INDEX NOTICE

TO MAKE THIS MICROFILM AVAILABLE AT AN EARLY DATE, IT HAS BEEN RELEASED WITHOUT AN INDEX. SHOULD AN INDEX BE PUBLISHED IN THE FUTURE, IT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE MICROFILM VOLUME WITH WHICH IT IS RECEIVED.

REAGAN AND AFRICA

REFUGEES:
Africa's S eful R rd

0001 9999 00 046806 OC10 SMP
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS INTL
300 N. ZEEB RD.
ANN ARBOR MI 48106




CEUTA
MELILLA
Tunis
Algiers
TUNISIA
Rabat
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
Benghazi
Tripoli
Cairo
LIBYA
EGYPT
El Aiun
WESTERN SAHARA
MAURITANIA
CAPE VERDE IS.
Praia
Nouakchott
UPPER VOLTA
Ougadougou
NIGER
CHAD
SENEGAL
Dakar
THE GAMBIA
Banjul
MALI
Bamako
Niamey
Ndjemena
Khartoum
SUDAN
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
GUINEA
Conakry
GUINEA-BISSAU
Bissau
BENIN
Porto Novo
NIGERIA
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa
Freetown
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
Monrovia
IVORY COAST
Abidjan
GHANA
Accra
Lagos
TOGO
Lome
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Bangui
CAMEROON
Yaounde
SOMALIA
Mogadishu
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Malabo
SAO TOME E PRINCIPE
Libreville
GABON
UGANDA
Kampala
KENYA
Nairobi
RWANDA
Kigali
BURUNDI
Bujumbura
ZAIRE
CONGO
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
ZANZIBAR
Dar es Salaam
TANZANIA
SEYCHELLES IS.
Victoria
Luanda
Moroni
COMORO IS.
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
Lusaka
Lilongwe
MALAWI
Salisbury
ZIMBABWE
MOZAMBIQUE
Tananarive
MAURITIUS
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
REUNION
Port Louis
NAMIBIA
Windhoek
BOTSWANA
Gaborone
Pretoria
Maputo
SWAZILAND
Mbabane
SOUTH AFRICA
LESOTHO
Maseru

Africa Report

America's Leading Magazine on Africa

Please enter my subscription as indicated below (six issues per year):

INDIVIDUAL	*INSTITUTION*	
$15/1 year	$18/1 year	—Regular Mail to Canada/Overseas: Add $3 per year
$28/2 years	$34/2 years	—Air Rate Overseas: Add $14 per year
$40/3 years	$48/3 years	

NAME ______________________________

ADDRESS ______________________________

CITY ______________ STATE ______________ ZIP ______________

☐ I am enclosing payment. ☐ I wish to be billed.

(Make checks payable to Transaction Periodicals Consortium)

D | 1 | 1 | A | R | X

EFFC

No Postage Stamp
Necessary if Mailed
in the United States

BUSINESS REPLY CARD

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1129 NEW BRUNSWICK NJ

AFRICA REPORT
Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

Africa Report

America's Leading Magazine on Africa

A Publication of the African-American Institute

JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1981 VOLUME 26, NUMBER 1

IN THIS ISSUE

As *Africa Report* went to press, President-elect Reagan had not announced the full list of members of his administration. Nevertheless, many aspects of policy toward Africa could already be discerned. Several articles provide a background to this subject. Richard Deutsch, writing from Washington, analyzes African policy options in the light of the Reagan philosophy. He considers that "the Reagan administration's preoccupation with global superpower competition for control of resources will ensure Washington's attention to African issues." In a paper on southern Africa, Chester A. Crocker and associates from the Center for Strategic and International Studies discuss policy choices in a framework that may be close to the thinking of the new administration. Ali A. Mazrui gives a perspective on how party changes in the White House appear to Africa.

Taking the recently concluded UNCTAD talks in Geneva as a starting point, John Parry, writing from that city, believes that African nations will continue to suffer from fluctuating and worsening trade terms until they begin seriously to plan and work together in the field of commodity exports.

The cover story examines in text, figures, and photographs the growing tragedy of Africa's refugees.

The nature of Mozambique's achievement of independence, not to mention the ruling party's rejection of colonial Portuguese institutions, presented the country with carte blanche in devising its legal system. Allen and Barbara Isaacman write with firsthand experience of some of the problems and some of the achievements of the new structure.

In an interview with Thozamile Botha, undertaken by Richard Deutsch, we present a significant basis for assessing developments in South Africa. The interview is augmented by extracts from Mr. Botha's appearance before the Africa Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. His views are significant because of his role in both the political and labor fields and because he has recently joined the exiled opposition after active involvement inside the country. This issue also contains World Bank figures and analyses that show the critical situation faced by most African economies.

The annual index for 1980 will appear in the next issue.

The African-American Institute
George N. Lindsay, Chairman
Donald B. Easum, President

Publisher: Ronald E. Springwater
Editor: Anthony J. Hughes
Assistant Editor: Margaret A. Novicki
Washington Correspondent: Richard Deutsch
Editorial Secretary: Barbara Kitchin

Circulation, Subscriptions, Advertising, Management, and Production Services by Transaction Periodicals Consortium:

Art Department: Richard J. Levins, Fern Shegoski, Judith Martin Waterman
Production Editors: Alex Fundock III, George P. Bassett

The cover photo of a woman and her child in a Sudanese refugee camp was taken by Duncan Willetts for Camerapix.

Africa Report, a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly in July-August, September-October, November-December, January-February, March-April, and May-June, and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017. Editorial correspondence and letters to the Publisher should be sent to this address. Correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, advertising, and other business matters should be sent to Transaction Inc., Rutgers—The State University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates—*Individuals*: U.S.A. $15, Canada $18, air rate overseas $29; *Institutions*: U.S.A. $18, Canada $21, air rate overseas $32. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5717; Editor (212) 949-5731.

© The African-American Institute, Inc., 1981

Reagan and Africa

By RICHARD DEUTSCH

The Reagan administration's African policies may not come into sharp focus for weeks or months after the inauguration, but broad themes underlying the new administration's policies are already evident.

African concerns — such as the struggle for majority rule in South Africa — are not expected to be high-priority issues during Mr. Reagan's presidency, as they were in the early years of the Carter administration. But neither will Africa — U.S. policy towards the continent — be considered largely insignificant as was the case throughout most of the Nixon-Ford years.

The Reagan administration's preoccupation with global superpower competition for control of resources will ensure Washington's attention to African issues.

"We're talking about a global context in which the problems and issues that occur anywhere are related to those in other regions, and it's not possible to assume that Africa is in an arena all by itself. That note of realism is a central one," says an informed source at the center of the new administration's thinking on African issues.

It was no accident that Ronald Reagan used his first postelection press conference to state categorically, "I believe in linkage." This was a clear signal that Mr. Reagan and his advisors consider Soviet actions anywhere in the world to affect U.S.-Soviet relations.

If Mr. Reagan's word is good, the United States will no longer tolerate Soviet "policies of aggression" in Africa: neither direct Soviet intervention, nor aggression by Soviet client states such as Libya or Ethiopia will go unchallenged in Washington. In particular, the Soviet-Cuban military presence in Ethiopia and Angola has long rankled Mr. Reagan and his aides, and they intend to counter this perceived threat to U.S. interests. Primarily, they will "link" strategic arms limitation negotiations to Soviet behavior in Africa as well as in other regions. Secondly, they will be tempted to move decisively to provide America's "friends" in Africa with "defensive" arms.

In the Horn of Africa, the Reagan administration will at first be justifiably wary of establishing a "defensive alliance" with Somalia. Washington will not support Somali claims to the Ogaden, nor openly send arms to Mogadishu that can be used inside Ethiopia. However, the Reagan administration will retain U.S. access to Somali "military facilities" at Berbera. If the situation in the Persian Gulf remains unstable, and Western control over events in the region continues to deteriorate, the U.S. "facilities" at Berbera will soon become a full-fledged American base along with additional new U.S. bases in Egypt.

Criticism of an expanded U.S. military presence in the Horn of Africa by some African governments will be shrugged off in Washington. "We're not going to be intimidated by such criticism," says a Reagan aide. "Many African governments are delighted that the U.S. recognizes the problems in the Persian Gulf, and that we intend to defend our interests."

Unstated, of course, is the understanding that if Ethiopia uses force to keep the United States out of Berbera, Washington will respond with force. In the face of Ethiopian belligerence, such as an invasion of Somalia, the Reagan administration is far more willing than its predecessor to arm Somalia and provide troops from other "friendly" Third World nations as well. A situation short of open hostilities — such as Soviet-Ethiopian aid for a "liberation movement" inside Somalia — could provoke clandestine U.S. arms shipments to Mogadishu. The new Republican-controlled Senate is expected to open the way for these activities by removing many current statutory controls on the CIA and vastly increasing U.S. defense spending.

The Reagan administration will also seek to counter Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa by substantially increasing U.S. economic and military assistance to Kenya and Sudan, both important Western supporters in the region.

In North Africa, the new administration will be inclined to move carefully but deliberately to counter Libyan influence. Egypt's and Sudan's defenses against Libyan forays will be bolstered. France will be encouraged to try once again to bring about a diplomatic solution to the civil war in Chad, and to bring pressure to bear for the withdrawal of Libyan troops from that nation. If such efforts fail, as they have many times in the past, Washington may seek a renewed flow of Western arms to anti-Libyan factions in Chad. More arms sales to Tunisia are to be anticipated as well.

The Reagan administration will also give unequivocal public backing to King Hassan of Morocco, including additional supplies of "defensive arms" for use against the Polisario. At the same time, U.S. officials will work quietly for a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara dispute.

"Don't pull the rug out from under people oriented our way," says a Reagan aide, objecting to attempts by congressional liberals to block arms sales to Morocco in an effort to pressure King Hassan into negotiations with the

Polisario. "We have the most influence over our friends, and if we weaken our friends to get negotiations we are creating a formula for chaos . . ."

In fact, "support for our friends" may well be one of the major precepts of Reagan administration policy-making, if for no other reason than that Mr. Carter's abandonment of the shah of Iran set off a chain reaction of instability that appears to have left the Soviet Union poised over the West's oil supplies. Hopefully, the Reagan administration will judge individual regimes by their actions and not by ideological labels, leaving the door open for friendship with Congo and Mozambique as well as Gabon and Kenya.

It seems clear, however, that many Reagan aides with previous experience in African affairs have a score to settle in Angola. The Reagan administration will probably approach Jonas Savimbi as a legitimate nationalist leader with a major role to play in helping govern Angola, and the United States will push for political accommodation between Savimbi and the government in Luanda. At the same time, conservative forces in the U.S. Senate will press for a lifting of legislative restrictions on the covert provision of arms or assistance to factions in Angola. These restrictions, originally embodied in the Clark Amendment, barely survived a conservative onslaught during the last days of the 96th Congress and are not expected to last long in the 97th. With these restrictions removed, the Reagan administration will be able to implicitly threaten as well as encourage the Luanda government to send the Cubans home and reach a settlement with Savimbi's UNITA forces.

"We can't function in the world if only the Soviet Union's allies and friends get tangible support when they need it . . . the ultimate goal is to get the Cubans out of southern Africa and get conciliation in Angola. We want to do this, and to make it clear to Africa that external powers should not be allowed to create African governments through the force of arms," says an informed Reagan source.

Such an approach to the situation in Angola may await a settlement in Namibia. The Luanda government has said it will be in a position to ask the Cuban troops to leave once Namibia is independent.

The Reagan administration is expected to support Namibian independence, and to encourage the continuation of negotiations to end the war there. Not to be discounted is an early attempt by the Reagan administration to orchestrate a negotiated settlement to the Namibian dispute, with or without the United Nations. At this point, such an attempt has a greater chance of success under Mr. Reagan than Mr. Carter. Reagan has far more clout in Pretoria than his predecessor and is likely to have at least as much influence with the Frontline states and with SWAPO, particularly if the United States continues to support Robert Mugabe's government in Zimbabwe and avoid the obvious tilt towards South Africa expected from a conservative Republican administration.

The Reagan administration may well open with a strong gesture of confidence in Mr. Mugabe, perhaps with a high-profile U.S. effort to support a flow of private American capital into Zimbabwe. Mr. Mugabe's Marxist statements will tend to be forgotten by Reagan officials, as long as Mr. Mugabe leaves such political sympathies in the past and avoids the temptation to emasculate Mr. Nkomo and establish a one-party state.

A pledge of greater U.S. assistance to Zimbabwe and sizable U.S. help to get an independent Namibia off the ground would come as part of a larger effort by the Reagan administration to reorder U.S. assistance policies. The new U.S. administration will try to use assistance to facilitate a greater flow of private American investment to Africa. Aid will also be used to promote development of raw material and mineral resources, to support U.S. involvement in national efforts to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency, and especially to bolster African governments considered friendly and strategically important to the United States.

Such an assistance policy is a clear departure from recent U.S. practice, which has targeted most assistance to meet the needs of "the poorest of the poor." Reagan administration sources say that aid will not be used as a form of "international charity," but to meet outstanding humanitarian needs such as disaster and refugee relief, and to support U.S. policy goals. The new administration can be expected to get the necessary congressional approval to make these projected changes in assistance policies. Even the outgoing 96th Congress, considered far more liberal than the 97th, refused to raise most bilateral aid levels over the past two years. Only by tying U.S. assistance to policy goals can the administration hope to coax higher aid levels from Congress, or even maintain present levels given the current state of the American economy.

A similar streak of pragmatism will lead the Reagan administration to make strong efforts to maintain good relations with Nigeria, the second-largest source of U.S. imported oil and perhaps the most promising new experiment in democracy in the developing world. The Reagan administration is also aware that the U.S. balance of payments deficit with Nigeria exceeds that with any other nation, and would like to see this gap begin to close. In doing so, the administration might find it advantageous to accommodate Nigeria's commitment to the achievement of majority rule in South Africa.

The Reagan administration is expected to back off from official criticism of South Africa's racist system. The "codeword" for U.S.-South African relations may well become "frank talk" or "private persuasion." American officials will stress that Washington is not trying to impose an American model for change in South Africa, because a Carter administration attempt at this seemed only to create a backlash.

At the same time, U.S. officials will make clear that it is in the West's interest to see genuine and rapid movement towards majority rule in South Africa, or towards a racial power-sharing arrangement in that country that meets the acceptance of most South African blacks. In taking this approach, the Reagan administration hopes to avoid having to choose between black Africa and white South Africa.

Washington will also emphasize that as long as African governments not economically dependent on South Africa continue to trade with Pretoria, the United States will not seriously entertain appeals for American disinvestment. Not to be counted out, on the other hand, is a request by Mr. Reagan for congressional legislation requiring U.S. corporations to follow fair employment practices in South Africa. Mr. Reagan's ties to big business would seem crucial in such an effort.

Such an approach fits nicely with Republican campaign rhetoric that Reagan's administration is to be "realistic" and "pragmatic." Most African governments would probably not be ecstatic over such a U.S. stance on southern Africa, but most could probably live with it, and it would be backed by prominent Republicans with any degree of international sophistication. It may, however, raise hackles in a growing right-wing faction of the U.S. Senate.

The new Senate, controlled by the Republicans for the first time in more than two decades, is far more conservative than that of the 96th Congress. Republicans now control Senate legislative committees, enabling conservatives to direct both the flow of legislation and the little-noticed but highly influential work of committee staffs. The Foreign Relations Committee is to have only about a dozen staff members chosen by Democratic senators compared to three times that number picked by conservative Republicans — a situation symptomatic of a general reversal of roles for liberal and conservative staff in the Senate.

The new Senate can be expected to do away with most restrictions on U.S. intelligence activities, to take the lid off foreign military sales, and give Mr. Reagan the leeway to take a far tougher stand with the Soviets. In particular, the new Senate may ask Mr. Reagan to lift the ban on the sale of U.S. goods to South Africa's military and police, on grounds that this restriction discriminates against U.S. business. In taking these positions, the new Senate will claim to be reflecting the dominant public mood as expressed in the November elections.

The Senate chamber will also, however, become home to a growing number of senators associated with the "New Right" movement and considered ideological soulmates of Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). The New Right bloc in the Senate can be expected to press the Reagan administration to form an open alliance with Pretoria against the expansion of "communist" influence in southern Angola spreading from Mozambique and Angola. These senators will be on the lookout for "communist tendencies" on the part of Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, will probably denounce SWAPO's Sam Nujoma as a communist and try to derail U.S. support for Namibian independence, and will call for immediate armed assistance to Jonas Savimbi in Angola. In taking such positions, these senators may "outflank Reagan on the right," and prove as much an irritant to Reagan's "pragmatic" policies on southern Africa, as Senator Helms and his followers have been to Carter's "idealism." If New Right Senate forces become a dominant influence on Reagan's Africa policies, this will ignite charges of U.S. racism in southern Africa. At the very least, it will infuriate black Americans and many liberals, and could hand the Soviet Union a propaganda coup.

The new House of Representatives has also shifted hard to the right following the elections. The Democratic majority in the House has been sliced so thin that conservative Democrats from southern and southwestern states have formed a caucus to "battle with the liberals on the House floor." Although the new group will avoid joining with the Republicans on party-line votes, its practical effect will be to push the House to the right of the liberal Democratic leadership on many issues. "We now mean to moderate the liberal leanings of the House leadership," says Democratic Congressman Charles Stenholm of Texas, the group's leader.

In the Senate, Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.) will continue to fight an uphill battle for liberal policies on African issues; and in the House, many members of the Africa subcommittee can be expected to do the same with backing from the Congressional Black Caucus. But liberals who survived the elections face intimidation from New Right political action groups that have already targeted 20 moderate and liberal senators for defeat in 1982. Liberals, now a clear minority, will have to choose their causes more carefully, and gather political energy for fights on the most pressing and basic issues.

Looking to the future, two different political scenarios seem to have an equal chance of emerging in Washington. Mr. Reagan may move to form a broad moderate-conservative coalition on most domestic and foreign issues, holding New Right influence to a minimum. If so, liberal efforts on Africa policy may prove to have a moderating effect on a wide range of issues.

Mr. Reagan, on the other hand, might support broadscale New Right attacks on basic civil rights legislation and domestic social programs that will engage most liberal and Black-American political energy, leaving little for foreign concerns. If so, perhaps only New Right policy on southern Africa will arouse sharp opposition because of its racial overtones, while the Republican right-wing will be given a free hand to "arm America's anti-communist friends" in Africa.

During the last days of Mr. Carter's reign and the opening of Mr. Reagan's, many in Washington concerned with Africa policy hoped the new president would follow the first path. But fearing he would choose the latter, they tended to agree with this assessment of a leading Washington activist on African policy: "I don't want to forecast, but the future is not very hopeful. Everything Reagan has said so far on Africa has been marked by an inability to understand the situation or by racism. So I am not hopeful about this administration. Its instincts, not only of Mr. Reagan but also of those around him, are all out of sync with the directions and attitudes of the African world. I would expect U.S. relations with Africa to worsen over the next few years, unless the Reagan administration comes quickly to its senses and recognizes new African realities. There is some possibility of this." □

A U.S. Policy for the '80s

By CHESTER A. CROCKER with MARIO GREZNES and ROBERT HENDERSON

In the early 1960s the rise of numerous independent African states helped to foster the impression that southern Africa, beset by a historic clash between African nationalism and white power, was moving toward an abyss of racial conflict. The perception was premature, and American policy subsided into a posture of living with the region's contradictions. The major Western allies straddled African nationalism, Portuguese colonialism, and continued rule by the white minorities of Rhodesia and South Africa.

By 1975 American interest was rudely reawakened. The Portuguese imperial buffer protecting Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Namibia (South-West Africa), and South Africa was suddenly stripped away in 1974-75. The Western nations appeared to be ill-prepared and impotent to deal with decisive Soviet-Cuban military intervention that created the Marxist MPLA government of Angola. The previously low-level Rhodesian bush war expanded rapidly as the white authorities lost control of their Mozambique border. Militant rhetoric and communist arms were in increasingly plentiful supply. The 1976 Soweto riots in South Africa seemed to echo developments further north, sending a shock wave through South Africa and the capitals of the West. This gloomy prospect caused Washington once again to shift gears. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger started to back away from the Nixonian straddle of the early 1970s, a move which required a more active diplomacy with African nations, stronger verbal pressure for change in white-ruled areas, and American involvement in the search for accommodations in Rhodesia and Namibia. Washington could no longer simply enjoy its varied interests in southern Africa; it would have to work actively to preempt Soviet-backed revolutionary change and deter further communist adventurism in the mineral-rich region stretching from Zaire's Shaba province to Cape Town.

The Carter administration carried the new perception further, and devised new tactics for implementing it. Washington, we were told, would stop reacting to Soviet moves and treating Africa as an arena for waging the cold war. Henceforth, we would use a "pro-African" policy, greatly expand our diplomatic ties in Africa, and base our policy on "African solutions" and human-rights goals. Ambitious diplomatic efforts were undertaken on Namibia and Rhodesia. South Africa's *apartheid* (institutionalized, legalized racism) was condemned in shrill terms. Washington adhered to a mandatory arms embargo under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and started conducting a strong verbal tilt toward nationalist guerrillas in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Today, the southern African outlook appears less gloomy than five years ago. The climate for Western policy is more favorable, and the communist powers appear to have been largely confined to their embattled Angolan strongpoint where UNITA guerrillas continue to tie down large numbers of government troops and the still large (20,000-25,000 men) communist expeditionary force. Namibia is not yet independent, but fragile progress has been made toward an internationally recognized settlement. Rhodesia has become Zimbabwe under the leadership of a Marxist ex-guerrilla leader, Robert Mugabe, who has apparently committed himself to a moderate path of mixed economy principles and multiracialism. Mugabe's relations with Moscow are icy, and the Soviets are not doing particularly well in neighboring Mozambique, Mugabe's wartime sanctuary. In South Africa as well, there are at last signs of a new pragmatism and flexibility in the policies of the P.W. Botha government that assumed power in 1978. Though this does not make meaningful change certain, it makes it seem at least possible for the first time since the Afrikaner Nationalists took over in 1948.

We are thus in a new phase. Does it mean that the tide of racial conflagration and Soviet adventurism has been turned? Or, is this simply a lull in the storm as the parties take a breather during the Mugabe "honeymoon" period, before a future crisis over Namibia and the big battle over South Africa itself? What role did Washington's rhetorical and diplomatic activism play in improving the prospects, and what is the correct policy for the 1980s? The answers are less obvious than appearance might suggest.

The Southern African Choices

In the first place, we Americans are too quick to apportion credit and blame. The Zimbabwe settlement resulted from several ingredients, and the U.S. role had mixed results. Given the long background, the 1979 Lancaster House agreement and Mugabe's electoral victory are probably the best that could be hoped for. But it was British political

Chester A. Crocker is director of African Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Mario Greznes is research intern and Robert Henderson is research fellow of Third World Studies, both also of the center. This paper was commissioned by Freedom House as a guide for its own formulation of policy on the crucial choices facing American policy-planners in southern Africa. It was originally published in the November/December issue of *Freedom at Issue*, by whose permission it is reproduced here. © 1980 Freedom House Inc.

courage and diplomatic virtuosity that brought the tangle and the war to an end. And the settlement occurred only because all parties had exhausted their diplomatic and military options, creating a window for peace. Even then, London had little choice but to operate on the premise that the military struggle would drag on unless Mugabe's wing of the Patriotic Front (PF) was satisfied with the election outcome. Zimbabwean voters, operating on the same premise, made sure that it was. By sticking to the "high ground" and offering the PF a virtual veto over the settlement process at key stages in the struggle, Washington helped to write this scenario in which militant guerrillas gained power through Western democratic forms.

We can only hope that there is compensation in the fact that Zimbabwe's new leader is probably the most able nationalist in the country. He faces a balancing act of heroic proportions in the months ahead. But he does so having inherited one of Africa's most productive economies and efficient administrations. He has the potential, therefore, to turn Zimbabwe into a major success story in southern Africa, a center of growth and stability that could have beneficent effects on all its neighbors, not least South Africa itself. But this script is not yet written.

The American visitor to southern Africa hears a babble of voices and conflicting assessments adding up to a dissonant chorus. This is especially true within South Africa itself, because that society is both more open and fragmented than most African countries. In the new period that has opened up since Zimbabwe's independence, Americans must learn to live with the babble of voices, resisting the specious argument that we face simple choices between black and white Africans, between pro-Western and Marxist governments, or between our interests and our principles. In reality, American interests and principles cut across the shifting ideological and color lines of southern Africa, just as they cut across the divisions within South Africa itself.

In our approach to the stability and development of southern Africa, we in the West are well advised to be as pragmatic as the politically diverse states of the region—Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and, now, Zimbabwe—have shown themselves to be. This means that, where possible, we should try to build on and strengthen linkages between them on conditions they are prepared to accept. It would be tragic if the United States listens to the racially polarizing instincts of more distant Africans and some in the West who want us to promote the "de-linking" of the region's economies and infrastructures along racial lines. It would also, in all likelihood, be futile. These links represent more than a past history of colonial convenience and domination by white-ruled South Africa; they also signify a basis for the survival and future development of highly vulnerable economies.

The integrity and interdependence of the region as an arena for U.S. policy is not obvious, and is contested by many. But coherent policy toward the individual countries that comprise the subcontinent depends on our recognizing that the region's substantial potential rests on such integration and on rational economic policies. For understandable reasons, African-ruled states would prefer to reduce their dependence on rail lines to South Africa's ports, and they can be expected to move in this direction where possible. But unless outside aid flows into these countries in truly massive proportions—a most unlikely event—they recognize that their South African links can be moderated but not ended. At present, the infrastructure of railroads, harbors, roads, airfields, and telecommunications provides a network for the food, manufactured goods, capital, technology, and expertise that generally flow from south to north; and the raw materials, labor, and political pressures that generally move north to south. This network is vital to the survival of the political systems and economies of the region, as most of its African leaders are quick to recognize (though reluctant to dwell upon in public).

The network of ties also helps to explain southern Africa's economic importance. It accounts for most of Africa's nonfuel mineral output. Southern Africa (including Zaire and Tanzania) contains about one-third of the population of sub-Saharan Africa, but it accounts for 45 percent of its GDP. If Nigeria is excluded, the latter figure rises to nearly 60 percent.

Nearby African states are not doing South Africa a favor by maintaining such ties; nor are we doing so by encouraging them to build upon what already exists. The greatest obstacle to development in other parts of Africa is precisely the absence of those things that southern Africa can continue to enjoy: mobility of capital and labor; trade and transport links; currency convertibility; regional electric power development; and mobility of scarce management, technical, and entrepreneurial skills. What would happen if they were disrupted by political confrontation, the hosting of guerrilla movements aimed at South Africa, and the triumph of ideological economics?

The answer is all too predictable. South African preponderance in the region does *not* derive from these links but from its own economic dynamism and technological advancement. These ties rarely translate into the satellitization of African states, as Pretoria has frequently discovered already. But if ties are cut, South Africa is in a position to extract a fearful price from its less developed neighbors. Development and mineral output in nearby African states will stagnate, and Western dependence on South Africa as a beleaguered mineral giant would only increase. Western economic interests would suffer, as access to markets and investment opportunities became further fragmented. And which outsiders would be prepared to step in to undo the region's own folly?

The Western nations face another choice between pragmatism and ideological stereotypes as they define their relations with the various *types of African governments* that exist in southern Africa. The American purpose should be to pursue our economic interests and capitalize on Moscow's current isolation from most of the region. This means concentrating our capital, talents, and aid on the region as a whole—not operating as though the African states consisted of easily distinguished "hostiles" and "friendlies," using Marxist rhetoric as the litmus test. (It is a fact that most African governments utilize Marxist verbiage while pursuing ideologically eclectic policies.) The behavior of both Mugabe and Mozambique's president, Samora Machel, demonstrates an avid interest in Western ties and a highly developed survival instinct that bears almost no relationship to East-West polarities; even Moscow's Angolan client appears uneasy within the fraternal socialist embrace.

Angola remains a special case while a major internationalized civil war continues there. But, in general, the United States must play an active regional role if our interests and the region's own potential are to be realized. Meaningful levels of official economic support and investment are one way to strengthen stability and economic progress. In the case of Zimbabwe, it is deplorable that the American political system can come up with no more than roughly $50 million for this year and next as a response to that country's urgent foreign-exchange needs for such purposes as restoring rural health and education, refugee resettlement, land reform and agricultural development, and revitalization of the country's outdated capital stock. Zimbabwe's foreign exchange shortfall could approach U.S. $500 million during the first post-independence year. Failure of the West to support the pragmatism reflected in Mugabe's early policies and first budget plan could help create a self-fulfilling prophesy if his government is unable to deliver to its supporters in key areas.

Of course, there is a conditionality implicit in such Western support of African governments in the region, but we cannot expect them to perform *before* we support their efforts. The same logic applies to such countries as Mozambique and Zambia, whose precarious economies and weak governmental systems could slide further in the absence of constructive outside involvement.

Military assistance and flexible budget aid are also appropriate policy tools in this region. So far, Western abstinence and a peculiar American complex about such matters have prevented Washington from playing any useful role in the security assistance field in southern Africa. This, more than any other factor, explains Zambia's recent turn to the USSR for arms in 1979-80, at a time when it faced regular pounding from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's far superior forces. The end of the Zimbabwe war has removed, at least for now, that contested political vacuum from the map of southern Africa, and denied Moscow the chance to exploit an indeterminate civil conflict in the name of "liberation." But Washington must be prepared to respond to regional security needs in the 1980s. If South Africa's relations with its neighbors turn sour – or if African governments begin to lose control of guerrillas targeted against Pretoria – the fragile polities of the region could disintegrate in short order. This threatened to happen at the height of the Rhodesian conflict as the governments of Zaire, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique faced the pressure of well-armed guerrillas and retaliatory strikes from both Salisbury and Pretoria. We must be prepared to help governments to retain primacy over guerrillas on their own territory and to defend their sovereignty if South Africa overplays its military superiority. Failure by the West to play such a role could lead to a proliferation of dangerous power vacuums on South Africa's periphery.

In sum, the West must engage itself effectively in southern Africa's black states, and this will require that meaningful resources stand behind U.S. policy. Commenting on the prognosis for the 1980s, the *Economist* (London) recently noted that "each of the black countries of the region is now finely poised between stability and disaster." While it is true, the magazine added, that "socialism in southern Africa has had a dreadful decade" – Angola apart – it is clear that now is no time for Western timidity or neglect of the region.

The Problem of Namibia and Angola

The end of the Zimbabwe conflict is only the beginning of a new set of challenges for U.S. and Western policy. In the short to medium term these will probably center on the closely intertwined conflicts in Namibia and Angola. So great is the overlap between these two wars, in fact, that we outsiders sometimes have a problem deciding which is the key to the other. The Carter administration and many observers in Europe and Africa prefer to operate as though the Angolan civil war were simply an extension of South Africa's battle with the Angola- and Zambia-based guerrillas of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). In this view, Angola should be considered a fullfledged member of the Frontline States grouping, a diplomatic partner whose cooperation in the search for a Namibian settlement is essential. (Washington would probably already have recognized the MPLA government in

Photo: Camerapix

Jonas Savimbi: "The U.S. would serve its own interest by admitting publicly the legitimacy of the UNITA struggle"

Luanda, were it not for the [illegible] political repercussions of being seen to accommodate [illegible] Soviet-Cuban *fait accompli* and to legitimize [illegible] communist military presence in Angola.)

This school of thought believes that the only way to get the Cubans out is by stopping the regular South African raids into Angola and by obtaining reconciliation between the MPLA government and its UNITA opponents who operate in central and southern Angola. Presumably, a Namibian settlement would accomplish both objectives, since UNITA – it is argued – would lose South African support that is critical to its continued anti-MPLA struggle. By such reasoning, it follows that the Soviet-Cuban presence is somehow justified or legitimate until Namibia is settled and UNITA finally defeated. In any event, the pressures of UN and African diplomacy have now placed Namibia on the top of the Western calendar, while the Angolan war is hardly on it at all.

A different view of the situation is held by many centrists and conservatives in America and Europe (as well as the governments of China and most pro-Western Arab states) that Angola is the logical focal point for policy. It is in Angola, after all, that anticommunist forces are effectively engaged in trying to liberate their country from the new imperialism of Moscow and its allies. Not only is Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement a genuine nationalist grouping with unquestioned popular support in its ethnic home base; it is also succeeding in bloodying the Cubans, raising the price of adventurism to Moscow, and raising doubts in many Angolan minds about the benefits of the socialist alliance. This process should be encouraged with the aim of getting the Cubans out so that a genuine political reconciliation can take place. As for Namibia, while a settlement is important there, it will not by itself end the Angolan strife, because

"What useful role can we play to help South Africans toward a nonracial future?"

Savimbi is by no means the tool of South Africa. He could continue to operate with the active support of other African states and governments elsewhere. Accordingly, the West should back UNITA, until such time as the MPLA is prepared to negotiate and to expel the communist forces from Angola. Namibia, according to this argument, is a separate and less important issue.

There are flaws of logic in both views. There is little doubt that Savimbi could survive the loss of the logistical cooperation UNITA now gets from the South Africans, assuming his important African, European, and Arab supporters do not desert him. Hence, the Angolan problem will *not* go away just because Namibia is settled. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a meaningful reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA could occur if UNITA were first weakened decisively. This would be the reconciliation of victor and vanquished. The West has few reasons for supporting any such reconciliation, given UNITA's strong anti-Soviet record and strong popular support in the country.

On the other hand, should Washington change course and back UNITA outright, it is not obvious how this path would lead to reconciliation either. It could produce an escalation of conflict, and it would probably rule out responding to frequent hints from the MPLA of a desire to reduce sharply its Soviet-Cuban ties. As far as the Angolan conflict is concerned, the United States would serve its own best interests by admitting publicly the legitimacy of the UNITA struggle and maintaining the pressure for a departure by communist combat forces. The ultimate goal should be to reduce or eliminate the communist combat presence in southern Africa and to bring about a political compromise acceptable to all major political forces in Angola. We should identify with the desire of Angolans themselves to rid their land of foreign troops and the fighting they represent.

In Namibia, the low-level guerrilla conflict continues while the parties (South Africa, SWAPO, the Western parties, and the Frontline States) maneuver over two distinct political tracks—both, in theory, aimed at an independent Namibia. The "internal" track sponsored by South Africa entails the creation and support of local political and administrative authorities of moderate ("safe") stripe to whom power would be transferred. The "international" track leading to UN-supervised elections and internationally recognized independence has the support of the Western powers, the Frontline States, the UN itself, and (in varying degrees) SWAPO and South Africa. The government of Prime Minister P.W. Botha in Pretoria is pursuing both tracks, using the first as a lever to obtain improvements (from its standpoint) in the second.

It is a complex tangle, and the military dimension of it is likely to grow costlier and bloodier. South Africa argues that its presence as an administering power is legal (derived from a League of Nations mandate since revoked by the UN), and it insists on the right to prevent SWAPO intimidation of Namibian voters during the elections that would precede independence. Most other nations (including the United States) consider South African presence in Namibia to be "illegal," and they maintain that the UN—not South Africa—will determine the definition of a "free and fair" election.

In practice, neither Pretoria nor SWAPO has much confidence in the concept of "free and fair" elections. This problem is aggravated by the folly of the UN General Assembly majority, which declared in 1976 that SWAPO was the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, a position that undermines UN credibility and feeds South African distrust. For their part, African diplomats are quick to note that SWAPO will not gain office under the UN transition plan unless it can win the election; but the more candid among them also concede that SWAPO is unlikely to lose, since the Namibian people—if given the chance by Pretoria—will probably vote for the party that will "end the war."

The U.S. position in this puzzle should consist of three elements. Washington should not align itself with any proposed "internal settlement" created by South Africa unilaterally. Such an arrangement makes sense only as an interim step toward an international settlement. The United States and its allies have nothing to gain from backing a South African client government in circumstances that assure a continuation of internationalized warfare. Second, American diplomacy should press hard to allay Pretoria's concern about the impartiality of any planned UN peacekeeping and election-monitoring operation in Namibia. The General Assembly has set a frightful precedent in backing SWAPO that makes a mockery of democratic principles and procedures—especially when one recalls the tendency of a largely illiterate rural populace to vote for the men with the guns. Third, the United States should retain its flexibility about the modalities of an international settlement for Namibia. Washington, under the Carter administration, has invested considerable energy and skill in the Western Five-UN transition proposals, but this should not blind us to the need for a fall-back position if these proposals go off the track. Let us hope that we Americans can be humble enough to recognize that our best diplomatic effort on this track *could* fail. Other frameworks can presumably be devised, and our goal should be to avoid becoming boxed into our own proposals if they appear incapable of bridging the remaining gaps. This is especially pertinent in a situation where we have limited leverage over any of the parties and are obliged to operate jointly with our NATO allies to give our views real weight.

Coping with South Africa's Complexity

The American stance toward the Republic of South Africa is inevitably the centerpiece of our regional policy. Politically, South Africa is the focal point of intense pressure for basic change toward a more just, nonracial society. Such pressure flows from within South Africa, much of the African and international community, and from within our own society. Consequently, any U.S. regional policy must be consistent with and based upon an understanding of where we are headed in our relationship with Pretoria. Second, South Africa is by any definition an important regional power on the world scene, and it is by far the most important country in the southern African region. Militarily, economically, technologically, and in most other respects the Republic towers over its neighbors. To take but one measure, South Africa accounts for 65 percent of the GDP of southern Africa (even when defined to include Zaire and Tanzania). Third, it is in South Africa that the West's most important regional interests are at stake—both our tangible economic and strategic interests and also our political and moral interests in nonviolent change.

A major weakness of American policy toward South Africa is the inadequate level of public understanding on which it is based. Too few Americans comprehend how much South Africans and we in the West have to lose if the process of change is thwarted or degenerates into internationalized civil strife. South Africa is not a minor issue. A second weakness is the highly polarized opinions about South Africa that exist at the fringes of our political process where, regrettably, there is greatest interest in the problem. Proposals for disinvestment, for complete economic disengagement, for support of nationalist guerrillas, make as little sense as arguments on the other side that call for a close political-military relationship with Pretoria. The latter ignores the fact that the monopoly of political power held by 4.5 million whites over some 22 million Africans, Coloureds (mixed race), and Asians cannot long continue. The former arguments ignore the base for cautious optimism that does exist, and neglect to specify what useful consequences might follow from such action.

The West can neither embrace South Africa, in its current form, nor can it walk away from the problem. In political terms, South Africa is not embraceable without our incurring massive diplomatic damage and risking severe domestic polarization. However, that country is also by its nature a part of the West. It is an integral and important element of the Western global economic system. Historically, South Africa is by its nature a part of us. In our judgments of it, we reflexively apply Western standards of political behavior. We also see much of ourselves and project many of our domestic agenda there.

Photo: Sygma/Peter Marlow

South African troops in Namibia: "The U.S. should retain flexibility about the modalities of a settlement"

The long-term objective is the emergence of a domestic order in South Africa that will permit the United States to pursue a full and normal relationship with it. Whether this happens depends on the pace of change, how change occurs, and who participates in it. The things we value—democratic principles, a strong market economy, nonracialism—are unlikely to take root if we wash our hands of South Africa or play down its problems. The task, therefore, is to steer a course between destabilizing the Republic—there has been enough destabilization of important countries in recent years—and aligning ourselves with the cause of white minority rule. It is not our task to prejudge basic questions about the ultimate blueprint that ought to be resolved by South Africans themselves.

Our guide in relations with Pretoria needs to include common sense and fundamental American principles. If U.S. history has meaning for Africa, it is that a multiracial society with guarantees of individual and minority rights is possible and can work. As a democracy, we cannot endorse situations or constitutions that are racist in purpose or effect; nor can we endorse the abuse of Western norms by people of whatever race dedicated to seizing or holding power through violence. Such an approach to the problem of encouraging evolutionary change must include a clear recognition that some South Africans—and quite a few outsiders—do not support this goal since it would limit their power and influence. If we are to be serious in southern Africa (probably the biggest "if" in the minds of those who live there), we must act in ways that permit the supporters of evolutionary change to gain and hold the initiative.

Reading the above, many Americans will pose two basic questions: Is it possible for the United States to play such a role? And, why is it so important that we do so—what is at stake? On the first question, some close observers of the South African scene doubt that it is still possible for moderates of all races to coalesce around an effective strategy for change, no matter what outside well-wishers might do. Analogies drawn from the American civil-rights experience, it is argued, do not fit, while analogies from places like Rhodesia or Algeria are not encouraging. Moreover, in the history of National Party rule since 1948, there is little basis for either trust between the races or optimism in the West. Skeptics argue that, in general, Afrikaner nationalism and the quest for "cultural survival" of this unique white tribe has translated into the domination or brutal coercion of everyone else. Even if the Afrikaner elite now recognizes that *apartheid* is a dead end, it is not clear that controlled change is possible. By the time blacks have acquired the tangible bargaining power to challenge white rule, they are likely to have lost interest in meaningful compromise over power-sharing.

These arguments cannot be dismissed, but they can be answered. In the past five years, and especially since Botha took office in 1978, the obscure politics of Afrikanerdom have become more pragmatic and rational, less tribal and ideological. The best talents within this determined but intellectually isolated community of white Africans appear to be coalescing around that leadership—in the press, the military, business, the church, and the universities. On grounds of both political ethics and practical politics, leading Afrikaners may now be coming to realize that purposeful change is absolutely essential. The immediate obstacle, in their view, is not the feasibility of such change (though that is hotly debated); rather, it is the problem of how to organize and lead Afrikanerdom away from the dead end—and to do so in a more or less democratic context (for whites).

Black politics, meanwhile, are increasingly fragmented on tactical and leadership issues, but united in the confidence that basic change is coming through whatever combination of violent and nonviolent strategies is available. The real optimists in South Africa are in the black (i.e., African, Coloured, and Asian) communities; that optimism is tempered by the knowledge that quite a few black lives and material interests may have to be sacrificed in order finally to convince whites to sit down and bargain without preconditions. *Their* greatest obstacle is the problem of organizational unity: how best to organize themselves—as guerrillas, trade unionists, civic associations, students, consumers, cultural-political movements, and participants in business and government service—for the ultimate bargaining process.

This set of circumstances does not justify giving up on South Africa. Its future has not yet been written, despite the storm clouds that gather. Unlike most, the South African economy is showing the capacity to generate resources for growth and social change. The still enormous disparity in the kinds of physical power in the hands of whites and the nonwhite majority provides a slim margin of time and a firm check on sudden political disintegration. For the West to write off the place prematurely, whether for domestic political convenience or to shed an embarrassing international burden, would be an action of the highest moral cowardice.

The second question—what is at stake?—has already been partially answered. Our political principles and multiracial society give us an inherent interest in democratic change. The diversity of our international and African interests also predisposes us to change that is consistent with our world role and the values we stand for abroad. But there are also some very important tangible interests involved.

In military and strategic terms, the Cape Route linking the South Atlantic and Indian oceans is a conduit for the majority of Western imports of petroleum and nonfuel minerals. At present, it is not vulnerable to imminent disruption in any credibly foreseeable *peacetime* scenario. In fact, in peacetime, the potential threat to Western oil and mineral supplies is greater on land than at sea. But there are two worrisome contingencies, and they are important ones.

First, at a time of general war or even limited conflict that could break out *elsewhere*, these supplies remain vital. It is clearly more than a mere convenience that South Africa's excellent port and air facilities not be in the hands of a potential adversary (or be made available to such an adversary) at such a time. The Soviet Union is unlikely to start a war by disrupting Western shipping in the southern oceans—because this is what such action would lead to. Besides, there are far more convenient places from which Moscow might seek to disrupt oil traffic further north. But the USSR would have major advantages *once war occurred* if political forces hostile to the West were in control of South Africa. This concern is applicable both to a wartime scenario in Europe and to a large-scale Middle East conflict in which the Western nations became involved.

Second, for the same reasons, it is clearly not in the U.S. interest that change in South Africa lead toward a government that was dependent for its existence and survival on Soviet military power (as in Angola). This is a possibility that must be faced if change in South Africa degenerates into large-scale destruction and revolutionary violence. In such a scenario, the very presence of Soviet forces at Africa's sensitive southern tip would constitute a powerful basis for the political intimidation of the Western nations during conditions of tension and crisis. This is all the more true since maritime leverage would be supported by control over critical mineral exports from South Africa itself.

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is committed to "a moderate path of mixed economic principles and multiracialism"

These military interests, it must be emphasized, do not argue for a U.S. or Western embrace of white-ruled South Africa; nor do they mean that Washington should be opposed to African majority rule in a unitary South African state. But they do imply a strong preemptive interest in forestalling a Soviet combat presence in southern Africa, and they reinforce the political reasons for the West to oppose the militarization of political change in South Africa.

In addition, the United States has a broader concern for the way major powers behave in regions of tension and conflict. It is not in our interest that the use of military force become established as the principal means for effecting political change—in southern Africa or anywhere else. This region is not a Western sphere of influence in any formal sense; but it is far more important to the West than it is to the Soviets and their allies (except as a source of anti-Western pressure). There can be no presumptive communist right to create political facts and *faits accompli* by the use of superior military power there. How the United States conducts itself globally and regionally in southern Africa will determine whether or not Moscow is offered such an opportunity.

U.S. and Western *economic* interests in South Africa fall into three basic categories. First, South Africa is one of Africa's few growth points. U.S. investors, like their European counterparts, have clear interests in participating in such a market. As the scale of the U.S. trade deficit in Africa continues to grow—the continent accounted for nearly 50 percent of the world-wide deficit last year—there are strong incentives to expand sales and profit remittances from South Africa. Although there is a large U.S. trade deficit with South Africa, that country is nonetheless by far our largest market in Africa, with the single exception of Egypt (where U.S. aid brings exports to about the same level as to South Africa).

Second, there is the need to retain and expand U.S. and Western access to a reliable supply of imported minerals at reasonable prices. The long-term trend toward severe Western minerals-import dependence is well documented and needs only summary treatment here. The key points to bear in mind are stark and straightforward. U.S., European, and Japanese vulnerability to possible supply disruptions, price manipulation, or stagnant exploration and output will get progressively more acute in the next twenty years. Substitution and technological innovation may offer relief as prices of key commodities rise, but only in some cases and with quite long lead times. In the meantime, Africa as a whole has emerged as the world's most important source of many imported minerals, and a significant source of most others. What gives African mineral reserves their importance for Western interests is the fact that the bulk of output is exported and will continue to be for the long-term future.

South Africa holds a special place among African raw-materials exporters. It is by far the dominant producer-exporter of nonoil minerals in Africa and the Third World; only the United States, the USSR, Canada, and Australia outstrip the Republic as minerals-producers. Because of its output and export of coal and uranium, diamonds and precious metals, ferro-alloys that are central to Western steel production (manganese, chrome, and vanadium), platinum group and base metals, it is a fact—not opinion or propaganda, as is sometimes alleged—that South Africa is the Saudi Arabia of minerals.

There is, futhermore, a regional dimension to South African minerals prominence. Although Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Zaire, and Angola are also important producers of some minerals, it is not realistic to view them as alternatives to South Africa. In few if any cases would they be able to take up the slack if, for whatever reason, South African production were to fall sharply or be purposefully curtailed. In the event of serious regional conflict or of Western economic sanctions against Pretoria, one should not assume that nearby black African ores would reach the market and displace South African exports. If South Africa itself slides into protracted civil conflict sufficient to affect mineral exports, there is no reason to suppose that the neighboring economies and transport-power networks would remain unaffected.

A third category of economic interest in South Africa is related to that country's potential to serve as a regional engine of development. Neighboring African states such as

Zimbabwe will not be content to play the role of Pretoria's satellites, nor should we urge them to do so. But the Republic offers neighboring Africa things that no other state—African or external—can offer as readily or in as substantial a scale: jobs and training in the modern sector, a demand for electric power and port facilities, a source of capital seeking external investment outlets, substantial market potential for raw materials and processed goods, and a source of expertise and experience in a wide range of developmental fields. All of this, of course, becomes a mirage or a delusion if meaningful, evolutionary change fails to occur in South Africa or if the region becomes engulfed in international strife.

Summing Up

The preceding discussion makes clear that it matters how change occurs in South Africa and how the Republic relates to the region of which it is an integral part. The catalogue of U.S. and Western interests does *not* present us with a clearcut choice between short-term interests on the one hand and longer-term interests and principles on the other. The issue is *not*: can we live with change? Rather, it is: what kind of change do we want and how do we limit the costs of getting from here to there? The right kind of change in South Africa and the region will *not* require the destruction or dismantling of existing dynamic economies, efficient administrative services, and developed infrastructure. Nor does it require the eclipse of Western political values and strategic interests such as minerals access. Not, that is, unless we contribute to such a scenario by the creation of self-fulfilling prophesies.

Western policy in southern Africa in the 1980s will demand a careful sophistication that is unlike our past performance. U.S. parsimony over aid to Zimbabwe colors perceptions of our policy throughout the region as local actors wonder about the seriousness of American purpose there. Our tendency to stereotype black and white Africans into neat clichés undermines the flexibility needed for an imaginative policy. Because they have to live there, Africans are more pragmatic than distant observers. Americans are unlikely to do well if they persist in viewing southern Africa through the lens of contending propaganda machines for various factions. The region will be shaped by forces more substantial and concrete than journalistic conventions like "racist regim s" or "Marxist guerrillas."

The U.S. inclination to downplay the role of tangible power realities in faraway places also bedevils our approach. Southern Africans have to live within the context of existing power relations, just as they must adapt to changes in those relations that may occur. When Westerners fail to support those forces that could support their interests—or when they do not appear to know what side to be on, as in the view that Cubans are "stabilizing" Angola—they simply become irrelevant.

If the United States is to have a serious policy in southern Africa, it must include some basic decisions. First, our policy proposals and initiatives must be backed by tangible and intangible resources that are relevant to the region. We cannot compete with the other world power in the region if we ignore its aims and have little to offer ourselves. Recent experience makes clear that Moscow believes it will profit from the destabilization or overthrow of governments and systems that are tied to us, politically or economically. Far from resolving conflicts or meeting regional development needs, Moscow and its allies profit from keeping the pot boiling. In conditions of economic slide and political uncertainty, Western investment will be deterred and Western hopes for nonviolent change undermined. Our diplomacy must include the capacity to back friendly governments with tangible assistance—technical, economic, political, and military. It must be backed by the evident involvement of our highest political levels. Diplomatic efforts toward regional accommodation will prove little if our posture is simply to align ourselves verbally with whatever trends and forces appear to have the upper hand in southern Africa.

Second, a serious policy will restrain our tendency to stereotype local factions and will thereby broaden our options to conduct a flexible policy. Continued blacklisting of Mozambique for U.S. assistance—regardless of its professed desire for an opening to the West—is shortsighted. At the very least, Washington must have the capacity to explore the potential for fostering realignments that are in our own interest.Similarly, in relations with South Africa our interest is best served by an opening up of attitudes—most particularly in the white community—something that cannot be done by isolating it. Every effort should be made, by the public and private sectors of the Western nations, to expand contacts that could promote attitudinal change and the opening up of social and economic relations. The strength of Western societies lies in the diversity of institutions and bases of influence within them; such pluralism is seldom seen in the Third World, and southern Africa is no exception. South Africa urgently, perhaps desperately, needs new avenues and organizations in which different racial and income groups can deal with each other openly. The failure to strengthen such institutions inside the Republic can only encourage violent confrontation. More thought should be given to how Western governments and societies can respond to this need.

Third, U.S. effectiveness in southern Africa will be a function of its global credibility and sense of purpose. Our capacity to discourage radicalization will depend on whether we have alternatives to offer. By the same token, our ability to deter Soviet-inspired militarization of local conflicts relates to the Soviet perception of us on a world-wide basis. Certainly, there is no place in our policies for attitudes that suggest that Soviet and American goals are equally legitimate.

Finally, we need a stronger basis for approaching the question of nonviolent change within South Africa. It is no longer enough to maintain general political pressure—e.g., through the arms embargo—and to talk about the goal of "full political participation" for blacks in the system. Given the magnitude of the task, the American call for an all-parties national convention to "settle" the South African problem has an artificial ring. The dismantling of institutionalized racism in South Africa will require hundreds of decisions, not one, and it has to start somewhere. Indeed, it has already started. The question, therefore, is what useful role we can play to help South Africans of all groups think their way from today's situation toward a nonracial future.

Some will call this intervention, and in a sense it is. But the purpose is benign, and our failure to do anything at all except talk about the ultimate goal accomplishes rather little. Pressure in necessary, yet the sources of effective pressure are severely limited. We do not want to destabilize South Africa or jeopardize our own economic and strategic interests. The power to coerce South Africa is not in our hands, especially not in the hands of the U.S. government. Hence, our limited influence must not be wasted in largely symbolic gestures or undermined by ignorance of internal South African timing and dynamics. In the final analysis, we are likely to find that our ability to support the things we want to see is greater than our ability to dictate or threaten. □

The Search for Commodity Stability

By JOHN PARRY

Early in the morning of November 15, 1980, producers and major consumers reached agreement in Geneva on the terms of a new three-year pact regulating world trade in cocoa. The compromise agreement satisfied nobody — the United States, the world's largest consumer, refused to be associated with it, and Ivory Coast, which produced 22 percent of the world's cocoa in 1979, also refused to accept the pricing mechanism contained in it. But the very fact that agreement was reached at all signified a realization on the part of all concerned that something has to be done to stabilize world commodity prices.

This realization lies behind the grudging acceptance earlier in 1980 of the idea of a "Common Fund" to stabilize prices of all major commodities. The brainchild of Gamani Corea of Sri Lanka, secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the fund is scheduled to start operating in 1982. Its stated aim is to link the various individual commodity agreements together, thus enabling them to help each other in supporting prices in times of economic crisis.

"Without some sort of order in commodity markets in the next decade, the economies of developing countries will be exposed to enormous stresses and strains," Corea said in an interview. "This is particularly true of Africa, where many countries are heavily dependent on commodities such as cocoa for their foreign trade. In fact Africa has the biggest stake of all in getting our integrated program on commodities off the ground. If we had had that program in operation last year, the current crisis in primary products would not be so severe."

And what will happen to Third World, and particularly African economies, if the integrated program on commodities fails to take hold? "I dread to think," says Corea, simply.

Corea is critical of African nations for allegedly not being assertive enough in international commodity negotiations. "Too often they simply sit there and let events sweep them along," he said. "What's needed is for African governments to get together before negotiations on a given commodity, work out their joint position in advance, and stick to it when the time comes to talk with the consumer nations. That's the way the major world producers of natural rubber did it when we were negotiating an agreement on that particular commodity. They came to the negotiating table with a united front, didn't budge, and ended up getting what they wanted. African countries should do the same in negotiations on subjects such as cocoa — but the work has got to be done at home, in Africa. It's no good coming here to Geneva and expecting to work out some kind of Pan-African compromise here. It just doesn't work."

What is the integrated program for commodities? Basically it is the umbrella-like parent of the Common Fund, a plan devised by UNCTAD to put together a whole series of international agreements covering a dozen commodities. The agreements would be basically designed to ensure price stability through an agreed floor and ceiling price of each commodity, maintained through the use of buffer stocks or national stockpiles managed by an international organization that would have the right to buy or sell at a given moment to keep the price stable.

So far UNCTAD has negotiated agreements on natural rubber, cocoa,

Cocoa being harvested in Ivory Coast, the world's leading producer of the commodity

John Parry is a British writer based in Geneva, reporting on international affairs.

tin, coffee, and sugar. But some of these agreements are on shaky ground. The cocoa pact, while accepted by 80 percent of the producer nations and all the major consumers (with the exception of the United States) was criticized by many participants at the Geneva meeting as not going far enough towards price stabilization. The fragile agreement on tin is also being assailed from all sides — by the tin producers, who claim their demands for a higher floor price are not being heeded, and by the consumers, who claim that any attempt to regulate the world's tin supply by abandoning a free-market economy in favor of controlled supply and demand would knock the bottom out of the market.

The United States, the world's largest consumer of tin, is once more cast as the villain in these negotiations because it holds out for the principle of a free-market economy and wants buffer stocks, financed jointly by producers and consumers, to be created to stabilize prices. The major tin producers say this is neither necessary nor economically feasible.

The United States is also opposed to the inclusion in a new International Tin Agreement, supposed to come into force in 1981, of export controls. These are an integral part of the current agreement, and the producers claim they are necessary because they protect the commodities-oriented economies of developing countries. The United States says they inhibit a free-market economy.

The United States has also been accused of trying to "sabotage" the negotiations on a new tin agreement by unilaterally selling off tin from the vast stockpile held by the U.S. government. But UNCTAD sources say this has apparently had little effect on world prices so far.

Negotiations for the conclusion of an international pact on tea are being hampered by a basic dispute between producers in Asia and those in Africa. As Corea explains it, this dispute stems from the desire of the traditional producers of tea, particularly India and Sri Lanka — China does not, as yet, play an active part in the international negotiations on commodities — to limit production to an agreed overall figure. The major African producers — Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Malawi — are opposed to any such limitation because, they say, it will inhibit the growth of the tea industry domestically.

According to Corea this is a shortsighted attitude. "We have to show them that they have no stake in investing in a declining and unhealthy industry," he says. "Prices will continue to fall in a free market. Of course it's easy to understand that developing countries don't like to see brakes put on their key industries. But it's our job to persuade them that international regulation, far from hindering them, will help them because it will bring the price stability without which planned growth is impossible. That's what we're trying to do with tea."

Gamani Corea, secretary-general of UNCTAD: "Africa has the biggest stake in getting our commodities program off the ground"

One of the problems in putting together an international pact on tea, according to UNCTAD, is the stagnation of import demand in consumer countries as a result of the economic recession. Producing countries are unhappy over falling prices, particularly since these are accompanied by increased production costs: at a meeting in Malawi in 1979 it was generally agreed that a system of export quotas was the best means of stabilizing prices, but the African nations went along with this decision reluctantly and it has yet to be implemented.

Although Corea likes to cite the International Sugar Agreement as one of UNCTAD's major achievements, it has in fact signally failed to achieve its objective of stabilizing world prices. Hardly had the agreement been concluded when prices moved from below the floor level to well above the "ceiling." They have continued to fluctuate wildly ever since, thus rendering the agreement to all intents and purposes impotent. The United States, according to members of its delegation at the UNCTAD Cocoa Conference here in November, expects equal fluctuations to affect the New International Cocoa Agreement, which is due to come into force on March 31, 1981 — provided a sufficient number of producing and consuming countries ratify it. "We feel

Photo: Camerapix

Tea fields in Kenya: A pact of tea is hampered by a dispute between producers in Asia and Africa

that the price adjustment and financing provisions (of the new agreement) are deficient, and we do not believe they will be adequate to deal with what we see as a potentially serious surplus situation in the world cocoa economy," U.S. delegate Douglas W. McMinn said.

Basically, the new cocoa agreement represented a compromise between producers and consumers. Minimum and maximum prices will be $1.10 and $1.50 a pound, and cocoa will be bought or sold from a buffer stock to try to keep international market prices within this range. There are provisions for adjusting the minimum and maximum prices through stages to $1 and $1.60 a pound if conditions demand heavy use of the buffer stock.

The Ivory Coast has consistently held out against the new pact because, it says, the "floor" price is too low. Ivory Coast's Agriculture Minister Denis Bra Kanon has consistently called for a minimum price of $1.20, but at the Geneva conference he received little support from other producers, particularly Brazil and Ecuador, the major Latin American cocoa nations. Ghana, which had originally been a supporter of the Ivory Coast position, went along with the majority decision to set up the new pact because, according to its delegation at the conference, they felt that the Ghanaian economy could not face a 1981 without some kind of international regulation of cocoa. The country's economy is so heavily dependent on cocoa that an unfettered free market could have disastrous consequences.

Since the political and economic uncertainties that have played havoc with world commodity prices over the past two years seem certain to continue for the next two — if not longer — what should the world be doing to put its commodities house in order? According to Corea, the basic problem is one of education, and education in a dual fashion, directed at consumers on the one hand and producers of major commodities on the other. "I think we ought to move to a new phase in commodity agreements in 1981, one in which on the one hand we are persuading the major producers that they have got to work together — and not against each other — in negotiating new agreements, and on the other hand we are asking the consumers to take a more realistic attitude and accept that the producers, too, have a role to play in the open market and the pricing structure." "Basically," he says, "we have to promote a policy of awareness, of the *desperate need* for putting our house in order."

One recent development that gives Corea some cause for concern is the election of Ronald Reagan, and with him the entry into force in Washington of a more conservative line in international trade negotiations. Will this mean that the United States takes a less active role in the formulating of international commodity agreements? Corea hopes not — but he's not sure. The United States indicated in the 1970s that it has a new approach to the

Munger

Africana Library

The Afrikaners

Edited by Edwin S. Munger $12

These timely essays are by South Africans chosen by the editor and individually introduced: Alan Paton, *The Afrikaner as I know him*; Christiaan Barnard, *The creed of an Afrikaner*; Piet Cillie, *The white tribe*; W.A. De Klerk, *An Afrikaner revolution*; Tini Vorster, *Growing up as an Afrikaner*; Madeleine Van Biljon, *Merely an Afrikaner*; Willem De Klerk, *I am an Afrikaner*; Ebbe Dommisse, *The changing role of the Afrikaans press*.

Samuel Motsuenyane, *A Tswana growing up with Afrikaners*. Erika Theron, *Afrikaner-Coloured relations*; J.H. Coetzee, *The fact and fallacy of our image*; John H Chettle, *Afrikaners and the future*; Henry Katzew, *Afrikaner suvival: the undiscussed question*; Gerrit Viljoen, *An Afrikaner looks ahead*

There is a personal foreword by the editor, photographs of the contributors, and an index.

Also published by the Library

The Hunter and His Art, A Survey of Rock Art in Southern Africa

Jalmar and Ione Rudner

60 color plates;
87 black and white drawings; maps;
diagrams
288 pages 10 x 11½ inches, hard cover. $32.00

The Rudners are well known both inside and outside South Africa for their work in archaeology and ethnology. Their studies in many remote corners of South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Lesotho, and Botswana are reflected in this survey of rock art in Southern Africa. During their 20 years of travel, the Rudners made hundreds of tracings from the original paintings and engravings, selecting 60 to be reproduced in color in this book, along with numerous other drawings in black and white

Africana Byways

Edited by Anna H. Smith

28 drawings and photographs
189 pages, 6 x 9 inches, hard cover. $6.00

The dean of Africana libraries in South Africa has gathered and edited a fascinating and valuable series of articles of interest to the Africana collector. The pieces, all by acknowledged experts in their fields, cover historical photographs, reprints of Africana books, Johannesburg newspapers from the period 1887-1889, botanical illustrations, early cartoons, and Ndebele arts and crafts, and others. There is a detailed 18-page index.

Report on Portugal's War in Guinea-Bissau

Al J. Ventner

23 photographs; 2 maps
206 pages; 8½ x 11 inches; hard cover. $3.00

An essential book for understanding political change in Portuguese Africa. One chapter contains a long field interview with General Spinola that was the earliest clear indication of the coming revolution in Portugal.

"Unusually objective account of the Portuguese side of the Guinea-Bissau war" —Foreign Affairs

Munger **Africana Library Notes**

Volume XI / 1980-1981 Subscription Price $12

In Publication

The Buthelezi Commission $4

The Commission is considering the future of Natal and constitutional changes towards a new open society in South Africa. Documentation includes speeches by Gatsha Buthelezi concerning the Commission, its membership, the Inkatha Movement, comments by prominent South Africans, and photographs.

USSR, Its Communist Allies, and Southern Africa, by David E. Albright $3

A superb and informed analysis of contemporary Soviet policy in Southern Africa with extensive foothotes citing Russian and Western sources.

Poppie Nongena by Elsa Joubert: A Summary $2

An English summary of a heartrending novel based on interviews with "Poppie," a black South African woman. It details her struggle against the inhumanity of apartheid regulations and racial discrimination.

This bestselling novel of all time in Afrikaans created a great political and literary storm among Afrikaners. The issue includes an extensive summary, copious book reviews from South Africa and England, photographs, and an interview with the author.

String Figures of Angola, by Mary and Louis Leakey $7

Reprint of a rare publication currently costing upwards of $50 when it can be found in Africana bookshops. Diagrams by Dr. Mary Leakey on how to produce the figures, photographs.

Sam Nujoma: Profile of Swapo's Leader, by Colleen Hendriks $3

Ms. Hendriks spent three years as a military correspondent in Namibia for the Argus Newspapers. She interviewed Nujoma's parents in Namibia and took photographs of them. These she gave to Nujoma when she interviewed him extensively in Paris at the SWAPO conference, attended by ambassadors of some twenty countries, including the foreign minister of Cuba. Color photograph

Munger Africana Library Notes are eclectic within the field of Africana. Issues are generated from seminars by distinguished visitors, reports of current field research, unpublished historical manuscripts, and other material deemed useful to Africanists. Large color photographs of African art objects or of subjects illustrative of the text are a feature of most issues.

Subscriptions are $12 a volume. Prices of individual issues vary, but the total cost of a year's issues is always in excess of the $12 subscription price.

For further information on subscriptions and publications, write to

Munger Africana Library
Pasadena, California 91125
U.S.A.

question of commodity stabilization, and this is certainly true today as it was five years ago," he said. "But the process of translating this broad policy commitment into deeds is something else. It takes some time for a commitment like this to filter down. You can convince the generals, but the soldiers are still in the trenches!"

Will the advent of the Reagan administration make this process even slower? Corea doesn't believe so. "I don't expect a reversal of the basic policy commitment, but what we've got to do is persuade the new administration to continue working as hard as possible for implementation of the integrated program for commodities." he said. "I think we've got a lot of hard lobbying to do with the Federal Trade Commission, but I think there's one thing very much in our favor: we know that the Americans now see regulation of world commodity markets not just as part of the North-South dialogue, but in its true global context. I'm optimistic about the way we can work with the new administration."

Key to the success of the integrated program for commodities is the bringing together of producers and consumers for joint action. Already in some discussions — the tin conference has been a prime example — there has been talk by producers of setting up their own OPEC-style cartel to regulate world prices irrespective of what the consumers want. At the cocoa talks, Ivory Coast's Bra Kanon threatened that his country could "perfectly well" build up its own cocoa stockpile and deal independently with consumers. Other countries could certainly make the same claim: it has been estimated that Ghana could produce up to 800,000 metric tons of cocoa without even replacing any of the 60 percent of Ghanaian cocoa trees that are over 25 years old.

But the troubles which OPEC itself has incurred as a result of the Iraq-Iran war have tended to put a brake on such "go it alone" talk and it seems likely that most producers will put their faith, at least in the immediate future, in the Common Fund.

But will the fund, which in its present form is a much truncated version of what was originally proposed, succeed? Most UNCTAD officials insist that it is the only viable alternative to unfettered chaos in all world commodity markets, but some diplomats from industrialized countries are less sanguine. The pact, put together in June 1980 after four years of North-South wrangling, will probably have at its disposal less than half the resources originally planned for it — $6 billion. The total initial capital contributions from direct and voluntary government commitments will be $750 million, split into $400 million for the "first account," to be used for financing buffer stocks, and $350 million for the "second account," for financing other measures, such as market research, promotion, and related activities. In addition to government contributions, each individual international commodity agreement will pay an entrance fee equivalent to a third of its maximum financial requirements for buffer stocks. From this capital, UNCTAD hopes that the fund's management can then raise substantial borrowing from international capital markets.

In many cases the commodities produced in African countries are unsuitable for stocking, and thus the "second account" offers the greatest benefits for them. In both cases, however, the success of the fund ultimately depends on how many international commodity agreements can be put together by UNCTAD in the next 24 months, thus highlighting the urgency of Corea's search for solutions.

"Second account" money will be loaned to Third World commodity producers on concessional terms, with loans concentrated on the least-developed countries, which have a high degree of dependence on one or two commodities. Many of these, of course, are in Africa. The idea behind the "first account" is that it will provide low-interest loans to member commodity agreements for buffer stocking: Third World nations originally wanted all member commodity agreements to be called on to put up the money to save another agreement that would be in danger of defaulting, but eventually conceded that this was not feasible.

The fund is envisaged by UNCTAD as acting as a catalyst in the establishment of commodity agreements anxious to take advantage of its financial sources. But many Western diplomats feel that it offers too little to make any appreciable difference.

Corea, however, is optimistic about the fund's future — as indeed, he is about the entire future of commodity agreements. "It's wrong to say that the fund has only $750 million," he says. "That $750 million is the capital of the fund, just like a bank has capital. We could easily raise $6 billion on that capital if we had to, but at the moment we're concentrating on putting the individual agreements together. The $6 billion can come later — if we need it." □



a/ Weighting 1975-1977, see Annex.

b/ Index in current dollars divided by the United Nations index of export unit values of manufactured goods.

Used with permission of UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, October 1980.

Creating a New Legal System

By ALLEN ISAACMAN and BARBARA ISAACMAN

When Mozambique became independent on June 25, 1975, it inherited a repressive legal system. Even before Frelimo had assumed power, its experience in the northern liberated zones had convinced the leadership that it would not be sufficient merely to Africanize or Mozambicanize the existing state's apparatus. The colonial state, including police, judges, lawyers, and laws, had to be dismantled and replaced with new institutions designed to serve the interests of the Mozambican people within an emerging socialist context.

It has been more than five years since the euphoric days of independence. Sufficient time has elapsed to make a preliminary assessment, however tentative, of the extent to which the new government has achieved these objectives and to identify the nagging problems that have yet to be overcome.

Any discussion of postindependence transformations must necessarily include a brief examination of the colonial legal system and of that developed in the liberated zones, both of which have had a profound impact on the redefinition of the law and the judicial process. Under the colonial government, race and class discrimination exacerbated the lack of judicial safeguards characteristic of all totalitarian regimes. In the rural areas, where 90 percent of the Mozambican population lived, local administrators served both as prosecutor and judge. As Rui Balthazar, a prominent white critic of the colonial regime and Mozambique's first minister of justice, recalled:

> . . . at local and district levels administrative and judicial functions were merged in the same office. The colonial administration thus concentrated in his hands all the means necessary to safeguard and maintain colonial exploitation. The administrator supervised the economic sectors; secured the recruitment of forced labour for the plantations, public works or works abroad; collected taxes; was the person responsible for security; distributed favors and judged and punished at his discretion. It was hard to find an administration without the constant ritual of palmatorias [beatings] . . . .

Numerous United Nations and International Labor Organization reports document his claim of capricious and excessive punishments.

In the urban centers, the court system served to protect the property rights of the settler population and to prevent any agitation for change. That theft of $300 was treated as a serious crime punishable by long-term imprisonment symbolized the settler community's preoccupation with crimes of property, since few Africans could amass such wealth. Conversely, robbery of goods valued at $70 or less, whose owners were primarily poor shantytown dwellers, was considered a minor offense. Political opposition of any form was not tolerated; and dissidents, both black and white, were apprehended by the notorious secret police (PIDE) and sent to Machave Prison, the penal camp at Ibo Island and the cacao plantations of Sao Thome. Many never returned.

In 1964 Frelimo initiated the armed struggle. In those areas liberated from Portuguese control, Frelimo had to develop a new legal system, however rudimentary, to fill the void created by the collapse of the colonial regime. Colonial criminal law vanished with the flight of the Portuguese administrator; and the old property, tax, and labor laws had no meaning with the planters' departure. Starting from the proposition that "laws do not arise [spontaneously] . . . but to defend the interest of certain social classes," Frelimo sought to formulate a new juridical system to reflect both the needs of the peasants on whose support it depended and the concrete experience of the armed struggle. In a somewhat telescoped account, Sergio Vieira, a member of the Frelimo Central Committee, described the debates within Frelimo and between militants and the rural population that underpinned this process.

> And so we began to pose the problem . . . . Precisely what was the object of the struggle? To accomplish what?

Allen Isaacman is a writer and teacher at the Department of History, University of Minnesota. Barbara Isaacman is an attorney. During the past two years they have been teaching at the University Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, in the faculties of history and law, respectively.

> Were the zones not ours, colonialism had left them, and now what?
>
> We posed this question, and a new property law began, and the collective fields started. With a new system of distribution in operation, we began to give to each person according to his work and not according to his ownership. . . . And so a new property law arose as well as a new fiscal law. The colonial taxes had disappeared, but there was a contribution toward out power — the part of the product that was for the Popular forces, for the schools, for the kindergarten, for the hospitals.

In a similar way, though not without debate and error, new commercial laws were formulated to govern the operation of the cooperatives, a new military law was enacted to guarantee the rights of Portuguese prisoners, and Frelimo took an unequivocal position against the exploitation of women.

Independence held out the prospect of continuing this process throughout the country. There were, however, powerful obstacles that prevented overhauling immediately the legal system, not the least of which was the lack of lawyers, judges, and other trained



legal personnel to formulate new legal codes. Indeed, during the transitional government, which ruled for eight months before independence, not a single Mozambican was appointed to exercise judicial or prosecutorial functions, and at independence only about 25 lawyers remained in the country. That the Portuguese codes were cumbersome, procedurally complicated, and extremely legalistic further complicated the initial efforts to rewrite the law.

The government immediately took two steps to reduce many of the ambiguities and abuses inherent in the colonial codes. Five days before independence, the Frelimo Central Committee approved a new constitution, which automatically revoked all laws in conflict with its fundamental objectives. The constitution recognizes work as the criterion for the distribution of national wealth, commits the state to the battle against illiteracy and to the emancipation of women, and outlaws all acts creating divisions or privileged positions based on color, race, sex, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, level of education, social position, or occupation. In one fell swoop the legal basis of race and class discrimination was eliminated.

A month later the legal profession, which had served the interest of the settler community, was nationalized. Thereafter, all citizens, regardless of race or class, had the right to free legal representation. This decision, which further accelerated the emigration of many of the remaining lawyers, exacerbated existing shortages and insured long delays. The flight of Portuguese lawyers also accelerated the process of giving Mozambicans without formal legal training important positions in the judicial system, just as had been done in the liberated zones.

Along with these far-reaching actions, the government introduced specific legal reforms to redress the most grievous colonial abuses. Given the exploited position of workers and the central role that Frelimo assigned to the working class in the Mozambican revolution, it was natural that labor relations would be one of the first areas to be reconstructed. During the colonial period the labor courts were used to stifle worker discontent and protect the privileged position of employers. Since only employers could afford lawyers, the claims of unrepresented workers were generally dismissed on technicalities. The new labor commissions, founded in September 1975, had the task of protecting the working class. Staffed by laypersons, they used principles of common sense and popular justice to resolve employee grievances against their employers. By adopting this standard rather than the archaic rules of the past, the labor commissions have been able to counter many inequities built into the colonial codes, which remain intact and have had an important impact in improving conditions of employment and the workplace.

The government also gave immediate priority to restructuring the family and ending the exploitation of women. During the armed struggle, Frelimo had begun in the liberated zones to attack practices that kept women subordinate. Its concerted campaign against polygamy, child marriages, initiation rites, and bride-price has been intensified since independence and is the major task of the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM). To consolidate gains made against these exploitative practices and enshrine in the law the concept of marriage as a partnership of equals, it was necessary to scrap the colonial Family Code, which reflected Portuguese patriarchal attitudes, and the reactionary ideology of the Portuguese Catholic Church. The new Family Code is ready to be promulgated, and its principles — built around equality of the spouses in their rights and responsibilities toward each other and their children — are being studied at neighborhood and village meetings throughout the country. The new Family Code will serve an important educational function and will provide a model of the new family toward which all are expected to strive.

The most significant legal development has been the creation of a new judicial system. During the past two years more than 200 courts have been established in all provinces, in the major urban centers, and in some district seats, localities, and communal villages in each province. For most Mozambicans living in rural areas this is the first time they can have their cases tried in a court of law.

The election of lay judges to all tribunals ensures popular participation in the judicial process. It also both requires that the formalistic colonial procedures be drastically simplified and means that decisions are generally based on common sense and principles of popular justice rather than on the letter of the colonial law. According to the senior judge of Maputo Province, there has been a substantial reduction in penalties for property crimes as well as a concerted effort to rehabilitate convicted criminals through work programs and political reeducation, rather than incarceration. Penal records indicating that of the more than 12 million Mozambicans there are currently only 3,800 in jail — a figure well below that of the colonial period — bear out this claim.

At the local level and in the communal villages the tribunals are composed entirely of lay judges selected either by the legislative assembly or by members of the community. The court meets weekly and deals primarily with family disputes and petty crimes punishable only by fines. At communal village 25th of September, in Inhambane Province, we were told by the ten-person tribunal that the most frequent scenario involves a married woman who has cohabitated with another man while her husband is working in the South African mines. At communal village M'sawize in Niassa Province, domestic problems were the major issue with which the tribunal dealt.

More serious crimes and complicated civil matters are resolved by district and provincial courts, where at least one judge must have some formal legal training. Orland Joao, a district judge in Inhambane, is typical. He has a sixth-grade education supplemented by a year's legal training course. At the provincial level the presiding judge must have a university law degree. At both levels lay judges act more like juries — making findings of fact — while the trained judges draw conclusions of law.

Photo: Allen Isaacman

Court in Maputo: Mozambique has created a new judicial system

All criminal trials, except those that deal with issues of national security, are open to the public, and the accused is constitutionally guaranteed representation by either a public defender or a person of his choice. The trials we witnessed in the Maputo provincial court were characterized by a presumption of innocence, cross-examination of witnesses, the transcription of testimony, and judicial review.

The small number of prosecutors, public defenders, and trained judges makes delays in bringing accused persons to trial quite common. Teodato Hunguana, the Minister of Justice, acknowledged this difficulty to us but held out the hope that the combination of crash courses and a new generation of university-trained lawyers would alleviate the problem within two to three years. Presently, of the 3,800 prisoners in jail, 2,900 are awaiting trial.

In addition to the civilian court system, a Revolutionary Tribunal was established in March 1979 to deal with the serious threat created by the infiltration of mercenaries from Rhodesia. Between 1976 and 1979, there had been more than 350 attacks, and Frelimo leaders felt that drastic legal, as well as military, steps at deterrence had to be taken. Since its inception the tribunal has heard cases of espionage, terrorism, murder, and other crimes "against the people and state security." Less than 50 defendants have been found guilty, receiving sentences ranging from three years to death. Since the independence of Zimbabwe nine months ago and the reduction of mercenary activity, only six people have been convicted, and three have been executed after losing their appeals.

The government has also taken steps to reform the penal system. In highly publicized actions, prison guards and other officials, including the director of Machave Prison, have been jailed for mistreating prisoners. Of far greater potential significance is the recent decision to close down the antiquated colonial jails and move the prisoners to rural centers where rehabilitation through education and collective labor — both very difficult in the confining quarters of the urban prisons — will be emphasized. As of August 1980, there were prison centers operating in almost every province, and about 1,000 Mozambicans have been transferred there.

The most controversial components of the Mozambican legal system are the reeducation centers, which were first organized in the liberated zones and increased in numbers during the unstable period immediately after independence.

We had heard rumors and read Western press allegations about harsh conditions and brutality in Mozambique's reeducation centers, which invited comparison, it was said, with Siberian labor camps. What we actually saw at

M'sawize, a camp housing ex–secret police and colonial collaborators, was completely unexpected. The sentries at the rope gate were detainees, and the only weapon we noticed throughout our visit was in the hands of a camp resident going off to hunt for the center's food. The center had no armed guards, no dogs, no barbed wire fences, and no cells.

The center's 33-year-old commandant and his eight assistants mingled easily with the detainees and expressed no concern that their families lived less than 300 yards from the prisoners' barracks. When we pressed him about the lax security, he acknowledged that when the center had first opened in 1977 there had been a number of unsuccessful attempts at escape. The remoteness of the center and the speed with which neighboring peasants reported the fugitive to authorities had soon convinced the residents of the futility of such attempts.

The political background of the prisoners at M'sawize makes it unique. When we spoke with detainees who had been held at other centers, we learned that most had been arrested for theft or related crimes. Ramon Sainda, a merchant caught selling stolen property, and Ricardo Mungey, accused of embezzling $12,000 from the factory he managed, were typical of the residents at the Chibutu center, while at Inhassune most were "marginals" — unemployed petty criminals — detained for theft and vagrancy.

Nevertheless, conditions at the various centers were remarkably similar. Inmates are organized into a series of brigades. Brigade members live and work together and are responsible both for each other's health and welfare and for deciding how fellow members who infringe the camp codes should be disciplined.

A typical day, according to interviews with 30 residents from seven centers, begins at 4:30 A.M. After an hour of exercise followed by breakfast, detainees working in brigades start their assigned tasks. Most residents farm, but we observed smaller groups constructing houses, forging hoes, weaving, and repairing roads. All the brigades, including those clearing fields a few kilometers from the camp, are unsupervised, although each has a "responsible" elected from among its members. The two hours before lunch are devoted to literacy classes and political education. The afternoon includes a discussion of the day's national and international news, a work stint, showers, and supper. After dinner there are sports and cultural activities until 9:00 P.M. This schedule is repeated without variation Monday through Saturday morning.

Living conditions are harsh. The food, primarily corn porridge and relish, is not terribly interesting by Western standards, but it is no worse than the diet of most rural Mozambicans. Similarly, housing and health facilities are rudimentary though comparable to those we observed in rural communities throughout the country.

The most startling aspects of all the reeducation centers is the lack of coercion. Not one center has barbed wire, high walls, or even gates, and all the detainees with whom we spoke indicated that they had never suffered or witnessed corporal punishment. When we expressed our skepticism one day, Mario Balate, a resident and veteran of several camps, angrily interrupted, "I am describing what happened. I am not trying to defend the government. If they hit us I would say so." Problems, such as petty thefts, fights, and laziness, are resolved at weekly brigade meetings where members recommend appropriate action to the commandant, who makes the final decision. Extra work, in one form or another, on Saturday afternoon or Sunday, is the typical punishment.

Instead of coercion, the organizing principle of the centers, according to their staffs, is rehabilitation with the aim of reintegrating the detainees into Mozambican society. The twin mechanisms are literacy training and political education. The daily literacy classes provide the first access to education for many of the camps' residents (at the time of independence it was estimated that 95 percent of the population was illiterate). Political education occurs in formal classes, informal discussions, daily news announcements, and cultural events. Frelimo officials believe that the residents' daily experience in working jointly, developing self-reliance, and participating in collective decision making within the brigades reinforces and adds meaning to the new values instilled in the classroom.

Although exact statistics are unavailable, according to high-level Justice Ministry officials, the reeducation centers are in the process of being phased out. They emphasize that the reeducation centers were established as a temporary measure to fill a vacuum created by the paralysis of the colonial legal system and the flight of almost all judges on the eve of independence. During the past year at least three centers have been closed, and 2,000 inmates, including several hundred political offenders, have been reintegrated into Mozambican society. This represents close to 50 percent of all detainees.

Justice officials concede that there were abuses in the uncertain period after independence. Local vigilance groups, police, soldiers, and rural administrators sometimes overstepped their authority. Direct intervention by President Machel in 1977 ended most of these abuses but not before a number of Mozambicans were arbitrarily arrested and sent without trial to the centers for an indefinite period. Since the establishment of the popular tribunals in 1978, all those accused of crimes have been publicly tried and, if found guilty, given determinate sentences in prison and not sent to reeducation camps.

Although Mozambique cannot yet guarantee to all its citizens their day in court, it has made great strides in the first five years of independence in dismantling the colonial legal system, which protected only the rich and powerful. Today all citizens have access to the small number of courts and lawyers that exist, and the most glaring abuses of the past have been eradicated. Even without the complete revocation of all colonial legislation, the involvement of workers and peasants in the judicial system ensures that the principles of social justice enshrined in the constitution, rather than the oppressive rules of the colonial codes, will guide the new courts in their decision making. □

african update

Monitoring economic and political developments around the Continent

January-February 1981

UN sets multi-party Namibia talks in January to end impasse

"Acute mistrust and lack of confidence" in the Namibia negotiations led Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the UN secretary-general, to schedule a "pre-implementation [of UN resolution 435] multi-party meeting" for January 7-14 somewhere in southern Africa, probably Maputo.

According to Waldheim's November 24 report, the UN did not get Pretoria to agree to a ceasefire date, which, the secretary-general said, "should be set in the early part of 1981."

South Africa however apparently dropped its reported demand that the meeting write a constitution guaranteeing rights for Namibia's white minority. Waldheim pointed out that "the task of drawing up and adopting a constitution is the function of the constituent assembly" which will be chosen in the UN-supervised elections.

The vague nature of the January meeting, to build trust and confidence, apparently stems from Pretoria's concern that the National Party's right wing will threaten Prime Minister Pieter Botha's rule if, as appears likely, South Africa's foe, the South-West African People's Organization, wins a UN-supervised election.

To avoid a sell-out charge, Western diplomats said, South Africa is expected to be represented at the meeting by its senior official in Namibia, the administrator-general, officials of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and several of the territory's internal political parties in face-to-face talks with SWAPO. The Botha government, this argument runs, can then claim that not it but the Namibian politicians accepted a settlement which could install SWAPO on South Africa's northwest border.

The other concerned parties in the negotiations—the front-line African states, Nigeria, the OAU and the five Western powers conducting the prolonged discussions—will send observers to the January conference.

Continued on next page

Zimbabwe's coalition rule threatened by feuding and violence

By all accounts, Zimbabwe's economy is recovering rapidly from eight years of warfare, but Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has his hands full with the 25,000 war-hardened guerrillas who have not yet been integrated into civilian life.

Sporadic factional fights between guerrillas loyal to Mugabe's Zanu-PF party and to Minister of Home Affairs Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front erupted into open warfare in a township outside Bulawayo, the country's second-largest city, in November. More than 50 people were killed and over 300 injured—most of them civilians—after volatile political rallies for municipal elections. Zimbabwe's new national army moved in and separated the combatants. The government plans to disarm the guerrilla forces.

Later, nine senior officials of Nkomo's party were detained by security police, apparently in retaliation for the Bulawayo violence, which Zanu supporters blamed on Nkomo's party. Nkomo, who said he was disillusioned by the arrests, persuaded his party officials, however, to seek talks with Zanu-PF in an effort to prevent further outbreaks of factional fighting.

Nkomo's supporters have been especially angered by controversial statements made by senior government ministers. Manpower Minister Edgar Tekere said Nkomo was in the government as a matter of "charity" and Finance Minister Enos Nkala called for the formation of a one-party state. It was not clear what effect the December 7 acquittal of Tekere on a charge of murdering a white farmer will have on the political scene.

That the feud between the two parties was not likely to end quickly was demonstrated in December when a rally in Bulawayo for Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere had to be called off because of poor turnout. Bulawayo is Nkomo's stronghold and Nyerere was a major backer of Mugabe during the war.

Mugabe has disowned some of the statements made by radical ministers such as Nkala and Tekere but he warned in late November that his government will deal severely with "political malcontents and hooligans." He said he might set up "vigilante groups" to identify troublemakers and report them to the authorities.

Zimbabwe's economy, meanwhile, is reported thriving, with its GNP expected to jump 6 percent in 1980. Although wary of the political strife, multinationals are flocking to

Continued on next page

Guinea-Bissau coup leaders to try Cabral

President Luis de Almeida Cabral was overthrown in a coup launched by his Prime Minister, Maj. João Bernardo Vieira, on November 14, and was to face charges on the alleged torture and murder of hundreds of political prisoners. Two senior government officials were killed in the coup: Antonio Buscardini, in charge of state security, and Otto Schatt, a senior member of the ruling African Party for the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC).

The coup apparently was the outcome of a long power struggle between the blacks of Guinea-Bissau and the mixed-race people from the Cape Verde Islands, Guinea-Bissau's sister republic. Cabral is Cape Verdean, as were many members of his government, and had supported the merger of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde into one nation.

Following the coup, a Council of the Revolution was formed, composed of six army officers and three civilians, all of whom are Guinean blacks. The coup was supported by the military and met with little popular resistance, largely due to widespread dissatisfaction over the poor state of the country's economy.

Observers noted that another reason behind the coup may have been the adoption of a new constitution in early November which made the president the executive head of the government and eliminated the powers of the Prime Minister, a post Vieira had held for two years. Vieira was one of the PAIGC guerrilla leaders during the 11-year war for independence from Portugal, and also served as commander of the armed forces and president of the national assembly.

One of the first acts of the new government was to release from prison Rafael Barbosa, former president of the PAIGC's central committee. Barbosa was serving a life sentence for conspiring to overthrow Cabral and for advocating a cut in Guinea-Bissau's links to Cape Verde. He is also a close friend of Guinea's President Sekou Toure, whose government welcomed Vieira's takeover.

Cape Verde, on the other hand, condemned the coup and offered asylum to all its citizens in Guinea-Bissau. The new government, however, to allay Cape Verde's fears, banned all acts of intimidation and banditry against Cape Verdeans. The government also told Lisbon's ambassador that it would like to strengthen Guinea-Bissau's links with Portugal.

At a rally in the capital, Bissau, one week after the coup, Vieira alleged that more than 500 political prisoners were executed during Cabral's six-year rule. Journalists were taken to see mass graves which contained, in part, the bodies of black soldiers formerly in the Portuguese colonial army who were involved in an attempted coup in 1978. Cabral, who is being held under house arrest in Bissau, will be tried for the murders, as well as for corruption and economic mismanagement. The ousted President's chief adviser, José Araujo, who was out of the country during the coup, and the Cape Verdean President, Aristides Pereira, are to be tried in absentia for complicity in the alleged murders. (New York *Times*, November 17, 23 and 28, 1980; London *Times*, November 18 and 24, 1980; *Economist*, November 22, 1980; London *Guardian*, November 17, 1980.) □

Namibia *continued*

Prior to Waldheim's report, both Botha and Foreign Minister Roelof Botha told South Africans to brace for economic sanctions. "It is time we must accept that sanctions are going to come," said the Foreign Minister, warning that South Africa was "not without the power to retaliate," an allusion to strategic minerals bought by the West.

Roelof Botha visited several Western capitals in November and reported that the West was exerting "intensive pressure" for a speedy settlement. He warned that this pressure could lead to a breakdown of the negotiations. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 22, 180; London *Guardian*, November 18 and 26, 1980; Johannesburg Radio, November 17, 1980; London *Times*, November 17, 1980.) □

Zimbabwe *continued*

Salisbury and some of them have moved their Africa regional headquarters from other countries to Zimbabwe's capital. (*Business Week*, December 15, 1980; *Financial Times*, November 18 and December 5, 1980; London *Times*, December 1, 1980; Salisbury Radio, November 30, 1980; Washington *Post*, November 24, 1980.) □

Big edge for Motlana in poll of Soweto

Soweto's black consciousness Committee of Ten has overwhelming support among the township's residents, a Johannesburg *Star* opinion poll found in November.

The poll tended to confirm the committee's contention that the government-set up body to run the township, the Soweto Council, and its chairman, David Thebehali, who were elected with only 6 percent of eligible voters participating, have little backing among the estimated 1.5 million township residents.

The poll found that if elections were held with Thebehali running against Committee of Ten chairman Dr. Nthato Motlana, Thebehali would receive 7 percent and Motlana 73 percent. A three-way election posited between the committee, the Soweto Council and Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement would also result in a huge victory for Motlana's group—69 percent versus 9 percent for Inkatha and 5 percent for Thebehali's group.

Motlana was unanimously reelected chairman by the committee in November and several activists were appointed to bring the complement up to ten. The new committee comprises: Rev. Lebamang Sebidi, vice chairman; Tom Manthata, general secretary; Mrs. Zola Khumalo, organizing secretary; Leonard Mosala, treasurer; Mrs. Ellen Khuzwayo, social welfare and health; Legau Mathabathe, education; John Motata, transport; Philip Wauchope, sport; and Pat Ndabezitha, administration. (*Voice*, November 25, 1980; Johannesburg *Star*, November 15 and 22, 1980.) □

$650 million pledged to southern Africa in effort to halt dependency on Pretoria

Industrialized nations and international lending organizations have pledged $650 million to the nine southern African states which are economically dependent on South Africa for food, transportation and communications links.

The nine met in Maputo in November with delegates from 32 nations and 17 donor organizations in an effort to win some $1 billion in pledges for the top priority projects aimed at reducing dependency on Pretoria over the next ten years. Among the invited were delegates and observers from most European nations, the Soviet Union and the U.S., which promised $25 million. Also attending were the EEC, Comecon, OPEC, the UN, the African Development Bank (which pledged nearly $400 million) and Scandinavian development agencies, among others.

Priority will be given to building a communications and transport network independent of South Africa. Emphasis will be on development of Mozambique's infrastructure because its railways and ports are a principal alternative trade route for the landlocked nations of southern Africa.

One priority will be reducing trade links, conceived in the colonial era, which are directed toward doing business with overseas industrial countries rather than with one another.

The meeting follows the conference of heads of state of the countries involved—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe—in Lusaka last April.

The Maputo meeting comes at a time when South Africa has been steadily increasing its exports—mostly food—to the rest of Africa, a projected $1.2 billion in 1980. South Africa is the principal or second-biggest trading partner of all but two (Angola and Tanzania) of the nine nations. The head of South Africa's biggest business organization, the Association of Chambers of Commerce, noted recently: "For most of these countries we are the best and the closest—probably the cheapest—market. More and more of these countries will come to rely on us for essential imports." (*Financial Times*, November 27, 1980; *Economist*, November 22, 1980; *Modern Africa*, November/December 1980.) ☐

Pretoria begins education experiment

The South African government is introducing compulsory education for blacks on "an experimental basis" in six townships near Pretoria beginning with the new school term in January.

The pilot program, which will be extended to other areas in 1982 if successful, will make education mandatory and free for blacks up to the age of 12. Currently, so-called Bantu education, which blacks consider inferior to that for whites—an inequity which has caused considerable unrest—is voluntary. Education is free and compulsory for whites, Coloureds (mixed-race people) and Asians up to the age of 16. The government spends about $900 annually on each white pupil and $89 on each black child.

It is estimated that about one-half of the country's eight million black children attend 12,000 black-only schools and half of them drop out at age eight or nine. ☐

WESTERN AFRICA

Cape Verde

• According to a late October report on Lisbon Radio, Cape Verde has turned down Soviet requests for naval facilities in its archipelago. The **Soviet Union** had reportedly requested access to a port in Cape Verde to replace its loss of naval facilities at Conakry, Guinea.

Cape Verde's refusal to grant access was said to reflect its commitment to a policy of non-alignment and its desire not to alienate Western countries providing economic assistance.

The Cape Verde Premier, Pedro Pires, visited France in mid-October, where talks were held on increasing economic cooperation between the two nations. (*West Africa*, November 3, 1980; Lisbon Radio, October 25, 1980.)

Chad

• Libya's involvement in the Chad **civil war** on the side of President Goukouni Woddeye's Popular Armed Forces (FAP) was escalating in October and November, with the arrival in Chad of an estimated 1,500 to 3,000 Libyan troops and the introduction on a large scale of Libyan weaponry and planes. Col. Muammar Qaddafy's government is pouring in military assistance to Woddeye's forces to enable them to wrest control from former Defense Minister Hissene Habre's Armed Forces of the North (FAN) and to implement a military solution to the 16-year-old civil war.

Jet bombers were employed for the first time in the war in late October. The aircraft, which strafed positions held by Habre's FAN, were believed to be the type used by the Libyan air force. Libyan troops were reported deep into Chad, some in and around the capital city of Ndjamena, where a virtual military stalemate between FAP and FAN exists, and others holding the Aouzou strip, the northern border between the two nations annexed by Libya and believed to be mineral-rich. Three airfields in various locations in Chad are reportedly being manned by Libyan planes, including Soviet-built bombers.

The Libyan news agency, JANA, maintained that Qaddafy met with Woddeye in early November in a former Habre stronghold, the northern city of Faya-Largeau, to demonstrate their hold over the territory, but FAN spokesmen denied that the city had been taken over.

Observers believe that Qaddafy aims to install a Chad government favorable to the Tripoli regime to legitimize its annexation of the Aouzou strip, which is said to contain uranium and manganese deposits. Another Libyan objective is believed to be Qaddafy's desire to create an Islamic Saharan republic encompassing all the Moslem countries in north and central Africa. With two unfriendly countries to Libya's east and west, Egypt and Tunisia, Qaddafy is attempting to strike southward into Saharan Africa.

Other African nations have condemned Libya's involvement in the war. The OAU, at the July summit in Freetown, denounced in vague terms "foreign power involvement" in Chad and its ad hoc committee on the war has been seeking a negotiated settlement based upon the Lagos Accord which united the 11 rival factions into a transitional national unity government and implemented a ceasefire.

In mid-October, an OAU "peace conference" was held in Lome, Togo, under the auspices of the ad hoc committee, composed of Togo, Guinea, Congo and Benin. All the major factions were represented and both Woddeye and Habre briefly attended the meeting. Although a five-point peace plan was drawn up with provisions for a ceasefire, a neutral peacekeeping force and free elections, and the propositions were agreed to in principle by all parties, radical differences in the amendments brought up by each caused the meeting to end inconclusively. (Washington *Post*, November 7 and 25, 1980; *West Africa*, October 27 and November 19, 1980; London *Times*, November 10, 1980.)

The Gambia

• The Gambian government broke off diplomatic relations with **Libya** in late October, alleging that Tripoli was recruiting Gambian citizens to engage in subversive activities. The government also claimed that the Libyan embassy in Banjul had made "direct contacts with clandestine subversive elements whose sole aim is to spread confusion and disorder in the Gambia."

Following the rupture in relations between the two countries, 150 Senegalese troops were flown into Banjul and stationed at the airport, State House and a police camp outside the capital for what was termed "combined maneuvers." Senegal had broken off relations with Libya in June, accusing the Tripoli government of subversive acts aimed at the overthrow of President Leopold Senghor.

Both Senegal and the Gambia have maintained that Sheikh Ahmed Niasse, a Senegalese who has been working openly to overthrow Senghor and establish an Islamic republic there, has been recruiting citizens from both countries from his base in Libya.

After the Senegalese troops arrived in Banjul, the government of President Dawda Jawara reportedly banned two small opposition parties, the Movement for Justice in Africa, the Gambian offshoot of the Liberian MOJA, and the Gambian Socialist Revolutionary Party. Most of the parties' leaders were detained. (*West Africa*, November 10 and 17, 1980; *Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15, 1980.)

Ghana

• Tensions between the government of President Hilla Limann and **Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings**, former head of state and chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, reached a peak in late October, with Rawlings' detention for alleged subversive activities.

Rawlings was brought in for questioning and later released in connection with the arrest of Wilhelm Harrison Buller, a British Honduran picked up for overstaying his visa. Buller, according to the Interior Ministry, claimed he was in Ghana at Rawlings' request to organize, mobilize and train revolutionaries to subvert constitutional rule. He allegedly also maintained that two of Rawlings' close associates, Capt. Kojo Tsikata, formerly of the Ghana army, and Tsatsu Tsikata, an Accra lawyer, were also involved in the scheme. Rawlings denied the allegations, claiming that they were an attempt to provide justification for Military Intelligence's harassment of Capt. Tsikata.

The former army captain had earlier filed a writ before the Accra high court seeking an injuction to restrain Lieut. Col. Annor Odjidja, deputy director of Military Intelligence (MI) and 18 other MI officers from unlawful interference with his constitutional rights to life, liberty and privacy. Tsikata claimed that since June 1980, he had been a victim of constant harassment and surveillance by MI officers. In late October, he maintained that MI personnel had tried to kill him in an automobile accident.

After being detained, Rawlings went to the offices of the *Daily Graphic*, one of the country's leading newspapers, to protest the fact that only the government's side of the story in the Buller affair had been published. Subsequently, the *Graphic* printed an article in which Rawlings was said to have threatened that in the next revolution, civilians, including journalists, would die. The paper protested the alleged statement as an undue threat to the freedom and safety of journalists.

After the story appeared, five members of the editorial staff of the *Graphic* who had attended the meeting with Rawlings along with editor J.K. Addo-Twum, disassociated themselves from the paper's remarks, saying that Rawlings had not made such a statement.

Observers believed that the tensions between the government and the former AFRC head would continue, as the state of the Ghanaian economy declines steadily and popular discontent with the government increases. The Limann government has become increasingly security-conscious in recent months and Rawlings' popular appeal as something of a folk hero continues to concern officials. (*West Africa*, October 20, 27, November 3 and 10, 1980; London *Times*, November 1, 1980; London *Guardian*, October 29 and November 1, 1980.)

• President Hilla Limann carried out a **cabinet reshuffle** in November, shifting the Finance and Economic Planning Minister, Dr. Amon Nikoi, to a newly created post, economic adviser to the President. Two new departments were formed as a result of the shake-up; the Labor and Social Welfare Ministry, headed by Adisa Munkaila, and the Ministry of Information and Tourism, headed by Opoku Afriyie.

Eight of the 16 cabinet ministers retained their posts, including the Foreign Minister, Isaac Chinebuah, and Defense Minister R.S.K. Riley-Poku. Many deputy ministers and regional ministers were changed, however.

Observers believed that the reshuffle was undertaken in response to the mounting criticism of the Limann government from all sectors of the population over its apparent inability to deal with the country's serious economic crisis. Strikes, demonstrations, and rioting have been on the increase in the past few months, with Limann maintaining what many call an increasingly tenuous hold over the political scene.

Criticism of the government has been particularly harsh from Ghana's political parties. The minority party in the governing coalition, the United National Convention (UNC), ended its alliance with Limann's People's National Party (PNP) in September.

In November, the UNC issued a statement in Accra which said: "It appears that the Limann administration has not yet woken up to the grave national crisis which if not urgently resolved can lead to anarchy and chaos." The statement listed several actions that the government should take immediately to act "as a catalyst to solving the country's mounting problems." Among them were revamping the machinery of the government to achieve economy and efficiency, providing incentives to foreign exchange-earning industries, giving maximum financial support to those industries that produce or import basic necessities, and refraining from using high-handed methods to deal with labor unrest. (*West Africa*, October 27, November 3 and 17, 1980; London *Times*, November 15, 1980; Accra Radio, November 13, 1980.)

Guinea

• In October, President Sekou Toure, in a policy shift, announced Guinea's readiness to consider **foreign investment**, both private and public, in most sectors of the economy.

Toure was offering guidelines for the next five-year plan currently being drawn up in Guinea. He also proposed the setting up of private enterprises both in the rural and industrial sectors to increase their production, with the implementation of a system of incentives. (*West Africa*, October 13, 1980.)

Ivory Coast

• **President Felix Houphouët-Boigny**, sole candidate of the ruling Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI), was re-elected to a fifth term of office in mid-October, with 99.9 percent of the vote.

Elections to the national assembly were held in November, and for the first time voters were given a choice of candidates. Approximately 650 PDCI members contested the 147 seats in the assembly and a first round of elections was followed by a run-off. Voter turnout was low in the first round of the elections—only 30 percent—due to a poorly run voter registration and identification program.

It was estimated that two-thirds of the deputies elected are newcomers. Only 14 deputies were re-elected in the first round, 27 were defeated and 39 faced the run-off election. Only six government ministers stood for re-election; the Minister of Mines, Paul Gui Dibo, was returned to office as were the president of the national assembly, Philippe Yace, and Defense Minister Kouadio M'Bahia Ble. A former Minister of Finance, Henri Konan Bedie, relinquished his post with the World Bank to run for his district's seat and was successful. Bedie is currently being touted as a possible successor to the 75-year-old Houphouët-Boigny, particularly since Yace, long considered the heir-apparent, fell from favor and had his position as secretary-general of the PDCI abolished in September.

The daily newspaper, *Fraternité Matin*, reported that bribing of voters by candidates was widespread and that money played an important role in the campaign. Nevertheless, observers indicated that the new national assembly will be much different in character from its predecessor, since a majority of the deputies are new. A new cabinet will also be formed from among those elected to the legislative body, as part of Houphouët-Boigny's "democratization" program begun last June to improve the nation's economic performance. (*West Africa*, November 3 and 17, 1980; New York *Times*, November 9, 1980: *Economist*, October 18, 1980.)

• A new international **cocoa agreement** was adopted in Geneva in November after three weeks of negotiations. Producer and consumer nations met under UN auspices to develop a pact to replace the one which expired in March.

Aimed at stabilizing world cocoa prices, the new agreement was approved by 63 of the 67 countries at the conference, but the four dissenting nations included the world's largest producer, the Ivory Coast, and its largest consumer, the U.S. Togo and Gabon also withheld their approval. The chairman of the conference, Felipe Jaramillo, was hopeful that those countries would adhere to the pact prior to the April 1 deadline for signatures.

The most contentious issue was the setting of the floor price for cocoa. The agreement sets the minimum price at $1 per pound and the maximum at $1.50, with lower and upper intervention prices at $1.10 and $1.50. If market prices are equal to or fall below the lower intervention figure, the buffer stock will buy cocoa until the price is over the $1.10 level. If prices are at or above the $1.50 level, cocoa from the stock will be sold until the price falls.

The Ivory Coast, which exports about 23 percent of the world's cocoa, a figure which is expected to rise to 28 percent in 1981, is objecting to the agreement because it believes the pact would allow prices to fall too low. The U.S., conversely, maintained that it would not allow prices to reach a "realistic low" because of world surplus production.

Cocoa prices have fallen sharply in the past three years because of expanding production and surplus supplies. The Ivory Coast resorted to stockpiling cocoa in 1980 in a bid to raise world prices. (London *Times*, November 20, 1980; *Financial Times*, November 17 and 18, 1980.)

Liberia

• In early November, the ruling People's Redemption Council (PRC) released from jail 23 **political prisoners** who had been imprisoned since the April 1980 coup in which President William Tolbert was killed.

The Liberian head of state, Master Sgt. Samuel K. Doe, freed the detainees, warning them to follow his government and not be influenced by "reactionary forces."

Among those released were the late President's son, Stephen Tolbert, and a former Education Minister, Bernard Blamo.

A government spokesman said that trials of the remaining political prisoners would take place as soon as possible. The Minister of Justice, Chea Cheapoo, appealed to the PRC in late October to provide "speedy and impartial" trials to the detainees, and blamed the military court for unwarranted delays. (*West Africa*, November 3 and 17, 180; London *Times*, November 10, 1980; Monrovia Radio, November 9, 1980.)

• In a major policy statement in November on the condition of the Liberian **economy**, Master Sgt. Samuel Doe announced two new measures to be implemented to reduce government spending and raise revenues: a freeze on government hiring, and a requirement that all wage earners lend the government money by purchasing national savings bonds.

The hiring freeze will apply to all government employees and will include agencies and public corporations. All employees who earn in excess of $750 per month gross salary will be required to forgo two months' net salary to be applied against the purchase of savings bonds, and those earning under $750 will have to forgo one month's salary. The government will repay the amount with interest.

Doe characterized the state of the economy as "desperate" and said that when his government took over power in April, there was only $5 million in cash in the vault of the National Bank. He said the former government owed $700 million to other governments and financial institutions, owed $80 million to public corporations and $20 million to the National Bank. (*West Africa*, November 24, 1980.)

In early December, following a visit to Liberia by the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Richard Moose, it was announced that the U.S. government will provide the Doe government with $10 million in emergency aid, bringing the total of U.S. funds provided there since the coup to $28 million.

Moose told reporters that the U.S. government is concerned about the future of its strategic electronic installations in Liberia, and also about Monrovia's growing ties to Libya. Moose emphasized to Liberian officials that "it was not necessary for them to obligate themselves to Libya out of financial concerns." (Washington *Post*, December 2, 1980.)

Mali

• After months of **student unrest** in Mali, most of the nation's secondary and higher education institutions were re-opened in mid-November. The Minister of National Education, Lieut. Col. Sekou Ly, made the announcement and discussed changes to be implemented in the structure of secondary education, means of access to higher education and distribution of scholarships.

He noted that due to the widespread nature of the student unrest, only 7 percent took examinations at the end of the last academic year and announced that those who refused to do so and are no longer eligible to repeat are to be expelled. Several schools where the unrest was particularly volatile will not be reopened, including the Teacher Training Institute and the National School of Administration.

Primary school teachers went on strike in October, led by the Commission of Labor Committees, in protest over the continued detention of 12 teachers who were arrested last July. The detainees—exam graders and supervisers—had struck because of the government's failure to pay salaries. Ly pledged that overdue salaries would be paid "very shortly."

The government of President Moussa Traore has reacted very severely to student unrest throughout the year. Demonstrations in March in Bamako were put down by police and military units, resulting in some deaths and alleged maltreatment of imprisoned student leaders. The students focused their complaints on the failure of Mali's only party, the Democratic Union of Malian People (UDPM), which was created to return the country to constitutional rule, to address the people's needs.

In a speech in October, Traore said that the party's aim had not been achieved. He said that a special UDPM congress would soon be held to "realize the legitimate aspirations of the militants and thus to re-launch the party." He blamed the party militants for failing to gain the public's support for the party. As a result, the congress may be reorganized and party leaders possibly replaced. (*West Africa*, October 20, 27 and November 17, 1980; Radio Bamako, November 19, 1980.)

Nigeria

• The controversial **revenue allocation bill**, based on the report of the Okigbo Commission on how Nigeria's revenues, 85 percent of which are derived from oil, should be divided among the 19 states and federal government, was sent by President Shehu Shagari to the national assembly for approval in November.

A heated debate in the assembly arose over the issue of what percentage of the revenue should be allocated to the states and what percentage to the government. The bill gives the federal government 55 percent, the state governments 34.5 percent, and the remainder split between local governments and a special fund for the new federal capital at Abuja.

The governors of nearly all the states are united in their position that the government is receiving too much of the revenues. In addition, the governors of the five oil-producing states maintained that they should receive a larger share of the funds, while the poorer states argued that they are most in need.

Observers characterized the debate on revenue allocation as the first serious test of the American-style civilian constitution. It was believed that the issue, which cuts across party lines, would not be resolved before the Christmas recess. The bill must be passed by the national assembly before it can become law. (*Economist*, November 15, 1980, London *Times*, November 14, 1980; *West Africa*, November 10, 1980.)

• A public and governmental debate over sky-rocketing price of **rice**, one of Nigeria's staple foods, was raging in Lagos in October and November. Imported rice, at a cost of $36 per 50 kilogram sack on arrival in Nigeria, is being resold by wholesalers for as much as $180, and by small retailers at up to $230 per sack.

Many Nigerians were reportedly blaming the rising prices on hoarding by Syrian, Indian and Lebanese merchants, as well as on the government policy of limiting imports to save foreign exchange and encourage domestic production.

The House of Representatives and Senate voted in September to return to the past policy of unrestricted rice imports by private individuals, a move to which the government of President Shehu Shagari is adamantly opposed. The unrestricted import policy had been banned two and a half years ago by the military government then in power and Shagari continued to follow the policy.

Finance Minister Sunday Essang maintained that to revert to the old system, would "deal a blow to the very existence of small rice-growers and imperil the objectives of the green revolution," a plan to make Nigeria self-sufficient in food production. Demand for rice in Nigeria is estimated at more than one million tons annually, while only 650,000 tons are locally produced.

Currently, only the government is authorized to import rice through various licensed para-statal organizations. During the assembly debate, some legislators claimed that other government officials were benefiting from the current licensing arrangements. Senator Olusola Saraki, the Senate leader, was said to have been among the beneficiaries of the controversial licenses. (*West Africa*, October 27 and November 17, 1980; *Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15, 1980.)

• Nigeria cut its **oil output** by 20 percent in September, from an estimated two million barrels per day to 1.6 million, due to a glut on the world market. The slump in sales resulted in a loss of revenues of $13-15 million per day.

The decision to cut output was undertaken in line with an informal agreement by OPEC members to reduce the glut. Nigerian top quality crude, one of the highest priced in the world, sells for approximately $37 per barrel, and the government has remained determined to maintain that price level.

However, some observers believed that sales would pick up toward the end of 1980 because of the disruption in oil supplies caused by the Iraq-Iran war. The war had resulted in the withdrawal from the international market of the 3.5 million barrels per day sold by the two countries.

The four African members of OPEC—Algeria, Nigeria, Libya and Gabon—met in Algiers in early November to discuss oil supplies to developing countries and the latest developments on the international oil market. It was agreed that the four nations will divert part of their production to African countries hit hard by the loss of exports from Iran and Iraq. They also reportedly decided against increasing production or restoring cuts made during the oil glut. (Washington *Post*, November 1 and 10, 1980; London *Observer*, November 9, 1980; London *Times*, November 1, 1980; *West Africa*, October 20, 1980.)

• The leader of the opposition Unity Party of Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, criticized the government's **policy on South Africa** in November, attacking officials' statements that Nigeria would be forced to acquire a nuclear capability if the Pretoria regime did so.

Awolowo said: "We should never dream of, let alone attempt, to use nuclear power for military purposes." He also criticized the Nigerian army, saying that if the soldiers could not even shoot straight, how could they use nuclear firepower. He said it was dangerous to continue threatening to use the oil weapon to pressure changes in foreign policies toward South Africa because it would encourage oil consumers to find alternative sources.

Awolowo was also critical of the South African liberation movements, and said Nigeria could not be expected to shoulder their burden. He said the South Africans should resort more to urban and rural guerrilla warfare.

Earlier in November, in an interview with the Nigerian independent newspaper *Punch*, Awolowo denied allegations that he and his party were plotting to cause civil disorder in the country. He said his quarrel with President Shehu Shagari and the ruling National Party of Nigeria was over performance, and a political crisis would be "an ill wind that blows no one any good." (*West Africa*, November 7 and 18, 1980.)

A November-December 1980 ***Update*** *article on Nigeria inadvertently erred in reference to Nigeria's political parties. The "ruling party" mentioned in the article should have been the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The "political alliance" mentioned is between the NPN and the Nigerian People's Party (NPP).*

Senegal

• Prime Minister Abdou Diouf was slated to take over the presidency of Senegal by the end of 1980, upon **President Leopold Senghor's resignation.**

Senghor, 74, made public his plans to step down when he told *Le Monde*: "I am going at the end of the year, but this will only be a partial retirement. I shall continue, in particular, to concern myself with the setting up of an African international socialist movement."

According to Senegal's constitution, the Prime Minister automatically succeeds the President until the latter's term of office is completed, in Senghor's case until 1983. The President's resignation would enable Diouf to consolidate his position before the next presidential elections in February 1983. (London *Guardian*, December 2, 1980; *West Africa*, November 3, 1980.)

• Force was used by Senegalese police to break up an unauthorized public meeting of the **Sole and Democratic Teachers' Union** (SUDES) in Dakar in late October, resulting in several wounded.

SUDES called the meeting, which was banned by the governor of the Cap Vert region, to protest government measures taken earlier in the year, including suspensions and relocations of teachers. More than a thousand people attended the meeting, including delegations of teachers from all over the country and from other trade union organizations.

Police broke up the demonstration with truncheons, injuring six people. Four SUDES leaders, including Mamadou N'Doye, the union's secretary, were brought to the authorities for questioning and were told to remain at the disposal of the Justice Department pending further inquiries. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15, 1980; *West Africa*, November 3, 1980.)

Sierra Leone

• President Siaka Stevens paid an **official visit to Britain** in early November, receiving a promise of $7 million in development aid over a three-year period from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government. British officials projected that the aid will be used to develop Sierra Leone's transport system, including bridge construction and purchases of road-making equipment.

British aid to Sierra Leone totaled approximately $4 million in 1980, most of which was provided for technical cooperation, particularly manpower assistance. Aid was also allocated to the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board and the Guma Valley Water Corporation. Britain also administers a capital aid program of $4 million for an agricultural extension training scheme and workshops for the repair and maintenance of agricultural machinery.

In addition to shoring up ties between Britain and Sierra Leone, Stevens, in his capacity as chairman of the OAU, held talks with Thatcher and other officials on issues of concern to the African continent as a whole, particularly Namibia and South Africa.

Meanwhile in London, a political movement opposed to Stevens, called the Sierra Leone Alliance Movement (SLAM), announced its formation at a press conference on November 7. The organization is headed by a lawyer, Ambrose Ganda, who also founded and has coedited the opposition monthly *Sierra Leone Report*, for the past two years.

Ganda, characterizing the objective of the movement, said, "SLAM has taken upon itself the historic mission of rescuing our beloved motherland from further decline, and inevitable disaster and chaos."

In addition, Stevens was met with signs of serious discontent on the part of the student population upon his return to Freetown. A sit-down strike at the University of Sierra Leone in late October was followed by an incident in which students at Fourah Bay college kidnapped its vice-chancellor and forced him to lead a demonstration from the campus to State House. Police used tear gas to break up the unrest and detained several students. They were protesting the lay-offs of university lecturers. (*West Africa*, November 17, 1980; London *Times*, November 6, 1980.)

Upper Volta

• President Sangoule Lamizana was overthrown in a nonviolent **coup** in November led by Col. Saye Zerbo, a former foreign minister and the commander of armed forces in the Upper Volta capital of Ouagadougou. In a radio broadcast, Zerbo said the coup was necessary because of the political and economic situation in the country.

Upper Volta had been paralyzed by a series of strikes begun in early October by the National Union of African Teachers of Upper Volta. The union threatened a boycott of end of term examinations last June after its general secretary, Baba Ouedraogo, was demoted from his post. The union was also protesting a scheme to select teachers to train in France, claiming it was being used as a reward to strikebreakers.

Lamizana's government pledged to address itself to the problem, averting the boycott. However, it failed to meet the union deadline for discussion of the issues. Primary school teachers then refused to go to work at the start of the new term in October. The government threatened to block all teachers' salaries if they did not sign new contracts stating that they will not strike. That action provoked a three-day support strike called by the Trade Union Federation.

In late October, the teachers' union for secondary schools went out on an open-ended strike to support the National Union's cause and in early November, a general strike by all Upper Volta's trade unions was implemented. Ouagadougou was virtually shut down for two days and six federation members were reportedly arrested.

Lamizana addressed the nation in late October on the subject of the labor unrest, hinting that the unions were being manipulated in opposing the government. The opposition party, the Voltaic Progressive Front, has been supportive of the unions in their confrontation with the government. The government maintained that it would not negotiate with the strikers until they returned to work. The strike was suspended in an apparent conciliatory move just days before the coup. (New York *Times*, November 26, 1980; *West Africa*, October 27 and November 17, 1980.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Djibouti

• Djibouti's President Hassan Gouled again appealed for a negotiated peace in the **hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia** and between Ethiopia and Eritrean guerrillas.

The President made his appeal—emphasizing that he was seriously concerned about the "danger of expansion" the fighting represented—in a nationwide broadcast in mid-October, following an August 29 plea made while on a private visit to France, whose Foreign Legion provides Djibouti's defense.

Also in October, a Djibouti delegation had talks in Nairobi with the Kenyan government, another East African state concerned about the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict. The talks concluded with the two governments agreeing to cooperate on trade, including civil aviation, communications and tourism. (Djibouti Radio, October 5 and 19, 1980; *Africa Research Bulletin*, October 15, 1980.)

Ethiopia

• Sudan's President Gaafar al-Nimeiry, has once again offered to **mediate** the dispute between the Ethiopian government and Eritrean guerrillas, after five days of talks with Ethiopia's leader in Addis Ababa.

Nimeiry reportedly proposed a seven-point solution to the 18-year-long conflict, a program that was immediately accepted by the major Eritrean group, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), but not by the Ethiopian government.

The proposal calls for a ceasefire supervised by an international committee, followed by a referendum among the Eritreans to choose one of three options—full independence, federation with Ethiopia or regional autonomy within Ethiopia.

Complicating the peace negotiations was a two-month-long civil war between the EPLF and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which reportedly resulted in a severe setback for the ELF. There were reports that the ELF was trying to negotiate with the Ethiopian government. At the same time government forces took advantage of the fighting to mount a series of large-scale assaults on the dominant EPLF positions and a major offensive in December. (Washington *Star*, December 1 and 7, 1980; Eritrea Radio, November 25, 1980; *Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15, 1980.)

• Ethiopia's major offensive against ethnic Somali insurgents in the **Ogaden** reportedly has driven the guerrillas out of much of the desert region.

The Ethiopians were positioned along the disputed border in November, reports said. The Ethiopians said they had won major engagements in September and October with elements of the regular Somali army, who are assisting the Western Somali Liberation Front guerrillas. (Washington *Post*, November 23, 1980.)

• The U.S. navy reported that the **Soviet navy** has established an anchorage in Dahlak Islands in the Red Sea, 30 miles from the Ethiopian port of Massawa.

At the moment, U.S. sources said, the Soviet presence is probably related to the support of Russian ships carrying supplies to Ethiopia and Southern Yemen. (New York *Times*, October 28, 1980.)

Kenya

• The Kenyan government imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew and called a **military alert** in Northeastern province in November after six people were machine-gunned to death by bandits.

Nairobi claims that this attack and another were carried out by ethnic Somalis who live in the province or who perhaps crossed the border from Somalia. Tensions between Kenya and Somalia, which has laid claim to the province, were running high.

Somalia's government, which declared a state of emergency in October, said in December that Kenya and Ethiopia were planning to invade. The Mohamed Siad Barre regime is already involved in a war over Ethiopia's Ogaden region. What prompted the invasion charge was a December meeting in Nairobi between Ethiopia's leader, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, and President Daniel arap Moi. Both countries have had a mutual defense pact for several years, largely because of their suspicion of Somalia's expansionist claims. (New York *Times*, December 8, 1980; London *Times*, December 2, 1980; Nairobi Radio, November 11, 1980.)

• Many Kenyans were outraged in October at the $70 fine imposed by a British judge on an **American sailor** convicted of killing a Kenyan prostitute in Mombasa, a liberty port for the U.S. navy.

The light sentence even prompted the Attorney-General, James Karugu, to say in parliament, "I am not satisfied that justice was done," but he added that he could do nothing about it because of the independence of the judiciary. (Washington *Post*, October 21, 1980.)

Mauritius

• Thirteen trade union leaders and workers ended their **hunger strike** after 13 days in September after the government made concessions.

The 13 included the president and general secretary of the General Workers Federation and a negotiator for Federation des Travailleurs Unis—Mauritius' two main trade union groupings—as well as Paul Berenger, leader of the parliamentary opposition party, the Mauritian Militant Movement.

The unionists went on the fast to demand that 678 workers who were among 2,350 workers fired during the 1979 general strike be given back their jobs. All but the 678, mostly transport workers, had been reinstated.

The government agreed that all the workers still employed would immediately be hired by the Development Works Corp. until other jobs could be found for them.

The government apparently did not accede to the other demand—that the amendment to the anti-trade union law banning strikes be repealed. (*Intercontinental Press*, November 10, 1980; *New African*, October 1980.)

Seychelles

• A study into proposed **new development** on Mahe, the main island of the Seychelles archipelago, which would include new engineering projects to cater to the growing tourist industry as well as to the fishing industry, has been financed by the World Bank.

The feasibility study will be carried out by a British consulting engineers company in association with a Netherlands firm and a Seychelles company. It will look at projected land reclamation, new roads and a fishing port. Because of the growth of tourism, the government wants to build a new coast road between the capital, Victoria, and the airport and an extension of the existing commercial seaport. (*Financial Times*, November 24, 1980.)

Somalia

• Somalia's President Mohamed Siad Barre declared a **state of emergency** on October 21 and four days later announced a crackdown on dissidents.

In an address marking the 11th anniversary of his taking power in a bloodless coup, Siad Barre invoked emergency powers adopted by the new constitution of 1979, asserting that "opportunists" were threatening the country's stability at a time of Ethiopian "aggression."

Western diplomats in neighboring Kenya suggested that the state of emergency was aimed at neutralized supporters of the anti-Siad Barre Somali Salvation Front, which is based in Ethiopia and beams its radio broadcasts into Somalia. Last August's alleged invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian forces was in fact a cross-border raid by this guerrilla group, diplomats said.

Under the emergency powers, Siad Barre reinstated the disbanded Supreme Revolutionary Council, a 17-man body of senior armed forces officers who carried out the 1969 coup. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15, 1980; London *Times*, October 22, 1980; Mogadishu Radio, October 21, 1980.)

Tanzania

• In **parliamentary elections** on October 28, Tanzania's voters ousted more than half the sitting MPs, including one cabinet minister and a deputy minister, apparently in protest over the country's economic troubles.

President Julius Nyerere was re-elected in a yes/no referendum with 93 percent of the vote. In pre-election speeches, Nyerere said the economic problems were largely caused by factors beyond his control such as soaring oil prices, drought and falling commodity prices.

Following the election, Nyerere reshuffled his cabinet, replacing ailing Prime Minister Edward Sokoine, who resigned, with Cleopa David Msuya. Tanzania's ambassador to the UN, Salim Salim, was named Foreign Minister. These two men are considered leading candidates to succeed Nyerere, 58, who has said he will step down in 1985.

Nyerere also made changes in the top leadership of the country's only political party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, and named a new army chief of staff and a new army commander, Maj. Gen. David Msuguri, who heads the Tanzanian forces in Uganda. The former army commander, Lieut. Gen. Abdallah Twalipo, was appointed Defense Minister. (London *Times*, November 6 and 8, 1980; Dar es Salaam Radio, November 7, 1980.)

• An American company, Agrico Chemicals subsidiary of **Williams Co.** of Oklahoma, will build jointly with the Tanzanian government a $450 million ammonia **fertilizer plant**. The plant, one of the biggest of its kind in Africa, will be built at Kilwa Masoko near Tanzania's offshore Songo Songo gas fields, which will fuel the project. Kilwa Masoko has a natural deepwater harbor and when the plant is completed in about four years, fertilizer will be exported from there. (*Financial Times*, October 30, 1980.)

Uganda

• As Uganda headed toward its December 10 **elections**, the first time in 18 years citizens had the chance to choose their leaders, the politicians finally agreed on ground rules in an effort to ensure that the poll was fair. Nine Commonwealth officials and a 60-person observer team were to judge whether the election was free and fair.

Prior to the poll, the three parties lined up against Dr. Milton Obote's Uganda Patriotic Congress—the Democratic Party, Obote's chief rival, the Uganda Patriotic Movement and the Conservative Party—over the ruling by the interim government, which was dominated by Obote supporters, that each party should have separate ballot boxes at every polling place.

But after a meeting in Tanzania, whose security forces were still in Uganda, it was agreed on separate ballot boxes, instead of one, along with safeguards to ensure that the counting was fair. It was also agreed that the President did not have to run for parliament and would be chosen by a majority of the 126 elected MPs.

As election day approached there was still considerable lawlessness in Uganda and famine in Karamoja province. In the West Nile, fighting in October after an alleged invasion by Idi Amin supporters resulted in depopulation of the area, according to UN officials. Some 230,000 people were said to have fled into neighboring Zaire and Sudan. There were reports that no invasion occurred but that the newly formed Ugandan army killed hundreds of people in West Nile in retribution for the slaughters by Amin, whose home base used to be in the province. (Kenya *Weekly Review*, November 28, 1980; London *Guardian*, November 26, 1980; London *Times*, November 17 and 21, 1980.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

• In late November, the British Overseas Development Administration announced its plans to provide Cameroon with a **$20 million loan** tied to the purchase of British capital goods for the 1982-83 period. The loan is designed to make inroads into the French-dominated West African market. France provides more than 40 percent of Cameroon's imports and Britain less than 5 percent. The Cameroon government will propose projects involving the use of the British goods.

The announcement of the loan coincided with the visit to Cameroon of Britain's Trade Minister Cecil Parkinson to confer with the Prime Minister, Paul Biya. Parkinson led a high-level business mission to Cameroon and Gabon to bolster Britain's trade share in those two countries. He was accompanied by representatives from companies including Plessey and Leyland Vehicles. Trade opportunities for exporters in West Africa are believed to lie in the fields covered by those companies, as well as in agriculture. (*Financial Times*, November 26, 1980; London *Guardian*, November 20, 1980.)

Central African Republic

• In an interview published in late September in the French satirical weekly, *Le Canard Enchaîné*, former **Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa** blamed French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing for forcing him to leave what was then the Central African Empire. Bokassa was quoted as saying, "It was not my people who threw me out, it was Giscard."

In addition, he blamed his police forces for the massacres of schoolchildren in Bangui who were demonstrating against compulsory purchases of new uniforms. Bokassa alleged that Giscard falsely implicated him in the deaths, "since he was out to get me."

The French government has continued to play a strong role of support for the government of President David Dacko since it backed his coup against Bokassa. French troops have remained in the country to ensure stability. In late October, the French army began an airlift operation to bring 60 tons of foodstuffs and medicine to the famine-stricken Birao region in the northeast of the country. A shortage of food there was said to be the result of locusts, floods and an influx of refugees from the Chad civil war.

Meanwhile, according to a report on Bangui Radio in mid-November, Dacko appointed the former Minister of Planning, Jean-Pierre Lebouder, as Prime Minister. Dacko had placed the previous Prime Minister, Christian Bernard Ayandlo, under house arrest in August. Sylvestre Bangui, deputy prime minister in charge of foreign affairs, reportedly resigned as a result of Lebouder's appointment.

Dacko also announced that a "national seminar" was scheduled to be held in mid-December with the participation of political movements, labor, youth, women's organizations, and the army to bring about "a national union for the independence and renaissance of the Central African Republic." (Bangui Radio, November 12, 19 and 21, 1980; *West Africa*, October 27, 1980; *Africa Research Bulletin*, October 15, 1980.)

Gabon

• President Omar Bongo paid an **official visit to France** in late September, where he conferred with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Two accords were signed, one providing for the creation of a mixed commission on economic cooperation, which will hold its first meeting in February in Libreville, and the other on provisions for citizens of each country working in the other.

Bongo told Giscard that in the event that the Iraq-Iran war continued to disrupt oil supplies to France, Gabon would be willing to increase its deliveries. Gabon currently sells approximately 20 percent of its oil output to France. Bongo also came out in favor of "justified interventions" in Africa by foreign powers.

Giscard said: "Our two nations have been engaged for 20 years in an intense cooperation founded on mutual understanding of our problems and a just appreciation of our respective needs." (*Le Monde*, October 2 and 4, 1980.)

Sao Tome and Principe

• According to a report on Lisbon Radio in November, two **Portuguese diplomatic officials** were expelled from Sao Tome and Principe as personae non gratae after they protested the detentions of three Portuguese citizens on charges of involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow President Manuel Pinto de Costa.

Sao Tome officials claimed that military firearms were found at the home of one of the detained Portuguese nationals. One of the three was released for lack of evidence.

Zaire

• According to a report in the London *Observer*, President Mobutu Sese Seko sent the Zairian 31st parachute battalion, a crack French-trained force, to the northwest region of the country along the Ugandan border in late October, after **border violations** by Kampala troops pursuing pro-Idi Amin rebels into Zaire.

Mobutu denied Ugandan allegations that Zaire had been aiding the rebels against the Kampala government. The Zairian President visited the region to investigate the border incursions in late October and returned to Kinshasa with calm in the area restored. He said he regarded the issue as serious because the northwest is an important coffee-producing and tourist zone.

And in early November, Mobutu lodged a complaint with the Belgian Foreign Minister, Charles Nothomb, over activities in Belgium of Zairian opposition groups. Nothomb, on a visit to Zaire, replied that Belgium could not alter its status as a free land. Mobutu was reportedly particularly angered over the activities of Mangul Diaka, a former Education Minister, who currently heads the Congo-Kinshasa Liberation Council, an umbrella organization of anti-Mobutu movements formed in Brussels in July. (*West Africa*, November 17, 1980; London *Observer*, November 2, 1980; Kinshasa Radio, October 30 and 31, 1980.)

Zambia

• President Kenneth Kaunda announced in late October that Zambian security forces had thwarted an **attempted coup** involving Zambian dissidents and Zairian mercenaries, allegedly trained and backed by South Africa. Kaunda unveiled the coup plot to the public one week after an armed gang, numbering between 50 and 200, was discovered by police at a farm at Chilanga, south of the capital. After a few of the gang members, allegedly including some Katangese rebels, were caught, the government launched the largest security crackdown in years, imposing a dusk-to-dawn curfew and detaining several prominent Zambians, including three members of the military.

Although a list of the arrested was not made public, they were said to include: Patrick Chisanga, a former cabinet secretary, Edward Shamwana, a prominent lawyer, Valentine Musakanya, a former governor of the Bank of Zambia, and Elias Chipimo, a former high commissioner to Britain. Maj. Gen. Christopher Kabwe, recently appointed air force commander, and Maj. E.F. Mumba, an air force officer, were suspended from their posts and then detained.

Kaunda said that the gang discovered at the farm had in their possession detailed maps with key installations marked, and were caught only hours before the coup was to have been launched. He alleged that South Africa was behind the plot and that South African troops were to have crossed into Zambia from Namibia once the gang attacked key installations in Lusaka. He said that South Africa had "tanks, troops and armored cars" poised opposite the Zambian border town of Seshake, ready to move to support the plotters.

The South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roelof Botha, denying Kaunda's allegations, said: "Just as little as South Africa is responsible for Martians being green, just as little do we have to do with Dr. Kaunda's problem and what's more, Dr. Kaunda knows it." Many observers remained skeptical as well of South African involvement, noting that it would serve no useful purpose to have Kaunda removed, as Zambia is already heavily dependent on Pretoria for many economic needs.

Kaunda's government has faced mounting criticism from within since the end of the war in Zimbabwe, which turned people's attention on domestic economic problems no longer war-related. The labor movement has been a particularly harsh critic of the government, and Kaunda implied that it was connected to the coup plot when he said it was more just a coincidence that the powerful Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was planning a nationwide strike.

Two senior union leaders, Frederick Chiluba, chairman of the ZCTU, and his deputy, Newsted Zimba, had their passports withdrawn in the wake of the plot revelations. In addition, François Cros, regional director of Agence France-Presse news agency in Lusaka, was arrested and held incommunicado under the Preservation of Public Security Act, which allows for detention without charge for up to 28 days. Kaunda ordered his continued detention in late October.

Trials are to be held of those accused of involvement in the coup plot. Kaunda said, "Those who have been arrested have no need to fear if they are innocent. We follow the rule of law in Zambia." (London *Times*, October 29, 31 and November 8, 1980; *Financial Times*, October 27, 28, 29 and November 6, 1980; London *Guardian*, October 27, 28, 31 and November 5, 1980; *Economist*, November 1, 1980.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

• Algeria's first President, **Ahmed Ben Bella**, was given his freedom after 15 years in prison by President Chadli Benjedid, to mark the November anniversary of the beginning of the Algerian war against France.

Ben Bella, 64, was jailed in 1965 when his government was overthrown by the late President Houari Boumedienne. He spent 14 years in a three-room prison apartment near Algiers, and in July 1979, was allowed to live in M'Sila under house arrest. Ben Bella's continued imprisonment had been a source of embarassment to the two-year-old Chadli regime, as he is highly regarded by other third world nations for his struggle against French rule.

Chadli also pardoned Tahar Zbiri, who was condemned to death in absentia in 1967 for an attempt to overthrow Boumedienne. Zbiri was the colonel who arrested Ben Bella in 1965 during Boumedienne's coup. He later became army chief of staff, but broke with Boumedienne over socialist doctrine. After his coup attempt failed, he fled to Tunisia and then to Switzerland.

Chadli announced the pardons during a speech to the national assembly, but also warned that the releases were not to be interpreted by opposition groups as a sign of his government's weakness. He said: "We are all jointly responsible for our past." (London *Times*, November 1, 1980; London *Guardian*, October 31, 1980; New York *Times*, October 31, 1980.)

Egypt

• In the first major test of the new **U.S. Rapid Deployment Force**, 1,400 American troops were flown to the Cairo-West air base in November to conduct joint exercises with the Egyptian forces. The exercise was to prepare for delivering a combat-ready battalion to the Persian Gulf within 48 hours, to be followed by a brigade-sized force within a week and two divisions within 30 days, should a political crisis in the area arise.

Live-fire field exercises were conducted in the desert near the Wadi el-Natrun oasis, in which A-7 tactical planes and Cobra attack helicopters were utilized. The Pentagon estimated the cost of the operation at $25 million. One incident marred the combined effort, however: a C-141 transport plane delivering equipment to U.S. forces crashed, killing seven Americans.

While Egypt welcomed the opportunity to train with U.S. forces and has offered the U.S. air and naval "facilities," President Anwar Sadat said in a November interview that he would tell President-elect Ronald Reagan to "go to hell" if he demanded permanent military bases in Egypt. (New York *Times*, November 12, 19 and 21, 1980; Washington *Post*, November 14, 1980; Washington *Star*, November 11, 1980.)

• The Egyptian government continued to crack down on its **opposition** critics late in 1980, in a move characterized by the Socialist Labor Party as "a campaign aimed at giving the impression that the parliamentary opposition is collapsing."

The minority Socialist Labor Party, headed by former Minister of Agriculture Ibrahim Shukri, holds only 27 of the 392 seats in parliament, but is a vocal critic of government policies. In November, its newspaper, *Al Shaab*, accused the Al Ahram publishing house of trying to stop its publication by saying there was a shortage of newsprint. The party said it used less than one percent of the amount of paper used by Al Ahram, and maintained that the issue was "a crisis of democracy and freedom."

Al Ahram responded with a two-page rebuttal, which brought *Al Shaab* to public prominence. The newspaper prints 50,000 copies a week and is popular among students.

In late November, two members of the New Wafd Vanguard, a group trying to revive the Wafd Party, were arrested for demonstrating in one of Cairo's main squares.

And in October, former Vice Premier Mohamed Abdessalam Zayyat was arrested and later released, reportedly in connection with his recent book, *Whither Egypt?* The book is critical of the political and economic system and of the type of democracy practiced by the Sadat government. The book was regarded by officials as an incitement against the regime and 3,000 copies were seized from the printer before it went on sale. (New York *Times*, December 3, 1980; London *Guardian*, October 6, 1980.)

• One of the first joint ventures between a private American company, **Warner-Lambert**, and a publicly owned Egyptian firm, Bisco Misr, was announced in November. The two companies will build a $5 million plant in Alexandria to produce the American company's best-known product, Chiclets chewing gum.

The Egyptian government has been trying to attract foreign investment, but has had difficulties because of its highly protective attitude toward its public companies. (*Financial Times*, November 18, 1980; Washington *Post*, November 16, 1980.)

Libya

• In October, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafy threatened war with the U.S. if Washington does not withdraw its force from **Oman and Somalia**, the two countries where the U.S. is attempting to strengthen its military presence with regard to the Persian Gulf.

Qaddafy issued the warning in a cable addressed to President Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, which was carried by the state-run news agency, JANA. "Unless America withdraws its bases from Oman and Somalia, a military confrontation,

Tunisia

• The **French Prime Minister**, Raymond Barre, paid an official visit to Tunisia in October to hold discussions with his Tunisian counterpart, Mohamed Mzali, on the development of the two countries' political and economic relations.

The establishment of a $250 million Franco-Arab-Tunisian investment bank, supplied by 30 percent French, 30 percent Arab, and 40 percent Tunisian capital, was agreed upon. It was originally believed that Iraq would supply the Arab capital, but since Baghdad's war with Iran, the United Arab Emirates or Qatar may instead be involved.

Tunisia also agreed to unfreeze 85 percent of the blocked bank accounts held by French citizens. France pledged to implement measures to relieve the present trade imbalance between the two countries, and to increase French investment in Tunisia.

Tunisia has recently been beefing up security measures along its border with Libya, because, according to Interior Minister Driss Guiga, some of the regions close to the border "are in a state of clear instability stemming from the choice of sowing anarchy, disorder and instability in the life of peoples."

In mid-November, members of the Tunisian army out on patrol surprised three Libyans in a police car equipped with communications equipment several miles inside Tunisian territory and forced them back into Libya. The incursion was the latest in a series of Libyan infiltrations into Tunisia in recent months, according to government officials. (*Afrique-Asie*, November 23, 1980; Tunis Radio, October 25 and 26, November 15 and 17, 1980; *Jenue Afrique*, November 5, 1980.)

Western Sahara

• According to a report in the *Financial Times* in early November, secret high-level **negotiations between Algeria and Morocco** over the disputed Western Sahara have resumed, although both sides deny that the talks are taking place.

The two nations were said to be discussing a compromise agreement to achieve a solution to the five-year-long war. A conference on the war organized by the OAU ad hoc committee on the Sahara issue in September ended inconclusively when Morocco refused to accept the terms of the proposed settlement, including a ceasefire and referendum.

A concern over growing Libyan influence in North Africa shared by both the Algerian and Moroccan governments has reportedly motivated the latest round of discussions on the Western Sahara. Libya has made efforts recently to gain influence in Polisario, Algerian sources reported. (*Financial Times*, November 4, 1980.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

• A move by U.S. conservative Republicans to lift the **congressional ban** on assistance for military or covert operations against the Angolan government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos was defeated in November by House of Representatives Democrats.

The effort to repeal the ban was led by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) during a Senate-House conference on a foreign aid authorization bill. The bill that was adopted contains the requirement that any Presidential proposal to aid "military or paramilitary operations" in Angola be submitted to Congress. Congress can only approve such assistance by a joint resolution of both houses.

Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa and leader of the fight against lifting the ban, said: "This maintains the essential element of Congressional control." Solarz noted that even a threat of U.S. intervention in Angola on the side of the opposition movement, Unita, led by Jonas Savimbi, could have a "disastrous effect" on current negotiations for Namibia's independence.

The Ford administration had provided covert aid to Savimbi's faction during the Angolan civil war until Congress put an end to it.

In November, the Angolan President accused the U.S. of plans to renew its support for the dissident guerrillas, referring to statements made during the Presidential campaign in the U.S. Dos Santos said, "Calls are being made to resurrect Angolan puppet groups which were shamefully defeated on the eve of independence," apparently a reference to statements made by President-elect Ronald Reagan to the effect that the U.S. should support Savimbi.

And in a related event, Luanda government officials maintained in late October that France had lifted its embargo on arms exports to Angola. Angola was said to be interested in buying 12 long-range fishery protection boats. The French decision was reportedly reached after persistent warnings from the Angolan ambassador to Paris, Luis de Almeida, that economic progress between the two nations could not develop unless the arms embargo were lifted. (*West Africa*, November 24, 1980; New York *Times*, November 20, 1980; London *Times*, October 31, 1980.)

Mozambique

• During a mid-October meeting between Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, and Mozambique's President Samora Machel, a **security pact** between the two countries was signed, aimed at cooperation in battling anti-government dissidents.

The Mozambique Resistance Movement, a guerrilla group formed in opposition to Machel's government, has stepped up its activities in recent months, and in mid-October derailed a train on the 155-mile railway line from the Zimbabwe town of Umtali to the Mozambique port of Beira, causing a two-week shutdown of the line.

In the past the rebel organization received assistance from the former white Rhodesian government, but lost its base of support when Zimbabwe became independent.

In late October, the Zimbabwe government handed over to the Mozambique security forces an undisclosed number of the rebels, who were captured in Salisbury. Three men tried for "espionage and military sabotage" were executed by firing squad in Mozambique in October. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15, 1980; Washington *Post*, October 26, 1980; *Financial Times*, October 16, 1980.)

• President Samora Machel led a high-level delegation of Mozambican officials on an **official visit to Moscow** in November, to discuss Maputo's membership in Comecon and to strengthen economic ties between the two nations. Machel was accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Joaquim Chissano; the Planning and Agriculture Minister, Mario Machungo; the Industry Minister, Antonio Branco; and the governor of the national bank, Sergio Viera.

While the Soviet Union is Maputo's major military backer, Mozambique has stronger economic ties with other East European countries, including East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania. It was believed that this issue was addressed by Machel in his meetings with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov. Soviet officials were reportedly seeking Machel's assistance in gaining influence with Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, whose relations with Moscow have been cool since independence. The Soviet Union had supported Joshua Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African People's Union during the war.

The Soviet Union and Mozambique issued a joint communique at the end of the visit, in which Machel expressed his support for Soviet foreign policy. The statement warned the U.S. to stay out of Africa and pledged to work toward making the continent a nuclear-free zone. (London *Times*, November 24, 1980; Washington *Star*, November 24, 1980; London *Guardian*, November 18, 1980.)

South Africa

• Three young **black nationalists** were condemned to death in November for their role in the January armed attack on rural Soekmekaar police station in which a policeman was slightly injured.

The three and six others, who received stiff sentences ranging from ten to 20 years' imprisonment, were also convicted of "high treason" for being in possession of weapons and admitting membership in the banned African National Congress, which had trained them in guerrilla warfare following the 1976 unrest.

However, all nine were acquitted of the charge of complicity in the Silverton bank siege last January because the prosecution could not prove conspiracy and none of them had participated in the attack in which three gunmen and two of their hostages were killed by the police.

The condemned men, Ncimbithi Johnson Lubisi, 29, Petrus Tsepo Mashigo, 20, and Naphtali Menana, 24, had admitted their part in the Soekmekaar raid but claimed the attack was intended to harass and not to harm any one. They fired 56 rounds from AK-47s and hurled two hand grenades at the police station. They testified that the ANC had chosen the northern Transvaal station as a target because of anger over resettlement of blacks in the area.

Defense attorney Jules Browder argued for a reduction in sentences on the ground that the crimes were "outrageous offenses to some portions of the community [but]to other sections of the community taken to be part of the political scene and the times."

The trial judge gave permission for the three men under sentence of death to appeal their convictions and sentences, but denied the right of appeal to the others. (Washington *Post*, November 27, 1980; Transvaal *Post*, October 16 and 17, 1980.)

• The entire staff of **black journalists** on the Transvaal *Post*, the paper edited by blacks for black readers, was dismissed on November 28 by the Argus Company, which, along with South African Associated Newspapers, the other English-language newspaper group, has been hit by a nationwide strike of black newspaper workers.

Argus fired 71 journalists, most of them from the *Post*.

The strike by the Media Workers' Association of South Africa (Mwasa) started at the end of October as a sympathy action with black journalists who struck the Argus-owned *Cape Herald*, a weekly read by Coloureds (mixed-race people), and quickly encompassed virtually the entire corps of black journalists in the country. *Cape Herald*, *Post* and its weekend sister *Sunday Post* ceased publication, while nine other papers lost the services of their black staffs.

The Mwasa action has become a demonstration of anger at the white-owned newspaper companies for alleged exploitation of black journalists. Zwelakhe Sisulu, Mwasa president, said, "White capitalists who made millions of profits thought they owned black employees as well. Mwasa believes that management should pay striking workers because . . . they created the situation that made blacks strike."

White journalists have generally been indifferent to the strike after their union's offer of a merger with Mwasa was rejected. There have also been defections from the strike: Mwasa members at the East London *Daily Dispatch* returned to work and with half the *Cape Herald* staff back at work at the end of November the paper prepared to resume publication. (London *Times*, November 21 and 29, 1980; *Voice*, November 25, 1980; Johannesburg *Star*, November 22, 1980.)

• Both **NATO** and **EEC** were embarrassed in November when it was learned that separate South African delegations had talks with top officials of the two organizations.

South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha met privately in Brussels with NATO's secretary-general, Dr. Josef Luns—the first acknowledged meeting between a South African minister and a senior NATO official in many years. A NATO spokesman said: "Nothing whatsoever was discussed which might be regarded as at variance with long-standing NATO policy." Apparently Luns had given assurances in 1976 that there would be no cooperation between NATO and South Africa.

In the other incident, an avowedly propagandist South African delegation, which included the leader of the Lebowa homeland, met with senior EEC officials after the EEC president and the commissioner for development aid had instructed their staffs to have nothing to do with the South Africans. The delegation met with external relations department officials but a spokesman said the meeting "does not imply any modification of the commission's position."

The two groups of South African politicians were touring Europe apparently as part of a diplomatic offensive to persuade the West to be more cooperative toward Pretoria.

(London *Guardian*, November 19, 20 and 21, 1980; London *Times*, November 21, 1980.)

• A report in the *Financial Times* in November said there is circumstantial evidence of "collusion" between South Africa and the **Soviet Union** over the sale of gold, diamonds, platinum and other precious metals of which the two nations are the world's largest producers.

The *Financial Times* noted that it is "striking that this year both the Russians and the South Africans have been following broadly similar marketing policies by holding back some of their gold production from world markets to help bolster prices." Gold production in South Africa is projected at 680 metric tons this year, down from 703 in 1979, and Soviet sales are expected to reach only 50 tons, down from 229 last year.

The *FT* article gave prominence to a chance sighting in Moscow of Gordon Waddell, a key figure in the South African mining industry. Waddell and an official of the giant conglomerate Anglo American Corp. were spotted in the company of two Soviet officials. The Soviet Union and South Africa do not have diplomatic relations and officially do not trade with each other. The Soviets do, however, sell their diamonds through the De Beers Central Selling Organization, which controls the sale of virtually all the world's diamonds. (*Financial Times*, November 13 and 26, 1980.)

• The revelation last January that the Geneva-based **International University Exchange Fund** had been infiltrated by a South African security police captain has led to the impending closure of the fund.

The fund, which uses its grants to fight apartheid, went through months of sackings, squabbles and recriminations after Capt. Craig Williamson's cover as deputy director of the fund was blown. The South African government, by leaking documents stolen by Williamson, has been trying to wreck the fund by smearing it and other apartheid foes, arousing suspicions among the exiled South African liberation movements.

The five governments which supported the fund with an annual budget of $9 million—the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Canada—have begun to search for alternative financing for the fund's 1,600 remaining scholarships for refugee students, many of them from South Africa and Namibia. (London *Guardian*, November 3 and 19, 1980.)

• The Azanian People's Organization (Azapo), which has promised to implement **boycotts of concerts** by foreign artists, persuaded two Soweto promoters in November to cancel plans to bring black American singer Barry White and Jamaican Peter Tosh to South Africa.

Azapo maintains that tours by black Americans and others "give credibility to the South African regime." Azapo's publicity secretary said that visiting musicians and athletes were "part of the exploitative machinery." (*Voice*, November 25, 1980.)

Swaziland

• In September, the Swaziland Prime Minister, Prince Mbandla Dlamini, put an effective end to the work of a commission of inquiry into **alleged government corruption** and bribery, by assuming supervisory control over the commission's work.

The group, set up earlier in 1980 and headed by Justice Ismail Mahomed to investigate the activities of high government officials, issued a statement which said that the new provision "detracts from the independence, credibility, public image and dignity of the commission, and the commission has decided in these circumstances that it would not be proper for it to investigate any new matters." (Johannesburg *Star*, September 27, 1980.)

Business Briefs

ALGERIA: A West German consortium of four companies and Brazil's Brazpetro were awarded contracts of $170 million and $32 million respectively by Sonatrach for the research and development of **hydrocarbon** in Algeria.

BENIN: Czechoslovakia signed a contract worth $23 million to build a **brewery** and soft drinks plant at Abomey, 100 miles from Cotonou.

EGYPT: Siemens AG of West Germany won a $1.8 billion contract to provide Egypt with 50,000 new **telephone lines** and to rehabilitate 25,000 existing lines by 1985. A French consortium headed by Merlin Gerin was awarded a $13 million contract together with the Egyptian Electrica Authority to supply **electricity** to three new cities.

ETHIOPIA: The East German government concluded an agreement to build a **cement factory** valued at $105 million for Ethiopia. Cement output is expected to increase to 500,000 tons a year.

NIGERIA: Cement Co. of Northern Nigeria awarded a $105 million contract to a group of European companies consisting of O&K Orenstein Koppel AG and Michael Thomas and Partner KG of West Germany and Cements AB of Malmo, Sweden, to renovate and expand a **cement plant** in Sokoto. West Germany's Brown Boveri and CIE, a subsidiary of the Swiss engineering group, won a $100 million contract to supply a gas turbine-based **power plant**.

SOUTH AFRICA: Britain's Babcock and Wilcox Engineering firm won a $411 million share of $1.1 billion contract to build six turbo-generators for a **coal-fired power station** in South Africa. Germany's MAN group and France's Alstom Atlantique were given the $566 million contract for the boilers.

TANZANIA: Britain's Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering Ltd.'s industrial division won a secured contract to supply **electrical equipment** to Tanzania.

TUNISIA: Sweden's L.M. Ericsson won a $35 million order to install its AXE computerized **telephone equipment** to Tunisia.

ZIMBABWE: Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg AG of West Germany and Alsthom-Atlantique of France were awarded a $29 million contract to deliver four 120,000-kilowatt **steam turbine engines.**

An African Tragedy

By POUL HARTLING

"I do not believe that dealing with the problem of 3.5 million people, and giving them a chance to rebuild their dignity and their lives, is an impossible task for 46 nations and their 350 million inhabitants."
–President Nyerere of Tanzania, Arusha, May 1979

Of all the regions of the world where the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is active, Africa has the largest number of refugees and displaced persons. Although African countries practice a generous open-door policy towards refugees, large-scale assistance by UNHCR and the international community is needed to alleviate the often desperate plight of those who, for various reasons, have had to flee from their homes. In 1980, half the total UNHCR budget of $500 million is being spent in Africa.

The largest refugee problem on the continent is in the Horn of Africa. In Somalia, according to the government, approximately one million are registered in 30 camps, while additional large numbers are living outside organized settlements. It will take an immense international effort to solve the problem within the regional context. In March 1980, UNHCR launched an appeal for $40.7 million for assistance other than food to refugees in Somalia, while food requirements were estimated at $80 million. The rate of new arrivals and the magnitude of the refugee problem made it necessary to concentrate a substantial part of assistance measures on the provision of immediate relief in the camps: shelter, clothing, domestic items, medicines, and medical equipment. UNHCR has supplemented basic food rations provided by the World Food Program and also helped meet transport costs, purchase vehicles, improve the water supply, and provide educational assistance. Small-scale agricultural schemes have been extended and assistance has also been provided to some 200 urban refugees, living mainly in Mogadishu.

UNHCR, conscious of the massive international effort required to cope with the problem, sought additional technical expertise for the program to strengthen the government's implementation capacity to meet the increased requirements. Various other organizations within and outside the United Nations systems made major contributions, particularly in the areas of food and water supply, education and agriculture. UNHCR has also considerably strengthened its presence in Somalia, both in Mogadishu and in three new sub-offices in the regions of Gedo, Hiran, and the North West. In the neighboring small country of Djibouti, about one in 10 of the population is a refugee. While relief supplies have been provided to refugees, assistance for the promotion of self-sufficiency projects, including a pilot project in agriculture, has continued.

In this same region, the huge influx of refugees into Sudan has been placing great strains on the country's limited resources and caused serious problems. It was to draw attention to the difficulties caused by the presence of 441,000 refugees in their midst, from Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, and Zaire, that the Sudanese government declared 1980 "The Year of the Refugee in the Sudan" and organized an international conference on June 20 — Africa Refugee Day — to focus international attention on the problem. The presence of large numbers of refugees, mainly from rural backgrounds, in urban centres suffering from high unemployment and inflation rates, aggravated existing problems in Sudan of house rents, public transport, food supplies, and job competition.

The fine tradition of the extended family in Africa is often stretched beyond its limits when refugees arrive. This is what makes relief support from outside, by members of the United Nations family and the many voluntary agencies, who serve so unstintingly in the field, essential. One of the answers in a situation such as Sudan is a program of establishing settlements in rural areas, which will eventually help refugees to cease being a burden on their host community and become self-sufficient. After attaining economic independence, refugees could become an asset to the community, through small-scale farming or wage-earning opportunities. Another answer is the program, now being started, of semi-urban or suburban settlements which provide refugees access to wage-earning opportunities.

In Ethiopia, UNHCR activities have continued to focus on the special program initiated in 1978, within the framework of the Horn of Africa appeal. In cooperation with the Ethiopian government, an initial project is being established to provide assistance towards the reception and rehabilitation

Poul Hartling is the United Nations high commissioner for refugees.

of refugees who have returned or are returning to Ethiopia from neighboring countries. Measures cover the construction and equipment of reception centers, the immediate material needs of returnees while in the centers, and the provision of a basic self-supporting activity as rapidly as possible. Close monitoring of the situation is taking place so that, after a certain period, further needs and financial requirements can be assessed.

Assistance to the some 150,000 refugees in Tanzania has centered on assistance to organized rural settlements. At Ulyankulu, one of the largest organized refugee settlements of its kind in Africa, a self-sufficient community has been created for some 27,000 refugees from Burundi. Fully integrated into the Tanzanian economy largely through their own efforts, they are expected this year to earn about $1 million through sales of their products: maize, cassava, sorghum, tobacco, and bricks. Another group, some 36,000 mainly from Rwanda, have recently been naturalized by the Tanzanian government in a series of mass ceremonies, unique in Africa.

In northern Cameroon, UNHCR is assisting some 100,000 refugees who have fled across the Chari River from civil war in neighboring Chad. A $7.6 million program was launched for emergency supplies, including supplementary food, household equipment, and utensils, and to launch a school building program.

Educational aid to refugee students continues to be an important part of UNHCR activities, particularly with regard to refugees from South Africa and Namibia.

By the end of 1980, there were some five million refugees in Africa. Most of them remain on the continent. There may be some exceptions to this, not always of a permanent nature. Fortunately, voluntary repatriation — the best solution to all refugee situations — was possible in many cases.

Sudan, which has an outstanding record in refugee asylum and protection typical of Africa, experienced a massive voluntary repatriation in 1972 after agreement was reached to end the 17-year civil conflict there. This represented the biggest-ever movement of population organized to date by UNHCR on the African continent. UNHCR was called upon to provide for initial rehabilitation measures for the returnees as well as for the large number of Sudanese who had been displaced by events in their country.

UNHCR was also engaged in the rewarding task of helping returnees to Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Equatorial Guinea. Events in Zimbabwe over the past 12 months have meant an equally happy outcome for many thousands of Zimbabweans who have now returned home mainly from Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia. At the request of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, the UN Secretary-General asked UNHCR to coordinate the rehabilitation program of humanitarian assistance for 660,000 returnees and displaced persons. This is now in full swing, with distribution of agricultural tools, and seeds for planting.

African hospitality to, and protection of, refugees has been taken a step further than the universal 1951 Convention on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol with the 1969 Convention on Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

AFRICAN REFUGEES (Reproduced from Dept. of State Bulletin, April 1980)

Country of Asylum	Number of Refugees	Principal Country of Origin	Comments
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia	9,100	Western Sahara	Access not allowed to determine accurate numbers.
Angola	61,000	Namibia Zaire	
Botswana	20,300	South Africa Namibia Zimbabwe Lesotho	Repatriation to Zimbabwe should end substantial problem.
Burundi	50,000	Rwanda	Self-settled, some for as long as 20 years.
Cameroon	30,000	Equatorial Guinea	Political refugees becoming economic refugees.
Djibouti	20,000	Ethiopia (mostly Eritreans)	Urban refugee problem special; govt. encouraging resettlement in third country.
Ethiopia	10,900[1]	Sudan Somalia	
Gabon	60,000	Equatorial Guinea	Refugee status being withdrawn Mar. 1, 1980.
Kenya	6,500	Uganda Ethiopia	Numbers decreasing.
Lesotho	250	South Africa	
Mozambique	120,000	Zimbabwe	Repatriation should end problem.
Nigeria	370	Equatorial Guinea	Political refugees becoming economic refugees.
Rwanda	8,500	Burundi Uganda	Fairly well integrated.
Somalia	500,000[2]	Ethiopia	22 camps; great, long-term aid needed.
Sudan	330,000	Ethiopia Uganda Zaire	Additional assistance required.
Swaziland	3,700	South Africa Mozambique	
Uganda	112,400	Rwanda Zaire	
Tanzania	160,000	Rwanda Burundi Uganda	Many long-term; self-settled.
Zaire	653,000	Angola Rwanda Burundi	
Zambia	80,000	Zimbabwe Angola South Africa	Severe problem should be obviated by repatriation to Zimbabwe.

[1] Does not include displaced persons, estimated to be as many as 1 million.
[2] Does not include 500,000–700,000 refugees outside camps.

This was drawn up by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in consultation with UNHCR. This not only carries the definition of the term refugee further than the previous instruments but also deals positively with asylum and voluntary repatriation. The OAU Convention, which came into effect in 1974, states that "the granting of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act, and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any member state." Further, it acknowledges that no person should be compulsorily or forcibly returned by an African state to the territory he has left and where his physical integrity or liberty would be threatened. At the same time, the OAU Convention excludes acts of subversion by refugees against the territory they have left, and exempts criminals from the protection of refugee status. So far 18 of the 50 OAU member states have acceded to the 1969 Convention, while 33 have acceded to the more general 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol.

It was to review the increasing, urgent refugee problem on the continent that the Pan-African Conference on the Situation of Refugees was held in Arusha, Tanzania in May 1979. Attended by 38 African states (including all countries that have received refugees), 5 liberation movements, as well as the major Western industrialized nations, UN agencies, and 37 voluntary agencies and nongovernmental organizations active in the field of service to refugees, the conference spelled out detailed policies to be followed to alleviate the situation of refugees in the specific African context. These include a recognition of the basic rights of refugees to asylum, "nonrefoulement" (no forcible return to a country where a refugee fears persecution), declaration of amnesties to encourage voluntary repatriation, naturalization where integration in asylum countries has taken place, free movement to facilitate study, training or resettlement in third countries, and rural resettlement schemes. A joint OAU-UNHCR working group has been established to monitor progress achieved in the implementation of the Arusha recommendations. Guidelines are being drawn up

Photo: UNICEF/Arild Vollan

Mothers and children make up more than 90 percent of the one million refugees in Somalia

on the measures needed for incorporation into national legislations. UNHCR is also studying procedures and specific arrangements concerning the identification of refugees, which could be of benefit to African states confronted with large-scale influxes of asylum seekers.

Another major concern of the Arusha conference was that the refugee burden of Africa should be shared more equally among all African states. In his address, President Nyerere of Tanzania appealed to those countries that have very few refugees to provide rural refugee settlements or at least to contribute to the heavy local costs involved for those countries that do give such hospitality.

Until durable solutions can be found for refugees, UNHCR tries to devise projects to enable them to be occupied and become self-supporting, providing them with seeds and agricultural implements, where applicable. If voluntary repatriation is not yet possible, refugees are given assistance by UNHCR together with the host government, to become self-sufficient, usually in agriculture, or in the case of urban refugees, through training in skills leading to wage-earning opportunities.

We have high expectations that the international conference for assistance to refugees in Africa, to be held in Geneva on April 9-10, will obtain further resources to enable African countries to meet the already strenuous responsibility of hosting several millions of refugees. Detailed projects of assistance now are being worked out that will help refugees. The conference, sponsored by the UN, the OAU, and UNHCR, will also provide the occasion to increase the awareness of the international community to the plight of refugees in Africa.

While solutions in some areas are being found, elsewhere new problems may arise or existing ones may require increased assistance. However, thanks to the hospitality of the countries of asylum and the efforts of the international community, no refugee situation is without hope. In the constant search to improve the lot of the uprooted, those helping them — whether in the field in Africa or among the international community — act with the conviction that the world, which today provokes the departure of so many who are destitute and helpless, also works constantly to find solutions for them. In this humanitarian task, supported by the international community, UNHCR has an essential role to play. □

Thozamile Botha,

South African Trade Union Leader

Interviewed by RICHARD DEUTSCH

Thozamile Botha rose to prominence in South Africa with his founding in 1979 of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (Pebco), like Soweto's Committee of Ten an alternative to the government-set-up councils for administering the nation's black townships. Part of the renascent black consciousness movement that was silenced in the October 1977 crackdown, Pebco organized on the emotional issue of the government's plan to forcibly relocate Walmer township, an enclave of 6,000 blacks in an expanding "white" area. Botha, a popular political figure who drew crowds of up to 10,000 to Pebco's meetings, would tell his audiences their real leader was not himself but Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned African National Congress leader.

Port Elizabeth is a major manufacturing area, the center of South Africa's mainly foreign-owned auto industry. The growing defiance to the government articulated by Pebco was reflected in the increasing militance of auto industry workers. Botha worked at the Ford Motor Co. subsidiary and led a wildcat strike in November 1979 that quickly spread to other factories. The Ford strike touched off a series of strikes throughout 1980 which involved tens of thousands of black workers in the biggest year of labor unrest since the 1973 Durban strikes. Botha was interviewed while on a November-December speaking tour of the United States and Canada.

AFRICA REPORT: What led you to become involved with the trade union movement?

BOTHA: I saw the role of the trade union as the only mouthpiece of the workers and I saw the need for workers to organize into a union because they have grievances within the workplace—problems like those raised by the Ford workers when they went on strike demanding the scrapping of job reservation, demanding equal pay for equal work, demanding integration of training facilities, and also demanding the promotion of blacks to senior positions. These are some of the things that made me more interested in trade unionism and also in raising these issues, organizing people around them, and fighting for the rectification of these problems.

AFRICA REPORT: Was there a union at Ford when you arrived there?

BOTHA: There was the UAW (United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers Union) which did not want to participate in the Ford strike, saying the strike was political because Pebco (Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization) was involved and it was a political organization.

AFRICA REPORT: What is the purpose of Pebco?

BOTHA: Pebco was formed in a township near Port Elizabeth because of the problems we had with the poor craftmanship of houses. We were given houses without floors, without ceilings and plaster, and we had to pay exorbitant rentals. We had to pay for metered water and the streets were not tarred, so we also raised other issues about the problems that affected the black community as a whole—like the enforcement of Bantustan citizenship for blacks, the poorly built black schools, the mass removal of blacks from one area to another, especially in one instance where people were moved 30 kilometers away from town and from their workplace. Pebco was fighting for the improvement of these things. It was because of my involvement in Pebco that Ford decided to give me an ultimatum to choose between Pebco and my work and I therefore chose Pebco.

AFRICA REPORT: After the whole series of upheavals at Ford the end result was that the workers went back to work with pay and you were arrested and banned by the government.

BOTHA: Immediately after the strike was settled, the American consul went down to talk to the Ford workers' committee and Ford agreed to reinstate everybody. A day later I was arrested, kept in detention for eight days without trial and on release I was banned, meaning that I could not work any more, could not go to any factory, could not go out on public holidays or weekends. From 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. I had to stay indoors, could not be visited by friends at home, and could not meet with more than one person at a time in the street. Even my wife, if she wanted to meet friends, had to go into the street. Under those conditions I decided to leave the country for Lesotho.

AFRICA REPORT: What is the basic message that you are bringing to people in the United States?

BOTHA: I am mainly advocating the divestment of foreign investment in South Africa. Those who have invested in South Africa should withdraw their investments, should impose economic sanctions against South Africa, should discourage people who go to South Africa to sell their skills, their expertise, taking opportunities that could have been provided to blacks. Because blacks are denied this opportunity to be trained as technicians, the country is now hungry for expertise, and companies go to other countries and recruit people for South Africa. In overseas companies, when the workers go on strike, they threaten to close these businesses and open businesses in South Africa. For instance, Firestone and Ford closed plants in the United States in 1977 and 1976 when they had businesses in South Africa. They are concerned about human rights in South Africa and not concerned about human rights here. They lay off a number of workers here because there is a cheap labor system in South Africa. They know that there is a boom in South Africa and they can open businesses there.

AFRICA REPORT: So your position is that no matter what rules American corporations and companies follow in South Africa their very pressure in that country is exploitation of the black worker?

BOTHA: Certainly. In fact, their very existence there is in order to benefit from the cheap labor system. That is why they are even prepared to be voluntarily involved in building arms for South Africa, even building military and police cars.

AFRICA REPORT: What has been the response that you have received in the United States?

BOTHA: I must say that so far I am impressed by the role of the students in the colleges. They are taking a very positive step in fighting for divestiture from South Africa, especially the withdrawal of university funds invested in companies that have links with South Africa, and I regard this as a step forward. Although the campaign is now on a low note, I think it is growing because in each university that I have gone to there is a committee examining investment in South Africa.

AFRICA REPORT: Have you been to other places besides universities? What's your impression of the opinions and attitudes in the United States with respect to the situation in South Africa?

BOTHA: I have met with some trade unionists and with some government people. Both parties give me the impression that if they divest from South Africa they are going to lose a lot. They would rather remain in South Africa, wishing to change the system. In fact, they know fully well there are laws in South Africa that they have got to operate under—laws they cannot change. But of course many government officials contradict themselves by saying that if they pull out they won't have leverage to influence the South African government to bring about change, yet they say that they invest there to bring about change or to improve the quality of life of the blacks.

AFRICA REPORT: So it is your opinion that "attempts for change" like the Sullivan principles are basically worthless?

BOTHA: Certainly the Sullivan principles and the European Economic Community code, etc., are just an excuse for the perpetuation of the system that obtains in South Africa. These companies signed the Sullivan principles more than five years ago, but today not one of them has implemented those principles to the letter. In fact, if they make them law it is only then that the companies will operate under these laws and say they are implementing them. Yet this will not bring about change, because they are not attacking the system but just aiming at bringing about reforms.

AFRICA REPORT: Would you say that this particular point of view is the general feeling of black people in South

Photo: Tiuu Lukk

Ford, South Africa: The Ford strike, led by Botha, touched off a series of strikes throughout 1980

Africa, or not? How do most people in South Africa feel about American and European investment there?
BOTHA: It is clear that this is the view of the people. When Reverend Sullivan went to South Africa recently, he and his principles were attacked by trade unionists throughout the country and he was told to go away with his principles. Divestiture is the general view of the people. People are now prepared to suffer for meaningful change which would bring about change sooner than it would take while these companies remain in South Africa.

AFRICA REPORT: Now there are groups in South Africa, for instance Inkatha led by Gatsha Buthelezi, which do not advocate disinvestment by the United States. Would you say that this organization has a great deal more support or less support than yours?
BOTHA: Gatsha is one of the homeland, or Bantustan, leaders whose constituency is KwaZulu. He is leading by force a certain percentage of the people of KwaZulu because the Zulus, in order to work in Natal, must by force become members of Inkatha. Otherwise, a person cannot work in the civil service or be a teacher or whatever until he becomes a member. If one wants a home, a travel document, or a passport, first of all he must obtain homeland citizenship of KwaZulu—which means those that are members of Inkatha are members because they have to obtain certain necessities.

Thozamile Botha, founder of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization

AFRICA REPORT: No matter what happens between your group and Mr. Buthelezi's group, eventually there will be a struggle for majority rule in South Africa, a struggle for the black people to assume their rights. What role do you see in the struggle for the workers?
BOTHA: The role of the worker, first of all, is to organize, to take over the means of production. That's what the workers are fighting for: to take control, to fight against monopoly capital and also against imperialism. That is the battle of the worker. Their struggle is part and parcel of the total struggle that is fought for the liberation of the oppressed majority of the people of South Africa.
AFRICA REPORT: Once the oppressed people are liberated, will there be a role in South Africa for the white minority?
BOTHA: The freedom charter, which is a program of action of the African National Congress, says in its preamble that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people.
AFRICA REPORT: Your organization in Port Elizabeth, Pebco, is kind of an offshoot—is it part of the African National Congress, or did you join the ANC after you left South Africa?
BOTHA: I joined the ANC in exile because I could not join when I was inside the country. It is a banned organization and I would be arrested.
AFRICA REPORT: In your opinion, does the ANC offer the best hope for South Africa's black people in terms of liberation?
BOTHA: I regard it as the only authentic liberation group and vanguard of the struggling people of South Africa.
AFRICA REPORT: Are you going to work from Lesotho with the ANC to help bring about change?
BOTHA: I am working with the ANC as well as with the South African Congress of Trade Unions, which is a trade union operating in exile because they could not operate inside, due to harassment.
AFRICA REPORT: Do you have a message for the readers of *Africa Report* which might be a little bit more specific than the type of message you have been bringing to the students?
BOTHA: I have been calling for the withdrawal of funds from South Africa, so people should withdraw funds invested in any corporation or bank that has links with South Africa. And workers, or any other interested party, should support the workers in South Africa materially, physically, and morally when they go on strike in South Africa, because a worker is a worker. There is a disparity between the wages that Ford pays to workers in the United States and the wages they pay to workers in South Africa. Nothing is being said about this in the discussions I have had with different people. They are not concerned about that, they don't talk about the disparity between Ford here and in South Africa which is benefiting much more than they are benefiting here by paying higher wages in the United States than they do in South Africa. □

DOCUMENT

U.S. Firms and South African Divestment

Extracted from U.S. House of Representatives Africa Subcommittee Proceedings

The following excerpts are from the edited text of testimony and questioning of South African trade union leader Thozamile Botha when he appeared before the African subcommittee of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on November 13, 1980. The subcommittee chairman is Stephen Solarz, liberal Democratic party representative from New York.

BOTHA: I think we must make one point clear, that we are not fighting for reforms. This must be clear.

SOLARZ: Who is we?

BOTHA: The black people. The oppressed people are not fighting for reforms. We are fighting for a change of the basic structure of the South African government. We want to participate in decision making.... I remember the statement you made that divestment from South Africa is a nonstarter. That statement was very dangerous, in fact, because it supported the government of South Africa.

SOLARZ: Whether it was helpful or not, history will judge; but it certainly was true, and the statement is a reality. I think it would be best for those concerned about the need for change in South Africa to recognize it.

I think it is quite clear that the black people of South Africa want fundamental change, want an opportunity to play their proper role in determining the future of the country, but I must fundamentally disagree with you if you say to me because they are primarily committed to the elimination of apartheid they are totally uninterested in bringing about meaningful changes in the apartheid state on the way to the ultimate achievement of their objectives.

If you are to be taken at your word literally, nothing we can do short of bringing about total change instantaneously does any good. If that is in fact the case, I am afraid even your friends would have to opt out of the struggle, because while changes clearly are desirable and necessary, everybody knows it is not going to happen today or tomorrow.

BOTHA: It amazes me that it is difficult to divest from South Africa. The U.S. finds it very easy to divest in other instances. It divested from Cuba, from China for 25 years; it divested from Vietnam. Why can't they divest from South Africa? Why would they divest from those countries and they can't divest from South Africa?

SOLARZ: I can give you a long political analysis as to why it is not possible. The problem is essentially political, not economic. It is certainly not in the cards not to do business with South Africa, because, I think, it is unrealistic to expect the United States to be more catholic than the pope on this decision.

A substantial number of African countries—not just those immediately contiguous, whose economics are completely dependent on South Africa, but many other African countries, whose economies are not inextricably tied into South Affrica—do business with it as well.

I think so long as they continue to do business with South Africa it is unlikely we can persuade the U.S. Congress to prohibit Americans from doing business with South Africa.

BOTHA: But those countries depend entirely on South Africa for their economy.

SOLARZ: I exempted the southern African states in my statement. I pointed out other countries that also do business with South Africa whose economies are not dependent on South Africa for survival.

BOTHA: So, as long as the United States remains in South Africa, it continues its responsibility for the destruction, the slaughtering, and the exploitation and oppression of the black people in South Africa...

SOLARZ: My view is even if we were successful in bringing about this divestment, whites would continue to remain just as much in charge of South Africa as they are today, which is to say even this divestment would not fundamentally undermine the economic foundations of apartheid.

The future of South Africa will primarily be determined within South Africa itself. I think the rest of the world can make a contribution, albeit a marginal one, toward helping to shape it, but anybody who believes this divestment will produce the instantaneous or imminently eventual elimination of apartheid is living in a dream world.

BOTHA: You are right when you say South Africa's future will be determined by South Africa, but we don't want the involvement of other foreigners in South Africa. If you are not bringing about change, then get out, and we will deal with the South African government.

SOLARZ: Until that happy day arrives, in spite of the best efforts of many of your friends from the Congress, it is not possible to bring about divestment. American investment will remain, and so long as it remains, are you interested in the kind of economic opportunities it provides and would you, like many of the black people I spoke to in South Africa, favor an effort to at least make sure, as long as the investment is there, the firms involved do provide equal pay for equal work, do provide promotional opportunities, do negotiate with independent black labor unions; or are you essentially indifferent to whether the firms involved provide those opportunities?

BOTHA: They can never do what you are talking about now as long as that system is there...

SOLARZ: If the gentleman will yield, look at it from the other point of view. The examples you cited were Cuba, China, and perhaps Vietnam. We still have an embargo on Cuba, and the embargo was imposed originally to help bring Castro down, but 20 years and five American presidents later he is still in.

In China it was imposed because we didn't like the Communist regime in Beijing. Thirty-two years later they are still there. Of course, the embargo has been lifted, but it didn't do very much good, apparently, and I think the same is true with Vietnam.

What I think Mrs. Fenwick is trying to suggest is that while there may be some symbolic value in this divestment, the experience we have had in imposing these embargoes is they don't really produce the results they were originally intended to. You consume an enormous amount of political energy trying to achieve an objective that ultimately will have limited consequences. That doesn't mean if you are concerned about the situation in South Africa you should do nothing, but it does suggest we perhaps ought to look for other ways of influencing the future course of events in South Africa than thwarting the business efforts in this country that are represented in South Africa to obstruct such legislation. □

Africa Between Republican and Democratic Administrations

By ALI A. MAZRUI

To African observers the difference between Republicans and Democrats in the American political system sometimes appears to be relatively marginal. But do African observers underestimate the real difference between Reagan and Carter, between Democrats and Republicans?

Some of the differences are in terms of nuance and style. Curiously enough, American policy towards Africa under a Republican administration is likely to be very similar to Chinese policy towards Africa since the 1970s. Beijing's African policy has been almost completely based on Beijing's anti-Soviet policy. If the Soviet Union backs one political faction in a particular African country, China immediately considers backing the opposing faction almost regardless of the issues involved. China's favorites in black Africa are at times the same as South Africa's favorites — ranging from such right-wing dissidents as Jonas Savimbi in Angola to such unpopular regimes as Mobutu Sese Seko's government in Zaire.

A Republican administration in the United States is likely to have an Africa policy that, to some extent, is almost a mirror reflection of China's policy — a tendency to look at African issues neither on their merits nor from the perspective of direct U.S.-African relations, but from the perspective of U.S.-Soviet relations.

This tendency was certainly strong in the days of Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger. Kissinger thought of the world as a five-sided structure consisting of Western Europe, North America, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. The rest of the world only mattered to the extent to which it affected relations among these five major actors. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan once recommended benign neglect as an appropriate policy for black Americans. Henry Kissinger extended the policy of benign neglect to cover blacks everywhere.

And then, one fine morning, the Russians and the Cubans were in Angola. The Portuguese empire had collapsed and the so-called power vacuum in Angola was apparently about to be filled by the Soviets. A major shift in the policy of the Republican administration took place. A new interest in solving the problems of southern Africa emerged. Before long Kissinger was off on another mission in shuttle diplomacy — this time designed to pre-empt the Russians in Rhodesia and solve the problem there before it was too late. To everyone's surprise, Kissinger seemed to have done it again: he achieved a breakthrough with Ian Smith and got him to accept the idea of negotiating for majority rule. The initiative was then passed on to the British, who bungled it all with weak leadership at a conference in Geneva. Britain was then under a Labour government.

It took a British Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher to match Henry Kissinger's earlier breakthrough in Rhodesia. But whereas Kissinger's perspective on the issue had been almost entirely in terms of East-West relations, Margaret Thatcher was also concerned about North-South relations, especially between black Africa and Great Britain and within the broader framework of Commonwealth relations. Nigeria especially was breathing heavily down Thatcher's neck; and Nigeria's breath smelled of petrol. Anti-Soviet as her government might itself have been, the Tories looked at Zimbabwe/Rhodesia as an African problem and not merely as a pawn in East-West relations. This was a major difference from the perspectives of the Republican administrations under Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger.

Another possible characteristic of a Republican administration is likely to be a reduction of foreign aid to Africa, except to those countries that are regarded as strategically critical in terms of East-West relations. Foreign aid is not very popular in Congress anyhow — whatever administration is in power. Among Western powers, the United States is among the meanest in percentage of gross national product given to foreign aid. The United States comes after Holland, Sweden, France, Britain, Norway, and some others. The United States is also well below the contributions made by several members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Both Democrats and Republicans in Congress are responsible for this poor American performance. But when we judge by the performance of the executive branch, Republican administrations tend to be less enthusiastic about foreign aid than Democratic presidents.

Perhaps African White House watchers should be more discerning after all. There may be more difference between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan than meets the African eye. With the help of efficient political binoculars there should be no risk of mistaking one for the other.

Dr. Mazrui is professor of political science and director of the Center for Afro-American and African Studies at the University of Michigan.

Photo: Michael Evans/Sygma

President-elect Ronald Reagan: Policy towards Africa is likely to be "almost a mirror reflection of China's policy"

DOCUMENT

Africa in World Development

Extracted from World Development Report of the World Bank

Sub-Saharan Africa

Most of the countries in the region became independent in the 1960s. They inherited acute deficiencies in skills, institutions and general education; overcoming these has been a major concern of most of their governments. Progress has been considerable, yet severe shortcomings remain. The region's experience illustrates that human and institutional development are long, slow processes—their neglect today is not easily overcome tomorrow. And while they are costly, so is their neglect: as the analysis of Chapters 4 and 5 would predict, educational and institutional deficiencies coexist with low life expectancy, high fertility, inefficient investment and slow agricultural progress.

Growth

The growth of incomes has been disappointing, both in the middle-income and in the low-income countries (see Table 7.1). The two groups are distinguished mainly by differences in natural resources rather than in economic structure, institutional development or human skills. GNP per person (which, in the absence of reliable information on the large subsistence sector, can be measured only approximately) either fell or grew less than 1 percent a year in 11 countries during 1960–78; it rose more than 3 percent a year in four countries. (Some of these meager gains have been wiped out by deteriorating terms of trade.) Agriculture has been almost uniformly sluggish; food output per person appears to have declined in 25 countries (mainly in the Sahel) between 1969–71 and 1976–78.

The constraints that hampered growth in the past have not eased much. The discouraging prospects for growth in both low- and middle-income African countries—and the resulting likelihood of an increase in the proportion of people in absolute poverty—were described in Chapter 2 (page 11).

How the international economy affects African countries will depend on aid levels and on primary commodity prices, but importantly on their own actions as well. The potential gains from processing primary products for export remain largely untapped. Primary products typically account for 80–100 percent of merchandise exports (though not all are suitable for processing; see page 23). In some countries exports have stagnated because of poor domestic agricultural performance; many more have had to increase their food imports. Grain imports into Sub-Saharan Africa rose from about 1.6 to 2.6 million tonnes between 1965 and 1975 (and the US Department of Agriculture projects a rise to 4.5 million tonnes by 1985).

The importance of agriculture goes far beyond its effect on trade. As the region most dependent on

> The tables and text reprinted here with permission of the World Bank are excerpts from the World Bank's *World Development Report 1980*. References to other chapters and pages in the report are made in the text that follows. Those interested may obtain copies of the report in its entirety from Oxford University Press in New York for $13.50 hardcover and $5.75 paper.

Figure 7.2 Literacy, by region, 1945–75



a. Trends before 1960 are approximate.

Figure 7.1 GNP per person, 1960, 1970 and 1980

(1977 dollars)



a. Excludes Afghanistan, Israel and Turkey.
b. Excludes Cuba.
c. Excludes centrally planned economies (China, Laos, Cambodia, North Korea and Vietnam).
d. Excludes South Africa and Nigeria.

Figure 7.3 Life expectancy, 1960 and 1978[a]



a. Weighted by population. Excludes S. Africa, Cambodia and Israel.

agriculture—the main activity of more than 70 percent of its 360 million people—accelerating growth and reducing poverty and malnutrition in Africa depend more than anywhere else on improved agricultural performance. Evidence that farmer literacy affects the adoption of new farming methods (see page 48) has obvious implications for that improvement. But the problem is clearly much wider. Modern agricultural "packages" (of seeds, fertilizers and cultivation techniques) have yet to be developed for many African localities and subsistence crops. Agricultural programs generally have not reflected the considerable role that African women play in agriculture. And there are basic deficiencies in credit, infrastructure, agricultural incentives, extension services and market integration (the *World Development Report, 1978* considered in more detail the requirements for faster growth in Africa).

In large measure these deficiencies reflect institutional weaknesses and the related scarcity of experienced, trained people. Nor are their effects confined to agriculture. In several countries a significant industrial sector is already emerging, but the scarcity and high cost of suitably skilled labor and management remain major impediments to African industrialization.

While administrative weaknesses will take time to overcome, the effectiveness of many programs is also hampered by difficulties in financing operating costs, especially for materials and supplies. Progress could be more rapid if aid donors were to relax their traditional preference for funding capital rather than operating costs.

In addition, there is a serious danger that economic stringency in the next few years will lead to cutbacks in human development programs, despite the importance of their contribution—often exceeding that of additional physical investment—to Africa's long-term development potential. It is essential that aid donors, especially in the first half of the 1980s, should substantially increase their efforts to help African governments avoid such false economies (while maintaining the already very low consumption levels of most of their people).

Poverty

Given the trend in average incomes (particularly in agriculture), the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty has probably increased in many countries since the early 1960s; in 1975 an estimated half of the people in the region were absolutely poor. Most are subsistence and small-scale farmers, but in some countries (such as Somalia) a sizable proportion are nomads. As compared with the low-income countries of Asia, poor agricultural conditions and farming methods are a more important cause of low agricultural incomes than unfavorable land-man ratios.

Human development issues

Despite substantial gains since 1960, life expectancy remains below 50 and adult literacy rates below 25 percent in most countries. Both are generally below expected values for countries at their income levels. For example, the norm for life expectancy (Figure 7.4) is about 50 years for countries with average incomes of about $350; but Senegal, with that income level, has a life expectancy of only 42 years. Africa is the only region where fertility still shows no sign of decline—women surviving to the end of their child-bearing years average 6 to 8 children. And it is the only region where nutrition has steadily worsened.

FERTILITY. The contribution that slower population growth can make to raising incomes is particularly marked in Africa. The region's high infant mortality and low adult literacy are major reasons that population growth remains high.

Studies in Nigeria and Tanzania found that education among wives reduced fertility and infant mortality —though some studies in Africa have suggested that the initial impact of schooling (by increasing health and fecundity sooner than it reduces desired family size) may be to increase fertility. The contrast between Kenya and Lesotho is also suggestive: among African countries, they both have better-than-average records of literacy, life expectancy and child death rates—yet Kenya has the highest fertility rate in Africa and Lesotho the lowest. Data from the early 1960s show that in Kenya many more men than women were literate, while in Lesotho it was the other way round.

That is unlikely to be the whole explanation, of course; other possible reasons include the migration of men from Lesotho to South Africa, and differences in cultural values—which are strongly pronatal in many parts of Africa, so that (in contrast to other regions) desired family size often exceeds its actual size.

Partly for this reason, and partly because of the virtual absence in most countries of a primary health care network onto which family planning programs could be grafted, such programs in Africa have been few and feeble. Extending and strengthening family planning efforts, however, would cause an earlier and faster decline in fertility.

HEALTH. Primary health care can be provided inexpensively (about \$2-3 a person) in some of

Table 7.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: GNP per person

Countries	Average annual percentage growth 1960–70	1970–80	1960–80	Level, 1980[a] (dollars)
Low-income	1.6	0.2	0.9	186
Middle-income	1.7	2.1[b]	1.9	493

Note: Excludes South Africa.
a. 1977 prices.
b. If oil-exporting Nigeria is excluded, this figure falls to 1.5 percent.

Figure 7.4 Sub-Saharan Africa: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978



a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life expectancy to GNP per person.

the low-income countries (and could be financed to some degree by a reallocation of government expenditure away from urban hospitals); but since it is administratively demanding, progress is likely to be slow.

A few countries such as Mali, Kenya and Tanzania have begun to establish the necessary administrative structure. Village health workers can be trained cheaply, as has been demonstrated in Niger; but a study of Mali's health system noted that "at the village level, the most serious manpower constraint is the near total lack of literate people who can be trained as village health workers."

EDUCATION. Typically, education accounts for 15–25 percent of the budget and 3–6 percent of GNP; less than half the total is for primary education. Recent growth in school enrollment has been impressive, particularly in Benin, Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Somalia and Zambia. These countries spend more than 5 percent of their GNP on education and are in the top 25 percent of all developing countries on this count. For them, the key issue is not increasing education's share of the budget but (as in other African countries) using funds more effectively, improving educational quality and tackling serious problems of dropout and wastage.

Costs are a major obstacle to raising enrollment and school quality in Africa: costs per pupil as a percentage of GNP per person are the highest of all regions. Compared with Asia, this ratio in West Africa is more than twice as high for primary, five times for secondary and seven times for tertiary education. The high cost largely reflects the fact that teacher salaries (which typically account for 75 percent of educational costs) are high in relation to average incomes. In Upper Volta (which has the lowest literacy rate in Africa—5 percent) teachers' salaries are 24 times larger than GNP per person, compared with less than four times in Liberia. High salaries for all educated people are partly a colonial legacy; but the main cause has been a shortage of qualified teachers, which is now starting to ease. Salaries have fallen in real terms in several countries, including Benin, Tanzania and Sierra Leone.

There are various other ways of making education less expensive without making it worse, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In some countries, such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone, average class sizes are small enough (about 30 pupils) to be raised without much adverse effect on quality (see box on page 52). In Togo local communities pay part of teachers' salaries; in Somalia and Tanzania they contribute to construction costs.

While school enrollments have risen markedly, few countries have tried to deal with the large backlog of illiterate adults. Literacy campaigns that relied on students, volunteers and government servants were mounted in Somalia and Tanzania, with spectacular success: literacy rates are estimated to have risen from 2 percent and 10 percent to 60 percent and 66 percent, respectively, between 1960 and 1975. Such programs, however, lack the socializing effects of school attendance. There is also a risk that literacy skills may decay if they are acquired in circumstances that do not require their frequent use. This argues for programs that are not too brief and have an emphasis on such practical subjects as numeracy, hygiene, nutrition, family planning and agriculture.

There are politically difficult choices to be made in higher education. Governments often give stipends as well as free education to university (and sometimes even secondary) students. Many governments have also felt obliged to guarantee jobs to all university graduates—in activities whose productivity does not always match their salaries. Secondary and higher education is thus a doubly serious drain on budgets; and its social returns have been pushed well below the private returns to individuals—and below what they might be with better economic policies, since Sub-Saharan Africa badly needs more people with professional, scientific and administrative skills. Their shortage has been one of the biggest brakes on development projects—as reviews of World Bank project experience amply testify. But African countries also need to train them more economically (see page 50) in order both to increase their supply and to release resources for primary schooling and other human development programs.

Despite the conspicuous scarcities, there is concern about incipient unemployment among secondary-school graduates in some countries. This reflects the fact that job requirements and expectations tend to change more slowly than the supply of qualified people (see box on page 51). But as graduates find it harder to get jobs, they will be likelier to respond to the needs of the economy for more people to work in rural areas as extension agents, teachers and administrators.

Figure 4.1 Three decades against poverty

Income

GNP per person[a] *(1980 dollars)*	*1950*	*1960*	*1980*
Industrialized countries	3,841	5,197	9,684
Middle-income countries	625	802	1,521
Low-income countries	164	174	245

Average annual growth (percent)	*1950–60*	*1960–80*
Industrialized countries	3.1	3.2
Middle-income countries	2.5	3.3
Low-income countries	0.6	1.7

a. Excludes all centrally planned economies



Population

Average annual percentage growth	*1950–60*	*1960–70*	*1970–80*
Industrialized countries	1.2	1.0	0.7
Middle-income countries	2.4	2.5	2.5
Low-income countries	1.9	2.5	2.3
Centrally planned economies	1.9	1.7	1.3

a. Includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German DR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR
b. Includes Albania, Cuba, North Korea, Mongolia
c. Includes China



Books

THE MULTINATIONALS CONTROVERSY: EXPLOITATION OR DEVELOPMENT?

Suzanne Cronjé, Margaret Ling, Gillian Cronjé, *The Lonrho Connections: A Multinational and Its Politics in Africa*, Encino, Cal.: Bellwether Books, 1976, 316 pages, $15 cloth.

Thomas Biersteker, *Distortion or Development?: Contending Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978, 199 pages, $17.50 cloth.

These are two very different but valuable contributions to the small but growing literature on the activities and impact of multinational corporations (MNCs) in Africa. The study of the behavior and impact of MNCs in developing countries has animated substantial controversy as radical and Marxist analysts, drawing in large part on the dependency and underdevelopment literature on Latin America, have argued in recent years that MNCs have tended to generate underdevelopment rather than development in African societies — in terms of economic, social, and political capabilities. *The Lonrho Connections* contributes to this critique of MNCs, though Biersteker's *Distortion or Development?* does so even more effectively by its careful testing of radical and conventional theories regarding the impact of MNCs.

The Lonrho Connections, by several women researchers and a journalist, is a readable, critical study of the Lonrho Corporation, the British-based MNC whose spectacular growth in subsidiaries in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s attracted wide attention. It is a wide-ranging book that takes the reader into the manifold activities, behavior, and corporate and political relationships of a company operating in widely diverse sectors and environments. The foci of the book are many and not always drawn together tightly. The book is organized around how Lonrho developed and spread from its early Rhodesian base, sectors of Lonrho investments (e.g., mining and agrobusiness), its expansion into different areas of Africa, its corporate behavior and intracompany conflicts, the contrasts between its investments in white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa on the one hand and its posture as a friend of African development in black-ruled states on the other, and certain major and ambitious projects of Lonrho, e.g., its serving as a consultant to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its interest in strategic railway building in southern Africa, where the colonial economic and transportation grid has locked states into South Africa's economic sphere of influence.

Linking these subjects is a series of concerns that dwell pointedly on the character and impact of MNCs in Africa. However, the authors do not really generalize from Lonrho and acknowledge that Lonrho is in some senses atypical, in part because it has been quite willing to take political risks in its investments (indeed, has acquired a number of its subsidiaries at somewhat discount prices from others who feared the winds of change), in part because of its greater willingness (where necessary) to enter into partnership agreements with African governments in development schemes, contrasting its support with the behavior of older, more entrenched MNCs in different countries.

One concern is with how Lonrho has developed and expanded, the means by which it has established (or attempted to establish) itself in African states. Lonrho worked one way in white-ruled societies where capitalist mores and conventions were well established—in Rhodesia and South Africa, and in relations with Portuguese Mozambique. Here the expansion of Lonrho's interests, from a minor ranching corporation in Rhodesia into mining, agrobusiness (mainly sugar plantations and refining), and various services followed fairly conventional lines. However, Lonrho also expanded into virtually all the English-speaking states of East Africa (Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda), the Sudan, and major areas in West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast), while also attempting to expand into Zaire and elsewhere. The chief executive, Tiny Rowlands, has cultivated and capitalized upon personal relationships with African leaders and members of the rising comprador bourgeoisie in many African states. He has offered the ability of Lonrho to mobilize capital, technology, and managerial capacities in order to create large-scale development projects—sugar plantations and refineries in Malawi, Sudan, and the Ivory Coast, railways in Malawi and Zaire (both fell through), and the organization of oil transport and refining for all OAU countries (a prospect that backfired). More important, Tiny Rowlands has frequently contrived to arrive on the scene under timely political circumstances—in Malawi immediately following its independence, in Sudan at the time of the 1971 coup attempt to overthrow Gen. Numeiry (when the Lonrho jet was placed at the disposal of those rallying to Numeiry), at the OAU as it confronted the economic disaster of quadrupled oil prices in 1973-74 and as its staff was casting about for some ways to cope with the economic costs. What was crucial was not only the timing but the personal linkages Rowland developed with African political and economic leaders. Such linkages are the sinews by which MNCs create vested class interests among Africa's political and economic elites, tying them to the muscle of international capital. One sees the competition between sectors of international capital, but perhaps too little attention is devoted to the fact that African leaders often perceive common temporary interests with MNCs and have then moved to cut wholly or refashion these ties in their own interests when circumstances seemed more appropriate. Lonrho has had to cope with nationalizations in Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana and indigenization measures in Nigeria.

A second concern is to demonstrate how MNCs that appear to concern themselves with African development — and few have protested their virtues as energetically as Lonrho — perceive no conflict between this and continuing to amass large profits in the white-ruled, racist states in southern Africa. From the time that Lonrho started to stake out investments and create subsidiaries in black-ruled states, it was at pains to disguise its increasing investments in Rhodesia and South Africa, leaving all specifics out of annual reports, declaring such investments were "historic" and insignificant. At the same time that Lonrho, in 1973-74, was striving to offer itself as a consultant to the OAU, and all member states, to help them cope with their oil problems, it was increasing the number and value of its subsidiaries in Rhodesia. The OAU secretary-general's acceptance of Lonrho as consultant to the OAU created an enormous controversy because of Lonrho's southern African interests, the ending of the Lonrho consultancy, and the resignation of the OAU secretary-general. The authors also investigate at some length the contrast between Lonrho's support for development in African states and the successful efforts of its Rhodesian subsidiaries to avoid the UN sanctions against Rhodesia, contributing to Rhodesia's resistance to black rule. The authors devote a full chapter to Lonrho's interest in the strategic transportation system in southern Africa, which created so much difficulty for Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique, as the latter two sought to avoid continuing economic relations with Rhodesia under sanctions and white rule.

Another concern throughout the book is to delineate the character of corporate behavior, which in Lonrho is not atypical: the "unacceptable face of capitalism" (the British prime minister's phrase) in its payments and holding companies in the tax-exempt Bahamas; the wealth and privileges of the corporate elite as compared with austerity in Britain, poverty in Africa; the extensive interlocking of corporate ties, holding companies, and dummy corporations by which corporate holdings are concealed; and the secrecy and wheeling and dealing of corporate elites.

A last major concern, and one in which the authors are only peripherally successful, is to suggest that the contributions of MNCs like Lonrho to development are slight. This task is not approached systematically, and the criteria are conventional: extremely low wages in mines in South Africa and on sugar plantations, low contributions to employment, and profit repatriation. The authors are quite willing to acknowledge where Lonrho has appeared to contribute to development, as in new sugar projects, but little that is systematic emerges.

Distortion or Development?, by Tom Biersteker, a Yale political scientist, has a much narrower and more academic focus. It is equally readable, however, and ultimately a more important book. In the debate regarding the impact of MNCs on development, radical critics and conventional apologists of MNC behavior have tended to talk past one another, though radical critics have been much more energetic in testing for the alleged development contributions of MNCs. Biersteker has performed the extremely valuable task of lucidly setting forth the major theses of critics and neoconventional proponents of MNCs (the neoconventional advocates recognize fewer virtues of MNCs than the conventional ones do. Biersteker clearly outlines (chapters 1 and 2) the mechanisms of MNC behavior and first- and second-order consequences of MNC investments in terms of the arguments of the critics and neoconventionals. He assesses the theses in four major areas of the impact of MNCs: the impact on international capitalist movements (inflows vs. outflows); the displacement of indigenous production (artisanal, firm, market, and preemptive displacement); technology transfer and consequent patterns of consumption (extent and appropriateness of technology transfers, appropriateness of induced patterns of consumption); and social stratification and inequality (e.g., extent of support of allied indigenous comprador bourgeoisie elements, contributions to income inequality and widening of elite-mass gaps).

Biersteker then compares the arguments of the critics and neoconventional, noting carefully arguments that are matched and contrasting, mismatched and not addressed by one side or the other, or simply not raised. The latter brings out the central and contrasting assumptions of critics and neoconventionals: the critics assume that in the absence of MNC investment, local capabilities would exert themselves, whereas neoconventionals assume that in the absence of MNCs there simply would not be investment and development at all, an assumption that permits them to assume further that any MNC contributions are significant and worthwhile.

Biersteker tests the arguments of the critics and neoconventionals with data drawn from the manufacturing sectors in Nigeria (eliminating, crucially, oil, where comparisons with Nigerian firms was not possible). Biersteker draws upon data from industrial surveys, the central bank, and extensive interviews with MNC subsidiaries and Nigerian firms, primarily in four sectors — textiles, cement, sawmilling, and sugar refining — for 60 firms for the years 1963-72; though he also makes use of incomplete data from two other areas (tobacco and beer brewing), he actually has complete data for only slightly more than half the 60 firms for the 10 years. Biersteker's testing of his data is careful and sensitive. He deals with the assumptions of the critics and neoconventionals by examining the possibilities for alternatives in Nigeria in the absence of

MNCs in these fields. First he notes Nigeria's substantial population and large internal market, the relative skills and education levels of its people, the country's relative wealth and savings, and its historical production. The "what-if" problem regarding what would be done by Nigerians in the absence of MNCs is posed by Biersteker's examining the response of eastern Nigerians (in Biafra) when, during the civil war, they were cut off from MNCs and crucial imports. He finds that Biafrans maintained existing industrial establishments with local resources and adapted and created new technologies, developed an extensive weapons industry of a conventional and innovative kind, and demonstrated the capability to develop an advanced technology to refine petroleum for their own purposes and on a large scale. Thus, he is convinced that in Nigeria there exist alternatives to MNCs.

Biersteker concludes from his tests of the theses of critics and neoconventionals not only that the critics are much more frequently correct in their assessment of the impact of MNCs but that their theories are better in that they provide a larger number of new facts, discoveries, and useful generalizations. His tests with Nigerian data conclude that MNCs in manufacturing contribute to a net outflow of capital, whose consequences are less serious for Nigeria with its petrodollars than it would be for most African countries; generate artisan and preemptive displacement of production, some of market displacement, none of firm displacement (which does occur in Latin America); do contribute to technology transfers; do employ more inappropriate (because capital intensive) technologies, though the differences are not great, thus contributing to unemployment; introduce inappropriate consumption patterns, often following the lead, however, of Nigerian firms and government; and require and support local comprador groups in investment, trade, and the state and by paying higher salaries in most sectors do contribute to inequalities.

Biersteker's effort is the most complete testing of crucial theses on the impact of MNCs that I have seen. There are numerous criticisms that one could make. I think that the most important is that in breaking down the arguments of the critics for testing them, he never puts them together again. Therefore, his own conclusions lose much of their force, for the critics — radical and Marxist — link their theses, much of which are here substantiated, into a total critique of the pattern of development, and of capitalist development, and of the way in which power and social forces in the society work to benefit the relative few at the expense of the many. Nonetheless, this effort is highly original, honest, rigorous, and exceptionally clear and readable. Biersteker points out where both critics and neoconventional proponents of MNCs must think through their arguments more clearly. This is undoubtedly a landmark book in the field.

Jon Kraus
SUNY/Fredonia

The University of Michigan

Ali A. Mazrui
(Chairperson)
Oscar Gish
(Associate Chairperson)
Edward Dougherty
David F. Gordon
Murray Jackson
Miriam Meisler
Ben Yablonky

Mangedwa Nyathi
(Student Member)
Valerie Mims
(Student Member)
Leonard Suransky
(Coordinator)
Consultants:
Richard Porter
Joel Samoff
Raymond Tanter

Committee on Southern Africa

THE RE-CREATION OF ZIMBABWE:
PROSPECTS FOR EDUCATION AND RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

FEBRUARY 4-6, 1981

These themes will be broadly interpreted, the *educational* thrust embracing both secondary and post-secondary education and including adult, community, technical, agricultural and informal education; and the *rural* thrust focusing on issues such as the re-apportionment of land, upgrading the former "tribal trustlands," agricultural strategies, and the re-settlement of refugees. The conference will begin with a socio-political overview of the first year of Zimbabwe's independence.

The meeting which will be *intimate* and *informal* in nature, specifically geared to an audience familiar with Southern Africa, is to be held in the Michigan League, at the *Ann Arbor* campus of The University of Michigan, Wednesday to Friday, February 4-6, 1981.

The committee invites late submissions on the above themes. We request that prospective participants submit to us *two copies* of a two-page summary of their intended presentations, a preferred title for it, and a copy of their resume. In addition please include instructions about any audiovisual or other apparatus that may be needed. Materials should be sent to the **ZIMBABWE MINI-CONFERENCE SELECTION COMMITTEE** at the above address by January 10th, 1981.

Conference accommodation can be booked directly at The Bell Tower Hotel, 300 South Thayer, Ann Arbor, MI. 48104, (313-769-3010) at $28 (single) and $36 (double) per night (please mention the Zimbabwe Conference when booking).

Letter to the Editor

Serapião Criticizes Review

Allen Isaacman's review of my book *Mozambique in the Twentieth Century* (*Africa Report*, September–October 1980) demands a reply because of errors and innuendos that misrepresent both me and the reality of Mozambique today. Isaacman says that it is incorrect to talk about "black revolution in Mozambique against Portugal" because the expression "black revolution" connotates racism — the enemy being colonialism, not whites. To this assertion I must remind the reviewer that I clearly defined the enemy as colonialism by saying "the enemy was not the Portuguese people, nor the Portuguese settlers in Mozambique but the colonial system" (p. 90). I quoted President Machel (p. 91) when he reasserted that it was not the whites who were the true enemy: "to shoot a Portuguese soldier who surrenders or deserts would be a crime as taking a knife to a comrade." To analyze Mozambique as a black country where blacks are trying to solve their problems should not be equated with taking a racist stance. Although Mozambique is a multiracial society, Frelimo's leaders do identify exclusively as blacks in confronting certain issues. Recently, President Machel challenged that Europeans (i.e., whites) do not believe that Mozambique can embrace true socialism because blacks are intellectually incapable of mastering scientific socialism (*Tempo*, March 30, 1980, p. 7). His wife, Graca Machel, arguing along the same lines as President Machel, reiterated at the women's conference in Copenhagen that some people are wondering how those blacks (Mozambicans) in Africa can establish socialism (*Tempo*, August 17, 1980, p. 35).

It is quite erroneous to attribute racism to my observation that Frelimo's government had to neutralize mesticos and assimilados. Here the reviewer appears to entertain some confusion about the assimilados-mesticos. Does he think that there are no blacks among the assimilado-mestico group? His apparent misapprehension is revealed when he stresses my "obsession" with the race issue because I refer to assimilados and mesticos trying to neutralize Frelimo's socialist efforts and because I observe (rightly) that Frelimo's leadership comes from assimilado-mestico group. It is rather quite simply a statement of fact. Isaacman's reference to Mondlane, Machel, and others as evidence that I somehow thought that blacks were excluded from Frelimo's leadership because this leadership came from assimilado-mestico group demonstrates his misunderstanding of the concept of assimilado-mestico. The reviewer contends that I maintained that Frelimo's leadership comes from "somewhat privileged racial class group and was distinctly different from the majority of the militants." This is neither what I wrote nor intended to convey. This is rather his misinterpretation which arises again from Isaacman's confusion in trying to analyze the assimilado-mestico concept on racial terms. The assimilado-mestico who joined Frelimo pointedly rejected and discarded their privileged status. They believed that they no longer belonged to the privileged group like those assimilado-mesticos who refused to join the revolution. I stated this clearly (p. 143) when I noted that President Machel admitted that he was an assimilado in the colonial period (*Tempo*, November 16, 1977, p. 62).

On the whole problem of race in Mozambique, the reviewer says: "The last voices of nationalism and racism . . . were thrown out of Frelimo in 1969." Does he mean that those voices ceased to exist after 1969, or only that they were condemned in 1969? President Machel still today condemns racism in Mozambique (*Tempo*, March 19, 1980, p. 39; *Tempo*, August 3, 1980, p. 21). In fact, according to *Tempo*, the issue of race in Mozambique is even becoming internationalized. Foreigners have bluntly asked white ministers and mulattoes heading Mozamibican delegations abroad the following questions: "Are you really representing Mozambique? Are you really a Mozambican? But are there no blacks in Mozambique?" (*Tempo*, August 17, 1980, p. 35).

On the issues of regionalism and tribalism in Mozambique, the reviewer ascribes to me "an essentially undocumented claim of powerful tribal and regional animosities and tensions" (his words). To this allegation I must reply that there are *not* today in Mozambique "powerful tribal animosities," nor did I assert that there were. Indeed I denied that such things existed in Mozambique, when, as an example, I compared Mozambique with Kenya or Nigeria (p. 160). The existence of regionalism, on the other hand, I clearly documented (p. 162, ft. nt. 6). May I remind the reviewer that like all Mozambicans I am perfectly aware of these problems and, unlike an outsider, I do not need a reminder as to extraneous evidence required to substantiate.

The review's claims that I did not discuss labor problems in Mozambique ("nowhere is there discussion of labor migration to South Africa") should be corrected. All these issues are treated in the section on "labor and racism" (p. 77) and "The significant role of the liberated zone" (pp. 93-128).

Finally, Isaacman has tried to represent me as a Salazar and Caetano sympathizer (for reasons not clear to me but perhaps best known to himself) by making totally out-of-context quotations and self-serving interpretations. To maintain that I "rehabilitated" two former dictators flies in the face of my fundamental and deeply-held anti-colonial stance and ignores all my previous publications and writings on the subject — which unequivocally attest to my personal commitment and adherence to that philosophy.

Luis Benjamin Serapião
African Studies and Research Program,
Howard University,
Washington, D.C.

Allen Isaacman's Response:

In my recent review of *Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence*, I acknowledged that the inherent difficulties in writing a national history were compounded in the case of Mozambique by the limited primary research on which to base such a study. Allowing for these difficulties, I nevertheless came to the conclusion that the chapters written by Luis Serapião, unlike those of his co-author, Mohammad El-Khawas, lacked coherence, analytical rigor, and contributed very little to our knowledge of Mozambique. Specifically, I found the study to be deficient in five ways which I will briefly summarize.

Despite its title, the book is neither a history of Mozambique in the twentieth century nor a series of essays on the major events over the past eight years. Nowhere is there a serious discussion of the broad process of social and economic changes which were a fundamental part of the legacy of colonialism. The author's response that he spent three pages on the labor issue misses the point, since this is hardly sufficient to deal with the single most important aspect of twentieth-century Mozambican history. My second criticism, which is linked to the previous point, is that Serapião gives disproportionate emphasis to both the theories by Portuguese historians on the motivation for Lisbon's expansion (chapter 1) and to the philosophy and self-justifying ideology of the colonial regime (chapter 2). Almost 40 percent of Serapião's study is devoted to these two subjects which, though of some interest, are not nearly as central as many of the social and economic aspects of Mozambican history which are not treated.

Beyond these two general criticisms, I also questioned his "communication gap thesis" which he used to explain the inability of Frelimo to integrate splinter groups, his claim that regionalism was an important factor in contemporary Mozambique, and the emphasis he places on race. Since he only takes issue with the final two points — on regionalism and race — I will limit my discussion to them.

Little needs to be said on the question of regionalism which Serapião claims he has well documented. His argument rests in part on a set of sweeping regional stereotypes quoted below:

> These people [from Southern Mozambique] came to believe that they have a "civilizing mission" to the rest of the country. People from the Center have been eager to excel and have shown themselves to be academically orientated and quick to voice their opinions on national concerns. The people of the North can pride themselves on their early and constant resistance to colonialism; indeed, they have been known to claim that they are the most courageous people in the country. (p. 160)

It is interesting to note that the documentation he cites to sustain his "Southern civilizing mission" claim are "personal interviews with Mozambican *refugees in Lisbon* [emphasis mine], August 20, 1978." Whoever these anonymous refugees are, they hardly constitute a scientific and reliable source. As to the rest of the quote, neither the fact that Mozambicans from the central part of the country are eager to excel academically (as are Mozambicans from other parts of the country as well) nor the fact that people from the north take pride in their long tradition of resistance (as do other Mozambicans) demonstrates that regionalism is a factor in Mozambican politics. While there have been a few isolated incidents in the Beira region which may have had regional overtones, as Serapião claims, given Mozambique's economic difficulties, repeated Rhodesian attacks, and the concerted campaign of the Salisbury regime to stir up anti-Frelimo sentiment, the absence of divisive tendencies is the clearest indication of how successful the new government has been in the process of national building.

With regard to the vexing issue of race, Serapião contends that "it is quite erroneous to attribute racism to my observations that Frelimo's government had to neutralize mesticos [mulattoes] and assimilados." Despite his disclaimer, Serapião's racial obsession surfaces in the negative qualities he attributes to Mozambicans who happen to be mesticos [mulattoes] (pp. 149, 150, 152, and 158), and his claim that whites became citizens to "join mestizos and assimilados to thwart Frelimo's programs" (p. 158). Moreover, his discussion of Frelimo's policy toward mesticos and assimilados is also totally inaccurate. Frelimo has never identified either group as targets to be neutralized. Consistent with its Marxist analysis, it does speak of the threat of the "internal bourgeoisie" — which includes Mozambicans of *all* racial complexions. Frelimo has been unequivocal in its opposition to any analysis based on race since the split in 1969 when a minority faction was expelled from the movement on that issue, among others. This does not mean that racism has been wiped out in Mozambique, but rather that both the government and the party have mounted an ongoing campaign against it in all its insidious forms.

Finally, the author claims that I unjustly depicted him "as a Salazar and Caetano sympathizer (for reasons not clear to me but perhaps best known to himself) by making totally out of context quotations and self-serving interpretations." Quoted below are Serapião's statement about Salazar and Caetano. I leave it to the reader to make his or her own judgment on this issue:

> Before Salazar, Portugal was a bad joke in the European Chancelleries. Her currency was worthless, her army an obsolete remnant, her political integrity hopelessly fragmented and beggared. Yet, within a few years, Salazar balanced the budget, restored the currency, started a modern army,and constructed thousands of homes. Salazar had become the Savior of Portugal. (p. 37)

Serapião goes on to note:

> Later, Salazar would advocate a multiracial society he believed would bring peace to the colonies. The Portuguese policy, he once said, was not one of racial superiority, but one of human brotherhood. (p. 39)

Caetano comes off equally well:

> Like Salazar, Caetano believed that the objective that brought Portugal to Mozambique, as well as to other parts of Africa, was not economic profit. He emphasized humanitarian reasons and especially the expansion of the Christian faith. (p. 43)

Allen Isaacman
Department of History and Afro-American and African Studies,
University of Minnesota

Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date)

WESTERN AFRICA

Anamaleze, John, *The Nigerian Press: The People's Conscience?* New York, Vantage Press, 1979, $6.95, 142 pp.
Ayandele, E.A., *Nigerian Historical Studies*, London, Frank Cass and Co., 1979, $25.00, 294 pp.
Bledsoe, Caroline H., *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1980, $16.50, 217 pp.
Decalo, Samuel, *Historical Dictionary of Niger*, Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1979, $17.50, 376 pp.
Dosumu-Johnson, T.O., *Reflections of an African Nationalist*, New York, Vantage Press, 1980, $9.95, 301 pp.
Olaloku, F.A. et al., *Structure of the Nigerian Economy*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, $19.95, 260 pp.
Oyediran, Oyeleye, *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979, $25.00, 331 pp.
Sundiata, I.K., *Black Scandal*, Philadelphia, Institute for the Study of Human Issues (ISHI), 1980, $15.00, 230 pp.

EASTERN AFRICA

Boesen, J. & A.T. Mohele, *The "Success Story" of Peasant Tobacco Production in Tanzania*, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1980, Skr. 25, 169 pp.
Falke, Rev. H., From Uganda with Love, New York, Vantage Press, Inc., 1980, $8.95, 201 pp.
Hazlewood, Arthur, *The Economy of Kenya*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, $24.50 cloth, $12.95 paper, 204pp.
Hyden, Gorah, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980, $18.50 cloth, $7.50 paper, 280 pp.
Kongstad, Per and Metti Monsted, *Family, Labour and Trade in Western Kenya*, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1980, Skr. 25, 186 pp.
Schneider, Harold K., *Livestock and Equality in East Africa: The Economic Basis for Social Structure*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979, $17.50, 301 pp.
Stein, Leslie, *The Growth of East African Exports*, Totowa, New Jersey, Croom Helm Ltd., 1979, $28.50, 272 pp.
Swainson, Nicola, *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya: 1918-1977*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1980, $20.00, 320 pp.

CENTRAL AFRICA

Kofele-Kale, Ndiva, ed., *An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification*, 1980, $26.50, 421 pp.
Schatzberg, Michael G., *Politics and Class in Zaire*, New York, Africana Publishing Co. 1980, $29.50, 221 pp.

NORTHERN AFRICA

Eidelberg, Paul, *Sadat's Strategy*, Quebec, Dawn Publishing Co., Ltd., 1979, $3.50, 159 pp.
Ling, Dwight L., *Morocco and Tunisia: A Comparative History*, Washington, D.C., University Press of America, Inc., $9.00, 213 pp.
Waddams, Frank C., *The Libyan Oil Industry*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, $30.00, 334 pp.
Woodward, Peter, *Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism*, New Jersey, Barnes & Noble Books, 1979, $22.00, 182 pp.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Adelman, Kenneth L., *African Realities*, New York, Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1980 $16.50, 192 pp.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Adelman, Kenneth L., *African Realities*, New York, Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1980, $16.50, 192 pp.
Buthelezi, M. Gatsha, *Power is Ours: Buthelezi Speaks on the Crisis in South Africa*, New York, Books in Focus, Inc., 1979, $12.95, 198 pp.
Carter, Gwendolen M., *Which Way is South Africa Going?*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1980, $12.95, 162 pp.
Charton, Nancy, ed., *Ciskei*, London, Croom Helm Ltd., 1980, $32.50, 247 pp.
Child, Daphne, ed., *Zulu War Journal*, Hamden, Conn., The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1980, $10.50, 84 pp.
Colclough, Christopher and McCarthy, Stephen, *The Political Economy of Botswana*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, $34.50, 287 pp.
Cornevin, Marianne, *Apartheid: Power and Historical Falsification*, Paris, UNESCO, 1980, $14.25, 138 pp.
Crosby, Cynthia A., *Historical Dictionary of Malawi*, Metuchen, New Jersey, Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1980, $14.00, 280 pp.
Greenberg, Stanley B., *Race and State in Capitalist Development*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980, $40.00 cloth, $11.50 paper, 477 pp.
Lappé, Frances Moore and Beccar-Varela, Adele, *Mozambique & Tanzania: Asking the Big Questions*, San Francisco, Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1980, $4.75, 126 pp.
Libby, Ronald T., *Toward an Africanized U.S. Policy for Southern Africa: A Strategy for Increasing Political Leverage*, Berkeley, University of California, 1980, 120 pp.
Lye, William F. & Murray, Colin, *Transformations on the Highveld: The Tswana and Southern Sotho*, Totowa, New Jersey, Barnes & Noble Books, 1980, $19.50, 154 pp.
Macaskill, Frederick, *In Search of Liberty: Incorporating a Solution to the South African Problem*, New York, Books in Focus, Inc., 1979, $9.95, 230 pp.
Martin, Phyllis M., *Historical Dictionary of Angola*, Metuchen, New Jersey, The Scarecrow Press, 1980, $11.00, 196 pp.
Moodie, T. Dunbar, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1980, $5.95, 348 pp.
Morris-Jones, W.H. and Austin, Dennis, ed., *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* (Studies in Commonwealth Politics and History No. 9), Totowa, New Jersey, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1980, $25.00, 123 pp.
Munger, Edwin S., ed., *The Afrikaners*, Cape Town, Tafelberg Publishers Ltd., 1979, R 9.50, 180 pp.
Myers, Desaix et al., *U.S. Business in South Africa*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1980, $17.50, 375 pp.
Ngubane, Jordan K., *Conflict of Minds: Changing Power Dispositions in South Africa*, New York, Books in Focus, Inc., 1979, $14.95, 336 pp.
Price, Robert M., and Rosberg, Carl G., eds., *The Apartheid Regime* (Research Series, No. 43) Berkeley, California, Institute of International Studies (University of California), 1980, 376 pp.
Rotberg, Robert I. and Barratt, John, *Conflict and Compromise in South Africa*, Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1980, $22.50, 213 pp.
Rotberg, Robert I., *Suffer the Future*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, $15.00, 295 pp.
Seiler, John, ed., *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980, $24.50, 252 pp.
Simson, Howard, *The Social Origins of Afrikaner Fascism and its Apartheid Policy* (Uppsala Studies in Economic History 21) Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell Int'l (Distrib.), 1980, SEK 100, 234 pp.

Turkatenko, Nikolai, *Africa South: Imperialist Plots & Miscalculations*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency, 1979, 75 pp.

Wannenburgh, Alf, *The Bushmen*, Photography by Peter Johnson & Anthony Bannister, New York, Mayflower Books, 1979, $24.95

AFRICA GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL

Albright, David E., ed., *Communism in Africa*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1980, $12.95, 279 pp.

Alexander, Yonah & Friedlander, Robert A., *Self-Determination: National, Regional and Global Dimensions*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, $27.50, 378 pp.

Arnold, Guy, *Aid in Africa*, London: Kogan Page Ltd., 1979, 240 pp.

Barongo, Yolamu R., *Neocolonialism & African Politics*, New York, Vantage Press, Inc., 1980, $7.95, 106 pp.

Biersteker, Thomas J., *Distortion or Development?* Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1978, $17.50, 199 pp.

Charles, Milene, *The Soviet Union and Africa: The History of the Involvement*, Lanham, Md., University Press of America, 1980, $18.50 hardcover, $9.50 paper, 250 pp.

Chenery, Hollis, *Structural Change and Development Policy*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1979, $14.50 hardcover, $5.95 paper, 544 pp.

Chernoff, John Miller, *African Rhythm and African Sensibility*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980, $20.00, 222 pp.

Cronjé, Suzanne, Ling, Margaret and Cronjé, Gillian, *The Lonrho Connections*, Encino, California, Bellwether Books, 1976, $15.00, 316 pp.

Duignan, Peter and Rabushka, Alvin, *The United States in the 1980's*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1980, $20.00, 858 pp.

Fredland, Richard S., *Africa Faces the World*, Indianapolis, Indiana University–Purdue University of Indianapolis, 1980, $15.00, 217 pp.

Ignatyev, Oleg, *Secret Weapon in Africa*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, 189 pp.

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION 008940

(Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685)

1. TITLE OF PUBLICATION: AFRICA REPORT	A. PUBLICATION NO. 0 0 0 1 9 8 3 6	2. DATE OF FILING
3. FREQUENCY OF ISSUE: Bi-Monthly	A. NO. OF ISSUES PUBLISHED ANNUALLY: 6	B. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: $15

4\. LOCATION OF KNOWN OFFICE OF PUBLICATION *(Street, City, County, State and ZIP Code) (Not printers)*: 833 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017

5\. LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHERS *(Not printers)*: 833 UN. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017

6\. NAMES AND COMPLETE ADDRESSES OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR, AND MANAGING EDITOR

PUBLISHER *(Name and Address)*: African-American Institute, Ronald E. Springwater, Vice President and Treasurer

EDITOR *(Name and Address)*: Anthony J. Hughes, 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017

MANAGING EDITOR *(Name and Address)*

7\. OWNER *(If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stock holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be giving. If the publication is published by a nonprofit organization, its name and address must be stated.)*

NAME	ADDRESS
African-American Institute	833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017

8\. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES, AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES *(If there are none, so state)*

NAME	ADDRESS
NONE	

9\. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES *(Section 132.122, PSM)*

The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes *(Check one)*

[X] HAVE NOT CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS [ ] HAVE CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS *(If changed, publisher must submit explanation of change with this statement.)*

10. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION	AVERAGE NO. COPIES EACH ISSUE DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS	ACTUAL NO. COPIES OF SINGLE ISSUE PUBLISHED NEAREST TO FILING DATE
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES PRINTED *(Net Press Run)*	10,420	11,000
B. PAID CIRCULATION 1. SALES THROUGH DEALERS AND CARRIERS, STREET VENDORS AND COUNTER SALES	1,000	1,811
2. MAIL SUBSCRIPTIONS	6,100	5,833
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION *(Sum of 10B1 and 10B2)*	7,100	7,644
D. FREE DISTRIBUTION BY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS SAMPLES, COMPLIMENTARY, AND OTHER FREE COPIES	398	376
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION *(Sum of C and D)*	7,498	8,020
F. COPIES NOT DISTRIBUTED 1. OFFICE USE, LEFT OVER, UNACCOUNTED, SPOILED AFTER PRINTING	2,922	2,980
2. RETURNS FROM NEWS AGENTS	-----	-----
G. TOTAL *(Sum of E, F1 and 2—should equal net press run shown in A)*	10,420	11,000

11\. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF EDITOR, PUBLISHER, BUSINESS MANAGER, OR OWNER: Ronald E. Springwater, PUBLISHER

12\. FOR COMPLETION BY PUBLISHERS MAILING AT THE REGULAR RATES *(Section 132.121, Postal Service Manual)*

39 U. S. C. 3626 provides in pertinent part: "No person who would have been entitled to mail matter under former section 4359 of this title shall mail such matter at the rates provided under this subsection unless he files annually with the Postal Service a written request for permission to mail matter at such rates."

In accordance with the provisions of this statute, I hereby request permission to mail the publication named in item 1 at the phased postage rates presently authorized by 39 U. S. C. 3626.

SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF EDITOR, PUBLISHER, BUSINESS MANAGER, OR OWNER

PS Form Aug. 1978 3526 *(Page 1)*

July, Robert W., *A History of the African People*, third edition, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980, $20.00 hardcover, $10.95 paperback, 816 pp.

Krantz, Grover S., *Climatic Races and Descent Groups*, North Quincy, Mass., Christopher Publishing House, 1980, $14.95, 273 pp.

Lappé, Frances Moore & Collins, Joseph with Fowler, Cary, *Food First*, New York, Ballantine Books, 1978, $2.75, 579 pp.

Marnham, Patrick, *Fantastic Invasion*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, $10.95, 271 pp.

Mazrui, Ali, *The African Condition*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1980, 138 pp.

Miller, Joseph C., ed., *The African Past Speaks*, Hamden, Conn., Anchor Press, 1980, $27.50, 279 pp.

Mohamed, H.E., *The Asian Legacy in Africa and the White Man's Color Culture*, New York, Vantage Press, 1979, $8.95, 285 pp.

Mwaipaya, Paul A., *The Importance of Quality Leadership in National Development with Special Reference to Africa*, New York, Vantage Press, Inc., 1980, $4.95, 73 pp.

Onyioha, Chief K.O.K., *African Godianism*, New York, Conch Magazine Ltd. (Publishers), 1980, $15.00, 124 pp.

Rembe, Nasila S., *Africa & The International Law of the Sea*, Al phen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, 237 pp.

Rogers, Barbara, *The Domestication of Women*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, $22.50, 199 pp.

Scarritt, James R., ed., *Analyzing Political Change in Africa*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, $26.50, 351 pp.

Schmidt, Elizabeth, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid*, Washington, D.C., Institute for Policy Studies, 1980, $4.95, 140 pp.

Sears, Mason, *Years of High Purpose*, Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1980, $14.50 hardcover, $7.75 paper, 205 pp.

Sewell, John W. et al, *The United States and World Development: Agenda 1980*, New York, Praeger, 1980, 237 pp.

Smith, Anthony: *The Geopolitics of Information*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, $13.95, 181 pp.

Sow, I., *Anthropological Structures of Madness in Black Africa*, New York, International Universities Press, Inc., 1980, $17.50, 248 pp.

U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Africa Institute, *Africa In Soviet Studies*, Moscow, "Nauka" Publishing House, 1976, 343 pp.

LITERATURE

Breytenbach, Breyten, *A Season in Paradise*, New York, Persea Books, 1980, $13.95, 291 pp.

Brink, André, *A Dry White Season*, New York, William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1980, $10.95, 316 pp.

Brink, André, *Rumours of Rain*, New York, William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1978, $10.95, 446 pp.

Gellhorn, Martha, *The Weather in Africa*, New York, Dodd Mead, 1980, $7.95, 236 pp.

Hall, Richard, *Lovers on the Nile*, New York, Random House, 1980, $10.95, 245 pp.

La Guma, Alex, *Time of the Butcherbird*, London and Exeter, N.H., Heinemann Educational Books, 1980, $2.95, 119 pp.

Levine, Faye, *Solomon and Sheba*, New York, Richard Marek Publishers, 1980, $10.95, 227 pp.

Little, Kenneth, *The Sociology of Urban Women's Image in African Literature*, Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman & Littlefield, 1980, $27.50, 161 pp.

MacPherson, Malcolm, *Protégé*, New York, E.P. Dutton, 1980, $11.95, 274 pp.

Ngongwikuo, Joseph Anchangnayuoh, *Taboo Love*, Hicksville, New York, Exposition Press, 1980, $10.00, 192 pp.

Palmer, Eustace, *The Growth of the African Novel*, London, Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1979, $26.95 cloth, $13.95 paper, 333 pp.

Walker, Barbar K. and Warren S. eds., *Nigerian Folk Tales*, Hamden, Conn., Shoe String Press, Inc., 1980, $13.50, 157 pp.

Zake, S. Joshua L., *Truckful of Gold*, South Bend, Regnery/Gateway, Inc., 1980, $10.95, 269 pp.

BLACK DIASPORA

Bolt, Christine and Descher, Seymour, eds., *Anti-Slavery, Religion & Reform*, Hamden, Conn., Shoe String Press, Inc., 1980, $27.50, 366 pp.

Fowler, Carolyn, *A Knot in the Thread: The Life and Works of Jacques Roumain*, Washington, D.C., Howard University Press, 1980, $12.95, 400 pp.

Miller, John Chester, *The Wolf by the Ears*, New York, New American Library, 1980, $5.95, 323 pp.

UNESCO, *The African Slave Trade from the 15th to the 19th Century*, Paris, Imprimeries Reunies de Chambery, 1979, $17.00, 325 pp.

Vass, Winifred Kellersberger, *The Bantu Speaking Heritage of the United States*, Los Angeles, UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies, 1980, $6.50 softcover, $12.00 hardcover, 122 pp.

No Postage Stamp
Necessary if Mailed
in the United States

BUSINESS REPLY CARD

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1129 NEW BRUNSWICK NJ

AFRICA REPORT
Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

Behind the headlines from AFRICANA

12th year

AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD 1979-80 *Colin Legum*

The new volume of this annual survey focuses on relations between the superpowers and Africa, and includes the role of Cuba, the road to Lancaster House and Zimbabwean independence, and a review of ongoing tensions in southern Africa and the Horn. It also contains essays on the conflict in the western Sahara, Afro-Arab relations, and the return to civilian rule in West Africa.
Volume 12: ca 1300 pp. / $125
Volumes 1-11 are also available.

POLITICS AND CLASS IN ZAIRE *Michael G. Schatzberg*

"This study brilliantly demonstrates how the complete centralization of power in Zaire has not led to more effective governance but to the total exploitation of most of the population.... The description of the effects of the 1973 'Zairianization' of the country's entire commercial sector... is particularly compelling."–*Foreign Affairs* *228 pp. / $29.50*

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN NIGERIA *Edited by Henry Bienen and V.P. Diejomaoh*

The Nigerian economy, in the midst of an oil boom and massive rural to urban migration, is distinguished by rapid industrial growth and minimal growth in the rural sector. This volume throws light on Nigeria's political economy by analyzing the complex relationship between growth and income distribution. Volume 2 of the Political Economy of Income Distribution in Developing Countries series. Other volumes focus on Turkey, Egypt, and Mexico.
ca 550 pp. / $45.00

WHITE MAN, WE WANT TO TALK TO YOU *Denis Herbstein*

The first serious study of the Soweto riots of 1976. "Herbstein's lively prose and handling of events make this book entertaining as well as informative. His vivid portrayal of conditions in black Soweto, the politics of the Bantustans, and the siege mentality of the whites leaves a memorable impression."
–*Library Journal* *270 pp. / $14.50*

THE AFRICAN-ARAB CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN *Dunstan M. Wai*

Wai offers a comprehensive and specific examination of the Southern Sudanese quest for selfhood and discusses the international implications of secessionist politics in Africa.
240 pp. / ca $21.50

ETHIOPIA: EMPIRE IN REVOLUTION *Marina and David Ottaway*

"This is *the* book for students of the Ethiopian revolution, and a crucially important resource for students of comparative revolutions or comparative communism."–*American Political Science Review*
250 pp. / $27.00

CRISIS: IN THE THIRD WORLD *Andre Gunder Frank*

Frank systematically examines the complex and changing roles of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East in the world economic system. He analyzes the provocative correlation in Third World countries between the growth of internal violence, international conflict, and the inroads of international capital.
380 pp. / $29.50t cloth; $9.75t paper

AFROCOMMUNISM *David and Marina Ottaway*

This book weighs the character and possible future direction of "Marxist-Leninist" states in Africa – Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. The authors explain the successes and failures of these regimes in terms of African aspirations, and offer fresh insight into one of the most important political phenomenon of this decade.
ca 225 pp. / ca $24.00

Write for our complete catalog

AFRICANA PUBLISHING COMPANY
a division of
Holmes & Meier Publishers
30 Irving Place
New York, N.Y. 10003



The ancient Kingdom of Dahomey exchanged ambassadors with the court of Louis XIV.

Part of the fun of West Africa is bargaining. So here are three hints for successful bargaining: 1. Start at half of what you're willing to pay. 2. Never hurry. 3. Keep a sense of humor.

Handshaking is an important social grace in West Africa, so remember to shake hands with everyone in the room when you're being introduced. Also, always shake hands (pass food or gifts, etc.) with your *right* hand. That's important!

To see the "Venice of Africa" travel to Benin (Dahomey) and the village of Ganvie. Here over 10,000 people live in stilt houses, high and dry over a lagoon. Needless to say, they're fabulous fishermen.

In the 5th century A.D. while the Roman Empire was falling in Europe, the Kingdom of Ghana was a full-fledged political state in West Africa.

NOTE: Elephants have the right of way.

The air is so clear in Mauritania that scientists gathered there to witness the solar eclipse in 1973.

Abidjan, Ivory Coast is often referred to as the "Manhattan of Africa". It has a "Central Park", skyscrapers, and the Hotel Ivoire is often compared to a glass-enclosed Rockefeller Center.

While you're on a photo-safari in Gabon, perhaps you'll get a picture of the extremely rare situtongas. And perhaps you won't.

Dakar, Senegal is often referred to as the "Paris of Africa".



NOTE: When driving through the national parks remember that elephants have the right of way. They're bigger than you are.

Africa's "Macy's" and "Gimbels" are the open markets in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. They're not to be missed.

Air Afrique offers regularly scheduled, luxurious, non-stop jets from JFK to Dakar, Senegal, and then on to the rest of Africa. It's the only way to fly!

Now what are you waiting for? Isn't it time you discovered West Africa? Just call your Travel Agent or your nearest Air Afrique/Air France office today. Hurry!

AIR AFRIQUE

Africa begins with Air Afrique.
And it's just seven hours to the New Sun...
West Africa.

AFRICA REPORT

AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

$2.75

MARCH–APRIL 1981
ISSN 0001-9836

0001 9999 00 046806 0010 SMP
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS INTL
300 N. ZEEB RD.
ANN ARBOR MI 48106

WOMEN:
Equal Partners in Africa's Development?

CEUTA
MELILLA
Tunis
Algiers
TUNISIA
Rabat
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
Tripoli
Benghazi
Cairo
El Aiún
WESTERN SAHARA
LIBYA
EGYPT
MAURITANIA
CAPE VERDE IS.
Praia
Nouakchott
UPPER VOLTA
Ougadougou
NIGER
SENEGAL
Dakar
THE GAMBIA
Banjul
MALI
Bamako
Niamey
CHAD
Ndjemena
Khartoum
SUDAN
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
GUINEA
Conakry
GUINEA-BISSAU
Bissau
BENIN
Porto Novo
NIGERIA
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa
Freetown
SIERRA LEONE
IVORY COAST
GHANA
Lagos
Monrovia
LIBERIA
Abidjan
Accra
TOGO
Lome
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Bangui
CAMEROON
Yaounde
SOMALIA
Mogadishu
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Malabo
SAO TOME E PRINCIPE
Libreville
GABON
UGANDA
Kampala
KENYA
Nairobi
RWANDA
Kigali
ZAIRE
BURUNDI
Bujumbura
CONGO
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
ZANZIBAR
Dar es Salaam
TANZANIA
SEYCHELLES IS.
Victoria
Luanda
ANGOLA
Moroni
COMORO IS.
ZAMBIA
Lusaka
Lilongwe
MALAWI
Salisbury
ZIMBABWE
MOZAMBIQUE
Tananarive
MAURITIUS
NAMIBIA
Windhoek
BOTSWANA
Gaborone
MADAGASCAR
REUNION
Port Louis
Pretoria
Maputo
SWAZILAND
Mbabane
SOUTH AFRICA
LESOTHO
Maseru

AFRICA REPORT

America's Leading Magazine on Africa

Please enter my subscription as indicated below (six issues per year):

INDIVIDUAL	*INSTITUTION*
$15/1 year	$18/1 year
$28/2 years	$34/2 years
$40/3 years	$48/3 years

—Regular Mail to Canada/Overseas: Add $3 per year.
—Air Rate Overseas: Add $14 per year.

NAME ____________________

ADDRESS ____________________

CITY ____________________ STATE __________ ZIP __________

The total amount of my order is $ __________

☐ My check is enclosed (Make checks payable to Transaction Periodicals Consortium).

☐ Please bill my: ☐ MasterCard ☐ VISA

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date ____________________ Interbank No. ___ ___ ___ ___

Signature ____________________

D 1 1 A R X

E F F C