THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION ON PEACEB-UILDING IN POST-CONFLICT STATES: THE CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN, 2006 – 2020.

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NOVEMBER, 2022

DECLARATION

This project research is my original work and has not been presented for any other academic award at any other institution of learning.

Signed ....   **Date**……………17/11/2022

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This project research has been submitted for defence with my approval as the university supervisor.

Sign

DR.SOLOMON OWUOCHE

Date   17th November 2022

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my late grandmother Ayom Ayuen Deng who made sure that I go to school during the war period in the Sudan.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAA   Addis Ababa Agreement

AU   African Union

CPA   Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPDS   Centre for Peace and Development Studies

DDR   Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration

FPD   Former Political Detainees

GoS   Government of Sudan

ID   Identity Card

IGAD   Intergovernmental Authority on Development

JAM   Joint Assessment Mission

NACOSTI   National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation

NCP   National Congress Party

PDP   Nigerian People's Democratic Party

SANU   Sudan African National Union

SCC   Sudan Council of Churches

SPLA   Sudan's People Liberation Army

SPLM   Sudan People's Liberation Movement

SPLA-IG   Sudan's Peoples Liberation Army in Government

SPLM-IO   Sudan's Peoples Liberation Army in Opposition

UN   United Nations

UNMISS   United Nations Mission in South Sudan

ABSTRACT

This study examines the impact of political accommodation on peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020. The main objective that guided the study was: to determine the extent to which political accommodation has impacted peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020. This was further operationalised by the following specific objectives: to assess the impact of elite consensus and compromise in enhancing peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020; to examine the impact of inclusivity policies in enhancing peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020, and to assess the challenges hampering the effective implementation of political accommodation in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020. A longitudinal case study research design was employed by the study. Additionally, non-probabilistic sampling methods were used to gather primary data whilst secondary data was collected from the existing literature. The collected data was analysed largely through qualitative approaches. The main finding of the study was that the peace-building process was to a large extent influenced by elite consensus and compromise and inclusivity. However, the effective implementation of political accommodation in South Sudan was found to be hampered by a number of factors, including tribalism, mistrust and lack of consensus among the elites, exclusion of women, youth and other minority groups, as well as regional dynamics and interests. The study concludes that the peace-building process in South Sudan remains on course despite the country having experienced several instances of false starts. Specifically, elite consensus building and inclusivity policies were found to be the major drivers of this process. However, the establishment of a stable South Sudan, the desired end will remain a distant goal as long as the root causes of the systematic and structural constraints are not addressed. As such, the study recommends the need to redesign the peace-building instruments to make them more responsive to addressing the systematic and structural root causes of instability, and the need to do more research on the impact of religious accommodation on peace-building.

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background of the Study

Political accommodation is by no means a new construct or concept in the political science discourse. Different scholars have employed the concept variedly. Lijphart (1968) used the term accommodation to imply settlements of divisive issues and conflicts where only minimal consensus exists. An important aspect of political accommodation is that people and their representatives must have the will to accommodate the interests of others. Political accommodation is about taking fair account of the views of others and meeting the interests of as broad a segment of society as possible, in a balanced way, while still ensuring effective arrangements for governance and political dialogue processes. In both developed and developing societies, political accommodation has been applied to deal differently withthe challenge posed by the heterogeneity of the population.

In his ground-breaking work *The Politics of Accommodation*, ArendLijphartattempted to provide optimism for the state (Netherlands) unity and functional democracy in the absence of its supposed socially integrative prerequisites. In his analysis ofthe Netherlands, he identifies four main cleavages; Liberal, Socialist, Calvinist, and Catholic. He concludes that the Dutch, despite the apparent lack of a shared strong national identity and the absence of salient crosscutting social, political, or economic cleavages, has remained one of Europe's strongest and most stable democracies.

It is, however, in divided societies with multiple ethnic cleavages where political accommodation is even more relevant. Political instability in post-conflict countries is mainly attributed to heterogeneity settingand could be resolved by adopting consociational democracy whereby elites representing segmental parties cooperate among themselves to uphold peace and unity. ArendLijphart's power-sharing model that was applied with success in the Netherlands also succeeded in Belgium, Austria, Northern Ireland and Switzerland, it has, however, failed in Lebanon, Fiji, Cyprus, and Malaysia among others. This is evidence that the management of internal conflict in heterogeneous

societies is of great interest for studies from the perspectives of both theory, as well as policy in the current global debate.

As a strategy for ensuring peace and stability in post-conflict societies, political accommodation has been applied with a varying degree of success. In the case of South Africa, a largely racially divided society; the tension was eased through political accommodation incorporated into the constitution to maintain peace. President Nelson Mandela accommodated the former colonialists in his government to create an environment that promotes peaceful coexistence among all races in South Africa. However, those efforts remain transitory as the country witnessed xenophobic acts 20 years later. Despite many years of peace-building efforts in the Republic of South Africa, lasting peace through political accommodation was never created (O'Leary & John, 2012).

The same applied to Burundi that has been facing internal conflict since independence from the Belgian Administrative Authority in 1962. The conflict was mainly between ethnic groups and various political factions over the control of the government, the military and the economy of the State (Hatungimana, 2007). Attempts that were made in the year 2000 to maintain peace through negotiated peace settlements (Arusha Agreement, 2000) by instituting power-sharing arrangements that would accommodate interests of various ethnic groups that were excluded in the political and economic management of the state affairs remained unrewarding as the ruling elites continue fighting over power and resources on ethnic basis despite the pressure from the international community.

 Ethiopia has got a similar experience. Being a multi-ethnic society, the country has seen its unity in diversity stumble for many decades. Various ethnic groups within Ethiopia have applied different approaches to deal with the issue of diversity. Amhara, one of the dominant ethnic groups, adopted the assimilationists approach while Eritreans and Oromo opted for the secessionist approach. The Tigrayans, on the other hand, preferred the accommodationist to guarantee unity and stability of Ethiopia (Van der Beken, 2009).

After Eritreans seceded and Tigray took over the power, Ethiopia adopted ethnic Federalism in 1995 through its constitution as away of accommodating the interests of elites representing various groups to promote peace and stability. Although political accommodation has been largely implemented through ethnic federalism to enhance the peace-building agenda in Ethiopia, the country is still facing rebellions within and Ethiopia's unity remains threatened (Abbay, 2004).

The emerging debate that the existing literature has not focused on yet in post-conflict states is the nature of internal division in which the countries with heterogeneous settings are divided along ethnic lines. In most post-conflict states, most of which are in Africa, many states got their independence through liberation struggles and during the course of those liberation struggles, the unity of purpose was usually forged and hence an outlook of national unity would be portrayed (Mamdani, 2011). However, internal divisions would emerge after independence as the result of sharp differences within various groups and without consensus on how to manage those disputes, a country would be at risk of returning to war within itself.

Sustainable unity in Africa should be based on mutual understanding and agreement. However, the normative framework for national unity in modern Africa was not a result of consensus. African states won their independence without negotiating an internal social contract that would win and sustain national consensus (Deng, 1997). Therefore, the question of how the locals would negotiate their political system through constitutional design to ensure peaceful co-existence through compromise, consensus and tolerance from their leaders remains a complex puzzle from the African context.

In this view, there is an urgent need to find durable policy models for managing multi-ethnic societies to obviate ethnic conflict and violence in a manner acceptable within a democratic society. The political instability, economic changes and the ever-increasing levels of international migration that have contributed to the increasing range and extent

of inter-ethnic contacts show little sign of abating. Even were they to do so, the new ethnic diversity, which they have introduced into States, will not disappear overnight.

Putting all the above into perspective, detailed empirical studies are yet to be carried out in post-conflict states specifically on how peace building efforts can be achieved through the notion of political accommodation in countries emerging from civil war/violent conflict situations and are either ethnically, religiously, or racially divided.

It is against this background that this study seeks to analyse the impact of political accommodation in enhancing peace-building in post-conflict states, with a special reference to South Sudan. Lijphart's model of political accommodation in the Netherlands was largely seen to fit mainly in the European milieu. The current situation in most post-conflict states especially in Africa looks different in terms of the local context and needs to be addressed/ studied.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Political accommodation has been employed with varying degrees of success in different societies to resolve the problem of heterogeneity in order to build stable and peaceful societies. Lijphart (1968) aptly applied this approach to explain how the multiple cleavages (racial, religious, and linguistic) in the Dutch society could be bridged to produce a stable society. The model proved largely adequate in explaining the Dutch case.

In Africa, different approaches have been applied to deal with the challenge of building political accommodation in post-conflict societies. For instance, Rwanda focused on reconstructing the institutions of governance, South Africa focused on reforming the security sector and Ethiopia on the other hand, looked at ethnic accommodation from the perspective of ensuring ethnic inclusion in forming and populating the institutions of governance. But these approaches have largely proven inadequate as the levels of political contestation remain high and uncertainty of a re-lapse to conflict remains an existential reality. A case in point is Ethiopia.

In the case of South Sudan, a series of measures have been made to foster the spirit of dialogue and reconciliation in an attempt to build a harmonious society. These efforts culminated in the signing of the Juba Declaration (of January 2006) to integrate the militia group of General Pualino Matip into Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which in its wake generated optimism and a measure of political stability in South Sudan. In addition, the aspiration for peace and stability saw the staging of the South-South dialogue forum in 2010 that was aimed at building a broad-based consensus on issues that would promote unity in order to set the stage for an economic take-off in the young state. The conference brought together both state and non-state actors and served as a precursor to the 2011 referendum. The conference produced a pathway for writing a new constitution and created a timeline for the period the broad-based transitional government would last.

However, despite important progress being made in the sphere of creating a climate of unity in South Sudan through various political accommodation initiatives, the country remains potentially fragile, as recent political developments have demonstrated (de Walle, 2014). Indeed, since the inception of the republic, South Sudan has remained on the edge with short spans of peace quickly replaced with conflict situations. It is against this background that this study seeks to analyse how the pursuit of political accommodation has impacted the peace-building process in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020.

1.3 Research Objectives

This study was guided by the following research objectives.

1.3.1 Main Objective

To determine the extent to which political accommodation has impacted peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

i. To assess the impact of elite consensus and compromise in enhancing peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020.

ii. To examine the impact of inclusivity policies in enhancing peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020.

iii. To assess the challenges hampering the effective implementation of political accommodation in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020.

1.4 Research Questions

This study was largely be guided by the following research questions.

1.4.1 Main questions

To what extent political accommodation has impacted peace-building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020?

1.4.2 Specific Questions

i. How has elite consensus and compromise impacted peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020?

ii. What is the impact of inclusivity policies in enhancing peace building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020?

iii. What challenges have hampered the effective implementation of political accommodation in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020?

1.5 Justification of the Study

This study can be justified at two levels: the academic level and the policy level.

1.5.1 Academic Justification

A number of studies have been conducted on peace building, however, most of the studies have focused on issues such as the role of the church in enhancing peace building, the challenges of the DDR processes in ensuring lasting peace, as well as the role of the international community in furthering peace in post-conflict states. Indeed, there exists no single study focusing on the role of political accommodation in enhancing peace building

in post-conflict states in sub-Saharan Africa, including South Sudan. Ensuring peace and stability especially in a divided society is an important prerequisite for realising prosperity and development. This is consistent with the saying "without security, development is fruitless; without development, security is pointless" (Development and Security, 2009). This thus calls for an urgent need to address this diversity in the policies and programs of such states. An in-depth analysis of the South Sudanese case thus will hopefully produce valuable insights on the relevance for furthering the discourse on this area of research. This study therefore undoubtedly will prove useful to scholars as well as researchers of state building in their future endeavours to enhance the knowledge base in this area.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

At the policy level, the study has identified that there exist policy gaps when it comes to matters of political accommodation and peace building. As a result of this, the study has purposed to contribute to addressing the policy gaps and make recommendations on what needs to be done to fill those gaps with a view of strengthening the said policies. Particularly, running a multi-ethnic country is a complex endeavour, it is even worse when the said country has just emerged from a prolonged period of war, the situation is also very complicated when the said country has high levels of poverty and illiteracy rates.

Therefore, the findings and the recommendations made in this study will be of great importance to the policy makers as it will help them model workable mechanisms that can be applied to deal with the challenge of accommodating a society with multiple clans, ethnic, and even religious cleavages.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study will use South Sudan as the case study, and it focused on the period between 2006 and 2020. This is informed by the landmark developments that characterized this period, from South Sudan becoming a sovereign state (broke away from the Republic of Sudan), to the 2011 referendum, which resulted in the total independence of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan. It is also during this period that South Sudan experienced

quite many acts of political violence, attempted coups, historic signing of peace deals, and formation of a unity government, that a section of the leaders reneged on. The study will also highlight the significance of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) Accord, 2015, 2018 Peace Agreements respectively, and all other peace deals that have ever taken place in South Sudan since 2006-2011 when South Sudan gained independence.

Among the limitations of this study is the issue of the security of the researcher during fieldwork. Owing to the sensitivity of the issue under investigation, the researcher experienced uncooperative respondents during the fieldwork exercise. The issues of mistrust and ethnic suspicions between the members of different communities living in South Sudan rendered some relevant respondents not to participate in this study on the account of the researcher's ethnic background, while rival factions viewed the study as an espionage strategy by the government. In other situations, respondents turned violent on the researcher since the political accommodation issue is a very emotive issue that reminds the citizens of their past.

However, the researcher was able to forestall some of the issues by obtaining a recommendation letter from the university, the student's identification (ID) card, the research permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), and the clearance from the government of South Sudan. While the above measures did not eliminate all the risks that the researcher faced, they helped deal with most of the challenges or limitations raised.

1.7 Definition of Concepts
1.7.1 Political Accommodation
Arend Lijphart first crafted political accommodation in the 1970s as a model of sharing power under a grand coalition to accommodate the interest of various groups in order to promote sustainable peace in societies that are shapely divided (Lijphart, 1977). Since then, political accommodation became a methodology and a strategy employed in post-conflict states as a way to help various factions that hold various grievances against each

other to reconcile their political interests and share power on a consensus basis to prevent violent conflict.

In this study, political accommodation will be defined by elite consensus and inclusivity as its operational definitions. The study will use these operational definitions of political accommodation to examine how it impacts peace-building, how political accommodation through elite consensus and inclusivity influence the decision-making processes of the leaders with different political interests in societies that are heterogeneous in settings

1.7.2 Peace -building

Peace building is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, as well as economic transformation (Brian, 2000). According to Campbell (2011), throughout the 1990s, both practitioners and scholars have paid extensive attention to conflict prevention. Preventive actions are designed to resolve, manage, or contain disputes before they become violent. Conflict management, in turn, means the limitation, mitigation and containment of conflict. The notion of conflict prevention includes numerous activities such as conflict avoidance and conflict resolution, with techniques such as mediation, peace-keeping, peace-making, confidence-building measures, and track-two diplomacy.

In this study, peace-building will be characterized by conflict prevention, institutional development and economic growth as its operational definitions. However, the study will focus on conflict prevention, which will be measured by the frequency or prevalence of ethnic or civil conflicts that had occurred in South Sudan within the time frame of 2006-2020 that the study seeks to analyse. The researcher will not focus on institutional development and economic growth because of the limitation of time. This also applies to establishing the link between institutional development, economic growth and peace building, political consensus and peace building, inclusivity and peace building as well as compromise and peace building, all of which will require extensive resources – time and finances.

1.8 Research Methodology

This section describes the research method used in this study. Both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used to establish the relationship between the objectives of the study.

1.8.1 Research Design

The study adopted a qualitative research design. The design was deemed appropriate for the study because it enabled documentation and exploration of political accommodation in South Sudan. The characteristics of this approach are grounded upon the epistemological position that puts emphasis on interpretivism, as a way of understanding the social world considering how the participants of that world interpret it (Bryman, 2012).In addition, data in this study was collected in a phenomenological research design. This method underlines the perception of the people of the environment they live in and concerns their meaning of it, as well as how it emerges in experiences (Langdridge, 2007). The design was thus chosen to zoom into the lived experiences of the South Sudanese and to bring to the fore their perceptions regarding the impact of political accommodation on peace building.

1.8.2 Target Population

The study targeted members of various political groups that were accommodated and professionals of South Sudan politics who are heading various institutions concerning political activities such as think tanks, universities and media. Members of political groups including rebel groups, the government and journalists were deemed suitable category in this study because they have benefited from political accommodation in one way or the other. The professionals will comprise staff from the Centre for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS), the Sudd Institute, and the Department of political science at the University of Juba.

1.8.3 Sample Size and Sample Selection

In the determination of the sample size in a qualitative study, cognizance was made to the fact that no hard and first rules exist (Creswell, 1998). However, two factors played a significant role in informing the sample size; the first relates to the sample size that will reach redundancy/saturation. The second is the size of the sample that is needed to represent the variation within the target population. Sample size in qualitative studies is therefore estimated based on the approach of the study or the data collection method used (Patton, 2001). For each category, there are some related rules of thumb, represented in the tables below. This study employed a purposive sampling technique to select the sample. Purposive sampling technique was used to select individuals in the selected organizations who directly deal with issues of peace building in South Sudan. In the purposive sampling technique, the researcher decides whom to include in the sample based on the typicality.

Table 1: Rules of Thumb Based on Data Collection Method

Data Collection Method	Rule of Thumb
Interviewing key informants	Interview approximately five people.
In-depth interviews	Interview approximately 30 people.
Focus groups	Create groups that average 5-10 people each. In addition, consider the number of focus groups you need based on "groupings" represented in the research question. That is, when studying males and females of three different age groupings, plan for six focus groups, giving you one for each gender and three age groups for each gender.
Ethnographic surveys	Select a large and representative sample (purposeful or random based on purpose) with numbers similar to those in a quantitative study.

Based on the above Rules of the Thumb, the total sample size for the study is 30 participants for in-depth interviews. The 30 respondents were spread equally in the categories from which data was collected spread as shown in the table below:

Table 2: Study Categories and Sample Size

Category	Sample Size
Professional Groups	10
Rebel Groups	10
Government	10
Total	**30**

1.8.4 Methods of Data Collection

The data collection for this research used qualitative methods. The data collection lasted for three weeks in May 2019. Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews. A semi-structured interview is often used in confine data collection to structured interviews due to the varying degrees of structure in-between these extremes of qualitative methods. Semi-structured interviews are typically characterized by a series of questions, also often referred to as an interview guide, covering the areas of research interest, but not necessarily following the sequence outlined in the guide (Bryman, 2012). The researcher recorded the interviews audios tape recorder and notes from the proceedings. Secondary data was collected from books, documentaries, Internet sources, journals, articles, as well as publications.

1.8.5 Data Analysis

Thematic analysis was applied in analysing the collected data. Thematic analysis made it possible to mine emerging themes from the data guided by the objectives highlighted. According to Bryman (2012, p.578), thematic analysis "is not an approach to analysis that has an identifiable heritage or that has been outlined in terms of a distinctive cluster of techniques". However, for this analysis, an approach of Braun and Clarke (2006) was applied. It embraces six steps, though Braun and Clarke underline the recursively of the analysis process: familiarisation with the data, coding, searching for themes, reviewing

themes, defining and naming themes, and finally writing up. As a qualitative study, the transcription and preliminary coding of interviews conducted in English started while being in the field to cope with the later immense volume of data. Furthermore, the researcher was looking for themes that relate to the study focus, builds on codes identified in transcripts and create a ground for a theoretical understanding of the data, as well as their theoretical contribution to the reviewed literature (Bryman, 2012). This process of analysis was exercised through colour-coding and separate files of themes that were continuously reviewed and refined.

1.8.6 Ethical Considerations

In this study, ethical considerations were adhered to, the respondents were assured of their confidentiality. Confidentiality involves protecting sensitive information provided by respondents during research. To enhance confidentiality, it is important for investigators to obtain consent from participants. Confidentiality enables a researcher to protect respondents from psychological and physical harm. Sharing the information with the respondents for purposes other than research is unethical (Mugenda, 2003). The researcher also avoided bias by ensuring that the true existence from the respondent's point of view is reported. The respondents were granted the right to terminate the interview whenever they felt that they were insecure and or threatened. Therefore, the researcher was particularly sensitive about the issue of ethical behaviour that might harm the person and their family members, which might be caused by carrying out the research.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This section reviews the existing literature/ knowledge that is documented by various scholars on the concept of political accommodation and its relationship with peace-building in post-conflict states. The main aim of this section is to bring into perspective the studies done by various scholars on the topic under study and try to identify the gaps that this study will fill at both theoretical and empirical levels. Among other things, this study will dwell on, are different sub-themes focusing on the relationship between political accommodation and peace building.

2.1.1 Revisiting the debate: Understanding political accommodation and peace-building in post-conflict states

According to Marx Weber's definition of the state, a state is understood as a unitary, coherent and goal-oriented entity, which is the ultimate authority that owns legitimate use of violence within its territorial boundaries. However, states that are unable to control that legitimate use of force to rule over their populations and ensure that law and order are maintained within their territory in an authoritative manner are largely affected by conflicts and internal wrangles. They are classified as fragile with weaker institutions of governance, especially those states that has the existence of many nationalities within their territory that are pursuing different goals, which are contradictory to one another (Hartley, 2010). It is at this point that the concept of political accommodation of various interest groups comes in with a view of strengthening the capacity of such states to fully function in maintaining law and order within their respective jurisdictions. The process of state formation and peace building cannot take place in the absence of political accommodation of all the actors within a state and therefore, political accommodation becomes a critical issue that must be observed by post-conflict states to ensure that sustainable peace is achieved (Abbay, 2004).

From the global context, a number of states such as Northern Ireland, Cambodia, Kuwait, East Timor among others have been caught up in long periods of war and internal

conflicts because of competing interests among different groups that resides in these countries. One way these counties had sought to bridge the gap of their competing interests in order to stop the war or conflict was to embrace Lijphart's idea of political accommodation by bringing together all the interest groups into various structures of government (Guisepe, 2015). Political accommodation has always been used alongside other peace-building initiatives such as the demobilization of combatants from the fighting armies, disarmament of the war soldiers and mopping up of all the weaponry, and lastly the re-integration of the fighting groups back to the society. Whereas political accommodation as a concept did not yield the desired results in countries that it was applied such, Lebanon, Fiji, Cyprus, and Malaysia according to Hartley (2012), it remains popular at the centre of the international policy and academic debates as the best option to broker a lasting peace in post-conflict societies.

Mc Golan (2003) argues that the African continent has experienced so many successful coup d'état, 108 failed coup attempts, as well as 139 coup plots between 1956 and 2001. This scenario is accompanied by the challenges of political violence that have been experienced in many African states and to prevent or contain any act of lawlessness, violence or disruption of peace, political accommodation of various interest groups was sought as a nobble idea that should be practised by African states that have just emerged from conflicts (Mc Golan, 2003). However, little has been achieved in creating lasting peace despite all the efforts put in place and hence more studies are required to investigate it further.

South Africa was largely divided racially but immediately after its independence in 1994, President Nelson Mandela decided to include former colonialists or the ruling whites in his government with the aim of strengthening the peace-building endeavours in South Africa and ensuring a peace-full coexistence between all the races in South Africa. However, 20 years later, xenophobic acts have been witnessed whereby the majority of black South Africans attacked the whites, and non–nationals expelled them from their country. Despite many years of political accommodation of all races in South Africa, lasting peace was never created (O'Leary & John, 2012)

Political accommodation has also been practised in Kenya a number of times, for instance, after the disputed 2007/2008 elections which led to the post-election violence, the two protagonists Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga decided to sign a peace accord which led to the creation of the grand coalition government that accommodated all the political protagonists. Although the peace deal led to some political stability in Kenya, it never created a lasting peace. The 2013 and 2017 elections were also disputed with rigging claims by the opposition, which nearly took back the country into conflict (Tersoo &Ejue, 2015).

The Republic of South Sudan was born in the year 2005 after the signing in of the (CPA) between the leaders of the Republic of Sudan and the SPLM leadership, this agreement ended the prolonged years of war with the north. The first item on the agenda by the South Sudan government was state formation, peace building, disarmament, demobilization and the re-integration of the war soldiers back to society. Besides these, there was the political accommodation of all the sub-groups that participated in the liberation wars of South Sudan in 2011 after south Sudan became fully independent. However, in December 2013, war broke out because of an internal disagreement between President Salva Kiir and his Deputy President, Dr. Riek Machar, this led to the massive death of many people. Later on, through the intervention of IGAD, AU and the international community, a unity peace deal was signed in Addis Ababa in August 2015, whereby power was shared among the warring parties and a government of national unity was formed. However, the unity government did not last because war erupted again and the first vice president Dr. Riek Machar went into exile. This led to the continuation of war and massive killings of innocent civilians, destruction of property, and increasing the levels of poverty and underdevelopment in South Sudan (Tersoo &Ejue, 2015). The biggest question that needs to be answered is: what happened to the peace deal that was signed in Addis Ababa yet the peace deal embraced the idea of political accommodation among all the warring parties?

The challenges that most African countries face in the 21stCentury include how to stop violence in places where it is costing lives, building stronger institutions that are capable of containing violence and resolving disputes, successful engagement in nation-building

projects that respect the diversity of nationalities, religions, gender and the races. Finally, building developmental states that are equipped to spearhead economic development for the benefit of the African people's reference. It is against this background that this study seeks to critically analyse the impact of political accommodation on peace building in post-conflict states taking South Sudan into account as a case study.

The debate on whether sustainable peace and democracy can prevail in post-conflict states through peace building efforts has attracted global attention in the field of political science since the concept of peace-building was unveiled by then UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1994. Prevalence of violence increases in the most diverse States where settings are either characterized by multi-ethnic, multi-religious or multi lingual societies. An effort to correct these problems is to embrace unity in diversity and build institutions that are not personalized and free from patronage politics at the local level (Gurr, 2010). Peace building scholars argued that countries in the post-conflict scenarios are often keen on introducing a series of state-building measures and development initiatives that are aimed at peace building and reconstruction (Jeong, 2005). Although the ideas of these scholars greatly inform this study, however, all these scholars have not explored further the impact of political accommodation in enhancing peace building hence the rationale of this study.

Brian (2000) writes that peace building policy enables countries emerging from conflict to avoid a relapse into conflict by facilitating the establishment of durable peace, and preventing recurrence of violence by addressing the root causes and effects of conflict through processes of reconciliation, institutions building and economic transformation. Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992) also contended that to maintain peace, post-conflict states should work towards introducing institutions with structures that are inclusive and transformative to achieve sustainable peace with the major goal of mutual conciliation and peaceful coexistence. Peace building in this context will not only eliminate armed conflict but also create a positive peaceful environment that eliminates root causes of conflict and give actors incentives not to use violence to settle their difference (Burnett et al., 2007). However, the scholars are failing to acknowledge that all that they are

suggesting may not come to fruition in the absence of political accommodation hence the need for this study.

Most violent conflicts that occur in post-conflict states today are mainly caused by the tendency of centralization of power and resources by few cliques in power immediately after independence (Erdmann & Engle, 2007). This is more apparent in Africa where the institutions are personalized and state resources are mashed by elites (Jones, 2002). There are usually no institutions that would put them to account because bureaucracies are mostly in a state of inertia. Rosiny (2013) notes that elites would thwart transparency and responsibility for the state welfare and use ethnic sentiments to consolidate communal solidarity. This has created neo-patrimonialism where supporters of the rulers are rewarded with largesse such as jobs, contracts and favours elections are won on the account of the tyranny of the majority and the unit of analysis in the political system becomes prebendalism, clientelism and clanism (Mwakandewire, 2015). Although the authors are right in most of their assertions on the causes of conflicts and wars in post-conflict states, they have omitted the issue of lack of political accommodation as a major cause hence the rationale for this study.

The question that is left unanswered however is, how can the post-conflict states actualize democracy to quell institutionalized inequalities created by the dominant majority and personalization of public institutions by the ruling elite, but rather embrace fair distribution of resources through equal representations, use of dialogue and consensus as a tool to settle political or social differences? This question should have been answered by the introduction of the concept of political accommodation and peace building. It advocates that political institutions should be inclusive and the elite will have to compromise on fundamental issues that address underlying socio-political and economic issues that may trigger internal violence within the state boundaries (Terso&Ejue, 2015). On the contrary, that has remained an idea that has never seen the light of the day in terms of its implementation. Although fewer states in Africa have exhibited a semblance of peace through political accommodation, it leaves a lot to be desired hence this study seeks to fill in that gap.

2.1.2 Political Consensus and Peace Building

The on-going debate on whether states should accommodate or attempt to integrate the ethnic differences of citizens demonstrates a fundamental normative disagreement over the mechanisms of inter-ethnic cooperation. Each approach proceeds from different assumptions and epistemological positions regarding the durability and malleability of politically mobilized ethnic identities (Litvack, et al., 2008). Integrationists focus primarily on the long-term normative vision of the state; while accommodationists are more concerned with the immediate, short-term pressures states face. Both approaches translate into a much broader set of policy options with regard to constitutional design in divided societies than the familiar Lijphart–Horowitz debate has generated (Choudhry, 2008). This means that the issue of political accommodation is a key variable for any political consensus to take place and for the general success of any peace building initiative. This study seeks to reinforce this idea.

In Macedonia, Lyon (2013) study concerning integration and accommodation of ethnic differences indicates that Macedonian decentralization reforms offer limited local autonomy within an otherwise unitary state, along with its intention to fragment ethnic communities across multiple local units, is principally a mechanism for integrating local communities into state structures. In doing so, decentralization seeks to balance the more accommodationist aspects of the Framework Agreement foreseen nationally. Significantly, the inclusion of local power-sharing mechanisms suggests that the reform also intends to accommodate ethnic diversity in a way many other decentralization designs do not. However, discrepancies between the *de-jure* provisions and *de-facto* implementation of the reform in Macedonia have led to contradictory results.

Jok (2011) argued that traditional opposition parties have focused on token participation without genuine representation and decision-making influence. Much of the recent political debate within South Sudan on future governance arrangements has remained at the level of 'slogans' rather than exploring possible future arrangements in detail to achieve conciliation of competing political interests and perspectives.

2.1.3 Inclusivity and peace-building

The inclusion of the full diversity of local perspectives is a familiar challenge in peace building processes (De Weijer & Ulrika, 2012). The measure of the success of any peace-building initiative must not be the establishment of the values that are in advanced democracies but rather a creation of institutions with principles that compel individuals to consult, deliberate and negotiate with one another as they decide the future governance arrangements (Fang & Zurher, 2014).

Literature on the South Sudan conflict is awash with evidence linking the conflict to natural resources (Ballentine &Nitzschke 2005; Sachs & Warner 2001). Control over these resources has been found to be a key catalyst of these conflicts. While adopting different datasets, De Soysa (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) arrived at the same conclusion linking civil wars in South Sudan to lack of inclusivity in sharing the oil resources. Oil being a key source of revenue for the South Sudan government, if not equally shared, may indeed cause conflict. Previous studies have linked the South Sudan civil war to unequal sharing of the oil revenue, with most going to the enrichment of a small group of individuals (Bariyo, 2014). Whereas reports seem to suggest sharing of oil revenue as a potential cause of the South Sudan conflict, government officials are of a different opinion. A report by Reuters captures a government official claiming that the oil revenue does not go to any private individual but to the payment of salaries of civil servants (Reuters 2014). In the same vein, studies by Johnson (2014) and Sefa-Nyarko (2016) and others seem to agree with this notion of delinking oil from the civil wars in South Sudan. This study enriches the literature on the subject of inclusivity by focusing on its impact on peace-building efforts in South Sudan.

Horrowitz (2014) raised three questions that are largely neglected in the literature on the inter-ethnic political conciliation; first, the adaptability of consociationalism and centripetalism, to what condition can either be adopted? Second is the degradation of the electoral arrangement that would sustain an interethnic coalition? And third, if the robust guarantees of minority vetoes are adopted? How can it be protected? He doubts that it can overcome the stasis of immobilism it can produce.

In a survey done by McCulloch (2013) examining the results in divided societies such as Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Bosnia and Hezegovina, Indonesia, Kenya and Northern Ireland, he found out that in an attempt to consolidate moderation to enhance inclusivity, the outcome is likely to increase instability and in some cases, it may even increase extremism. There are both theoretical and empirical gaps on how the political systems achieve democracy with consensus and inclusion. Power-sharing deals in an attempt to maintain peace in Kenya (2008) and Zimbabwe (2010) were temporary. Therefore, the Lijphart-Horowtiz consociational and centripetal debate is yet to depict a clear picture in African democracies. This study seeks to fill this gap by drawing out the importance of political accommodation in any maturing democracy.

While for many citizens who reside in the grassroots, the peace builders' reference to inclusive peace building and much of the debate in policy and practice has focused on the bounds of inclusiveness to make peace building workable though it has been criticized that peace builders don't do much to incorporate local voices into the planning process. Inclusivity in peace building processes has been associated with more sustainable peace (Fang and Zucher, 2014).

Inclusivity has received renewed attention in international policy circles in recent years. Such revival is illustrated by the pledge of donors in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States to ensure local ownership and leadership in peace building processes. What is more, in his report "Peace building in the Aftermath of Conflict", United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon emphasizes that "inclusivity needs to be applied throughout peace building, from analysis, design and planning to implementation and monitoring" (United Nations, 2012).

However, the recent attention on inclusivity so far has not been translated into major changes in the way international actors operationalized peace-building. A recent review of two decades of peace building practice came to the conclusion that such practice "has

failed to be context-sensitive, oriented towards the long term, inclusive or accountable to local constituencies" (Paffenholz, 2013).

2.1.4 Compromise and peace- building

Political compromise is a way of reaching an agreement in which each person or group gives up party's or individual's leadership that was wanted in order to end an argument or political dispute (Diamond, 1996). There is considerable evidence that peace-building operations are more likely to reproduce important elements of the status quo than they are to propel post-conflict states toward a liberal democracy (Fang and Zucher, 2014).

Political accommodation was seen as a viable model to create peace-building in pluralistic coexistence in multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious nation-states (Deng, 2008). The assumption for this conflict resolution model is that it can provide the framework to guide choices, with intentions to unite and reconcile diverse political interests and develop a system that can prevent and mitigate conflict by ensuring that political belligerents have incentives to prioritize and engage in dialogue (Dawkins and Gaere, 2012). However, the existing literature has shown that policies designed to ethnicization in party politics have resulted in higher levels of ethnic violence.

Kendhammer (2010) argued that the Nigerian People's Democratic Party (PDP) succeeded in multi- ethnic coalition on basis of informal accommodation on ethnic compromise formula on one hand at the national level, on the other hand, it produced incentives for local elites to embark upon ethnic mobilization as a way of advancing the interests of their local communities.

South Africa was largely divided along the racial line and the peace-building efforts were introduced through accommodative political arrangements that allow negotiations of political structures to be incorporated into the constitution. Mozambique had sought to enhance peace through the promotion of peace-building efforts as a way of reconstructing state institutions to rebuild confidence in achieving sustainable peace. One of the ways was the promotion of political competition and reconciliation, and elections were held

though they were more about ending the civil war than establishing democracy (Manning, 2001). However, the results of elections in post-conflict states in Africa have been disappointing because they have been marred by the low voter turnout, opposition boycotts and entrenchment of incumbent leaders to remain in power.

Burundi had gone through a similar experience in trying to manage conflict by reaching some peace deal in 1992 and put some political arrangements in place in 2000 but could not escape political turbulences due to the lack of political accommodation through elite compromise to build political structures that are all-inclusive. In Ethiopia, a multi-ethnic setting has been an obstacle for the state progress but with the political accommodation formula, assimilationist and secessionist has been effectively discredited (Abbay, 2004) and accommodation path becomes unavoidable in the process of state-building. However, Ethiopia is still facing ethnic bases rebellion from Oromo regardless of the accommodation in place

2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Consociational Theory
This study will adopt consociational theory as a theoretical guide because the major focus is on consensual issues. Consociationalism advocates that institutional designs are crafted to manage conflict in an ethnically divided society. Arend Lijpart, a scholar associated with consociationalism had sought that political stability can be achieved in deeply divided societies if institutional arrangements bring together political groups with different views into a political compromise to share power and work together under one political system are put in place (Lijphart, 1977).

Taking Netherland as the example of the consociational model, Lijphart (1977) argued that for the societies that are divided along ethnic, racial, lingual or ideology to maintain a stable political system, the behaviour of the political elites is critical. He identified four features of consociationalism as follows; Grand coalition government is between parties from different segments of the society to share an executive power to maintain the unity of that given society. The second feature of consociationalism according to Lijphart is

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segmental autonomy, this is to allow various cultures, religious groups and other various sectors of the society to have the freedom to break away from the union should they feel like. The third feature is proportionality; this is on the ground that parliamentary elections should be guided by a proportional voting system that would guarantee various sections of the society to be elected to avoid exclusions. And finally, the minority veto is to put check and balances so that majority does not dominate the minority. According to Lijphart (1997) for the minority to be part of the system, they have to veto the majority on any given issue they are not satisfied with. This theory is mainly anchored on consensual compromise among the elite.

2.2.2 Why Consociationalism?
South Sudan got its independence from Sudan after a series of liberation struggles for over 50 years but eventually negotiated a peace settlement that culminated into independence in 2011. In those liberation struggles, the role played by elites in both sides of the political divide to compromise and build mutual trust was a major consensual approach in the Sudanese conflict (Dor, 2017). Therefore, consociationalism as a theory explains better the issues this study wants to highlight in the context of South Sudan.

Political accommodation, which this study is anchored on, was a concept coined by Lijphart as a model in Netherland to forge consensus on issues that divides them in order to maintain peace. The premise of the consociational approach according to Lijphart (1997) is that different segments of the society would be brought together and lives in mutual coexistence through political accommodation. That argument is what this study tries to advance in the context of South Sudan. Given its diversity in ethnic settings and the history of its liberation struggles, South Sudanese have been fighting for a state that accommodates the views and interests of all those who lives in it regardless of their religion or race.

After independence, political accommodation, which is well protected under consociationalism, becomes a viable option that would bring together various factions with different views and ideologies to have a consensus on how to manage the affairs of

South Sudan as an independent State. However, the question of whether the implementation of political accommodation could have maintained sustainable peace is the debate that this study intends to investigate and that is what informs the researcher's choice to use consociationalism as a theoretical guide.

John Stuart Mill, in his famous works, *"Considerations on Representative Government"* expresses doubt on whether democracy can possibly prevail in countries that are made up of different nationalities. Similarly, Bingham (2000) believes that the difficulty facing scholars and practitioners of institutional design in divided societies alike is how to find ways in which democracy and diversity can be combined in a legitimate system of government? Lijpart has answered the above question squarely in his model of consociationalism and this is why this study is anchored on it.

2.2.3 Weakness of Consociational Theory

Despite Consociationalism being the most sutaible theory in explaining political accommodation, it nonetherless has its inherent weaknesses. Donald Horowitz raised some important concerns that consociationalism failed to address. One of the critical issues Horowitz raised is the question of national unity needed for the outlook of the given political system. His concern is that if segmental autonomy is just given, and proportional voting is maintained, then there will be no unity of the country (Horowitz, 2002).

This weakness in the context of this study will be addressed by the researcher on the basis that this study is anchored on politics of inclusions with elites compromise to enhance peace so, designing institutions that do not discriminate against anybody keeps the unity of the purpose and therefore, the unity of the country would be maintained. This assumption could turn out differently but the research will rely on the fundamental assumption of consociationalism that bringing different interests together through institutional design will keep the peace.

In conclusion, consociationalism has been widely used sinceLijphart introduced it with his classic study of the Netherlands in the 1970s but it has never been always a success in

all cases. In all the classic examples of consociationalism model: Lebanon, Cyprus, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Fiji, and Malaysia, consociations have succeeded in countries such as Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, while in others such as Lebanon, Cyprus, Fiji, and Malaysia it has not been so successful. In sum however, consociationalism remains a very useful model of achieving political accommodation in multi-cleavage societies, as is the case in most of the developing world.

2.3 Hypotheses of the Study

This study will be guided by the following hypotheses:

1. Elite consensus/ compromise has had a positive influence on South Sudan's peace building (2006-2020).

2. There is a positive association between inclusively policies and peace building efforts in South Sudan (2006-2020).

3. There is a positive correlation between political accommodation and peace building efforts in South Sudan (2006-2020).

CHAPTER THREE
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE POLITICS

3.0 Introduction

The politics of accommodation, often expressed through elite consensus, compromise, and inclusivity, had dominated the history of Southern Sudanese politics from1947when the first formal debate on the status of the Southern region started to the year 2005, when the CPA was signed that granted the Southern region an opportunity to choose for either unity or secession at the end of the six-year interim period. South Sudan attained independence in Sudan in 2011 after it went through a long history of political struggles championed by Southern elites in a quest for freedom of their people from marginalization and an institutionalized inequality established by various regimes in Khartoum since the end of Egypt British Condominium in 1956.

The main aim of this chapter is to analyse, in retrospect, the impact of elite consensus, compromise and inclusive approach in the historical context of the political struggles by Southern Sudanese from 1972 to 1983, and then from 1983 to 2005, when the CPA was signed against the Sudanese regime in Khartoum. Additionally, the chapter aims to situate whether the political accommodation through consensus and compromise that were made by the elites did promote peace and unity among the people of Southern Sudan: did the Southern elite, in their decision-making, adopt consensus as the main approach? How inclusive were the liberations struggle waged by the Southern elites against the Northern elites? What impact did internal contradictions have on the elite consensus and compromise? By answering these pertinent questions, the chapter will highlight specific historical episodes to clarify the role of elite consensus, compromise and inclusivity as major forms of political accommodation.

3.1 The Southern Question: 1947-1956

The Juba conference of 1947 was the first political event that brought together political elites and chiefs representing various tribes all over southern Sudan to have their

collective opinion on the status of the Southern region. The conference was organized by the British and had sought to seek consensus and compromise among the Southern leaders in support of the independence of Sudan that included the Southern region that had been under the British administration separately since the 1930s. British was compelled to support the unity of the South and North into one Sudan despite its long-held possibility that the Southern region could be transferred to the East African colony sometime in the future (Johnson, 2014).

The political fight that the people of South Sudan have been engaged in since the beginning of the 19th century has been pushed back in time by the administration that is in power in the newly independent state of South Sudan. According to the political slogans used by the administration in Juba, the fight for independence by the people of South Sudan extends all the way back to the 1820s. It is common knowledge that during the time of the Turko-Egyptian occupation of Sudan, the people of South Sudan, who belonged to a wide variety of ethnic groups, fought against the enslavement of their people and the occupation of their lands by outsiders. Politics did not play any part in these struggles.

Political struggle is only conceivable for individuals who are aware of what they desire from a political standpoint, and at that time there were no educated South Sudanese. Egypt and Britain, the two countries that had colonial sway in Sudan, did not place a priority on the education of the South Sudanese. The British held the majority of colonial authority over the entire country, while Egypt was content to play a secondary colonial role as long as Britain fully recognized that its public colonial civil servants in Sudan were agents of both Britain and Egypt. Egypt was happy to play a secondary colonial role as long as Britain fully recognized that its public colonial civil servants in Sudan were agents of both Britain and Egypt.

The waters of the Nile have always been the primary focus of Egypt's long-standing interest in Sudan. It is still a reality of life in Egypt that there would be no Egypt if it were not for the waters of the Nile. It was abundantly obvious that Britain had vast

colonial interests in the Near East. Even if Egypt and the United Kingdom shared similar goals, Egypt's intellectual and technical capabilities were not on par with those of the United Kingdom. Therefore, Egypt decided it would be prudent and diplomatic to give the number one position to Britain rather than Sudan. Sudan was the country that Egypt had previously held that position over. Since the year 1898, the nation has been referred to as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. At the period in question, the United Kingdom had only just put an end to the institution of slavery in its own colonies, and it turned its focus to doing away with the same societal evil in Sudan. Arabs from the north of Sudan had no problem enslaving those from the south of the country. Because Northern Sudan had not created the kinds of fields and industries for which American slaveholders, for example, required African slaves, keeping slaves did not provide much of an economic benefit to the region. Instead, South Sudanese people were a prized commodity in the Arab slave trade, where they were sold to Egypt and to countries in the Arab Gulf. This trade took place in Egypt.

Egypt was interested in the Source of the River Nile, which largely flows through the territory of South Sudan; so, Egypt influenced the British to impose the Unity and, subsequently, the independence of Sudan on the people of Southern Sudan. British did it in the hope that she would gain the allegiance of the union between Sudan and Egypt to protect its large strategic interest in the region (Mawut, 1995). However, that imposition of the Sudan independence as one state including the southern region by Egyptian-British Condominium in 1956 divided the Southern elites further (Dor, 2017).

In the conference, the Southern elites were largely divided on the Southern question. The debate was primarily on whether the Southern region should be part of one Sudan as proposed by the British- Egyptian Condominium or should it be left alone to manage its own affairs and decide at the latter stage whether to join East Africa or Northern Sudan. According to the minutes of the conference, the majority of the Southern elites and chiefs expressed their opinion that Southern Sudan should be left alone to manage its own affairs because of backwardness and underdevelopment in the region. However, in the night, one chief called a mini-meeting and convinced the majority that was opposing the

support for the independence of Sudan that the South should join but on the condition of federalism as a system of governance in which the South would still manage its affairs within the whole Sudan. The idea was adopted by the conference and federalism became the agenda of the Southern elites.

Even though South Sudan just gained its independence from the north in 2011, the country has a long history of civil war and bloodshed. In Sudan, a brutal civil war raged for 22 years between the government in the predominantly Muslim, Arabic-speaking north and rebels from the south, where the majority of people are Christian or follow more traditional religions. The government was located in the north, and the rebels were located in the south.

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the administration of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir were finally able to come to an all-encompassing peace accord in the year 2005.
Together with the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Norway, and Italy, a group of African countries known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had a role in helping to broker the deal.

Inasmuch as the British were not pretty much concerned about the result of the Juba Conference of 1947 for it was only organized for formality's sake; nevertheless, the compromise that was reached by the southern elites to support the independence of Sudan on the condition that federalism should be granted to the Southern region as a preferred system of governance played a significant role in providing the legitimacy needed by the British to grant Sudan the independence in 1956 (Mawut, 1995).

The first encounter between the Northern and the Southern elites was in 1954, when the preparations for the declaration of independence were underway.   There was no consensus reached on the outstanding issues presented by the Southern elites, although a compromise was reached as a result of the promises made by the Northern elites that Southern politicians would be given positions in the National Assembly and Federalism,

which is the preferred system of Governance by the people of Southern Sudan, would be considered. However, after the declaration of Independence by the National Assembly, those promises were not honoured as promised because the intention of the Northern elites was to secure legitimacy for independence, which required constitutionally the support of the Southerners for it to be recognized (Arop, 2012).

When the Constitution was tabled for debate in the National Assembly, the Southern elites demanded federalism while the Northern elites pushed for a unitary system. This push and pull created tension and, therefore, denied any possible opportunity for consensus building. Northern politicians were the majority and used their numerical strength to shutdown Southern demand for federation and overwhelmingly voted for a unitary Islamic state. The elite from the South decided to boycott the elections to express their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. This event resulted in a constitutional crisis, and many Southern elites got frustrated (Ibid).

Both the implementation of a power-sharing deal and the installation of a new administration in South Sudan have been halted.

Among the contentious topics are disagreements on the number of states and local self-government, as well as concerns regarding security and the consolidation of a national army.

The struggle over how to fairly distribute power between the local and national levels via federalism and decentralization has remained at the heart of the debates and disagreements.

A prerequisite for long-term peace is the clarification of the nature of the connection that exists between the national and local levels of government.

This CM brief draws on the experiences of post-war nations that occurred in Africa to identify the requirements that must be met in order for federalism and decentralization to be implemented and to operate well in South Sudan.

After South Sudan achieved its independence in 2011, it didn't take long for the world's newest country to find itself embroiled in armed conflict once again.

In December 2013, violent conflict broke out in Juba, the nation's capital, and quickly spread across the country.

The conflict was initially sparked by competition for power between the two leaders President Salva Kiir (Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the former vice President Riek Machar (SPLM-IO, in opposition), but it soon turned increasingly ethnic as the two warring leaders mobilized their own ethnic constituencies – the Dinka dominated groups under Kiir, and predominantly Nuer fighters under Machar. Riek Machar is the former vice president of the Sudan People's Liber

Both of South Sudan's presidents adhered to distinct philosophies when it came to the administration of the country.

At the time of its independence in 2011, South Sudan was divided into ten states.

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) has always held the position that any attempt to subdivide the country into many federal entities would be detrimental to the nation's overall cohesion.

They advocated for the maintenance of the existing state structures (Johnson 2014).

The SPLM-IO advocated for a federal solution and supported the split of the country into 21 separate states.

However, after signing the peace accord in 2015, President Salva Kiir took control of the federalism program and raised the number of states to 28, which he eventually increased to 32 states. In total, there are now 32 states.

The opposition saw the measure as an attempt to curb the SPLM-IO and its Nuer constituency's grip over the territory they operate in, and they understood it as such. At this point in the battle, neither side can come to an agreement on the number of nations that should exist or where the borders between them should be formed. The fight for national authority has elevated the significance of administrative borders and divisions to a tool of paramount importance. However, despite the on-going power struggle, federalism and decentralization should still be considered as potential components of a solution to South Sudan's challenges. On the other hand, one may make the case that these two institutional reforms are prerequisites for administering the nation in a peaceful manner in the foreseeable future. A legally mandated devolution of authority from the

central government to regional units or states, as well as representation of these entities within the central government, is the defining characteristics of a federation.

This results in a shared sovereignty between the federal government and the many subnational bodies, which is not present in unitary nations. The transfer of authority, duties, and financial resources from the national level of government to subnational levels of government, such as the provincial or municipal level, is an example of decentralization. In a system that is not federal, the transfer of power is not required to be specified and safeguarded by the constitution, and the subnational entities do not necessary have their own representation at the national level. Both of these requirements are met in a federal system.

Both federalism and decentralization enable a wider variety of organizations to participate in decision-making processes and, as a result, to invest in the political system rather than undermining it. This is an advantage of federalism over decentralization.

By delegating constitutional authority to the states and provinces, efficient federal systems may also prevent abuse of authority at the national level. Decentralization, on the other hand, has the promise of bringing decision-making authority to a level that is more accessible to average residents. This might result in a higher degree of political engagement and a government that is more responsive to its constituents.

The majority of studies that have been done on decentralization reforms in Africa have made the assumption that if decentralization is done correctly, it will deepen democracy by increasing public participation in decision making and enhancing the accountability of lower-level government officials to the public (Blair 2000). Bringing the government closer to the people will not only ensure that social services and public decisions are better matched to local needs, but it will also enhance the efficiency and transparency in the use of government resources. Bringing the government closer to the people will also ensure that social services and public decisions are better matched to local needs (Connerley, Eaton and Smoke 2010).

Even after the imposition of the independence of Sudan on Southern Sudan, Southern intellectuals were also divided on the approach of how to secure the interest of the Southern people within the union of one Sudan. Along ideological lines, it was a debate

between the proponent of the significance of unity of the North and the South (One Sudan) fitted against imperialism on the one hand and the pro-British group that labelled the Arabs as the main enemy of the South on the other (Garang, 1971) that had dominated the political debates in the history of the Sudanese politics for more than five decades.

3.1.1 The 'Buthism' and the 'Bullenites' Analysis

The first internal contradiction among the Southern elites started after the Juba conference of 1947, when the people of Southern Sudan were consulted through their chiefs and few intellectuals at the time on the status of the Southern region to give their opinion on the Anglo- Egyptian proposal of independence of Sudan. The decision of Southerners in the conference was very clear that they should be left alone and will decide whether to join East Africa or Northern Sudan at a later stage when the South can manage its affairs first (Juba Conference 1947). However, that voice was ignored, and the British imposed the independence of Sudan in 1956 because of the pressure from Egypt to ensure that South Sudan became part of Northern Sudan. British could not let go of the interest of Egypt that was on the River Nile that flows through the South because of its other strategic interest in the region such as the Suez -canal that links her to India (Mawut, 1995).

The South Sudanese government faces insurmountable development obstacles, which, if left unaddressed, might cause the country's on-going civil war to go on for years and lead to the On the political front, the political system is fragmented and exclusive, the institutions of government are unstable, the capacity of the state is low, and the number of rebel groups and institutional corruption is expanding. The present crisis may be traced back to rent seeking in the political economy as well as the overly militarized political system and bureaucratic public administration. The economy is unstable, and the unpredictability of oil earnings continues to pose major economic issues. These challenges include an increase in inflation, a devaluation of the currency, and a depletion of foreign reserves. The nation has a poor level of resilience to shocks from the outside world, particularly shifts in the price of oil. The lack of economic diversification and the load of accumulated debt both make the current economic situation worse. The socioeconomic infrastructure and service delivery are lacking, which results in high

levels of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy, particularly among women. There is no pension program available for government employees. An unprecedented level of human suffering is being seen throughout the nation and in its surrounding areas.

When Sudan declared plans of its independence in 1954, Southern elites were consulted and inasmuch as the majority were leaning toward the decision of the South to be left alone under British colony as it was expressed in 1947 in the Juba Conference, although few educated Southern Sudanese who were promised jobs and positions in the Government of Sudan by their Northern counterparts supported the position of the northern elites despite the counter opinion from the Southerners. This resulted in a contradiction that denied Southern Sudanese elites the opportunity for consensus building among themselves on the Southern question. The internal differences between the proponents of one Sudan under the Northern rule on the one hand and those who wanted the South to be left alone as it was largely expressed in 1947on the other increased, and the tension widened as the elites were sharply divided.

The lack of consensus among the Southern political elites, which was generated by whether Southern Sudan should be part of independence one Sudan under the Northern rule or it should remain under British and decided at its will whether to voluntary join Sudan or the East Africa Community created two groups headed by Buth Diu and Bullen Alier who were the two Southern prominent politicians at the times.

The Buth line of argument, which was later on referred to as Buthism, (Garang, 1971), was that the independence of one Sudanese State would disadvantage the interest of the South due to the advanced development in the North as compared to the prevalent underdevelopment in the South. Joining the North, which was not equal to the South in terms of education and industrialization, would place the South under continued exploitation by the sophisticated northern traders. The Buthian argued that the South should remain under the British to develop itself first with tools of governing itself before joining anybody; therefore, the Arabs are the main enemy of the Southern people, not the British (Ibid).

The Bullent group (Bullenites), on the other hand, argued that if the Southern question is to be resolved, imperialism must be defeated first and to successfully do that alliances with the Northern liberations Movement is a way forward to establish an independent Sudan and then secure the interest of Southern people which is a federation within that one Sudan.

Buthism and the Bullenites debates became predominant lines of argument on the issues of Northern and Southern Sudan. The contestation between the Buth and Bullent groups on whose influence should determine the future of the Southern people promoted division rather than unity. The two groups could not forge a Consensus because of the increasing parallelism in their lines of argument.

As Sudan gained independence due to the pressure from Egypt and because of other strategic interests of the British that let her reluctance to hold unto the Southern proposal of being left alone under British Administration, the Bullen group (Bullenites) assumed victory, as they became part of the Sudan first government that was established. To their disappointment, the promises that were made by their Northern counterparts before independence were not honoured. On the contrary, the Northern elites tended to be interested in the legitimacy of Sudan's independence and that legitimacy was well protected only if the Southern elites were part of it.

The Buth group (Buthians), on the other hand, did not concede defeat as they mobilized a large number of the Southern political elites who felt that the main enemy of the South was the North and succumbing to the independence of one Sudan would mean long-suffering of the Southern people in the hands of the developed North (Garang, 1971). The Buthians scored a point when it became clear that the Southern Sudanese had just traded colonial masters (British for Northern Sudan) and not a partner as the Bullenites were arguing.

With the discontentment within the larger Southern intelligentsia on the imposed independence of one Sudan, the Mutiny of 1955 in Torit marked the liberation movement of the Southern political struggle.

In their justification of war, Southerners denounced nascent Sudan as a state built on''ethnically defined administrative units allied to the local population by incorporation of pre-Colonial patron-client relations'' (Mamdani, 1996, p. 37) and waged war based on what Francis Deng described as ''Southern identity of resistance'' (Deng, 2020, p.81). Deng (2020, p. 15) argued that the evolution of "the resistance began in the period before the Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule, a time when the South was a hunting ground for slaves''. Such humiliation exacerbates Southern Sudanese's views of Sudan as an oppressive, Arab-Islamic state, dismissing its legitimacy and attacking the essence of the state as an organised public authority. By attacking the state, Southerners shifted the critical elements of public authority adopted in the making of the state toward their struggle against dominance.

The significance of the Buthians and Bullenites' analysis to this study is to clarify that lack of consensus among the Southern elites on how to resolve the Southern problem has been historically recorded. Moreover, internal contradictions that have existed in attempts to resolve critical issues by political elites in South Sudan are rooted in the lack of consensus that started after the Juba Conference of 1947. However, there are times in history and the subsequence on and off consensus forged by the elites to compromise on the issues of existential threats.

3.2 The Anya-Anya War: 1955-1972

3.2.1 Coups and Negotiation of AAA

In 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud staged a bloodless coup overthrowing Prime Minister Isma'il Al- Azhari. He immediately dissolved parliament and banned all political activities across the Country. The new Government resorted to dictatorship tendencies in managing the state of affairs. Apart from appointing himself as President, Abboud closed the British Mission Schools in the South, introduced the Arabic language as a learning pattern, and built mosques and Islamic schools to foster the policy of Islamisation

(Khalid, 2003). Abboud's objective was to impose Arab culture and religion on Southerners who were neither Arabs nor Muslims. The regime was ruthless in approaching Southern issues. Deng (2020, p. 35) described the move in a harsh, but accurate depiction:

> *Blinded by their own experience with assimilation and their idealisation of the resulting model in the North, northerners generally assumed that their identity was the national model, and what prevailed in the South was a distorted image that the colonialists had imposed to keep the country divided. Arabisation and Islamisation, northerners believed, would triumph in the long run to reintegrate the country (*Aduot, 2021, p. 82)

There was no chance for any negotiation, let alone implementing the promises made to Southern elites before independence (Dor, 2017). After realizing that the Islamic state was already set up in Sudan with total disregard for Southern demand of federalism and inclusion into parliament and executive, for example, the Ministry of Southern Affairs with veto power as promised by the Northern elite prior to independence, the Southern elite resorted to violence as the only available option in the absence of consensus (Ibid). The Sudan African National Union (SANU) was formed to champion the cause of the Southern Sudanese through armed struggle by its military wing "Anya Nya". Their offices were set up in Kampala in 1962 to coordinate the war activities. Anya Anya waged war against the Khartoum Government with limited support from the region and international community despite the efforts of its leaders, William Deng Nhial and Joseph Odoho, who articulated the reasons for the liberation struggle in a book titled: *"The Southern Problem"*(Arop, 2012).

As the war ensued, Abboud's regime continued its repressive policies against Southern politicians and the population at large. However, in 1964, General Abboud was forced to step down by a popular uprising and an attempt to restore democracy was given a chance. The negotiation to handle the Southern problem was called by the interim leadership to the Round Table Conference in 1965. The Southern elites continued with their demands

for federation in the Round Table Conference, while their Northern counterparts urged for democratic elections first to pave the way for civil discussions. Elections were held, and William Deng Nhial, the leader of SANU, won with a majority in the South (Arop, 2012).

Again after the elections, the Northern politicians became the majority in the parliament. Instead of debating the Southern demand for federation in the parliament as promised, they opted to pass a bill calling for law and order in the South. The law silenced dissenting voices from the South who were calling for a change in the system of governance in Sudan. Tension continued, and the state of affairs remained unpredictable as the Anya-Anya resumed its guerrilla warfare activities as a result of frustration and the winner-takes-all approach deployed by the Northern elites leaving no chance for consensus and compromise (National Dialogue, 2017).

However, in 1969, an army officer, Colonel Jaafar Nimeri, staged a bloodless coup and immediately gained support from the civil population because the will for change had reached its peak within the masses. The civil strife and the Anya-Anya carnages had led to economic hardship across the country. As a result, there was a shift of attitudes from the Northern elites' approach of pursuing violence to solve the problem of the Southern people. Instead, the regime called for dialogue, and a consensus was reached within the Northern elite to grant Southern Sudanese some degree of autonomy. This proposal resulted in the negotiation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972,whichended the 17 years of civil war through a peaceful settlement (Arop, 2012; Dor, 2017).

On the other hand, Anya-Nya was struggling to unify its ranks as many smaller factions of guerrilla movements were pursuing different objectives. When the government in Khartoum called for a peaceful settlement, there was no unified leadership among the Southern elites (Dor, 2017). William Deng Nhial was assassinated earlier in 1967, and Anya-Anya factions were divided along different ideological lines (Arop, 2012). Nevertheless, the Anya-Anya managed to reach consensus within its ranks and files, and to that effect, General Joseph Lagu, the leader of the major faction, led the amalgamated

negotiation team from Southern Sudan to the peace talks in Addis Ababa as the leader of the rebels group.

The peace deal was reached with several compromises as Southern Sudanese were granted limited Autonomy while the central government remained superior to the government of the Southern region in terms of allocation of power and resources (Dor, 2017).

3.2.2 The Autonomy of the Southern Region 1972-1983

After the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, Abel Alier, the First President of the High Executive Council and Gen. Joseph Lagu,the leader of Anya Nya, who signed the AAA with the Khartoum Government and who later on succeeded Abel Alier had their internal rivalry on the ideological lines in handling certain issues of strategic interest of southern Sudan. The Southern elites were usually divided alongside both leaders, and some heated debates and public utterances against each group were often exchanged; however, both teams could not fight each other as much as there was no consensus among the elites from the political divide. This was because Khartoum controlled the allocation of resources and power at the centre. So the monopoly of violence was not in Abel Alier and Gen. Joseph Lagu hands; thus, each team could not forcefully impose its will on the other. The division among the elites within the high Executive Council was felt all over in schools across the Country. Students would be divided along with various factions of elites depending on the ideological divide, but such divisions never had manifestation in localized violence and the security sphere of the state. "When they quarrelled among themselves, it would not spill over to the other sectors of the communities" (D'Agoot, 2019).

However, the scenario was different whenever the Southern elites challenged the government in Khartoum on any given issue pertaining to the interest of the South. The competition between the Southerners and the northerners would be spilled over into the Army. In 1955, for example, the fight broke out in Torit due to the questions raised by Southern elites in Khartoum on the lack of implementation of the promises such as

Federalism and the inclusive representation of Southerners in the National Assembly (Ibid).

The division among the elites that were generated by the lack of consensus building led to the division among the wider population of Southern Sudan during the peace period of 1972-1983. Although the internal division within the political elites in Southern Sudan was largely attributed to the divide and rule policy by the Government in Khartoum, the elites from the South were not keen on consensus building to solve differences among themselves. The consensual approach would have built peace and confidence among the Southern politicians and hence promoted the unity of the Southern People.

In as much as Addis Ababa Agreement was a negotiated peace settlement through compromise made by the Anya Nya and the Sudan Government to give peace a chance in order to attain stability in the country, the Southern elites did not focus much on unity and accommodation politics in term of accepting views of the opposite group. The persistent lack of consensus on resolving political issues within Southern elites resulted in "Kokora", a Bari word for "divide or division". The idea of Kokora came as a result of ideological differences among the elites within the High Executive Council in 1981, which was largely caused by a lack of consensus on governance between those who remained inside Sudan during the Anya Nya war and those who were outside and between SANU and Southern Front, Nilotic and Bantu (Johnson, 2014). Although consensus has been attempted historically as an approach to solving critical political issues, the internal contradiction has played a negative role in thwarting those efforts and has negatively shaped the history of political struggles.

As a direct consequence of Kokora, the southern region became extremely fractured. Not just from an administrative standpoint, but also from a social and political point of view. The notion of Kokora is still being discussed in contemporary political discussions, especially those that are concerned with federalism and decentralization, which is proof that the events that took place in Kokora continue to have an impact in the current day.

Comparisons with the events that took place in Kokora in 1983 are not helpful to an open discussion on decentralization in South Sudan. The events that took place in Kokora are not the same as decentralization or federalism in modern times.

However, having an open conversation about Kokora and the lessons that can be learnt from it may contribute to talks about the manner in which South Sudanese seek to rule themselves and the manner in which a national identity may be developed. It is challenging to create a happy medium that allows for the empowerment of South Sudan's many local constituencies while still preserving and developing a sense of national identity for the country.

A presidential executive order was issued in October 2015 by the President of South Sudan to reorganize the country's ten states into a total of 28 states though Kokora and the decision to form 28 states were two separate policies implemented at different periods, the events of Kokora may give valuable insights with reference to the choice. Decentralization strategies that seek to promote the growth of the nation and the allocation of resources should be extensively debated and well prepared before being put into effect, as was made clear by the conflicts that surrounded Kokora. This involves having an open conversation on problems pertaining to legality and economic feasibility, as well as the roles and relationships of various levels of government, and the political advantages for inhabitants of South Sudan.

The argument of the author for this project is that the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) of 1972 was a major political accommodation event in the history of political struggle in Sudan because it represented an event where elites both from the North and the South for the first time since 1954 reached consensus and compromise as an approach to resolve outstanding political issues between the North and the South in a negotiated peace settlement as opposed to their previous approach of violence as a means of solving issues on the political divide.

3.3 The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army: 1983-2005

3.3.1 SPLA/M and Anya Nya II Peace Deal

The Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement SPLA/M was formed in 1983 by Southern Sudanese elites who were opposed to the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, citing its limitation in addressing what Dr. John Garang called *"The Fundamental Problem of the Sudan"*. The SPLA/M was anchored on the ideology of "New Sudan Vision" that aspires to champion the cause of Marginalized Sudanese people in the whole of Sudan, while the Anya Nya II Resistance Movement, who were also discontented with the AAA of 1972, were already in the bush fighting for the freedom of the separation of the Southern Sudan from the North.

There was a clash of ideology on how to solve the Southern question? The proponent of "New Sudan Vision" argued that the freedom of the Southern people should be viewed within the context of the freedom of all Sudanese people. This group was advocating for a unitary secular Sudanese state that safeguards equality for all people living in it regardless of religion, tribe or race. Garang crafted the idea bearing in mind the lessons of the Anya Nya I & II war that he believed was isolated because of its separatist goal. To Garang, fighting for the Independence of the Southern region would not rally the much-needed regional support from the neighbouring countries, which were facing their own internal resistance movements calling for independence at the time.

This line of argument was embraced by some intellectuals who believed that it was the best strategy to get support from the region and international Community bearing to avoid the Anya Nya I & II wars, whose support became limited due to its major focus on the separation agenda of the Southern region but opposed by the proponent of separation agenda who believed that the idea of New Sudan was misleading and would widen the scope of the war. This line of argument was that many, even within the SPLA/M itself, did not see fighting for the whole of Sudan as a priority because it was not easily understood, as Dr. Francis Deng termed it, "The complexity of Garang's vision".

As the tension ensued between the two factions, SPLA/M stood firm behind its ideology of New Sudan, which advocated for the establishment of a new political dispensation in the whole of Sudan, while Anya Nya II insisted on the idea of fighting for the separation of the Southern region. The suspicions of whose Idea should prevail denied any opportunity for consensus, and as a result, violence broke out. As a result, Anya Nya II forces were defeated, and their leaders, Samuel Gai Tut and Akuot Atem were killed (Dor, 2017).

Although SPLA/M got the advantage of Ethiopian Government support to dislodge the Anya Nya II forces, the Sudan Government, on the other side, also took advantage of the internal division among the Southern rebels and started alliances with the Anya Nya II by offering them logistical and training support to fight SPLA. This was a divide and rule strategy deployed by the Khartoum regime to keep Southerners against themselves. The division and the lack of consensus between the SPLA/M and Anya Nya II forces became a golden opportunity for the Khartoum Government to frustrate SPLA/M efforts to topple its Government in Khartoum (Ibid).

The SPLA/M military victory over Anya Nya II was short-lived as Anya Nya II quickly turned into a pro-Khartoum militia by the Sudanese government, a situation that threatened to spoil the goal of the liberation struggle. Garang immediately reconsidered his military approach and called for dialogue and negotiations. The SPLA/M decided from that point to shift away from a confrontational approach and lean toward a political accommodation strategy to keep the unity of the Southern people and avoid a condition that would divide the grassroots support for the liberation movement.

A compromise agreement was reached, and the unity accord was signed between Anya Nya II and SPLA in January 1988. As per that accord, Benson Kuany was integrated into the SPLA senior position as a Military commander, while Gordon Kong Chuol was appointed as a member of the SPLA/M politico-military high command, the highest military –political organ of the movement. This was a significant stage in the history of SPLA/M because the compromise deal that was reached by the rebel factions

consolidated the unity of the movement and subsequently boosted the morale of the SPLA/M. That rejuvenation led to a recorded number of victories against the Government of Sudan (Dor, 2017).

This was a major consensual approach to the political and ideological differences between the separatist and the unionist on the Southern question of how to solve fundamental problems in Sudan. The peace accord signed by the SPLA/M and Anya Nya II leaders paved the way for political accommodation as the strategy of uniting Southern elites, positioning compromise as a key tool for reaching consensus. The unity between the two factions set the foundation of the SPLA/M liberation struggle. Most of the Southern elites who were still with Khartoum and those in exile joined the Moment in large numbers, and most of them were accommodated in senior positions both in the military (SPLA) and the party wing (SPLM).

3.3.3 The Composition of SPLA/M Politico/Military High Command

Another critical stage where consensus was sought through a compromise to consolidate the unity of the Southern elites was during the formation of the SPLA/M military command. When discussing the formation of the SPLA/M in Bongo in Ethiopia, the challenge came in on how the hierarchy of the Movement would be like? The majority of the people present and seniors were from the Dinka tribe compared to the rest of the Southerners. Therefore, there was a need to balance the members of high command, and a compromise was reached where the likes of Chagai Atem, Francis Ngor, Majur Nhial were left out, and Arok Thon Arok, who was senior to Salva Kiir but came from the same village with John Garang had to give up his seniority and allowed Sava Kiir to be ahead of him to add to the balance.

However, that was not enough because four of the five high command members such as John Garang, KarbinoKuanyin Bol, Salva Kiir Mayardit and Arok Thon, were all from Dinka except William Nyoun, who was a Nuer. So Nyacigak Nyashilluk from Murle was brought on board by the virtue of diversity, and other members such as Riek Machar from Nuer, Lam Akol from Shilluk and Wani Igaa from Equatoria were given high command alternate membership based on diversity to accommodate the interest of their

constituencies. As noted by (Dor, 2017), this strategy was used for two reasons: First, as a mobilization strategy. The members of high command were to mobilize their constituencies to join SPLA/M and, secondly, for the SPLA/M to project itself as an inclusive and accommodative Movement compared to the Sudan Government that has been excluding the participation of the people from the South, West and East of Sudan.

From there on, the culture of political accommodation on diversity continued to be the SPLA/M policy. As the Movement went on, Yusuf Kwau Meki from Nuba Mountains, Malik Agaar from the Blue Nile and Yaser Araman from Northern Sudan were brought into the hierarchy of the movement based on inclusivity and accommodation. Dr. John Garang introduced at the latter stage of the SPLA/M the program called "Thin out". This imitative was meant to bring on board members of other tribes who joined the movement late. The significance of this program was that it recognizes the presence of the members of the other tribes because Dinka and Nuer, who went to the bush in the early days of the SPLA/M, dominated the Movement. Members of other tribes who later joined the Movement automatically became juniors to the rest, so the "thin out" initiative was introduced to accommodate them in to make the movement accommodative and inclusive.

The spirit of political accommodation through compromise was inculcated into the SPLA/M leadership as a method of solving political issues within its ranks and files. Garang embraced dialogue and compromise to build consensus. In 2001 when the CPA negotiation under the IGAD was about to enter a critical stage, Garang came under immense pressure from the International Community, particularly the TROIKA, which wanted SPLA/M united if they were to sign a peace deal with Khartoum.

Dr. Riek Machar was still with Khartoum since the SPLA/M split of 1991, and the international community felt that the presence of Dr. Riek, will give the SPLA/M bargaining power in negotiating against NCP. Americans initiated the dialogue between Dr. Garang and Dr. Riek,, resulting in the 2001 Nairobi accord, which brought Dr. Riek back to the SPLA/M. The Compromise was reached to accommodate him in the third

senior position James Wani Igga occupied. The accommodation of Dr. Riek Machar was another major consensual approach to the critical issues within the SPLA. As a result, SPLM went to the negotiations united, and CPA was signed, leading to South Sudan's independence in 2011.

3.3.3 Yei- Rumbek Reconciliation

Another milestone event in history where Southern elites employed compromise as a tool for consensus building on political issues was in 2004 in resolving the differences between Dr. John Garang and his Deputy Salva Kiir in what became famously known as Yei- Rumbek incident. In 2004, the CPA was about to be fully signed after all the protocols were agreed upon and signed between SPLM and NCP. Analysis of how the government of Southern Sudan would handle its political affairs in the Southern region and how they would participate in the national government in Khartoum was already a common talk in the SPLM circle.

An interim period of six years in the CPA was a time for the Government of Southern Sudan to organize itself for either unity government or independence South Sudan comes 2011 in a referendum. Within the Movement, there was an allegation that Dr. Garang wanted to remove his long time ally and Deputy Commander Salva Kiir Mayardit and replace him with the son of the former Anya Nya politician Nhial Deng Nhial. That allegation created a rift between Kiir and Garang and quickly spilt over into the grouping and security sphere of the SPLA.

The danger of such an allegation was that CPA was just inches away from being signed, and any split at that particular time would cause great damage to the SPLA/M. Based on that disquiets, the tension grew more in Yei, a town that was home to Salva Kiir. A fight nearly broke out between soldiers loyal to Chairman Dr. Garang and his Deputy Salva Kiir. Fortunately, some senior officers within the SPLA/M who chose to be natural in the fight quelled the tension and called for a unity meeting in Rumbek, the headquarters of the SPLA/M, to resolve the differences between the Chairman and his deputy.

National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum fuelled the tension through its insiders who were on Khartoum's government payroll. The NCP was worried about the peace deal that was about to be signed. They wanted to thwart peace efforts to prevent John Garang from becoming the First Vice President in Sudan and advance the agenda of New Sudan, which Khartoum viewed as dangerous to the NCP power base establishment. However, the NCP efforts never bore fruit as Salva resorted to a reconciliatory approach rather than confrontations (Johnson, 2015).

The Rumbek meeting was attended by most of the SPLA/M senior officers in its ranks and files. On the first day of the meeting, Salva Kiir expressed all his grievances against Garang, citing inequalities within the movement and a lack of trust between him and the Chairman. Other senior officials who talked in the meeting also stated their grievances that were historically rooted in how the leadership of the movement mistreated its cadres.

In the end, the SPLM elites reached a compromise to put their differences aside and focus on more fundamental issues of the liberation struggle for the benefit of the people of Southern Sudan. Peace between Dr. John Garang and Salva Kiir was reached, and the SPLA/M had a consensus that CPA was more important than anything else; therefore, the SPLM should sign the CPA while it's united within its ranks and files. That Consensus positively impacted the CPA, and the people of Southern Sudan were united behind the SPLA/M. Dr. Garang toured the whole Southern region, including Abyei and Nuba Mountains, to brief the people on the Peace Agreement and the strategy of the SPLM on how to approach the development agenda. Dr. John Garang also found it an opportunity to buy in the ideas of the grassroots into the SPLM development plans.

3.3.4 Comprehensive Peace Agreement- 2005

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the year 2005 between the National Congress Party (NCP) representing the North and the Sudan people's Liberation Movement (SPLM) representing the South marked an important event in the history of Sudanese politics. It was a consensual liberal peace anchored on mutual conciliation

between the two warring parties that brought elites together from both sides of the political divide to share power and wealth (CPA, 2005).

The CPA was a significant step for it ended not only the longest civil war in Africa but also laid a foundation essential for the realization of peace and stability in the Country. As noted by scholars (Zartman, 1989; Mamdani, 1999), peace and security are important precursors to realising democracy and social peace in any society. Thus, the elite from North and South Sudan reached a compromise to sign a Peace deal that let them share power and wealth. Lijphart (1977) argued that ensuring peace and security is one of the most potent ways of elites establishing accommodative behaviour in societies with deep cleavages.

 With such arrangements, the CPA became another major political accommodation event where elite consensus, compromise and inclusivity were all experienced.

3.4 Conclusion

The application of consensus building, compromise and inclusivity as major forms of political accommodation has been characterized by different circumstances under which they were applied by various groups of political elites in the history of Sudanese politics. Political elites had, on various occasions, applied consensus and compromise on a number of political issues in an attempt to find common ground to resolve political matters that sharply divided the population. The first political debate among the Southern elites was in 1947 at the Juba Conference. The elites and the Chiefs discussed the status of the Southern region to determine whether to be part of Sudan or join the East African region. There was no consensus reached as the majority expressed reservations of being part of the independent Sudanese state. However, Southern elites forged compromise as a result of persuasion made by a few elites to support the independence of the Sudan and demand federation as a preferred system of governance.

That compromise culminated in sharp differences between the Northern and Southern elites when the agenda of federalism was considered but rejected during the voting on the

floor of the Assembly by the Northern Sudanese who were the majority on one hand and among the Southern elite themselves as the line of argument widened between the Buthians who were pro- British rule and Bullenites who were pro -Arabs alliance on the other. Although consensus has been attempted historically as an approach to solving critical political issues, internal contradictions have played a negative role in thwarting those efforts and have negatively shaped the history of political struggles spearheaded by the Southern Sudanese.

The period of 1956 to 1972 witnessed a major compromise made by the elites from Khartoum to accept to negotiate peace with the Anya Nya, and Southern elites also reached a consensus to unite their ranks and files under one umbrella led by General Joseph Lagu. Therefore, AAA signed in 1972 was a major political accommodation event in the history of politics in Sudan because it represented an event where elites both from the North and South, for the first time since 1954, reached a consensus and compromised as an approach to resolve outstanding political issues between the North and South in a negotiated peace settlement as opposed to their previous approach of violence as a means of solving issues along the political divide.

During the Government of the High Executive Council, attempts to build consensus among the southern elites were subordinated to superior authority in Khartoum, and that is why it could not change anything much. Southern Sudanese had no monopoly means of violence, and hence the southern elites were constrained by the power at the centre. Moreover, since there were historical differences between the communities such as Dinka and Nuer, whose raiding was common at the time and to whose majority of the elite belonged, their differences, especially when they quarrelled among themselves, could not spill over into the security sphere because of the constraint they faced at the centre (D'Agoot, 2019).

However, the differences in the ideological standing that started in 1947 in the Juba Conference between the pro -British rule supporters and pro -the Arabs alliance, which later turned into (Buth vs Bullen) grouping in the debate, continued to be manifested by

the elites grouping alongside Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu. In this context, the Lagu group wanted the division of the Southern province into three federal regions, while the Abel group wanted the unity of the Southern region under one unitary regional government to be maintained. There was no consensus and compromise reached as the "Kokora" let's divide in Bari language group won the elections, and southern Sudan was divided into three federal regions (Johnson, 2015)

At the times of SPLA/M from 1983 to 2005, there was a more consensual approach largely because the new Sudan Vision in which the liberation struggle was anchored upon was an accommodative strategy to answer the fundamental problem in the Sudanese politics. Right away from its formation, members of other tribes were promoted to the high ranks to present the moment as more inclusive in the eyes of the Sudanese population. A compromise was reached in 1988 to accommodate the Anya II ruminants to consolidate the unity of the elites to enable the moment to gain more support at the grass-root level.

The SPLA/M split of 1991 stands out as the most difficult times the movement got sharply divided alongside ideological differences by its elites which resulted in the bloodies war because they could not reach consensus and compromise on how to handle critical issues in the affairs of the Movement. However, Dr. John Garnag and his rival Dr. Riek Machar finally reached a compromise deal in Nairobi in 2001, of which the Southern elites also reached a consensus to go into the negotiations of CPA as a united force to face the Government of Khartoum.

The peace deal (CPA) signed in 2005 was consensual liberal peace anchored on mutual conciliation between the warring parties. Its aim was to achieve peace through state building and security, and sharing of political power and wealth (CPA, 2005). The other major empathies are the transformation of the economy from war to a stable free economy with full observance of democracy and human rights.

This chapter argued that the intellectuals' debates on the North-South relations since the time of Anglo- the Egyptian British condominium in Sudan finally resulted in South Seceding from the North after 50 years of fighting. The elites from both sides of the political divide had been putting forward agenda of unity in the whole Sudan, which should have been achieved through consensus but were usually watered down by the interest group within the Northern elites on the one hand and the separation agenda of Southern Sudan which was predominantly supported by the majority of the Southern elites but had also faced opposition within on the other. Consensus had been endeavoured on and off in various political situations by the Sudanese elites as an approach to find common ground on political differences; nevertheless, it could not be fully achieved.

Whenever there are divergent views among the political elites on how to handle fundamental political issues of governance and institutional management, it ends up in a bloody war. The Anya Nya war of 1962 to 1972 resulted from frustration from the Southern elites when federalism was rejected, and participation of the Southern elite was denied by the Northern elites in the absence of consensus. The SPLM/A split of 1991 resulted from a lack of consensus on the strategies of the movement and how the state would be managed after the war. The elites could not reach consensus and compromise and therefore could not accommodate each other's views; hence the result was violence. However, history has shown that peace prevailed whenever the elites from the north and south reached a consensus and compromise on any given political issue.

CHAPTER FOUR
POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION AND PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS IN SOUTH SUDAN

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the impact of political accommodation on peace-building in post-conflict states with a special focus on South Sudan. The study's overall objective was to determine the extent to which political accommodation has impacted peace-building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020. In addition, the study was guided by three specific objectives: to the impact of elite consensus and compromise in enhancing peace-building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020; to examine the impact of inclusivity policies in enhancing peace-building in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020; and, to assess the challenges hampering the effective implementation of political accommodation in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020. Accordingly, the chapter is a synthesis of these aforementioned variables and their impact on the peace-building efforts in South Sudan from 2006 to 2020.

The data was obtained through key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and rigorous thematic analysis of secondary literature on the South Sudan conflict and peace-building processes. The data was used to draw a correlation between elite consensus, inclusive policies and obstacles in the implementation of political accommodation and peace-building processes in South Sudan.

4.1 The impact of elite consensus on South Sudan's peace-building process

The findings of this study corroborate previous findings by Lindsay Whitfield, Alexander Frempong, and Johanna Svanikier (2015) who contend that the success or failure of democracy is highly dependent on the behaviour of elites. The observed inclusive attempts in South Sudan fail to yield to the description of Higley and Burton for a *consensually united elite*. Instead, the elites in South Sudan are driven by personal and narrow interests that do not serve those of the groups or parties they purports to represent. Consequently, whenever stability is realized, so many peace processes remains fragile and unstable. The elite structure is thus loosely connected with no proper communication flow with those represented. As a result, the elites are not persistent in their quest to represent their respective groups' views. Instead, they push for their selfish interests. The arrangement is thus detrimental to the overall quest for stability in South Sudan.

The application of elite consensus has proven critical in managing incompatibilities among the political elites in achieving a win-win situation in the past. For example, during the pre-independence negotiations, it was through elite consensus that a common consensus was attained among the southern political elites at the Juba conference, which agreed on a two states solution and recognized Southerners as an independent entity. This was the case with the Juba conference of 1947 when the British- Egyptian Condominium faced opposition from a local elite consensus that demanded autonomy. In an interview with Dr. Majak D' Agoot (2019), a senior member of SPLM: "he noted that the emergence and existence of strong/hard interest and positions between political elites from Buth and Bullents threatened the realization of a common objective."

In addition, to the ideological clash between the two political elites, a negotiated consensus was reached when the northerners and the southerners agreed on a power-sharing settlement. However, the failure of the northern politicians to honour the terms of negotiations resulted in the collapse of the consensus and the interest and positions of the southerners were never taken care of after independence. The northern elite was to gain independence and establishment a federal post-colonial of Sudan. The analysis of the field data and ethnographic information from key respondents suggested that the failure

of the consensus building at independence was largely influenced by the colonial masters, and the implementation of any decision made was largely informed by colonial interests and by extension, the interests of northerner's political elites.

The study established that elite consensus has been an important determinant in the management of major conflict episodes leading to negotiated settlement during the Sudan civil war. As noted, the power relationship among the conflict parties tends to define the nature and the process of the consensus-building process, especially the asymmetric nature of the power relationships among the parties. At independence, the items of dispute settlement were largely uneven due to the asymmetric nature of power relations between the southerner's political elites and the superior authority of British- Egyptians. The use and monopoly of force defined the extent to which the parties shall abide by the negotiated settlement that affects its sustainability.

This reality played out during the initial negotiations between Northern and south Sudanese political elites, where the former had a monopoly of power. At the micro-level, the localization of the conflicts between the Dinka and Nuer was due to the lack of capacity to use force and monopoly of violence. For instance, "the elite misunderstanding and lack of consensus -when southern Sudan was ruled by a high executive council- over ideology and governance issues never escalated to full-blown crisis due to power monopoly and use of force." However, at the macro levels, the use and monopoly of violence were perceived as the only viable option in changing or addressing the issues of power relations, in ensuring that interests and positions are honoured. This resulted in escalating conflict situations between the northerners, and southerners' political elites could use and apply force to enforce change through violence.

 In most cases, the failure of the two elite camps to reach a viable consensus on social, political and economic matters, the situation would escalate a draw in the army. For example, major military incidents that sparked the onset of the civil war (mutiny of 1955 in Torit, Akobo in 1975 and Bor in 1983) is attributed to the lack of elite consensus, and the northern elites failed to honour the establishment of a federal system and the failure to

include the southerners into the general assembly. In this regard, the study noted that incidents of historical marginalization and the failures and lack of commitments to the negotiated settlements between the north and south political elites set the stage for the formation of SPLA/M.

In addition, commitment failures to any negotiated settlement, as earlier noted, ushered in a conducive environment where structural grievances could only be addressed or implemented through violence or the use of force as the only viable option in managing the conflict. This situation contributed to the legitimatization and direct use of violence/force, which inculcated the culture of violence that affected and continued to threaten the sustainability of peace agreements signed during the civil war. Further, Dr. Majak D' Agoot, noted that the conclusion of Anya Anya wars I&II and SPLA war of 1983-2005 were marked by political elites-driven agendas, whose failure to reach a consensus resulted in the recurrence of the major violence that threatened the sustainability of peace accords.

In support, this was the case with the de-escalation of the Anya-Anya crisis until the SPLA/M made peace with Benson Kuany, the commander of Anya-Anya, by integrating them into SPLA/ M through an inclusivity policy. The South-South dialogue was initiated in Juba to find a consensus on how the referendum would be held and the formation of the transitional government of independent South Sudan in 2011. Another millstone event in the history of the Southern elite in the liberation is the difference between Dr. John Garang and his Deputy Salva Kiir in what latter because famously known as Yei- Rumbek incident. In 2004, after the CPA was about to be fully signed after all the protocols were agreed upon between SPLAM and NCP, analysis of how the government would be done was already the common talk in the SPLM circle.

A detailed analysis of the protracted negotiations process between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A that culminated in the signing of the CPA, noted to be the most far-reaching of Sudan's recent peace agreements, reveals how achieving elite consensus is such as herculean task. To better understand the context of the CPA, this study evaluated the elements – position and interests – informing the behaviour of the

political elites in dictating the course of the negotiation process. Specifically, the views and perspectives of the government negotiator Mohamed el-Mukhtar Hussein and those of SPLM/A negotiator Cirino Hiteng Ofuho set the stage for the IGAD process, including the obstacles to progress before 2002. This is linked to the role of the mediator in managing both the internal and external risk factors that hinder the process from achieving the desired settlement. In addition, the study established that the elites' long-term ownership of the negotiated process played a critical role in building their consensus on the element of the negotiated settlement. Besides, it was established that the capacity to evaluate and examine the influence of various tangible elements – military and economic powers – of peace-building in a holistic manner tends to diminish the neglecting of potential risk factors and enhance the opportunity for sustainable peace.

What is more, the study reinforces how the mediation process is marred by uncertainties, especially in managing obstacles, as defined by strong positions and interests. This was the case in the 2004 wealth-sharing protocol, which contained thorny issues on how to handle the ample oil reserves located in the south (Douglas, 2001). As a result, the ownership of the environmental resources was postponed as a move to allow the parties to focus on more divisive issues of revenue sharing and the management of the petroleum sector. Another challenge that proved difficult to manage was the issues of "three areas" north of the 1956 boundary with a high affiliation to the South, the Blue Nile, Abyei and Nuba Mountains. The complexities of dealing with these issues saw the deferring of their resolutions – core grievances- to implementation stages due to the dire and sensitive nature of strong and committed (Gore & Paul WaniMay 2003).

For instance, though the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan protocol of May 2004 presented an ideal model for dealing with such issues in the country, its implementation continued to be faced with numerous challenges. The lagging of its implementation was linked to the lack of domestic and international attention compared with Darfur and weak political integration. Similarly, despite the post-conflict reconstruction being jointly led by the Gos and SPLM/A -through and in-depth planning process- it was still faced with implementation failures (Al-Dinar, 2004).

The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), facilitated by the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank through a holistic framework, reflected a lesson learned from other post-conflict reconstruction programmes, including Afghanistan. As a result, despite Sudan's post-conflict reconstruction framework having achieved a significant level of inclusivity – negotiating parties assumed a lead role in the JAM process-it also faced a poor implementation record, due to lack of local ownership (Bradbury,2006).

4.2 The Question of Elite Exclusion in the CPA Process

The study established that CPA was characterized by elements of exclusion that can be conceptualized in a broader analysis as defined within the scope of certain regions, positions, interests, concepts, themes and constituencies in line with their implication to peace building. Accordingly, Deng, Francis & Mohamed Khalil (2004), the bilateral nature of the north-south negotiation process might, to a large extent, directly lead to a flawed settlement and constitution. The exclusion of the former prime minister and leaders of key political parties contributed to a less participatory and accountable governance system for a peaceful Sudan, a situation that could only be rectified through international intervention. As such, this was the case with the IGAD process that looked at the CPA process as that between the powers behind the country's two major armed forces excluding the role of other actors, especially in Darfur.

Accordingly, the international community attributed the escalation of the Darfur crisis to the lack of minimal focus and attention. At the time, the priority was to attain a CPA settlement and not to derail the process, a situation that resulted in minimal pressure on the warring groups in Darfur towards the cessation of hostilities. The cost of the Darfur conflict resulted in a complex humanitarian emergency that eventually prompted and conditioned the Abuja AU-led talk – a scenario that was presided by the deployment of AU-peacekeeping force to Darfur - in negotiating a truce or text in May 2006 that was only signed by a single fractious armed group from Darfur. Consequently, this negotiated text lacked ownership and excluded other major conflict parties from the negotiating table thus negatively affecting its resilience (Waihenya, 2006). Further, she noted that the

inability of the AU to engender and build trust and commitment among the conflict parties weakened their capacity to negotiate with each other, thus affecting ownership and confidence enhancement.

More so, the aspect of exclusion might have created a false impression for the Darfur Armed groups that the conclusion of the CPA would ultimately offset a similar initiative for them, whereas the CPA limited the gains they could achieve PACT Sudan (2006). Alex de Waal notes that the need to prioritize the DPA presented an inclusive opportunity for Darfur movements to participate in the national building (De Waal & Yoanes,2002). In addition, a similar situation was faced in eastern Sudan, where Beja Congress-including Rashaida Free Lions- prioritized and insisted on the need to have separate negotiations after signing the June 2005 Cairo Agreement with the government. The opportunity for a pre-negotiation process and peace talk allowed for the inclusion of all the conflict parties resulting in the conclusion of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) of October 2006. The inclusivity of the ESPA made it more sustainable compared to the CPA and DPA; the ESPA complemented the Cairo Agreement and enjoyed a high level of ownership.

The role of tracking two actors in dictating the sustainability of the peace process is another important dynamic to be underlined. In the South Sudanese peace process, the grass-root organizations played a critical role that reinforced the elite engagements at all levels of the process (New Sudan Council of Churches, 2006). For example, the establishment and operation of the Sudan Peace Fund by the New Sudan Council of Churches spearheaded the people-to-people process aimed at reconciling the southern Sudan communities and political elites.

Further, the recent 2013-2016 crisis resulted from the lack of consensus in the SPLM. The struggle for power within the SPLM started in early 2013 when the Deputy SPLM chairman Dr. Riek Machar, presented 7points programme on what he called missing links. Their working relationship with president Kiir changed when Dr. Riek expressed his interest in the presidency in the 2015 elections. As a result, president Kiir withdrew

the powers he had delegated to Machar, and tension began brewing between their supporters.

President Kiir sacked Machar and the entire cabinet and formed a new government of ministers he believed were his supporters. Regrouping of anti-Kiir began, and the former allies of Kiir, known as FDs, joined Machar's reforms agenda. However, there was no consensus, and the war broke out in December 2013. Marial Aduot (2021, p. 229) argued that, in such a situation,

> The onset of civil war must be explained using an analytical lens seeking to explore what paved the way for inter-elite strife'' Such an approach narrowed the cause of war to how the loose coalition that held the SPLM together crumbled when the clique around President Kiir tightened its grip on the levers of power. As the access to power became concentrated in the hands of a few, this circle grew more prone to wielding violence to keep it.

The point of the above argument is that those targeted or squeezed out of power saw few options for redress other than taking up arms. Thus, I explain how South Sudan collapsed into violent political fratricide and argue that the violent power struggle did not emerge from the vacuum but was driven by the lack of consensus among powerful elites.

In conclusion, Consensus has been historically attempted to solve the political problem among the political elite in South Sudan but has never materialized; however, every time the elite agreed on any given issue, peace prevailed.

This scenario points to the importance of elite consensus in the sustainability of peace agreements in diffusing the likely escalation of violence. However, it emerged that the current peace in South Sudan is an elite-based peace that is negative peace. First, peace is commonly regarded as ''the antithesis of war, the beating of swords into ploughshares', a situation in which physical violence does not occur'' (Good hand, 2006, p.11). However, the formal ending of a civil war or conflict does not mean the termination of violence,

which is the meaning of negative peace. This was affirmed by an interviewee, who stated that:

> "Although it is a liberal peace, it is negative because it does not bring on board the people of South Sudan. There are two types of Peace, elite-driven peace and people-driven peace. The peace in South Sudan is elite-driven peace."[1]

4.3 The impact of inclusivity policies in enhancing peace- building in South Sudan

Inclusive governance is important to the realisation of peace dividends in states emerging from conflict. In the case of South Sudan, inclusivity discourse has been part and parcel of the liberation struggle. However, its utility as a tool for peace-building and unity in South Sudan is mixed. The spate of inclusivity policies straddles, striking a tribal and regional balance in government, women's inclusion and access to economic opportunities. Following the relative success of the inclusivity approach in resolving political disputes in other jurisdictions, for example, in Kenya after the 2007 disputed presidential elections, where the principle of inclusivity was applied to facilitate a power-sharing deal between the conflicting political parties (Mutisi, 2006), South Sudan has had instances of success with this approach.

Accordingly, over 55 percent of the study respondents opined that the inclusivity approach has helped in the peace-building efforts in South Sudan. Notably, the example of inclusivity principles embraced by the SPLA/M political arrangement is a testament to this end. Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, the movement has embraced the policy of recruiting members from all tribal and ethnic communities. This step allowed for the Agenda of the SPLA/M to be accepted widely since all the communities could see themselves as part of the cause and therefore supported the movement.

In both Anya Nya (I) and (II), the principle of inclusivity was prioritised to gain the support of the civil population across the Country. Further, the study revealed that the formation of SPLA/SPLM high politico-military command embodied a high

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[1]Research interview with Dr. Jacob Dut Chol, Senior Lecturer - Department of Political Science-

consideration of inclusivity. It was noted that the architects of the politico-military command comprising ChagaiAtem, Salva Kiir, KarbinoKuany, John Garang, Arok Thon and William Nyoun Bany were largely from Dinka Community and Dinka Bor in particular. While all but one (William Nyoun) of five high SPLA commands was from the Dinka community, in the principle of inclusivity, the command was expanded to include two more non-Dinka (NyacigakNyashilluk from Murlei). Other members, Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Wani Igaa, were given high command alternate membership based on diversity in order to accommodate the interest of their constituencies. It was used for two reasons, one as a mobilization strategy. The high command members were to mobilize their constituencies to join SPLA/M, and two, for the SPLM to project itself as an inclusive and accommodative than the Sudan government that excluded the people from the South, West and East. This was meant to consolidate the ideas of the New Sudan vision that was fighting for the whole Sudan for all Sudanese, regardless of their religion, race or tribe.

Further, South Sudan, as a pilot country (2012 – 2015) for the New Deal and its active participation in the G7+, has accorded it the opportunity to address the root causes of state fragility and build a path towards resilience. Particularly, the G7 framework came from the famous "Dili Declaration of 2010", which prescribed a country-owned process or transition out of fragility – for some of the worst conflict-afflicted states, including Afghanistan, Haiti, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan, among others. In this landmark Conference, it was agreed that concerted efforts be pursued between the states emerging from civil conflicts and donor countries as a strategy for achieving long-term solutions to peace-building. The domestication of this approach by South Sudan came in handy in 2013, when President Salva Kiir sacked his entire cabinet in an attempt to purge and weaken his political rivals before the SPLM's National Liberation Conference in December 2013 (Maphasa, 2020). This move triggered an attempted coup in December 2013, paving the way for the relapse into a civil conflict situation. In an attempt to resolve the stalemate, the then Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, while chairing a peace initiative, indicated that since the 2013 conflict was political, it could only be resolved on a 'give and take' and 'all-inclusive' principle. The government of South Sudan, in agreement with the inclusivity principle, coined a goal [New Deal Goal]

whose main aim was to foster an inclusive political settlement. To realize the inclusive political settlement, the government brought on board opposition, civil society, religious leaders, donor community, among other actors at all levels, to seek consensus on building a united path forward for the country. This deal was instrumental in helping South Sudan conduct a successful secession from Sudan in July 2011 (Wani, 2013). However, challenges with reforming the security sector, justice institutions, the creation of diversified economic foundations and strengthened capacity for accountable and equitable service delivery remain to be addressed (Ibid).

Additionally, implementing a more inclusive peace agreement puts women, youth and other minorities at its centre. Enhancing the spaces for these voices is necessary to improve their socio-economic and political opportunities (Mwayu, 2007). Further, Daron and Robinson (2012) posit that political inclusivity helps reduce political violence and instability and is also a key contributor to growth and development. As such, women and minority voices in governance institutions and policy-making have ascended since the signing of the CPA. The CPA of 2005 stipulated that 25 per cent of women's representation at all levels of government was an appreciation of their role in the liberation struggle. As a result, this move saw women Members of Parliament (MPs) in the South Sudanese Parliament rising from 28 to 170 from 2005 to 2010. As of 2021, the percentage of women MPs make-up 33.73 percent of the total numbers (170 out of 334 MPs) (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2021).

On the contrary, the inclusivity approach negatively affected peace in South Sudan. First, the study established a pattern where some actors regularly flouted power-sharing agreements, creating a continuous cycle of endemic instability. For instance, serial rebels such as the late General Gadet, David YauYau, and General Johnson Olony rebelled several times, throwing the peace agreements in doubt. Additionally, reflecting on the South Sudan Dialogue of the year 2006, inclusivity was not built on the key pillars of national unity but rather focused on putting prominent Southern Sudanese leaders in power. Indeed, according to Bona Malual of Southern front party and London group led by Dr. Elia Lumoro, "the biggest challenge then was the lack of accountability. Unity

drive only focused on power-sharing and not the inclusion of all tribes and ethnic groups".[2]

The study further reveals that inclusivity in South Sudan was organized at three levels; regional (Bhar el gazel, Upper Nile and Equatoria; tribal, Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Zande), and at the level of immediate relatives. However, the inclusivity approach in South Sudan did not adequately encompass bringing on board other categories in the society, such as women, youth, the elderly and people with disabilities. As described by one interviewee, "the nature of the inclusivity in South Sudan was guided by what was to be gained by the individual in question".[3] This approach has been argued to have a contributory effect on corruption, and lack of accountability as the focus of the inclusivity is simply on individual accommodation and community representation without real benefits to the larger society. In the end, the approach's overall effect is negative, as exemplified in the 2013 conflict, where the conflict took tribal dimension and family backing. It also allowed corruption to thrive.[4] The sentiments were further supported in yet another interview in which the interviewee opined that the nature of inclusivity put a strong emphasis on the feuding individual actors, thus making it difficult to accommodate elites other than ensuring that the constitution-making process was issues of citizens/ state relations are discussed.[5]

By designing inclusivity as a tool for the peace process, the bigger picture of inclusivity creating a culture of peace is missed, particularly because the grievances of those who are fighting are different from the grievances of the citizens, so when it is for peacemaking, it only becomes a tool for the elite to get to power. The South Sudan approach thus fails to create a peace opportunity.[6] The danger with the inclusivity approach practised in South Sudan was also revealed in an interview with an official from a non-governmental agency who noted that:

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[2]Interview with a Staff from the Sudd Institute, Juba-South, on 6[th]October, 2020.

[3] Interview with a Political Science Lecturer, Juba University, South Sudan, on 9[th]August, 2020.

[4] Ibid

[5] Interview with SUDD Institute official

[6] Ibid

"Inclusivity in the country is not institutionalized in a way that accommodates the ideas of others. As such the inclusivity focuses on individuals and communities, thereby resulting into more conflict where individuals who were not included the power sharing deal, rebelling and mobilizing their communities against those in power i.e. David YauYau in 2012".[7]

Additionally, the danger with inclusivity of the elite propagates the maintenance of a status quo, making it fragile as it is based on individual interest and is negative to peace-building because whoever is included at that particular time feels good. However, when removed, that person would think everything is wrong. It has developed into a perpetual cycle of violence that threatens the peace-building project. The solution is too institutionalized and makes it ideas based rather than being an accommodation of individuals or communities.[8]

4.4 Challenges hampering the effective implementation of political accommodation in South Sudan

The study established several internal and external factors that militated against implementing political accommodation mechanisms for peace-building in South Sudan. These are discussed below.

4.4.1 Ethnic mistrust

As revealed in the previous section, the focus of elite consensus and inclusivity in the South Sudan peace processes was an elite-driven process rather than founded on the need to address the root causes of state civil conflicts and state fragility. As a consequence, the flawed nature of these processes allowed for the entrenchment of tribalism as a section of the society felt a sense of satisfaction as long as the interest of an elite from their tribe was accommodated, notwithstanding the lack of trickle-down effects on the entire tribe in such approaches. Inclusivity, as practised, was revealed to be lacking in attending to issues of corruption and accountability. By focusing on issues that promote virtues of

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[7] Interview with an official from the Mission 21, a Protestant Mission Basel, based in Juba-South Sudan on 1st July, 2020.
[8] Ibid

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good governance, building inclusive and sustainable economic policies that promote youth employment, reduction of poverty and fighting illiteracy, among others, inclusivity and elite accommodation approaches have proved inadequate, bringing sustainable change in South Sudan remains elusive.[9]

Additionally, the field data supported the issue of tribalism, where more than half of the respondents noted that the narrow focus on tribal satisfaction as an approach to inclusivity hampered the effectiveness of political accommodation in South Sudan. Citing the peace Agreements achieved under (Big Tent) policy, a discussant during a focus group discussion opined that:

> "The peace realized only served a specific time, particularly, the 2011 referendum. However, the peace at the time could not hold after independence because too many forces were integrated, which was too big to manage and that led to all manner of insecurity instead of peace. Further, the absorption of Matip Soldiers in 2006 ethicized the armed forces that end up with the tribal representation."[10]

4.4.2 Mistrust and lack of consensus among key stakeholders in the peace processes

The effectiveness of political accommodation in South Sudan was affected by mistrust among the political elites. From 2006 to 2016, South Sudan has been characterized by elite compromise rather than elite consensus. The main focus in the South Sudan situation has been individual interests' characteristic of compromise and not the general good of the populace, which is the embodiment of "real" consensus. The study further revealed that the Juba declaration of 2006 was a compromise between giving General Matip position meant to facilitate independence. One interviewee pointed out:

> The only time South Sudanese had consensus was in 2010 in all parties dialogue, where South Sudanese elites from all political divides were genuinely united on the agenda of independence through a referendum.

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[9]Interview with political science lecturer, Juba University, South Sudan, on 10[th]August 2021.
[10] Interview with an official from the SUDD Institute in Juba, South Sudan, on 5[th]October, 2020.

Unfortunately, in post-2011, there was no common agenda for consensus, and that became a missing link towards achieving lasting peace-building in South Sudan. The search for it may emerge through the National Dialogue and constitutional review process.[11]

The Sudan peace process has also proven to be complex, involving multiple actors whose roles are mutually inclusive and exclusive. For instance, the CPA process did not fully enhance a complementary and coordinated process in promoting stakeholders' inclusivity. As a result, the presence of the government's 'sequencing policy' towards tackling armed insurrection, coupled with the failure of the conflict parties to commit to national projects, contributed to divisiveness.

Also, the lack of consensus, largely stemming from mistrust between the elites, means that the roles played by all South Sudanese in the achievement of independence and subsequent peace processes may go unrecognized. As such, the people do not see themselves as stakeholders in the liberation struggles and thus have no sense of ownership in the outcome of liberation or peace processes.

4.4.3 Exclusion of women and other minority groups in peace-building processes
Further to the aforesaid, the study found that minority, youth and women participation in politics in South Sudan was hampered by cross-cutting challenges such as age, levels of education, marital status, family background, as well as ethnic and regional variations (Kani, 2011; UN Women, 2011). These dynamics have been exacerbated by the variables such as high poverty levels in South Sudan that disproportionately affect women and other minority groups more than men. The implication of women, youth and other minority groups being locked out - is a loss of legitimacy to the peace-building processes.

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[11] Ibid

4.4.4 Regional dynamics and its effects on peace-building

The study also revealed that external forces, including regional and international interests, influenced the implementation of political accommodation in South Sudan. At the regional level, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda had a lot of influence on the internal peace processes in South Sudan. This consequently throws the question of whether the peace-building processes in Sudan have been organically driven or externally fuelled. In the case of South Sudan, President Bashir of Sudan, for example, wanted to see his allies in the South included in the government. President Museveni of Uganda, on the other hand, was keen on Garang's family and Kiir's positions preserved in any power-sharing arrangements. President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya was in favour of Former Political Detainees (FPDs) being brought on board. At the international level, "it was the same thing…there are people within the political elite preferred by certain external groups", according to an official from Sudd Institute.[12] In all of these cases, it is clear that the focus at any particular time depends on whose interests were being served and not the interest of the people of South Sudan.

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[12]Interview with an Official from Sudd Institute in Juba, South Sudan on 5thOctober 2021.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter highlights a summary of the findings, conclusion, and recommendations of the study.

5.1 Summary of Findings

With the conflict in South Sudan in its seventh year in 2020, the study sought to not only evaluate the impact of political accommodation on peace-building in post-conflict states but also consider the emerging narratives of such accommodation and to provide policy recommendations to peace process stakeholders. The study has revealed that the peace treaties in South Sudan have failed on multiple occasions and, as such the need for a lasting solution is evident.

After splitting from the larger Sudan in 2011, South Sudan became the youngest nation in the world. Just like in other newly independent states, the South Sudan case was not any different; it came with a huge human cost considering the many years of conflict between the Arab North and the non-Arab South. The conflict was so intense catching the eyes of the international community, who were consequently involved in a series of mediation processes between the North and the South. These processes resulted in the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2005 (Jok, 2015), nevertheless, while the separation was under way, many fundamental issues responsible for mistrust among the South were not addressed.

The focus of the peace processes was initially, the conflict between the North and the South and not the cold relations among the ethnic groups in the South (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The objective of this study was to revisit the status of and events surrounding the South Sudan conflict from a historical and contemporary perspective and assess the consequences of political accommodation considering the continued conflicts in South Sudan.

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From the findings, it is clear that the South Sudanese peace process has either been facilitated or hindered by some factors. Of these, the contribution of elite consensus and compromise in the peace-building processes in South Sudan was mixed. Accordingly, it is poignant to point out that the peace process in South Sudan remains elusive despite several attempts towards achieving it. A retrospective look at the previous peace agreements reveals lack of consensus has been a hindrance to peace-building efforts. For example, the 2015 peace agreement became untenable after sanctions were imposed on certain individuals thought to have played a role in the South Sudan conflict. The affected individuals used the tribal card to galvanize opposition to the 2015agreement. The study revealed that such acts not only compromised the peace processes but also left South Sudan roiled further in an endemic wave of civil conflict. The reverse, many thought could have helped South Sudan avoid the worst-case scenario – of protracted politically motivated tribal conflict situation.

Further, the study revealed that the lack of political goodwill both from the government and the political elites whose main interest was on the amount of power they control and would wish to retain hampers peace processes in South Sudan. By not integrating elites, stability in South Sudan remains elusive. According to John Higley and Michael Burton (2006), elite integration involves the relative inclusiveness of communication networks among elite persons and groups; and values consensus, which involves a consensus on the rules of the game. In this vein, the situation in South Sudan fits the argument by Higley & Burton, who claim that without a consensually united elite, liberal democracy is not possible. The elites in South Sudan thus lack access to central decision-making and thus take steps that impede peace processes. Additionally, by not integrating elites, the give-and-take nature of politics is sidestepped paving the way for political tension to ratchet up.

The study also noted the significance or centrality of inclusivity to successful peace-building outcomes. The main stakeholders were noted to have taken cognizant of this fact. Consequently, the government of South Sudan came up with a series of initiatives

that have seen most parts of South Sudan pacified with conflicts now limited to only fewer parts of the country.

It was further revealed that while not elected, political elites have positioned themselves as the representatives of their ethnic groups, a situation that has further hampered the peace process in South Sudan. Not all the elites have the mandate and legitimacy necessary for the representation of their groups and hence face an internal revolt within their ethnic communities. As such, the net effect on the overall stability of South Sudan is great. It was also noted that while the political elites have always been seen as advancing the needs and desires of the groups they claim to represent, they are characterized with deceit, lack of an inclusive vision, political commitment and political will, and this has negatively affected the overall peace process in South Sudan. It was noted that the inclusivity approach in South Sudan was more of an elite-driven process rather than a public good process in which as long as the interest of the elites is accommodated, the interest of the public that they purport to represent is ignored. Consequently, ethnicity is entrenched while a fallacy of peace is created that ends the moment the interest of the elite is not delivered as those represented easily revolt since no tangible fundamental issue is addressed but the interests of the elites.

The effective implementation of political accommodation in South Sudan was found to be hampered by some factors, including tribalism, mistrust and lack of consensus among the elites, exclusion of women, youth and other minority groups, as well as regional dynamics and interests.

5.2 Conclusion

The study concludes that the peace-building process in South Sudan remains on course despite the fact that the country has experienced several instances of false starts. Specifically, elite consensus building and inclusivity policies were found to be the major drivers of this process. However, the establishment of a stable South Sudan, the desired end will remain a distant goal as long as the root causes of the systematic and structural constraints are not addressed.

5.3 Recommendations

From the foregoing, the study suggests the following policy, as well as academic recommendations.

5.3.1 Policy recommendation

The study recommends the need to redesign the peace-building instruments, especially peace agreements to render them holistic and inclusive, thus transforming into multi-purpose vehicles for addressing the diverse tribal, political, economic, religious dynamics that define the South Sudanese society. Specifically, the study recommends the creation of a transitional authority to help in deconstructing the belief or practice that the basis for survival or organization of a state is ethnicity, and instead suggest the constitution of an inclusive government to increase its chances of winning the public's trust and legitimacy.

5.3.2 Academic recommendation

The study recommends that more studies be done on faith-based inclusion as a mechanism of augmenting peace-building efforts in conflict-afflicted states such as South Sudan. The logic is that if implementation of political accommodation is extended to other key institutions of the society, it can lead to building stable, inclusive and peaceful governance through the conciliation of diverse interests.

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APPENDIX 1: THE INTERVIEW GUIDE

THE INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

This is academic research titled, **"A Critical Analysis of the Impact of Political Accommodation on peacebuilding in post-conflict states: the case of South Sudan (2005 – 2018)"** You are kindly requested to assist the candidate in conducting the above study in partial fulfilment of the academic requirements for the award of Master's Degree in Political Science of the University of Nairobi. All the information you will provide will only be used for the purpose of this study.

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION ON PEACEBUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT SOUTH SUDAN(2005-2018).

1. The struggle for independence by Southern Sudanese against the North for over 50 years was driven by the quest for freedom, Equality, Justice and prosperity for all, with the South being an independent State, havethose values been realized?

2. The vision of the SPLM/A was to establish an inclusive system in New Sudan that would accommodate all those who live in it regardless of their religions, tribe or race, after independence, did South Sudan as a state geared toward that dream?

3. What do you understand by the concept of political accommodation?

4. Has political accommodation worked in South Sudan? If yes, explain how?

5. What are the challenges to political accommodation in South Sudan?

6. Can you name any other peacebuilding strategy other than political accommodation?

7. The International Community supported South Sudan's Government through peacekeeping mission (UNMISS) with an intention of strengthening institutional structures such as the Army, Police and Judiciary so that they become inclusive and vibrant to handle any internal disagreement among the political actors. Did such a support bear fruits?

8. In your view what factors are fuelling the current conflicts in South Sudan?

9. Who are the main actors in the current conflict?

10. Are elites one of the actors? What is their role in the current conflict?

11. Do you think the international community, IGAD, AU, TORIKA China are doing enough to stop the violence? Does internationally–led intervention through peacebuilding process the best way to maintain peace in South Sudan?

12. In your view was the attempted Coup externally instigated or was it an internal problem between the President and his Vice President?

13. What's your take on the recent peace deal that was signed in Sudan between the President and his former Vice president? Has it addressed the question of political accommodation?