trust inside networks restricting the chance of valuable discourse. It is consequently significant for states in the district to fortify between common commitment just as exchange with common society to help in showing governments' eagerness to acknowledge reactions and change approaches with the goal of tending to local area concerns. Common society can likewise fill in as



a fundamental public great all by itself outside the domain of governmental issues. Also, the consideration of non-administrative entertainers and other pertinent key partners in planning and conveying comprehensive public CVE techniques to upgrade their effect subsequently expanding their help base.

Quiet systems pointed toward accomplishing and advancing change are basic for repaying conditions in which political organizations are not reacting to the requirements of networks and residents significantly prompting a decrease of the danger of political viciousness. Free courts, races and systems like the media, common society associations and backing gatherings can give outlets pointed toward working with arrangement, broadcasting complaints and accommodating gatherings with the state, examining arrangements productively, and directing desires to accomplish political change successfully.

The precise maltreatment and separation of ladies is a purposeful and key strategy of numerous savage radical gatherings. Indeed, even before the vicious radicalism, key markers of expanded occurrences of fanatic belief systems involve expanded oppression ladies and young ladies. It is subsequently critical to advocate for the support of equivalent ladies' and young ladies' privileges and ensuring that legitimate structure and approaches directing sex uniformity are adequately set up and authorized as huge structure squares of preparation the counteraction of savage radicalism. Ladies are amazing voices of counteraction homes, networks and schools, associations and developments run by ladies have assumed huge parts in supporting for resistance and consideration.

Associations that are run and overseen additionally give elective financial and instructive exercises for the adolescent in danger. The associations can in this manner be utilized to remarkably help in the structure of the social union needed for opposing the allure of rough radical gatherings. A more noteworthy level of the current counter-savage fanatic projects are essentially centered around men. Ladies are likewise excluded from the dynamic cycles identifying with countering fierce fanaticism. It is accordingly essential to put resources into the financial self-sufficiency of ladies

as a basic system for the counteraction of fierce fanaticism as the financial status of ladies assembles versatility, just as that of their families, against joining radical gatherings.

Young people are disproportionately impacted by violent extremism since they can easily be lured into radical thinking by both terrorist groups and extremist groups. Failures by societies ensure the integration of young people in meaningful ways to ensure that they are not engaged in political violence as well as violent extremism. The youth however do play a very significant role and are already involved in the transformation of their communities, building peace and countering violence. These efforts by the youth however remain largely invisible in the society as a result of inadequate mechanisms for their effective investment, and absence of chances for organizations with the essential dynamic bodies and offices. It is subsequently significant for governments in the horn of Africa to guarantee support for the young and their associations as pioneers just as harmony developers and advertisers of social attachment in their own networks and as entertainers for re-joining and early admonition.

There is undeniable degrees of joblessness among the young in the horn of Africa because of poor or no admittance to schooling just as the difficulties coming about because of urbanization. Countries in which the rustic populace is ceaselessly running metropolitan habitats and significant urban areas experience the ill effects of restricted business openings and thusly experience high occurrences of medication misuse, crimes including joining brutal radical associations, among the youthful metropolitan populace. To support in appropriate formation of urban planning, the governments in the horn of Africa should expand opportunities for young people to ensure that they engage in viable economic activities by training them in a vocational skill, or receiving micro grants aimed at encouraging their creativity and entrepreneurship skills in order to provide them with greater resilience to the appeal of violent extremism.

Throughout the world, religion inspires and encourages individuals to do good deeds and acts of compassion. Understanding the importance of religious identity and ideology as well as the influence of religion on communities, people, and institutions is critical to countering violent extremism. It's also critical to challenge the growing idea that religion itself is a source of violence.

Challenges arise when dealing with obsessive beliefs and religious politics. As a result, religious leaders have a unique role to play in the fight against violent extremism.

### **6.3 Suggestion for Future Studies**

The research focused on violent extremism as well as the political economy of the Horn of Africa, with particular focus to Somalia and Eritrea. It is possible to duplicate the research in other African areas with varied social and political features to demonstrate any relevant patterns in the political economy, radicalization and violent extremism. " In addition, little study has been done on the impact of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa on fragility of economics and instability. As a result, more investigation into this topic is possible in the future. The horn of Africa, in particular Kenya, Eritrea, and Somalia, has seen preliminary studies on individual processes of radicalization and youth recruitment into extremist groups, but more investigation into the complex interactions between political and socio-economic factors in these countries is needed to establish the best mechanism for combating violent extremism in the region. We must examine the extent of the juvenile radicalization, what are the primary thrusts that produce adolescent respectability, is it simply inside the Muslim people group in Somalia and Eritrea, or is it cutting across the two countries all the way through. The results of this investigation will reveal the finer details of some of the corrective actions that Somalia and Eritrea might take to curb harsh fanaticism and radicalization inside their borders.

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The United Nations Secretary General.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What are the elements that make people in the area more likely to be recruited by terrorist organizations?

In Somalia and Eritrea, why are young people susceptible to the ideas of violent extremists and terrorists?

In what ways have extremist violence and terrorism harmed the economies of the two countries, Somalia and Eritrea?

In what ways did the counter-violent extremism initiative in Somalia and Eritrea engage the public and the communities?

Explain how religious leaders and organizations in Somalia and Eritrea are tackling violent extremism in their respective countries.

To what extent are Somalia and Eritrea's existing counter-violent extremism initiatives efficient and effective in their efforts to combat violent extremism?

Is there a way to avoid and quantify violent extremism in Somalia and Eritrea by policy changes and adjustments?

Do you have any ideas on how to communicate anti violent extremism messaging to the people in Somalia and Eritrea? If so, please share them with us in this section.

9. Describe the government's involvement in Somalia and Eritrea's fight against violent extremism

## APPENDIX II: INTRODUCTION LETTER



**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**  
College of Humanities and Social Sciences  
**Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies**

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Kenya

November 17, 2020

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: NOORDIN MOHAMED IBRAHIM – R50/12197/2018

This is to confirm that the above-mentioned person is a bona fide student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi pursuing a **Master of Arts Degree in International Studies**. He is working on a research project titled, **"IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE HORN OF AFRICA, A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA AND ERITREA"**.

The research project is a requirement for students undertaking Masters programme at the University of Nairobi, whose results will inform policy and learning.

Any assistance given to him to facilitate data collection for his research project will be highly appreciated.


Thank you in advance for your consideration.




Professor ~~Maria Mwangi~~,  
Director, IDIS  
&  
Professor of International Relations and Governance




# APPENDIX III: RESEARCH PERMIT

  
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**This is to Certify that Mr. NOORDIN MOHAMED IBRAHIM of University of Nairobi, has been licensed to conduct research in Garissa, Wajir on the topic: IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA AND ERITREA for the period ending : 24/November/2021.**

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