

**FACTORS AFFECTING THE BUILDING OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN POST
CONFLICT SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF SOMALIA (2000 – 2017)**

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted before to any other degree at any other institution.

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my beloved mother Nadifo Abdi Mohamed and my cousin, Abdiaziz Ahmed Barre who played central role in ensuring the completion of the project.

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I would like to appreciate Professor Peter Wanyande, who guided me while writing this project. He was extremely resourceful and selfless in offering scholarly assistance. I also want to thank Professor Fred Jonyo for facilitating the completion of the project and also for encouraging me to remain resilient throughout research study.

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ABSTRACT

This study assessed the factors affecting the building of political institutions in Somalia. It covered the period between 2000 and 2017. The study had the following objectives: to determine the influence of insecurity to the building of political institutions, to establish the role of clan-conflicts to the establishment of political institutions, to investigate the effects of corruption on the establishment of political institutions, and to examine the influence of political good-will on the establishment of political institutions. The study used historical institutionalism and rational choice theories in describing and explaining the findings. Moreover, the study used quantitative

and qualitative research methods to collect data. The use of quantitative research methods allowed the responses to be measured numerically. Thus, it allowed generalizations to be made about the population. On the other hand, qualitative research methods let the study gain significant insights regarding the subject matter. Through qualitative research methods, respondents had the latitude to respond to the questions they were asked in an open-ended structure. The study applied a cross-sectional research design. In that regard, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected at a particular time. Put differently, respondents were engaged only once at the specific time frame. The study further utilized focus group discussions, surveys, and interviews as the major research instruments in collecting primary data. Respondents were engaged face-to-face, through telephone, and on internet platforms. Similarly, secondary data was also put to use. The study made several findings relevant to the research questions and objectives. They included but were not limited to insecurity in the Federal Republic of Somalia. Respondents indicated that insecurity arising from militia groups was, and still is, a significant setback in the efforts geared toward building political institutions. The study also found that intermittent clan-based conflicts affected the building of political institutions. Corruption and lack of transparency were also identified as challenges affecting the establishment of political institutions. The study recommended full implementation of the current Somali provisional constitution, particularly chapter 14, Article 126, which spells out clear measures for safeguarding the internal as well as the external security of the Federal Republic of Somalia. It also recommended forming and implementing affirmative policy programs to address clan-based conflicts from marginalized clans. The study further suggested civic education to the citizens to inform them of the relevance of building political institutions.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISON	-	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQ-AI	-	Qaeda Organization networks
AU	-	African Union
DEOID	-	Department of International Development
DFI	-	Direct Foreign Investments

FMS	-	Federal Member States
IGAD	-	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
NGOs	-	Non- Governmental Organizations
STFG	-	Somali Transitional Federal Government
TFI	-	Transitional Federal Institutions
TFP	-	Transitional Federal Parliament
UN	-	United Nations
UNOSOM	-	United Nations Operation in Somalia
WB	-	World Bank

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Somalia still faces myriad challenges in building solid political institutions (Samatar, 2016). Viewed from a historical lens, Somalia gained independence in the 1960s by establishing parliamentary governance systems with relatively stable civil political institutions (Omar, 2017). Unfortunately, in 1969, a military coup overthrew the civilian government, forming an army regime under General Siad Barre.

Under the military regime, relatively stable state institutions were set up significantly in the security sector. However, its civil service was skewed towards advancing and aiding the survival of the military government (Annan, 2004). Towards the 1970s, social forces of clan interest began to infiltrate into national politics. Worse, the military government, under Siad Barre's leadership, began to de-institutionalize the state (Mankhaus, 2012). That was evident when the military secretariat consolidated power in the late 1970s by virtually monopolizing key structures of the state responsible for public policy formulation and implementation (Allen, 2013). For instance, heads of state parastatals were often reshuffled or demoted systematically to thwart potential rivals and voices of dissent against the military government (Ahmed, 2012).

Moreover, the survival of the state institutions under the military regime was made possible during the Cold War (Banerjee, 2019). The strategic location of Somalia along the India Ocean coast made it a viable theater for geo-politics between the then USSR and the US. Henze (1991) observed that by 1987, the Gross National Product of the Republic of Somalia was made up of an estimated 57% of foreign aid. The military governance structures were run and funded by foreign aid inflows from the US and the USSR. Despite the substantive amount of foreign assistance that Somalia received on the eve of the Cold War, little was achieved in terms of institution building (Henze, 1991).

Laitin, (2000) argued that close relatives from the Siad Barre clan and those close to the military government embezzled and diverted most of the resources set for reconstructing and developing state institutions. For example, foreign Aid that the US government donated to assist in

reinforcing the military capacity through training, equipping, and providing military skills to the Somali Army located at Fort Leavenworth dissipated without a trace and accountability (Boix and Syolik, 2013). In the end, that program stalled midway due to inadequate resources. The reduction of the influence of the Cold War in late 1989-90` predisposed the republic of Somalia to massive socio-economic constraints. Both the US and USSR froze financial aid to the government of Siad Barre.

The demise of military rule in 1991 led to the emergence of multiple centers of power and authority that degenerated into a series of civil wars. In an attempt to restore the civil government, external communities intervened through UNOSOM in 1993. The primary objective of UNOSOM was to facilitate a peaceful transition of power from the military to the civilian, foster national reconciliation among the rebel groups, and promote positive institution-building (United Nations, 1993). UNOSOM faced many challenges in its attempt to achieve the above objectives. For example, there was little time to enable it to re-draft a new constitutional framework, register voters, arrange for a referendum and carry out an election (Herbist, 1997).

It also had difficulty reconciling the interest of the warlords and those of the citizens; since the rebels did not prefer giving power to the citizens to elect their own leaders. Instead, the warlords chose to appoint delegates from various clans who were supposed to elect the leaders on behalf of the people. That way, their interest, and dominance were protected. Despite the attempts of UNOSOM to restore the civilian government, encourage reconciliation among rebels, and defend human rights and solid civil society, UNOSOM was finally withdrawn in 1995. However, it did not resolve the problem of weak institutions.

The failure of the UNOSOM to restore peace and civilian government exacerbated Somalia's political instability, leading to the insurgence of numerous warlords and Al-Shabab militia groups. As a result, the domestic and international community shifted attention to fostering national security instead of building state institutions (Horowitz, 2014). More resources have been channeled towards surveillance, detection, and persecution of militia groups such as Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda organizations. Thus, leaving little national resources for enhancing state capacity.

To abate the ever-increasing political instability in Somalia, the United Nations advocated for creating a Transitional Federal Government in 2004 (De Zeeuw, 2015). Transitional Federal government had well-defined goals. One, it was supposed to provide a long-lasting solution between the rebels and ultimately restore peace and pave the way for the creation of state institutions (social, economic, and, more particularly, political institutions) that would provide the basis for democratic governance (Bell, 2018). The TFG faced difficulties and massive challenges in meeting those objectives (Hanze, 2012). The citizens perceived it as a platform within which foreign Aid from the donor states was embezzled and siphoned to further the interest of the high-ranking state officials at the helm of power within the TFG. Patrick, (2011) observed that most of the resources in the form of Aid that were channeled in a bid to promote the development of state institutions within the TFG were diverted by some members of the federal parliament, thereby weakening the running of those political institutions.

By 2009, it was evident that the TFG had failed to achieve what it had envisaged to accomplish and to forge functional state institutions in the federal republic of Somalia (Jung, 2012). TFG had no robust institutional capacity to control famine, civil wars, and hunger. Somalia has recently engaged in over 15 conferences to restore sustainable peace and foster reconciliation. Against this backdrop, this study sought to examine the challenges that affect the building of political institutions in Somalia.

1.2 Problem Statement

Building solid political institutions in the Republic of Somalia has remained elusive since its collapse in 1991 (Rondinelli, 2007). Even in regions such as Somaliland and Puntland, where relatively solid political institutions exist, the two areas still struggle to forge strong and sustainable institutions.

Political institutions currently in existence discharge their duty in a manner that contradicts and is at variance with the provisional constitution. Ndulo and Duthie (2009) observed that majority of state institutions are no different from magnets designed to attract foreign aid, which contradicts their mandate of delivering public service and goods to the people of Somalia.

Worse, in the southern regions of Somalia, militia groups such as Al-Shabab; have captured and subverted the operations of the provisional constitution and the Federal institutions (Ndulo, 2009).

Substantive efforts have been made locally and internationally to create strong institutions. For instance, the establishment of the Federal National Government and its institutions in early 2000, Transitional Federal institutions, and the current political institutions under the Federal Government. Most of those efforts faced challenges that affected building solid political institutions. This led to weak and dysfunctional institutions with little capacity to deliver public goods.

The current Somalia Federal Government, which came to power following the demise of the Transitional Federal Government in 2012, is also facing myriad challenges to forging functional and sustainable political institutions (Patsiaouras, 2009). Establishing a single center of authority and power with sound institutions remains a work in progress with numerous challenges. It is against this backdrop that this study sought to examine the challenges that affect the building of political institutions in Somalia

1.3 Research Questions

- i. How does insecurity affect the building of political institutions?
- ii. How do clan conflicts affect the building of political institutions?
- iii. How does corruption affect building of political institutions?
- iv. What are the effects of political good-will on the building of political institutions?

1.4 Objective

1.4.1 General Objective

To examine the factors affecting the building of political institutions in Somalia.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

- i. To assess the influence of insecurity on the building of political institutions.
- ii. To establish the role of clan conflicts in the building of political institutions.

- iii. To investigate the effects of corruption on the construction of political institutions.
- iv. To examine the influence of political good-will on the building of political institutions

1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justifications

The project increased the scope of available scholarly literature on building solid political institutions. It provided a fresh understanding of the challenges of building strong political institutions. The study unearthed scores of challenges through its findings; when resolved through a set of recommendations provided, it would help scholars with wide knowledge of the importance of building political institutions. It also added more academic literature on factors that challenge building political institutions across countries- following prolonged conflicts and civil wars- particularly in the Federal Republic of Somalia.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

It provided policy value by proposing a range of policy-based programs, such as feasible affirmative action programs that would elevate the marginalized groups in society to enhance national cohesion and inclusivity. That way, rebelling factions would not feel left out and thwart the institution-building process. Secondly, the study suggested introducing redistributive policy measures to ensure equal and equitable distribution of national resources. Lastly, through the study, implementation of Articles 51, 126, and chapter 14 of the provisional constitutions were encouraged to avert insecurity matters that pose grave threats to the institutional building process.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

The study was done in Somalia. It focused on the periods between 2000 and 2017. During that period, over 15 conferences have been held in Somalia and other countries to build strong political institutions in Somalia. However, the resolution of each conference has not resulted in significant fruits concerning institution building. So, by focusing on that time frame, the study was able to assess efforts put in place to build strong political institutions as well as the challenges affecting building political institutions in Somalia.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Somalia still faces myriad challenges in building solid political institutions (Samatar, 2016). Viewed under the historical lens, Somalia gained independence in the 1960s and established parliamentary governance systems with relatively stable civil political institutions (Omar, 2017). Unfortunately, in 1969, a military coup overthrew the civilian government, forming a military regime under General Siad Barre.

Several issues characterized the leadership under Said Barre. Firstly, he tried to initiate a widespread modernization and nationalization of industries, the banking system, and other such institutions. He also promoted cooperative farms during his regime and the use of Somali languages to eliminate tribalism. Through political maneuvers, this leader made the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party the Somali's vanguard party as from 1976. His controversial leadership led to the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia. After Somalia was defeated in the Ogaden War, there were strained relationships between the government and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Somalia Rebellion can also be blamed for the severed ties between the Somalia government and the Soviet Union. After their fallout with the Soviet Union, the Somalia government under Barre lied to the United States. This relationship went on throughout the Cold War even though Barre's regime began ties with China and maintained its Marxist-Leninist philosophies. Barre's leadership at home led to much opposition, especially because he was dictatorial. During his leadership, tribal politics increased, there were also cases of abuse of the National Security Service, and the worst of his administration was the Isaaq Genocide. The country's economy depreciated; from then, some rebellions were carried out against his government. The Somali Rebellion of 1991 was successful, leading to his removal from power. Even then, the Somalia government did not settle because this ushered in a period of Civil Wars that forced him to run away to exile in Nigeria.

Notable is that under the military regime, relatively stable state institutions were set up especially in the security sector. However, its civil service was skewed towards advancing and aiding the survival of the military government (Annan, 2004). Towards the 1970s, social forces of clan

interest began to infiltrate into national politics. Worse, the military government, under Siad Barre's leadership, began to de-institutionalize the state (Mankhaus, 2012). That was evident when the military secretariat consolidated power in the late 1970s by virtually monopolizing key structures of the state responsible for public policy formulation and implementation (Allen, 2013). For instance, heads of state parastatals were often reshuffled or demoted systematically to thwart potential rivals and voices of dissent against the military government (Ahmed, 2012).

Moreover, the survival of the state institutions under the military regime was made possible by virtue of the Cold War (Banerjee, 2019). The strategic location of Somalia along the India Ocean coast made it a viable theater for geo-politics between the then USSR and the US. Henze (1991) observed that by 1987, the Gross National Product of the Republic of Somalia was made up of an estimated 57% of foreign aid. The military governance structures were run and funded by foreign aid inflows from the US and the USSR. Despite the substantive amount of foreign assistance that Somalia received at the eve of Cold War, little was achieved in terms of institution building (Henze, 1991).

Laitin, (2000) argued that close relatives from the Siad Barre clan and those close to the military government embezzled and diverted most of the resources set for reconstructing and developing state institutions. For example, foreign Aid that the US government donated to reinforce the military capacity through training, equipping, and providing military skills to the Somali Army located at Fort Leavenworth dissipated without trace and accountability (Boix and Syolik, 2013). In the end, that program stalled midway due to inadequate resources. The reduction of the influence of the Cold War in late 1989-90` predisposed the republic of Somalia to massive socio-economic constraints. Both the US and USSR froze financial aid to the government of Siad Barre.

The demise of military rule in 1991 led to the emergence of multiple centers of power and authority that degenerated into a series of civil wars. In an attempt to restore the civil government, external communities intervened through UNOSOM in 1993. The primary objective of UNOSOM was to facilitate a peaceful transition of power from the military to the civilian, foster national reconciliation among the rebel groups, and promote positive institution-building

(United Nations, 1993). UNOSOM faced many challenges in its attempt to achieve the above objectives. For example, there was little time to enable it to re-draft a new constitutional framework, register voters, arrange for a referendum and carry out an election (Herbalist, 1997). It also had difficulty reconciling the interest of the warlords and those of the citizens; since the rebels did not prefer giving power to the citizens to elect their own leaders. Instead, the warlords chose to appoint delegates from various clans who were, in turn, supposed to elect the leaders on behalf of the people. That way, their interest, and dominance were protected. Despite the attempts of UNOSOM to restore the civilian government, encourage reconciliation among rebels, and defend human rights and solid civil society, UNOSOM was finally withdrawn in 1995. However, it did not resolve the problem of weak institutions.

The failure of the UNOSOM to restore peace and civilian government exacerbated the political instability in Somalia, leading to the insurgence of numerous warlords and Al-Shabab militia groups. As a result, the domestic and international community shifted attention to fostering national security instead of building state institutions (Horowitz, 2014). More resources have been channeled towards surveillance, detection, and persecution of militia groups such as Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda organizations. Thus, leaving little national resources for enhancing state capacity.

To abate the ever-increasing political instability in Somalia, the United Nations advocated for creating a Transitional Federal Government in 2004 (De Zeeuw, 2015). Transitional Federal government had well-defined goals. One, it was supposed to provide a long-lasting solution between the rebels and ultimately restore peace and pave the way for the creation of state institutions (social, economic, and, more particularly, political institutions) that would provide the basis for democratic governance (Bell, 2018). The TFG faced difficulties and massive challenges in meeting those objectives (Hanze, 2012). The citizens perceived it as a platform within which foreign Aid from the donor states was embezzled and siphoned to further the interest of the high-ranking state officials at the helm of power within the TFG. Patrick, (2011) observed that most of the resources in the form of Aid channeled to promote the development of state institutions within the TFG were diverted by some members of the federal parliament, thereby weakening the running of those political institutions.

By 2009, it was evident that the TFG had failed to achieve what it had envisaged to accomplish and to forge functional state institutions in the federal republic of Somalia (Jung, 2012). TFG had no robust institutional capacity to control famine, civil wars, and hunger. Somalia has recently engaged in over 15 conferences to restore sustainable peace and foster reconciliation. Against this backdrop, this study sought to examine the challenges that affect the building of political institutions in Somalia.

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Substantive efforts have been made locally and internationally to create strong institutions. For instance, the establishment of the Federal National Government and its institutions in early 2000, Transitional Federal institutions, and the current political institutions under the Federal Government. Most of those efforts faced challenges that affected building of solid political institutions. This led to weak and dysfunctional institutions with little capacity to deliver public goods.

The current Somalia Federal Government, which came to power following the demise of the Transitional Federal Government in 2012, is also facing myriad of challenges in a bid to forge functional and sustainable political institutions (Patsiaouras, 2009). Establishment of a single

center of authority and power with sound institutions remains work in progress with numerous challenges. It is against this backdrop that this study sought to examine the challenges that affect the building of political institutions in Somalia

1.3 Research Questions

- v. What are the challenges affecting the building of political institutions?
- vi. What are the remedies to the challenges affecting the building of political institutions?

1.4 Objective

1.4.1 General Objective

To examine the building of political institutions in Somalia.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

- v. To assess the challenges affecting the building of political institutions.
- vi. To establish the remedies to the challenges affecting the building of political institutions.

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1.5.1 Academic Justifications

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study, implementation of Articles 51, 126, and chapter 14 of the provisional constitutions was encouraged so as to avert insecurity matters that pose grave threats to the institutional building process.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

The study was done in Somalia. It focused on the periods between 2000 and 2017. During that period, over 15 conferences have been held in Somalia and other countries with a view of building solid political institutions in Somalia. However, the resolution of each meeting has not resulted in significant fruits concerning institution building. So, by focusing on that time frame, the study was able to assess efforts put in place to build strong political institutions as well as the challenges affecting building political institutions in Somalia.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The section examined previous epistemological knowledge that focused on the challenges which post -conflicts societies face in their bid to develop functional political institutions. Concerning the case of the Federal Republic of Somalia, pertinent literature gaps were identified. The study attempted to fill these gaps through its findings and by extension, through a set of recommendations in chapter- four of the study.

In collaboration with the London College of Economics (2009), Price Water House Coopers conducted a study on Afghanistan's political and institutional building. It sought to establish the influence of militia groups (Taliban) in restoring peace and strengthening state institutions. The study employed qualitative research methods and survey research instruments to collect data. The study established that the Taliban and Hizb-1 militia groups posed grave threats to building strong political institutions in Afghanistan. The Taliban and Hizb-1 rebelled against state institutions and threatened to set up a parallel government. That study left a gap by essentially failing to provide a tenable solution of regulating the influence of Militia groups in building strong political institutions.

Zoran and Ljiljana (2016) studied factors that hinder implementation programs that promote institutionalism and the development of state institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The study applied the institutionalism approach. That study established that pertinent policies and laws that guide the operations of certain state institutions, such as the electoral bodies, were at variance with the public optics of the citizens. As such, adherence to such rules by the citizens was not feasible. They generated conditions that contradicted democratic values and conferred institutional instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The study failed to explain how such polices could be reformed to spur democratic governance.

Omar, (2017) conducted a study on the factors that hindered the development of state institutions in Somalia. It applied qualitative as well as quantitative research methods. It used a time series

gathered for three-months. The study found a strong positive correlation between terrorism activities and state failure. Put differently, that study found that the existence of weak state institutions provides safe havens for extremist organizations to carry out domestic and international terrorist attacks. That study did explain how terrorists could be stopped from interfering with the process of state building

Hersi and Ali (2019) studied the factors that influenced institution-building in the current Somali Federal Government. The study applied an old institutional approach to explaining its objectives and findings. It used quantitative research methods. It conducted an online survey whereby 1,073 respondents were interviewed using questionnaires. The study established that an ineffective framework of sharing national revenue between the two levels of government in Somalia also posed challenges to the institutional building.

Doornbos (2002) studied the contributions of the Federal political systems to building functional state institutions in Somalia. The study used survey research strategies. It established that there was a lack of unanimous agreement among Somali citizens regarding modalities that Somalia had to adopt to create institutions that would work in the current Federal Political systems. However, that study did not explicitly identify or explain the factors that hindered development of institutions under the current federal system of governance.

A systematic review of scholarly literature uncovered several knowledge gaps. For example, feasible security policies that would attenuate the influence of militia groups such as Al-Shabab; were found to be weak and required strengthening. The present study proposed ways of filling this gap through the implementation of chapter 14 of Somalia's provisional constitution, significantly Articles 51 and 126 of the body. It further identified corruption as a challenge and proposed accountability and transparency programs to be itched into the public service sector.

In this study by Aiken (2008), the researchers acknowledged that peace and trust were crucial after ethnic conflict. The research question was on developing political trust after civil strife. Since these were considered the most important factors for political stability after civil disputes, Aiken (2008) sought to demonstrate that when there is improved provision of public services,

trust is built and thus trust creates space for building political institutions. The researchers' project focused on Sierra Leon and employed micro-level data. This study showed more trust in the people when the government listens and responds to their needs (Aiken, 2008). The study also identified that the government's performance bears with it the hypothesis that its exploratory powers reduce significantly once its responsiveness is introduced into the analysis. The study's outcome showed that trust can be built in post-conflict societies through listening and getting close to the people. The two major limitations of this study were that the study focused on Sierra Leon, and yet the social-political issues in this country may be different from the social-political issues in Somalia. Secondly, this study relied on micro-level data and since the data was collected from other studies whose limitations were not factored in, it may not be reliable. This research will try to fill this gap by specifically focusing on Somalia and also conducting a study to determine the means through which political institutions can be established in Somalia after the long conflict

Walter's study examined civil wars and establishing governments in states where civil strife has ended (Walter 2015). In this study, the researchers were interested in investigating the establishment of governments in regions where civil wars have happened. The study also intended to establish how governments can be installed so that civil wars do not reoccur. This article also contrasted the classical theories of grievances and opportunity. The article instead advanced the theory that the civil wars can recur if the leadership does not consider the significance of legal and political institutions and their roles in creating political reforms. The study also observed that there was a need to establish governments in such a way that there is no room for the government to have to maintain the militia groups. Thus, this study relied on a statistical analysis of post-conflict years. This article demonstrated a need for solid political institutions post-civil war (Walter 2015). The study, however, had gaps in their method of study. Besides, the research did not examine the challenges facing Somalia such as how to prevent the militia group from interfering with the government. It, however, clarifies that strong political institutions can impact stabilizing the government from infiltration by militia groups.

A global study on militia indicated several instances where states strongly connected with the militia. In this study that Carey conducted, Colaresi and Mitchell (2015) focused on Syria,

Sudan, and many other parts of the world, revealing that several governments enjoy some benefits when they work closely with the militia. State-militia relationships were found to be logistically beneficial to the government during civil wars. The research was conducted through a systematic global scale analysis and patterns of these informal linkages. The researchers found that more than 200 informal state militias had a relationship with the state. These militias were there even in nations where there were no civil wars. The research further uncovered that the presence of militia had benefits as already seen, and also had their down turns. Most significantly, the study showed that the presence of militia was primary in the uprising of civil wars. This research relied on empirical studies even though the gap that was identified is that the study did not specifically evaluate how the militia interferes with the implementation of political institutions. This study will fill this gap as it will focus on how Al-Shabaab as a militia interferes with establishing government institutions in post-civil war Somalia.

Establishing a government post-civil war in Somalia presented several challenges, Mohamed (2018) in this research essays looks at the establishment of a federal government in Somali post-the civil war. In this study, one will realize that even though the study partially examines the issues of leadership in Somali after a long period of war, the central idea of the paper is to look at the progress made by the federal system of governance (Mohamed, 2018). In the study the researcher argues that since Somalia is a developing nation that is emerging from a very long period of civil war the federal system of governance would not have been the best for the nation. Thus, this qualitative research approach will determine some of the challenges the federal government faces. In the end, this research study used the qualitative approach to uncover numerous challenges facing Somali society stemming from the civil wars that existed prior to the establishment of the government (Mohamed 2018). One of these severe challenges mentioned by the researcher is the existence of the Al-Shabaab Militia groups. This approach is significant to the study since it helps highlight some of the emerging issues surrounding establishing a government in Somalia post-civil-war (Mohamed,2018). The gap in this study is that it is more inclined toward identifying the challenges facing the federal governance system. This study will thus fill this gap by looking at all the underlying factors that affect the establishment of political institutions after the war. This way, the study will be more specific.

Jok (2021) undertook a study to examine factors that impacted on state building in South Sudan. In their study there were key factors that were identified. For starters, the researchers identified that fact that ethnicity played a central role in the state building within South Sudan. Ethnicity was found to play a double role (Jok, 2021). For instance, ethnicity played the key role of causing the people to create a government that meets their special needs. On the other hand, ethnicity was found to develop a state of exclusion, especially for the minority ethnic groups who felt that they were not fairly represented (Jok, 2021). This study indicated that when building political institutions in Somalia, ethnic political has a role to play. However, ethnic politics can be of adverse effects. The gap in this research was that the study did not give any solutions to the issues of state influence on building political institutions. Also the study focused on South Sudan where the problem is different. In south Sudan, the problem is ethnicity, while in Somalia, the problem is the case of militia groups.

Collier and Sambanis (2002) also examined the factors that affect the creation of governments after a long period of civil wars. In this study that examined civil wars in different regions in the world, the researcher undertook a literature review where the results showed that civil wars always cause disruption of leadership and the end of civil wars is just an initial part of creating stable governments (Collier and Sambanis, 2002). The study identified the fact that the way the government is formed, and the way the conflicting parties get involved in the formation of governments. This process of inclusion and the process of creating a political understanding is very significant and relevant to the creation of stable government. While this literature review contributed immensely to understanding the case of Somalia, this study was a literature review which did not offer accurate limitations of the entire process of selection of literature. Thus this study will try to fill that gap by giving a purely scientific evidence that is specific to the case of Somalia.

To better understand how armed militia groups can affect the stability of a government, Raleigh (2016) took a research study on the impacts of the armed militia groups in countries with Africa. In this study the researcher. In their study, the researchers identified the roles that armed militia play in disrupting the formation of governments. Additionally, the research showed that when governments are faced with such predicaments, most African leaders tend to retaliate with force

on in some cases if the militia have military strength, they make a peace agreement that is characterized by having the needs of the rebels met or incorporating them into the government (Raleigh, 2016). The study further showed how political stability is challenged by such threats from within. This study however failed also to point out the best approach that African states can take to ensure that stable governments can be created in these African countries in such environment with armed militia. This study will bridge this gap. The study by Raleigh (2016) used both qualitative and quantitative research methods to understand the factors that may affect peace and stability after an armed conflict. The issues that were identified in this study were issues like unresolved civil conflicts, the lack of inclusion in the formation of governments and failure to ensure complete disarmament. This study as seen proposed the best ways in which stable governments can be formed after a period of civil wars. The only factor that this paper did not consider especially in the African context is corruption. This is an area that this research will examine and thus fill this gap. Moreover, since this study is interested in the formation of government.

Roy (2014) conducted a study that looked into the establishment of government in a similar way as Raleigh (2016). In their study, the main objective was to determine some of the factors that affect political stability and peaceful governance in a new government. The researchers relied on a quantitative study. The research study results showed that political instability after events of war are mainly affected by the opposing teams (Roy, 2014). In cases where the opposing teams are the militia groups or any form of violent groups, then it is highly likely that the government will face some instability. The researchers pointed out on one solution which they witnessed and this was the inclusive leadership. This solution when examined closely might not be effective in the case of Somalia where some of the opposing leaders are representatives of terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab. The limitations of this study were that the study depended on quantitative data yet quantitative data fails to offer enough information. This specific study will fill this gap by relying heavily on both quantitative and qualitative data.

Rowley (2000) also identified the challenges of establishing governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. In their research study, they identified. The first issue this research identified was ethnicity and ethnic competitions. The researchers pointed out that in most African societies, the competition

between ethnicities threatened the stability of any government in place. The Second issue that was identified was political marginalization (Rowley, 2000). The researchers identified the fact that Most African societies had some regions or ethnic groups that were marginalized. As such, such groups were easily used to threaten peaceful coexistence and establishment of stable government especially when they know clearly that they are not included in the leadership. Finally, African states were mainly faced with the lack of resources to keep governments stable and well equipped to defend itself from external and internal aggression (Rowley, 2000). This last finding fits well with the case of Somalia. The limitation of this study was that it was only a literature review and literature reviews fail to provide a detailed account of the overall study strategy. This study method did not also offer enough details on the selection and exclusion of articles used and lack of details on the way the analysis was conducted.

Another review of various studies in this area was done by Cillier (2021). In their review, they sought to identify some of the major challenges that cause failure of governments and return to civil war after such wars are solved. The problem of proper resolutions and respect for peace pact were some of the problems that were identified (Cillier, 2021). Ineffective resolutions were characterized by the lack of proper sharing of power between the warring parties. Apart from sharing of power the researchers found out that there are instances where the resources are the causes of conflict and yet even after the end of civil war, there is still lack of proper sharing of these resources. The study showed that in most cases where there is return to civil war after an end of another civil war, mainly it is caused by a lack of respect to the pact and political agreements made. The study's gap is found in the fact that study was a review of various literature on this subject.

Nayak (2014) conducted a study that investigated the political institutions in India. In this study interest was directed towards finding out the factors that affect the building of institutions in the country. The researcher sought also to establish if there was any government militia existing in India and the impact that they had on the government institutions and the stability of the governments (Nayak, 2014). The research also sought to examine how such countries ensure that there is peace that the government institutions operate without interference from external forces like the militia. The research did not identify the existence of any specific body that worked as a

militia for the government. The study also found out that such issues were responsible for failures of governments. The gap in this study was found in its inability to offer any forms of remedies for these factors affecting political institutions.

Williams (2003) also carried out a research to determine the factors that could prevent government institutions from having stable lasting governments that progress democracy. The central interest for this study was on how the governments can establish democratic leadership and the factors that can hinder such (Williams, 2003). The researcher used both a qualitative and quantitative research approach. The researchers sourced their data from political leaders and political scientists who were familiar with the region. The researchers found that there is a connection between the ethnic rivalries, and unequal representation with the existence of undemocratic and unstable governments (Williams, 2003). The researchers saw that lack of unequal representation in a country with deep ethnic rivalries, was a recipe for political instability. This study however had two gaps that one must fill. The first one is that it fails to address the issue of terrorism and armed militia like in the case of Somalia. The second gap is that the study failed to factor in solutions to political instability caused by external factors such as ethnic rivalries.

Conducted in Afghanistan, this study aims to identify the role played by non-governmental and even religious institutions in ensuring a stable government (Monten, 2014). This exclusion is theoretically questionable, as if the definition of civil society groups were organized around interests, technically all interests would qualify for this category. At the same time, while it may be useful to distinguish between the goals of various civil society groups, their lack of inclusion in the civil society category is highly controversial (Monten, 2014). The gap in this specific research is seen in the failure by these researchers to identify how religion can also be a problem to political stability and the quest to have a democratic state.

The research by Apollos (2001) was conducted to evaluate the approaches best for government in conflict prone areas. The researchers suggests some important policy conclusions for conflict-prone countries. One is that policies to tackle poverty and environmental degradation will reduce the likelihood of war, as well as being critical development objectives (Apollos, 2001). Reducing

large horizontal inequalities is essential to eliminate a major source of conflict. Policies that diminish private incentives to fight, especially once conflict is under way, are also needed. Above all, there is a need to secure inclusive government—from political, economic, and social perspectives—and a flourishing economy so that all major groups and most individuals gain from participation in the normal economy (Apollos, 2001). The gap in this study is that the researcher do not go beyond the socioeconomic factors to look at other issues such as existence of militia groups and their roles in affecting the building of political institutions.

Thomas, Reed and Wolford (2016) conducted research on the effects of rebels groups on democratic governance of African nations to gain a better understanding of how they can affect political institutions. The investigator of this study. The researchers found that rebels disrupt political institutions formation in their research (Thomas, Reed & Wolford, 2016). In addition, the research showed that when political institutions are confronted with situations like these, most African leaders are prone to retaliate with force, although in some cases, when rebel groups have military might, they can reach a peace agreement in which the requirements are met of the rebels are confronted or incorporated into the political institutions (Thomas, Reed & Wolford, 2016). The study also demonstrated how such internal threats threaten political stability. However, this study also failed to identify the most effective strategy that African states can employ to ensure the establishment of stable political institutions in these African countries despite the presence of rebels. Moreover, this study was general and it did not factor in the idea that these rebel groups emerge after a long season of civil wars. This gap will be filled by this study.

Another study was conducted by Moss (2014) who also identified the factors that prevent the implementation of programs and policies in that promote the creation and stability of government institutions. The program also examined how political leaders can lead peacefully without external interference. This is a study that was done in Rwanda and the study went ahead to identify some of the policies and the mechanisms that the country has put in place with the aim of averting any more civil wars (Moss, 2014). In the process of making these findings, the researchers also discovered that the international community had a role to play in the stability of a nation and a political leadership. While this study focused on Rwanda and the establishment of

government in the region, the study failed to show the role that democratic leadership can play in creating a stable government and also the establishment of a representative leadership.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The study made use of two major theories in describing and explaining the subject matter of the study. A combination of historical institutionalism as well as rational choice theories were applied in the study. The study discussed the main assumptions of those approaches, their application to the study and their weaknesses. By using those two theories, the study was able to conceptualize the elements that give meaning to political institutions. That is, how political institutions are formed, structured and the routinized practices and standard principles that shape behavior of people working in such institutions. The second theory, provided the study with imperative insights into the behavior of specific individuals that are mandated to execute the functions of such political institutions in relation to the set beliefs and rules of the institutions. It further strengthened the weaknesses of the first approach.

2.2.1 Historical Institutionalism Theory

The theory came into the limelight around 1920s. It emerged as a one of the approaches that shaped the development of state institutions in post-World War 1. The main proponents that championed its development included: DiMaggio, Powell and Meyer (Rowan, 2015).

A brief historical understanding of this theory Historical Institutionalism is a social science theory that was developed to explain the importance of time, sequences, and path on the stability or shaping up of institutions. It also explains how these three mentioned elements mold the political, social and economic behaviors. When compared to rational change theory and functionalist theories, this theory tends to give emphasis that there are several outcomes that there are small events that can have a very significant impact on the political institutions that may be irreversible once the change takes place. Thus this theory also holds that such outcomes may be inefficient. A critical connection. As already mentioned, historical institutionalism as a term was first used in the 1990s on new publications it was also used in the 80s even though it was mostly used in the 1990s. Due to an increased. Robert and Geels (2019) in his analysis of this theory has revealed that there is an old institutionalism and a new institutionalism. The new

institutionalism is one that is best understood through contrasting it with the old constitutionalism. The Old institutionalism is explained as one that was overwhelmingly focused on the detailed narratives of the institutions. This old approach did not take much focus on the comparative analyses. Therefore, the old institutionalism was unhelpful for comparative research and when applied as exploratory theory. This old institutionalism was thus undermined because of its less usefulness. At this time also scholars chose to increase the highlighted formal rules in the structures of administration and it was also difficult for scholars to describe institutions accurately.

Sociological institutionalists and ideational scholars are perceived by Robert and Geels (2019) as having criticized versions of Historical Institutionalism that adopt materialist and rationalist ontologies. Scholars who use ideational approaches argue that institutional change occurs during episodes when institutions are perceived to be failing or during episodes of uncertainty, as this creates room for an exchange of ideas and a receptivity for institutional change. Robert and Geels (2019) uncovers the idea that political scientists such as Henry Farrell, Martha Finnemore, Mark Blyth, Oddny Helgadóttir, and William Kring argue that Historical Institutionalism has over time tended to engage more with rational choice institutionalism than with sociological institutionalism. Vincent Pouliot similarly writes that soft rational choice... informs most versions of [Historical Institutionalism]. According to Michael Zürn, Historical institutionalism "lacks a theory of action."

One notable thing about this theory is on how it was developed. According to Hameiri (2019), this theory and its development must touch in Marxism and the input of the earlier empiricist dialectical thinkers and positivists as well as historical institutionalists. In other words, when developing this theory, the scholars that came in later rejected the use of linear fashion and examined the conditions under which a given trajectory would be followed (Hameiri 2019). Works that study historical institutionalism tend to reject functionalist explanations of institutions. As a result, they are wary of explanations that work backwards from the functions of institutions to their origins for how they came to be. Historical institutionalists typically view the conflict and contention that led to the establishment of institutions as the cause of their inseparability even when the circumstances that led to them changed.

Also when discussing historical institutionalism as a theory, one must consider that the mechanisms of institutional stability are essential. This concept of path dependence is a concept used to understand the mechanism of institutional stability. The concept of path dependence is essential in the understanding of this theory. Hence because of the path dependence, institutions can sometimes have substantial stability even in instances when the institution goes in the direction of suboptimal arrangement. According to Hameiri (2019) path dependence involves the outcomes that are seen at a critical juncture and are thus triggered by positive or negative mechanisms. These mechanisms reinforce the recurrence of a given pattern that then informs the future direction that institutions may take. In other words, the path dependence makes a reversal difficult especially when a given path is already taken since there are increased costs when switching from one path to another.

Under the lens of historical institutionalism, an institution is simply a set of rules, laws, beliefs and routinized standard practices that help regulate and change the behavior of individuals; bound by the dictates of such institutions (Hameiri, 2019). Roberts and Geels, (2019) argued that institutions are established laws and customs that confers a change of behavior within a given society. Political parties, electoral bodies, parliament, judiciary, executive and civil service are examples of institutions. For instance, Parliament makes laws that regulate the behavior of citizens, the judiciary interpret and the executive implement the established laws. The approach underscores the study of power, structures of governance and functions of institutions (Boakye and Beland, 2019). Governance in the modern states occurs in and through political institutions. Hence, political institutions play important role in influencing and shaping political landscape (Otto, 2019).

2.2.1.1 Strengths of Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism explicitly focuses on the structural arrangement and functions of state institutions (Zheng et al., 2019). It places high premiums on how power is exercised in and through state institutions. Moreover, it describes the functions of state institutions (Suddaby, 2010). The central thrust of the approach assumes that once institutions are set up, automatically they would elicit the results expected from them by the citizens. It assumes that rules, customs,

beliefs and standard principles of behavior would be adhered to with or without motoring systems (Ottoson, 2019). The roles of individuals are subsumed by the institutions and as such, institutionalism tends to ignore the influence of individuals. Thus, the behavior of individuals that are important to the functioning of political institutions are relatively not put into consideration. Rational choice theory addresses that weakness by studying the specific behavior of persons mandated to execute roles of the institutions.

2.2.1.2 Weakness of Historical Institutionalism Theory

Despite the strengths and assumptions of historical institutionalism theory, it has certain shortcomings. Cai and Mehari, (2015) observed that this theory places high premiums on the analysis of internal dynamics for the institutional change. It also gives less credit to the influence of individuals mandated to run the affairs of institutions. Put differently, it over-looks the self-interest and power of individuals running institutions. This theory also assumes that the laws, policies and rules defining institution will be ‘automatically followed and obeyed’. However, in some instances that might not be the case since self-interest often influence the functioning of the institutions.

The strengths and assumptions of historical institutionalism are ‘complemented’ by the use of the second theory, rational choice theory, which put into consideration the role of individuals in the study of the institutions in addition to the institutional laws, policies and rules described by the institutionalism theory. Thus, a well-balanced theoretical framework is presented by using the two theories.

2.2.2 Rational Choice Theory

The development of this theory was heavily attributed to the efforts of behavioralists in the United States (Hinich, 1997). Scholars such as Anthony Downs and William Riker were associated with the development of rational choice theory (Hinich and Muger, 1997). Its proponents sought to study institutions beyond the functions and structures as was advanced by the old institutionalism approach. Instead, behavioralists were interested in unraveling specific behavior of individuals who gets opportunity to carry out functions of institutions through the use of empirical scientific methods. The approach found its application in the works of

Anthony Downs around 1957 in his study of political parties and their influence of electoral contest in the US.

The rational choice theory is a theory mainly used in social work. This theory can however be applied in understanding the building of political institutions. The rational choice theory when applied in its normal context is used to explain the way in which people make decisions. According to Abell (2000) the definition given of rational choice theory is that it describes a decision making process that is characterized by proper consideration of several factors. In other words, when a person is making a rational choice, they consider the risks, costs, and benefits of the decision they make. This choice is a direct opposite of irrational choice because irrational choice focuses mainly on the decisions that please a person emotionally but is not critically thought through. Understanding this theory is important since it helps scholars understand why some people make the decisions that they make and it can also help the decision makers to make the right decisions.

According to Abell (2000) this theory can be applied in many different scenarios. It can be applied in the field of philosophy, psychology, economics and even in political science. This theory holds that an individual can sometimes be persuaded by self-interests to make decisions. However, the individual can also make a decision based on rational thinking where they make choices guided by critical analysis of the benefits and losses as well as factors that may come out of these decisions. According to Abell (2000) it involves weighing options before getting involved in the decision. Abell (2000) is of the opinion that economics, psychology, and philosophy are just a few of the fields in which rational choice theory can be utilized. According to this theory, people make decisions based on their own self-interest in order to maximize their benefits. After weighing their options, individuals select the option they believe will be most beneficial.

Munga (2012) has stated in their study in this theory that, individual preferences determine how they choose what will serve them best. For instance, if a person wants to keep their health safe, they might decide that quitting smoking is best. Because smoking relieves stress, another person may decide to try it. Despite the fact that these are opposing options, both people make them for

the best possible outcome for themselves. Other theories of social work clash with rational choice theory as unveiled by Munga (2012). According to psychodynamic theory, for instance, unconscious processes cause humans to seek gratification. In contrast, rational choice theory asserts that every action can be rationally justified. Because the benefits are worth the cost, people strive to maximize them.

2.2.2.1 Assumptions of the Rational Choice Theory

Its primary assumption lies on the role of individual(s) mandated to run state institutions (Abell, 2000). It assumes that an individual is inherently self-calculating and profit oriented. That is, an individual is a self-maximizing being; driven by cost-benefits associated to an entity. Thus, social actions of individuals possess overarching influence on the building of state institutions in the modern states (Munga, 2012). Moreover, it assumes that individuals select their social actions optimally based on the highest returns that accrues by virtue of engaging in such social actions. Social actions that individuals choose; are assumed to be the best after an individual's calculations, personal assessment and or judgement. Hence, hitherto individual's social behavior is more or less influenced by the benefits they are likely to gain as opposed to the rules, laws and beliefs defining institutions.

This approach assumes that in as much as rules, laws, policies and routinized practices that defines institutions exist, the decision to adhere to and obey them; is primarily an individual's choice. Hence, individuals would always execute their social actions regardless of the institutions; provided those social actions guarantee maximum social returns to the individual compared to the options available at the disposal of the individual (Rogowski, 2013). Last but not least, it assumes that individuals are self-interested and, in most cases, the social action they choose to undertake promises the highest social welfare and or benefits. That is, human behavior is driven by the gains attached those actions. If the benefits outweigh the cost, then human beings would most likely engage in those actions while when the cost outweighs the benefits, they would refrain from such undertakings (Hinich and Munga 1997). In a nutshell, rational choice offers imperative empirical analysis regarding individual's behavior which subsequently offers significant insights into human social actions and outcome including in institutional context.

2.2.2.2 Strengths of the Theory

This theory is vital in predicting and or, explaining human social behavior in relation to the standard practices, laws, rules and belief of an institution. In that regard, rational choice theory can be utilized to build more sustainable political institutions that put into considerations individual social behavior as one of factors that positively influences the functions of institutions. Most importantly, it creates room for empirical measurement of human contribution the functionality of political institutions. That is, the sustainability of institutions cannot be attributed to laws, beliefs and rule of institution but also to the specific behaviors of those mandated to run institutions.

2.2.2.3 Its Weakness

Despite the strengths of rational choice theory, it also has inherent weaknesses. It makes a sweeping assumption that all human actions are driven by cost-benefit dynamics. Hedstrom, (2008) observed that there are certain human social actions that do not end -up generating benefits but still certain individuals do engage in them. For instance, acts of altruism meant to save human lives, freedom fighters, philanthropic undertakings et cetera. Secondly, it is relatively difficult to rationally calculate the cost benefits of all options or choices available before selecting the one with the most benefits.

Green, (2002) argued that complex and macro-institutions such as civil services have clear guidelines on how individuals within organization(s) should carryout themselves and as such, self-interest, pursuit of self-benefits are significantly minimized. Thus, generalizations on the basis of individual behavior are relatively difficult (Blume, 2008).

2.2.2.4 Application of the Two Theories in the Study

The lens of rational choice approach can be used to describe and explain the perceptions of the citizens in the republic of Somalia. Samatar, (2012) observed that state officers mandated to execute the functions of state institutions often favor the clans that they identify themselves with. For instance, during the reign of Siad Barre, over and above 51% of the national police force as well as the army was made up of personnel from the clan of Siad Barre. Moreover, appointment of senior civil servants in the executive reflected the clan of the head-of state (Menkhaus, 2007).

Thus, majority of the citizens associate power and authority with personal development. That kind of perception has conferred negative implications on the building of state institutions since each clan fight to be in power. The weaker ones align themselves along the axis of the dominant clans leading to political polarization and pervasive tensions that affects creation of functional political institutions in Somalia.

Rational choice theory also finds its application in the descriptions and explanations of the social actions and general behavior of senior civil servants in the defunct Somali Transitional Federal Government. Latin, (2010) observed that foreign aid that were channeled to Somalia in a bid to reconstruct state institutions between the period of 2004 and 2010 were diverted into personal accounts of those state officers that were tasked to implement the programs of the Transitional Federal Government. Similarly, International Crisis Group, (2011) argued that Transitional Government accepted liability of misuse, financial misappropriation and mismanagement of foreign aid which was supposed to support the development of state institutions.

Furthermore, Public account committee in the TFG released a report between the period of 2009 and 2010 that detailed the revenues that the Republic of Somalia received in form of aid. The report further indicated that approximately \$72 million that were disbursed to Somalia in form of aid were siphoned and diverted to private accounts instead of developing state institutions. Public account and Audit committee also released a report that indicated corruption surged significantly throughout the tenure of transitional government leading to the loss of public finances of nearly \$ 250 million between the period of 2007 and 2009. Thus, the loss of public resources reflects the social actions of specific individuals mandated to executive the functions of state institutions and as such, rational choice theory enables the study to understand the contributions of individuals in the processes of institution building.

Through rational choice theory, deep seated personal interest of business persons that engage in unlawful transactions with the state are illuminated. Bryden, (2012) observed that dysfunctional state institutions in Somalia often promote the interest of business persons. For instance, prime institutions such ports authority are constantly under the influence of business cartels. For instance, in 2012, Kismayo seaport was heavily controlled by the business cartels instead of

Federal Government (Samatar, 2012). Similarly, in the southern regions of Somalia, Al-Shabab has engaged civilians in constant ambush to an extent that some of them are forced to pay fees before undertaking their daily businesses in the township (Bryden, 2012). Thus, so long as there are no functional state institutions, the interest of Al-Shabab and some businessmen keep on advancing unabated. Thus, there is need to build strong and sustainable state institutions with capacity to deliver public goods such as security, educations, healthcare; so as deter unlawful persons from as acting as parallel center of authority.

2.3 Definition and Operationalization of Key Concept

Definitions of key variables that constitute independent and dependent variables were defined lexically and thereafter, operationalized to suit the context of the study.

Political Institutions: Scott, (1991) defined them as those public organizations with legitimate authority, rules, beliefs and routinized standard guidelines which can confer a change of behavior in a given jurisdiction. In this context, it was used to mean those organizations with legitimate authority to set, formulate and implement public policy. They create laws, rules and deliver public services to the citizens. They include: Parliament, Executive, Judiciary, civil service, political parties and electoral bodies.

Post Conflict Societies: Collier, (2000) defined post conflict societies as those societies in which open warfare has ended albeit the probability of those societies experiencing a relapse into violence remains high. Lambach, (2007) argued that post conflict societies are those societies that are recovering from episodes of prolong civil wars and public disorder.

In this study, post conflict societies mean those states, nations or societies that are grappling to recover from prolonged periods of civil wars and civil disobedience. Such states are in the process of reconstructing and re-building their structures of governance in order to achieve cohesive and stable political system.

2.4 Hypotheses

H1: Insecurity negatively affects building of strong political institutions

H2: Clan-conflicts negatively affect building of political institutions

H3: political goodwill has a role in building political institutions

H4: Corruption negatively affect building political institutions.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The section discussed the following: sampling technique, target population, research design, reliability, validity, research ethics, analysis, findings and presentation.

The research study incorporated qualitative as well as quantitative methods with a view to glean qualitative and quantitative data. Through the application of mixed methods, the study was able to capture a well-balanced set of data that incorporated the strengths of qualitative as well as quantitative research methods. Mixed methods allowed the qualitative data to be analyzed numerically. Thus, it conferred some degree of accuracy and reliability to the study.

3.3 Qualitative Research Method

The choice of the above research method was influenced by its ability to offer respondents a wide latitude to share their responses (Kothari, 2015). That way, well balanced and diverse views were gleaned from the respondents. Similarly, the application of the method also minimized the surge of bias and prejudice which conferred validity and reliability on the data that was obtained.

Quantitative Methods

Quantitative method was also applied whereby generalization of findings was made to represent the larger population (Kumar, 2018). This method, also enhanced precision and accuracy of data in addition to facilitating conversion of nominal data to numerical data (Blog, 2017).

Data was collected through Survey research methods, interviews and focus group discussions. In order to obtain qualitative and quantitative data, respondents were informed about the subject matter, questions and objectives of the study through letters of consent. Research instruments which were applied included: survey methods, focus group discussions and interviews. A set of

questions in the form of interview guide was attached in appendix A; were asked. Each respondent was given 15 minutes to share their opinions and responses. Those views were recorded and later analyzed as indicated in chapter 3 of the project. Moreover, secondary sources of information was also sought whereby per reviewed journals, books, articles regarding political institution building was reviewed and relevant information gleaned to help in the analysis.

Why qualitative and quantitative Research Methods were chosen for the study

The emergence of digital approaches especially the use of digital channels has made it possible for qualitative research to be carried out. Before the advent of such technology qualitative research had to be carried out on a face-to-face basis relying on groups (Kumar, 2011). The digital methods have played very crucial roles in to make more accessible ways of measuring the qualitative insights like through online communities and through the use of online focus groups. Through such approaches one can share and show information materials, stimulus and information. Well-designed online communities gives a researcher an opportunity to collect quantitative data through quick survey and polls for a given audience as stated by Kumar (2011). The holistic picture brings together the qualitative and quantitative research. In other words, one of the reasons why researcher combine both qualitative and quantitative data is because they together offer a holistic picture. The use of this two also means that a researcher can have a multi-stage discussion where their hypothesis can be validated and better understanding of these hypotheses and further make a better understanding and widen the scope to before the solution is tested through further qualitative exploration.

Another reason why the combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods will be used is because it creates a scenario where the researcher combines the ‘why’ and the ‘what’ of a study. What this means is that the employing this method increases the insight gathered when undertaking a research. Kumar (2011) are of the ideas that the researcher is in a position to learn more from the data collected compared to what they would gather from a quantitative or qualitative. For instance a study can give a statistical outcome based on a figure, but combining it to qualitative research offers more reasons to the statistical outcome. Kumar (2011) says that the researcher through this approach do not merely quantify the results. They try and also give some qualitative reasoning behind their findings. Kumar (2011) argues that previously, the use of

different systems to collect, analyze, and report results was a big part of the difficulty of combining qualitative and quantitative research. To put it simply, researchers were often forced to choose because both options were out of your budget. Through digital, technology can now provide a single platform that handles both, reducing costs, complexity, and resources at the same time. Previously, qualitative research required a lot of time and effort; online qualitative projects are much faster. Most scholars undertaking research are realizing that if they want to keep their studies more accurate with outcomes that connect well with the readers then they must go beyond giving figures only. This means developing a more in-depth comprehension based on empathy, and combining qualitative and quantitative research methods that will enables the researcher to not only form a more genuine, unbiased results but also to take immediate action to meet their requirements. Therefore, in this study, the researcher has chosen to use bot the qualitative and quantitative research methods to get more insight form the information collected.

In order to obtain qualitative and quantitative data, respondents were informed about the subject matter, questions and objectives of the study through letters of consent. Research instruments which were applied included: survey methods, focus group discussions and interviews. A set of questions in the form of interview guide was attached in appendix A; were asked. Each respondent was given 15 minutes to share their opinions and responses. Those views were recorded and later analyzed as indicated in chapter 3 of the project. Moreover, secondary sources of information was also sought whereby per reviewed journals, books, articles regarding political institution building was reviewed and relevant information gleaned to help in the analysis.

3.4 Research Design

The study utilized cross-sectional design. It was selected due its ability to enable collection of data at one particular point (Blog, 2013). Secondly, it has the capacity to provide greater internal validity between variables under the study (Kumar, 2011). In that context, two main research instruments attached in appendix A and with questions pertinent to research questions; were prepared and administered to the respondents. For the focus group in particular, a group of 5-7 persons were engaged and each respondent was given 15 minutes to share their views. Similarly, survey instruments were also utilized whereby questionnaires were administered to respondents.

The study also applied narrative interviews in which respondents were approached on face -to-face basis. Each respondent had approximately 15 minutes to narrate the challenges facing institution building in Somalia as well as the contributions of state institutions to the creation of stable political stability. All the pieces of information that was obtained from respondents were analyzed in chapter 3.

3.5 Research Site

The research was done in Mogadishu. That was informed by the fact that security in Mogadishu is relatively stable and as such, the safety of the research participants was guaranteed throughout the research process. Secondly, the city is made up of diverse population which was heterogeneous in nature. Thus, the information that was provided was well balanced with minimal biasness and prejudice. Access to participants was also made possible since most of them were residing in the city.

3.6 Target Population

Civil servants were the main target population. Currently, their total number stands at approximately 3200 officials (United Nations, 2019). The target population were found in the following institutions: Federal Parliament, Judiciary, executive and the civil service work-force.

3.7 Sampling Methods

Approximately 80 research respondents participated in the study. Those respondents comprised current civil servants and policy makers which; according to United-Nations estimated population, stood at 3200 (United Nations, 2019). The study also considered political leaders such as members of parliament, religious, business persons and community leaders. The study thereafter, calculated and determined sampling interval at a constant figure; which was 80. That was then followed by sampling along the sampling frame. The research participants were selected through counting process starting from a random fixed point in the sampling frame. As the number increased from one towards 3200, every 80th person was selected to constitute the sample size for the study. In other words, the exercise entailed determination of a sample interval and thereafter, dividing the known number of civil servants by the sample interval. When that was done, the study arrived at 40 respondents which constituted the civil servants.

Furthermore, the use of purposive sampling technique was greatly applied in engaging politicians, civil society and business persons. Those respondents had sound knowledge regarding institution building. Those were 40 in number. Thus, the sum total for all respondents were 80. The respondents were divided into 10 groups and each group had 5-8 respondents. Each respondent was given 10mins to share his/her views. The responses from the respondents in 8 groups were recorded and analyzed in chapter 3.

3.8 Data Collection

The collection of primary data was done through the survey, interviews and focus group discussion. In that context, questions pertinent to research objectives were prepared. Respondents were first made aware of the research study through a letter of consent and research authorization letter from the University of Nairobi. They all signed and expressed consent. The day of data collection was set through official appointment. The execution of data collection was done through focus group discussions in which 5 research participants per group, were engaged and each was given ample time, approximately 15 minutes to share their views. The responses they provided were recorded for analysis. Similarly, narrative interviews were conducted in which research participants shared their views in 15 minutes session per respondents. Moreover, questionnaires were administered to respondents. All those were equally recorded for analysis. academic journals, peer reviewed journals, published books and articles that were relevant to the study was also used

3.9 Validity and Reliability

Validity was achieved by aligning research instrument to the research objectives. The reliability was achieved through admission of research instruments more than once. The respondents were asked the same questions twice and they provided similar responses. Thus, the study attained consistency in the responses from the research participants.

3.10 Ethical Considerations

Scientific research ethics were adhered to throughout the research process. In that regard, the consent of participants was sought before commencement of the research. Participants expressed

direct consent by pending their signatures prior to the commencement of data collection. Their responses were kept confidential and was used only for academic purposes. Their safety was guaranteed during and after research process. Most importantly, the significance of study was explained to them regarding political institution building.

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

The chapter entails analysis of data, findings, presentation and explanation of findings. It further discusses hypothesis by upholding and or, rejecting null hypothesis. Research instrument attached in appendix A was used to glean information that was necessary in answering the study questions. The chapter is organized in two main parts: The first part discusses personal demographics data; that is, their age, gender, marital status, occupations et cetera. Such information was analyzed by the use of SPSS software and presented in tables and graphs. The second part of the chapter discusses data that was pertinent to the research questions and objectives- that was derived from the respondents.

4.2 Respondents' Response Rate

A total of 80 persons took part in the research study. The study employed interview guide enclosed in appendix A to gather responses to study questions. The first section of the interview guide required respondents to share their personal data which included: Gender, Age, Education level, Occupation and Marriage status. The output results on SPSS windows were displayed in Tables as indicated below.

4.2.1 Gender of Respondent

Table 4.1: Gender of the Respondents

Gender of the respondent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Female	33	41.3	41.3	41.3
Male	47	58.8	58.8	100.0
Total	80	100.0	100.0	

The results displayed showed the total number of respondents that participated in the research study. A total of 80 respondents were actively involved. Of these, 41.3% were female whereas 47% were male. Females expressed some level of reservations since only those females that were educated preferred to engage in the research compared to those that were uneducated. The second question required the respondents to disclose their ages.

4.2.2 Age in Years of the Respondents

Table 4.2: Age in Years of the Respondents

Age in Years of the respondents		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	20-24	3	3.8	3.8	3.8
	25-29	9	11.3	11.3	15.0
	30-34	11	13.8	13.8	28.8
	35-39	18	22.5	22.5	51.3
	40-44	16	20.0	20.0	71.3
	45-49	12	15.0	15.0	86.3
	Over 50 years	11	13.8	13.8	100.0
	Total	80	100.0	100.0	

Participants whose age bracket were between 20-24, were approximately 3.75%. Those whose age category were between 25-29 were 11.3%. Those between 30-34 were approximately 13.8% while those in the age bracket of 35-39 were 22.5%. Those between 40-44 years of age constituted 20%. Those whose age category was between 45-49 were 15% whereas those respondents whose age category were over -50 years were 13.8%.

The next question asked participants about their educational level. The output window exhibited results as shown.

4.2.3 Level of Education of the Respondents

Table 4.3: Level of Education of the Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Primary	3	3.8	3.8	3.8
	Secondary	16	20.0	20.0	23.8
	Tertiary/Post-secondary level	61	76.3	76.3	100.0
	Total	80	100.0	100.0	

An estimated 3.8% indicated primary level. Those that had secondary as the highest level of education were approximately 20%. While 76.3% indicated tertiary level

4.2.4 Marital Status of Respondents

Table 4.4: Marital status of respondents

Marital status of respondents		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Married	61	76.3	76.3	76.3
	Single	19	23.8	23.8	100.0
	Total	80	100.0	100.0	

A total of 76.3% of the respondents indicated that they are married while 23.8%, indicated that they are single. The next set of questions were pertinent to the research hypothesis.

4.3 Factors Affecting Building of Political Institution in Somalia

4.3.1 Insecurity

Research hypothesis/Alternate hypothesis: Insecurity affect political institution building in Somalia.

Null hypothesis: Insecurity does not affect building of political institution in Somalia.

In order to test the above hypothesis, respondents were asked to rate the effect of insecurity on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%. The responses were run on the Ch-Square. The level of confidence was at 95%. The P-value on the Chi-square was 0.017. Since the level of confidence was at 95%, alpha therefore was at 0.05. The observed value (sig) was 0.017 which was less than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis, was rejected. Research hypothesis was upheld. The data analyzed supported the research hypothesis. Therefore, H1: Insecurity affect political institution building in Somalia was upheld. In line with this finding, the researcher affirmed that insecurity is indeed a challenge to the building of political institution in Somalia. The output results were displayed as shown below.

Table 4.5: Test Statistics

Test Statistics	
How would you rate the effect of insecurity on political institution building?	
Chi-Square	17.000 ^a

df	7
Asymp. Sig.	.017

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 10.0.

Table 4.6: How would you rate the effect of insecurity on political institution building in Somalia?

How would you rate the effect of insecurity on political institution building in Somalia?			
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
11-20%	5	10.0	-5.0
21-30%	15	10.0	5.0
31-40%	11	10.0	1.0
41-50%	17	10.0	7.0
51-60%	12	10.0	2.0
61-70%	11	10.0	1.0
71-80%	6	10.0	-4.0
81-90%	3	10.0	-7.0
Total	80		

The researcher also calculated the measures of central tendency. The results were shown below.

Table 4.7: How would you rate the effect of insecurity on political institution building?

Statistics		
How would you rate the effect of insecurity on political institution building?		
N	Valid	80
	Missing	0
Mean		5.10
Median		5.00
Mode		5
Std. Deviation		1.860
Variance		3.458
Minimum		2
Maximum		9

The chi-square output test results indicated that insecurity affects the building of political institutions in Somalia. Respondents were asked to elaborate more on how insecurity affects the building of political institutions in Somalia. For instance, one respondent noted as follows:

“... I come from Galmudug region and I work in the ministry of internal security. In my own personal views, I think insecurity is a major factor that negatively affect institution building in our country. Take a look at the southern regional member states, majority of them are under the control of Al-Shabab. Garowe for example, in Puntland state, restoring peace and public order has been rendered elusive. Neither the National Government nor the Federal Government has been able to forge robust measures to contain the aggressive tendencies of Al-Shabab in those regions. The syndicate systematically regulate nearly all the public affairs in those regions. Under such prevailing social circumstance, I do not think if meaningful institution building process can be realized without putting such criminal organizations under control”

The views of that respondent were echoed by another respondent who noted as follows:

“...I have lived in Puntland for close to two-decades now as we speak and I work for National Communication Authority. Right now, I am speaking as a citizen of Somalia and not on behalf of the commission. With regard to insecurity as a challenge to institution building, I must say that Al-Shabab is to be blamed on the current dysfunctional federal and national institutions. That organization made the previous Transitional Federal government unable to govern effectively... Al-Shabab is not just a simple organization posing as a threat to the national security! It is a highly complex social organization that receives support from very influential political elites in this country. It is supported by the business community, community leaders and even religious organizations. Therefore, it should be seen as serious complex organization whose interest stands at variance with the national interest. Let us look back in 2014 for example, the AMISOM operations managed to successfully drive them out of South-Central Somalia. However, by 2015, the operations of the AMISOM stalled midway which essentially, resulted in a resurgence of Al-Shabab in Mogadishu, Garowe and Kismayo. In Garowe specifically, they have openly taken responsibility for many attacks. Clan politics fuels their spread across the southern regions of Somalia thereby, disrupting institution building process. Worse off, they sometimes claim to be a parallel government, in which they subject the public to high `taxes` in exchange for tranquil business environment.”

The respondents unearthed negative activities of Al-Shabab in the southern regions of Somalia. Those views revealed how federal institutions became completely dysfunctional to an extent that even provision of public goods such as national security, could not be made available by the state institutions. The views of the respondent give insights into the implications of having weak political institutions on the political stability of Somalia. For example, in October 2016, Al-Shabab placed the cities of Afmadow located in lower Juba and Afgoye in lower Shabelle under siege (Khalil, 2019). In September, 2016, Al-Shabab openly purged government security officials that were tasked with restoring public order in the town of El Wak in Gedo (Skjelderup, 2020). Al-Shabab took control of the city and had it not been for the support of the AMISOM forces, Al-Shabab would have completely taken control of the city and government of Somalia. However, even AMISOM itself was not free from the negative influences of Al-Shaba and that was evident in 2015 when Al-Shabab launched an attack on AMISOM military bases in the regions of Lego in Bay Janaale in lower Shabelle and some parts of El Adde in Gedo. Similarly, in July 2016, a military base occupied by the Ethiopian forces in the villages of Halgan, Balet Weyne and Bulo Burte in Hiran was severely set ablaze by the Al-Shabab. Such attacks on AMISOM bases made it to withdraw its operations in the regions that it claimed to be under its operations.

The operations of the AMISOM with regard to how they dealt with Al-Shabab clearly indicated that Al-Shabab was and still is, a major challenge in building functional state institutions in Somalia. The activities of Al-Shabab poke holes on the existing security structure in the central Government and Federal Government. That was evident on high dependency on AMISOM operations and accommodation of Al-Shabab instead of stopping their operations completely to pave way for building of state institutions.

Still on the subject of insecurity as a challenge to institution building in Somalia, another respondent made the following remarks: "... in as much as Al-Shabab have to be blamed on the massive insecurity that have made institution building in the federal republic of Somalia seem like an exercise in futility, we must also not forget the fact that; both the central and federal government has been aiding their ability to wield power and control a number of regions in Somalia. The national government for example has been accused of not availing material support to AMISOM in order to able it execute her mandate effectively"

The remarks above reveal important insights into some of the reasons that made AMISOM to withdraw its operations in Somalia. Lack of material support and funding from the international donors made it to reduce its operations in the regions that it had already captured from Al-Shabab. For instance, in October 2016, Ethiopian forces withdrew from significant regions which included but not limited to: Tiveglow in Bakool and Halgan in parts of Hiran. Ethiopian cited frustration from the federal government of Somalia which refused to fully cooperate with AMISOM in their course (O'Neill, 2020). Its withdrawal exacerbated the difficulty in building functional state institutions in those regions since Al-Shabab recaptured some of them.

4.3.2 Clan-conflicts

The next question asked respondents to rate the effect of clan-conflicts on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%. The response rates were shown below:

To test the second hypothesis, data was run on a Chi-Square. The results revealed chi-square of approximately 17.2. The Degree of Freedom (df) was 7. Asymp. Sig 0.016.

Since the null hypothesis stated: Clan-conflicts has no effect on political institution building
 Research hypothesis: Clan-conflict affect political institution building.

The above hypothesis was tested at a confidence level of 95. Which represented an alpha of 0.05 that is, P-value. It was this alpha value/P-Value, that formed the basis of rejecting the null hypothesis. Since the observed chi-square Sig- value was 0.016 and was less than P-value of 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. Instead, the research hypothesis was confirmed. Therefore, on the basis of these findings, the research study confirmed that clan-conflicts affect political institution building in Somalia. The output results for testing hypothesis were shown as seen below:

Table 4.8: Test Statistics

Test Statistics
How would you rate the effect of clan-conflicts on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%

Chi-Square	17.200 ^a
Df	7
Asymp. Sig.	.016

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 10.0.

Table 4.9: How would you rate the effect of clan-conflicts on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%?

How would you rate the effect of clan-conflicts on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%			
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
0-10	3	10.0	-7.0
11-20	7	10.0	-3.0
21-30	12	10.0	2.0
31-40	18	10.0	8.0
41-50	12	10.0	2.0
51-60	14	10.0	4.0
61-70	9	10.0	-1.0
71-80	5	10.0	-5.0
Total	80		

Moreover, measures of central tendency were also calculated whereby the response rate revealed a mean of 4.65 with a standard deviation of 1.822. The maximum was 1 while the minimum was 8. The median was 4.50 while the mode was 4.

Table 4.10: How would you rate the effect of clan-conflicts on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%

Statistics		
How would you rate the effect of clan-conflicts on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%		
N	Valid	80
	Missing	0
Mean		4.65

Median	4.50
Mode	4
Std. Deviation	1.822
Variance	3.319
Minimum	1
Maximum	8

The output results upheld the research hypothesis that clan-based conflicts affect the building of political institutions in Somalia. Respondents provided divergent views on the subject of clan-based conflicts. For example,

One such respondent remarked as follows:

“... I am a descendant of the Baidari lineage and our sub-clan mainly occupy the Southern Somalia, Central and Northern regions of Somalia. To answer your question, regarding challenges that affect political institution building in here in Somalia, I can only say that; negative application of clan identity and clannism in general is the problem. Influential political elites representing the dominant clans have mastered the art of invoking clan-based emotions in order to advance their own personal political or economic interest. When politicians are campaigning, they often engage clans in political campaigns that drive wedges against the various clans in Somalia. Politicians always use incendiary words on the basis of “us versus them” a situation which has led to massive marginalization of clans that are considered minority groups while empowering those that are considered the dominant clans. I mean, just do your research on the civil service here in Somalia, most of the executive positions are held by persons from the dominant clans. So, in my opinion, I think clannism is not bad per se because naturally, people are different and that diversity should be used positively. So, if we are to build our public institutions, I think top leaders of our country should embrace genuine inclusivity by giving every member equal opportunity to hold any position in the public sector regardless of their clans.”

The respondent above brought into the discussion the clan dynamics as sources of challenges facing political institution building in the federal republic of Somalia. Once again, the lens of rational choice theory finds its applications in the clan-based politics in Somalia. Just like the respondent mentioned, the existence of different clans in the federal government of Somalia is not a problem. However, the clan-based elites and politicians who make use of the clan differences among and between clans for purposes of achieving their narrow economic and political interest is the problem. Mohamed and Samatar, (2019) observed that clan dynamics in the federal republic of Somalia have negative social consequences as it fuels division among various clans; thereby conferring massive challenges on building stable and functional political institutions. Samatar, (2019) argued that political leaders who occupy top leadership of the country perpetuate those clan politics either directly or indirectly through marginalizing clans that are considered minority and have insignificant influence on national politics. Regions that minority clans come from are largely left under-developed and few of them gets absorbed into the public civil service. As such, marginalized clans often stage insurrection against the already weak state institutions or even government authority as a way of expressing their frustrations and grievances. In the process of rebelling against the government, they weaken state institutions through refusal to adhere to the set rule of law and other social responsibilities.

The wide and deep divisions emanating from clan-based politics makes it difficult to precisely define and identify the functions and roles of the upcoming state institutions and structures even after the promulgation of the federal government of Somalia in 2012 (Odowa, 2020). Clan politics obliterates the ongoing reconstruction and state building processes in Somalia since clan social systems; determines and controls business as well as private sector (Robinso and Matissek, 2020). Even in the current political dispensation, federal government has no discernable local leaders that are not fraught with clannism in their political articulations at the regional level (Robinso, 2020). Worse-off, clannism influences seem to over-ride other positive social forces such as robust civil society organizations and pressure groups that could otherwise advance the government programs and policies with minimal interference from the clan-based social forces (Muse, 2019). In other regions such as in the Southern Somalia, nearly all federal government decisions are required to factor in clan dynamics; as that is viewed as a way of respecting clan values, beliefs and norms; meant to promote their cultural heritage.

Mohamed, (2020) observed that in most federal member states, notably in Somaliland, South-Central and Puntland, there are no active political parties or civil society organizations that can mobilized the local population and advance their interest at the national level in an attempt to reconstruct an all-inclusive government. Instead, clan-based social structures shape the behavior, activities and interest of local population through provision of social security welfare, and basic social services that the locals deem necessary for their day-to-day endeavors. In that regard, little commitment is invested in building state structures and institutions since most of the local population consider themselves marginalized and left out from the national development by federal and central government. Clan therefore, provides security for its membership and as such, other clans might develop conflicting interest that might be at variance with the conventional values held by majority of clans; leading to clan-based conflicts, xenophobia, loss of lives and property (Affi, 2020).

The clannism therefore is comparable to a bedrock on which the Somali identity is grounded upon. With no robust economic and social institutions that transcends beyond clan- systems, the political developments in the federal republic of Somalia rests under the control of the two major dominant clans. Those include: Hawiye and Darood clans. The rest of the remaining clans align the themselves along Hawiye -Darood continuum in their attempt to struggle for state power and benefits that accrues by virtue of being represented in the national government (Skjelderup, 2020). Such clans that align along Hawiye-Darood axis include: Dir, Digil, Abgaal, Ajuran, Hawadle, Mursade, Gerre Rahwein, Habargedir Murule, and Isaaq. Whereas, those clans that align themselves along the Darod clan include: Ogaden sub-clan, Harti and Marehan.

Hawiye clan has been associated with pride and power since the leaders form the transitional federal government and even in the current government mostly are associated with the Hawiye clans. The various clans are further grouped into what is commonly known as clan alliances. The alliances are specifically formed to advance mutual clan interest and protect all the members that associate themselves with the alliances. The alliances engage in relentless struggle of power and authority to an extent that some clan alliances also attempt to usurp state power through undemocratic means such as conflicts and insurrections (Mohamed, 2020). Such clan alliances create huddles on state building efforts in the federal republic of Somalia.

4.3.3 Political Goodwill

The next question asked respondents to rate the effect of political goodwill on political institution building.

The third hypothesis stated that:

Null hypothesis: political goodwill has no effect on political institution building in Somalia.

Research hypothesis: Political goodwill has an effect on political institution building Somalia.

Testing this hypothesis was done at confidence level of 95. Thus, P-Value was at 0.05. The degree of freedom (df) was 3. The observed sig value on the chi-square was 0.00. That was less than P-Value which was set at 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected. The research study confirmed the research hypothesis. Therefore, political goodwill affect political institution building in Somalia.

Table 4.11: Test Statistics

Test Statistics	
Kindly rate the effect of political good will on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%	
Chi-Square	21.400 ^a
Df	3
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 20.0.

Table 4.12: The effect of political good will on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%

Kindly rate the effect of political good will on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%			
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
0-10%	23	20.0	3.0
11-20%	31	20.0	11.0
21-30%	23	20.0	3.0
31-40%	3	20.0	-17.0
Total	80		

The mean average was observed at 2.08, Standard deviation was 0.854. Minimum was 1 while maximum was 4. Measures of central tendency were shown as indicated in the table.

Table 4.13: The effect of political good will on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%

Statistics		
Kindly rate the effect of political good will on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%		
N	Valid	80
	Missing	0
Mean		2.08
Median		2.00
Mode		2
Std. Deviation		.854
Variance		.728
Minimum		1
Maximum		4

The output results indicated that in deed political goodwill affect the building of political institutions in Somalia. Respondents were asked to share their views regarding the influence of political goodwill on the building of political institutions. One such respondent noted as follows:

“...I am a civil servant, working currently with the ministry of planning. In response to your research questions, there are scores of challenges that affects the building functional state institutions here in the Federal Republic of Somalia. To be more specific, let us make reference to the political leaders of our country who constantly advance and exercise their parochial political and economic interest behind the scenes. Politicians employ various forms of political chicanery such as shifting alliances across clans in Somalia; giving them advantage to use clan dynamics to influence efforts tailored to build state institutions in our country. To put my assertions into context, look at the political events that took place in 2014. During those days, the political rapport between the then President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud who belonged to the Hawiye clan and his Prime Minister Honorable Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed, who belonged to Darood clan; were extremely fraught with tensions, mistrust and lack of confidence. Such bad relations between executive leaders and all political leaders at large, have always thwarted internal process meant to enhance the capacity of our state institutions.”

The above sentiments were also corroborated by another respondent who noted as follows:

“...I work in the Judicial service and I have lived in Somalia for over three-decades. I have had an opportunity to witness scores of challenges that affects functionality of state institutions here in Somalia. However, bad politics and poor leadership remains greatest challenges that hinder institution building in Somalia. By bad politics, I mean situations whereby political leaders place their narrow individual interests beyond the national interest of our country. Our political leaders often orchestrate plans and ways of making the state ungovernable by undermining the elected leaders. For example, the massive tensions that characterized the running of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012. Such tensions were often fueled by some political leaders that were against the plans of the government through the office of the prime minister; to establish national security institutions. In that regard, the then appointed Prime Minister Abdiweli, was more vocal in advancing and discharging the functions of his office in building security institutions. The noble actions of the Prime Minister were construed by some of the executive members in the office of the president, as undermining to the office of the president. The prime minister was eventually brought down and all those programs that were designed to foster and enhance state capacity, stalled since 2013.”

The above respondents brought on board the net negative effects of lack of political will, in the efforts devoted to building state institutions. Political tensions that often engulf the office of the President and the Prime minister, to some extent generates political rivalry as each office often project itself as more dominant and powerful than the other. The office of the president sometimes exercises more control on the office prime minister since it appoints the prime-minister. Prime minister`s actions therefore, are expected to reflect the interest of the president. Should there be a conflict of interest between the two offices, the office of the president takes precedent and the appointment of the prime minister can sometimes be recalled as it happened in 2013. Such political dynamics between the two offices often infiltrate into the national development programs; whereby state institutions like security sector, becomes under the influence of executive without the support of either the prime minister or the president. Thus, making implementations of programs meant enhance institutional capacity relatively difficult.

The respondent mentioned that the concentration of executive powers in the office of the prime minister ought to be exercised within the rule of law. The respondent advocated that the key

arms of the government to work synergistically as opposed to undermining each other. The narrow interest of the political class should be regulated through policy framework as anchored on the federal provisional constitution as part of efforts geared towards institution building.

4.3.4 Corruption

The next question asked respondents to rate the effect of corruption on political institution building in Somalia.

The fourth hypothesis was tested as shown below;

Research hypothesis: Corruption affect political institution building in Somalia

Null hypothesis: Corruption has no effect on political institution building in Somalia

The level of confidence was 95%.

P-Value was 0.05.

Observed values on the Chi-square test were; degree of freedom (df) was 6. Sig. 0.003. Since sig which in this case was 0.003 was less than 0.05 (P-Value). The study rejected the null hypothesis above. In that regard, research hypothesis was confirmed. On the basis of this finding, corruption was found to be a challenge affecting political institution building in Somalia. Output results were indicated as seen below.

Table 4.14: Test Statistics

Test Statistics	
Rate the impact of corruption on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%	
Chi-Square	19.750 ^a
Df	6
Asymp. Sig.	.003

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 11.4.

Table 4.15: The impact of corruption on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%

Rate the impact of corruption on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%			
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
21-30%	6	11.4	-5.4
31-40%	6	11.4	-5.4
41-50%	8	11.4	-3.4
51-60%	21	11.4	9.6
61-70%	17	11.4	5.6
71-80%	15	11.4	3.6
81-90%	7	11.4	-4.4
Total	80		

Calculation of measures of central tendency revealed a mean average of 6.38, median was 6.00, std, Deviation was 1.649. Minimum 3 while maximum was 9. The results were in the table below.

Table 4.16: The impact of corruption on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%

Statistics		
Rate the impact of corruption on political institution building in a scale of 0-100%		
N	Valid	80
	Missing	0
Mean		6.38
Median		6.00
Mode		6
Std. Deviation		1.649
Variance		2.718
Minimum		3
Maximum		9

The output results showed that corruption affects political institution building. Respondents were further asked to shed light on the influence of corruption and the above. On the subject of corruption, a number of views were captured. For example,

One respondent remarked as follows: "... I come from the central- Somali and by profession, I am an accountant. Currently, I am a member of the public account committee in the federal parliament. In my own personal view, I think corruption in the National and Federal government is the biggest challenge in building political institutions in Somalia. To substantiate my stand point, I will start with the executive whereby in March 2017, the president and the cabinet appointed a new Prime Minister one, Hassan Ali Kheyre. Interestingly, parliament did not approve him. In order to influence the members of the parliament, the PM made attempts to buy and win the allegiance of some of the influential members of parliament by giving monies summing up-to approximately \$100000. Unfortunately, after six months, a vote of no-confidence was put forth; which made most members of parliament to either support or be seen as against the government."

The sentiments above were echoed further with another respondent who remarked: "...the current state of corruption in the federal government cannot allow constructive state building to be done in here in Somalia. I mean, look at the Somali police force, National Intelligence and Security Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Directorate et cetera. Those ministries report the highest number of corruption cases day- in- day out. State officials also perpetuate the spread of corruption, take a look at the Somali police force (SPF) and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA); Those two state institutions do set police checkpoints all-over across the capital of Mogadishu. At those checkpoints, they embezzle and extort funds from public road users like motorists before allowing them to continue with their destination. I have personally witnessed a situation whereby a woman was denied to drive to her destination just because she did not afford to pay \$50 to the police officers that were posted to secure Marinda boarder junction located at Abdiaziz district"

The respondents above mentioned corruption as one of the challenges that affects the building of political institutions in the federal government of Somalia. Menkhuse (2007) observed that the federal government of Somalia has received and still continue to receive financial support from internal as well as from the international organizations; which are meant to enhance state capacity and build political institutions in Somalia. However, large portions of those financial resources are prone to be diverted to private accounts leaving little or none for developing state capacity and strengthening its institutions (Drebee, 2020). Basing on rational choice theory that has been used in the study, imperative insights into the behavior of state officials and their personal narrow interest is uncovered. It reveals how individuals mandated to run state institutions often act contrary to the responsibilities and duties required from them. Pilferage of funds meant reconstruct and strengthen state institutions do not only reduce state capacity but also leads to erosion of the social fabrics of society and in general, it can lead to underdevelopment due to its negative consequences in weakening state structures. Sofe, (2020) observed that lack of resources to run the functions of various state institutions hinders service delivery to the citizens and in some cases, it makes sections of citizens to lose faith in government and all its apparatus since their expectations on provision of public goods are not met. In return, deprived citizens can be pushed into staging insurrections against established authorities (Maragia, 2020).

The respondents were further asked to indicate other factors affecting political institution building in Somalia.

Response rate:

Table 4.17: In your own opinion what do you think are the factors affecting political institution building in Somalia?

In your own opinion what do you think are the factors affecting political institution building in Somalia?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Failed policies	9	11.3	11.3	11.3
	lack of full implementation of the provisional constitution	8	10.0	10.0	21.3
	Insecurity	17	21.3	21.3	42.5
	High levels of corruption	8	10.0	10.0	52.5

	Clan-cantered politics	9	11.3	11.3	63.8
	political goodwill	4	5.0	5.0	68.8
	political culture	7	8.8	8.8	77.5
	political-economic reasons	7	8.8	8.8	86.3
	Risk aversion	2	2.5	2.5	88.8
	Business elites	9	11.3	11.3	100.0
	Total	80	100.0	100.0	

Approximately 11.3% of the respondents indicated that failed policies affect political institution building. That is, policies that gets formulated by the Federal Government but eventually failed to be implemented by the state institutions. Similarly, 21.3% indicated that insecurity was a major factor hindering political institution building. These respondents discussed insecurity with reference to the militia group-commonly known as Al-Shabab. Others described insecurity arising from the inability of the state to protect their property. 10.0% indicated corruption as a problem to institution building.

Moreover, 11.3% of the respondents indicated that clan-based politics was the problem to institution building, 5% indicated political goodwill. These respondents cited the interest of politicians that often stand at variance with the government`s agenda. Other respondents indicated political culture as a challenge to political institution building. That is, Somali culture of nomadic pastoralism and high preference to informal and negotiated governance affects attempts of building political institutions.

In addition, an estimated 8.8% indicated political and economic reasons were some of the factors affecting political institution building. These views were further echoed by 11.3% of the respondents who indicated that business elites also to some extent affect political institution building. That is, the existence of weak political institutions gives them the leverage to evade perceived high taxes, stringent state regulations and or even nationalization of private enterprises that would be otherwise be imposed by strong political institutions. Similarly, an estimated 2.5% indicated risk aversion as a problem to institution building. These group of respondents perceived building of political institutions as “predatory”. That is, by building political institutions, the chances of being governed under oppressive state institutions remains high.

Instead, preference to the existence of political institutions remains high as opposed to increasing the capacity of political institutions.

4.3.5 Lack of Full Implementation of the Current Provisional Constitution

A total of 10.0% of the respondents admitted that- lack of full implementation of the provisional constitution of the Republic of Somalia significantly affects building political institutions. The current provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia clearly spells out the principles defining the structural and functional mandate of the political institutions in Somalia. In chapter 5 of the constitution, devolution of the authority and powers of the state in the republic of Somalia is clearly spelt out. Furthermore, in Article 48 of the same constitution, the structures of the government have been clearly defined and their mandate in Article 51. Article 52 also discusses the manner in which the various Federal Member States Governments should cooperate and collaborate for mutual benefits. In Article 54, the provisional constitution discusses the powers of the Federal Government in relation to those ones of the Federal member states. Chapter 11 also discusses the values of the civil service and the appointment of high-ranking state officials. However, in actual sense, 10% of the research participants admitted that appointment to the civil service often do not adhere to the values of the civil service of merit and impartiality. Instead, nepotism and ethnicity are often applied in the appointment of the state officials.

One respondent remarked as follows:

“... I have had a chance to live and work under the defunct National Federal Government, Transitional Government and now the current Federal government. There is a tendency of not adhering to the constitution in this country. Our very own constitution discourages nepotism, negative ethnicity and other non-merit based- methods of appointing high ranking state officials but look at what happens in reality...”

The study found out that subversion of the constitution and undermining it by not fully implementing its provision leaves the existing state institutions without substantive powers and or authority. For example, Chapter 9. Article 105, outlines the powers of the Judicial Authority

of the Republic of Somalia. However, as Menkhaus, (2012) observed, high ranking state officials more often than not, disobey court orders thereby undermining the Judicial institutions.

The graphs below indicate the frequencies of the respondents to the question regarding the factors affecting political institution building in Somalia.




Figure 4.1: In your own opinion what do you think are the factors affecting political institution building in Somalia

Contribution of the study

The research study provided significant insights into the factors that influence the building of political institutions in the Federal Republic of Somalia. The study contributed in unraveling the influence of insecurity as one of the factors that hinders the building of political institutions in Somalia. The study shed light on the nexus between the building of political institutions and the impediments arising from intermittent insecurity in Somalia. Insecurity arising from violent extremism tendencies was found to be major threats to the building of political institutions. It also attempted to explain the influence of clan-conflicts in the various Federal Member States. The research study illuminated, the infiltration of clan-based forces and their manifestations to the political institution building. It highlighted the perceptions that are deeply entrenched;

regarding being in power by one clan or groups of clans; and their relations with those clans in the opposition side. The study also discussed the influence of political good-will and its ripple effects on the building of political institutions.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The chapter entails discussion of findings in the previous chapter. The chapter provides conclusion, recommendations and areas for further study. The findings were relevant to the research question and objective. This study is about: The challenges affecting building of political institutions in Somalia. The research instrument attached in appendix A, was used to collect data to answer research questions.

5.2 Summary of Findings

This study arrived at a number of findings which included:

5.2.1 Persistent Insecurity

Perpetual instances of insecurity in the Federal Republic of Somalia were mentioned as one of the challenges that affect political institution building. 21.3% of the respondents attributed the major insecurity incidents to the militia group such as Al-Shabab. The militia group mainly operate in the southern regions of Somalia. Respondents admitted that such militia group subvert the constitution and subject the citizens to conditions that are very insecure and completely wanting. The militia group undermine the political institutions by suspending the authority and functions of political institutions in the regions under their control and instead, assert their own rules and policies against the will of the people.

5.2.2 Clan -Conflicts

Respondents mentioned clan -conflicts as a challenge to building political institution in the Republic of Somalia. In the study, 11.3% respondents attributed intermittent clan-based conflicts to politicians and clan-based elites. Respondents indicated that the application of clan based-dynamics in the public institutions - greatly affect the values, beliefs and policies of political institutions in Somalia.

Political Culture

Approximately 8.8% of the respondents mentioned political culture as a challenge to building of political institutions. The study found out that political culture of Somali people that place high value on clannism and nomadism- to some extent remain at variance with building of political institutions. Menkhaus, (2017) made similar observation that Somali prefers relatively informal and “negotiated governance or political arrangement” to more “formal rule of law” that defines political institutions.

Political and Economic Issues

Economic issues arising from powerful business stakeholder in Somali was also mentioned as a challenge to building of political institutions. Respondents indicated that the interest of powerful business elites often thrives in the existence of weak institutions. That way, building of political institutions would otherwise lead to strong government that might turn out to be oppressive, or even increase taxes on private own businesses in an attempt increase national revenue. Worse-off, the fear of their business being nationalized compel them to resist building of state institutions.

Failed Policies

The study established that existence of failed government policies affects institution building in Somalia. That often occur when policies governing the functions of state institutions do not get implemented as envisaged by policy makers.

5.3 Conclusion

This study sought to assess the challenges that affect building of political institution in Somalia. The study established that lack of political goodwill to fully implement the Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia affects the functioning of political institution- since most of the provisions in the constitution are not fully operationalized. It also found out that persistent clan -based conflicts affects the efforts geared towards building of political institution since it contradicts the set values of institutions. Insecurity arising from militia group was also found to be a challenge affecting the building of political institutions-since the militia

groups suspend the authority as well as powers of the established political institutions in the regions under their influence.

5.4 Recommendation

On the basis of findings, the following recommendations were made:

1. Regarding the general objective, the study recommended holistic implementation of Article 51 of the provisional constitution. That way, functions of the two levels of government would be clear and that would eliminate the problem of overlapping of roles. Similarly, chapter 5, Article 52 requires the cooperation of the National government and the Federal Government. In addition, chapter 14, Article 126 outlines measure of curbing internal as well as external sources of insecurity. By implementing those chapters, through the government institutions, challenges that arise from insecurity and affect institution building would be reduced
2. On the basis of the general objective also, the research study recommended civic education to be conducted in order to sensitize Somalia citizen on the essence of building political institutions. In addition, the current political institutions should be granted more powers, authority and resources so as to promote their independence.
3. In order to address the general objective further, the study recommended inclusion of affirmative action policies in the regions that are deemed greatly marginalized and less developed. That way, the application of clan identities would be reduced. Moreover, clans that perceive themselves as marginalized would feel as part of government. Thus, clan conflicts that affects institution building would be reduced

5.5 Recommendation for Further Studies

The study suggested that further research should be done on the areas below:

The influence of the external actors in the building of state institutions in the Somalia.

An assessment of the contributions of political parties to political stability

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE

The research project sought to assess the challenges that affect building of political institutions in Somalia. It uses a set of questions as indicated below. The first section, requires you to disclose your personal data which include: level of education, occupation, gender, Age, et cetera. The second section requires that you to respond to questions pertinent to the research question and objectives.

Kindly, share accurate information as they would help in developing the findings as well as recommendations. The study uses System Usability Scale () to measure your responses. Most importantly, the data that you will disclose is considered confidential. (SUS) for ranking your responses starts from 0-100. Thank you for your time.

Part A: Personal demographics

1. Gender
 - (a) Female ()
 - (b) Male ()
2. Age
 - (1) 20-24 ()
 - (2) 25-29 ()
 - (3) 30-34 ()
 - (4) 35-39 ()
 - (5) 40-44 ()
 - (6) 45-49 ()
 - (7) Over 50 ()
3. Education
 - (1) Primary ()
 - (2) Secondary ()
 - (4) Tertiary ()

- 5. Occupation?
 - (1) Business ()
 - (2) Civil servant ()
 - (3) Student ()
 - (4) Others ()
- 6. Marital status
 - (1) Married ()
 - (2) Single ()

SECTION B

- 7. Do you think there are challenges that affect building of political institution in Somalia?
 - (1) Strongly Agree ()
 - (2) Agree ()
 - 3) (Neither agree nor disagree ()
 - 4) Disagree ()
 - 5) Strongly disagree ()
- 8. If yes, kindly mentioned examples of those challenges

- 9. Kindly explain how those challenges affect the building of political institutions

- 10. How would you rate the effect of insecurity on political institution building in Somalia in a scale of 0-100%?
- 11. How would you rate the effect of political goodwill on political institution building in Somalia in a scale 0-100%
- 12. How would you rate the effect of corruption on political institution building in Somalia in a scale of 0-100%
- 13. How would you rate the effect of clan-based conflicts on political institution building in Somalia in a scale of 0-100%

14. Do you think the challenges you have mentioned above can be addressed?

(1) Strongly Agree ()

(2) Agree ()

3) (Neither agree nor disagree ()

4) Disagree ()

5) Strongly disagree ()

15. If agree, kindly explain.....



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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

AUTHORIZATION TO CONDUCT FIELD RESEARCH

This is to confirm that Ali Abdullahi Mohamed of Registration Number (C.50/11801/2015) is a bonafide student in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi.

Abdullahi is pursuing a Degree in Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration. He is researching on, **"Building of Political Institutions in Post – Conflict Societies: A case of Somalia 200 - 2017"**.

He has successfully completed the first part of his studies (Coursework) and is hereby authorized to proceed to the second part (Field Research). This shall enable the student to collect relevant data for his academic work.

It is against this background that the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi requests your assistance to enable the student in collecting relevant academic data. The information obtained shall be used only for academic purposes.

The student is expected to abide by your regulations and the ethics that this exercise demands. In case of any clarification, please feel free to contact the undersigned. Thanking you for support.

Yours Sincerely,

Professor Fred Jonyo,
Chairman,
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI



Federal Republic of Somalia
House of the People
Office of the Secretary General

Ref: 1875/XXG/B-10/21: الرقم

Date: February, 01 2021: التاريخ

To: - Professor Fred Jonyo,
Chairman
Dep. of Political Science & Public Administration
University of Nairobi.


Dear Professor Jonyo,

Thank you for your kind communication regarding your student **Mr. Abdullahi Mohamed Ali**. I am aware that he has successfully completed his course work and is at this juncture starting working on his field research part - "*Building of Political Institutions in Post – Conflict Societies: A case of Somalia*".

As per your request, I am granting him permission for the study to be conducted in Somalia where he can get first hand resource materials for his project.

Please accept the assurance of my highest considerations.

Yours faithfully.


Mr. Abdikarim Haji Abdi Buh
Secretary General of the House
of The People – Federal Parliament.



Tell: +252-61-6101444

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Website: <http://www.parliament.gov.so>