

# AFRICA REPORT

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JULY-AUGUST 1982

ISSN 0001-9836

## OUR FRIEND INDEED? Morocco's King Hassan II

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
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**IN THIS ISSUE**

Our cover story examines in detail the war in Western Sahara between the Moroccan government and Polisario. Tony Hodges examines the military situation, its effects upon Morocco, and the international ramifications. In addition to this independent analysis, four interviews allow participants or involved observers to present their view of the situation in their own words.

From the mountain kingdom of Lesotho, Adrian Clark describes the difficult circumstances faced by that country because of its internal economic and political situation, problems that are compounded by the fact that it is entirely surrounded by South Africa.

A recent article on the republic of Togo contained some criticism of the rule of its president, Gnassingbe Eyadema. In questions put to him by *Africa Report* editor Anthony J. Hughes, the president responds to allegations that his regime is repressive.

In a report from Johannesburg, Miriam Lacob reports on how blacks in South Africa are reacting to Washington's policy of increasing communication with Pretoria.

Edward Kannyo examines the decisions faced by Latin American nations in their dealings with Africa. Many of them are torn between their loyalty to South/South unity and their sense of belonging to the West. Some of them even feel an ideological affinity with Pretoria. In the absence of resolute action by African states, Kannyo suggests, Latin America will continue to maintain a balancing act between South Africa and black Africa.

We have also included letters to the editor and the book review section.

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The cover photo of King Hassan II of Morocco with visiting American officers and officials was taken in February 1982 in Marrakesh by Philippe Ledru/Sygma. First row, left to right, are: Vice-Admiral William Rowdon, chief of the Sixth Fleet; King Hassan II; Admiral Thomas Hayward, chief of U.S. Naval Operations; and the American ambassador to Morocco, Joseph V. Reed.

Some of the photos illustrating the articles on our cover topic were taken by Sharon I. Sopher, producer of *Blood and Sand*, a controversial new documentary on U.S. involvement in the Western Sahara war. The film is distributed by 1st Run Features, (212) 673-6881.

Circulation, Subscriptions, Advertising, Management, and Production Services by Transaction Periodicals Consortium:

**Art Department**  
 Judith Martin Waterman

**Production Editors**  
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*Africa Report*, a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly in July-August, September-October, November-December, January-February, March-April, and May-June, and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and letters to the Publisher should be sent to this address. Correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, advertising, and other business matters should be sent to Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 8010, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: U.S.A. \$18, Canada \$21, air rate overseas \$42; *Institutions*: U.S.A. \$24, Canada \$27, air rate overseas \$48. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5717; Editor (212) 949-5731. Copyright © 1982 by the African-American Institute, Inc.

# The Endless War

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BY TONY HODGES

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Photo: Sharon I. Sopher

Moroccan troops on U.S.-made armored personnel carriers: Polisario says the United States has internationalized the war

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A year ago, in June 1981, there was a glimmer of hope in the war-torn Western Sahara. At the summit conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Nairobi, King Hassan

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Tony Hodges is a British journalist and writer who has followed the Saharan war closely since receiving a research grant from the Ford Foundation in 1978. He has made frequent visits to Northwest Africa and is the author of the *Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara* (Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N.J., 1982). His second book, *Western Sahara: Polisario's War for Independence*, is to be published shortly by Lawrence Hill and Company.

---

II of Morocco announced for the first time that he would accept a referendum in the territory, where his armed forces have been battling the nationalist guerrillas of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro, or Polisario for short, since 1975.

But a year later the war still rages. The OAU has failed to bring about a cease-fire and the referendum seems postponed to the Greek Calends. Moreover, the challenge of the Sahara has engulfed the OAU itself in one of the gravest crises of its 19-year history; and Polisario is now accusing the United States of "internationalizing" the war by escalating arms sales to the Moroccans. With peace prospects as dim as ever, the conflict in this arid but phosphate-rich slab of desert may be

entering a critical and dangerous new phase.

Today, the 40,000 or so Moroccan troops in the Sahara control only about a tenth of the territory's total land area of 127,000 square miles. Their job is to defend just two enclaves, near the Atlantic coast, and they rarely venture into the great desert wilderness beyond. The main Moroccan enclave, which is in the extreme northwest, near the old preannexation Moroccan-Saharan border, has been dubbed the "useful triangle" since it includes the old Spanish colonial capital of El-Ayoune, the huge (though closed) phosphate mines at Bou-Craa and the region's only precolonial city, Smara. Between August 1980 and May 1981, the Moroccan Forces Armées Royales

(FAR) built a continuous "sand wall" around this area, from Ras el-Khanfra, at the southern tip of the Zini mountains, on the pre-1975 border, to Smara and then in an arc via the Bou-Craa mines towards the Atlantic coast, to the south of El-Ayouun. By May 1982, the "wall" had been extended southwards to enclose also the little coastal settlement of Boujdour, 110 miles south of El-Ayouun. All along this Great Wall of the Sahara are minefields, radar installations, and sensors to detect approaching guerrilla vehicles, and, at regular intervals, artillery units and troops dug into bunkers and trenches.

But, beyond the useful triangle, the Moroccans now control only one tiny enclave — around the twin towns of Dakhla and Argoub on the Río de Oro bay, 180 miles to the south of Boujdour. The small bases and villages occupied by the FAR in the desert hinterland at the beginning of the war, in 1975-76, have all been abandoned under a long-drawn-out retrenchment campaign. They had proved too vulnerable to guerrilla attack.


Polisario's units, or *katibas*, are dispersed throughout the territory's vast desert expanses. They come together only to stage large attacks and then scatter into small groups in classic guerrilla tradition. Their familiarity with the desert "moonscape" or rock-strewn plains, dried-up river beds, craggy outcroppings and salt pans is astonishing to the outsider — but quite natural to a people of nomadic traditions, who had to know the desert and its secrets perfectly to survive.

Their fighting ability has also struck observers. "Under fire the soldiers are cool and often astonishingly brave," observes Nick Downie, a veteran of the elite British SAS regiment who has witnessed guerrilla wars, as a soldier or filmmaker, from Zimbabwe to Afghanistan. "Subunits and junior commanders react swiftly to exploit opportunities as they arise, in battles sometimes fought at 40 or 50 miles per hour. Of the 16 or 17 nationalities that I have fought against, commanded, or observed in battle, the Saharans' skill gets by far my highest rating." But perhaps this testimony should not cause any surprise. The Saharawis' warrior traditions are second to none. The *ghazzi*, or

raid, was one of the great institutions of the desert for centuries; and when the Europeans began their colonial expansion into this inhospitable region, the Saharawis resisted, fiercely and heroically, until 1934.

The Saharawi nationalists' degree of control of the hinterland is virtually total. A *Le Monde* correspondent, who traveled over 1,200 miles with the guerrillas last December, reported that "the most complete calm reigned in the regions we crossed, where we were unable to detect any trace whatever of a Moroccan presence."

For the most part, the Polisario *katibas* stage small harassment raids against the Moroccan defense lines, probing them to find their weak spots and keeping the FAR guessing at their intentions. Major attacks are relatively infrequent and often appear to be timed to draw the maximum diplomatic, as well as military, advantage. But when they are launched these attacks can sometimes prove devastating. Last October, for example, a 3,000-strong guerrilla force fell upon an isolated Moroccan base at Guelta Zemmour, a mountain stronghold and water source



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**TABLE 1**  
**Morocco's Growing Trade Deficit**  
 (in million dirhams; \$1 = .164 dh)

	Jan.-Sept. 1980	Jan.-Sept. 1981	% Change
Exports	6,973	8,197	17.6
Phosphates	2,204	2,731	23.9
Imports	12,214	16,606	36.0
Crude Oil	2,819	4,242	50.5
Trade Deficit	5,241	8,409	

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, London.

22 miles west of the Mauritanian border and some 90 miles beyond the Great Wall. The base was briefly overrun, a large number of its 2,600 Moroccan defendants (100, according to the Moroccan government, many more according to Polisario) were killed and 230 taken prisoner, and during 10 days of fighting five Moroccan aircraft were shot down — two Mirage F-1 jets, a Northrop F-5E fighter, a C-130 Hercules transport, and a Puma helicopter. The guerrillas withdrew after their attack, allowing the Moroccans to reoccupy the base; but in view of its vulnerability, the FAR decided to pull out completely from Guelta Zemmour on November 7. Two days later they abandoned another large base, at Bir Enzaren, 160 miles to the southwest. That was the last point they had controlled beyond the useful triangle and the small enclave on the Rio de Oro bay.

Since then, the guerrillas have lain relatively low. There have been occasional hit-and-run raids on the "wall," but no big attacks. But observers in North-West Africa suspect that Polisario may be "digesting" the sophisticated weapons systems, such as long-range ground-to-ground missiles, that it needs to make a really major attack on the Moroccan defense lines.

Since the start of the war, the Moroccan government has had to more than double the size of its armed forces, from 70,000 men in 1975 to about 180,000 now. At least 40,000 are stationed in Western Sahara; and most of the rest of the army is based in southern Morocco or strung along Morocco's eastern border with Algeria. The cost of this massive military commitment is placing severe strains on Morocco's

fragile economy, which has been additionally buffeted by the world recession, a huge oil import bill, and a terrible drought, which ravaged Moroccan agriculture in 1980-81.

The government's combined security expenditure, by the ministries of defense and the interior, rose to \$1.1 billion, or 32% of total recurrent expenditure, under the 1982 budget. But total defense-related expenditure is far higher, when spending under the investment budget, various annex budgets, and special treasury accounts is taken into account, and some estimates of total security expenditure go as high as \$1.9 billion a year. Some of the country's arms imports are paid for by the Saudis. But a large part of the military payments burden falls on the Rabat authorities; and financial constraints have brought delays in paying bills. Earlier this year, the French defense minister, Charles Hernu, announced a halt in the delivery of spare parts for Morocco's weapons systems because of Morocco's mounting arrears — until, on April 9, the French government agreed to reschedule \$328 million of Moroccan debts. The Moroccans' payments difficulties have also delayed the sale of 108 Chrysler-manufactured M-60 tanks, whose sale to Morocco was announced by the Reagan administration more than one year ago.

The financial constraints really are tight. This year, the overall state budget deficit has risen to \$1.3 billion. And heavy state borrowing has raised the state's debt service obligations to \$838.8 million, 57% more than last year. The government also has severe foreign exchange problems — because of soaring imports, swollen by the huge

rises in the cost of oil imports (up 50% in 1981) and food imports (up 70% last year) following the drought, which wiped out 40% of the livestock and reduced the grain harvest to only 2.1 million tons in 1981, compared to 4.3 million tons in 1980 and annual needs of around 5.5 million tons. Overall, imports rose by 35% last year, to reach an estimated \$4.05 billion. Exports, which rose by almost 20%, totaled only \$2.2 billion, leaving a trade deficit of \$1.9 billion.

Large-scale foreign borrowing has been needed to offset the trade deficits; and, according to the London-based Economist Intelligence Unit, the debt service ratio has now reached the very high level of 35% of export earnings.

The economic crisis has not been without its social and political repercussions. The drought accelerated the rural exodus that has transformed Morocco's demographic structure since independence, raising the urban component of the population from only 14% in 1956 to 46% by last year. Casablanca alone has 3.2 million of Morocco's 20 million inhabitants, and about a third of them are crammed into vast insalubrious shantytowns, where unemployment is rife and discontent intense. Indeed, the anger of the bidonvilles erupted into violent riots in Casablanca in June 1981, following a government decision to raise the prices of basic foods under orders from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce the budgetary burden of its subsidy fund, the Caisse de Compensation. Over 600 are believed to have died when the army moved in to restore order, and some 2,000 were detained. Since then, more than 200 leaders and activists of the main opposition party, the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), and of the principal trade union movement, the Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT), have been jailed in a series of political trials; and both of the USFP's newspapers, *Al-Moharrir* and *Liberation*, have been barred from publication.

Though all the main parties, including the USFP, still support the Saharan war, despite its cost to the economy, the war is no longer an effective unifying cause at home. The "national union," by which the palace and the opposition



allied in common cause to annex Western Sahara in 1974-76, has been overwhelmed by the scale of the social and economic problems within the country. And, just as the king's leadership of the great Saharan jihad — which reached its climax in the 350,000-strong Green March of November 1975 — boosted royal prestige, marginalized the opposition parties, and thereby allowed the king to introduce a relative political liberalization, which culminated in the 1977 general elections, so the renewed domestic political strains of late have obliged the king to revert to markedly more repressive methods of rule.

However, the king barely has the time to give adequate attention to his array of domestic economic, social, and political challenges. He is preoccupied with the Saharan crisis on the diplomatic, as well as the military, front. Diplomatically, he is on weak ground, especially in the Third World. Fifty states, all from the Third World, now formally recognize Polisario's Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Twenty-six of them are African; and it was to avert the danger of the SADR's admission to the OAU as a full member-state (for which only a simple majority of its 50 members was required) that King Hassan made his celebrated declaration to the OAU summit in Nairobi on June 26, 1981, that he would accept a "controlled referendum" in the Sahara. The king was commended for his magnanimity, and the SADR was kept out of the OAU — temporarily.

Both Polisario and its principal African ally, Algeria, doubted Hassan's sincerity. They suspected his referendum pledge was a ploy designed simply to buy time and keep the SADR out of the OAU. They doubted that he would really accept a fair and genuine referendum, for they were, and remain, convinced that such a poll would produce a pro-independence majority, and they do not believe that the king is prepared to risk riding out the domestic political repercussions of a Moroccan withdrawal, which would amount to an admission on his part that the entire Saharan cause, to which he has been so committed since 1974, had failed. Indeed, just two days before his Nairobi speech, Hassan had declared on Mo-

roccan TV, "We will not renounce a single grain of this Moroccan Sahara, for which so many of us have sacrificed their blood, and which has cost us so much money."

Moreover, when he returned home from Nairobi, he seemed to have the most restrictive idea of how the referendum would be held. He was not keen to have the option of independence put to the voters; he insisted that the Moroccan forces and administration should remain in the territory while the poll was held; and he seemed to exclude the idea of Polisario's participating freely in the run-up to the vote. "As to the people of Tindouf, they can come to vote in Morocco [sic] if they want to, or, if they are against us, stay there, because we have no need of troublemakers," he said on July 2, 1981.

But if the king was stalling for time, his very acceptance of the principle of a referendum shifted the terrain of debate to Polisario's advantage. The right of the Saharawis to vote on their future was no longer at issue. Now debate would focus on the conditions for a fair and genuine poll. After Hassan's Nairobi speech, the OAU summit adopted an eight-point resolution, which urged the warring parties to "observe an immediate cease-fire," set up a seven-member "Implementation Committee" (Kenya, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tanzania) with "full powers" to arrange for a cease-fire and the referendum, requested the UN to join the OAU in sending a peace-keeping force, and mandated the Implementation Committee to "take, with the participation of the UN, all necessary measures to guarantee the exercise of a general and regular referendum of self-determination by the people of Western Sahara."

The Implementation Committee duly met in Nairobi on August 24-26 and laid down a set of ground rules for the planned referendum. The poll, it stated unambiguously, "shall be one of self-determination, which will enable the people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on the future of their territory." All adult Western Saharans, whether registered in the last Spanish census in the territory in 1974 (which counted 74,000 Saharawis) or living as refu-



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gees in neighboring territories (a greater number perhaps than were within the Spanish colony itself) would be entitled to vote. King Hassan's plea that the question to be put should be cast in terms of the traditional *bayaa*, or act of allegiance, to the Alawite throne, was rejected: "The people of the Western Sahara shall be given the following choice: (a) independence, or (b) integration with Morocco." Furthermore, the warring parties' troops would be "confined to their bases," an "adequate number of OAU and/or UN peace-keeping forces" would be stationed in the territory, and "an impartial interim administration supported by civilian, military, and police components" would be set up.

But one controversial issue torpedoed the committee's efforts. King Hassan made it plain that he would not negotiate with Polisario. The guerrillas, he insisted, were merely mercenaries of the Algerian government, and so he would only talk to the Algerians. But Algeria's President Chadli

Benjedid would have none of that. Polisario, he argued, was a genuine national liberation movement, which had fought against the Spanish from 1973 to 1975 and since then had battled against Morocco and, until 1979, Mauritania. Algeria was aiding the Saharawi nationalists' independence struggle but could not be expected to negotiate in lieu of them. Morocco, he affirmed, must sit down with Polisario and negotiate an agreement on the modalities of the cease-fire and the referendum under the Implementation Committee's auspices.

Since King Hassan could not accept this, the committee found itself in a cul-de-sac. It decided, under these inauspicious circumstances, to refrain even from naming "the parties to the conflict," maintaining an ambiguity about whether Morocco was fighting Polisario or Algeria. It could therefore do no more than urge these unnamed warring parties to "agree on a cease-fire through negotiations under the auspices of the Implementation Commit-

tee." No target date could be set for the cease-fire, let alone the referendum.

Almost half a year later, on February 6-7, the foreign ministers of the states comprising the committee, meeting in Nairobi, tried to find a way out of the impasse. They decided that "the time has come for the heads of state of the Implementation Committee to name the parties to the conflict" and that they were Morocco and Polisario. But when the heads of state of the committee met for their second session, in Nairobi on February 8-9, the Moroccan foreign minister, M'hamed Boucetta, warned these recommendations were totally unacceptable. "I must say here, solemnly, that Polisario is not recognized as a liberation movement. What is called the SADR is not recognized as a state. His Majesty the King had clearly stated that Morocco will negotiate only with its equals, with recognized states."

Once again, the Implementation Committee shied away from taking the bull by the horns. The foreign minis-



The Moroccan army built a defensive wall around the territory it controls

Photo: Christine Spengler/Sygnia

ters' proposals were amended and the committee decided, as President Moi of Kenya later explained, "not to name the warring parties although we know who the parties are." Once again, no date could be set for the cease-fire or the referendum.

While the Moroccans hailed Nairobi III as a great victory, Polisario's secretary-general, Mohammed Abdelaziz, expressed regret on February 10 that the Implementation Committee's efforts "had not led to a peace agreement between the two parties, Morocco and the Polisario Front," and once again appealed to Morocco to hold direct, bilateral talks.

President Benjedid was equally dismayed, though perhaps not surprised. Since the June 1981 OAU summit, he had harbored doubts about the sincerity of King Hassan's referendum pledge — a pledge that provided no more than "a glimmer of hope, as yet a tenuous one," according to a 91-page memorandum submitted by the Algerians to the first Implementation Committee meeting at the end of August.

If King Hassan had hoped that by promising a referendum he would be providing the Algerian government with a pretext to terminate its commitment to Polisario and force the guerrillas to accept the holding of a poll under conditions stacked in Morocco's favor, he must have been disappointed. His Nairobi speech was interpreted as a sign of weakness; and so the Algerian government decided to press home its advantage. It gave the Implementation Committee time to go through its paces, to put King Hassan's sincerity to the test. And, in its August memorandum, it laid down stringent conditions for the ensuring of a free and fair plebiscite — among them universal adult suffrage, the return of all refugees, the exclusion of the Moroccan administration from the conduct of the referendum, Polisario's right to campaign freely throughout the territory, the "substantial withdrawal of Moroccan troops, together with a negotiated confinement to barracks of the remainder of the Moroccan forces," and the stationing of a UN peace-keeping force responsible to an international, interim administration.

Meanwhile, the Algerians held some




Photo: Michael Evans/The White House

King Hassan is confident he has a firm ally in the White House

secret exploratory conversations with Moroccan officials; but when it became clear that Morocco would not negotiate the modalities of the cease-fire and the referendum with Polisario, they were adamant, as in the past, that they would not negotiate over the Saharawi guerrillas' heads. When the Tunisian premier, Mohammed M'Zali, declared in January that "contacts exist between Morocco and Algeria, and there is talk of a project for a high-level meeting," the official Algerian press agency, APS, was quick to express astonishment that M'Zali had "situated the problem of Western Sahara in a bilateral Algerian-Moroccan framework" when it was "universally accepted" that the Moroccans are fighting the Saharawis alone.

Moreover, to tighten the military pressure on Morocco, the Algerian government concurred with Polisario's decision to stage its assault on Guelta Zemmour. Finally, after the impasse at Nairobi III, Algeria and its African allies resolved to turn the tables on

Morocco in the OAU by reactivating the SADR's application for full OAU membership a fortnight later, when the OAU Council of Ministers opened in Addis Ababa. Edem Kodjo, the OAU secretary-general, issued delegates' credentials to an SADR delegation, headed by foreign minister Ibrahim Hakim, since a majority of OAU states backed the application. He ignored Moroccan allegations that the SADR did not constitute an "independent sovereign African state" and was ineligible for membership — and indeed an unattainable two-thirds majority would have been required, under the OAU charter, to so rule.

Thus, when the Council of Ministers opened its 38th session on February 22, the SADR's foreign minister, decked out in his traditional sky blue *draa*, took his seat in the conference chamber. "Morocco has always said that it would negotiate only with member-states of the OAU," quipped the Saharawi information minister, Mohammed Salem Quld Salek. "Then let it come and sit

down at the negotiating table to sign a peace agreement with the SADR."

The Moroccans had been completely upstaged. Their only recourse was to walk out of the proceedings, and over the next six days they gradually persuaded 18 African states to follow suit. Since then, two other OAU-sponsored conferences, on information media and labor affairs, have suffered boycotts and the OAU has become virtually paralyzed. On March 23 Boucetta requested that President Moi, the current chairman of the OAU, convene an extraordinary OAU summit. But, though he was personally opposed to the SADR's admission to the OAU, Moi knew that it would be impossible to persuade two-thirds of member-states, as required by the charter, to back the Moroccan call, and so he called together the eight members of the OAU's bureau. They met in Nairobi on April 23-24 and decided to appeal to all African governments to surmount their differences at the next ordinary OAU summit, which is to be held in Tripoli on August 5-8.

It seems almost inconceivable that the SADR will be "unseated" there. Not only is Libya one of Polisario's supporters of longest standing, but Morocco has no chance of raising the two-thirds majority it needs to overturn what happened at Addis Ababa. The real danger is that the Tripoli summit will not achieve its two-thirds quorum. Only 18 states (and 19 walked out at Addis Ababa) have to stay away or walk out to leave the summit inoperative; and the Saharan controversy may be used as a pretext by some of the more right-wing African regimes to do so merely to snub Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya.

Meanwhile, as the pre-Tripoli diplomatic jousting got underway, King Hassan flew to Washington for talks with President Reagan on May 18-21. Reagan has been determined to stand by traditional U.S. allies in the Third World — to lessen the risks that the more endangered among them, like Hassan II, end up suffering the fate of the Iranian shah or Anastasio Somoza. "We intend to carry out a relationship that assures Morocco that it will be able to count on the U.S. as a steadfast and reliable friend," was how Deputy As-

**TABLE 2**  
**U.S. Military Assistance to Morocco**  
( \$ millions)

	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982 (est.)	FY 1983 (prop.)
Foreign Military Sales Credits	25.0	33.4	30.0	100.0
Training (IMET)	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.6

sistant Secretary of State Morris Draper put it on March 25, 1980.

A new ambassador to Morocco, Joseph Verner Reed, a former vice-president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, was appointed. And when he handed in his credentials to King Hassan on November 5, he promised: "My country will do its best to be helpful in every way possible. Count on us. We are with you."

So far, the promise seems to have been kept. As the military, diplomatic and economic pressures on his kingdom mount, the king is confident that he has a firm ally in the White House. There are solid strategic reasons for this entente. Morocco lies astride the entrance to the Mediterranean, one of the most strategic waterways in the world. It provides port facilities to the Sixth Fleet; and last February King Hassan agreed, during a visit to Marrakesh by Alexander Haig, that transit facilities would be provided to the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) at Moroccan air bases. The idea is to allow U.S. troops and aircraft to transit through Morocco en route to a crisis point in the Middle East. "Morocco happens to be properly situated," a Pentagon official said. "Morocco to Egypt is a good hop."

A formal agreement on the provision of these facilities was signed on May 27, following King Hassan's visit to Washington. Though its full text remains secret, apparently to minimize adverse Arab reaction to Morocco's cooperation with the RDF, it is known that the agreement gives U.S. aircraft access to Casablanca's Mohammed V Airport (formerly Nouasseur) and later, after a \$20 million dollar investment in upgrading, to an air base at Sidi Slimane.

However, strategic location is not the only plus factor about King Hassan's Morocco, in Washington's eyes. King

Hassan is also seen as an Arab moderate, who helped initiate the Egyptian-Israeli contacts that culminated in Camp David, then only reluctantly broke diplomatic relations with Cairo, and is now, after the return of Sinai to Egypt, trying to bring President Mubarak's regime out of its ghetto in the Arab world. Additionally, King Hassan has been a bulwark of Western interests in Africa, as shown most starkly by his dispatch of Moroccan troops to Zaire in 1977 and 1978 to help quell the revolts in Shaba.

For all these reasons, the Reagan administration has been warm to the king's requests for military aid. The U.S. government fears that the king could not survive politically the erosion of his prestige and credibility that would result from a major reversal in the Sahara, whether it was brought about on the battlefield or in a free and fair referendum. It has therefore redoubled U.S. military support for Morocco and backed Hassan's rejection of bilateral talks with Polisario, while formally declaring its backing for the OAU's efforts to bring about a cease-fire and a referendum.

The scale of the Guelta Zemmur attack, and the number of planes the Moroccans lost there, came as a shock to both King Hassan and the Reagan administration. The king claimed that the attackers had used Soviet-made ramp-launched SAM-6 missiles supplied by Libya, and his claim was quickly endorsed in Washington, though no proof has yet been available to substantiate the accusations. In any event, the military balance seemed to have tilted dangerously to Polisario's favor, and the Reagan administration undertook to restore the balance. A 23-member U.S. military delegation, headed by the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Francis J. West, flew to Morocco in

November and traveled down to the Moroccan-held sector of Western Sahara to examine Moroccan security needs on the spot. "The Moroccan government has asked us for assistance to counter the threat posed by the introduction of the SAM-6 missile into the conflict in Western Sahara, and we are in the process of considering what type of assistance our government will furnish to Morocco," West explained.

The first priority was to train Morocco's pilots to cope effectively with missiles, whether SAM-6 or perhaps SAM-9, a more effective version of the shoulder-fired SAM-7. A team of about 30 U.S. trainers began instructing Moroccan pilots at the end of the year, while the administration announced on April 29 that it would be selling Morocco 381 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, worth \$29 million. In addition, Morocco bought antimissile "electronic countermeasures" for its aircraft, from Italy, where it has also been shopping for more Augusta Bell helicopters recently.

During his November visit to Morocco, West advised the Moroccans to engage in more aggressive and mobile counterinsurgency tactics. U.S. officials apparently feel that Polisario will eventually try to take on the "wall" unless it is forced to respond to offensive commando-style raids by Moroccan units; and they fear that the purely static, defensive deployment of the Moroccan troops along and behind the "wall" will, in the long run, drain their morale. A team of 25 U.S. experts is apparently being sent to Morocco to begin instruction in commando-style tactics.

To coordinate the growing military cooperation, Morocco and the United States have set up a joint military commission, which held its first session in Fez on April 26-27 to discuss the "nuts and bolts" of Morocco's security needs, as one Pentagon official puts it. More than 80 U.S. officials took part—among them eight generals, one assistant secretary of state, and two assistant secretaries of defense.

Shortly before the meeting, the administration announced that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to Morocco would be increased more than threefold, from \$30 million in fiscal

year 1982 to \$100 million in FY 1983, half in the form of loan guarantees and half in direct credits at low interest. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Peter Constable informed Congress on April 20 that this increased credit would help Morocco, in view of its serious foreign exchange problems, to purchase spare parts for its existing weapons systems and such new equipment as electronic countermeasures for its air force, night vision systems, ground sensors, and possibly the delayed M-60 tanks.

Additionally, on the diplomatic front, Polisario had accused the United States of pressuring some African governments to walk out of the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa to protest the SADR's seating.

However, the Reagan administration's Moroccan policy has run into flak on Capitol Hill. On April 30, Representative Howard Wolpe's House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa came to the opinion that the administration's policy could harm U.S. economic interests in Algeria, cause the United States diplomatic embarrassment in Africa, endanger the OAU, and increase the opportunities for the U.S.S.R. and Cuba to assist Polisario "in a widening conflict." Furthermore, the subcommittee argued, "by encouraging Morocco to sustain indefinitely an unwinnable war, U.S. policy may well be contributing to the possibility for sudden radical change in Morocco itself."

The subcommittee voted to agree to only \$50 million of FMS credits in FY 1983, only half the administration's request, and this was then endorsed by the full House Foreign Affairs Committee a few days later. The committee also decided to bar the provision of training, "which has as its principal purpose improving the ability of the Moroccan armed forces to carry out offensive counterinsurgency military activities in the Western Sahara." The administration promised to report every six months to the committee on its military training programs in Morocco and gave an assurance that there were no plans to send U.S. military personnel to the Western Sahara itself.

The administration concurs with the Foreign Affairs Committee that Morocco cannot win the war outright,

but it does appear to believe that the Moroccan war effort is sustainable. The purpose of the stepped-up U.S. military aid, a Pentagon official explained, is to "beef-up the confidence of the king and restore the military equilibrium." The idea would appear to be to instill in the minds of Polisario and Algeria a warning that the guerrillas will not be allowed to win or even worsen Morocco's military predicament. But



Photo: Tamir Hultman/Africa News Service

**Polisario has sustained very low casualties in the war**

Washington's current policy could just be a recipe for prolonging the fighting. For who, in the long run, could expect to win a war of attrition?

Polisario, by all accounts, has sustained very low casualties in this war. The war does not cost Algeria much; and with their oil and gas revenues, both Algeria and Libya are in a better state to sustain the Saharawis than is oilless Morocco to go on fending them off. Under such circumstances, are not Polisario and Algeria likely to assume that time is on their side, even if they may have to wait several more years? □

# M'hamed Boucetta,

## Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Morocco

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INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

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**AFRICA REPORT:** What are the most important issues in Moroccan-American relations? What differences exist between Washington and Rabat in the field of foreign affairs?

**BOUCETTA:** First of all one should stress the ties of friendship that have always existed between the two countries. We want to reinforce these links in all fields including cultural affairs, economic and commercial relations, and military cooperation. One also has to look at the global issues that concern us both and are of special concern to Morocco in view of its role as an African country, as a member of the Arab community, as a Sahelian state, and as an Islamic state, particularly bearing in mind the problems that currently exist in the Middle East, notably the Palestinian question. You know that his Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco has a special responsibility in this regard as chairman of the Committee on Jerusalem, and that the Committee, at its last meeting, gave him the delicate and important task of explaining the Islamic position to the United States' leadership. We have had an excellent opportunity to do this during our visit to the U.S., where we have had a chance to present this point of view at every level.

**AFRICA REPORT:** There are no other major differences?

**BOUCETTA:** Obviously there was not total agreement on every issue, especially concerning the question I just referred to. The important thing was to bring these points of view into the open as a means of seeking solutions. On the fundamental issues, on the basic principles that the two countries stand for, on our overall global orientation there was, if not total agreement, at least very significant understanding. We have a very similar approach to world affairs on issues such as freedom, safeguarding peace, the maintenance of stability in certain regions, and the defense of certain moral values; on such matters we certainly have views which, if not identical, are extremely close. In evaluating the political problems as they exist in various regions of the world, notably in the Middle East, the differing points of view needed to be set forth and to be faced.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Would you, for example, like to see the United States abandon the Camp David process?

**BOUCETTA:** Yes. Our position on Camp David has always been clear, in light of the undertakings taken in the Arab world, especially at the Rabat summit in 1974. Since that time Morocco has played a significant role in bringing the Arab world to take realistic positions, permitting cooperation with the rest of the world on this subject, which can be reduced to three issues. Before there can be a valid settlement to the problems of the Middle East, Israel must withdraw from the territories it occupied by force in 1967, including Jerusalem. Secondly, the Palestinian question has to be viewed as the number 1 issue and the Palestinians must be represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization. Thirdly, it is impossible to envision a partial solution; there must be a comprehensive solution. That is why, from the Arab point of view and indeed from the Egyptian, Camp David was deficient in not addressing the totality of the issues involved. That position was made clear at the Baghdad summit and is supported throughout the Arab community. That is not to say that the return of the Sinai to Egypt does not represent a positive move. On the contrary, we believe that it represents a positive step. As far as the other issues are concerned, notably the Palestinian question, I think we have to find something other than Camp David. You have to associate the Palestinians with the solution of their own problems.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Turning to another question, are you satisfied with the attitude of the U.S. administration on the future of Western Sahara? Do you believe that Washington is committed to the victory of your forces on the battlefield? After six years of war you only control 10 percent of the territory; do you believe that a military victory is possible?

**BOUCETTA:** I can see that you are directly under the influence of Polisario's propaganda! That's the first time I have heard it said that our forces control a mere 10 percent. I had heard it said that we only control half the territory.

That is all Polisario propaganda. I would like to tell you with all seriousness on this occasion that we control and have our people *throughout* the territory of Western Sahara. I can undertake to confirm this in the most unambiguous way by inviting any interested and responsible person in the field of media and information to come and confirm that what I say is the truth. This is very important. Many countries, especially in Africa, have been erroneously informed. They were informed, in tendentious and false reports, that Morocco controls only a limited part of the territory. That is untrue. I can confirm to you that we are in military control and that our administration operates through every part of the territory. There is one exception, a small portion of the territory called La Guera, right at the edge of the Western Sahara, where the Mauritians have been established for a long time. Its status will be sorted out in an appropriate manner once the war is finished. But essentially we control the whole territory. You asked me about the American position. We are satisfied by the fact that the hesitation at first displayed by the previous administration with regard to the issue of sovereignty no longer exists. We are satisfied by the fact that the initiative taken by Morocco, especially at Nairobi in June 1981, when the king proposed a new consultation with the people for the expression of their wishes, has the support of Washington, as it has of the total membership of the Organization of African Unity. The referendum will permit renewal of the peoples' expression of their will to remain part of Morocco, or indeed to be consulted on the issue. Moreover this initiative demonstrates to the United States and to other countries that Morocco has always sought a just and peaceful solution to this issue and that we have no interest in maintaining a state of tension in the region. I think that those in the U.S. administration who are concerned with this matter appreciate our point of view. That gives us some satisfaction. That is the diplomatic and political aspect of the issue. Then there is the issue of substance. The basic issue is that there are forces working for subversion and destabilization in the region. That is why we are under attack. Our territory is the object of aggression and that is why we have requested arms, to defend ourselves against that aggression.

**AFRICA REPORT:** I would like to pose a question regarding events in Morocco itself. For more than two years Morocco has faced a very difficult economic situation, accompanied by social and political problems. How do you see the economic and political future and in what way can the United States be helpful?

**BOUCETTA:** It is true that we have been through a difficult period economically and, as in any country in the world, such difficulties are accompanied by social problems. This is due to a number of factors. It was due to the war that was imposed upon us. We had to devote considerable efforts and resources to the defense of our sovereignty and our territorial integrity. It was also due to natural disasters, such as the drought the country underwent for a considerable period of time. It was also due to the disturbed state of the world economy because of energy problems, the price of oil, inflation, and the strength of the dollar. Nevertheless, Morocco was able to demonstrate that even while

fighting the war—a conflict that was imposed upon it—it was able through the mobilization of its resources to overcome all these difficulties. We now know that the current agricultural season will be, though not perfect, much better than those of the past few years. That will solve a lot of our problems. We also know that the considerable efforts we have made in certain sectors, notably in the field of energy, will enable us to overcome other difficulties. We have asked for help from several countries for assistance with cereals and other food. The United States is one of the countries that agreed to help in that regard. We are now implementing our five-year plan under conditions that, though far from perfect, are fairly satisfactory.

**AFRICA REPORT:** As far as the United States is concerned, apart from aid, are you satisfied with the levels of trade and investment?

**BOUCETTA:** Satisfied? No, because they have not reached the levels that could be achieved. But an effort is under way, especially since the visit to Morocco last year of the U.S. secretary for commerce and following the exchanges between representatives of different sectors in the two countries. I am confident that the launching of considerable economic and commercial cooperation will take



M'hamed Boucetta: "We are satisfied that the hesitation of the Carter administration about our sovereignty in the Sahara no longer exists"

Photo: Camerapix

place as a result of the current visit of His Majesty the King to the United States.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Turning to a broader aspect of international affairs, what role should the major powers play in Africa, especially the United States and Soviet Union? From the African point of view, is it legitimate that these two powers should have military agreements and access to facilities in Africa?

**BOUCETTA:** The role they should play as responsible powers is to abide by the rules that are widely accepted; that is, not to come with any imperial or neocolonial intentions. That is extremely important because the people of Africa are highly sensitive to these issues and will never permit the return of colonialism in any form. Those powers must be honestly interested in the development of peoples who for so long have been exploited and who have been economically and socially disadvantaged by comparison with the rest of the world. Having said that, we have always taken the view that Africa should not become a theater of confrontation, whether it be ideological or military. Africa should not be a battleground for a cold war, which always runs the risk of becoming a hot war. That is why we in Morocco, in our foreign policy and in the various fora where we present our point of view, have sought to maintain a balance between these two powers and to have the best possible relations with all. It is our belief that certain tendencies toward hegemonism have inclined some African leaders to undertake subversion, for the installation of a certain ideology. In our own region, for example, we are suffering from these phenomena. We know that what is

called Polisario is not a real liberation movement dedicated to defending a territory. It was created to implant a certain ideology and to spread a certain subversion. We know that it is armed by an arsenal established in Libya by the Soviet Union. We know that transit is made across Algeria. If you compare what is happening elsewhere in our continent, such as in the Horn of Africa and in southern Africa, you can see that there is a series of problems of which we must take note.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Can you give me a rundown on your relations with your neighbors, with Algeria for example?

**BOUCETTA:** Our relations are very bad with Algeria because we believe they are harming us, supporting aggression against us. They display a clear desire for expansionism and hegemonism. In the matter of Western Sahara, it is they who create the circumstances that keep our relations in such a poor state. We would like to have excellent relations with our neighbors. We would like to have good relations throughout the Maghreb, to allow our peoples to develop. But this matter of Western Sahara, created and maintained by Algeria, does not permit any progress in bilateral relations.

**AFRICA REPORT:** And Libya?

**BOUCETTA:** With Libya, it is an absolute... abracadabra! I can't say beyond that as far as relations are concerned. They insisted strongly that they wanted to reestablish diplomatic ties. They said they renounced all that they had been doing in the direction of support for Polisario and their radio attacks upon us and upon our way of seeing things. So we started on the path of trying to reestablish relations but the Libyans implemented none of the things they had promised. We therefore had to return relations, not quite to the point of official rupture but almost to that point, to where they had been before.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Mauritania?

**BOUCETTA:** Mauritania is a problem for us, a very sad problem. The more we search for an improvement in our relations, in line with our common destiny—we cannot do without one another, given our proximity—the more it is our impression that they, for their part, move in another direction, into another camp that is hostile to us.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Is there any other issue that you would like to comment upon?

**BOUCETTA:** I think we have covered a wide field. What I would just like to reconfirm is our position on Western Sahara, since that is the focus of the greatest interest. I must stress that we have here a territory that has always belonged to Morocco, which was colonized. We tried to find a solution through negotiation and understanding. That is how matters went between ourselves and Spain. Currently, in spite of the difficulties that have been created for us, we maintain our position of allowing the population, as has been demanded, the freedom to re-express their wishes, to be consulted again. We believe this could take place under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity or of the United Nations. We have nothing to hide and we are confident that the people will freely decide to maintain their loyalty to Morocco. It is our opponents who are doing all in their power to avoid a peaceful outcome. □



Land mines recovered by Morocco are shown as evidence that Polisario "is armed by an arsenal established in Libya by the Soviet Union"

Photo: Sharon I. Sopher



# Mohamed Abdelaziz, Secretary-General, the Polisario Front

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INTERVIEWED BY TONY HODGES

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**AFRICA REPORT:** The war in Western Sahara has gone on for several years now. How can it be ended?

**ABDELAZIZ:** The liberation war first began in 1973 against the Spanish colonialists. Then from 1975 we had to fight against Moroccan and Mauritanian expansionism. More recently, Mauritania pulled out of the war. But Morocco has remained intransigent and stubborn. Nonetheless, we have continued our war of liberation and we have succeeded in freeing the greater part of our national territory. Our cause is now known throughout the world. We enjoy widespread solidarity, particularly in the United Nations and in the Organization of African Unity [OAU], where the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic [SADR] was recently admitted as a member state with full rights.

Many countries have made several attempts to persuade the king of Morocco to withdraw from the war and resolve this problem. However, these calls for peace have not received a favorable response from the king. He continues to persevere in his intransigence. He refuses to move towards peace. More than that, he is trying to get the great powers to meddle in this problem. But the Saharawi people are determined to continue their struggle, whatever the cost, and there is no doubt that it will end in victory, the victory of national independence.

**AFRICA REPORT:** At its last summit, in Nairobi in June 1981, the OAU proposed that a referendum of self-determination be held in Western Sahara. Do you think this could resolve the conflict?

**ABDELAZIZ:** Over the past few years we have repeatedly called on Morocco to accept a peaceful solution. When the OAU summit decided on the holding of a free, general, and regular referendum of the people of Western Sahara, we were the first to welcome this initiative and show our good faith, our willingness to cooperate with the OAU to bring this about. Consequently, we called on Morocco to negotiate with a view to applying the OAU resolution. But our appeals were in vain. Morocco's door remained shut.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Have you not stipulated certain pre-conditions that would have to be met before a genuine referendum could be held?

**ABDELAZIZ:** We have defined our position on this question many times. We have said that the occupying forces

and administration must be withdrawn from our territory. The return of all the Saharawi refugees to their national territory is necessary. There must be international forces and an interim administration in the territory; and international forces must be stationed between Morocco and the SADR to create the security that would allow the Saharawi people to express their will freely.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Are you confident that the majority of Saharawis would vote for independence?

**ABDELAZIZ:** It is obvious that we have been waging a popular war. The war is not the choice of a group or a minority. It is a war of liberation, based fundamentally on all Saharawis, no matter where they are or which social stratum they belong to. The United Nations' mission of inquiry, which visited the territory in 1975, presented evidence which does not brook the slightest doubt that the Saharawi people, in its entirety, holds aloft the banner of the Polisario Front, supports its political program, and wants independence and the establishment of a state under the Polisario Front's leadership.

During 1975-76 the Saharawi people were the victims of a conspiracy, a crime that has few precedents in the world. In the greatest secrecy, Spain, which had made pledges to us, signed its agreements with Morocco and Mauritania. Yet, despite this, the Saharawi people resisted and scraped together whatever they could to defend themselves. This shows what the Saharawi people really want—independence, and nothing else.

**AFRICA REPORT:** At its June 1981 summit, the OAU set up an Implementation Committee to bring about a cease-fire and a referendum. But despite meeting twice, in August 1981 and February 1982, it has so far been unable to achieve either objective. Why do you think it has so far proven so unsuccessful?

**ABDELAZIZ:** As you know, the Implementation Committee was created at the 18th Summit of the OAU. At that time we declared our willingness to cooperate with it; and so we did not spare any effort to help it accomplish its task—the organization of a free, general, and regular referendum of the people of Western Sahara. However, this committee was faced with three fundamental factors that brought about its failure. First of all, Morocco's intransigence. Secondly,

the attitude of certain members of this committee who lined up completely with Morocco's expansionist theses and so betrayed the OAU's confidence.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Which members of the committee?

**ABDELAZIZ:** Notably Guinea. The third factor, and this was the basic one, was that, just as the OAU undertook to settle this war on a just basis, Africa's will came up against America's attitude—the United States' interference in the conflict, which amounted to throwing oil on the fire. These three factors were at the root of the Implementation Committee's failure.

**AFRICA REPORT:** In what way did the U.S. bear some responsibility for the failure of the Implementation Committee?

**ABDELAZIZ:** After the 18th Summit of the OAU, the United States immediately showed that it supported the Moroccan position by providing all sorts of military aid to Morocco. Last October, the United States took a very serious step when an American delegation visited Guelta Zemmour to evaluate Morocco's needs. This reinforced Morocco's intransigent position, its rejection of the OAU resolutions. And last February we noticed incredible activity by American diplomats pressuring African countries to boycott the OAU during the meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, which saw the SADR's admission to the OAU. In the final analysis, this shows a real desire to destroy this continental organization.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How did the SADR succeed in gaining admission to the OAU?

**ABDELAZIZ:** We proclaimed the SADR in 1976 and, after years of struggle, many countries recognized the SADR and a very large number of countries throughout the

world recognized the Polisario Front as the sole legitimate representative of the Saharawi people. After a majority of African countries had recognized the SADR, we submitted a request for admission to the OAU and a majority responded favorably. Since the king of Morocco had shown no willingness to solve the conflict or apply the resolutions of the OAU Implementation Committee, we were left with no alternative but to take up our legitimate rights, and it was in this context that the SADR took its place in the OAU at the Addis Ababa conference last February.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Morocco has argued that the SADR's admission to the OAU is null and void on the grounds that the SADR is not, as the OAU Charter requires for membership, an "independent sovereign African state."

**ABDELAZIZ:** I think this accusation is more valid for Morocco than the SADR. It's the king of Morocco who has opened the door to the United States, to install bases in his country; so I would prefer to ask whether Morocco is independent and sovereign.

Since 1975 Morocco has applied every kind of label to the Polisario Front and the SADR. It says that those who are fighting are foreigners—Cubans, Russians, Vietnamese. These arguments are merely designed to justify its aggression. In the final analysis they only serve to sow confusion.

It is the people, the people's will, which determines independence. The Saharawi people exist. They are defending their desire for independence. They have proclaimed an independent state on their territory—the SADR. And the SADR has diplomatic relations with a lot of states in the world.

It is true that there are parts of our territory that are occupied by the Moroccan forces. But there have been prece-



Saharawi refugee camp: "The return of all refugees to their national territory is required for a referendum"

Photo: Sahara-Libre

dents for the OAU. The example of Guinea-Bissau is very eloquent in this respect. Guinea-Bissau was admitted to the OAU as an independent, sovereign state before Portugal's withdrawal, at a time when certain parts of its territory were still under Portuguese colonial occupation. So these accusations are ridiculous. Let's take the case of Namibia. If Namibia proclaimed its independence today, it would not have the right to be a member of the OAU according to Morocco's ridiculous criteria, while at the same time South Africa, which has a territory, a capital, and so on, would have to be a member of the OAU. That's completely illogical and ridiculous for our continental organization.

**AFRICA REPORT:** The admission of the SADR to the OAU has aroused enormous controversy in Africa. OAU meetings have been boycotted by several member states over this issue, and there are fears that the coming summit in Tripoli may end up without a quorum and not be able to carry out its business. Is the OAU's very future at risk over this question?

**ABDELAZIZ:** We don't think that the SADR's admission causes any problems. Rather, it is a triumph of legality against confusion and injustice. Certainly, it is a hard blow against those who have expansionist and aggressive desires and who, for want of their theses being accepted, hope to sabotage the OAU. Morocco, prodded by the United States and a small number of African countries, was shocked by the SADR's admission and is spreading the idea that the OAU is going through a crisis. The last meeting of the Bureau of the OAU's 18th Summit, which has just met in Nairobi, responded clearly to this by saying that the situation is not exceptional and that the OAU has experienced crises before this and has succeeded in overcoming them.

What really is in crisis is Moroccan expansionism, which has failed in its aim of distorting the OAU Charter and its cardinal principles: respect for the frontiers inherited from the colonial epoch and a state's admission to the organization when it has been recognized by the majority of its members. The king of Morocco is trying to expose Africa to a crisis, and by allying with the United States he is trying to internationalize a decolonization conflict.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Meanwhile the war continues. What are your military objectives at the present time?

**ABDELAZIZ:** The war in Western Sahara has seen several stages over the past few years: first of all against Spanish colonialism, then against the tripartite Madrid Agreement, then against French intervention, then later against the beginning of American intervention, and now the final stage, which is marked by the United States' direct intervention. Prior to this stage, we had succeeded in liberating most of our national territory. Only certain points on the coast remained. With the help of the United States, Morocco has constructed a wall around these localities—a wall with sandbanks, mines, and electronic detection systems, all linked up with the air force. The war is now being fought around these points. The last stage could be more difficult because we are now no longer facing Morocco alone but American experience and technology as well. But we think that once we have cleared this stage, we will have achieved final victory. To sum up, our present objectives



Phosphate mines at Bou-Craa: The area is encircled by the Moroccan-built defensive wall

Photo: Sharon I. Sopher

are to fight against the last occupied points of our national territory.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Which are the enclaves controlled by Morocco?

**ABDELAZIZ:** The localities that this defense wall surrounds are our capital, El-Ayoune, the city of Smara, Bou-Craa, Boujdour, and finally Dakhla, which is in the south. In all, about one-tenth of Western Sahara, something like 30,000 square kilometers.

**AFRICA REPORT:** You have said that these enclaves are very heavily defended. Surely it would be very difficult for your forces to break into them.

**ABDELAZIZ:** Our experience and victories in the military field have shown us that the enemy's equipment is not decisive and does not stop us. If you compare our forces and armaments with Morocco's, you would think that our victories were miracles. At Guelta Zemmur, for example, there was a natural defense system, the mountains, and, on top of that, another system, coordinated electronically with aircraft. But that did not stop us from annihilating 2,500 soldiers there. It is because of the determination of our people and army, and their faith in the justice of their cause, that we will break through the wall and liberate our country.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Recently, U.S. officials have implied that the Polisario Front is acting on behalf of Libya, with Soviet weapons, to destabilize Morocco. How do you react to this?

**ABDELAZIZ:** This argument is a derisory one. It does not convince anyone. The United States knows that the struggle of the Saharan people is a national liberation struggle for self-determination. It is not a new struggle. Evidence of it was provided by the UN at the time of the mission of inquiry's visit in 1975. And by the OAU, too. The Americans have visited the region. They have visited us, at official level and at congressional level. They have concluded from these visits that ours is a nationalist struggle, that the Saharawi people and its leadership, the Polisario Front, are fighting for their liberation, and that they have been forced to undertake this struggle.

**AFRICA REPORT:** The Reagan administration has recently announced a substantial increase in its military aid to Morocco, from \$30 million to \$100 million a year. How do you view this increased U.S. military support for Morocco?

**ABDELAZIZ:** By increasing its military aid to Morocco threefold and committing itself militarily and politically to Morocco's aggressive, expansionist king, the United States is assuming a large measure of responsibility for this war, for the aggression against the Saharawi people, and for the genocide of which it is victim. The United States has taken a very serious step. All the countries of the world, particularly in Africa and Europe, must take note of this danger and assume their responsibilities by pressuring the United States, to prevent the United States from continuing its action, which is very serious and has dangerous implications for the peace and security of the peoples of Africa and Europe.

**AFRICA REPORT:** You said that the United States' military support for Morocco is internationalizing the conflict. Do you mean that there is a real danger of the Saharan war becoming a focus of East-West confrontation?

**ABDELAZIZ:** The American intervention is real, tangi-

ble, and material. An American delegation went as far as Western Sahara itself in October to evaluate Morocco's needs. The American arms stores have been opened up to Morocco, so that Morocco can take all the weapons it needs. American experience is at Morocco's disposal. American military experts are now working in Morocco and Western Sahara. Recently, an 80-member American delegation, including eight generals, arrived in Morocco to extend American intervention. There has already been an internationalization, and the responsibility for this falls on the United States.

As far as we are concerned, we have tried, despite our limited means, to avoid this internationalization. But from now on we will no longer allow the United States to exterminate us and we will look for all the weapons and all the means we need to defend ourselves. For us, this is a matter of legitimate self-defense.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Since the Reagan administration took office in Washington, has the Polisario Front been able to put its views directly to American officials?

**ABDELAZIZ:** We have tried to maintain the contact established with the previous administration. But the new administration has been blind. It has embraced expansionist, aggressive Morocco's positions and closed the door in our face. We wanted a means of contact; but this has been rejected categorically by the new American administration.

**AFRICA REPORT:** If you were able to talk to U.S. officials, what policy would you recommend that they adopt?

**ABDELAZIZ:** We would advise them to avoid internationalizing a well-known decolonization problem. We would advise them to avoid exposing the region of the Maghreb and the Mediterranean to a war with unforeseeable consequences. We would ask them to advise their chosen friend and ally to quit this war and end it by peaceful means, that is to say by negotiating with the authorities of the SADR.

**AFRICA REPORT:** But it would seem that U.S. officials fear that King Hassan would be in serious domestic political trouble and might even lose his throne if he withdrew from Western Sahara. Does this not make it unlikely that the Reagan administration would follow your advice?

**ABDELAZIZ:** This is indeed the argument used by the American authorities. But we think it is the war that is having serious repercussions for Morocco and putting the king's throne in danger. The Moroccan people and soldiers want peace. They want solutions to the social and economic problems brought about by the effort devoted to this war by the king of Morocco. If the United States wants to save the king of Morocco, it must make him pull out of this war. It must help him put an end to this war.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What kind of relations would you like to establish with the United States in the future?

**ABDELAZIZ:** We have defined our position in our general political program and in our constitution. We are prepared to establish relations with all countries on the condition that there is mutual respect between us. We do not have the slightest complex about establishing cooperative relations with the United States, as soon as the United States respects our people's right to life and nationhood. □



Photo: Sharon I. Sopher

**Mohamed Abdelaziz (center):** "The Saharawi people are determined to continue their struggle, whatever the cost"

# Robert Flaten, Director, North Africa, U.S. Department of State

INTERVIEWED BY TONY HODGES



Photo: Sahara-Libre

Moroccan prisoners of war: "We do not believe this conflict is winnable in a military sense"

**AFRICA REPORT:** What is American policy regarding Morocco's claim to sovereignty in ex-Spanish Sahara?

**FLATEN:** We have recognized the Moroccan administrative control of the Western Sahara, but not the question of Moroccan sovereignty, which we believe should be worked out through a referendum.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Is there any limitation on the use of U.S.-supplied arms by Morocco in Western Sahara?

**FLATEN:** The American-made and -supplied equipment that has been sold to Morocco comes under the same kind of restrictions that it does with all countries with whom we have security agreements, and falls under the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Specifically, does that mean that Morocco can utilize American-supplied weaponry without restriction in Western Sahara?

**FLATEN:** It means that the purpose for which we export arms are purposes of legitimate self-defense and internal se-

curity, as spelled out in the Arms Export Control Act. Those are the restrictions that are applied to sales everywhere.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you believe that these arms are in fact being used in legitimate self-defense in view of the fact that Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara has not even been recognized by the U.S. government?

**FLATEN:** In view of the fact that Morocco is recognized by the UN as the administering authority of the Western Sahara, we have not challenged the use of American-supplied equipment.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you believe that Morocco could win the war in Western Sahara militarily?

**FLATEN:** We have repeatedly stated that we do not believe that this conflict is winnable in a military sense.

**AFRICA REPORT:** The assistant secretary of defense, Francis West, talked a few weeks back about the U.S. being able to provide training for the Moroccan armed forces to carry out more mobile, commando-type operations in the




Photo: Camerapix

**President Chadli Benjedid:** "We are working hard to improve relations with Algeria"

Western Sahara against Polisario. Does the United States in fact plan to provide that kind of training?

**FLATEN:** I think that the training that we are able and willing to provide to Morocco falls within the same category as equipment; that is, we will provide to friendly governments who are eligible training which is for legitimate self-defense, as we have so testified before the Congress.

**AFRICA REPORT:** And that would include mobile commando-type operations against Polisario?

**FLATEN:** I'm not going to define it any further than that.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Would the United States, under any circumstances, consider sending military experts or officials to Western Sahara?

**FLATEN:** No.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Why did the U.S. government propose raising Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to Morocco to \$100 million in fiscal year 1983?

**FLATEN:** The Moroccan government has been experiencing a serious financial problem over the course of the last couple of years, largely stimulated by a drought. And the equipment, which we had agreed to sell to the government of Morocco for its modernization program, has been held in abeyance pending their ability to fund it. I am speaking specifically of M-60 tanks that were approved by the Congress a year ago. We're still waiting for the letters of offer and acceptance to be signed.

**AFRICA REPORT:** The House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee voted to reduce the FMS credits

from the \$100 million requested by the administration to \$50 million, on the grounds that a threefold increase from the level of military aid in fiscal year 1982 would send the wrong signals to Morocco and encourage those in Morocco who believe that an ultimate military victory is possible. How do you react to that line of argument?

**FLATEN:** First of all, technically, what the House of Representatives did in the Foreign Affairs Committee—the House itself has not acted—was to increase the FMS levels from fiscal year 1982's \$30 million to \$50 million for fiscal year 1983. What they did not do was to accept our request that it go to \$100 million. So technically they increased the credits from \$30 million to \$50 million. Secondly, the House of Representatives and the Senate have taken a serious interest in the Western Sahara conflict over the course of the last four or five years, and they have a legitimate basis, because of their knowledge and experience over the years, to express an opinion about how best to bring about a peaceful settlement. The committee and the administration share the same objective—a peaceful settlement. And we share a dialogue that has been going on for several years; and I think that in that dialogue we hope to come up with the best possible policy for this country's interests.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Polisario has claimed that U.S. surveillance planes have flown over Western Sahara. Is this true?

**FLATEN:** I have nothing for you on this.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Can you give any details of the kind of weapons systems that Morocco is hoping to acquire?

**FLATEN:** The essential large item is the tank, for overall force modernization.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Why does this administration consider King Hassan's Morocco an extremely important friend and ally of the U.S.?

**FLATEN:** I think that there are at least three very important reasons. One is that this is a traditional friend, over a long period of time, and this administration is determined to solidify and strengthen its relations with its traditional friends. The second is that this is a strategic piece of terrain, at the choke-point in the Mediterranean-Atlantic. It is a state that has both Atlantic and Mediterranean responsibilities. And third, it is a country with whom we have been able to talk and maintain a constructive and useful dialogue on the vital Middle Eastern questions over a period of years.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Would you also include the provision of transit facilities for the Rapid Deployment Force as another example of the importance of your relationship with Morocco?

**FLATEN:** Sure. I would include that within the concept of the strategic location.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What would the U.S. armed forces wish to utilize these transit facilities for?

**FLATEN:** Well, let me say a couple of things. First of all, we are not intending to have Americans permanently stationed. We are not talking about any American bases. We are talking simply about agreement in advance that under certain agreed circumstances for our common interests, that we would be able to bring aircraft through Morocco to a military contingency further east.

**AFRICA REPORT:** During his visit here in May, the Moroccan minister of state for foreign affairs, M'hammed Boucetta, told the press that these facilities would not be used to facilitate American intervention in the Middle East and that they were being granted within the framework of Morocco's need to defend its territorial integrity. This would appear to be at variance with what you have just said.

**FLATEN:** I think that our agreement is that these facilities would be used for purposes that are mutually defined as in our common interest.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Would it be correct to assume that these transit facilities have nothing to do with the conflict in the Sahara?

**FLATEN:** Yes.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you think that King Hassan is seriously prepared to negotiate a solution to the war?

**FLATEN:** King Hassan has made his proposal to the OAU, the chiefs of state assembled at Nairobi. He has agreed to the formulations, the precisions of the Implementation Committee, in Nairobi in August and again in Nairobi in February.

**AFRICA REPORT:** However, the work of the Implementation Committee seems to have ground to a halt as a result of an inability to name who the parties to the conflict actually are. Morocco does not consider Polisario to be its antagonist in Western Sahara, but rather Algeria. On the other hand, Algeria is adamant that it will not negotiate with Morocco because Polisario is an indigenous and genuine national liberation movement. And as a result of this disagreement, it seems to have been impossible to make any headway towards the cease-fire that the Implementation Committee is attempting to bring about. Do you see any way out of this deadlock?

**FLATEN:** I think, as a professional diplomat, there are many formulas that could be put together which could help the negotiating process get underway and could overcome what would appear to be, as you describe it, a procedural difficulty. The OAU is actively engaged at the present time in trying to find ways to solve that essentially procedural program.

**AFRICA REPORT:** It has been reported that, during the OAU Council of Ministers' meeting in Addis Ababa last February, U.S. diplomats sought to convince a number of African states to withdraw from the meeting on account of the seating of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. Is there any truth in those reports?

**FLATEN:** Let me say that we find the seating by the Secretariat, although it is of course an OAU matter, to be inconsistent with the decision taken by the OAU itself to try to bring about a referendum. It does not seem logically consistent to call for a referendum to determine the future of the territory and then to offer recognition to one party. Since this is a conflict in which the whole world has an interest in a peaceful resolution, we have made our views of the inconsistency of these two points known. We have also made known that we support the OAU mediation process that would lead to a decision through a referendum.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How does the currently warm relationship between the United States and Morocco affect

U.S. relations with Algeria? How do you see ties with Algeria developing?

**FLATEN:** I am personally quite satisfied that the nature of our dialogue with the Algerians is improving. We have some differences, as we have with many other countries, but our relations are probably better than they were a couple of years ago.

**AFRICA REPORT:** You don't anticipate that the increase in American military aid to Morocco could jeopardize relations with Algeria?

**FLATEN:** I don't think that the nature of the increase in military assistance to Morocco has any particular relevance to things that are of great significance to Algeria, and certainly not in the military sense. This is not enough money to change the balance of power in the region. It will not upset that balance of power.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you have anything to add about U.S. relations with this subregion of Africa?

**FLATEN:** I would say that it is our very firm desire to be able to improve our relations with the three countries of the Maghreb. We are probably being more successful in that with Morocco and Tunisia than we have been with Algeria, but I think that we are working very hard to improve those relations with Algeria also. We define our interests as in a stable and developing North Africa. We are as concerned with the development of the economies—I suppose particularly of Tunisia and Morocco because they don't have the oil wealth that Algeria has—but we are also concerned with the development of the economy of Algeria. We are as concerned with that as we are with the development of their security. And we believe that in the course of the economic development, and in our own improved economic ties with all three countries, that there is more hope for stability in the region than I suppose the public focus on this conflict in the Western Sahara would lead us to expect. □



Secretary of State Alexander Haig reviews Moroccan troops: "We have not challenged Morocco's use of American-supplied military equipment"

Photo: Owen Franken/Sygma

# Howard Wolpe,

## Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, U.S. House of Representatives

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INTERVIEWED BY TONY HODGES

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**AFRICA REPORT:** The administration recently requested an increase in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits for Morocco from \$30 million in fiscal year 1982 to \$100 million in fiscal year 1983. Why did the House Foreign Affairs Committee agree to an increase to only \$50 million?

**WOLPE:** For several reasons. The most immediate concern is that we do not think it wise for the United States to become implicated in the Spanish Saharan conflict; and we think there is a real danger that King Hassan's war in the Spanish Sahara could become an American war. We don't think that it should. We also think there is a danger that excessive military assistance flowing from this country may have the unintended consequence of prolonging the Spanish Saharan conflict. We think that it is much more in the interest of the United States to try to work to secure a peaceful resolution of that conflict. We think that a peaceful resolution of the conflict will serve both the Moroccans' own interest and the interest of the United States.

More generally, we see at least three distinct interests that need to be weighed as America approaches the question of our relationship to Morocco and the question of the Spanish Saharan conflict. First, there is a genuine issue of self-determination in the former Spanish Sahara, and the creation of an opportunity for genuine self-determination in that region is consistent with both our own history and our own values. Secondly, we have an interest in maintaining a positive relationship with Morocco. Morocco has been a traditional friend. Morocco has been supportive of Ameri-

can policies in the Middle East and has supported American positions in international forums. And we have an interest in seeing that Morocco is capable of defending its own territorial integrity. Thirdly, we have an interest in obtaining a peaceful solution in the Spanish Sahara. We see continued escalation of that conflict involving very serious risks, in terms of the involvement of powers from outside the region. We see harm being done to our relationships with Algeria, where we have oil and other substantial economic interests and where you have a country that is anti-Soviet and is assuming an increasingly critical leadership role with respect to the Third World. It's also a country that was enormously helpful to the United States in our Iranian hostage-taking situation.

We also think that the longer the conflict continues, the greater the difficulties that the Organization of African Unity will experience and the greater will be the strain between the United States and the majority of states in the OAU. So, for all these reasons, we think that, very bluntly, while some military assistance to Morocco is appropriate, consistent with our own objectives of helping Morocco to maintain its own territorial integrity and security, that the administration's request simply went too far and cannot be justified in terms of those general considerations.

**AFRICA REPORT:** The Reagan administration would appear to believe that, without the provision of considerable military assistance, Morocco might not be able to effectively sustain its defenses against the Polisario guerrillas



# Gnassingbe Eyadema,

## President of the Republic of Togo

INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

**AFRICA REPORT:** How would you define the political and economic system of Togo?

**EYADEMA:** For the past two years our country has been governed under a constitutional system. Before reaching this situation, we passed through several stages. You will recall that during the first few years of independence we underwent a series of upheavals. The politicians at that time had transformed the country into a playing field for settling their personal accounts. This situation almost plunged the country into civil war. At the request of the people, the army intervened for the first time in 1963 to re-establish law and order. The armed forces immediately handed the country back to civilian rule, since they had no political ambitions. Unfortunately these new political masters quickly returned the country to its earlier unhappy state.

For the second time at the behest of our people, the army was obliged to intervene to save the country yet again after it had reached the brink of civil war. Several years later, judging that its mission to bring about national reconciliation had been carried out, the army decided to withdraw. That decision did not meet with the people's approval. We came to understand that the people wanted real peace. That is why we took the decision in 1969 to create the Togolese Peoples Rally [RPT], a party that gives the Togolese an ideal framework for liberal and democratic discussion. Ten years later the people decided to institutionalize the system and as a result democratic elections and a referendum were held in December 1979.

Today our constitutional government follows its normal course. On the economic front we have a system characterized as liberal. You will note that, bearing in mind the low level of capital accumulation and the small number of businessmen who are nationals, the state has intervened to create the basic infrastructure that is indispensable for the development of our economy. Nevertheless, our country attaches great importance to promoting both domestic and foreign private enterprise. In this regard we are paying spe-

cial attention to the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Your critics accuse you of having seized power by force, of pursuing an oppressive regime, and of undertaking a cult of personality in an extreme form. How do you reply to these accusations?

**EYADEMA:** Anyone who wants an excuse to drown a dog will say it has rabies! As I just said, every time the army had






Photo: Camerapix

**President Eyadema: "Every time the army intervened in the political life of Togo, it was at our people's behest"**

to intervene in the political life of our country, it did so at our people's behest. On two separate occasions, the army expressed its wish to return power to civilian rule but the people categorically rejected such a hand-over. Anyone who has observed the politics of this country over recent years will appreciate that it is within our vanguard party, the RPT, that all our problems are freely and democratically solved.

As for the alleged repressive system of which you speak, we consider such an accusation no more than a whimsical outburst! In 1963, at the time of its first intervention, the army set free 2,507 political prisoners. In 1967, following its second intervention, a further 500 were set free. Today there are exactly three political detainees in Togo. To start off, there were five of them, but since January 13 two have been set free. They had been jailed for their participation in the 1977 mercenary plot to assassinate me, a plot that was also intended to destabilize the country. You can judge the situation for yourself. Beyond that we are ready to welcome any organization that would like to visit Togo's prisons. Furthermore, such a visit would not be the first. The Red Cross and Amnesty International have already been here.

**AFRICA REPORT:** The Togolese economy is based upon phosphates, coffee, and cocoa. What steps do you intend to take to diversify the situation?

**EYADEMA:** For several years now we have been taking measures to diversify our economy. It is true that phosphates are important, but it is agriculture that is vital to our economy. We are sparing no effort to promote this sector. The year of 1975 was named as the Year of the Peasant, in order to strengthen rural life. Then in 1977 during a national seminar, we launched the Green Revolution. The overriding

objective of that program was to produce more and become less dependent on the outside world.

Beyond that, the party and the government have endowed the country with a wide range of institutions providing for the marketing of crops by the peasant producers. At the same time we have stressed the necessity of widening the range of products destined for export. On the industrial front our activity has concentrated on the processing of our agricultural products. Specifically we have opted for agro-industrial complexes and for canneries for our agricultural products. To that should be added the development of our cultural and tourism resources.

**AFRICA REPORT:** The Western nations look upon Togo as a good, anticommunist friend. Do you accept this compliment?

**EYADEMA:** For the past 15 years, our country has followed an open-door policy. The corollary of that is cooperation with all countries on the basis of reciprocal equality and respect for national sovereignty. Togo is a member of the United Nations and follows a policy of positive neutrality. That option permits us to have relations with all states, without exception. For us, ideological considerations are not a factor when it comes to choosing friends.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How are your relations with Ghana since the Rawlings coup? Your neighbor to the east, Benin, is a socialist state. Aren't you rather isolated in this region?

**EYADEMA:** We have good relations with those two countries. I am sure you will agree with us in recognizing that each country has the right to choose freely its own political options. For us Togolese, the essential fact is that together with these countries we may be able to build our continent. Hence, in pursuit of this theme we created the

Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] to deal with our economic problems—the only battle really worth fighting. Within this organization our respective political options are not a factor. Whatever our ideology might be, we are agreed that what really matters is economics and the development of our nations.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Although your country is small you have personally acted as mediator in several African disputes. How do you explain this?

**EYADEMA:** It is true we are a small country. But the measure of a country does not go only according to its size or population. We have a saying in Togo that "If your neighbor's house catches fire you should help him extinguish it; otherwise the blaze might spread to engulf your house as well." This saying explains our desire to be ready at the side of our African brother in seeking solutions to the problems of our continent. It is our belief that no development can take place unless there is peace. That is why we do everything we can to preserve our continent from conflict that might detract us from the economic struggle we are waging for the good of our peoples. That is the context within which we have made our contribution toward the peaceful settlement of certain conflicts in our continent.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What is the status of your relations with the United States? Would you like to see an increase in trade, investment, and aid? What differences exist between the two countries in international affairs?

**EYADEMA:** We have good relations with the United States. The Americans are helping us in carrying out a number of projects, notably in the fields of education, village water supplies, and agriculture. We have pursued this relationship in the interest of our peoples. For us Togolese, development remains our overriding objective. We are counting upon domestic and foreign investors to achieve that aim.

With that goal in mind, we are hoping for closer economic relations between Togo and the United States. As for international affairs, the two countries often take the same positions. Peace and stability are principles that our two countries hold dear. Like Togo, the United States makes an effort to create a climate favorable to peace and stability in the world.

One example that I could cite is the Malvinas crisis. The solutions proposed by the U.S. in search of a peaceful outcome to this conflict have points that resemble the Togo proposal. In fact, in the course of an audience that I granted to a special envoy of the Argentine president on April 15 I made the following proposals: "(1) withdrawal of the Argentinian forces from the Malvinas in conformity with UN Resolution 502 of April 3, 1982; (2) the dispatch of UN Blue Berets to the archipelago; and (3) continuation of the U.S. mediation." We hope that active diplomacy will contribute to a peaceful and definitive solution to this crisis in order to avoid the useless loss of human life.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Mr. President, is there anything you would like to say to American readers of *Africa Report*?

**EYADEMA:** I have already made it clear that development is our principle objective. Nevertheless, we are developing within a complex environment characterized by an extremely difficult set of economic circumstances. The prices for our agricultural exports continue to fall. The arbitrary fixing of the prices of our produce by the industrialized countries is one of the components of the constant worsening of the international economic situation. These two phenomena are such as to throw our economic development plans into disarray. That is why we are looking for a strengthening of cooperation among those nations who believe in peace, in order to hasten the arrival of a new international economic order, marked by greater justice in economic relations. □



Phosphate mine near Lomé: "Our country attaches great importance to promoting both domestic and foreign private enterprise"

Photo: United Nations

## U.S. steps up negotiations to resolve Namibia independence

The Reagan administration is moving forward "on an urgent basis" toward a settlement of the Namibia independence issue, according to the State Department.

The stepped-up negotiations in June included the dispatch of Gen. Vernon Walters, the U.S. special envoy, for talks with front-line African leaders, a meeting in Bonn between Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and Sam Nujoma, president of the South-West African People's Organization, and "contact group" consultations in Angola, Zambia and Tanzania.

Nujoma said SWAPO still re-

jected the voting formula as too complicated, but added that he now believed the U.S. wanted a speedy end to the conflict.

Apparently, the U.S. and the other contact group nations have shelved for the time being "phase one," which contains the ticklish voting proposals, and are proceeding with "phase two," which concerns the ceasefire, the UN peacekeeping force and the withdrawal of South African troops and SWAPO forces to designated bases.

In a reversal of its doubts over the "impartiality" of the UN, South Africa reportedly is ready to endorse "phase two," except for

some questions about the size and composition of the UN force.

A key element in the new contact group package may be formal linkage between the withdrawal of South African troops in Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Reportedly, this direct linkage was decided after secret talks this year between Walters and Cuban officials in Havana and meetings between Crocker and senior Angolan officials.

The U.S. ambassador to Pretoria, Herman Nickel, was optimistic this month that phase two could be implemented by the middle of September, with a goal of elections next March. (London *Times*, May 22, June 3 and 4, 1982; *Financial Times*, June 3, 4 and 8, 1982; *Washington Post*, June 3, 1982; *Johannesburg Star*, May 22, 1982.) □

## Zimbabwe seeks European investment

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and several ministers made a three-week tour of Europe in May and June in an attempt to attract aid and private investment. Since independence two years ago, Zimbabwe has managed to obtain only an estimated \$40 million in foreign investment.

Mugabe and his aides, principally Dr. Bernard Chidzero, the Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, repeatedly emphasized to the Europeans that Zimbabwe offers good protection for investments, as stipulated in the constitution, which Mugabe called "the most rigid in the world." Zimbabwe's refusal to adopt an investment code safeguarding foreign capital and facilitating the repatriation of profits is apparently the reason for the reluctance of European and American investors.

The Zimbabwean team's tour may have proved disappointing, though, for on his return Mugabe hinted at a softening of his government's attitude. In Harare in June,

Mugabe said: "If there is a need for an investment code, we will consider having one." Later, the state-owned Zimbank, noting that the economy will remain "sluggish" for a while, appealed for action to attract foreign investment and boost exports.

The government was more successful in receiving its promised foreign aid. West Germany signed a \$70 million aid agreement and Greece agreed to provide economic, tourist and trade assistance.

The other major mission of the European tour, linked to the investment appeals, was an effort to counterbalance what the government regards as an undeservedly bad press overseas. Officials cited the press coverage of the dismissal of Joshua Nkomo from the government and decried the "hysterical overreaction," particularly the erroneous predictions of public unrest and civil war. (*Financial Times*, May 18 and June 8, 1982; *New York Times*, June 2, 1982; Harare Radio, May 25, 1982; *London Times*, May 21, 1982.) □

## Whites and blacks denounce 'reforms'

Moderate whites joined blacks in denouncing the President's Council's proposals in May that Coloureds (mixed-race people) and Indians—but not the black majority—be included in a new multiracial governmental system.

In Durban, Gatsha Buthelezi, the KwaZulu homeland leader, shared a platform with Dr. Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the parliamentary opposition. Slabbert called the reforms "nefarious" and Buthelezi warned of "the forces of pent-up frustrations and violent reactions." Afterward, the right-wing Conservative Party attempted to get the security police to press charges against Buthelezi for "intemperate" language. Buthelezi later said that polarization between black and white has "never been worse than it is now."

*Continued on next page*

## WESTERN AFRICA

### Benin

● President Mathieu Kérékou carried out a ministerial reshuffle in April, resulting in a cabinet composed of more civilians, 13, than military men, nine, for the first time since the 1972 coup d'état. Kérékou retained for himself the Minister of Defense position.

Two cabinet ministers said to be of a strong pro-Soviet orientation were sacked and another demoted. Simon Ifede Ogouma, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was replaced by Tiamiou Ajibade, ambassador to West Germany. Capt. Philippe Akpo, who had been relieved of his position as Minister of Rural Development in 1980, was named Minister of Public Health, taking over from Paul Kpoffon. And François Codjo Azodogbehou, formerly Minister of Rural Development, was posted as prefect of the province of Oueme, replaced by Gedeon Dassoundo.

Another significant move was the sacking of the Minister of Information, Martin Dohou Azonhiho, demoted to the position of prefect of Mono province, and replaced by Amidou Baba Moussa. Azonhiho

### South Africa admits atrocities in Namibia

The South African army has admitted that some troops are responsible for atrocities against the Namibian people and said "several" soldiers will be prosecuted.

"We do get our rotten apples," said Commandant As Kleynhans in Namibia. The army announcement followed three reports this year by church groups, which made allegations of atrocities. (Johannesburg *Star*, June 5, 1982; London *Times*, June 2, 1982.)

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Trade unionists have warned of more labor unrest as the number of strikes so far this year approaches the total for 1981, South Africa's second-biggest strike year ever.

Last year, according to a report by the government's National Manpower Commission, there were 342 strikes, nearly all technically illegal, involving 93,000 workers, most of them black. The worst year for strikes was 1973, with 370 and 98,000 workers involved. Black union leaders pointed out, however, that many work stoppages are not reported to the government and thus not included in the official statistics.

Many of last year's strikes focused on company pension schemes, which black workers believed were inequitable and inadequate. This year, because of the recessionary economy, most strikes are in support of higher wages,

against lay-offs and for union recognition.

Strikes increased last year although security police attention turned away from militant students toward the leaders of unregistered black unions. While only 21 out of 768 people detained in the years 1979 and 1980 were trade unionists, in 1981 more than 300 trade unionists were arrested out of a country-wide total of 722.

In detailing the 1981 strike statistics, the commission chairman, Dr. Hennie Reynders, said there was "no reason for unnecessary alarm." Noting that the strikes affected production less than in most industrialized nations, Reynders said, "We must guard against regarding every strike as virtually a national crisis." (Johannesburg *Star*, May 29, 1982; *Sowetan*, May 27, 1982; London *Guardian*, May 26, 1982.) □

### Reforms continued

At another meeting in Durban, Bishop Desmond Tutu, the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, again urged Indians and Coloureds not to join the whites in the proposed new political system. Blacks would never forget, Tutu said, that "Indians and Coloureds deserted us and delayed our liberation," and he warned of a "day of reckoning."

Albert Robinson, a director of the Anglo American conglomerate, said that any serious attempt to confine political power to just whites, Coloureds and Indians would lead to chaos and civil war. (London *Times*, June 3, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, May 22 and 29, 1982; *Sowetan*, May 21, 27 and 28, 1982.) □

## WESTERN AFRICA

### Benin

● President Mathieu Kérékou carried out a ministerial reshuffle in April, resulting in a cabinet composed of more civilians, 13, than military men, nine, for the first time since the 1972 coup d'état. Kérékou retained for himself the Minister of Defense position.

Two cabinet ministers said to be of a strong pro-Soviet orientation were sacked and another demoted. Simon Ifede Ogouma, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was replaced by Tiamiou Ajibade, ambassador to West Germany. Capt. Philippe Akpo, who had been relieved of his position as Minister of Rural Development in 1980, was named Minister of Public Health, taking over from Paul Kpoffon. And François Codjo Azodogbehou, formerly Minister of Rural Development, was posted as prefect of the province of Oueme, replaced by Gedeon Dassoundo.

Another significant move was the sacking of the Minister of Information, Martin Dohou Azonhiho, demoted to the position of prefect of Mono province, and replaced by Amidou Baba Moussa. Azonhiho

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battalions from Chad. Meanwhile, the three countries supplying the troops met in Kinshasa in late May, setting down the following additional conditions: a ceasefire timetable by June 10 to lead to negotiations and elections, and \$36 million from the UN to pay for the peace-keeping force for three months. The UN had approved a resolution earlier in the month calling for voluntary contributions to a fund to help finance the force.

## The Gambia

● Sir Dawda Jawara was re-elected President of the Gambia in May, defeating his opponent Sherif Dibba, who campaigned from a prison cell where he is awaiting trial in connection with last July's coup attempt.

Observers indicated that the victory of Jawara and his People's Progressive Party, which won 27 of the contested 35 parliamentary seats, demonstrated popular approval for the Senegambia confederation, which went into effect in February.

Dibba, whose National Convention Party won three seats, lost his parliamentary seat in the elections. He had accused Jawara of failing to consult the people properly before setting up Senegambia. He is being held on charges that the NCP was involved in last July's armed revolt, which was crushed by Senegalese troops. The NCP has denied any involvement in the revolt.

In late May, Jawara formed a new cabinet, dismissing Vice President Assan Camara, who was replaced by former Information Minister Bakary Darbo. Other demoted ministers included: Local Government Minister M.L. Sako, formerly Justice Minister, and Agriculture Minister Saihou Sabally, who was replaced as Minister of Finance by Sherif Sisay. (*West Africa*, May 10 and 24, 1982; *London Guardian*, May 4 and 7, 1982; *London Times*, May 7, 1982.)

## Ghana

● Ghana and Libya signed several agreements in May following the visit to Accra of Maj. Abdel Salam Jalloud, deputy to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, which will temporarily ease Ghana's economic plight and strengthen bilateral relations.

Libya will provide Ghana with 360,000 tons of crude oil worth \$97 million—about 60 percent of the oil needed for the next six months—at favorable prices. Ghana will have a grace period of one year to begin payment for the oil, and then six months in which to remit the funds, which will enable the country to use its export earnings for urgently needed imports of raw materials and other goods. Ghana was allocating some 50 percent of its export revenues to meet the cost of oil imports.

Libya will also provide Ghana with 50 tractors, medicines and assistance for the mining industry, and a joint holding company, the Ghana-Libya Arab Bank, will be set up.

Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings, chairman of the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) which overthrew President Hilla Limann's government last New Year's Eve, filled the remaining ministerial vacancies in his government in May, appointing Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, a Legon law lecturer, Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning. K.K. Kwayei was named Secretary for Labor and Social Welfare. Botchwey presented a revised budget statement shortly after his appointment, and among the economic measures introduced were a reduction by nearly one-half of interest rates to encourage capital investment, and a sharp drop in the amount of money in circulation.

All outstanding trade debts and sales of goods and services are to be paid via the banking system, not by cash, in order to facilitate savings for productive investment. The income tax legislation is to be reviewed and the interest rate on all agricultural loans was slashed from 20 to eight percent, to encourage small scale farming.

Stricter controls over government expenditure will be introduced, and in early June it was announced that Ghana will close one-quarter of its embassies worldwide.

In other news, 74 officials of the banned People's National Party of former President Hilla Limann were freed by the government in April. The PNDC also announced that all three universities and other higher education institutions would

be reopened and encouraged to restructure their systems of education to reflect the new "revolutionary trends." Students had been enlisted to perform various tasks after the coup, including the removal of cocoa rotting in the bush. (*West Africa*, May 10, 17, 24 and June 7, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, June 3, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982.)

## Guinea

● President Sekou Touré was re-elected to a seven-year term of office in May, winning 100 percent of the votes cast. He has been President since 1958, and is Africa's longest serving leader. He was the only candidate in the election. (*West Africa*, May 17, 1982.)

## Guinea-Bissau

● In a cabinet reshuffle in May, President João Bernardo Vieira took over the Armed Forces and Interior ministries and appointed Victor Saude Maria, formerly President of the Council of the Revolution and Minister of Foreign Affairs, as Prime Minister. The post had been vacant since Vieira seized power in 1980.

Lamine Mane was named Foreign Minister, relinquishing the Natural Resources ministry. Former Armed Forces Minister Paulo Correia was named Rural Development Minister. Correia was implicated in a coup attempt while Vieira was in Cuba in March; however, the President denied that an attempt had taken place.

Former Central Bank governor Vitor Monteiro was named Economy and Finance Minister and the Economic Planning ministry was made into a secretariat of state. (*West Africa*, April 12 and May 24, 1982.)

## Ivory Coast

● Phillips Petroleum Co.'s Ivory Coast subsidiary announced in late May that oil and natural gas was found in two discovery wells and one development well offshore.

The company also reported the completion of the construction of the second of four development wells in the Espoir field off the Ivory Coast.

The Phillips unit is the operator and majority stake holder, with 57.5 percent, in the Ivory Coast wells. Other participants include AGIP, Ltd. with 22.5 percent, Sedco Inc. with 10 percent and Petroci, Ivory Coast's national oil company, with 10 percent. (*Wall Street Journal*, May 26, 1982.)

## Liberia

● In May, Liberia's head of state, Samuel Doe, undertook his first official visits outside of Africa since he seized power in April 1980, traveling to the People's Republic of China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to solicit aid for his financially strapped nation.

Doe's trip abroad came a few weeks after Liberia celebrated Redemption Day, the second anniversary of the military coup in which former President William Tolbert was killed. Doe had temporarily lifted strictly enforced curfew restrictions "to afford the Liberian people the possibility of joyously participating in national Redemption Day celebrations," which were marked by a speech by the head of state and other festivities. When Doe returned from his trip abroad, he announced the permanent lifting of the curfew, which had been in force since his coup.

Doe met with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang during his visit and won a \$30 million loan to revive the Liberian Sugar Corp., and \$13 million to renovate the port of Harper, according to Radio Monrovia. Liberia and South Korea signed two agreements on economic and technical cooperation.

The Liberian head of state also reportedly accepted an invitation to visit the U.S., although a date has not been set for the trip. Meanwhile, the U.S. has agreed to send Liberia \$15 million worth of rice, proceeds from which will be used to finance several agricultural projects.

And a UN mission to Liberia headed by Under Secretary-General Abdurahim Farak earlier in the year recommended a \$400 million aid package to assist the country in overcoming its economic problems, which include a 4.4 percent decline in national revenue, a budget deficit and an acute shortage of currency. The UN official recommended \$200

million in aid to finance public investment and infrastructure programs and another \$200 million for priority development projects. (*West Africa*, April 26, May 3, 10, 17 and 24, 1982; Radio Monrovia, May 18, 1982; London *Guardian*, April 12, 1982.)

## Mali

● Geological prospecting carried out in Mali over the last few years has resulted in the discoveries of substantial deposits of gold, kimberlite, phosphates, zinc, lithium, barium, copper and other metals, according to Sekou Diallo, director general of the national Geology and Mining Department.

Promising gold deposits were found in the Kalan region with the assistance of Soviet specialists. A mine is under construction with Soviet aid. The kimberlite deposits are said to contain considerable diamond resources.

And the extraction of phosphates is being carried out in Markala and Bouarem, the mining of which is expected to net 10,000 tons this year. (*West Africa*, May 24, 1982.)

## Mauritania

● The sixth summit of Saharan states was held earlier in the year in Nouakchott, opened by Mauritanian President Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla, who called for a "clean-up of the Saharan political climate by transcending sub-regional conflicts." He also appealed for a peaceful settlement of the Chad and Western Sahara disputes, and said that sub-regional economic integration was the best way to resist domination by industrialized countries.

The meeting was also attended by the Presidents of Algeria, Chad and Mali, but Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya and President Seyni Kountché of Niger did not attend, although they were represented by Maj. Abdessalam Jalloud and Foreign Minister Daouda Diallo, respectively.

The final communique of the meeting reaffirmed the six nations support for the right of self-determination of the Western Sahara people, but avoided mentioning Polisario and its self-proclaimed government, the Saharan Arab Demo-

cratic Republic (SADR) by name. The SADR's admission to the OAU as a member state in February remains a divisive issue among African governments.

Mauritania was formerly allied with Morocco for the control of the disputed Western Sahara, but withdrew from the conflict in 1979 and does not officially recognize the SADR, although it has received Polisario delegations. Recognition could draw Mauritania back into the conflict, although on the side of Polisario, a situation which the government seeks to avoid.

Morocco has recently alleged that Mauritania allows Polisario to use its territory for attacks against Moroccan troops and physically backs the guerrillas. The Mauritanian Information Minister, Moustafa Diop, countered the allegation with: "We do not want . . . to be drawn back into the war. To our knowledge, neither Polisario nor Morocco use our territory, but it is vast. Do you think we have a surplus of food or equipment to give abroad? Mauritania cannot afford the luxury of aiding another state." (*Africa Research Bulletin*, April 15, 1982; *West Africa*, April 5 and 12, 1982.)

## Niger

● Students at Niamey University's regional Issa Korombe and Kassai schools went on strike in late April for three weeks because of their objections to a recent conference on education at Zinder which proposed cost-cutting measures including a reduction in the number of residential students and a parental or village contribution to grants.

Students cited other major complaints about the Niger educational system, including insufficient cafeterias and lodging facilities, lack of teachers and non-payment of grants, according to a spokesman for the Union of Nigerien Students. Following discussions with four government ministers, the government reportedly agreed in principle to grant recognition to the union, a status it had not previously been accorded. Talks were scheduled to take place on the other demands of the students.

In other news, exile sources reported in May that three political



prisoners died in Niamey after being mistreated. Sidde Hassane, secretary-general of the National Union of Niger Workers from 1969 to 1974, died at a prison camp at Tillaberi shortly after his arrest. The two others were arrested with several others in the wake of an alleged sabotage plot in April in the northern mining city of Arlit. Fourteen Tuaregs, including 13 Malians and one Nigerian, were said to have been plotting to sabotage the Arlit uranium mines and reportedly confessed to having links with Abdoulaye Diori, son of former President Hamani Diori, who was overthrown in 1974. (*West Africa*, May 24 and 31, 1982.)

- According to a late April report in *Jeune Afrique*, the Niger government is moving closer to civilian rule with its decision to transform the National Development Council, an organization composed of all sectors of the population, into a **constituent assembly**, the first since the military came to power eight years ago.

President Seyni Kountché announced the move in April in a speech marking the eighth anniversary of the army's taking power. According to Kountché, "the aim is to associate everyone in the responsible management of Niger's affairs."

The constituent assembly will have strong representation among rural people, and half of the seats will be held by members of Samariya, a youth association, and of cooperatives, "the two pillars of development in Niger society." (*Jeune Afrique*, April 28, 1982.)

## Nigeria

- Nigeria's decision to support the oil price and production levels set by OPEC earlier in the year, causing a serious decline in oil revenues and therefore a foreign exchange crisis, forced the country to impose a wide range of **austerity measures** in April and May aimed at reducing imports.

Nigeria's oil output increased in May from a March low of 680,000 barrels a day to 1.3 million a day, following Saudi Arabia's threats of heavy sanctions against international oil companies cutting shipments from Nigeria.

Among the austerity measures designed to discourage imports and preserve foreign exchange that were introduced by the Nigerian government in April and May were: import restrictions on a wide range of goods, withholding of import licenses for goods also made in Nigeria, suspension and review of planned capital projects not yet under way, shutting of private docks and jetties to discourage smuggling, and an increase in excise duties.

In early June, it was reported that Nigeria has drawn more than \$740 million in special drawing rights from the IMF to support its foreign reserves. Because of the declining oil revenues and a soaring trade deficit, Nigeria's reserves fell to \$1.4 billion in late March, enough to cover only one month of imports. The Nigerian government also reportedly negotiated a six-month interest-free loan of \$1 billion from Saudi Arabia, in return for not breaking ranks with OPEC. The IMF drawings and the Saudi loan were said to give Nigeria the required breathing space to allow the import restrictions to take effect.

Meanwhile, observers indicated that the import curbs are likely to result in an economic slowdown, inflation and rising unemployment in the West African country. (*Financial Times*, April 21, May 20, June 2 and 5, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, May 14, 1982; *London Guardian*, May 6, 1982.)

- In May, President Shehu Shagari granted a pardon to former **Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu**, leader of the secessionist state of Biafra during the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war, as "a final seal put on the rehabilitation and reconciliation measures" following the war.

Ojukwu had been living in the Ivory Coast for the last 12 years, and was expected to return home to Nigeria. His re-entry onto the Nigerian political scene a year before national elections take place could have an effect on their outcome.

Observers speculated that Ojukwu will support President Shagari's ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN), thereby dividing the Ibo vote in the eastern states that once made up Biafra between his supporters and those of Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Ibo leader. Azikiwe,

leader of the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), broke an alliance with the NPN and formed an opposition front with the Unity party of Nigeria (UPN), led by Obafemi Awolowo, earlier in the year. The important Ibo vote can reportedly decide the outcome of the election between the northern-based NPN and western-based UPN.

In other news, the Nigerian Federal Electoral Commission (Fedeco) registered a new party, the Nigerian Advance Party (NAP), led by Lagos lawyer Tunji Braithwaite, bringing the number of legal political parties to six. (*West Africa*, June 7, 1982; *London Observer*, May 23, 1982; *Financial Times*, May 20, 1982.)

## Sierra Leone

- Violence and serious voting irregularities marred Sierra Leone's first elections under the one-party All People's Congress set up by President Siaka Stevens in 1978. Over 200 candidates approved by the party executive were contesting the 85 seats in the 104-member parliament. Twelve seats are reserved for tribal chiefs and seven members are nominated by the President.

Abdulai Conteh, Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister, was among the more than 100 reported injured in the violence of the election campaigns leading up to the May 1 voting. Election results in 13 of Sierra Leone's 66 constituencies were annulled because of reports of ballot-rigging and fighting between rival supporters, and new elections for those districts were scheduled for late June.

Nearly 40 members of parliament lost their seats in the one-party legislature, including two cabinet ministers. Thirteen other ministers were elected unopposed and 17 members of the old parliament were re-elected.

Stevens, defending the election process at a press conference, said: "When you consider our own position here, this backwater of the world with 80 to 90 percent illiteracy, difficult means of communication, we won't praise ourselves. We could have done better, but we are satisfied that we have done our best, and that we have done fairly well."

When asked whether he would step down from the presidency as he had earlier said at the last APC convention, Stevens responded: "You want to see me out? Leave that to me and my people. I am old enough to know when I am no longer wanted."

Stevens followed the elections with the appointment of 25 cabinet ministers, five ministers of state and ten parliamentary special assistants. Stevens retained for himself the Minister of Defense portfolio, and appointed Salia Jusu Sheriff as Minister of Finance. Sheriff, an accountant, is widely respected for his honesty and integrity and is seen as a suitable choice to manage Sierra Leone's ailing economy, which has been wracked by several financial scandals over the last year.

Abdulai Conteh remains Foreign Minister, and Abass Bundu was appointed Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Sheka Kanu takes over the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning from S.S. Banya, who was named Minister of the Interior. (*West Africa*, May 10, 17 and 24, 1982; *London Times*, April 19, May 3 and 7, 1982.)

## Upper Volta

- The government of Upper Volta led by Col. Saye Zerbo continued to be plagued by **labor unrest** in April, when six unions formerly affiliated with the Voltaic Trade Union Confederation (CSV) before it was dissolved called a 72-hour general strike.

The labor action was called to protest government limitations on the right to strike and to demand the re-legalization of the CSV and the lifting of an arrest warrant for former CSV secretary-general Soumana Toure. Toure has been in hiding since last November. According to reports, however, the strike did not receive unanimous support and many workers returned to their jobs after the first 24 hours. Some 60 civil servants were sacked by the Minister for Public Works and Labor for responding to the strike call.

The Secretary of State for Information, Capt. Thomas Sankara, resigned from the government in late April, reportedly in connection with his opposition to restrictions placed on the trade unions and the press.

He was replaced by Capt. Adama Ouedraogo. (*West Africa*, April 26, May 10 and 17, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982.)

## EASTERN AFRICA

### Comoros

- In legislative elections held for the Comoran parliament in March, 37 out of 38 seats were won by candidates supporting President Ahmed Abdallah.

The budget for fiscal 1982 reflects the aim of the Comoran authorities to stop further deterioration of the economy. Besides an increase in domestic revenue and a new tax on business turnover, which will increase state revenue, several measures have been taken to limit expenditures. These include setting up of a financial controller, establishment of a quarterly system of payment, increasing control over certain expenditures such as oil and transport, and reducing the size of the civil service by one-third. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982.)

### Djibouti

- Djibouti has received a \$3 million **credit** from the International Development Association, the soft loan arm of the World Bank, to improve its capacity to prepare and coordinate its development strategy.

At the same time, a 200-bedroom Sheraton Hotel offering the first international standard accommodations has opened after the recent rebuilding of Djibouti's airport and harbor facilities. To become "the Zurich of Africa and the Hong Kong of the Red Sea," as Commerce Minister Aden Robleh Awaleh put it, Djibouti is promoting itself as a haven for banks. Some advantages that Djibouti boasts include a currency that has the confidence of traders and international bankers and no exchange controls affecting money brought in or out of the country. (*New African*, June 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1982.)

### Ethiopia

- Ethiopia's massive offensive against guerrillas in Eritrea was re-

ported in May to have failed. The main aim of the 100,000 man force was apparently to capture the town of Nakfa, but it was not accomplished.

Reports said the government's army suffered heavy casualties, perhaps 20,000 killed or wounded. The failure was seen as a personal blow to Ethiopia's head of state, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had personally directed the offensive. A huge team of Soviet advisers was said to have helped direct the campaign. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982; *Economist*, May 15, 1982.)

### Kenya

- Kenya now has three **detainees** held without trial after having had none for more than three years. Among the three men arrested in June was George Anyona, a member of parliament until the nation's only party, the Kenya African National Union (Kanu), refused him clearance as a candidate.

In May, Anyona, who is a former detainee and longtime critic of the government, was expelled from Kanu, along with Oginga Odinga, the former Vice President and ex-detainee. Odinga and Anyona reportedly had been talking about starting a party in opposition to Kanu. Kanu's organizing secretary said the expulsions should serve as a warning to any party member who tries "to create disunity" among Kenyans. Shortly afterward, the national assembly made Kanu the only legal political party and outlawed opposition.

The others detained were Mwangi Muriithi, deputy director of intelligence until his dismissal in 1981, and John Khaminwa, a lawyer for Muriithi and Anyona, who was detained after he brought habeas corpus petitions for their release. The three are detained under the Preservation of Public Security Act, for which habeas corpus does not apply.

Before the detentions, President Daniel arap Moi threatened tough action against "revolutionaries promoting foreign ideologies." For the last few months, Odinga has sharply criticized the government and three colleges were closed down in May

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The budget for fiscal 1982 reflects the aim of the Comoran authorities to stop further deterioration of the economy. Besides an increase in domestic revenue and a new tax on business turnover, which will increase state revenue, several measures have been taken to limit expenditures. These include setting up of a financial controller, establishment of a quarterly system of payment, increasing control over certain expenditures such as oil and transport, and reducing the size of the civil service by one-third. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982.)

### Djibouti

- Djibouti has received a \$3 million **credit** from the International Development Association, the soft loan arm of the World Bank, to improve its capacity to prepare and coordinate its development strategy.

At the same time, a 200-bedroom Sheraton Hotel offering the first international standard accommodations has opened after the recent rebuilding of Djibouti's airport and harbor facilities. To become "the Zurich of Africa and the Hong Kong of the Red Sea," as Commerce Minister Aden Robleh Awaleh put it, Djibouti is promoting itself as a haven for banks. Some advantages that Djibouti boasts include a currency that has the confidence of traders and international bankers and no exchange controls affecting money brought in or out of the country. (*New African*, June 1982; *African Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1982.)

### Ethiopia

- Ethiopia's massive offensive against guerrillas in Eritrea was re-

ported in May to have failed. The main aim of the 100,000 man force was apparently to capture the town of Nakfa, but it was not accomplished.

Reports said the government's army suffered heavy casualties, perhaps 20,000 killed or wounded. The failure was seen as a personal blow to Ethiopia's head of state, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had personally directed the offensive. A huge team of Soviet advisers was said to have helped direct the campaign. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982; *Economist*, May 15, 1982.)

### Kenya

- Kenya now has three **detainees** held without trial after having had none for more than three years. Among the three men arrested in June was George Anyona, a member of parliament until the nation's only party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), refused him clearance as a candidate.

In May, Anyona, who is a former detainee and longtime critic of the government, was expelled from KANU, along with Oginga Odinga, the former Vice President and ex-detainee. Odinga and Anyona reportedly had been talking about starting a party in opposition to KANU. KANU's organizing secretary said the expulsions should serve as a warning to any party member who tries "to create disunity" among Kenyans. Shortly afterward, the national assembly made KANU the only legal political party and outlawed opposition.

The others detained were Mwangi Muriithi, deputy director of intelligence until his dismissal in 1981, and John Khaminwa, a lawyer for Muriithi and Anyona, who was detained after he brought habeas corpus petitions for their release. The three are detained under the Preservation of Public Security Act, for which habeas corpus does not apply.

Before the detentions, President Daniel arap Moi threatened tough action against "revolutionaries promoting foreign ideologies." For the last few months, Odinga has sharply criticized the government and three colleges were closed down in May

after student boycotts of a political nature.

Odinga rebutted the criticism of his attacks on the government by saying, "To point out shortcomings is in fact a very healthy exercise and should not be construed as being anti-government." (London *Times*, June 7, 1982; Nairobi Radio, May 21, June 2 and 3, 1982; Kenya *Sunday Nation*, May 15 and 23, 1982.)

## Madagascar

- The International Monetary Fund has cut much of its \$85 million **standby credit** to Madagascar for 1982. Government failure to meet economic performance targets negotiated as conditions for the loans was said to be the main reason for the agency's withholding of funds. (*Financial Times*, April 20, 1982.)

## Mauritius

- Increased lobbying against the U.S. use of **Diego Garcia** island as a military base was expected as a major foreign policy initiative by the new socialist-inclined government of Mauritius that swept into power in mid-June.

The Mauritian Militant Movement's secretary-general, Paul Berenger, had said: "We consider Diego Garcia as our territory which has been stolen. We will do everything to recover it." The MMM will ask India, the OAU and the UN to support its claim. The MMM has also said it will be nonaligned and favors declaring the Indian Ocean a nuclear-free peace zone, a position supported by the area's other nations, Madagascar, Seychelles, Tanzania and Mozambique. The party has said it will end harbor rights at Port Louis for both U.S. and Soviet warships.

As for policy toward South Africa, while the former government built up tourism and trade the MMM is hostile to Pretoria. However, Berenger reversed policy a few days before the election, saying that Air Mauritius could continue to fly to South Africa, that South African Airways would not lose its landing rights on the island and South African investment would not be nationalized. (*New York Times*, June 13, 1982; *Financial Times*, June 9, 1982.)

## Seychelles

- The trial of seven foreign **mercenaries** accused of treason in last November's botched coup attempt has been postponed until the end of the trial of 43 mercenaries in South Africa for allegedly hijacking an Air India plane.

Umesh Saxena, the Air India pilot, told a South African commission sent to the Seychelles that he flew the plane to Durban under the threat of death and that he was warned by the gunmen not to use the word "hijack." India refused to let the aircraft's crew testify in South Africa because the two countries do not have diplomatic relations.

The Seychelles' government believes the coup stemmed from superpower interest in the Indian Ocean oil tanker routes, which are near the islands. The U.S. maintains a space-tracking station on Mahe island.

James Michel, the Seychelles' Information Minister and army chief of staff, said the South Africans have several motives for their alleged involvement. But he added that in the end the coup "has done more harm internationally to South Africa than to us." Michel also claimed that elements of the CIA—but not the U.S. government—were involved in the coup effort. (*London Guardian*, June 4, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982; *London Observer*, April 11, 1982.)

## Somalia

- President Mohamed Siad Barre's early March **cabinet reshuffle** appeared to have helped stabilize his control of the army, the power base for his regime, although not without inciting one coup attempt.

When Siad Barre dismissed 20 out of 25 ministers in his cabinet in March, the most significant change was the return of Gen. Mohamed Ali Samatar to the Defense Ministry. Samatar replaced Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed, who had held the post for the last two years. Observers noted that Siad Barre's attitude toward Mohamed changed when the general was perceived as acquiring too much influence in both the army and the government.

The President then assigned Mo-

hamed to the Health Ministry in a move that was deliberately intended to undercut his influence. On April 28, the dissident "Radio Kulmis" reported that an abortive coup attempt was led by Mohamed in collusion with other former cabinet ministers and army officials. Seventy army officers reportedly were arrested. The radio said the government is wary of the publicity if the men are brought to trial since some of the accused are said to be relatives of Siad Barre.

In spite of Siad Barre's consolidation of the army, serious rioting continued in northern Somalia, principally in Hargeisa, where government forces reportedly have killed and jailed many who protested the Mogadishu regime. Opposition has been growing in northern Somalia, which was a British protectorate before independence, since a new anti-government organization, the Somali National Movement (SNM), announced its formation in April 1981.

Observers noted that while the SNM has organized demonstrations, the Hargeisa incidents resulted more from Somalis' frustrations over economic problems than from the efforts of the SNM itself. Northern Somalia believes that it has suffered more than areas near the capital. (Mogadishu Radio, May 11, 1982; "Radio Kulmis," April 28, 30 and May 10, 1982; *London Times*, April 22, 1982; *London Observer*, April 11, 1982.)

## Tanzania

- In late April, the IMF suspended its **loan program** with Tanzania pending a renegotiation of the original borrowing agreement. Tanzania has lacked the foreign exchange to meet the loan requirements.

The extent of Tanzania's foreign exchange shortage is severe for a country that is already considered one of Africa's least developed nations. In addition to a widespread scarcity of domestic goods and services, a lack of spare parts for all sectors of its industry and transportation, international airlines may cancel their service to the country because the Bank of Tanzania has failed to pay the airlines in hard currency. Hence, President Julius Nyerere is asking countries aiding

Tanzania not to initiate projects but to salvage those under way so the country may begin to rebuild its economy.

While Tanzania has managed to secure food aid to counteract this year's poor harvest and severe drought, an inadequate transportation infrastructure will prevent the grain from being effectively distributed. It was likely that tons of imported grain would rot in the port of Dar es Salaam while villages in the remote areas of the country suffer. (London *Observer*, May 23, 1982; *Financial Times*, April 20 and May 21, 1982.)

## Uganda

● Uganda's economy appeared in June to be on the way to recovery, but the security situation remained volatile.

By May, the Ugandan government had carried out virtually all the recovery measures stipulated by the World Bank and the IMF. The bank then granted through its International Development Association (IDA) a \$70 million reconstruction loan to finance essential agricultural imports, spare parts and raw materials. The IDA also loaned a further \$35 million to help rehabilitate Uganda's industrial sector. However, the bank estimated in May that to implement fully the country's recovery program would require \$1.4 billion in aid over the next three years.

Meanwhile, President Milton Obote attempted to assert greater control over the undisciplined army, whose anti-guerrilla efforts have also included looting, robbing and killing of civilians. In June, a team of Commonwealth military instructors completed training of the first batch of Ugandan officers and NCOs who will be training the army.

Two American reporters were detained for two days in May when they tried to interview an army commander. They claimed they were beaten by soldiers.

In May, the government published a list of 237 people held without trial as security risks. On April 15, Amnesty International had urged the government to put a stop to "widespread killings, torture and the unlawful detention of civil-

ians." (London *Times*, June 7, 1982; *Financial Times*, May 28, 1982; London *Guardian*, May 13, 22 and 28, 1982; Kampala Radio, May 27, 1982.)

## CENTRAL AFRICA

### Cameroon

● In April, President Ahmadou Ahidjo paid his second visit to Britain since Cameroon's independence in 1960, a trip believed aimed at strengthening both London's and British business' links with the country where French economic ties are still dominant. France is Cameroon's main trading partner, providing over 43 percent of its imports, as well as substantial financial aid, whereas Britain supplies only 2.75 percent of imports.

Ahidjo's government has been making efforts to encourage British investment in Cameroon, and last November, to facilitate contacts. Douala/London routes were initiated on Cameroon Airlines and British Caledonia.

Ahidjo's visit came after two high-level trade missions visited Cameroon, one in late 1980 led by the British Minister of Trade, and the second in late 1981 led by the Duke of Kent, vice president of the British Board of Trade. The Cameroon President met with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym and representatives of the British private sector.

Concrete results of Ahidjo's trip included the signing of an investment promotion and protection agreement, a double taxation agreement and a pact whereby Britain will supply \$20 million worth of capital projects to Cameroon provided the work goes to British contractors.

In April, the British company Plessey won a new contract extending its work for the Garoua International Airport, the largest British construction project under way in Cameroon. The \$34 million original contract, part of a major modernization project for the airport, was awarded to Plessey in 1979 for systems design and management and supply of equipment and services. The new contract adds another \$10

million to the total value of the project. (*West Africa*, April 26 and May 3, 1982; *Jeune Afrique Economie*, May 1982; London *Times*, April 16, 1982.)

### Central African Republic

● Ange Patasse, leader of the opposition Central African People's Liberation Movement (MPLC), and implicated in the abortive March coup against President Andre Kolingba, arrived in Lomé, Togo in April, where he was granted asylum as a "political refugee."

Brig. Gen. François Bozize, former Minister of Information, and Gen. Alphonse Mbaikoua, former Justice Minister, both alleged coup plotters, fled the country, and Mbaikoua was reported to have reached southern Chad.

In his first speech to the nation nearly a month after the coup attempt, President Kolingba warned that order would be maintained and any attempts at subversion would be crushed with "the full vigor of the law." He attacked the officers who had attempted to lead the Central African Republic into "perilous and criminal adventures."

More than 60 people said to be members of the MPLC political bureau were arrested and imprisoned in March and were replaced in their administrative and economic posts by "more reliable people." Kolingba also reshuffled his cabinet in the wake of the coup, filling positions vacated by the alleged coup plotters, Bozize and Mbaikoua. A new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lt. Col. Jean-Louis Gervil-Yambala, was also appointed, and the Economy and Finance, and Trade and Industry Ministers were sacked for pro-Patasse sympathies. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, April 15 and May 15, 1982; *Jeune Afrique*, April 14, 1982; *West Africa*, April 5, 1982.)

### Equatorial Guinea

● The government of Equatorial Guinea expects to be inviting bids during the summer for permits to explore onshore and offshore oil. Gepsa, a joint venture of the Equatorial Guinea government and the Spanish state-owned Hispanoil, currently hold the only valid exploration-production permit in the

country and is drilling north of Bioko Island.

Although there has not yet been an oil discovery, Equatorial Guinea has been termed a "favorable area" for exploration according to Petroconsultants S.A., a Geneva-based company that is handling the project for the government and the World Bank.

And in mid-April, an international donors conference was held in Geneva, convened by the Equatorial Guinea government and organized with the cooperation of the UN Development Program to raise urgently needed financial assistance. Representatives of 29 countries, the European Economic Community, eight international organizations and various UN agencies were in attendance to discuss the government's reconstruction and development program, the \$141 million target cost of which was set by the UN.

Consultations between the Equatorial Guinea government and donor countries and organizations were arranged to discuss implementation of financial pledges.

Several "high priority" projects were determined by the UN to be necessary to pull Equatorial Guinea out of economic crisis, including a \$33 million agricultural development program, \$32.5 million for transport and development, \$23.8 million for improving water supplies and housing, and \$20 million for industrial development, mining and energy. (*West Africa*, April 26 and May 17, 1982.)

## Gabon

• In late May, an agreement was signed by an 18-member consortium representing six West European countries with the government of Gabon for the construction of the second phase of the **Trans-Gabon Railway** at a cost of \$560 million. The agreement provides for work to begin by the Office of the Trans-Gabon Railway and the Eurotrag consortium on a 211-mile section of the railway from Booue to Franceville, to be completed by late 1987. The first 205-mile stretch from Libreville to Booue is nearly finished.

The work will be financed by the Gabon government and by a loan guaranteed by the export credit or-

ganizations of the six European countries—France, Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Construction on the first leg of the railway was undertaken by Eurotrag, but without the participation of the two British companies now involved: Taylor Woodrow International and George Wimpey International. They joined the consortium in June 1981.

It is hoped that the railway will enable Gabon to exploit more of its natural resources such as iron, lead, zinc, copper, gold, diamonds, and timber. Manganese and uranium are already being exploited. (*Financial Times*, May 12 and 24, 1982.)

• A wave of arrests of alleged opponents of President Omar Bongo in March and April, carried out by the security service, the Center of Documentation, was aimed according to observers at quashing **opposition forces** linked to the Movement for National Recovery (Morena).

Three journalists, Samuel Nguema Mba, editor of the national daily *L'Union*, François Ondu, head of Radio Gabon, and Jean-Baptiste Assé Bekafe, a journalist at a regional radio station, were imprisoned in Libreville in late March.

Other detainees included a former cabinet minister under President Leon Mba, Jean-Marc Ekoh, and a civil servant and secretary at the Ministry of Mines.

Bongo undertook a minor cabinet reshuffle in April, appointing his cousin, Julien Mpouho-Epigat, Minister of National Defense with responsibilities for internal security, replacing Gen. Barthelemy Mbia, who was named minister without portfolio.

Morena was believed to be behind the distribution of anti-government tracts in Libreville during the February visit of Pope John Paul II. The pamphlets called for a multi-party system, but Bongo said the constitution does not authorize such a political system and he issued a strong denunciation of the opposition. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982; *Le Monde*, April 10, 1982.)

## Zaire

• Responding to a U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs

Committee vote to reduce **military sales credits** for Zaire from \$20 million to \$4 million and to reject Reagan administration requests for \$15 million in budgetary support, Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko decided to renounce U.S. aid in May, citing "insulting remarks" by American congressmen.

The Zairian news agency, AZAP, denounced the "intolerable attitude" of some members of Congress, following "U.S. allegations that aid was embezzled." Mobutu was said to have convened a cabinet meeting to review the implications of what was termed the "deterioration of U.S.-Zairian relations caused by the unfriendly attitudes of certain American officials." According to State Department officials, the matter is under discussion with Zaire "in diplomatic channels."

Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to halve the proposed \$20 million in military assistance to Zaire, following a staff report which urged the U.S. government to limit its involvement with the Mobutu regime. "It is increasingly risky for the U.S. to expect perpetuation of the status quo" in Zaire, the report read.

Overall U.S. aid to Zaire is estimated by some to have reached over \$100 million a year in the past few years, although aid has been temporarily suspended since January because Zaire is about \$3.5 million behind in repayments. The Reagan administration's total aid proposed for Zaire in the new budget was more than \$70 million, including military, budgetary, development and food assistance.

Mobutu visited Washington last December to confer with President Reagan and to seek additional military assistance. He returned to the U.S. on a private visit in April with nearly 100 members of his family. He was said to have spent upwards of \$1.5 million on the vacation trip which took his entourage to Disney World and to New York, while Zaire is in arrears on official loan repayments.

In mid-May, Mobutu announced that Zaire was renewing diplomatic relations with Israel, making it the first of the black African countries that severed relations with the

country during the 1973 Middle East war to do so. Zaire will set up an embassy in Tel Aviv, not Jerusalem as originally stated. U.S. officials speculated that by renewing relations, Mobutu hopes to enlist Israel on his side in the Congress.

While Israeli officials praised Zaire's resumption of diplomatic ties as a breakthrough and expressed hope that other African countries would follow suit, Zaire drew fire for the move from the Arab League, which began a diplomatic offensive to prevent other nations from following its example.

League officials were to visit 18 African nations and a special meeting of the Arab League foreign ministers was called for mid-June. League secretary-general Chedli Klibi said African nations would be reminded of Israel's ties with South Africa, "a strategic alliance." Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates broke diplomatic relations with Zaire and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa suspended dealings with the country. Zaire received \$37 million from the bank between 1975 and 1981. (*Washington Post*, May 14, 1982; *New York Times*, May 29, 1982; *Le Monde*, May 25, 1982; *Financial Times*, May 14 and 20, 1982.)

## Zambia

● In mid-April, Zambia suspended rail-traffic for a few weeks to and from Zaire following the stoning of a Zambian-operated train on the Zaire side of the border. The embargo stranded 10,000 tons of cargo, including foodstuffs and mail, destined for Zaire at the rail station in Ndola, Zambia.

The railway dispute was the latest in a series of border incidents between Zaire and Zambia. In March, three Zairians were killed in an exchange of fire during a clash in the Copperbelt region of northern Zambia, allegedly initiated by Zairian troops. The skirmish caused thousands of Zambians to flee their villages and temporarily closed the border.

Meanwhile, Zaire said about 20 detained Zambians would be released when administrative problems were sorted out, following a

demand for their unconditional release from the Lusaka government. (*West Africa*, April 26, 1982; *London Times*, April 16, 1982.)

● Zambia's state-controlled Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) announced they will reduce the number of employees but raise production targets to offset continuing low prices on the international metal markets. Copper is Zambia's main export.

Francis Kaunda, chairman of ZCCM, said that both local and expatriate workers would be cut back, and the use of contractors and purchase of non-essential equipment would be curtailed. The company employs 55,000 Zambians and 2,500 expatriates.

Kaunda said: "Looking at the year ahead, I see very little prospect of any significant upturn in the price of copper. The solution to our immediate problems must therefore be sought and found at home." Copper production dropped to 560,000 tons from 610,000 tons in 1980.

On the agricultural front, Zambia is also facing serious problems because of poor rains. According to Prime Minister Nalumino Mundia, Zambia will import 400,000 tons of the staple crop, maize, this year at a cost of \$74 million, mainly from Zimbabwe and South Africa. Maize production fell this season to six million bags from 7.9 million last year. (*Financial Times*, May 7 and 24, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, May 24, 1982.)

## NORTHERN AFRICA

### Algeria

● Algeria is prepared to seek a "new phase" of cooperation with the U.S., according to Col. Slimane Hoffmann, head of the foreign policy commission of the ruling National Liberation Front and a close aide of President Chadli Benjedid.

Hoffmann told the *New York Times* in late April: "We are ready for a balanced exchange, a relationship in which the rights of each party are respected and preserved. Our call is to the American people to improve our relations in the economic field, and also socially and culturally."

Hoffmann spoke against the background of Reagan administration moves to increase military aid and other assistance to Morocco and Tunisia. The Algerian leader said this would be harmful to peace in the area. "If this American policy continues, we will take measures. We will then get more arms."

The Algerian mediation role in the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis was cited as grounds for Algerian hopes that relations between the two countries could improve. But, Hoffmann said, the Reagan administration's plans to strengthen Morocco and Tunisia as part of a "strategic consensus" of moderate countries could only be seen as "indirectly aimed at Algeria." "We need more economic cooperation with the West and with the U.S., we are open to it. In America, however, they still put us in the Eastern bloc," Hoffmann said.

Meanwhile, the Algerian government is continuing to press U.S. and Italian buyers of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) to sign long-term contracts at prices above market levels, after such an agreement was concluded with France. France is paying about \$5.41 per million BTUs for the Algerian LNG under terms of its recently concluded 20-year supply agreement.

Negotiations with three American companies, Southern Natural Gas, Consolidated Natural Gas and Columbia Gas Transmission, have failed to resolve the price issue, as the corporations are seeking a \$4.94 per million BTUs price for the gas. The Reagan administration has reportedly made it clear to the gas companies that it would look with disfavor on any accord under which Algeria would get its asking price.

In another development, Algeria's Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia, who mediated the release of the American hostages from Iran, died in a plane crash in May on his way to play a similar role in the Iran-Iraq war. His plane was shot down by two unidentified fighters just inside Iran's borders. He was replaced in his post by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim. (*London Times*, May 7 and 10, 1982; *New York Times*, April 25 and May 10, 1982.)

## Egypt

• Some headway appears to have been made in recent months towards Egypt's **reconciliation** with moderate Arab states. Sultan Qaboos of Oman paid an official visit to Cairo in late April after the return of the Sinai to Egypt by Israel, and Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohamed Boucetta was scheduled to make the first official Arab visit since Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

In another breakthrough, four pan-Arab banks agreed to participate as co-managers with Chase Manhattan in a \$200 million standby credit to Egypt. Among the co-managers are: Union des Banques Arabes et Françaises, whose shareholders include the Commercial Bank of Syria, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, and the Banque Exterieur d'Algerie; the European Arab Bank; the Arab African International Bank; and the United Gulf Bank.

Although Oman, along with Somalia and Sudan, did not break diplomatic relations with Egypt after the Baghdad summit of 1979 agreed to impose political, economic and diplomatic sanctions on Egypt for signing the Camp David accords, Sultan Qaboos' visit was seen as a first step in a rapprochement process. Boucetta's expected trip was believed to result in Morocco becoming the first of the Arab states to resume diplomatic relations and could launch a slow reconciliation process with other moderate Arab states.

Meanwhile, the Arab Steadfastness Front, composed of Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Syria and the PLO, met in Algiers in late May and denounced the recent reconciliation attempts. Algeria's foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim, reaffirmed the group's opposition to the Camp David agreement and warned other Arab states against resuming diplomatic relations with Egypt.

Saudi Arabia and some of the other conservative Gulf states have quietly been encouraging Egypt's return to the fold, due in part to the Iran-Iraq war. Egypt has been supplying weapons to Iraq and is the only country with the military strength to assist the country if nec-

essary. While Cairo has not ruled out taking military action in the Gulf should Iran provoke it, it appeared unlikely, and Egyptian authorities were calling for a peace conference in early June to resolve the war. (*Economist*, June 5, 1982; *Financial Times*, April 30, May 8, 18, and 25, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, May 6, 1982.)

## Libya

• In late May, **Mobil Corp.** confirmed that it is attempting to negotiate a withdrawal from its oil operations in Libya because of declining profits and the deterioration in U.S.-Libyan relations.

William Tavoulaareas, president of Mobil, said, "We've been taking a beating in Libya for a year and a half. We're starting to leave. We have cut production to just about zero. We told them we want out." He said the Libyan government has been unwilling to discuss the company's withdrawal.

Mobil, the second largest U.S. oil company, had been expected for some time to follow Exxon Corp.'s decision in November to relinquish its oil concessions in Libya. The Mobil joint venture company's production had fallen from as much as 100,000 barrels of oil per day in 1981 to around one quarter of that level because of the world oil glut. In January, President Reagan imposed an embargo on Libyan oil imports and requested that all Americans working in Libya return home.

Meanwhile, in mid-May, another American oil company, Amerada Hess, reached an agreement with Libya whereby Tripoli will sell crude to the company at a discount below the \$36 a barrel price set by OPEC. Amerada Hess will exchange the Libyan oil in Europe for oil that can be brought into the U.S. The agreement will cut Amerada's losses of some \$3 million a month on the Libyan oil it purchases.

Libya's oil production has fallen off from 1.6 million barrels a day in 1981 to between 200,000 and 300,000 because of the glut on international markets, and the OPEC decision to maintain its \$36 a barrel asking price.

Libya retreated slightly from its hard-line oil pricing policy in early June by signing a contract with Ita-

ly's state-owned energy concern, ENI, under which Tripoli granted Italy an interest-free loan which will have the effect of reducing the price of Libyan oil by \$2.50 a barrel. Italy has agreed to purchase an average of 100,000 barrels of Libyan crude at the OPEC price for the last six months of 1982 in return for which Libya will allow Italy four years to pay 15 percent of the purchase with no interest charges. Tripoli also agreed to resume debt payments owed to Italian manufacturers, halted over Italy's refusal to buy Libyan crude at its high prices. Italy is Libya's largest trading partner, and the north African country was said to be some \$850 million behind in payments to Italian exports because of "temporary liquidity problems," according to Libyan Prime Minister Abdessalem Jalloud, who was in Rome in late May. (*Christian Science Monitor*, June 7, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, May 14, 25 and 26, 1982; *Financial Times*, April 14 and May 25, 1982.)

## Morocco

• Following King Hassan's **official visit to Washington** in mid-May, the U.S. and Morocco reached an agreement that grants transit rights to American military planes at Moroccan air bases during unspecified emergencies in the Middle East and Africa.

The U.S. will initially be allowed to use part of the Mohamed V airport north of Casablanca, but there will be no permanent basing of U.S. aircraft or military equipment in Morocco. The agreement is for six years.

According to State Department spokesman Dean Fischer, Morocco was not given any additional military or economic aid in return for the bases, although Hassan "obviously figures that this will improve the atmosphere between the two countries," said another American official.

The Reagan administration will reportedly ask Congress for \$20 million to upgrade the Moroccan military airfield at Sidi Sliman, northeast of Rabat, to enable it to handle large American troop and cargo transports.

Some members of the U.S. Congress have recently been expressing



concern over the strengthening of the U.S.-Moroccan relationship, fearing that it could drag the U.S. into the Western Sahara war. The House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee recently voted to halve the administration's requested \$100 million in military sales credits to Morocco, moved to prohibit U.S. military personnel from operating in the Western Sahara and ruled out American military training of Moroccans for "offensive counterinsurgency" in the disputed territory.

Meanwhile, in late April, the Pentagon notified Congress that it plans to sell Morocco 381 Maverick air-to-ground missiles for about \$29 million, to demonstrate "that the U.S. remains willing to support the legitimate defense needs of Morocco."

American policy towards Morocco's involvement in the Western Sahara war has shifted away from that under the Carter administration which sought to link arms sales to Moroccan progress on a negotiated settlement in the war. President Reagan called King Hassan "a firm friend of the U.S." during their White House talks in May. (*Financial Times*, May 29, 1982; *New York Times*, May 12, 21 and 28, 1982; *Washington Post*, May 28, 1982.)

- The Democratic Labor Confederation (CDT) and the opposition Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) were permitted to reopen their offices throughout Morocco in April, nearly a year after they were closed following the Casablanca riots and demonstrations in June 1981. The CDT and USFP had called a strike which turned violent and was put down by police. Several hundred people were reported killed in the unrest.

The measure came a week after a conference convened by King Hassan, a "national colloquium on economic recovery," was held, and both CDT and USFP delegations were invited.

In the wake of the 1981 unrest, police detained all members of the CDT central bureau and many other unionists, most of whom have since been released. The CDT secretary-general, Noubir Amawi, and five others were due to appear in court

in Casablanca in May. (*Le Monde*, April 9, 16 and 30, 1982.)

## Sudan

- **Standard Oil Co.** of California is seeking bids for the construction of oil-producing facilities, a pipeline and a refinery in Sudan, through its Chevron Oil Sudan Unit and White Nile Petroleum Co., it was announced in early June.

Standard and the Sudanese government each hold one-third share of the White Nile Petroleum Co., while the International Finance Corp., an affiliate of the World Bank, and the Arab Petroleum Investment Corp. hold one-sixth each.

A 35-mile pipeline will link oil field producing facilities in southern Sudan with a central refinery near Rabak, 150 miles south of Khartoum. The refinery's expected output is 25,000 barrels per day.

Chevron claims to have 400 million proven barrels of oil in its 600-mile concession in southern Sudan, and has spent \$350 million on seven years of drilling. Standard, its parent company, has hinted at reserves of 10 billion barrels.

There are also plans for an \$800 million refinery on the White Nile at Kosti, but financial support has not yet been found. A consortium of lenders is being sought to finance the scheme. (*Wall Street Journal*, June 4, 1982; *London Observer*, April 4, 1982; *Sudan Progress*, April 1982.)

- Following an early May visit by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to Sudan, the Khartoum government invoked its 1976 mutual defense treaty with Cairo and discussions were taking place on deployment of **Egyptian troops** along Sudan's 1,200-mile border with Ethiopia.

The Sudanese army was placed on alert in May to intercept Libyan-trained and supported saboteurs allegedly infiltrating Sudan to destabilize the government of President Gaafar al-Nimeiry.

Sudan has accused Ethiopia of giving asylum to Sudanese dissidents and opponents of Nimeiry and of cooperating with Libya to undermine his regime. Three Sudanese were arrested at the Ethiopian

border in early May and were said to have been carrying arms and explosives.

In March, another Sudanese was detained at Khartoum airport after having arrived from Addis Ababa allegedly in possession of plastic explosives and telescopic sights.

The Egyptian Defense Minister, Gen. Abu Ghazali, held discussions on details of the defense agreement with Sudanese officials in Khartoum in May, and Nimeiry paid a return visit to Cairo in early June. (Cairo Radio, May 6 and June 1, 1982; *London Guardian*, May 19, 1982; *London Times*, May 6, 1982.)

## Tunisia

- **Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's** late April visit to Washington culminated in the signing of an agreement for the purchase of F-5E jet fighters, M-60 tanks and anti-aircraft weaponry, and demonstrated further evidence of the Reagan administration's new focus on **military** instead of economic cooperation.

The U.S. plans to increase military aid to Tunisia from \$82 million this year to \$140 million for fiscal year 1983, although the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee voted in May to maintain the 1982 level of military aid, but supply \$31 million in economic support.

Reagan administration policy is to bolster militarily moderate north African countries as part of a "strategic consensus." Tunisia has sought closer military cooperation with the U.S. since the January 1980 commando raid on the mining city of Gafsa, allegedly carried out with Libyan assistance.

While Mzali was in Washington, however, he said he believed Libya was no longer attempting to launch subversion against the Tunisian government. Col. Muammar Qaddafi "has told us he wants better relations, and we have taken him at his word," the Prime Minister said.

The Reagan administration had defended its plans for increasing military aid to Tunisia by saying the country "is under direct threat from Libya and inadequately equipped militarily." But Mzali said the government had devoted most of its

spending in the past years to development, education, health and agriculture, neglecting the military. "We need to be able to protect our coasts, where now we can't even prevent foreigners from fishing our waters," he said.

Critics of the increased military assistance to Tunisia allege that it is dangerous for the Reagan administration to be shifting its emphasis from economic and food assistance to military hardware at a time when the country is suffering from serious economic problems which have been reflected in increased social discontent. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982; *New York Times*, May 12, 1982; *Financial Times*, April 30, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 29, 1982; *Washington Post*, April 29, 1982.)

## Western Sahara

- A late April meeting of the executive bureau of the OAU in Nairobi failed to find a solution to the impasse over the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Polisario's self-claimed government, to the organization as its 51st member state, and referred the matter to the OAU summit scheduled for Tripoli in August.

The meeting had been called by OAU chairman President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya in hopes of resolving the crisis which threatens to jettison the summit if a quorum cannot be reached. Other OAU meetings have been disrupted since the SADR was granted admission, as Morocco and its supporters have walked out when the Polisario delegation is seated.

The SADR was admitted as a member state at a council of ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in February, resulting in one of the organization's most serious crises. Member governments are divided between those supporting the decision and those supporting Morocco's claim that it was taken in violation of the OAU charter. The OAU secretary-general Edem Kodjo made the decision to seat the SADR without consulting chairman Moi, although a simple majority of the organization voted at the Freetown, Sierra Leone, summit in 1980 to admit the Polisario government. (*Af-*

*rica Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1982.)

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### Angola

- In mid-April, Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes paid the first official visit to Angola by a Western head of state since the country's independence in 1975. His trip was aimed at improving relations between the former colonial power and its African ex-colony.

Eanes was accompanied by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Exports, Ricardo Bayro Horta, six secretaries of state and a group of private businessmen interested in developing or extending commercial links with Angola.

The Portuguese President held discussions on bilateral relations with Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and also held talks with Swapo leader Sam Nujoma on the conflict in southern Africa and prospects for Namibia's independence.

As a gesture of good will, dos Santos announced that three Portuguese political prisoners, including a lieutenant-colonel of the Portuguese army, held in Luanda for the last six years, will be released.

On the subject of trade, Angola provisionally awarded a Portuguese consortium a \$200 million contract for work on the Cambambe Dam, the biggest single award to Portuguese firms since independence. The dam was built on the Kwanza river in 1972 by the Portuguese and supplies most of Luanda's electricity. Angola is seeking a 15-year credit on the project and is negotiating with Portugal over financing.

The Angolan government will also allow Portuguese firms to take a stake in other Angolan companies, and is interested in Portuguese cooperation in coffee, sugar, cotton, sisal and fruit production.

Eanes returned to Portugal after the four-day visit saying "a new page in the common history" of the two nations had been written. Meanwhile, because of a decline in earnings from Angola's main export, oil, the government was considering the possibility of raising foreign loans to reduce the budget

deficit. According to the Finance Minister, Ismael Martins, the Angolan government received offers of credit from U.S. and European banks in recent months. The largest offer reportedly came from Chase Manhattan after the former chairman, David Rockefeller, visited Angola in February. Bankers Trust has also offered Luanda a small credit line.

The loss in revenues from oil has caused the Angolan government to freeze all new projects and to call on Portuguese assistance to put port machinery in working order. Portugal is also assisting in reviving agricultural production, as imports of basic goods, including food, have been reduced. (*Financial Times*, April 16 and 29, 1982; *West Africa*, April 26, 1982; *Le Monde*, April 15 and 21, 1982.)

### Botswana

- In April, the government of Botswana devalued its currency, the pula, by 10.3 percent against the U.S. dollar, raised domestic interest rates, cut back government spending and froze public and private sector wages—part of a package aimed at correcting its international payments account. These fiscal measures follow a decline in Botswana's foreign exchange earnings due to a slump in the world diamond markets.

Botswana, which mines 15 percent of the world's diamonds and may overtake South Africa as the world's largest producer by the end of the decade, currently depends on the International Diamond Cartel, managed by De Beers Consolidated Mines of South Africa, for sale of its principal export. At present, De Beers, a partner in Botswana's three mines including the new Jwaneng mine which doubled the country's export potential, is cutting back on its purchases in order to maintain the price of the gemstones. Meanwhile, the government of Botswana is considering developing other mineral resources including coal, platinum and chrome, to lessen its dependence on diamonds.

In addition to Botswana's diamond surplus, the worst drought in recent years has resulted in an almost total failure of maize and sor-

ghum crops and an international appeal for food aid. This year's grain production, amounting to about 20,000 tons, is less than one-fifth of domestic consumption. The destruction of grazing land in the northern part of the country has forced many farmers to slaughter cattle, which will however sustain beef exports. (*New York Times*, April 16 and May 13, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, May 10, 1982; *Financial Times*, April 22 and May 8, 1982; *Johannesburg Star*, April 17, 1982; *Economist*, April 10, 1982.)

## Lesotho

- Earlier in the year, the Development Fund of the European Common Market agreed to provide \$5.6 million for a full-scale feasibility study of the proposed Lesotho Highlands Development Scheme, a major dam and power station project which would divert the southward flow of Lesotho's Malibamatso and Singo rivers northward into South Africa's Vaal basin.

While some of the long-term effects of the project include meeting South Africa's water needs for the next century as well as an expected revenue increase equal to the entire revenue of the Lesotho government, observers note that the project will bring few extra benefits for the people of Lesotho. The project will not effect the annual exodus of 100,000 workers from Lesotho seeking jobs in South Africa's mines, and the resulting hydroelectricity will not make the country energy independent.

Future agricultural development will also be restricted since a high percentage of Lesotho's already scarce arable land will be inundated. Construction, which could begin as early as 1987, will probably be financed by a consortium coordinated by the World Bank.

In other economic news, the government rejected proposals by De Beers Consolidated Mines to avert the closing of the Letseng-La-Teria diamond mine, which accounts for 70 to 80 percent of Lesotho's export earnings. De Beers had suggested that the government, a 25 percent partner in the mine, defer collections of a sales tax levied on the mine.

And in late May, Chief Peete,

Lesotho's Agriculture and Marketing Minister, was wounded in an ambush as he and his family were returning from church in their car. The Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), the military wing of the exiled Basotho Congress Party, claimed responsibility for the attack. Lesotho Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan accused South Africa of allowing the BCP to launch attacks from bases within its territory. The BCP seeks the overthrow of Jonathan, who voided the country's 1970 election when it appeared that his Basotho National Party would lose to the BCP. (*Financial Times*, May 29, 1982; *Washington Post*, May 24, 1982; *New African*, May 1982.)

## Malawi

- Following the mid-April visit of Malawi's Minister of Finance, Lynold Chaziya, and the central bank governor, John Tembo, to the U.S. to negotiate loans, Malawi's currency, the kwacha, was devalued by 15 percent against the currencies of the country's main trading partners, Britain, South Africa, West Germany and Zimbabwe.

The devaluation was described by a central bank spokesman as one of several measures to improve and strengthen the economy, which has been hurt by falling world prices for its major exports—tobacco, sugar, tea, groundnuts, and cotton—as well as increasing energy bills.

In other news, Malawi signed an agreement earlier in the year with a Dutch oil company, Shell Exploration BV, to carry out prospecting for oil and gas on the bed of Lake Malawi. (*Wall Street Journal*, April 27, 1982; *African Research Bulletin*, April 15, 1982.)

## Mozambique

- In early June, Mozambican government troops launched a major offensive against bases and positions held in Manica province by the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MRM), which has been attempting to destabilize President Samora Machel's government by sabotaging road, rail and pipeline links to Zimbabwe. The activities of the MRM have effectively disrupted Zimbabwe's ability to develop trade routes via Mozam-

bique's Indian Ocean ports, a move which would lessen Harare's economic dependence on South Africa.

The government offensive, reportedly involving thousands of troops, comes at a time when Mozambique is experiencing economic depression and a severe drought which has resulted in shortages of foodstuffs and services in major towns. In response to reports that local villagers have acquiesced to the presence of the rebels, Machel was continuing to organize people's militias.

Machel was also expanding bilateral cooperation with Portugal, its former colonial ruler. A military agreement was signed with Lisbon in late April following a visit to Mozambique by a high-ranking Portuguese military delegation. The pact provides for Mozambicans to be trained in Portuguese military colleges and could result in Portuguese military instructors working in Mozambique. And in late May, a gift from the Portuguese army believed to include machine guns and other weapons and ammunition arrived in Maputo.

Also, a Franco-Portuguese consortium won a \$200 million contract to renew an aging railway line between Malawi and Mozambique, which is land-locked Malawi's main outlet to the sea. The 400-mile line is close to collapse due to heavy traffic rerouted along it in response to guerrilla activity against other routes in the south.

The Soviet Union is also increasing military assistance to Mozambique following the visit to Maputo of Gen. Alexei Yepichev with a high-level Soviet military delegation: And in early June, the Mozambican national security director, George Costa, defected to South Africa, claiming the Soviet Union was trying to dominate the country to gain access to the riches of southern Africa. (*New York Times*, June 8, 1982; *Financial Times*, April 29 and June 4, 1982; *London Guardian*, June 1, 1982; *Maputo Radio*, May 10, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, April 30, 1982.)

## South Africa

- The death sentences of three young members of the banned Afri-

can National Congress were commuted to life imprisonment in June, a move which followed an international campaign for clemency that had the support of the Reagan administration.

The administration had backed a UN Security Council resolution of April 9 that asked Pretoria to commute the sentences and last month Secretary of State Alexander Haig cabled the UN secretary-general reaffirming support for the resolution.

The three men, Petrus Mashigo, 20, Naphtali Manana, 24, and Johnson Lubisi, 29, were convicted of treason for belonging to the ANC and for a botched attack on a rural police station. They were sentenced to death although no one was killed in the incident. (*Washington Post*, June 6, 1982; *Sowetan*, May 24, 1982.)

- A series of **sabotage** bombings was carried out in late May and early this month apparently by the banned African National Congress.

On June 4, an explosion in a Cape Town building housing the controversial President's Council killed one man.

On June 3, bomb blasts destroyed overhead power lines on the railroad between Johannesburg and Soweto.

On June 2, explosions destroyed sections of the railroad leading to the major port of Richard's Bay, from which South Africa's expanding coal exports are shipped. Two other blasts wrecked a big fuel depot belonging to the French oil company, Total.

On May 28, bombs in Hector-spruit, 20 miles from the Mozambican border, damaged a transformer substation operated by the government-owned Electricity Supply Commission and set fire to a British Petroleum fuel depot.

In apparent retaliation, the ANC representative in Swaziland and his wife were killed on June 4 when their car blew up. (*Financial Times*, June 5, 1982; *London Guardian*, May 29, 1982.)

- Six members of the **Azanian National Youth Unity** (Azanyu) organization were detained in May in a security police swoop on their homes in Kagiso, Krugersdorp and Soweto. They were being held incom-

## Blacks boycott Coca-Cola

A major boycott of Coca-Cola products was under way in the eastern Cape and Transvaal, organized by a black trade union.

The General Workers' Union of South Africa (Gwusa) launched the boycott in May after the company continued to refuse to recognize the union or re-hire 250 workers dismissed from its South African Bottling Co. subsidiary in Port Elizabeth last October. The Transvaal secretary of the union, Donsie Khumalo, said that companies which did not negotiate with unregistered unions were "exploiting and dividing blacks."

Gwusa is seeking support for the boycott from other trade unions and has received the backing of the Geneva-based International Union of Foodworkers. (*Sowetan*, May 14 and 24, 1982; *Johannesburg Star*, May 15, 1982.)

municado under the 14-day detention law, Section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act.

Among the detainees were the organization's general secretary, Siph' Ngcobo, the treasurer, Mrs. Bafedile Rampete, and the Kagiso branch chairman, Mfana Mtshali. Three other executive members of Azanyu were already in jail, serving sentences ranging from 18 months to five years for refusing to testify in the trial of Khotso Seatlholo, who was convicted in March of conspiring to overthrow the government.

In June, Azanyu's acting president, Nhlanganiso Sibanda, was detained under Section 22. The president, Nthuteng Seleke, has been imprisoned since March. (*Sowetan*, May 25 and June 4, 1982.)

- The South African government has claimed that three of the five political **detainees** put in psychiatric hospitals recently had faked their illnesses as part of "a conspiracy to highlight mental illnesses, thereby gaining publicity."

The claim came in a letter from the departing ambassador to Washington, Donald Sole, in response to questions from 32 senators and representatives.

Specifically, Sole said that Thozamile Gqweta and Sam Kikine, leaders of the South African Allied Workers' Union, as well as Esther Levitan, were faking mental illness when they were hospitalized. Dr. Liz Floyd, girlfriend of Dr. Neil Aggett who died in police detention, and Rene Roux were genuinely ill, according to Sole.

All have since been released, but Gqweta and Kikine were re-detained in May for an upcoming Ter-

rorism Act trial spotlighting the black trade union movement. The other three have apparently been listed as state witnesses in that trial.

Sole refused to comment on Aggett because an inquest is under way. In June, a statement Aggett made shortly before his death was made public; the union activist detailed alleged torture by the security police. (*London Times*, June 3, 1982; *Sowetan*, May 13, 1982.)

- Three prominent Americans have joined the board of directors of an **American subsidiary** of Consolidated Gold Fields of London, which itself is controlled by the giant South African conglomerate, Anglo American/De Beers.

The U.S. subsidiary, the Amcon Group, added the outside directors in an apparent effort to be seen as a "serious long-term investor" in the U.S., in the words of its chairman.

The new directors are: Stansfield Turner, CIA director in the Carter administration; Irving Shapiro, former Du Pont chairman; Cecil Andrus, Interior Secretary during the Carter administration; and Benton Love, chairman of Texas Commerce Bancshares Inc.

Amcon, controlled by Minorco, Anglo American's Bermuda holding company set up to make North American investments, owns 22 percent of Newmont Mining Corp., which has holdings in South Africa and owns 25 percent of the big U.S. mining company, Peabody Coal. (*New York Times*, June 1, 1982.)

- Manpower Commission statistics covering January to September 1981 show that average earnings of all race groups increased 20 percent

but the gap between **white and black wages** widened.

The commission's report said the growing difference between white and black wages was to be expected because most skilled workers are white. It also pointed out that the biggest increases in earnings for blacks and Coloureds (mixed-race people) were in civil service jobs, thus demonstrating that the government is making an effort to close the gap. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 29, 1982.)

- A Singapore firm has had its U.S. **export privileges** abolished for the next 19 years because it illegally sold used American-made helicopters to South Africa in 1978.

The Commerce Department said in May the firm violated U.S. law when it bought the 11 helicopters and spare parts from an American company, stating on its export license application the aircraft were bound for Indonesia. Instead, the firm, Jamson Aviation and Spares, sold the helicopters to South Africa, which then sent them to Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 15, 1982.)

- Dr. Mamphela Ramphele, one of the founders of the black consciousness movement, had her **ban** and banishment to a rural area 220 miles from Soweto extended for a further two years in May.

- **Trade** between South Africa and the rest of the continent reached \$2.4 billion last year, double the 1978 figure. Pretoria boasts that it trades with 47 of the 51 OAU nations despite their political hostility to the white-minority regime.

An indication of the expanding trade was the 1981 statistic showing that 49,463 people from Africa visited South Africa on business trips. A further 210,662 Africans visited the country on vacation and 11,939 arrived for studies.

Zimbabwe has been foremost in the effort to break away from economic dependence on Pretoria, but if trade figures are any indication, there has been only limited success. Last year, South Africa bought 21 percent of Zimbabwe's exports, while providing 25 percent of its neighbor's imports. Because of 15 years of sanctions, which ended in 1980, major sectors of Zimbabwe's

manufacturing industries are geared to the South African market. (Johannesburg Radio, May 5 and 18, 1982; *South African Digest*, May 14, 1982.)

- The Pretoria-appointed authorities of minuscule KwaNdebele homeland in northern Transvaal have asked the government for "independence."

KwaNdebele was created in 1980 out of 16 farms north of Pretoria. It is now little more than a chain of resettlement camps in which tens of thousands of Ndebele people have been dumped by Pretoria. Only 23 percent of the population have jobs. There is one town, which has a legislative assembly, government offices, a school and a few businesses, most of them belonging to the homeland's authorities. None of the KwaNdebele cabinet attended high school.

If and when "independence" is granted, all the people living in the homeland as well as some 274,000 other Ndebeles living across South Africa will be stripped of their South African citizenship. There is a possibility that South African businessmen will establish a Sun City-like casino complex in KwaNdebele, which is even closer to Pretoria than the BophuthaTswana entertainment center. (London *Observer*, May 28, 1982; *Sowetan*, May 25, 1982.)

- British officials reacted with open skepticism to South African government denials in June that it was providing anti-ship missiles and Mirage spare parts to **Argentina** for use against Britain in the South Atlantic.

The denials followed reports in the Johannesburg *Star* that sea-skimming Gabriel missiles (manufactured under Israeli license) and aircraft spare parts were loaded aboard a Uruguayan cargo plane in a remote corner of Cape Town's airport.

According to the *Star*, the allegations "had been circulating for some weeks" and the newspaper got its story from a "a high-level and authoritative source." Under the nation's strict censorship laws, the *Star* submitted the report to the Department of Foreign Affairs be-

fore publication, where it was viewed "at high level" three times, and then published with "certain amendments."

After the *Star* report, Prime Minister Pieter Botha warned that legal action may be taken against newspapers which print "speculative and reprehensible" stories about arms sales.

For years, Pretoria has been fostering military ties with Argentina and other so-called "pariah" nations. Particularly controversial was the posting of four Argentine military men to South Africa as diplomats from mid-1979 to 1981. Among them was Alfredo Astiz, a reputed torturer now held by the British and implicated in the torture-deaths of French and Swedish nationals. The others were also reported by a South African newspaper to have been operators of the Escuela Mecanica de la Armada, a notorious Buenos Aires detention center where 5,000 people were killed.

There was speculation that the four men, all attached to the Argentinian embassy in Pretoria, operated as a team to help train the South African security police. (London *Observer*, May 30, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, May 29, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, May 24 and 25, 1982; *Africa Now*, May 1982.)

## Zimbabwe

- Some 5,000 Zimbabweans temporarily living or working in **South Africa** have effectively been refused new Zimbabwean passports by their government. These Zimbabweans hold old Rhodesian passports, which are no longer valid.

Reportedly, of the very few passports which have been granted through the Zimbabwean trade mission (the two countries do not maintain diplomatic relations), only Zimbabweans under age 16 or over 60 have received them.

One white Zimbabwean, who is not yet eligible for South African citizenship, and who was refused a new passport, said: "I think it is a disgrace that they should take away my birthright." He said an official told him that the refusal was probably because he lives in South Africa. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 29, 1982; *Sowetan*, May 26, 1982.)

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# A Delicate Independence

BY ADRIAN CLARK

A general election has been promised for Lesotho for the near future, 12 years after the coup of 1970 when Chief Leabua Jonathan, with army backing and South African assistance, suspended the Westminster-style constitution and refused to hand over power after his party's defeat at the polls.

Such promises have been made before, but "circumstances" have prevented their realization. Among the circles of Jonathan's Basotholand National party (BNP), such circumstances translate as the delicate security situation, whereas for followers of the main opposition Basutoland Congress party (BCP), they are interpreted simply as the unwillingness of the ruling party to submit itself to the popular will.

The security situation remains delicate, with attacks by the South African-backed Lesotho Liberation Army on the increase over the past year. Likewise the ruling party can hardly be credited with a sudden desire to return to its democratic roots. Perhaps the BNP now believes that the BCP is too divided and politically compromised to pose a significant threat at the polls.

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Adrian Clark, an Irish citizen, has been working and writing in Africa for the past 10 years and is currently based in Lesotho.

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Perhaps they believe that the Basotho people will recognize some of the benefits brought about since independence and that they will affirm their confidence in the established leaders to embark on radical strategies in an attempt to overcome Lesotho's structural dependence on surrounding South Africa.

If international pressure has been significant in persuading the government to hold elections, such pressure has certainly not been evident. Indeed, the flow of international aid to Lesotho, particularly from the United States and Western Europe, has continued to increase since the general election results of 1970 were officially disregarded.

Without doubt, the absence of democratic forms of government has led to considerable unrest, sporadic uprisings, and guerrilla attacks, as well as state repression and detention and murder of some opposition sympathizers. It

has also hampered the development of Lesotho, one of the least-developed nations in the world. But Lesotho's problems, both political and economic, are only partly of its own making. They result more fundamentally from its history as a British colony and its continuing status as a labor reserve for the South African economy.

As American professor Richard Weisfelder explains, however: "A natural human reluctance to concede that their nation is less than master of its own destiny has led Basotho to hold their fellow nationals accountable for the failure to achieve their desired objectives. . . . It has [thus] been possible to organize a body of the discontented against any political incumbent."

Although Lesotho has but little to distinguish it, in economic terms, from a South African "homeland" or "bantustan," Basotho people in general resent such comparisons. They are proud of their internationally recognized status as an independent nation and a member of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. And they revere the memory of the remarkable Chief Moshoeshe I — ancestor of both the present-day ceremonial monarch and the prime minister — who in the first half of the last century molded together various tribes into a homogenous Sotho nation.

For many years the Basotho maintained their independence against Zulu and Boer alike, but in 1868, when it became prudent to accept British protec-

tion, they were forced to accept the loss of the kingdom's best land and much of their national autonomy. Thereafter, Lesotho's colonial history is essentially one of transformation from a grain reserve for the region into a reserve of cheap labor for the gold mines, farms, and industries of South Africa.

The British administration facilitated the process by assisting labor recruiters, by imposing various taxes, and by neglecting development of the local economy. This, combined with population growth, land erosion, land shortages, and the uncertainties of rain-fed agriculture in a semiarid environment, led rapidly to a situation in which more and more households became dependent on labor migration to South Africa for their very subsistence needs.

With the formation of a customs union and currency union, and the development of commerce and finance through large South African concerns, Lesotho became almost totally integrated into the wider South African economy.

Today, 16 years after independence, the above situation remains fundamentally unchanged. Over one-half of the

adult male population is absent on the mines and industries at any one time and over 70% of income in rural households (over 90% of the total population) is made up of remittances from migrant workers. Meanwhile a mere 40,000 (6% of the labor force) are in formal employment at home.

Lesotho produces little over one-half of its food requirements and has a large and growing balance of payments deficit that is financed through dues from the Southern African Common Customs Union, aid, and migrant remittances. At the same time, Lesotho carries the burden of providing health, education, and other services for those who contribute to the South African economy through their labor, without receiving any budgetary transfer to offset costs. Certain observers have therefore argued that by the criteria of fiscal integrity, control of labor migration, and even political sovereignty, Lesotho is an archetypal labor reserve economy — not unlike the South African "homelands."

What this means in practice is that most Basotho men are away from home for about 15 years of their working

lives. During this time they are normally kept in single-sex compounds and hostels and subjected to South Africa's harsh apartheid laws, without having any political rights in that country.

Meanwhile the women are left to look after the children, the home, and the few acres of agricultural land. The absence of male labor during certain agricultural seasons reduces food production and the separation of husband and wife leads to family problems and haphazard arrangements for the rearing of children. The high rates of illegitimacy, sexually transmitted diseases, and certain other health problems, as well as the considerable degree of family violence, are attributable in a large degree to the migrant labor system.

Despite these considerable social defects of the migrant labor syndrome, the main immediate danger to Lesotho is not the continuation of the system but the decreasing numbers of new contracts available for the mines. The mines have steadily professionalized migrant mine work, taking people for longer contracts, paying them more, and accepting fewer novices. In the words of one mine recruitment official: "Miners used to live at home and visit the mines; now they live at the mines and visit their homes."

The implications are serious for Lesotho. Each year well over 10,000 young people pass the primary school exams, whereas the rate of job growth rarely reaches 2,000 in a good year and only 3,500 novices can be expected to be employed by the South African mines. Others may of course, at considerable risk, enter the Republic illegally in search of work and some may join the small informal sector in Lesotho. Many thousands of semieducated youngsters each year will join the ranks of the unemployed.

The obstacles facing any government in this miniature country (about the size of Maryland or Belgium) are formidable. The lack of success of the BNP government in significantly improving the economic position is more a result of Lesotho's historical and geographical situation than a measure of the lack of democratic and dynamic government.

The ruling party cannot, however, be



Prime Minister Jonathan with Ntsu Mokhehle, leader of the opposition BCP, in happier times

Photo: Africamera



absolved of blame; indeed many will argue that it has in some ways further entrenched Lesotho's dependence on South Africa during its 17 years of government. The party initially received strong support from the South African government, which saw Chief Jonathan's conservative party, with its backing by the powerful Catholic Church, as a useful bastion against the pseudo-socialist and pan-Africanist policies of the older Basutoland Congress party, led by Ntsu Mokhehle.

Pretoria persuaded Jonathan to accept advice, assistance, and support from the South African Nationalist party. South Africans were placed in key government positions after the BNP won the 1965 pre-independence elections. The BNP government subsequently followed a pro-South African and strongly anticommunist line. South African refugees were muzzled and a largely hostile civil service was gradually weeded out. Jonathan's government even cooperated closely with South African police and bowed to South African opposition to the establishment of certain industrial enterprises in Lesotho that threatened to compete with those in the Republic.

This pro-South African line is considered as one explanation for BNP's defeat in the 1970 elections (the BNP won 23 seats vs. the BCP's 36). At this point, however, Jonathan's South African legal advisors, along with officials of the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, successfully persuaded him to remain in power, with promises of further support. And apart from a slight hiccup in relations between the United Kingdom and Lesotho, the Western world largely concurred in this situation.

Since the coup, the government has maintained control of the country through a highly centralized decision-making structure, police repression (in 1974 approximately 1,000 people, mostly unarmed, were killed by police after an abortive coup), strict control of the civil service, and through acceptance of large amounts of foreign aid money. It has severely limited labor organization and in April this year made it illegal for bank employees to go on strike. It has refused bursaries to students who are known for their antigov-



Photo: Adrian Clark

**Maseru: A new shopping center built with South African capital and the Lesotho National Development Corp.**

ernment views and has limited employment in its labor-intensive schemes mainly to card-carrying BNP members. The creation of a nominated interim assembly in 1974, which continues to include some opposition figures, did little to placate the general population but did serve to improve the government's international image.

In recent years the government has seen fit to exploit international hostility towards South Africa in order to increase Western economic and political support. Jonathan has developed a populist style similar to that of some Bantustan leaders, and has risked the occasional burst of rhetorical denunciation to align himself with widespread hostility to apartheid. Such denunciation increased after the 1976 Soweto uprisings and the independence of the Transkei homeland in the same year. The subsequent closure of Lesotho's borders with the Transkei resulted in a special UN program of assistance amounting to over \$100 million.

Apart from the labor force and the impressive mountain range and rivers, Lesotho has few resources. Mining is limited to one significant diamond mine

at Letseng-la-Terai, worked by De Beers, which makes up more than half the country's visible export earnings. Tourism is as yet in its infancy as a revenue earner and the potential for hydroelectric power remains untapped. Wool, mohair, and livestock are important revenue earners but agriculture in general has declined in recent years. Agricultural production is severely handicapped by the lack of arable land (only about 15%), droughts, and soil erosion, as well as by the lack of male labor and modern infrastructure and practices. Manufacturing industry (mainly bricks, canning, textiles) is as yet limited (4% of gross domestic product), having been completely neglected during colonial rule.

In 1975 a World Bank team pinpointed the country's major economic constraints as the lack of skilled manpower, lack of natural resources, the low absorptive capacity, and the difficult geographical position. The government subsequently accepted its recommendations to create employment through industry, commerce, and tourism.

This policy has had little impact to

date. The National Development Corporation (LNDC) has busily advertised the good investment opportunities in Lesotho by virtue of its low wages, tax shelters, training grants, and easy repatriation of profits, as well as its privileged access to South African and European Community markets (through SACUA and the Lomé Convention, respectively).

ment has been more successful in encouraging investment spending and in developing the physical, institutional, and social infrastructure necessary for the emergence of a true national economy. Most such investment has gone into road construction, such as the Southern Perimeter Road, in which the U.S. Agency for International Development is closely involved.

market. And the 50% literacy rate, which was long regarded as exceptional, has now been surpassed by many African countries.

Progress has been made, with U.S. and Danish assistance, in establishing appropriate rural health programs, and the government has eventually, despite opposition from the powerful Catholic Church, embarked on a population



Photo: Alastair Matheson/UNICEF

As most of the male labor force is working in South Africa, much of the work in Lesotho is left to women

Its most spectacular achievements have been in creating new shopping centers and assisting in the establishment of international hotels and a number of largely South African-owned small manufacturing and assembly plants. Such ventures have created only a few thousand jobs and their main benefits would seem to have accrued to international investors.

If results in job creation have been generally disappointing, the govern-

More money has been spent over the past few years on education and health, which historically have been the preserves of the Catholic and Presbyterian (LEC) churches. A World Bank and Irish government-funded technical training program is attempting to move secondary education away from its largely academic bias, but schools' curricula are still remarkably inappropriate for the preparation of school leavers for an extremely limited job

management program (which seeks to reduce population growth from 2.3% per annum to 2.1%).

Early government attempts to create jobs through agriculture were distinctly unsuccessful and have been supplanted by labor intensive road construction programs that appear to have more potential. Food-for-work schemes (supported by the U.S. Catholic Relief Services and World Food Program) have provided food to families in need but

have had little development impact. Fears are expressed that such programs serve to entice people away from agricultural production and accusations are often made that government uses the handouts to engender political support.

Total agricultural production decreased during the 1960s and 70s and the country is dependent for around half its food supplies on South Africa. After a series of disappointing area-based projects, the government has, ironically, now embarked on a massive program that may actually decrease the number of jobs in agriculture.

The Food Self-Sufficiency Program aims to make the country self-sufficient in maize and wheat within five years. To do so the government has entered into contracts with South African farmers to plough, fertilize, spray, and harvest fields that are loaned to the program by Basotho farmers. The government is meanwhile purchasing its own equipment and agricultural supplies to extend the program to the whole country. The farmers welcome the project (and the area under cultivation is already twice the initial estimate) for they reap 50% of the harvest without having to provide any input in terms of capital or labor.

The dangers of this program are strikingly evident. Unless the country experiences consistently good climatic conditions and yields are comparatively high (around three tons per acre) the government stands to lose a lot of money on the program — maybe \$20 million. Storage facilities have not been adequately planned and farmers are only tangentially involved in the operation of the project, their skills are not being improved, and agricultural production is becoming increasingly dependent on high-technology inputs from the industrialized nations.

Self-sufficiency may be achieved but at the cost of increased dependence on Western technology and with many of the deleterious effects that have accompanied other "Green Revolutions."

The Lesotho government is not normally prone to making expenditures on vast luxury projects, as sometimes witnessed in other Third World countries. The planned international airport is criticized in some quarters as one such



**The powerful Catholic Church is the largest in the country and has openly supported Jonathan's BNP**

project, but the government insists that it is necessary to lessen dependence on surrounding South Africa. Others are concerned at the increasing expenditures on the armed forces, which are often seen as forces of internal repression rather than national defense.

One important project that seeks to promote Lesotho's independence is the Highlands Water Project, estimated to cost about \$1.25 billion and described as the biggest such project in the world. The project, which has long been hindered by disagreement with South Africa, will comprise five dams, 70 miles of tunnels, and 3 HEP stations that will provide for local consumption and export.

Many of Lesotho's major projects are heavily reliant on international aid and finance, and despite the poor performance of Lesotho in terms of human rights and democratic rule, the government has been remarkably successful in securing such aid from the West (over 60% of all development expenditures). The United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, European Community, Canada, Ireland, and United Nations are all substantial donors in projects ranging from an abattoir and mohair-spinning project to the development of a national pony stud and international airport. The World Bank, African Development Bank, and OPEC are also important providers of finance-capital.

It is ironic that many of the donor countries have substantial investments in South Africa itself, which is largely responsible for the structural underdevelopment of Lesotho. Maybe they assist Lesotho to show the world that they are sensitive to the plight of one of the

hostages of the apartheid system. Involvement in Lesotho is also one means of trying to keep the country sweet for investment opportunities and is a means of exerting some control on events in South Africa.

Lesotho depends heavily on the West but in terms of international politics it maintains a nonaligned stance. Despite opposition from Western powers and South Africa, diplomatic relations have recently been established with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Albania, although none of these nations has as yet any presence in the country.

At the same time, Lesotho has joined the newly formed association of majority-ruled southern African states (SADCC), although not the Frontline states. It has provided refuge and assistance to large numbers of South African refugees and has successfully improved its relations with the South African liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) were previously more closely aligned to the historically more radical BCP, but the latter has forfeited their support through its evident collaboration with South Africa. There is plenty of evidence, for example, to show that the "Lesotho Liberation Army," headed by the leader of the BCP, receives at least tacit support from Pretoria.

Whether such collaboration has affected the popular support for the opposition BCP is difficult to tell. Certainly the exiled opposition leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, retains the respect and allegiance of huge numbers of Basotho in the country and in the South African mines. The question of who would triumph in fairly conducted elections is still an open one.

But even if the BCP were to win the forthcoming elections (probably early 1983), it is hard to see what new policies it could implement to enable the country to escape from the South African stranglehold. Maybe the most that can be expected from such elections is that they may bring peace to this troubled country. Real development in Lesotho will have to wait until the liberation of South Africa as a whole, although even this will be no panacea for Lesotho's problems. □

# Black Reactions to Reagan

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BY MIRIAM LACOB

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An episode in "Marabi," a play about backyard life in prewar Johannesburg that was recently staged there, makes ironic reference to what appears to be a rapidly fading image of America. A shady impresario, seeking to win over George, a young black musician, offers him a saxophone from America.

George is ecstatic. "America? If it comes from America it's got to be good. All the best things come from America," he says. But asked to repeat the lines after the show, the actor added his own. "That's not true any more, is it?" he said.

His was a common response in a community that at the consumer level still aspires to American goods, slang, and entertainment, but at the political level is voicing anti-American sentiment that some say was first expressed in 1976, when then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was greeted with "go

home" signs during his visit to Soweto.

Interviews with a wide range of politically aware black South Africans, including journalists, trade unionists, and community leaders, revealed a community that has noted a distinct shift in American policy towards Pretoria by President Ronald Reagan's administration — a community in no way convinced that quiet diplomacy and a "more positive and reciprocal relationship" between the two nations, as advocated by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, will effect any meaningful reform in South Africa.

Blacks spoke instead of the Reagan administration's muted response to the death in detention of trade unionist Neil Aggett, contrasting it with the presence of two senior U.S. diplomats at the funeral of black consciousness leader Steve Biko during the Carter administration. They expressed reservations about the American role in the stalled Namibian negotiations and pointed to an apparent silence on the part of the Reagan administration on the enforcement of the Reverend Leon Sullivan's employment principles for American firms doing business in South Africa. Despite expressions of abhorrence at apartheid by senior members of the Reagan administration, the majority

said they believed the present United States government was providing both financial and moral support to the South African regime.

This conviction was expressed even by community leaders like Ellen Kuswayo, who described herself as a member of the last "realistic," or moderate, generation. "Sometimes I think Mr. Reagan is a racist. Sometimes he gives me the impression he would do well in white South Africa," she said. "Maybe Mr. Reagan is more hooked to the wealth of South Africa, and therefore to the color of the people who hold that wealth," she added.

Black disapproval of the changed diplomatic climate has already been felt by the United States diplomats in South Africa. Many black leaders, including Bishop Desmond Tutu, head of the South African Council of Churches, and Zwelakhe Sisulu, the banned former president of the Media Workers' Association of South Africa, are refusing to meet with members of the Reagan administration. Leaders are also refusing invitations to American-sponsored events or at least making no particular effort to get to them.

Kuswayo, for example, said she had accepted an invitation to meet Herman Nickel, the newly appointed ambas-

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Miriam Lacob, a South African by birth and a graduate of the Columbia School of Journalism, recently returned to her homeland for the first time in two-and-a-half years. ●

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sador to South Africa, to "hear what he had to say" in Johannesburg. But she said she would be unwilling to travel to the American Embassy in Pretoria, 30 miles away, for the same purpose.

A briefing held by Nickel in Johannesburg for local journalists was boycotted by the *Voice*, the country's only black-owned newspaper, and was attended in strictly token fashion by Sam Mabe, a journalist with the *Sowetan*. Mabe, who arrived too late for the briefing, said he was not much concerned at missing the event.

Black South Africans employed by the American government complain of political pressures they experience from the community as United States employees, saying they are socially ostracized for their connection. "You are looked on as a sellout because of Reagan's [policy of] constructive engagement. I try to explain it, but to no avail," said one.

A white U.S. foreign service officer, who served in South Africa during part of the Carter administration, complained of personal difficulties he has in advocating "constructive engagement" to members of the black community. "I have few problems pushing constructive engagement for Namibia,

but many more in South Africa in the face of bannings, detentions, and Aggett's death in detention," he said.

He also indicated that the effects of the black "boycott" have not gone unnoticed. "A lot of Afrikaans doors are open to us, and a lot of black doors are closed to us. Some were closed before, but now it is more than previously," he said.

The most recent events that observers, like Black Sash president Sheena Duncan, claim have "seriously damaged" the black community's view of the Reagan administration were the March Senate subcommittee hearings on security and terrorism presided over by conservative Alabama Republican Jeremiah Denton and his assistant Joel Lisker. The hearings were conducted with the open assistance of the South African government. Lisker, who traveled to South Africa to collect information before the hearings, was quoted in the Johannesburg *Star* as praising the South African government for its cooperation.

The subcommittee hearings, which purported to show the role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in "fomenting and supporting" terrorism in southern Africa and paraded a string

of alleged former African National Congress (ANC) and South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) members before the commission for that purpose, received negligible coverage in the United States but extensive and mostly uncritical publicity in South Africa. Although several English press reports clearly stated the hearings were not an administration event, mentioned the State Department's discomfort, and described Denton's position as peripheral in the Reagan constellation, members of the black community did not make the distinction. Most said if the hearings were not run by the administration they were at least condoned by it. It was a view echoed by a black South African employed by the American Embassy, who described the subcommittee as a "political ploy to justify the United States government helping the South African government."

South African media, especially the government-controlled broadcasting service, gave major prominence to the testimony of Crocker, described in the Johannesburg *Star* as "the man who guides United States policy on Africa," and to that of a young Ciskeian woman, Nokonono Kave, who has since returned to South Africa under government protection and dropped out of sight.

Crocker's statement to the subcommittee that the United States "categorically condemned all terrorist and violent acts by SWAPO and the African National Congress" was widely interpreted as revealing America's alliance with the South African authorities. It was also interpreted as a statement of opposition to the liberation organizations many black South Africans support at least in principle. Recent polls in South Africa reported wide support for the ANC, founded in 1912 and banned in the 1960s. This support was voiced despite the fact that under South African security laws, mere membership in a banned organization carries the penalty of two years in jail.

"The guy's [Crocker's] utterances about what black people term liberation movements, describing them as revolutionary and saying we shouldn't expect to get assistance from America, has caused people to give up on



Photo: Miriam Jacob

Reactions to Pace College, a commercial high school in Soweto funded by American business, have been mixed among black South Africans

America," said one prominent black journalist.

The testimony, however, that excited the most talk in the townships and was most exploited by government-controlled and conservative media was that of Kave. The black response, with the exception that of Kave's uncle, Ciskeian President Lennox Sebe, was that Kave was a "paid agent" of the South African government.

In her testimony, Kave claimed to be a friend of Biko, joining the ANC after she fled South Africa in 1976. She told the Denton hearing a detailed story of torture, rape, and threats following her defection from the organization in Russia. Several English-speaking newspapers, most notably the *Rand Daily Mail*, discounted her origins and testimony, describing it as "a few bizarre allegations about drugs and rape." Elsewhere, however, as in the *Sunday Times*, the country's most widely read newspaper, which usually takes a strong line against the ANC and SWAPO, it was described as a "tale of stark terror, of rape, of a poison attempt on her life, and of being drugged and hospitalized in a Soviet psychiatric ward." Only at the tail end of Kave's saga did the newspaper note skepticism expressed in Washington and by the woman's Canadian sponsor over her origins and motivations.

Most blacks, questioned on their response to the hearings, immediately



Photo: Miriam Lacob

**At a consumer level, South African blacks may aspire to American goods, but on the political level they voice anti-American sentiments**

commented on wide speculation about the whereabouts and connections of the Ciskeian woman, who apparently received royal treatment from the South African government on her return. This included a radio interview in which she claimed the ANC worked closely with the Palestine Liberation Organization in planning terror activities in South Africa.

"I don't think that poor child has a chance of walking upright in any street in South Africa and declaring her identity," said Kuswayo. "We didn't believe what she said," she added, noting that her skepticism was increased because the South African authorities are being so "gentle, generous, and loving with this one."

To South African observers the Denton hearings represented the epitome of the Reagan administration's anticommunism, which they claim is taking precedence over concern for human rights and clouding the administration's judgement.

"I think the United States government is allowing South Africa to define the nature of the security problem in southern Africa, that is, to argue that it is essentially a struggle against communism," said University of Witwatersrand industrial sociology lecturer Edward Webster.

"The United States is prepared to levy sanctions against Russia and Poland, because it is fighting communism, and it is prepared to use a carrot with South Africa, because it is fighting apartheid. I can only draw one conclusion, that they are more concerned with the Soviet Union than they are concerned with apartheid," he added.

Webster, himself accused and acquitted in 1975 of "furthering the aims of communism," noted that Bartholemew Hlapane, one of the first former ANC members to testify before Denton, was also the "number one witness" during his own trial. Hlapane was described in a column by *Star* journalist Nimrod Mkele as an "old-timer" rehashing a statement he first made in 1964.

Tutu also strongly criticized the Reagan approach. "They are so blinded by their obsession with communism that basically they are saying, 'Any enemy of communism is our friend; we don't

care what their record is on human rights' . . . You ought to explain to me why the United States has this extraordinary penchant for backing the wrong horse."

Possibly of more concern to Americans was a widely expressed cynicism about America and its relationship to South Africa regardless of who is in the White House.

"The United States is part of what we are suffering. I see them [American leaders] all the same way. There was a time when the Kennedys were making happy noises and people believed there might be pressure coming from the Americans, but it was all an illusion. There was never any type of pressure for change in this country. In fact, what has been happening through the years is they have been strengthening their ties with South Africa, and what Reagan is doing now is a culmination of earlier ties," said one community leader, who spoke from the perspective of 18 months in solitary confinement and a banning order.

To many, apparently, Western business ties with South Africa coupled with capitalist economics are inimical to change. "There is no difference between the American situation and South Africa's; they are both capitalist countries. . . . Anyone who becomes president of America can't be a man of the people," said a student activist who claimed to have seen the inside of every prison in Pretoria in the course of his harassment by the South African police.

Asked if they perceived a difference between Reagan's policies and the more strident human rights orientation of the Carter administration, many responded with cynicism, citing the experiences of Andrew Young, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who "even became unpopular in his own country," in Kuswayo's words, because of his alleged Third World orientation.

"Carter was slightly better; he bluffed the people and some of us bought the story. Reagan is bluffing and none of us is buying the story," said African Writers' Association President Mthobi Motlatshe.

"At no point were the people impressed," said a Cape Town commu-

nity organizer. "Ordinary people would see things at face value and say he [Carter] was a good man and all that, but not the people who are politically involved. We see Reagan in the same way."

Cynicism about the effect of anything other than concerted Western action was also expressed by an Inkatha spokesman, Gibson Thula, who wrote in an article in the *Star* that "most black people realize that the Western countries, no matter how antagonistic to apartheid a particular government may be, are not going to champion the cause of blacks in South Africa actively and aggressively."

The negative attitude was also extended to American business interests in South Africa and their relationship with black employees, despite the fact that many do pay superior salaries to local firms, and despite a major investment by the American Chamber of Commerce in the construction of Pace College, a commercial high school in the heart of Soweto. American corporate businessmen at a chamber luncheon spoke earnestly amongst themselves of the pressures they experienced from the U.S. as signatories to the Sullivan Code. Asked if they still experience the pressure under the Reagan administration, they earnestly said they did. In an interview minutes later with a banned community leader, however, the principles were dismissed as "a lot of hot air."

"Equal opportunity employer was a nice slogan," said a black executive for an American advertising agency, "but they never checked what it means to black people. It means applying every aspect of democratic America to South Africa; but they don't, they hide behind the laws of the country."

Pace College, projected to cost over \$6 million at completion, opened last July to 263 students and is expected to have a full enrollment of about 600 students by 1985. With a teacher-to-pupil ratio of about 20 to 1, far smaller than that of most Soweto schools, Pace, housed in a stunningly beautiful building, has experienced intense competition for admission; but at the same time, reaction to the school has been mixed. Some members of the community praised the project as "the kind of




Photo: Miriam Jacob

Many blacks believe the present U.S. government provides financial and moral support to the South African regime

foreign investment we need," but others criticized the commercial orientation of the school and its relatively high fees.

Rex F. Pennington, former headmaster of an exclusive Natal boys' school and now head of the college, said 19 of the students pay the full \$1,400 school fee, while 180 of the students are on "full bursaries," which means parents must come up with a \$400 balance, a sum that one observer commented could represent several months' earnings for a typical black worker.

"It would be more helpful if it was the kind of school where they were churning out graduates who would help the community, not just fill the need for black business graduates," said journalist Carol Mathiane.

"I don't mind, let us have part of the money they are getting out of our coun-

try," said Tutu. "But let them not think it legitimizes their being here. It will not count in their favor, because they are not doing us a favor."

Tutu's words could be interpreted as representing an approach diametrically opposed to constructive engagement. It was an opinion expressed by many blacks, tempered by the opinion that American disengagement from South Africa is unlikely. Asked what kind of policy they thought America should follow, many expressed the opinion that there is little outside agents can do, and that the task rests with the black community itself.

"I don't think the Reagan method will lead to change. The South African situation is unique; we have to solve it ourselves. I can't see it any other way," said Shakes Sikhakane, general secretary of the Food and Beverage Workers' Union. □

# The Latin Balancing Act

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BY EDWARD KANNYO

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Latin American countries face a delicate problem in balancing their economic and political ties with independent Africa on the one hand and those with South Africa on the other. The past two decades have witnessed the consolidation of African independence, a growth of Third World consciousness, and the expansion of trade between developing countries. This same period has seen South Africa's emergence as an intermediate industrial power, expanding commercial, political, and military links with similar states round the world, some, but by no means all of them, pariahs themselves.

Thus, Pretoria has sought vigorously to expand its economic links with industrializing states in the Latin American region, notably Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. With some, the basis for contact has been ideological compatibility, a right-wing philosophy that claims to set Western, Christian values

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Edward Kannyo is director of the Africa Project of the New York-based International League for Human Rights.

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President Bordaberry of Uruguay was visited by former South African Prime Minister Vorster

Photo: Alain Keller/Syigma

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against atheistic communism. With the exception of Cuba, which has identified itself with the anticolonial and anti-apartheid cause since its 1959 revolution, most Latin American states have maintained or established links with South Africa and with black Africa as well. This growing triangular relationship has the potential for mutual gain as well as contradictions and conflict.

Economic and political links between Latin America and black Africa are a relatively recent phenomenon. Until the 1970s, South Africa was the

only major economic partner of Latin American countries on the African continent.

South Africa took the initiative in forging links with Latin America as part of its efforts to break out of growing political and diplomatic isolation in the 1960s. The major instruments used in this campaign were the political exploitation of a shared "anticommunist" ideological outlook and the slow but steady creation of a financial infrastructure designed to facilitate penetration of Latin American economies.

One of the earliest major South African ventures into the Latin American region involved an invitation extended to the country by the Inter-American Development Bank in May 1965 to join a 17-nation consultative group to provide capital goods, finance, and technical advice in a \$285 million development program for Ecuador. This invitation stemmed out of South Africa's expressed interest in projects totalling \$50 million. They included modernization of Ecuador's railroad, water, and sewage systems, bridge building, and the development of the country's fishing industry.

South Africa's foreign minister, Dr.



Hilgard Muller, and the secretary for commerce and industry, H. Kotzenberg, visited Brazil, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Uruguay in July 1966. In Brazil, the delegation discussed trade expansion and arranged for a Brazilian trade delegation to make a fact-finding tour of South Africa, which was carried out in September and included Portuguese-controlled Angola and Mozambique.

Later, the South African government announced that it would make a line of credit available to Latin American states, and, by 1968, Brazil and Ecuador had availed themselves of it. South African Minister of Economic Affairs Jan Haak announced in November 1968 that the South African Reserve Bank would purchase \$1.9 million worth of bonds made available by the Inter-American Development Bank. This purchase allowed South African contractors and exporters to

tender for any development projects financed by the bank in the member countries.

The Uruguayan minister of finance and chairman of the Central Bank of Uruguay visited South Africa in 1973 and, as a result of discussions held between officials of both countries, South Africa deposited \$14.3 million in the Central Bank of Uruguay and bought \$7.1 million worth of treasury bonds from the bank. The following year, Paraguay's General Alfredo Stroessner, one of Latin America's most despised dictators, made an official visit to South Africa. It was the first official visit by any non-African leader (Dr. Banda of Malawi had visited South Africa in 1971) and represented a diplomatic coup of sorts.

In the course of the visit, two treaties were signed by the foreign ministers of both countries: one concerned cultural exchanges and scientific and techno-

logical cooperation, and the other related to economic cooperation and investment. When he returned home, General Stroessner announced that South Africa had accorded Paraguay a loan of \$20 million.


Senior South African civil servants visited Paraguay and Uruguay in 1975. In Paraguay, they signed agreements involving plans for South Africa to build two sugar plants and a pulp processing plant; investment in two hydroelectric projects that Paraguay was building jointly with Brazil (Itaipu) and Argentina (Yacireta); the provision of a \$34.2 million line of credit for the purchase of South African equipment and services; and the financing of the construction of buildings to house the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs. In Uruguay, the discussion centered on tourism and beef exports.

South African Prime Minister John Vorster returned General Stroessner's visit in August 1975; in the course of the trip, loans totaling \$6.2 million were arranged to assist road building, housing, agriculture, and the liquidity of a Paraguayan bank. Vorster also visited Uruguay and met President Bordaberry. The South African Industrial Development Corporation offered the Uruguayan Fuel Alcohol and Cement Authority a \$15 million credit and aid facility for the construction of a cement plant in the city of Paysandu. A South African mission visited Uruguay in May 1976 to negotiate the construction and financing of two refrigeration plants.

Since the 1970s, South African economic links with Latin America have grown dramatically. South African industry has developed export markets for steel and steel products, chemicals, and other industrial products. Minerals and other raw materials have also been exported to Latin America.

Brazil and Argentina are South Africa's principal economic partners in Latin America. Table 1 indicates the evolution of trade between South Africa and Brazil and Argentina between 1974 and 1980.

Trade statistics do not give a full account of South Africa's involvement in the Latin American economies. For one



Angolan oil rig: Brazil's state oil company has a contract to conduct oil exploration in Angola

Photo: Angola Info

thing, many exporters and importers disguise their dealings with South Africa by using third countries or concealing the origin and destination of trade items. Secondly, over the years, South Africa has acquired substantial investments in key Latin American countries, particularly Brazil and Argentina.

One important area of activity that has attracted South African capital and enterprise in Brazil has been mining. In 1973, the South African Anglo-American Corporation established a Brazilian subsidiary, Anglo-American do Brasil (Ambras), and announced that it had created two companies in partnership with the Brazilian Industria e Comercio Mineiros SA and the U.S. Bethlehem Steel to carry out a search for precious as well as base metals in the country. In 1975, Ambras purchased a 49% holding in Morro Velho, a gold mining group in Minas Gerais; 40% in Unigeo, a company prospecting for gold and base metals in Bahia; 30% in Brasex, an explosives factory chain; 50% of Rolta, a construction consortium (the other 50% held by the South African Roberts Construction); 40% of Sopermi, a diamond prospecting company; and shares in a fertilizer factory built by South African Louis Luyt's Fertchem International. In

1981, Ambras acquired a controlling interest in Morro Velho. De Beers, the South African diamond concern, has been prospecting for diamonds in Mato Grosso. In 1981, South African investments in Brazil were estimated at \$98 million.

In 1969, South African Airways inaugurated a weekly flight from Johannesburg to New York via Rio de Janeiro, the first route to link South Africa and Latin America. Varig, the Brazilian airline, set up a reciprocal service in 1970.

South African interest in Argentina has been directed towards mining, particularly the exploitation of the country's untapped deposits of copper, coal, iron ore, and oil, commercial agriculture, construction, fishing, and chemicals.

Economic relations between the two countries have developed steadily since the 1970s. In 1973, 11 firms engaged in business with South Africa established the Argentina-South Africa Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires. By 1978, membership in the Chamber of Commerce had increased to 247. The South African-Argentinian Chamber of Commerce opened in Johannesburg in 1978.

South Africa has exported iron, steel, manganese, and asbestos to

Argentina. Recently, plans have been announced to export South African-made color television sets. In 1981, sales of the South African Krugerrand gold coin were launched in Argentina. Argentina has exported processed foodstuffs, leather goods, machine tools, agricultural machinery, chemicals, textiles, table sets and cutlery, building materials, and home appliances to South Africa.

As in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America, one important way in which South African capital has penetrated the Argentinian economy has been through joint venture arrangements. One such venture involved the formation of a joint fishing company, MARASA, created by Mar Argentino S.A. Pesquera and two South African companies, Rentmeester Beleggings and Willem Barends. The joint company would possess the largest fishing fleet in the southern hemisphere and one of the largest in the world. The controlling share would remain in Argentinian hands while the South African companies would supply most of the fleet of trawlers and a 31,000-ton fishmeal factory ship.

Another important area of growth in South African-Argentinian economic relations has been tourism. Under an agreement between Aerolineas Argentinas and South African Airways, there are regular direct flights between the two countries. Empresa Argentina Lineas Maritimas (ELMA), the Argentine shipping line, has a regular steamship service to South Africa. In 1979, Argentinian tourists spent \$20.7 million in South Africa. South African Airways and Aerolineas Argentinas carried 20,000 passengers between South Africa and Argentina in the same period.

If Argentina and Brazil have been South Africa's most important economic partners, the country's entrepreneurs have not neglected other Latin American countries. Shaft Sinkers, an Anglo mining subsidiary, has carried out contracts in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru; General Mining, which Anglo helped capitalize in the 1960s, has been involved in prospecting for gold and other minerals in Venezuela. The two major South African construction companies, Roberts Construction and Con-



President Stroessner of Paraguay paid the first official visit by a non-African leader to South Africa in 1974. He is shown here (right) with President Pinochet of Chile

Photo: Alain Keller/Sigma



Photo: United Nations

South African capital penetrates Latin American economies via joint ventures in areas such as fisheries

cor, have obtained contracts in Latin American countries.

In recent years, South African exports to Latin America have included cement and fertilizer plants to Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay; mining equipment to Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru; agricultural equipment to Brazil and Paraguay; heavy engineering equipment to Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru; and telecommunications equipment to Venezuela. In 1980, apart from Argentina and Brazil, South Africa's principal trading partners were Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

In contrast to its spectacular success in penetrating Latin American economies, South Africa's diplomatic and political achievements in the region have been less impressive. Up to 1980, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay maintained diplomatic missions at the ambassadorial level in South Africa, while Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru maintained consular missions in the country. South Africa had diplomatic representation at the ambassadorial level in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay. South Africa

had consulates in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru. In 1981, South Africa accredited its first resident ambassador in Santiago, Chile.

South Africa has suffered some major reverses in her diplomatic push in Latin America. In 1974, in reaction to United Nations and African pressure, Mexico closed its consulate in Pretoria. On November 28, 1979, South Africa's ambassador to El Salvador, Archibald Gardiner Dunn, was kidnapped by guerrillas of the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación-Farabundo Martí (FPL). One of their demands was the termination of diplomatic relations with South Africa. A few hours after the abduction, the new military regime, which had overthrown General Carlos Humberto, broke diplomatic relations with South Africa because of her apartheid policies. The government claimed that the decision had been made before Dunn's abduction. In October 1980, the guerrillas announced that they had put their captive to death. Following the overthrow of the regimes in Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979, both countries broke off diplomatic relations with South Africa.

South Africa has established military relations with a number of key Latin

American countries, particularly in the naval sphere. South Africa has stationed permanent military attachés in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Argentina and Paraguay maintain similar missions in South Africa. In 1978, Lieutenant General Robert Rogers, commander of the South African air force, visited Argentina and Chile; and in 1979, General Magnus Malan, then chief of the South African Defense Force, visited Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In 1981, South African Rear Admiral Marthinus Albertus Becker visited Chile.

Three members of the Chilean ruling military junta visited South Africa in 1981. They were General Cesar Mendoza Duran, director of the Carabineros; General Fernando Matthei, head of the Chilean air force; and Admiral José Merino Castro, head of the navy. In speeches made during Admiral Merino's visit, he and General Constand Viljoen, chief of the South African Defense Force, reportedly stressed Chile's and South Africa's commitment to "the fight against communism and support for the ideals of a free Christian society."

In 1981, Chile was reported to have purchased Crotale surface-to-air mis-

siles manufactured in South Africa under license from France. This transaction suggests the possibility of South Africa's using Chile to beat the international arms embargo with the latter as a middle man.

Navy vessels from Argentina and Chile regularly call at the key South African base of Simonstown. In 1977, the South African navy participated in the "Unitas XVII" naval exercises, which involved the ships of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In 1981, the Chilean training vessel *Esmeralda* called at Cape Town at the invitation of South Africa. The visit coincided with the South African Republican Festival.

In recent years, the sustained campaign waged by African states and the United Nations against apartheid and growing economic links with black Africa have led some Latin American states to adopt a more cautious approach toward political relations with South Africa. Brazil, the most powerful South American state, has taken the lead in this shift.

For a long time, Brazil's economic links with Africa were mainly restricted to the former Portuguese colonial possessions through the special relationship that existed between the two countries. During the governments of Janio Quadros and João Goulart (1961-64), there was some attempt to move Brazil's foreign policy close to the nonaligned states, but this effort was cut short by the "anticommunist" coup of 1964. Up to the early 1970s, Brazil generally supported the Portuguese colonial regime in spite of criticism by African and other states in the United Nations and elsewhere. By the beginning of the 1970s, however, the expansion of the Brazilian economy, the development of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the country's growing needs for markets and oil led her to reach out to black Africa and other regions that had been outside her traditional sphere of economic and political activities.

In 1972, the then Brazilian foreign minister, Mario Gibson Barbosa, visited seven African states. In January 1974, in a significant departure from the country's previous position, Brazil's foreign minister signed a joint

declaration with the visiting Nigerian commissioner for foreign affairs in which the two officials agreed on the right to self-determination and independence and repudiated "apartheid, colonialism, and all forms . . . of colonialism." Three months later, the coup that was to lead to the dissolution of the Portuguese colonial empire took place in Lisbon.



**TAMA is the trademark of Interbras, which markets Brazilian goods overseas**

In July 1974, Brazil recognized the Partido Africano de Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) as the "legitimate ruler" in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The next year, the country surprised many observers when it became one of the very first to recognize the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) regime at a time when many leaders in Western countries and elsewhere were raising an alarm over the Cuban and Soviet connections of the Angolan leadership. Since then, Brazil has expanded economic and political ties with black African countries, particularly Nigeria

and the former Portuguese colonies. Table 2 indicates the growth of trade between Brazil and black Africa.

Brazil's trade with black Africa has now surpassed its trade with South Africa. With black Africa, Nigeria is now the most important trading partner. In 1980, total trade between the two countries amounted to \$250 million (20% of total trade with black Africa). These factors are closely related to Brazil's increasing efforts to identify itself with Africa's political aspirations.

As with South Africa, Brazil's black African economic relations have not been confined to commercial exchanges. Joint ventures, participation in African financial institutions, and technical assistance have all formed part of Brazil's economic penetration of the African economies. Examples of these activities include a contract between Angola and a subsidiary of Petroleos Brasileiros S.A., the Brazilian State Petroleum Company, to search for oil in Angola; the creation of a Brazilian-Nigerian commission to coordinate joint ventures; Brazilian assistance to Ivory Coast for the production of soy beans; the participation of Brazilian experts in Nigeria's livestock and agricultural industries; and Brazilian management of supermarkets in Angola. In the financial sector, Brazil has acquired 20% of the Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale (BIAO).

Brazil's political rapprochement with black Africa has involved public dissociation from and even public criticism of South Africa's policies. An important example of the shift in Brazil's policies has been the change in her attitude towards the hoary idea of creating a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization" (SATO).

For at least the last 10 years, South African political leaders and strategists and conservative leaders and groups in Western Europe, the United States, and South America have advocated the creation of a politico-military alliance, along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), involving South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and possibly Paraguay. The rationale behind this proposal has always been the alleged Soviet or "communist" threat to the

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South Atlantic sea lanes. Whatever the reality of the alleged threat, for South Africa, such an alliance would have the advantage of linking it militarily and politically with the Western defense system and thus signify a spectacular reentry into the international community. South Africa also hopes to benefit from the strength and experience of the stronger Brazilian and Argentinian navies.

The Council for Inter-American Security, a conservative American organization, convened a meeting in Washington in August 1979 to discuss the "SATO" proposal. Among the participants were retired Argentinian General Ramon Diaz Bessone; Brazilian General Carlos de Meira Mattos; Ray S. Cline, a retired former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Dirk Kunnet, director of International Studies at the University of Johannesburg; and Patrick Wall, a British Conservative party member of Parliament.

In May 1981, the Council for Inter-American Security and two conservative Argentinian organizations, the Carlos Pellegrini Foundation and the Ateneo de Occidente, organized a symposium in Buenos Aires on the theme "NATO, the Communist Threat." It was widely believed that the "SATO" proposal would be the focus of discussion. Shortly after news of this meeting was publicized, the chairman of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, who was also Nigeria's permanent representative, Akporode Clark, condemned the projected meeting and invited the "friendly governments of Latin America immediately and categorically" to dissociate themselves from any involvement with the meeting and declare their "firm opposition to a military alliance with the racist regime." In response to Clark's appeal, the Brazilian Mission to the United Nations publicized a letter it had sent to him dissociating the Brazilian government from the meeting.

During a visit to Nigeria in April 1981, Brazilian Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro criticized South Africa's armed incursions into Angola and Mozambique. He indicated Brazil's opposition to the "SATO" proposal and declared that Brazil had more "in

common with Nigeria than any other South Atlantic country."

Brazil has closed down its consulates-general in Pretoria and Cape Town and downgraded her embassy. It now consists only of a business attaché at the level of second secretary. It has also officially banned arms exports to South Africa. In 1980, South Africans Gary Player, Dale Hayes, and Gavin Levenson were denied visas to play on the South American professional golf circuit by Brazil (and Argentina).

Brazil's efforts to dissociate itself politically from South Africa have gained it a substantial amount of credibility in black Africa. Brazil was the only Latin American country to be invited to the Zimbabwe independence celebrations. In September 1981, during a visit to Brazil, Mozambique's foreign minister, Joaquim Chissano, was reported to have said that he would be asking for Brazilian support, "including military assistance to counter South African aggression."

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


Photo: Diego Goldberg/Sygma

**Loading wheat at Buenos Aires: South African interests in Argentina include commercial agriculture**

Argentina too has established economic links with Africa. As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, trade with Africa exceeds trade with South Africa. This growth in trade must be counted as a big factor in Argentina's recent adoption of a low profile in relations with South Africa.

Following condemnation of the "anticommunist" meeting mentioned above, the Argentinian Mission publicized a letter it had sent to the Special Committee Against Apartheid indicating that Argentina "resolutely and clearly" opposed conclusion of any military pact with South Africa. The statement also reiterated Argentina's desire to strengthen links and expand cooperation with African countries "both bilaterally and within the United Nations and the nonaligned movement."

In a letter to the chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, which was publicized in October 1981, the Argentinian Mission to the United Nations revealed that the Argentinian government had decided not to issue visas to representatives of sports bodies, members of sports teams, or individual sportsmen from South Africa or to anybody intending to engage in sporting activities in the country.

Following South African attacks in Angola in late 1981, Foreign Minister

Oscar Camilion criticized the incursions. Currently, although South Africa maintains an ambassador in Buenos Aires, Argentina's mission in South Africa is headed by a charge d'affaires.

Chilean trade with black Africa has recorded a remarkable jump in recent years. Table 3 indicates the evolution of trade between Chile and South Africa, and Table 4 indicates trade between Chile and black Africa. In 1980, Chile's trade with South Africa was only 12% of recorded trade with the continent (excluding North Africa). In 1980, most of Chile's trade with black Africa was with Gabon and was most probably largely accounted for by oil imports.

In spite of the growing importance of trade with black Africa, the ideological proclivities of the Pinochet regime and relative political isolation still appear to outweigh economic considerations in relations with Africa. As recently as 1981, Chilean Rear Admiral Francisco Ghisolfo Araya, vice-chief of staff of the navy, asserted the need for an alliance linking Argentina, Brazil, Britain, Chile, and South Africa during a reception for the visiting South African Rear Admiral Martinus Albertus Becker. In 1981, Lieutenant-General Jack Dutton, former chief of staff (operations) of the South Africa Defense Forces, was appointed to be South Af-

rica's first resident ambassador in Santiago.

From the perspective of black Africa, the evolving triangular relationship between Latin America, black Africa, and South Africa cannot be anything but unsatisfactory. South Africa's links with Latin America enable the apartheid regime to breach its political and diplomatic isolation and strengthen its economy. Even more ominously, they have enabled it to purchase oil and possibly arms in spite of efforts to deny it these commodities.

At the same time, black Africa has so far achieved limited leverage over the policies of Latin American states. With the exception of Nigeria, black Africa is still too economically and politically weak to dissuade Latin American states from maintaining economic links with South Africa.

Africa's own economic needs militate in favor of maintaining and even expanding economic relations with Latin America. Trade and other links with the region provide Africa with opportunities to diversify economic relations and reduce dependence on Europe and North America without the threat of great power domination. Africa and Latin America also have a common interest in cooperation in the context of global negotiations for a better deal for developing countries in international trade. Africa and Latin America produce certain key commodities such as coffee, cocoa, copper, and iron ore whose prices are best protected through cooperation among producers.

At the very least, through the United Nations and other international forums, African states can be expected to press Latin American states to minimize diplomatic and political ties with South Africa and dissociate themselves from the apartheid regime. Such a concession would merely bring Latin American states into line with such states as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and West European states (and even some black African states), which maintain close economic ties with South Africa but politically keep a reasonable distance.

That black Africa has achieved some progress in this direction is indicated by the behavior of Latin America states in the United Nations. Analysis of the

**TABLE 1**  
**Evolution of Total Trade (Exports and Imports) Between South Africa and Argentina and Brazil**  
 (Millions of U.S. dollars)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Argentina	28	18	18	26	31	44	74
Brazil	78	64	71	149	153	223	305

**TABLE 2**  
**Evolution of Total Trade Between Latin America and Black Africa**

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Argentina	62	57	109	154	241	337	321
Brazil	379	378	431	431	693	900	1,228

**TABLE 3**  
**Evolution of Trade Between Chile and South Africa**

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
	4.9	2.1	1.3	10.7	11.8	22.1	37.1

**TABLE 4**  
**Evolution of Trade Between Chile and Black Africa**

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
	40.2	5.5	0.3	13.1	67.9	165.9	279.9

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook, 1981* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1981)

voting record of Latin American states during the 1981 session of the United Nations General Assembly on resolutions pertaining to apartheid or repression in South Africa indicates that Latin American states supported them, abstained, or absented themselves. In no case where the roll call vote is recorded did any Latin American state vote against a resolution that could be described as hostile to the South African regime.

Latin American states are represented on United Nations bodies designed to combat apartheid and free Namibia from South African control. Haiti and Peru are currently members of the Special Committee Against Apartheid. Chile is a member of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, to which Brazil and Mexico have pledged contributions. Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Mexico, and Venezuela are members of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

Aside from voting records and participation in anti-apartheid activities in the United Nations (a fairly painless way of scoring points with Africa and the rest of the nonaligned movement), the states of Latin America display a

wide spectrum of positions vis-à-vis Pretoria. At one end are those that have broken or greatly reduced relations and that participate in military and other embargoes. Apart from Cuba, the most important state in this category is Mexico.

At the other end of the spectrum are those states that openly maintain political, diplomatic, and, in some cases, even military ties with South Africa. This group includes Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In the middle are the majority of states in the region, which in varying degrees take a political stand against apartheid while maintaining normal commercial and often low-level diplomatic relations with South Africa. Brazil and, since fairly recently, Argentina are the prime examples in this category.

African states are loathe to criticize Latin American states publicly for their links with South Africa. The need to maintain Third World solidarity, the known existence of commercial links between some African countries and South Africa, and the fact that African states maintain normal relations with North American and West European states that have political and economic relations with South Africa must all be

counted among the factors that lead African countries to be cautious in their attitudes towards Latin America over the South African question. Whether indirect or discreet pressures exercised within the context of the United Nations and elsewhere will persuade Latin American states to make a clear break with the apartheid regime remains to be seen.

#### POSTSCRIPT

The outbreak of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis has thrown into relief the uncertainties and contradictions of the foreign policies of the Argentinian military regime. Shortly after Argentinian troops occupied the disputed islands, reports appeared in the international press to the effect that a secret South Atlantic Defense Treaty linking Argentina and South Africa had been in existence for a decade. Other signatories of this pact were reported to be Brazil, Israel, Paraguay, Taiwan, and Uruguay. The reports were immediately denied by the South African government.

Following the outbreak of fighting between British and Argentinian forces, further reports suggested that South Africa might have supplied Argentina with missiles and aircraft parts. These reports were also denied by South Africa. Prime Minister Pieter Botha went further and lamented the fact that two Western "anticommunist" nations had gone to war.

As the tide of battle turned against Argentina, the regime intensified efforts to secure widespread Third World support. In an address to the meeting of the coordinating bureau of non-aligned nations held in Havana, Cuba at the beginning of June 1982, Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez claimed that the United States and Britain planned to join South Africa in an alliance "that would threaten the independence of much of Latin America and Africa." He also proclaimed his country's "opposition" to South Africa.

It is ironic that General Mario Benjamin Menendez, the man who was appointed governor of the Falklands/Malvinas by the military regime, was one of 38 foreign generals who visited South Africa in 1981. □



# Letters to the Editor

## Crisis in the Sudan

Dr. Dunstan M. Wai's article, "Crisis in North-South Relations," in *Africa Report* (March/April 1982), deals with only one aspect of the political malaise of the Sudan, and that from a narrow southern partisan perspective. Consequently, it fails to place that crisis within the wider context of Sudanese political, social, and economic development of the last 13 years, and distorts or blacks out the opposite viewpoint. In this sense, the article is both lopsided and myopic.

To begin, neither the South nor the North is at present a monolithic bloc with regard to the crisis under discussion or any of the many other crises enveloping the ailing Sudan.

Opponents of President Nimeiry and General Lagu are numerous, and they could, particularly in the case of Nimeiry, cite many serious mistakes and shortcomings. But none would go so far as to detract from the two's lifetime achievement—the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which rendered both men folk heroes. The two men, at a crucial time in the history of the Sudan, were able to stand tall and overcome the biases of their groups' separate heritages and of their personal commitments as commanders-in-chief

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Dr. El Bashir has written widely on the subject of North/South relations in the Sudan, which was also the subject of his own dissertation in 1974.

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of opposing armies that had been fighting for 17 years. They sat down and talked peace and reconciliation. Of course, such a great achievement should not put them above criticism. In the opinion of this writer, no man should be accorded such a privileged position, even President Nimeiry. Yet when it comes to the South, the two men who had so courageously put their lives and careers on the line when many cynics had doubted or been opposed, should be criticized objectively and according to concrete evidence.

To describe Nimeiry and Lagu as pushovers who could easily be manipulated by political forces in the Sudan displays both naiveté and ignorance of the nature and demeanor of the two men.

"The anti-southern region elements," according to Dr. Wai, are "mostly the Pan-Arabists (the Muslim Brothers, Arab Socialists, and traditional sectarians—the Ansar, and the Khatimiyya leaders)." If those leaders singled out by Dr. Wai were in any position to influence the thinking of Nimeiry, which they tried by force and by reconciliation, it would be to influence him to step down, send his officers back to the barracks, and restore democracy so that they could regain power. The scrapping of the Addis Ababa Agreement is not by any stretch of the imagination their first priority, as Dr. Wai would have us believe.

Careful reading of the article shows that Dr. Wai is one of those southerners who wants the South to remain intact as one region. This is a legiti-

mate cause that is also sponsored by one of the most respected Sudanese politicians—Abel Alier and other southern politicians of similar status. But objectivity should have induced Dr. Wai to inform his readers that Lagu, who is pursuing a legitimate cause, is not alone, and that he represents a wide constituency of southerners who want to see the South "decentralized." The attention of readers should be drawn here to the term used by Lagu's wing, "decentralization," as opposed to the term "redivision," used by the Council for the Unity of South Sudan, which Dr. Wai uses without any reference to the former term.

Fairness should have induced him to inform his readers of the size of Lagu's group, which is by no means insignificant, or of the fact that the group does not reside solely in Khartoum.

Both Nimeiry and Lagu are master military tacticians who are also veteran winners of bitter political battles for their survival. Nimeiry has proven his invincibility in this regard for 13 years, during which time he was able to outmaneuver his enemies and rivals every time and emerge as supreme. He has just recently survived one of the worst such battles. The emergence of Gen. Lagu, a member of a small equatorial tribe, as the sole leader of the military wing of the Anya Anya prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, is a testimony to his ability and astuteness in the art of survival in a multiethnic, multicultural region. Since then he has proved that he can stand on his own in

dealing with the intricacies of southern ethno-provincial politics.

To explain the crisis in North-South relations in terms of the personal survivability of two politicians is, however, not enough. In absence of any national consensus or viable economic or political development, Nimeiry has a difficult job of regulating regional, sectarian, and partisan conflicts, which periodically get out of hand. Nevertheless, he has succeeded in containing them, including those in the South, by juggling them constantly and hitting one against the other in the process.

In comparing Nimeiry with Lagu in this respect, one should remember that Nimeiry is in power, while Lagu is not; nevertheless Lagu is manipulating certain existing southern ethnic fears and aspirations in order to become part of the political process and the distribution of meagre economic allocations to the region. One should recall that Lagu, as a former guerrilla warfare commander, is good at fighting and scoring from the sidelines. In other words, both Nimeiry and Lagu are using their old acquired skills to manipulate existing real problems, which has been the stuff of politics since the beginning of history. Academicians, idealists, and ideologues fail to take into account the slow and inevitable process of history and therefore tend to become impatient.

In the age of the nation-state and the sanctity of African borders inherited from the European colonial masters and accepted by the founding fathers of the Organization of African Unity, there was no solution to the southern problem without a compromise—the autonomy of the South within national unity of the Sudan. Both Nimeiry and Lagu were wise enough to perceive that. Now that the imperatives of ethnic politics in the South have lead certain southern groups to call for "decentralization" or "redivision," depending on how one looks at it, Dr. Wai is condemning them categorically as stooges.

It is not clear whether others among the supporters of the maintenance of the southern region as it now stands share Dr. Wai's polemics. It should be pointed out, however, that the northern Sudanese position vis-à-vis the Egyptian position in 1955, the southern Sudanese position vis-à-vis the north-

ern Sudanese position in the period 1955-72, and now the position of Lagu's faction vis-à-vis that of Alier's have one thing in common—they are all legitimate and should be accommodated, notwithstanding the stipulations of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The laws and logic of history of the region are very instructive in this respect, and should not be smothered and suppressed because of a decade-old document that has more than served its purpose.

Calling Lagu a pushover or a northern stooge is not going to solve the mushrooming problem. Threatening darkly the outbreak of old, ugly hostilities between the North and the South overlooks the basic fact that the conflict is essentially a southern one, between different ethnic groups and aspiring elites and leaders. Nimeiry as a president should have stayed out of it. But if he had done just that, he would not be Nimeiry, the obsessed, adroit manipulator. However, even his noninterference would not have prevented the ethno-provincial clash that should have been anticipated by any serious student of Sudanese history and politics in particular, and of the African nation-building process in general. The southern Sudan and its disparate ethnic groups and aspiring elites are no different from any other ethnic groups or elites in northern Sudan, the rest of Africa, or the Third World. To think otherwise is merely anachronistic, ethnocentric wishful thinking.

Ahmed E. El Bashir

### Politics in Nigeria

The article in *Africa Report* (January-February 1982), entitled "Shagari's First Two Years," by Larry

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Diamond is basically sound in its analysis of Nigeria's current political scene. In its favor (unlike most Nigerian on-the-scene political analysts) it is not slanted, even subtly, to favor one or another of the political parties. However, its interpretation of the struggles within as well as between the divided political parties, and the resultant projections onto the political screen, are slightly different from mine.

Since the 1979 election campaign, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) has positioned itself at the conservative end of the political spectrum, with the People's Redemption Party (PRP) at the pro-people, militantly egalitarian end. The other parties have situated themselves in between. Though there is this vague issue-orientation, the basic motivation for political affiliation remains parochial self-interest and fear of any leadership that is not locally based.

Mr. Diamond's article says, "Ethnicity is being displaced as the organizing force of politics." Yet at another point one reads, "though ethnicity will likely be the most important determinant of mass voting behavior in 1983." Yes, there are political motivations other than ethnicity that have appeared in Nigeria, but not necessarily more laudable.

The current political scene differs from that of the First Republic in the 1960s in several basic ways. First, the four regions that comprised the Federation in 1959-66 are now broken down into 19 states with police power shifted from the regions to the federal government. This has given many of the smaller minority groups a pivotal influence by enabling them to swing their newly acquired power base at a state level to one major ethnic group or the other. In this way, the almost complete domination of the larger ethnic groups in each of the former regions has been broken.

Secondly, three of the five parties had presidential candidates from the North, making it extremely difficult for this huge area to regain the dominance it once had over the South at the federal level. Thirdly, the constitutional constraints requiring a presidential candidate to have the electoral support of 25% of the voters in at least two-thirds of the states means that in some way

each party has to have trans-regional and trans-ethnic support if it wants to survive as a political force.

Fourthly, the Westminster-style parliamentary system that prevailed in the First Republic has been replaced by American-style direct elections for chief executive of federal and state governments. Nevertheless, alliances of convenience in the legislature still have to emerge in order to achieve a legislative majority.

During the 1979 campaign, all five parties pledged to improve education, agriculture, and national development, but when the election rolled around, ideology—whether liberal, radical, or conservative—played little part in the people's choice. The true definition of each party lay closer to its historical leadership than to its manifestos. Popular perception of the parties and the behavior of its leaders were the best determinants. With exceptions, of course, it all seemed to boil down to "who can we trust to look after *our* interest," and "who will get me a bigger piece of the pie?" Thus for these preconceptions to change, the role of the old leadership would have to change first.

If we can put aside ethnicity and class as motivations for the moment, the endemic nature of nepotism and corruption in Nigeria must be considered much more seriously than it has been to date. Comparing it to corruption elsewhere might be an interesting exercise but it doesn't negate the gravity of the problem. Though there is a cultural base for these twin phenomena in the traditional extended-family system and its gift giving, in the modern context these have been transformed into simple graft and bribery, which in turn frequently leads politicians to employ demagogic appeals to ethnicity to further their own ends. It is this political exploitation of preexisting dormant xenophobic fears, rather than strong racist feelings, that seem to create the ethnic problem in Nigeria. Yet the degree to which these corrupt practices are accepted as normal by Nigerian society, they are rendered that much more difficult to control. It tends to blur growing class relationships and reinforce local, micro-national traditional, religious, and family loyalties, and

concomitantly influence party affiliations and electoral choices. All are blended into the political fabric of the nation. Ideology defined here as a collective solution for society's problems beyond one's personal interest alone, is hard to come by in such an atmosphere.

During the 1979 electoral campaign, queries put to voters in the South regarding Mallam Aminu Kano, who is generally associated with close contacts to the masses and fidelity to social solutions, elicited an almost universal response: "He's a fine candidate... sincere... but he doesn't stand a chance." His party, the PRP, lacked the funds to spread the notion that he was a viable candidate. The need to be on the winning side was and is strong in Nigeria.

Nevertheless, the four differences mentioned above are greatly influencing the developing political alignments during and since the 1979 campaign, in spite of the apparent parallels with the First Republic. When the First Republic fell to the military in the first coup, the control wielded by the northern feudal aristocracy fell with it, necessitating its regrouping into the entrepreneurial class in order to compete. The burgeoning southern-based bourgeoisie took over at that point and thereafter the struggle for control seesawed back and forth between alliances of the sectional elites through two more successful coups, one unsuccessful coup, and a bitter civil war.

Under the newly established rules of a more centralized 19-state structure, for any party to be successful it had to find allies outside of its local power base. The current representatives of the northern elite in the NPN managed successfully to win the 1979 election by drawing their counterparts in four states, where smaller ethnic groups dominated, into their orbit. The war of the political elites had evolved into a battle of picking off interethnic individual allies, based on shifting power relationships without too much regard for any broader based popular benefits. This victory then must be seen in this light, i.e., as a major party assuming a "Big Brother" role and not as a true cross-cutting trend or a division that cut across ethnicity, as implied by Mr. Diamond.

In the heartland of northern Nigeria, the PRP, the furthest left of the parties, analyzes this state of affairs as a return to the old politics of the 1960s, with all the dangers and pitfalls inherent in this resurrection. To join one or the other of these interethnic polarities would only reinforce the centrifugal forces that are tearing apart the national fabric. They feel that by refusing to join any existing or future group of parties that tends to reinforce its ethnic character or the interethnic jockeying for power between parties, a broad national democratic front of all parties around a minimal common program could emerge, until the edges of the ethnic frictions are worn smooth. They hope that such a national coalition could lead to broader and more progressive solutions to national problems, rather than to help line the pockets of any one group. And during and after this transitional period of four or five years, the PRP would have a chance to cleanse itself of its own opportunistic elements, while building a popular base for a "successful socialist struggle by a vanguard party."

A presumption seems to be made here that is consistent with this stand, that if Nigeria's bourgeois revolution took place when the power of the feudal aristocracy was broken by the first military coup, then a *national* consolidation has to take place during the transition period, before the next phase, when a more adequate distribution of the national wealth can take place.

However, this line of thinking was seriously disrupted when the PRP itself was hit by a party cleavage. The two elected PRP governors in Kano and Kaduna States, without the prior agreement of Aminu Kano, the party leader, and the National Directorate, took unilateral action to meet with the so-called progressive caucus of governors. This move was seen by the dominant group in the PRP as an attempt to create the gang-up against the ruling party, the NPN, that the PRP had opposed so strenuously. The two PRP governors were expelled but they pulled some of the federal- and state-level office holders and contract seekers with them, including a majority of their legislators and some of the more extreme left-wing intellectuals. Aside

from the possible influence of opportunism emerging from this unfortunate split, there was the tactical difference that counterposed support for a national coalition government versus the possible electoral advantage of joining an ideologically disparate group of parties in opposition.

Through gigantic turnouts numbering in the hundreds of thousands, the masses of Kano State have demonstrated their continuing devotion to Aminu Kano and his concept of how a "party of the masses" should behave. This is likely to be true in Kaduna State as well, but it does remain to be seen how much of an effect on the other 17 states of this nation this defection will have, for this debate will have to be brought to the country on foot and by word of mouth, since the media reports in Nigeria are for the most part palpably slanted toward the viewpoint of the party that controls the news source.

The intense struggles that have been going on within and between this and the other parties have generated a lot of political heat until now, with charges flying back and forth between party leaders and in the legislatures regarding proper oil revenue allocations, the posting of presidential liaison officers to each state, and disagreements over patronage appointments. But aside from Aminu Kano's candidacy in 1979, there has been little ideological content and few meaningful choices have been presented to the people.

There are now attempts at top-level realignments of the opposition parties, but neither of the two old giants in past struggles, Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe, have demonstrated a willingness to step down either in favor of or in concert with the other. The winning over of a faction of the Great Nigerian People's party (GNPP) and the Rimi splinter from the PRP may or may not be significant, but since an ideological void exists within all these elements, the unifying force remains rank opportunism. On the other hand, this is the divisive force as well, what with each of the contestants looking for maximum gain. Neither is it likely that the official PRP and the NPN could get together in any electoral alliance, for they are even further apart than the leadership of the four groups that will

make up the new People's Progressive Alliance (PPA).

Thus, there is far from any guarantee that the rank and file of any of the existing parties will dutifully follow any leadership realignments into new party formations. It is doubtful that either Awolowo could draw any significant support from among the Igbos, or Azikiwe among the Yorubas.

What can happen however, is the beginning of an ideological polarity among the parties. A more integrated bourgeoisie could emerge in this fashion, along with a similar awakening of working-class trans-ethnic perceptions. Perhaps three parties, roughly approximating a Right, Left, and center. Massive shifts from one party to another would not be out of the question, for party loyalties are still far from fully consolidated.

But now with the old North broken down to some degree on a class basis, through the struggles between Aminu Kano's PRP and the NPN, the framework for such an issue-oriented shake-out is in place, even though the glimmerings of developing class feeling are still largely local and motivations are still complex and based on old-style affinities and past perceptions and fears.

Moreover, there exists another major influence on the Nigerian political scene, namely oil. This dominant natural resource represents the primary source of the country's capital, and effectively greases the wheels of government. As a result, taxes are relatively low and the proportion paid by rich or poor is not a major issue. This gives incumbency and victory polls an even greater significance in developed countries like the States, where immense private wealth exists independent of government. Political control in the Nigerian context means direct control and distribution of the oil wealth, through contracts for import licenses, construction, and capitalization of industry. It encourages the favoritism that so dominates the politics of Nigeria and creates almost insuperable difficulties in the path of the development of a mass party based on a genuine social platform. Dipping into the oil pot is much less perceptible than digging directly into the people's pockets for high taxes.

Efforts of individuals or parties to paint themselves as "progressives" do not change the basic reality that a shift in government control of the wealth of the nation would merely enrich another ethno-regional elite—unless this change was based on a party or alliance of the masses with an accompanying broad, socially developed ideology and morality of its own.

Under current circumstances, anything short of a national government including all the organized parties will continue to divide instead of uniting on a national level. If anything approaching this unity does come to pass, there could be a greater concentration on social issues and solutions, and clientage and patronage can be exposed as a simple variation of the filter-down system. And even if a sharpening of class differences did occur, obviously stability would not automatically follow. Yet it would be a necessary progression toward an egalitarian and more prosperous society.

Nigeria's influence in Africa and the world today is great. Its size, wealth of natural resources, and development to date place it center stage, yet its problems are overwhelming. Development is dragging and uneven, with millionaires being made by the dozens, while the people remain basically at or near subsistence levels. Unless this pattern is altered, an ominous future faces the nation, with a likely return to military government.

The intense struggle to find a genuine ideological mass base, and to excise the all-pervading opportunism and corruption represents the scaffolding on which the contentious political struggles of Nigeria will take place. Although there is only the barest beginning in this direction, this movement is not merely wishful thinking, for there is also a kind of compulsion to achieve it that permeates the thinking of most Nigerians. The enlightened speak of the continuing flow of events in ominous tones and are truly concerned. Whether they can translate the concern into directed and courageous action will determine whether they can avoid national disaster and continue along the path toward becoming a major world power.

Alan Feinstein

# Books

## A SOUTH AFRICAN THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY?

Is South Africa a threat to the security and stability of its black neighbors? This simple question must be at the heart of any discussion of South African military capability and its security policies, but it is more often begged than answered with any clarity.

Opponents of the present regime frequently perceive its continued existence as a threat to southern Africa. They argue that until black nationalists control Namibia and South Africa, no regional peace is possible. Given this point of view, any South African efforts to bolster its capabilities against either external or internal attack will be construed as dangerous and demanding of international condemnation and reaction. Further, any Western involvement in the Republic that either directly or indirectly enhances the South African military posture will be similarly condemned. Few of these critics see any hazards to regional stability in increased Soviet bloc military aid to black regimes, because they believe these regimes are acting defensively and they are sure the bloc advisers and troops will leave on request.

But of course this viewpoint is myopic. Since the supporters of black nationalism insist on the irrevocability of their regional goals, they must accept the military consequences of their

commitment. Guerrilla activities will engender South African military reactions. In turn, guerrillas will ask for increased bloc aid, and that aid will bring a further increase in South African concern about its security, greater South African military expenditures, and, over a longer time period, some form of Western military involvement in the region.

In fact, regional security and stability depend on all regional regimes and on the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC). It is a burden none wants to shoulder itself, although all in effect displace it onto their enemies. This ingenuousness about responsibility makes for deepening pessimism about the prospects for peaceful resolution of present regional conflicts.

This having been said, at this point, South Africa is the major threat to regional peace. The irony is that it has only recently become so (despite the rhetoric of two decades attacking it for being aggressive) in a massive (for Africa) military buildup carried out in reaction to an overcautious appraisal of the dangers of Soviet regional destabilization implied by the Soviet-Cuban-East German intervention in Angola. The increases in military expenditure and in overall capabilities are now reasonably well-known facts. South African budgets and South African Defense Force (SADF) white pa-

pers provide firm bases for evaluations of both quantitative and qualitative growth.

Some analysts see clandestine aid from Western sources as crucial to this South African buildup. It is certainly true for specific kinds of armament that Western aid has been invaluable: for instance, the U.S. Public Broadcasting System has documented effectively in two television programs the role of Western corporations and arms dealers (and the possible role of the State Department and the CIA) in helping South Africa to produce the long-range 155mm howitzer and its ammunition, which is now the bulwark of its army ordnance.

But the emergence of a South African threat to the region does not lie in increased expenditures or in expanded capabilities — even including the possible availability of a nuclear weapon and one or more delivery systems. The South African threat reflects a marked change in official attitudes about regional policy and particularly about resorting to force in regional conflict.

To begin with South African perceptions of external threat: at no time in the past two decades, despite the low level of South African military preparedness, has that country faced a substantial military challenge in the region. Even during the Angolan intervention, when its armaments, logistics, and manpower were stretched very thin, the

SADF had no significant trouble dealing with the Cuban forces and the Soviet armament put in place against it. And since 1976, its own military buildup has far outpaced that of its potential regional antagonists.

Nonetheless, South Africa feels more threatened now than ever before. Its fear grows out of a widespread Afrikaner perception of the non-Afrikaner world: it is seen as alien, at best troublesome to Afrikaner communal values, and at worst tied irretrievably to communist aims for the destruction of Christianity and for world domination. This perception remains central in Afrikaner theology and education. Although it is seldom expressed explicitly in statements by present government leaders, quasi-religious references often appear in speeches and public statements. At least one senior security official, Dr. Lukas D. Barnard, director-general of the National Intelligence Service (successor to the Bureau of State Security, BOSS), often wrote, before he joined the government, of the Christian justification for South Africa resorting to nuclear weapons. His views are probably shared by most members of the state security council, the cabinet offshoot that makes all important security decisions for South Africa.

Two important leavening elements constrain the impact of this quasi-religious impulse. First, at least since the September 1978 installation of P.W. Botha as prime minister, the structure of governmental decision making has become much more rational. Decisions can no longer be made

by the prime minister or the defense minister or a senior security official in isolation. High-level consultation is now a prerequisite. Second, a dogged economic determinism runs through the analyses of many officials (and more so among academicians), emphasizing that South Africa's regional economic preponderance is sufficient to build collaborative relationships with its black neighbors. Some even envision an eventual formal regional institutional framework, although most are more realistic about the residual impact of political antipathy toward South Africa. This argument downgrades (usually implicitly) the necessity for regional military action.

In one sense, answering the question posed at the start of this essay depends on a determination of the mix of irrational quasi-religious impulse and relatively pragmatic calculation in the new structures of governmental decision making. There are very few hints of this process. There is one foreboding suggestion. SADF raids into Angola have not ended. Uncoordinated raids, like that on Cassinga in 1978, which disrupted foreign minister R.F. (Pik) Botha's Namibian negotiation strategy, no longer occur. More-recent raids were the product of coordinated decision making within the state security council, involving both military and civilian officials.

Will these preemptive raids be expanded and extended in the region? And when will the apocalyptic impulse become dominant, with its woeful implications for the expansion of regional warfare? Certainly, larger and more

sophisticated SWAPO raids will bring incrementally larger SADF reactions, but until such time as South Africa itself is threatened by a major conventional attack, South African resorting to massive regional military action or even to nuclear weapons seems unlikely. Of course, guerrilla attacks from neighboring states on the Republic would bring preemptive raids of the kind now directed at southern Angola.

What should the U.S. government do? "Disarming" the South Africans is neither feasible nor appropriate. The basic problem is not even political, but psychological. It requires shifting downward and making more pragmatic mutual perceptions of threat in southern Africa. Vis-à-vis South Africa, this means in the first instance getting that government to accept UN-supervised elections in Namibia, whatever the political outcome. With that sore point disposed of, the real threat to the Republic will be far smaller. Some relaxation of South African hypersensitivity should result. For the regional black states, it may be necessary to give defensive military aid to allay their fears of South African attack and to reduce their potential dependence on Soviet bloc arms sources and advisers. Then, South Africa must be encouraged and pressed to go about the business of accelerated domestic change. At the same time, black regimes should be aided to achieve greater development and reduced dependence on South Africa.

John Seiler  
Poughkeepsie, New York

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
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
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*GNP at market prices rounded to US\$ tens of millions. GNP per capita rounded to nearest US\$10.*

	Population (000)		GNP at market prices (US\$ millions)		GNP per capita (US\$)		Growth rates (%)	
	mid-1979	mid-1980 (P)	1979	1980 (P)	1979	1980 (P)	Population 1970-79	GNP per capita (real) 1970-79
Algeria	18,260	18,919	32,360	36,410	1,770	1,920	3.2	2.8
Angola <sup>1</sup>	6,901	7,078	2,970	3,320	430	470	2.4	-9.6
Benin	3,425	3,530	940	1,080	270	300	2.9	0.6
Botswana	773	800	610	730	780	910	2.2	12.0
Burundi	4,022	4,097	760	830	190	200	2.2	1.5
Cameroon	8,245	8,444	4,890	5,660	590	670	2.2	3.1
Cape Verde <sup>1</sup>	319	324	80	100	260	300	2.0	4.8
Central African Republic <sup>1</sup>	2,245	2,294	620	680	280	300	2.3	0.9
Chad	4,365	4,455	500	530	120	120	2.0	-2.4
Comoros <sup>1</sup>	345	353	90	100	260	300	4.0	-4.3
Cong. People's Republic of the	1,497	1,537	1,010	1,120	670	730	2.5	-0.2
Djibouti <sup>1</sup>	325	352	150	170	460	480	8.2	-4.9
Egypt, Arab Republic of	38,868	39,773	19,570	23,140	500	580	2.0	5.3
Equatorial Guinea	354	363	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.2	n.a.
Ethiopia	30,861	31,468	3,810	4,320	70	140	2.2	0.3
Gabon	645	657	2,210	2,420	3,420	3,680	1.1	5.2
Gambia, The	587	603	130	150	220	250	3.0	0.4
Ghana	11,313	11,679	4,470	4,920	400	420	3.1	-3.0
Guinea	5,275	5,425	1,430	1,590	270	290	2.9	0.6
Guinea-Bissau <sup>1</sup>	779	793	130	130	170	160	n.a.	n.a.
Ivory Coast	8,227	8,637	8,810	9,920	1,070	1,150	5.7	1.3
Kenya <sup>2</sup>	15,274	15,865	5,940	6,630	390	420	3.5	2.6
Lesotho <sup>1</sup>	1,309	1,341	480	520	370	390	2.4	9.5
Liberia	1,797	1,858	940	980	520	520	3.4	0.5
Libya	2,862	2,978	24,280	25,730	8,480	8,640	4.2	-1.6
Madagascar	8,480	8,714	2,760	3,030	330	350	2.5	-2.5
Malawi	5,817	5,951	1,260	1,390	220	230	2.9	3.0
Mali	6,750	6,940	1,240	1,340	180	190	2.6	2.5
Mauritania	1,588	1,634	480	530	300	320	2.7	-0.7
Mauritius	941	958	1,010	1,020	1,080	1,060	1.4	6.4
Morocco	19,538	20,182	15,250	17,440	780	860	3.0	3.5
Mozambique <sup>1</sup>	10,199	10,473	2,550	2,810	50	270	2.5	-5.3
Namibia <sup>1</sup>	980	1,009	1,270	1,420	1,290	1,410	2.8	0.3
Niger	5,163	5,318	1,530	1,760	300	330	2.8	-1.2
Nigeria	82,603	84,732	75,130	85,510	910	1,010	2.5	5.3
Reunion <sup>1</sup>	517	525	1,790	2,010	3,470	3,830	1.8	-0.9
Rwanda	4,947	5,098	930	1,040	190	200	2.8	1.6
Sao Tome and Principe <sup>1</sup>	110	113	50	60	460	490	1.7	-0.2
Senegal	5,518	5,661	2,510	2,560	450	450	2.6	0.1
Seychelles <sup>1</sup>	65	66	100	120	1,580	1,770	2.6	3.8
Sierra Leone	3,381	3,474	860	950	250	270	2.6	-1.2
Somalia	3,828	3,914	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.3	n.a.
South Africa	28,469	29,285	56,830	66,960	2,000	2,290	2.7	0.6
Sudan	17,862	18,371	8,060	8,640	450	470	2.7	1.5
Swaziland <sup>1</sup>	541	557	350	380	650	680	2.6	4.4
Tanzania <sup>3</sup>	17,538	18,141	4,430	4,780	250	260	3.4	0.8
Togo	2,420	2,476	970	1,020	400	410	2.4	1.2
Tunisia	6,194	6,354	7,200	8,340	1,160	1,310	2.1	5.7
Uganda <sup>1</sup>	12,797	13,201	3,710	3,750	290	280	3.0	-3.5
Upper Volta	5,642	5,733	1,000	1,110	180	190	1.6	-1.2
Zaire	27,509	28,291	5,750	6,340	210	220	2.7	-2.6
Zambia	5,580	5,766	3,000	3,220	540	560	3.1	-1.9
Zimbabwe	7,146	7,396	3,940	4,640	550	630	3.3	-1.7

<sup>1</sup> Estimates of GNP per capita and its growth rate are tentative.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes data for Mayotte.

<sup>3</sup> Mainland Tanzania.

(P) Preliminary.


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
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
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