

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTER-COMMUNITY
CONFLICTS MANAGEMENT: A CASE OF KENYA DEFENSE FORCES (KDF) IN
KAPEDO**

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A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE POST


GRADUATE DIPLOMA IN STRATEGIC STUDIES

SEPTEMBER 2022

DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented in any school or university for an award of any degree or any other academic award.

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
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This research project was conducted under my supervision and is submitted for examination with my approval as the university supervisor.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my lovely wife and children. Through your support, I have been able to take the milestones. May God always bless you.

ABSTRACT

The Pokot-Turkana conflict in the North Rift region particularly in Kapedo area has persisted since pre-colonial era. The two pastoral communities continue to attack each other in a bid to steal livestock and gain control over grazing fields. While interventions of different natures have been rolled out, Government of Kenya's (GOK) deployment of the military in 2012 was perhaps a move of the last resort. While ethnic-based conflicts have attracted the interest of numerous researchers, the effectiveness of military intervention in inter-community conflict in Kenya has not been exploited. It is against this background that this study sought to examine the effectiveness of military security intervention in inter-community conflict management with specific emphasis on the deployment of Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) to manage the Kapedo conflict. For this reason, the study's specific objectives were to investigate the influence of the presence of military personnel in managing the Pokot-Turkana conflict and to examine the strategies applied by the KDF in intervening the Pokot-Turkana conflict. Descriptive research design was used to guide this research. The study targeted a population of 5,000 within Kapedo, Nyangaita, and Alale villages. Through purposive and random sampling techniques, the study sampled a population of 112 respondents. Data was collected through interviews and questionnaires. Validity of the research instruments were established by experts from the University of Nairobi. Qualitative data was analysed through descriptive analysis while hypotheses were tested by the use of F-test statistics. The general result indicated that military intervention strategies were effective in intercommunity conflict management in Kapedo. The strategies that were adopted by KDF included military presence in the area (Kinetic responses strategies), Raiding bandit's hide-outs strategies and disarmament strategies. The results indicated that military presence strategy did not significantly contribute towards inter-community conflict management in Kapedo area. However, the strategy adopted by KDF in raiding bandits' hide-outs was fairly effective and disarmament strategy was very effective in inter-community conflict management. The two interventions measures were effective because the operation achieved peace and calmness across the North Rift region within a short time. However, the study established that the presence of KDF military personnel did not effectively manage the Pokot-Turkana conflict, most likely because the bandits were not intimidated by the presence of KDF personnel. The military was not very effective in the conflict management as they ignored the post-conflict integration of the warring communities.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The United Nations and other international communities supported by regional organizations which include NATO and EU have actively participated in the conflict management and resolutions. They heavily invested their resources and advocated for the implementation of both coercive and non-coercive measures in solving the animosity that existed among opponents to ensure that the lasting halt of violence has been achieved. It is the responsibility of the international community to prevent armed conflict in order to maintaining tranquillity in the community.¹ Once the prevention has proved not to be possible, the peacekeepers are consulted to assist in enforcing and maintaining a safe environment that will provide a secure place for every one and political processes advancement as well as discourage the reopening of violence. For instance, with the support of member states, the UN deployed military-led peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Kabul among others.

Sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized by numerous conflicts. These conflicts have taken different forms. Many of these conflicts have received national and international conflict management attention that resulted in peace agreements that appear durable.² These include conflicts associated with independence movements against colonialism in Africa in the Twentieth Century, the Biafra War in Nigeria in the 1960s, the Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978-79, the genocide in Rwanda of 1994, among other well-known examples. However, there are other violent intercommunal conflicts, particularly at the intra-state level, which do not receive

¹ Ramos-horta, S. "Uniting our strengths for peace-Politics, Partnership and People." *Report of the High-Level Independent panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. 2015. pp. 23-34

² Binnendijk H & S. Johnson. *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. (Washington: Centre for Technology and National Security Policy. National Defense University Press, 2004). pp. 12-57

similar attention at the national and international level. Many of these conflicts have persisted without much intervention.³

Similarly, the military has been deployed severally in Kenya to restore peace and contribute in post-conflict reconstruction. Ideal examples include the use of the military to counter the Somali secession conflict (locally known as the Shifita war) 1963-1967, the deployment of military to quash the Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF) in 2007, the 2007/08 post-election violence, and the use of the military to manage the Pokot-Turkana conflict in Kapedo area.⁴ The focus of the current study is the use of the military to manage the Kapedo conflict. As of January 18, 2021, the International Federation of Red Cross reported that cumulatively at least 25 police officers and 198 civilians have been killed and an additional 9,000 families displaced, and 18,000 others affected.⁵

The kind of conflict that exists between the Pokot and Turkana communities in Kapedo area is mainly cattle rustling, this is because majority of the communities that live in that area are pastoralist groups. These groups depend entirely on pastoralism and livestock keeping.⁶ Many Africa communities practice pastoralism as their mainstay activity across the continent which has been affected severely by climate change as a result of global warming leading to drought, aridity and desertification.⁷ The drought pandemic has caused pastoralists to lose hundreds of their livestock every year due to the scarcity of the essential resources such as water and pasture due to lack of sufficient rainfall. As a result, grazing areas available becomes inadequate more

³ GoK. *National Policy For The Sustainable Development Of Arid And Semi-Arid Lands*. (Nairobi: Government of Kenya Printers, 2005). pp. 1-18

⁴ Ibid, p.10

⁵ GoK. "Arid Lands Resource Management Project, Report Turkana." Accessed Sept. 2, 2021, http://www.aridland.go.ke/arid_annual_reports/arid_annual_07-08/turkana_07-08.pdf. pp. 1.7

⁶ Ibid, p. 2

⁷ ICRC. "Livestock Study in the Greater Horn of Africa". Accessed Sept. 2, 2021, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/regional-livestock-study-book.pdf>. pp. 2-8

so, due to the rising population of people and livestock forcing the communities to exacerbate land- based conflicts among themselves as they compete for pasture and water. Pastoralists are found in twenty one countries in Africa.⁸

A KDF contingent was dispatched in November 2014 after Kenya Police were attacked by bandits in East Turkana.⁹ The involvement of the military witnessed the use of advanced arsenal including armoured personnel carriers. KDF officers focused in flashing out bandits and community disarmaments. Intermediaries led by Kenya Red Cross Society and government officers played a key role in the operation. They were tasked with collecting guns surrendered by the bandits.

While it is not clear when KDF personnel were pulled out of the region, reports indicate that the officers made several attacks in major bandit backyards killing unmentioned number of them. The intervention measures used by the KDF officers were pursued for several months before the operation was called off. Today, the bandits are moving on with their activities uninterrupted. It is against this background that this research sought to examine the strategies employed by the KDF in intervening in intercommunal conflict and the efficacy of the strategies.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

With the deployment of the KDF in 2014 to manage the Kapedo conflict a general expectation was that the perennial conflict experienced for decades would be put to rest. Kenyans' expectations of an exemplary job to be done by the KDF was informed by previous experiences where KDF personnel effectively neutralised intercommunal conflicts and restored peace.

⁸ Bevan, J. *Between a rock and a hard place: armed violence in African pastoral communities*. (New York: UN Development Programme, 2007). pp. 25-36.

⁹ Obare, O & W. Netya. "West Pokot leaders demand withdrawal of KDF from Kapedo, threaten to sue at ICC." *The Standard*, Accessed Sept. 2, 2021, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/rift-valley/article/2000140878/west-pokot-leaders-demand-withdrawal-of-kdf-from-kapedo-threaten-to-sue-at-icc#>. pp. 3-32

KDF officers in Kapedo successfully raided hideouts and neutralized a significant number of the bandits. Villages, caves and forests that were suspected to be bandits' hideouts were cordoned searched and culprits arrested to a point where local leaders started protesting against the KDF operations on bandit Badlands.¹⁰ A significant number of locals both from Pokot and Turkana communities surrendered their illegally acquired guns, which partly signified success of the mission. Nonetheless, even though not as bad as before the KDF operation, the conflict is still on. Pokot and Turkana communities continue to raid each other uninterrupted.¹¹

To-date, limited research has been conducted to examine the effectiveness of KDF security mission in Kapedo. It is against this background that the current research was interested in assessing the effectiveness of involving the military in inter-community clashes with particular emphasis of the Turkana-Pokot conflict. The current study assessed the effectiveness of using the military in intercommunal conflict. To meet this general objective, the study sought to respond to the following two questions; First, did the presence of military personnel in Kapedo area help in managing the conflict? Second, what strategies did the KDF apply in managing the conflict situation in Kapedo?

1.3 Objectives of the Research

The general objective of this study was to investigate the effectiveness of military intervention in managing inter-community conflicts. The study focused on the Kapedo conflict. The specific objectives of the study include

- i. To examine the strategies applied by the KDF in intervening in the Pokot-Turkana conflict.

¹⁰ Dolan, G. *A Historical Journey towards the Rights of Pastoralist Communities*. (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2006). pp.23

¹¹ Ibid, p.23

- ii. To assess the effectiveness of military presence and intervention in Pokot-Turkana conflict.

1.4 Literature Review

The section undertakes to review literature from different researchers and scholars who have made contributions on effectiveness of military intervention in inter-community conflict management. The literature reviewed was from both local and international context in assessing the intervention of the military in management of inter-community conflicts.

1.4.1 Causes of Inter-Community Conflict

Currently clashes have become a rampant problem affecting many countries across the world caused by different antagonist groups out and within the states. These stretch from religious context, political, border and to ethnicity among other types with the main purpose of protecting individual interests. As these conflicts occur, they normally affect a single country but at times the spill over effects is felt across the continent or even across the globe depending on the magnitude of the conflict.¹² Most of these conflicts lead to loss of lives and property, mass displacement of people, asylum, businesses destruction or decrease of their performance thus leading to poor performance of the economy. A country's economy is severely affected by these conflicts as external investors and tourists are discouraged on the other hand, other internal effects include disruption of efficient local production and investment.

For the last twenty years, the subject of ethnic conflicts experienced a lot of attention from scholars and researchers, and there are a number of studies which have been done on this matter. Many others have agreed that ethnicity actually exists in the African continent although there have been mixed reactions in relation to its effects. Cordel and Wolff observed that most

¹² Cordell K, S W. *Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences and Responses*. (UK: Policy Press, Bridge Street. Conflict Threatens Kenya Tourism, McClatchy News Service. 19th January 2008). pp. 18-39.

researchers have differed on the causes and effects of ethnicity on the African continent, he argues that this is a positive attribute which has continued to act as a strength of the African continent.¹³ However he cautions that these differing opinions are as a result of the individual researcher's background, geographical orientation as well as political alignments.

The understanding of ethnic-based conflicts may be assisted by the literature materials researched by different scholars and research on this area which has become a state security issue in many countries drawing the attention of many academicians, which may provide some guidance in answering some questions such as; what is the drive for many ethnic-based conflicts? Why do they appear randomly? Why do people and groups instigate them or why do people support them? Who are these people that engage in ethnic- based conflicts and is there a mobilized process or any strategy or tactics used in warfare executions? Is there any environment factor steering these conflicts instead of acting as anti- conflict agent? But these questions regarding the effects of ethnic conflicts on socio economic development have not been asked or answered.¹⁴

Oucho notes that during the decolonization period, high sentiments of nationalism were proclaimed by various leaders.¹⁵ This was necessary because the idea of state formation was key in helping the newly independent African states to progress. This according to the author led to the practice of amalgamating the existing ethnic communities to form one nation. This was done in all independent African states. However, he observed that despite the said amalgamation, there was no serious work that was done in uniting these ethnic communities to form an organically unified nation. Therefore, the ethnic conflicts have kept on occurring in almost all

¹³ Ibid, p.25

¹⁴ Gray, C S. Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary change in Warfare: the sovereignty of context. *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army College*. Fevereiro 2006. pp. 20-37

¹⁵ Oucho J O. 'Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflicts in Kenya', *African Social Studies*, Vol. 3, pp. 12-16

the African states and they have threatened their continued existence. Ethnic communities have engaged in constant conflicts with each other as they strive to fight for power, influence over resource allocation as well as dealing with their historical differences.¹⁶ However, whether these fights have resulted into socio economic development or not is what has never been answered.

From Devine explanation of the primordial versus instrumental set theory, primordial theory asserts that the need to form socio stimuli classifications among humans is an ability that one is born with.¹⁷ This proves that mortals are ethnic by nature and groups themselves according to ethnicity. This shows that ethnicity is innate not learnt and as a result human tends to value the people in their groups than the outsiders. However, some underlying factors that cause ethnical conflicts are not entirely innate but are learnt from the surrounding environment as people or groups compete for the available resources causing them to change accordingly.¹⁸

Ethnic conflict does not superfluously originate from natural human tendencies but partly as a result of environmental influence. These environmental influences may emanate from political territorial, social or cultural environmental issues that causes differences between the involved ethnic groups or people in the society.¹⁹ There are two levels of ethnic conflicts which are; vertical and horizontal. Vertical ethnic conflicts involve a superior group or a group that has more power or the dominating group over the rest or the inferior group while horizontal ethnic conflicts are between two equally considered groups or parties.

¹⁶ Gray. Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary change in Warfare: the sovereignty of context. *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army College*. Fevereiro 2006. p. 22.

¹⁷ Devine P. Persistent conflicts between the Turkanas and the Pokots: Causes, and policy implications. Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Nairobi.

¹⁸ Durch, W J. *Are we Learning Yet? In Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace and The Henry I. Stimson Center, 2006), pp. 573-608.

¹⁹ Wamwere K. *Towards Genocide in Kenya; The Curse of Negative Ethnicity*. (Nairobi: Mvule Africa Publishers, 2013).

1.4.2 The Pokot -Turkana Conflict

The Pokot-Turkana conflict emerged as a result of continuous disagreements concerning livestock. Without livestock in the picture these conflicts fail to make sense and any attempt of trying to solve is bound to fail. Although not all aspects of conflicts can be explained from history or can be totally understood in terms of their dependence on livestock between the two communities. However, it should not be interpreted that in every particular occurrence of conflict or conflicting processes livestock was the main cause.²⁰ If that is done then oversimplification of the violent conflicts incidences that were based on pre-colonial interactions of the two communities will have been made, thereby making wrong assumption while in reality raiding was not a fleeting episode.

The relationship between the two communities is mainly a violent and conflict-bound relation that has been shaped and propagated from historical as well as cultural aspects which influence relation between the Pokot and Turkana. The cultural aspect is well structured on legitimized engagement of conflict, where cultural transitions of boys from childhood to adulthood is comprised of radicalized training to engage in structured conflict.²¹ The conflict was driven by a group incursion or an organised attack to a community with the intention of stealing livestock (usually cattle). The conflict was therefore in no way expected to lead to a territorial expansion, but as a way of fulfilling cultural objective and to expand communal resources and wealth.²²

However, despite that Pokot-Turkana conflict was not aimed to lead to territorial expansion, or gaining influence over the other community, there was no defined territorial boundary between the two communities. This could be attributed by the way of life of these communities who are

²⁰ Devine, Patrick R. *Persistent conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana: Causes and policy implications*. Diss. University of Nairobi, 2016, pp. 1-65.

²¹ Ibid, p. 20

²² Ibid, pp.23

nomads and have no permanent residence and move from one place to another in search of pasture for their livestock. It is also not true to imply that lack of a defined boundary jeopardized territorial imperative between the communities. Territorial imperative deals with territorial behaviour that was popularized in social science in the second half of the Twentieth Century.²³ Specifically, it implies to the efforts by individuals or groups of individuals in defending and protecting territories they perceive belongs to them. A study was conducted in the 1950s on the concept of territorial imperative in Kenya, which noted that territorial imperative as a socio-biology theory that is mandated to provide biological explanation enhanced evolution in structured social behaviour as well as organization in humans. In the circumstance that there is perceived intrusion into the territory of a community, then there is high tendency of manifestation of exclusive defensive territorial imperative.²⁴ The pre-colonial historical records indicate that raiding and aggression between the Pokot and Turkana shows that Turkana were more likely than not the aggressors than the Pokot were.

One of the operational and tactical elements of the raids between the communities was that neither of the two communities raided far away into the enemy's territory. This could be associated by lack of familiarity with interior terrains of the enemy's territory that would increase the risk of getting harmed in the process of the raid. This means that the radius of undertaking raiding activities was limited in either territorial side of the two communities.²⁵ Hostilities between the communities are frequent during periods of extreme environmental stress that cause fluctuations in livelihood patterns of the communities. The communities used traditional weaponry of spears, *rungus*, bows and arrows, machetes among others. However, the use of traditional weaponry is in the recent times being replaced by use of sophisticated weapons

²³ Ibid, p. 24

²⁴ Ibid, p. 26

²⁵ GoK. *Arid Lands Resource Management Project, Report Turkana*. pp. 65.

such as modern rifles that have proliferated the country mostly through the Kenya Somali border.

The conflict between the two communities was mainly brief surprise attacks that targeted to raid livestock that could be easily driven away in a short time. The raids and counterraids that were organized did not target to deplete the entire livestock that would render the raided destitute with no means of getting on with life. Even though there were some killings that were occasionally reported during the raids, the killings were rare, and never indiscriminate. Cattle obtained from the raids were not exchanged for other goods or other items in trade but regarded as seeds to grow or increase one's wealth.²⁶

Fighting between the Pokot and Turkana was hand-to-hand, and the casualties of the war were mainly the Pokot or the Turkana participating in the raid or counterraiding, but never included the killing of children, women or old people as they were not part and parcel of the raids. The structure of raiding activities was communicated by the community elders to young generations as the elders were the custodians of traditional conflict management imperatives. Raids were carried out during seasons and it was therefore possible to predict the season or period in which raids would be carried out by one community. It was common that during the seasons of undertaking the raids, the community being raided would move to other regions to avoid insecurity occasioned by the raids. Raiding was not seen as a way of personal enrichment but a patterned behaviour, constituted by strategies and tactics that were much more a means of survival through adaptation in calamitous or hardship situations, and much less a culturally charged response to calamitous or hardship situations.²⁷

²⁶ Ibid, p. 65.

²⁷ Anon. J. *Factsheet - The Turkana-Pokot-Sabiny Cross-Border Conflict Management Initiative*. (USAID: 2005). pp. 19-24.

1.4.3 Strategies Applied by the Military in Intervening in the Inter-Community Conflict

Numerous previous studies suggest that one of the prime roles of international community is to prevent armed conflicts.²⁸ However, when it is not plausible to prevent armed conflict, security forces are forced to get involved in the conflict as way of deterring the same and therefore maintain a safe environment that would prevent resumption of conflict and enhance safe space for the advancement of political processes.

The challenges in the current environment, the sophistication of the different actors in conflicts have increased the complexity of conflict management. The population involved or affected by the conflict, the operations that are involved, together with the increase in modern technology and development of democratic space, adds up to increase challenges in conflict management as well as increasing the spectrum of tasks by the military.²⁹ However, resolution of conflicts is as well based on non-coercive measures that points towards relooking on the use of military on resolving internal conflicts as a way of balancing and integration with other instruments of power. The use of military in settling conflicts and disputes among communities faces rapid evolution, where its action is developed in a much more complex environment. Thus, as stated by Smith, "the desired result should be known before deciding whether the military has a role to play in achieving this result".³⁰

According to a study conducted by Jones military force can accomplish five strategic functions: to destroy, coerce, deter, contain or improve.³¹ These functions are deployed according to the possibility of achieving a certain desire, whether in isolation or in combination. These functions

²⁸ Ramos-horta, *Report of the High-Level Independent panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. 2015. p.16.

²⁹ Durch, J & E Madeline. "The Purposes of Peace Operations." *In Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009, p. 9-20).

³⁰ Smith, R. *The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World*. (Portugal, Lisbon: Editions 70).

³¹ Jones, B. 'Strategic Summary' *In Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009, p. 1-8).

may be deployed at different levels, either individually or combined to complement independently as a way to execute these activities.

There are three modern activities that are carried out by the military, or commonly used by the military in executing defence and security strategies: traditional combat operations, wide variety of non-traditional activities, such as humanitarian assistance, peace-making efforts, and also offer assistance and interaction with other instruments of power.³² The improved military operational strategies show increased changes and efforts developed by the military towards neutralizing insecurity threat and provision of stability by means of non-military vectors. The use of such strategies has been found to be more effective and to contribute towards effective diplomatic, economic and psychological results rather than the traditional use of military force.³³

Previous studies observe that establishing the rule of law, facilitating the internal security mechanism to regain control, and facilitating the levels of violence to be within the normal standards for the community, then the objective of the military in establishing security and stability is said to be achieved. However, it is also established that achieving the desired military objectives of promotion of peace and providing security stability is different and may not be similar to achieving a self-sustaining situation of peace.³⁴ The execution of a military strategy towards establishing peace and security may achieve the desired results, but it is unlikely to guarantee sustainable and lasting peace unless it is accompanied by programmes designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Thus, it is vital to complement military action with other

³² Ibid, p.6.

³³ Howard, L M. *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). pp.56-60.

³⁴ AJP-01(C). *Allied Joint Doctrine*. (OTAN –Bruxelas, 2007).

instruments of power, to ensure there exists dynamic balance with non-military objectives that will facilitate sustainable and lasting peace in the target region.³⁵

1.4.4 Research Gaps

Evidently, most of the previous studies have focused on the cause and effects of ethnic conflicts. A significant percentage of researchers have examined the socio-economic effects of ethnic-based conflicts. Notably, none of the studies have examined the effectiveness of intervention measures designed to stop the conflicts and enhance post-conflict reconstruction. Additionally, another significant research gap identified by this review related to the areas of government policies with regards to the response measures in mitigating the impact of these conflicts. This study authoritatively confirms that most of these government reactionary measures are not based on any kind of research or evidential data. It is for this reason that the current study sought to investigate the effectiveness of military security intervention in inter-community conflict management with special attention to the deployment of KDF to manage the Turkana-Pokot conflict in Kapedo area and its neighbouring regions.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

This study used Edward Azar's theory of protracted social conflict. Azar came up with a unique framework of analysing conflicts which he referred to as the protracted social conflict theory (PSC). He isolated four basic conditions that must exist before a protracted social conflict can occur.³⁶ These include the community content, human needs deprivation, bad governance, the negative role of the states, and international linkages. Under the community content, Azar observes that a community can be identified using religion, culture, race as well as its ancestry. It's these same identities according to Azar that are relied upon to solicit for basic needs. Most

³⁵ Ibid, p.2

³⁶ Galtung, J. 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 3, 1969, pp. 167-191.

African states were ruled by a single ethnic community which subordinated other smaller ethnic communities. This therefore meant that the dominant communities deliberately ignored the needs of smaller ethnic communities. This led to massive resistance from the dominated communities hence weakening the countries social fabric.³⁷

The second precondition for conflict according to this theory is the deprivation of needs of the community. Members of any single ethnic community usually look upon the community to address their concerns. Once their concerns are ignored, it leads to more grievances and complaints that a community harbour collectively. The author makes a distinction between different kinds of needs. He lists them as political needs, economic needs, security needs, as well as the acceptance needs.

The third factor according to Azar is the negative role that the state plays.³⁸ The government of any country has been endowed with the authority to govern and use force where necessary to regulate society, to protect the citizens and to provide the collective goods, Azar noted that once the state has failed to stop this kind of domination of the majority over the minority, the role of the state is critical in increasing the levels of peoples frustrations of the dominated ethnic communities. Azar noted that in most cases, the states which experience these kinds of the protracted social conflicts are usually characterized by dictatorial governments.

The fourth factor is security concerns where communities would feel part and parcel of the larger community, if their security is guaranteed. However, if they notice any discrimination in form of security of the members of such a community, then they tend to take matters into their own hands as a way of attempting to provide security to their members.

³⁷ Earl, C. H. 'Peacebuilding and human security: a constructivist perspective.', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009, Spring/Summer, pp70-71

³⁸ Galtung, J. 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 3, 1969, pp. 167-191.

This theory is relevant to this study because it touches on critical issues that are noted as significant issues in Pokot-Turkana conflict. The scarcity in form of resources is a major factor where the communities fight over the few resources available. The communities also feel delineated with the government as the government fails to undertake enough efforts to provide basic facilities vital for survival of each community member. The individuals originating from the Pokot communities and the Turkana communities are faced with environmental challenges such as drought which leads to fights over scarce natural resources. Negative cultures which promote cattle rustling, raids as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The North Rift region is also another example which explains the massive failure of the various peace building initiatives which have been adopted over the years, bad style of governance at the national and at the local level as well as the effects of politics are also part of the reasons as to why these conflicts have persisted.

1.6 Hypothesis

- i. H₁: The strategies used by the KDF did not manage the Pokot-Turkana conflict.
H₂: The strategies used by the KDF managed the Pokot-Turkana conflict.

- ii. H₁: KDF presence and intervention in Pokot-Turkana conflict was not effective.
H₂: KDF presence and intervention in Pokot-Turkana conflict was effective.

1.7 Research Methodology

Research methodology considers the methodology that is adopted by the study such that the research objectives of the study are fully achieved. It brings out the research design adopted by the study, the population and the sampling technique, data collection method as well as the analysis that was adopted in the study.

1.7.1 Research Design

This study used descriptive research design. This is because the study sought to obtain information that would systematically describe a phenomenon, and a situation that specifically explains the strategies used by KDF in intervention as well as managing Pokot-Turkana conflict. Descriptive research involves the use of many kinds of research methods to investigate the research variables. The current study collected and analysed qualitative and quantitative data. The design allows an elaborate and intensive description of the study variables that help to answer the research questions without manipulating or trying to influence or change the observed phenomenon.³⁹

1.7.2 Variables

The independent variables of this study are the military intervention strategies which may include raiding bandit hideouts, disarmament, and kinetic approaches while the dependent variable is inter-community conflict management.

1.7.3 Study Population

The study was conducted in three villages within the large Kapedo area, namely, Kapedo village, Nyangaita village, and Alale village. The identified villages have an estimated cumulative population of 300 people. Administratively, they are headed by a chief and assisted by village administrators.

1.7.4 Sampling Technique

This study combined purposive and random sampling technique to select the respondents of the study. Purposive sampling helped in the identification of KDF officers and other state administrators involved in security operations in the identified area while random sampling

³⁹ Creswell, J et al. Advanced Mixed Methods Research Designs. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003). (pp. 209–240).

helped in the identification of respondents from within the villages. Random sampling gives each unit equal chances of being selected while purposive sampling uses readily available data.⁴⁰

1.7.5 Sample Size

The sample population for the current study was derived from the three identified villages: Kapedo, Nyangaita, and Alale. All the three villages have witnessed bandit attacks and security interventions in equal measures.

Table 1: Sample Population

Stratum	Population
Rift Valley Regional Commissioner	1
Baringo County Police Commander	1
Local Administrators	10
KDF Officers	5
Villagers	100
Total	117

1.7.6 Research Instruments

The study used questionnaires and interviews in data collection. The questionnaire had two parts. Part one sought respondents' demographic information and part 2 had both open and closed-ended questions. Part two of the questionnaire was categorized into three sub-sections, namely, presence of military personnel, attacks on bandit strongholds, and military-led disarmament measures. Kothari agrees that questionnaires possess several advantages such as affordable, being interviewer-bias free; and responses are in interviewees' own words.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 211

⁴¹ Kothari, C. *Quantitative Techniques*. (New Delhi, New Age International Publishers, 2004). Pp. 13-27

1.7.7 Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted in Mt Elgon. The researcher visited the target population to engage with the respondents. The filled questionnaire was collated after a week and data analysis followed soon thereafter. The findings of the pilot study were important. The findings helped the researcher in refining the research objectives, a sample population evaluation, research instruments' testing, evaluating and deciding upon research methods, resolving as many potential problems or issues as possible, and approximating the period and costs the project required.

1.7.8 Validity

The researcher presented the contents of the questionnaire and the interview guide to research experts from University of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies for reviewing for the purpose of guaranteeing the validity of data instruments. The recommendation of the review guided the adjustment of the data collection instruments. Validation of the research instruments is important because it ensures that the instruments are designed in the most appropriate form to collect the needed information.

1.7.9 Reliability

To test and ensure consistency, the current study used the test re-test method to ensure data collection instruments' consistency. Test re-test is an effective technique because it entails administering one test exceeding a singular test to similar respondents and exploring their feedback to note affinity.

1.7.10 Data Collection Procedure

The researcher obtained a research authorization letter from the graduate school, University of Nairobi. A research permit was sought from National Commission for Science, Technology and

Innovation (NACOSTI). Thereafter, the researcher approached respective administrative authorities in a bid to get authorization to administer the questionnaire and conduct interviews.

1.7.11 Data Analysis

First, the researcher reviewed the interview transcript and questionnaires and sort them thereafter. Sorting data collected ensured completeness and consistency. The questionnaires and interviews generated both quantitative and qualitative data. The analysis of qualitative data was thematical and results were presented in narrative form.

1.7.12 Ethical Consideration

First, consent of the research participants was of utmost importance. The researcher started with seeking research permission from University of Nairobi and the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation and the administrative authorities within the study locale. On the other hand, the researcher sought the consent of research respondents before administering questionnaires or interviews. All the responses were given voluntarily. Secondly, the research was conducted in strict observation of anonymity and confidentiality of the research participants. Data collection and analysis did not reveal the real identity of the respondents.

1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Research

The study focused on one-on-one interviews and administration of questionnaires within three of the most affected villages by the Pokot-Turkana conflict. First, the security risk of collecting data in the vast area in the wake of constant bandit ambush over the past few months was a major limitation to effective data collection. Second, the restrictive social interaction rules set out by the government of Kenya in the face of unprecedented health challenges introduced by Covid-19 was another major limitation to the data collection phase of the current study. Consequently, it was not possible to meet all the units in the sampled population. While time

and financial constraints might have inhibited the actualization of the planned data collection phase, the researcher prepared a time plan and a budget, which was instrumental in countering these hurdles. Furthermore, the findings of the research hugely relied on the respondents' frame of mind and honesty. The researcher mitigated this limitation by creating a good rapport with the respondents. While the researcher expected all the respondents to turn up on time for interviews, it became apparent that a significant number of the respondents would have turned up late or fail to show up. To mitigate this shortcoming, the researcher adjusted his timeline to suit the desires of the respondent.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The chapter starts with the introduction where, the dependent and the independent variables are explained. The chapter then covers statement of the research problem. Research objectives are then highlighted. The chapter then investigates the literature review of the study where empirical studies and the respective research gaps are assessed. The chapter then focuses on theoretical framework where the study investigates the anchor theory of the study. The hypotheses of the research are then stated, and research methodology stipulated. Scope and limitations of the research are then assessed, while chapter outline is then considered.

The subsequent chapter two explains inter-community conflicts as it expresses nature and causes of Pokot-Turkana conflict in Kapedo, chapter three explains the strategies adopted by KDF in Kapedo to bring security and stability. Chapter four shows the study analysis and presentation of findings while chapter five provides the summary and conclusion of the findings.

CHAPTER TWO

THE INTER-COMMUNITY CONFLICTS: NATURE AND CAUSES OF POKOT-TURKANA CONFLICT IN KAPEDO AREA

2.1 Introduction

Chapter One examined the nexus of the Pokot Turkana conflict with a special emphasis on the strategies applied by the Military during intervention. In doing so, the researcher identified research gaps, came up with a Theoretical Framework and designed the research methodology.

This chapter discusses the nature and causes of Pokot-Turkana conflict in Kapedo area. It starts with discussing the primary causes of the conflict, the effectiveness of the military intervention, the impact of the inter-community conflict in the region and the last section concludes the chapter.

2.2 The Primary Causes of the Conflict

The primary causes of conflict in Turkana-Pokot conflict can be summarized in a number of factors namely, the land issue, poor governance structures, proliferation of firearms, scarcity of natural resources, divisive local politics, and cultural differences.⁴²

2.2.1 The Land Issue

Since the Turkana and Pokot communities are traditionally pastoralists, the question of land ownership and possession has been antagonistic. Controlling grazing land in the North Rift region has attained a life-or-death status. Besides grazing rights, land is also crucial in providing access to water and pasture to graze livestock. Non-compliance with land rights, poor local

⁴² Bollig, Michael. Ethnic conflicts in North-West Kenya: Pokot-Turkana Raiding 1969—1984. *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (1990), pp. 73-90.

governance, and historical land injustices in the North Rift region are the major unresolved land challenges that have contributed to the escalation of inter-communal violent conflicts in Kenya. This problem has affected the majority of Kenyans in rural and urban areas alike. Erosion of traditional and cultural states of governing land in the North Rift region led to a power vacuum which has never been filled by the national government or the county government in resolving land conflicts. Therefore, these communities living in the North Rift region have got several disputes over land boundaries between them besides the escalation of inter-clan conflicts over land.⁴³

2.2.2. Poor Governance Structures

A report published by UNESCO in 2016 observed that the North Rift region especially in Arid and semi- Arid areas have suffered from the problem of marginalization which has caused under- development in these areas.⁴⁴ The report further documents acutely low police-to-civilian ratio in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) areas hence the administrative structures are not as strong as those of other areas. These forms of under-development are evident in several sectors such as poor education systems, poor health systems, absence of major infrastructural projects such as roads, health facilities, and markets. The situation has also been worsened by poor administrative system. Therefore, the citizens in this region have a sense of both physical, economic, social and cultural insecurities. Consequently, civilians in the region feel that the government does not care about them which causes the problem of distance-decay.⁴⁵ They are

⁴³ Huho, Julius M. Conflict resolution among pastoral communities in West Pokot County, Kenya. *A Missing Link*. 2012. p. 28.

⁴⁴ Schilling, Janpeter, R. Locham, T. Weinzierl, J. Vivekananda, and Jürgen Scheffran. The nexus of oil, conflict, and climate change vulnerability of pastoral communities in northwest Kenya. *Earth System Dynamics* 6, no. 2 (2015), pp. 703-717.

⁴⁵ Binnendijk H & S. Johnson. *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. (Washington: Centre for Technology and National Security Policy. National Defence University Press, 2004). Pp.91.98

forced to take law into their own hands to protect themselves, a role the government should be doing.

2.2.3 The Proliferation of Firearms

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons refers to the practice of availability of illegal arms and weapons in the wrong hands, which points at the availability of a black market that supplies the firearms. Several studies such as that of UNESCO and NG security report have revealed that due to perennial conflicts in Northern Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, and the nature of the Kenya borders which are largely porous, there has been an increasing inflow of illegal arms in Kenya and the pastoralist communities have taken advantage of the weak systems of governance in Turkana County to acquire these illegal arms and weapons. Therefore, the acquisition of these firearms has increased the impetus of these communities to engage in violence.⁴⁶

2.2.4 Scarcity of Natural Resources

According to Devine, Members of the Turkana and the Pokot communities living in Kapedo area are both pastoralist groups. Pastoralism has always been associated with keeping of livestock on a large-scale basis for survival leading to the problem of overstocking. The County governments of Turkana and west Pokot annual reports of 2017 and 2018 respectively pointed out that North Rift region is known to have a problem of acute water shortage, meaning that there is also inadequate pasture for their livestock to keep on grazing. This has forced the members of two communities to fight over grazing lands and the little amount of water and

⁴⁶ Ibid p. 41

pasture which is available. The author Devine warns that unless something is done to mitigate on this scarcity, these conflicts are likely to be perennial.⁴⁷

2.2.5 Divisive Local Politics

According to several reports such as the National Government security report of 2015, the 2017 County Governments of Turkana annual report, and the 2018 West Pokot annual report suggest that over the years, the local politicians such as Councillors and Members of County Assembly have been the major reason as to why conflicts in these areas have never been ended. This, according to the National government report of 2015, is because these politicians incite their respective communities against each other. They do these through arming the morans, sponsoring cattle raids and ethnic attacks, supporting the burning of livestock and torching of the rival communities house as well as killings of members of the rival communities. Unless efforts are made to tame these rogue politicians from inciting their communities, Devine warns that these conflicts will never be contained.⁴⁸

2.2.6 Cultural Differences

The problem of cattle rustling, and stock-theft has been a common culture among the pastoralist groups which has existed for ages. Surprisingly, this practice is not done for commercial reasons but for socio-cultural reasons. Devine argues that it's used to gauge the capacity of a young man (the Moran) to marry or to under-go a certain rite of passage.⁴⁹ The author further observes that the reason as to why cattle rustling and stock theft continues is that cattle and livestock is used as a store of wealth, it's also used as a medium of exchange where bride price is paid in terms herds of cattle. The young men who lacked any forms of

⁴⁷ Devine, Patrick R. *Persistent conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana: Causes and policy implications*. Diss. University of Nairobi, 2016., pp. 23-57.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 48.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 33

asset and relied on cattle rustling and stock-theft in order to ensure that they have acquired assets. This helped them to restore their own style of prestige.

2.3 The Effectiveness of Military Intervention in Intercommunity Conflict

While the effectiveness of the military operation in the North Rift region remains unclear, the success of the KDF in managing intercommunity conflicts in other parts of Kenya is clear and well documented. An ideal example is the 2008 military operation in Mt. Elgon.⁵⁰

In response to the escalating violence in Mt. Elgon between 2005 and 2008, the Government of Kenya in early March 2008 authorized the military to intervene and stop the killings and restore peace and order. This operation was authorized after the Internal Security operation led by the police and codenamed Operation *Tafuta Amani* failed to achieve the intended objective.⁵¹

The Kenyan army launched an operation dubbed *Okoa Maisha* (save life) targeting the Sabao Land Defence Forces (SLDF) which was accused of carrying out an increasing number of attacks on villages, killing people, stealing cattle and destroying homes. Upon deployment the military immediately sealed off Mt Elgon region from the media, the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies and human rights organizations from accessing the region. The operation started on the 10th of March was meant to restore order and peace in the region. During the press briefing on the 14 of March 2008, the Police Spokesman outlined the mission of Operation *Okoa maisha* as to arrest and bring to justice persons responsible for the crimes committed in Mt Elgon area, recover all illegally held firearms, create an enabling environment for the population to cooperate with the Police in the investigation of serious crimes reported

⁵⁰ Isura, C. *300 still missing 3 years after operation Okoa maisha in Mt. Elgon*. Accessed Online from: <http://westfm.co.ke/index-page-news-bid-3728.htm#ixzz2cn3nYPXf>

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 2.

without fear of retribution, prevent commission of further crimes in the area and restore law and order in the region.⁵²

This operation resulted in the death of SLDF Deputy Leader and Military Commander Mr. Wycliffe Kirui Matakwei on 16 May 2008. High ranking SLDF commanders were also charged in criminal courts, and it was quickly followed by a vaporization of SLDF in the late spring of 2008. Operation *Okoa Maisha* was carried out by over 400 members of security forces composed of the military, the Kenyan police, the general service unit, the administrative police and the anti-stock theft police. The military set up a base at Kapkota where all the operations were coordinated.⁵³ According to government figures, a total of 3,265 persons were detained in Kapkota military camp, out of which 2,187 were released after questioning. When the operation ended, the leaders and members of SLDF had been identified and arrested. The people of Mt Elgon returned to rebuild their shattered lives.⁵⁴ They were appreciative of the efforts made by the Army to rid them of the SLDF menace that had dogged them for so long. Severally, they came out in demonstration in support of the military operations, insisting that the security forces should stay on and even establish a permanent base in the region and take part in the post-conflict reconstruction of the region's dilapidated infrastructures. Owing to the community demand, the government agreed to set up a military base in Kapkota to serve as deterrence to future conflicts, and from where the military could operate in their routine post-reconstruction tasks.⁵⁵

⁵² Ngulutu, Boniface M. *The military in post-conflict reconstruction: the case of Kenya Defence Forces in Mount Elgon conflict, 2005-2012*. Diss. University of Nairobi, 2013, pp.1- 43.

⁵³ Huho, Julius M. Conflict resolution among pastoral communities in West Pokot County, Kenya. *A Missing Link*. 2012. p. 28.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 28

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, "Sabaot Land Defense Force Committing Atrocities Against Humanity", 2007

2.4 The impact of the Inter-Communal Conflicts in The North Rift Region

The major effects of the perennial conflicts among the Pokots and the Turkana community living in Kapedo areas have not only affected the warring communities but also the country as a whole. Devine (2016) notes that the worsening of the security situation by the bandits has not only affected the Kenyan people, but these conflicts have also gone regional. For instance, Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni was once quoted publicly alleging that the members of the Pokot community from Kenya should stop carrying out cattle raids in Uganda," Watu Wa West-Pokot Muwache Kuiba ng'ombe Zangu" the president Lamented. Therefore, Devine categorizes the effects of these conflicts into three categories; namely, political effects, Economic effects and social effects.⁵⁶

2.4.1 The Political Impact

The problem of inter-communal violent conflicts in these regions according to Devine has caused ethnic disintegration and lack of national cohesion in Kapedo area and the entire north Rift region. This can be attributed to escalation of hate that communities have for each other. The politicians are known to benefit from these kinds of ethnic clashes because it's what helps them advance their political and economic interests through ethnic mobilization. The conflict has also been responsible for causing political instabilities not only in Kenya especially during the electioneering periods.

2.4.2 Social Impact

The persistence of these conflicts in Kapedo area according to Devine has led to a number of serious and disastrous effects which are social in nature such as massive deaths, loss of family members, bread winners as well as wiping out of family properties and family members. This has led to a number of citizens in these counties to suffer from stress and

mental anguish. It has also led to strong hatred and feelings of bitterness from members of these two communities. This has worsened the problem of lack of social interactions amongst the members of these communities. The problem of massive displacement of communities is also a social impact of these inter-communal violent conflicts. These displacements make children and students to be moved to safer grounds, they are usually housed in make-shift camps as they wait for peace and calm to be restored. Therefore, this negative social impact impacts on the standards of living of the residents in this region and it raises the cost of living since there is very little economic activity that takes place in these areas. As a result of these, children are unable to attend school, locals are unable to access proper medical care hence social under development.⁵⁷

2.4.3 The Economic Impact

Turkana and the Pokot communities are pastoralists and rely on pastoralism to ensure their survival, however, as a result of their perennial conflict, poverty rates have gone up immensely in these areas. The absence of investors, collapsing of commercial enterprises and withdrawal of basic government social services to Kapedo area such as provision of education, adequate health care system, construction of roads, dams and rural electrification has negatively denied the region the much-needed economic empowerment among the residents. This has been caused by the unending violence and destruction of property. As a result, the area of Kapedo remains highly underdeveloped, with increased poverty levels with both high dependency level and increased infant mortality rates.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Ibid p. 48.

⁵⁸ Ibid p. 49

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has established that Pokot-Turkana conflict is a perennial challenge that has affected the communities for many decades. Owing to the fact that the two communities are pastoralists, some of the key issues that have fuelled the conflict include desire to control grazing field, poor governance structures, proliferation of light firearms, scarcity of natural resources and cultural differences. It is prudent to conclude that effectiveness of the military operation in the North Rift region remains unclear. However, the success of the KDF in managing intercommunity conflicts in other parts of Kenya is clear and well documents.

CHAPTER THREE

STRATEGIES APPLIED BY THE KDF IN INTERVENING IN THE POKOT-TURKANA CONFLICT

3.1 Introduction

Chapter two discussed the causes and nature of the Turkana-Pokot conflict in Kapedo area. The researcher discussed the effectiveness of the military intervention in conflict management as well as the impact of the conflict to the community in terms of economic, social as well as political impact.

This chapter provides a background on the deployment and the strategies adopted by KDF in the intervention of Pokot-Turkana conflict. The chapter starts with discussing the constitutionality of the intervention of KDF in Kapedo area, the justification of this intervention, the operation itself and the strategies adopted in the conflict management initiative, as well as the conclusion of the chapter.

3.2 Constitutionality of the Kenyan Military Intervention in Kapedo

Military intervention that focuses to restore domestic law and order is a very noble idea, nevertheless it is important also to regulate their conduct. If human beings are not monitored, they easily violate the laws of the land. This section therefore analyses the extent to which the Kenyan military subscribed to the Kenyan constitution during their interventions in the Pokot - Turkana conflict. The constitutionality of the interventions and the effectiveness of the

parliament of Kenya in facilitating the military is a very important point of consideration.⁵⁹ This is crucial because the military, as the coercive institution of the state, cannot be left to the military leadership and the President of the Republic of Kenya alone.

While the military is a state institution which is equally important, the security of the citizens is even more critical and like other state institutions it should not escape public scrutiny. It is imperative that the civilian leadership, and most importantly parliament, must be closely involved in matters related to security.⁶⁰ The parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of the military is therefore critical in any state. It is also important to note that prior to the launch of the military involvement in the North Rift region, the then old Kenyan constitution was still partly in play and was silent on the military intervention into domestic conflicts save for the requirement for the KDF to perform its secondary role when called upon to assist the internal security forces in situations beyond their capability, to maintain law and order. The Kenyan concept of developing a new State constitution and subsequent implementation, limits the arbitrariness of political power. While the concept recognizes the necessity of government, it also insists upon limitations placed upon its powers. In essence, constitutionalism is an antithesis of arbitrary rule. For the Kenyan military to function effectively, they needed to operate within a constitutional framework.⁶¹

The constitution of Kenya sets the rules and powers of the governors and the rules of the political game. The constitution forms the crucial aspect in this case as a rule-binding instrument. Similarly, it is worth mentioning that the Kenyan parliament played a central role

⁵⁹ John Locke, "Two Treatises of Government": In Peter Laslett, ed. Cambridge texts in the *History of Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 355-6.

⁶⁰ Ibid p.27.

⁶¹ Mwesiga Baregu, "Parliamentary Oversight of Defence and Security in Tanzania's Multiparty Parliament": In Len Le Roux, Martin Rupiya and Naison Ngoma ed. *Guarding The Guardians: Parliamentary Oversight and Civil-Military Relations: The Challenges for SADC*, South Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies; 2004.

in the military intervention in the North Rift region. Legislatures are the most important organ of the state. The parliament has the power of and the right to direct how the military force is employed to preserve territorial integrity and security of the state. The parliament discussed the North Rift region security issue and assessed security policies and approved the deployment of the military. The study brings to the fore the sanctity of parliament and constitutionalism aspect in this decision-making process because, the state is the only organization in society with a legitimate monopoly of force.⁶² This is delegated to the military and the military must therefore be accountable to the democratic and legitimate authority. As an instrument of national power, the Kenyan military was required to conduct its activities within the confines of the nation state, hence the reason that the parliament must sanction its activities.

In society, the issue of human rights has become an essential requirement for democratization and good government. This conditionality has equally elevated the role of parliament more than ever to ensure their protection particularly after the reign of HE Daniel Arap Moi. Inevitably, this has made parliamentary oversight organ over the security apparatus of the state including prevailing over the military to respect sanctity of life and desist from acts which may violate human rights whenever they are deployed in armed conflict environment.⁶³ The military as a disciplined force must have controls within its institutional chain of command to ensure adherence to the Law of the Armed Conflict (LOAC) and avoid lest they degenerate into an instrument of torture to the innocent civilians. The institutionalization of these measures in the Kenyan constitution and empowering the parliament with requisite authority over military deployment enabled the military to operate in the Pokot-Turkana conflict within the confines of the law up to the completion of the mandated mission.

⁶² Ibid, p. 8

⁶³ Nwabueze, B.O., *Constitutionalism in the Emerging States*, London: C. Hust and Company; 1973, pp. 2.

3.3 Legality and Justification of Kenya Defence Forces Intervention in the Conflict

The Kenya Defence Forces intervention in Pokot-Turkana conflict was much informed by the roles enshrined in the Kenyan Constitution. Under the Old Constitution, the primary role of the military was the provision of defence and protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.⁶⁴ Further, as a secondary role, the military could be called upon to intervene in internal security matters as and when the mandated internal security machinery is unable to effectively deal with the threat. Similarly, the military is mandated to provide Civil- Military assistance to civil authority in matters related to community development project as well as provision of assistance in major national disasters and emergencies. Owing to the magnitude of the Turkana-Pokot atrocities committed in North Rift region, it was apparent that the internal security forces deployed to address the situation was far much outmatched by the bandits in terms of weaponry superiority and guerrilla tactics which the police and other internal security agents are not trained to handle. KDF's deployment was in response to the National Security Council requirement for the military to secure an entry point into the conflict under its secondary role to restore peace and security in the region.

The Kenya Constitution enacted in 2010 further elaborated the KDF roles as stipulated in Kenya Gazette Supplement Act of 2012. Under the Supplement Act Part 2, Constitution, Structure, Command and Administration of the Defence Forces, states as follows: "An Act of Parliament to provide for the functions, organization and administration of the Kenya Defence Forces pursuant to article 232 and 239(6) of the constitution to give effect to article 241 and other relevant articles to provide for the disciplinary matters, and for connected matters." Para

⁶⁴ Ministry of Interior and Internal Coordination of Government report on security situation in Turkana and West Pokot County (2016), GOK printer, Nairobi

6(1) states that; “pursuant to article 241(1) Of the Kenya Constitution, the Defence forces consists of the Kenya Army, Kenya Air Force and Kenya Navy”.⁶⁵

The functions of the Kenya Defence Forces under para 8 of article 241(3) of Kenya constitution stipulates that the roles of the Defence Forces are to defend and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, assist and cooperate with other authorities in situation of emergencies or disaster and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances and, deployment to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly⁶⁶.

The 2010 constitution gave the military explicit mandate to be deployed in such situations and ordered to carry out post-conflict or post-emergency reconstruction tasks in aid to the civil authorities due to immense capability and resources endowed inherent in the Defence forces. The case of Pokot-Turkana conflict intervention though sanctioned by the constitution of the time was a sacrosanct mission because the constitution provided for the KDF participation in such conflict beyond the capability of the internal security mechanism.⁶⁷ In this context the legal existence and continued participation in post-conflict reconstruction tasks by the KDF in the region is further embedded in the 2010 constitution, as stated in the above Gazette Supplement Act of September 2012.

3.4 The Immediate Reason of the Military Deployment

President Uhuru Kenyatta deployed the military on 3rd November 2014 to quash the Kapedo conflict. The immediate cause of the conflict was an early morning attack by suspected Pokot bandits in Turkana East on Saturday. At least 21 police officer and three civilians were

⁶⁵ Rod Hague, Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin, 3rd ed. *Comparative Government and Politics: AnIntroduction*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1993, p. 261.

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ Nwabueze, B.O., *Constitutionalism in the Emerging States*, London: C. Hust and Company; 1973, pp.3

reportedly killed. The incident happened at an area hit by an on-going wave of insecurity at the Kapedo border point between Baringo County and Turkana. Government sources said the officers and the three employees of Toyota Kenya were heading to Kapedo when the bandits ambushed them at Kasarani area along Kapedo-Lokori road in Turkana East Constituency.⁶⁸

However, before the November 2014 killing of police officers and civilians, the area had over the years been associated with bloodbath. While the November 2017 massacre staged by suspected bandits was perhaps one of worst in the history of the region, statistics from the National Police Service indicate that since then, more than 118 police officers have been killed.⁶⁹

3.5 The Military Deployment

On November 4th 2014, after the expiry of President Uhuru Kenyatta's 24-hour ultimatum for the Pokot and Turkana communities to surrender the firearms and ammunitions stolen from the police killed the previous day, KDF immediately deployed following this Strategic guidance. There was heavy exchange of fire in areas of Kapitewoi in Kapedo, Baringo County, as Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) began an air and ground offensive to flush out bandits who killed 21 police officers. In a show of might, military helicopters, tanks, lorries and more than 10 armoured personnel carriers carrying soldiers were moved to the area on Sunday evening after the President toured the region.⁷⁰

The deployment of the military was welcomed and resisted by the locals in equal measures. The raiding community, mostly the Pokot, complained a lot about the firepower used by the army to counter the perpetrators of the conflict. They indicated that the military power was

⁶⁸ Bevan, J. *“Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition”*, p.33

⁶⁹ Ibid p. 35.

⁷⁰ Ibid p. 35

excessive and uncalled for. Some of the local leaders observed that while the military was sent to objectively quell the conflict, the operation was mostly conducted in Pokot villages.⁷¹

For instance, on November 4th, 2014, KDF planes reportedly engaged bandits at Kapitewoi area with reports that two Pokot herders were killed and more than 30 head of cattle killed in the process. This took place even as elders rushed to beat the ultimatum to deliver the guns stolen from officers. On November 5th 2014, intermediaries led Kenya Red Cross Society and government officers picked four guns which had been placed under a dry fallen acacia tree at Toplane Dam in Chesamu area near Silale hills where the bandits are suspected to be hiding. Pokot leaders were not happy with how the operation was being conducted. Consequently, the leaders led by Kapenguria constituency legislator Samuel Moroto filed a case at the High Court seeking to compel the government to withdraw the military from the area. Justice Odunga refused to hear the case citing poor drafting.⁷²

On the other hand, most of the Turkana villages welcomed the operation because they felt the military deployment would dispense justice. Note that the 2014 conflict was triggered by a section of the Pokot community attacking Turkana villages to steal livestock. Numerous Turkanas were killed in the raids.⁷³ Even though some Turkana families responded by staging counter attacks, they did not recover their stolen animals. Thus, the Turkana counter raids were not successful. Thus, conducting most of the operations in Pokot villages appeased the Turkanas.

⁷¹ Ibid, p.68

⁷² Bevan, *Between a rock and a hard place*, p. 26

⁷³ GoK. "Arid Lands Resource Management Project", p.45

3.6 Strategies Applied by the KDF in Intervening in Intercommunity Conflict

The military has always played an important role in national and international relations. However, its priorities have been changing, adapting to the evolution of strategic contexts, successively used first as a means of coercion, then as a deterrent and more recently as a tool for the prevention and resolution of conflicts.⁷⁴ This form of use should be regarded not as a succeeding substitution of the context of use, but as a broadening of the spectrum of use.

In this spectrum, generically, military force can accomplish five strategic functions, namely, to destroy, coerce, deter, contain or improve. These functions are performed in isolation or in combination, according to the strategic concept that achieves the desired political result, and can be developed at different levels, individually or in a complementary manner, independent of the activities to execute.⁷⁵

In the context of security and defence in the 21st century, the military runs three main types of activities. First, traditional combat operations, second, a wide range of "non-traditional" activities, ranging from humanitarian assistance to special operations through to the peace operations. Third, support activities and interaction with other instruments of power.⁷⁶ This spectrum of usage reflects very significant changes associated with a growing appreciation of the actions developed by use of non-military vectors. This trend has become more pronounced and results in more effective diplomatic, economic and psychological strategies, as well as the problems inherent to the use of military force.

The conduct of military operations began to be the "art of the possible," implying that more and more forces adapt to non-military contexts and political, legal, socio-cultural, economic,

⁷⁴ Alberts, D. S. & Hayes, R. E. *Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Informational Age*. (Washington, DoD Command and Control Research Program, 2003).

⁷⁵ Howard, L. M. *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁷⁶ Marten, K. Z. *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

technological and geographical constraints. Thus, in addition to the means, the use of military force started to require another fundamental prerequisite: opportunity.⁷⁷

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has established that the deployment of the military to quash inter-community conflict is constitutional. It is one of the KDF roles as stipulated in Kenya Gazette Supplement Act of 2012. Under the Supplement Act Part 2, Constitution, Structure, Command and Administration of the Defence Forces, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces can deploy the military to counter internal aggressions. It is against this background that President Uhuru Kenyatta deployed the military to counter atrocities in Kapedo area.

⁷⁷ Zartman, W. *Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods & Techniques*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE STUDY FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

Chapter Three evaluated the strategies that were adopted by KDF in inter-conflict management in Turkana-Pokot conflict in Kapedo area. The chapter also indicated the reasons that necessitated the intervention of the military and clarified on the constitutionality of using military in such intervention.

Chapter Four presents the findings of the data collected, the analysis and interpretation of the study findings the conclusion and summary of the chapter.

4.2 Response Rate and Demographic Profile

Descriptive statistics describes the response rate of the study, it also describes the summary of the distribution of the respondents in terms of gender, age, years of experience in resolving conflicts,

4.2.1 Response Rate

A total of 62 questionnaires were distributed, out of which 50 were successfully completed and returned. This represents a response rate of 76%. According to Mugenda and Mugenda a 50% response rate is adequate, 60% good and above 70% rated very well. The response rate was good enough for the researcher to proceed on. Data was analysed through descriptive analysis.

4.2.2 Gender Information

Data analysis results indicated that 40% (25) respondents were female while 60% (37) were male. In this regard, male respondents constituted the majority of the study respondents who successfully filled and returned the questionnaire as shown in Figure 1. This scenario is attributed to the fact that targeted social institutions within the conflicting communities have less

females compared to the males. Nonetheless, note that there was a fair balance of gender. Thus, the information collected represented both genders fairly.




Figure 1: Gender Information

4.2.3 Respondent's Age

Majority of the respondents were between 30-39.9 years followed by 40-49.9 years as shown in figure 2. 5(10%) of the respondents were aged between 18-29.9 years, 19(38%) were aged between 30-39.9 years, 16(32%) were aged between 40-49.9 years, and 10(20%) were aged between 50 years and above. Evidently, majority of respondents were aged between 30-39.9 years. Furthermore, 90% of the respondents were aged at least 30 years old. Thus, the majority of the population was considered old enough to understand not only the current events in the North Rift region but also historical occurrence that might be fueling the conflict.




Figure 2: Respondent's Age Bracket

4.2.4 Years of Experience in Resolving the Conflict

The study asked the respondents to indicate the number of years they have been directly involved in any form of conflict resolution between the Pokot and Turkana communities. Figure 3 shows the results. The frequency indicates that majority of the respondents had been involved for between 1 to 5 years (42%) followed by 6 to 10 years (35%). A significant percentage of the respondents had been involved for less than one year (15%) while the number of respondents involved for at least 10 years were 5(9%). Combined, the number of respondents who had been engaged in conflict resolution for more than a year was 86%. In this regard, it is prudent to conclude that 86% of the respondents understand the conflict properly and know what it may take to have peace in the region.

Years of Experience in Conflict Resolution




Figure 4: Years of Experience in Conflict Resolution

4.3 Research Analysis and Findings

The independent variable of the study was military intervention strategies that was comprised of strategies in raiding bandit hide-outs, strategies applied in disarmament operation and kinetic approaches which involve the presence of military personnel. The descriptive research for each of the variables is therefore explained to indicate the responses from the study respondents.

4.3.1 Kinetic Approaches (Presence of Military Personnel)

The respondents were required to respond to various questions that indicated the extent to which the presence of the military (KDF) was effective in managing the Pokot-Turkana conflict. The results are displayed in the table 4.1 below.

Table 4. 1: Kinetic Approaches Descriptive Statistics

		Statistics				
		Have you been affected by the Turkana-Pokot conflict?	Did you witness the military security operation in Kapedo area to flash out bandits?	How many military personnel were deployed in the area?	How many operation security bases were set up in your village?	Please explain the nature of the military security operations within your village.
N	Valid	62	62	62	62	62
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		.94	.82	3.53	2.71	4.10
Median		1.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	4.00
Mode		1	1	4	3	4

Source: Author, (2022)

The question on whether the respondent was affected by Turkana-Pokot conflict, majority of the respondents indicated that they were indeed affected by the conflict with a mean of 0.94 median and mode of 1. The respondents who were affected by the conflict were assigned a value of 1 while those who were not affected were assigned a value of 0.

Similarly, the respondents who agreed that they witnessed military operations to flush out bandits in Kapedo area, were assigned a value of 1 while those who did not witness were assigned a value of 0. Most of the respondents witnessed the military security operation in Kapedo area as they had a median and a mode of 1, the mean was also close to 1. The respondents indicated that the military personnel that was deployed in the area was between 200 to 500 as indicated by most respondents. The mode as well as the median of the respondents was 4. Most of the respondents agreed that there were in average 3 (median and mode equal 3) bases of operation by the military in their villages. Most of the respondents also felt that they were satisfied with the nature of the military operation in their village as in a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 is being most satisfied with the operation, the mode and the median were 4.

4.3.2 Raiding Bandits' Hide-out Strategy

In order to determine the extent to which the military raided the various bandits' hide-outs, the respondents were asked whether military operations were directed to bandit stronghold or randomly across the villages. The respondents who stated that the operations were directed to bandit stronghold were assigned a value of 1, while those that stated that the operation was randomly across the village was assigned a value of 0. The respondents were also asked the form of attack that was used in the operations, those that stated bombs were assigned by 2 and the use of assaulted riffle was assigned a value of 1. The respondents were also asked how military personnel relate to civilians and the responses were rated in a scale of 1 to 5 with the best reason assigned a value of 5. Table 4.2 indicates the summary of these responses.

Table 4. 2: Raiding Bandits’ Hide-out Strategy Statistics

		Statistics		
		Directed to bandit stronghold [1]; Randomly across the village [0]	Which of the following forms of attack were used? Bombs [2]; Rifle Assault [1]	How did the military personnel relate to the civilians
N	Valid	62	62	62
	Missing	0	0	0
Mean		.82	1.31	4.00
Median		1.00	1.00	4.00
Mode		1	1	4

Source: Author, (2022)

Table 4.2 indicates that most respondents believed that the military operations was mostly directed to bandit stronghold rather than randomly across the village as the median and the mean was 1. The respondents also indicated that most forms of attack used by the military was use of assault rifles since both mean and median was 1. Most respondents also agreed that the military personnel related quite well with the civilians as the mean, mode and median was 4.

4.3.3 Disarmament Strategy

Disarmament approaches strategy sought to determine the strategy adopted by the military personnel in undertaking disarmament exercise. The respondent were asked whether the military engaged local authorities in disarmament operation, where an affirmative response was assigned a value of 1, and a value of 0 for a negative response. The respondents were also requested to explain the extent of engaging the local authority on the exercise. The explanation was rated in a scale of 5. The effectiveness of disarmament operation was also asked to the respondents and the responses were rated in a scale of 1-5. A summary of responses is indicated in table 4.3.

Table 4. 3: Disarmament Operation Statistics

		Statistics		
		Did the military personnel engage local authorities in disarmament operations?	Explanation on engaging local authorities in disarmament	Effectiveness of disarmament operations
N	Valid	62	62	62
	Missing	0	0	0
Mean		.94	3.73	2.73
Median		1.00	4.00	3.00
Mode		1	4	3

Source: User, (2022)

According to table 4.3 the military personnel engaged local authorities in disarmament operations as the median and the mode was 1 while the mean was 0.94 that was close to 1. On the other hand, there was good explanation in relation to engaging local authorities in disarmament operation where the mode and the median had a rating of 4 from a possible rating of 5. However, the effectiveness of disarmament operation had a median and mean of 3 that indicated that there was a fair but not the best effectiveness of disarmament operation.

4.3.4 Inter-Community Conflict Management

Inter-community conflict management was the dependent variable of the study. The assessment of the extent to which KDF military personnel were successful in undertaking inter-community conflict management in Kapedo area, various 5-point Likert Scale questions were asked where 1 indicated that the respondent was very unsatisfactory on the particular conflict management while 5 indicated that the respondent was very satisfied in regard to conflict management. Table 4.4 indicates a summary of the responses for each of the statement that sought to assess inter-community conflict management.

Table 4. 4 Conflict Management Statistics

		Statistics					
		Flashing out bandits	Protecting civilians	Disarmament	Preventing recurrence of the conflict	Improving Turkana-Pokot social relationship	Post-conflict reconstruction
N	Valid	62	62	62	62	62	62
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.81	4.00	3.87	1.74	1.85	2.37
Median		4.00	4.00	4.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
Mode		4	4	4	2	2	3

Source: Author, (2022)

Table 4.4 indicates that flashing out bandits in conflict management was undertaken satisfactorily by KDF in Kapedo as the median and mode was 4. This is also the case for protecting civilians as it had a mean, median and mode of 4. The disarmament exercise was also undertaken satisfactorily with a median and a mode of 4. However, both the prevention of recurrence of the conflict as well as improving Turkana-Pokot social relationship were unsatisfactory as they had a median and mode of 2. The respondents were also mainly neutral in regard to post-conflict reconstruction as it had a median and mean of 3.

4.4 Hypotheses Testing

The hypotheses of the study were as follows:

- i. H₁: The strategies used by the KDF did not manage the Pokot-Turkana conflict.
H₂: The strategies used by the KDF managed the Pokot-Turkana conflict.
- ii. H₁: KDF presence and intervention in Pokot-Turkana conflict was not effective.
H₂: KDF presence and intervention in Pokot-Turkana conflict was effective.

The hypotheses were tested by the use of F statistical test that was obtained from undertaking regression analysis. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) was tested to determine whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. The null hypothesis was rejected if the p-value was less than 0.05 for each hypothesis.

The independent variables comprised of kinetic approaches strategies (presence of military personnel), raiding bandits' hide-out strategy and disarmament strategies. These variables were obtained by aggregating the values assigned to each question that the respondents answered regarding the variables. The higher the value therefore means that the higher the use of the strategy in managing the inter-community conflicts.

4.4.1 Regression Summary

Table 4. 5: Regression Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.806 ^a	.650	.631	1.982

a. Predictors: (Constant), Disarmament Approaches, Presence of Military Personnel (Kinetic Responses), Raiding Bandit Hide-outs

The regression model summary provides a summary of various statistics that relate to the predictability of the dependent variable. The co-efficient of determination is given by R square that gives the extent to which the dependent variable would be explained by changes in the independent variables. Table 4.5 indicates that R Square is 65% that suggests that inter-community conflict management could be explained by military presence, effective raiding of bandits' hide-outs as well as appropriate disarmament approaches.

4.4.2 Analysis of Variance

The F-test was undertaken by use of ANOVA where a p-value of less than 0.05 would mean that the null hypothesis would be rejected while a p-value of 0.05 and above would mean that the study would fail to reject the null hypothesis. Table 4.6 indicates the result of F-test statistics.

Table 4. 6: F-Test Statistics

F-Test Results ^a						
Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	
1	Regression	422.377	3	140.792	35.845	.000 ^b
	Residual	227.816	58	3.928		
	Total	650.194	61			

a. Dependent Variable: Inter-Community Conflict Management

b. Predictors: (Constant), Disarmament Approaches, Presence of Military Personnel (Kinetic Responses), Raiding Bandit Hide-outs

The significance (p-value) is less than 0.05 that indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected. The study therefore indicates that military intervention in inter-community conflicts particularly in Kapedo area is effective.

4.4.3 Effectiveness of Military Intervention Strategies

The effectiveness of the military intervention strategies adopted by KDF in Pokot-Turkana conflict was assessed by determining the co-efficient of each of the strategies. Coefficients with negative values contributed negatively towards management of the inter-community conflicts. However, coefficient values that were close to 0 or were zero indicated that the strategies were weak in enhancing the management of the conflict. Table 4.7 indicates the respective coefficients for each strategy.

Table 4. 7: Regression Coefficients

Model		Coefficients ^a				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6.293	1.366		4.606	.000
	Presence of Military Personnel (Kinetic Responses)	.017	.084	.020	.202	.840
	Raiding Bandit Hide-outs	.341	.322	.122	1.061	.293
	Disarmament Approaches	1.226	.178	.711	6.886	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Inter-Community Conflict Management

Table 4.7 indicates that the presence of military personnel or the kinetic responses strategies were not very effective in inter-community conflict as the coefficient was close to zero (0.017). Proper strategy in raiding bandits' hide-outs was fairly effective in managing the conflict while disarmament approaches by the military was the most effective strategy in enhancing conflict management.

The military mode of intervention was through raiding bandit hideouts and disarmament. The initial days of the operation witnessed use of heavy military arsenal including firearms and bombs that majorly targeted bandit hideouts in caves, forests and within villages.⁷⁸ Respondents observed that the military used extreme force never witnessed before to announce their presence and differentiate its operation from that of the administrative police officers previously deployed in the area.

After few weeks of showcasing the military might, the operation turned to more friendly disarmament approaches. With the help of local authorities, administrative police officers,

⁷⁸ Ibid p.42

elders, political officers, and non-government organizations, the military personnel conducted a successful disarmament exercise that witnessed the civilians surrendering the highest number of firearms. In some instances, the military forcefully took livestock from suspected villagers to compel them to surrender illegally owned firearms. Besides, innocent villagers were compelled to report to the authority individuals who owned firearms illegally.⁷⁹

The fact that a relatively higher number of firearms were surrendered during the military operation compared to previously conducted disarmament exercises conducted by the police suggests that the military operation was more successful. Villagers rated the success of the military operation average but better than the previous ones. Additionally, villagers reported enjoying peace during the operation and few months after the military left. The North Rift region witnessed temporary peace because the communities were not disarmed fully. Some individuals and families did not surrender their firearms and the raids resumed few months after the military was recalled.

4.5 The Achievements of the Military Operation

The immediate impact of the military operation was calmness and peace within the Turkana and Pokot communities. Respondents to the current study indicated that informed by previous experiences in the area and other conflict-torn areas within Kenya, the two communities are aware of how tough a military operation can be. Therefore, by aggressively raiding bandit hideouts and using different approaches such as forcefully taking away livestock to compel villagers to identify bandits hiding in the villages, the military successfully demonstrated the seriousness of the security operation. The flashing of bandits from villages and further attacking their hideout in forests and caves restored peace within the community. Furthermore, the fear instilled on the civilians played a major role in making the disarmament

⁷⁹ Devine, Persistent conflicts between the Turkanas and the Pokots, p. 44.

exercise easier and effective. Respondents to the current study indicated that the local authorities with the help of the police and non-governmental organizations had a relatively easier experience convincing the locals to surrender their firearms.

However, unfortunately, the military achieved temporary peace for few months. The two communities surrendered most of their firearms and the raids were stopped. Local authorities, police officers, and non-governmental organizations used the opportunity to hold inter-community meetings targeting long-term peaceful coexistence. However, while the Pokot and Turkana communities surrendered a considerable number of firearms, the military lacked a sustainable strategy to maintain peace in the region during and after the operation. For instance, villagers reported that the military did not construct social amenities such as hospitals, schools, and markets that could be shared by the two conflicting communities.

Thus, suspicion remained high between the Pokot and Turkana communities. The Pokot were cautious not to surrender all their firearms because they suspected the Turkanas could not surrender all of their firearms. As a result, the communities withheld a considerable number of firearms for protection just in case the rival community attacked. Cattle rustling resumed few months after the departure of the military. The years that followed the withdrawal of the military witnessed further proliferation of light weapons and ammunitions. Today, inter-community cattle rustling and killing of civilians and police officers is still experienced widely. For instance, according to the Kenya Red Cross Society rapid assessment reports, the conflict between Pokot and Turkana communities escalated by 15th January 2021 to a level that threatened safety and security of the residents in the Baringo County bordering Turkana County. The conflict led to 26 houses burnt down, killing of 10 people among them 3 police officers and approximately 1,500 families displaced as they flee from conflict torn villages

prompting the Government to declare a full security operation to restore peace and order. The security operation led to more combat between the police and bandits with increased casualties with gunshot wounds, more people fleeing away from the conflict area and fear of police brutality. Some community water points were vandalized, schools and health facilities closed due to insecurity. Kenya Red Cross further reported that the approximately 1,500 people were displaced from their homes due to loss of their shelter burnt down or fleeing from insecure areas and putting up with neighbours far from the conflict area but cut off from access to basic commodities and supplies.⁸⁰ Due to fear of insecurity, many markets and shops/businesses in the area was disrupted and the Government was pushed to introduce a 6pm to 6am curfew. The police further mounted several road blocks on major roads in the area to limit movement of people.

4.6 Summary of Result Findings

The two core strategies used by the military were aggressively flushing out bandits from the hide-outs and disarmament. The two interventions measures were effective because the operation achieved peace and calmness across the North Rift region within a short time. Additionally, the aggressive attacks intimidated the locals, which made the disarmament exercise easier and effective. Therefore, the current study established that the strategies used by the KDF was effective in managing the Pokot-Turkana conflict. However, the study further established use of kinetic responses (use of the military presence) to scare or force the militants into submission, did not have significant influence in impacting Pokot-Turkana conflict. Soon after the operation ended and the KDF personnel recalled, the conflict resumed as usual. Inter-community attacks and cattle rustling continues as usual with many civilians and police officers being killed during the attacks.

⁸⁰ GoK. "Arid Lands Resource Management Project, Report Turkana." Accessed Sept. 2, 2021, http://www.aridland.go.ke/arid_annual_reports/arid_annual_07-08/turkana_07-08.pdf.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Introduction

Chapter four analysed data collected from the respondents. The chapter described the data and the study variables to understand the responses by the respondents. It analysed the data and tested hypotheses to answer the research questions. Chapter five concludes on the use of military personnel in conflict management and compares past involvement of the military engagement with the present and forecasts future engagement.

5.2 Management of the Communal Conflict in the Past

In the past, the nature of inter-community conflicts was relatively less aggressive, and the weapons used were not as grievous as the ones used today. As a result, peace initiatives were effective in the management of communal conflicts in the past. As a way of dealing with dysfunctional effects of the conflict, various NGOs, government institutions and private initiatives were started to intervene and to support active non-violent communal peace-keeping groups movements with focus on the area administration system. The overall goal of the peace projects was to contribute to the consolidation of the democratic process between the conflicting communities through a more informed and responsible engagement of the people.⁸¹

An ideal example is the Peace Tree Network (PTN) in the Mt. Elgon region in the 1990s. PTN, through its youth network organized trainings for the other youth who were involved in the Mt. Elgon conflict and even those who were in prison at the time the project was on-going,

⁸¹ Ngulutu, Boniface M. *The military in post-conflict reconstruction: the case of Kenya Defence Forces in Mount Elgon conflict, 2005-2012*. Diss. University of Nairobi, 2013.

and they did this through the support provided by the PTN.⁸² The area youth happened to understand that conflict instigated by political manipulation only benefited politicians and violence never leads to a lasting solution. The rehabilitated youth trained by the PTN continued with the mission to reach out to their peers re-integrating with the community after being in jail or in the bush fighting with the militia. These efforts were geared to realizing reconciliation benefits. The youths were able to organize football matches in the region between the conflicting clans/groups to foster reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in the region. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, NGOs embarked on the project of sending to the field peace workers to engage with fighting clans. They focused on advocacy work with specific objectives of strengthening the capabilities of the youth of Mount Elgon to participate in decision making and monitor the local democracy.⁸³

5.3 Current Communal Conflict Management Systems

Today, the nature of communal conflict has transitioned from using blunt weapons to small arms and light weapons. While simple weapons such as machete and bows characterized communal conflicts in the past, light weapons such as machine and sub-machine guns are widely used in modern days. Today, bandits use more sophisticated arsenal than police officers. It is against this background that the modern days have witnessed few bandits overwhelming hundreds of police officers.⁸⁴

While peace initiatives are still effective today, the use of General Police Officers and the military to quash inter-community conflict is slowly becoming the order of the day. In the Mt. Elgon conflict, for instance, several internal security missions were not effective in stopping the

⁸² Ibid, p. 14

⁸³ Ibid, p. 20

⁸⁴ Fisher, Ronald J., Herbert C. Kelman, and Susan Allen Nan. *Conflict analysis and resolution*. Syracuse University Press (2013).

Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF) atrocities. In 2005 and 2006, the SLDF rebels were responsible for horrific abuses, including killings, torture and rape of civilians during armed conflict in the Mt. Elgon area of western Kenya. The SLDF was an armed group formed in 2005 to resist government attempts to evict squatters in the Chebyuk area of Mt. Elgon district. It killed over 600 people and terrorized the local population through physical assaults and threats, and the seizure and destruction of property. Worsening of the conditions surrounding the civilian life made the government to deploy the army to suppress the violations in the region. The Kenyan Army was deployed in March 2008 to quell the insurgency. Local residents initially welcomed attempts to deal with the rebellion but later some residents accused the army for pursuing a strategy of rounding up all the adult males in the district. The people of Mt. Elgon were victimized, by the rebel militia which committed hideous crimes and people welcomed the army to deal with it.⁸⁵

The atrocities committed by the SLDF, included killings of civilians, torture, extortion and rape. Throughout the period the civil police authorities were unable to deal with the situation because SLDF seemed to have more powerful weapons as compared to the police. The SLDF set up its own administration in the Mt. Elgon area. It destroyed property and taxed the local residents. The SLDF did not respect the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law (the laws of war). Although not a signatory but the rebel militia in Mt. Elgon district was obliged to respect Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II) which was ratified by Kenya, and customary international humanitarian law. This law requires the humane treatment of all persons taking no active part in hostilities, prohibits deliberate or indiscriminate attacks

⁸⁵ Achoka, J. S., and P. G. Okoth. Education and peace in conflict scenarios: The case of Mt. Elgon region in Kenya. *International Journal for Disaster Management & Risk Reduction Vol.* (2008), pp. 108-221.

on civilians, and prohibits the destruction of property indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Serious violations of the laws of war carried out intentionally or recklessly are war crimes.⁸⁶

In response to the escalating violence in Mt. Elgon, the Government of Kenya in early March 2008 authorized the military to intervene and stop the killings and restore peace and order. This operation was authorized after the Internal Security operation-led by the police and codenamed Operation *Tafuta Amani* failed to achieve the intended objective. The Kenyan army launched an operation dubbed *Okoa Maisha* (save life) targeting the Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF) which was accused of carrying out an increasing number of attacks on villages, killing people, stealing cattle and destroying homes. Upon deployment the military immediately sealed off Mt. Elgon region from the media, the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies and human rights organizations from accessing the region.⁸⁷

5.4 Future Communal Conflict Management Systems

It is becoming increasingly obvious from current security threats that military forces including KDF will continue to be deployed in low intensity conflicts in support of the Police. With this changing and dynamic environment, the use of very small and highly technical units are likely to be deployed to augment kinetic forces in quelling conflicts and bringing lasting solutions in conflict zones like kapedo. Such specialised units may include medical teams and presence of engineering elements with varied logistical capabilities to synergise peace efforts. The deployment of such forces will seek to open up ungoverned spaces, bring government services closer to the aggrieved citizens and ensure they overturn economies within conflict zones in order to stimulate employment opportunities and elevate the livelihood of the population.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p.115

⁸⁷ Ibid, p.120

5.4 Conclusion

The form and nature of inter-community conflict in Kenya has transformed over the years. While in the past, the form of inter-community confrontation was mild and barbaric weapons such as machetes and bows were used, today, the proliferation of small and light weapons has made inter-community conflict to be complex and sophisticated. As a result, peace keeping mission by local leaders, governmental institutions and NGOs are no longer as effective as they were in the past. Today, besides peacekeeping missions, the military is deployed to manage communal conflicts.⁸⁸

Nonetheless, it is imperative to note that while significant amount of literature has been focused on discussing the Pokot and Turkana conflict in the North Rift region, details on how the military undertook intervention measures to manage the conflict remains low. Because of its amorphous definition and its dynamic nature, techniques used to measure the Kenya military involvement in managing the Pokot-Turkana conflict remains under-explored. Furthermore, there is little information on how the Kenya military undertook the tasks of managing the conflict. Existing concepts and measurement methodology proposed by the current study tends to be inflexible: it is context-specific and may lose its relevance when applied to various situations such as where the military was involved. It simply puts the military in the category of countering cattle rustling and village raids as a static concept and not a dynamic process where the military can change and reconstruct the conflict-torn North Rift region.

⁸⁸ Fisher, Ronald J. *Interactive conflict resolution*. Syracuse University Press, 1997.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Letter to Respondents

Dear Respondent,

I am a student from University of Nairobi pursuing post graduate diploma in strategic studies. I am carrying out a study on effectiveness of military security intervention in inter-community conflict management: a case of Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) in Kapedo. The main aim of this questionnaire is to help me collect data on the relevant factors so as to determine how each affect conflict management. The confidentiality of the information provided was highly granted as the main motive of the study is purely for academic purposes.

You are humbly requested to answer the questions with an open mind, honestly and sincerely.

You was required to tick in the box of your choice or indicate your opinion about an issue in the space provided. Your cooperation was highly appreciated.

Yours Faithfully,

Oliver Hiribae

Appendix II: Research Questionnaire

Section A: Demographic Information

1. What is your gender?

Female [] Male []

2. Your age bracket (Tick whichever appropriate)

10-25 Years [] 25-35 [] 35-45 [] Over 45 []

3. What is your highest education level? (Tick as applicable)

KCPE [] KCSE [] College [] Bachelors' degree []

Others-specify.....

4. What is the name of your village?

.....

5. Have you been affected by the Turkana-Pokot conflict?

Yes [] No []

Section B: Presence of Military Personnel

6. Did you witness the military security operation in Kapedo area to flush out bandits?

Yes [] No []

7. If yes, roughly how many military personnel were deployed in the area?

1-49 [] 50-99 [] 100-199 [] 200-500 [] over 500 []

8. How many operation security bases were set up in your village?

.....

9. Please explain the nature of the military security operations within your village.

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Section C: Military Attacks on Bandit Strongholds

10. Were the military operations directed to bandit stronghold or randomly across the villages?

Directed to bandit stronghold [] Randomly across the village []

11. Which of the following forms of attack were used?

Bombs [] Rifle Assault []

12. How did the military personnel relate to the civilians

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Section D: Military-led Disarmament Measure

13. Did the military personnel engage local authorities in disarmament operations?

Yes [] No []

14. If yes, please explain how?

.....
.....
.....
.....

.....

.....

15. How effective was the disarmament operations?

Average [] Effective [] Very Effective []

Section E: Conflict Management

In your view, rate the effectiveness of the use of military in managing the conflict in your area based on the following aspects:

No.	Criteria	Scale				
		Very Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Neutral	Satisfactory	Very Satisfactory
		1	2	3	4	5
1	Flashing out bandits					
2	Protecting civilians					
3	Disarmament					
4	Preventing recurrence of the conflict					
5	Improving Turkana-Pokot social					

	relationship					
6	Post-conflict reconstruction					

Appendix III: Consent Form

Effectiveness of Military Security Intervention in Inter-Community Conflict Management: A Case of Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) In Kapedo

I, agree to participate in the research project titled “effectiveness of military security intervention in inter-community conflict management: a case of Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) in Kapedo” conducted by Oliver Hiribae who has discussed the research project with me.

I have received, read and kept a copy of the information letter. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about this research and I have received satisfactory answers. I understand the general purposes, risks and methods of this research.

I consent to participate in the research project and the following has been explained to me:

- The research may not be of direct benefit to me
- My participation is completely voluntary
- My right to withdraw from the study at any time without any implications to me
- The risks including any possible inconvenience, discomfort or harm as a consequence of my participation in the research project
- The steps that have been taken to minimize any possible risks
- Public liability insurance arrangements
- What I am expected and required to do
- Whom I should contact for any complaints with the research or the conduct of the research

- I am able to request a copy of the research findings and reports
- Security and confidentiality of my personal information.

In addition, I consent to:

- Audio-visual recording of any part of or all research activities (if applicable)
- Publication of results from this study on the condition that my identity will not be revealed.

Name: _____ (please print)

Signature:

Date:

Appendix IV: Work Plan

Table 1: Work Plan

Activity	August-September 2021			Oct 2021	Nov.- Dec 2021	Jan 2022
Proposal writing						
Submission of draft proposal						
Data collection and analysis						
Submission of draft project						
Submission of final project report						

Appendix V: Budget

Table 2: Budget

Item	Unit Price (ksh)	Units	Total
Research permit	2500	1	2500
Laptop	35000	1	35000
Travelling	1000	14	14000
Food	800	14	11200
Airtime	500	14	7000
Printing Charges	5	1000	5000
Other Materials and Services	700	14	9800
Miscellaneous			10000
Total			94500

KDF in Kapedo

ORIGINALITY REPORT

15%

SIMILARITY INDEX

14%

INTERNET SOURCES

2%

PUBLICATIONS

6%

STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1

etd.uwc.ac.za

Internet Source

2%

2

www.ijsrp.org

Internet Source

1%

3

Submitted to Griffith University

Student Paper

1%

4

kenyanemergency.wordpress.com

Internet Source

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5

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6

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7

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Internet Source

1%

8

Submitted to Kaplan College

Student Paper

1%

9

Submitted to University of Greenwich

Student Paper

1%

